

# **A DIGEST OF INDIAN LAW**

## **CASES VOL. IV**

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A  
DIGEST OF INDIAN LAW CASES

CONTAINING

HIGH COURT REPORTS, 1862—1909;

AND

PRIVY COUNCIL REPORTS OF APPEALS FROM INDIA,  
1836—1909,

WITH AN INDEX OF CASES,

COMPILED UNDER THE ORDERS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

BY

B. D. BOSE

OF THE INNER TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW; ADVOCATE OF THE HIGH COURT, CALCUTTA;  
AND EDITOR OF THE INDIAN LAW REPORTS, CALCUTTA SERIES.

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
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*See* RIGHT OF SUIT—REGISTRATION OF  
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3 C. L. R. 231

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**NARVA TENURE.**

—Grant of narva village *Its history and incidents*  
in inam—Alienations

**NARVA TENURE—contd.**

*by narvadars—Baharkhali—Gammajmun—Patimajmun—Revenue survey in a narva village—Suit by inamdar to recover rent as settled by the survey—Landlord and tenant.* The narva tenure and its incidents discussed and explained. The inamdar of the narva village of Dakor desires that the revenue survey should be introduced into it. The usual measurements and assessments were made, and the Superintendent of the Revenue Survey, following the analogy of the system prevalent in Government villages, held a conference with the narvadars and drew up a scheme to which the narvadars assented, for the future management of the village and for settling the future relations between the narvadars and the inamdars as representing the fiscal interests of the Government. The narvadars agreed to retain their narva tenure along with an assessment made upon the principles of the revenue survey; and they resigned their right over baharkhali lands aliened from the several narva shares, on the understanding that the inamdar was to levy from the tenants one-fourth of the difference between the quit-rent actually paid and the full assessment as ascertained by the survey. The narvadars and their tenants, the actual holders of the baharkhali lands, having refused to pay this one-fourth, the inamdar sued them to recover it or the full assessment as ascertained by the survey. *Held*, that the inamdar was entitled to recover the one-fourth according to the scheme, which was binding on the whole body of narvadars, even though the defendant and others, being a minority, had not assented to the action of the majority. The inamdar's fiscal rights include the right to levy the ordinary assessment, except where a contract stands in the way, and he can raise the assessment to a limit which is fair and equitable according to the custom of the



**NARVA TENURE—concl'd.**

country. As between the narvadar and the Government, there is nothing to prevent the former from consenting to the exclusion of any part of the village lands from the contract. The severance of such parts makes it immediately subject to full taxation on ordinary principles, and any agreement with an incumbrancer in limitation of the narvadar's right to take rent can operate only as a ground of action against the narvadar themselves. *MANOHAR GANESH TAMBEKAR v. CHUTABHAI MITHABHAI* I. L. R. 8 Bom. 347

**NATIVE CHRISTIANS.**

See CONVERTS.

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I. L. R. 2 Mad. 209

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 783

Converts from Hindu religion—Joint family—Co-parcenership—Inheritance—*Indian Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 93—Intestate and testamentary succession.* Parcenership can be a part of the law governing the rights of a Christian family converted from the Hindu religion. *Tellis v. Saldanha*, I. L. R. 10 Mad. 69, disapproved. The Indian Succession Act (X of 1865) does not affect rights of co-parcenership as between those to whom it applies. The purpose of that Act was to amend and define the rules of law applicable to intestate and testamentary succession. It is with the *devolution* of rights on intestacy that the Act deals. It does not purport to enlarge the category of heritable property. S. 93 of the Act actually recognizes a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. *Navroji Manockji Wadia v. Perozbai*, I. L. R. 23 Bom. 80, referred to. The distinction between co-partnership and inheritance is that in the case of inheritance property devolves on death, it survives in the case of co-parcenership; on inheritance new rights are acquired, on survivorship the enjoyment of existing rights is increased by the removal of one from the body of co-sharers. *FRANCIS GHOSAL v. GABRI GHOSAL* (1906) I. L. R. 31 Bom. 25

**NATIVE CONVERTS' MARRIAGE DISSOLUTION ACT (XXI OF 1866).**

See DIVORCE ACT, s. 2.

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 252

**NATIVE INDIAN SUBJECTS.**

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—NATIVE INDIAN SUBJECTS.

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 178

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I. L. R. 15 Bom. 216

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2 B. L. R. A. C. 73  
10 W. R. 385

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See FOREIGN JURISDICTION ACT, 1879, ss. 4, 6 AND 8.  
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 607

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I. L. R. 21 Calc. 911

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See CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS TO MAGISTRATE.  
I. L. R. 12 All. 595  
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 235

1. Law of Native State—Law of British India—Difference—Burden of proof. It lies on him, who asserts it, to prove that the law of the Native State differs from the law in British India and in the absence of such proof it must be held that no difference exists except possibly so far as the law in British India rests on specific Acts of the Legislature. *RAGHUNATH v. VARJIVANDAS* (1906)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 578

2. Kathiawar States—Whether British territory—Relation of British India



**NATIVE STATE—contd.**

with Native States how ascertained—Sovereign powers of the Governor of Bombay in Council—Exercise in Native States through Political Agent—Courts of Political Agent and Assistant Political Agents, if King's Courts—Function of Governor in Council on appeal, whether judicial—Appeal to Privy Council. The rights and powers of contract possessed and exercised over the Native States in India by the British Indian Government, with the corresponding restrictions upon the independent action of those States are, to some extent, the necessary consequence of the suzerainty vested in the predominant power. But apart from this general source, rights of very varying kinds have been acquired in connection with the several States, from other sources. Such rights differ not only in origin but in kind and in degree in the cases of different States, so that in each instance in which the nature or extent of such rights becomes the subject of consideration, enquiry has to be made into the circumstances of the particular case. *Sayad Muhammad Yusuf-ud-din v. The Queen-Empress*, 2 C. W. N. 1 : s.c. L. R. 24 I. A. 137, referred to. On a view of the relation of the Kathiawar States and their people to British India, and the character of the control exercised by the British Indian Government over those States and particularly with relation to the administration of justice:—*Held*, that the Kathiawar States are not included within the King's dominions. Large as has been the political control exercised over them, any assertion of territorial sovereignty has been avoided. No legislative power over them has ever been claimed. The intervention in their affairs has never been carried further than was judged necessary, in the emergency for the maintenance of peace, good order and security. The position of the Chiefs has always been respected and at least, in the case of the more important among them, many of the functions commonly regarded attributes of sovereignty have been preserved to them. The form adopted in establishing and regulating tribunals in the province has been that which was regular and appropriate, if it was not British territory, but quite irregular and inapplicable, if it was. *Damodhar Gordhan v. Deoram Kanji*, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 337, explained. If a Court, administering justice on the King's behalf, makes an order, judicial in its nature, by which some one is injuriously affected, the person aggrieved is not precluded from applying to the King in Council to redress his wrong merely by the fact that he is not the King's subject. The jurisdiction exercised by the Courts of the Assistant Political Agents and the Political Agent in Kathiawar, and by the Governor of Bombay in Council on appeal, is political and not judicial. No appeal lies to His Majesty in Council from the Courts in Kathiawar or from the decision of the Governor of Bombay in Council on appeal. *HEMCHAND DEVCHAND v. AZAM SAKARLAL CHHOTAMLAL* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 33 Cal. 219 s.c. 10 C. W. N. 361 L. R. 33 I. A. 1

3. *Native State, location of British troops in—Power of cantonment*

**NATIVE STATE—contd.**

authorities as to grant or user of land—Treaty, absence of—Power restricted to military purposes—Land belongs to State—Parsi Tower of Silence, grant of land for—Control of cantonment authorities. The Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, which had its head-quarters in the Secunderabad cantonment was a force in the employment of the East India Company and commanded by Company's officers, but maintained by agreement, in Hyderabad territory, for the protection of the Nizam. There never was in existence any treaty prescribing the limits of the powers of the Nizam's officers on the one hand, and the military commander commanding the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force on the other, with respect to the management, control and disposition of the cantonment and the land comprised in it. When the Nizam's government admitted a British force within its territory, and allotted to it Secunderabad cantonment as its head-quarters, it no doubt, by necessary implication, conveyed to the military authorities all powers of jurisdiction, control and management incident to maintaining the efficiency and the discipline of the troops, the peace and good order and convenient use of the cantonment. But it would be going a long way beyond this to hold that the officer commanding the troops was empowered to alienate, in perpetuity, land forming part of the cantonment and undoubtedly Hyderabad territory for a purpose wholly unconnected with military requirements. The appellants, who were members of the Parsi community, claimed that the founders of the Parsi Tower of Silence which stands on a portion of certain land situated in the Secunderabad cantonment were in their lifetime owners of the land in question, and that the property had devolved upon themselves as descendants and representatives in title, of the original founders. The respondents, who were also members of the Parsi community, contended that the land in question had been granted to the whole Parsi community for a public purpose, and to enure for the benefit of the community generally for all time by the cantonment authority. The most important document relied upon by the appellants was issued by an officer of the Hyderabad State and purporting to express a transaction by which the State had assented to the grant of the land in question to the founders, and directed possession of it to be delivered to them. Another document in evidence also obtained on behalf of the founders, through their agent, purported to be issued by the authority of the Brigadier Commanding the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, and to certify that the Parsis of Secunderabad had permission to enclose the land in question, which was given for a tower to be built on it. *Held*, that the consideration set out above must be borne in mind in estimating the effect of the two documents; that the first, emanating from the State purported to deal with, and enforce, a grant of the land to the founders by name, and the delivery of possession to them; that the second document, emanating from the Cantonment authorities, did not deal with title or possession, but gave permission to use the land, already conveyed, for the particular purpose of a Tower of Silence, and to



**NATIVE STATE—concl'd.**

enclose the land, which were matters obviously within the discretion of the commanding officer, and that the effect of the two documents was to allow a good title in the founders, and not in the Parsi community. *PESTONJI JIVANJI v. SHAPURJI EDULJI CHINYOY* (1907). I. L. R. 35 Calc. 478 s.c. 12 C. W. N. 465 L. R. 35 I. A. 7

**NATURE OF TENANCY.**

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—NATURE OF TENANCY.

**NAVIGABLE RIVER.**

See ACCRETION—NEW FORMATION OF ALLUVIAL LAND—CHURS OR ISLANDS IN NAVIGABLE RIVERS.

See FISHERY, RIGHT OF.

W. R. 1864, 108; 243  
15 W. R. 212  
11 C. L. R. 11  
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 53  
I. L. R. 8 Mad. 467  
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 434  
I. L. R. 12 Mad. 43  
I. L. R. 17 Calc. 963  
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 252  
12 C. W. N. 105; 304; 559  
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 117

**NAWAB NAZIM OF BENGAL DEBTS ACT (XVII OF 1873).**

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT —CHARTER ACT, (I. 15)—CIVIL CASES 24 W. R. 311

1. ———— Right of appeal. Act XVII of 1873 was not intended to deprive the Nawab Nizam of Moorshedabad of any right of appeal to the High Court which he had before it was passed. *NAWAB NIZAM OF BENGAL v. AMRAO BEGUM* 21 W. R. 59

2. ———— Submission of decree of Court as a claim to Commissioners—*Power of High Court*. Certain judgment-creditors were held to have committed an error of judgment in submitting their decree to Commissioners appointed under Act XVII of 1873, as if it were a new and unascertained claim. Where this was done, and the Commissioners expressed their opinion upon the matter involved (although it had already been determined), the High Court held that it had no authority to enquire into their award. *OMRAO BEGUM v. COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED UNDER ACT XVII OF 1873* 24 W. R. 394

s. 11—*Agreement for appropriation of payments—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 60—Suit for rent*. So far as the Nawab Nazim's Debts Act is concerned, rent due by the Nawab is on the same footing as any other debt incurred by him, and before his property can be made liable to satisfy such rent debt, the consent of the Governor General in Council must first be obtained to the issue of execu-

**NAWAB NAZIM OF BENGAL DEBTS ACT (XVII OF 1873)—concl'd.**

tion. *ROOKMINY BULLUB ROY v. MULK JAMANIA BEGUM*. I. L. R. 9 Calc. 914; 12 C. L. R. 534

1. ———— s. 12—*Jurisdiction of Commissioners—Parties*. The Commissioners appointed under the Nawab Nazim's Debt Act (VII of 1873) (an Act to provide for the liquidation of the debts of the Nawab Nazim, and for his protection from legal process) having ascertained and certified that a certain zamindari was nizamut property (*i.e.*, held by the Government for the purpose of upholding the dignity of the Nawab Nazim for the time being), the fact that this property had, before the passing of the Act, been conveyed by the Nawab Nazim to his son, did not deprive the Commissioners of jurisdiction to deal with the question. The plain language of s. 12 of the Act is not controlled by any words in the preamble. A suit brought by a claimant against the Government and the grantee to recover the property, without the Nawab Nazim having been joined as a party, could not proceed. *OMRAO BEGUM v. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 704; 12 C. L. R. 595  
L. R. 10 I. A. 39

2. ———— *Award of Commissioners conclusive—Construction of documents not establishing a charge on immoveable property*. Commissioners appointed under Act XVII of 1873, by their award, found that an estate was in the possession of the Government for the purpose of upholding the dignity of the Nawab Nazim for the time being, a finding within their competence to make, of which the effect was that the Government held the property freed and discharged from all claims. In a suit against the Government it was alleged that the estate, when in the hands of the Nawab, had been charged with payment of an annuity and arrears in favour of the plaintiff's father on his abandoning the title which he had set up to the property. Held, that the above award, under the Act, would have been a sufficient answer to the claim, even if the charge had originally attached to the estate. But in equity no charge could be created unless there was an intent to charge. Here the documents showed that this payment had not been legally charged upon the property, neither party having contemplated this result, and there having been only a mandate by the Nawab for payment of the annuity out of his treasury. *OMRAO BEGUM v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA*

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 584  
L. R. 19 I. A. 95

3. ———— *Commissioners, award of—Power of Commissioners notwithstanding alienation of State lands*. In a suit by the son of the Nawab Nazim of Moorshidabad to recover from a person wrongfully in possession, land which had been found to be a portion of State lands:—Held, that the Commissioners appointed under the Nawab Nazim's Debts Act had jurisdiction to declare the land claimed in the suit to be State property notwithstanding the fact



**NAWAB NAZIM OF BENGAL DEBTS ACT (XVII OF 1873)—concl'd.**

that an alienation of such land had taken place before the date of the Commissioners' award. *Omrao Begum v. Government of India*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 704, followed. *HASSAN ALI v. CHUTTERPUT SINGH DUGARH* . . . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 742

**NAWAB OF CARNATIC ACT (XXX OF 1858).**

Claims against Nawab—*Onus of proof*. Act XXX of 1858 of the Legislative Council of India for the administration of the estate and payment of the debts of the late Nawab of the Carnatic empowered the Supreme Court at Madras to investigate in a summary manner claims against the Nawab's estate. *Held*, that the provisions of the Act not only limited the extraordinary remedy which it gave to certain defined classes of debt, but threw upon a claimant more than the ordinary burden of proof by compelling the holder of any written acknowledgment, or security, to prove the actual consideration given for it; and upon those claiming the price of the goods delivered, proof of the fair and actual value of such goods. *GHOOLUM MOORTAZAH KHAN v. GOVERNMENT*

9 Moo. I. A. 456.

**NAWAB OF SURAT.**

administration of private estate of—

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT—APPEALABLE ORDERS . . . 5 Moo. I. A. 499

1. Nawab of Surat Act (XVIII of 1848)—*Sanction of Government to bring suit*. The permission of Government in 1858 to the Agent for the Governor of Bombay at Surat to pay certain moneys of the widow of the late Nawab of Surat to whomsoever a certificate of heirship to her might be granted by the Civil Court is not a sufficient authority under Act XVIII of 1848 for the institution against her grand-daughters of a general civil suit under Regulation IV of 1827 or Act VIII of 1859. Nor does permission given in 1871 to institute a suit authorize the continuation of a suit instituted in 1869. *AJMUDDIN KHAN v. ZIAUNNISSA BEGAM* . . . 12 Bom. 156

2. "Sue forth," meaning of—*Sanction obtained after suit filed*. The expression "sue forth" in s. 1 of Act XVIII of 1848 does not mean to sue for and to obtain so as to make the consent of the Governor a condition precedent to the institution of a suit. Accordingly, where the grand-daughter of the Nawab of Surat was sued along with her husband without previously obtaining the required consent, and it was contended that the suit was irregularly instituted, and the proceedings thereunder void:—*Held*, that the suit was rightly instituted, such a consent not being a condition precedent to the filing of the suit. *ZIAUNNISSA BEGUM v. MOTIRAM*  
I. L. R. 129 Bom. 46

**NAZIR.**

See GUARDIAN—APPOINTMENT.

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 553

misappropriation by—

See SURETY—LIABILITY OF SURETY.

9 B. L. R. Ap. 26

of mosque—

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—ENDOWMENT.

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 401

power of—

See PENAL CODE, s. 186.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 596 ; 759

1. Guardian—*Minors Act XX of 1864—Bombay Civil Courts Acts (XIV of 1869 and X of 1876)—Officer of Government—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 456*. The Nazir of a Civil Court, who is appointed guardian of the estate of a minor under Act XX of 1864, is not an officer of Government within the meaning of s. 32 of Act XIV of 1869 as amended by s. 15 of Act X of 1876. An officer of Government, in order to come within those enactments, must be a party to a suit in his official capacity. A Subordinate Judge who, under s. 456 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X) of 1877, as amended by s. 73 of Act XII of 1879, appoints the Nazir or any other officer of his Court to act as guardian of a minor plaintiff or defendant in a suit in his Court, has no jurisdiction to hear it and pass a decree against that officer as guardian *ad litem* of the minor. *Trimbak Nimbaji v. Shivram*, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 642 note, followed. *MOHAN ISHWAR v. HAKU RUPA* . . . I. L. R. 4 Bom. 638

2. Liability of Nazir—*Avoidance of responsibility*. A Nazir is the head of an important department and must be solely responsible for the truth of what he reports or admits. He cannot be permitted to avoid responsibility by urging that his mohurrir deceived him. *QUEEN v. TOFUZZAL ALI* . . . 7 W. R. Cr. 109

3. Attachment of property in execution of decree—*Failure to return property attached in satisfaction of decree—Beng. Act V of 1863, ss. 4 and 8*. In a suit brought against the plaintiff in the Collector's Court for arrears of rent a decree was obtained, and a warrant was issued for the attachment of certain moveable property belonging to the plaintiff. The warrant was addressed to the Nazir of the Collector's Court and was by him delivered to one of the registered peons of the Court for execution. The peon reported to the Nazir that he had attached the property in question, and had placed it in charge of certain persons, whose receipt for it he produced and filed. Subsequently, the plaintiff paid the amount of the decree into Court and an order was made releasing his property from the attachment. A peon was sent to restore the property to the plaintiff, but the persons in whose charge it was said to have been left alleged that they had never taken possession of the property, and the peon was



**NAZIR—contd.**

unable to restore the property to the plaintiff. In a suit brought by the plaintiff against the Nazir to recover the property or its value:—*Held*, that the Nazir was not liable, Bengal Act V of 1863 having altered the relation which formerly existed between the Nazir and the peons of the Revenue Courts, and put them in the position of paid servants of Government. *KALEE COOMER CHATTERJI v. SIDDHESUR MUNDUL*

11 B. L. R. 256 : 19 W. R. 335

4. ————— *Warrant of arrest of judgment-debtor—Escape of debtor—Negligence.* The plaintiff sued out a warrant for the arrest of his judgment-debtor on the 4th December 1876. The warrant was lodged with the Nazir on the 16th December, and was to be in force till the 4th January 1877. On the 22nd December 1876 the Nazir was informed that the judgment-debtor was already in the civil jail under a writ of execution issued by another creditor. The Nazir then returned the warrant to the Subordinate Judge who had issued it. On the 29th December, the Subordinate Judge again sent it to the Nazir's office, where it was duly received by the Nazir's karkun (defendant No. 2). This fact was not reported by the karkun to the Nazir (defendant No. 1) until the 4th January 1877. On the 1st January 1877 the judgment-debtor's debt was paid by Government, and he was released in honour of Her Majesty's assumption of the title of Empress of India. The judgment-debtor thereupon left the district, and could not be found, and the plaintiff's warrant remained unexecuted. The plaintiff sued the Nazir and his karkun for allowing his judgment-debtor to escape. *Held*, that the Nazir ought not to have sent the warrant back to the Subordinate Judge, and that there was no necessity for a fresh order on it until the time which it had to run had expired. *Held*, further, that, if the Nazir forgot the existence of this unexecuted warrant on the 1st January 1877, and thus allowed the debtor to be released from the former process, when he ought to have been re-arrested under the plaintiff's warrant, there was actual negligence on his part, making him liable in damages to the plaintiff. *Quære*: Whether or not the Nazir could have been made responsible for the negligence of the karkun, who was not his servant, but the servant of, and paid by, the Government and appointed by the District Judge, if the warrant had been lodged with the karkun in the first instance, and that fact had never been communicated to the Nazir, and if he had never known of the existence of the warrant. *KASTURCHAND v. RAVJI SADASHIV* . I. L. R. 4 Bom. 65

5. ————— *Misrepresentation of solvency of surety, by witness to surety bond.* The plaintiff held a money-decree against *M*, who was arrested in execution of it. On being brought to the Court, however, *M* applied for his discharge as an insolvent under s. 273 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859). He was released on the security of *G*, who executed a bond for the appear-

**NAZIR—concl'd.**

ance of *M* at the enquiry into his insolvency. The defendant attested the bond, and wrote in the attestation that *G* was a solvent person. In consequence of the non-appearance of *M*, the plaintiff sought to execute his decree against the surety *G*, who, on his arrest, also applied for his discharge on the ground of his insolvency, and was discharged after inquiry. The plaintiff thereupon sued the defendant for the amount of his decree and cost of execution, on the ground of his representation in the attestation that *G* was solvent. *Quære*: Whether the Nazir was liable to the plaintiff for negligence in not taking a proper surety. *NAGO MAHADEV v. NARAYAN RAMCHANDRA*. I. L. R. 4 Bom. 465

6. ————— *Nazir of Small Cause Court—Power to receive plaints.* A Nazir of a Court of Small Causes is not authorized to receive plaints. *RAJ CHUNDER GOPE v. JOOGAL GOPE*

18 W. R. 172

**NECESSARIES.**

See GUARDIAN—DUTIES AND POWERS OF GUARDIANS . 3 W. R. 217  
I. L. R. 20 Bom. 61

See MINOR . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 320

————— bond executed for—

See MINOR—LIABILITY OF MINOR ON AND RIGHT TO ENFORCE CONTRACTS.  
5 W. R. 2  
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 872

————— expenses of legal proceedings as—

See MINOR—REPRESENTATION OF MINOR IN SUITS . I. L. R. 7 Calc. 140  
I. L. R. 17 Mad. 257

See PLEADER—REMUNERATION.  
I. L. R. 17 Mad. 306

————— what are—

See MINOR . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 768

**NECESSITY FOR ALIENATION.**

See HINDU LAW—

ALIENATION—ALIENATION BY WIDOW—

ALIENATION FOR LEGAL NECESSITY.

WHAT CONSTITUTES LEGAL NECESSITY.

ENDOWMENT—ALIENATION OF ENDOWED PROPERTY.

JOINT FAMILY—POWERS OF ALIENATION BY MEMBERS—MANAGER.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 797

See ONUS OF PROOF—HINDU LAW—ALIENATION.



**NEGATIVE COVENANT.**

See CONTRACT. I. L. R. 36 Calc. 354

**NEGLIGENCE.**

See ADMINISTRATOR.

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 637

See BILL OF LADING.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 79

See CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT, 1863,  
ss. 151, 226 . 8 B. L. R. 265, 433

See CARRIERS.

See CARRIERS ACT, s. 6.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 786

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 398

See CAUSING DEATH BY NEGLIGENCE.

I. L. R. 16 All. 472

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882 s. 102.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 8

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, ss. 568,  
623 . I. L. R. 31 Bom. 381

See COLLISION . 11 C. W. N. 173

See CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

See CULPABLE HOMICIDE.

See HUNDI—EN DORSEMENT.

5 C. W. N. 313

See HURT—GRIEVOUS HURT.

2 Mad. Ap. 32

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 49

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—DAMAGE  
TO PREMISES LET.

3 B. L. R. A. C. 277

5 B. L. R. 401

See MADRAS HARBOUR TRUST ACT, s. 70.

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 524

See MINOR—REPRESENTATION OF MINOR  
IN SUITS . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 735

See MORTGAGE—MARSHALLING.

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 424 ; 429

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 383

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 268

See ONUS OF PROOF—BAILMENTS.

I. L. R. 9 All. 398

See ONUS OF PROOF—PROFITS, SUITS FOR.

I. L. R. 12 All. 301

See PENAL CODE, s. 204 A.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—LIABILITY OF  
PRINCIPAL . 6 C. W. N. 429

See PUBLIC HEALTH, OFFENCE AFFECTING.

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 276

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 59

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 494

See RAILWAY COMPANY.

See RASH AND NEGLIGENT ACT.

5 C. W. N. 376

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT  
—CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 622.

I. L. R. 9 All. 398

**NEGLIGENCE—contd.**

See ZAMINDAR, DUTY OF.

14 B. L. R. 209

——— contributory ———

See ENCROACHMENT.

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 368

See NEGLIGENCE I. L. R. 16 Bom. 254

1. ——— Requisites for action for negligence—*Act contrary to law*. To sustain an action for negligence, there must be an obligation on the part of the defendant to use care, and a breach of that obligation to the plaintiff's injury is an act contrary to law. *SVAMI NAYUDU v. SUBRAMANIA MUDALI* . 2 Mad. 158

2. ——— Sending goods by railway company—*Carrier—Duty of persons sending goods of a dangerous nature—Notice—Act XVIII of 1854, s. 15—Action for compensation for destruction of life*. *Held* (PEARSON, J., dissenting). that a person who sends an article of a dangerous and explosive nature to a railway company to be carried by such company, without notifying to the servants of the company the dangerous nature of the article is liable for the consequences of an explosion, whether it occurs in a manner which he could not have foreseen as probable or not. *Held*, also (PEARSON, J. dissenting), that such a person is liable for the consequences of an explosion occurring in a manner which could not have foreseen, if he omits to take reasonable precautions to preclude the risk of explosion. *LYELL v. GANGA DAI* . I. L. R. 1 All. 60

3. ——— Railway Company—*Injury to persons travelling*. The plaintiff was a passenger travelling on the defendants' railway, and received severe injuries from a fall which he experienced in stepping upon the platform when the train stopped. *Held*, that the Railway Company was guilty of negligence in not keeping the station properly lighted in allowing the train to overshoot the station, and in not warning the plaintiff against alighting; also that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff were caused by the negligence in question, and that the plaintiff did not by his own want of care contribute to the accident. *WOODHOUSE v. CALCUTTA AND SOUTH EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY* . 9 W. R. 73

4. ——— Hire of boats—*Damage—Liability of bailee*. A contracted with B for the hire of certain cargo boats. While being towed by a steamer which A had chartered according to agreement, the boats sustained great damage by reason of gross negligence on the part of C, whom A had placed in charge. *Held*, that A must be held responsible to B for the negligence of C. *GREESH CHUNDER BANNERJEE v. COLLINS* . 2 Hyde 79

5. ——— Damages for personal injuries—*Unfenced hole—Licensee—Contractor*. The plaintiff claimed to recover Rs 63,500 from the defendants as damages for injuries sustained by him by reason of his having fallen into a hole which had been dug upon certain land of the defendants



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on the 1st September 1885. The land in question was the property of the first defendants (the Port Trustees), and was in their possession at the date of the accident to the plaintiff; but an agreement had been made, whereby it was to be leased by them to the second defendant, who was accordingly let into possession in January 1886. For some years, the first defendants had been in the habit of letting out the greater part of the land for tenting purposes in lots marked out with pegs, but the tents were taken down each monsoon. For two or three years previously to the accident, people had been accustomed to cross the land without any hindrance or prohibition. The plaintiff himself had used the path across the land, as a short cut, for a period of eighteen months. This path led across the tenting ground to a gate which was generally open, and which opened upon the high road. No express permission had ever been given to any of the person who were in the habit of using this path. It was a mere beaten track, and, so far from being a public way, it was from time to time obstructed, in the tenting season, by the ropes and pegs of the tents. The plaintiff had for sometime been in occupation of a bungalow belonging to the first defendants, which was situated in that part of the land which was furthest away from the high road. There was a regularly constructed roadway from the bungalow to the high road, which the plaintiff might have used, but, as a short cut, he and others were in the habit of using the beaten track. For this he had merely a tacit permission. On the morning of the 1st September 1885, he left his bungalow and went to his business, as usual, by the short cut across the land. When returning by the same way at about 11 o'clock at night he fell into the hole which had been dug in the afternoon of that day, and sustained the injuries complained of. The hole was several feet deep and was dug right across the pathway. The plaintiff had no notice of the hole being dug, or of any intention to dig it. The night was very dark, and there was no negligence on the part of the plaintiff, nor any want of ordinary care and caution. There was no watchman and no fence, nor was there any light which might enable persons using the path to avoid the danger. The second defendant, as above stated, had agreed to take the said land from the first defendants on lease for building purposes. On the day of the accident, some months before the execution of the lease, the second defendant, through his engineer and contractor *H* applied to the first defendants for permission to make "borings" in the land, which permission was given. *H* thereupon caused the hole in question to be dug. In their written statement the first defendants contended that in using the short cut across their land, the plaintiff was a trespasser, and that he had used it without their knowledge, or consent; that the hole was dug without their knowledge, and that the "borings" for which they had given permission, were merely small holes of a diameter of six inches, or thereabouts, which could not have been a source of danger.

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The second defendant pleaded that at the time of the accident he was not in possession of the land, but had merely entered into an agreement for a lease of it; that he had employed a competent engineer and contractor, *H*, to make borings, in order to ascertain of what the sub-soil consisted, and that *H* contracted to do the work and obtain leave from the first defendants to enter on the land; that the said *H* subsequently entered on the land, and according to his own discretion and without any control or interference from him (the second defendant), took such steps as he thought necessary to ascertain the nature of the said sub-soil; and he (the second defendant) contended that, if there had been negligence in the performance of the work, he was not liable. *Held*, (i) that there was negligence in digging the hole across a path used by several licensees, and in not placing any person or light to warn passengers of the danger arising from the hole and the excavated earth which was heaped up near it. *Held*, (ii) that the first defendants were not liable to the plaintiff. The permission which they had given to *H* was a permission to make "borings" only; and the hole, which was actually dug by *H*, was dug without their knowledge or permission. *H* was not shown to be in any sense their servant or agent. The plaintiff was a bare licensee, and the first defendants were under no obligation to him to keep the path in a safe state or in good order. *Held*, (iii) that the second defendant was liable to the plaintiff. *H* was not a contractor, in the legal sense, so as to exempt the second defendant from responsibility, but was the servant of the second defendant *pro hac vice* and that the digging of the hole was within the course of his employment, or within the scope of his authority. The Court of first instance awarded as damages, a sum of Rs 33,000, which, on appeal, was reduced to Rs 17,000. **EVANS v. TRUSTEES OF THE PORT OF BOMBAY**

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 329

6. ——— Suit for damages by parents of a child killed by negligence—*Act XIII of 1855—Death by negligence—Contributory negligence—Liability for negligence of servants—Damages, Assessment of—Deduction for maintenance of child—Funeral expenses.* The plaintiff's unmarried daughter, a child of between five and six years old fell into an open manhole of a sewer in a lane in Bombay on the 20th August 1880, between 4½ and 5 o'clock P.M., and, when her body was recovered, life was extinct. The sewer was vested in the Municipality of Bombay, and was under the control of the Municipal Commissioner by virtue of ss. 220 and 289 of the Bombay Municipal Act of 1888. When such manholes are opened, it is the duty of the Municipal Commissioner under s. 321 of that Act to have them properly fenced and guarded. On the 28th August 1890, the manhole in question was opened for the purpose of inserting a flushing-door in the sewer. From the time the manhole was opened until the occurrence of the accident the deceased child's mother was seated at the corner of the



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street selling cucumbers about four yards from the manhole in question. The hole was at first properly fenced with four timber hurdles about 4 feet high set upright round it at a distance of 2 feet from the hole, secured at the corners with ropes. Soon after 4-30 P.M., the superintendent in charge of the work gave orders to cease work and close the manhole for the night. The accident took place almost immediately afterwards. The Judge found on the evidence that the child fell into the open hole in the interval that elapsed between the taking down of the fence and putting the cover on the hole. What she was doing the instant before she fell, there was nothing to show. She was seen running and playing about the street during the afternoon. Her mother, who was sitting close by, did not see the accident, her attention being at the moment occupied by some customers. She admitted that before the accident occurred she knew the fence was down and the hole open, and she would not have left the child go to it had she been playing beside her. *Held*, (i) that the defendants were guilty of negligence, and that they were liable for negligence of their servants, although the latter acted contrary to the express orders given by their superior; (ii) that although the mother of the child might have been guilty of negligence which contributed to the accident, yet if the defendants could, by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, have avoided the mischief which happened, her negligence would not excuse them; (iii) that, as regards damages, in cases of this nature, distinct evidence of the loss sustained or benefit expected is not necessary. The jury may look at all the circumstances of the case, and especially at the position of the parents and age of the child, and call in aid their own experience in arriving at their conclusions. Where damages are allowed, a reasonable sum should be deducted on account of the maintenance for such period as the child might reasonably have been expected to live with her parents. In an action under Act XIII of 1855, no sum can be awarded in respect of funeral expenses, whether for removal or disposal of the body or for outlay—for ceremonial or obsequial purposes. *NARAYEN JETHA v. MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONERS OF BOMBAY*. . . . . **I. L. R. 16 Bom. 254**

**7. ———— Liability of principal for acts of contractor—Right of support of house by adjoining soil—Principal and Agent or Contractor.** The plaintiffs were owners of a house consisting of a ground-floor and upper storey and measuring 77 feet in length. On the south side of the house was a gully, 3 feet 6 inches wide, separating it from another upper-storied house. The plaintiffs in the suit complained that in January, 1891, the defendant by his servants dug a trench, 8 feet deep, along the whole length of the gully for the purpose of laying a drain pipe, and that the work was done so negligently that the plaintiffs' house was injured and became in such a dangerous condition that it had to be pulled down. The plaintiffs claimed R3,996 as damages. The defendant denied the negligence, and alleged that the work

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was not done by his servants or agents, but by a contractor. *Held*, that the defendant was liable for the act of his contractor. The work was necessarily attended with risk, and the defendant could not free himself from liability by employing a contractor. The defendant, as well as the contractor, was liable to the plaintiff's. *DRONDIBA KRISHNAJI v. MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONERS OF BOMBAY*. . . . . **I. L. R. 17 Bom. 307**

**8. ———— Loss by fire—Sale set aside—Decree in favour of vendor—Possession—Purchaser in possession after decree and pending appeal—Accident—Liability for damage—Maxim, Volenti non fit injuria.** The plaintiff and the second defendant A were brothers, and worked a cotton press in partnership. In August, 1884, A sold the press for R35,000 to V (the first defendant), who paid A R5,000 earnest-money, and was put into possession. The plaintiff then brought a suit (No. 327 of 1884) against A praying for a dissolution of the partnership. V was also a party defendant to that suit. The plaintiff alleged that R35,000 was much too low a price for the press, and he objected to the sale. He prayed that V might be restrained from continuing in possession of the press and working it, and that a receiver might be appointed to take possession of it until further order. On the 21st April 1885, on a motion, the Court refused to grant an injunction and receiver, but ordered V to pay R30,000 (i.e., the balance of the purchase-money), to the solicitors of the parties, for investment until the hearing of the suit, and directed that, if that sum was not paid by the 21st May, 1885, a receiver should be appointed to take possession of the press. The suit (i.e., No. 327 of 1884) was heard on the 15th February, 1887, when it was held by the Court that the sale by A to V was without authority; that the defendant V took nothing under it, and that the plaintiff was entitled to have it set aside. Certain matters still remained to be decided; but on the 28th February, 1887, the decree in the suit was made giving effect to the findings already arrived at on the 15th February. The decree by consent directed various accounts to be taken, and among others, an account of the profits realized by the working of the press by the defendant V since his possession thereof, credit being given to him for all sums expended by him in the repairs, maintenance, and working of the said press and for the management thereof by him. The decree further ordered that the defendant V should be repaid the R30,000 which he had paid under the order of the 21st April, 1885, and directed "that on such payment the said defendant V do forthwith give over possession of the press to the plaintiff and the defendant A." The defendant V at once gave notice of his intention to appeal. There was some delay in drawing up the decree. The minutes were spoken to on the 31st March, 1887; the decree was sealed on the 13th April, 1887. Meantime on the 6th April, 1887, and while the defendant V was still in possession, a fire broke out in the press, and much damage was done. Subsequently to the sealing of the decree as above stated, the press in its damaged



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condition was handed over to the plaintiff's firm by V, who also desisted from prosecuting his appeal, the injury to press having made it contrary to his interest to appeal. In May, 1887, the plaintiff filed the present suit, claiming to recover R50,000 from the defendant V as the value of the press, or such further sum as might be necessary to rebuild and restore it. He alleged that the fire was caused by the working of the press, and contended that the working of the press by the defendant V after the decree of the 28th February was an act of trespass by him, and that therefore, independently of the question whether the fire was caused by the negligence of V and his servants, the said V was liable for the loss occasioned by the fire. *Held*, that, independently of negligence, the defendant V was not liable to the plaintiff for the loss occasioned by the fire. Down to the decree of the 28th February, 1887, the defendant in keeping possession of the press and working it was, no doubt, a trespasser, but subsequently to that decree he remained in possession and worked the press with the consent of the plaintiff. The maxim *volenti non fit injuria*, applied to the circumstances of the case. *Held*, also, that, no negligence having been proved against the defendant, the suit must be dismissed. **JAMSETJI BURJORJI BAHADURJI v. EBRAHIM VYDINA**

**I. L. R. 13 Bom. 183**

9. ————— **Penal Code, s. 286—Negligent dealing with explosive—Probable danger to human life—Loaded gun left in open place.** C, having returned to his house after dawn from watching his crops at night with a loaded gun, and finding his house-door locked, placed the gun, loaded, with the hammer down on the cap, on a cot outside his house and went for a short time to a neighbouring house. A, the child of a neighbour, four years old, was killed by the gun exploding. C was convicted under s. 286 of the Penal Code for negligently omitting to take order with the gun sufficient to guard against probable danger to human life. *Held*, that the conviction was bad in law. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. CHENCHUGADU** **I. L. R. 8 Mad. 421**

10. ————— **Penal Code, s. 289—Negligence with respect to animals.** To sustain a charge under s. 289 of the Penal Code, there should be evidence not only of negligence, but also that such negligence would probably lead to danger to human life or of grievous hurt. **ANONYMOUS**

**3 Mad. Ap. 33**

11. ————— **Pony negligently tied up in bazar.** The High Court refused to interfere with an order passed under s. 289 of the Penal Code by a Magistrate fining the owner of a pony which had been tied negligently, which was running about loose in a crowded bazar, and thereby endangering the lives and limbs of persons, that section referring not only to savage animals, but to any animal. **QUEEN v. CHAND MANAL**

**19 W. R. Cr. 1**

12. ————— **Negligent act by Government official—Absence of malicious intention—**

**NEGLIGENCE—contd.**

**Premature closing of water-supply by mistake of Revenue officer—Right of action—Parties.** Plaintiff, a Government *raiyat*, occupied lands the cultivation of which depended upon a supply of water from a Government channel which was ordinarily kept open until a specified date, when it was closed. Defendant, a Revenue officer employed by the Government, negligently, but without malice and without any intention of harming plaintiff, caused the channel to be closed at an earlier date than was customary, thereby causing damage to plaintiff's crops. It was part of defendant's duty to see that the channel was closed at a certain date, but he had, on this occasion, closed it too soon by mistake. Plaintiff sued defendant for the damages which he had thereby suffered. *Held*, that, inasmuch as plaintiff's right to a supply of water was founded on contract, a right of action, in case of the water being improperly withheld, might exist as against the Government, but that there was none as against the defendant, by whom no legal injury had been committed. *Semble*: That, if malicious intention on the defendant's part had been proved, plaintiff might have had a cause of action. **Krishna Ayyan v. Venkatachella Mudali**, 7 Mad. H. C. 60, and **Ramachandra v. Narayanasami**, I. L. R. 16 Mad. 333, referred to. **CHINNAPPA MUDALIAR v. SIKKA NAIKAN** (1900) . . . **I. L. R. 24 Mad. 36**

13. ————— **Negligence of bailee—Bill of lading, construction of.** M shipped 4,000 bags of rice in the S.S. *Thorndale* belonging to B for delivery at Tuticorin under a bill of lading which contained amongst others the following condition:—"The Company is to have the option of delivering these goods or any part thereof into receiving ship or landing them at the risk and expense of the shipper or consignee as per scale of charges . . . and is also to be at liberty until delivery to store the goods or any part thereof . . . In all cases and under all circumstances, the liability of the Company shall absolutely cease when the goods are free of the ship's tackle and thereupon the goods shall be at the risk, for all purposes and in every respect, of the shipper or consignee." The ship arrived at Tuticorin on the 23rd October and began discharging goods on the 24th. Heavy rains commenced on the 27th and continued till the 30th, but the discharge of the goods was not stopped and continued till the 30th. The bags got wet while being landed and became damaged by remaining on the foreshore without being immediately removed by M. M sued B for damages for the bags damaged and lost. It was found that the damage might have been averted if the bags had been removed by M immediately on their being landed and it was also found that B had not taken any precautions to protect the bags. On the above facts:—*Held*, that B was bound to take reasonable care and that his landing and stacking the goods uncovered on the foreshore during rainy weather amounted to actionable negligence. *Per* **SUBRAHMANIA AYYAR, J.**, that the first of the two conditions in the bill of lading did not



**NEGLIGENCE—contd.**

apply to the landing of the goods and that the second condition did not exempt the defendants from liability for negligence as bailees till actual delivery on land. *Per MILLER, J. (contra)*. The second condition in the bill of lading applied to all stages of the transaction covered by the contract, including the stages of landing and storing, and the defendant were thereby exempted from liability for their negligence on such operations. If the second condition should be struck out, the defendants will still be protected from liability by the first condition. *SHEIK MAHAMAD RAVUTHAR v. THE BRITISH INDIA STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY (1906)*

**I. L. R. 30 Mad. 79**

**14. — Misfeasance on the part of Municipality—***The Municipality not keeping a ditch and sluices at a dam in proper order—Collection of the storm water in the ditch—The water passing over lands of another and doing damage* The plaintiff sued to recover damages from the defendant Municipality for injury done to his property by storm water. The water had collected in an adjoining ditch, which the Municipality had not kept in a state of repair, but had allowed it to be choked with the rubbish of the town. They constructed a dam in the adjoining creek, but allowed the sluices at the dam to be choked up with weeds, sedges and silt. The consequence was that the storm water which had collected in the creek passed on to the plaintiff's land and did damage. *Held*, that there was misfeasance on the part of the Municipality, for they had turned their works by their negligence into a nuisance so as to throw the water collected on their property—the creek—on to the plaintiff's land, and that, therefore, they were liable for the damage caused thereby. *Borough of Bathurst v. Macpherson, 4 App. Cas. 256, followed. RAJENDRALAL v. SURAT CITY MUNICIPALITY (1908)*

**I. L. R. 33 Bom. 393**

**15. — Negligence of carrier—***Carrier liable unless exempted by clear and unambiguous words—Bill of lading, construction of—Burden of proof—Contract by carrier exempting himself from liability for negligence is legal and not void as opposed to public policy—Letters Patent, cl. 15—Whole case open on appeal.* The defendants carried 4,000 bags of rice and other goods, consigned to plaintiffs from Rangoon to Tuticorin, under a bill of lading which contained, *inter alia*, the following general condition:—"The said goods to be carried and delivered, subject to the terms and conditions hereof, including those at the foot of this bill of lading, in the like good order and condition, at the port of Tuticorin, the Act of God . . . the Queen's enemies . . . accidents, loss or damage from vermin . . . accidents of sea, land . . . of whatsoever kind, and accidents, loss or damage from any act, neglect or default of whatsoever of the pilot, master, mariners or other servants of the company excepted . . ." Among the conditions at the foot of the bill of lading was the following:—"The company is to have the option of delivering

**NEGLIGENCE—contd.**

these goods or any part thereof, into receiving ship or landing them at the expense and risk of the shipper or the consignee, as per scale of charges to be seen at the Agent's office, and is also to be at liberty, until delivery, to store the goods in receiving ship, godown or upon any wharf, the usual charges therefor being payable by the shipper or consignee . . . In all cases and under all circumstances the liability of the company shall cease absolutely when the goods are free of the ship's tackle and thereupon the goods shall be at the risk, for all purposes and in every respect, of the shipper or consignee." The ship arrived at Tuticorin and the defendants, under the powers reserved to them by the last recited clause, landed the cargo. In a suit brought by the consignees (plaintiffs) to recover damages caused to the goods by the negligence of defendant's servants after such goods were free of the ship's tackle and before they were delivered to plaintiffs:—*Held, per CHIEF JUSTICE and SANKARAN NAIR, J. (WALLIS, J., dissenting)*, on the construction of the bill of lading, that the liability of the defendants at that stage was specially provided for by the last recited clause, that they could not invoke in aid the general negligence clause in the body of the document and that they were not exempted from liability for negligence. Exemption of shipowners from liability for negligence must be provided for in clear and unambiguous terms and must not be left to inference from general words. The words "in all cases and under all circumstances" in the last clause, though as wide and general as possible, will not cover the case of negligence, which must be expressly provided for. Under the contract and the circumstances of the case, the defendants had to prove that the goods were ready for delivery before they became damaged. *Per WALLIS, J.*—The bill of lading sufficiently protected the defendants from liability for negligence during the discharge of the cargo. The general condition in the bill will, by itself, limit the shipowner's liability during the whole time he was in possession of the goods and will apply during the loading and discharge of the goods. The last clause cannot be considered as imposing on the shipowner at that stage, a liability for negligence, which had been already generally stipulated for. The artificial rule of construction laid down by *WALTON, J.*, cannot be applied where the exemption clause does not stand by itself, but occurs, in a bill of lading containing complicated stipulations, as the bill under consideration. In the latter case the document must be considered as a whole. The last recited clause must be read with the general condition in the body of the bill and so read, clearly exempted the defendants from liability. The plaintiff's suit was not for non-delivery but for failure to deliver in proper order and condition; and the plaintiffs were bound to prove when they were delivered and also that the bags were in a bad condition at such time. *Per CHIEF JUSTICE and WALLIS, J.*—In England it is competent to a shipowner to protect himself by express con-



**NEGLIGENCE—concl'd.**

tract from liability for the negligence of himself or his servants. This is also the law applicable in India. *Per SANKARAN NAIR, J.*—The rule of English law which allows shipowners to exempt themselves, by express contract, from liability for negligence, cannot be applied in India, as it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Indian Contract Act and the manifest intention of the Legislature in enacting such provisions. S. 148 of the Contract Act includes bailments for carriage and the shipowner is a bailee in respect of the goods entrusted to him. S. 151 of the Act lays down the absolute minimum of care required of bailees. Having regard to the provision of s. 152, which allows a bailee to undertake a higher responsibility, and to the absence of provisions allowing a bailee to limit such liability, the amount of care required by s. 151 is irreducible by any contract between the parties. A contract limiting such liability will be opposed to public policy and void under s. 23 of the Contract Act, as it will be against the interests of the mercantile community and not necessary in the interests of the shipowners. *Price & Co. v. Union Lighterage Company*, [1903] 1 K. B. 750, referred to. *Rathbone Brothers & Co. v. MacIver Sons & Co.*, [1903] 2 K. B. 378, referred to. *Nelson Line (Liverpool), Limited v. James Nelson & Sons, Limited*, [1908] A. C. 16, referred to. *Jellicoe v. The British India Steam Navigation Company*, 1 L. R. 10 Cal. 489, referred to. *The Irrawaddy Flotilla Company v. Bugwandas*, 1 L. R. 10 Cal. 620, referred to. *Per Curiam*: In an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent from the judgments of two Judges who have differed in opinion, the appeal is not confined to the point on which the learned Judges differed and the whole case is open on the appeal. *Kunhunni v. Sri Vallabhan*, 11 Mad. L. J. 10, followed. *SHEIK MAHAMAD RAVUTHER v. THE BRITISH INDIA STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY, LD.* (1908) . . . . . I. L. R. 32 Mad. 95

**NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.**

See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT.

See PROMISSORY NOTES.

See JURISDICTION—CAUSES OF JURISDICTION  
—CAUSE OF ACTION—NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

suit on—

See JURISDICTION—CAUSES OF JURISDICTION  
—CAUSE OF ACTION—NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 159.  
I. L. R. 23 Cal. 573

[Act V of 1866 mentioned in the following cases, paras. 1 to 11, was repealed and its provisions reenacted in the Civil Procedure Code: see Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) ss. 532 to 538.]

**NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS—concl'd.**

1. ———— **Return of summons—Procedure.** In a suit under Act V of 1866, the summons should be returned in the usual way; and after the expiration of the required time, an order of the Court or a decree should be obtained. *SCHILLER v. MARKER* . 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 283

2. ———— **Time to obtain leave to defend—Act V of 1866, s. 3.** Although Act V of 1866, s. 3, only gives the defendant seven days to get leave to come in and defend an action on a bill, note, etc., the Court must be satisfied before granting a decree that the defendant has had a full opportunity to obtain leave to defend. *GROR v. PALMER*  
1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 395

3. ———— **Extension of time for appearance—Jurisdiction.** Where, in a suit under Act V of 1866, the defendant is at such a distance as would make it impossible for him to put in an appearance within the seven days allowed by the Act, the Court will stay execution for a time long enough to allow him to appear. Suits cannot be brought under this Act against persons resident out of the jurisdiction. *CHANDRAKANT ROY v. POGOSE* . . . . . 3 B. L. R. O. C. 83

4. ———— **Leave to appear and defend—Practice—Costs.** The Court will give leave to a defendant to appear and defend in suits under Act V of 1866, where he shows a defence apparently real; but where there is a doubt as to the *bonâ fides* of the defence, payment of money into Court will be ordered or security directed to be given. The Court has, in giving leave to defend, a discretion to order security for costs, not only where it doubts the *bonâ fides* of the defence, but also if it considers the matter of defence raised is unnecessary, though allowable. If the plaintiff has not been heard at first against the defendant's application, the Court will always allow him to come in afterwards and show that the leave ought not to have been granted, or, if granted at all, in more stringent terms. *VONLINTZGY v. NARAYAN SING*  
6 B. L. R. Ap. 64

5. ———— **Leave to defend.** In an action on a promissory note under this Act the defendant was allowed to come in and defend after the plaintiff had obtained a decree; the decree was set aside and written statements ordered. *JOSEPH v. SOLANO* . . . . . 9 B. L. R. 441: 18 W. R. 424

6. ———— **Notarial protest—Evidence of dishonour—Hundi—Bill of exchange.** A notarial protest of any bill of exchange noted at any time after the passing of Act V of 1866 is *primâ facie* evidence that the bill has been dishonoured under s. 13 of that Act, although the sections relating to summary procedure on bills of exchange did not come into operation till May 1st, 1866. A hundi which contains a direction on sufficient consideration to the drawee, and accepted by him, is within the terms of the Act, and such a document is assignable without any regular form of endorsement, if sufficient cause appears in the handwriting of an endorser to indicate an intention to assign it.



NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS—*contd.*

EAST INDIA BANK v. KHOJAH VULLIE GOOLWANY . . . 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 247

7. ———— Decree—*Right of plaintiff suing under the Act.* Under the summary procedure on Bills of Exchange Act (V of 1866), the plaintiff is entitled to claim by his summons and obtain by his decree whatever sum, principal and interest, is, on the legal construction of the instrument, demandable. DESOZA v. RANGAIAN . . . 6 Mad. 257

8. ———— Promissory note—*Consideration—Evidence.* In a suit under the Bills of Exchange Act to recover R1,200 on a promissory note the Court gave a decree for R700 only, that being shown to have been the full consideration received for the note. RAMLAL MOOKERJEE v. HARAN CHANDRA DHAR . . . 3 B. L. R. O. C. 130 : 12 W. R. O. C. 9

9. ———— Endorsement struck out—*Promissory note—Evidence.* A plaint was presented under Act V of 1866 by the endorsees of a promissory note endorsed as follows: "Received from the Chartered Mercantile Bank.—J. M. Reid, Agent." The note had not been paid when presented, and the endorsement was struck out. Admission of the plaint was refused, unless evidence was given that the note had been paid, and to explain why the endorsement was struck out. As under Act V of 1866 evidence could not be received, the plaint was not admitted. CHARTERED MERCANTILE BANK v. SECONDE . . . 3 B. L. R. O. C. 146

10. ———— Suit on promissory note payable by instalments. Where a promissory note is payable by instalments, and contains a stipulation that, on default in payment of the first instalment, the whole amount is to become due, a suit to recover the whole amount on default made in payment of the first instalment cannot be brought under Act V of 1866. REMFRY v. SHILLINGFORD . . . I. L. R. 1 Calc. 130

11. ———— Costs—*Suit under R500—Jurisdiction of Small Cause Court.* In an undefended suit brought under Act V of 1866 on a promissory note for R342, there was nothing in the petition to show that the suit could not have been brought in the Small Cause Court, the High Court gave a decree for amount of note and costs. DUFF v. FISHER . . . 8 B. L. R. Ap. 10

12. ———— Summary procedure on—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Ch. XXXIX—Leave to defend, extension of time to apply for—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 1, and Sch. II, Art 159.* In a suit under Ch. XXXIX, Civil Procedure Code, 1882, the Court has no power, after the time fixed by the summons for obtaining leave to appear and defend has expired, to extend the time. *Quere:* Whether the Court has power to grant an extension of time if an application for such extension be made before the time fixed by the summons has expired. QUAZIE MAHMUDAR ROHMAN v. SARAT CHANDRA DUTT (1900) . . . 5 C. W. N. 259

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS—*concl.*

13. ———— Payment—*Contract of purchase—Hundi taken in part payment.* Defendants agreed to sell paddy to plaintiff on the term that the balance of the price, after giving credit for an advance of R1,000, should be paid by plaintiff on delivery at a place mentioned. It was agreed that an assignment of a debt for R100 and a hundi for R900 should be accepted as payment of the advance. Defendants sold the paddy to a third party at a higher price, and plaintiff now sued for damages for breach of contract. *Held,* that plaintiff was entitled to damages. As the R100 assigned and the hundi for R900 were agreed to be the payment of the advance of R1,000, the acceptance of the hundi operated as payment, though it might be only conditional, and the right to receive the R900 as part of the price might revive, if the hundi should be dishonoured, and notice of dishonour duly given. *Held,* also, that the property in the paddy had passed to the buyer under s. 78 of the Contract Act and under s. 95 of that Act the defendants, as vendors, would have a lien on the goods and would not be bound to deliver until the price had been paid, including the R900 due under the hundi, if the letter were dishonoured. KUTTAYAN CHETTY v. PALANIAPPA CHETTY (1904) . . . I. L. R. 27 Mad. 540

14. ———— Fraud—*Forged indorsement—Holder in due course—Onus of proof—Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881) ss. 9, 46, 58, 59.* No person can claim a title to a negotiable instrument through a forged indorsement. Such an indorsement is a nullity and must be taken as if no such indorsement was on the instrument. *Chandra Kali Dabee v. E. P. Champan, I. L. R. 32 Cal. 799,* not followed. *Hunsraj Purmand v. Ruttonji Waiji, I. L. R. 24 Bom. 65,* followed. Where a plaintiff establishes the fact that a negotiable instrument was obtained from its lawful owner by means of fraud the onus of proving that a third party was a holder in due course lies on the defendant. BANKU BEHARI SIKDER v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (1908) . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 239

## NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT (XXVI OF 1881).

See HUNDI.

See JURISDICTION—CAUSES OF JURISDICTION—CAUSE OF ACTION.

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 133

See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

See PRESIDENCY SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT (XV OF 1882).

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 364

Local usage—*Applicability of Act XXVI of 1881 to natives of India.* The provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act are strictly applicable to natives. Where any local usage is relied on under s. 1 of the Act, it should be alleged and established by



**NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT  
(XXVI OF 1881)—contd.**

the party who relies upon it. *JAMBU CHETTY v. PALANIAPPA CHETTIAR* (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 526

ss. 4 and 13—

See PROMISSORY NOTE—FORM.

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 689

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 49

ss. 4, 26, 27, 28—

See JOINT FAMILY, LIABILITY OF.

11 C. W. N. 139

ss. 7, 32, 53, 64, 115, 134—*Bills of exchange drawn on defendant and endorsed over to plaintiff by the Bank in whose favour they were drawn—Failure of defendant to pay—Suits to recover on the bills—Plaintiff's capacity—Holder deriving title from holder in due course—Bills accepted need not be dishonoured and protested—Acceptor liable at maturity—Assent not signed on the bills, but on copies—Assent not valid.* The plaintiff sued to recover on certain bills drawn on the defendant and endorsed over to the plaintiff by the Banks, in whose favour they were drawn. The suits were dismissed on the grounds that (1) the suits were defective in form inasmuch as the plaintiff was suing as agent without disclosing his principals and (2) the suits were not competent as the bills had never been dishonoured and protested. *Held*, (i) that the bills were endorsed over to the plaintiff by the Banks in whose favour they were drawn, so that he was a holder deriving title from holders in due course, and as such he was competent to sue under s. 53 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881). *Held*, further, (ii) that the bills were made payable at Bombay. Therefore under ss. 134 and 32 of the Act the acceptor became liable at the maturity of the bills and the suits were not bad, because the bills had not been dishonoured and protested. S. 115 of the Act merely enacts that a bill is not dishonoured until it has been dishonoured by the drawee in case of need where such drawee is named in the bill. Presentment is not necessary to charge the acceptor. The acceptor is the principal debtor and his liability is independent of the presentment, the acceptance having been signed on the copies of the bills and not upon the bills or upon one of their parts in accordance with s. 7 of the Act. *Held*, that a material requirement of law had been omitted with the result that there was no valid acceptance. *ARDESHIR SORABSHA v. KHUSHALDAS* (1907)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 247

ss. 8 and 9—

See PROMISSORY NOTES—ASSIGNMENT OF,  
AND SUITS ON PROMISSORY NOTES.

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 280

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 461

2 C. W. N. 286

ss. 8, 32, 78—

See LIMITATION . I. L. R. 28 Mad. 205

**NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT  
(XXVI OF 1881)—contd.**

1. — ss. 8, 78—*In a suit by a payee named in a negotiable instrument or an indorsee, plea that such payee or indorsee is benamidar not allowable.* According to the law merchant which governed negotiable instruments in this country before the passing of the Negotiable Instruments Act, no person could sue on a negotiable instrument unless he were named therein as payee or had become entitled as indorsee or bearer. Ss. 8 and 78 of the Negotiable Instruments Act have reproduced the law as it stood before the passing of the Act. The general provisions of the Indian Contract Act as regards the rights and liabilities of undisclosed principals were not intended to alter these well established rules as to negotiable instruments. In a suit on a negotiable instrument by the payee named therein or the indorsee, it is not open to the defendant to plead that such payee or indorsee is a mere benamidar. *Ganapati Naiken v. Saminatha Pillay*, C. R. P. No. 578 of 1895, unreported. *Gurumurti v. Sivayya*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 391, overruled. *SUBBA NARAYANA VATHIYAR v. RAMASWAMI AIYAR* (1906).

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 88

2. — Right of indorser indorsing for collection—Indorser on regaining possession of bill, may strike out name of indorsee and himself sue on the bill. The holder of a negotiable instrument within the meaning of s. 8 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, to whom payment must be made under s. 78 of the Act, is the person who on the face of such instrument, is entitled in his own name to the possession thereof and to receive or recover the amount due therefor from the parties thereto. *Subba Narayana Vathiyar v. Ramaswami Aiyar*, I. L. R. 30 Mad. 88, referred to. Where the drawer or indorser takes up a bill by paying the holder, he is entitled to strike out subsequent parties and maintain a suit on such bill against the parties antecedent to himself. Where a bill is indorsed for collection and is returned by the indorsee to the indorser, the former ceases to be the holder within the meaning of s. 8 of the Act, and the latter can maintain a suit on the bill by striking out the name of the indorsee. English and American cases on the subject considered. *SUBRAMANIA CHETTY v. ALAGAPPA CHETTY* (1907) I. L. R. 30 Mad. 441

s. 9—Hundi—Holder in due course—*Effect of fraudulent endorsement to fictitious indorsee.* Two hundis not payable to bearer were intrusted to a broker by the payees for sale. The broker represented to the payees that a certain firm, known as Har Sahai Mal Kedar Nath, was willing to purchase them, and the payees accordingly endorsed them over to Har Sahai Mal Kedar Nath. The broker then forged two further endorsements on the hundis, the first from Har Sahai Mal Kedar Nath to Kedar Nath Chandu Lal; the second from Kedar Nath Chandu Lal to Bhola Nath Moti Ram. Both the last mentioned firms were fictitious. The hundis were then sold as by the last endorsees to Mahbub



# NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT (XXVI OF 1881)—*contd.*

s. 9—*concl'd.*

Bakhsh Muhammad Husain, who realized the amounts thereof from the drawee. *Held*, on a suit by the payee against the last endorsees and the broker, that the last endorsees were not protected as holders in due course and the plaintiffs could recover. *Hunsraj Purmanand v. Ruttonji Walji*, I. L. R. 24 Bom. 65, and *Arnold v. The Cheque Bank*, L. R. 1 C. P. D. 578, followed. *JAI NARAIN v. MAHBUB BUKSH* (1906). I. L. R. 28 All 428

ss. 9, 58—

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 10, ART. 48  
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 799

ss. 9, 46, 58, 59—

See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS  
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 239

s. 13—*Negotiable instrument—Promissory note—Reference in the note to collateral security, effect of—Deposit of title-deeds.* An instrument, signed and bearing a 1-anna stamp, was in the following terms, viz., "On deposit of title-deeds named hereinbelow for value received by me, I promise to pay three months after date Rs 160 to A B or order," then followed the details of the title-deeds. *Held*, that the instrument was a negotiable instrument. *RAMA v. SETHA*  
I. L. R. 17 Mad. 85

s. 17—

See BILL OF EXCHANGE.  
I. L. R. 15 Bom. 267

s. 30—

See HUNDI—NOTICE OF DISHONOUR.  
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 977

ss. 30, 39—*Hundi payable at sight—Liability of drawer where holder agrees to an arrangement with acceptor for payment—Notice of dishonour, omission to give—Discharge of drawer.* Where the acceptor of a hundi payable at sight at first accepted the hundi unconditionally, but subsequently said he would pay in three days' time and the holder of the hundi agreed to this arrangement of which however he did not give any notice to the drawer, and where the acceptor having failed to pay the amount of the hundi within the three days the holder did not give notice of dishonour till after ten days. *Held*, that the conduct of the holder discharged the drawer from his liability under the hundi according to the terms of ss. 30, 39 and 86 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. *ASKARAM BAID v. PIR BUX* (1908). 12 C. W. N. 644

s. 35—

See DECREE—FORM OF DECREE—BILL OF EXCHANGE. I. L. R. 16 Calc. 804

ss. 35, 43—

See MAJORITY, AGE OF.  
I. L. R. 7 All 490

# NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT (XXVI OF 1881)—*contd.*

ss. 37, 39—

See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY—DISCHARGE OF SURETY. I. L. R. 13 Mad. 172

s. 46—

See PROMISSORY NOTE—ASSIGNMENT OF AND SUITS ON, PROMISSORY NOTES.  
I. L. R. 17 Mad. 197

s. 51—

See PROMISSORY NOTES—ASSIGNMENT OF, AND SUITS ON, PROMISSORY NOTES.  
I. L. R. 24 Mad. 654

ss. 64, 66—

See PROMISSORY NOTE—ASSIGNMENT OF, AND SUITS OF, PROMISSORY NOTES.  
I. L. R. 21 All 450

s. 66—

See PRINCIPAL AND SURETY—DISCHARGE OF SURETY. I. L. R. 13 Mad. 172

ss. 79, 80—

See INTEREST—OMISSION TO STIPULATE FOR, OR STIPULATED TIME HAS EXPIRED—CONTRACTS. I. L. 23 Mad. 18

s. 80—

See INTEREST. I. L. R. 29 All 33  
L. R. 34 I. A. 6

s. 80—*Collateral agreement to pay interest—Construction.* S. 80 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881) confers a right to interest in the absence of any specified rate, but does not take away a right otherwise existing by contract. Where hundis were silent as to interest, but there was a collateral agreement (effective in this case) granting interest at a specified rate: *Held*, that the above section did not apply. *GHANSHIAM LALJI v. RAM NARAYAN* (1906)

I. L. R. 29 All 33  
s.c. L. R. 34 I. A. 6

s. 93—

See HUNDI—NOTICE OF DISHONOUR.  
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 977

s. 94—

See HUNDI—NOTICE OF DISHONOUR.  
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 526

s. 98—

See HUNDI—NOTICE OF DISHONOUR.  
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 977

Cl. (c)—*Damage suffered by drawer by omission to give notice of dishonour—Onus of proof—Partnership between drawer and acceptor—Acceptor also drawer—Discharge of acceptor by limitation—Effect on liability of drawer.* When the endorsee of a bill sues the drawer to recover the amount due under the bill, and relies upon s. 98 (c) of the Negotiable Instruments Act to excuse the omission to give



**NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT**  
(XXVI OF 1881)—*concl'd.***s. 98—concl'd.**

notice of dishonour, the *onus* lies on the endorsee to establish that the drawer could not have suffered damage by the omission. The mere fact that the drawer and acceptor of a bill are partners does not give rise to the presumption that they are partners in respect of the drawing of the bill, or that the bill was drawn by one of them on behalf of both. In such a case the acceptor is not also a drawer, so as to render notice of dishonour unnecessary under s. 98 (e). The fact that the acceptor of a bill is not liable (because he was joined as a party to the suit after the period of limitation had expired) does not discharge the drawer from his liability, where the suit has been instituted as against him in time. *JAMBU RAMASWAMY BHAGAVATHAR v. SUNDARARAJA CHETTI* (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 239

**s. 118—**

See *ONUS OF PROOF—DOCUMENTS RELATING TO LOANS, EXECUTION OF, AND CONSIDERATION FOR, ETC.*

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 367

**NEGOTIABLE SECURITY.**See *COSTS* . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 27**NEPAL.**

Whether in India—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 503—Evidence taken on commission in Nepal—Conviction under s. 411, Indian Penal Code, on such evidence—General Clauses Act (X of 1897), s. 3, cl. (27)—Burden of proving if Nepal is in India.* In a case where a commission was issued under s. 503, Criminal Procedure Code, for the taking of evidence of witnesses in Nepal, and accused was convicted on such evidence:—*Held*, that the *onus* of proving that Nepal is in "India," as defined by the General Clauses Act, s. 3, cl. (27), lies on the party who alleges that the evidence taken there is proper evidence, and on their failing to do so, the conviction must be set aside. *Quare: Whether Nepal is in India.* *SANGHIR LAMA v. EMPEROR* (1902)

7 C. W. N. 635

**NEPHEW.**

See *HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—SPECIAL HEIRS—MALES—NEPHEW.*

**NEW POINT.**See *PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF.*

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 709

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**NEW TRIAL.**See *CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 108.*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 269

See *EVIDENCE ACT, s. 167.*

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See *SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE—REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT* . 3 B. L. R. A. C. 135  
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See *SMALL CAUSE COURT, PRESIDENCY TOWNS—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE—REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT.*

7 Bom. O. C. 180  
12 B. L. R. 34 ; 37  
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See *WITHDRAWAL OF SUIT.*

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 239

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**in criminal case—**See *CHARGE TO JURY—MISDIRECTION.*

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See *CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 403.*

6 C. W. N. 640

See *EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—CONSIDERATION OF, AND MODE OF DEALING WITH, EVIDENCE.* . 6 C. W. N. 921

See *REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—REVIVAL OF COMPLAINT AND RE-TRIAL.*

24 W. R. 24  
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3 C. W. N. 332  
4 C. W. N. 576

See *REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—SENTENCES.*

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18 W. R. Cr. 8 ; 23 ; 38  
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See *REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—VERDICT OF JURY AND MISDIRECTION.*

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 459  
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 485

See *VERDICT OF JURY—POWER TO INTERFERE WITH VERDICTS.*

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 749  
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 711

Conditions of. Where, no case of fraud or surprise having been made out, a party to the suit sought for a new trial on the



**NEW TRIAL—concl'd.**

ground of discovery, after judgment, of an important document, which was in the possession of the opposite party, but of which the party first named had neglected to obtain discovery before judgment:—*Held*, that a new trial should not lightly be granted, and in the present case it ought not to be granted. *TURNBULL & Co. v. DUVAL* (1902) . . . 6 C. W. N. 809

**NEW ZEALAND.**

native appellate Court of—

*See* PRIVY COUNCIL . 12 C. W. N. 1081

**NEWSPAPER.**

*Printing Presses and Newspaper Act (XXV of 1867), s. 3*—Name of printer and publisher. A newspaper was printed and published bearing the following words: "Printed and published at Cochin for the Malabar Economic Company at the Company's Goshree Vilasam Press." *Held*, that these words did not satisfy the requirements of Act XXV of 1867, s. 3. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. HARI SHENOY*

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 443

**NEWSPAPER ARTICLE.**

*See* LIBEL . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 495

**NEWSPAPER LIBEL.**

*See* LIBEL . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 495

**NEWSPAPERS (INCITEMENTS TO OFFENCES) ACT (VII OF 1908).**

*s. 3*—Nature of offences under the Act—Incitement to assassination—"Incitement," meaning of—Direct or indirect incitement—General incitement, not addressed to particular persons—Construction of offensive article. The question of the intention or knowledge of an individual may determine his criminal liability under the ordinary law of abetment by incitement by means of words, written or spoken, but under the Newspapers (Incitements to Offences) Act no question of the intention of the writer, printer or publisher arises, and no personal liability is imputed to any particular person. The order thereunder is not one against any person, but is purely restrictive and directed against the use or intended use, of a press for the purpose of printing or publishing a newspaper containing any incitement to murder or to any offence under the Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908) or to any act of violence. The words "any incitement" in s. 3 (1) of the Newspapers Act include direct and indirect incitement, and need not be addressed to any particular person, nor expressed in violent and outrageous terms. "To incite" means "to move to action, to stir up, to stimulate, to instigate or to encourage," and a newspaper article comes within the scope of s. 3 if it is, as a matter of fact, calculated, directly or indirectly, to produce that effect. *Per RYVES, J.*—There can be no hard-and-fast canon as to what words or given set of words constitute

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**NEWSPAPERS (INCITEMENTS TO OFFENCES) ACT (VII OF 1908)—concl'd.**

*s. 3*—concl'd.

"incitement." It is a question of fact in each case, and must usually depend largely on concomitant circumstances. The articles must be read as a whole and, as far as possible, in the sense in which it was read by the section of the public to which it was primarily addressed, and also considered with regard to the occasion and place of publication and the class or status of persons likely to be affected by it. *GIRIJA SUNDAR CHUCKERBUTTY v. EMPEROR* (1908)

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 405

**NEXT FRIEND.**

*See* CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 461.  
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 561

*See* COMPROMISE—COMPROMISE OF SUITS UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

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I. L. R. 19 Bom. 135  
I. L. R. 23 Bom. 653  
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*See* MINOR—REPRESENTATION OF MINOR IN SUITS . . . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 488

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*See* BETTIAH RAJ . 13 C. W. N. 454  
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**NOABAD MEHAL.**

1. ————— *Noabad mehal in Chittagong district—Incidents—Taraf and Noabad property distinguished—“Noabad taraf,” what is—Settlement whether permanent or temporary.* Where the question was whether a certain mahal, known as mahal *Noabad taraf* Joy Narain Ghosal, in the district of Chittagong, was a part of the permanently settled *taraf* of the proprietor, or consisted merely of ordinary *Noabad* lands temporarily settled and liable to periodical re-settlement and annexed to the proprietor's *taraf* for convenience only:—*Held*, that the special history of the tenure from 1763 when it was created showed that the mahal was neither the one nor the other. The mere fact that a mehal is a *Noabad* mehal does not necessarily attach to it the incidents of ordinary *Noabad* properties of later creation. All *Noabad* mehals of Chittagong have this in common that the proprietors have to pay rent or revenue to Government. But the incidents of different *Noabad* mehals may vary very greatly. The incidents of the present mehal determined, and *held*, mainly upon the basis of a *kabuliyat* executed by the proprietors in favour of the Government in 1852, that the revenue was fixed in perpetuity on the *hasila* area only. *RAM SUNDAR SAHA v. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* (1907) . . . . . 11 C. W. N. 928

2. ————— *Noabad Taluk—Temporary Settlement—Re-settlement—Area, if must be same—Preferential right of former holder to have settlement.* There is no legal obligation on Government at re-settlement to include any lands in a *Noabad* talukdari tenure according to the boundaries or dags of any former survey. *Prasunno Kumar Roy v. The Secretary of State for India*, 3 C. W. N. 695 : s. c. I. L. R. 26 Calc. 792, followed. A temporary settlement-holder, specially an intermediate holder for 10 years, is not entitled to a settlement of the same area at the same rate though he may have a preferential right to the fresh settlement the Government makes at the expiry of the old settlement. *HAIDAR ALI SIKDAR v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* (1908) . . . 13 C. W. N. 235

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7 C. L. R. 378

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**NON-OCCUPANCY RAIYAT.**

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13 C. W. N. 267 ; 269

1. ————— *Heritability—Right of non-occupancy raiyat whether heritable—Custom and contract—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 5 (2), 79, 82, 160 (e). Held by the Full Bench (BRETT and MITRA, JJ., dissenting), that the right of a non-occupancy raiyat has not been made heritable by the Bengal Tenancy Act, but if such right were heritable by the time of the*



**NON-OCCUPANCY RAIYAT—concl'd.**

passing of that Act it has not been taken away by it. *Per GEIDT, J.*—The Legislature has not by any enactment, express or implied, conferred the right of inheritance on non-occupancy raiyats; and apart from custom or contract the right of a non-occupancy raiyat is not heritable. *LAKHAN NARAIN DAS v. JAINATH PANDAY* (1907).

I. L. R. 34 Cal. 516

2. *Non-occupancy holding, if heritable and transferable—Conflict of authorities—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 21, 23, 178 (3), 183, Illustrations.* The state of the authorities on the question whether a non-occupancy holding is heritable or not is not satisfactory. The Full Bench in *Lukhan Narain Das v. Jainath Panday*, I. L. R. 34 Cal. 516, leaves the question undecided. *Karim Chowkidar v. Sunder Bewa*, I. L. R. 24 Cal. 207, referred to. *UDAY CHANDRA DAS BAIRAGI v. HARI DAS BAIRAGI* (1909) . . . 13 C. W. N. 937

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13 C. W. N. 580

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Power to non-suit a plaintiff. *Semble*: The Courts in India have powers to pass judgment of non-suit. *PARSOTAM GIR v. NARBADA GIR* . . . I. L. R. 22 All. 505  
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I. L. R. 1 All. 512

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TING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.  
I. L. R. 1 All. 400

ss. 43, 83, and 241—*Vendor and purchaser—Agreement—Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Cause of action—Assessment of revenue.* The purchaser of a certain estate paying revenue to Government agreed with the vendors, shortly after the sale, that they should retain a certain portion of such estate free of rent, and that he would pay the revenue payable in respect of such portion. In 1853, in a suit by the vendors against the purchaser to enforce this agreement, the Sudder Court held that the revenue payable in respect of such portion of the estate was payable by the purchaser. In 1875, on a fresh settlement of the estate, the representatives in title of the purchaser applied, to the settlement officer to settle such portion of the estate with the representative in title of the vendors. The settlement officer refused this application, but it was subsequently allowed by the superior revenue authorities. The representative in title of the vendors then sued the representatives in title of the purchaser in the Civil Court, claiming "that he might, in accordance with the agreement between the vendors and the purchaser, be exempted from paying revenue in respect of such portion, as against the defendants, without any injury to the Government: that the defendants might be ordered to pay as heretofore such revenue: and that the defendants might be ordered never to claim or demand from him any revenue they might be compelled to pay in respect of such portion." *Held, per SPANKIE, J.,* that, assuming that the agreement between the vendors and the purchaser was enforceable, the act of the defendants in moving the settlement officer to settle such portion of the estate with the plaintiff gave the plaintiff a cause of action. Also that the object of the plaintiff's suit being to obtain a declaration that, as between him and the defendants the latter were bound to pay revenue in respect of such portion, the suit was not barred by cl. (b), s. 241 of Act XIX of 1873. Also that, although the revenue authorities might regard the decision of the Sudder Court as binding on the parties then before the Court, for the currency of the then settlement, that decision, that settlement having expired, and s. 83 of Act XIX of 1873 having come into force, could not control the power of the revenue authorities to settle the land in question with the plaintiff who was its proprietor. *Held, per OLDFIELD, J.,* that, with reference to ss. 43 and 83 of Act XIX of 1873, the Civil Courts could not relieve the plaintiff of his liability to pay revenue. *Held, by the Court*

# **NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES LAND REVENUE ACT (XIX OF 1873)—*contd.***

s. 43—*concl'd.*

that, in the absence of proof that the agreement by the purchaser was intended to extend beyond the period of the settlement then current, and that it was binding upon his representatives in title, the plaintiff could not obtain the declaration which he sought. *HIRA LAL v. GANESH PRASAD*  
I. L. R. 2 All. 415

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I. L. R. 11 All. 328  
I. L. R. 14 All. 500

1. *Objection filed after time limited by Court but before action taken under s. 113.* Held, that the provisions of ss. 214 and 219 of Act XIX of 1873 do not apply to an *ex parte* decision of a question of title by a Court of Revenue acting under s. 113 of the said Act. Held, also, that a Court of Revenue acting in partition proceedings under s. 113 of Act XIX of 1873 was not precluded from dealing with an objection brought before it merely by reason of such objection not having been filed within the time limited by the Court for filing objections, the Court not having up to that time taken any action under s. 113 of the said Act. *Muhammad Abdul Karim v. Muhammad Shadi Khan*, I. L. R. 9 All. 429, distinguished. *TULSI PRASAD v. MATRU MAL*.

I. L. R. 18 All. 210

2. *Partition—Question of title—Parties referred to Civil Court—Revenue Court not empowered to limit the time within which recourse must be had to the Civil Court.* When in the course of partition proceedings under the North-Western Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1873, objections raising a question of title are preferred, and the Revenue Court under s. 113 of the Act refers the parties to the Civil Court, the Revenue Court has no power to fix a limit of time within which recourse must be had to the Civil Court. *JAMNA PRASAD v. BALMUKAND* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 225

3. *Partition—Co-owners—Agreement not to partition not binding upon heirs of parties thereto—Appeal—Question of proprietary right.* Held, that an agreement amongst the members of a family holding property jointly that the family property should not be partitioned could not bind the property in the hands of the descendants of the parties to such an agreement; also that the question whether such an agreement could be binding on the property in the hands of the descendants of the parties thereto was a question of proprietary right within the meaning of s. 113 of Act XIX of 1873, and an appeal would, therefore, lie from the finding thereon. *ABU MUHAMMAD KHAN v. KANIZ FIZZA* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 All. 185

ss. 113, 114—

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I. L. R. 2 All. 619  
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I. L. R. 14 All. 500

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I. L. R. 25 All. 277

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I. L. R. 9 All. 429; 445

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I. L. R. 2 All. 839  
I. L. R. 5 All. 280  
I. L. R. 9 All. 388  
I. L. R. 18 All. 59

1. *Procedure—Inquiry into objections raising questions of title.* When a Collector or Assistant Collector has determined to enquire into objections raising questions of title preferred under s. 113 of the N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act, 1873, his proceeding thereupon must be conducted as an original suit in a Civil Court. *RANJIT SINGH v. ILAHI BAKSH* . . . I. L. R. 5 All. 520

2. ss. 113, 114, 241 (f)—*Partition—Question of title raised before and decided by Assistant Collector—Appeal to wrong Court—Suit in Civil Court for declaration of title—Jurisdiction.* In an application for partition before an Assistant Collector certain parties raised an objection that they were exclusively entitled to a portion of the land sought to be partitioned. The Assistant Collector tried the question of title so raised under s. 113 of the North-Western Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1873, and decided it in favour of the objectors. The applicants appealed to the Collector, who entertained the appeal and reversed the finding of the Assistant Collector, and this decision was upheld by the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue. Before the partition proceedings were completed, the unsuccessful objectors filed a suit in the Civil Court praying for a declaration that the lands in question were their exclusive property and, if necessary, for a decree for possession. Held, that the suit was maintainable. No appeal lay on the revenue side from the Assistant Collector's order on the plaintiff's objection, which was now final; and inasmuch as the suit had been instituted before the completion of the partition proceedings, it was not obnoxious to the prohibition contained in s. 241 (f) of Act XIX of 1873. *Muhammad Sadiq v. Laute Ram*, I. L. R. 23 All. 291, referred to. *MUHAMMAD JAN v. SADANAND PANDE* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 394

s. 114—

See APPEAL—NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES ACTS . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 141

s. 115—

See PARTITION—JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT IN SUITS RESPECTING PARTITION.  
I. L. R. 9 All. 429



# **NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES LAND REVENUE ACT (XIX of 1873)—contd.**

## **s. 124—**

See PARTITION—MODE OF EFFECTING PARTITION . . . I. L. R. 22 All. 329

## **s. 125—**

See CO-SHARERS—ENJOYMENT OF JOINT PROPERTY—CULTIVATION.

I. L. R. 3 All. 818

I. L. R. 4 All. 515

Private Partition. S. 125 of Act XIX of 1873 does not apply to a partition by private agreement. *Gaya Singh v. Udit Singh*, I. L. R. 13 All. 396, referred to. *Ram Prasad v. Dina Kuar*, I. L. R. 4 All. 515, dissented from by KNOX and BANERJI, JJ. *KASHI PRASAD v. KEDAR NATH SAHU* . . . I. L. R. 20 All. 219

## **ss. 131, 132—**

See PARTITION—JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT IN SUITS RESPECTING PARTITION.

I. L. R. 9 All. 429

ss. 132, 241.—Act (Local) No. III of 1901 (*United Provinces Land Revenue Act*), s. 223 (k)—Partition—Civil and Revenue Courts—Jurisdiction. A plaintiff came into Court upon the allegation that a certain grove had upon partition been wrongly allotted to the defendants' mahal, whereas it should have been allotted to his (the plaintiff's) mahal and he claimed a decree for a declaration of his title or for possession. Held, that s. 203 (k) of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1901, barred the cognizance of such a suit by a Civil Court. *Kishen Prasad v. Kadher Mal*, All. Weekly Notes (1900) 11, distinguished. *JAGAN NATH v. TIRBENI SAHAI* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 31 All. 41

## **s. 135—**

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—REVENUE COURTS—PARTITION 7 N. W. 346

I. L. R. 10 All. 5

See PARTITION—JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT IN SUITS RESPECTING PARTITION.

I. L. R. 10 All. 5

## **s. 146—**

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—SALE-PROCEEDS . . . I. L. R. 6 All. 112

## **ss. 146, 148—**

See CO-SHARERS—GENERAL RIGHTS IN JOINT PROPERTY.

I. L. R. 14 All. 273

## **s. 148—**

See INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES—ARREARS OF REVENUE.

I. L. R. 23 All. 5

## **s. 154—**

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—GIFT—VALIDITY.

I. L. R. 21 All. 165

# **NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES LAND REVENUE ACT (XIX OF 1873)—contd.**

ss. 154, 190.—Mahal taken under direct management—Rent of sir land fixed by Collector—Sale of mahal before release from direct management. A mahal was taken by the Collector under direct management and the late proprietor was recorded as ex-proprietary tenant of the sir land and his rent was fixed by the Collector under the provisions of s. 190 of Act No. XIX of 1873. While still under direct management the mahal was sold. The purchaser paid up the arrears of land revenue due thereon and possession was given to him. Held, that the purchaser was entitled to claim from the ex-proprietary tenant the rent fixed by the Collector: it was not incumbent upon him to get the rent fixed again. *HASAN ALI KHAN v. MAZHAR-UL-HASAN* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 318

## **ss. 166, 167, 168—**

See PRE-EMPTION—RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION.

I. L. R. 13 All. 224

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—INCUMBRANCES—N.-W. P. LAND REVENUE ACT . . . I. L. R. 22 All. 321

## **s. 184—**

See BENAMI TRANSACTION—CERTIFIED PURCHASES—N.-W. P. LAND REVENUE ACT.

I. L. R. 21 All. 29

## **ss. 185, 186—**

See RIGHT OF SUIT—SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE . . . I. L. R. 21 All. 137

## **s. 188—**

See PRE-EMPTION—RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION

I. L. R. 1 All. 277

I. L. R. 13 All. 224

ss. 189, 241.—Northern India Canal and Drainage Act (VIII of 1873), s. 45—Canal dues money paid as under a mistake and without protest—Suit to recover, if maintainable—Claim realisable as revenue—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Arts. 14, 96. A suit in a Civil Court to recover money paid as canal dues under a mistake (and without protest) does not lie by reason of s. 241 of the North-Western Provinces Land Revenue Act, and s. 45 of the Northern India Canal and Drainage Act. *BALWANT SINGH v. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* . . . 8 C. W. N. 121

## **s. 190—**

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—CONSTITUTION OF RELATION—ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF TENANCY BY RECEIPT OF RENT.

I. L. R. 6 All. 52

## **s. 191—**

See PRE-EMPTION—CONSTRUCTION OF WAJIB-UL-AZ . . . I. L. R. 22 All. 1



# **NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES LAND REVENUE ACT (XIX OF 1873)—*contd.***

ss. 194, 195 (Act VIII of 1879, s. 20—

See COURT OF WARDS.

I. L. R. 7 All. 687

ss. 194 (g), 203—Act (Local) No. III of 1899 (Court of Wards Act), ss. 9, 35 and 47—Power of Court of Wards to sell property under its superintendence. The estate of a Muhammadan lady, named Hawa Begam, was, at her own request, taken under the superintendence of the Court of Wards under s. 194, cl. (g), of Act No. XIX of 1873. This was in 1896. In 1902 the Court of Wards sold a portion of Hawa Begam's property, as was alleged, without her consent. *Held*, on suit by persons claiming title through Hawa Begam to recover the property so sold, that the Court of Wards was under the circumstances entitled to sell, even without the owner's consent, and that its discretion could not be questioned in any Civil Court. *Semble*: That if the property had been placed under the superintendence of the Court of Wards, under s. 9 of Local Act No. III of 1899, and if the sale had been made without the consent of the proprietor, otherwise than on the ground set out in the concluding paragraph of s. 35, the sale would have been a bad sale and the Civil Court could have entertained a suit to question the power of the Court of Wards to sell. *MOHSAN SHAH v. MAHBUB ILAHI* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 589

s. 195—

See LUNATIC . . . I. L. R. 1 All. 476

ss. 203, 205B—

See MINOR—LIABILITY OF MINOR ON, AND RIGHT TO ENFORCE, CONTRACTS.

I. L. R. 23 All. 288

ss. 205, 205B—

See GUARDIAN—DISQUALIFIED PROPRIETORS

I. L. R. 5 All. 264 ; 487

I. L. R. 22 All. 364

See GUARDIAN—DISQUALIFIED PROPRIETORS.

I. L. R. 24 All. 136

ss. 214, 219—

See APPEAL—N.-W. P. ACTS—N.-W. P. LAND REVENUE ACT.

I. L. R. 18 All. 210

ss. 220, 231—

See N.-W. P. RENT ACTS, s. 1.

I. L. R. 6 All. 170

s. 221—

See ARBITRATION—ARBITRATION UNDER SPECIAL ACTS—N.-W. P. LAND REVENUE ACT . . . I. L. R. 14 All. 347

# **NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES LAND REVENUE ACT (XIX OF 1873)—*concl.***

ss. 222-231—

See ARBITRATION—ARBITRATION UNDER SPECIAL ACTS—N.-W. P. LAND REVENUE ACT . . . I. L. R. 18 All. 172

s. 241—

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—RENT AND REVENUE SUITS, N. W. P.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—REVENUE COURTS—PARTITION.

I. L. R. 25 All. 19

See PARTITION—JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT IN SUITS RESPECTING PARTITION . . . I. L. R. 9 All. 429

I. L. R. 10 All. 5

I. L. R. 20 All. 75

I. L. R. 23 All. 291

s. 241, cl. (i)—

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—RENT AND REVENUE SUITS.

I. L. R. 25 All. 527

s. 243—

See RULES MADE UNDER ACTS—CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 320.

I. L. R. 12 All. 564

s. 257—

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 23—ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.

I. L. R. 22 All. 220

See PRE-EMPTION—RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION . . . I. L. R. 17 All. 226

# **NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES LAND REVENUE ACT (VIII OF 1879).**

s. 20—

See COURT OF WARDS.

I. L. R. 7 All. 687

# **NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES LOCAL RATES ACT (III OF 1878).**

(*Kanungo and Patwaris Act (IX of 1889)*)—Cess—Assignment of Government revenue—Assignees not entitled to cesses. *Held*, that an assignee of the Government revenue assessed on a certain *patti* was not entitled to receive *patwari* rates and local cesses from the *zamindar*: such rates and cesses have to be paid by the *zamindar* to the Government. *KESHO DAS v. NARAIN SINGH* (1901) I. L. R. 23 All. 505

# **NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES MUNICIPAL IMPROVEMENTS ACT (VI OF 1868).**

s. 12—

See N.-W. P. AND OUDH MUNICIPALITIES ACT, 1883, ss. 69, 71.

I. L. R. 8 All. 677



# **NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES RENT ACTS (XVIII OF 1873 AND XII OF 1881).**

See ARBITRATION—ARBITRATION UNDER SPECIAL ACTS AND REGULATIONS—N.-W. P. RENT ACT.

I. L. R. 2 All. 119

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—RENT AND REVENUE SUITS, N.-W. P.

See JURISDICTION OF REVENUE COURT—N.-W. P. RENT AND REVENUE CASES.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—PAYMENT OF RENT—NON-PAYMENT.

I. L. R. 18 All. 290

1. — s. 1—*Application of the Civil Procedure Code to suits in the Revenue Courts—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 43, 373—Suit, withdrawal of—Relinquishment of part of claim.* Held, by the Full Bench (STUART, C.J., dissenting), that the Courts of Revenue in the North-Western Provinces, in those matters of procedure upon which the Rent Act of those Provinces (Act XII of 1881) is silent are governed by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. The principle of decision in *Nilmoni Singh Deo v. Taranath Mukerjee*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 295, followed. Held, therefore, that the procedure provided by ss. 43 and 373 of the Civil Procedure Code is applicable to suits tried under the N. W. P. Rent Act, 1881. MADHO PRAKASH SINGH v. MURLI MANOHAR. HIRA SINGH v. MAKUND SINGH . . . I. L. R. 5 All. 406

2. — *Application of the Civil Procedure Code to suits in the Revenue Court—Judgment in accordance with award—Appeal—N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), ss. 220, 231.* The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, relating to awards are not applicable to suits under the N.-W. P. Rent Act, 1881, the matters in dispute in which have been referred to arbitration, as s. 96A of that Act specifically imports into it the procedure of the N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act with regard to arbitrations. FAHIMUNNISSA v. AJUDHIA PRASAD . . . I. L. R. 6 All. 170

1. — s. 2—*Procedure—Case begun while Act XVIII of 1873 was in force.* The question whether land held by a person whose proprietary rights in a mehal have been sold in execution of a decree while Act XVIII of 1873 was in force, was held by him as *sir* at the time of such sale, must be determined by that Act. HARI DAS v. GHANSHAM NARAIN . . . I. L. R. 6 All. 286

2. — and s. 9—*Procedure—Landholder and tenant—Sale of occupancy right in execution of decree.* Held, that a landholder who had attached the occupancy right of an occupancy tenant in certain land in execution of a decree before Act XII of 1881 came into force was not entitled under s. 2 of that Act to bring such right to sale after that Act came into force, that section not saving the right of a landholder to bring such a right to sale in execution of a decree, and s. 9 of that Act expressly

# **NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES RENT ACTS (XVIII OF 1873 AND XII OF 1881)—contd.**

s. 2—*concl'd.*

prohibiting the sale of such a right in execution of a decree. NAIK RAM SINGH v. MURLI DHAR

I. L. R. 4 All. 371

MURLI RAI v. LEDRI . . . I. L. R. 7 All. 851

s. 3—*Sir land—Settlement.* Land recorded as *sir* during the progress of a settlement of the district in which it is situate is not *sir* land as defined in s. 3 (4) of Act XVIII of 1873. Such land does not become *sir* land within the meaning of that definition until the settlement is closed and confirmed. HARI DAS v. GHANSHAM NARAIN

I. L. R. 6 All. 286

ss. 5 and 6—

See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—EXEMPTION FROM ENHANCEMENT BY UNIFORM PAYMENT OF RENT, ETC.—VARIATION BY CHANGE IN NATURE OF RENT, ETC.

I. L. R. 1 All. 301

s. 7—

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—PROPERTY IN TREES AND WOOD ON LAND.

I. L. R. 8 All. 467

I. L. R. 9 All. 88

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—TRANSFER BY LANDLORD . . . I. L. R. 8 All. 189

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—TRANSFER OF RIGHT.

1. — *Ex-proprietary tenant—Possession of sir land, right to.* Since Act XVIII of 1873 came into force, a co-sharer entitled to obtain by pre-emption the proprietary right of another co-sharer is not entitled ordinarily to a decree against the vendor for possession of the *sir*, but only for the possession of the proprietary right in the *sir*. He is, however, entitled to possession of the *sir* land as against the vendee. BALDEO PANDEY v. JHARI KUAR . . . 7 N. W. 334

2. — *Usufructuary mortgage—Ex-proprietary tenant—Sir land.* Held, by the Full Bench (OLDFIELD and BRODHURST, JJ., dissenting), that a person who creates a usufructuary mortgage of zamindari property becomes an ex-proprietary or occupancy-tenant of the *sir* land under s. 7 of the N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1881). Per PETHERAN, C.J.—A usufructuary mortgagee is, for the time being, the proprietor of the property inasmuch as a proprietor is the person entitled to exclusive possession at the time; and the intention of the Legislature, as expressed in s. 7 of the Rent Act, is that, when a zamindar ceases to be entitled to occupy the *sir* land as proprietor, he shall have the right to occupy it as an ex-proprietary tenant under s. 5. *Bhagwan Singh, v. Murli Singh*, I. L. R. 1 All. 459, dissented from. Per STRAIGHT, J.—The words “lose” and “part with” in s. 7 of the Rent Act were intended to cover all cases in which a proprietor of land has either voluntarily or by operation of law deprived himself permanently or tem-



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**s. 7—contd.**

porarily of the power to exercise full proprietary right over his property. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*—The meaning of the words “proprietary rights” in s. 7 of the Rent Act is equivalent to that of the term “full ownership,” corresponding to *dominium* in the Roman law and fee-simple estate in English law. The right of a usufructuary mortgagee cannot be called proprietorship; and having regard to s. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, the execution of a usufructuary mortgage does not amount to a transfer of the proprietary right. The word “lose” as used in s. 7 of the Rent Act means the transfer of proprietary rights otherwise than by the will of the owner in consequence of some incident of law. The term “part with” is a general expression including both absolute and temporary alienation; and a usufructuary mortgage is a “parting with” some of the incidents of ownership, and falls within the purview of s. 7, inasmuch as the rights of possession and of the enjoyment of the usufruct are transferred from the mortgagor to the mortgagee, though such a transfer does not amount to a total alienation of proprietorship. *Bhagwan Singh v. Murli Singh, I. L. R. 1 All. 459*, dissented from. *Gopal Pandey v. Parsotam Das, I. L. R. 5 All. 121*; *Ganga Din v. Dhurandhar Singh, I. L. R. 5 All. 495*; and *Gulab Rai v. Indar Singh, I. L. R. 6 All. 54*, referred to. *Per OLDFIELD, J.*—The words “loss or part with his proprietary rights in any mehal” in s. 7 of the Rent Act mean a loss or parting which divests absolutely of all proprietary rights, leaving no interest of a proprietary kind in the mehal; this does not happen in a usufructuary mortgage, and therefore the latter is not a loss of, or parting with, proprietary rights, within the meaning of s. 7. *Bhagwan Singh v. Murli Singh, I. L. R. 1 All. 459*, approved. *Per BRODHURST, J.*—The word “lose” in s. 7 of the Rent Act, means involuntarily lose, as for instance, by auction sale, and “part with” means voluntarily and entirely divested of by means, e.g., of gift or private sale. “Proprietary rights” means the whole of the proprietary rights; and a usufructuary mortgagor of zamindari property cannot be said to have lost or parted with his proprietary right therein, and therefore does not, under the provisions of s. 7 of the Rent Act, become an ex-proprietary or occupancy tenant of the *sir* land. **INDAR SEN v. NAUBAT SINGH**

**I. L. R. 7 All. 553**

**3. —** *Usufructuary mortgage of zamindari including sir—Losing or parting with proprietary right in mehal—Ex-proprietary tenant.* A zamindar who makes a usufructuary mortgage of his zamindari including his *sir* land does not so “lose or part with his proprietary rights” within the meaning of s. 7 of Act XII of 1881 as to become an ex-proprietary tenant of his *sir* land. *Bhagwan Singh v. Murli Singh, I. L. R. 1 All. 459*, and *Indar Sen v. Naubat Singh, I. L. R. 7 All. 553*, referred to, and the judgments of the minority

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of the Court in the latter case approved. *Khiali Ram v. Nathu Lal, I. L. R. 15 All. 219*, and *Jarao Bibi v. Kifayat Ali Khan, All. Weekly Notes (1893) 177*, referred to. **MADHO BHARTI v. BARTI SINGH** . . . . . **I. L. R. 16 All. 337**

**4. —** *Ex-proprietary tenant—Ex-proprietary tenancy arising on sale of part of the zamindar's share.* In order that the provisions of s. 7 of Act XII of 1881 may come into operation, it is not necessary that the zamindar should lose or part with his proprietary rights in respect of the whole of his interest in the mehal. **BHAWANI PRASAD v. GHULAM MUHAMMED.**

**I. L. R. 18 All. 121**

**MURLIDHAR v. PEMRAJ** . . . . . **I. L. R. 22 All. 205**

**5. —** *Ex-proprietary tenancy.* The words “held by him as *sir*” in s. 7 of Act XII of 1881 (N.-W. P. Rent Act) must be construed to mean land belonging to him, or to which he was entitled, as *sir*, and as literal an interpretation should be placed upon these words as is consistent with the canons of construction. In 1879 one of the defendants sold a one-third share of certain *sir* land in a village to the plaintiff, who, at that time, was in cultivatory possession thereof under a deed of mortgage executed in his favour by the same defendant in 1877. The plaintiff alleged that, after the sale, he continued in possession of the *sir* land till 1884, when he was dispossessed thereof by the defendants. He sued for recovery of possession of the land. *Held*, that the defendants, being ex-proprietary tenants of the land in dispute, were entitled to hold possession thereof, by operation of law, with reference to the terms of s. 7 of the N.-W. P. Rent Act; and the plaintiff's contention that because for four or five years the defendants failed to assert their ex-proprietary tenant rights, they were debarred from doing so, could only be well founded if there had been any provision either in the Limitation Act or the Rent Act creating such a disability. *Held*, also, that, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff was in possession of the land in dispute as mortgagee at the time of the sale, and continued in possession afterwards, his vendor must be taken to have “held” the land as his *sir* at the time of the sale of his proprietary interest, within the meaning of s. 7 of the Rent Act. **HARJAS v. RADHA KISHAN.** . . . . . **I. L. R. 8 All. 256**

**6. —** *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 41, 48—Transfer by ostensible owner—Meaning of “held”—Statute, Construction of—Retrospective effect—Mortgage of sir land before passing of Act XVIII of 1873—Sale of mortgagor's rights while that Act was in force—Right of mortgagee.* In 1869 A and J, two co-sharers of a moiety of a 10 biswas share in a village (F and W being also co-sharers in the same moiety), joined with H, the holder of the other moiety, in giving to K a usufructuary mortgage of 87 bighas of land,



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being the whole of the *sir* land appertaining to the 10 biswas share. The deed of mortgage authorised the mortgagee to retain possession of the land until payment of the mortgage-money and to receive profits in lieu of interest; and he obtained possession accordingly. In 1872 *F*, *W*, and *A* gave to other persons usufructuary mortgage of their 5 biswas share together with a moiety of the 87 bighas of *sir* land; and it was stated in the deed that half the mortgage-money due to *K* on the mortgage of 1869 was due by the executants, and that they accordingly left the same with the mortgagees in order that the latter might redeem. In November 1876 *H*'s 5 biswas share, together with its *sir* land, was sold in execution of a decree. Subsequently, *K*, alleging that the mortgagees under the deed of 1872 and the purchasers under the execution sale of 1876 had dispossessed him, and that his mortgage-debt had not been paid, sued to recover possession of the 87 bighas of *sir* land, by virtue of his mortgage-deed of 1869. The Court of first instance held that the plaintiff was not entitled to enforce his mortgage in respect of *F*'s and *W*'s share in the 87 bighas, because they were not parties to the deed of 1869. The lower Appellate Court further held that from the date of the execution sale of November 1876 *H* became an ex-proprietary tenant of his *sir* land, and that to give the plaintiff possession thereof would be contrary to the provisions of s. 7 of Act XVIII of 1873 (N.-W. P. Rent Act). *Held*, that, inasmuch as it was clear that at the time when the mortgage-deed of 1869 was executed *F* and *W* were aware of the transaction which made *K*, the mortgagee, under the deed, of the whole property, and that, knowing this, they allowed the possession of *A*, *J*, and *H* to appear as if covering the entire zamindari rights in the 10 biswas share of the *sir* land, and inasmuch as the statements contained in the mortgage-deed of 1872 were an admission on the part of *F* and *W* that the mortgage of 1869 was executed with their consent, the equitable doctrine contained in s. 4 of the Transfer of Property Act applied to the case and *F* and *W* had no defence, either in law or in equity, to the plaintiff's suit, with reference to their shares, and for the purpose of obviating the lien of 1869. *Ramcoomar Koondoo v. Mcqueen*, 11 B. L. R. 46, referred to. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*, with reference to the effect of the execution-sale of November 1876, in regard to the provisions of s. 7 of Act XVIII of 1873, that the general rule that statutory provisions have no retrospective operation did not apply to the case; that, by reason of the sale, *H*, who had proprietary rights in the mehal, and held the 5 biswas share of the *sir* as such (the word "*held*" as used in s. 7 of the Rent Act not being confined to manual or physical holding), lost his proprietary rights, and so became an ex-proprietary tenant of the land belonging to him at that time; that although the mortgage of 1869 must not be so affected as to deprive the mortgagee

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of all his rights, yet by the terms of s. 7 of Act XVIII of 1873 and by virtue of the sale his means of benefiting by the mortgage were necessarily changed; that neither the preamble nor s. 1 of the Act contained any saving clause which would justify the interpretation that all the conditions included in a usufructuary mortgage are to be exempted from the operation of the Act, or of s. 7 in particular, merely because the mortgage was a subsisting one: that under these circumstances possession must be given to the plaintiff of such rights as *H* had at the time of the mortgage, subject only to *H*'s rights as an ex-proprietary tenant; that the rights of the purchaser of *H*'s share under the sale were subject to the mortgage of 1869; and that by virtue of the rule enunciated in s. 48 of the Transfer of Property Act, the rights of the mortgagees under the deed of 1872 must give way to the incidents of the prior deed of 1869, both mortgages being usufructuary. *Tulshi v. Radha Kishan*, All. Weekly Notes (1886) 74, referred to. *Per TYRRELL, J.*, that in 1876, by reason of the execution sale, the *sir* rights and interest of *H* mortgaged by him in 1869, as such, went out of existence, and assumed a different character; that over that tenure in its altered character the plaintiff, though he still had his mortgage charge, had not in the existing state of the law, a right to physical possession of the actual land; and that, subject to this new right of *H*'s, the plaintiff retained his mortgage charge of 1869 over the zamindari interest in the portion of the land acquired by *H*'s vendees. *KARAMAT KHAN, v. SAMI-UD-DIN* I. L. R. 8 All. 409

**7. — and s. 14—*Suit for profits—Ex-proprietary tenant—Sir land held equally.*** A certain mehal, of which the plaintiff in this suit claimed a one-third share of the profits for a certain year, belonged in equal shares to the defendant (lambardar), and *S* and *R*, his two brothers, who had certain *sir* land in partnership. The plaintiff had acquired the share of *S* by auction-purchase, *S* thus becoming an ex-proprietary tenant. The *sir* land was not included in the rent-roll of the mehal, but was admitted by the defendant to be assessable with rent at a certain rate per bigha. *Held*, that, whatever might be the course proper to be taken for the purpose of assessing such *sir* land or *S*'s share of it with rent, and notwithstanding that such course had not been taken, the plaintiff was entitled in this suit to claim and obtain his share in the profits of the *sir* land. *MUHAMMAD ALI v. KALIAN SINGH* I. L. R. 1 All. 659

**s. 8—**

*See* RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—MODE OF ACQUISITION.

7 N. W. 318

I. L. R. 4 All. 157

*See* RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—SUBJECT OF ACQUISITION.

I. L. R. 7 All. 586



**NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES RENT ACTS (XVIII OF 1873 AND XII OF 1881)—*contd.***

ss. 8 and 9—

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—TRANSFER OF RIGHT . . . I. L. R. 7 All. 866

s. 9—

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—APPLICATION FOR EXECUTION AND POWER OF COURT.

I. L. R. 10 All. 130 ; 132 note

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—ABANDONMENT, RELINQUISHMENT, OR SURRENDER OF TENURE I. L. R. 7 All. 847  
I. L. R. 13 All. 396

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—EJECTMENT—GENERALLY.  
I. L. R. 10 All. 615

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—PROPERTY IN TREES AND WOOD ON LAND.  
I. L. R. 6 All. 19  
I. L. R. 9 All. 88  
I. L. R. 10 All. 159  
I. L. R. 21 All. 297

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—TRANSFER BY TENANT . . . I. L. R. 12 All. 419  
I. L. R. 15 All. 219 ; 231  
I. L. R. 16 All. 398

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—MODE OF ACQUISITION.  
I. L. R. 17 All. 33

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—TRANSFER OF RIGHT.

s. 10—

See RIGHT OF SUIT—ACCRUAL OF RIGHT.  
I. L. R. 15 All. 399

s. 14—*Determination of rent—Landlord and tenant—“ May apply.”* The words “ may apply ” in s. 14 of Act XII of 1881 mean “ shall apply,” if the landholder wants to procure such a determination of his tenant’s rent as would give him a title to sue his tenant under that Act for arrears of rent, and if he cannot get the rent arranged between himself and his tenant by other legitimate means, such as an amicable settlement between themselves or the like. RAM PARSAD RAI v. DINA KUAR . . . I. L. R. 4 All. 515

ss. 18, 31, 34—

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—ACCRETION TO TENURE . . . I. L. R. 5 All. 260

s. 21—

See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—LIABILITY TO ENHANCEMENT—CONSTRUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AS TO LIABILITY TO ENHANCEMENT . . . I. L. R. 3 All. 365

**NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES RENT ACTS (XVIII OF 1873 AND XII OF 1881)—*contd.***

s. 29—

See PLAINT—RETURN OF PLAINT.  
I. L. R. 3 All. 766

s. 30—

See GRANT—POWER TO GRANT.  
I. L. R. 2 All. 545 ; 732

s. 31—

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—ABANDONMENT, RELINQUISHMENT, OR SURRENDER OF TENURE I. L. R. 7 All. 847  
I. L. R. 13 All. 396

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—TRANSFER BY TENANT . . . I. L. R. 18 All. 354

s. 34—

See INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES—ARREARS OF RENT.  
I. L. R. 18 All. 240

s. 36—

See ESTOPPEL—ESTOPPEL BY CONDUCT.  
I. L. R. 15 All. 189  
I. L. R. 22 All. 83, 93

ss. 36-39—

See RES JUDICATA—COMPETENT COURTS—REVENUE COURTS.  
I. L. R. 3 All. 63 ; 81  
I. L. R. 4 All. 1  
I. L. R. 6 All. 295  
I. L. R. 18 All. 270

ss. 36, 39, and 40—

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—EJECTMENT—NOTICE TO QUIT.  
I. L. R. 10 All. 13

s. 39—

See RES JUDICATA—COMPETENT COURT—REVENUE COURTS.  
I. L. R. 2 All. 428  
I. L. R. 3 All. 81 ; 521  
I. L. R. 18 All. 270

s. 42—*Assessment of price of crops belonging to an evicted tenant—Effect of such assessment.* Held, that where a landholder, having ejected a tenant upon whose holding there are growing crops, applies under s. 42, cl. (c), of Act XII of 1881, for assessment of the price, he is bound by the assessment which the Revenue Court may make, and cannot afterwards refuse to pay the price fixed. SHAM LAL v. CHOKHE . . . I. L. R. 19 All. 68

Affirmed on appeal under the Letters Patent. SHAM LAL v. CHOKHE . . . I. L. R. 19 All. 464

s. 44—

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—ALTERATION OF CONDITION OF TENANCY—DIGGING WELLS OR TANKS.  
I. L. R. 21 All. 386



**NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES RENT ACTS (XVIII OF 1873 AND XII OF 1881)—contd.**

**s. 56—**

See VENDOR AND PURCHASER—LIEN.

**I. L. R. 3 All. 433**

*Landholder and tenant*

—*Landholder's lien for rent*—"Rent payable"—"Arrear of rent due." The first paragraph of s. 56 of Act No. XII of 1881 applies not only where there is rent in arrear due from the cultivator to his landlord, but also where rent is accruing due in respect of the period during which the produce was being grown. Hence, where anyone, except the landlord, wishes to bring to sale the produce of a cultivator, he must, in order to avoid the prohibition contained in s. 56 of Act XII of 1881, tender to the immediate landlord of the cultivator the amount, if any, for which the landlord might, on the next ensuing sale day, distrain the produce for arrears of rent. **JAGAN NATH PRASAD v. BHIKA RAM** . . . **I. L. R. 15 All. 375**

**s. 84—**

See RES JUDICATA—COMPETENT COURT—REVENUE COURTS.

**I. L. R. 10 All. 347**

**s. 93—**

See CO-SHARERS—GENERAL RIGHTS IN JOINT PROPERTY.

**I. L. R. 14 All. 273**

See CO-SHARERS—SUITS BY CO-SHARERS WITH RESPECT TO JOINT PROPERTY—MISCELLANEOUS SUITS.

**I. L. R. 16 All. 28 ; 333**

**I. L. R. 20 All. 73**

**I. L. R. 17 All. 423**

**I. L. R. 2 All. 334**

See INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES—MESNE PROFITS. **I. L. R. 1 All. 261**

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—RENT AND REVENUE SUITS, N.-W. P.

See JURISDICTION OF REVENUE COURT—N.-W. P. RENT AND REVENUE CASES.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—TRANSFER BY TENANT . **I. L. R. 12 All. 419**

See ONUS OF PROOF—PROFITS, SUITS FOR **I. L. R. 12 All. 301**

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—TRANSFER OF RIGHT . **I. L. R. 7 All. 691**

**I. L. R. 9 All. 244**

See SUBORDINATE JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF **I. L. R. 16 All. 363**

See VALUATION OF SUIT—APPEALS. **I. L. R. 15 All. 363**

**1. s. 93(h)—"Recorded co-sharer."**

*Held*, that a co-sharer of a mehal whose share was recorded in "shamilat" with all the other pattidars, but was not specially defined in the khewat in a

**NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES RENT ACTS (XVIII OF 1873 AND XII OF 1881)—contd.**

**s. 93(h)—contd.**

fractional or separate form, was a "recorded co-sharer," within the meaning of s. 93 (h) of the N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1881). **SHIB SHANKAR LAL v. BANARSI DAS** . . . **I. L. R. 7 All. 891**

**2. Village expenses**

—*Expenses of cultivating sir land held in partnership by plaintiff and defendant.* A recorded co-sharer of a mehal sued the lambardar for his share of the profits of the mehals for the year 1286 Fasli. At the time of the institution of the suit, the profits for 1287 and 1288 also were due, but no claim was then made in respect of them. The suit was struck off on account of the non-appearance of the parties under s. 140 of Act XII of 1881 (N.-W. P. Rent Act) with leave to the plaintiff to bring a fresh suit. Subsequently the plaintiff brought a suit against the same defendant for his share of the profits of the mehals for 1287 and 1288 Fasli. *Held*, that the Courts below had properly refused to deduct from the plaintiff's claim as "village expenses" within the meaning of s. 93 (h) of the Rent Act certain charges on account of the expenses of cultivation of sir land held in partnership by the plaintiff and the defendant. **MULCHAND v. BHIKARI DAS** **I. L. R. 7 All. 624**

**s. 94—**

See CO-SHARERS—SUITS BY CO-SHARERS WITH RESPECT TO JOINT PROPERTY—MISCELLANEOUS SUITS.

**I. L. R. 16 All. 28 ; 333**

**I. L. R. 22 All. 334**

Act XIX of 1873, s. 3, cl. 8—*Limitation—Expiration of agricultural year—Suit by co-sharer for profits—Date of taking account and dividing profits.* *Held*, by the majority of the Full Bench, that the share of a co-sharer in an undivided mehal of the profits of the mehal for any agricultural year are due to him from the lambardar as soon as, after the payment of Government revenue and village expenses, there is a divisible surplus in the hands of the lambardar, unless by agreement or custom a date is fixed for taking the accounts and dividing the profits, in which case any divisible surplus which may have accrued prior to that date is due on that date, and the divisible profits in respect of any arrears which may be collected after that date are due when they reach the hands of the lambardar or his agent. *Held, per* STUART, C.J., and SPANKIE, J.—That where by agreement or custom there is no date fixed for dividing such profits, the share of a co-sharer becomes due on the last day of the agricultural year as fixed by Acts XVIII and XIX of 1873. **BHIKHAN KHAN v. RATAN KUAR** **I. L. R. 1 All. 512**

**s. 95—**

See GRANT—POWER TO GRANT.

**I. L. R. 2 All. 545 ; 732**



**NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES RENT ACTS (XVIII OF 1873 AND XII OF 1881)—*concl'd.***

s. 95—*concl'd.*

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—REVENUE COURTS—ORDERS OF REVENUE COURTS . I. L. R. 19 All. 101

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—EJECTMENT—GENERALLY.

I. L. R. 10 All. 615

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—TRANSFER BY LANDLORD . I. L. R. 8 All. 189

See RES JUDICATA—COMPETENT COURT—REVENUE COURTS.

I. L. R. 2 All. 200

I. L. R. 3 All. 51

I. L. R. 6 All. 295, 403

I. L. R. 18 All. 270

s. 106—

See CO-SHARERS—SUITS BY CO-SHARERS WITH RESPECT TO THE JOINT PROPERTY—RENT. . I. L. R. 2 All. 264

I. L. R. 6 All. 576

s. 118—

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—RENT, SUITS FOR, AND INTERVENORS IN SUCH SUITS . I. L. R. 9 All. 394

ss. 128 (a), 140—*Judgment by default. —Appeal.* S. 128 (a), Act XII of 1881 (N.-W. P. Rent Act), refers to the procedure described in ss. 124, 125, 126, when no appearance has been put in on the day fixed by the summons or proclamation for the appearance of the defendant, or on any subsequent day to which the hearing of the case may be adjourned prior to the recording of an issue for trial, and not to subsequent non-appearance of parties on a day fixed for trial of issues, to which s. 140 relates. MUHAMMAD ABDUL RAHMAN KHAN v. MUHAMMAD QUTAB-UD-DIN.

I. L. R. 6 All. 446

s. 148—

See APPEAL—N.-W. P. ACT.

I. L. R. 3 All. 63

I. L. R. 4 All. 237

I. L. R. 13 All. 364

See RES JUDICATA—COMPETENT COURT—REVENUE COURTS.

I. L. R. 10 All. 347

s. 149—

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—TRANSFER OF RIGHT . I. L. R. 7 All. 691

ss. 171, 177, and s. 93 (i)—*Government revenue, assignee of—Mehal not charged where the revenue is assigned—Act XIX of 1873, s. 167.* Muafidars or assignees of Government revenue are not in precisely the same position as Government itself would have been, and possessed of identical rights and powers, in respect of the recovery of

**NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES RENT ACTS (XVIII OF 1873 AND XII OF 1881)—*concl'd.***

s. 171—*concl'd.*

arrears of revenue due to them. An arrear of assigned revenue is not a prior charge on the property in respect of which it is payable, against all the world. The effect of the provisions of ss. 93 (i), 171 and 177 of the N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1881) is to show that what the Legislature contemplated was to place the revenue assigned to a muafidar upon the same footing as rent; that therefore, in order to recover an arrear of revenue, a muafidar must bring a suit in the Revenue Court; that, upon obtaining a decree he may apply for execution against the immoveable property of the judgment-debtor; that where such property is a mehal, the Collector may make certain arrangements for discharge of the debt; and that, failing such arrangements, such immoveable property may be sold, subject to any incumbrances there may be upon it. BITHAL DASS v. HARPHUL . I. L. R. 6 All. 503

s. 177—

See PRE-EMPTION—RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION . . . I. L. R. 1 All. 277

I. L. R. 13 All. 224

ss. 177, 178, 188—

See CO-SHARERS—GENERAL RIGHTS IN JOINT PROPERTY.

I. L. R. 14 All. 273

s. 181 and s. 179—*Objection dismissed for want of prosecution—Suit to set aside sale—Limitation.* The limitation provided by s. 181, cl. (b), of Act XII of 1881 is none the less operative because the order under s. 179 of the Act in consequence of which a suit has been brought in a Civil Court may be an order made not on the merits, but in default of prosecution of his objection by the objector. Sardhari Lal v. Ambika Persahd, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 521; L. R. 15 I. A. 132; Khub Lal v. Ram Lochun Koer, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 260; Kaminee Debia v. Issur Chunder Roy Chowdhry, 22 W. R. 39; and Sadut Ali v. Ram Dhone Misser, 12 C. L. R. 43, referred to. Kallu Mul v. Brown, I. L. R. 3 All. 504, discussed. . LUCHMI NARAIN v. MARTINDELL

I. L. R. 19 All. 253

s. 183—

See APPEAL—N.-W. P. ACTS—N.-W. P. RENT ACT. . I. L. R. 4 All. 237

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 622.

I. L. R. 12 All. 198

s. 185—

See REVIEW—GROUND FOR REVIEW.

I. L. R. 19 All. 522

s. 189—

See APPEAL—N.-W. P. ACTS—N.-W. P. RENT ACT.



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— s. 190—

See APPEAL—ORDERS.

I. L. R. 16 All. 375

— s. 191—

See APPEAL—N.-W. P. ACTS—N.-W. P. RENT ACT. I. L. R. 5 All. 309

— s. 199—

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 622.

I. L. R. 12 All. 198

— s. 203—*Suit for profits—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 5—General Clauses Act (I of 1887), s. 7. Held, that a suit for profits under s. 93 (b) of Act XII of 1881, the period of limitation for the filing of which expired in respect of a portion of the claim on a day when the court was closed could not be brought on the day when the Court re-opened, but, so far as that portion was concerned, was barred by limitation. MUHAMMAD HUSEN v. MUZAFFER HUSEN. I. L. R. 21 All. 22*

— s. 206—

See APPELLATE COURT—OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—SPECIAL CASES—JURISDICTION.

7 N. W. 49

I. L. R. 12 All. 419

— ss. 206, 207, 208—

See SUBORDINATE JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF. I. L. R. 6 All. 36; 295

I. L. R. 16 All. 363

— s. 207—

See APPELLATE COURT—EVIDENCE AND ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON APPEAL.

I. L. R. 6 All. 440

— s. 208—

See REMAND—GROUND FOR REMAND.

I. L. R. 5 All. 438

I. L. R. 6 All. 378; 440

I. L. R. 10 All. 31

— *Remand—Suit not tried on the merits in the Court of first instance—Jurisdiction of Civil or Revenue Court. Held, that the application by an Appellate Court of the provisions of s. 208 of Act XII of 1881 is not precluded by the fact that the Court of first instance has dismissed the suit on a preliminary point without any trial of it on its merits. BHOLAI KHAN v. ABU JAFAR. I. L. R. 21 All. 267*

— s. 209—

See ONUS OF POORF—PROFITS, SUIT FOR. I. L. R. 12 All. 301

1. — *Land in mehal held by the lambardar as "khud-kasht" at a nominal rental—Liability of lambardar to co-sharer for profits. The land in a certain mehal was recorded as held by*

**NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES RENT ACTS (XVIII OF 1873 AND XII OF 1881)—*concl'd.***

— s. 209—*concl'd.*

*M*, the lambardar as "khud-kasht" at a certain nominal rental. For two years in succession *M* sublet such land in part or in whole for a less amount than such nominal rental; the third year such land lay fallow. Certain persons sued as co-sharers in the mehal to recover from *M* their share of the profits on account of such years. *M* set up as a defence to the suit that there were no profits—on the contrary, a small loss. The lower Courts held *M* answerable for the rental recorded. *Held*, that it was doubtful whether the provisions of s. 209 of Act XVIII of 1873 were applicable in the present case, and that, even if such provisions were applicable, the lower Courts having neither found that more was realized from the land than had been accounted for by *M*, nor that the failure to realize more was owing to gross negligence or misconduct on his part, the decree of the lower Courts could not be sustained. MANGAL KHAN v. MUMTAZ ALI

I. L. R. 2 All. 239

2. — *Suit by co-sharer for profits—Burden of proof. When a co-sharer claims a dividend on the full rental of the mehal, and the lambardar pleads in reply that the actual collection fell short of that rental, the burden of proof lies on the co-sharer to show that the deficient collection was attributable to the conduct of the lambardar, in the sense of s. 209 of the N.-W. Provinces Rent Act (XII of 1881), before he can succeed in getting a decree for a sum in excess of the actual collections. DHANAK SINGH v. CHAIN SUKH*

I. L. R. 8 All. 61

**NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES RENT ACT (XII OF 1881).**

— s. 1—

See JURISDICTION—SUITS FOR LAND—RENT. I. L. R. 23 All. 282

Ch. II (ss. 4 to 55A) and s. 93—*Landholder and tenant—Suit for rent—Plea of custom allowing deductions on account of land rendered unculturable by action of river—Such deduction not an "abatement of rent" within the meaning of the Act. An abatement of rent, in the sense of Ch. II of the North-Western Provinces Rent Act (XII of 1881), implies the reduction of the rent payable for the holding, if not permanently, at all events for an indeterminate period, the rent as abated being substituted for the original rent, and continuing to be the rent of the holding until altered by agreement or by further order. A tenant cannot apply under Ch. II on any ground for a reduction or revision of rent for a particular year only, and having no effect beyond that year on the rent payable for the holding. In a suit for arrears of rent under s. 93 (a) of the North-Western Provinces Rent Act, 1881, the defendant proved a local custom, whereby a tenant was entitled to a proportionate deduction from*



# **NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES RENT ACT (XII OF 1881)—*contd.***

## **s. 1—*concl'd.***

the rent for any year for such lands as were in that year, owing to fluvial action, unculturable by being submerged by water or covered by sand. No application for abatement of rent had been made under Ch. II of the Act. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the defendant did not by his plea seek for an abatement of rent in the sense of Ch. II, namely, a reduction permanently or for an indeterminate period of the rent payable for his holding, but only a remission or deduction from such rent for a particular year and in respect of such portions of the holding as were unculturable in that year, and inasmuch as no such remission could have been obtained in proceedings under Ch. II, the custom did not override any of the provisions of the Act, and must be given effect to by the Court trying the suit. *Radha Prasad Singh v. Baldeo Misr*, *All. Weekly Notes* (1893) 29, distinguished. *BENI PRASAD KUARI v. DUKKHI RAI* (1901) **I. L. R. 23 All. 270**

**1. s. 9—Occupancy tenant—Transfer—Usufructuary mortgage of occupancy holding.** *Held*, that the second paragraph of s. 9 of the N.-W. P. Rent Act, 1881, is no bar to the creation of a usufructuary mortgage of an occupancy holding by the tenant having a right of occupancy. *Khiali Ram v. Nathu Lal*, *I. L. R. 15 All. 219*, followed. *Ganga Din v. Dhurandhar Singh*, *I. L. R. 5 All. 495*, and *Abadi Husain v. Jurawan Lal*, *I. L. R. 7 All. 866*, referred to. *BRIJ MOHAN DAS v. ALGU* (1904) **I. L. R. 26 All. 78**

**2. s. 32 (2)—Agra Tenancy Act (II of 1901), ss. 22, 32 (2)—Occupancy holding—Succession—Suit for declaration of right to a share in an occupancy holding—Civil and Revenue Courts—Jurisdiction.** *Held*, that a suit in a Civil Court for a declaration of the plaintiff's right to a share in an occupancy holding is not precluded by s. 32 (2) of the Agra Tenancy Act. *Held*, also, that there was nothing in the Rent Act of 1881 to prevent a woman becoming an occupancy tenant, and if she did so, on her death the tenancy would pass to her heirs and not the heirs of her husband. *AYUB ALI KHAN v. MASHUQ ALI KHAN* (1908) **I. L. R. 31 All. 51**

## **s. 10—**

**See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—RENT AND REVENUE SUITS—N.-W. PROVINCES . . . I. L. R. 23 All. 481**

**s. 23—Suspension of revenue, and consequent suspension of rent—Lessee entitled to the benefit of suspension of rent.** *Held*, that, when the Local Government, under s. 23 of the North-Western Provinces Rent Act, suspends payment of revenue, and when suspension of rent has in consequence been ordered, a lessee is entitled to the benefit of the latter suspension. *MADAN MOHAN LAL v. DILDAR HUSAIN* (1902) **I. L. R. 24 All. 465**

# **NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES RENT ACT (XII OF 1881)—*contd.***

## **s. 31—**

**See LANDLORD AND TENANT—ABANDONMENT, RELINQUISHMENT OR SURRENDER OF TENANCY I. L. R. 25 All. 77**

**See MORTGAGE—POSSESSION UNDER MORTGAGE . . . I. L. R. 24 All. 538**

**s. 35—Decree for rent—Execution—decree—Application to eject tenant—Limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 179—Agra Tenancy Act (II of 1901), s. 175 et seq.—Appeal.** A landholder obtained under Act XII of 1881, s. 35, a decree for arrears of rent against certain tenants. The decree-holder did not attempt to execute this decree against the tenants, until more than three years had elapsed from the date thereof; but meanwhile she did apply for and obtained the ejectment of the tenants. *Held*, that execution of the decree was barred and that the decree-holder's application for ejectment could not operate to save limitation. *Sed quære*, whether any appeal lay from the order of the first Court (Assistant Collector) disallowing execution. *Kharag Singh v. Pola Ram*, *I. L. R. 27 All. 31*, doubted. *MAHARANI OF DUMRAON v. BUDDHA KURMI* (1905) **I. L. R. 28 All. 131**

**ss. 42, 95 and 206—Landholder and tenant—Ejectment—Appraisal of tenant's crop—Assignment of right to receive price of crops—Mode in which such price can be realized—Jurisdiction—Civil and Revenue Courts—Actionable claim—Act IV of 1882, s. 135.** A zamindar ejected a tenant and having done so, caused the value of the tenant's crops standing on the land to be assessed in the manner provided for by s. 42 of the North-Western Provinces Rent Act. The tenant assigned his right to get the assessed value of the crops from the zamindar to a third person. *Held*, on suit by the assignee to recover the amount of the assessment, (i) that the assignee's proper remedy was by suit in a Court of Revenue, and not by application to execute the order awarding compensation; (ii) that the suit was not a suit of the nature cognizable by a Court of Small Causes; and (ii) that the assignment to the plaintiff after the award had been made was not an assignment of an actionable claim within the meaning of s. 135 of Act No. IV of 1882 (Transfer of Property). *MATHURA DAS v. MURLIDHAR* (1902) **I. L. R. 24 All. 517**

**s. 43—Landholder and tenant—Suit to recover rent in kind—Duty of officer appointed to divide produce or appraise standing crops—*Res judicata*.** Where, under s. 43 of the North-Western Provinces Rent Act, 1881, an officer is appointed to divide produce, or estimate or appraise a standing crop as between a landholder and his alleged tenant, such officer is not empowered to come to any decision as to the liability of the tenant to pay rent, if such liability is denied. If, therefore, an officer appointed for the purposes of s. 43 should take upon himself to determine any question as to the liability of the tenant to pay rent



**NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES RENT ACT (XII OF 1881)—*contd.*****s. 43—*concl.***

his decision will not in any subsequent suit between the parties be *res judicata*. *Harnarain Singh v. Ram Nihora Lal*, *All. Weekly Notes* (1903) 40, followed. *JAFAR KHAN v. GHULAM MUHAMMAD* (1903) **I. L. R. 25 All. 282**

**s. 56—Landholder and tenant—Distraint—Hypothecation for rent or produce of land.** Held, on a construction of s. 56 of Act XII of 1881, that, when the rent of a tenant is in arrears, the landlord is entitled to distrain any crop growing on the tenant's holding, no matter by whom that crop was sown. *Geetum Singh v. Buldeo Kahar*, 4 N.-W. P. 76, and *Fatima Begam v. Hansi*, **I. L. R. 9 All. 244**, referred to. *MEGH SINGH v. TIKA RAM* (1901) **I. L. R. 24 All. 127**

**s. 93—**

*See ante*, CH. II AND S. 93.

*See* INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES—ARREARS OF REVENUE.

**I. L. R. 23 All. 5**

*See* JURISDICTION—SUITS FOR LAND—RENT **I. L. R. 23 All. 282**

*See* JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—RENT AND REVENUE SUITS—N.-W. PROVINCES. **I. L. R. 23 All. 360; 481; 486**  
**I. L. R. 24 All. 153**

1. **Cl. (a)—Suit for rent—Limitation—Limitation Act (XI of 1877), s. 5.** S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, applies to a suit under s. 93 (a) of the North-Western Provinces Rent Act, 1881. *Muhammad Husen v. Muzaffar Husen*, **I. L. R. 21 All. 22**, dissented from. *BENI PRASAD KUARI v. DHARAKA RAI* (1901) **I. L. R. 23 All. 277**

2. **Cl. (i)—Jurisdiction—Suit by muafidar to recover from a lambardar assigned revenue collected on his behalf.** Held, that the provisions of s. 93, cl. (i), of Act XII of 1881 are wide enough to include a suit by a muafidar to recover from another muafidar, who was appointed as lambardar to collect the assigned revenue payable by the zamindars to the muafidars, the plaintiff's share of such assigned revenue. *Abdul Karim v. Fazal Azim*, *All. Weekly Notes* (1893) 102, dissented from. *SHEODARSHAN DAS v. AHSAN ALI* (1904) **I. L. R. 26 All. 570**

**s. 95—**

*See ante*, SS. 42, 95 AND 206.

*See* JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—RENT AND REVENUE SUITS—N.-W. PROVINCES **I. L. R. 23 All. 360; 481**  
**I. L. R. 24 All. 153**

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*See* JURISDICTION—SUITS FOR LAND—RENT **I. L. R. 23 All. 282**

**NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES RENT ACT (XII OF 1881)—*concl.*****s. 148—**

*See* LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 14.

**I. L. R. 23 All. 434**

*See* PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—RENT, SUITS FOR, AND INTERVENORS IN SUCH SUITS **I. L. R. 25 All. 83**

**ss. 178 to 181, 192, 196—Execution of decree—Order of Collector under s. 181 passed on appeal—Civil suit—Jurisdiction.** Held, that no civil suit would lie at the instance of a person aggrieved by an order passed by the Collector of a district under s. 179 or s. 180 of Act XII of 1881, when such order was passed by the Collector acting as an appellate Court. *Kaleshar Prasad v. Sita Ram*, *All. Weekly Notes* (1899) 185, referred to. *BALCHAND v. TULSHA KUNWAR* (1904) **I. L. R. 26 All. 23**

**s. 189—**

*See* APPEAL—N.-W. P. ACTS—N.-W. P. RENT ACT (XII OF 1881), s. 189.

**s. 206—**

*See ante*, SS. 42, 95 AND 206.

**NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES RENT AMENDMENT ACT (XIV OF 1886).****s. 5—**

*See* APPEAL—N.-W. P. ACTS—N.-W. P. RENT ACT **I. L. R. 13 All. 193**  
**I. L. R. 14 All. 50**

**NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES TENANCY ACT (II OF 1901).**

*See* AGRA TENANCY ACT, 1901.

**NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH ACT (XX OF 1890).****s. 42.**

*See* HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—N.-W. P.—CIVIL **I. L. R. 18 All. 375**

**NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH KANUNGOS AND PATWARIS ACT (IX OF 1889).**

**Act III of 1878 (Local Rates Act)—Cess—Assignee of Government revenue—Assignee not entitled to cesses.** Held, that an assignee of the Government revenue assessed on a certain *patti* was not entitled to receive *patwari* rates and local cesses from the *zamindar*: such rates and cesses have to be paid by the *zamindar* to the Government. *KESHO DAS v. NARAIN SINGH* (1901). **I. L. R. 32 All. 505**



# **NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH LODGING-HOUSE ACT (I OF 1892).**

— s. 5, sub-s. 2—*Lodging house—House of "pragwal" used for accommodation of pilgrims—Liability to take out license.* Held. that a "pragwal" who according to custom affords accommodation to his clients when they come to Allahabad for religious purposes, is bound, under the N.-W. P. and Oudh Lodging-house Act, 1892, to take out a license in respect of such houses as he may use for the accommodation of his clients. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BEHARI LAL* . I. L. R. 20 All. 534

# **NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH MUNICIPALITIES ACT (XV OF 1873).**

— ss. 27, 32, 38.

See *RIGHT OF SUIT—OBSTRUCTION TO PUBLIC HIGHWAY.* I. L. R. 1 All. 557

— ss. 28, 43—

See *APPELLATE COURT—OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—SPECIAL CASES—NOTICE OF SUIT.*

I. L. R. 1 All. 269

— *Suit against Local Government—Notice of suit.* Where in a suit against a Municipal Committee, the Magistrate of the District was impleaded as representing the Local Government, the Court refused to allow the plea that the Local Government had not been made a party to the suit in accordance with the provisions of s. 28 of Act XV of 1873. The notice previous to suing a Municipal Committee for a thing done by them under that Act required by s. 43 of the Act is only necessary where compensation is claimed for the thing done. *MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE OF MORADABAD v. CHATRI SINGH* . I. L. R. 1 All. 269

— ss. 29, 42—*N.-W. P. and Oudh Municipalities Act (XV of 1873), s. 15—Municipal Board—Powers of taxation—Procedure—Consideration of objections to proposed tax—Final imposition of tax—Special meeting.* The N.-W. P. and Oudh Municipalities Act, 1883, not conferring the powers given by Act XV of 1873 to "cancel or vary" a tax imposed, the procedure to be adopted for the enhancement of an existing tax must be the same as that prescribed for the imposition of a new tax. In imposing a new tax the procedure laid down in s. 42 of Act XV of 1883 must be strictly followed. Where therefore neither the special meeting of the Board at which an assessee's objections to a proposed tax were considered, nor the special meeting at which the tax was finally imposed, were properly constituted within the meaning of s. 29 of Act XV of 1883: Held, that the imposition of the tax was invalid. *Municipality of the City of Poona v. Mohan Lal*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 51, approved. *STRACHEY v. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CAWNPORE.* I. L. R. 21 All. 343

— s. 38—

See *PUBLIC ROAD* . I. L. R. 7 All. 362

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# **NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND OUDH MUNICIPALITIES ACT (XV OF 1873)—contd.**

— s. 43—

See *LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 22.*

I. L. R. 2 All. 296

1. — *Suit against Committee for declaration of right—Right of suit.* *Semble:* S. 43 of Act XV of 1873 contemplates suits in which relief of a pecuniary character is claimed for some act done under that Act by a Committee or any of their officers, or any other person acting under their direction, and for which damages can be recovered from them personally, and not a suit against a Committee for a declaration of the plaintiff's right to reconstruct a building which has been demolished by the order of such Committee and for compensation for such demolition. *MANNI KASAUNDHAN v. CROOKE* . I. L. R. 2 All. 296

2. — *Suit against Municipal Committee—Claim for a declaration of right—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Art. 120—Cause of action.* The lessee of certain land belonging to the plaintiffs, situate within the limits of a Municipality, applied to the Municipal Committee for permission to establish a market on such land, and such permission was refused by the Committee on the 26th November, 1878. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs, on behalf of the lessee and on their own behalf as proprietors of such land, applied to the Committee for such permission, sending such application by post. No orders were passed by the Committee on such application because it had come by post. On the 18th April, 1879, the plaintiffs sued the Committee for a declaration of their right to establish a market on such land, and for a perpetual injunction restraining the Collector as President of the Committee from interfering with their so doing. The cause of action alleged was the refusal of the Committee of the 26th November 1878. Held by *STUART, C.J.*, on the question whether such suit was barred by the provisions of s. 43 of Act XV of 1873, not having been brought within three months next after the date of the alleged cause of action, that it was not so barred, inasmuch as the provisions of that section were only applicable to suits brought against a Committee for something done under that Act in which compensation was claimed, and not to those in which compensation was not claimed; and that therefore the present suit was not governed by the provisions of that section, but by Art. 120, Sch. II of Act XV of 1877. Also, that the rejection of the lessee's application gave the plaintiffs a cause of action, as there was privity between them and the lessee; and that, as there was nothing in the Municipal rules prohibiting the presentation of an application by post, the application of the plaintiffs should not have been rejected. Held by *DUTHOIT, J.*, that the suit of the plaintiffs was governed by the provisions of s. 43 of Act XV of 1873, and was therefore beyond time. *Municipal Committee of Moradabad v. Chatri Singh*, I. L. R. 1 All. 269; *Manni Kasaundhan v. Crooke*, I. L. R. 2 All. 296;

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**NORTH WESTERN PROVINCES AND  
OUDH MUNICIPALITIES ACT (XV  
OF 1873)—concl'd.**

— s. 43—concl'd.

and *Chunder Sikhur Bundopadhyaya v. Obhoy Churn Bagchi*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 8, referred to. **BRIJ MOHAN SINGH v. COLLECTOR OF ALLAHABAD**

I. L. R. 4 All. 102

*Held*, by the Full Bench (reversing the decision of DUTHOIT, J., and affirming that of STUART, C.J.) that such suit was not barred by limitation under the provisions of s. 43 of Act XV of 1873, because it had not been brought within three months after the date of the alleged cause of action, inasmuch as the provisions of the section were only applicable to suits brought against a Committee for something done under the Act in which compensation was claimed, and not to those in which compensation was not claimed. *Held*, also, by the Full Bench (confirming the decision of STUART, C.J.), that the refusal of the Municipal Committee to allow the plaintiffs' lessee to establish the market gave them a cause of action. **BIRJ MOHAN SINGH v. COLLECTOR OF ALLAHABAD**

I. L. R. 4 All. 339

**NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND  
OUDH MUNICIPALITIES ACT (XV  
OF 1883).**

— s. 46—

See **MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—  
SPECIAL ACTS—NORTH-WESTERN PRO-  
VINCES AND OUDH MUNICIPALITIES ACT,  
1883** . . . I. L. R. 22 All. 111

1. — s. 55—*Municipal Board—Power of Municipal Boards to frame bye-laws—N.-W. P. and Oudh Municipalities Act (XV of 1873), s. 22—Nuisance.* Cl. (c) of s. 55 of Act XV of 1883 was not intended to empower a Municipal Board to make rules which would enable it to confiscate private rights without making any compensation, or to treat as nuisances acts which are not in law or with regard to public health or convenience capable of being considered nuisances. The clause was meant to give to Municipal Boards power to make rules for prohibiting the establishment of markets, that is, to prevent new markets being established, and to give them power to control the maintenance of existing markets or of markets which might be established with their sanction. By "maintenance" is meant the keeping up of a market in such a manner as would make it a fit place for the carrying on of a market having regard to public health and public convenience. **GANGA NARAIN v. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CAWNPORE** . . . I. L. R. 19 All. 313

2. — *Municipal bye-law, presumption as to validity of.* Where a person was tried for and convicted of a breach of certain bye-laws purporting to have been duly passed by a Municipal Board: *Held*, that the presumption was that such bye-laws had been passed with due regard to the necessary procedure and were not illegal, and that it lay upon the accused to object to their validity, and was no part of the duty of a

**NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND  
OUDH MUNICIPALITIES ACT (XV  
OF 1883)—concl'd.**

s. 55—concl'd.

Court exercising appellate or revisional jurisdiction to enter of its own motion into the question whether such rules had been properly framed in accordance with the provisions of the law on that subject. *Municipality of Sholapur v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co.*, I. L. R. 20 Bom. 732, referred to. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAM CHANDAR**

I. L. R. 19 All. 493

1. — s. 69—*Complaint of offence against Municipal bye-law—Power of Municipal Board to give a general authority to institute complaints on its behalf.* *Held*, that s. 69 of the N.-W. P. and Oudh Municipalities Act, 1883, confers upon Municipal Boards in the N.-W. P. and Oudh the power to delegate generally their authority to make complaints in respect of municipal offences, and this general delegation includes not merely the giving of authority to do the formal act of presenting a complaint to a Court, but the exercise of discretion as to whether in any given case a complaint shall or shall not be made. **POWELL v. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MUSSOORIE**

I. L. R. 22 All. 123

2. — and s. 71—*Municipal rules—Infringement of rules—Prosecutions—N.-W. P. Government Notification No. 865, dated the 3rd November, 1869—Rule VI, legality of.* Municipal Boards and Magistrates should see that, before prosecutions are instituted under the municipal rules care is taken that the requirements of s. 69 of Act XV of 1883 (N.-W. P. and Oudh Municipalities Act) are satisfied. A District Magistrate, who was also Chairman of a Municipal Board, having information that a certain person had evaded the payment of octroi duty, directed his prosecution for breach of municipal rules. The Magistrate, in thus causing proceedings to be taken, acted wholly of his own motion and authority. The accused was tried and convicted under Rule 6, Government, N.-W. P., Notification No. 865, dated the 3rd November 1869, read with s. 45 of Act XV of 1873 (N.-W. P. and Oudh Municipalities Act). This rule provided that any person evading or abetting the evasion of the octroi duties specified in a schedule should be deemed to have committed an infringement of a bye-law. It purported to have been made under s. 12 of Act VI of 1868 (Municipal Improvements Act, N.-W. P.), which authorized the making of "rules as to the persons by whom, and the manner in which, any assessment of taxes under this Act shall be confirmed, and for the collection of such taxes." *Held*, that, assuming the rule to have been legally made under s. 12 of Act VI of 1868, which was not clear, and that it was saved by s. 2 of Act XV of 1873, it would, as declared in s. 71 of Act XV of 1883 (N.-W. P. and Oudh Municipalities Act), continue in force until repealed by new rules made under such last-mentioned Act, and be deemed to have been made under that Act, and its operation was therefore subject to the provisions of that Act,



**NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND  
ODDH MUNICIPALITIES ACT (XV  
OF 1883)—concl'd.**

**ss. 69 and 71—concl'd.**

and among them to s. 69, which made it a condition precedent to the institution of a prosecution against the petitioner, that there should be a complaint of the Municipal Board or of some person authorized by the Board in that behalf. *Held*, that the position of the Magistrate of the district in connection with s. 69 was neither better nor worse than that of any other member of the Board, and unless he had been duly authorized by the Board as a Board, he had no more *locus standi* to cause a prosecution to be instituted personally than any other individual member; and the words of s. 69 being mandatory, and the petitioner having from the outset urged this objection to the legality of the proceedings, he was entitled to the benefit of it now, and the conviction was illegal and must be set aside. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. YUSUF KHAN*. I. L. R. 8 All. 677

**NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND  
ODDH MUNICIPALITIES ACT (I OF  
1900).**

**ss. 3 and 87—Municipal Board—By-laws—Interpretation of statutes.** Where a rule framed by a Municipal Board forbade the "erection or re-erection of any building" in the Civil station except with the previous sanction of the Board, it was *held*, that such prohibition could not apply to the inclosing by means of a canvas screen of a certain space adjoining a house. *KAMTA NATH v. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ALLAHABAD* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 All. 199

**s. 47—Contract—Mode of execution by Board.** Where a contract entered into with a Municipal Board for the supply of material for road-making was endorsed both by the Secretary and the Vice-Chairman of the Board and this endorsement referred to the contents of the contract and its confirmation: *Held*, that this was a sufficient compliance with the requirements of s. 47 of the Municipalities Act. *MUNICIPAL BOARD OF NAJIBABAD v. SHEO NARAIN* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 346

**s. 49—Suit against a Municipal Board—Notice of suit—Whether notice necessary in the case of a suit for an injunction against an act threatened.** *Held* by *AIKMAN, J.*, (*KNOX, J.*, *dissentiente*), that where a suit is brought against a Municipal Board to which the North-Western Provinces and Odh Municipalities Act, 1900, is applicable to obtain an injunction prohibiting the Board from levying a tax which the Board has threatened to levy on the plaintiff, the service of such notice as is prescribed by s. 49 of the said Act is a condition precedent to the maintainability of the suit. *The Municipal Committee of Moradabad v. Chatr Singh*, I. L. R. 1 All. 269; *Manni Kasaundhan v. Crooke*, I. L. R. 2 All. 296, and *Brij Mohan Singh v. The Collector of Allahabad*, I. L. R. 4 All. 102, 338, distinguished. *KNOX, J.* (*contra*).—Where the suit is for an injunction merely, no previous notice

**NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND  
ODDH MUNICIPALITIES ACT (I OF  
1900)—cont'd.**

**s. 49—concl'd.**

is necessary. *Shahebzadi Shahunshah Begum v. Fergusson*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 499, referred to. *GREENWAY v. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CAWNPORE* (1906) I. L. R. 28 All. 600

**s. 128—Ss. 128 (c), 132—Municipal Board, powers of—By-law—By-law held to be unreasonable, and its enforcement refused.** The English law as to the necessity of by-laws being reasonable is applicable to by-laws framed in the exercise of their statutory powers by Municipal Boards in India. The Municipal Board of Naini Tal passed a by-law, under the powers conferred upon it by s. 128, cl. (c), of N. & O. Act I of 1900, to the following effect, namely:—"No coolie, whether bearing loads or not, no servant, except in attendance on his master, and no prostitute shall use the upper North Mall (one of two parallel roads running along the north side of the Naini Tal lake) at any time." *Held*, that, as regards the words "no servant, except in attendance on his master," this was, under the circumstances, an unreasonable by-law; and the Court declined to give effect to it. *EMPEROR v. BAL KISHAN* (1902) I. L. R. 24 All. 439

**s. 147—By-laws of Municipality—Continuing breach—Recurring fine—Imposition of fine in advance.** *Held*, that where, as in s. 147 of N. & O. Act I of 1900, it is directed that a breach of some law may be punished with a fine of a certain sum *per diem* so long as the breach continues, it is not competent to the Court to impose such fine in advance whilst sentencing an offender in respect of the original breach; but there must be proof of the continuing breach having been committed. *Ram Krishna Biswas v. Mohendra Nath Mozumdar*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 565, followed. *EMPEROR v. WAZIR AHMAD* (1902)

I. L. R. 24 All. 309

**s. 152—Order of Municipal Board under s. 87 for removal of building erected without permission—Disobedience of order—Finality of order.** No prohibition, notice or order, issued by a Municipal Board under s. 87 of N.-W. P. and Odh Municipalities Act, 1900, is liable to be called in question otherwise than by means of an appeal under s. 152 of the Act. *EMPEROR v. SHADI* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 386

**s. 167—**

See PENAL CODE, ss. 425, 426.

I. L. R. 29 All. 565

**s. 183—Jurisdiction of Civil Courts.** A Municipal Board granted permission to B to build a temple. The District Magistrate, acting under s. 183 of the Municipalities Act, made an order cancelling the permission given by the Municipal Board and the Local Government confirmed this order of the District Magistrate. B brought a suit for a declaration that he had a



# **NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND ODDH MUNICIPALITIES ACT (I OF 1900)—concl'd.**

## **s. 183—concl'd.**

right to build the temple. *Held*, that the suit was not maintainable. *Held*, further, that the Civil Court had no power to disturb the order of the District Magistrate who acted within his jurisdiction and whose order had been duly confirmed by the Local Government. *Abdul Aziz v. Municipal Board of Pilibhit*, 2 All. L. J. 222, followed. *BULAKI DAS v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* (1909)

I. L. R. 31 All. 371

**s. 187—Rules framed by Local Government for the regulation of Municipal Elections—Procedure—Power to award costs—Suit to set aside order awarding costs—Jurisdiction.** A Magistrate trying a petition to set aside the election of a member of a Municipal Board is not empowered to award costs against the unsuccessful party, and if he does so, it is competent to the party against whom costs are awarded to sue in a Civil Court to have as much of the Magistrate's order as relates to costs set aside. *CHANDRA BHAN v. GIRWAR LAL* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 475

# **NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND ODDH WATER-WORKS ACT [(I OF 1891).**

**ss. 34, 40 and 41—Construction of Statutes—Omission to give notice of re-occupation of house—Water rate paid during period of non-occupation.** *Held*, that the provisions of s. 41 of the North-Western Provinces and Odh Water-Works Act, 1891, would not apply to the case of a person who had in fact regularly paid the water rate due in respect of the house during the period of its non-occupation. *EMPEROR v. SUMER CHAND* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 375

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## \_\_\_\_\_ of declaration—

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## \_\_\_\_\_ of deposit of rent in Court—

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5 W. R. Act X, 88

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## \_\_\_\_\_ of meeting—

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## of transfer—

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SUITS CONCERNING DOCUMENTS.

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I. L. R. 12 Bom. 658

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AS TO—NOTICE TO PARTIES.

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TENANCY ACT . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 590

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I. L. R. 9 Mad. 346

1 C. L. R. 421

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8 C. W. N. 454

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QUIT . . . 13 C. W. N. 146

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—DENIAL OF TITLE.

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 3; 248

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 669

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 218

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 354

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 339

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 104

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TRANSFER BY TENANT;

6 C. W. N. 916; 919

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I. L. R. 35 Calc. 675

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AND 80 . . . I. L. R. 26 All. 207

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NOTICE—*contd.*to quit—*concl.*

See SERVICE TENURE.

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 72

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 938

11 C. W. N. 46

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TOWNS—JURISDICTION—IMMOVEABLE  
PROPERTY, RECOVERY OF.

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 216

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—PRO-  
CEDURE IN SPECIAL APPEAL.

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 110

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AND 116 . . . 8 C. W. N. 901; 904

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to remove nuisance or obstruc-  
tion—

See NUISANCE—UNDER CRIMINAL PROCE-  
DURE CODE.

See PENAL CODE, s. 188.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 9

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 475

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 1

to Revenue authorities, of  
alleged transfer, effect of—

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY.

L. R. 28 I. A. 46

## to show cause—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 437

I. L. R. 6 All. 367

I. L. R. 9 All. 52

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 207

I. L. R. 20 All. 339

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—NATURE,  
FORM, AND SUFFICIENCY OF SANCTION.

I. L. R. 18 All. 358

1. ——— Calcutta Municipal Act  
(Beng. III of 1899). ss. 406, 407, 408 and  
474—Notice under s. 408—Standard plan—Necessity  
of attaching a copy of the plan to the notice—  
Bustee improvement—Power and duty of the  
Corporation in respect thereof. The duty of the  
Corporation in improving bustees is a most im-  
portant one and they have been invested with the  
most ample power, but when certain penal sections  
enforced by the criminal law are put in motion  
on the report of the servants of the municipality  
it is incumbent on the Magistrate and the author-  
ities of the Corporation to see that the legal  
procedure which is a condition precedent to any  
conviction, is strictly and properly carried out.  
Where a letter was issued by the Deputy Chairman  
requiring the petitioners to do certain works, but  
no notice under s. 408 was issued directing them to



**NOTICE—contd.**

specifically carry out the works : *Held*, that the conviction of the petitioners under s. 277 of Beng. Act III of 1899 for neglecting to carry out the works, cannot stand. When the Municipality directs one of several owners of a *bustee* to carry out certain improvements and issues a general notice under s. 408 of Beng. Act III of 1899, it is the duty of the Municipality to serve him with a copy of the standard plan approved by the General Committee under s. 407 and point out to him on that plan what work he is to do. *KANAI LAL JALAN v. THE CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA* (1906)

11 C. W. N. 508

2. ——— **Public Demands Recovery Act (Beng. Act I of 1895), s. 10—Non-service of notice, effect of—"Adult"—Sale—Suit to set aside sale—Procedure—Limitation—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 312—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 12 (b).** Where it is alleged that notice has not been served under s. 10 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, the onus is on the party alleging want of notice. *Rakhal Chandra Rai Chowdhuri v. Secretary of State, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 603*, referred to. It is not sufficient that such notice should be actually served ; it must be served in accordance with the provisions of s. 31 of the Act "Adult" in that section does not mean a person who has attained majority within the meaning of the Majority Act, but a person of such an age as to be capable and responsible for the due communication of the notice to the member of the family for whom it is intended. A duly made certificate has on its filing the force and effect of a decree. Until, however, service of notice under s. 10, which has the effect of an attachment, no particular property is bound by the decree. A sale without prior attachment is irregular, but not a nullity. *Kishory Mohun Roy v. Mahomed Mujaffar Hossein, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 188*, referred to. The due making and filing of the certificate gives it the effect of a decree, and therefore non-service of notice under s. 10 does not affect the validity of the certificate itself. A suit to set aside a sale on the sole ground that the decree under which it was held was an invalid decree simply because of absence of notice under s. 10, fails because such absence of notice does not affect the validity of the decree. *Baijnath Sahai v. Ramgut Singh, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 775*, followed. *Saroda Charan Bandopadhyaya v. Kista Mohun Bhattacharjee, 1 C. W. N. 516* ; *Chunder Kumar Mukerjee v. The Secretary of State, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 698* ; *Gopal Das v. Hardeo Das, 5 C. W. N. 86* ; *Ambica Prosad v. Gopal Bux Das, 1 C. L. J. 550* ; *Ramrup Sahay v. Khushal Misser, 6 C. W. N. 630* ; *Srinath Hore v. Bishan Chandra Das, 2 C. L. J. 594* ; *Umid Ali Bhuyan v. Raj Lakshmi Debya, I. L. R. 33 Calc. 84* ; *Ramrup Sahai v. Kushal Misser, 3 C. L. J. 280* ; *Sham Lal Madal v. Nilmani Das, 5 C. L. J. 385, 387*, not followed. The Certificate Officer has jurisdiction to transfer the execution of the decree. The Collector of the 24-Parganas is *ex officio* Collector of Calcutta. The Collector of the 24-Parganas may, in his capacity of Certificate Officer, sell

**NOTICE—contd.**

immoveable property in Calcutta. Ss. 244 and 312 of the Civil Procedure Code apply to execution proceedings under the Public Demands Recovery Act. Art. 12 (b), Sch. II, of the Limitation Act bars the suit. *HARI CHARAN SINGH v. CHANDRA KUMAR DEY* (1907)

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 787

3. ——— **"Adult," meaning of—Public Demands Recovery Act (Bengal Act I of 1895), ss. 10, 12, 31—The Collector of 24-Parganas—Certificate Officer.** A person above the age of sixteen years at the date of the service of notice is an "Adult" within the meaning of s. 31 of the Public Demands Recovery Act. When a notice under s. 10 of the Public Demands Recovery Act actually reaches the judgment-debtor and he contests the claim, it cannot be said that the notice was not validly served because the person on whom the service was made is not proved to be residing with the judgment-debtor, the object of serving the notice being to enable the judgment-debtor to contest his liability. The Collector of 24-Parganas is the proper Certificate Officer to enforce a certificate under the Act against immoveable property in Calcutta. *HARI CHARAN SINGH v. CHANDRA KUMAR DEY* (1907)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 286

4. ——— **Cantonment property—Grant—Offer of compensation—Condition precedent—Notice to one of three executors—Joint occupants.** *Held*, that the notice of resumption was not a condition precedent to the right of resumption. Even assuming that notice was a condition precedent, that provision had been satisfied by giving notice to one of the three executors, who were joint occupants. The provision as to notice was nothing more than a statement of what will be done, when practicable, for the purpose of saving the occupant from such inconvenience as an immediate resumption might involve. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. VAMANRAV* (1905)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 137

5. ——— **Invalid notice—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 108 (i)—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Arts. 110—116—Royalty, suit for.** Where it was stipulated that certain notice was to be given two months before the 30th of Chaitra : *Held*, that a notice, dated 1st Falgoun (= 13th February), was not a valid notice when the 30th Chaitra fell on 12th April, as it was not a full two months' notice, but fell short of it by one day. *BHOLA NATH DAS v. DURGA PROSAD SINGH* (1908)

12 C. W. N. 724

6. ——— **Contempt of Court—Service of notice of motion for committal—Personal service necessary—Service upon attorneys not sufficient.** Where an application is made for committal of a person to jail for disobedience of the Court's order, it is necessary not only that the order should be served upon the defaulting party personally, but the notice to commit should also be similarly served upon him. Service upon the party's attor-



**NOTICE—concl'd.**

neys is not sufficient. *BAI MOOLBAY v. CHUNILAL PITAMBER* (1909) . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 630

**NOTIFICATION.**

\_\_\_\_\_ force of—

See STAMP ACT, 1879, s. 12.  
I. L. R. 5 Bom. 188

\_\_\_\_\_ issue of, before commencement of Act—

See BENGAL IRRIGATION ACT, ss. 1, 6.  
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 487

\_\_\_\_\_ issued under repealed Act, continuance of—

See PETROLEUM ACT (VIII OF 1899), ss. 1 (3), 11 AND 15 . 7 C. W. N. 658

\_\_\_\_\_ meaning of—

See BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT, 1884, s. 2.  
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 699

\_\_\_\_\_ of sale—

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE.  
I. L. R. 34 Calc. 381

\_\_\_\_\_ publication of—

See EMBANKMENTS. . L. R. 11 Calc. 570

See GAMBLING . 21 W. R. Cr. 23

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See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—  
N.-W. P.—CIVIL. I. L. R. 18 All. 375

\_\_\_\_\_ No. 1288 of 3rd March 1882—

See STAMP ACT, 1879, s. 3, CL. 10.  
I. L. R. 18 Calc. 39  
I. L. R. 13 All. 66

See STAMP ACT, 1879, s. 61.  
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\_\_\_\_\_ No. 2955 of 1st December 1882—

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I. L. R. 13 All. 66

\_\_\_\_\_ No. 361, dated 18th April 1883—

See COURT FEES ACT, s. 26.  
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 145

\_\_\_\_\_ No. 173 of 14th March 1889—

See REFORMATORY SCHOOLS ACT, s. 22.  
I. L. R. 15 All. 208

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\_\_\_\_\_ No. 458 of 18th March 1898—

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TIONS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

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**1. MISCELLANEOUS CASES.****1. ——— Order forbidding nuisance—**

*Power of Magistrate—Towns Improvement Act (XXVI of 1850).* Held, that a Magistrate, as President of a Municipal Committee, had no power to issue an order forbidding as a nuisance an act not included in the rules passed under Act XXVI of 1850. GOVERNMENT v. SHAM SOONDER

1 Agra Cr. 34

**2. ——— Order prohibiting traffic—**

*Bom. Reg. XII of 1827, s. 19.* A notice prohibiting general traffic over certain level-crossings on a railway, provided for particular villages, forbidden, as not falling within the scope of Regulation XII of 1827, s. 19, cls. 1 and 6. *In the matter of a prohibitory notice under BOMBAY. REGULATION XII of 1827 . . . . .*

8 Bom. Cr. 23

**3. ——— Misfeasance—Negligence—Mu-**

*nicipality—The Municipality not keeping a ditch and sluices at a dam in proper order—Collection of the storm water in the ditch—The water passing over lands of another and doing damage.* The plaintiff sued to recover damages from the defendant Municipality for injury done to his property by storm water. The water had collected in an adjoining ditch, which the Municipality had not kept in a state of repair, but had allowed it to be choked with the rubbish of the town. They constructed a dam in the adjoining creek, but allowed the sluices at the dam to be choked up with weeds, sedges and silt. The consequence was that the storm water which had collected in the creek passed on to the plaintiff's land and did damage. Held, that there was misfeasance on the part of the Municipality, for they had turned their works by their negligence into a nuisance so as to throw the water collected on their property—the creek—on to the plaintiff's

**NUISANCE—contd.****1. MISCELLANEOUS CASES—concl'd.**

land, and that, therefore, they were liable for the damage caused thereby. *Borough of Bathurst v. Macpherson*, 4 App. Cas. 256, followed. RAJ-  
ENDRALAL v. SURAT CITY MUNICIPALITY. (1908)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 393

**2. UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.**

**1. ——— Order to close drain—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, ss. 62, 308—Power of Magistrate—Order not in writing.** The accused was fined by the Magistrate for not having closed a drain in pursuance of the verbal order of the Magistrate. Held, that the Magistrate should have proceeded under Ch. XX, Act XXV of 1861, inasmuch as the nuisance was not one from which immediate danger was apprehended, and not under s. 62, which empowered the Magistrate to put an immediate determination to the continuance thereof. A written order not having been given, the procedure was faulty, and therefore quashed. Only Magistrates of a district or division can act under Ch. XX, s. 308. GOVERNMENT v. CHOONEELALL

2 Agra Cr. 1

**2. ——— Assistant Magistrate, power of—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, ss. 62, 308—Penal Code, s. 188.** An Assistant Magistrate, as he came within the definition of the term of "any Magistrate," was competent to pass an order under s. 62 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, which contemplated circumstances under which the immediate order is urgently required, and in this respect differed from s. 308 of that enactment, and that it should be read alone with s. 188 of the Penal Code. GOVERNMENT v. MAHOMED BUKSH

1 Agra Cr. 23

**3. ——— Order to prevent breach of the peace—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, ss. 62, 318.** It was not necessary that an order issued by a Magistrate under s. 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whereby a breach of the peace was prevented, should be supplemented by a proceeding under s. 318 of the same Code. QUEEN v. LUTEEF HOSSEIN . . . . .

10 W. R. Cr. 1

**4. ——— Order made on dismissal of complaint—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, ss. 62, 308.** Where a Magistrate dismissed a complaint under s. 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it was held that it was competent for him to pass an order under s. 62 of that Code in the same case, provided he called on the defendant to show cause why s. 62 should not be applied. KALIDAS BHATTACHARJEE v. MOHENDRO NATH CHATTERJEE

12 W. R. Cr. 40

S.C. *In the matter of the petition of KALIDAS BHATTACHARJEE . . . . .*

5 B. L. R. Ap. 82 note

**5. ——— Requisites of order—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 62—General and continuous order.** Under Act XXV of 1861, s. 62, it was necessary that the direction should be addressed



**NUISANCE—contd.****2. UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE—  
contd.**

to a particular person or particular persons, and not to the public generally, and with reference to a particular occasion only, and not for a continuance. **ANONYMOUS** . . . **8 Mad. Ap. 9**

**6. ————— Notice and inquiry—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 62—Order without notice or inquiry.** An order issued by a Magistrate under s. 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in consequence of a mahirzanama signed by certain persons but without any notice to the defendant or inquiry by the Magistrate is illegal. **ANONYMOUS** **4 Mad. Ap. 67**

**7. ————— Prohibitory order—Procedure—Rule to show cause.** Under s. 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Magistrate cannot pass a prohibitory order without having previously issued a rule to show cause why the order should not be passed. **QUEEN v. LACHMIPAT SINGH** **5 B. L. R. Ap. 81**

**s. c. In the matter of the petition of LUCHMEEPUT SINGH** . . . **14 W. R. Cr. 17**

**In re KALIDAS BHATTACHARJEE** **5 B. L. R. Ap. 82 note**

**s. c. KALIDAS BHATTACHARJEE v. MOHENDRA NATH CHATTERJEE** . . . **12 W. R. Cr. 40**

**COLLECTOR OF HOOGHLY v. TARAKNATH MUKHOPADHYA** . . . **7 B. L. R. 449: 16 W. R. 63**

**8. ————— Ground necessary for order—Power of Magistrate to make prohibitory orders as to nuisance.** When a Magistrate makes an order under s. 518, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, on the ground that he has received information, and is satisfied with it, no interference is possible; but when he states the nature of the information, the High Court can see whether such information justifies the order made. Before a prohibitory order under s. 518 can be made, there ought to be information or evidence before the Magistrate that the act prohibited was likely to cause a riot or affray, and that the stoppage of that act would prevent such riot or affray. **GOSHAIN LUCHMUN PERSHAD POOREE v. POHOOP NARAIN POOREE** . . . **24 W. R. Cr. 30**

**9. ————— Condition precedent to making of order—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 518, expl. 1.** The existence of the circumstances mentioned in explanation I is a condition precedent to the action of a Magistrate, under s. 518, Code of Criminal Procedure. **In the matter of KRISHNA MOHUN BYSACK** . . . **1 C. L. R. 58**

**10. ————— Ground for making order—Criminal Procedure Code (XXV of 1861), s. 62—Act X of 1872, s. 518—Power of Magistrate—Procedure—Report of police.** There is nothing in s. 62, Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, to justify a Magistrate in making an order under that section on the mere report of a police officer. **QUEEN v. BHYRO DAYAL SINGH** **3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 4: 11 W. R. Cr. 46**

**NUISANCE—contd.****2. UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE—  
contd.**

**11. ————— Limit of order—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 518—Inquiry into act necessitating order—Order made without jurisdiction.** *Per AINSLIE, J.*—In dealing with the civil rights of a subject under s. 518 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is incumbent on the Magistrate to limit the operation of his order to such reasonable time as may be necessary to enable him to hold a full and sufficient inquiry as to whether the act prohibited is likely to cause a breach of the peace is within, or is in excess of, the legal right of the person forbidden to do it; and, if necessary, to deal with the case under the other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, which enable him to meet cases of probable breach of the peace. *Per BROUGHTON, J.*—Where an order on the face of it appears to have been made without jurisdiction, no subsequent explanation can make it good. **In the matter of ABDOOL v. LUCKY NARAYAN MUNDUL** . . . **I. L. R. 5 Calc. 132**

**12. ————— Nature of order—Perpetual Injunction—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 518—Powers of Magistrate—Rival hāts.** A Magistrate is not empowered to pass an order under s. 518 of Act X of 1872 which has more than a temporary operation: the grant of what is in effect an order for a perpetual injunction is entirely beyond his powers. **GOPI MOHUN MULLICK v. TARAMONI CHOWDHURANI** **I. L. R. 5 Calc. 7: 4 C. L. R. 309**

**13. ————— Perpetual injunction—Magistrate, power of.** A Magistrate has no power to pass a perpetual injunction under s. 518 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872. **Gopi Mohun Mullick v. Taramoni Chowdhurani**, **I. L. R. 5 Calc. 7**, followed. **BRADLEY v. JAMESON** **I. L. R. 8 Calc. 580: 11 C. L. R. 414**

**14. ————— Duration of Magistrate's order—Criminal Procedure Code (1872), s. 518 (1882, s. 144)—Penal Code, s. 188.** In 1876 a Magistrate passed an order under s. 518 of Act X of 1872 (Criminal Procedure Code), directing the Saraogis of Etah to take one of their annual religious processions along a particular route and at a particular hour. In 1886, in which year there was no fresh promulgation of the order, the Saraogis took their procession along another route and at different hour, and for so doing some of them were convicted and sentenced under s. 188 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that the conviction was wrong, the order of 1876 having a temporary operation only. **Gopi Mohun Mullick v. Taramoni Chowdhurani**, **I. L. R. 5 Calc. 7**, referred to. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SHEODIN** . . . **I. L. R. 10 All. 115**

**15. ————— Order for protection of property—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872), s. 518.** A Magistrate has no jurisdiction to make an order under s. 518 of the Code of Criminal Procedure merely for the protection of property.



**NUISANCE—contd.****2. UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE—  
contd.**

*In the matter of the petition of* PRAYAG SINGH. EMPRESS *v.* PRAYAG SINGH I. L. R. 9 Calc. 103

16. ———— **Recall of order—Order made without jurisdiction.** Where a Deputy Magistrate, without taking evidence, made an order under s. 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861, changing a day on which a hât used to be held, and subsequently, on taking evidence, found that his first order was wrong and passed without jurisdiction, he was held to have acted properly in recalling his first order. *MOHUN SIRDAR v. OBHOY CHURN MOOKOPADHYA* . . . 13 W. R. Cr. 72

17. ———— **Order in disputes as to land—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 62.** S. 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply to disputes connected with lands, but refers specially to nuisances and other similar matters in which immediate action is necessary, in order to avoid a risk of illegal consequences. *RAJ BULLUB ADDHYA v. GOBINDO CHANDER MOITRO* . 12 W. R. Cr. 66

18. ———— **Order as to moveable property—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 62—Likelihood of breach of the peace.** The power of issuing orders to prevent breaches of the peace, etc., conferred on a Magistrate by s. 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, extends only to immoveable property of the description set forth in Ch. XXII of that Code. *QUEEN v. GOLUCK CHUNDER GOOHO* 12 W. R. Cr. 38

19. ———— **Private dispute as to pathway—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 62.** S. 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply to a private dispute between two parties relative to a path. *NILKOMUL MOOKHOPADHYA v. ANUND CHUNDER LUSHKUR* . . . 19 W. R. Cr. 6

20. ———— **Dispute as to interest in land—Question for Civil Court—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 62.** The purchaser of an interest in land at a sale in execution of decree obtained an order for possession under s. 263 or 264, Act VIII of 1859, and a dispute arose between him and another person who had some interest in the land, as to what passed under the sale certificate. Without ascertaining the rights of the parties, the Magistrate made certain orders, the effect of which was to exclude the auction-purchaser for some time from exercising the right alleged to have passed to him under the purchase. *Held*, that the Magistrate ought to have made no order at all with reference to the property, leaving it to the parties to determine their rights in the Civil Court, and that he had ample power under the section to do what was necessary to prevent a breach of the peace. *LALOO v. ADAM SIRCAR. GOVERNMENT v. SURJAKANT ACHARJIA. DENGOO SHAIKH v. ADAM SIRCAR* 17 W. R. Cr. 37

21. ———— **Order for removal of wall—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 62.** S. 62 of the

**NUISANCE—contd.****2. UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE—  
contd.**

Code of Criminal Procedure does not authorize a Magistrate summarily to direct a person to remove a wall erected on land alleged to belong to another person in the absence of evidence showing that a riot or affray was likely to occur. *RADHAKISHORE v. GIRIDHAR SAHEE* . 13 W. R. Cr. 91

22. ———— **Order for removal of buildings—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 62.** Orders by Subordinate Magistrates in one case directing the removal of a house on the ground that it was in a dangerous and dilapidated condition, and in the other directing the removal of a granary on the ground that it had been improperly erected upon land required to be kept unoccupied for common purposes, were set aside by the High Court because the Subordinate Magistrate acted without jurisdiction. *ANONYMOUS* . 4 Mad. Ap. 34

23. ———— **Order for removal of obstruction—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 518, 521.** A Magistrate of the second class having passed an order under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 518, for the removal of an obstruction, the Magistrate on appeal held that, though the Proceedings of the Subordinate Magistrate were without jurisdiction, he (the Magistrate) was competent under s. 518 to direct the removal of the obstruction, and he passed an order accordingly. *Held*, that the order of the Magistrate under s. 518 was illegal, and that he should have proceeded under s. 521 and the following sections of the Code. *In the matter of the petition of BRINDABAN DUTT* . . . 21 W. R. Cr. 24

24. ———— **Dispute as to right of possession—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 518—Breach of peace imminent—Order not to interfere with a temple.** Where a dispute arises as to the right of the possession of lands and buildings, a Magistrate, if he considers a collision between the parties and a serious breach of the peace imminent, may properly proceed under Ch. 39, instead of Ch. 40 of the Criminal Procedure Code. If the Magistrate had jurisdiction, the proceedings, not being judicial, cannot be revised by the High Court. An order to abstain from interference with a temple, and its property is an order to abstain from a "certain act" within the meaning of s. 518 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *ELAVARISU VANAMAMALAI RAMANUJA JEEYARSVANI v. VANAMAMALAI RAMANUJA JEEYAR* . . . I. L. R. 3 Mad. 354

25. ———— **Order to alter doorway of temple—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 62.** The temple of Pandharpur, a public temple, is visited at certain periods of the year by a large concourse of pilgrims. With a view to prevent the dangers arising from overcrowding, and to improve the ventilation, the Magistrate, by a written order, under s. 62 of the Criminal Procedure Code, directed the hereditary priests of the temple to widen and lighten the doorway. *Held*, that such order was legal under the above section. *Semble*: That the



**NUISANCE—contd.****2. UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE—  
contd.**

case would have been the same had the temple been private property; and also that the power of Magistrates to issue orders under the section in question is entirely discretionary. *REG. v. RAM CHANDRA EKNATH* . . . 6 Bom. Cr. 36

**26. ——— Power of Magistrate to order repair of a house not adjoining the public road—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 133, 135, and 136—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 188.** S. 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not empower a Magistrate to order the owner of a house standing apart from any public road in its own compound to repair such house. By "persons living or carrying on business in the neighbourhood," injury to whom the power to pass orders under s. 133 is intended to prevent, are meant, not the persons who in the exercise of their private rights may use a building supposed to be in a dangerous condition, but unascertained members of the public whose ordinary avocations may take them to the neighbourhood of such building. *Queen-Empress v. Narayana*, I. L. R. 12 Mad. 475, and *Queen-Empress v. Bishamber Lal*, I. L. R. 13 All. 577, distinguished. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. JASODA NAND* . . . I. L. R. 20 All. 501

**27. ——— Disputed possession of temple—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 144—Magistrate, jurisdiction of.** The District Temple Committee dismissed the trustees of a certain temple and appointed others. The dismissed trustees retained possession. A breach of the peace having become imminent in the opinion of a Deputy Magistrate, he made an order, under the Criminal Procedure Code, s. 144, directing the newly-appointed trustees not to interfere with the temple or its management. *Held*, that the Magistrate had jurisdiction to make the order, and the High Court declined to interfere on revision. *PALANI-APPA CHETTI v. DORASAMI AYYAR* . . . I. L. R. 18 Mad. 402

**28. ——— Order as to procession in public streets—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 518—Public worship—Conflict of rights—Duty of Magistrate when public peace threatened.** In affording special protection to persons assembled for religious worship or religious ceremonies, the law points to congregational rather than private worship, and it may fairly be required of congregations that they should inform the Magistrate or police at what hours they customarily assemble for worship, in order that the rights of other persons may not be unduly curtailed. No sect is entitled to deprive others for ever of the right to use the public streets for processions, on the plea of the sanctity of their place of worship, or on the plea that worship is carried on therein day and night. The duties of a Magistrate in cases where the public peace is likely to be disturbed by one sect attempting to prevent another from using the public streets for processions, discussed. The

**NUISANCE—contd.****2. UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE—  
contd.**

principles laid down in *Muthealu Chetti v. Bapun Saib*, I. L. R. 2 Mad. 140, examined, explained and approved. *SUNDRAM v. QUEEN. PONNUSAMI v. QUEEN* . . . I. L. R. 6 Mad. 203

**29. ——— Order to remove embankment—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 62.** The Subordinate Magistrate issued an order to two persons directing them to remove a certain embankment, whereby the adjacent lands of the complainant were in danger of being flooded. *Held*, that the act of the defendant was not an act which could be prohibited by the Subordinate Magistrate under s. 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *ANONYMOUS* . . . 5 Mad. Ap. 19

**30. ——— Order to destroy tank—Obstruction to enjoyment of public rights.** The defendant had made a tank in the bed of a khal by throwing two bunds across it, and on complaint to the Magistrate, he, finding that the tank had been in existence only for about six years, passed an order under s. 62, Act XXV of 1861, directing the defendant to destroy the bunds, on the ground that they were an obstruction to the enjoyment of the river by the public in the rainy season; and that the bunds interfered with the drainage of the country and tended to the injury of the crops and of the inhabitants. The High Court *held*, that s. 62 did not authorize the passing of such an order. *QUEEN v. GOLAM DARBESH* . . . 1 B. L. R. S. N. 27: 10 W. R. Cr. 36

**31. ——— Trespass by cattle—Penal Code, s. 188.** A Magistrate issued an order warning owners of cattle to take proper care of them; and that in case of disobedience or neglect they would be punished according to law, and did punish them for disobedience under s. 188 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that the Magistrate was not competent, under s. 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861, to pass such an order. The order contemplated under that section is in the nature of an injunction, and such an order passed by a Magistrate would not be legal. The conviction under s. 188 of the Penal Code was therefore illegal. *In the matter of AMIRADDI* . . . 2 B. L. R. A. Cr. 45

S.C. *QUEEN v. AMEERUDEEN* . . . 12 W. R. Cr. 36

**32. ——— Penal Code, s. 289.** An order by a Magistrate prohibiting the straying of cattle within certain local limits is not an order within the meaning of s. 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There can be no conviction for disobedience of such order under s. 289 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN v. MOZAFAR KHALIFA* . . . 9 B. L. R. Ap. 36

S.C. *GOVERNMENT v. MOZUFFER KHALIFA* . . . 18 W. R. Cr. 21

**33. ——— Order to cut down trees as being a nuisance—Removal of nuisance—Power**



**NUISANCE—contd.****2. UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE—  
contd.**

of Magistrate. Under s. 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861, a Magistrate has no power to issue an order *ex parte* to cut down trees on the representation of a party supported by the report of the police that the existence of the trees was a nuisance. *QUEEN v. RAM CHANDRA MOOKERJEE* 5 B. L. R. 131

S.C. UTTAM CHANDER CHATTERJEE *v.* RAM CHANDER CHATTERJEE . . . 13 W. R. Cr. 72

34. ———— **Order to remove stacked timber—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 62—Illegal order.** Where a complaint was made by A that timber belonging to his master, which had been cut and stacked in a certain place, had been removed by B, who said that the timber was cut not by A's master, but by himself, and that he had stacked it in a place where he always put his timber, it was held that the Magistrate could not proceed under s. 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but was bound to try the charge brought against B, and either restore the timber to A or leave it where it was, according to the result of the investigation. *KARTICK CHUNDER BAL v. CHUNDER NATH CHUKERBUTTY* . . . 15 W. R. Cr. 56

35. ———— **Rival hâts—Order as to holding of hât or market—Rival hâts—Act XXV of 1861, s. 404—Judicial order—Power of revision by High Court.** An order of a Magistrate under s. 62, Criminal Procedure Code, 1861,—e.g., prohibiting one of two rival proprietors of two different hâts from holding his hât on certain days of the week in order to prevent obstruction, annoyance, and injury,—was not a judicial order, and was therefore not open to revision by the High Court under s. 404, Criminal Procedure Code. *PHEAR, J. (dissenting). QUEEN v. ABBAS ALI CHOWDHRY* 6 B. L. R. F. B. 74

S.C. ABBAS ALI CHOWDHRY *v.* ILLIM MEAH 14 W. R. Cr. 46

LALLA MITTERJEET SINGH *v.* RAJCOOMAR SIRCAR 18 W. R. Cr. 22

See as to s. 518 the corresponding section of Act X of 1872. *In the matter of the petition of MOKUT SINGH* . . . 6 N. W. 16

36. ———— **Rival hâts—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 62.** When two hâts or markets were held on the same day on adjacent pieces of land, and it was shown to lead to riots and affray, and annoyance to persons lawfully employed in their usual avocations that they should be so held, an order by the Magistrate under s. 62, prohibiting the parties from holding the hâts on the same day, was held to be a proper order under s. 62, Act XXV of 1861. *QUEEN v. KALIKAPRASAD* 5 B. L. R. Ap. 82 note: 11 W. R. Cr. 5

37. ———— **Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), s. 62—Act X of 1872, s. 518—Rival hâts—Power of Magistrate.**

**NUISANCE—contd.****2. UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE—  
contd.**

A Magistrate has power, under s. 62 of Act XXV of 1861, to prohibit a particular landholder from holding a hât on a particular spot on a particular day at least for a temporary period, if he is satisfied upon reasonable grounds that the order is likely to prevent, or tends to prevent, a riot or an affray. *In the matter of the petition of BYKUNTRAM SHAHA ROY* . . . 10 B. L. R. F. B. 434

S.C. BYKUNTRAM SHAHA ROY *v.* MEAJAN 18 W. R. Cr. 47

OVERTULING SHEEB CHUNDER BHUTTACHARJEE *v.* SAADUT ALLY KHAN . . . 4 W. R. Cr. 12

38. ———— **Order under s. 518, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872—Order to close a hât.** In a case in which the Magistrate passed an order under s. 518, Criminal Procedure Code, for closing a hât on the ground that it was only a mile apart from another hât and a breach of the peace was not unlikely, the Sessions Judge recommended that the order should be set aside, s. 518 applying only when a breach of peace was imminent. *Held*, that under expl. 2, s. 518, the order could be made in all cases upon such information as satisfied the Magistrate, and the order was one which he had power to make. *BHOLANATH BOSE v. KOMURUDDIN* . . . 20 W. R. Cr. 53

39. ———— **Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 518.** The operation of s. 518, Criminal Procedure Code, was confined to cases where, in the opinion of the Magistrate, the delay which would be caused by adopting a different procedure from that specified in the explanation to that section would "occasion a greater evil than that suffered by the person on whom the order is made or would defeat the intention of this (39th) Chapter." Where a Magistrate, without hearing the petitioner or giving him an opportunity of being heard, and simply on the foundation of a police officer's report, directed the petitioner to abstain from holding a hât upon his land on a certain day because another party had long been accustomed to hold a hât on his land adjacent to the petitioner's hât on the day following that on which the petitioner held his hât, it was *held* that his order passed under s. 518 was *ultra vires*, the police officer's report being vague and insufficient, and a private interest of this kind not affording a ground for making an order under s. 518 or any other order under the Criminal Procedure Code. *BANEE MADHUB GHOSE v. WOOMA NATH ROY CHOWDHRY* 21 W. R. Cr. 26

See KALI NARAYAN ROY CHOWDHRY *v.* ABDUOL GUFFOOR KHAN . . . 22 W. R. Cr. 24

40. ———— **Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 518—Hât, removal of, order of Magistrate as to.** Where a Magistrate made an order under s. 518 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1872), directing one of two rival hât proprietors to remove his hât to such a distance



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as to render it useless for the purposes for which it was established, it was held that the order came within the purview of the Full Bench decision of *Gopi Mohun Mullick v. Taramoni Choudhrani*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 7; 4 C. L. R. 309, and might be set aside as in excess of jurisdiction. *SHRUT CHUNDER BANERJEE v. BAMACHARAN MOOKERJEE*

4 C. L. R. 410

41. ———— *Order prohibiting holding of hât—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 134, 144—Penal Code, s. 188—Disobeying order of public servant—Trader at hât.* A District Magistrate, by an order made under s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, after stating that it appeared that one "G G S has recently established a hât at S in the vicinity of K, an old-established hât, and held it on the same days, and that, in consequence of the establishment of the new hât and the endeavours made to induce or force people to frequent the new hât instead of the old one, a serious breach of the peace or riots are imminent," ordered that the said G G S and all other persons abstain from holding such hât on those days. The order was duly made and promulgated, but not strictly in accordance with s. 134 of the Code, and the orders of Government made thereunder. Notwithstanding the order, one P C A was found exposing goods for sale as a trader at the hât on one of the prohibited days, and he was thereupon charged with disobeying the order of the Magistrate, and convicted of an offence under s. 188 of the Penal Code. Held, that the conviction was bad, as P C A did not come within the description of the persons intended by the order to be prohibited from "holding" the hât, which referred to "holding" as owner or manager, not as a trader. Held, also, that the terms of s. 134 of the Code and the notification made by Government thereunder as to promulgation and issue of an order are directory, but an omission to follow strictly such direction, though it is an irregularity, does invalidate the order: where therefore it is shown that the order has been brought to the actual knowledge of the persons sought to be affected by it, such omission does not prevent the case coming within s. 188 of the Penal Code. *In the matter of the petition of PARBUTTY CHARAN AICH. PARBUTTY CHARAN AICH v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* I. L. R. 16 Calc. 9

42. ———— *Order prohibiting use of musical instruments—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 62.* A Magistrate cannot, under s. 62, Code of Criminal Procedure, in general terms forbid two parties to use any musical instrument in the neighbourhood of each other's house, though he may forbid their doing so for the purpose of mutual annoyance. *In re RAM CHUNDER GEER GOSSAIN* 6 W. R. Cr. 40

43. ———— *Order stopping music while passing place of worship—Illegal order.*

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An order of the Magistrate directing that all music should cease when any procession is passing a certain place of worship:—*Held, ultra vires.* *MUTHIALU CHETTI v. BAUPUN SAIB*. I. L. R. 2 Mad. 140

44. ———— *Order prohibiting collection of rents—Dispute as to right to rent by rival proprietors—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 518.* In case of a dispute between rival parties as to the payment of rents by tenants, a Magistrate has no power, under s. 518 of Act X of 1872, to make an order that no rents should be collected until such time as the right and title of one party should have been established by a competent Court. *PROSUNNO COOMAR CHATTERJEE v. EMPRESS*

8 C. L. R. 231

45. ———— *Order not to collect cesses—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 62.* A Magistrate cannot pass an order, under s. 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, directing a certain person to abstain from a certain act, or to take order with certain property, unless he is satisfied that such direction on his part is likely to prevent, or tends to prevent, a riot or affray; nor can he pass an order under that section, calling upon a person to enter into recognizances not to collect certain cesses. *In the matter of LUCHMIPUT SINGH*

14 W. R. Cr. 3

46. ———— *Order to prevent obstruction—Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), ss. 62 and 308—Act X of 1872, ss. 518 and 521.* When a case falls both under s. 62 and under s. 308 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the order of the Magistrate ought not to be absolute in the first instance. He should give the defendant an opportunity to show cause against the order. *Semle*: Whether a case comes under either of these two sections or under both, the order of the Magistrate ought to contain a clear statement of the facts upon the basis of which the Magistrate has made the order. *In the matter of HARIMOHAN MALO. In the matter of JOYKRISTO MOOKERJEE*

1 B. L. R. A. Cr. 20: 10 W. R. Cr. 5

47. ———— *Procedure—Case falling within scope both of s. 62 and s. 308, Criminal Procedure Code, 1861.* In a case within s. 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which also falls within the scope of s. 308 of the same Code, a Magistrate must conform to the more particular directions of the latter section, not to those of the former. *KHAN CHAND v. COLLECTOR OF BOOLUND SHAHUR*

1 N. W. Pt. 7, 110: Ed. 1873, 197

48. ———— *Removal of obstruction—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 308—Joint Magistrate in charge of division.* Proceedings under s. 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the removal of obstructions may be originated by a Joint Magistrate in charge of a division of a district. *In the matter of the petition of PUNCHANUN BOSE*

15 W. R. Cr. 41

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49. ———— *Jurisdiction of Joint Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 308.* The Magistrate of a district can alone hold proceedings in a case (such as the removal of a thatched house) under s. 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Joint Magistrate, while in charge of the Magistrate's office, has no such jurisdiction. *In the matter of GREESH CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY* 15 W. R. Cr. 36

50. ———— *Order as to future obstruction—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 521, 526.* S. 526, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, does not enable a Magistrate to make any orders except such as are mentioned in s. 521, under which he can only deal with existing obstructions; the Magistrate has no power to direct what is to be done in the case of any future obstruction. *KASHI CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY v. YAR MAHOMED* 21 W. R. Cr. 10

51. ———— *Removal of public nuisance—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 308—Summary order to police.* In order to remove a public nuisance, a Magistrate is bound to proceed under s. 308 and following sections of Ch. XX of the Criminal Procedure Code and is not competent to pass a summary order to the police to do so. *QUEEN v. DAMODUR DASS* . . . 2 N. W. 452

52. ———— *Nuisance in public place, necessity for proof of—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 521.* In a prosecution under s. 521, Criminal Procedure Code, it is necessary to show that the act complained of is a nuisance, and that it was committed in a thoroughfare or public place. *MUZHUR ALI v. GUNDOWREE SAHOO* 25 W. R. Cr. 72

53. ———— *Order for removal of prostitute—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 521.* The Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1872), s. 521, does not warrant a Magistrate's interference with a prostitute for the purpose of removing her from her dwelling-house simply on the ground of her profession, so long as she behaves herself orderly and quietly and creates no open scandal by riotous living. *NUNDO KUMAREE PESHAGUR v. ANUND MOHUN GOOHO* . . . 24 W. R. Cr. 68

54. ———— *Private road with right of way over it—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 311 et seq.* S. 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the other sections of Ch. XX of that Code referred to public thoroughfares and not to private roads over which a right of way has been established. *GOOROO CHURAN GOON v. GUNGA GOBIND CHATTERJEE* . . . 8 W. R. 269

55. ———— *Dispute as to right to water.* In a case of a dispute as to the right to the use of water the Magistrate should not proceed as for a nuisance under Ch. XX, Criminal Procedure Code, 1861. *QUEEN v. MADHOO CHURN* 13 W. R. Cr. 51

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56. ———— *Obstruction of drain—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 308.* The obstruction of a drain into which the sewage of complainant's premises fell does not fall either under s. 308 or 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but is matter for a civil suit and injunction. *In re TROYLAKNATH BOSE* . . . 5 W. R. Cr. 58

57. ———— *Prevention of nuisance by public—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 308.* S. 308 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, does not apply where a private individual charges the public with committing a nuisance in the exercise of an admitted right. *BECHARAM GHOROOEE v. BOISTURNATH BHOYAN* 14 W. R. 771

58. ———— *Order for protection of public health—Power of Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 521.* A Magistrate's powers, under s. 521, Code of Criminal Procedure, are confined to the instances specifically mentioned in that section, which does not confer general powers upon a Magistrate to pass any order he may consider necessary for the protection of the public health. It is only from a thoroughfare or public place that under that section a Magistrate is at liberty to direct a nuisance to be removed. *In the matter of the petition of SOOJAUT HOSSEIN* 22 W. R. Cr. 19

*PETAMBUR JUGI v. NASARUDDY*

25 W. R. Cr. 4

59. ———— *Obstruction of thoroughfare—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 308.* In the case of a complaint under s. 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for the removal of an obstruction from a thoroughfare, a Magistrate should first inquire if the road is a public one or not. If he finds in the affirmative, he has jurisdiction to proceed; if in the negative, he should withhold his hand and abstain from carrying out the order for the removal of the obstruction. *In the matter of the petition of BECHARAM BHUTTACHARJEE* 15 W. R. Cr. 67

60. ———— *Obstruction to public thoroughfare—Criminal Procedure Code (1882), ss. 133, 137, and 437—Further inquiry—Jurisdiction of Sessions Judge.* In a complaint for alleged obstruction of a public thoroughfare, the Magistrate, after making preliminary inquiries, was of opinion that the alleged way was not a public thoroughfare, and refused to take action under s. 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Session Judge, being of opinion that the Magistrate should have gone on with the case, directed a further inquiry under s. 133. Such inquiry was held, and the Magistrate, without taking evidence in support of the complaint, made his conditional order under s. 133 absolute under s. 137. *Held*, that the order of the Sessions Judge, directing a further inquiry was *ultra vires*, there being no section of the Code



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under which an order for further inquiry could be made in the case, s. 437 having no application. *Held*, also, that the Magistrate, before whom the petitioner showed cause, should not have made his conditional order under s. 133 absolute without taking evidence upon the matter of the complaint: the words "evidence in the matter" meaning "in the matter of the complaint," and not simply evidence which the opposite party might offer. *SRINATH ROY v. AINADDI HALDER*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 395  
1 C. W. N. 217

61. ———— *Private road*—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 308.* Although a road may be a private one, a Deputy Magistrate has jurisdiction to make an order under s. 308, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861, if it appears that s. 320 applies to it,—that is, if it is open to the use of a certain class of persons who used it a few days before the occurrence of the dispute. *TARINEE CHURN SHAH v. BONOMALI NAG* 19 W. R. Cr. 33

62. ———— *Order not to frequent public places*—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 133.* A general order of the Magistrate directing the public not to frequent the roads and public place in a village between certain hours is one made without jurisdiction under s. 133, Act X of 1882. *In the matter of KOMUL KRISTO BONICK* . . . . . 12 C. L. R. 231

63. ———— *Order prohibiting cremation in certain place*—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 521.* An application to have it declared that a certain place could not be used for cremation purposes, would not come under Act X of 1872, s. 521. *GUDADHUR KAMILA v. BAIDANATH JANA* . . . . . 24 W. R. Cr. 6

64. ———— *Order of removal of burning ghat*—*Burning ghat or cremation-ground*—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 133, 140, 437*—*Jurisdiction of District Magistrate to order further inquiry in a proceeding under s. 133 of the Code*—"Legalised nuisance"—*Private cremation-ground, duties of owner of*—"Public place"—"Trade or occupation"—*Form of Notice.* A District Magistrate has, strictly speaking, no power under s. 437 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882) to order a further inquiry into a proceeding under s. 133 of the Code, which has been practically dropped by a Subordinate Magistrate, the proper course being to refer the matter to the High Court. Although a burning ghat or cremation ground may not in itself be a "nuisance" within the meaning of cl. 2, s. 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882) still a Magistrate will have jurisdiction to take action under that section if it is shewn that such a ghat or ground is in such an offensive state, or that cremation is carried upon it in such an offensive manner, as to be a source of injury, danger, or annoyance to persons living in the vicinity. *Queen-Empress v. Saminadha*

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*Pillai, I. L. R. 19 Mad. 464, and Bamford v. Turnley, 31 L. J. Q. B (Ex. Ch.) 286, referred to and discussed. Brindabun Chander Roy v. Chairman of Municipal Commissioners of Serampore, 19 W. R. Cr. 309, distinguished.* A private proprietor may be guilty of acts done on his private property, which may give rise to a public nuisance; the owner of a cremation ground may be held to create a "nuisance" if he allows the cremation of bodies upon that ground to be so performed as to annoy or endanger the lives and properties of persons living in the neighbourhood. The proprietor of a cremation-ground cannot be said to be carrying on any "trade or occupation" within the meaning of cl. 3, s. 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code. A Magistrate has no power under s. 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code to order the removal of a burning ghat from its position, but he can direct a proprietor to "remove the nuisance," i.e., to take such steps as would result in the cremation of corpses ceasing to be a nuisance to the public. *INDRA NATH BANERJEE v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* . . . . . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 425  
2 C. W. N. 113

65. ———— *Excavations near a public place*—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 133*—*Magistrate's power to order the excavations to be fenced, and not to be filled up.* Under s. 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), a Magistrate has no power to order excavations adjacent to a public way or any public place to be filled up; he can only order them to be fenced. *In re SULEMANJI GULAM HUSEN*  
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 714

66. ———— *Obstruction in a public river*—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 133*—*Meaning of "obstruction" as used in the section.* S. 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882) contemplates not only that the way, river, or channel where an unlawful obstruction is made, must be one of public use, but also that the obstruction must be of that public use. Where a dispute arose between the proprietors of two talukhdari villages situate on the banks of a river about the diversion of the course of the river by means of a dam and a trench made by one of them in the current of the river, and each talukhdar claimed the river as his own private property:—*Held*, that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to interfere under s. 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882). *In re JASWAT-SANGJI FATESANGJI* . . . . . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 988

67. ———— *Service of notice of orders under s. 133*—*Procedure*—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 133.* The mode of service of notice of an order under s. 133, considered. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NARAYANA* . . . . . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 475

68. ———— *Order regulating boat traffic at a landing place*—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 144*—*High Court's power of*



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revision when order cannot be made under that section. An order regulating the boat traffic at a certain landing place of a river in the manner directed by the order passed in this case held to be not an order that is authorized by s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code. If the order be one that cannot be made under s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the mere fact of the order purporting to have been made under that section does not prevent the High Court from interfering with it in revision. *Abayeswari Debi v. Sidheswari Debi*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 80, and *Ananda Chundra Bhattacharjee v. Stephen*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 127, followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PRATAP CHUNDER GHOSE*. I. L. R. 25 Calc. 852  
2 C. W. N. 593

69. ———— **Order against minor—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 144.** An order purporting to have been made under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, to the effect that the petitioner should not go to a certain village or allow any of his servants, relations or friends to go there, is of the most indefinite character. A Magistrate cannot make such an order against a minor and hold him responsible for the acts of other persons. *GOLAM MOHAMAD v. BHUBAN MOHAN MOITRA*.  
2 C. W. N. 422

70. ———— **Order purporting to be made under s. 144—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 144—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 435, 439—Jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with such an order—Ex parte order—Property beyond the jurisdiction of the Court passing the order.** R purchased some properties in execution of a mortgage-decree, and was put in possession of the same. The Joint Magistrate of Dacca, purporting to act under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, ordered R or any of his subordinates to refrain from entering upon the lands and properties and directed him to show cause why the order should not be made absolute or rescinded. No cause being shown when the case was called on, the order was made absolute *ex parte*. Held, that looking at the nature of the case and to the language of s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code it was clear that the section does not apply to a case like the present and the order purporting to be made under that section is therefore bad. Held, further, that when an order, though purporting to be made under s. 144, does not properly come within the scope of that section, the High Court's power of revision is not ousted by the provision in the last part of s. 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Ananda Chandra Bhattacharjee v. Carr-Stephen*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 127, and *In the matter of Krishna Mohun Bysack*, I. C. L. R. 58, followed. Where the party called upon to show cause appeared in Court ten minutes after an order absolute had been made *ex parte*, and applied to be heard, but the Magistrate declined to do so, it was held that the Magistrate ought, under the circumstances, to have

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heard the applicant and that he exercised an unwise discretion in not doing so. No order under s. 144 can be made by a Magistrate where the property is situated outside the local limits of his jurisdiction. *ROOP LALL DASS v. MANOOK*.  
2 C. W. N. 572

71. ———— **Jurisdiction of a Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 144—Penal Code, s. 188.** Where a Sub-Divisional Magistrate, by an order purporting to have been made under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, directed certain prostitutes and their zamindars, under whom they held the land, to remove the houses of the former from a particular site within 24 hours and to take up their quarters on the opposite side of a railway line, on the ground that the visitors to the prostitutes have to cross the railway lines and thereby their lives would be endangered, and for the disobedience of the said order directed prosecution under s. 188, Penal Code:—Held, that s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, was not intended to apply to such cases, and the orders referred to were *ultra vires*. In the matter of the petition of *BIRESHWAR*.  
2 C. W. N. 70

72. ———— **Order to abstain from certain act—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 144.** A Deputy Commissioner passed an order under s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, prohibiting a person from collecting, or attempting to collect, any rent, either herself or through any of her officers or servants, from the raiyats of two specified parganas, and also from effecting any sale or putting in hand any transaction with regard to standing trees or collected timbers in an estate, or erecting any adda or kachari in such parganas for a period of two months. Upon an application to set aside such order:—Held, that the acts which the petitioner was directed to abstain from were not acts which come within the meaning of the words "a certain act" as used in s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that the order should be set aside. *ABAYESWARI DEBI v. SIDHESWARI DEBI*. I. L. R. 16 Calc. 80

73. ———— **Order forbidding person from collecting rent—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 144, 439—Superintendence of High Court—Charter Act (24 & 25 Vict., c. 104), s. 15—Revision.** An order forbidding a person who claimed an interest in certain properties from collecting any rent from the raiyats on the properties does not fall within s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such an order is therefore made without jurisdiction, and may be set aside under the High Court's powers of revision and superintendence conferred by s. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and s. 15 of the Charter Act. Chapter XI of the Code of Criminal Procedure refers to interference or dealing of some kind with the land itself or with something erected or standing upon it, and is directed to the prevention or direction by prompt order of some definite act on



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the part of an individual, so that injury or nuisance may not be caused. *ANANDA CHUNDRA BHUTTA-CHARJEE v. STEPHEN* . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 127

74. ———— **Magistrate's authority to prohibit the public generally from giving caste-dinners—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 144—Public notice.** Owing to the prevalence of cholera, the District Magistrate of Broach issued an order, in the form of a proclamation, under s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), forbidding the public generally to give caste-dinners in the city. The order was posted in different quarters of the city, including the street in which the accused had his dwelling-house. A few days after the promulgation of this order, the accused gave a feast in a private house to about 500 people of his caste. He was thereupon convicted of disobedience to an order duly promulgated by a public servant under s. 188, cl (b) of the Penal Code, and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 35. *Held*, reversing the conviction and sentence, that the District Magistrate's order was, both in its substance and its manner of publication, illegal, as being beyond the powers conferred by s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The power of the Magistrate under that section is confined to the direction to a particular person to abstain from acts of a certain character, or to the public generally to abstain from similar acts when frequenting a particular place. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. LAKHINIDAS MAKANDAS* . I. L. R. 14 Bom. 165

75. ———— **Order under Criminal Procedure Code (Acts X of 1882 and V of 1898), s. 144, made ex parte—Absence of proof of emergency—Insufficient notice.** Ordinarily in proceedings under s. 144 notice should issue upon the person against whom the order was directed. It is only in the case of emergency, or where the circumstances do not admit of the serving in due time of a notice upon such person, that service of notice is dispensed with, and the order may be made *ex parte* under sub-s. (2). Where therefore an order was passed by the Magistrate directing the petitioners to remove certain huts erected by them within three hours from time of service of order and there was nothing on the record or in the Magistrate's explanation to show that there was any emergency in the matter or that it was of such a nature that the circumstances did not admit of the service in due time of the notice upon the petitioners, the High Court set aside the order. *MAHAMADDI MOLLAH v. EMPRESS* . 2 C. W. N. 747

76. ———— **Power of Magistrate to determine rights and shares of parties—Dispute regarding right to property—Civil Court—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 144 and 145.** It is not because private parties or members of the same family dispute regarding their respective rights to land or crops, that a Magistrate is called upon to interfere. A Magistrate cannot take upon himself to decide questions of

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fact and Mahomedan law, so as to satisfy himself as to what are the actual rights of the parties to the lands in dispute. If he has good reasons to believe that such a dispute is likely to cause a breach of the peace, the law enables him to ascertain and maintain actual possession, or, if it is shown that the members of the family are inclined to break the peace, he can bind them all over to keep the peace. Where there was a dispute between the parties, who were related to one another as to the amount of their shares to certain property which was claimed on the one hand to be joined in certain shares and on the other hand to exclusively belong to the other party, and no proceedings had been taken under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, nor was there anything to show that there was any probability of a breach of the peace, the Magistrate passed the following order: "The applicants must not plough more than 12 annas of the land." *Held*, that such an order could not properly fall within s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as an order under that section could only be passed on some emergency and would have effect for only two months. The present order in its operation would have effect, and was intended to have effect, until the parties went to a Civil Court to settle their disputes, and no emergency was even suggested. That the order therefore was entirely without any authority of law and must be set aside. *DAIMULLA TALUKHDAR v. MAHARULLA TALUKHDAR* . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 918

77. ———— **Judicial proceeding—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, ss. 308, 404.** An order made by a Magistrate under s. 308 of Act XXV of 1861 was not a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 404 of that Act. *ASHBURNER v. KESHAV VALAD TAKU PATIL* 4 Bom. A. C. 150

(*Contra*) *COLLECTOR OF HOOGLY v. TARAKNATH MUKHOPADHYA* . 7 B. L. R. 449: 16 W. R. 63

Such an order is now by special enactment made a judicial order.

78. ———— **Procedure—Rules in Criminal Code—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 308.** Where a Magistrate has commenced proceedings under s. 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he is not at liberty to proceed otherwise than in conformity with the rules laid down in Ch. XX of the Code. *QUEEN v. PITTI SINGH* . 8 W. R. Cr. 37

79. ———— **Opportunity to show cause—Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), Ch. XX, ss. 308-315—Order of Magistrate.** A Magistrate does not act legally under that chapter, if he does not first call on the person with whose property he proposes to interfere to appear and show cause. *COLLECTOR OF HOOGHY v. TARAKNATH MUKHOPADHYA*

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See *QUEEN v. RAI LACHMIPAT SINGH*.  
5 B. L. R. Ap. 81: 14 W. R. Cr. 17



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5 B. L. R. Ap. 82 note

80. ———— *Opportunity to show cause—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 133—Erection of buildings—Unconditional order.* Every order made under s. 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Act X of 1882, must appoint a time within which, and a place where, the person to whom it is directed may appear before the Magistrate, and move to have the order set aside or modified. No unconditional order can be made under that section. *EMIRESS v. BROJOKANT ROY CROWDHRY*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 637

81. ———— *Opportunity to show cause—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 521, 525, 528.* An order by a Magistrate under s. 521, Act X of 1872, for the removal of a nuisance does not become absolute until an opportunity is given to the person affected by it to show cause why the order should not be carried into effect. No order can be made under s. 528 of the Code unless there is imminent danger or fear of injury of a serious kind to the public involved in the case; and where a Magistrate who had made an order under s. 521 subsequently directed further inquiry to be made it was held that he must be considered to have abandoned his proceedings under s. 528, and that he should have proceeded under s. 528 instead of finding the party charged under s. 188 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN v. BROJENDRO LAL*

21 W. R. Cr. 86

82. ———— *Obstruction in public way—Inquiry under s. 133, Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882)—Previous orders when no bar to such inquiry.* An application was made under s. 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882) for the removal of an obstruction in a public thoroughfare, but after a personal local inspection by the Magistrate and without any evidence being taken, the parties were referred to a civil suit, and the order was refused, the Magistrate holding that the way was not a public way. A civil suit was then filed, and during its pendency a second application was made under s. 133 of Act X of 1882, with a like object, which was refused on the ground that the civil suit was pending and that there was no likelihood of a breach of the peace. The civil suit resulted in the way being held to be a public thoroughfare. A third application was then made under s. 133 to have the obstruction removed, but the Magistrate held that in face of the two previous orders he could not interfere. *Held*, that the order of the Magistrate was wrong, upon the ground that he was bound to make such inquiry, and as there never had been any inquiry into the matter, the first decision being no decision at all, but a mere dictum of the Magistrate upon a personal local investigation without hearing evidence, and thus not on judicial inquiry, and the second decision being based merely upon the pen-

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dency of the civil suit and the previous improper order, and that neither of these orders operated, therefore, as a bar to the Magistrate inquiring into the matter of the present complaint. *MAKHAN LALL SAHA v. MAKHAN CHORA SAHA*

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 271

83. ———— *Order calling on party to appear and show cause—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 308—Removal of nuisance—Filling up tank.* *Held*, that a Magistrate cannot proceed to pass an order for the removal of a nuisance, under s. 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, without calling on the party to show cause why the order should not be passed against him, and without hearing the objections, even if they are filed after the time fixed for the representation but before he takes up the case. A Magistrate's power to fill up a tank is by s. 308 limited to having it fenced in; but where the tank is proved to be injurious to the community, he may under that section treat it as a public nuisance, and cause it to be filled up. *QUEEN v. BISTOO CHURAN CHUCKERBUTTY*

10 W. R. Cr. 27

84. ———— *Appearance of party to show cause.* Where a person to whom an order has been issued under s. 521 of the Code of Criminal Procedure appears to show cause against such order, the Magistrate is bound to take evidence under s. 525 of the Code. *on the matter of* *MOHUR MANDAR*

8 C. L. R. 431

85. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 133 and 137—Magistrate's duty to take evidence under s. 137.* Under s. 137 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a Magistrate is bound to take evidence as a basis for the order he has to make. Where a Magistrate had, without taking any evidence, ordered a privy to be removed, and it appeared that in so doing he had acted solely on his own opinion that the privy was a nuisance:—*Held*, that he acted illegally and *ultra vires*. *In the matter of the petition of* *MAHADAJI SHADASIV TILAK*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 375

86. ———— *Appearance of party to show cause—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, ss. 308, 404—Thoroughfare—Obstruction, Removal of—Powers of Magistrate.* Where in a proceeding before a Magistrate under s. 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for the removal of an obstruction from a thoroughfare or public place, the accused appears and shows cause, it is the duty of the Magistrate to inquire whether there is a thoroughfare or public place, and whether there is an obstruction. If the Magistrate makes the inquiry upon evidence before him he does not act without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction. The High Court cannot set aside his order except for an error in law, or an excess of jurisdiction. It is not a ground for interference that the Magistrate



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has come to an erroneous decision upon the evidence. *ANGELO v. CARGILL*.

9 B. L. R. 417 : 18 W. R. Cr. 41

87. ———— *Appearance of party to show cause—Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), s. 308—Order made without recording evidence.* Where the Magistrate, on the report of the Civil Surgeon of the district, passed an order under s. 308, Act XXV of 1861, that the defendants should appear and show cause why certain tanneries should not be removed as being a nuisance and injurious to health and after the defendants had shown cause, the Magistrate went himself to the place and thereupon made his former order absolute, the High Court, on an objection that the order was not legal, it having been made without recording legal evidence, refused to interfere. *QUEEN v. ALA BUKSH*.

7 B. L. R. 482 note : 12 W. R. Cr. 24

88. ———— *Slaughter-house, order prohibiting—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 308—Power of High Court to interfere with order.* When a Magistrate, under s. 308, Criminal Procedure Code, has ordered the suppression of a trade or occupation as a nuisance and injurious to the health of the community, the High Court will not interfere, unless they find either that there was no reasonable evidence before the Magistrate of the trade being injurious to the health and comfort of the community, or that the cause shown was such as ought to have satisfied the Magistrate that his order for suppressing the trade was not reasonable and proper. The Court take the findings of fact by the Magistrate to be correct, unless they see that there is not on the record any evidence to warrant such findings. *MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER FOR THE SUBURBS OF CALCUTTA v. AMANAT ALI*.

89. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 308.* The condition and the conduct of an old-established slaughter-house were proved to be, in fact, an offensive nuisance and dangerous to the health of the neighbours; but the evidence did not show it was in a worse condition than at any time since its establishment; the occupiers, when summoned, refused to ask for a jury under s. 310, Criminal Procedure Code. *Held*, that the Magistrate was justified in suppressing the "trade or occupation" under s. 308. *MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONERS OF THE SUBURBS OF CALCUTTA v. MAHOMED ALI* 7 B. L. R. 499 : 16 W. R. Cr. 6

90. ———— *Private slaughter-house—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 521.* Where a Deputy Magistrate had treated the slaughtering of cattle as a "nuisance" under s. 521 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and ordered its discontinuance within a private enclosure belonging to some Mahomedans:—*Held*, that, though the act complained of might be shocking to the prejudices of Hindus it could not properly be regarded as a nuisance, and that, at any rate, the act being done in a private place

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and not on a thoroughfare, it could not be dealt with under s. 521. *MUZHUR ALI v. GUNDOWREE SAHOO* . . . . . 25 W. R. Cr. 72

91. ———— *Order to pull down house—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 308—Report of jurors—Illegal order—Obstruction to public way.* The Magistrate of a district issued an order, under s. 308 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, calling upon the petitioner to remove a building, on the ground that it was unlawful obstruction upon a high road. A jury of five persons was appointed by the Magistrate's successor, under s. 310, to report within fifteen days whether the order was reasonable and proper. The jurors, being without instruction, took different views as to the performance of their duties; but four of them visited the premises, and were unanimous in finding that the building complained of was not on the high road at all. Five days after receiving reports to this effect, the Magistrate issued another order to the petitioner, requiring him to pull down his house within fifteen days, as the jurors had made no report within the time prescribed. The petitioner showed cause under s. 313, but without effect, and the order was repeated. The proceedings were ultimately forwarded to the Sessions Judge, whose successor in office returned them with the remark that nothing appeared to have been done contrary to the law for the removal of nuisances. *Held*, that the petitioner had shown sufficient cause to satisfy the Magistrate, under s. 313, that the order to pull down the house was not reasonable and proper. *REG. v. DALSUKRAM HARIBHAI* . . . . . 2 Bom. 407 : 2nd Ed. 384

92. ———— *Nuisance caused by tank—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 308—Removal of tank.* The order of a Magistrate under s. 308, Code of Criminal Procedure, should be confined to a direction to remove the nuisance complained of. In the case of a tank, the Magistrate cannot order the proprietor to excavate it. The proprietor ought to have the discretion allowed him as to the mode in which he will remove the nuisance caused by the tank. If a Magistrate is compelled to direct the excavation of the tank, the actual cost of excavation can alone be charged against the proprietor, at whose disposition the soil taken out in the course of excavation must be placed. *In the matter of PAUL DOSS* . . . . . 10 W. R. Cr. 51

93. ———— *Presumption as to place being public thoroughfare—Finding of jury—Interference of High Court.* The fact of a Magistrate taking action under s. 521 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is *prima facie* sufficient to show that he considers the *locus in quo* to be a thoroughfare or public place, and if no objection is taken that it is not such, and the jury find that the order made under that section is reasonable and proper, the High Court will not interfere. *In the matter of IMANDI KHAN* . . . . . 8 C. L. R. 399



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94. ———— **Functions of jury—Obstruction—Public thoroughfare—Procedure.** Before a Magistrate can make an order under s. 521 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to remove an obstruction from a path alleged to be a public thoroughfare, he must first, in a proceeding held under s. 532, have come to the conclusion that the path is open to the use of the public. The only functions which a jury appointed under s. 523 can exercise are to consider whether the order made by the Magistrate under s. 521 is reasonable and proper, it being no part of their duty to determine the rights of parties in property. *Held*, therefore, that where a Magistrate, through a mistaken view of the law, ordered the removal of an obstruction on a pathway under s. 521, and had further submitted this order to the consideration of a jury appointed under s. 523, before he had himself come to a conclusion whether such pathway was a public thoroughfare, the only course left open to him under such circumstances was to stay all proceedings initiated under s. 521, and take action under s. 532. *In the matter of the petition of CHUNDER NATH SEN* I. L. R. 5 Calc. 875 : 6 C. L. R. 379

95. ———— **Nuisance, order for the removal of—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 133—Bonâ fide claim—Jurisdiction of Magistrate and of jury.** Where in a proceeding under s. 133, Criminal Procedure Code, the petitioner appeared and objected, on the following amongst other grounds, that there was no pathway and no right of way open to the public over the land which belonged to him :—*Held*, that the Magistrate ought to have determined where the objection was *bonâ fide* before he took further action, and this was not a matter which could be properly considered by a jury. *BUDHAI NATH v. NIL MAHANTO* . . . . . 4 C. W. N. 596

96. ———— **Obstruction of public ways—Dispute as to public right.** The powers embodied in ss. 133, 134, 135, 136, 137 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, with regard to the obstruction of public ways are not intended to be exercised where there is a *bonâ fide* dispute as to the existence of the public right. Where there is such a dispute the Court should pass no order under those sections until the public right has been established by proper legal proceedings, civil or criminal. *BASAR- UDDIN BHUIAH v. BAHAR ALI*

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 8

97. ———— **Question of title—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 133, 135—Application for order to remove obstruction—Disputed title—Jurisdiction of Criminal Court.** Where an application is made under s. 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, calling on a person to remove an obstruction, and such person *bonâ fide* raises a question of title :—*Held*, that the case then becomes one for a Civil Court. The section contemplates only an enquiry as to the existence or non-existence of the ob-

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struction complained of, not an enquiry into disputed questions of title. *ASKAR MEA v. SABDAR MEA* . . . . . I. L. R. 12 Calc. 137

*LALL MIAH v. NAZIR KHALASHI*  
I. L. R. 12 Calc. 696

98. ———— **Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 133-187, Course to be followed in the administration of—Claim of title—Bonâ fides of claim of title, right of Magistrate to enquire into—Jurisdiction.** The mere assertion of a claim of title made without reasonable ground, or honest belief in it or honest intention to support it, will not oust a Criminal Court of its jurisdiction under ss. 133-137 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In proceedings under s. 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code with reference to obstructions to public ways, it is open to the Magistrate to enquire into the *bonâ fides* of the claim and where he decides against its *bonâ fides*, he must state reasons for his decision, which will be subject to revision by the High Court. Such a claim must be set up at or before the hearing and not afterwards. *In re Chunder Nath Sen*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 875 : 6 C. L. R. 379 ; *Chuni Lall v. Ram Kishen Sahoo*, I. L. R., 15 Calc. 460 ; *Mutty Ram Sahoo v. Mohi Lall Roy*, 7 C. L. R. 433 : I. L. R. 6 Calc. 291 ; and *R. v. Sandford*, 30 L. T. 601, referred to. *LUCKHEE NARAIN BANERJEE v. RAM KUMAR MUKERJEE*  
I. L. R. 15 Calc. 564

99. ———— **Criminal Procedure Code (1882), ss. 133-138—Procedure.** Where a claim is raised to the land in respect of which proceedings are taken, the Magistrate, before proceeding further, should satisfy himself as to the *bonâ fides* of the claim. *Luckhee Narain Banerjee v. Ram Kumar Mukerjee*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 564, and *Queen-Empress v. Bissessur Sahu*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 562, approved of. *UPENDRA NATH BHUTTA- CHARJEE v. KHTISH CHUNDER BHUTTACHARJEE*  
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 499

100. ———— **Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 133, 137—Conditional order—Jurisdiction—Bonâ fide question of title.** Where a party against whom a conditional order was made under s. 133, Criminal Procedure Code, for an alleged obstruction of a public pathway, showed cause stating that the way was not a public way and claiming title to the land, and the Magistrate, after taking evidence, decided that such claim was a *bonâ fide* one, and directed the party to institute a civil suit within 15 days in order to establish his claim and stayed proceedings in the meantime :—*Held*, that the Magistrate was wrong in making the Civil Court to establish his title without having first decided whether the public had a right over the alleged pathway. Ss. 133 and 137 explained. *Luckhee Narain Banerjee v. Ram Kumar Mukerjee*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 564, and *Queen-Empress v. Bis-*



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*Bissessur Sahu, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 562*, referred to.  
MUKUNDA LALL DEY v. HARIBOLE SHAHA

2 C. W. N. 554

101. *Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), ss. 133-139—Bonâ fide question of title—Jurisdiction of Magistrate and jury in such cases.* Upon the institution of proceedings under s. 133, Criminal Procedure Code, the opposite party raised the contention that the way alleged to be obstructed was not one which is or may be lawfully used by the public. The Magistrate, without dealing with this objection, referred it to a jury, and upon receiving their report that it was a reasonable and proper order, he directed the removal of the obstruction. *Held*, that the Magistrate should have found whether the objection taken was a *bonâ fide* one, and if he found it to be so, he should have abstained from further action until the public right of way had been determined by a competent Court. *Luckhee Narain Banerjee v. Ram Kumar Mukerjee, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 561*, followed. The jury was not competent to decide whether the way alleged to be obstructed was public or not, for the decision of this matter affected the right of the Magistrate to interfere under s. 133, and it is only when the Magistrate is competent to pass an order under the section that a jury can be appointed to consider whether it is a reasonable and proper order. Whether the Magistrate had not expressly found that the objection was made *bonâ fide*, but the police report made by his order contained ample reason for such finding, the High Court set aside the order under s. 139 as *ultra vires*. *NASARUDDI v. AKILLUDDI* . . . 3 C. W. N. 345

102. *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 133—Question of title—Bonâ fides of claim of title, right of Magistrate to enquire into—Jurisdiction of Civil Court.* In a proceeding under s. 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code for the purpose of compelling the removal of an obstruction from a public way where a *bonâ fide* question as to the way being public is raised, there is no jurisdiction to make an order under the section, and the question should be left for determination by the Civil Court. To have this effect, however, the claim must be *bonâ fide*, and not a mere pretence to oust jurisdiction, and it is for the Magistrate to say whether the claim be *bonâ fide* or not. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BISSESSUR SAHU* . . . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 562

103. *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 133 and 137—Bonâ fide question of title—Jurisdiction of Magistrate—Public Nuisance.* When a question of title is *bonâ fide* raised, the Magistrate ought not to make an order under ss. 133 and 137 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but should allow the party an opportunity for the determination of the question by Civil Court. The claim of title must, however, be

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*bonâ fide* and not a mere pretence to oust jurisdiction and it is for the Magistrate to say whether the claim is a *bonâ fide* one or a pretence. *Luckhee Narain Banerjee v. Ram Kumar Mukherjee, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 561*, and *Queen-Empress v. Bissessur Sahu, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 562*, followed. Although no length of enjoyment can legalize a public nuisance—see *Municipal Commissioners of Calcutta v. Mahomed Ali, 7 B. L. R. 499*—yet the long possession or enjoyment of what is said to be a nuisance may give to the objection of the person so possessing or enjoying it the character of a *bonâ fide* dispute as to title such as might have the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under ss. 133 and 137 of the Code, and making the question a proper one for the Civil Court. *PREONATH DEY v. GOBERDHONE MALO* . . . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 278

104. *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 133—Bonâ fide question of title.* When the person called upon under s. 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code to show cause why an obstruction should not be removed from a public way denies that it is a public way, it is for the Magistrate to determine whether this is a *bonâ fide* objection, and he cannot, in spite of the objection (unless he determined that it is not *bonâ fide*), refer the matter to a jury. *KAILASH CHUNDER SEN v. RAM LAL MITTRA*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 869

105. *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 133 and 137—Reference by Sub-Divisional Magistrate to a second class Magistrate.* A Sub-Divisional Magistrate having made a conditional order under s. 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882) against a person to remove an obstruction on a public thoroughfare, or appear and shew cause before a second class Magistrate, the said person appeared as directed, and the order was made absolute under s. 137. In revision the High Court held that, having regard to the penultimate paragraph of s. 133, the order was not illegal on the ground that it was made absolute by a Magistrate with second class powers other than the Magistrate who made the conditional order. *In re Narasimha, I. L. R. 9 Mad. 201*, approved of. *PREONATH DEY v. GOBERDHONE MALO*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 278

106. *Order requiring abatement of nuisance in certain time—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 133, 137, 140.* A Sub-Divisional Magistrate having made a conditional order, under s. 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against a person to abate a nuisance or appear and show cause before a second class Magistrate why the order should not be enforced, the said person appeared as directed and the order was made absolute under s. 137. The second class Magistrate then issued a notice and order under s. 140, requiring the nuisance to be abated within a certain date. The District



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Magistrate, having referred the case on the ground that the second class Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass final orders in such cases:—*Held*, that the order was not illegal. *In re NARASIMHA*

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 201

107. ——— Application for jury—*Obligation of Magistrate to appoint jury—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 521.* When the person, on whom a notice has been issued under s. 521, Code of Criminal Procedure, applies for a jury, the Magistrate is bound to appoint one and cannot decide the matter by a local inquiry. *In the matter of MOTHOR CHUNDER DOSS*

2 C. L. R. 509

108. ——— Question referred to jury—*Effect of referring a question not for jury to decide.* *Held*, that the agreement of the accused to refer the matter to a jury, which had given the case against them, in no way deprived them of their legal rights, or affected the fact that the question of the expediency of discontinuing the alleged nuisance, which had been referred to the jury, ought not to have been so referred. *MUZHUR ALI v. GUNDOWREE SAHOO*

25 W. R. Cr. 72

109. ——— Discontinuance of proceedings—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 521—Absence after enquiry of ground for proceeding further.* When after inquiry a Magistrate finds that there is no sufficient cause for proceeding under s. 521 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he is competent to let the matter drop. *In re SHONAI PORAMANICK. SHONAI PORAMANICK v. JOGENDRO SHAHA.*

1 C. L. R. 486

110. ——— Withdrawal of case—*Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1872), s. 521.* Where a Magistrate, in a proceeding under s. 521 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, satisfies himself that there is no necessity for proceeding further under that section, he is competent to let the matter drop. *In re Shonai Poramanick, 1 C. L. R. 486, followed. In the matter of the petition of ISSUR CHUNDER NATH. ISSUR CHUNDER NATH v. KALI CHURN NATH*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 883: 11 C. L. R. 235

111. ——— Procedure after decision by jury—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 523, 526—Order of Magistrate after decision of jury.* A Magistrate who on the application of the party called on refers a matter as to whether a pathway is a thoroughfare or not for the consideration of a jury under s. 523 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, is bound to make an order upon the report of the jury and in accordance with their decision as required by s. 526 of the Code. *NYAN v. SHER ALI*

22 W. R. Cr. 86

112. ——— Building encroaching on public way—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 133, 139 (1)—Public nuisance, order respecting—Bonâ fide claim of right, whether it affects Magistrate's jurisdiction.* Where a person erects a

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building encroaching upon a public way, a Magistrate has jurisdiction to pass an order under s. 139 (1) and such jurisdiction is not ousted by any claim of that person, however *bonâ fide*, to make such encroachments. *Luckhee Narain Banerjee v. Ramkumar Mukherjee, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 564; Queen Empress v. Bissessur Sahu, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 562; and Preo Nath Dey v. Goberdhone Malo, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 278, distinguished. ADHORE CHANDRA DEY v. AMBIKA CHURAN ROY (1902)*

6 C. W. N. 886

113. ——— Dispute as to land—*Decree of Civil Court, existing—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 144, order under, effect of—Landlord and tenant—Jurisdiction.* An order under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, made or affirmed contrary to an existing decree of the Civil Court, in respect of the same lands, is illegal. Where the dispute was between a landlord and a tenant, and the landlord obtained a decree for *khas* possession in respect of such land as had been leased to the tenant, the fact that the landlord was unable to point out the particular lands of which he had obtained possession under the decree does not justify an order under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, to keep the landlord out of such possession, it being on the tenant to show, under the circumstances, what lands he held from the landlord. *GOBIND SAHAI v. SIMS AND CARRUTHERS (1902)*

6 C. W. N. 466

114. ——— Encroachment on road—*Criminal Procedure Code, s. 133—Encroachment upon unmetalled portion of a Government road.* *Held*, that any obstruction upon a public road is a nuisance, within the meaning of s. 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whether in point of fact it causes practical inconvenience or not. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KEDAR NATH (1901)*

I. L. R. 23 All. 159

115. ——— Jurisdiction of Magistrate—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 188—Disobedience of an order of a public servant, lawfully promulgated—Order under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, interfering with the exercise of private rights of individuals, if lawful—Magistrate, jurisdiction of, to pass such orders.* If a Magistrate apprehends a breach of the peace, he can restrain temporarily the exercise of any private person of his lawful right to prevent such breach of the peace, by making an order under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code; and disobedience to such an order amounts to an offence under s. 188, Indian Penal Code. *Bycuntram Shaha Roy, 10 B. L. R. 443, followed. TEKAIT KUNJ BEHARI NARAIN DEO v. BHIKO SINGH (1900)*

5 C. W. N. 329

116. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 144, 487—Order to "abstain from a certain act"—Trial by Magistrate who made the order, of persons alleged to have disobeyed it.* On a petition being filed in the Court of a Sub-Divisional First-class Magistrate setting out that a



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breach of the peace was likely to arise from the simultaneous use of a certain mosque by members of the *Hanifi* and *Shafi* sects, the Magistrate passed an order, addressed to ten members, who were named, and several others of the *Hanifi* sect, and to three members, who were named, and several others of the *Shafi* sect. The order concluded as follows:—"I do order hereby that the following order should be observed in regard to the entry of the said mosque by any of you or any other Musalmans of the *Hanifi* and *Shafi* sects for a period of two months from this date, unless in the meanwhile you establish your right in a Court of competent civil jurisdiction." It sets out five periods of half an hour each during which each sect, respectively, might enter the mosque on ordinary days, and two periods of one hour each in which each sect might enter the mosque on other days: *Held*, that the order was within the powers conferred by s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Certain members of the *Hanifi* sect having entered the mosque in disobedience to the order hereinbefore referred to, they were charged, under s. 188 of the Indian Penal Code, with disobedience to an order by a public servant. The case was tried by the Magistrate who had passed the order. *Held*, that the Magistrate was not competent to try the case inasmuch as he had made the order under s. 144. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ABDULLA SHAEB (1900)**

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 262

**117. — Management of temple—**  
*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 144—*  
*Order to abstain from interfering with the management of a temple until the eviction of another person—*  
*Legality of order.* An order passed under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure directed a person (i) not to interfere with the management of a certain temple, (ii) until another person should be duly evicted from the management by due course of law. *Held*, that the first portion of the order was a direction to "abstain from a certain act," within the meaning of those words as used in s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; but that the latter portion contravened the provisions of sub-s. (5) of that section, and that to that extent the order was made without jurisdiction. **RAMANADHAN CHETTI v. MURUGAPPA CHETTI (1900)**

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 45

**118. — Obstruction of pathway—**  
*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 133—*  
*Public pathway, obstruction of—Order of removal—*  
*Claim of title, bonâ fides of—Magistrate's jurisdiction.* When a person, in showing cause against an order, under s. 133, Criminal Procedure Code, to remove an obstruction from an alleged public pathway, claims that such pathway was on his own private property and had never been a public pathway, the only issue which arises for the Magistrate's decision is whether the objection so raised is a *bonâ fide* objection or a mere pretext to oust the Magistrate's jurisdiction

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A Magistrate had not the jurisdiction in such a case instead of coming to an express finding on this issue, to proceed to determine whether or not there was a public pathway. *Luckhee Narain Banerjee v. Ram Kumar Mukherjee, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 564*, followed. **RAKHAL CHANDRA SHAHA v. KAILASH CHANDRA SARKAR (1902)** . 7 C. W. N. 117

**119. — Possession—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 107, 144, 145—**  
*Possession, dispute relating to—Finding arrived at without instituting proceeding under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, if proper—Chaukidari Act (Ben. Act VI of 1870), s. 51, order under, effect of—*  
*Security to keep the peace, order if proper.* Where, in a case of dispute relating to possession of land, a Magistrate, without instituting a proceeding under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, found that the petitioners were not in possession, and, on that ground, issued an order under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, restraining them in the exercise of certain rights claimed by them as in possession of the lands in dispute, and also proceeded to bind the petitioners over to keep the peace under s. 107, Criminal Procedure Code: *Held*, that the Magistrate was not competent to arrive at a finding as to possession, except in a judicial inquiry held under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, nor could he rely on a previous order passed under s. 51 of the Bengal Chaukidari Act, as such order only transferred the right to the lands in question, and did not give possession to anybody. *Held*, also, that proceedings under s. 107, Criminal Procedure Code, could not properly be instituted in such a case. *Held*, also, that Magistrate's order under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, having ceased to operate by lapse of time, no order would be passed in respect of it. **SARODA PROSAD SINGH v. EMPEROR (1902)**

7 C. W. N. 142

**120. — Removal of prostitutes—**  
*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 133, 139—*  
*Public nuisance—Prostitutes, trade and occupation of—Removal of house from roadside, order for—*  
*"Physical comfort" of the public—Jury, opinion of.* The mere existence of houses of prostitutes by the roadside, and the fact that they ply their trade in those houses, cannot affect the "physical comfort" of the passers-by. In a proceeding under s. 133, Criminal Procedure Code, certain prostitutes were called upon to remove their trade and occupation from the slopes and neighbourhood of a road; they appeared, and, in showing cause, claimed a jury, which was appointed; the jury were of divided opinion, and the majority suggested that they should be directed to mend their habits, but did not recommend the removal of their houses; and the Magistrate made an absolute his conditional order of removal of their houses. *Held*, that the order of the Magistrate, based upon the report of the jury, was neither reasonable nor legal, and must be set aside. **BASANTA BAISTABI v. EMPEROR (1901)**

5 C. W. N. 566



**NUISANCE—contd.****2. UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE—  
concl'd.**

**121. ———— Revival of proceedings—***Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 133—Nuisance, removal of—Effect of dropping of previous proceeding—Magistrate, jurisdiction of, to take fresh proceedings regarding the same matter.* There is no bar in law to the revival of a proceeding under s. 133, Criminal Procedure Code, with regard to the same matter which had been previously dropped, provided there are materials before the Magistrate upon which *prima facie* he could act. The question whether the matter with regard to which a proceeding has been instituted does or does not properly come within the purview of s. 133, Criminal Procedure Code, must be raised and decided at the trial. *ISHAN CHUNDRA CHAKRAVARTI v. PRASANNA KUMAR ROY* (1900).  
**5 C. W. N. 173**

**122. ———— Time limit—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 144—Urgent cases of apprehended danger, order made upon—Limit as to time—Lapse—Renewal—Magistrate's jurisdiction.** A Magistrate is not competent to make an order under s. 144, Code of Criminal Procedure, which, not being limited in time, purports on the face of it to be in the nature of a perpetual injunction. Where an order under s. 144, Code of Criminal Procedure, has lapsed on the expiry of two months under sub-s. (5) of that section, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to make an order for its renewal. *REMJIT SINGH v. LUCHMAN PRASAD* (1902).  
**7 C. W. N. 140**

**3. PUBLIC NUISANCE UNDER PENAL CODE.**

**1. ———— Prescriptive right.** No length of enjoyment can legalize a public nuisance. *MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONERS OF THE SUBURBS OF CALCUTTA v. MAHOMED ALI*  
**7 B. L. R. 499 : 16 W. R. Cr. 6**

**2. ———— Unfenced Well—Penal Code, ss. 290, 43.** Omission to fence a well on private ground within eight yards of a highway and open to it, is not punishable as a public nuisance. *QUEEN v. ANTHONY* . . . **I. L. R. 6 Mad. 280**

**3. ———— Omission to keep ponies from straying—Penal Code, s. 290.** The omission of a person to keep his ponies from straying is not a public nuisance punishable under s. 290 of the Penal Code. *JOYNATH MUNDUL v. JAMUL SHEIKH*  
**6 W. R. Cr. 71**

**4. ———— Prostitute visiting dâk-bungalow—Penal Code, s. 290.** A prostitute, by visiting a dâk-bungalow at the request of a person staying there, but against whom there is no evidence of any impropriety of speech or gesture or act, or that she had occasioned annoyance to the public generally or to any persons who, in the exercise of their public right, were lodging in the bungalow, is not liable to be convicted under s. 290 of the Penal

**NUISANCE—contd.****3. PUBLIC NUISANCE UNDER PENAL CODE—  
—contd.**

Code as having committed a public nuisance. *QUEEN v. BEGUM* . . . **2 N. W. 34**

**5. ———— Keeping a gaming-house—Penal Code, ss. 109, 290—Abetment.** The lessee of a house, who permitted disorderly people to use it for gambling and thereby caused annoyance to the public, was convicted of an offence under the Penal Code, s. 290; it appeared, however, that the accused had not engaged the house with the object of letting it out as a gaming-house. *Held*, that the conviction was right. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. THANDAVARAYUDU*  
**I. L. R. 14 Mad. 36**

**6. ———— Soliciting for purposes of prostitution—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 268, 290.** *Held*, that the soliciting for purposes of prostitution of passers-by on a public road is not a public nuisance as that term is defined in s. 268 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NANNI* . . . **I. L. R. 22 All. 11**

**7. ———— Requisite proof—Penal Code, s. 290—Offence under special law.** In a case of public nuisance under s. 290 of the Penal Code, it must be proved that injury, danger, or annoyance has been caused, either in regard to the enjoyment of property or the exercise of a public right on the part of a portion of the community or of any particular class of people. The fact that there is a special law to meet a particular offence (in this case, cattle trespass) does not prevent the punishment of the offenders under the Penal Code, if an offence which could have been rightly punished under the Penal Code was established. *ONORAM v. LAMESSO WEBSTER v. KEENA* . . . **9 W. R. Cr. 7**

**8. ———— Penal Code, s. 291—Previous conviction and order to desist.** Before a conviction can be had of committing a public nuisance under s. 291 of the Penal Code there must be proof that there was a previous conviction of an offence and an injunction by a public servant to desist from continuing such nuisance. *In the matter of MOHESH CHUNDER*.  
**20 W. R. Cr. 5**

**9. ———— Erection of shed for religious ceremonies—Penal Code, ss. 258, 290—Annoyance to persons of other religion.** Certain Mahomedan inhabitants of a village erected during the Muharram, a temporary shed on land forming part of the village site and placed in the shed a religious symbol. They were convicted by a Magistrate under s. 290 of the Penal Code of committing a public nuisance, on the ground that the act was certain to cause annoyance to the Hindu inhabitants of the village whose temples were in the vicinity, and was therefore calculated to lead to a breach of the public peace. *Held*, that the conviction was illegal. *MUTTUMIRA v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* . . . **I. L. R. 7 Mad. 58**

**10. ———— Repeating or continuing public nuisance—Penal Code, s. 291—Injun**



**NUISANCE—contd.****3. PUBLIC NUISANCE UNDER PENAL CODE—contd.**

*tion by public servant not to repeat or continue—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 134, 143, 144, Sch. V, Form 20.* To support a conviction under s. 291 of the Penal Code, there must be proof of an injunction to the accused individually against repeating or continuing the same particular public nuisance. It must be shown that the person convicted had on some previous occasion committed the particular nuisance, had been enjoined not to repeat or continue it, and had repeated or continued it. The authority under which a Magistrate can order or enjoin a person against repeating or continuing a public nuisance is s. 143 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is the infringement of this order that is punishable under s. 291 of the Penal Code. What is contemplated is an order addressed to a particular person. A Magistrate's powers to deal with public nuisances are contained in Chapters X and XI of the Criminal Procedure Code. Chapter XI is only properly applicable to temporary orders in urgent cases. It is only in such cases that an order may be made *ex parte*, and any exception is allowed to the general rule that it shall be directed to a particular individual. In such emergent cases an order may, under s. 144 of the Code, be directed to the public generally, when frequenting or visiting a particular place, to abstain from a certain act: but this provision does not apply to a proclamation directed not to the public generally frequenting or visiting a particular place, but to a portion of the community. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. JOKHU*. I. L. R. 8 All. 99

**11. ——— Annoyance to a particular religious sect—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 268 and 290—Private nuisance.** The accused cut up, on his verandah, meat that was to be cooked for a dinner-party, exposing it to the sight of persons passing along the road, among whom were some Jains, whose temple was close by. The Jains complained to the Magistrate that the accused had made the air offensive, and caused annoyance. The Magistrate found that the meat was not in an offensive state, but convicted the accused of committing a public nuisance, under s. 268 of the Penal Code, on the ground that he had done an act by which several persons, being Jains, were much annoyed, it being a well-known fact that they had great repugnance to the killing of animals of every sort. *Held*, reversing the conviction and sentence, that in this case no real damage or injury was caused to the public or to the people in general dwelling in the vicinity, and that it was a case of private rather than of public nuisance, and therefore not one falling within the purview of the criminal law. The applicant's act was an annoyance merely by reason of its hurting the feelings of the Jains who have a repugnance to the killing of animals, and did not constitute an offence under s. 291 of the Penal Code. *Muttumira*

**NUISANCE—contd.****3. PUBLIC NUISANCE UNDER PENAL CODE—contd.**

*v. Queen-Emperess, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 590, referred to. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BYRAMJI EDALJI*

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 437

**12. ——— Obstruction to public highway—Penal Code (1860), ss. 268 and 283—Encroachment.** Whoever appropriates any part of a street by building over it infringes the right of the public *quoad* the part built over, and thereby commits an offence punishable under the Penal Code, s. 290, if not one punishable under s. 283. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. VIRAPPA CHETTI*

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 433

**13. ——— Obstruction on tidal navigable river—Penal Code, ss. 268, 283, 290.** Persons placing a bamboo stockade across a tidal navigable river for the purpose of fishing, although leaving in such stockade a narrow opening for the passage of boats, which passage was, however, kept closed except on the actual passage of a boat, were charged, at the instance of a Sub-Divisional Officer, with causing an obstruction under s. 283 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that, although it was doubtful whether s. 283 applied to the case, they had committed an offence under s. 268 of the Penal Code, and were punishable under s. 290 of that Code. *In the matter of the petition of UMESH CHANDRA KAR* I. L. R. 14 Calc. 656

**14. ——— Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 268, 283-290.** The mere fact of an encroachment on a tidal navigable river does not necessarily amount to a public nuisance so as to render a person causing such encroachment liable to punishment under s. 290 of the Penal Code, but there must be evidence that such encroachment causes one of the results specified in s. 268. *In the matter of the petition of Umesh Chandra Kar, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 656*, considered and commented on. The rule laid down in that case to the effect that any encroachment, however slight, on a tidal navigable river constitutes an offence under s. 290, is too widely stated. Each case should be determined on its own merits, and a decision arrived at as to whether the encroachment has caused an obstruction or not. The petitioner was charged with having erected a jag in a tidal navigable river constructed of tress and dams, and thereby having committed offences under ss. 281 and 290 of the Penal Code. There was evidence to show that the jag was about 45 cubits long and 20 cubits broad, and that it was erected on the silted side of the river where it was about 300 hats broad, and that it did not obstruct the ordinary navigation of the river. The lower Court held that the jag could not but cause an obstruction, and convicted the petitioner under s. 283. *Held*, that, as there was no evidence to show that the petitioner had caused any danger, obstruction, or injury to any person in any public way or line of navigation, the conviction under that section could not be sustained. *Held*,



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further, that he could not be convicted under s. 290, as there was no evidence of any obstruction to the ordinary navigation of the river. *JUGAI DAS DALAL v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* . I. L. R. 20 Cal. 665

15. ——— **Slaughter of kine by Mahomedans on their own property—Penal Code, ss. 268, 290.** A person wilfully slaughtering cattle in a public street, so that the slaughter could be heard and seen by the passers-by, would commit an offence punishable under s. 290 of the Penal Code. But where certain Mahomedans, for a religious purpose, killed two cows before sunrise in a private compound partly visible from a public road, and the killing of one of the cows only was witnessed by one Hindu :—*Held*, that the circumstances proved did not amount to the commission of a public nuisance as defined in s. 268 of the Code. *Muttumira v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 7 Mad 590, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ZAKIUDDIN* I. L. R. 10 All. 44

16. ——— **Cremation—Disobedience to an order duly promulgated by a public servant—Penal Code (1860), ss. 188 and 290—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 143—Illegal order.** On the 11th August, 1894, the District Magistrate promulgated an order prohibiting the people of the village of Thirukodikaval from using their burning grounds situated on the southern bank of the Cauvery, and directing them to use other burning grounds which had been provided. On the 11th May, 1895, certain persons, in defiance of this order cremated a corpse at the spot interdicted and were convicted under ss. 188 and 290 of the Penal Code, but the conviction under s. 188 was reversed on appeal. *Held*, that when persons entitled to use particular spot dedicated for the communal purpose of cremation, use it for that purpose in a manner neither unusual nor calculated to aggravate the inconveniences necessarily incidental to such an act as is generally performed in this country, they cannot be convicted of a public nuisance on the ground that their act caused material annoyance and discomfort to persons near the place on the occasion referred to. *Held*, further, that the order of the District Magistrate was not warranted by s. 143, Criminal Procedure Code, or by any other law, and must therefore be set aside. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SAMINADHA PILLAI* I. L. R. 19 Mad. 464

17. ——— **Private action in respect of nuisance—Public thoroughfare—Damage in common with others—No special damage—Mandatory injunction, suit for—Maintainability of.** A private action cannot be maintained in respect of a public nuisance save by a person who suffers particular damage beyond what is suffered by him in common with all other persons affected by the nuisance. *BHAWAN SINGH v. NAROTTOM SINGH* (1909) . . . I. L. R. 31 All. 444

**NUNCUPATIVE WILL.**

*See* DECLARATORY DECREE, SUIT FOR—REVERSIONERS . I. L. R. 7 All. 163

*See* DECLARATORY DECREE, SUIT FOR—SUITS CONCERNING DOCUMENTS. I. L. R. 1 All. 688

L. R. 5 I. A. 87

*See* HINDU LAW—WILL—NUNCUPATIVE WILL.

*See* PROBATE—OF WHAT DOCUMENTS GRANTED . I. L. R. 25 All. 313

*See* WILL—NUNCUPATIVE WILLS. 3 W. R. 63  
I. L. R. 24 Bom. 8

**O****OATH.**

*See* OATHS ACTS.

*See* OATHS ACT (X OF 1873), s. 9. I. L. R. 29 All. 49

*See* WITNESS—CIVIL CASES—SWEARING OR AFFIRMATION OF WITNESSES. 1 Mad. 99 note  
2 Mad. 246

*See* WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—SWEARING OR AFFIRMATION OF WITNESSES. 13 W. R. Cr. 17

administration of, by arbitrat-  
tors—

*See* APPELLATE COURT—OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—SPECIAL CASES—AWARD . I. L. R. 1 All. 535

*See* ARBITRATION—AWARDS—VALIDITY OF AWARDS AND GROUND FOR SETTING THEM ASIDE . I. L. R. 1 All. 535

agreement to take—

*See* COMPROMISE—COMPROMISE OF SUITS UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE. 4 Mad. 422

4 Mad. Ap. :  
I. L. R. 12 Mad. 483  
I. L. R. 14 All. 147

power to administer—

*See* MUNSIF, JURISDICTION OF. I. L. R. 11 Mad. 375

1. ——— *Power to administer oath—Act X of 1861—Mad. Regs. II. of 1832, s. 6, and VI of 1816, s. 27.* Since the repeal of s. 27 of Madras Regulation VI of 1816 and s. 6 of Madras Regulation III of 1802 by Act X of 1861, the Court has no longer the power of settling cases by "oath." ANONYMOUS . . . 4 Mad. Ap. :

2. ——— *Non-judicial proceeding—Charge of giving false evidence on.* In a non-judicial proceeding, the object of which is to dis-



**OATH—concl1.**

cover the writer of a scandalous petition, it is not competent for the Magistrate conducting the proceeding to administer an oath. The High Court reversed a conviction for giving false evidence where an oath was administered under the above circumstances. *REG. v. JIBHAI VAJA* . 11 Bom. 11

3. ————— *Decree upheld in appeal on strength of oath—Final adjudication.* A suit of 1898 had been affirmed on appeal on the strength of an oath taken under the Oaths Act. *Held*, that it was a confirmation of the original decree. As between the parties, a decree arrived at after the taking of an oath on a question of fact in the case is none the less a final adjudication. *AHMED v. MOIDIN* (1901) . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 444

**OATHS ACT (VI OF 1872).**

————— *Omission to take oath or taking it irregularly.* Under Act VI of 1872, s. 5, the omission to take any oath, or any irregularity in the form in which it is administered, does not invalidate the proceedings. *QUEEN v. TARINEE CHURN BOSE* 21 W. R. Cr. 31

**OATHS ACT (X OF 1873).**

## s. 4—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 122.  
I. L. R. 26 All. 371

## ss. 4, 5—

See PENAL CODE, s. 193.  
I. L. R. 29 Mad. 89

## s. 5—

See FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERAL CASES.  
I. L. R. 16 Mad. 421  
I. L. R. 27 Cal. 455

## ss. 5 (b), 13—

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION.  
I. L. R. 36 Cal. 808  
13 C. W. N. 942

## s. 6—

See FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERAL CASES.  
I. L. R. 19 Cal. 355

1. ————— and s. 13—*Witness—Omission to take evidence on oath or affirmation.* S. 6 of the Oaths Act (X of 1873) imperatively requires that no person shall testify as a witness except on oath or affirmation; and notwithstanding s. 13 of the same Act, the evidence of a child of eight or nine years of age is inadmissible if it has been advisedly recorded without any oath or affirmation. *Queen v. Sewa Bhogta*, 11 B. L. R. 294, dissented from. The nature of judicial oaths and affirmations and the history of Indian legislation on the subject discussed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MARU*  
I. L. R. 10 All. 207

2. ————— *Omission to take evidence on oath or affirmation—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 118—Competency of persons of tender years.* The competency of a person to testify

**OATHS ACT (X OF 1873)—concl2.**

## s. 6—concl2.

as a witness is a condition precedent to the administration to him of an oath or affirmation, and is a question distinct from that of his credibility when he has been sworn or has affirmed. In determining the question of competency, the Court, under s. 118 of the Evidence Act, has not to enter into enquiries as to the witness's religious belief, or as to his knowledge of the consequences of falsehood in this world or the next. It has to ascertain, in the best way it can, whether, from the extent of his intellectual capacity and understanding, he is able to give a rational account of what he has seen or heard or done on a particular occasion. If a person of tender years or of very advanced age can satisfy these requirements, his competency as a witness is established. Having regard to the language of the Oaths Act (X of 1873), a Court has no option, when once it has elected to take the statements of a person as evidence, but to administer to such person either an oath or affirmation as the case may require. *Queen-Empress v. Maru*, I. L. R. 10 All. 207, referred to. In a trial for murder before the Court of Session, one of the witnesses was a boy of twelve years of age, and, in answer to questions put by the Sessions Judge, he said that he worshipped Debi and understood the difference between truth and falsehood; that he did not know what would be the consequences here and hereafter of telling lies, but that he would tell the truth. The Sessions Judge proceeded to record the boy's statement, but without administering to him any oath or affirmation. *Held*, that there was nothing in law to sanction this procedure on the part of the Judge. The High Court required the attendance of the boy and of the accused, and, having satisfied itself of the competency of the former to depose as a witness, examined him as to his account of what had occurred. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. LAL SAHAI*  
I. L. R. 11 All. 183

1. ————— s. 8—*Oath purporting to affect a third person—Revocation of consent to be bound by statement made on oath taken in a particular form.* The plaintiff in a civil suit offered to be bound by the statement which the defendant might make on oath holding the arm of his son. The defendant accepted the proposal, took the required oath, and made a statement which had the effect of defeating the plaintiff's claim. When the defendant came into Court to take the oath, the plaintiff attempted to revoke his proposal, but alleged no further reason than that he did not understand what he had intended and did not think the defendant would speak the truth. *Held*, that the form of oath above indicated ought not, having regard to s. 8 of Act X of 1873, to have been administered; but as it had been administered, and was a form of oath specially binding upon Hindus, the statement made upon it should be accepted. *Held*, also, that, when one party to a suit offers to be bound by the oath of the other party, and such other party



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accepts the proposal, the party so offering to be bound should not be allowed to revoke his proposal except upon the strongest possible grounds proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be genuine grounds for revoking the proposal. *Lekh Raj Singh v. Dulhama Kuar*, I. L. R. 4 All. 302, referred to. *RAM NARAIN SINGH v. BABU SINGH*

I. L. R. 18 All. 46

2. and ss. 9, 10, 11—*Applicability to criminal proceedings*—"Party to a judicial proceeding" does not include complainant or accused. The provisions of ss. 8-11 of the Oaths Act (X of 1873) do not apply to criminal proceedings. The expression "party to a judicial proceeding" in s. 8 of the Act does not include either the complainant or the accused in a criminal case. In the course of a trial on a charge of assault the complainant's pleader agreed to be bound by the evidence on oath of a material witness, provided he swore on the Gita (a sacred book of the Hindus). The witness took the required oath, and stated that there was no assault, but merely a taking held of the hand. The Magistrate did not believe this witness, and proceeded with the trial. He convicted the accused on the other evidence in the case, and sentenced him to a fine of R25. *Held*, that the Magistrate was not bound to decide the case on the evidence of the witness who swore the special oath. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MURARJI GOKUL-DAS* . . . . . I. L. R. 13 Bom. 389

## ss. 8-12—

See APPEAL—ARBITRATION.

I. L. R. 4 All. 283

See ARBITRATION—REVOCATION OF, OR WITHDRAWAL FROM, ARBITRATION.

I. L. R. 4 All. 302

## s. 9—

See RES JUDICATA—ADJUDICATIONS.

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 259

1. *Consent by guardian of a minor defendant to accept the oath of the plaintiff.* It was agreed by the defendants who were majors, and by the father and guardian of a minor defendant on his behalf, that one of the issues in a suit should be determined under the Oaths Act, s. 9, by the oath of the plaintiff. The oath was taken, and a decree was passed accordingly. *Held*, that the minor defendant was bound by the consent of his guardian since there was no evidence of fraud or gross negligence on the part of the latter, although the Court had not sanctioned the agreement under s. 462, Civil Procedure Code. *CHENGALREDDI v. VENKATAREDDI*

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 483

See ARUNA CHALLAM v. MURUGAPPA.

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 503

2. *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 462—Offer by guardian of minor defendant to be bound by oath of plaintiff.* The

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offer of the guardian of a minor defendant on behalf of the minor to abide by the deposition to be given by a plaintiff on oath taken in a particular form under the Indian Oaths Act stands on a very different ground from an agreement or compromise contemplated by s. 462 of the Civil Procedure Code. In such a case the minor is bound by the consent of his guardian, although given without the leave of the Court, provided that there is no fraud or gross negligence on the part of the guardian. *Chengalreddi v. Venkatarreddi*, I. L. R. 12 Mad. 483, approved of. *SHEO NATH SARAN v. SUKH LAL SINGH* . . . . . I. L. R. 27 Cal. 229  
4 C. W. N. 327

3. *Vakil, authority of, to bind client—Pleader—Agent holding a power-of-attorney authorizing him to act and appear for a party to a suit.* An Agent, holding a power-of-attorney authorizing him to act and appear for a party to a suit, cannot bring the suit to a close by offering to be bound by the oath of the opposite party in a particular form. Nor can a pleader so bind his client. Under the Indian Oaths Act (X of 1873), no person but the party himself can make such an offer as is contemplated in s. 6. *SADASHIV RAYAJI v. MARUTI VITHAL* . . . . . I. L. R. 14 Bom. 455

4. *Offer by one party to be bound by oath of other party if taken in a certain form—Acceptance of the offer—Subsequent retraction of the offer.* The plaintiff offered under s. 9 of the Indian Oaths Act (X of 1873) to be bound by the oath or affirmation of the defendant in a prescribed form upon a certain point. The defendant accepted the offer and took the oath. *Held*, that the plaintiff could not retract his offer to be bound by the oath. *ARAJI v. BALA* . . . . . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 281

5. *Agreement to be bound by statement on oath of specified person—Such agreement not revocable except for special cause.* Where a party to a suit has made either a reference to arbitration or a reference to the oath of a witness such as is provided for by s. 9 of the Indian Oaths Act, 1873, he should not be allowed arbitrarily to withdraw from the reference. *Lekhraj Singh v. Dulhama Kuar*, I. L. R. 4 All. 302, and *Ram Narain Singh v. Babu Singh*, I. L. R. 18 All. 46, 49, referred to. *CHIDDU v. KUNWAR SEN* (1906)

I. L. R. 29 All. 49

6. and ss. 10 and 11—*Offer by party to be bound—Conclusive proof of the matter stated.* Defendant in a suit, before trial, filed a petition under s. 9 of the Indian Oaths Act, 1873, to the effect that, if the plaintiff should make an oath according to law regarding certain facts, "this defendant will forfeit his right of contesting this suit." He subsequently desired to withdraw the petition on insufficient grounds, but the plaintiff took the oath, and on the strength thereof all the issues were decided and a decree passed in plaintiff's favour. The suit was, however, remanded on appeal, for disposal after recording evidence on both



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sides. On appeal by plaintiff against this order of remand :—*Held*, (i) that there is nothing in ss. 9 to 11 of the Indian Oaths Act, 1873, which allows a party who has agreed to the administration of an oath under those sections to retract after the opponent has accepted the proposal; (ii) that the Act gives the Court a discretion to administer the oath or not, and though it should not administer it if good grounds be shown for retracting, it is justified in so doing, notwithstanding the retraction if the grounds are frivolous; (iii) that if “the matter stated,” as referred to in s. 11 of the Act, affords sufficient material for the decision of the suit, a decree may be passed on the facts so proved. But if the facts so proved are not sufficient for the decision of the case, such further facts as are necessary should be proved by evidence adduced on both sides. The Act provides, not for the adjustment of a suit in an arbitrary way, but merely for the conclusive proof of facts; such facts, if not sufficient for the decision of the suit, should be supplemented by facts duly proved by evidence; and (iv) that the facts proved by the special oath are conclusively proved, and any further evidence that may be taken should be limited to matters not proved by the oath.

THOYI ANMAL v. SUBBAROYA MUDALI  
I. L. R. 22 Mad. 234

7. — ss. 9, 11—*Special oath—Binding effect—Conclusive evidence.* In a proceeding under s. 144, Code of Criminal Procedure, one of the parties undertook to withdraw his claim to the matter in dispute, if the other party should take an oath to a certain effect. The latter took the oath. *Held*, that the oath was not binding as conclusive evidence on the party who threw out the challenge in a subsequent civil proceeding, the parties having had in mind only the proceeding under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at the time the oath was taken. BADIADUDDIN AHMED v. NIZAMUDDIN HAIDER (1906) . . . I. L. R. 33 Cal. 386  
s.c. 10 C. W. N. 501

8. — ss. 9 and 11—*Defendant taking oath proposed by plaintiff—Oath conclusive.* The plaintiff in a suit stated that he would accept whatever evidence the defendant would give with the Ganges water in his hand and on his honour. The defendant swore with Ganges water in his hand that the claim was false inasmuch as the amount due to the plaintiff had been set off against a large sum due to the defendant. *Held*, that the suit must be dismissed, the defendant having sworn in the manner prescribed. CHEDI LAL v. JWALA PRASAD (1909)  
I. L. R. 31 All. 315

ss. 10, 11—*Referee's depositions inadequate for decision of question referred—Appeal after death of referee—Practice.* Where a case had been decided under the provisions of ss. 10 and 11 of the Oaths Act (X of 1873) with reference to the depositions of a person appointed by agreement of the parties as referee, and where, after the death of the referee, on an appeal being preferred

**OATHS ACT (X OF 1873)—*cont'd.*****s. 10—*concl'd.***

against the decree so based upon those depositions, it was found that the said depositions did not fully cover the questions in issue between the parties :—*Held*, that the case should be remanded to the lower Court for disposal according to the usual procedure.

MAHABIR PRASAD MISR v. MAHADEO DAT MISR  
I. L. R. 13 All. 386

**s. 11—**

See RES JUDICATA—ADJUDICATIONS.

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 259

1. — Agreement to be bound by oath—Judgment on such agreement—*Mad. Reg. III of 1806, s. 6.* The mere agreement of one of the parties to a judicial proceeding to be bound by the oath of the other is in itself no adjustment of the suit. If the matter stated in the agreement is sufficient as the grounds of a decision, a judgment may be passed, for then it would be conclusive evidence under the Oaths Act. The difference between Regulation III of 1802, s. 6, and the Indian Oaths Act, 1873, s. 11, discussed. VASUDEVA SHANBOG v. NARAINA PAI . I. L. R. 2 Mad. 356

2. — Agreement to be bound by oath of a particular person—*Discretion of Court.* The Oaths Act (X of 1873) does not constrain a Court to pass a decision in favour of a particular party. If a party to a suit says he will be bound by the oath of a particular person, s. 11 of the Act only means that *pro tanto* he will be bound, i.e., so far as the matter of that evidence is concerned, and that evidence will be conclusive as to its truth as against him throughout the whole of the litigation. But it in no way compels the Court trying the case to accept it as conclusive. *Vasudeva Shanbog v. Naraina Pai, I. L. R. 2 Mad. 356*, approved. MUHAMMAD ZAHUR v. CHEDA LAL  
I. L. R. 14 All. 141

3. — and s. 8—*Defendant examined in usual form.* S. 11 of the Oaths Act (X of 1873) is not applicable to the evidence of a defendant who has been examined under the usual form of oath, and not under any oath or form of affirmation under s. 8. SREEMUNT RAM TOTADAR v. RAM KISHEN SEN . . . 22 W. R. 387

4. — ss. 11, 12—*Where the plaintiff agreeing to take an oath subsequently refuses, the Court cannot dismiss the suit, but must record the fact of refusal under s. 12 and proceed with the suit.* The defendant in a suit agreed in the course of the trial to be bound by the statement on oath of the plaintiff as to certain facts. By an agreement in writing between the parties the plaintiff agreed to take the oath as required on a certain date; that if he failed to do so the suit should be dismissed; and that if the defendant prevented the taking of the oath, there should be a decree for the plaintiff. Before the appointed day, the plaintiff applied to withdraw from the agreement, but the Court refused the application. The plaintiff failed to take the oath and the Court declined to allow the plaintiff to adduce further



**OATHS ACT (X OF 1873)—*contd.*****s. 11—*concl'd.***

evidence and dismissed the suit. *Held*, that the Court ought not to have dismissed the suit, but should have recorded the refusal and the reasons therefor under s. 12 of the Oaths Act and proceeded with the trial. The agreement did not amount to an adjustment of the suit so as to bar further proceedings in the trial. *Umayammi v. Muthia Nadar*, 17 *Mad. L. J.* 99, distinguished. *Vasudeva Shanbog v. Naraina Pai*, 1 *L. R.* 2 *Mad.* 356, followed. *Per MILLER, J., obiter*: If by the act of the party refusing to take the oath, the other party has lost evidence, which was available to him, the Court may be justified in refusing to allow the former to adduce evidence. *MOYAN v. PATHUKUTTI* (1907) . . . **I. L. R. 31 Mad. 1**

1. **s. 12—*Refusal to take the oath—Presumption.*** Where the Lower Appellate Court, at the instance of the defendant, called upon the plaintiff to swear on the Koran that the defendant's case was false, which the plaintiff refused to do:—*Held*, that the Lower Appellate Court was justified in raising a presumption, from the plaintiff's refusal, that his case was false, the Court having power to act as it did under the provisions of Act X of 1873. *ISSEN MEAH v. KALARAM CHUNDER NAW* . . . **2 C. L. R. 476**

2. **Refusal to take on oath—*Effect of such refusal—Estoppel—Evidence.*** The plaintiff sued to recover certain land from eight defendants, alleging it to be his exclusive property. One of the defendants pleaded that he was a co-owner with the plaintiff, who had hitherto paid him his share of the rent. In the course of the case he offered to withdraw his opposition to the plaintiff's claim if the plaintiff would swear a binding oath that his (the defendant's) allegations were false, and that the plaintiff had held exclusive possession of the property. The plaintiff refused to take the proposed oath. The Court, however, attached no importance to the refusal, and on the evidence passed a decree for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, and in the Appellate Court the plaintiff's son, on behalf of his father, refused the oath, while on the other hand the defendant said he was willing, if required, to swear to the truth of his case. The Judge was of opinion that the plaintiff's refusal to take the proposed oath and the defendant's readiness to take it was, under the circumstances of the case, conclusive, and disregarding the recorded evidence, he reversed the decree of the lower Court, and allowed the defendant's claim. *Held*, (reversing the appellate decree and restoring the decree of the lower Court), that the Appellate Court was wrong in deciding the case on the ground of the plaintiff's refusal to take the proposed oath. That refusal did not conclusively prove the falsity of the plaintiff's claim. It was merely a piece of conduct which was evidence to be considered in the case together with the other evidence. In this case there was abundant other evidence, all of which was in favour of the plaintiff, and his

**OATHS ACT (X OF 1873)—*contd.*****s. 12—*concl'd.***

refusal to take the oath did not necessarily constitute a sufficient reason to set aside that evidence. A party who makes an oath as prescribed by his adversary confers by so doing on his statement the character of conclusive proof, but his mere refusal to make the oath does not, under the terms of the Oaths Act (X of 1873), justify any legal presumption against him. Such refusal is to be considered merely as a piece of conduct to be considered along with the other evidence. *CHINTAMAN BHAT v. SHRINIVAS BHAT* . . . **I. L. R. 22 Bom. 680**

**s. 13—**

*See* ARBITRATION—AWARDS—VALIDITY OF AWARDS AND GROUNDS FOR SETTING THEM ASIDE . . . **I. L. R. 1 All. 535**

*See* COMMISSION—CIVIL CASES. **7 C. W. N. 806**

*See* FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERAL CASES. **I. L. R. 19 Calc. 355**

1. **Omission to take evidence on oath of affirmation.** The word "omission" in s. 13 of Act X of 1873 includes any omission and is not limited to accidental or negligent omissions. *JACKSON, J., dissented. QUEEN v. SEWA BHOGTA* . . . **14 B. L. R. F. B. 294 : 23 W. R. Cr. 12**

2. **Omission to take evidence on oath or affirmation.** S. 13 of Act X of 1873 does not render the evidence of a child of nine years of age inadmissible, if the evidence has been advisedly, and not by an omission, recorded without any oath or affirmation. *QUEEN v. ANUNTO CHUCKERBUTTY* . . . **14 B. L. R. 295 note : 22 W. R. Cr. 1**

3. **Competent witness.** The accused was charged with throwing *B* and *C* down a well. She was charged with the murder of *B* under s. 312 of the Penal Code, and on that charge she was tried and acquitted. Thereupon the Joint Magistrate, without holding any further preliminary inquiry, committed her on a charge, under s. 307, of attempting to murder *C*. The only eye-witness of the offence, according to the Sessions Judge, was a child, and as she did not understand the nature of an oath or solemn affirmation, her evidence was taken on simple affirmation. The jury found the prisoner guilty, and she was sentenced to ten years' transportation. *Held*, that the omission to administer either an oath or solemn affirmation, although knowingly made, did not render the child's evidence inadmissible. *QUEEN v. ITWARYA* . . . **14 B. L. R. 54 : 22 W. R. Cr. 14**

4. **Omission to swear jury in sessions case.** *Quære*: If the jury in a sessions case are not sworn, whether the omission is one which would be covered by s. 13 of the Oaths Act, 1873. *QUEEN v. RAMSODOY CHUCKERBUTTY* . . . **20 W. R. Cr. 9**



**OATHS ACT (X OF 1873)—concl'd.****s. 13—concl'd.**

5. ——— *Omission to administer an oath or affirmation—Witness, Competency of—Child, Evidence of.* At a trial on a charge of murder one of the witnesses for the prosecution was a girl about ten years old. The Sessions Judge allowed her to be examined without administering any oath or affirmation, as it was found that she did not understand the nature of either. The prisoner's counsel objected to the admissibility of her statements, but the objection was overruled, and the prisoner was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. *Held, per JARDINE, J.,* that the girl's evidence was admissible. The "omission," referred to in s. 13 of the Indian Oaths Act (X of 1873) includes any kind of omission, and is not restricted to accidental or negligent omissions. *Queen v. Sewa Bhogta, 14 B. L. R. 294: 23 W. R. Cr. 1,* approved; and *Queen-Empress v. Maru, I. L. R. 10 All. 207,* dissented from. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SHAVA. I. L. R. 16 Bom. 359*

6. ——— and s. 6—*Examination as witness of a child of tender years—Intentional omission to administer affirmation.* A child, aged about six years, was called as a witness in a Sessions Court. The Judge satisfied himself of his intellectual capacity to give evidence, but intentionally omitted to administer an affirmation on the ground that he was of too tender years to render any attempt to bind his conscience expedient or practically operative. The Judge did not examine the child for the purpose of eliciting whether he knew it was wrong not to tell the truth, or whether he knew the difference between right and wrong, but he told him to tell the truth and permitted him to be examined as a witness. *Held,* that the child should have been affirmed. *Quære:* Whether the omission to affirm the child having been intentional on the part of the Judge, the case came within the provisions of Oaths Act, s. 13. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. VIRAPERUMAL I. L. R. 16 Mad. 105*

**s. 14—**

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 132.

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 440

See FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERAL CASES.

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 355

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 375

See MAGISTRATE—POWERS OF MAGISTRATES . I. L. R. 16 Mad. 421

**"OBJECT" HELD SACRED.**

See RELIGION, OFFENCES RELATING TO.

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 852

**OBJECTION.**

See APPEAL—OBJECTIONS BY RESPONDENT.

See APPELLATE COURT—OBJECTION TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.

See PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—PRACTICE AS TO OBJECTIONS.

**OBJECTION—concl'd.**

See REMAND—OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS ON REMAND.

——— taken for first time on appeal—

See APPELLATE COURT—OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.

See JURISDICTION—QUESTION OF JURISDICTION.

See PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—PRACTICE AS TO OBJECTIONS.

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—PROCEDURE IN SPECIAL APPEAL.

——— to apportionment—

See COMPENSATION I. L. R. 34 Calc. 451

——— to validity of decree—

See EXECUTION OF DECREE.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 26

**OBJECTS AND REASONS FOR ACT.**

See STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF.

11 Moo. I. A. 551 .

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 241 .

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 145 .

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 544 .

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 732

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 788

L. R. 22 I. A. 107

**OBSCENE ADVERTISEMENTS.**

See OBSCENE POST-CARDS.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 247

**OBSCENE POST-CARDS.**

——— *Post-cards containing obscene advertisement—Post Office Act (VI of 1898), ss. 20, 61.* Transmission by post of printed post-cards containing an advertisement of a patent medicine in language of an obscene character is an offence within ss. 20 and 61 of the Post Office Act (VI of 1891). *The Queen v. Hicklin, L. R. 3 Q. B. 360, Empress of India v. Indarman, I. L. R. 3 All. 837, and Queen-Empress v. Parashram Yeshvant, I. L. R. 20 Bom. 193,* relied upon. *SARAT CHANDRA GHOSE v. KING-EMPEROR (1904)*

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 247

**OBSCENE PUBLICATION.**

See PENAL CODE, s. 292.

I. L. R. 28 All. 100

1. ——— "Obscene," meaning of the word—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 292 and 293.* In interpreting the word "obscene" in ss. 292 and 293 of the Penal Code, the Courts may rightly follow *Reg. v. Hicklin, L. R. 3 Q. B. 360,* where Lord Cockburn, C.J., says: "I think the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may



**OBSCENE PUBLICATION—concl'd.**

fall." Whether a publication is obscene is a question of fact. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PARASHRAM YESHVANT* . . . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 193

2. ——— Destruction of book by order of Criminal Court—*Penal Code, s. 293—Act X of 1872 (Criminal Procedure Code), s. 418.* A book may be obscene, within the meaning of the Penal Code, although it contains but a single obscene passage. The defence to a charge of selling and distributing certain obscene books was that they were sold and distributed in good faith in prosecution of a religious controversy. *Held*, that the excessive obscenity of such books took away the protection which their controversial nature might otherwise have afforded them. *Held*, also, that the intention of the seller and distributor must be gathered from the character of the matter contained in such books. As he had chosen to sell and distribute what was obscene, it must be presumed that he intended the natural consequences of his act, namely, corruption of the minds and prejudice of the morals of the public. It was not sufficient for him to say that his intentions were good. It was his public act that must be the test of his intentions; and having done an unlawful act, it was no answer to say that he thought it lawful. *Queen v. Hicklin, L. R. 3 Q. B. 360*, and *Steele v. Brannan, L. R. 7 C. P. 261*, followed. At the conclusion of the trial of a person for the sale and distribution of obscene books, the Court trying him ordered the destruction of certain copies of such books, voluntarily surrendered by him, under s. 418 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *Held*, that such Court was not empowered by that section to make such an order. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. INDARMAN* . . . I. L. R. 3 All. 837

**OBSTRUCTION.**

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, CH. XIX, PROV. H. I. L. R. 30 Bom. 115

See RESISTANCE OR OBSTRUCTION TO ARREST.

See RESISTANCE OR OBSTRUCTION TO EXECUTION OF DECREE.

**——— of public servant—**

See PENAL CODE, s. 186 6 C. W. N. 120

**——— on public street—**

See ENCROACHMENT.  
I. L. R. 34 Calc. 844

**——— removal of—**

See NUISANCE—UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

**——— to flow of water—**

See INJUNCTION—SPECIAL CASES—OBSTRUCTION OR INJURY TO RIGHTS OF PROPERTY—WATER.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 26 (1871, s. 27) . . . I. L. R. 1 Mad. 335

**OBSTRUCTION—concl'd.****——— to flow of water—concl'd.**

See PRESCRIPTION—EASEMENTS—RIGHTS OF WATER.

See RIGHT TO USE OF WATER.

**——— to navigation—**

See NUISANCE—PUBLIC NUISANCE UNDER PENAL CODE . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 656  
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 665

*Beng. Act V of 1864.* To render a person liable to punishment under s. 16, Bengal Act V of 1864, for obstructing the line of navigation of a Government canal, it must be shown that he wilfully obstructed the navigation. *QUEEN v. KABIL MANJI* . 2 B. L. R. A. C. 23  
S.C. *QUEEN v. KALIL* . 11 W. R. Cr. 18

**——— to public way—**

See NUISANCE—UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE . 6 C. W. N. 886  
I. L. R. 23 All. 159  
7 C. W. N. 117

See RIGHT OF SUIT—OBSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC HIGHWAY.

See WRONGFUL RESTRAINT.  
5 C. W. N. 215

**——— to right of way—**

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—DISPUTES AS TO RIGHT OF WAY, WATER, ETC.  
5 C. W. N. 335

**——— to rights of property—**

See INJUNCTION—SPECIAL CASES—OBSTRUCTION OR INJURY TO RIGHTS OF PROPERTY.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—INJURY TO ENJOYMENT OF PROPERTY

**——— to road or public way—**

See BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT, 1884, s. 217.  
I. L. R. 17 Calc. 684

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—PUBLIC WAYS, OBSTRUCTION OF.

See MADRAS POLICE ACT, 1859, s. 48.  
I. L. R. 4 Mad. 235

See MADRAS POLICE ACT, 1888, s. 71.  
I. L. R. 14 Mad. 223

See MAGISTRATE—GENERAL JURISDICTION.  
I. L. R. 15 Mad. 83

See PENAL CODE, s. 283.  
I. L. R. 4 Mad. 235  
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 275

See RIGHT OF SUIT—OBSTRUCTION TO PUBLIC HIGHWAY.

**OCCUPANCY.**

See PUNJAB LAWS ACT.  
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 635



## OCCUPANCY HOLDING.

- See AGRA TENANCY ACT (II OF 1901).  
I. L. R. 28 All. 696  
I. L. R. 29 All. 129; 327
- See BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885).  
12 C. W. N. 114, 899
- See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 29 (b).  
11 C. W. N. 62
- See CENTRAL PROVINCES TENANCY ACT.  
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 470
- See ESTOPPEL . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 904
- See DEATH OF RAIYAT WITHOUT HEIRS.  
13 C. W. N. 12
- See DISPOSSESSION . 13 C. W. N. 108
- See LANDLORD AND TENANT.  
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 904  
12 C. W. N. 72; 589
- See LETTERS PATENT APPEAL.  
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1096
- See N.-W. P. RENT ACT (XII OF 1881),  
s. 9 . I. L. R. 31 All. 51
- See MORTGAGE . 13 C. W. N. 12
- See OCCUPANCY RIGHT.
- See OCCUPANCY TENANT.
- See PURCHASER . 13 C. W. N. 652
- See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY.
- See SALE OF . 13 C. W. N. 913
- See TRANSFER . 13 C. W. N. 630
- See UNREGISTERED TRANSFEREE.  
13 C. W. N. 98

*Non-transferable occupancy holding—Co-sharer landlord's decree for rent—Sale in execution—Purchase by decree-holder—Purchase at mortgage-sale—Rights of purchasers.* In a suit for recovery of khas possession by the plaintiff who had purchased an occupancy holding in execution of a mortgage decree, the defendant claimed under a lease from co-sharer landlord who also had purchased the holding in execution of a decree for his share of the rent. *Held*, that the question of transferability of the holding did not arise. *AYEN-UDDIN NASYA v. SRISH CHANDRA BANERJI* (1906)

11 C. W. N. 76

2. *Similarity of possession—Temporary lease—Occupancy raiyat—Right of landlord to recover khas possession—Costs.* Where a lessee of lands in the occupation of raiyats who had *jote* rights obtained khas possession of the lands with the consent of the raiyats for the purpose of indigo cultivation: *Held*, that the lessee being merely a landlord in occupation did not acquire occupancy right in the lands and the lessor became entitled to khas possession on the expiry of the lease. *RAM LOCHI KOERI v. HERBERT COLLINGRIDGE* (1907)

11 C. W. N. 397

3. *Occupancy-holding—Right of occupancy—Sale of non-transferable occu-*

## OCCUPANCY HOLDING—contd.

*pancy holdings in execution of money decree—Subsequent recognition by landlord—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244—Questions for Court executing decree—Issue raised by judgment-debtor as defendant in separate suit that property sold was not saleable—Estoppel.* Where the purchaser of a non-transferable occupancy holding at a sale in execution of a money-decree obtains the landlord's consent to the sale and his recognition of the purchaser as a tenant as soon as can reasonably be expected after the objections to the purchaser's obtaining possession have been overcome, the sale is rendered valid in law. It is not necessary that the consent of the landlord should be obtained prior to the execution proceedings. Where in execution of a money decree against the defendant an occupancy holding belonging to him was sold and he had failed to raise the objection at the time of the sale, that the holding was not transferable, although he had full knowledge of the execution proceedings and had full opportunity to raise the objection: *Held*, that it was not competent to him to resist the purchaser after the confirmation of the sale and that as between himself and the purchaser the title to the property vested in the latter on such confirmation. *Sheikh Murullah v. Sheikh Burullah*, 9 C. W. N. 972; *Durga Charan Mandal v. Kali Prasanna Sarkar*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 727; and *Bhiram Ali Shaikh Shikdar v. Gopi Kanth Shaha*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 355, referred to. *DWAR-KANATH PAL v. TARINI SANKAR RAY* (1907)

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 199

4. *Occupancy holding, transferability of—Custom and usage, proof of—Second appeal, ground of—Finding of fact.* To prove a custom or usage that occupancy holdings are transferable in any locality, it is not sufficient to shew simply that such holdings are sold in the village or neighbouring villages. The essence of a usage of transferability is that transfers made to the knowledge of, but without the consent of, the landlord are valid and must be recognised by him. *Jagun Proshad v. Posun Sahoo*, 8 C. W. N. 172, followed. When occupancy holdings are not transferable by custom the person who purchases them in execution of a money-decree purchases nothing. They are not transferable as between the judgment-debtor and the decrec-holder. *PEARY MOHAN MUKERJEE v. JOTE KUMAR MUKERJEE* (1906)

11 C. W. N. 83

5. *Occupancy-holding, non-transferable—Transfer, if may be questioned by transferor's heirs—Transfer by will—Void or voidable—Landlord's option.* The transfer of an occupancy holding, which is not transferable by local custom or usage, is not a void transaction. It is binding between the parties, namely, the transferor and the transferee, and all persons claiming through them, and is voidable only at the option of the landlord. The heirs of an occupancy raiyat would therefore be bound by a transfer of the holding made by will. *Bhagirath Changa v. Sheikh Hafizuddin*, 4 C. W. N. 679, *Basarat Mandal v.*



**OCCUPANCY HOLDING—contd.**

*Sabulla Mandal*, 2 C. W. N. cclxxix; *Ambica Nath Acharji v. Aditya Nath Maitra*, 6 C. W. N. 624; *Ayenuddin Nasya v. Srish Chandra Banerjee*, 11 C. W. N. 76, relied on. *HARI DAS BANERJEE v. UDOY CHANDRA DAS BAIRAGI* (1908)

12 C. W. N. 1086

**6. ————— Transferability—**

*Usage—Growing usage not sufficient—Usufructuary mortgage by tenant—Subsequent relinquishment to landlord—Right of landlord to re-enter—Mortgage or out and out sale.* In 1894 an occupancy raiyat executed a usufructuary mortgage of the holding, put the mortgagee in possession, and though it was arranged that the tenant would continue to pay rent to the landlord, the tenant left the village and abandoned all connection with the land. In 1901, the tenant executed a deed of relinquishment in favour of the landlord and surrendered the land to him, and it did not appear that he had paid any rent since. *BRETT, J.*, held, on second appeal, upon a consideration of the terms of the mortgage-bond and the circumstances connected with the transaction, that, although the document purported to be a usufructuary mortgage for sixty years, the transaction was really an out and out sale and the deed was drawn up in that form in order to evade the provisions of law against the transfer of occupancy holdings. *Held*, by *RAMPINI, C.J.*, and *MITRA, J.*—That apart from such consideration, the moment the deed of relinquishment was executed by the tenant, the landlord became entitled to re-enter. A growing usage of transferability of occupancy-holdings is of no effect against the landlord. The usage, to be effective, must have already grown up. *Ambica Churn Chakravarti v. Dya Gazi*, 10 C. W. N. 497; *Rasik Lall Dutt v. Bidhu Mukhi Dasi*, 10 C. W. N. 719, relied on. *RAJENDRA KISHORE ADHIKARI v. CHANDRA NATH DUTT* (1907)

12 C. W. N. 878

**7. ————— Occupancy hold-**

*ing, non-transferable—Transfer—Transfer in possession as tenant of transferee—Ejectment.* Where on a transfer of a non-transferable occupancy holding the original tenant takes a sub-lease under the transferee and in a suit by the landlord for *khas* possession pleads that the holding was transferable and that he is in occupation as a sub-tenant under the transferee: *Held*, that the landlord is entitled to *khas* possession by ejecting both the original tenant and the transferee. *Rajani Kanto Biswas v. Ekkowri Dass*, 11 C. W. N. 811; *s.c. I. L. R. 34 Calc. 689*, explained. *KALI CHARAN GHOSH v. ARMAN BIBI* (1908) . 13 C. W. N. 220

**8. ————— Occupancy hold-**

*ing—Usufructuary mortgage by raiyat—Rent receipt recognising mortgage—Landlord's suit for khas possession.* When an occupancy raiyat executed in favour of one B a usufructuary mortgage with possession, which was recognised by the landlord as shown by written receipts of money on account of rent wherein the payment of rent was expressed to be "through B, the mortgagee:" *Held*, that

**OCCUPANCY HOLDING—concl'd.**

the landlord was not entitled to recover *khas* possession. *Barada Charan Dutt v. Hemlata Dasi*, 13 C. W. N. 242, reversed. *BARODA CHURN DUTT v. HEMLATA DAS* (1909) . 13 C. W. N. 833

**9. ————— Civil Procedure**

*Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244—Occupancy holding—Unregistered transferee—Auction-purchaser of his interest, if bound by rent-decree against registered tenant—Right to apply to set aside sale as fraudulent—Locus standi.* A purchaser in execution of a decree against an unregistered transferee of an occupancy holding as well as the unregistered transferee himself are bound by a decree for rent subsequently obtained against the registered tenant. The purchaser is therefore a representative of the judgment debtor within the provisions of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code and may apply to set aside a sale held in execution of the rent decree on the ground of fraud. *Ishan Chunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar*, 1. L. R. 24 Calc. 62, followed. *Azgarali v. Asaboddin Kazi*, 9 C. W. N. 131, *Gopi Nath Chattopadhyaya v. Sajani Kanta Singh*, 10 C. W. N. 240, referred to. *HARADHAN RAKHIT v. GIRISH CHANDRA MUKERJEE* (1908) . 13 C. W. N. 98

**OCCUPANCY RIGHT.**

*See* *BENGAL TENANCY ACT*, s. 21.

9 C. W. N. 141

10 C. W. N. 351

*See* *OCCUPANCY HOLDING.*

*See* *REVENUE SALE LAW*, s. 37.

10 C. W. N. 497

*See* *RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY.*

*See* *TRANSFER* 10 C. W. N. 499; 1033

**————— sale of —**

*See* *KHOTI SETTLEMENT ACT.*

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 267

*See* *OCCUPANCY HOLDING.*

**OCCUPANCY TENANT.**

*See* *ENHANCEMENT.*

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 607

*See* *INAMDAR* I. L. R. 28 Bom. 74; 92

*See* *KHOTI SETTLEMENT ACT.*

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 290

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 267

*See* *LANDLORD AND TENANT*

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 531

*See* *NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES RENT ACT* . I. L. R. 26 All. 78

*See* *OCCUPANCY HOLDING.*

**OCCUPIERS AND OWNERS.****————— Fine imposed on —**

*See* *BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT*, 1864, s. 67.

8 B. L. R. Ap. 9

3 W. R. Cr. 33, 57

W. R. Cr. 45



**OFFENCE.**

See OFFENCE ON THE HIGH SEAS.

See RAILWAY COMPANY 11 C. W. N. 583

by alien in Foreign State—

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—  
NATIVE INDIAN SUBJECTS.

I L. R. 18 Bom. 178

date of—

See PROSECUTION I. L. R. 34 Calc. 909

during journey—

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—  
OFFENCES COMMITTED DURING JOURNEY.

in contempt of Court—

See CONTEMPT OF COURT.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 476  
(1872, s. 471).

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 487  
(1872, s. 473).

specification of—

See WARRANT OF ARREST—CRIMINAL  
CASES . . . 6 B. L. R. Ap. 129

**OFFENCE BEFORE PENAL CODE  
CAME INTO OPERATION.**

1. ———— **Murder**—*Beng. Reg. IV of 1797—Act XVII of 1862—General Clauses Consolidation Act (I of 1868), s. 6—Repeal of statute, effect of—Right of defence to High Court.* Up to the 1st January, 1862, a person committing the offence of murder was liable to trial and punishment under the Regulations. By Act XVII of 1862 the Regulations prescribing punishments for offences were repealed "except as to any offence committed before the 1st January, 1862." By the same Act it was declared that no person who should claim the same should be deprived of any right of appeal or reference which he would have enjoyed under such Regulations. By s. 6 of Act I of 1868, the repeal of an Act does not affect anything done, or any offence committed, or any fine or penalty incurred before the repealing Act shall have come into operation. Under the provisions of this section, the repeal of Act XVII of 1862 by Act VIII of 1868 and Act X of 1872 did not, in respect of offences committed before the 1st January 1862, affect the penalties prescribed by such Regulations, nor were any of the Regulations prescribing punishments for offences, which were in force before the passing of Act XVII of 1862, repealed in respect of offences committed before the 1st January, 1862, prior to the passing of Act I of 1868. *Held*, accordingly, where a person committed murder in the year 1855, that such person was punishable under the Regulations. *Held*, also, that, inasmuch as such right as the right of reference given by s. 3 of Regulation IV of 1797 accrues on conviction, and therefore in the present case

**OFFENCE BEFORE PENAL CODE  
CAME INTO OPERATION—concl'd.**

had not accrued before Act XVII of 1862 was repealed, it is doubtful whether a person convicted of murder committed before the 1st January, 1862, has such right. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. MULUA*

I. L. R. 1 All. 599

2. ———— *Beng. Reg. IV of 1797—Act XVII of 1862—General Clauses Consolidation Act (I of 1868), s. 6—Repeal of statute, effect of.* The prisoner was found guilty and sentenced under Regulation IV of 1797 to transportation for life, for a murder committed in 1861, before the Penal Code came into operation, and the case was sent up to the High Court to confirm the sentence. Regulation IV of 1797 was repealed by Act XVII of 1862, and that Act was wholly repealed by Acts VIII of 1868 and X of 1872. *Held*, on reference to a Full Bench, that the conviction was illegal, s. 6 of Act I of 1868, which provides that the repeal of any Act or Regulation shall not affect any offence committed before the repealing Act shall have come into operation, not being applicable. *EMPRESS v. DILJOOR MISSER* . . . I. L. R. 2 Calc. 225

3. ———— **Perjury or forgery**—*Act I of 1848—Sanction in case of perjury or forgery.* A case of perjury or forgery alleged to have been committed in a case before a Civil Court before January 1st, 1862, can be dealt with only under the old Procedure Law (Act I of 1848), according to which the sanction of the Court before which the offence was alleged to have been committed was necessary before criminal proceedings can be instituted. *In re RADHAJEEBUN MOOSTAFEE*

5 W. R. Cr. 8: 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 97

4. ———— **Forgery**—*Procedure in case of forgery.* In a case of filing a forged vakalatnamah in a Civil Court before January 1st, 1862, the prosecution can only proceed in the ordinary way, i.e., by way of commitment by a Magistrate on the complaint of the party aggrieved. *QUEEN v. ENAYET HOSSEIN* . . . 5 W. R. Cr. 43

5. ———— **Mortgage of property previously mortgaged**—*Bom. Reg. XIV of 1827—Religious Law of Hindus.* Regulation XIV of 1827 (Bombay), s. 1, cl. 1, art. 7, and the Religious Law of the Hindus, are not applicable to the case of a party charged with mortgaging his house a second time previously to redeeming the same from a prior mortgagee. *REG. v. ANNAJI VALAD GOVINDRAM*

1 Bom. 93

**OFFENCE ON THE HIGH SEAS.**

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—  
GENERAL JURISDICTION.

8 Bom. Cr. 63

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 23

1. ———— **Punishment—Procedure**—*European British subject—7 Will. IV, and 1 Vict., c. 85, s. 2—1 & 15 Vict., c. 19, s. 5—Jurisdiction—Act XIII of 1835.* In prosecuting a British subject for an offence committed on board a British



**OFFENCE ON THE HIGH SEAS—contd.**

ship upon the high seas:—*Held* (i) (PHEAR, *J. dubitante*), that he must be charged with an offence under English law; (ii) that the punishment must be according to English law; (iii) that the trial must be according to the procedure of the local Court. Therefore, where a British subject was charged before the High Court with having committed an offence under 7 Will. IV, and 1 Vict., c. 85, s. 2, on board a British ship, upon the high seas, within the Admiralty jurisdiction of the Court, and found guilty of an offence under 14 & 15 Vict., c. 19, s. 5:—*Held*, that the conviction was good, and that the prisoner would be rightly punished with rigorous imprisonment, which is defined by s. 53 of the Penal Code to be equivalent to imprisonment with hard labour, and that the trial had been rightly proceeded with under Act XIII of 1865. *QUEEN v. THOMPSON* . . . . . 1 B. L. R. O. Cr. 1

See *EMPEROR v. SALIMULLAH*.

I. L. R. 39 Calc. 487

2. ———— **Law applicable—Stat. 30 & 31 Vict., c. 124, s. 11—Procedure—Power of Legislature.** The substantive law applicable to a British-born subject tried in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay for destroying a British ship on the high seas, at a distance of more than three miles from the shores of British India, is the English law, and not the Penal Code, notwithstanding the provisions of Stat. 30 & 31 Vict., c. 124, s. 11. The same substantive law is applicable to prisoners who conspire together in Bombay to destroy such ship on the high seas, and such ship is so destroyed in consequence. The procedure applicable in such cases is the ordinary criminal procedure of the High Court. The question whether the Indian Legislature has power to legislate with reference to offences committed on the high seas considered. There is not any Act of the Indian Legislature now in force which provides for the offence of destroying a ship, when committed at a greater distance than three miles from the coast, or for the abetment in British India of such an offence so committed. *REG. v. ELMSTONE* . . . 7 Bom. Cr. 89

3. ———— **Jurisdiction of Criminal Courts—Power to legislate for high seas—Stats. 12 & 13 Vict., c. 96, and 23 & 24 Vict., c. 88.** An offence committed on the high seas, but within three miles from the coast of British India, as being committed within the territorial limits of British India, is punishable under the provisions of the Penal Code. The ordinary Criminal Courts of the country have jurisdiction over such offences by virtue of the Stat. 12 & 13 Vict., c. 96, ss. 2 and 3, extended to India by Stat. 23 & 24 Vict., c. 88. *Semle*: The Governor General of India in Council has no power to legislate for offences committed on the high seas outside the territorial limits of British India, though he has power to legislate in respect of offences committed on the high seas within three miles of its coasts. Meaning and effect to Stat. 12 & 13 Vict., c. 69, ss. 2 and 3, considered. *Queen v. Thompson*, 1 B. L. R. O. Cr. 1, commented on. *REG. v. KASTYA RAMA* . . . . . 8 Bom. Cr. 63

**OFFENCE ON THE HIGH SEAS—concl'd.**

4. ———— **Jurisdiction of Criminal Court—Law applicable to offence committed within three miles of Goa—Treaty Act (IV of 1880)—Stat. 30 & 31 Vict., c. 124, s. 11—Stat. 37 & 38 Vict., c. 27—Procedure.** The rule laid down in *Reg. v. Elmstone*, 7 Bom. Cr. 89, to the effect that English and not Indian law is applicable to offences committed on the high seas, is altered by Stat. 37 & 38 Vict., c. 27, which provides that such offences shall be tried and punished according to the local law. The accused, who was captain of a native craft, was charged with having dishonestly sold his cargo and scuttled his ship in the course of a voyage from Aleppy to Bombay. The accused was arrested in the Ratnagiri District, and committed for trial to the Sessions Judge of Ratnagiri, who convicted him under ss. 407 and 437 of the Penal Code and sentenced him to five years' rigorous imprisonment. On appeal, the accused contended that the Sessions Judge of Ratnagiri had no jurisdiction to try the case: 1st, because the first offence, if it took place at all, was committed within the territorial waters of Goa; and, 2ndly, because the offence, if committed on the high seas, could only be tried according to the law of England and not according to the Penal Code. *Held*, (i) that the Court at Ratnagiri had jurisdiction. If the offence were committed within three miles of Goa, the Treaty Act (IV of 1880) between England and Portugal as regards the Goa territory conferred the right to try such cases in British India. (ii) If the offence were committed beyond the three-mile limit and on the high seas, the Court had jurisdiction and the Penal Code applied under the provisions of Stat. 30 & 31 Vict., c. 124, s. 11, and Stat. 37 & 38 Vict., c. 27. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ABDOL RAHMAN* . . . . . I. L. R. 14 Bom. 227

5. ———— **Trial of British seaman for offence committed on a British ship on the high seas—Procedure at such trial—Merchant Shipping Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict., c. 104), s. 267—Merchant Shipping Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict., c. 91), s. 21—Courts (Colonial) Jurisdiction Act, 1874 (37 & 38 Vict., c. 27)—Jurisdiction of Criminal Court.** The trial of a British seaman for an offence committed on a British ship on the high seas must be conducted under the Code of Criminal Procedure, though the offence charged must be an offence under English law. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GUNNING* . . . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 782

**OFFENCE RELATING TO DOCUMENTS.**

See FALSE EVIDENCE FABRICATING FALSE EVIDENCE.

See FORGERY.

1. ———— **Penal Code, s. 477—Destruction of pottah.** The tearing up of a pottah is destruction of valuable security within the meaning of s. 477 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN v. NITTAR MUNDLE* . . . . . 3 W. R. Cr. 38



**OFFENCE RELATING TO DOCUMENTS—concl'd.**

Penal Code, s. 477—concl'd.

2. ————— *Valuable security—Unstamped and inadmissible document.* The fact that a document has not been stamped, and is not therefore receivable in evidence, does not prevent its being a "valuable security" within the meaning of s. 477 of the Penal Code. *ANONYMOUS*

7 Mad. Ap. 26

3. ————— and s. 95—*Destruction of a valuable security—Unstamped document purporting to be a valuable security—Act causing slight harm.* A, having had certain transactions with B, wrote out a rough account showing his indebtedness to B and signed the total. The paper was not stamped. B afterwards presented it to A and demanded payment of the total amount. A paid part only, and after an altercation tore up the paper. *Held*, that the act of tearing up the paper constituted the offence of destroying a valuable security, and the harm caused was such that a person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of it. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAMASAMI* . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 148

4. ————— and s. 426—*Destruction of promissory note—Mischief—Jurisdiction of Sessions Court.* P M was convicted by a Magistrate under s. 426 of the Indian Penal Code on a charge of mischief by tearing up a promissory note for Rs. 20. *Held*, that the offence charged fell under s. 477 of the Penal Code, and was therefore triable by a Sessions Court only. *In re MADURAI*

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 54

5. ————— s. 477A—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 222 (2)—Criminal breach of trust by public servant—General falsification of accounts for a period extending over two years.* The alteration in the law by s. 222 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) does not apply to a charge under s. 457A of the Penal Code (falsification of document). It applies only to criminal breach of trust or dishonest misappropriation of money. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MATI LAL LAHRI*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 560

3 C. W. N. 412

**OFFENCE UNDER THREAT.**

————— Penal Code, s. 94—*Proof requisite.* To obtain the benefit of the exception allowed by s. 94 of the Penal Code, it must be shown that the prisoners were compelled to set as they did from apprehension that instant death would be the consequence of a refusal. *QUEEN v. SONOO*

10 W. R. Cr. 48

**OFFER MADE WITHOUT PREJUDICE.**

See WRITTEN STATEMENT.

12 B. L. R. Ap. 19

**OFFERINGS.**

See ATTACHMENT—SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—OFFERINGS TO HINDU DEITY.

**OFFICE.**

————— intrusion on—

See INJUNCTION—SPECIAL CASES—INTRUSION ON OFFICE.

————— suits concerning—

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—OFFICES, RIGHT TO.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—OFFICE OR EMOLUMENT.

**OFFICE-BROCAGE AGREEMENT.**

See AGREEMENT OPPOSED TO PUBLIC POLICY . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 530

**OFFICER.**

————— acting in two capacities—

See COLLECTOR.

See MAGISTRATE . 5 B. L. R. Ap. 89  
8 B. L. R. 422  
24 W. R. Cr. 1

————— appointed to conduct appeal—

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—ACQUIT-TALS, APPEALS FROM.

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 273

————— dismissal of—

See RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY.

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 185

————— liability of—

See COMPANY—WINDING UP—LIABILITY OF OFFICERS.

See GOVERNMENT OFFICERS, ACTS OF.

See JUDICIAL OFFICERS.

————— of corporation or company—

See PLAINT—FORM AND CONTENTS OF PLAINT—PLAINTIFFS.

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 41

I. L. R. 20 All. 167

See PLAINT—VERIFICATIONS AND SIGNATURE . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 60

L. R. 20 I. A. 139

See WRITTEN STATEMENT.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 268

————— of Government—

See COLLECTOR . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 318

See GOVERNMENT OFFICERS, ACTS OF.

See JUDICIAL OFFICERS.

See PUBLIC OFFICER.

See PUBLIC SERVANT.



**OFFICER—concl'd.**

## — of sea customs—

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—  
REVENUE . I. L. R. 1 Mad. 89

## — suit against—

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 424.  
13 C. L. R. 195  
I. L. R. 20 Bom. 697  
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 584

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—GOV-  
ERNMENT.

See SMALL CAUSE COURTS, MOFUSSIL—  
JURISDICTION—GOVERNMENT, SUITS  
AGAINST

See SUBORDINATE JUDGE, JURISDICTION  
OF . I. L. R. 21 Bom. 754; 773  
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 170

## — suit to set aside order of—

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—  
REVENUE COURTS—ORDERS OF REVE-  
NUE COURTS.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II,  
ART. 12 . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 429

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II,  
ART. 14.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—ORDERS, SUITS TO  
SET ASIDE.

— with head-quarters in munici-  
pality—

See MADRAS DISTRICT MUNICIPALITIES  
ACT, s. 55 . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 453

## — with powers of Civil Court—

See SONTHAL PERGUNNAHS SETTLEMENT  
REGULATION . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 133

**OFFICIAL ACTS.**

## — presumption of—

See SEDITION . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 141

**OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE.**

See APPEAL—ORDERS.  
I. L. R. 25 Mad. 406

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 244.  
I. L. R. 30 All. 231

See COMPANY—TRANSFER OF SHARES  
AND RIGHTS OF TRANSFEREES.  
I. L. R. 16 Bom. 80

See CONTRACT . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 289

See COST—SPECIAL CASES—OFFICIAL AS-  
SIGNEE . I. L. R. 7 Bom. 484  
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See INSOLVENCY—CLAIMS OF ATTACHING  
CREDITORS AND OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE.

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See INSOLVENT . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 145

See INSOLVENCY ACT (11 & 12 Vict., c. 21).

See INSOLVENCY ACT (11 & 12 Vic., c. 21),  
ss. 7, 26, 36 . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 462

See INSOLVENCY ACT, s. 73.  
I. L. R. 14 Bom. 189

See JURISDICTION I. L. R. 31 Calc. 667

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—OFFI-  
CIAL ASSIGNEE . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 43  
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See PUBLIC OFFICER.  
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See RIGHT OF SUIT—INSOLVENCY.  
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I. L. R. 11 Bom. 620  
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See VARIANCE BETWEEN PLEADING AND  
PROOF—SPECIAL CASES—FRAUD.  
I. L. R. 11 Bom. 620  
L. R. 14 I. A. 111

## — commission to—

See INSOLVENCY ACT, s. 19.  
I. L. R. 8 Mad. 79  
I. L. R. 13 Calc. 66

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## — election by—

See INSOLVENCY—SALES FOR ARREARS  
OF RENT . I. L. R. 1 Mad. 59

## — liability of—

See COSTS—SPECIAL CASES—OFFICIAL  
ASSIGNEE . I. L. R. 7 Bom. 484

## — power of, to convey—

See INSOLVENCY ACT, s. 7.  
I. L. R. 19 Mad. 74

## — priority of—

See INSOLVENCY—CLAIMS OF ATTACHING  
CREDITORS AND OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE.

See INSOLVENCY ACT, s. 7.  
5 B. L. R. 309

## — right of—

See INSOLVENCY—PROPERTY ACQUIRED  
AFTER VESTING ORDER.  
I. L. R. 8 Calc. 556  
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 232  
I. L. R. 17 Mad. 21  
I. L. R. 18 Mad. 24

See INSOLVENCY—RIGHT OF OFFICIAL  
ASSIGNEE IN SUITS.  
10 B. L. R. Ap. 23

See INSOLVENCY ACT, s. 7.



**OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE—contd.****validity of sale as against—**

See INSOLVENCY—SALES FOR ARREARS OF RENT . . . I. L. R. 1 Mad. 59

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 855

1. *Official Assignee of insolvent judgment-debtor not a necessary party to such suit—Decree in such suit cannot declare property liable to be attached, but only that it is the property of the judgment-debtor.* S. 253 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives a statutory right of suit to the unsuccessful party in claim proceedings and when the property of the insolvent judgment-debtor, which was attached in execution had vested in the Official Assignee during the pendency of such claim proceedings, the latter is not a necessary party to such suit. The decree in such suit should, where property had so vested, only declare the property attached to belong to the judgment-debtor and ought not to declare it liable to attachment. *ANNAPURANI AMMAL v. SUBRAMANIAN CHETTIAR* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 347

2. *Official Assignee—Disallowance of claim of Official Assignee to have proceeds of sale in execution of decree against insolvent judgment-debtor paid to him—Appeal.* Held, that the Official Assignee not being the representative of an insolvent judgment-debtor, no appeal would lie against the disallowance of his claim to have the proceeds of a sale in execution of a decree against the insolvent judgment-debtor paid over to him. *Kashi Prasad v. Miller*, I. L. R. 7 All. 752; *Sardarmal v. Aranvayal Sabhapathy*, I. L. R. 21 Bom. 205, and *Chandmull v. Rane Soondery Dossee*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 259, referred to. *OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE v. HAZARI LAL* (1908) I. L. R. 30 All. 486

3. *Insolvency Act (11 and 12 Vict., c. 21) s. 7—Insolvent—Vesting order—Withdrawal of petition for insolvency—Right of Official Assignee to bring suit—Right of Official Assignee to continue suit after withdrawal of petition.* On the 14th October, 1903, a petition in insolvency was filed and a vesting order was made by the Court. On the 15th June, 1904, the insolvents took out a rule nisi to withdraw their petition, and the rule was made absolute on the 21st September, 1904. But the orders were not drawn up till 27th February, 1906. In the meanwhile the Official Assignee filed a suit on the 2nd March, 1905, on behalf of the insolvents to recover a sum of money alleged to be due to the insolvents' firm in respect of certain mercantile transactions. It was objected on behalf of the defendant that the Official Assignee was not entitled (i) to bring the suit and (ii) continue the suit after the withdrawal of the petition. Held, that at the date of the institution of the suit the insolvency proceedings were still in force and the assets still remained vested in the Official Assignee. The subsequent coming into force of the order could not vitiate the institution of the suit and it was clear that the Official Assignee was competent to bring the suit. He was also competent to continue it, for the order of withdrawal, even after it became

**OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE—concl.**

operative, was not effective to divest the Official Assignee and re-vest the property in the insolvents. A withdrawal of a petition for which no provision is made in the Act, cannot be regarded as the legal equivalent to its dismissal by consent. *Haji Sajjan v. Macleod* (1907) . . . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 321

4. *Commission—Sale of Insolvent's Estate—Commission on sale of mortgaged property—Indian Insolvency Act (11 and 12 Vict., c. 21), ss. 19, 21, 31—Supreme Courts' Officers Act (XV of 1848), ss. 1, 2—Practice.* On the application of the mortgagee, an order was made in insolvency proceedings directing the Official Assignee to sell certain immoveable properties belonging to an insolvent, but which were subject to a mortgage:—Held, that the Official Assignee was not entitled to charge a commission out of the insolvent's estate on the full value of the properties sold, but only on the amount coming to the insolvent's estate. Held, also, that although the practice of this Court for over thirty years had apparently been to allow such commission, it was contrary to the provisions of the Indian Insolvency Act (11 and 12 Vict., c. 21) and the Supreme Courts' Officers Act, 1848. In *re Howard Brothers (Insolvents)*, 13 B. L. R. App. 9, commented on. In *re OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE'S COMMISSION* (1909) . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 990

**OFFICIAL LETTERS.**

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—GOVERNMENT GAZETTE . . . 7 B. L. R. 63

**OFFICIAL TRUSTEE.**

See ATTACHMENT—MODE OF ATTACHMENT AND IRREGULARITIES IN ATTACHMENT. . . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 250

See PROBATE . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 156

1. *Public officer—Civil Procedure Code, s. 2.* *Semle*: The Official Trustee is a public officer within the meaning of s. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. *ABDUL LATEEF v. DOUTRE* . . . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 250

2. *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 2, and s. 424—Notice of suit.* The Official Trustee is a "public officer" within the definition given in s. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. The cases in which a public officer is entitled to notice of suit under s. 424 of the Code are those in which he is sued for damages for some wrong inadvertently committed by him in the discharge of his official duties, and the object of giving notice is that, if a public body or officer entrusted with powers happens to commit an inadvertence, irregularity, or wrong, before any one has a right to require payment in respect of that wrong, he shall have an opportunity of setting himself right, making amends, restoring what he has taken, or paying for the damages he has done. The Official Trustee, therefore, is not entitled to notice of suit, when the question to be decided relates to the rights of the *cestuis que trustent* in respect of the trust-fund, and not to a wrong committed by him. *SHAHUNSHAH BEGUM v. FERGUSSON* . . . I. L. R. 7 Calc. 499



**OFFICIAL TRUSTEE—concl'd.**

3. ——— Appointment of Official Trustee—*Official Trustees Act (XVII of 1864), s. 10—Consent of Beneficiaries.* On an application under s. 10 of the Official Trustees Act (XVII of 1864), where the petition was not signed by one of the beneficiaries, the Court held, upon other evidence, that such beneficiary was desirous of having the Official Trustee appointed as trustee of the will. *In the goods of COLLETT*. I. L. R. 25 Calc. 856

4. ——— Official Trustees Act (XVII of 1864), ss. 10, 15, and 17—*Trustees' and Mortgagees' Powers Act (XXVIII of 1866), s. 34—Indian Trustees Act (XXVII of 1866), ss. 6 and 26.*—"Property," meaning of—"Vesting," meaning of. The main purpose of the Official Trustees Act was to place the Official Trustee and his successors in office in the same position and vested with the same powers as the persons who held the property in trust previous to the appointment of the Official Trustee, and a wide meaning must be given to the words "property" and "vest." That "property" in the Official Trustees Act was meant also to include action or actionable claims, and the vesting thereof was intended to have the effect of giving the Official Trustee complete power of enforcing all claims of demands in respect of the trust estate. The plaintiff, as a creditor of *S E E*, had obtained letters of administration to his estate and now brought this suit for the recovery of R12,000 on a mortgage which had been executed in favour of *S E E*. *S E E* in his lifetime was the trustee of a sum of R70,000, and the Official Trustee, who had been appointed trustee in his place and who was made a defendant in this suit, claimed the benefit under the said mortgage on the allegation that the said sum had been advanced by *S E E* out of the trust funds. The plaintiff contended that she was entitled to the usual mortgage decree and to get in the money thereunder, and that the proper course for the rival claimants to the money represented by the plaintiff in her personal capacity on the one side and the Official Trustee on the other was then to proceed to establish their rights to the money by separate suit or otherwise. *Held*, that the contention of the plaintiff was not correct, and the Court was bound to determine the question raised by the plaintiff representing the estate of the deceased and the Official Trustee representing the trust estate, and that the Official Trustee could adduce evidence in this suit to shew that the money was advanced out of the trust estate. *GABRIEL v. SOLOMON*

4 C. W. N. 70

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See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 13 (1859, s. 1, CL. 5) . . . Marsh. 573

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**ONUS OF PROOF—contd.**

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—ENCROACHMENT—ADVERSE POSSESSION.

13 C. W. N. 698

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I. L. R. 4 Calc. 314

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I. L. R. 13 All. 571

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See NEPAL . 7 C. W. N. 635

## that Permanent Settlement of 1793 applies to particular land—

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MAPS. I. L. R. 30 Calc. 291

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See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 116. 13 C. W. N. 661; 664

## 1. ACCOUNT.

See HINDU LAW—PARTITION. 13 C. W. N. 309

1. ———— Balance of account—*Suit for sum due on balance of account.* Where a plaintiff sues for a specific sum of money due on a balance of account, it is for him to start his case and show what sum is due on the account; and until he has done so, the defendant need not be called upon to rebut him. RUTTUN CHAND BYSACK v. BOCHA BIBEE

12 W. R. 529

2. ———— *Suit founded on statement of account.* Where a claim was founded upon a distinct statement of an account signed by the defendant, in which he acknowledged a particular sum to be due to the plaintiff:—*Held*, that it was for defendant to produce evidence to rebut the *prima facie* case made against him. ELIAS v. JORAWAR MULL . 24 W. R. 202

## 2. ACCOUNT BOOKS, ENTRIES IN.

1. ———— *Suit for possession—Dispute as to whether transaction was a mortgage or sale—Entries in account books showing debts.* The plaintiffs sued

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*2. ACCOUNT BOOKS, ENTRIES IN—*concl.*

for possession of certain lands, alleging that they had been mortgaged to the defendant by their father under two documents. The defendant produced them and relied upon them as deeds of sale which conveyed to him absolutely the lands mentioned in them. The form of the instruments was not conclusive, but it appeared *aliunde* by the conduct of the defendant himself that the deeds were intended as mere securities for money, and that he had treated them as such. Certain entries in the defendant's accounts also treated the respective considerations named in the deeds as continuing debts due to the defendant from the plaintiffs' father. *Held*, that the entries, when put in evidence, were sufficient to shift the burden of proof from the plaintiffs to the defendant, and that it was incumbent on the latter to give either oral or documentary evidence which in some way neutralised or explained away their effect or showed that they related to other transactions than those mentioned in the two documents. GOVINDA v. JESHA PREMAJI

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 73

## 3. AGENT.

1. ———— Gomastah, suit against—*Suit to recover advances due from discharged gomastah.* In a suit to recover advances alleged to be due from a discharged gomastah, who pleaded acquittance at the time of his discharge:—*Held*, that plaintiff was bound to prove the payments to, and the receipts from, the gomastah, and to put in original documents, and not mere transcripts, even if the defendant had remained silent. WATSON & CO. v. SREEDHUR MUNDLE . 10 W. R. 421

2. ———— Agents of official assignee, suit against—*Proof of items of account.* Agents who have collected money on account of an insolvent estate are severally bound to prove to the assignee or his representative that the expenditure of the several amounts charged in their accounts has been actually and properly made and the *onus probandi* rests on such agents. It is incumbent on such agents to offer proof in support of all the items in their accounts which are impugned, and the propriety, or the actual expenditure of such items should form the subject-matter of issues properly framed. NUJUF ALI v. PATTERSON

2 N. W. 104

3. ———— Principal, suit against, for acts of agent—*Authority of agent, Proof of.* In a suit against a principal as liable for the acts of an accredited agent of the latter, the onus lies on the plaintiff to prove that the alleged agent was the duly accredited agent of the defendants in reference to the transaction, the subject of the claim. HATHE RAM v. GORIND RAM . 3 Agra 131

## 4. ARBITRATION.

1. ———— Reference to arbitration—*Consent obtained by threats and undue influence.*



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*4. ARBITRATION—*concl'd.*

When it is averred that the consent of one of the parties to an arbitration was obtained by threats and through undue influence exerted by persons in authority, the *onus probandi* is on the person making the averment. *PURVATHA VURDHAY NAUCHIAR v. JAYAVERA RAMAKOMARA ETTYAPA NAICKER*

4 W. R. P. C. 31

S.C. ZAMINDAR OF RAMNAD *v.* ZAMINDAR OF YETTIAPPOORAM . . . 7 Moo. I. A. 441

## 5. ATTACHMENT IN EXECUTION.

1. ——— Attachment of person of debtor—*Execution of decree.* In an application for an order for execution of a decree by attachment of the person of the debtor, the onus is on the judgment-debtor to show that he has no means of satisfying the debt, and that he has not been guilty of any misconduct; and not on the creditor to show that, by sending the debtor to prison, some satisfaction of the debt would be obtained. *SETON v. BIJOHN* . . . 8 B. L. R. 255 : 17 W. R. 165

2. ——— Claim by judgment-debtors to property seized in execution of a decree against them as representatives of original debtors—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 234.* Where, in execution of a decree against the representatives of a deceased debtor, specific property was seized as the property of the deceased debtor and as being in the possession of his representatives and the judgment-debtors claimed the property so seized as their own:—*Held*, that the burden of proof lay on the decree-holder who asserted that the property seized in execution of his decree was the property of the deceased debtor and as such in the possession of the judgment-debtors. *ABDUL RAHMAN v. MAHOMED AZIM* . . . 4 C. W. N. 151

## 6. BAILMENTS.

1. ——— Negligence—*Hiring—Accident*—*Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 106—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 150, 151, 152.* The question of the burden of proof in cases of accidental injury to goods bailed depends upon the particular circumstances of each case. In some cases, from the nature of the accident, it lies upon the bailee to account for its occurrence, and thus to show that it has not been caused by his negligence. In such cases it is for him to give a *prima facie* explanation in order to shift the burden of proof to the person who seeks to make him liable. If he gives an explanation which is uncontradicted by reasonable evidence of negligence, and is not *prima facie* improbable, the Court is bound in law to find in his favour, and the mere happening of the accident is not sufficient proof of negligence. *S* hired a horse from *W*, and while it was in his custody it died from rupture of the diaphragm, which was proved to have been caused by over-exertion on a full stomach.

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*6. BAILMENTS—*concl'd.*

In a suit by *W* against *S* to recover the value of the horse, the defendant gave evidence to the effect that the horse became restive and plunged about, that he might then have touched it with his riding cane, that it shortly afterwards again became excited, bolted for two miles, and at last fell down and died. This evidence was not contradicted on any point, nor was any other evidence offered as to how the horse came to run away. There was evidence that the horse was a quiet one, that for some time previously it had done hardly any work, that it was fed immediately before it was let out for hire, and that rupture of the diaphragm was a likely result of the horse running away while its stomach was distended with food. The Court of first instance held that the defendant was bound to prove that he had taken such care of the horse as a man of ordinary prudence would under similar circumstances have taken of own property, that he must have used his whip freely, or done something else which caused the horse to bolt, and that in so doing he acted without reasonable care, and had thus caused the animal's death. The Court accordingly decreed the claim. *Held*, by *EDGE, C.J.*, that if the burden of proof was originally upon the defendant, it was shifted by the explanation which he gave, and which was neither contradicted nor *prima facie* improbable; and that the decree of the lower Court, being unsupported by any proof, and based on speculation and assumption, was one which that Court had no jurisdiction to pass, and should consequently be set aside in revision under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Per BRODHURST, J.*, that as the decree was not only unsupported by proof, but opposed to the evidence on the record, the lower Court had "acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally," within the meaning of s. 622. *SHIELDS v. WILKINSON*

I. L. R. 9 All. 398

## 7. BOUNDARY.

1. ——— Disputed boundary—*Removal of boundary.* Where a dispute arises regarding the direction of a boundary which one of the parties to a suit has demolished and the other party proves its general direction, the onus of proof that the direction is wrongly stated, if it be so, lies on the former, who removed the boundary. *JUDONATH MULLICK v. KALEE KRISTO TAGORE*

25 W. R. 524

2. ——— Failure of proof. Suit concerning the boundary line between contiguous mehals. The land in dispute (which, with the mehals adjacent, originally formed part of a permanently-settled zamindari, consisted of revenue-paying mehals, and of mehals alleged to be lakhiraj, all belonging to one proprietor) was so situated that it necessarily belonged either to Havelee, one of the latter, or to the contiguous rent-paying mehals. The Permanent Settlement did not define the boundary, nor was it fixed in subsequent resumption proceedings against Havelee, which ended in a



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*7. BOUNDARY—*contd.*

temporary settlement of that mehal for twenty years. The ownership of Havelee having become severed from the ownership of the other mehals, the question of boundary arose, not as a question of revenue between the Government and a zamindar, but as one of title to land between the zamindars and proprietors of two contiguous and separate estates. The appellant having failed to prove that no part of the disputed land was included in the respondent's settlement (some portion at least being shown to belong to Havelee), and also having failed to prove by independent evidence his own right to recover the land specified in the plaint:—*Held*, that the suit should not have been determined upon that mere failure on his part to support the burden of proof cast upon him, because the judgment would be as final and conclusive between the parties as an adjudication on the merits would be, and its effect would be to give something to the respondent which on the evidence belonged to the appellant's mehals.

LEELANUND SINGH v. MOHESHUR SINGH

3 W. R. P. C. 19: 10 Moo. I. A. 81

See LEELANUND SINGH v. LUCHMUNUR SINGH.  
10 C. L. R. 169

where the Privy Council explain this case.

3. ———— *Lakhiraj tenure and mal land of zamindar.* In a question of boundary between a lakhiraj tenure and a zamindar's mal land, there is no presumption in favour of one or the other, but the onus is on the plaintiff to prove his case. BEER CHUNDER JOOBRAJ v. RAM GUTTY DUTT . . . . . 8 W. R. 209

4. ———— *Failure to prove alleged boundary.* Where the plaintiff sued to recover a quantity of land by rectification of certain survey awards, which he averred demarcated erroneously the boundary between his zamindari and the zamindaris of the defendants, it was held, on a consideration of the evidence, that his suit was rightly dismissed because he failed to prove the position or existence of a stream which he stated was the true boundary between the zamindaris. LEELANUND SINGH v. MOHENDRO NARAIN SINGH  
13 W. R. P. C. 7: 13 Moo. I. A. 57

5. ———— *Suit for possession where defendant alleges land to be within zamindari, but in protected tenure.* In a suit by a talukdar to obtain khas possession of certain land as being an encroachment by the defendants, who admittedly held land within a howla appertaining to the talukh, the defendants alleged that the land in dispute was situate within a nim howla which they held within the howla. *Held*, that the onus was on the plaintiff to show that the land was not within the howla, and that he was entitled to khas possession. RHIDOY KRISTO MISTRI v. NOBIN CHUNDER SEN  
12 C. L. R. 457

6. ———— *Suit for khas possession—Onus of proving intermediate tenure—Onus of proving that a parcel is outside intermediate*

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*7. BOUNDARY—*contd.*

*tenure—General rule as to onus of proof in suits for ejectment.* In a suit by a landlord for khas possession of land in defendants' possession, the defendants set up and proved an intermediate tenure. *Held*, that it was on the plaintiffs to show that the parcel of land sought to be resumed was outside such tenure. *Sahib Perhlad Sein v. Budhoo Sing*, 12 Moo. I. A. 275, explained. *Rhidoy Kristo Mistri v. Nobin Chunder Sen*, 12 C. L. R. 457, followed. In this respect it makes no difference whether the plaintiff admits the existence of the under-tenure or the defendant proves such tenure to exist, although denied by the plaintiff. *Mohima Chunder Mazumdar v. Mohesh Chunder Neogi*, 1. L. R. 16 Calc. 473; *Forbes v. Mahomed Hossein*, 12 B. L. R. 210; *Hurryhur Mookhopadhya v. Madab Chunder Baboo*, 14 Moo. I. A. 152, referred to and discussed. RAJENDRO KUMAR BOSE v. MOHIM CHANDRA GHOSE  
3 C. W. N. 763

7. ———— *Lands in zamindari—Settlement of shikmi talukh.* Lands situate within a zamindari must *prima facie* be considered as part of the zamindari; and it is for those who insist on the separation of lands from the general lands of the zamindari and on their settlement as a shikmi talukh to establish their title. WISE v. BHOOBUN MOYEE DEBIA  
3 W. R. P. C. 5: 10 Moo. I. A. 165

8. ———— *Suit for confirmation of possession of lands alleged to be within certain talukh.* In a suit for confirmation of right and possession in respect of lands alleged to be within plaintiff's permanently-settled talukh, where plaintiff incidentally remarked that defendant (as intervenor in a previous rent suit) had claimed the lands as appertaining to another talukh which plaintiff alleged had no existence:—*Held*, that it was an error of law in the lower Appellate Court to place on the defendant the onus of proving the existence of that other talukh, instead of following the usual and recognized course of requiring the plaintiff to prove that the lands in suit belonged to his talukh. GUNGAMALA CHOWDHRAIN v. MADHUB CHUNDER ROY . . . . . 10 W. R. 413

9. ———— *Mouzah which may belong to one of two zamindaris—Possession.* If a particular mouzah has been held for many years as part of a particular mehal or zamindari, the fact of such holding affords a strong presumption that it is part of that mehal, even as against a purchaser at a sale for arrears of revenue of another mehal who claims that part of the mehal purchased by him. It is not conclusive evidence against such auction-purchaser, nor could any length of adverse holding prior to his purchase preclude the auction-purchaser from recovering it, if he could show clearly that it belonged to the mehal which he had purchased. PRAN KISHEN BANERJEE v. JUGGOBUNDOO DUTT  
7 W. R. 207

10. ———— *Suit for possession of land once bed of a nullah.* In a suit for



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*7. BOUNDARY—*contd.*

possession of land which had once formed the bed of a nullah of which defendants held a julkur settlement, but which was situated within plaintiff's settled estate :—*Held* that, as defendants had failed to show that their settlement extended beyond the fishery rights, plaintiff was entitled to recover possession. *MONOHUR CHOWDHRY v. NURSINGH CHOWDHRY* . . . . . 11 W. R. 272

11. ———— *Suit for possession—Disputed plots of land.* In a suit to recover possession of two parcels of land alleged to have been comprehended in one plot on the ground that they had been held by the plaintiff and defendant jointly until by certain proceedings the former was virtually deprived by the latter of the usufruct, the defendant's case being that the parcels were divisible into two distinct plots, one held by the plaintiff and himself jointly and the other by himself exclusively. *Held*, that it was on the plaintiff to prove that the disputed parcel was a part of the land held jointly by him and the defendant. *GUNGA PERSHAD DUTT v. LOKENATH NUNDEE* . . . . . 12 W. R. 179

12. ———— *Suit by purchaser of share of co-sharer in land jointly settled.* Where the settlement proceedings showed that the question of extent of the shares of several persons on settlement was in dispute, and that the settlement was made jointly without prejudice to title, the onus, in a suit by a purchaser of one of the shares, was *held* to be on the plaintiff to show the extent of his vendor's share. *GOOROO CHURN PODDAR v. HAFEEZA BIRBE* . . . . . 7 W. R. 366

## 8. CLAIMS TO ATTACHED PROPERTY.

1. ———— *Allegation of application by debtor during attachment.* Plaintiff, alleging that an attachment subsisted, and that therefore the mortgage under which defendant claimed was invalid, is bound to prove his allegation, and the onus is not discharged by showing that the attachment was made some years previous to the alienation. *TOOL-SEE DUTT MISSEER v. BROJO MOHUN THAKOOR* . . . . . 9 W. R. 332

2. ———— *Proof of attachment—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 235, 239, 270—Priority.* Plaintiff claimed priority under s. 270, Act VIII of 1859, asserting that the property attached and sold by defendant was an identical property which he had attached prior to defendant's attachment. *Held*, that he was bound to prove the due attachment of the property, *viz.*, by proof of having obtained a written order, under s. 235, prohibiting defendant from alienating the property by sale, gift, etc., and by the publication of the said order in the manner prescribed by s. 239. *KANHYA LALL PUNDIT v. DINONATH SIRCAR* . . . . . 17 W. R. 23

3. ———— *Suit by unsuccessful claimant for confirmation of alleged possession and adjudication of title—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 246.* Where an unsuccessful claim-

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*8. CLAIMS TO ATTACHED PROPERTY—*contd.*

ant, under s. 246, Code of Civil Procedure, sues for confirmation of alleged possession and adjudication of title, the onus in the first instance is on plaintiff, and an important question in the case is, who was in possession at the time of the attachment. *TOOFANEE DOSS v. MUN RAKHUN ROY* . . . . . 15 W. R. 202

4. ———— *Right to begin—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 246.* Where a claim was made under s. 246 of Act VIII of 1859, by a third party, to some timber, which had been attached by a prohibitory order under s. 234 :—*Held, per* PEACOCK, C.J., L. S. JACKSON, PHEAR, and MACPHERSON, J.J. (MITTER, J., dissenting), that the claimant must begin. The onus is on him to prove that the goods attached were his property, or in his possession, and therefore not in the possession of the judgment-debtor. His evidence must be confined to proving his own claim, and he cannot be allowed to show a title in a third person with whom he has no connection. *Held (per* MITTER, J.), that, on the proper construction of the words "proceed to investigate the same with like powers as if the claimant had been originally made a defendant" the onus of proof as against the claimant is on the decree-holder. *Nito Kali Debi v. Kripanath Roy*, 8 W. R. 358, and *Misree Begum v. Punnoo Singh*, 8 W. R. 362, overruled. *NGA THA YAH v. BURN* . . . . .

2 B. L. R. F. B. 91 : 11 W. R. F. B. 8

5. ———— *Suit by a claimant to property under attachment.* The defendant having attached certain property as belonging to his judgment-debtor, B, the plaintiff, applied for the removal of the attachment alleging that she had purchased the property from B prior to the defendant's decree. Her application was rejected, and an order maintaining the attachment passed. The plaintiff thereupon brought the present suit to establish her right to the property in question. The Court of first instance dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appealed to the District Judge, who reversed the lower Court's decree, holding that it was incumbent on the defendant to show that the alleged transaction of sale was fictitious. On second appeal by the defendant to the High Court :—*Held*, that the District Judge was wrong in throwing the burden of proof on the defendant. The defendant had obtained an order maintaining his attachment, and it was incumbent on the plaintiff, who impugned that order by the present suit, to prove her case. For this purpose it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove the payment of the purchase-money, and that she had been in possession since the alleged sale. *GOVIND ATMARAM v. SANTAI* . . . . .

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 702

6. ———— *Objections to attachment—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 278, 279, and 283—Suit on title under deed of sale to declare property not liable to be taken in execution.* In proceedings under s. 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure the objector pleaded that the property sought to be



**ONUS OF PROOF—contd.****8. CLAIMS TO ATTACHED PROPERTY—contd.**

attached was his by virtue of a certain registered sale-deed. This objection was disallowed on the finding that the deed relied upon was fictitious. The objector then brought a separate suit to have the property declared not liable to be taken in execution; but he did not file the sale-deed in question or account for its non-production. *Held*, that under the circumstances of the case it was in this instance for the plaintiff to prove that the deed he relied on was not fraudulent and collusive, as has been found in the previous proceedings. *Govind Aitaram v. Santai*, I. L. R. 12 Bom. 270, referred to. *RAM NATH v. BINDRABAN*

I. L. R. 18 All. 369

**7. ——— Suit for confirmation of possession—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 246—Claim—Deed of sale.** A decree-holder caused the right, title, and interest of his debtor in certain land to be attached in execution. A claim was preferred under s. 246, Act VIII of 1859, by a previous purchaser, but was rejected. In a suit thereupon instituted for confirmation of possession on reversal of the order, the defence was that the purchase was benami. *Held*, that the onus was on the plaintiff to make out his case. *MAHIMA CHANDRA KUNDU v. NURUDDIN*. 3 B. L. R. A. C. 70: 11 W. R. 422

*TULSEE MONEE DOSSEE v. PEARY MOHUN BABOO*  
25 W. R. 79

**8. ——— Suit to establish right after rejection of claim—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 246.** In a suit brought to establish the plaintiff's right to certain property after an order against him under s. 246, Act VIII of 1859, the defendant admitted that the property had been in the possession of the person against whom the plaintiff had obtained his decree, but stated that it had passed to him by conveyance executed by that judgment-debtor in his favour; the plaintiff alleged that this deed of sale was fraudulent and void. *Held*, that the onus was on the plaintiff to show that the deed was not *bona fide*, and not on the defendant to prove the actual execution of the deed. *LALA RUDRA PRASAD v. BINODE RAM SEN*

3 B. L. R. A. C. 71 note: 10 W. R. 321

**9. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 246—Claim.** The plaintiff sued to establish his right to a decree, of which he stated he was the assignee, and which he alleged the defendant had seized and sought to sell as the property of the plaintiff's assignee. The defendant admitted the assignment, but alleged that it was a fraudulent transaction. *Held*, that the onus was on him to prove that the transaction was not a *bona fide* one. *LALBEHARI DUTT v. SRINATH MOOKERJEE*

3 B. L. R. A. C. 73 note

**10. ——— Suit to establish right to attach—Civil Procedure Code, s. 283—Right of defendant to set up title of third person.** In a suit brought under s. 283 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) to establish the right to attach

**ONUS OF PROOF—contd.****8. CLAIMS TO ATTACHED PROPERTY—contd.**

property, it is for the plaintiff to prove that the property in question is the property of the judgment-debtor. The onus of proof is upon him. He can have no right to attach property which is proved either never to have belonged to his judgment-debtor, or having been his, to have passed out of his possession and ownership, and become, in law, the property of others prior to the time at which attachment is sought. The defendant in defending such a suit may therefore rely on the title of a third person. *ADAM ISUFBHAI v. JAMNADAS RANCHORDAS*

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 94

**11. ——— Suit for declaration of title—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 246—Equitable right.** Certain property belonging to one *S* was mortgaged by him in 1810 and 1813 to *O*, under form of conditional sale. *S* had three sons, *H*, *A* and *N*, and in 1819 he sold the property included in the mortgage of 1810 and 1813 to his sons, *H* and *A*. In 1820 *H* and *A* entered into a fresh arrangement with *O*, who accepted from them a fresh mortgage of the property in lieu of those of 1810 and 1813, and of this mortgage in 1831 he obtained a decree for foreclosure. Subsequently, the Government resumed the property and settled it with *O*'s widow as representing the proprietor, and the plaintiff afterwards purchased a one-third share of the estate. The defendant was the holder of a decree obtained in 1836 against the heirs of *S* on a money-debt of *S*, and in execution of that decree he, in 1866, caused the rights of *N* in the property to be attached and sold, and himself became the purchaser. On attachment, the plaintiff preferred a claim to it under s. 246, Act VIII of 1859, but it was disallowed. In a suit by the plaintiff praying for his right of ownership and possession, which was menaced by the defendant's decree and sale:—*Held*, the onus was on the defendant to show that he had an equitable right which he could assert against the plaintiff. *SHURFUN BIBEE v. COLLECTOR OF SARUN*

12 B. L. R. 66 note: 10 W. R. 199

**12. ——— Allegation of assignment by deed of sale—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 246.** If a plaintiff coming into Court, under s. 246 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to set aside an attachment and sale, shows in proof of his title that a deed of sale has been executed in his favour by the judgment-debtors, and that consideration-money has passed and possession has been given him, he starts his case sufficiently. If the defendant alleges, notwithstanding, that the sale was collusive and fictitious, it is for him to show that it was so. *DIGUMBUREE DOSSEE v. BANEE MADHUB GHOSE*

15 W. R. 155

**13. ——— Suit by unsuccessful claimant to set aside sale of land—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 246.** Where the plaintiff filed a suit to set aside a sale of land after he had been unsuccessful in an application made under s. 246 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1859, to raise an attachment that had been laid on such land:—*Held*, that the onus lay

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ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*8. CLAIMS TO ATTACHED PROPERTY—*concl.*

on the plaintiff to prove his title, and not on the purchaser to prove that of the judgment-debtor. *NATHU SADASHIV v. RAMCHANDRA ANNAJI*

5 Bom. A. C. 76

14. ——— Suit to establish title under deeds of gift—*Proof of bonâ fides*. In a suit to establish title, unsuccessfully asserted in an execution case, to property sold in satisfaction of a decree, where plaintiff claims under a gift and other titles originating with the judgment-debtor, it is not sufficient for plaintiff to make out a *prima facie* case, leaving it to defendant to demonstrate fraud; plaintiff is bound to satisfy the Court of the genuine *bonâ fide* nature of the transfer. *RAM KISHORE SINGH v. RAMSURBO CHATTERJEE*. 11 W. R. 454

15. ——— Suit for value of goods taken in execution where a claim to them is allowed under s. 246, Act VIII of 1859—*Evidence of title*. *M*, to whom *C*, his judgment-debtor, had made over certain goods, attached the same in execution of his decree as the property of his judgment-debtor, but, on a claim being preferred to the goods by *D* and *B* under s. 246 of Act VIII of 1859, they were ordered to be released from attachment; they remained, however, in the possession of *M*. *D* and *B* having sued *M* to recover the value of the goods, the lower Court held that, inasmuch as *M* failed to sue within a year to set aside the order of the miscellaneous department, and establish his right to take the property in satisfaction of his decree as belonging to his judgment-debtor, the plaintiff's right to it must be admitted without further enquiry or proof, and decreed the claim on the basis of that order alone. It was held in special appeal that the defendant was not debarred by that order or by the law of limitation from disputing the plaintiff's right to the goods, and that the plaintiffs were bound to prove their right to entitle themselves to a decree and that the miscellaneous order was not conclusive proof of their right, and still less such an adjudication on the question as precluded a readjudication of it. *MADHO PARSHAD v. DURGA PARSHAD*. 7 N. W. 85

## 9. CONTRACT.

1. ——— Construction of contracts—*Allegation of special law*. The onus is on the party who contends that a contract is governed by special and not by general rules of law. *TEJ CHUND v. SREEKANTH GHOSE*

6 W. R. P. C. 48: 3 Moo. I. A. 261

## 10. CONTRIBUTION.

1. ——— Suit for contribution of Government revenue. In a suit to recover the amount of excess payments of Government revenue made by the plaintiffs on account of their co-sharers to save the estate from sale (each proprietor holding a well defined although not actually separated share):—*Held*, that the onus was on the plaintiffs

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*10. CONTRIBUTION—*concl.*

to prove their shares and amount of revenue payable on them. *AGHOREE RAM SAHOY v. RAMOLEE SAHOO*. W. R. 1864, 309

2. ——— *Money paid to Government treasury*. In a suit for contribution for money admittedly paid by plaintiff into the Government treasury on account of defendants' share of the revenue, where defendants plead previous payment to the plaintiff:—*Held*, that the burden of proving such payment was upon the defendants. *MOHADEO MISSER v. LAHOREE MISSER*. 24 W. R. 250

## 11. CUSTOM.

1. ——— Custom at variance with law of inheritance—*Proof of custom—Khojas*. Where a defendant alleged a special custom of the Khoja community at variance with the Hindu law of inheritance:—*Held*, that the burden of proving the alleged custom rested upon her. *RAHIMATBAI v. HIRBAI*. I. L. R. 3 Bom. 34

2. ——— Impartibility—*Suit for partition—Presumption as to partibility*. In a suit for the partition of part of a *deshgat vatan*, brought by the younger brothers of a joint Hindu family against their eldest brother the *desai*, the defence was that the *vatan* was held by him as an impartible inheritance, subject to a right, by custom, that a brother should receive maintenance out of the income derived from it. *Held*, that there was no such general presumption in favour of the impartibility of estates of this kind as to shift the burden of proof, which was upon the *desai*, to show, that the *vatan* had, contrary to the general Hindu law, been inherited by him alone. It was for the *desai* to show, by evidence of the nature of the tenure of the *vatan*, that it was impartible or to show, by evidence of family custom or of district, *i.e.*, local custom, that impartibility attached to it, such evidence being strong enough to rebut the presumption of the prevalence of the general Hindu law. *ADRISHAPPA v. GURUSHIDAPPA*

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 494

3. ——— Adoption—*Custom, proof of*. It is a general rule and fundamental principle amongst Brahmins, Kshatriyas, and Vaishyas, that they are absolutely prohibited from, and incapable of, adopting a daughter's or sister's son or son of any other woman whom they could not marry by reason of propinquity. The burden of proving a special custom to the contrary amongst any members of these regenerate classes, prevalent either in their caste or in a particular locality, lies upon him who avers the existence of that custom. *GOPAL SAFRAY v. HANMANT SAFRAY*

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 273

4. ——— Forfeiture of rights of mohuntship by marriage—*Right of succession*. Where the plaintiff proved his right of succession to a *math* on the death of its mohunt, the



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*11. CUSTOM—*concl'd.*

burden of proving that his subsequent marriage worked a forfeiture of his office and its appendant property and rights, lay upon the defendant who impugned the plaintiff's right on account of the marriage. *GOSAIN RAMBHARTI JAGRUPBHARTI v. SURAJBHARTI HARIBHARTI* I. L. R. 5 Bom. 682

5. ——— Maintenance—*Custom to reduce maintenance.* Suit by a late Rajah's brother for maintenance allowance, which the present Rajah opposed on the ground that, as the plaintiff was no longer the ruling Rajah's brother, his allowance must be diminished. *Held*, that the onus was on the defendant to prove a custom of entitling him to diminish the allowance heretofore enjoyed in right of plaintiff's position in the family. *MOOKOOND NARAIN DEB v. MOORALEE MOHUN* . 6 W. R. 91

6. ——— Right to take fees—*Vatandar joshi, right of. to take fees.* The burden of proving that the vatandar joshi of a village is not entitled to officiate and take fees in the family of any particular caste, lies upon the person or persons asserting exemption. *RAJA VALAD SHIVAPA v. KRISHNA BHAT* . . . . . I. L. R. 3 Bom. 232

## 12. DAMAGES.

1. ——— Suit for damages against defaulting witness—*Proof of liability.* In a suit for damages against a defaulting witness the onus is on the plaintiff to prove that he was damaged by the non-attendance of the witness. The mere failure of the defendant to appear as a witness is not *per se* a sufficient proof of his liability to damages. *DWARKANATH KOOREE v. ANANDO CHUNDER SAN-NEL* . . . . . 5 W. R. S. C. C. Ref. 18

2. ——— Suit for damages for wrongful occupation—*Refusal to give up possession.* A party holding a decree for a share of a mouzah brought a suit for possession and damages on the allegation that he found the defendant in occupation of a part of the land on which indigo plants were standing, and permitted him to continue for a time till the plants should be removed, defendant promising them to give over possession, but that, when the time came, defendant refused to give over possession and was still occupying the land. *Held*, that it lay upon the plaintiff to show wrongful occupancy on the part of the defendant. *GOUR SURUN DASS v. SCRONDY* . . . 15 W. R. 144

## 13. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

1. ——— Release of debtors—*Debt owing by partnership.* The burden of proof that a creditor by agreeing to an arrangement whereby a firm indebted to him conveyed to two of the partners thereof certain property in trust to pay off his and certain other debts, thereby released the remaining members of the partnership, lies upon the parties who were originally liable to such creditor. *KALAI KHAN v. MADHO PERSHAD* . . 3 N. W. 129

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*13.—DEBTOR AND CREDITOR—*concl'd.*

2. ——— Debts contracted by persons in wrongful possession—*Suits to charge zamindari.* Where it was sought to charge a zamindari with debts contracted by persons who were at the time usurpers in wrongful possession of the zamindari, solely on the ground that the documents evidencing the loans recited that they were for the purpose of discharging the kists due to Government:—*Held*, that, as between the lawful owner and the creditor, the onus was on the creditor who was seeking to set up a charge in his favour made by one who was in possession, but without title; and therefore, in absence of any evidence on behalf of the creditor as to the circumstances in which the transactions were had with the usurping zamindar in possession, and the failure to connect the loans with the debts contracted by the former and lawful zamindars, the suit was rightly dismissed. The case of *Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Munraj Koonweree*, 6 Moo. I. A. 393, distinguished. *CHIDAMBARA SETTI v. MUTTUVIJEYA* 3 Mad. 260

## 14. DECLARATION OF TITLE.

1. ——— Suit for declaration of title—*Proof of title.* Where a plaintiff brings a suit for a declaration of his title as owner, he is bound to establish his title affirmatively. He is in the same position as any other plaintiff, and must make out his case, and the *onus probandi* that he is in possession as owner is upon him. *RASSONADA RAYAR v. SITHARAMA PILLAI* . . . . . 2 Mad. 171

2. ——— Production of title-deeds. The plaintiff sued for declaration of her title to property, of which the defendant was in possession, but of which she produced the title-deeds in favour of herself. *Held*, that the onus was on the defendant to disprove the plaintiff's title. *SWARNAMAYI RAU v. SRINIBASH KOYAL* . 6 B. L. R. 144

3. ——— Reversioner—*Setting aside deed of sale.* In a suit for a declaration of plaintiff's reversionary title as heir to his late uncle's property, and for reversal of a deed of sale from that uncle set up by the defendant, the widow not having been made a party to the suit and her consent to or dissent from the alleged conveyance not having been ascertained, the issue tried was whether the deed was genuine, and whether defendant has possession under it. *Held*, that the onus was rightly placed on the defendant. *BYKUNT NATH ROY v. GREESH CHUNDER MOOKERJEE* 15 W. R. 96

4. ——— Suit for confirmation of possession—*Intervenor.* In a suit for confirmation of possession and declaration of title (the principal defendants admitting plaintiff's possession and title), in which a vendee from such defendants intervenes and claims the property on the allegation of being in possession:—*Held*, that such vendee must prove possession before he could



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*14. DECLARATION OF TITLE—*concl'd.*

question the plaintiff's title. *LALLA RAM SUHAE SINGH v. LALLA OOOJODHYA PERSHAD*

5 W. R. 233

5. ———— *Onus of proof—*

*Admission by party to suit, effect of, as shifting burden of proof—Admission not causing estoppel—Presumption as to admission by party—Right to rebut presumption—Question tried without specific issue—Remand—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 55, 562, 566.*

In a suit for property to which the plaintiff alleged he was entitled by inheritance from his natural father the defence was that he had been adopted into another family and therefore was no longer his natural father's heir, and this contention was supported mainly by the plaintiff's admissions made in deeds and other documents signed by him, to none of which, however, the defendant was a party. *Held*, by the Judicial Committee, that although the onus was on the defendant to prove the adoption the proof of the admissions shifted the onus on to the plaintiff on the principle stated in *Slatterie v. Pooley*, 6 M. & W. 664, 669, that "what a party himself admits to be true may reasonably be presumed to be so," and until the presumption was rebutted the fact admitted must be taken to be established. *Held*, also, that where, as in the present case, there was no estoppel, the defendant being no party to the deeds, the plaintiff could give evidence to rebut such presumption. *Heane v. Rogers*, 9 B. & C. 577, 586; *Newton v. Liddiard* 12 Q. B. 926; *In re Simpson* L. R. 2 Ch. D. 72, 89, and *Trinidad Asphalt Company v. Coryat*, [1896] A. C. 587, followed. In this case their Lordships held that the plaintiff, so far from rebutting the presumption, had, in order to account for the admission made in the documentary evidence, put forward two different and inconsistent explanations, one of which was absurd and the other in its most important parts unproved and had failed to prove his title. Where no specific issue had been framed on the question of adoption, but the matter had been tried and determined without any objection on the part of the plaintiff, who had not been taken by surprise, but was fully informed by the defendant's lists of documents and from the cross-examination of his witnesses that the defence would be taken: *Held*, that under the circumstances it was undesirable that the case should be sent back to be re-tried on a special issue framed as to the adoption. *CHANDRA KUNWAR v. CHAUDHRI NARPAT SINGH* (1906)

I. L. R. 29 All. 184; L. R. 34 I. A. 27

## 15. DECREES AND DEEDS, SUITS TO ENFORCE OR SET ASIDE.

1. ———— *Decree, suit to set aside—*

*Decree alleged to be fraudulent.* Where a decree in execution of which formal possession has been obtained is impugned by the party in actual possession as fraudulent and collusive, the onus lies on the im-

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*15. DECREES AND DEEDS, SUITS TO ENFORCE OR SET ASIDE—*contd.*

pugners to prove their allegation. *RABIA KHANUM v. WISE* . . . . . 23 W. R. 329

2. ———— *Deed, suit to set aside—Allegation that document is false.* In a suit for a declaration that a document propounded by the defendant is false, it lies upon the plaintiff to prove that allegation. *RAM NIDHEE KOONDOL v. GOLUCK CHUNDER MOSHANTO* . . . . . 11 W. R. 280

3. ———— *Relationship between parties as showing bonâ fides of transaction.* The relationship between parties to a conveyance of property may be immaterial if the purchase is found true, but is not immaterial where the question to be decided is whether the purchase was true or fraudulent. The mere handing over of the purchase-money from one party to the other in the presence of strangers, and the registration of the deed, are not sufficient to prove the transaction to be *bonâ fide*. *PRAN KISHEN DEB v. LOKENATH SINGH MOJOOMDAR* . . . . . 10 W. R. 445

4. ———— *Suit for possession and to have deeds declared fraudulent—Purchaser.* The plaintiff executed a deed of sale of a moiety and a lease of the other moiety of certain property to B. B instituted a suit under s. 15, Act XIV of 1859, which was dismissed. B then returned the deed of sale and lease to A, with the following endorsement under his signature: "Returned; no claim." A instituted the present suit for recovery or possession of the said property, and the defendant set up in his defence that he had no right to sue for a moiety of the property, as the same had been conveyed to B, and that the endorsement on the deed of sale was not admissible in evidence, as it had not been registered. *Held*, that the onus was upon the defendant to prove his purchase. *GIRISH CHANDRA ROY CHOWDHRY v. AMINA KHATUN*

3 B. L. R. Ap. 125

5. ———— *Suit to have deed cancelled as a forgery.* Under the special procedure provided in the Registration Act (III of 1877), the defendant, in whose favour a document was said to have been executed, succeeded in obtaining an order from the District Registrar for the registration of the same, although the plaintiff, who was alleged to have executed it, appeared before the Sub-Registrar, and subsequently before the Registrar, and denied executing it, and alleged it to be a forgery. In a suit brought under the above circumstances to have the document declared void, and to have it cancelled:—*Held*, that, under the circumstances, the onus of proof was properly placed on the defendant. *MOHIMA CHUNDER DHUR v. JUGUL KISHORE BHUTTACHARJI*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 736; 9 C. L. R. 471

6. ———— *Suit to set aside agreement on ground of fraud—Want of opportunity of giving evidence in lower Court.* Where an appellant alleges that a *razinamah* was obtained



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from him by duress or fraud, the onus is on him to prove his allegation. Where also an appellant complains that he had not an opportunity of giving his evidence to the Court below, the onus is on him to show that he tendered evidence which the Court rejected. *NOTEET LALL OPADHYA v. JUGGURNATH GURG* . 5 W. R. P. C. 25: 1 Moo. I. A. 1

7. ——— Suit to set aside order finding deed not genuine—*Proof of bonâ fides*. In a suit brought to set aside an order of the Small Cause Court in which that Court had held that a certain deed was *malâ fide*:—*Held*, that the onus was on the plaintiff to show that it was executed *bonâ fide*. *ISHAN CHANDRA DAS v. RUKIMUDDIN SOWDAGAR* . 2 B. L. R. A. C. 326 note

S.C. *ESHAN CHUNDER DOSS v. RUKEMOODDEEN SOUDAGUR* . 10 W. R. 412

8. ——— Suit for declaration of right to property—*Possession under deed of gift—Allegation of fraud—Presumption*. In a suit for a declaration that certain property, which plaintiff as decree-holder attempted to sell, belongs to his judgment-debtor, where the opposite party claims to have been in possession of the same under an alleged *hibba*, and plaintiff gives sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable presumption that there has been fraud and collusion in the case, it becomes the duty of the Court to go on to the evidence on the other side, and ascertain whether the transactions which are the subject of enquiry are fraudulent or valid. *KADUMBINEE DOSSIA v. UNNOPOORNA DAYE* . 14 W. R. 289

9. ——— Proof of *bonâ fides* of deed made under suspicious circumstances. Where the authenticity and *bonâ fides* of a *hibba* were called into question, on the ground that, at the time the instrument was executed, the executants were in a state of indebtedness, and the registration was delayed until the making of certain decrees against them:—*Held*, that it lay on the parties whose intention was impugned to give evidence of a satisfactory kind of the *bonâ fides* of the suspicious transaction. *CHUNDER NARAIN SEN v. AMIRTO LALL SEN* . 24 W. R. 292

10. ——— Allegation of want of *bonâ fides* of trust-deed. Where it is found on the face of a deed creating a trust that the transaction is *bonâ fide*, it is for the creditors who impugn the *bonâ fide* nature of the trust to prove their plea. *KASHESHUREE DASSEE v. KRISHNA KAMINEE DEBEA* 2 Hay 557

11. ——— Proof of *mooktearnama* alleged to be forged. Where a *mooktearnama* on the authority of which a suit was brought was impugned by the defendant as a forgery, and as not executed by the party alleged to have granted it, the Court held that, notwithstanding its attestation in due form by the Munsif of Muttra, the onus was on the parties charged to prove its genuineness. *Bis-*

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*RAM SINGH alias BISHEN SINGH v. INDURJEET KOONWAR* . 6 W. R. 2

12. ——— Execution of deed by *purda-nashin lady*—*Suit to set aside deed*. In a suit by the heirs of a Mahomedan *purda-nashin lady* to set aside a deed of sale executed by her whilst living apart from her relations in the house of the purchaser, who had occasionally acted as her *mooktear*:—*Held*, that some evidence to impeach the deed should be given by the plaintiffs before the onus of supporting it is thrown on the purchaser. *THAKOOR DEEN TEWARRY v. ALI HOSSEIN KHAN*

13 B. L. R. 427: 21 W. R. 340  
L. R. 1 I. A. 192

s. c. in lower Court . 8 W. R. 341

13. ——— Execution of document by *purda ladies*—*Evidence—Agency*. The plaintiff sought to make two *purda ladies* liable on a document which he alleged had been executed by a third person as their agent. *Held*, by the Privy Council (reversing the decision of the High Court) that strict proof of the agency must be given. *AZELZOUNISSA v. BAQUR KHAN*

10 B. L. R. 205: 17 W. R. 393

14. ——— Suit to set aside deed on ground of fraud—*Existence of motive*. In a suit by a judgment-creditor to recover the amount of certain decrees by attachment and sale, and to have a certain deed of *bye-mokasa*, which was set up by the judgment-debtor's wife, set aside as executed in fraud of creditors; where plaintiff showed the existence in the mind of the judgment-debtor of a sufficient motive for the fraud, and also that the said debtor was in the management of the estate claimed and in the receipt of its rents, it was held that plaintiff had started a *prima facie* case, which shifted the onus on the defendant to prove the *bonâ fides* of the deed. *GOWHUR ALI KHAN v. SAKHEENA KHANUM* . 15 W. R. 507

15. ——— Suit to recover possession—*Fraudulent deed*. In a suit to recover immoveable property alleged to have belonged to the plaintiff's husband which she inherited from him, and from which, after seven years' possession, she was ousted by the defendant, whose possession was conferred by the Magistrate under s. 318 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861, the defendants claimed under a deed of sale which the lower Courts found to have been executed in fraud of creditors:—*Held*, that, if plaintiff was in possession for seven years since her husband's death, she should not be allowed to be dispossessed on the ground of a fraudulent deed to which defendant was a party years previously, to which plaintiff was no party. *ECHAMOYEE v. HURRO SOONDREE DASSEE* . 12 W. R. 155

16. ——— Suit to set aside compromise of claim—*Consideration—Disputed adoption*. The defendant, the divided brother of a deceased Hindu, disputed the title of the plaintiff, a



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minor adopted by his deceased brother, to succeed to the estate of the deceased. To induce the defendant to acknowledge the validity of the adoption, the adoptive mother of the plaintiff, as his guardian, executed a conveyance of one moiety of the family house to the defendant. *Held*, in a suit to cancel the conveyance, that the burden of proving that the defendant's objection to the validity of the adoption was groundless, and the conveyance therefore without consideration, was upon the plaintiff. *SUBRAMANIA AYYAN v. VENKATA RAYAR*

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 254

17. ——— Suit to set aside sale—*Allegation of fraud*. *N*, as reversionary heir of the former proprietor, and as now entitled to possession on the death of that proprietor's mother, sued for land in the possession of *O*, who obtained by it purchase at a sale in execution of a decree passed on a bond granted by *O*, which bond and decree were alleged by *N* to be fraudulent and collusive transactions. *Held*, that the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that the decree was fraudulently obtained. *GREESH CHUNDER CHATTERJEE v. MOHESH CHUNDER NYALUNKAR* . . . . . 10 W. R. 173

18. ——— Transfer of interest in joint family by one member to the other members. Where one brother of a joint undivided family transferred his interest in the joint property to the other brothers after a decree had been passed against him, although before attachment:—*Held*, that, when a question arose in such a case, the onus was on the brothers to whom the transfer was made to prove the *bona fide* character of the transaction. *BROJO LALL SANDYAL v. BHOBO SOONDUREE DEBIA CHOWDRAIN* . . . . . 17 W. R. 499

19. ——— Suit to set aside collusive decree—*Suit by judgment-debtor on allegation of decree being fraudulent and collusive*. *A*, having obtained a decree in a suit instituted on a bond, purporting to have been executed by plaintiff's father and one *D*, proceeded to execute it by putting up for sale certain rights and interests of plaintiff as the legal representative of her father. Plaintiff sued on the allegation that the decree was fraudulent and collusive, and that she had not been served with notice of proceedings taken in execution. *Held*, that it was for the plaintiff to make out her case of fraud, and that it was not for defendant to show that the decree obtained from a competent Court was not collusive, or that notice had been actually served. *MOHIMA CHUNDER MULLICK v. BURODA SOONDUREE DOSSEE* . . . . . 12 W. R. 147

20. ——— Suit to have deed declared a forgery—*Setting up forged lease*. *D* sued *T* for arrears of rent on the allegation that he held a *khusra jumma*. *T* admitted only a lower rent alleging that he held a *jumma* under a *miras howladari pottah*. *D*, failing in that suit, brought another suit for a declaration that the deed put forward by *T* was a false document. *Held*, that the

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plaintiff was bound to make out a *prima facie* case before the onus could be thrown upon the defendant of proving the genuineness of his *pottah*. *JOY CHUNDER TUPPADAR v. RAM CHURN DOSS*  
15 W. R. 117

21. ——— Deed conveying property to other than legal heir—*Suit by Mahomedan widow for share of property*. In a suit by a Mahomedan widow against the brother of her deceased husband for her share of the property of her husband, the defendant set up a *tumliknamah* by which the deceased conveyed the property away to the son of the defendant. *Held*, that the burden of proof was on the defendant, and that he was bound to adduce the very strictest proof of the conveyance, as it cut away property from the natural heir. The *tumliknamah* was rejected, having regard to its terms and to the probabilities and facts of the case. *SADUK ALI KHAN v. PEAREE* . . . . . 9 W. R. 142

22. ——— Voluntary deed—*Suit by settlor to set aside his deed*. One *M* (the original plaintiff) was priest in the family of the first and second defendants, and was treated with much kindness by the first defendant (*N*), upon whom he chiefly relied for advice in worldly matters. A sum of R30,000, which was the bulk of his property, was in deposit in the defendants' firm at interest. Early in 1887 he became ill, and in June 1887 he expressed a wish to execute a trust-deed and an English will. He gave instructions to *N* for the trust-deed. By this deed, which contained no power of revocation, he settled R30,000 upon the first and second defendants (who were uncle and nephew), as trustees to perform his funeral ceremonies and to carry out certain religious observances and to pay two annuities, each of R25, and with the residue to found a Sanskrit class. The deed provided for the payment during his lifetime, of a sum of R100 per mensem for his maintenance and expenses, or such larger sum as he might require for such purposes, but in other respects it was not to come into operation until after his death. The will of even date gave certain property to his wife, and subject to this bequest gave the residue of his property to his sister. After receiving instructions for these documents, *N* took them to an attorney. From these instructions drafts were prepared, which were read over to *M* in his room by the attorney's managing clerk. Neither drafts, nor instructions, nor the documents themselves were, however, left with *M*. The drafts were then engrossed, *M* having made some trifling corrections in them. On the 23rd June 1887 he attended at the house of the attorney. The documents were explained to him by the attorney, and were interpreted to him by a High Court interpreter. *M* was then examined by a medical man with a view to ascertain whether he was capable of understanding what he was doing. *M* then executed the trust-deed and the will, and both were then duly attested. At the same time *M* signed the accounts in the defendants' books,



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and the balance of the money, which stood to his credit over and above the Rs30,000 comprised in the deed, was produced and made over to him, and he made it over to N to be kept by him personally. Shortly after this, M's sister and her son came to Bombay, and he fell under their influence. He became dissatisfied with what he had done with the Rs30,000, and on the 21st November 1887 he executed a will by which he purported to remove the deed and the will of the 23rd June, and he left the whole of his property to his sister. On the 2nd September 1888 his nephew took him to Surat, and on the 14th September 1888 at Surat he executed a deed revoking the trust-deed of the 23rd June 1887. He also signed instructions and a power-of-attorney under which this suit was filed. He died subsequently to the filing of the suit, and his sister and executrix became plaintiff. The plaint prayed that the deed of the 23rd June 1887 should be set aside on the ground of undue influence, etc., but the personal charges against the defendants were abandoned at the hearing. *Held*, that the deed must be set aside on the ground that the circumstances of the case threw upon the defendants the burden of showing that M understood the effect of the settlement and its finality. This they had failed to do. The facts of the case brought it within the principles deducible from *Anderson v. Elsworth*, 3 Giff. 154; *Forshaw v. Welsby*, 30 Beav. 243; and *Wollaston v. Tribe*, L. R. 9 Eq. 44. *BAI MANT-GAVRI v. NARONDAS CALLIANDAS*

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 549

**23. ——— Suit for cancellation of instrument—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 39—Fiduciary relationship—Undue influence—Gift to spiritual adviser—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 111.** In a suit under s. 39 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) for cancelment of a deed of gift executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant, the plaintiff was a Chatri by caste, well advanced in years, and the defendant was his guru or spiritual adviser, a Brahman held in high consideration in the locality where he resided. The gift comprised the whole of the plaintiff's property and the only reason for its execution was the plaintiff's desire to secure benefits to his soul in the next world, and his having heard the defendant recite the holy book called Bhagwat. Almost immediately, after execution of the deed the plaintiff repudiated it, and sued for its cancellation on the ground of fraud. *Held*, that, having regard to the fiduciary relation subsisting between the parties, the improvidence of the gift, the absurdity of the reason alleged for it, and the principle recognized by s. 111 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872), the burden rested upon the defendant to show that the transaction was made without undue influence and in good faith; and, in the absence of such proof, the plaintiff was entitled to obtain cancellation of the deed. *Sital Prasad v. Parbhu Lal*, I. L. R. 10 All. 535, referred to. *MANNU SINGH v. UMADAT PANDE*  
I. L. R. 12 All. 523

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**24. ——— Deed of gift and endowment executed by Mahomedan widow in favour of agent—Fiduciary relationship—Burden of proving absence of undue influence.** An instrument executed by a widow, after setting apart the rental of villages belonging to her as her patrimony to defray the expenses of her and her deceased husband's tombs, gave to her managing agent, who was her sole adviser, the management of the endowment in perpetuity with the residue, after the above expenditure should have been met, for himself, so that a large surplus would have remained each year in his hands and he would have been the person substantially interested. *Held*, that this transaction was within the well-recognized principle that every onus is thrown upon a person filling a fiduciary character towards another of showing conclusively that he has acted honestly and *bona fide*, without influencing the donor who has acted independently of him. In a suit by the agent's representative to have the gift enforced against the widow's successor in the estate, this burden had not, in the opinion of the Courts below, with which their Lordships concurred, been sustained, and it was held that the gift had been rightly set aside. *WAJID KHAN v. EWAZ ALI KHAN* . . . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 545  
L. R. 18 I. A. 144

**25. ——— Power of revocation in a voluntary deed—Onus of proof—Mahomedan Law—Relinquishment of share—Voluntary settlement—Document whereby heirs give up their rights in the property in favour of one heir—Deed supported by valuable consideration.** In a suit to impeach a deed to which he has been a party, the onus lies on the plaintiff to make out a case for setting aside on equitable grounds a deed duly executed for valuable consideration. *Melbourne Banking Corporation v. Brougham*, 7 App. Cas. 307, 311, followed. *ASHIDBAI v. ABDULLA* (1906)  
I. L. R. 31 Bom. 271

**16. DEED, EFFECT AND OPERATION OF.**

**1. ——— Deeds of gift between joint brothers of part of family estate—Deeds of partition—Subsequent partition between them of residue.** Two brothers, the only members of a joint Hindu family, executed and registered mutual deeds of gift to one another of their interests in specified portions of their family estate. In after years the younger brother sued the elder for partition of the estate excepting so much of it as had already been the subject of the above gifts. The elder defended the suit on the ground that the deeds of gift had not been intended to operate, not representing any real transaction. To negative their effect, the burden of proving that the transaction was not real, but only a pretence, was laid upon the defendant who failed to adduce that proof. *SHAM CHAND PAL v. PROTAP CHUNDER PAL* . . . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 78  
L. R. 24 I. A. 186  
1 C. W. N. 594



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1. ———— **Execution, admission of—*Suit on document.*** Where a defendant admits the execution of a document upon which he is sued, the onus lies on him to get rid of the effect of such admission. *YEKNATH BABAJI v. GULABCHAND KAHANJI* 1 Bom. 85

*MOKOOND NARAIN DEO v. JONARDUN DEY BURNICK* . . . . . 15 W. R. 208

2. ———— **Mortgage-deed, possession under.** Where the execution of a mortgage-deed was admitted and long possession of the mortgagee under that decree was established:—*Held*, that the onus of proving that the transaction was impeachable lies on the person who impugns it and denies that the money which was consideration for its execution was paid. *HURPAUL SINGH v. ZAHOO-RUN* . . . . . 2 Agra 202

3. ———— **Mortgage-deed—Registration Act (III of 1877), s. 59—Endorsement certificate by Registrar.** In a suit brought by a mortgagee upon a mortgage by conditional sale for payment of the mortgage-debt or in default for foreclosure, one of the defendants not being one of the original mortgagees, but a purchaser at auction sale under a Rent Court decree, resisted the suit and put the plaintiff to proof of the document under which he claimed. *Held*, that the mere production of the deed of mortgage which had been thus questioned, and the fact that that deed of mortgage contained an endorsement certificate by the Registrar in the usual manner under s. 59 of Act III of 1877, were not sufficient to shift the burden of proof on to the defendants. *MANOHAR SINGH v. SUMIRTA KUAR* . . . . . I. L. R. 17 All. 428

4. ———— **Consideration, payment of—Recital in deed—Presumption.** When it has been found that a deed has been duly executed, and that a certain sum of money has passed in consideration of that deed, and where there is a recital in the deed of the fact that the balance of the consideration-money was paid previously to the execution of the deed, then there is something more than a presumption that the whole consideration has passed upon the deed. *DOMUN SINGH v. BHUGGOBUTTY DEBEA* 8 W. R. 215

5. ———— **Presumption as to bonâ fides.** Where a mortgage is found to be genuine, and the receipt of consideration admitted, the Court is bound to assume, unless it be shown to the contrary, that the transaction was a real one, and that the consideration-money was paid. *RADHANATH BANERJEE v. JODOONATH SINGH* 7 W. R. 441

6. ———— **Deed of sale—Acknowledgment of payment in deed—Delivery of deed.** In a suit to recover the balance of purchase-money alleged to have been due upon the sale of a

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decree where the plaintiff's case was that the consideration-money was not paid, but a rooqua given for it, payable when the mutation of names took place:—*Held*, that the onus of proving non-payment was thrown upon the plaintiff in consequence of the acknowledgments she had made of the receipt of the whole purchase-money, viz., an admission which was made and recorded under Act XX of 1866, at the time when the deed was registered, and again an acknowledgment made in the petition presented to the Court which made the decree for mutation of names. Although when a deed of sale containing an acknowledgment of payment is written, payment is not made, it may become an acknowledgment afterwards, i.e., when the deed is handed over. *ALLEE SHAH v. AMANEE BEGUM* . 19 W. R. 149

7. ———— **Proof of execution and bonâ fides of transaction—*Suit on mortgage bond.*** Where a claim is made under an alleged mortgage against a *bonâ fide* purchaser for value, and the defendant puts in issue the genuineness of the transaction, the onus is upon the plaintiff of proving *primâ facie* the *bonâ fides* as well as the actual execution of the mortgage; and if the Court discredits the plaintiff's witnesses as regards the *bonâ fides* of the transaction, it is at liberty to dismiss the suit, although the defendant gives no substantial evidence of fraud. *BRAJESHWARA PESHKAR v. BUDHANUDDI*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 268: 7 C. L. R. 6

8. ———— **Proof of execution and consideration—*Suit on bond.*** In a suit on a bond the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon showing that it was executed by the defendant. The onus lies on the defendant of showing the want of consideration. *JUGGUT CHUNDER CHOWDHRY v. BHUGWAN CHUNDER FUTTEHDUR* . Marsh. 27: 1 Hay 57  
1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 67

*KURUFOOL KOOR v. RAJKALEE KOOR* 17 W. R. 439

9. ———— **Receipt of consideration—*Suit on bond.*** Though a bond may be genuine and duly executed, the receipt of consideration must nevertheless be proved. *GHANSAM SINGH v. CHUKOWREE SINGH* . . . . . W. R. 1864, 197

10. ———— **Payment under letter of assignment.** When a defendant admits execution of a bond, but denies receipt of consideration, the onus of proving receipt is on the plaintiff. When a defendant admits having written a letter of assignment directing the plaintiff to pay certain sums of money due by the defendant to the third parties named in the letter, the plaintiff is bound to prove such payment. *ROOF MUNGUL SINGH v. ANUND ROY* . . . . . 3 W. R. 111

*JHALOO v. FURZUND ALI* . . . . . 5 W. R. 20

11. ———— **Proof of consideration—Promissory note—*Suit by professional money-lender***



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*against a young man recently come of age—Presumption—Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), s. 118—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 114, ill. (c).* Professional money-lenders sued a young man recently come of age to recover certain loans of money alleged to have been advanced by them to him on promissory notes. The defendant, who under the will of his father was entitled to a large property but had not yet come into possession of it, was of an extravagant and reckless character. He pleaded, as to part of the consideration for the notes, that he did not receive it, and as to a further part that the consideration was immoral. In dealing with the case the Court laid down the following propositions, not as rules of law, but as guides in considering the evidence in such a case: (i) That upon the above facts the ordinary presumption that a negotiable instrument has been executed for value received was so much weakened that the defendant's allegation that he had not received full consideration was sufficient to shift the burden of proof and to throw upon the money-lenders (the plaintiffs) the obligation of satisfying the Court that they had paid the consideration in full. That is the practical effect of ill. (c) to s. 114 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872). (ii) Where the plaintiff, in answer to such a defence, affirmed that he had paid the consideration in full, and was corroborated by his books and witnesses, the onus of proof again shifted over upon the defendant. (iii) The burden of proof thus thrown upon the defendant could only be met by a perfectly truthful and harmonious statement which the Court felt able to rely upon with confidence. In the absence of this, the ordinary presumption laid down in s. 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881) must prevail, viz., that until the contrary is proved, the presumption should be made that every negotiable instrument was made for consideration. *MOTI GULABCHAND v. MAHOMED MEHDI THARIA TOPAN* I. L. R. 20 Bom. 367

12. ———— *Proof of consideration for a registered mortgage—Income-tax returns—Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 76 and 77.* The defendant in a suit for money secured by registered mortgage to be paid by him to the plaintiff denied the consideration of which he had, before the registering officer, acknowledged the receipt. The original Court, which dismissed the suit, would not have decided in favour of the defendant but for its having been shown, on an inspection of copies, officially certified, of income-tax returns made by the plaintiff, that he had not stated the interest accruing on the mortgage as part of his income. This judgment was reversed in appeal. The Judicial Commissioner was of opinion that the certified copies should not have been admitted in evidence, in reference to ss. 76 and 77 of the Indian Evidence Act (I of 1872); and also that, assuming the false statement of income to have been made, it still

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remained unproved by the defendant that the acknowledged consideration had not been paid. The judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed by their Lordships, who concurred in the opinion that the returns, if the plaintiff had wrongly omitted to make a full return of income, would not have had any weight in changing the onus which lay upon the defendant of showing that no consideration had passed for this mortgage. *ALI KHAN BAHADUR v. INDAR PERSHAD* . . . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 950  
L. R. 23 I. A. 92

13. ———— *Suit on bond—Proof of consideration where defendant denies and proves that he acknowledged receipt of it.* In a suit on a bond, plaintiff rested his case entirely upon the bond and the defendant's acknowledgment therein that RS,000 was received in cash. At the trial the defendants proved that acknowledgment to be fictitious, and that only a part of the money had been advanced. *Held*, that the onus was upon the plaintiff to prove in some other way the advance which he alleged. *LALA LAKMI CHAND v. HAIDAR SHAH* . . . 4 C. W. N. 82

14. ———— *Proof of amount due—Suit on bond.* In a suit on a bond, it is for the plaintiff to prove the amount of the debt, and this will be done sufficiently in the first instance by proof of the execution of the bond. It is for the defendant to prove in answer, if he can, that such amount is less than the sum sued for. *SIVARAMAIAH v. SAMU AIYAR* . . . 1 Mad. 447

15. ———— *Recital in bond—Consideration.* The plaintiff sued on a bond, which recited that the defendant had received the consideration mentioned in the bond. *Held*, that the onus was on the defendant to show that the recital in the bond was not correct. *FULLI BIBI v. BASSIRUDI MIDHA* 4 B. L. R. F. B. 54

*S.C. FOOLEE BIBEE v. BASSIRUDI MIRDHA. BAMA NATH CHUCKERBUTTY v. ROMANATH ROY* 12 W. R. F. B. 25

*RUGHONATH DOSS v. LUCHMEE NARAIN SINGH* 10 W. R. 407

16. ———— *Admission—Consideration.* A sued B on a bond, in which it was recited that B had received the amount. B, in his written statement, admitted execution, but stated that he had received the amount mentioned therein, not under the bond, but on the pledge of certain jewellery. *Held*, that on the admission of the execution of the bond, which contained the recital of payment the onus was upon B to prove that payment had not been made under the bond. *MANIKLAL BABOO v. RAMDAS MAZUMDAR* 1 B. L. R. A. C. 92 : 10 W. R. 132

17. ———— *Proof of want of consideration—Suit for money due on bond.* When in a suit for money due on a bond, both the execution



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and the receipt of the consideration are denied, the defendant must prove the latter plea, if the execution be established by the plaintiff. **KISHENDYAL SINGH v. MONOHUR LALL . . . 2 Hay 381**

**18. ——— Suit on bond—**  
*Onus thrown on wrong party, effect of.* The defendants in a suit on a bond admitted the execution of the bond, but denied that they had received, as the bond recited they had at the time of its execution, the consideration for it. The Court of first instance, instead of calling on the defendants to establish the fact that they had not received the consideration for the bond as it ought to have done under the circumstances, irregularly allowed the plaintiff to produce witnesses to prove that the consideration for the bond had been paid at the time of its execution. The evidence of these witnesses proved that the consideration of the bond had not been paid at the time of execution, and that, if it had been paid at all, it had been paid at some subsequent time. *Held*, that, although the plaintiff ought not to have begun, yet, as he had done so, and his witnesses had proved that the consideration for the bond had not been paid as admitted in the bond, a new case was opened up in which the onus was shifted back to the plaintiff to establish that he had, not at the time alleged in the bond, but at some subsequent time, paid to the defendants the consideration for the bond. **MAKUND v. BAHORI LAL . . . I. L. R. 3 All 824**

**19. ——— Non-receipt of full consideration—***Suit on bond.* In a suit for money due on a bond between the representatives of the original parties to it, the defendant attempted to reduce the claim on the ground that the money had not been received in full, the bond having been given partly in respect of an old debt, and partly in respect of a credit, in account, upon which the debtor had not, in fact, drawn certain items. The Judicial Committee concurred with the High Court, which had reversed so much of the decree of the Court of first instance as disallowed these items; the latter Court not having correctly adjusted the burden of proof, and having acted as if the plaintiff had relied on his own books to prove the debt, besides having erred in weighing the evidence. **RAJESWARI KUAR v. RAI BAL KRISHAN . . . I. L. R. 9 All 713**  
**L. R. 14 I. A. 142**

**20. ——— Judge's duty to decide**  
*secundum allegata et probata.* The plaintiffs sued upon two bonds executed by the defendant in their father's favour, one for R200 and the other for R99-15 annas. The defendant in his written statement, as well as in his deposition, admitted execution of the bonds in question, but pleaded non-receipt of consideration. The Subordinate Judge held that the bond for R200 was not proved, but awarded the claim upon the other bond. On appeal, one of the issues raised by the Assistant Judge was—are the bonds in suit proved? He

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held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove execution of the bonds, and dismissed the claim *in toto*. *Held*, reversing the decision of the lower Court, that the defendant having admitted execution of the bonds in question, the Assistant Judge acted illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction in raising the question of the execution. The first rule of adjudication is that a Judge shall decide *secundum allegata et probata*. The only question that could be tried in the present case was non-receipt of consideration. **GORAKH BABAJI v. VITHAL NARAYAN . . . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 435**

**21. ——— Allegation of payment—**  
*Allegation of loss of document.* The plaintiff in a suit on a bond for money accounted for not producing it by alleging that the defendant had stolen it. The defendant admitted the execution of the bond, but alleged that he had paid it. *Held*, that the defendant was bound to begin and prove payment either by the production of the bond or other evidence, or by both. **CHUNI KUAR v. UDAI RAM . . . I. L. R. 6 All. 73**

**22. ——— Plea of payment—***Suit on bond—Alleged theft of bond by obligors.* The plaintiff sued on a bond made in his favour by the defendants, which he alleged had been stolen by the defendants. The defendants, while admitting the execution of the bond, pleaded payment, and that the bond had been returned by the plaintiff to them. They did not produce the bond, nor did they offer any evidence of the alleged payment. *Held*, that, as the defendants admitted the bond and pleaded payment, the burden of proof of such payment lay on them. **SAVJI BIN SATU v. PATLU . . . 8 Bom. A. C. 139**

**MEHEROONNISSA v. ABDOOL GUNEE**

**17 W. R. 509**

**23. ——— Bond in favour of one undivided brother for the benefit of himself and others—***Suit by promise alone—Payment to younger undivided brother—Discharge.* In a suit on a bond executed by the deceased father of defendants, in favour of the plaintiff, the defendants, while admitting the bond and the consideration for which it had been given, contended that, inasmuch as plaintiff had four undivided brothers and the deed had been executed in his name for the benefit of himself and his brothers, the latter should have been joined as plaintiffs, and that plaintiff could not maintain the suit alone. They also pleaded payment to plaintiff's undivided younger brother, which payment, they contended, was binding on the plaintiff. *Held*, that plaintiff was entitled to sue for the family debt without joining his undivided brothers, the contract on which the suit was based being in plaintiff's sole name and not purporting to have been obtained on behalf of any others but himself. And that, as to the payment pleaded, if true, plaintiff was, as regards the promisor, the only



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person *prima facie* entitled to payment; it therefore lay on the promisor to show that a payment to a third party was binding on the plaintiff, which had not been done. The contention that payment to any member of the family was by itself necessarily binding on the member who took the contract, could not be supported. **ADAIKKALAM CHETTI v. MARIMUTHU** . . . **I. L. R. 22 Mad. 326**

**24. ——— Bond in favour of one co-sharer—Payment of such bond made to another co-sharer when a discharge.** Where a debt due to one member of a joint family has been paid by the debtor to another member of the family, the question whether such payment operates as a discharge depends on the circumstances under which it was made. *A* and *B* were members of joint Hindu family. Both managed the joint property for the common benefit. Each used to recover debts due on bonds taken in the other's name. In 1890 defendant passed a bond to *A*. In 1892 he passed a mortgage bond to *B*, the consideration for which was stated to be the balance due on the former bond. Subsequently *A* sued defendant on the bond of 1890. *Held*, that under the circumstances the mortgage-bond passed to *B* operated as a valid discharge of *A*'s claim under the previous bond. **GURUSHANTAPPA v. CHANMALLAPPA** . . .

**I. L. R. 24 Bom. 123**

**25. ——— Suit for money lent on acknowledgment—Proof of consideration.** Where the plaintiff sued to recover money lent, relying upon a samadaskat or acknowledgment of debt given by the defendant:—*Held*, that s. 9 of Bombay Regulation V of 1827 contained the rule of law applicable to the case, and that the onus lay on the defendant to prove that he had not received full consideration for the acknowledgment of indebtedness he had subscribed. **MOTI KAHANJI v. DIPCHAND VIRCHAND** . . . **5 Bom. A. C. 81**

**26. ——— Suit for money lent—Admission of receipt of note.** Where a plaintiff suing for repayment of a loan fails to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that a pledge alleged to have been made as security was made, he is nevertheless entitled to a decree, unless the Court holds that the loan itself was not made. A party admitting the receipt of a note for Rs. 1,000 on loan becomes primarily liable for it to the lender, and it is for him to show that the advance was made, not on his credit, but on that of some other person. **MONOHUR DOSS v. GUNGA PERSHAD** . . . **2 N. W. 264**

**27. ——— Suit for value of hundi—Proof of payment—Possession of hundi.** On 2nd August 1872 *A K* filed a plaint against *M H* and *M R*, in which he alleged that on 1st April 1870 *M R* had given a hundi for Rs. 500, for value received, to *A K*, that on 27th March 1871 *M H* purchased this hundi from *A K*, promising to pay him Rs. 534 for it; that *M H* gave the hundi to his brother *I H*

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for the purpose of obtaining payment of the amount from *M R*; and that *I H* subsequently informed *A K* that the hundi had been lost. *A K* accordingly prayed that defendants *M H* and *M R* might be decreed to pay to him Rs. 534 with profit and interest. *M R* admitted that he had executed the hundi, and had given it to *A K* for Rs. 500. He further alleged that it had been presented to him for payment by *I H*, to whom he had paid the amount with interest on 31st March 1871, and he produced the hundi with a receipt, purporting to be by *I H*, indorsed upon it. *I H* denied the payment by *M R*, and alleged the indorsement on the hundi to be a forgery. *Held*, that the admission by *M R* of the drawing of the hundi for value received laid on him the burden of proving payment, and that, though the possession by *M R* of the hundi was a circumstance in his favour, yet, as it did not in itself amount to proof of payment, the *onus probandi* was not thereby shifted on to the plaintiff. **ABDUL KARIM v. MANJI HANSRAJ** . . . **I. L. R. 1 Bom. 295**

**28. ——— Statement in ikrar reserving equity of redemption—Loss of document—Absolute sale, deed of.** Plaintiff sued for confirmation of possession and registration of certain property which had been mortgaged to him by defendants. The transaction on the face of the deed was an absolute sale, but an ikrar was executed at the same time as the mortgage which reserved the equity of redemption to the mortgagor. This ikrar was made over to the defendant, the mortgagor. Plaintiff's allegation was that the ikrar-namah was returned to him by the mortgagor, who thus surrendered the equity of redemption. Defendant alleged the ikrar had been lost, and had somehow found its way to the plaintiff. *Held*, that the presumption of law was in favour of the plaintiff, who had possession of the ikrar, and that the onus of proving its loss lay upon the defendant. **RAJ KOOMAR SINGH v. RAM SUHAYE ROY**

**11 W. R. 151**

**29. ——— Satisfaction of decree—Proof of payment made out of Court—Statement in receipt.** Where money was paid in satisfaction of a decree, not through the Court, and a receipt was taken, but execution was afterwards enforced in a suit for refund of the money so paid:—*Held*, that the statement contained in the receipt to the effect that the decree had been satisfied was sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show that it was an incorrect statement. **DAVLATA v. GANESH SHASTRI** . . . **I. L. R. 4 Bom. 295**

**17A. DOMICILE.**

*Domicile of origin—Abandonment—Acquiring fresh domicile—Onus of proof—Immoveable property, rights over.* The person, who attacks a settlement on the ground of nationality, must show conclusively that the



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nationality of the settlor was foreign, and, if he succeeds in doing so, the onus is then shifted upon the person supporting the settlement to show that the settlor had acquired a fresh domicile in British India, and that his estate ought to be administered according to Indian law. All rights over immovable property are governed by the law of the country where the property is situate, this principle being universally recognised. *De Nicols v. Curlier*, [1900] A. C. 21; *In re De Nicolas*, [1900] 2 Ch. 410, dissented from. *A. L. BONNAUD v. EMILE CHARRIOL* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 631

## 18. EASEMENTS.

1. ———— **Claim to restrain exercise of proprietary rights**—*Criminal Procedure Code* (Act X of 1882), s. 147. The right to restrain another from exercising ordinary proprietary rights over his own land is of the nature of an easement different from the ordinary rights of owners of land: the burden of proof would therefore lie upon the party alleging such rights. *HARI MOHAN THAKUR v. KISSEN SUNDARI* . . . I. L. R. 11 Calc. 52

2. ———— **Right of way**—*Suit for declaration that party who has obtained an order under s. 320, Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, has no right of way*—*Proof of right to possession*. In a suit for a declaration that defendant had no right of way over certain land belonging to the plaintiff, where it appears that the defendant had obtained an order from the Magistrate under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 320, it was held that the onus of proving an easement did not lie, with the defendant, but that it was for the plaintiff to prove that he was entitled to exclusive possession. *PUCHAI KHAN v. ABED SIRDAR* . . . 21 W. R. 140

3. ———— **Right of way or water-course over land**—*Suit to have right to easement determined after order of Magistrate under s. 532, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872*. Where the right to have a way or water-course over certain land is disputed by the owner thereof, and an order, under s. 532 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has been passed by the Magistrate in favour of the person claiming the right, the fact of such an order having been made will not be sufficient to relieve the latter from the onus of proving the claim, in a subsequent suit by the owner to establish his right to the exclusive use of the land. *Puchai Khan v. Abed Sirdar*, 21 W. R. 140, dissented from. *OBHOY CHURUN DEY v. LUKHY MONEE BEWA* . . . 2 C. L. R. 555

4. ———— **Right to water**—*Suit for removal of outlets for water: plaintiff alleging right to its exclusive use*. In a suit for the removal of certain outlets made by defendant in an aqueduct, on the ground that plaintiff was entitled to the exclusive use of the water of the aqueduct, where the defence set up was that the portion of the

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aqueduct to which the dispute related was where water flowed through the lands of the defendant's zamindari:—*Held*, that it was for plaintiff to make good the title he alleged. *ONRAET v. KISHEN SOONDUREE DOSSEE* . . . 15 W. R. 83

## 19. EJECTMENT.

1. ———— **Suit for ejectment**—*Limitation Act, 1859, s. 15*. The law obtaining in India requires that in actions of ejectment the Courts should always enforce the rule that a plaintiff must recover by the strength of his own title; and a party who might have shifted the burden of proof, if he had proceeded under s. 15 of Act XIV of 1859, cannot, if he let slip that opportunity, obtain the same advantage in an action of ejectment. *DADABHAI NARSIDAS v. SUB-COLLECTOR OF BROACH* . . . 7 Bom. A. C. 82

2. ———— **Trespass—Proof of title**. In an ejectment suit, the defendant, though a trespasser, is entitled to require the plaintiff, who seeks to eject him, to prove that he has a superior title. *KALU v. BARSU* . . . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 803

3. ———— **Defence of right of permanent occupancy—Defence of special character**. In suits by the trustee of a temple to recover possession of certain lands with mesne profits, defendants set up in defence that they were absolute owners of the land in question, or, at least, were entitled to rights of permanent occupancy. In support of the latter contention, they relied, *inter alia*, upon certain pymash documents, which contained the word *ulavadai*, the use of which term, they contended, established the alleged right of permanent occupancy. *Held*, (i) that, where the occupier of land resists a suit for ejectment by setting up a claim of a right of permanent occupancy, the onus of establishing such a right lies on the defendant, inasmuch as by it he seeks to derogate from the ordinary incidents of property, and (ii) that the right expressed by the term *ulavadai* (which means an act or right of ploughing or cultivating lands) cannot be assumed to be a permanent right. *RANGASAMI REDDI v. GNANA SAMMANDHA PANDARA SANNADHI* . . . I. L. R. 22 Mad. 264

4. ———— **Limitation—Tenancy**. When a plaintiff seeks to eject persons from premises claimed by him, on the ground that they are in wrongful possession of the premises, he is bound to show that he or some of the persons under whom he claims have been in possession of the property within twelve years before suit. A mere allegation in the plaint that the persons sought to be ejected were the tenants of the person through whom the plaintiff claims will not shift the burden of proof. *Rao Karan Singh v. Bakar Ali Khan*, L. R. 9 I. A. 99, explained and distinguished. *GOPAUL CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY v. NILMONEY MITTER* . . . I. L. R. 10 Calc. 374



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*19. EJECTMENT—*concl.*

5. ———— *Claim to joint ownership.* In a suit to eject the special appellant from a portion of a house which he claimed to be in possession of as part owner:—*Held*, that the lower Appellate Court was wrong in laying down that it was not called upon to decide whether the defendant was entitled to share in the house, as the onus of proving an exclusive title to the property lay on the plaintiff. *ISUBJI v. KHATIZA*

Bom. 189 : 2nd Ed. 181

6. ———— *Proof of possession.* *Quære*: Whether a plaintiff in ejectment is entitled to succeed upon mere proof of antecedent undisturbed possession. *JOYTARA DASSEE v. MAHOMED MOBARUCK*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 975 : 11 C. L. R. 399

7. ———— *Ejectment, evidence of—Presumption of acts of Courts being bona fide.* An ejectment alleged to have taken place under direct action of Court, and supported by documents issued by, and filed in, the Court, must be presumed to have been real and *bona fide*, until the party ejected proves that all these proceedings were fictitious, and that he never lost possession of the land, but still holds it. *BUDURUDDEN v. HANIFF MULLICK*

5 W. R. 180

## 20. ENHANCEMENT OF RENT.

1. ———— *Suit for enhancement—Fair and equitable rent.* A plaintiff who sues for enhanced rent is bound to prove that the present rate is not fair and equitable. *HILLS v. JENDAR MUNDUL*

1 W. R. 3

GOLAM ALI v. GOPAL LALL TAGORE

1 W. R. 58

SUMEERA KHATOON v. GOPAL LALL TAGORE

1 W. R. 58

2. ———— *Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 7 and 188—Customary rate of rent—Fair and equitable rent.* In a suit for enhancement of rent of a tenure under s. 7 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, it is for the plaintiff to start his case by proving that the existing rate was below the customary rate payable by persons holding similar tenures in the vicinity, or that it was not fair and equitable, before the onus can be shifted to the defendant to prove that the existing rent was fair and equitable. *HEM CHANDRA CHOWDHRY v. KALI PRASANNA BHADURI* I. L. R. 26 Calc. 832

3. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 13.* S. 13 of Act X of 1859 was applicable, not merely to raiyats having rights of occupancy, but to all under-tenants and raiyats. The landlord cannot, by giving notice of enhancement, compel the tenant to pay more than a reasonable rent, and he cannot enhance without notice specifying the grounds of enhancement. The onus of proving the existence

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of the grounds alleged is upon the landlord. *BAKRA-NATH MANDAL v. BINODRAM SEN*

1 B. L. R. F. B. 25 : 10 W. R. F. B. 33

4. ———— *Ground of enhancement—Act X of 1859, s. 17.* In a suit for enhancement of rent, on the ground that "the produce and productive powers of the land have increased otherwise than by the agency or at the expense of the raiyat," the onus is upon the plaintiff to prove the grounds upon which he seeks enhancement. *RAJKRISHNA MOOKERJEE v. KALI CHARAN DOBAIN* . 6 B. L. R. Ap. 122 : 15 W. R. 109

*DHUNRAJ KOONWAR v. OOGGUR NARAIN KOONWAR* . . . . . 15 W. R. 2

5. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 17, cl. 2.* Where in a suit for enhancement on the ground that the productive powers of the land have been increased otherwise than by the agency or at the expense of the raiyat, the defendant admits the increase in productiveness, but denies the alleged cause, the onus of proving that the productiveness has been increased by other means lies on the plaintiff. *PULIN BEHARI SEN v. WATSON*

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 904

S.C. POOLIN BEHAREE SEIN v. WATSON

9 W. R. 190

Overruling *NOBEEN KISHEN BOSE v. SHOFAT-OOLLAH* . . . . . 1 W. R. 24

6. ———— *Nature of tenancy—Grounds of enhancement.* In a suit to recover rent at an enhanced rate after notice had been granted, a kabuliati was put in in support of the plaintiff's case and admitted by defendants. A pottah put in by defendants was found by the lower Court to be a forgery. *Held*, that plaintiff's contention that the kabuliati does not give the full terms of the agreement binds him to show beyond all reasonable doubt what were the actual terms of the pottah. Having failed to do this, the kabuliati was treated as complete and conclusive evidence of the nature of the tenancy, which was inferred by the Court to be permanent and at a fixed rate. *Held*, that it lay upon the plaintiff to make out distinctly the different grounds on which he rested his right to enhance, *viz.*, excess of area, increase of productiveness apart from the tenant's agency, and increase in the value of produce. *GOLAM ALI v. GOPAL LALL THAKOOR* . . . . . 9 W. R. 65

s.c. on appeal to the Privy Council, *SOORASOONDERY DEBI v. GOLAM ALI* 15 B. L. R. 2 note 19 W. R. 142

7. ———— *Purchaser of estate settled in perpetuity.* When the purchaser of a moiety of an estate settled in perpetuity some years ago according to a jamabandi then made does not sue directly to set aside the jamabandi of settlement, but many years after the settlement he sues to enhance the rents entered therein, to entitle him to succeed he must show that since the period of settle-



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ment circumstances have occurred which have tended to raise the value of the raiyat's lands, and consequently to entitle him to an increased share of the surplus profits arising from the lands. *RAM LOCHUN PAUL v. BROJO MOHINEE*

W. R. 1864, Act X, 118

8. ————— *Similar rates.*

Where a plaintiff sues for enhancement, on the ground that the defendant does not pay the rents paid by others in the neighbourhood for similar lands, and the defendant denies his liability to pay such rents owing to his having mokurari pottahs, the onus is on the defendant to prove those pottahs. *PRANNATH ROY CHOWDHRY v. MOHEHOODEEN AHMED* . . . . . 6 W. R., Act X, 39

9. ————— *Custom to exempt certain land.*

In a suit for enhancement, where the defendant pleads that rent has been assessed on lands covered by hedges and ditches and forming boundaries between fields, and that according to custom such land is not liable to pay rent at all, the onus is on the defendant to prove the custom. *HAROO CHOWDHRY v. JOYESSUR NUNDEE*

6 W. R., Act X, 46

10. ————— *Excess lands.*

In a suit for enhancement of rent on the ground that defendant holds land in excess of what he pays rent for, it is plaintiff's duty to show that the lands in question are all included within the tenure of the defendant, but that the latter has been paying rent for a quantity less than the area of those lands. *AHMED HOSSEIN v. BUNDEE* . . . . . 15 W. R. 91

11. ————— *Alteration of area of tenant's holding.*

To entitle the plaintiff to a decree for enhancement of rent on the ground of an alteration in the area of the defendant's holding, the plaintiff must show that the defendant is holding lands in excess of what he is paying rent for, and in order to do that he must show for what quantity of land the defendant is paying rent. *SURJA KANTA ACHARJEE v. BANESWAR SHAHA*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 251

12. ————— *Act X of 1859,*

*s. 16—Presumption.* In a suit for enhancement, the burden of proof that a tenure is protected under s. 16, Act X of 1859, is on the defendant, and it is only for the plaintiff to rebut any presumption which the defendant may make out under that section. *NOBOKRISTO MOJOOMDAR v. TARA MONEE*

12 W. R. 320

13. ————— *Proof of varia-*

*tion in rate of rent—Act X of 1859, s. 16.* In a suit for enhancement, the presumption under s. 16, Act X of 1859, established by twenty years' holding at a uniform rate, cannot be rebutted by the fact that the plaintiff did not obtain direct possession of the estate for many years, and was for other reasons prevented from suing, but the onus is on the plaintiff to prove that the present rent has been varied or

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fixed at a period subsequent to the decennial settlement. *DHUN SINGH v. CHUNDER KANT MOOKERJEE* . . . . . W. R., 1864, Act X, 25

14. ————— *Variation of rent.*

The fact alone of variation in the amount of rent paid between one year and another does not necessarily establish a right in the plaintiff to enhance or affect the defendant's right to hold at a fixed rent. It is for the defendant to account for such variation. *HURO NATH ROY v. CHITTRAMONEY DOSSEE* . . . . . 3 W. R., Act X, 122

15. ————— *Proof of uniformity of rent.*

In a suit for enhanced rent of a talukh, the existence of which as an ancient talukh is undoubted, and in which the only question is whether the rent is fixed or variable, the onus is first on the defendant to prove that he has held at a uniform rate for twenty years, and (if the defendant prove so much) then on the plaintiff to prove that the rent has varied since the permanent settlement. *RASHMONEE DEBEA v. HURRONATH ROY* . 1 W. R. 280

16. ————— *Beng. Reg. VIII of 1793, ss. 48, 51—Registration.*

In a suit for enhancement of rent:—*Held*, that, in order to bring a talukh within the scope of s. 51, Regulation VIII of 1793, it was sufficient to show that the tenure existed, and was capable of being registered at the time of the decennial settlement, the fact of actual registration not being an essential element in the formation of a talukh. *Held*, further, that the effect of proof of the existence of such a talukh at the time of the decennial settlement was sufficient to throw the onus on the plaintiff to prove that it was held at a variable rent. *RADHIKA CHOWDHRAIN v. BAMASUNDARI DAS* . . . . . 4 B. L. R. P. C. 8

*S.C. BAMASOONDUREE DOSSEE v. RADHIKA CHOWDHRAIN* . . . . . 13 W. R. P. C. 11  
13 Moo. I. A. 248

Reversing decision of High Court in *BAMA SOONDEREE DOSSEE v. RADHIKA CHOWDHRAIN*

1 W. R. 339

17. ————— *Liability of land comprised in a zamindari to enhancement—Dependent talukh:—Resumed lakhiraji—Beng. Reg. XIX of 1793.*

In a suit for enhancement of rent in respect of land which the defendant claimed to hold as a dependent talukh:—*Held*, that the onus was upon the zamindar to show that the land was included in the zamindari at the time of the permanent settlement. *ASSANULLAH v. BUSSARAT ALI CHOWDHRY*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 920

18. ————— *Plea that some lands never paid rent—Suit for enhancement.*

When a landlord sues for enhanced rent and is met by an allegation that certain plots of land never paid any rent at all, the onus is on him to prove that the lands did at some former time pay him rent. *GUNGADHUR SINGH v. BIMOLA DOSSEE*

5 W. R., Act X, 37



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SHEEB NARAIN ROY v. CHIDAM DOSS BYRAGEE  
6 W. R., Act X, 45

DHUN MONEE DEBEE v. SUTTOORGHUN SEAL  
6 W. R., Act X, 100

UMBIKA CHURN MUNDLE v. RAMDHONE MOHURIR  
11 W. R. 35

GUMANI KAZI v. HARIHAR MOOKERJEE  
B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 15 : W. R. F. B. 115

RAM COOMAR GHOSAL v. DEBEE PERSHAD  
CHATTERJEE . . . 6 W. R., Act X, 87

19. ———— *Lakhiraj.* The suit was for enhancement of rent. The defendant set up that certain plots of land, the rent of which was sought to be enhanced, were *lakhiraj*, and therefore not liable to pay rent. *Held*, that the onus was not upon the defendant to prove the land was *lakhiraj*, but upon the plaintiff to prove that the land was *mal*, or rent-paying. *Semle* : The Courts are accustomed to require some *prima facie* evidence from defendants raising such defence that they hold some *lakhiraj* lands. SRIDHAR NANDI v. BRAJA NATH KUNDU CHOWDHRY 2 B. L. R. A. C. 211  
14 W. R. 286 note

20. ———— *Separation of mal and lakhiraj lands.* In a suit for assessment at enhanced rates, in which the defendant admits that the main portion of the lands in dispute are *mal*, but does not separate the rent-free lands, the plaintiff is not bound to prove that the lands are *mal* until the defendant points out their precise situation. SUTTO CHURN GHOSAL v. TARINEE CHURN GHOSE  
3 W. R. 178

ASHRUFONISSA v. UMUNG MOHUN DEB ROY  
5 W. R., Act X, 48

NEHAL CHUNDER MISTREE v. HUREE PERSHAD MUNDUL . . . 8 W. R. 183

21. ———— *Plea that certain of the lands included in notice are not enhanceable—Onus of proof of such fact—Notice of enhancement.* In suits for enhancement of rent, where the tenant pleads that a portion of the land sought to be enhanced is held by him rent-free, the onus is on the tenant to prove *prima facie* that such portion of the land is so held by him ; and if he be successful in this, the onus is then shifted upon the landlord to rebut such *prima facie* evidence. NEWAJ BUNDO-PADHYA v. KALI PROSONNO GHOSE  
I. L. R. 6 Calc. 543 : 8 C. L. R. 6

22. ———— *Alienation of land being lakhiraj.* In a suit for enhancement of rent upon a certain area of land which plaintiff alleged to be *mal*, defendant set up that a portion of that area was *lakhiraj* and did not belong to plaintiff's zamindari. *Held*, that plaintiff was bound to prove that he had received rent for the disputed portion before he could obtain a decree for rent for such portion. *Quære* : Is it sufficient that defend-

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*20. ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—*concl.*

ant's plea is a mere allegation of *lakhiraj*, or must it be supported by *prima facie* evidence ? MUN MOHUN DEY v. SREERAM ROY . 14 W. R. 285

23. ———— *Evidence of receipt of rent.* In a suit for enhancement of rent, where defendant gives *prima facie* proof of a rent-free title, such as a proceeding of the resumption authorities releasing his lands under s. 48, Bengal Regulation XIX of 1793, the onus is on the plaintiff to prove receipt of rent. HEERA RAM BHUTTA-CHARJEE v. ASHRUF ALI . . . 9 W. R. 103

24. ———— *Allegation of debutter land.* In a suit for enhancement of rent, where defendant pleads that a parcel of it is debutter land, the property of another party, the onus lies on the plaintiff to prove that the land is *mal*, even though the alleged owner puts forward no claim. PREM CHAND BARIK v. BROJONATH KOONDoo CHOWDHRY . . . 10 W. R. 205

25. ———— *Suit for arrears of rent.* In a suit for arrears of rent at an enhanced rate where the defendant set up that he had relinquished all the *mal* land in his occupation, and that the residue of the land in dispute was *lakhiraj* :—*Held*, that the onus was upon the plaintiff to prove that the land for which he sued for enhanced rent was rent-paying, and not on the defendant to make good his defence. MAHOMED AZSSAR ALI v. NASSIR MAHOMED . . . 3 B. L. R. A. C. 304

26. ———— *Suit to contest enhancement—Act X of 1859, s. 14.* In a suit brought by a raiyat under s. 14, Act X of 1859, to contest a notice of enhancement, the *onus probandi* is on the raiyat. PRITHEE RAM CHOWDHRY v. CHIDAM CHUNDEE SHAHA . . . 8 W. R. 8

## 21. GENEALOGICAL DESCENT.

1. ———— *Suit for partition of hereditary property—Proof of genealogical descent.* In a suit for partition of hereditary property, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to trace back his genealogy to the original grantee and to prove that no other descendant of that grantee except himself and the defendants are in existence. It is sufficient for him to show that he and they are the only representatives of the person who last held the property. If others claim a share, it is for them to show that they have any rights which operate to restrict the plaintiff's *prima facie* right to treat such property as the exclusive property of himself and the defendants. KAKAJI BIN RANOJI v. BAPUJI BIN MADHAVRAV . . . 8 Bom. A. C. 205

2. ———— *Common ancestor—Claim as collateral heir.* Where the plaintiff claimed as paternal uncle's grandson and only heir of N, and the evidence showed that N's father was one of three brothers, but it was not stated in the plaint, nor shown by the evidence, who was the father of the three brothers :—*Held*, that the suit ought to be



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*21. GENEALOGICAL DESCENT—*concl'd.*

dismissed, it being incumbent on the plaintiff claiming as a collateral heir to show who the common ancestor was from whom he derived title. *KEDARNAUTH DOSS v. PROTAB CHUNDER DOSS*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 626 : 8 C. L. R. 238

## 22. HINDU LAW.

## (a) ADOPTION.

1. ——— Suit to set aside adoption—*Invalidity of adoption.* A plaintiff suing for a declaration that an adoption is invalid is bound to prove the invalidity. *BROJO KISHOREE DOSSEE v. SREENATH BOSE* . . . . . 9 W. R. 453

2. ——— Allegation of fraudulent adoption. In a suit to have it declared that an adoption which has long taken place, and has been acted upon, and in virtue of which defendants are in possession, is a fraudulent and false adoption, the onus lies on the plaintiff to make out, to some extent at any rate, the fraud and falsehood alleged. *GOOROO PROSUNNO SINGH v. NIL MADHUR SINGH* . . . . . 21 W. R. 84

3. ——— Improper and unauthorized adoption. In a suit in which plaintiffs, claiming as heirs of a deceased Hindu, sought to set aside an adoption effected by the widow as without authority and otherwise improper, the lower Appellate Court held that the onus lay with the plaintiffs to prove their affirmation in respect to the adoption. *HUR DYAL NAG v. ROY KRISTO BHOONICK*

24 W. R. 107

4. ——— Adoption under will—*Proof of validity of adoption.* A Hindu died leaving a son (who afterwards died a minor and unmarried), a widow, and three daughters. On the death of the minor, the widow succeeded to the property, and, under a will of her late husband, adopted in 1851 a son of her husband's brother. The widow died in 1866. One of the daughters, as guardian of her infant son born in 1853, brought a suit to set aside the will, and with it the adoption, and for recovery of possession of the property left by her minor brother. The defence set up was that the will was genuine; that the plaintiff should have sued within twelve years from the adoption; and that she had in 1851 admitted the adoption in having accepted a dar-patni from the guardian of the adopted son. *Held*, that the onus was upon the adopted son to prove the validity of the adoption, and not upon the plaintiff suing as heir to prove its invalidity, even though he alleged fraud and adduced no evidence in support of it. *TARINI CHARAN CHOWDHRY v. SARODA SUNDARI DAS*

3 B. L. R. A. C. 145 : 11 W. R. 468

5. ——— Validity of adoption depending on whether natural son alive or dead—*Deed or will conferring estate on a person described as adopted son—Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 107, 108—Person not heard of for seven years—*

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*22. HINDU LAW—*contd.*(a) ADOPTION—*contd.*

*Presumption of death.* One *S* died in September 1878, leaving a widow *B*. The year before his death his only son (*Bala*), a child of eight years old, had left his home and was never heard of again. A few days before his death, *S* adopted the plaintiff (his nephew) and executed a deed of adoption, which stated that he had no hope that his son *Bala* was alive, and that he had therefore adopted the plaintiff. The deed further declared the plaintiff to be the owner of all *S*'s property with all the rights of a natural son, but provided that, in the event of the lost son returning, he should have half. In 1892 the plaintiff, as *S*'s adopted son, brought this suit to recover some of *S*'s property, which was in the hands of the defendants, who claimed it as *S*'s heirs. They (*inter alia*) impeached the plaintiff's adoption. *Held*, that, in order to recover the property as the adopted son of *S*, it lay on the plaintiff to prove a valid adoption. It was a condition precedent to prove that at the date of the adoption *S* was without a son. It was therefore for the plaintiff to prove that *Bala* was then dead. There was at that time no presumption that *Bala* was dead, and, there being no evidence on the point, it was impossible to say when he died, or consequently that the adoption was valid. *Held*, however, that plaintiff was entitled to succeed as donee under the deed of adoption. It was clearly *S*'s intention to give the estate to the plaintiff as being his adopted son. But if the adoption was invalid, the gift had no effect. The onus here was on the defendants. It was for them to show that *Bala* was at that date alive and the adoption therefore invalid. That burden they had not discharged, and the plaintiff therefore was entitled to a decree. *Per FARRAN, C.J.*—Where a deed of gift or will confers an estate upon a named person, because he fills or by reason of his filling a certain character, he is entitled to recover the estate without affirmatively proving that he fills such character. The onus of proving that he does not fill the character, which is the reason of the gift, lies upon those who dispute his claim. The whole question is one of onus of proof. *RANGO BALAJI v. MUDIYEPPIA*

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 296

6. ——— Suit to enforce the mortgage against son's shares—*Joint Hindu family—Mortgage by father—Legal necessity—Burden of proof.* As a general rule, a creditor endeavouring to enforce his claim under a hypothecation-bond given by a Hindu father against the estate of a joint Hindu family in respect of money lent or advanced to the father having only a limited interest, should, if the question is raised, prove either that the money was obtained by the father for a legal necessity, or that he made such reasonable inquiries as would satisfy a prudent man that the loan was contracted to pay off an antecedent debt, or for the other legal necessities of the family. There is a distinction between such cases as this and cases in which a



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*22. HINDU LAW—*contd.*(a) ADOPTION—*concl'd.*

decree has been obtained against the father and the property sold, or cases in which the sons come into Court to ask for relief against a sale effected by their father for an antecedent debt. Where a decree was obtained against the father and a sale effected, the presumption is that the decree was properly made. Where a son comes into Court to ask for relief against a sale effected by his father for an antecedent debt, it is for the son to make out a case for the relief asked for. In a suit against the members of a joint Hindu family upon a bond given by their father and in which family property was hypothecated no evidence was given on either side as to the circumstances in which the bond was given. There was no evidence to show that any inquiry had been made by the plaintiff as to the objects for which the bond was executed by the father. *Held*, that the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff to show either that the money was obtained for a legal necessity, or that he had made reasonable inquiries and obtained such information as would satisfy a prudent man that the loan was contracted to pay off an antecedent debt or for the other legal necessities of the family, and that, no evidence having been given, the suit must be dismissed. *JAMNA v. NAIN SUKH* . . . I. L. R. 9 All. 493

## (b) ALIENATION.

7. ———— *Alienation by Hindu widow—Proof of necessity.* Where the validity of an alienation by a Hindu widow is the question for the consideration of the Court, the onus of proving the necessity for the alienation rests with the alienee. Where in such a case the plea of necessity fails, the Court will not grant a decree for immediate possession unless a very strong case of waste and deterioration be made out. What is sufficient evidence to support a sale by a Hindu widow of property in which she has only a life interest. *CHUTTER DHAREE SINGH v. HURCOOMAREE*

1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 99

*NUND COOMAR SINGH v. GUNGA PERSAUD NARAIN SINGH* . . . 10 W. R. 94

And the same is the case in a suit by a son to annul an alienation of ancestral property by the father. *JUGDEL NARAIN SUHAYE v. LALLA RAM PROKASH* . . . 2 W. R. 292

8. ———— *Purchaser, duty of—Suit for possession—Plea of bonā fide purchase.* In a suit to recover possession the onus is on the defendant who pleads that he is a *bonā fide* purchaser for value without notice of plaintiff's title to make out that plea. *JEEBUNISSA v. UMUL CHUNDER CHACKLANUVIS* . . . 18 W. R. 151

See *VARDEN SETH SAM v. LUCKPATHY ROYJEE*  
9 Moo. I. A. 303

9. ———— *Widow's power of alienation.* It is incumbent on the purchaser of

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*22. HINDU LAW—*contd.*(b) ALIENATION—*contd.*

realty from a Hindu widow to enquire whether the circumstances are such as to confer on her the power of alienation. *HEERALALL SHAHA v. JADUB CHUNDER CHENCHKEY* . . . Cor. 119

10. ———— *Good faith—Failure to make inquiry as to widow's right to sell.* A purchaser from a childless Hindu widow is bound to satisfy himself as to her right to sell. If he does not act with due care in the matter, he cannot be said to have acted legally in good faith, although he may have fully believed, or taken for granted, that all was right. *RAMDHONE BHUTTACHARJEE v. ISHANEE DABEE* . . . 2 W. R. 123

11. ———— *Purchase from Hindu widow.* Upon those who claim under an alienation from a Hindu widow rests the onus of showing that the transaction was within her limited power. *COLLECTOR OF MASULIPATAM v. CAVALY VENCATA NARAINAPAH*

2 W. R. P. C. 61: 8 Moo. I. A. 529

So with a purchaser of immoveable property dealing with any one with a qualified power.

See *VADALI RAMAKRISTNAMA v. MANDA APPANYA*  
2 Mad. 407

12. ———— *Voluntary transfer alleged to have been made by a Hindu widow—Burden of proving her knowledge of her rights—Gift.* Where a voluntary transfer by a Hindu widow is alleged, the burden of proving that it was a free gift, made with knowledge by her of her rights is on the donee. The plaintiff, widow of the only son who survived his father who was the owner of village lands and other property, had become, on her husband's death without issue, entitled, as the widow, to the estate which he had inherited. But she obtained possession of only half of it. The other half was in the recorded possession, when this suit was brought, of the widow of her late husband's younger brother, who died in his father's lifetime. The case which the latter widow, as defendant, now sought to make was that she had become entitled to a share in the estate as the result of a series of transactions, by way of family arrangement, in which the two widows, and their mother-in-law, widow of the deceased father, had taken part. These included a reference to arbitration, a release and dakhil kharij in settlement records. *Held*, that the plaintiff must succeed, in the absence of proof of which the burden was on the defendant that the plaintiff, when ceding half of the estate to which she was entitled, had knowledge of her right as widow, to the whole, and had freely made what in effect was a gift. *DEO KUAR v. MAN KUAR*

I. L. R. 17 All. 1

L. R. 21 I. A. 198

13. ———— *Power of widow of sonless Hindu to mortgage ancestral property—Pardanashin woman, conditions necessary to the*

13 E 2



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*22. HINDU LAW—*contd.*(b) ALIENATION—*contd.*

*execution of a valid deed by—Power of reversioner to sell or mortgage reversionary interest in—Expectancy—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 6, cl. (a).* K died in 1866 possessed of considerable property, both moveable and immoveable. He left surviving him a widow, H, who died in 1878, a daughter, A, married to one L, and two grandsons, I and S, sons of A, the latter of whom, S, died some time subsequent to 1881, as did also his father L. In December 1877, a mortgage-deed was executed over certain of the ancestral property of the family of K, the ostensible executants being L for himself and H, A, and I through L as their general attorney. This deed was to secure a debt of Rs 10,000 stated to be to some small extent for an advance in cash, and as to the balance in respect of certain previous debts and interest thereon. At the date of this bond both I and S were minors. In April 1881, H having in the meanwhile died and I having attained majority, but S being still a minor, a second bond of a similar nature to the former was executed by L, A, and I for Rs 20,000, this sum being recited as composed of various debts of earlier date with interest thereon of an advance to pay Government revenue, an advance for expenses of the marriage of L's daughter, and a very small balance in cash. It was not shown that the debts secured by either of these two bonds were debts incurred for legal necessity by the widow or daughter of K, or that the mortgagees, after due inquiry, had reasonable grounds for believing that such necessity existed, nor was it shown that the mortgages were entered into with the consent of all the husband's kindred under circumstances which might raise a valid presumption that the debts secured by them were properly incurred. It was further not shown that the power-of-attorney under which L purported to act in executing the bond of 1877 on behalf of H, A, and I was ever properly explained to the professed executants or that they understood its import nor was it shown that either of the bonds was duly explained to and comprehended by the professed executants other than L himself, in manner required by law in the case of documents executed by pardanashin women; nor, though at the date of the execution of the second bond I had attained the age of majority, did it appear that he signed the bond with any clear knowledge of its contents or of the liability which he was professing to incur thereby, or otherwise than through the influence brought to bear on him by his father L. *Held*, on suit by the mortgagees to bring to sale the ancestral property which had been of K in his lifetime in enforcement of the two mortgages abovementioned, that the mortgages were not binding on the alleged executants or on the ancestral property at the date of suit in the hands of A. I's interest in the family property in suit could only be affected by the mortgage of the 2nd of April 1881 on proof that the debt was in fact one, or was on reasonable inquiry by, and statements made to, the lenders

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*22. HINDU LAW—*contd.*(b) ALIENATION—*contd.*

of the money believed by them to be one, in respect of which his mother A, as a Hindu daughter in possession, could mortgage or charge the family property beyond her own then vested interest in it, or on proof that he, as one of the reversioners, by joining with his mother in executing the documents of mortgage, led the lenders of the money to believe that such a necessity existed for the loan as enabled the Hindu daughter to create a valid mortgage on the family property beyond the extent of her own life-interest. The Hindu law which prevails in the N.-W. Provinces recognizes no power in a reversioner to sell or mortgage his interest in expectancy, even although he may be the heir-apparent. It is absolutely necessary, before holding that a pardanashin lady or her property is liable on a contract alleged to have been made by her or in consequence of an alleged execution by her of a general power-of-attorney, to be reasonably satisfied that the liability she was incurring and the nature of the transaction were explained to her; and more particularly is this the case if it is sought by reason of her having executed a document, to fix her and her property with a liability to pay a debt, which, if the document had not been executed by her or by an agent appointed by her with adequate power, could not have been enforced against her property. It is also necessary when money-lenders in this country seek to enforce against the property of a Hindu family a contract of mortgage made by a reversioner, who, although of age at the time, was then still of tender years and without experience of business, for the Court, when the question is raised, to be satisfied that the reversioner understood the nature of the transaction and the effect of the contract which he was entering into, or that the reversioner of the family property, in which the reversioner had an estate in expectancy only, was liable for the debt in respect of which the mortgage is sought to be enforced, and that no unfair advantage was taken of the reversioner's youth and inexperience. *ACHHAN KUAR v. THAKUR DAS* . . . . . I. L. R. 17 All. 125

Affirmed by Privy Council in *SHAM SUNDER LAL v. ACHHAN KUNWAR* . . . . . I. L. R. 21 All. 71  
L. R. 25 I. A. 183

14. ———— *Necessity for alienation—Adequacy of consideration—Purchaser.* The onus of proving the necessity for a sale by a Hindu widow and the adequacy of the purchase-money lies on the purchaser. *JADU NATH SIRCAR v. SONAMONEE DOSSEE* . . . . . Cor. 70

*BISSONAUTH ROY v. LALL BAHADOOR SINGH*  
1 W. R. 247

*WOOMA CHURN BANERJEE v. HARADHUN MOOKERJEE* . . . . . 1 W. R. 347

15. ———— *Mortgage by Hindu widow.* The burthen of proving the necessity for a mortgage by a Hindu widow rests on the



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*22. HINDU LAW—*contd.*(b) ALIENATION—*contd.*

mortgagee where that necessity is disputed by the next heir. *GOLAB SING v. RAO KURUN SING. RAO KURUN SING v. MAHOMED FYAZ ALI KHAN*  
10 B. L. R. P. C. 1: 14 Moo. I. A. 178

18. ————— *Purchaser of ancestral property—Proof of inquiry as to existence of necessity.* In justifying the purchase of ancestral property, the purchaser is not bound to prove the fact that family necessity actually existed; it is sufficient if he establishes that he made *boni fide* inquiry into the matter and was in that inquiry reasonably led to suppose that the necessity did exist. *SOORENDRO PERSHAD DOBEY v. NUNDUN MISSER* . . . . . 21 W. R. 196

17. ————— *Duty of purchaser of ancestral property.* Where ancestral property is to be sold or mortgaged, all that the purchaser has to do is to see that there is sufficient pressure upon the estate to render the transfer necessary. The fact of there being a decree, an attachment, and a proclamation for sale, is sufficient pressure. *SHEORAJ KOOPER v. NUCKCHEDEE LALI.*  
14 W. R. 72

18. ————— *Alienation by Hindu.* In a suit brought by a Hindu son, for himself and on behalf of three infant brothers, to set aside a sale of certain ancestral lands which had been made by his father without his concurrence:—*Held*, that the onus of proving that the payment of the debts, on account of which the property was sold, was not a common family necessity, was properly laid by the District Judge upon the plaintiff. *BABAJI SAKHOJI v. RAMSHET PANDUSHET*  
2 Bom. 23

19. ————— *Proof of power to alienate—Degree of proof.* Although as a general rule it may lie upon those who claim under an alienation of ancestral property for necessary purposes to show that the transaction was within the limited power of the party alienating, yet particular circumstances may shift the burden of proof. No fixed rule can be laid down as to the degree of proof requisite in such cases. *KAIHUR SINGH v. ROOP SINGH* . . . . . 3 N. W. 4

*TASOUWAR ALI v. KOONJ BEHREE LAL*

3 N. W. note

20. ————— *Malabar law—Loan to karnavan.* There is no invariable presumption on whom the burden of proof lies as to the necessity of a loan made to the karnavan. *ELAYACHANI-DATHIL KOMBI ACHEN v. KENATTUMKORA LAKSHMI AMMA* . . . . . I. L. R. 5 Mad. 201

21. ————— *Application of purchase-money—Sale by Hindu widow—Duty of purchaser.* Where a Hindu widow sells as guardian of her minor son and for his maintenance, the purchaser must show the necessity for the sale, but he

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*22. HINDU LAW—*contd.*(b) ALIENATION—*contd.*

need not see to the application of the money. *RA-DHA KISHORE MOOKERJEE v. MIRTOONJOY GOW*  
7 W. R. 23

*KOOL CHUNDER SURMA v. RAMJOY SURMONA*  
10 W. R. 8

*RAM PERSHAD SINGH v. NAJBUNNISSA KOOPER*  
9 W. R. 501

22. ————— *Duties of purchaser—Application of purchase-money.* A purchaser for value is not bound to prove the antecedent economy or good conduct of a Hindu widow who alienates a portion of her husband's estate, nor to account for the due appropriation of the purchase-money, but he is bound to use diligence in ascertaining that there is some legal necessity for the loan, and he may be reasonably expected to prove the circumstances connected with his own particular loan. *GOBINDMONEE DOSSEE v. SHAM LOLL BYSACK. KALI COOMAR CHOWDHRY v. RAM DOSS SHAHA* . . . . . W. R. 1864, 153

23. ————— *Application of purchase-money—Alienation by Hindu widow.* In a sale by a Hindu widow under necessity, where the vendee pays a fair price and acts *boni fide*, the mere fact of only two-thirds of the purchase-money being paid to creditors does not invalidate his conveyance, as he is not bound to see to the application of the purchase-money. *RAM GOPAL GHOSE v. BULLODEB BOSE* . . . . . W. R. 1864, 385

24. ————— *Obligation on creditor seeking to enforce a charge on property sold.* In transactions such as the alienation by a widow of her estate of inheritance derived from her husband, any creditor seeking to enforce a charge on such estate is bound at least to show the nature of the transaction, and to show that in advancing his money he gave credit on reasonable grounds to an assertion that the money was wanted for one of the recognized necessities. *KAMESWAR PERSHAD v. RUN BAHADUR SINGH* . . . . .

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 843: 8 C. L. R. 361  
L. R. 8 I. A. 8

*KASHINATH SITARAM OYE v. DADKI*  
6 Bom. A. C. 211

25. ————— *Proof of execution of deed by Hindu widow.* The plaintiff, to make good his claim against the estate of his deceased debtor, relied upon a document purporting to have been signed by the latter's widow, since then also deceased. The Court of first appeal, however, found that there had been no actual execution of the instrument by the widow, and dismissed the suit. The burden of proving due execution by the widow lay upon the plaintiff, who relied upon it as binding the estate which she represented, a matter commented on in *Kameswar Pershad v. Run Bahadur Singh*, I. L. R. 6



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*22. HINDU LAW—*contd.*(b) ALIENATION—*contd.*

Calc. 843 : L. R. 8 I. A. 8. RAMRATAN SUKAL  
v. NANDU . . . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 249  
L. R. 19 I. A. 1

26. ———— *Creditor, obligation of—Proof of satisfaction of debt.* Where a party, entitled to impeach an alienation by a widow of her husband's estate sues to set aside such an alienation, and the defendant establishes not only that he had a charge on the estate in virtue of a mortgage-deed executed by the widow, but that the debt to him was on account of advances made to her for purposes for which she would have been entitled to alienate the estate as against the next heirs, it does not follow that because plaintiff had a right to demand this peculiar proof of the ordinary rule which requires the party who alleges payment to prove payment is to be inverted in his favour, or that the debt is to be presumed to be satisfied, unless the contrary is shown by the creditor; and if he alleges that the mortgage-deed was not *bona fide*, the burthen lies on him to prove his allegation. CAVALLY VENCATA NARAINAPAH v. COLLECTOR OF MASULIPATAM

10 W. R. P. C. 47 : 11 Moo. I. A. 619

27. ———— *Suit to set aside alienation—Suit to set aside sale in execution of decree of joint family property as improperly made.* Where joint family property is sold in execution of a decree against the head of the family, and purchased *bona fide* and for valuable consideration, the onus lies on members of the family who impugn the sale to show that the decree was an improper one. SHEO PERSHAD SINGH v. SOORJBUNSEE KOOR

24 W. R. 281

28. ———— *Suit for share of alienated property—Mortgage by one member of joint family—Suit for possession of property.* In a suit by a Hindu widow to recover a share of property alleged to have been inherited from her husband (J), and which had been mortgaged by her husband's brother (B) and sold under a decree obtained on the mortgage, the question was raised whether the money for which the property was mortgaged had been borrowed by B for his own private use, or for the benefit of the family. *Held*, that the onus was on the defendant to show that the plaintiff had derived any benefit from the money. SREEMUTTY v. LUKHEE NARAIN-DUTT . . . 22 W. R. 171

29. ———— *Alienation by Hindu father—Necessity—Specific performance, suit for, against father.* There is no legal presumption in the Madras Presidency that a sale by a Hindu father is valid until the contrary is shown. Where a suit is brought against the father of an undivided Hindu family having an infant son, for the specific performance of a contract to sell land, presumably ancestral, the Court, having thereby notice that the vendor's powers can be exercised without a breach of trust only where there exists a necessity sufficient

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*22. HINDU LAW—*contd.*(b) ALIENATION—*contd.*

in law to justify the sale, and that the infant son is entitled to interdict the sale, is bound to require the plaintiff to give some proof of the necessity for the sale. GURUSAMI SASTRIAL v. GANAPATHIA PILLAI  
I. L. R. 5 Mad. 337

30. ———— *Alienation by widow—Proof that money on mortgage was advanced for purpose justified by legal necessity—Evidence of sufficiency of husband's estate to maintain widow.* A Hindu proprietor's heirs in possession after the death of his widow, who had mortgaged part of the inheritance, were sued by the mortgagee's heir, who represented him, to enforce the mortgage as binding on the land. There was evidence that, after the mortgage was executed, previous mortgages made by the widow were paid off with the borrowed money; but there was no evidence connecting any of those securities with a debt of the husband; or that the mortgage was made for a legitimate purpose. *Held*, that, although the suit was brought by the representative, and not by the original mortgagee, the burden of proving the money to have been advanced to the widow for a purpose justified by legal necessity was on the plaintiff; and that it was incumbent on him to adduce sufficient evidence of the nature of the transaction. That general evidence to the effect that the husband died in debt, and that the widow substituted new securities at reduced interest for former mortgages, was not sufficient to exempt the plaintiff from having to prove the particulars of the transaction and its justification. That the burden of proving that the estate left by the husband was sufficient to maintain the widow was not thrown upon the defendants. Hunooman Pershad Pandey v. Mundraj Koonweree, 6 Moo. I. A. 393, discussed. MAHESHAH BAKSH SINGH v. RATAN SINGH . . . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 766  
L. R. 23 I. A. 57

31. ———— *Purchase by son at sale for arrears of rent against father—Proof of bona fides of sale.* Where a son purchased a property sold for arrears of rent, on account of the default of his father, and both father and son were living together at the time of the purchase :—*Held*, that the onus was on the son to prove that his purchase was *bona fide*. HUR SUHAYE MISSER v. DEEN DYAL SINGH . . . 7 W. R. 275

32. ———— *Alienation by manager of infant's estate—Presumption of bona fides—Obligation of purchaser to inquire—Necessity for charge.* Under the Hindu law, the right of a *bona fide* incumbrancer who has taken from a *de facto* manager a charge on lands created honestly, for the purpose of saving the estate, or for the benefit of the estate, is not (provided the circumstances would support the charge had it emanated from a *de facto* and *de jure* manager) affected by the want of union of the *de facto* with the *de jure* title. The question



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*22. HINDU LAW—*contd.*(b) ALIENATION—*contd.*

as to the onus of proof in such cases is one not capable of a general and inflexible answer, but the presumption proper to be made will vary with circumstances. Thus, a mortgagee, who is setting up a charge in his favour made by one whose title to alienate he knew to be limited, must prove the facts which embody the representations made to him of the alleged deeds of the estate and the motives influencing his immediate loan; but such proof must not be required from one not an original party, after a lapse of time and enjoyment and apparent acquiescence. Where, also, a charge is created by the substitution of a new security for an older one, and the consideration for the older one was an old precedent debt of an ancestor not previously questioned, the presumption will arise in favour of a consideration that binds the estate. The lender is bound to inquire into the necessity for the charge, and to satisfy himself that the manager is acting for the benefit of the estate. But if he does so inquire and acts honestly, the real existence of an alleged sufficient and reasonably credited necessity is not a condition precedent to the validity of his charge, and he is not bound to see to the application of the money. *HUNOONMAN PERSHAD PANDEY v. MUNDRAJ KOONWEREE*

6 Moo. I. A. 393 : 18 W. R. 81 note

33. ———— Sale of property by guardian for minor—*Allegation of fraud*. In a suit by three brothers to recover an estate sold by their two brothers as their guardians during their minority, as they alleged, without necessity and in collusion with the purchaser:—*Held*, that the onus was on the plaintiff to prove the sale fraudulent and collusive. *ACHUNTH SINGH v. KISHEN PERSHAD SINGH* . . . . . W. R. 1864, 37

34. ———— Sale of property of minor or person under disqualification by party in fiduciary position—*Proof of bona fides*. When a person, after attaining majority, questions any sale of his property made by his guardian during his minority, the burden lies on the person who upholds the purchase not only to show that, under the circumstances of the case, either the guardian had the power to sell or that the purchaser reasonably supposed he had such power, but, further, that the whole transaction, so far as regarded the purchaser's part in it, was *bona fide*. Following the principle laid down by the Court in the case of *Kanailal Jowhari v. Kaminee Dabee*, 1 B. L. R. O. C. 31 note, it was held that, when either the person who sells labours under disqualification, or the purchaser stands in a fiduciary relation to the owner of the property, the *bona fides* of the dealing cannot be presumed, but must be made out by the purchaser. *ROOP NARAIN SINGH v. GUJADHUR PERSHAD NARAIN* . . . . . 9 W. R. 297

35. ———— Suit to set aside sale made by guardian—*Act XL of 1858, s. 18—Fraud or*

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*22. HINDU LAW—*contd.*(b) ALIENATION—*contd.*

*collusion—Purchaser*. Where a plaintiff alleges fraud or illegality as a ground for setting aside a sale made under s. 18, the onus lies upon him to make out a *prima facie* case of fraud or illegality, and to show that the debt, which formed the consideration for the sale in such case, was one for which the minor was not responsible. *Per PRINSEP, J.*—A stranger purchasing from a guardian, acting under the authority granted under s. 18 of Act XL of 1858, will be entitled to every protection from the Courts, so long as it is not shown that he acted in a fraudulent or collusive manner, knowing that the debts, for the liquidation of which the purchase-money would be applied, were not debts lawfully binding on the minor. The burden of proof in such a case would lie heavily on the person seeking to set aside the alienation. But where the purchaser is himself the creditor, and therefore has the means of satisfying a Court as to the origin and nature of the debts and how they are binding on the minor, the burden of proof is shifted on the purchaser, when the plaintiff has established a *prima facie* case. *SIKHER CHUND v. DULPUTTY SINGH*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 363 : 5 C. L. R. 374

36. ———— Alienation for debt contracted by karnavan—*Presumption—Proof of agency and authority to contract debts*. There is no presumption of law that every debt contracted by the karnavan of a Malabar tarwad is for the uses of the tarwad and chargeable on the tarwad estate. The creditor must show, in the first instance, if it is disputed, that the obligor had authority from the tarwad as their agent and manager to contract debts, and that he assumed to act in the particular instance as such agent and manager. The creditor having established these facts, it lies on the tarwad to show that the obligor was not acting within the scope of his authority in the particular instance. *KUTTI MANNADIYAR v. PAYANT MUTHAN*

I. L. R. 3 Mad. 288

37. ———— Suit on a mortgage executed by a Hindu father—*Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)—Joint Hindu family—Sons not made parties—Notice*. Where the sons in a joint Hindu family come into Court seeking to get rid of the effect, as against their interests in the joint family property, of a decree on a mortgage executed by their father obtained in a suit to which they were not made parties, the burden of proof lies on them to establish that the mortgagee, when he brought his suit, had notice of their interests in the mortgaged property. *RAM NATH RAI v. LACHMAN RAI*

I. L. R. 21 All. 193

*BIJAI BAHADUR SINGH v. MEWA LAL*

I. L. R. 21 All. 195 note

38. ———— Alienation by ancestor—*Suit by heir*. Where an heir's title to an estate is uncontested, and his possession is only obstructed by an alleged conveyance on the part of an ancestor,



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*22. HINDU LAW—*concl'd.*(b) ALIENATION—*concl'd.*

it lies upon the party holding possession, and who causes the obstruction, to prove that such a conveyance has taken place. *KAMINEE MOHUN CHUCKERBUTTY v. KALEE KANT SEIN*

14 W. R. 275

39. ——— Subject of purchase—*Evidence of right and interest on purchased property.* A purchaser of another's rights and interests is bound to show what may be properly comprised under that denomination. *RAM NATH ROY v. SALEEM AHMED KHAN. JADOO NATH ROY v. SALEEM AHMED KHAN.*

3 N. W. 188

## (c) MAINTENANCE.

40. ——— Right in property beyond mere maintenance—*Right of widow exercising rights of ownership over estate of husband.* Where the widow has been allowed to exercise acts of ownership in respect of landed property belonging to her deceased husband incompatible with a mere right to maintenance from his estate, the onus of proof that the widow is entitled to nothing beyond a bare maintenance lies upon the party asserting this. *Now-INDH SINGH v. SOHUN KOORER.*

3 N. W. 12

## (d) MARRIAGE.

41. ——— *Hindu law—Panchals—Kurbars—Sub-divisions of Shudra tribe—Inter-marriage valid—Custom as to illegality.* A marriage between a man of the Panchal caste and a woman of the Kurbar caste is valid. The Panchals and the Kurbars are sub-divisions of the Shudra tribe. The onus lies upon the party alleging an illegality by reason of immemorial custom to prove such prohibiting custom. *Inderun Valungy-pooly Taver v. Ramasawmy Pandia Talaver, 13 Moo. I. A. 141, and Fakirganda v. Gangi, 22 Bom. 277, followed. MAHANTAWA v. GANGAWA (1909)*

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 693

## (e) STRIDHAN.

42. ——— Purchase with stridhan, proof of—*Hindu wife seeking to exempt property from the debts of her husband.* A Hindu wife seeking to exempt property from responsibility for her husband's debts must clearly prove that she had stridhan, and that the property was purchased *bonâ fide* with her exclusive funds. *BROJOMOHUN MYTEE v. RADHA KOOMAREE*

W. R. 1864, 60

43. ——— Proof of property being stridhan—*Gift of Hindu widow.* The burden of proving property (the subject of a gift of a Hindu widow) to be stridhan rests with those claiming under her. *CHUNDER MONEE DOSSEE v. JOYKISSEN SIRCAR*

1 W. R. 107

*BISSESSUR CHUCKERBUTTY v. RAM JOY MOJOM-DAR*

2 W. R. 236

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*

## 23. HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. ——— Suit by wife to recover property from husband—*Alienation by husband of securities belonging to wife.* In a suit by a Mahomedan wife, who had left her husband's protection on account of ill-usage, for recovery, among other property, of certain securities belonging to her which had got into the husband's possession, and the detention of which he justified on the ground that he had purchased them from her, and on their endorsement and delivery to him had paid the full value for them, the correct principle as to the onus of the proof is that, although the wife may have failed to establish affirmatively the precise case alleged by her, her husband, having admitted the receipt of the securities from her, was bound to show something more than mere endorsement and delivery; that the relation of the parties being what it was it lay upon him to prove that the transactions which he set up were *bonâ fide* sales and purchases, and that he actually gave full value for what he received from her; and where it was proved that the wife had the securities while under her husband's protection, and some had passed from her to him and others to his creditors, and that the wife left her husband's house in destitution, the proof adduced by the husband as to the sale for full consideration to him must be full and clear, and such as to satisfy a Court of Justice that the transactions were conducted fairly and properly, and with a due regard to the rights and interests of the wife. Where it was in proof that a portion of the immoveable property of the wife had passed to a *bonâ fide* purchaser under conveyances executed by the wife to her husband or to such purchaser, the burden of proof in a suit by her to recover the property is upon her, as she seeks to be relieved from the effect of her own conveyances, the execution of which she does not dispute against one who, if not an absolute stranger, stands in no fiduciary relation to her. *BUZLOOR RUHEEM v. SHUMSOONNISSA BEGUM. JUDONATH BOSE v. SHUMSOONNISSA BEGUM*

8 W. R. P. C. 3: 11 Moo. I. A. 551

s.c. in High Court. *BUZZUL RUHIM v. SHUM-SHEROONNISSA BEGUM. MIRTUNJOY BOSE v. SHUM-SHEROONNISSA BEGUM. JUDONATH BOSE v. SHUM-SHEROONNISSA BEGUM*

W. R. F. B. 60

2. ——— Suit by wife for property after divorce—*Mahomedan law.* In a suit by a Mahomedan lady against her husband after divorce for recovery of property belonging to her which her husband held before the divorce, the possession of the husband being the possession of the wife, the onus lies on the husband to prove his right to the property; till that was done, the presumption was that the property so held by the husband was held by him on behalf of the wife. *ABDOOL ALI alias SHOAGEEA v. KURRUMNISSA*

9 W. R. 153

3. ——— Suit for possession of property of which husband and wife have been tenants—*Nature of possession.* In a suit to recover certain property on the allegation that



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plaintiff's father had obtained it in gift from his wife *L.*, and that it had been in the possession of father and son more than thirty years, defendant having had his name recorded in the Collectorate as heir to *L.*:—*Held*, with reference to the fact, that there had been a tenancy of husband and wife together, that it was incumbent on plaintiff to prove that his possession was possession on his own account, and not that of an agent. *VELAET ALI KHAN v. AZMUN* . . . 11 W. R. 513

## 24. INTERVENORS.

1. ———— Suit for rent—*Proof of receipt and enjoyment of rent.* In a suit for rent under a kabuliati, if a third party intervenes and supports the defendant's case that the rents have been paid, not to the plaintiff, but to the intervenor, the onus of proving such previous receipt and enjoyment is altogether on the intervenor; and until his intervention is disposed of, the plaintiff need not prove his title or the kabuliati. *RAM BHUROSE SINGH v. JAWA MAHATOON* . . . 11 W. R. 319

*RADHA KISHORE TALOOKDAR v. GOLUCK CHUNDER ROY* . . . 11 W. R. 366

2. ———— Suit against person holding under decree under s. 77, Act X of 1859. The onus of proving title was on a plaintiff seeking to oust a person formally declared by a decree under s. 77, Act X of 1859, to be in enjoyment of the rent of disputed land and consequently in possession. *RUNGO MONEE DOSSEE v. UNNO-POORNA DEBIA* . . . 7 W. R. 149

3. ———— Suit to get rid of decision in favour of intervenor. In order to get rid of the effect of a Collector's decision in favour of an intervenor under s. 77, Act X of 1859, the party entitled must bring a suit to establish his title, it being not enough for him merely to establish a vague allegation of dispossession and throw it upon the defendant to prove title. *MOHESUR MOOKERJEE v. KALEE DOSS MOOKERJEE* . 11 W. R. 573

4. ———— Suit after successful intervention under s. 77, Act X of 1859. Plaintiff's suit for rent against the raiyats of certain land alleged to belong to a mouzah (Baboollee) which they had bought at an auction sale having been dismissed in consequence of defendant's intervention, under s. 77, Act X of 1859, they brought an action against her to recover possession. The defence was that the land in dispute did not belong to plaintiff's mouzah, but to defendant's mouzah, Gyruptore. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were bound to prove their own case, and to show that the land belonged to their purchased estate (Baboollee). In this case, however, both parties had consented to have the case decided on the question whether mouzah Gyruptore was or was not in existence and the defendant could not therefore make out

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a new case in special appeal. *MOONDUR BIBEE v. HONOOMAN PERSHAD* . . . 11 W. R. 277

5. ———— Suit after intervention under s. 77, Act X of 1859—*Right to rent.* Where a suit by the purchaser of an alleged lakhiraj tenure for rent from his under-tenant was thrown out by the intervention of the superior landlord, under s. 77, Act X of 1859:—*Held*, that all the plaintiff had to do in a regular suit brought by him in consequence was to prove that he was entitled to the rent from the under-tenant. It was not necessary for him to prove that his land was valid lakhiraj. *RAJ CHUNDER GHOSE v. JOY CHUNDER DUTT* . . . 12 W. R. 197

6. ———— Civil Procedure Code, s. 73. Where the plaintiff sued to recover possession of certain property which he alleged he had purchased from *H.*, and proved his purchase, and *B.*, the mother of *H.*, intervened and contended that the property was her own and purchased for herself and not on behalf of *H.*:—*Held*, the onus was on *B.* to prove the title. *JAGGADANAND MISSEER v. HAMID RASUL* . . . 8 B. L. R. 182 note

*S.C. JUGGODANUND MISSEER v. HAMID RUSOOL* . . . 10 W. R. 52

7. ———— In a suit upon a registered kobala for possession of certain property the appellant intervened alleging a prior purchase by him from the plaintiff's vendor and was made a defendant. On the plaintiff having proved their title against the original defendants, the lower Courts held that the onus was on the appellant, who was not shown to be actually in possession to prove his allegation. *Held*, that the lower Courts were right in so holding. *Jaggadanand Misser v. Hamid Rasul*, 8 B. L. R. 182 note; 10 W. R. 52, approved and followed. *BALNIA KUNDU DUROYE v. ADIKUNDA PUNDA* . . . 7 C. L. R. 560

8. ———— Proof of title. A plaintiff who sues by right of inheritance for the recovery of lands in the possession, not illegal or forcible, of defendants, to the rents whereof it was held in a previous suit, in which he intervened, that he had not been in the actual enjoyment, is bound to prove as well his title to the estate as his lineal descent from, or relation in such decree of contiguity as would entitle him to part succession to, the original acquirer thereof. *CHYTUN MYTEE v. LUKHEE CHURN PATNAIK* . . . 8 W. R. 258

9. ———— Suit for kabuliati—Act X of 1859, s. 77—*Intervenor.* In a suit to obtain a kabuliati, the defendant admitted the plaintiff's title. A third party intervened (under s. 77, Act X of 1859) alleging that he was in actual receipt and enjoyment of the rent. *Held*, that the onus was on the intervenor to prove that he was *bona fide* in actual receipt and enjoyment of the rent, and not on the plaintiff to prove his possession. *BAHARULLA v. MAJAN* . . . 3 B. L. R. Ap. 61



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KISHEN CHUNDER DOSS v. BURATEE SHEIKH.  
2 W. R., Act X, 36

10. ——— Suit for declaration of right—*Suit for usufruct of property—Unsuccessful intervention.* The mortgage of certain property having been purchased by S, he sold it to G, who foreclosed, got a decree for possession, and sold it to W. W's intervention having failed in a suit for arrears of rent by a party setting up a title intermediate between him and the raiyat, on the ground of a miras pottah obtained from the mortgagor subsequently to the mortgage, he (W) sued to have his right declared to the rents payable by the raiyat. *Held*, that it was not only not necessary for the plaintiff to prove possession, but the very ground he took was want of possession, his cause of action being that he was prevented from enjoying the usufruct. *Held*, also, that it was for the defendant to show that the incumbrance did not injure the outturn of the property. GORIND CHUNDER BANNERJEE v. WISE

12 W. R. 19

## 25. LANDLORD AND TENANT.

1. ——— Allegation that lands are held under different title. Where a raiyat holds lands of considerable extent under a zamindar, and alleges that one or two plots occupied by him are held under a different title, the onus is on him to prove his allegation. RAM COOMAR ROY v. BEJOY GORIND BURAL

7 W. R. 535

2. ——— Allegation of independent title—*Suit to confirm title* In a suit by the lessee of the purchaser of the rights and interests of the first defendant to obtain possession of some portions of land alleged to fall within the share of the zamindari so purchased, defendants contended that the plots which were the subject of suit, although falling within the ambit of the zamindari, did not in fact form a portion of it, but were lakhiraj lands belonging to themselves by a title independent of the title to the zamindari. The evidence showed the principal defendant to have been in receipt of the rents and profits of the land in suit, as well as of his share of the zamindari. *Held*, that the onus lay upon the defendants to show the alleged independent title; failing to do so, the *prima facie* title made out by the plaintiff ought to prevail. SHUMDAN ALI v. MUTHOORNATH DUTT

14 W. R. 226

3. ——— Rival tenants—*Resignation of tenancy.* In a suit between two rival tenants claiming to hold under the same landlord, where one of them admitted the tenancy of the other, but pleaded resignation by him of his tenancy and a lease to himself the onus of proof was held to rest upon him who made the allegation. KISHEN CHUNDER SHAHA v. HOOKOOM CHAND SHAHA

W. R. 1864, 47

4. ——— Allegation of particular tenure—*Proof of title.* The onus in a suit in which the plaintiff seeks to obtain a declaration that

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*25. LANDLORD AND TENANT—*contd.*

the defendants held a tenure under him lies on the plaintiff, who must prove strictly the title under which he seeks that declaration. ROYES MOLLAH v. MUDHOOSOODUN MUNDUL

9 W. R. 154

5. ——— *Transferability of tenure—Presumption.* There is no presumption that any tenure held is not a transferable tenure, and a landlord who sues for khas possession on the ground that a tenure sold was not transferable must establish his case as an ordinary plaintiff. DOYA CHAND SHAHA v. ANUND CHUNDER SEN MOZUMDAR

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 382

6. ——— *Transferability of tenures.* In a suit brought to recover possession of certain lands forming part of the patni estate of the plaintiffs and constituting the raiyati holding of one M, which lands were sold in execution of a money-decree against M and purchased by the defendant, the defendant set up that the tenure held by M was of a permanent and transferable nature. *Held*, that the onus of proving the transferability of this tenure was upon the defendant. Doya Chand Shaha v. Anund Chunder Sen, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 382, not followed. KRIPAMOYI DABIA v. DURGA GOVIND SIRKAR

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 89

7. ——— *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 106, 108—Transferability of tenancy—Suit by zamindar to set aside a Court-sale of his raiyat's interest.* A zamindari raiyat mortgaged the land comprised in his holding, and the mortgagee, having sued and obtained a decree on his mortgage, attached the mortgagor's interest in the land and purchased it at the Court-sale held in execution of his decree. The zamindar who had intervened unsuccessfully in execution now sued to set aside the sale and to eject the decree holder and the judgment-debtor from the land. Neither party adduced evidence. *Held*, that there was no presumption that the tenant was a tenant-at-will, nor was there a presumption that the tenancy was not transferable—such presumptions being contrary to ss. 106 and 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, respectively. The burden of proof, therefore, lay on the plaintiff and had not been discharged, and the suit must consequently be dismissed. APPA RAU v. SUBBANNA

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 60

8. ——— *Non-transferable tenure.* Where a plaintiff sets up a case of an exceptional nim osut-howla, alleging it to be not transferable, the plaintiff should be called on to prove the allegation, before a defendant in possession, under an order of a Revenue Court, can be called on to prove title. HURRO SOONDERY DEBIA v. AMEENA BEGUM

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 188

5 W. R., Act X, 72

9. ——— *Suit for possession under mokurari lease.* In a suit to recover possession of land under a mokurari lease granted to plaintiff by the zamindar (defendant who admitted its validity) from the other defendant who had



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*25. LANDLORD AND TENANT—*contd.*

been in possession twenty years, and who also claimed a mokurari interest:—*Held*, that the onus lay with the substantive defendant to show that his lease was mokurari. *RUGHONATH DOBEY v. PURES RAM MAHATA* . . . 10 W. R. 9

10. ————— *Khadimi tenure.* Where persons have long held as Khadims under the superior holders or managers of endowed property and claim to hold a permanent khadimi-tenure from which they are not liable to be ejected, except for misconduct, the *onus probandi* is on them. *CHAND MIAN v. KHONDEAR ASHRUTOLLAH* . . . 6 W. R. 89

11. ————— *Allegation that lands are sir—Sale in execution of decree.* Where a person whose proprietary rights in a mehal have been sold in execution of a decree alleges that land held by him at the time of such sale was held as *sir*, the burden of proof lies on him. *HARI DAS v. GHANSHAM NARAIN* . . . I. L. R. 6 All. 286

12. ————— *Suit for possession of ayma land—Identification by plaintiff.* Where a plaintiff establishes a *prima facie* case of the identity of ayma land which he claims through his ancestor, who had been allowed by the Collector to retain it, it will rest with defendant to prove that the land is his own or that it is not the ayma land which the plaintiff's ancestor once held. *MOLLA ABDOOR RUB v. HURRYHUR MOOKERJEE* . . . 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 50

13. ————— *Gorabundi tenure—Transferability, proof of.* The onus lies on a plaintiff claiming in virtue of a purchase of the tenure from a former holder to be entitled to possession of gorabandi lands, to prove that such lands are transferable. *CHUTTERBHUI BHARTI v. JANKI PROSAUD SINGH* . . . 4 C. L. R. 298

14. ————— *Khoti tenure, proof of—Suit for rent.* In a suit by a kabuliatar khot for rent from cultivators holding lands in a khoti village, the onus does not lie on the plaintiff to prove the land to be khoti; but the holder of land in a khoti estate must prove that he is exempted from paying rent according to the custom of the country. *MUHAMMAD YAKOUB v. MUHAMMAD ISMAIL* . . . 9 Bom. 278

15. ————— *Suit for value of trees cut by tenant—Nature of tenure.* There is no presumption that orchard lands in Behar are held on a bhaoli tenure, there being many instances of orchards there held on a nukdi tenure. The onus of proving the special nature of the tenure is on the zamindar suing for the value of trees cut down and not on the tenant-defendant. *DOOMUN SINGH v. SOOKUN LALI* . . . 2 W. R. 12

16. ————— *Orchard land—Possession of planter of trees.* Although generally it may be taken that land whereon an orchard is planted belongs to the zamindar, and has been granted to a stranger to plant trees thereon, in which

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*25. LANDLORD AND TENANT—*contd.*

case it reverts to the zamindar after the trees have disappeared and the land has become arable, yet when it is asserted that the land belongs to the planter of the orchard, having been acquired by purchase, it is for the zamindar to prove that the land belongs to him and was given for plantation; and in the absence of such proof the holder or occupant may rely on his long possession. *DHUNEE RAM v. AMANUT HOSSEIN* . . . 2 Agra Pt. II, 161

17. ————— *Suit by landlord for possession of land in his estate—Right to possession.* When a landlord sues for possession of land within his estate, the onus is on him to prove that he is entitled to that possession. *GUDADHUR BANERJEE v. KANYE DEKHOORIA* . . . 8 W. R. 191

18. ————— *Suit by talukhdar purchaser at sale—Dispossession and disputed title.* A talukhdar who had purchased at an execution-sale the under-tenure of one of his tenants, sued him to obtain possession of the land contained in the purchased holding, of some of which he said he had been dispossessed, and in regard to the remainder of which his title was disputed. *Held*, that the deputation of an Ameen was improper, and that the onus lay on the plaintiff to prove his case. *SHUSTEE RAM PAUL v. NOBO KANT ROY CHOWDHRY* . . . 14 W. R. 190

19. ————— *Lease of land of particular nature—Proof that it came under that designation.* Where a landlord leased out some land to a tenant, reserving to himself only such portion of it as fell under the definition of nila zamin:—*Held*, that it was for the landlord, in a suit for the possession of such nila zamin, to bring evidence to prove what portion of the land leased out was nila; and that, in the absence of such evidence, the whole land must be taken as having been leased out to the tenant. *REILY v. BAMA SOONDUREE DOSSEE* . . . 25 W. R. 398

20. ————— *Suit for possession—Dispute as to ground and nature of possession.* In a suit for possession of a portion of land on the allegation that it had belonged to plaintiff as his ancestral property up to the date of his being ousted, when the defendant, admitting the alleged possession, contended that it had been not that of an owner, but only permissive possession as that of a tenant:—*Held*, that the burden of proof lay on the defendant. *BOISTUB CHURN SEIN v. TRAHEE RAM SEIN* . . . 15 W. R. 32

21. ————— *Suit to recover share of holding after sale in execution of decree for rent—Proof of status as tenant and recognition of division of tenure.* In a suit to recover a share of a holding, the whole of which had been sold in execution of a decree for arrears of rent, the plaintiff, who claimed to hold a divided portion of the tenure, was held bound to prove either that such division had been recognized and ratified by the zamindar or that the latter received rent from him, i.e., he would have to prove his status as tenant in



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respect of the share in question. *HURHUR SINGH v. OOMA KOORER* . . . 16 W. R. 93

22. ———— *Exercise of right incidental to tenure—Objection to right.* When a party objects to the exercise by another of an ordinary legal right incidental to his tenure, it is for the objecting party to give some *prima facie* evidence as to the grounds on which that objection is founded. *GYARAM MUNDUL v. GYARAM NAIK*

1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 22: Marsh. 28: 1 Hay 65

23. ———— *Right of occupancy—Permanent cultivators—Suit for ejectment.* The defendant's ancestors were the only cultivating tenants of the lands of a certain temple from the year 1829, and in a suit brought by the temple trustees against one of the defendants in 1858 it was found that the occupancy of the defendant's ancestors dated back at least to 1806. In 1833, the defendant's ancestor was recognized by the Collector who then managed the temple, as an hereditary raiyat. In the paimash account of 1827, defendant's ancestor was described as a "cultivating parakudi ulavada," a term which does not necessarily imply a right of occupancy. *Held*, in a suit by the trustee of the temple to eject the defendants after notice to quit, that the burden of proving that a right of occupancy was not an incident of defendants' tenure lay on the plaintiff. *KRISHNASAMI PILLAI v. VARADARAJA AYYANGAR* . I. L. R. 5 Mad. 345

24. ———— *Right of occupancy—Permanent cultivator—Paracudi.* The defendant's ancestors or predecessors in title were the cultivating tenants of the lands of a certain temple from a date not later than 1827, in which year they were so described in the paimash accounts. In 1830 they executed a muchalka to the Collector, who then managed the temple, whereby they agreed among other things to pay certain dues. They were described in the muchalka as paracudis. In 1857 the plaintiff's predecessors took over the management of the temple from, and executed a muchalka to, the Collector, whereby he agreed among other things not to eject the raiyats as long as they paid kist. In 1882, the dues (which were payable separately) having fallen into arrear, the manager of the temple sued to eject the defendants. *Held*, that the burden of proving the permanent character of the tenure set up by the defendants lay on them. *Krishnasami v. Varadaraja*, I. L. R. 5 Mad. 345, discussed and distinguished. *THIAGARAJA v. GIYANA SAMBANDHA PANDARA SANNADHI* . I. L. R. 11 Mad. 77

25. ———— *Defendant admitting tenancy, but pleading its permanent nature.* Where the defendant admitted that he was a tenant, the onus was upon him to show that his tenancy was such as he set up, namely, a permanent tenancy at a rate which cannot be enhanced. *KHETTER KRISTO MITTER v. DINENDRO NARAIN ROY*

3 C. W. N. 202

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26. ———— *Suit for ejectment—Right of occupancy.* In an ejectment suit by a landlord against his tenant the plaintiff cannot succeed unless he shows that under the terms of the tenancy and in the circumstances that exist he has a right to eject the defendant, although the latter may allege and fail to establish a right of permanent occupancy. *VENKATACHARLU v. KANDAPPA*

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 95

27. ———— *Ejectment, suit for—Occupancy-rights—Madras Rent Recovery Act (Madras Act VIII of 1865), s. 12.* A zamindari, having given to the defendant, who was a cultivating raiyat in the zamindari, a notice to quit, now sued to eject him from his holding. The defendant pleaded that he and his ancestors had been jirayati raiyats from time immemorial, and it was found that their holding had lasted at least one hundred and fifty years. The defendant had executed and delivered to the plaintiff a muchalka for one year, and he had made no default in payment of rent. *Held*, that the onus was on the plaintiff, and as she had failed to prove that the defendant's tenancy had commenced under her or her ancestors, the suit should be dismissed. *VENKATA MAHALAKSHMANMA v. RAMAJOGI* . . . I. L. R. 16 Mad. 271

28. ———— *Right of tenant to dig a tank on his land.* In a suit by a zamindar alleging that the defendant, his tenant, had dug a tank on his land, and thereby done him damage by converting the land from its original state, and the conversion is admitted by the defendant, but his defence is that he had a right to convert it, the onus is on the defendant to show his right to dig the tank. In the absence of clear proof of the nature of his tenure, he should at least show that the digging the tank is a fair and reasonable use of the land, and one which will not be to the detriment of the zamindar. *TARINI CHARAN BOSE v. DEBNARAYAN MISTRI* . 8 B. L. R. Ap. 69

29. ———— *Proof of zamindari rights—Right to garden planted with trees.* The owner of a bagh in an estate in which he is not possessed of any zamindari rights must, if he claim a higher right than that ordinarily possessed by a tenant planter or the successor of such a planter, produce evidence in support of his claim; but when the bagh has been admittedly planted by a zamindar and has been, on the sale of his zamindari rights, reserved by him, it is incumbent on the purchaser to prove that by the reservation the vendor reserved only the interest which a tenant-planter would have possessed in the bagh. *ALI BUKSH v. MUDUN GOPAL*

3 Agra 369

30. ———— *Suit for assessment of lands accreted to zimma tenure—Beng. Reg. VIII of 1793, s. 51—Beng. Reg. XI of 1825.* A suit for the assessment of lands accreted to a zimma tenure must be tried upon s. 51, Reg. VIII of 1793, the burden being on the plaintiff to prove that the tenure is liable to the assessment sought; and the



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provisions of that law are not affected by Reg. XI of 1825, as regards the mode in which, the condition on which, and the burden of proof with which, the zamindar may proceed to assess. *PANIOTY v. JUGGUT CHUNDER DUTT* . . . . . 9 W. R. 379

Upholding, on review, *JUGGUT CHUNDER DUTT v. PANIOTY* . . . . . 8 W. R. 427

31. ———— *Acknowledgment of tenancy—Suit for kabuliat.* In a suit before the Collector for a kabuliat, on the ground that the defendant had occupied and cultivated certain lands of the plaintiff, the defendant pleaded that he was co-parcener with the plaintiff of the land, but he admitted that he had given a kabuliat for some of the lands he occupied. *Held*, that, since by giving the kabuliat the defendant had acknowledged the plaintiff to be his landlord, the onus of proving the plea was upon the defendant. *JUGGOBUNDU MOZOOMDAR v. GOOROO PERSHAD ROY Marsh.* 54

*GOOROO PERSHAD ROY v. JUGGOBUNDU MOZOOMDAR* . . . . . W. R. F. B. 15: 1 Hay 228

32. ———— *Suit by raiyat for pottah at fair and equitable rates.* The proprietors of a certain holding having refused the terms of the Government, a farming settlement was made with the present defendant who undertook to confirm and ratify all amulnamahs granted by the zamindars while the settlement proceedings had been pending. Plaintiff, being a raiyat without a right of occupancy, but one who had got an amulnamah, sued for a pottah at the rate fixed by the amulnamah. *Held*, that the amulnamah formed the basis of a special contract between the parties and took their case out of the purview of ss. 5 and 8 of the Rent Law; and that by the terms of the amulnamah the defendant was bound to give plaintiff a pottah on fair and equitable rates ("upajukta"), which were to depend on the rates which he himself obtained from Government. *Held*, that the onus of proving that the rate which he claimed was fair and equitable was upon the plaintiff. *KISHEN PERSHAD SINGH v. MOHUN SINGH* . . . . . 15 W. R. 420

33. ———— *Suit for rent—Waste and lakhiraj land.* In a suit for rent, when the raiyat pleads that part of the land is waste and lakhiraj, the onus is on the landlord to prove that such land has paid rent to him in previous years. *MOTEE LALL ADUCK v. JUDHOOPUTTEE DOSS* . . . . . 2 W. R., Act X, 44

*GUMANI KAZI v. HARIHAR MOOKERJEE*  
B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 15: W. R. F. B. 115  
Marsh. 527

*MIRTOONJOY CHUCKERBUTTY v. BURUDA KANT ROY* . . . . . 6 W. R., Act X, 18

*BISSÈSUR CHUCKERBUTTY v. WOOMA CHURN ROY* . . . . . 7 W. R. 44

34. ———— *Plea of payment.* In a suit for rent if the tenant pleads pay-

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ment the *onus probandi* is on him. *PUREEAG LALL v. RAM JEWAN LALL* . . . . . 1 W. R. 264

*KOONJO BEHARY BANERJEE v. ROY MOTHORA-NATH CHOWDHRY* . . . . . 1 W. R. 155

35. ———— *Intervenor—Plea of payment.* In a suit for rent where defendant denies the relationship of landlord and tenant as subsisting between himself and the plaintiff, and states that he paid his rent to an intervenor, it is not enough that the intervention is set aside; it still remains for the Court to investigate the question whether the defendant is a raiyat of the plaintiff. *JAGURDEE v. RADHA KISHORE* . . . . . 13 W. R. 259

36. ———— *Eviction of tenant by title superior to lessor.* Where a tenant is sued for rent, he can set up eviction by title paramount to that of his lessor as an answer, and, if evicted from part of the land, an apportionment of the rent may take place. The onus is on the lessor who claims to be entitled to an appointment to show what is the fair rate of the lands out of which the tenant was not evicted. *GOPANUND JHA v. LALLA GOBIND PERSHAD* . . . . . 12 W. R. 109

37. ———— *Suit under special arrangement.* In a suit for rent alleged to be due under a particular arrangement, the existence of which is repudiated by defendant, it is for plaintiff to prove the arrangement. *SHUMBHOO GEER GOSSAIN v. RAM JEWAN LALL* . . . . . 8 W. R. 509

38. ———— *Rent of whole tenure—Suit by shareholder.* In a suit for rent by a shareholder where the defendant contends that he is not bound to pay otherwise than by entirely to the person entitled to the whole rent, the onus is on the plaintiff to show that he is entitled to sue for a fractional portion. *LALUN v. HEMRAJ SINGH* . . . . . 20 W. R. 76

39. ———— *Rate of rent, proof of—Evidence that rent stated in lease has been realized.* The mere fact that a tenant some time ago gave a kabuliyat for a limited period at a particular rate of rent is not sufficient in itself to throw upon the defendant the entire burden of proving what the present rent is without any evidence on the part of the landlord that the rent specified in the kabuliyat had ever been realized from him. *MOKUNDA CHANDRA SARMA v. ARPAN ALI SHEIKH* . . . . . 2 C. W. N. 47

40. ———— *Shifting of onus—Claim for rent—Written receipts, if necessary proofs of payment—Written receipts, if primary evidence.* Written receipts for payments are important, but by no means necessary as proof; nor are they of the nature of primary evidence, the loss of which must be shown in order to let in secondary. On the evidence in the case it was held that, though the case is a most obscure and of an unsatisfactory character, and that, although the plaintiff had given good reasons for holding that such part of the defendant's case as related to the missing receipts was not worthy of belief, yet that the



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defendant did give evidence of payment of the rent claimed, sufficient to throw back again on the plaintiff the onus of proving that the rent was still due. Plaintiff's evidence was silent on the crucial point of payment, her Dewan kept out of the way of examination, and no sufficient grounds had been assigned for reversing the decrees of the High Court. *RAMESWAR KOER v. BHARAT PERSHAD SAHI* . . . . . 4 C. W. N. 18

41. *Evidence—Plea of payment.* In a suit by a landlord against his tenant for arrears of rent due for a portion of the year 1283 (1876), the defendant pleaded payment and called as his witness the plaintiff's agent, who admitted the receipt of certain payments from the defendant's under-tenant during the time for which the arrears were demanded, but swore that they were payments made in respect of arrears due on account of previous years. The lower Appellate Court, reversing the decree of the Court of first instance, gave the defendant credit for the payments so admitted. *Held*, that the lower Appellate Court was wrong; that the defendant, having pleaded payment, was bound to prove that the admitted payments were in respect of that portion of the year 1283 for which the arrears were claimed. S. 12 of the Rent Law applies to receipts given directly by the landlord to the tenant, and not to receipts given to third persons. *SYEFUN v. RUDDER SOHAY*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 582

42. *Proof of determination of tenancy—Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 20.* The defendant held under a lease from the plaintiff which expired in 1867, when he gave up possession without any notice. In a suit subsequently brought against him for arrears of rent of 1867, 1868, and 1869 :—*Held*, that the onus was on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant held on after the term of the lease had expired. No written notice or relinquishment was necessary. S. 20, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, did not apply. *TILAK PATAK v. MAHABIR PANDAY* . . . . . 7 B. L. R. Ap. 11: 15 W. R. 454

43. *Suit for arrears of rent—Proof of rate of rent.* In a suit to recover arrears of rent from the defendants who, as ticcadars of the plaintiff's share in a certain mouzah, had been in possession from 1262 to 1281, without having paid any rent, the plaintiff, who claimed a bhowli rent at the rate of 9 annas of the crop, proved that in the mouzah in question the raiyats paid rent at that rate. *Held*, that, under the particular circumstances, the onus was on the defendants who alleged that the proper rate was 8 annas to prove their allegation. *LOCHUN CHOWDHRY v. ANUP SINGH*

8 C. L. R. 426

44. *Alleged possessions of portions only of land.* In a suit to recover arrears of rent under a kabuliati the defendant who had paid rent for upwards of four or five years pleaded that he had obtained possession of portions only of the lands demised. *Held* (reversing the

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decision of FIELD, J.), that the onus was upon the defendant. *BANY MADHOB MOOKERJEE v. SRIDHUR DEB GHUTTUCK* . . . . . 10 C. L. R. 555

45. *Suit for ejectment and for arrears of rent—Disputed rate of rent.* In a suit for arrears of rent, and for ejectment in consequence of non-payment, where defendant challenged the rate claimed as well as plaintiff's right to sue alone :—*Held*, that the onus lay on plaintiff to prove his claim to the rate of rent sued for and to show that he was sole proprietor. *ASHRUF v. RAM KISHEN GHOSE* . . . . . 23 W. R. 289

46. *Suit for ejectment—Ground for retaining possession, proof of.* In a suit for ejectment by landlord against tenant after proof of due service of notice, the onus is on the tenant to show any ground for retaining possession. *NUBO COOMAR GHOSE v. OZIR SHIKDAR* . 23 W. R. 238

47. *Nature of tenure—Evidence of.* In a suit in ejectment valued under R100, the defendants, who were sued as yearly tenants, replied that their tenure was a mirasi gujasta tenure, and in proof of their allegation adduced evidence which was not displaced by the plaintiffs. The lower Courts considered that defendant's allegation was well founded. *Held*, that, there being evidence of the defendant's allegation, the plaintiffs, having failed to make out a *prima facie* case, were not entitled to a decree for ejectment. *BYJI NATH SAHOO v. RAMDOUR ROY*

7 C. L. R. 369

48. *Suit by landlord to eject tenant on expiration of tenancy.* Where a landlord sues to eject a raiyat on the ground of his tenancy having expired, the tenant is not called upon to state the character of his tenancy until the plaintiff has given *prima facie* proof that it is of a terminable character, and that it has terminated. A sued to eject B on the ground that a temporary settlement effected with him had expired. B set up a gujasta title to the land. The lower Courts disbelieved plaintiff, but called on B to support the title he had set up, and he failing to do so, gave A a decree. *Held*, that A's suit should have been dismissed when it was found that the evidence he put forward was unworthy of credit. *BULLEE AHEER v. NISHAN SINGH*

3 C. L. R. 209

49. *Suit to eject tenant holding over after expiry of lease.* In a suit to eject a tenant holding over after the expiry of a pottah which was merely for a number of years, the onus is on the landlord to show that the tenure was such that the express limit of years may be fairly applied to the possession and construed to give the right of re-entry. *ROY ODYTE NARAIN SINGH v. UBHURUN ROY* . . . . . 4 W. R., Act X, 1

*SHEEB DYAL PAULEET v. DWARKANATH SOOKUL.*  
2 W. R., Act X, 54

50. *Right of occupancy.* Where a tenant holding under a terminable



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lease which does not provide for re-entry makes no allegation of previous possession, and there is no admission of it on the other side, the tenant is bound to go out at the expiration of his term; and if he claims a right of further occupancy, it is for him to prove that right. *PUDDOMONEE DOSSIA v. JHOLLA PALLY* . . . . . **7 W. R. 283**

**51. ————— Ejectment—Right of occupancy.** In a suit by a zamindar against a raiyat for recovery of possession of land, of which the plaintiff alleged he had granted the defendant a lease and taken a kabuliati, and that the lease had expired, the defence was that the defendant did not hold under any lease from the plaintiff, that the kabuliati was not genuine, and that the defendant by his holding had acquired a right of occupancy. *Held*, that the onus was on the plaintiff to prove the kabuliati, and not on the defendant to prove that he had acquired a right of occupancy. Therefore, where the plaintiff failed to prove the kabuliati, the suit was held to be rightly dismissed, though the defendant failed to show any right of occupancy. *WALLAH ALLEE v. GOLAM GOUS*  
**10 B. L. R. Ap. 32: 19 W. R. 215**

**52. ————— Refusal to quit after notice.** In a suit by a zamindar to obtain khas possession of land within his estate, if a defendant is a middleman, the right of plaintiff follows as a matter of course, unless defendant can make out his claim to exclude the zamindar; but if defendant is a raiyat, plaintiff must show some cause of action beyond the bare circumstance of defendant's refusal to quit after notice under X of 1859. He must show that the raiyat is of a class liable to eviction. *LALLA JOYNATH SAHEE DEO v. LUTCHEN CHRISTIAN* . . . . . **16 W. R. 158**

*See PRAHLAD SEN v. DURGAPRASAD TEWARI.*  
**2 B. L. R. P. C. 111: 12 W. R. P. C. 6**  
**12 Moo. I. A. 286**

**53. ————— Suit under Act X of 1859, s. 23, cl. 5.** In a suit under cl. 5. s. 23, Act X of 1859, the question of illegal ejectment was the only question for adjudication. The onus in such a cause was upon the plaintiff. *ASGUR v. GOLUCK CHUNDER CHOWDHRY* . . . . . **8 W. R. 383**

**54. ————— Suit for possession by tenant—Appropriation of crops by another tenant.** In a suit to recover possession where a plaintiff had held over the term of his lease and raised a crop which was appropriated by defendant (an adjacent tenant), on the ground that the disputed land was his alluvion:—*Held*, that the onus lay upon the defendants (tenant and zamindar) to show that the land held by the plaintiff was removed from the control of the owner of the estate by circumstances which brought it under the control of the defendant-tenant. *HEMA PANDEY v. GUJADHUR ROY*  
**24 W. R. 108**

**55. ————— Suit to set aside order of Settlement Officer—Sonthal Pergunnahs Settle-**

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*ment Regulation (III of 1872), ss. 24, 25.* In a suit instituted in January, 1887, by a plaintiff to set aside a settlement made under Regulation III of 1872, and to recover khas possession of a mouzah, alleging that the defendant held the lands as chakran, and that the services for which he held them had ceased, the defendant pleaded that the tenure was dar-mokurari, that the lands had been settled as such in June, 1877, and that the suit was consequently barred by the special limitation provided by s. 25 of the Regulation. It was contended that the onus of proving the tenure to the dar-mokurari, which had been thrown on the defendant, had been wrongly so thrown on him, as the suit was substantially one to set aside a decree. *Held*, that the onus of proving the validity and propriety of the settlement proceedings upon which he relied had been properly thrown on the defendant. *NADIAR CHAND SINGH v. CHUNDER SIKHUR SADHU*  
**I. L. R. 15 Calc. 765**

**56. ————— Suit for damages for illegal distraint.** In a suit for recovery of damages by a plaintiff on the ground that his landlords, the defendants, had distrained their paddy alleging higher jummas, the onus is on the plaintiff to prove the annual rent payable by him. *CHUNDER KANT MUKERJI v. HEM LAL MONDAL*  
**1 C. W. N. 463**

**57. ————— Penal Code (Act XLV of 1830), s. 424—Dishonest removal of property to avoid distraint—Distraint for arrears of rent under the Rent Recovery Act—Absence of presumption in favour of its legality—Onus of proof on prosecution to prove legality—Conviction in absence of such proof—Illegality.** Where a distraint is made under the Rent Recovery Act for arrears of rent, there is no presumption that it is legally made; and, if persons are charged with having dishonestly removed property to avoid it, the prosecution must prove that it was a legal distraint. In the absence of such proof, persons who have resisted the distraint, or have removed their property to avoid it, cannot be convicted of an offence, inasmuch as they had a right of private defence of their property unless the distraint was legal. *KING-EMPEROR v. GOPALASAMY (1902)*  
**I. L. R. 25 Mad. 729**

**58. ————— Permanency of tenancy.** In a suit for ejectment, where the defendant sets up a permanent tenancy, the onus is upon the defendant to show this. *ISMAIL KHAN MAHOMED v. AGHORE NATH MUKERJEE (1903)*  
**7 C. W. N. 734**

## 26. LEGITIMACY.

**1. ————— Proof of legitimacy—Proof of heirship depending upon illegitimacy of defendant—Suit for possession.** The plaintiffs in a suit to eject the defendant from land of which he was in actual possession having to prove not only their relationship (which was not disputed), but their heir-



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ship, which depended upon the illegitimacy of the defendant, were held bound to give sufficient general evidence in support of their case, to throw upon defendant the onus of proving his legitimacy. *MAHOMED GOUR ALI KHAN v. ASHRUFFOONISSA*  
2 W. R. P. C. 13: 9 Moo. I. A. 422

*MAHOMED GOUR ALI KHAN v. AHMED KHAN*  
2 W. R. P. C. 13: 9 Moo. I. A. 504

2. ———— *Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 112—Presumption as to paternity of child born after death of husband—Burden of proof—Illness of husband, rendering act of begetting child improbable.* Where a child was born after the death of the husband, under such circumstances as to give rise to the presumption under s. 112 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872): *Held*, in a suit by the appellants to dispute the paternity of the child, that the burden of proof lay on them, and that on the evidence the presumption was not rebutted. See *Nogendra Nath Pahari v. Ram Gobind Pahari*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 111, *Reporter's Note*. *TIRLOK NATH SHUKUL v. LACHMIN KUNWARI* (1903)

I. L. R. 25 All. 403: s.c. L. R. 30 I. A. 152  
7 C. W. N. 617

## 27. LIMITATION AND ADVERSE POSSESSION.

1. ———— *Plea of limitation.* When a defendant pleads limitation, the *onus probandi* is on the plaintiff. *BROJENDRO COOMAR ROY CHOWDHRY v. RADHA GOBINDO SHAH* . 1 W. R. 235

*COLLECTOR OF RUNGPORE v. PROSUNNO COOMAR TAGORE* . . . . . 5 W. R. 115

*PANDURANG GOVIND v. BALKRISHNA HARI*  
6 Bom. A. C. 125

*KUMOLA DASSEE v. AZMUR ALI* . 7 W. R. 13

*NOBOKISHORE DEY v. RAMKISHEN* . 9 W. R. 131

*BHILOO MUNDUL v. MOTEE LALL GHOSE MUNDUL*  
9 W. R. 251

*GOSSAIN DOSS KOONDOL v. SIROO KUMAREE DEBIA* . . . . . 12 B. L. R. 219: 19 W. R. 192

*GHOGOOLEE v. MUZHUR HOSSEIN*  
24 W. R. 389

2. ———— *Limitation—Suit for possession—Dispossession—Cause of action.* In a suit between two zamindars, the appellant sought to disturb the admitted possession for about eleven years of the defendant. The defendant insisted on a possession of much longer duration as a statutory bar to the suit. *Held*, that the onus was on the appellant to prove that the cause of action accrued to him on a dispossession within twelve years before suit, and that he, or some other person through whom he claims, was in possession during that period. *MITRASUR SINGH v. NUND LALL SINGH*  
1 W. R. P. C. 51

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*S.C. NITRASUR SINGH v. NUND LALL SINGH*  
8 Moo. I. A. 199

*SIDHEE NUZEER ALI KHAN v. WOOMESH CHUNDER MITTER* . . . . . 2 W. R. 75

*MAHOMED HOSSAIN v. SURATHOONISSA KHANUM*  
2 W. R. 89

*KEDARNATH ACHARJEE v. BHUGWAN CHUNDER NUNDEE* . . . . . 2 W. R. 153

*GOOROODOSS ROY v. HURONATH ROY*  
2 W. R. 246

*JUGODUMBA CHOWDHRAIN v. RAM CHUNDER DEO*  
6 W. R. 327

*BOOLEE SINGH v. HUOBUNS NARAIN SINGH*  
7 W. R. 212

*LALL SINGH v. MODHOOSOODUN ROY*  
8 W. R. 426

*DINOBUNDHOO SUHAYE v. FURLONG*  
9 W. R. 155

*BUSSEERONISSA CHOWDHRAIN v. LEELANUND SINGH* . . . . . 14 W. R. 135

*AMEER ALI v. IDERJEET KOOR 15 W. R. 43*

*KALEE NARAIN BOSE v. ANUND MOYEE GOPTA*  
21 W. R. 79

3. ———— *Adverse possession—Proof of loss of title by.* *Held*, by the Privy Council (affirming the judgment of the High Court), that, where the plaintiff has established his title to land, the burden of proving that the plaintiff has lost that title by reason of the adverse possession of the defendant is upon the defendant. *RADHA GOBIND ROY v. INGLIS* . . . . . 7 C. L. R. 364

4. ———— *Joint ancestral property—Limitation.* *Held*, that the admission of certain property being joint ancestral throws the burden of proving exclusive and adverse possession beyond limitation upon the sharer refusing to admit other heirs. *DABEE SUHAI v. SHEO DASS RAI*  
1 Agra 285

5. ———— *Limitation Act, 1877, Art. 144.* Under Art. 144 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877), it is not for the plaintiff to prove that he has been in possession within twelve years before suit, but it is for the defendant to show that he has held adversely to the plaintiff for twelve years. *NYAMTULA v. NANA VALAD FARIDSHA*  
I. L. R. 13 Bom. 424

6. ———— *Suit for possession.* Where a defendant pleads partly title and partly purchase, and asserts his own possession on ancient titles, denying that the plaintiff's father or ancestor had been in possession of any portion of the land in dispute for a very long period, the onus of proving possession within the period of limitation is on the plaintiff. *ISHUR CHUNDER BISWAS v. BISSUMBHUR BISWAS* . . . . . W. R. 1864, 107



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7. ———— *Suit for possession—Proof of adverse possession.* In a suit to recover possession, where defendants plead limitation, and plaintiff proves that the commencement of the possession of the party through whom defendants claim was as tenant, it is for those who set up the plea of limitation to show when the nature of that possession was changed, and how it became adverse. RAMDHUN SATRA v. NOBIN CHUNDER CHOWDHRY . . . . . 12 W. R. 250

8. ———— *Suit for possession—Limitation.* Where a plaintiff brought a suit in 1856 to recover landed property which was in the possession of the defendant since 1845, and at the time of the institution of the suit it was held that before the plaintiff could recover he must prove, first, possession within twelve years before suit; and, secondly, title to possession. BEER CHUNDER JOBRAJ v. DEPUTY COLLECTOR OF BHULLOOAH . . . . . 13 W. R. P. C. 23

9. ———— *Benami transaction—Limitation.* In a suit for immoveable property under a kobala more than twelve years old, where defendant pleads that plaintiff was only a benamidar and was never in possession, plaintiff must prove not only title, but also possession within twelve years of the filing of the suit. KEDARNATH MAHATA v. KADUMBINEE DEBEA . . . . . 10 W. R. 239

10. ———— *Suit for possession—Limitation.* In a suit for possession of land on the ground that it belonged to plaintiff's talukh where defendant pleaded limitation:—*Held*, that the burden lay with the plaintiff to prove that he had possession (*i.e.*, enjoyed the land) within twelve years of the suit. RAM LOCHUN CHOWDHRY v. JOY DOORGA DOSSIA . . . . . 11 W. R. 283

11. ———— *Suit for possession.* The plaintiff's ancestors having been declared by a decree of the Peishwa's Government in 1722 to be entitled to the whole of the patilki watan of Pandarai and the defendants having a watan patra from the Raja of Satara in 1742 in favour of their claim to a half share, but being unable to show that their ancestors had any concern with the watan for a period of ninety-six years subsequent thereto, during which the plaintiff's ancestors were recognized as owners:—*Held*, that the onus was on the defendants to show sufficient adverse possession previous to suit as to entitle them to the property. AMIRTRAY P. KOKDI v. MANAJI J. JAGTAP . . . . . 3 Bom. A. C. 49

12. ———— *Suit to recover possession of land—Limitation.* A suit to recover possession of an unenclosed piece of ground must be brought within twelve years from the time the cause of action accrued, and in deciding this the issue is, not that the plaintiff must show that he

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exercised some right of ownership over the ground within the twelve years preceding the filing of the action, but that twelve years had not elapsed between the day the defendant interfered with the plaintiff's possession and the date on which the plaintiff filed his claim. SAGANGOWDA BIN BASANGOWDA v. BASAPA BIN CHENAPA . . . . . 9 Bom. 62

13. ———— *Limitation—Settlement.* In a suit for possession, where defendant denies plaintiff's title and sets up a defence involving the plea of limitation, the question of limitation does not depend upon whether defendant was in possession, but upon whether plaintiff was in possession. Where defendant admitted that the permanent settlement was ordered to be made with the party in possession, and that it was made within twelve years prior to the suit with the party from whom plaintiff claimed:—*Held*, that, until the contrary was shown, that party was rightly presumed to be in possession, and plaintiff's claim was not barred by limitation. MAHOMED KOBEER v. ABDOL AZEEM . . . . . 24 W. R. 315

14. ———— *Suit for possession—Proof of title.* In a suit to obtain possession, where defendant pleads limitation, plaintiff is bound not only to prove his title, but also to show affirmatively that his cause of action accrued within twelve years before the commencement of the suit; and he must succeed upon the strength of his own title, not upon the weakness of his opponent's. LUTCHOO KHAN v. FOLEY . . . . . 24 W. R. 273

15. ———— *Suit for possession—Limitation.* In a suit for possession of land the defendants claimed to hold under a valid miras tenure so as to be entitled to the ground rent from the raiyats, and to pay the plaintiff who was the superior landlord merely the miras rent. *Held*, that, the plaintiff being admitted to be landlord, the onus was upon the defendants to prove either that they had a valid miras tenure, or that they had held adversely to the plaintiffs as mirasdars for more than twelve years, and that the plaintiffs had notice of such adverse holding. *Prahlad Sen v. Budhu Singh*, 2 B. L. R. P. C. 111, cited and followed. OGRA KANT CHOWDHREE v. MOHESH CHUNDER SICKDAR . . . . . 4 C. L. R. 40

16. ———— *Dispossession—Presumption—Onus probandi—Limitation—Joint owners, Adverse possession between.* Under the former Limitation Act the cause of action, under the present law the event from which the limitation is declared to run, must have occurred within the prescribed period, and it lies on the plaintiff to show this. Accordingly, where the suit is for dispossession and the cause of action is dispossession, the plaintiff is bound to prove possession and dispossession within twelve years. Possession is not necessarily the same thing as actual user. When land has been shown to have been in a condition unfit-



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—*contd.*

ting it for actual enjoyment in the usual modes, at such a time and under such circumstances that that estate naturally would, and probably did, continue till within twelve years before suit, it may properly be presumed that it did so continue, and that the previous possession continued also until the contrary is proved. Such a presumption is in no sense a conclusive one. Its bearing upon each particular case must depend upon the circumstances of that case. Many acts which would be clearly adverse, and might amount to dispossession as between a stranger and the true owner of land, would, between joint owners, naturally bear a different construction. MAHOMED ALI KHAN v. ABDUL GUNNY

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 744 : 12 C. L. R. 257

17. ———— *Conflicting evidence of possession—Presumption of possession from title—Possession and actual user—Character of land in dispute—Mode of enjoyment.* It is only when the evidence of possession is strong on both sides and apparently equally balanced that the presumption that possession goes with title should prevail. The principle does not apply where the evidence of possession is equally unworthy of reliance on both sides. *Dhram Sing v. Hurpershad Sing*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 38, explained. Possession, however, is not necessarily the same as actual user. When therefore the plaintiff has to prove possession of land in dispute within the statutory period of limitation, if there is anything special in the character of the land, for example, when it is permanently or temporarily incapable of actual enjoyment in any one of the customary modes, a presumption in favour of continuance of possession, though in no sense a conclusive one, may arise. *Mahomed Ali Khan v. Abdul Gunny*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 744 : 12 C. L. R. 257, referred to. *THAKUR SINGH v. BHOGERAJ SINGH* . . . . . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 25

18. ———— *Suit for possession—Previous dispossession—Limitation—Evidence.* In every suit for the recovery of land, on the allegation of previous dispossession by the defendant, the plaintiff must start his case by showing that, at some time within twelve years previous to the institution of the suit, he has been in possession of the land sued for. *Perhlad Sein v. Rajender Kishore Singh*, 12 Moo. I. A. 397 ; *Dawkins v. Lord Penrhyn*, 4 App. Cases 951 ; and *Noyes v. Crawley*, 10 Ch. D. 31, 36, cited. *BHOOTHNATH CHATTERJEE v. KEDARNATH BANNERJEE* . I. L. R. 9 Calc. 125

19. ———— *Suit for possession—Previous dispossession—Limitation.* Where in a suit for the recovery of land based on title, the plaintiff alleges that he has been in possession of the land and was dispossessed therefrom by the defendant within twelve years prior to the institution of the suit, mere proof of such possession will not be sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to a decree. *Wise v. Ameerunnissa Khatoon*, L. R. 7 I. A. 73, followed. *Kawa Manji v. Khowaz Nussio*, 5 C. L.

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R. 278, disapproved. *ERTAZA HOSSEIN v. BANY MISTRY* . I. L. R. 9 Calc. 130 : 11 C. L. R. 393

20. ———— *Limitation Act, 1877, Sch. II, Art. 142—Burden of proof—Date of dispossession or discontinuance of possession.* The claimants had shown that they formerly were proprietors of the land to which they alleged title, and from which they claimed to oust the defendants ; but they had been dispossessed, or their possession had been discontinued, some years before this suit was brought by them and the land was occupied by the defendants who denied their title. That being so, the burden of proof was on the claimants to prove their possession at some time within the twelve years (prescribed by Art. 152 of Sch. II of Act XV of 1877) next preceding the suit. That the claimants certainly showed an anterior title was not enough, without proof of their possession within twelve years, to shift the burden of proof on to the defence to show that the defendants were entitled to retain possession. *MOHIMA CHUNDER MOZUMDAR v. MOHESH CHUNDER NEOGI* I. L. R. 16 Calc. 473  
L. R. 16 I. A. 23

21. ———— *Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Arts. 142, 144—Burden of proof.* The plaintiff, who was the sister of the defendant, sued in 1888 to recover from him a moiety of a paramba purchased by them jointly in 1877. In 1878 the plaintiff went to live elsewhere, but from time to time returned and spent a few days with the defendant on the land in suit. The defendant pleaded limitation. *Held*, that the Limitation Act, Sch. II, Art. 144, applied to the suit, and the burden of proving adverse possession lay on the defendant. *ALIMA v. KUTTI*  
I. L. R. 14 Mad. 96

22. ———— *Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Arts. 142 and 144.* In cases falling under Art. 142 of the Limitation Act, the plaintiff must at the outset show possession within twelve years, and cannot rest merely on a proof of title ; while in cases falling under Art. 144 the plaintiff may rest content with proof of title only in the first instance, and the burden lies on the defendants to show that they have had a possession inconsistent with the title of the plaintiff for more than twelve years before suit. The plaintiff sued to recover possession of certain land, together with mesne profit until recovery of possession, alleging that he had obtained possession under his sale and that his possession was obstructed by the defendants. *Held*, that the suit fell under Art. 142, and not 144, of the Limitation Act, and that it was for the plaintiff to show that he, or those under whom he claimed, had been in possession within twelve years before suit. *Rao Karan Singh v. Bakar Ali Khan*, I. L. R. 5 All. 1 ; L. R. 9 I. A. 99, and *Mohima Chunder Mozumdar v. Mohesh Chunder Neogi*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 473 ; L. R. 16 I. A. 23, explained. *FAKI ABDULLA v. BABAJI GUNGAJ* . . . . . I. L. R. 14 Bom. 458



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—*contd.*

23. ———— *Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Art. 142—Sale while vendor is out of possession—Adverse possession.* In a suit brought by a vendee to recover possession of immoveable property which was not in the possession of his vendor at the time of the sale, the defence having raised the point of adverse possession for more than twelve years:—*Held*, that the onus lay upon the plaintiff to show that the claim was not barred by the defendant's adverse possession by proving that his vendor had been in possession within twelve years before the date of sale under Art. 142, Sch. II of the Limitation Act. *KASHINATH SITARAM OZR v. SHRIDHAR MAHADEV PATANKAR*

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 343

24. ———— *Suit for possession of immoveable property—Question of title—Limitation Act, s. 28.* Where a suit for the recovery of possession of immoveable property is resisted by a plea of adverse possession for more than twelve years, the question of limitation becomes a question of title, and it lies upon the plaintiff in the first instance to give satisfactory *prima facie* evidence of his possession within twelve years of the suit. *Mohima Chunder Mozoomdar v. Mohesh Chunder Neogi*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 473, and *Parmanand Misr v. Sahib Ali*, I. L. R. 11 All. 438, referred to. *JAFAR HUSAIN v. MASHUQ ALI* . . . I. L. R. 14 All 193

25. ———— *Suit for possession of immoveable property.* In a suit for possession of immoveable property it is for the plaintiff to show by some *prima facie* evidence that he has a subsisting title not extinguished by the operation of limitation before the defendant can be called upon to substantiate a plea of adverse possession. *Parmanand Misr v. Sahib Ali*, I. L. R. 11 All. 438 and *Jafar Husain v. Mashuq Ali*, I. L. R. 14 All. 193, referred to. In dealing with the question of possession as between brothers and sisters in native families regard must be had to the conditions of life under which such families live, and to the fact that in such families the management of the property of the family is, by reason of the seclusion of the female members, ordinarily left in the hands of the male members. In the case of such families slight evidence of enjoyment of income arising from the property is sufficient *prima facie* proof of possession. *Fazal Karim v. Umda Bibi*, All. Weekly Notes, (1884) 171, referred to. *INAYAT HUSEN v. ALI HUSEN* . . . I. L. R. 20 All 182

26. ———— *Suit for possession—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Art. 142—Evidence and proof of possession.* A suit for the proprietary possession of land was defended on the ground of limitation, resting on the defendant's possession displacing the plaintiff's case that her predecessor in title had possessed the land within twelve years before the suit. This defendant had a possession which was admitted to have extended

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back for seven years before the suit. The documentary evidence showing that he had been in possession for more than five years immediately preceding those seven years was exactly similar to the evidence which accompanied his possession during that period. The evidence consisted of a series of documents such as were usually given to and received by the possessor of lands, and they extended throughout the period in dispute, going back far behind the twelve years which would bar. It was not necessary to consider whether the burthen of proof was shifted merely by the seven years' admitted possession, as the additional evidence raised the inference that the same possession had continued for more than twelve years. *Held*, that the burthen of rebutting this inference had not been discharged by evidence given by the plaintiff, while the evidence for the defendant had amply sustained the burthen originally laid upon him to show his twelve years' possession. *INNASIMUTTU UDAYAN v. UPAKARATH UDAYAN* . I. L. R. 23 Mad. 10

27. ———— *Ejectment, suit for—Limitation.* In an action of ejectment the plaintiff need not fail merely because he cannot prove that he has been in possession of the land claimed within twelve years; he must show that his cause of action (that is, the taking possession of the land by another person) has accrued within that period. *PANDURANG GOVIND v. BALKRISHNA HARI* . . . 6 Bom. A. C. 125

28. ———— *Suit for possession—Ejectment—Evidence—Previous possession.* Where, in a suit for possession of land, the plaintiff proves merely that he has been in possession of the disputed land at some time within twelve years previous to the filing of the plaint, such evidence is not sufficient to throw upon the defendant burden of proving his title to the land. *Wise v. Amirunnissa Khatoon*, L. R. 7 I. A. 73, followed; and *Gour Paroy v. Wooma Soonduree Debia*, 12 W. R. 472, cited. *DEBI CHURN BOIDO v. ISSUR CHUNDER MANJEE*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 39 : 11 C. L. R. 342

29. ———— *Ejectment, suit for—Proof of possession—Dispossession.* In an ejectment suit, where the plaintiff claims land from which he alleges that he has been dispossessed, the general rule is that the burden is upon the plaintiff to show possession and dispossession within twelve years, or, at least, that the cause of action arose within twelve years, and this rule is not intended to be interfered with by the Privy Council in *Radha Gobind Roy v. Inglis*, 7 C. L. R. 364. *MORO DESAI v. RAMCHANDRA DESAI* . I. L. R. 6 Bom. 508

30. ———— *Right of Crown to waste lands—Title suit by Crown for declaration of title and possession.* Assuming that the Crown has the right to oust any person who, without sanction, occupies waste land which has not been appro-



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—*contd.*

appropriated for any public purpose, it cannot, by a suit brought for a declaration of title or for ejectment, the date at which the cause of action arose not being stated in the plaint, compel a defendant to prove possession for sixty years. As a general rule, a plaintiff must not only show he has a title, but that he has a subsisting title, which he has not lost by the prescriptive section of the Limitation Act. The probable explanation of the ruling in *Radha Gobind Roy's Case*, 7 C. L. R. 364, is that, when a plaintiff proves title and possession, it is to be presumed that his possession continues till the defendant proves that the possession was interrupted, but that, where the plaintiff can prove title only, and not possession, he must prove that the adverse possession of the defendant, or the acts of which he complains as impugning his title, occurred within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA *v.* VIRARAYAN

I. L. R. 9. Mad. 175

31. ———— *Waste land subsequently made cultivable—Presumption—Constructive possession.* The doctrine of constructive possession applies only in favour of a rightful owner, and must not, as a rule, be extended in favour of a wrong-doer, whose possession must be confined to land of which he is actually in possession. In a suit for the possession of lands formerly uncultivable, but subsequently brought under cultivation, the District Judge had allowed the plea of limitation to prevail against the plaintiff upon a finding—based, not upon evidence of actual possession by the defendants, but upon an inference from part of the evidence—that the defendants had been in constructive possession for over twelve years prior to the suit. *Held*, that, so far as the judgment and decree of the District Judge related to certain plots described as patit or uncultivable lands, they must be set aside, and the case remanded to the District Judge to determine (a) how far the presumption in favour of the plaintiff as to the continuance of the uncultivable state of the lands till within twelve years of suit applied; and (b) how far that presumption had been rebutted by evidence of actual possession on the part of the defendants. MOHINI MOHAN ROY *v.* PROMODA NATH ROY

I. L. R. 24 Cal. 256  
1 C. W. N. 304

32. ———— *Dispossession—Ejectment—Evidence—Proof of title.* In June, 1878, the plaintiff sued the defendant for the recovery of possession of certain land. At the trial it was proved that he had been continuously in peaceable possession of the land until the month of May 1878, when he was forcibly and illegally dispossessed by the defendant. *Held*, that the evidence was sufficient to call upon the defendant to show his title to the land. MOHABEER PERSHAD SINGH *v.* MOHABEER SINGH . I. L. R. 7 Cal. 591; 9 C. L. R. 164

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—*contd.*

33. ———— *Suit for possession after wrongful dispossession—Proof of title.* In a suit for possession, it was found that the plaintiff had been in possession within twelve years from the institution of the suit, but he had been wrongfully dispossessed by the defendant. The plaintiff was unable to prove possession previous to being ousted for a longer period than eleven years. *Held*, that, the ouster by the defendant having been wrongful, the onus was not thereby shifted to the plaintiff, and that under the circumstances the defendants were bound to prove their title. See *Mohabeer Pershad Singh v. Mohabeer Singh*, I. L. R. 7 Cal. 591; 9 C. L. R. 164. BROJO SUNDER GOSAMI *v.* KOILASH CHUNDER KUR . 11 C. L. R. 133

34. ———— *Suit for possession where defendants have been long in possession—Limitation.* In a suit by Government against ghatwals, the defendants were found to have been in possession "for a very long time," and although they had failed to prove possession in excess of sixty years, the onus was held to lie on the Government to prove possession within sixty years. BROMANUND GOSSAIN *v.* GOVERNMENT . 5 W. R. 136

35. ———— *Limitation—Boundaries.* No proof of anterior title in the claimant such as would be involved in the decision of a question of boundaries in his favour can relieve him of the burden of proving that he was in possession within twelve years prior to suit, or shift it upon his adversaries so as to compel them to prove the time and manner of his dispossession. TARA SINGH *v.* CHAIDA MULL . 2 Agra 177

36. ———— *Limitation—Suit by reversioner to set aside alienation by widow.* In a suit for possession by the purchaser of the right of a reversioner to the estate of a widow, which was instituted within one day of the extreme time of twelve years allowed by the law of limitation, reckoning from the alleged date of the widow's death:—*Held*, that it was necessary under such circumstances, for the plaintiff, in order to rebut the plea of limitation, to prove, not only that the widow died on the date alleged, but that she actually held possession up to the time of her death. KALEE NATH *v.* JOY DOORJA DOSSEE . 11 W. R. 173

37. ———— *Suit for possession—Limitation—Chur lands.* In a suit to recover possession of land under cultivation, when the defendant pleads adverse possession, it is, under ordinary circumstances, for the plaintiff to show *prima facie* that the cause of action upon which he is suing is not barred by limitation, and not for the defendant to prove his adverse possession in the first instance. When a suit is brought for possession of jungly or unculturable lands, or lands which have never been under cultivation, the rule is different, and the defendant must establish his adverse possession for more than twelve years. When a suit is brought for possession of chur or other land under



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cultivation at the time of the institution of the suit, but previously jungly or unculturable, the *onus probandi* still lies on the plaintiff; but on his proving that the chur was formed, or the land first became culturable, within twelve years before he instituted his suit, the onus is shifted to the defendant, who must establish his adverse possession for more than twelve years. *MAHOMED IBRAHIM v. MORRISON*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 36

38. ——— Suit for possession of land after submersion—*Limitation*. Where the suit was for possession of certain land, on the allegation that it was land belonging to plaintiff's village, but submerged at the time of settlement, if the plaintiff could show the identity of the land submerged with the land which has since been left dry, the onus is on the defendant to show that some other person had been in adverse possession for twelve years before the plaintiff preferred his claim, and that such adverse possession commenced from a time when plaintiff was in a position to dispute it. *HUR SAHAL v. MAHOMED DALIM KHAN*

2 Agra 64

39. ——— Accreted lands—*Re-survey of lands*. In a suit in which plaintiff claimed some land as an accretion to his estate, but in which defendant claimed the said land as forming part of his estate according to the survey of 1846, and an ameen reported that, though an erroneous survey in 1865 included the said land in plaintiff's estate, yet, in the earlier survey, it had been thaked as defendant's, who indeed had obtained a decree for it against the Government:—*Held*, that, before plaintiff could be entitled to a decree for the land in suit, he must establish facts which, according to the law of accretion, would be sufficient not only to extinguish defendant's title, but also to create a right in plaintiff's favour: the mere circumstances of the survey of 1865 including the said land in plaintiff's estate not being sufficient proof of the facts to be found. *MOWLA KOOMAREE v. MUTTY SINGH*

25 W. R. 129

40. ——— Suit for possession of alluvial land—*Evidence of possession in absence of landmarks*. The plaintiff sued to recover a tract of chur land as parcel of his mouzah of J., the defendant alleging the said land to be a parcel of his mouzah of G. About the year 1830, a large tract of land was diluviated by the River Chutol within the mouzahs belonging respectively to the plaintiff and defendant, and after re-formation in 1837 a proceeding was taken by the plaintiff before the Magistrate under which he was ordered to be put in possession of a considerable tract of such newly formed land, the Magistrate laying down the boundaries. After nearly twelve years (*i.e.*, in 1849), the defendant's father brought a civil suit to set aside the Magistrate's decision, and the ultimate finding was that the plaintiff had been in possession of the land descri-

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—*contd.*

bed in the Magistrate's order from and since the date of that order. *Held*, that that decree must be taken to have established that the plaintiff was in possession of the land described in the Magistrate's order, and had continued in such possession; the question in the present suit being whether the lands now claimed are identical with those so described. *Held*, also, that the onus of proving that issue lay upon the plaintiff, because the foundation of his suit was that, having been in possession, he was dispossessed as a consequence of certain measurements made by Government officers. *Held*, further, that plaintiff had failed to sustain the burden of proof. He relied principally on the boundaries given by the Magistrate and certain maps prepared then and later as compared with the Government map of 1853; but their Lordships were unable to place firm reliance upon any inference drawn from these maps. Their Lordships were also of opinion that in questions of this kind, where the natural boundaries and landmarks have disappeared, evidence of possession was very important and satisfactory, and that there was no reason to distrust the witnesses of the respondent proving such possession. *GRIJA KANT LAHORY CHOWDHRY v. HURISH CHUNDER CHOWDHRY*

19 W. R. P. C. 114

41. ——— Right to alluvial land—*Change in course of river—Boundaries—Disputed settlement*. At the permanent settlement the River Gunduck divided mouzah Sohagpore (zillah Tirhoot) from the village of Dumri (zillah Sarun). In 1837 the river got into its southern channel, and a quantity of chur land to the north was resumed by Government and settled with the zamindars of Sohagpore. In 1846 it was again settled with the same zamindars, who remained in possession until 1848, when the river having returned to its northern channel the deara land was claimed by proprietors on the southern or Sarun side of the river: the consequence was an Act IV of 1840 suit which was decided in favour of the zamindars of Sohagpore. In 1856, on the expiry of the last temporary settlement, the question arose with whom Government should engage for the revenue, and it was finally decided by the Board of Revenue that a settlement should be made with the zamindars of Dumri, who accordingly obtained possession. The Board's decision proceeded on two principles,—*viz.*, that a usage existed that the main channel of the Gunduck should be the boundary of the zamindaries, and that therefore the interest of the zamindars of Sohagpore had been of a limited, temporary, and conditional character. These zamindars then brought a suit to impeach this settlement and to recover possession. After decision, appeal and remand, it was finally decided by the High Court that the land in dispute was identical with that formerly settled with the maliks of Sohagpore, who (it was assumed) had a permanent proprietary interest therein. *Held*, that the proper



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issues to be tried were : *first*, whether the land had been settled in 1837 with the maliks of Sohagpore as proprietors of alluviums which had gradually accreted to their estate, or upon what other grounds such settlement was made, the onus of proving gradual accretion being on the plaintiffs; and, *secondly*, whether there was at the permanent settlement, and has been since, a clear and definite usage such as supposed by the Board of Revenue, the burden of proving the affirmative of this being on the defendant. *RAJENDUR PERTAB SAHEE v. LALLJEE SAHOO* . . . . . 20 W. R. P. C. 427

42. ———— Alluvion and diluvion—*Alluvial land after diluvion—Re-formation of chur land—Limitation.* In a suit for possession of chur lands as re-formations on the original site of plaintiff's or his vendor's lands, or accretions thereto, where limitation is pleaded by defendant in adverse possession, the onus lies on plaintiff to prove that, before disappearance or diluvion, the land in dispute was in the possession of his vendor. *GOKOOL KRISTO SEN v. DAVID* . . . . . 23 W. R. 443

The evidence to be given and the onus of proof in cases of re-formed chur lands was also discussed in *AUKHIL CHUNDER CHOWDHRY v. DELAWAR HOSSEIN* . . . . . 6 C. L. R. 93

43. ———— *Re-formation on old site of lands after diluvion—Limitation.* Where, in a suit for possession of lands which have re-formed upon the old site after diluviation, the defendant relies upon a statutory title of twelve years' possession, the plaintiff, in order to succeed, must, according to the rule laid down in the case of *Nitrasur Singh v. Nund Loll Singh*, 8 Moo. I. A. 199, prove satisfactorily that the defendant has not been in possession for the period of twelve years next preceding the commencement of his suit. And where the evidence is not sufficient to support an affirmative finding that the whole of the lands claimed have re-formed within twelve years preceding the institution of the suit, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to show specially the portion, if any, which has not so re-formed. *Per JACKSON, J.*—I am unable myself to see on what principle or by what means the Court could of itself undertake to divide the portion of the land which may have re-formed within twelve years from the larger part which evidently re-formed more than twelve years ago, and had been in the adverse possession of the defendants. *RUNJIT SINGH v. SCHOENE. KILBURN & Co.* . . . . . 4 C. L. R. 390

44. ———— *Diluvion—Possession on re-formation—Subsequent diluvion—Possession, Suit for.* *Per GARTH, C.J.*—Where a person can show that he has been in possession of certain lands prior to such lands becoming diluviated his possession must be considered as continuing during the time of diluvion, until such time as he becomes dispossessed by some other person; and in such a case, the onus lies upon the dispossessor to

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—*contd.*

show that he has acquired a title under the law of limitation which has put an end to the rights of the original possessor. *Nitrasur Singh v. Nund Loll Singh*, 8 Moo. I. A. 199, and *Radha Gobind Roy v. Inglis*, 7 C. L. R. 364, distinguished. *KALLY CHURN SAHOO v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* I. L. R. 6 Calc. 725 : 8 C. L. R. 90

45. ———— *Suit for possession of land—Presumption of possession and ownership.* If, in a suit for possession of land which was covered with water more than twelve years before the institution of the suit, the plaintiff proves that he exercised acts of ownerships as by letting out the julkur to tenants, that is *prima facie* evidence of possession and ownership; and unless the defendant can make out a twelve years' statutory title by adverse possession, the plaintiff's possession must be presumed to have continued, and it is not necessary for him to show a possession by acts of ownership within the twelve years. *MOHINY MOHUN DAS v. KRISHNO KISHORE DUTT* I. L. R. 9 Calc. 802 : 12 C. L. R. 337

46. ———— *Alluvion and diluvion—Title—Limitation—Acts of ownership.* In a suit for declaration of title to, and recovery of possession of, alluvial lands which had been diluviated more than twelve years before the institution of the suit, the plaintiffs proved their title and possession up to the time of diluviation, and alleged that the lands had re-formed within twelve years, without alleging or proving possession during that period. The defendants, on the other hand, alleged that the re-formation had taken place more than twelve years before suit, and that they had acquired a title to the lands by adverse possession for that period. *Held*, that in such a case the submergence of the lands after diluvion ought to be presumed until the contrary was shown, and that the onus of proving reformation before twelve years and adverse possession was shifted to the defendants. *Per WILSON, J.*—As a general rule, where a plaintiff claims land from which he alleges he has been dispossessed, the burden is upon him to show possession and dispossession within twelve years. Proof of possession within twelve years does not necessarily mean proof of acts of ownership within that time. The nature of the proof of possession must depend on the nature of the case. There are many cases in which the party on whom the burden of proof in the first instance lies may shift the burden to the other side by proving facts giving rise to a presumption in his favour. In the case of lands gradually diluviated and gradually re-formed, if the diluviation has been more than twelve years before suit, the claimant, unless he can show possession since the re-formation, must at least show that he was in possession down to the date of the diluviation. Where the true owner is in possession at the time of diluviation, his possession is presumed to continue as long as the land continues



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submerged: probably also afterwards, until he is dispossessed. *Per FIELD, J.*—Although, according to the general rule, it lies upon the plaintiff, who is met with a plea of limitation, to show his own possession within twelve years before the institution of the suit when the property in dispute is capable of actual or visible possession, yet, in the case of property which is not susceptible of actual and visible possession, an exception from the nature of the thing must be made to the general rule. In such cases, when the title and possession have been proved to be in a certain person up to a certain point of time,—when there has been no transfer of the title to any third person, and there is no evidence that possession was exercised by a person other than the person having the title,—so long as actual visible possession was possible, the possession of the person having the title will be presumed to continue until the property has again become susceptible of actual visible possession. Proof of possession is presumptive proof of ownership, because men generally own the property which they possess. And if the ownership of property is proved and there is nothing to show that the possession of such property is with any person other than the owner, it may fairly be presumed to be with the owner. Such a presumption then takes the place of evidence to show the plaintiff's possession, within twelve years before suit, of a property in which, from the nature of the thing, evidence of actual possession is impossible. *MANO MOHUN GHOSE v. MOTHURA MOHUN ROY*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 225: 8 C. L. R. 126

**47. ————— Diluviation—**

*Subordinate tenure—Suit for recovery of possession of land—Re-formation on the site of plaintiff's villages.* In a suit, brought by the plaintiffs on the 10th December, 1888, for recovery of possession of three plots of land, on the allegation that the lands in dispute were re-formations on the site of the villages of K and M, which were let out in patni and darpatni to third parties in 1868; and that the rights of the patnidar and the dar-patnidar were re-acquired by them in the years 1878, 1880, 1883, and 1892, the defence was that the lands were not re-formation, but accretion to the defendant's villages of C. *Held*, that, as the plaintiff's title to, and possession of the villages of, H and M, down to the time of their diluviation, was not denied, and as it was found that the disputed plots of land were part of the said villages, it was not incumbent on the plaintiffs to prove possession of the lands in dispute previous to the diluviation, but the onus lay on the defendants to prove adverse possession for more than twelve years prior to the institution of the suit, and the suit was not barred by limitation. *Woomesh Chunder Goopto v. Raj Narain Roy*, 10 W. R. 15, and *Davis v. Abdul Hamed*, 8 W. R. 55, referred to. *GUNGA KUMAR MITTER v. ASUTOSH GOSSAMI*

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 863

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**48. ————— Accretion—Right of riparian proprietors—Title to alluvial land contested between villages on opposite banks—Prescription.** The plaintiffs were the proprietors of a village on the southern bank, who disputed with those of a village on the northern bank, the ownership of alluvial land formed by the Ganges. The current, after having encroached upon the southern bank, went away from that side of the river towards the northern, leaving the tract of alluvial land now in dispute. This appeared on its previous site to the south of the main stream. It was then carried away by diluvion, and again appeared after that. This land was claimed by the plaintiffs, not as part of their old land, but on the strength of their having held possession, adversely and without interruption, for more than twelve years before their dispossession by the defendants, by whom they alleged themselves to have been ousted within less than twelve years before they brought this suit. The evidence did not support their claim, the burden of proof being on them. It was shown that after the second recession of the river towards the north and after the re-appearance of the alluvial land on the south of the current, the land had been taken by the Government into their possession and that the latter had made over the greater part of it to the defendants who had since held this part. There had not been shown to have been any actual possession held of the remainder by the plaintiffs, who had thus failed as to the whole to prove the continued possession necessary to their acquiring title. *UDIT NARAIN SINGH v. GOLABCHAND SAHU* . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 221  
L. R. 26 I. A. 236

**49. ————— Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Arts. 142, 144—Boundaries, Dispute as to—Ownership of land reclaimed from a bhil contested between proprietors of contiguous estates—Prior possession of land by one of two claimants—Presumption as to continuance of possession of land by original owner, limitation being pleaded by party in possession.** In suits relating to disputed boundaries where the decision of the lower Court as to the ownership involves questions of the correctness of surveys, maps, recorded description, and other such evidence, the appellant should do more than show points requiring explanation. He should be prepared to show in what respect the decision has been wrong in regard to the evidence, and what other course would be right. The question was as to the ownership of land reclaimed from a bhil within the confines of one or other of two adjoining revenue mehals, the one belonging to the plaintiff, the other to the defendants, and involved the identification of the land in suit with some that had been covered with water, but of which the plaintiff's possession, with title, had been affirmed in proceedings of the revenue survey in 1857. In consequence of the nature and condition of the land, there was no evidence of any act of possession done by either party



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—*contd.*

during the first two years of the twelve immediately preceding the date of the institution of the suit, and during the last ten years the defendants had been in possession. The latter, having tried and failed to establish adverse possession in themselves contended that, even if the plaintiff's possession had been shown to have existed in 1857, he could not succeed without his showing that his possession remained till later than the 9th April, 1869, the suit having been filed on 9th April, 1881, or unless he proved some act of dispossession by the defendants within that period. *Held*, that the presumption was in favour of the plaintiff's possession, which had been with apparent title, having in fact continued over the two years in question, as to which continuance there was no evidence to the contrary. If the burden was on the plaintiff to show possession down to within twelve years of suit, it had been discharged. *RAJKUMAR ROY v. GORIND CHUNDER ROY* . . . . . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 660  
L. R. 19 I. A. 140

50. ———— *Suit for possession of lands forming bed of river—Fishery rights—Presumption—Possession.* In a suit to recover possession of certain lands in the bed of a river which had changed its course, and to get rid of the effect of a Deputy Magistrate's order under s. 318, Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, it was found that plaintiffs had been in possession when the lands were surveyed some years previously as part of their village, and had continued in possession up to the year in which the criminal proceeding was held. *Held*, that the presumption raised by the plaintiff's continued, and undisturbed possession was not rebutted by defendant's allegation that he was entitled to the julkur of the river. *HOGG v. DENONOTH KOONDoo* . . . . . 11 W. R. 566

51. ———— *Omission to give purchaser possession until long after sale—Suit to recover possession.* Where the right, title, and interest of a party had been sold in execution, but possession was delivered to the purchaser more than fifteen years after the sale, such irregularity was held not to entitle the party first mentioned to a decree in a suit to recover the property unless he could prove possession for a period of more than twelve years before he was dispossessed. *ATTOTRAM DOSS v. BALUNKEE DOSS* . . . . . 14 W. R. 357

52. ———— *Suit for confirmation of title—Possession.* In a suit by a Hindu widow for confirmation of her title to certain land in right of her husband, the defendant, who had a possessory award of the property given to her under s. 15, Act XIV of 1859, pleaded that the plaintiff was never in possession. *Held*, that the onus was on the plaintiff to show that she was in possession within the period of limitation. *SHANTO MONEE GOOPTAH v. SUTTO BHAMA GOOPTAH* . . . . . 7 W. R. 34

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—*contd.*

53. ———— *Suit to establish proprietary right.* Where plaintiff sues to establish proprietary right as against a mokurari-dar, it is not necessary for him to prove that he has been in actual possession within twelve years. *PROTAP NARAIN MOOKERJEE v. KARTICK CHUNDER MOOKERJEE* . . . . . 10 W. R. 192

54. ———— *Limitation—Suit on bond—Instalment-bond—Indorsement of payment of instalments.* Where a defendant sets up the defence of limitation, he must plead it and show that the claim is barred. If, when the plaintiff has proved his case, the facts show that the cause of action accrued at a date earlier than the period of limitation and the plea of limitation has been set up by the defendant, the latter will be entitled to take advantage of the plaintiff's evidence that the claim is barred, and to have judgment given in this favour. The obligee of a bond, by which the obligor covenanted to pay the sum of R3,800 by annual instalments of R200 and in which it was also agreed that payments of the instalments should be indorsed on the bond, brought a suit against the obligor alleging default in payment, and claiming to recover the amount of the bond. He gave credit for payment of the instalments for seven years and alleged that his cause of action arose upon default in payment of the eighth instalment. The bond showed on its face indorsements of the payments for which credit was given. The obligor alleged that no instalments were paid after the third year, that therefore the debt became due at an earlier date than that stated by the plaintiff, and that the claim was barred by limitation. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the defendant adduced no evidence to show that the later instalments were not paid, and inasmuch as the evidence produced by the plaintiff did not show that the debt accrued at a date earlier than the limitation period, the plea of limitation failed. *RADHA PRASAD SINGH v. BHAJAN RAI* . . . . . I. L. R. 7 All. 677

55. ———— *Suit for possession by member of family admittedly not joint—Partition.* The plaintiff sued for possession of certain property, alleging that it had belonged to a joint family, of which he had been a member, and had been allotted to him on partition. The partition was not proved, and the suit was dismissed on the ground of limitation. On second appeal it was contended that, if the partition was held not to be proved, the family must be held to be joint; and as the possession of one member could not be adverse to another, the decree dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation was erroneous. *Held*, that, as the family was admittedly not joint, the plaintiff was bound to remove the bar of limitation by showing some sort of possession by himself within twelve years before his suit could be entertained, and, as he had not done so, his suit was properly dismissed. *TULSHI PERSHAD v. RAJA MISSER* . . . . . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 610



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*27. LIMITATION AND ADVERSE POSSESSION  
—*contd.*

56. ———— *Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Arts. 127 and 144—Suit for possession of land alleging a previous partition.* The defendant had purchased the land in question at a sale in execution of a decree obtained by him against cousins of the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed to recover the land, alleging that it was his share of ancestral property which had been allotted to him on partition four or five years before suit, and of which he had actually been in separate possession. The lower Court upon these allegations rejected the plaintiff's claim, holding that the suit was not one for partition and did not fall within Art. 127 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877), but that Art. 144 applied, and that the plaintiff had failed to show that the defendant's adverse possession had begun within twelve years preceding the suit. On appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, reversing the decree and sending back the case, that under Art. 144 it was for the defendant to prove adverse possession for twelve years before suit. HANMANTA KOLAJI v. MAHADEV KONDARI

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 513

57. ———— *Suit for redemption of usufructuary mortgage—Plaint, form of—Proof of title—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 118.* There is a clear distinction as to the onus of proof between cases where a plaintiff sues for possession of land by redemption of mortgage and cases where the defence to a suit for possession of land is twelve years' adverse possession by the defendant. In each case the plaintiff must plead his title; and if that title is in issue, he must make it out by at least *prima facie* evidence before the defendant can be put to proof of his defence. Where the defence is twelve years' adverse possession, the defendant must plead and make out the title he alleges, and thus show that the title of the plaintiff, which otherwise had been proved or admitted was lost. In a suit for possession of land by redemption of mortgage, the very nature of which presupposes that the possession of the defendant or his predecessor was lawful, the plaintiff must in his plaint show the title upon which he relies and therefore a title subsisting at the date of suit. Unless he gives *prima facie* evidence to show that his suit is within time, he fails to prove his title or subsisting right to the property. *Philipps v. Philipps*, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 127; *Dawkins v. Lord Penrhyn*, L. R. 4 Ap. Cas. 51; *Radha Gobind Roy Sahib v. Inglis*, 7 C. L. R. 364; *Rao Karan Singh v. Bakar Ali Khan*, L. R. 9 I. A. 99; *Paja Kissen Dutt Panday v. Narendar Bahadur Singh*, L. R. 3 I. A. 85; *Ram Chandra Apaji v. Balaji Bhaurav*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 137, and other cases referred to. PARMANAND MISR v. SAHIB ALI

I. L. R. 11 All. 438

58. ———— *Possession of usufructuary mortgagees.* The possession of a usufructuary mortgagee being the possession of all

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—*contd.*

the persons who have the right of redemption, that is, of all the persons entitled to the estate, it is only when after redemption possession is taken by some of the persons so entitled that their possession can become adverse as against the others. INAYAT HUSEN v. ALI HUSEN . I. L. R. 20 All. 182

59. ———— *Limitation—Act XV of 1877, Sch. II, Art. 127—Proof of exclusion from joint family property—Mere non-participation in or refusal to live on joint property, insufficient—Hindu law—Suit by one of three widows against her two co-widows, for partition of widow's estate in their late husband's property—Proof of unchastity on part of plaintiff during widowhood, no ground for refusal—Tenant-in-common—Partition a matter of right.* One Panguni died in or about the year 1881 leaving three widows surviving him. The three widows, as tenants-in-common, participated for some time in the profits of their late husband's property. After his decease, one of the widows began to lead an immoral life and refused to live with the other two. In 1895 she sued her co-widows for partition and for an allotment of her one-third share of the property. She claimed to have participated in the profits of the family property until 1890, but the defendants contended that she had ceased to participate therein for more than twelve years before the institution of the suit, and raised the plea of limitation. They also pleaded that plaintiff was not entitled to claim partition, by reason of her unchastity. It was proved that plaintiff had been living with her paramour subsequent to her husband's decease, and had supported herself without recourse to the family property, and had refused to live with defendants. *Held*, that the burden lay on the defendants of proving that plaintiff, who was admittedly a tenant-in-common with them till 1882, was excluded from enjoyment of the property. Mere proof of refusal on the part of the plaintiff to live with her co-widows, or of non-participation by her in the family property, did not establish ouster or exclusion by defendants, and there was no other evidence to show that she had abandoned her interest to their knowledge. *Held*, *al o.*, that proof of plaintiff's unchastity after her husband's death did not disentitle her to claim partition of the property by metes and bounds. A widow, being a tenant-in-common, is entitled to partition as a matter of right, and the Court has no discretion in the matter. SELAM v. CHINNAMMAL (1901) . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 441

60. ———— *Joint family—Adverse possession of a co-sharer as against another co-sharer—Burden of proof.* The land in question in this suit had formerly been the joint property of three brothers, Kalian, Dullabh and Vallabh. In 1884 Kalian and Vallabh removed to a village elsewhere, and Dullabh was left in exclusive possession of the land, which he cultivated until his death in 1894, when his daughter, the first defendant,



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—*concl'd.*

entered into possession. In 1888, however, Kalia and Vallabh had sold the land to one Nagar, who in 1895 sold it to the plaintiff. In 1897 the plaintiff brought this suit for possession. The first Court passed a decree in his favour, but on appeal the Judge reversed the decree, holding that the defendant and her father Dullabh had had adverse possession for more than twelve years, and that the suit was therefore barred. On second appeal: *Held*, by the High Court, that adverse possession had not been proved. The burden of proving adverse possession should have been placed on the defendant. Possession, to be adverse, must be shown to be continuous, public and adequate to the circumstances of the case. As between brothers, especially when no partition is proved, the adverse possession of one should be proved by more satisfactory evidence than was given in this case. *JAGJIVANDAS v. BAI AMBA* (1900). . . . . **I. L. R. 25 Bom. 362**

## 28. MESNE PROFITS.

1. ——— Suit for mesne profits—*Possession by wrong-doer.* In suits for mesne profits, when the defendants have been in possession of the property as wrong-doers, it lies upon them to show what were the sums realized as rent during the time of their possession. *Brojendro Kumar Roy v. Madhub Chunder Ghose*  
**I. L. R. 8 Calc. 343**

2. ——— *Mesne profits, suit for—Onus—Notice of vacating possession.* In a suit for mesne profits, as in other cases, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to establish, not only the existence of his right, but also the extent of it. There is nothing in the circumstances of the present case to take it out of this general rule. *Ishan Chandra Burdhan v. Ainuddin Mia* (1901)  
**5 C. W. N. 720**

## 29. MINORITY.

1. ——— Plea of minority. Where a defendant pleads minority, the onus on him to prove his plea. *Nilmonee Chowdhry v. Zuheerunnissa Khanum* . . . . . **8 W. R. 371**  
*Chyet Narain Singh v. Bunwaree Singh*  
**23 W. R. 395**

## 30. MONEY LENT.

1. ——— Failure to prove an alleged transaction of lending money. Upon the evidence the decision of the High Court was affirmed as to a question of fact, *viz.*, whether the defendant's deceased father had, or had not, in his lifetime, in consideration of a payment to his order by the plaintiff, promised repayment. The High Court, reversing the decree of the first Court, had found that there had been no sufficient proof of the alleged

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transaction. This was the conclusion also on this appeal; and, although it was possible that the money might (as it was indicated in the judgment), have been wrongly obtained from the plaintiff by persons about him, it was not shown to have been received by the alleged borrower. *Lachmi Prasad v. Narendro Kishore Singh*  
**I. L. R. 14 All. 169**  
**L. R. 19 I. A. 9**

## 31. MORTGAGE.

1. ——— Suit for redemption of mortgage—*Alleged sale.* In a suit for redemption of property which, the plaintiff alleges to be mortgaged, but which the defendant contends was sold absolutely, the onus is on the plaintiff to prove the mortgage; and the existence of a mortgage cannot be presumed from the failure of the defendant to establish the alleged sale. *Balaji Narji v. Babu Deoli* . . . . . **5 Bom. A. C. 159**

2. ——— *Evidence Act, I of 1872, s. 110.* The plaintiff sued to redeem certain land, alleging that it had been mortgaged by his father to the defendant in 1854-55. The defendant denied the mortgage, and alleged that he purchased it under a deed of sale from the plaintiff's father in 1849, and had ever since been in his possession as owner. The deed of conveyance was not forthcoming nor was the alleged mortgage-deed. The Court of first instance rejected the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the mortgage was not proved. The lower Appellate Court reversed the decree of the Court of first instance. The defendant appealed. *Held*, that the defendant's possession was *prima facie* evidence of a complete title, and that the plaintiff, who alleged that the defendant was merely a mortgagee, was bound to prove his own right as mortgagor, clearly and indefeasibly. Mere statements that the property had been mortgaged, which failed to establish any particular mortgage, did not shift the burden of proof, or require the mortgagee to show what were the terms of such mortgage, or his right to retain possession under it. *Ramchandra Apaaji v. Balaji Bhaurav*  
**I. L. R. 9 Bom. 137**

3. ——— *Lost mortgage-deed.* In a suit for redemption, the mortgage-deed dated 21st July, 1840, having been lost, the Judicial Commission held that the onus lay, not upon the mortgagor to prove that the term did not expire before 13th of February, 1856, but upon the mortgagee to prove that it did. *Held*, by the Privy Council, that the burden of proof was *prima facie* on the mortgagor, regard being had, as respects the quantum of evidence required, to the opportunities which each party might naturally be supposed to have of giving evidence. *Kishen Dutt Ram Pandey v. Narendar Bahadoor Singh*  
**L. R. 3 I. A. 85**

4. ——— *Beng. Reg. XVII of 1806—Promulgation of Statute.* The plaintiff



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sued, on the 31st of December, 1861, to redeem a mortgage of lands in Sarun, dated the 30th of November, 1801. The mortgage-money was payable on the 28th September, 1806. If not paid, the property was to vest absolutely in the mortgagee without foreclosure. The defendant admitted that he had not foreclosed, but stated that Regulation XVII of 1806 was promulgated in Sarun on the 7th January, 1807, and consequently that the money became due before the Regulation was promulgated. *Held*, that the onus was on the plaintiff to prove that the Regulation was promulgated before 28th September, 1806. *SARIFUNNISSA v. INAYET HOSSEIN*. B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 415 : 5 W. R. 88

5. ———— *Accounts*. In taking an account on mortgage in a suit for redemption, where the mortgagee had been in possession, it lies upon the mortgage to prove what is due from the mortgagor in respect of principal and interest. *GANGA MULIK v. BAYAJI*. I. L. R. 6 Bom. 669

6. ———— *Profits*. In a suit for redemption, on the ground that the debt has been satisfied with interest, the onus is on the plaintiff. A mortgagee is not an assurer of the continuation of the same rate of profits as his mortgagor was able to raise. Hence an estimate of the rental preceding the mortgagor's possession is not sufficient proof of the profits in his time. *SHAH MAKHAN-LAL v. SRIKRISHNA SINGH*

2 B. L. R. P. C. 44 : 11 W. P. C. 19  
12 Moo. I. A. 157

7. ———— *Evidence Act, I of 1872, s. 110*. The plaintiffs averring that their ancestor had mortgaged three villages to the ancestors of the defendants in 1842 for R2,500, putting the mortgagees into possession, sued to recover possession of 15 biswas of each village, asserting that the mortgage-debt had been redeemed from the usufruct. The defendants, admitting the proprietary title of the ancestor of the plaintiffs to the villages, alleged as to 10 biswas of each village that they were sold to their ancestors in 1842 by him for R1,250 and as to the other 10 biswas of each village, that they were subsequently mortgaged to their ancestors by him for R14,000, borrowed by him from them for the purpose of defending a suit arising out of the previous sale, which sum had not been satisfied from the usufruct. *Held* (STUART, C.J., dissenting), that the burden of proving the mortgage of the 10 biswas of each village of which the defendants alleged the sale lay on the plaintiffs. *RATAN KUAR v. JIWAN SINGH*

I. L. R. 1 All. 194

8. ———— *Possession*. Where a suit was brought to redeem a mortgage, and the defendants pleaded possession under a sale:—*Held*, that, under the circumstances, there having been long undisputed possession, that the onus of proving that the possession was less than a proprietary possession, and was referable to a mortgage,

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*31. MORTGAGE—*contd.*

lay on the person who claimed to redeem it. *RUGHOO NATH RAI v. CHUNDOO LALL*

2 Agra Pt. II, 195

9. ———— *Joint mortgage—Redemption by one mortgagor—Suit for other mortgagor for his share*. K and J jointly mortgaged 36 sihams or shares of an estate to C, giving him possession. C transferred his rights as mortgagee to T and M. In execution of a decree for money against K held by M, K's rights and interests in the mortgaged property were sold, and were purchased by P, whose heirs paid the entire mortgage-debt. R, an heir of J, sued the heirs of P to recover from them possession of J's sihams in the mortgaged property, on payment of a proportionate amount of the mortgage-money paid by P. The plaintiff alleged that the mortgage to C had been made forty years before suit. The defendants contended that a much longer period had expired since the date of the mortgage: that forty-one years had elapsed since C transferred his rights as mortgagee; that they had redeemed the property twenty-one years ago and had been since its redemption in proprietary and adverse possession of the sihams in suit: and that the suit was barred by limitation. Neither party was aware of the date of the mortgage, and neither adduced any proof on the point. *Held*, that, the defendants being admittedly in possession, though the existence of a mortgage as the origin of their possession was conceded by them, it lay upon the plaintiff to give *prima facie* proof of the subsistence of that mortgage at the date of suit: but that, assuming that notice was given to the defendants by the plaintiff to produce the mortgage-deed, and that they failed to do so, very slight evidence would have been sufficient to satisfy the obligation which lay on the plaintiff. *Kishen Dutt Ram Pandey v. Narendar Bahadoor Singh*, L. R. 3 I. A. 85, referred to. *NTRA BIBI v. JAGAT NARAIN*

I. L. R. 8 All. 295

10. ———— *Sale of land in execution of decree—Suit by third party to recover*. In a suit to redeem certain land demised on kanam in 1850 by A to the predecessor of B, C, who was in possession of the land, was made a defendant. A proved his title to the land and possession up to 1850. C pleaded title to the land, and denied that B had ever been in possession. Both pleas were found to be false. It was found, however, that C had been in possession from 1869 to 1885, and that in 1876 the land had been sold in execution of a decree against C (to which A was not a party) and purchased by D, who re-sold to C in 1879. The lower Court held that C's possession must be taken to have been derived from B, till the contrary was proved. *Held*, that the burden of proving that his possession was not derived from B lay upon C. *NILAKANDAN v. THANDAMMA*

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 460

11. ———— *Usufructuary mortgage—Mortgagee in possession—Suit for balance of mort-*



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*31. MORTGAGE—*contd.*

*gage-money.* A plaintiff in possession under an usufructuary mortgage, and suing for the balance due, is bound to prove that he has not realized the amount due under the conditions of the lease from the usufruct. *CHUTTUR DHAREE SINGH v. SUREER HOSSEIN* . . . . . **1 W. R. 28**

**12.** ———— *Suit by mortgagee for possession under usufructuary mortgage.* An estate was mortgaged with the stipulation that the interest of the mortgage-debt should be deducted out of the usufruct, and that, if the profits fell short, the mortgagor would make up the deficiency. After a time, the mortgagor tendered the amount of the principal sum and forcibly took possession of the property. The mortgagee sued to recover possession and obtained a decree with *wasilat*. *Held*, that the plaintiff might have sued under Act XIV of 1859, s. 15; but that, suing as he did, the onus was on him to produce the accounts and show that something was due to him as interest. *PRANKISHOREE v. CHUNDEE CHURN BISWAS* . . . . . **19 W. R. 429**

**13.** ———— *Suit by mortgagee for possession and to set aside mokurari lease.* In a suit by mortgagees under a *zur-i-peshgi* mortgage, not only for possession, but also for setting aside a *mokurari* lease which was alleged to have been granted by the mortgagor prior to the mortgage, and under which defendants had been in possession for some time in accordance with a Magistrate's order:—*Held*, that the onus was on the plaintiffs to give some evidence to impeach the validity of the *mokurari*; but this having been done, and a strong *prima facie* case made out, the onus was shifted, and it became incumbent on the defendants to show that the *mokurari* was executed before the *zur-i-peshgi*, and that it was granted *bona fide* for a real consideration and intended to be co-operative as between the mortgagors and the lessee. *SHAMNARAIN v. ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL* . . . . . **23 W. R. P. C. 111**

**14.** ———— *Suit by mortgagee under usufructuary mortgage.* In a suit in which the plaintiff prayed for the sale of property which had been mortgaged to him as security for a loan under a *zur-i-peshgi* *ijara* lease, and of which he had been dispossessed by the defendant under colour of a decree, it was *held* that, as the plaintiff had had for a great many years the usufruct of the land for the very purpose of repaying himself the principal and interest of his loan, the burden was on him to show that there was anything remaining due to him, and that the onus also was on him to prove that the *ijara* gave him the right to sell the property upon some contingency. *MUJEE-DUNNISSA v. DILDAR HOSSEIN* . . . . . **20 W. R. 178**

**15.** ———— *Suit for possession after foreclosure—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 239, 240—Suit on mortgage—Attachment.* A suit on a mortgage foreclosed under Beng. Reg. XVII of 1806, s. 8, comprising property attached before the date of the mortgage under s. 81 and the following

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*31. MORTGAGE—*conclld.*

sections of Act VIII of 1859, was brought against the purchaser of the attached property, which had been sold under the decree obtained by the attaching creditor. The defence was that the mortgage falling within the provisions of s. 240 of the Act was void as against the attaching creditor and those claiming under him. For the mortgagee it was contended that the attachment could not prevail, it not having been proved affirmatively that the requirements of s. 239 relating to the intimation of the attachment had been complied with. *Held*, that this objection to the validity of the attachment could not be raised for the first time on this appeal, even if it was not rather for the mortgagee, seeking to deprive the attaching creditor of his possession, to prove the non-observance of the formalities in question. *RAMKRISHNA DASS SURROWJI v. SURFUNNISSA BEGUM* **I. L. R. 6 Calc. 129; L. R. 7 I. A. 157**

**16.** ———— *Mortgage suit—Fraud—Collusion.* In a suit on a mortgage, where collusion and fraud are pleaded by a subsequent auction-purchaser of the mortgaged property, the onus is upon the plaintiff to prove that the transaction was perfectly genuine and free from taint of fraud. *Brajeshware Peshakar v. Budhanuddi*, **I. L. R. 6 Calc. 268**, referred to and explained. *Ishan Chunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar*, **I. L. R. 25 Calc. 62**, distinguished. *SHIB NARAIN PAHARI v. SHANKAR PANIGRAHI* (1900)

**5 C. W. N. 403**

## 32. NOTICE.

**1.** ———— *Liability under Act—Road Cess Act (Beng. Act IX of 1880), ss. 52, 53—Evidence Act, s. 114—Presumption.* Where under an Act certain things are required to be done before any liability attaches to any person in respect of any right or obligation, it is for the person who alleges that that liability has been incurred to prove that the things prescribed in the Act have been actually done. *Held*, that the notice provided by s. 52 of the Road Cess Act did not come within the presumption of s. 114, cl. (e), of the Evidence Act, and must be proved. *ASHANULLAH KHAN BAHADUR v. TRI-LOCHAN BAGCHI* . . . . . **I. L. R. 13 Calc. 197**

**2.** ———— *Service of notice—Execution of decree—Presumption.* In the case of execution of decree of twelve years' standing, the defendant is not bound to prove service of notice, but the Court may presume that notice has been regularly served, unless the party alleging irregularity can produce evidence to the contrary. *KASEE KANT v. GOPAL KISTO MOITRO* . . . . . **W. R. 1864, 314**

## 33. PARTITION.

**1.** ———— *Suit for partition—Plea of prior separation.* In a suit for partition of joint family property, in which the defendant pleads that a partition has already taken place, the onus is on



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*33. PARTITION—*contd.*

the defendant to prove the alleged partition. *GOOROO PERSHAD MOOKERJEE v. KALEE PERSHAD MOOKERJEE* . . . . . 5 W. R. 121

2. ——— Private partition—*Private arrangement—Subsequent partition by Collector.* *A* and *B* were joint owners of a mouzah. *B* leased his share in patni to *C*. By arrangement between *A* and *C*, a partition of the lands was made, and each party collected the rents of the lands allotted to him. Forty years afterwards, a butwara of the mouzah was made by the Collector between *A* and *B*, whereby lands held by *C* under the previous arrangement were allotted to *A*. *C* was no party to the butwara proceedings. In a suit brought by *A* against *C* for possession of the lands so allotted, the plaintiff alleged that the previous division of the lands between *A* and *C* was a temporary one, made after the commencement of the butwara proceedings. The lower Appellate Court found that the plaintiff's allegations had not been proved, and dismissed the suit. *Held* (TOTTENHAM, J., dissenting), that the decree of the lower Court was correct as it lay on the plaintiff to show that the private partition had come to an end. *OBHOY CHURN SIKKAR v. HURI NATH ROY* I. L. R. 8 Cal. 72 : 10 C. L. R. 81

3. ——— Suit for possession on allegation of partition. In a suit to obtain possession of certain lands, on the ground that they had been assigned to plaintiffs by a partition made by the Collector :—*Held*, in the matter of certain of the plots which plaintiffs alleged to be included in particular daghs in the butwara chittahs, that as defendants denied that they were so included, it was on the plaintiffs to prove their allegation. *Held*, in respect to a dagh in which plaintiffs were admitted to be entitled to a certain quantity of land, that it was their business to prove that the particular lands which they claimed had been assigned to them by the butwara proceedings. *BHUGGOBUTTY GOOPTA v. SARODA SOONDUREE DEBEA* 11 W. R. 337

4. ——— Suit for possession after partition—*Interference with possession after Collector's award.* In a suit for possession with mesne profits, on the ground that the lands claimed were allotted to plaintiff's share by a butwara under Bengal Regulation XIX of 1814, where defendant, admitting the allegation, urged that plaintiff had given up possession as soon as the butwara was completed :—*Held*, that it was for plaintiff to prove that defendant had interfered with the possession awarded to him by the Collector. *MOBARUK ALI v. IMDAD ALI* . . . . . 16 W. R. 200

5. ——— Suit to have property excluded from partition—*Nature of possession.* In two suits in which the prayer was substantially to have certain property which had been included in a butwara before the Collector excluded from such butwara, it was held that, as plaintiff's possession was admitted and defendant had failed to prove his plea that such possession was in the quality of

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*33. PARTITION—*contd.*

tenant under him, plaintiff was entitled to a decree. *BIPIN BEHAREE LUKKUN v. GHASOO* 11 W. R. 16

6. ——— Suit to stay partition by Collector—*Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 42—Declaration of specific rights.* A person bringing a suit under s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act to stay a partition directed by the Collector under Bengal Act VIII of 1876, on the ground that a private partition has already been come to, must prove not only that there has been a private partition, but also that under that partition he is entitled to, and was in possession of, in severalty, some specific portion of the property again sought to be partitioned by the Collector ; and such person is entitled to no declaration affecting the rights of other shares in the parent estate. *Khoobun v. Wooma Churn Singh*, 3 C. L. R. 453, distinguished. *KALUP NATH SINGH v. LALA RAMDEIN LAL* . . . I. L. R. 16 Cal. 117

## 34. POSSESSION AND PROOF OF TITLE.

1. ——— Suit for 'possession—*Weakness of defendant's case—Title, proof of.* In a suit for possession of land, where plaintiff's title and previous possession are both denied, it is not proper for a Court to start with the case put forward by the defendant, the onus of proof being primarily on plaintiff. *WALKER v. ATNA RAM MUNDUR* 14 W. R. 478

2. ——— Person out of possession—*Evidence of title.* Possession is evidence of title, and is primarily exclusive. It is for him who impugns this exclusive title to show that the possession arose in some way which has preserved his own right. In every case the person who has been out of possession for more than twelve years must make out some *prima facie* title, and some agreement or acknowledgment of that title, such that possession is deprived of its ordinary effect through being held on a joint right or a subordinate right. *RAMCHANDRA NARAYAN v. NARAYAN MAHADEV* . . . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 216

See also *TATYA v. ANAJI*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 220 note

and *VITHOBA v. NARAYAN*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 221 note

3. ——— Proof of title. A decree-holder sued to establish that certain property was the property of *W*, his judgment-debtor, such property being claimed by *A* as his. He proved that for five years and more *W* had been in possession of such property as ostensible owner. *Held*, that, this being so, it rested with *A* to prove his title. *MATHURA DAS v. MITCHELL* I. L. R. 4 All. 206

4. ——— Evidence of title—*Dispossession, Proof of.* Possession is evidence of title ; and if the plaintiff proves that he has possession, and that his possession has been forcibly



# **ONUS OF PROOF—contd.**

## **34. POSSESSION AND PROOF OF TITLE— contd.**

disturbed, he makes out a *prima facie* title for the defendant to rebut. **MAHOMED BUX v. ABDUL KUREEM alias ABOO** . . . . . **20 W. R. 458**

**5.** ————— *Person in possession without title.* In the case of the owner of land seeking to recover possession on the allegation that the party in possession has no right to continue in it, and showing a *prima facie* title to possession, he can claim a decree unless the party in possession has a tenure entitling him to retain possession. **RAM MONEE v. ALEEMOODEEN** . . . . . **20 W. R. 374**

**JOYKISHTO MOOKERJEE v. HUREEHUR MOOKERJEE** . . . . . **12 W. R. 365**

**KOONJ BEHAREE RAU v. BUKSHEE LUCHMUN DOSS** . . . . . **19 W. R. 188**

**RAJKISHEN MOOKERJEE v. PEAREE MOHUN MOOKERJEE** . . . . . **20 W. R. 421**

**HUREE MOHUN PODDAR v. GUREEBOOLAH MULLICK** . . . . . **22 W. R. 417**

**KALEE KISHEN ROY v. BROJENDRO COOMAR ROY CHOWDHRY** . . . . . **24 W. R. 266**

**BATAI AHIR v. BHUGGOBUTTY KOER** . . . . . **11 C. L. R. 476**

**6.** ————— *Dispossession—Proof of title.* When a person forcibly dispossessed sues to recover possession, the burden of proving title is on the party by whom he was forcibly dispossessed. **SHAMA SOONDUREE DEBIA v. COLLECTOR OF MALDAH** . . . . . **12 W. R. 164**

**7.** ————— *Dispossession—Proof of title.* In a suit to recover possession, on the allegation of a previous possession and forcible ouster, both being denied by defendants who set up a title of their own, it is for plaintiffs to prove the alleged ouster. If they do so to the satisfaction of the Court, the burden of proof will be on the defendants to show the title on which they ousted the plaintiffs. Should the defendants prove such a *prima facie* title, then it will be the duty of the Judge to call upon the plaintiffs to establish their title. **GOUR PAROY v. WOOMA SOONDUREE DEBIA** . . . . . **12 W. R. 472**

**DAITARI MOHANTI v. JUGO BUNDHOO MOHANTI** . . . . . **23 W. R. 293**

**8.** ————— *Dispossession.* Proper procedure pointed out in a suit for recovery of possession of certain lands on an allegation of illegal dispossession, where defendant sets up a superior title as proprietor against the allegation of a similar title on the part of plaintiff. If defendant in such a case established his better title as a landlord, then plaintiff cannot, in a Civil Court, succeed on the title of an under-tenant. **KOBEEROODDEN v. NYAN BIBEE** . . . . . **8 W. R. 354**

**DABJEE SAHOO v. TUMEEZOODDEEN** . . . . . **10 W. R. 102**

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## **34. POSSESSION AND PROOF OF TITLE— contd.**

**RADHA BULLUB GOSSAIN v. KISHEN GOBIND GOSAIN** . . . . . **9 W. R. 71**

**9.** ————— *Ejectionment—Proof of title.* Where A was illegally dispossessed by B of land for which A obtained a decree in a suit with C, and A brought a suit to recover possession:—*Held*, that, the dispossession being proved, the onus of proving the title was in the first instance on B, and that the mere fact of the land being identical with that decreed to A in his suit with C could not entitle him to a decree in his suit with B. **JADUB NATH v. RAM SUNDAR SURMA** . . . . . **7 W. R. 174**

**10.** ————— *Proof of title—Forged evidence.* Suit by A to recover immovable property in the possession of B and his predecessors, whose title had been unchallenged for forty-four years, on the ground that the estate was mortgaged only by A's ancestors, and that B and those claiming under him were only usufructuary mortgagees in possession. *Held*, that the *onus probandi* was on A, who could only succeed by the strength of his own title, and not by reason of the weakness of B's title. **SEVVAJI VIJAYA RAGHUNADHA VALOJI KRISTNAN GOPALDAR v. CHINNA NAYANA CHETTI** . . . . . **10 Moo. I. A. 151**

**11.** ————— *Title—Suit after ejectionment.* The plaintiff, a lessee in perpetuity of a piece of land from the inamdar of the village in which it was situated, sued the defendant, who had dispossessed him more than six months before the date of suit, to eject him from the land. The defendant set up a lease from the same inamdar, but it was held to have been granted without any authority. Both the leases required to be registered under Act XX of 1866, but were not registered. *Held*, that the plaintiff, although suing more than six months after the date of dispossession and without resorting to a possessory suit (Act XIV of 1859, s. 15; Act I of 1877, s. 9), was entitled to rely on the possession previous to his dispossession as against a person who had no title; the onus being on defendant to prove his title. **KRISHNARAV YASHVANT v. VASUDEV APAJI** . . . . . **I. L. R. 8 Bom. 371**

**12.** ————— *Suit to establish title and for possession after decree under s. 15, Act XIV of 1859.* In a suit to establish title and recover possession from a person who has obtained possession under s. 15, Act XIV of 1859, the defendant need not prove his title, and his possession cannot be disturbed, unless the plaintiff gives proof of a better title; the onus being on the plaintiff to prove everything. **MAENOODDEEN v. GREESH CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHRY** . . . . . **7 W. R. 230**

**13.** ————— In a suit against a landlord to recover possession of land of which plaintiff alleged himself to have been illegally dispossessed:—*Held*, that, if plaintiff sought to recover possession without reference to any right or title, but simply on the ground of having been illegally eject-



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contd.**

ed, his remedy would have been under s. 15, Act XIV of 1859. Not having availed himself of this remedy, he was bound to show that he had title to re-enter, and that the landlord had ejected him without any right to do so. **NUND KISHORE LALL v. SHEO DYAL OOPADHYA**. 11 W. R. 168

**RAM MOHAN DASS v. JHUPPRO DOSS**

14 W. R. 41

**CROWDY v. RAM BHUROSE CHOWDHRY**

23 W. R. 383

a suit brought under s. 27, Bengal Act VIII of 1869.

**14. ——— Suit by heirs of last full owner of property—Proof of title.** Where a defendant in possession of certain property resists a suit for possession thereof, brought by parties who have proved themselves to be the nearest heirs of the last full owner, the onus is on the defendant to prove his title. *Tariny Churn Chowdhry v. Saroda Soonduree Dassee*, 3 B. L. R. A. C. 145, and *Thakur Deen Tewary v. Ali Hossein Khan*, 13 B. L. R. 427, cited and followed. **RAM-PROTAB MISSEER v. ABHILACK MISSEER**

3 C. L. R. 170

**15. ——— Written statement—Admission.** In a suit by A against B for recovery of ancestral jamai lands, of which he alleged that he had been dispossessed by B, B stated in his written statement that A's ancestor having relinquished the land, the zamindar had leased the same to him, B, and he had been in possession since. He also stated how A's ancestor relinquished, and that he, B, had thereupon obtained a pottah. He denied that he had dispossessed A. *Held*, that, B having admitted the possession of A's ancestor, it lay upon B to prove his title. **BAIKANTHANATH KUMAR v. CHUNDRA MOHUN CHOWDHRY**

1 B. L. R. A. C. 133; 10 W. R. 190

**16. ——— Allegation of ownership as mortgagee only.** Where a person is alleged to be in possession, not as owner of the full proprietary right, but as mortgagee, the burden of proof of such qualified ownership lies on the party asserting it. Such a case falls within the scope of s. 110, Act I of 1872. **SHEORUTTONGIR v. DOORGA**

6 N. W. 36

**17. ——— Land purchased benami by plaintiff for defendant—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 110.** The plaintiff sought to recover possession of certain lands, alleging that he had been dispossessed. The defendants, who were in possession, alleged that at an auction sale the plaintiff had bought the lands benami for the defendants. *Held*, that the burden of proving a *prima facie* case that the land belonged to the plaintiff was on him. **HARI RAM v. RAJ COOMAR OPADHYA**

1. L. R. 8 Calc. 759

**18. ——— Title.** In a suit to recover possession of certain property, on proof

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contd.**

that the plaintiff had been dispossessed by a benami-dar, in whose favour a conveyance had been executed by the plaintiff's father :—*Held*, that the presumption arising from the defendant's recent and unexplained possession being rebutted by the plaintiff's prior continuous and peaceful possession, the defendant must show affirmatively that his title was a valid one, and could not raise the defence that the plaintiff was prevented from showing it to be invalid. **MAHESH CHANDRA BANERJEE v. BARADA DEBI**

2 B. L. R. A. C. 274; 11 W. R. 185

**19. ——— Obstruction to execution of decree by a claimant—Civil Procedure Codes (Act VIII of 1859), s. 229, (Acts X of 1877 and XIV of 1882, s. 331).** In a suit under s. 229 of Act VIII of 1859 (s. 331 of Acts X of 1877 and XIV of 1882), the onus is on the plaintiff to establish a *prima facie* case of possession, and it is then incumbent on the claimant to answer that case, and show, if possible, a better title. **RAKHAL CHURN MUNDUL v. WATSON & Co.**

1. L. R. 10 Calc. 50

**20. ——— Resistance to execution by third party—Suit for possession—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 331.** The plaintiff had obtained a decree for possession of certain land against his tenant B. On proceeding to execute his decree, he was obstructed by the defendants. He therefore filed a claim against them for possession under s. 331 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), which was duly registered as a suit. The lower Court found as a fact that the plaintiff through his tenant B had been in possession of the land. The defendants pleaded that the land had belonged not to the plaintiff, but to one J, on whose death they were entitled to it. *Held*, that in a proceeding under s. 331 of the Civil Procedure Code, where possession is shown to have been with the plaintiff, the defendants are not, without showing title in themselves, at liberty to impeach the plaintiff's title, or to set up a *jus tertii*. The onus of proving a better title than the plaintiff's rests with them, and they may prove their title as a defence. **BAPUJIRAO v. FATTESING SHAHAJI BHOSLE**

1. L. R. 22 Bom. 967

**21. ——— Proof of title—Unregistered deed of sale—Oral evidence inadmissible.** On the 18th January, 1876, plaintiff became a purchaser at a Court's sale of the right, title, and interest of G and N in a shop, and, having been obstructed by defendant in obtaining possession of it, sued to recover it from him. The plaintiff was filed on the 27th January, 1877. Defendant answered that he purchased it from G under a deed of sale dated 5th January, 1865, and that he had been in possession since that day. The deed of sale was not admitted in evidence for want of registration, but it was found that defendant had been in possession as owner since 5th January, 1865. *Held*, that, as the defendant admitted that he had derived his title



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contd.**

from *G* (of whose interest in the shop the plaintiff was assignee), the burden of proof lay upon the defendant, and that he had failed to prove his purchase, inasmuch as his unregistered deed of sale could not be received in evidence, and oral evidence was inadmissible in place of the deed. *SAMBHUBHAI KARSANDAS v. SHIVLALDAS SADASHIVDAS*

**I. L. R. 4 Bom. 89**

**22.** ————— *Suit to have property declared liable in execution of decree.* In a suit for the sale of certain property in satisfaction of a decree against a judgment-debtor (since deceased), where it was found that the judgment-debtor had made over the property to his wife in lieu of her dower, and that she had transferred it to defendant:—*Held*, that the onus was on the plaintiff. *LYAKUT ALI v. COURT OF WARDS*

**10 W. R. 423**

**23.** ————— *Proceedings to obtain possession in execution of decree.* Where a judgment-creditor admits having obtained possession of a portion of the land without opposition from the judgment-debtor, the onus lies on him to show that he was unable, nevertheless, to obtain possession of the remainder. *AMJATT ALI v. AZHUR ALI*

**21 W. R. 241**

**24.** ————— *Khas mehals in 24-Pergunnahs—Relation between owners and the Government—Right to possession—Ejectment.* There is no relation of landlord and tenant between the Government and the owner of khas mehals in the 24-Pergunnahs. The latter is the landlord of the raiyats, and is not himself a raiyat. The right and title of the Government are to the rent, but do not include a right to the possession of the lands, though such a right might arise by forfeiture or extinction of the ownership; and the onus is on the Government to prove its claim to the possession of the lands. *GUNGA GOBIND MUNDUL v. COLLECTOR OF 24-PERGUNNAHS*

**7 W. R. P. C. 22 : 11 Moo. I. A. 345**

**25.** ————— *Suit to establish title—Bom. Reg. XVII of 1827, s. 7, cls. 1 and 2—Bom. Act I of 1865—Miras land.* On the 28th August, 1857, the plaintiff passed a kabuliati to Government and took possession of certain miras land, abandoned by the mirasdar for four or five years previous to that date. The plaintiff continued in possession of his land, and paid the Government assessment from 1864 till 1872. In an action brought by the plaintiff to recover possession of the land, he alleged in the plaint that he had taken the defendants as partners in the cultivation of the land, and had been dispossessed by them. Both the lower Courts rejected the claim. The lower Appellate Court based its decision on the ground that, as the plaintiff failed to prove the fact of his alleged partnership with the defendants, he could not succeed, notwithstanding that Court found in the plaintiff's favour the other facts stated above.

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contd.**

*Held*, on special appeal, that, as the suit was one to establish title and recover possession, the Judge should, on the facts found and having regard to Regulation XVII of 1827, s. 7, cls. 1 and 2, and Bombay Act I of 1865, have called upon the defendants to prove their claim to hold possession as against the plaintiff's right of occupation. *TRIMBAK RANU v. NANA BHAVANI*

**12 Bom. 144**

**26.** ————— *Title.* In a suit to recover possession of land and wasilat under a ganti jumma, which had originally belonged to the defendants, the main question was as to ten cottahs, of which possession by receipt of rent only was claimed from the defendants, whose dwelling-house was thereon. The defendants alleged that the ten cottahs were not included in the ganti jumma, under which plaintiffs claimed. *Held*, that the onus was on the plaintiffs to prove that the ten cottahs were included in the ganti jumma under which they claimed. It was not on the defendants to show the extent of that tenure while it was in their possession and when it was transferred to the plaintiffs, although the fact was one peculiarly within their knowledge. *GIRDHAR HARI v. KALIKANT ROY CHOWDHRY*

**3 B. L. R. A. C. 161 : 11 W. R. 501**

**27.** ————— *Evidence—Jaghir tenure—Auladad grant.* By a sanad dated March 1854, the plaintiff's ancestor granted to *B*, the defendant's ancestor, a jagir of a certain mouzah. *B* died in 1872, and plaintiff subsequently brought a suit to recover possession of the mouzah, alleging that the grant to *B* was an ordinary service jaghir. The plaintiff filed a kabuliati which had been executed by *B*, the terms of which supported the plaintiff's allegation as to the nature of the grant. The defendant alleged that the grant was auladad, but failed to produce the sanad or account for its non-production. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree. *JUGGERNATH SAHEE v. AHLAD KOWUR*, 19 W. R. 140, distinguished. *THAKUR DOYAL v. RAM NARAIN SINGH*

**I. L. R. 8 Calc. 375**

**28.** ————— *Suit for lands granted as jaghir tenure—Non-production of documentary evidence.* In a suit to recover possession of certain lands upon the ground that they were granted as a jaghir tenure by the plaintiff's ancestor to one *P* and his lineal descendants, and that such descendants had failed:—*Held*, that it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove the grant alleged in his plaint, without which no cause of action would have been shown; and as the tenure was created in the proper and usual manner,—i.e., by pottah and kabuliati—the latter would be in the possession of the plaintiff's ancestors. As this was not produced, no secondary evidence given of it, and no foundation laid for giving such evidence, it was unnecessary to go further into the plaintiff's case. *JUGGERNATH SAHEE v. AHLAD KOWUR*

**19 W. R. 140**



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—*contd.*

29. ————— *Proof of title.*  
The plaintiff sued for possession under the allegation that the property in dispute was under the management of the defendant. The defendant having denied management, and set up a title by purchase, and his possession for more than thirty years having been proved :—*Held*, that the onus of showing a possession for his benefit was rightly thrown on the plaintiff. *KIRAT SINGH v. RAM DOSS* . . . . . **W. R. F. B. 8**

30. ————— *Adverse or permissive occupancy—Proof of title.* A donee, under a deed of gift, brought a suit to recover a piece of land which he alleged his donors had given for a temporary purchase to the defendant in possession six years before ; and the Munsif found that it was so, and allowed the claim. But the District Judge, on appeal, considering that the plaintiff had failed to prove his donors' title to the land reversed the Munsif's decree. *Held*, that the Judge was in error in requiring the plaintiff to establish the title of the donors, without enquiring whether the defendant had obtained possession merely by their permission ; and that the suit must be remanded for a finding by the District Judge on that point. *SAKALCHAND SAVAICHAND v. DAYABHAI ICHHACHAND* . . . . . **4 Bom. A. C. 70**

31. ————— *Shifting of burden of proof—Land taken by Government as forest reserve—Madras Forest Act (Mad. Act V of 1882).* Portions of certain land, which had been taken up by Government as forest reserve, were claimed by one who had admittedly been in possession and enjoyment of them for thirty years. The Government failed to establish any subsisting title of its own. *Held*, that the burden of proof had been shifted on to the Government and had not been discharged, and accordingly that the claim should be allowed. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. KOTA BAPANAMMA GARU* . . . . . **I. L. R. 19 Mad. 165**

32. ————— *Suit for land attached under s. 3 of Act IV of 1840.* In a suit for possession of land attached by the Magistrate under s. 3 of Act IV of 1840, the *onus probandi* is on the plaintiff. *MOHESHUR SINGH v. RAMAPUT SINGH* . . . . . **W. R. F. B. 7 : 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 35**

33. ————— *Suit by zamindar against trespasser.* An award under Act IV of 1840 does not relieve a party of the obligation to prove his right and title, when sued by the zamindar as a trespasser. *BYDONATH SORBHON v. KENOO-RAM HOLDAR* . . . . . **1 W. R. 211**

34. ————— *Possession under order of Criminal Court—Suit to eject on ground of title.* A, being in possession of lands as purchaser under deeds of sale from B, the person last seised, was forcibly ousted from possession by C and D, who set up a title to the lands under an alleged deed of gift from B. A made a complaint

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to the Criminal Court, and under an order of that Court was again put into possession, C and D being directed to institute a suit in the Civil Court to establish their claim, which they accordingly did relying upon their title, and impeaching the deeds of sale. In such circumstances :—*Held*, by the Judicial Committee, reversing the decree of the Court at Calcutta (without prejudice, however, to any question which might arise between A and any other party claiming under B), that it was incumbent on C and D to prove some title to the land claimed before they could put A to proof of his title. *RAM RUTTON RAE v. FURROOKOONNISSA BEGUM* . . . . . **4 Moo. I. A. 233**

35. ————— *Ejectment by order of Magistrate under s. 319, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861—Suit to recover possession.* The plaintiffs were in possession of certain land when the Magistrate, acting under s. 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, placed the defendant in possession until the rights of the parties should be determined by a competent Civil Court. *Held*, in a suit to recover possession of the property instituted more than six months after the plaintiffs were dispossessed, that they could not recover without showing their title, the onus being on them to prove it. *ASHUMANDE AGATH KUNHI PATHUMAH v. MAKACHINDE AGATH MAKACHI* . . . . . **4 Mad. 478**

*RAJESSUREE DEBIA v. BRINDABUTY DEBIA* . . . . . **7 W. R. 212**

*LUCHMEN PERSHAD v. MAHARANEE OF BURDWAN* . . . . . **17 W. R. 181**

36. ————— *Suit after order of Criminal Court under s. 530, Act X of 1872.* In a suit for possession and for establishment of title against parties in possession under an award of the criminal authorities under Act X of 1872, s. 530, the *onus probandi* is on the plaintiffs. *HURI RAM v. BHIKAREE ROY* . . . . . **25 W. R. 20**

As also under s. 318 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861. *HURRO SOONDUREE v. SONATON DOSS* . . . . . **25 W. R. 464**

37. ————— *Suit after order under the Land Registration Act (Beng. Act VII of 1876).* Where a person who, by an order of the Collector passed under the provisions of the Land Registration Act (Bengal Act VII of 1876), has been declared to be out of possession of certain land, brings a suit for the recovery of possession, it lies on him in the first instance to make out a *prima facie* case. *MUDDUN MOHUN PODDAR v. BHAGGOMANTO PODDAR* . . . . . **I. L. R. 8 Calc. 923**

38. ————— *Suit for produce of trees—Title, proof of.* In a suit to prevent the defendants from obstructing the plaintiff in his enjoyment of fruits of certain trees, which he claimed as heir of a person who purchased that right, the defendants denied the existence of the right, and alleged possession and enjoyment in themselves.



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*Held*, that the District Judge, on appeal, having found the possession and enjoyment to be in the defendants, was right in throwing upon the plaintiff the burden of proving his title to the trees or their produce. *LALDAS RAMDAS v. KASHIRAM*  
4 Bom. A. C. 60

39. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230, suit under—Title, proof of.* S. 230, Act VIII of 1859, only gave an applicant the right, without instituting a separate suit, of contesting the decree-holder's right to dispossess him, but did not exempt the applicant from the onus of proving his case. *MAHOMED AUSUR v. PROKASH CHUNDER SHA* . . . 8 W. R. 8

40. ————— *Claim—Dispossession—Act VIII of 1859, s. 230.* One share-holder, being disposed by the other of a certain julkur in execution of his decree, brought a suit under s. 230, Act VIII of 1859, alleging that the julkur had been a part of their joint mehal; and that, on partition thereof, the julkur was left ijmali. The decree-holder set up that the julkur had been formed after the partition, and by diluvion of one of his own villages. *Held*, that the onus was upon the claimant to prove his case. *UDAI TARA CHOWDHRAIN v. ABDUL GANI* . . . 3 B. L. R. Ap. 90

*S.C. WOODOY TARA CHOWDHRAIN v. ABDUL GUNNY* . . . 12 W. R. 16

41. ————— *Title by possession—Attachment and sale under a decree of property claimed by a third person—Suit by a third person to establish his title—Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), ss. 230-246.* S obtained a money-decree against the sons and heirs of A, and under that decree attached a shop as part of A's estate. N (father of A) applied to have the attachment removed under s. 246 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), alleging that the shop was his. The application was rejected, and the shop was sold in execution and bought by P, the defendant. N then brought his suit against P (the purchaser) to establish his title. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. On appeal, the District Judge reversed that decree, holding that the plaintiff had been in possession of the shop and had proved his title. The defendant appealed to the High Court. *Held*, that, the plaintiff having proved his possession at the date of the execution sale, it lay upon the defendant (P), who claimed the property, to prove a title in himself or in the judgment-debtor A, and that, he having failed to do this, the plaintiff was entitled to a decree declaratory of his right to the property as against the defendant. Where a dispossessed party proceeds, under s. 230 of Act VIII of 1859, to vindicate the possession of which he has been deprived, although he may give evidence of his title, he is not bound to do so, but may rest his right to recover on his possession and cast upon the decree-holder the burden of proving his title,

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*i.e.*, his right to dispossess the applicant. *Per WEST, J.*—A person in possession of property which is sold in execution as that of another is not called upon, when suing to establish his title, to prove his proprietorship as by an action *in rem* against all the world. It is enough if he establishes a good title as against the judgment-debtor whose right has been sold; and as he is in possession, that possession in itself affords a ground for an assertion of full proprietorship for the purpose of the suit, except so far as the right vested in the judgment-debtor can be shown affirmatively to contradict or qualify it. Possession constitutes an interest requiring affirmative proof of a superior title on the part of any one who seeks to disturb it, and therefore, where a person in possession of property which has been sold in execution as being the property of another sues to establish his title to such property, the burden of proof lies, not upon him, but upon the person who claims as purchaser at the execution-sale. *PEMRAJ BHAVANIRAH v. NARAYAN SHIVARAM*  
I. L. R. 6 Bom. 215

42. ————— *Suit for confirmation of possession—Proof of title.* In a suit for confirmation of possession of certain lands sold in execution of a decree as lakhiraj, the onus was held to lie on the plaintiff to prove his title, notwithstanding the defendant's admission that the lands in question were within the boundaries of the plaintiff's zamindari. *PURSEEDH NARAIN SINGH v. BISSUSSUR DYAL SINGH* . . . 7 W. R. 148

43. ————— Where a party who asserts that he is in possession without adducing any evidence in support of his title, sues for confirmation of title as against a *bonâ fide* purchaser for valuable consideration, without notice from the party in whose name the property stood, who exercised acts of ownership and gave himself out to the world as the real proprietor, plaintiff cannot put the defendant of proof to his title till he has proved his own. *LEKHRAJ ROY v. MUTTY MADHUB SEN*  
14 W. R. 95

44. ————— *Right to begin—Adoption, proof of—Proof of loss, and admission of seconding evidence, of a document alleged to have been executed—Evidence Act (1 of 1872), s. 65.* A suit for possession by right of inheritance was brought by a claimant, alleging himself to be the heir, against the alleged adopted son of the last male owner, denying that an adoption purporting to be made by the widow had been duly authorized by the deceased. The Court of first instance called upon the defendant to prove his title as a son by adoption notwithstanding that the plaintiff was out of possession, and could not have succeeded, in the event of the defendant's failure to prove it, without first proving his own title as collateral heir by descent, thus in effect, proposing to make the establishment of the plaintiff's title depend upon the failure or success of the defendant in proving the



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adoption. The High Court pointed out the error of this proceeding, and the Judicial Committee affirmed its judgment, concurring also in its finding that the adoption had been proved. It was found also that the loss of the anumati-patra had been established, so that secondary evidence of it was receivable. *KALI KISHORE DUTT GUPTA MOZUMDAR v. BHUSAN CHUNDER alias BEPIN CHUNDER DUTT GUPTA* . . . **I. L. R. 18 Calc. 201**  
**L. R. 17 I. A. 159**

45. ———— *Presumption of ownership—Possession—Suit for ejectment—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 110.* It is usually for the plaintiff who seeks ejectment to prove his title. But where he proves himself to have peaceably enjoyed possession for a considerable time, the person who has recently dispossessed him has to meet the presumption of law that the plaintiff's possession indicates his ownership. In a suit for possession of immoveable property and other reliefs, it was proved that the plaintiff and his predecessors in title had been in undisturbed possession for thirty or forty years previous to his dispossession by the defendant. The defendant alleged, but failed to prove, that the plaintiff had paid him rent as tenant-at-will of the premises. The lower Appellate Court, upon the finding that the plaintiff's possession was that of a licensee, modified the first Court's decree, which had allowed the claim in full. *Held* (by *MAHMOOD J.*), with reference to s. 110 of the Evidence Act, that although in the first instance the burden of proving his title was on the plaintiff, it was shifted by his proving long undisturbed possession, that the defendant's failure to prove the alleged payment of rent went far to prove that the plaintiff's possession was adverse; and that the Court below, in acting upon the theory that such possession was that of a licensee had wrongly set up for the defendant a defence, which he had not set up for himself. *LACHHO v. HAR SAHAI*

**I. L. R. 12 All. 46**

46. ———— *Possession—Declaration of title—Suit by person in possession for declaration of title—Burden of proof—Evidence—Effect of plaintiff's possession—Presumption of title—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 110.* The plaintiffs brought this suit in 1898 for a declaration that certain land in the village of S belonged to them, and that they might be confirmed in possession. They alleged that they purchased the land in July, 1888, from the *patel* of the village, and had been in possession ever since, and that their vendor had previously been in possession. They now sued because their possession had been threatened by the orders of Government officials. It was admitted that the plaintiffs had been in actual possession since 1888. The District Judge held that the burden of proof of title to the land lay upon the plaintiffs. He was of opinion that they had failed to prove it, and he dismissed the suit. *Held per JENKINS, C.J.*, and

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*RANADE, J.* (*WHITWORTH, J.*, dissenting), that the plaintiffs being in possession (not shown to have wrongfully originated), such possession was good against the whole world except a person who could show better title; that the burden of proving such title lay therefore upon the defendant; that he had failed to prove it; and that therefore the plaintiffs were entitled to the declaration sued for. *Per WHITWORTH, J.*—That the evidence did not show such possession in the plaintiffs as under s. 110 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872) shifted the burden of proof upon the defendant; that, prior to the alleged sale to the plaintiffs in 1888, the defendant had been in the position of an absentee owner of the land in question, represented partly by the village officers and partly also by the village community, and that he might be said to be in possession; that the sale to the plaintiffs in 1888 by the *patel* of the village, who should have protected the defendant's interests, was a wrongful act; that the plaintiffs were therefore not relieved from the burden of proving their title; and that they had not proved it. *Per RANADE, J.*—When a person in possession of land has been dispossessed, and sues to recover it, the fact of his previous possession will not entitle him to a decree unless he sues under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) within six months of the date of dispossession. If he sues after the six months have expired, he must prove a *prima facie* title. In such a case he is entitled to a decree, unless a superior title is proved on the other side. It is in reference to such cases that it has been held that possession is evidence of title, and that the plaintiff, who proves such possession and subsequent disturbance, shifts the burden of proof on the defendant when the *prima facie* title is made out. When no such *prima facie* title is made out by the plaintiff, who asks for a declaratory decree, he cannot obtain that decree on the mere ground that he was in possession and that the defendant had no title. Mere wrongful possession is insufficient to shift the burden of proof. *HANMANTRAY v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* (1900) . **I. L. R. 25 Bom. 287**

## 35. PRE-EMPTION.

1. ———— *Suit for pre-emption—Proof of antedating of a deed.* In a suit by A to enforce a right of pre-emption, in which the purchase to B was admitted, but it was alleged that B's deed of purchase had been antedated, the onus lay on A to prove that B's deed had been antedated. *KUMAR ALI v. AZMUT ALI* . . . **8 W. R. 383**

2. ———— *Suit on ground of vicinage—Ownership.* In a suit to establish a right of pre-emption on the ground of ownership of contiguous land, no amount of mis-statement on the part of the defendant as to the ownership of such land can relieve plaintiff of the onus of proving his ownership. *BEHAREE RAM v. SHOORHUDRA*

**9 W. R. 455**



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*35. PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*

3. ————— *Recital in deed of sale as to price.* In a suit to establish a right of pre-emption to property which had been sold, in which plaintiff alleged that the actual value was different from that which was recited in the deed of sale between the defendants, the vendor, and the vendee:—*Held*, that it was for plaintiff to give some evidence in support of the allegation that the amount stated as the price by the defendant was wrong. *GOLAM AYHYA v. JOY MUNGUL SINGH*

13 W. R. 435

MAHOMED MORUL HOSSEIN v. HYDER BUKSH

W. R. 1864, 304

4. ————— *Purchase money—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 106.* In a suit to enforce the right of pre-emption, in which the plaintiff impugns the correctness of the price stated in the instrument of sale, although the burden of proof *prima facie* is on him to show that the property has in fact been sold below the stated price, yet very slight evidence is ordinarily sufficient to establish his case; and when such case is established, it rests upon the defendants, the vendor and vendee, to prove by cogent evidence that the stated price is the correct one. The principle laid by the Privy Council in *Kishen Dutt Ram Panday v. Narendar Bahadoor Singh*, L. R. 3 I. A. 85, applied. *Mahomed Noorul Hossein v. Hyder Buksh*, W. R. 1864, 304, and *Golum Ayhya v. Joy Mungul Singh*, 13 W. R. 435, referred to. *BHAGWAN SINGH v. MAHABIR SINGH*

I. L. R. 5 All. 184

5. ————— *Dispute as to price—Assessment of amount.* *Bhagwan Singh v. Mahabir Singh*, I. L. R. 5 All. 184, followed as to the rule of *onus probandi*, where the plaintiff in a suit to enforce a right of pre-emption impugns the correctness of the price stated in the instrument of sale. In determining the amount of the price which a pre-emptor has to pay, the Court is not called upon to assess the amount which would be a fair and reasonable price for the property, but to ascertain what amount actually changed hands as consideration for the sale. *TAWKKUL RAI v. LACHMAN RAI*

I. L. R. 6 All. 344

6. ————— *Purchase-money—Evidence of consideration.* In suits for pre-emption where the amount of the consideration for the sale is in dispute, the rule as to the burden of proof is that, in the first instance, the plaintiff who alleges the price stated in the deed of sale to be fictitious must give some *prima facie* evidence leading to the presumption that the price so stated was not the true price. Having done that, it then lies upon the vendor and vendee to give such an explanation by evidence as will go to rebut the presumption raised by the plaintiff's evidence. In the majority of cases, the only *prima facie* evidence which the plaintiff pre-emptor could produce would be either evidence showing that the vendor or the vendee had made an admission that the price was fictitious, or

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*35. PRE-EMPTION—*concl'd.*

else evidence showing that the market value of the property was so much less than the alleged price as would lead any reasonable man to come to the conclusion that the alleged price was not the real price. Where the price stated in the deed of sale was nearly five times the market value of the property sold, and the purchaser gave no explanation showing why he was willing to buy the property at a price apparently so extravagant:—*Held*, that there was sufficient evidence upon which to find that the price alleged in the contract was fictitious. *Bhagwan Singh v. Mahabir Singh*, I. L. R. 5 All. 184, followed. *SHEOPARGASH DUBE v. DHANRAJ DUBE*

I. L. R. 9 All. 225

## 36. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

1. ————— *Evidence as to liability of agent to account.* In 1884 a deed of release exonerating an agent from liability to account was executed by his principal, stating that there had been a settlement between them. In 1885 the agent signed an *ikrarnama* addressed to the principal, stating that there had not been a settlement of accounts, and that he was willing to account from the day of his appointment to date. Subsequently, having resigned his employment, the agent brought a suit to have the latter document set aside, but that suit was dismissed. In a suit brought by the principal, the release of 1884, and its contents, were proved to the satisfaction of both the Courts below, which dismissed the suit on that ground, although the *ikrarnama* of 1885 appeared to them, in fact, to have been made. Upon the plaintiff's appeal, it was contended that the onus was on the defendant to explain his execution of the *ikrarnama*. *Held*, that, inasmuch as it had been found by two Courts concurrently that the release of 1884 was valid, and that it necessarily followed from that finding that the document of 1885, so far as it expressed the agent's willingness to account, was false, the onus was as much upon the principal to explain his reception of the *ikrarnama* of 1885 as upon the agent to explain its execution. The question as to the burden of proof had therefore been rendered immaterial by the facts proved. On the materials before them the Courts below had rightly decided in favour of the defendant. *NILMONI SINGH DEO v. KIRTI CHUNDER CHOWDHRY*

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 847  
L. R. 20 I. A. 95

2. ————— *Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 111—Gift to an agent—Undue influence—Mental capacity of donor.* *Held*, that there is nothing to prevent an agent from being the object of the bounty of his principal. If an agent can clearly show that a gift was made in his favour by a donor who was in a position to exercise a free and unfettered judgment with full knowledge of what he was doing, the gift will be upheld. *PHUL CHAND v. LAKKHU* (1903)

I. L. R. 25 All. 358



**ONUS OF PROOF—contd.****37. PROFITS, SUITS FOR.**

1. ——— Suit by recorded co-sharer for profits—*Claim for profits not collected in consequence of defendant's negligence or misconduct—Jamabandi—N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1887), ss. 93 (h), 209—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 106.* In a suit under s. 93 (h) of the N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1881), by a recorded co-sharer against a lambardar for his recorded share of the profits of a mehal, in which the plaintiff seeks to make the defendant liable under s. 209, not only for the profits which the latter has actually collected, but for those which through gross negligence or misconduct he has omitted to collect, the burden of proving such negligence or misconduct rests in the first instance on the plaintiff. No general rule can be laid down as to the quantum of evidence which the plaintiff in such a case must give in order to shift the burden of proof on to the defendant. The mere production by the plaintiff of the jamabandi or rent-roll is not sufficient to cast upon the defendant the necessity of proving that there was no negligence or misconduct in him. S. 106 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872) does not apply to such a case. So held, by the Full Bench, MAHMOOD, J., dissenting. Held, by MAHMOOD, J., (contra) that the production of the jamabandi by the plaintiff in a case where he claims his share of the profits according to the jamabandi and the lambardar-defendant pleads that the actual collections fell short of the jamabandi, established a *prima facie* presumption in favour of the plaintiff so as to throw upon the defendant, with reference to s. 106 of the Evidence Act, the necessity of proving circumstances which rendered it impossible for him to collect the profits according to the jamabandi. MUHAMMAD INAYAT HUSAIN v. MUHAMMAD KARAMAT-ULLAH . . . I. L. R. 12 All. 301

**38. RECOGNIZANCE TO KEEP PEACE.**

1. ——— Likelihood of breach of peace—*Party obtaining summons.* The onus lies on the person who has obtained the summons to prove that the defendant is likely to commit a breach of the peace. BEHARI PATAK v. MAHOMED HYAT KHAN . . . 4 B. L. R. F. B. 46  
12 W. R. Cr. 60

**39. RELINQUISHMENT OF PORTION OF CLAIM.**

1. ——— Objection of former suit for same cause of action—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7—Omission to sue for portion of claim.* Where a defendant objected under Act VIII of 1859, s. 7, that the plaintiff omitted in a former suit to include the portion which he now claimed, and in respect of which he then had a cause of action, the objection being one of fact, the burden of proof was held to lie with the objector. SKINNER & Co. v. SHAMA SOONDUREE . . . 19 W. R. 429

**ONUS OF PROOF—contd.****40. RESUMPTION AND ASSESSMENT.**

1. ——— Suit for resumption—*Suit under Beng. Reg. XIX of 1793, s. 10.* In suits in a Civil Court for resumption under Regulation XIX of 1793, s. 10, the onus was upon the plaintiff to prove a *prima facie* case. The decisions in *Sonaton Ghose v. Abdool Farar*, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 109, and *Heera Monee Dobi v. Koonj Behary Holdar*, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. Ap. 8, upheld. The mere fact of the lands falling within the ambit of his estate does not show that the lands are mal or rent-paying. HARIHAR MCKHOPADHYA v. MADHAB CHANDRA BABU. NABAKRISHNA MOOKERJEE v. KAILAS CHANDRA BHUTTACHARJEE

8 B. L. R. 566; 20 W. R. 459  
14 Moo. I. A. 152

BISHNATH CHOWDHRY v. RADHA CHURN GANGOOLY . . . 20 W. R. 465

2. ——— *Rent-free tenure—Beng. Reg. XIX of 1793, s. 10—Reg. II of 1819, s. 30.* In a suit brought in the Civil Court before Act XIV of 1859 came into operation to enforce a right under s. 10, Regulation XIX of 1793,—that is, to resume lands alleged to be held by the defendant under an invalid lakhiraj grant:—*Held*, that the suit was not barred by s. 28, Act X of 1859. The onus was on the plaintiff to prove that the case fell within s. 10, Regulation XIX of 1793,—i.e., that the grant was made subsequent to December 1st, 1790. PARBATI CHARAN MOOKERJEE v. RAJKRISHNA MOOKERJEE . . . B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 162

S.C. SONATUN GHOSE v. ABDUL TURUB . . . 2 W. R. 105

(Contra) OMESH CHUNDER ROY v. DUKHINA SOONDERY DEBIA . . . W. R. F. B. 95

ELIAS v. TITHARAM ROY . . . 1 W. R. 164

3. ——— *Invalid lakhiraj tenure.* In a suit to resume and assess lands under 100 bighas held as rent-free on an invalid title, if the defendant files his sanad showing the area to be above 100 bighas, it is for the plaintiff who alleges the *prima facie* good title of the defendant to be bad to prove it to be so. BEER CHUNDER JOOBRAJ v. SHIBJOY THAKOOR . . . W. R. 1864, 8

4. ——— *Auction-purchaser.* Certain lands which had been let out in patni were, on default by the patnidar in payment of rent, sold by auction under Bengal Regulation VIII of 1819, and purchased by M, who granted them in patni to the plaintiff. In a suit for resumption on the allegation that the defendants were in possession of a portion of the lands as invalid lakhiraj by withholding payment of the mal rent thereof from after 1793, the defence was that the lands in dispute were valid rent-free lands existing as such from before 1790. Held, that, on the grounds of the decision of the Privy Council in *Harihar Mukopadhyaya v. Madhab Chandra Babu*, 8 B. L. R. 566, the principle that the onus is on the plaintiff to show that the lands are mal applies to cases where the plaintiff, as



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in the present case, is the representative of an auction-purchaser. *ARFUNNESSA v. PEARY MOHUN MOOKERJEE*

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 378: 25 W. R. 209

5. ————— *Proof of rent-free grant before permanent settlement.* In the year 1862 the plaintiff brought a resumption suit against *A* in respect of the lands in dispute in this case, upon the ground that she was holding them by an invalid lakhiraj title, and obtained a decree. After some years the plaintiff brought the present suit against *B*, who derived her title through *A*, to have the rent assessed. *B* pleaded, by way of bar to the jurisdiction, that the lakhiraj grant, under which *A* claimed, was made previously to 1790. Held, that the onus of proving this plea was upon *B*. *HEERA LALL PORAMANIC v. BARIKUNNISSA BIBEE*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 501: 1 C. L. R. 596

6. ————— *Lakhiraj and mal lands.* In a suit by a zamindar to resume land which has been held as lakhiraj, if the lakhirajdar claims under a grant of date prior to the 1st of December 1790, the onus is on him to prove it. If the lakhirajdar claims under a grant subsequent to that date, the zamindar is not entitled to a decree until he has shown in the first instance that the land claimed is part of his zamindari and at one time was mal land. And in the latter case, the lakhirajdar is not put to proof of his title until the zamindar has established the fact of the land having once, at some time subsequent to 1st December 1790, been rent-paying land. *MAHOMED AKHIR v. REILY*

24 W. R. 447

7. ————— *Declaration of lakhiraj title—Assessment of rent.* In a suit instituted in 1877, *A* prayed for a declaration that he had a lakhiraj title to certain lands, the defendant stated that the lands, for a declaration of a title to which *A* now sued, formed part of certain lands which had been the subject of resumption proceedings, which were terminated in 1863 by a decree declaring that the lands which were the subject of that suit, including the lands now claimed by *A*, were not lakhiraj. It being found as a fact that *A* had neither been a party to, nor been represented in, the resumption proceedings; that he had been in quiet and undisturbed possession of the lands which he now claimed for more than twelve years before the institution of his suit; and that proceedings had been taken by the defendant calculated to disturb such possession:—Held, that, although the onus of proof lay on the plaintiff, it was not necessary for him to prove that the lands claimed by him to be held as lakhiraj had been held rent-free from before the date of the permanent settlement; but it was sufficient for him to prove that the defendant was, at the time of the institution of the suit, debarred by lapse of time from instituting a suit for the resumption or assessment of rent upon

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*40. RESUMPTION AND ASSESSMENT—*contd.*

the land. *ABHOY CHURN PAL v. KALLY PERSHAD CHATTERJEE*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 949

S.C. *OBHOY CHURN PAL v. KALI PROSAD CHATTERJEE*

6 C. L. R. 260

8. ————— *Lakhiraj grant.* If a person claiming under a badshahi-lakhiraj grant made before the 1st of December 1790 can show that he has held the land as lakhiraj since the 1st of December 1790, this will be a conclusive bar to a suit for resumption, whether brought by the Government, or by a purchaser at a revenue sale, or by any other person;—that is, in order to prove a grant anterior to the 1st December 1790, it is sufficient to give evidence of possession dating back to the 1st of December 1790. *Sristeedhur Sawunt v. Romanath Rokhit*, 6 W. R. 58, cited. A person seeking to resume lakhiraj land must give *prima facie* evidence to show that rent has been paid for that land at some time since the 1st of December 1790. *Parbati Charan Mookerjee v. Rajkrishna Mookerjee*, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 162; *Sonatan Ghose v. Abdul Farar*, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 109; and *Harihar Mukhopadhyaya v. Madhab Chandra Babu*, 8 B. L. R. 566, referred to. *KOYLASH-BASHINY DOSSEE v. GOCOLMONI DOSSEE*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 230: 10 C. L. R. 41

9. ————— *Rent-free lands—Landlord and tenant.* In suits for the resumption of lands alleged by the defendant to be lakhiraj, the burden of proof is in the first instance on the plaintiff to show that the lands are mal. The fact that the defendant is a tenant of the plaintiff's is a matter to be taken into consideration by the Court in determining whether, on the facts of the case, the plaintiff has made out a *prima facie* case; but unless the Court finds that the plaintiff has made out a *prima facie* case, judgment should be given for the defendant. *Harihar Mukhopadhyaya v. Madhab Chandra Babu*, 8 B. L. R. 566: 14 Moo. I. A. 153; *Akbar Ali v. Bhyea Lal Jha*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 666; and *Newaj Bundopadhyaya v. Kali Prosunno Ghose*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 543, cited. *BACHARAM MUNDUL v. PEARY MOHUN BANERJEE*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 813: 12 C. L. R. 475

10. ————— *Rent-free lands—Landlord and tenant.* In a suit for resumption of lands where the defendants allege that the lands are lakhiraj, the onus is on the plaintiff, in the first instance, to show that the lands are mal, and if he fails to make out a *prima facie* case, the suit should be dismissed. *Bacharam Mundul v. Peary Mohun Banerjee*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 813, followed. *Newaj Bundopadhyaya v. Kali Prosono Ghose*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 543, and *Akbar Ali v. Bhyea Lal Jha*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 666, cited and distinguished. *NARENDRA NARAIN RAI v. BISHUN CHUNDRAS*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 182

11. ————— *Suit for rent of land where defendant pleads a lakhiraj tenure.*



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*40. RESUMPTION AND ASSESSMENT—*contd.*

The rule which, in cases where the defendant pleads lakhiraj, lays on the plaintiff the onus of proving that the land is mal, is not inflexible, but may be altered according to circumstances, as in this case, where the defendant admitted plaintiff's title as landlord and never set up any plea of lakhiraj until years after the suit was brought, when a second Ameen was deputed to the spot to make a local enquiry. *GOONOMONEE DOSSEE v. BURRODAKANT ROY* . . . . . 18 W. R. 191

12. ———— *Alleged lakhiraj lands.* The Full Bench decision—*Parbati Charan Mookerjee v. Rajkrishna Mookerjee*, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 162, ruling that before a plaintiff can resume lakhiraj lands he must first prove that he has collected mal rents, and defendant need not first prove his lakhiraj title—was held not to be applicable to the present case, in which it was proved the plaintiff collected mal rents from the time the land was capable of bearing any. *RAMSOONDUR CHUCKERBUTTY v. RAMESSUR ACHARJEE* . . . . . 8 W. R. 454

13. ———— *Beng. Regs. XIX of 1793 and XIV of 1825—Evidence of exemption from resumption.* *Semle*: The exclusion of lands as lakhiraj from the decennial and permanent settlements is of no weight, *per se*, as evidence of exemption from resumption under Regulation XIX of 1793. The general presumption is in favour of the liability to assessment of land, and by Bengal Regulations XIX of 1793 and XIV of 1825 the *onus probandi* lies on a claimant to lakhiraj to establish his title to exemption,—not by inference, but by positive proof of a grant to hold as lakhiraj, or by a proprietary right, prior to the grant of the Dewanny (12th August 1765); and that the possession was *bona fide* taken under it, or an enjoyment of lands as such, and descendible to heirs at or since that time. *DHEERAJ RAJA MAHATAB CHUND BAHADOOR v. GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL* . . . . . 4 Moo. I. A. 466

14. ———— *Suit by lakhirajdar.* One lakhirajdar cannot maintain a suit for resumption against another, and force the defendant to prove his title. The onus is on the plaintiff. *KAEMI KHAN v. SAHEBA JAN* . . . . . 7 W. R. 362

15. ———— *Invalid lakhiraj.* The Government, when acting as agent of a zamindar, can only sue to resume invalid lakhiraj lands under 100 bighas; the onus of proof of its being mal when so claimed is on the zamindar. *RAM LOCHUN SIRCAR v. DENONATH PAUL* . . . . . 2 W. R. 279

16. ———— *Suit for assessment—Suit by zamindar to assess lands usurped or alienated by lakhirajdar.* The onus in a case in which the plaintiff is an ordinary zamindar, suing to assess lands which he asserts to have been illegally usurped or alienated by a dependent lakhirajdar subsequent to the permanent settlement, rests on the plaintiff. *BEHAREE LALL ROY v. KALEE DOSS CHUNDER* . . . . . 8 W. R. 451

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*40. RESUMPTION AND ASSESSMENT—*contd.*

17. ———— *Suit by auction-purchaser at sale for arrears of revenue to assess rent on lakhiraj land—Limitation Act, 1859, s. 1, cl. 14.* In a suit by an auction-purchaser to assess rent on land claimed as valid lakhiraj, the onus is on the raiyat to prove that the land has been held as lakhiraj from the year 1790. *SHAM LALL GHOSE v. SEKUNDER KHAN* . . . . . 3 W. R. 182

*FORBES v. MEAN JAN* . . . . . 3 W. R. 69

*HEERA MONEE DEBIA v. LOKENATH MUNDUL* . . . . . 2 W. R. 135

*NOBO LAL KHAN v. ADHEERANEE NARAIN KOONWAREE* . . . . . 5 W. R. 191

18. ———— *Lakhiraj land—Beng. Reg. XLI of 1795, s. 10.* Where certain land apparently lakhiraj was represented in village papers as part of mal land, and included within the boundary of the revenue-paying mehal:—*Held*, on the zamindar's suit for assessment of the land, that the onus of showing that the case is within s. 10, Regulation XLI of 1795, lay on the zamindar. The inclusion of the land in the boundary is not conclusive evidence, nor is it binding when the boundary has not been made judicially. The landlord proving it to be so, the plaintiff claiming rent-free possession would be required to prove his rent-free possession (peaceably and not tainted with fraud) for sixty years before he can get a decree. *MAHA-BEER PERSHAD v. OOMRAO SINGH* . . . . . 1 Agra 167

19. ———— *Rent-free land—Benares.* In a suit for rent of land in the province of Benares which was rent-free and recorded as such at the revision of settlement in 1840-41 and 1842, the zamindar must show that, if it was lakhiraj in 1197 Fasli, there has been a legal resumption and assessment by judicial award; or if mal in 1197 Fusli, he must prove legal resumption and actual levy of rents. The burden of proving this by direct and specific evidence lies on the zamindar. *MOTEE LALL v. JANKI ROY* . . . . . 3 Agra 364

20. ———— *Suit to have certain lands declared mal.* Where it is admitted that the defendants hold certain lands within the plaintiff's zamindari, some at least of which are rent-paying, the defendants, if desirous of proving that any of these lands are rent-free, are bound to give some *prima facie* evidence of the fact, before they can call upon the plaintiff, the zamindar, to prove that the whole or any part of the lands are mal. *AKBUR ALI v. BHYEA LAL JHA* . . . . . I. L. R. 6 Calc. 666 : 7 C. L. R. 497

21. ———— *Suit for rent-paying land—Suit by auction-purchaser for land alleged by him to be mal.* In a suit by an auction-purchaser for the khas possession of land alleged to be mal land fraudulently alienated by the former zamindar as lakhiraj, the burden of proving that it is mal is on the plaintiff. *ANDREW v. LYON* . . . . . 2 Hay 362



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*40. RESUMPTION AND ASSESSMENT—*contd.*

22. ——— Suit for land alleged to be lakhiraj—*Proof of receipt of rent.* In a suit to recover possession of land within plaintiff's estate, in which defendant sets up a rent-free title, all that plaintiff is required to show is that either he or his predecessor had received rent for the land at some time subsequent to the perpetual settlement, in which case the onus of proving title falls on the defendant. *RAM NARAIN SINGH DEO v. BISTOO THAKOOR* . . . . . 15 W. R. 299

23. ——— Suit for possession of resumed lands—*Application for and refusal of settlement.* Where, in a suit for possession of resumed lands, the plaintiff contends that the laws under which the lands in dispute were resumed (Bengal Regulations II of 1819 and III of 1828) contemplate assessment and not ejectment, the plaintiff must prove that he had formerly applied for and been refused a settlement of the lands. *ABDOOL GUNNY v. COMMISSIONER OF THE SUNDERBUNS* . . . . . 2 W. R. 239

24. ——— Suit for land as lakhiraj—*Dispute as to land being mal or lakhiraj.* In a suit in which plaintiff claimed four plots of land as belonging to his patni, and defendant alleged that they formed part of the resumed land of a jote for which he had obtained a decree in a resumption suit, and of which he had ever since been in possession, the parties went to trial on the issue whether the land was mal as beyond the limits of the decree, or lakhiraj as included in the chittahs, according to which possession was given to the defendant in execution. On a consideration of what the latter had received under the decree, the first Court held that he was not entitled to retain the disputed land. The Appellate Court did not look beyond the plaintiff's chittahs. *Held*, that the circumstances justified the first Court in deviating somewhat from the usual rule of law as regards the *onus probandi*, and that the course taken by it was most consonant with justice. *DOSSEE v. RAM NIDHEE KOONDOL* . . . . . 15 W. R. 183

25. ——— Suit to declare land liable to assessment—*Suit for ejectment by purchaser at sale for arrears of revenue on the ground that land is mal—Homestead land.* The purchaser of an estate at a sale for arrears of revenue, after withdrawing a suit for arrears of rent, sued to eject the defendant from a piece of land on which his homestead was, *i.e.*, to declare the land liable to assessment and to obtain khas possession. *Held*, that the onus lay with the plaintiff to prove that the land was mal, and that he and his predecessors had received rent for it. *BISSAMBHUR BANERJEE v. KOYLASH CHUNDER BOSE* . . . . . 23 W. R. 388

26. ——— Suit for declaration of lakhiraj title—*Possession, proof of—Title, proof of.* Where a plaintiff comes into Court to prove a lakhiraj title, no proof of possession for years (unless it be carried beyond 1790) as apparent lakhiraj can

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*40. RESUMPTION AND ASSESSMENT—*contd.*

excuse him from proving his title. *RAM JEEBUN CHUCKERBUTTY v. PERSHAD SHAR* 7 W. R. 458

27. ——— Suit for possession of lakhiraj land—*Beng. Reg. XIX of 1793, s. 10.* Suit to recover possession of land from which the plaintiff had been ousted by the defendant under s. 10, Regulation XIX of 1793, on the ground that it was an invalid lakhiraj created after 1st December 1790. *Held*, that the zamindar, having no right to oust the lakhirajdar, unless the lakhiraj was created after 1st December 1790, must prove that the lakhiraj was created subsequently to that date, and that it was not for the lakhirajdar to prove that the lakhiraj was created prior to that date. *MUN MOHINEE DOSSEE v. JOYKISSEN MOOKERJEE* . . . . . W. R. F. B. 174

*PREM SHEWUK DOSS v. ISHREE PERSHAD* . . . . . 2 W. R. 303

*TAREENEERPERSAD GHOSE v. KALLEECHURN GHOSE* . . . . . Marsh. 215 : 2 Hay 90

28. ——— Purchaser at sale in execution of a decree. The onus of proving that a tenure is lakhiraj is not obviated by the circumstance that the person alleging that it is bought the tenure as lakhiraj at a sale in execution of a decree. *LALLA SHEEBLALL v. GHOLAM NUBBEE* . . . . . Marsh. 255 : 2 Hay 23

29. ——— Validity of lakhiraj tenure. In a suit to recover the possession land from which the plaintiff claiming to be a lakhirajdar has been forcibly evicted by the land-holder, the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree for possession unless he can show a *prima facie* case of lakhiraj tenure. *Semble* : If he show such *prima facie* case, the Court will give a decree for possession, and leave the zamindar to dispute the existence or validity of the alleged lakhiraj tenure in a resumption suit. *SREENATH LALL v. JUNMEYJOY MULLICK* . . . . . Marsh. 550 : 2 Hay 649

30. ——— Long possession of purchaser. In a suit to recover possession of land which plaintiffs alleged to be lakhiraj, and of which they had been dispossessed by the defendant (zamindars):—*Held*, that, as plaintiff had purchased the lands as lakhiraj, and had been admittedly in possession of them as such for a very long time, it was for the zamindar, who pleaded a right to oust them summarily under s. 10, Bengal Regulation XIX of 1793, to prove that the lakhiraj title was invalid as having been created subsequent to 1790. *MUNSA-RAM DOSS KURMOKAR v. GRIDHAKEE RAM DOSS* . . . . . 10 W. R. 278

31. ——— Proof of collection of rents. In a suit for possession of alleged lakhiraj land, if the alleged lakhirajdar proves possession as purchaser of the alleged lakhiraj land, the Court ought not to put upon him the burden of proving a title; but if the zamindar wishes that point to be tried in this or another suit, he must accept the onus of proving that the lakhiraj is held



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*40. RESUMPTION AND ASSESSMENT—*contd.*

on an invalid title, by proving that he collected mal rents from the land, and that he is not barred by limitation. *Gossain Sheo Suhaye Geer v. Mahodeo Suhay* . . . . . 6 W. R. 294

32. ———— *Proof of previous possession rent-free.* In a suit to recover possession of lakhiraj land on the allegation that the plaintiff has been wrongfully evicted, the plaintiff is entitled to succeed if he proves that he previously held possession of the land as lakhiraj. *Joykishen Mookerjee v. Pearee Mohun Dutt* . . . . .

8 W. R. 160

33. ———— *Suit by raiyat after dispossession for invalid lakhiraj land.* A zamindar obtained a decree against a raiyat for assessment, on the ground that the raiyat held under an invalid lakhiraj, but instead of assessing turned the raiyat out of possession. *Held*, that a suit by the raiyat for recovery of the land on the ground of anterior possession was not sustainable and the raiyat must prove his title as against the zamindar; his anterior possession under the invalid lakhiraj, the decision as to which he did not sue to set aside within the proper time, being the possession of a mere trespasser, and not that of an occupant raiyat. *Wooma Soonduree Thakooranee v. Kishoree Mohun Banerjee* . . . . .

8 W. R. 238

34. ———— *Suit for declaration of land as lakhiraj—Decree for rent, evidence of.* Where plaintiffs sued for declaration that certain lands were lakhiraj, on the ground that defendant had obtained a decree in the Collector's Court against them for rent:—*Held*, that the onus lay upon the plaintiffs to show that they were holding the land as true lakhiraj, and that the Collector's decree was wrong. *Harendra Kishore v. Kedarnath Mitter* . . . . .

10 W. R. 188

35. ———— In a suit for confirmation of possession and declaration of lakhiraj right against purchasers at a sale for arrears of Government revenue, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove affirmatively that the land has been held rent-free from the time of the permanent settlement. *Ram Churn Lall v. Hatee Mahtoon* . . . . .

13 W. R. 247

36. ———— *Proof of possession for twelve years.* In order to lands being released from the assessment of Government revenue, they must be shown to be lakhiraj lands which were in existence at the time of the perpetual settlement, it is not sufficient to prove lakhiraj possession for twelve years. *Eshan Chunder Shah v. Hatimoozzumah Khondker* . . . . .

13 W. R. 334

37. ———— *Suit for confirmation of possession of lakhiraj—Proof of title.* In a suit for confirmation of possession of mokurari and lakhiraj land for a declaration that the plaintiff has a lakhiraj and mokurari title, the onus is on him. *Huree Narain Roy v. Doorga Churn Deghooia* . . . . .

17 W. R. 449

ONUS OF PROOF—*concl.*40. RESUMPTION AND ASSESSMENT—*concl.*

*See Khelatchunder Ghose v. Poorno Chunder Roy* . . . . . 2 W. R. 258

38. ———— *Evidence of land being lakhiraj—Production of rent-free sanad.* The production of a lakhiraj sanad is not necessary to prove that land is held rent-free. The fact may be legally established by long and uninterrupted possession without payment of rent, raising the presumption that the land had been held rent-free from the decennial settlement. *Dhruv Singh v. Russomoyee Chowdhraia* . . . . .

10 W. R. 461

39. ———— *Suit for rent.* If no rent has ever been paid for land, this is *prima facie* strong proof of a *de facto* exemption protected by limitation. The party claiming the rent must satisfy the Court that the remedy is not affected by lapse of time, and that the land was held for some service due and rendered to the zamindar, or otherwise by the zamindar's permission. If the holding were merely permissive, it could not prejudice the zamindar's right. *Ali Bux v. Roof Koor* . . . . .

2 N. W. 106

## 41. SALE OF GOODS.

——— *Sale of goods by sample—Proof of inequality of sample.* In a sale of goods by sample, the onus is on the party alleging that the goods are not equal to sample. *Ishera Yarn Mills Company v. Abdool Kurreem* . . . . .

Bourke O. C. 276

## 42. SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE.

1. ———— *Suit by purchaser—Incumbrances—Title—Possession.* In a suit by an auction-purchaser of a permanently-settled estate to recover certain julkurs, of which the defendants had been admittedly in possession for nearly fifty years, and which they claimed as incidents to a tenure which existed before the date of the permanent settlement, it was held that the onus was on the plaintiff to prove his title affirmatively. *Forbes v. Meer Mahomed Hossein* . . . . .

12 B L. R. P. C. 210 : 20 W. R. 44

2. ———— *Suit for rents and profits of uncultivated land brought into cultivation.* Suit by purchaser of a mootah at a sale for arrears of revenue for the rents and profits of a hamlet, consisting of lands which, when uncultivated, were given by the then zamindar to the defendant (respondent). The plaintiff alleged that the lands were included in the assets upon which the permanent assessment was fixed, but being unable to prove his allegation, his suit was dismissed. *Vencata Niladry Row v. Vutchavoy Vencataputty Raj* . . . . .

5 W. R. P. C. 80

3. ———— *Incumbrance—Act XI of 1859, s. 54.* Where the surrounding circumstances suggest the creation of a *bona fide* incumbrance executed in contemplation of an impending sale for arrears of revenue which would be protected by s. 54



**ONUS OF PROOF—contd****42. SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—*concl'd.***

of Act XI of 1859, it is for the party setting up such incumbrance to establish its *bonâ fide* character. **MONOHUR MOOKERJEE v. JOYKISHEN MOOKERJEE** 5 W. R. 1

4. ——— **Claim to protection from ejectment by auction-purchaser—Act XI of 1859, s. 37.** Where a raiyat claims protection from ejectment by an auction-purchaser under the proviso to s. 37, Act XI of 1859, the onus is on the raiyat to prove the character of his holding. **DOMUN LOLL v. PUDMUN SINGH**

W. R. 1864, Act X, 129

5. ——— **Revenue sale law—Act XI of 1859, s. 37—Purchaser of estate sold at auction, rights of.** The onus of proving that under-tenures in a talukh sold at a revenue sale under Act XI of 1859 fall under any of the exceptions to s. 37 of that Act is on the person alleging the under-tenures to be within such exceptions. **RASH BEHARI BOSU v. HARA MONI DEBYA** . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 555

6. ——— **Act XI of 1859, s. 37—Incumbrance, annulment of—Burden of proof—Tenure held since permanent settlement.** In a suit for ejectment by a purchaser at a revenue sale, the defence was that the defendants held the land as a subordinate talukh, which had been in existence and in their possession and that of their predecessors since the time of the permanent settlement. It was found as a fact that the tenure was in existence in the year 1798-99. The plaintiff's suit was dismissed, and he now contended that the facts found could not protect the tenure in the absence of proof that the tenure was in existence at the date of the permanent settlement. *Held*, that, although in the first instance the burden of proof is upon the defendants, the fact that defendants were in possession for such a length of time was sufficient to discharge the onus and establish that the tenure was protected. That in a case like this no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to when the burden of proof shifts from one side to the other, and that each case must be governed by its merits. **NITYA-NUND ROY v. BANSHI CHANDRA BHUNJAN**

3 C. W. N. 341

**43. SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT.**

1. ——— **Ejectment, suit for—Avoidance of under-tenure—Incumbrance—Beng. Act VIII of 1869, ss. 59, 60, 66.** In a suit by the purchaser of an under-tenure, under ss. 59 and 60 of the Rent Act (Bengal Act VIII of 1869), to obtain possession of lands held by the defendant, on the ground that the holdings are incumbrances which have accrued thereon by an authorized act of the previous holder of the under-tenure, it lies upon the plaintiff to show that the defendant's holdings are such incumbrances as the plaintiff is entitled to avoid under s. 66 of the Rent Act. **GOBIND NATH SHAHA CHOWDHURI v. REILY** . I. L. R. 13 Calc. 1

**ONUS OF PROOF—contd.****43. SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—*concl'd.***

2. ——— **Suit to set aside patni sale—Irregularity—Non-service of notice—Proof of service—Evidence Act, s. 106.** In a suit against a zamindar to set aside the sale of a patni tenure under Regulation VIII of 1819 on the ground of non-service of notice, the onus of proving service lies on the defendant according to the spirit of s. 106 of the Evidence Act. **DOORGA CHURN SURMA CHOWDHRY v. NAJIMOODDEEN** . 21 W. R. 397

**44. SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE.**

1. ——— **Suit to set aside sale—Irregularity.** When a judgment-debtor sues to set aside a sale in execution of a decree on the ground of irregularity, the onus of proving the irregularity is on him. **NUFUSA v. MAHOMED AKBAR GAZEE** 2 W. R. 74

2. ——— **Fraud, proof of—Irregularity.** In a suit to set aside an execution sale on the ground of fraud, the *onus probandi* rests on the plaintiff to prove his allegation; mere irregularity in the issue of processes will not of itself prove fraud, even where the auction-bids were so small as to excite suspicion. **KUBEERUN v. SUFEEHUN** . 24 W. R. 388

3. ——— **Proof of irregularity—Non-affixing of notices previous to sale.** Several years after the purchase by the defendant of immoveable property at a sale in execution of a decree, the judgment-debtor sued this purchaser for the lands on the ground, amongst others, that the notices required by Bengal Regulation XX of 1795, s. 12, had not been affixed previous to the sale. *Held*, that the onus of proving the default in affixing the notices lay upon the plaintiff, the judgment-debtor. **MOHESH NARAIN SINGH v. KISHINANUND MISSER** . Marsh. 592: 2 Ind. Jur. O. S. 1 5 W. R. P. C. 7: 9 Moo. I. A. 324

4. ——— **Allegation of fraud—Knowledge of fraud.** In a suit to set aside a sale in execution of decree on the ground of fraud, where the plaintiff alleges the fraud only came to his knowledge at a certain time:—*Held*, that the burden of proving such knowledge on the part of the plaintiffs, prior to the time stated by them, lay on the defendants. **NATHA SINGH v. JODHA SINGH** I. L. R. 6 All. 406

5. ——— **Bonâ fides.** In execution of a decree, the judgment-debtor's right, title, and interest in a certain property were attached. The plaintiff thereupon preferred a claim under conveyances from the judgment-debtor; but it was rejected, and the property was sold. The judgment-creditor purchased the same at the auction and sold it to the defendant, who ousted the plaintiff, who thereupon sued to recover possession under his conveyance. *Held*, that the onus was not entirely on the plaintiff to prove the *bonâ fides* of the sale, but that the evidence adduced by the defendant should be examined also. **DEBI v. MADAN MOHAN SINGH** . 2 B. L. R. A. C. 326



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*44. SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—*concl'd.*

6. ———— *Purchase by granddaughter from grandmother—Stranger purchasing bonâ fide—Proof of bonâ fides.* When a granddaughter purchases from a grandmother, and attempts to oust a stranger who purchased *bonâ fide* and without notice, full and satisfactory proof of the *bonâ fides* of the transaction is necessary, even though no motive for fraud is proved. *IMDAD HOSSEIN v. ALIKOONNISSA. DABEE DUTT MISSEER v. ALIKOONNISSA* . . . **W. R. F. B. 77**

7. ———— *Proof of want of bonâ fides—Suspicion.* In a suit to have a purchase made at an execution sale set aside on the ground that it was not *bonâ fide*, but collusive, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, and it is not sufficient for him only to show circumstances which create a suspicion of the *bonâ fides* of the transaction. But in a suit for possession of land and for a declaration of plaintiff's title by virtue of purchase, it is not sufficient for him to produce a deed executed by a judgment-debtor: the plaintiff must free his case of such suspicions as may arise from his own position with reference to the vendor, and from any such circumstance as the improbability of such a purchase having been made. *ROOP RAM DASS v. SASEERAM NATH KURMOKUR* . . . **23 W. R. 141**

See *GOLUCKNATH GHOSE v. SREENATH BOSE* **24 W. R. 209**

8. ———— *Suit for confirmation of sale—Suit to set aside order cancelling sale—Sale for inadequate price, allegation of—Material irregularity, proof of.* In a suit for confirmation of a sale held in execution of a decree by the Collector under s. 320, Civil Procedure Code, and to set aside an order by the Collector cancelling the sale, where it is pleaded in defence that the property was sold for an inadequate price, it lies on the defendant to show that there has been a material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale. *BANDI BIBI v. KALKA* . . . **I. L. R. 9 All. 602**

## 45. SERVICE OF SUMMONS.

Application to set aside *ex parte* decree—*Proof of service of summons.* Where a judgment-debtor applies to set aside an *ex parte* judgment on the ground that there was no effectual service of summons upon him, he should be called upon to give his evidence or to make out a *prima facie* case. *KHUDEERUN LALL v. CHUTTER-DHAREE LALL* . . . **21 W. R. 242**

*JHUTOO KOER v. LULITA KOER* **22 W. R. 423**

## 46. TRUST, REVOCATION OF.

Religious endowment—*Proof of revocation—Limitation.* In 1813 certain lands were dedicated by deed to the religious service of an *adol*, and in 1820 that dedication was confirmed in a partition-deed. The plaintiff sued to set aside alienations of the property and to have the

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*46. TRUST, REVOCATION OF—*concl'd.*

trusts of the dedication-deeds declared. The holders of the property alleged that a subsequent partition-deed had been executed in 1845, and that the dealings of the family had shown an intention to revoke the trusts. *Held*, that it lay upon the holders to prove the revocation of the trusts, and that, on failure to do so, they could not set up the law of limitation in answer to the plaintiff's suit. *JUGGUTMOHEENEE DOSSEE v. SOKHEEMONEE DOSSEE* . . . **10 B. L. R. 19: 17 W. R. 41**  
**14 Moo. I. A. 289**

## 47. VALUATION OF SUIT.

Assertion by defendant that suit is overvalued. When the defendant asserts that a suit is overvalued, the onus of proving the truth of his assertion lies on him. *UMA SANKAR ROY CHOWDHRY v. MANSUR ALI KHAN* **5 B. L. R. Ap. 6: 13 W. R. 327**

## 48. WILL.

1. ———— *Evidence and proof of will—Suit for declaration that will is not genuine—Omission, by party impeaching will, to give evidence or cross-examine witnesses.* The defendants (widow and sister-in-law of a deceased *talukdar*) set up a will under which they alleged they took all the property of the testator absolutely, whereupon the plaintiffs, the next reversioners, sued for a declaration that the will was not genuine and that the alleged testator died intestate. *Held*, by the Judicial Committee that the onus was on the defendants, who set it up, to prove that the will was genuine, and not on the plaintiffs, who impeached it, to show that it was a forgery. The fact that the plaintiffs omitted to give any evidence that the will was forged, though they asserted that "they would prove it to be spurious if necessary," raised no presumption of the genuineness of the will. Nor did the omission of the plaintiffs to cross-examine some witnesses called by the Court previously to hearing to explain the alleged loss and consequent non-production of the will give rise to any presumption in favour of its validity. They were not bound to cross-examine the witnesses, which they could not have done without permission of the Court, but were perfectly justified in waiting until evidence in support of the will was produced at the trial. *SUKH DEI v. KEDAR NATH* (1901) **I. L. R. 23 All. 405: s.c. L. R. 28 I. A. 186; 5 C. W. N. 895**

## 49. WITNESS.

1. ———— *Refusal to come into Court as witness—Presumption.* In a suit to recover possession of land claimed by virtue of a sanad from a rajah, in which plaintiff gave *prima facie* evidence of the authenticity of the sanad and subpoenaed the rajah to prove it, it was held that the lower Court did very right in considering the plaintiff's



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*49. WITNESS—*concl'd.*

testimony to be strengthened by defendant's (rajah's) refusal to come into Court with his own story; and that the onus lay on the rajah to rebut the plaintiff's evidence, or to prove minority or other personal disqualification. *RADHA KISTO SING DEO v. GUDADHUR BANERJEE* 8 W. R. 453

## 50. WRONGFUL CONVERSION.

1. ——— Suit for wrongful conversion of timber—*Failure to prove actual or constructive possession.* In a suit under the Civil Procedure Code, in which the plaintiffs allege that the defendants wrongfully and forcibly took away and were detaining timber which had been in the plaintiffs' constructive possession and to which they are entitled, and the relief asked for is the restitution of the timber with costs of suit, if it be proved that the defendants had forcibly and wrongfully taken property in the plaintiff's actual or constructive possession, it would then be for the defendants to show that they were entitled to the timber. In the present case, the plaintiffs having failed to show their possession of the timber or the forcible or wrongful dispossession or conversion of the goods and the defendants having made good their title to the timber:—*Held*, that the judgment should have been for the defendants. *SNADDEN v. TODD FINDLAY & Co.* 7 W. R. 286

## 51. MISCELLANEOUS CASES.

1. ——— Suit by purchaser of tora garas huk—*Evidence of alienability.* Suit by the purchaser of a certain annual payment by Government, called *tora garas huk*, sold in satisfaction of a decree. *Held*, that the onus was on the Government to prove that there was something in the nature of this payment which made it incapable of alienation, and that the Government had failed to give such proof. *SHUMBHOO LALL GIRDHUR LALL v. COLLECTOR OF SURAT*

4 W. R. P. C. 55: 8 Moo. I. A. 1

2. ——— Suit for closing new road and opening old one—*Title—Trespass.* In a suit for closing a new road opened by the defendants through the land of the plaintiff, and for opening an old road which had been closed by the defendants:—*Held*, that the only question which can be tried in the suit is, whether the defendants have trespassed on the land of the plaintiff by opening a road. The onus is upon the plaintiff to prove that the land belongs to him. *HIRA CHAND BANERJEE v. SHAMA CHARAN CHATTERJEE*

3 B. L. R. A. C. 351: 12 W. R. 275

3. ——— Admission of assets by heir of deceased judgment-debtor—*Proof of extent of property.* When an heir of a deceased judgment-debtor admits possession of some of the latter's property, the onus is on the heir, and not on the decree-holder, to prove the extent of that pro-

ONUS OF PROOF—*concl'd.*51. MISCELLANEOUS CASES—*concl'd.*

perty. *MATUNGINEE DEBIA v. GUGUN CHUNDER BHOY* . . . . . 2 W. R. Mis. 41

4. ——— Suit for share of income-tax—*Manager, possession as.* Suit for share of income-tax by a co-sharer who, the lower Court found, was the defendant's manager. *Held*, that the mere production of a deed showing that the defendant had in it nominated other persons to collect the rents of her share, without proof of cessation of possession, did not shift the onus from the plaintiff of proving that he had ceased to hold possession of the defendant's share as her manager, or that the defendant, and not the plaintiff, had actually collected the rents. *RAMNATH GHOSE v. AMRIT MOYEE DOSSEE* . . . . . 5 W. R. 168

5. ——— Suit for disturbance of kazi in his office—*Proof of legality of his appointment as kazi.* Where it was shown that the plaintiffs had acted as kazi of Bombay for more than twenty years, it was held, in an action against the defendant for disturbing the plaintiff in his office and thereby depriving him of his fees, that the onus was on the defendant to show that the plaintiff had been illegally appointed; and on the defendant failing to show that, the plaintiff was entitled to succeed. *MUHAMMAD YUSSUB v. SAYAD AHMED*

1 Bom. Ap. 10

6. ——— Suit for share of joint property under family arrangement—*Proof of cause of action.* A plaintiff suing for a share of joint property which she claimed under a family arrangement said to have been reduced to writing as an *ikarnamah*, and upon the happening of the necessary conditions, it was held that the rules with regard to the onus of proof which are applicable to a suit for a share of joint family property were not directly applicable, and the plaintiff was bound to give some *prima facie* proof of her cause of action. *RAM CHUNDER MITTER v. KISTOO KAMINEE DOSSEE*

10 W. R. 194

7. ——— Suit for share of zerait land under ticca pottah granted by co-sharers—*Effect of decision without jurisdiction.* Where, under a ticca pottah granted to him by several shareholders, plaintiff claimed the share of rent said to be due to him by the defendant (another shareholder) in respect of the occupation of a certain quantity of the zerait land which constituted the holding of the combined shareholders, and the defendant objected that the plaintiff's share was less than what he stated it to be:—*Held*, that the burden of proving the extent of his share lay on the plaintiff. In such a case even a raiyat resisting the claim of a shareholder to rent would be entitled, if he had good reason to do so, to make the plaintiff prove the amount of his share; and the only onus on an intervenor would be to prove *bona fide* possession. A decision set aside by a superior Court as made without jurisdiction cannot have any probative force whatever between the parties. *SOOKRAM MISSEER v. CROWDY* . . . . . 19 W. R. 285



## OPINIONS OF JUDGES.

———— memoranda of—

See JUDGMENT—CIVIL CASES—WHAT AMOUNTS TO.

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## OPIUM.

———— illegal possession of—

See ACT XIII OF 1867, s. 20.

8 B. L. R. Ap. 7

See OPIUM . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 1016

See OPIUM ACT (I OF 1878), s. 9.

I. L. R. 25 All. 262

———— illegal sale of—

See ACT XXI OF 1856, s. 38.

16 W. R. Cr. 69

1. ——— Bom. Reg. XXI of 1827, s. 4

—*Keeping smuggled opium—Sentence on conviction.* Where more than one person is convicted under s. 4, Regulation XXI of 1827 (Bombay), of keeping smuggled opium, each of the convicts is liable to the whole penalty therein imposed, viz., the forfeiture of double the value of the opium and double the amount of the duty leviable thereon. REG. v. VAKHATCHAND . . . 1 Bom. 50

But this was overruled by the following case, which approved of the case of *Reg. v. Rajgur Venecgur*, 3 Moo. Fouz. Rep. 673, and held that, where several persons knowingly harbour, keep, or conceal a parcel of smuggled opium, one penalty of double the value of such opium and of double the amount of duty leviable upon it only is recoverable under Regulation XXI of 1827, s. 4. REG. v. SHOWDAR GHENAR . . . 7 Bom. Cr. 39

2. ——— Act XXI of 1856, s. 53—

*Possession by servant.* Where opium was found in the possession of a person who was a servant of the accused, and who alleged that he obtained it from the wife of the accused, and that the wife had purchased it from an opium cultivator, it was held that the accused could not be convicted under s. 53, Act XXI of 1856, as it had not been shown that the purchase by his wife was authorized by the accused, and therefore her possession of the opium or that of the servant could not be considered the possession of the accused. QUEEN v. GUNESH MANA . . . 20 W. R. Cr. 54

3. ——— Illegal possession of—Opium

*Act (I of 1878), s. 9 (c)—Possession of railway receipt for an undelivered parcel of contraband opium.* The possession of a railway receipt relating to an undelivered parcel of contraband opium lying in a railway office, under circumstances showing knowledge of its contents, constitutes possession of the opium within s. 9, cl. (c) of the Opium Act. *Kashi Nath Bania v. Emperor*, I. L. R. 32 Calc. 557, discussed and followed. ASHRUF ALI v. EMPEROR (1909) . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 1016

## OPIUM ACT (I OF 1878).

———— Breach of license under—Beng.

*Act IV of 1866, ss. 36, 37, 39, 40—Beng. Act II*

## OPIUM ACT (I OF 1878)—contd.

*of 1876—Bengal Excise Act, VII of 1878—Liability of master for servant's breach of license.* A, who held a certificate under Act VII of 1878 (the Excise Act) from the Deputy Commissioner of Police that he was entitled to a license from the Collector to sell muddut upon the conditions set forth therein, obtained such a license from the Collector under Act I of 1878 (The Opium Act) upon the conditions mentioned. No license was granted by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, it not being usual for licenses to be granted by the police where a license had been issued by the Collector upon a certificate from the Deputy Commissioner. A was charged under s. 40 of Act IV of 1866 [as amended by Bengal Act II of 1876] with a breach of the conditions, not of the license, but of the certificate, the act complained of having been committed by A's servant. Held, that the sale of muddut is regulated by Act I of 1878, and therefore no license from the Commissioner of Police for the sale of muddut was requisite under ss. 36 and 37 of Act IV of 1866. Held, further, that s. 39 of Act IV of 1866 applied to the case, and that under that section a license from the Deputy Commissioner of Police was necessary for the sale of muddut, and accordingly that A, although he had obtained a certificate from the Deputy Commissioner of Police entitling him to a license under Act I of 1878, was liable to punishment by reason of his not having, under s. 39 of Act IV of 1866, also obtained a certificate from the Deputy Commissioner. See *In re Bhoobun Chunder Shaw*, 11 C. L. R. 461. DAVIS v. KOYLASH CHUNDER GHOSE . . . 13 C. L. R. 336

— s. 3—*License to possess opium—Transport of opium.* A person having a license for the possession of opium as a medical practitioner, limited to eight pollums of opium, sent his servant to buy from a licensed dealer at Sholavaram and bring to Madras four pollums of opium; he was convicted of the offence of transporting opium without a license. Held, that the conviction was right. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAMANUJAM . . . I. L. R. 13 Mad. 191

— s. 4—

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 23—ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—GENERALLY.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 626

— ss. 5 and 9—*Licensed vendor, liability of, under s. 9 for keeping incorrect accounts.* S. 5 of the Opium Act (I of 1878) declares that the Local Government, with the previous sanction of the Governor General in Council, may make rules consistent with the Act regulating the sale of opium. Under this section, rules were issued by the Government of Bengal with the previous sanction of the Governor-General in Council on the 21st February 1898, rule 15 (1) of which declares that a person to whom a license has been granted may sell opium by retail in accordance with the condition specified in the license. The conditions of the license for retail sale of opium are contained in Form No. 1 made under rule 15. Under art. 13 of this form, the holder of the license is to keep a daily correct account showing the quantity of opium received



OPIUM ACT (I OF 1978)—*contd.*s. 5—*concl'd.*

and sold and other details. Art. 18 sets out that on infringement of any of the conditions contained in the form or imposed by the Opium Act the license may be cancelled. The petitioner, a licensed vendor of opium, was convicted of having kept incorrect accounts in contravention of the rules made under s. 5 of the Opium Act, and having thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 9 of that Act. He was sentenced to pay a fine of R200, and in default of payment to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four months. *Held*, that the conviction and sentence must be set aside, there being nothing in any of the rules made under s. 5 of the Act which would make the preparation of an incorrect account punishable under s. 9. *UMESH CHUNDER GHOSE v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*. I. L. R. 26 Calc. 571 3 C. W. N. 365

## s. 9—

See MAGISTRATE—GENERAL JURISDICTION.  
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See MAGISTRATE—SPECIAL ACTS—OPIUM ACT . . . I. L. R. 19 All. 465

See OPIUM, ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF.  
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 1016

1. *Liability of master for act of servant.* Contrary to the conditions of his master's opium license, the servant sold a preparation of opium between sunset and sunrise. The master was not present, and there was no evidence to show that he had directly or otherwise authorised the illegal sale. *Held*, that the master was not liable to a penalty under s. 9 of Act I of 1878. *In the matter of BHOOBUN CHUNDER SHAW*. 11 C. L. R. 464

2. *Act XIII of 1857—Wrongful entrance and illegal search, liability of police officer for—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882, ss. 155, 156, and 165—Non-cognizable offence.* An offence under s. 9 of the Opium Act (I of 1878), and not coming under s. 14 of that Act, is a non-cognizable offence, and is therefore one for which, by s. 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a police officer cannot arrest without warrant; and he has therefore, under s. 155 of the Code, no authority to investigate such an offence without the order of a Magistrate; nor under s. 165 can he make a search in respect of it. The power of arrest without warrant referred to in cl. (g) of s. 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code is an unqualified power, and not a conditional power, as in s. 24 of Act XIII of 1857, which only gives the right to a police officer to arrest without warrant in case the accused does not furnish the security required by that section. Where a police officer therefore, in respect of an offence under s. 9 of the Opium Act not coming under s. 14 of the Act, made a search in the house of the accused without an order of a Magistrate:—*Held*, that his action could not be justified, either under s. 24 of Act XIII of 1857 or under the Code of Criminal Procedure, and that he was liable in an

OPIUM ACT (I OF 1878)—*concl'd.*s. 9—*concl'd.*

action for damages for the illegal search. *BAHABAL SHAH v. TARAK NATH CHOWDHRY*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 691

3. *Possession of illicit opium—Custody of a locked box, containing opium lawfully belonging to the owner of the box.* A locked box, containing the stock of opium and books of a licensed vendor of opium, the key of which was kept by the owner, was found in the house of a person who lived next door to the shop of the opium vendor; and it appeared that the opium vendor, instead of taking his box home with him at night was in the habit of leaving it with his neighbour for safe custody. *Held*, that the custodian of the box could not properly be convicted of the offence of unlawful possession of opium, inasmuch as the possession of the opium was not his, but that of the legitimate owner. *EMPEROR v. GAJADHAR* (1903)

I. L. R. 25 All. 262

ss. 9, 10, 11—*Rules framed under the Act—Rule 4—Possession of opium exceeding statutory quantity—Knowledge, if necessary, to constitute offence—Construction of penal statute—Common carrier, if protected—Crew of boat, if in possession of cargo—Possession of manjhi—Confiscation of boat, when justified.* Opium in respect of which it is to be presumed that an offence has been committed must be opium in the possession of the accused, but such possession need not be to the knowledge of the accused. Where the provision of an enactment is penal it must be read plainly. There being no reservation in favour of common carriers in s. 10 of the Opium Act, a common carrier is not exempted from the provisions of this section, which is of a character that is exceptional, but by no means uncommon. Where opium exceeding five tolas was found in a boat of which one C was the manjhi and master and the other accused were the crew, and there was nothing to shew how the opium came to be on the boat, or that either C or the crew of the boat knew that it was there. *Held*, that C being in possession of the boat as manjhi and its master was in possession of the opium and was rightly convicted of an offence under s. 9 of the Opium Act. *Held*, also, that the crew, who presumably had no right to handle the cargo except by C's orders, were not in possession of the opium and could not be convicted under s. 9 of the Opium Act. As no improper conduct was imputed to the owners of the boat, an order confiscating the boat was set aside. *CHEDI MALA v. EMPEROR* (1904)

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## ORAL EVIDENCE.

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*See* CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 244.

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*See* CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 2—"DECREE," DEFINITION OF.*Order on petition.* On every petition made before him, a Magistrate should make an order, either granting or refusing it. An order merely to "file" it is improper. *BHOMAR MUNSHI v. DIGAMBAR DAS* (1902) 8 C. W. N. 548**ORDER AND DISPOSITION.***See* INSOLVENCY—ORDER AND DISPOSITION.**ORIGINAL SIDE OF HIGH COURT.***See* JURISDICTION OF HIGH COURT.

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*See* HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—  
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*Jurisdiction—Appeal—*  
*Additional Judicial Commissioner sitting alone.* Case in which an appeal, heard by the Additional Judicial Commissioner of Oudh sitting alone, was remanded to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner to be tried by the Judicial Commissioner and the Additional Judicial Commissioner sitting together. *GANGA BAKSH SINGH v. DALIP SINGH* (1901)

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*See* WILL—CONSTRUCTION.

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 482

1. ——— *Limitation—Suit for redemption of mortgage.* Under Act I of 1869, a suit for redemption is not barred where the instrument of mortgage fixes a term within which the mortgage might be redeemed, and such term did not expire before 13th February, 1856. *KISHEN DUTT RAM PANDAY v. NARENDAR BAHADOOR SINGH*

L. R. 3 I. A. 85

2. ——— *Interest of registered talukhdar—Trustee.* An Oudh taluk standing in the name of *J S* as kabuliatar, having been confiscated under Lord Canning's proclamation of March 1858, was summarily settled with *J S* on the 24th April following. A talukhdari sanad was granted to *J S* and he was subsequently registered as talukhdar under the provisions of Act I of 1869. In a suit against *J S* by persons alleging themselves to be joint in family and estate with him, to have their interest in the taluk declared, *held* by the Commissioner of Seetapore in Oudh, confirming.



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—*contd.*

the decision of the Settlement Officer, that, under Act I of 1869, the defendant was protected by his sanad against any claim of the plaintiffs in respect of the talukh. *Held*, by the Privy Council, on appeal, that as a person who has been registered as a talukhdar under Act I of 1869, and has thereby acquired a talukhdari right in the whole property, may nevertheless have made himself a trustee of a portion of the beneficial interest in lands comprised within the talukh for another and be liable to account accordingly, the suit must be remanded for trial as to whether the defendant had agreed, or become bound, to hold the villages comprised in the summary settlement and sanad, or the rents and profits thereof, in trust for the plaintiffs. **HARDEO BUX v. JAWAHIR SINGH**

**I. L. R. 3 Calc. 522 : L. R. 4 I. A. 178**

*Held*, by the Privy Council after remand that Act I of 1869, which was passed before the suit was decided by the Court of first instance, did not operate so as to change the relative conditions of the parties, and to put an end to the trust upon which the defendant had previously held the estate. The estate in his hands remained thereafter subject to the trust and there can be no difference in this respect between an express trust and a trust implied or presumed from a fair and reasonable interpretation of the acts and declarations of the defendant. **HARDEO BUX v. JAWAHIR SINGH**

**L. R. 6 I. A. 161**

**3. ——— Interest of registered talukhdar—Trust—Joint estate.** A talukhdari estate though entered in the name of one member of a joint family in the lists prepared in conformity with the Oudh Estates Act (I of 1869), may be subject to trust, implied from the acts and declaration of the talukhdar, for the joint family as a joint estate. **Hardeo Baksh v. Jawahir Singh, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 522 : L. R. 4 I. A. 178. PIRTHI LAL v. JAWAHIR SINGH . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 493**

**L. R. 14 I. A. 37**

**4. ——— Effect of sanad to confer proprietary right on a talukhdar, not being a trustee—Claim to under-proprietary right against talukhdar, distinguished and not concluded by a decree for the former right in his favour.** Unless a talukhdar who holds such a sanad as is referred to in the Oudh Estates Act (I of 1869), has agreed in some way, or has otherwise become legally bound, to hold the estate comprised in the sanad, or some part of it, in trust for another person, the principle on which *Sookhraj Koowar v. Government, 14 Moo. I. A. 112*, and *Haradeo Baksh v. Jawahir Singh, L. R. 6 I. A. 161*, were decided, is not applicable to make the talukhdar hold subject to a charge for the benefit of such other person. The talukhdar in whom no such trust is vested is entitled to the proprietary right in the lands forming the talukhdari estate comprised in the sanad. A claim against the talukhdar for the proprietary right included lands in which the claimant alleged himself to have purchased under-proprietary rights which were not claimed. A decree maintaining the talukhdar's

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—*contd.*

proprietary right was made without prejudice to a claim for the under-proprietary rights. **HAIDAR ALI KHAN v. NAWAB ALI KHAN**

**I. L. R. 17 Calc. 311**

**L. R. 16 I. A. 183**

**5. ——— Talukhdars—Title obtained by talukhdar under his sanad—Effect of confiscation of 1858 upon previous gift—Attempt to establish trust for claimants as to part of talukhdari estate—Claim to sub-proprietary right distinguished.** The sanad granting a talukhdar's estate confers *prima facie* an absolute title upon the grantee. A gift of villages by a talukhdar to collateral relations, if effectively made in 1850, and whether absolute or only for the maintenance of the donees out of the rents and profits was rendered by the effect of the confiscation of 1858 inoperative after that event to establish an interest as against the talukhdar holding under a sanad comprising the villages. Where a claim was based upon the principle that the conduct of a sanad-holding talukhdar and of his predecessor had been sufficient to establish against him a liability to make good, out of his talukh, interests, as to which ground was supposed to have been given for his relations to claim :—*Held*, that such a claim was not established merely by the claimants having been left in possession of villages, and having paid to the talukhdar only the proportion of the revenue assessed upon them, during the whole time of the troubles in Oudh, and afterwards. *Held*, also, that the question of the claimants having an under-proprietary right in such villages was entirely irrelevant to a claim for a declaration that they had proprietary right therein, on which latter title they sought to found a right to have their names entered in the settlement record ; and *held* that, although there are cases in which the claimant of a proprietary right may be allowed to maintain on the same facts, that he is an under-proprietor, this claim was not one of them. **RAM SINGH v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF BARA BANKI**

**I. L. R. 17 Calc. 444**

**L. R. 17 I. A. 54**

**6. ——— Estate of a sanad-holding talukhdar—Lineal primogeniture by custom—Award of a body of talukhdar within s. 33 of Oudh Estates' Act—Withdrawal of a voluntary admission.** The title to a talukhdari estate devolving upon a single heir by a custom of lineal primogeniture was contested. The plaintiff claimed to succeed his deceased brother as talukhdar. The defendant, who was his paternal uncle, was in possession. Before the annexation of the province, the kabuliati had been taken in the name of the plaintiff's brother as talukhdar, who afterwards had been settled with, at both the summary settlements. By primogeniture, whether lineal or by proximity of degree (of which latter kind there was no evidence as to its being the customary one) he was the heir. To him a sanad had been granted, and the talukhdari had been entered in list II under the Act of 1869. On the other hand, it was urged that the above was consistent with the existence



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—*contd.*

of a trust for the benefit of the titular talukhdar's uncles, of whom the defendant was the survivor, they having assented to the recognition of a nominal title in their nephew. *Held*, that in intention as well as in form the grant of the talukhdari had been made absolutely to the sanad-holding talukhdar. In regard to the state of things before annexation, it might have been questioned whether or not the property was being held benami at that time. But after the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, had become law, the title shown by the plaintiff must prevail, and he must recover the estate, unless a trust for the defendant should have been established. There had been no consideration given, and there was nothing to create a trust. There had been no transfer, no estoppel, and no bar by time. In 1868 an award had been made by a body of talukhdars as arbitrators within s. 33 of the Act, between members of the family other than the present disputants. This as well as a *wajib-ul-uruz* of one of the villages of the talukh was admissible as evidence of what was the custom in regard to its devolution. In 1879 the plaintiff had, on his brother's death, while admitting "the custom prevailing in my family of gaddinashini," joined in a petition that the defendant's name should be entered dakhil kharij in the revenue records. *Held*, that there might be a withdrawal of any gratuitous admission, unless there should be some obligation not to withdraw it; that there was no such obligation here; and that there had been no proof of any title upon which the admission could rest. **MUHAMMAD IMAM ALI KHAN v. HUSAIN KHAN**

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 81  
L. R. 25 I. A. 161  
2 C. W. N. 737

7. — A talukhdar settled with, on terms imposing a trust on him—*Settlement of estate—Second summary settlement, 1858—Effect of the confiscation—Rights of the Government.* A sanad-holding talukhdar, whose name has been entered in lists I and II, made in conformity with the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, holds the talukh subject to such trusts as have been validly created. At annexation, four descendants of a Mahomedan proprietor were entitled in equal shares to the ancestral estate, which in 1858, at the second summary settlement, was settled with the only one of the four who presented himself to the Settlement Officer. The settlement with him, as talukhdar, which was then made, was, however, made upon terms providing that the absent co-sharers on their return should obtain their shares. This accorded with his application expressing his willingness. *Held*, that the question whether the talukhdar had become a trustee for the plaintiff in respect of his share depended on the terms on which the estate had been granted to the talukhdar by the Government at the second summary settlement, it having been at their absolute disposal as a consequence of the confiscation of March 1858. The trust was not affected by the sanad. No special provision as to the co-sharer's return or admission to share had

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—*contd.*

been deemed necessary by the Chief Commissioner, who authorized the settlement with the talukhdar in reliance on his assurance. The right of the co-sharer, who returned in 1859, was accordingly established. **HASAN JAFAR v. MUHAMMAD ASKARI**

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 879  
L. R. 26 I. A. 229  
4 C. W. N. 65

8. — Title under sanad from Government—*Trustee.* Although a sanad granted by the Government of India subsequent to the proclamation of March, 1858, of an estate in Oudh, confers an absolute legal title on the grantee, such grantee may nevertheless, by an express declaration of trust, or by an agreement to hold in trust, constitute himself a trustee of the estate for a third party. **SHERE BAHADUR SINGH v. DURIAO KUAR**

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 645

9. — Mortgage—*Birt zamindari—Settlement—Under-proprietary rights—Sub-settlement—Malikana—Act XXVI of 1866.* An estate in Oudh, which had been confiscated under Lord Canning's proclamation of the 15th March, 1858, was granted to B as talukhdar. G S, who at the date of the proclamation was in possession of the estate as mortgagee "with Birt zamindari rights" under a conditional deed of sale from the former owner, was thereupon dispossessed, and B put into possession. Failing in other attempts to recover possession, G S brought a claim in which he asserted proprietary right as mortgagee, and prayed that the regular settlement might be made with him. The claim was dismissed by the Settlement Officer as being for a direct settlement of a superior proprietary right, and as such barred by the Oudh Estates Act (I of 1869). On appeal to the Commissioner, the claim was modified into one for a sub-settlement of an under-proprietary right, and a decree was made declaring the plaintiff's under-proprietary zamindari title, and awarding him possession under the terms of the deed of conditional sale, till such time as the mortgage should be redeemed or the title perfected by foreclosure. On appeal to the Judicial Commissioner, this decree was reversed and the claim dismissed, on the ground that the effect of the mortgage-deed was to convey to the plaintiff, on the mortgage becoming absolute, the full proprietary title, and not merely a subordinate one. *Held*, by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council that the "Birt zamindari rights," which the mortgage purported to convey, implied a merely subordinate zamindari interest, and that the claim of the plaintiff to a sub-settlement was valid. *Quære*: Whether, even if the interest intended to be conveyed by the mortgage was not in strictness sub-proprietary, a sub-settlement might not have been supported. *Quære*: Whether, under Act XXVI of 1866, B as talukhdar was entitled to malikana. **GOUR SUNKER v. MAHARAJA OF BULRAMPORE**

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 839  
L. R. 6 I. A. 1



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—contd.

ss. 2, 1—

See HINDU LAW—STRIDHAN—DESCRIPTION AND DEVOLUTION OF STRIDHAN.  
I. L. R. 25 All. 476

1. — ss. 2, 13, 14 and 22—*Transfer to person not in line of succession—Effect of transfer in changing rules of succession—Brother—Half-brother—Marginal notes to sections of Act—Persons acquiring taluks by request taking effect before passing of Act I of 1869—“Legatee,” definition of.* The expression “would have succession” in s. 14 of the Oudh Estates Act (I of 1869) must be confined to persons in the special line of succession that would have been applicable to the particular case, if the transferor or testator had died intestate and the death had occurred at the date of the transfer, or (in the case of a gift by will) at the time when the succession opened. In other words, the expression “a person, who would have succeeded according to the provisions of this Act,” is equivalent to “the person or one of the persons to whom the estate would have descended according to the provisions of the special clause of s. 22 applicable to the particular case.” The younger son of a talukhdar, whose name was entered in lists I and II of the lists mentioned in s. 8 of Act I of 1869, acquired the talukhs from his father by transfer or bequest and died intestate. In a suit by his eldest brother’s son, who claimed the estate against the widows as the eldest male lineal descendant of the original talukhdar: *Held*, that the younger son not being, on the above construction of s. 14, in the prescribed line of succession the estate devolved, on his death under s. 15 of the Act as if it had been acquired “from a person not a talukhdar,” and the rules of succession, by which it had been originally governed, no longer applied to it. Under the changed rules of succession (the ordinary Hindu Law), the widows were the preferable heirs. The word “brother” in cl. 6, s. 22 of Act No. I of 1869 includes a half-brother. Marginal notes to the section of an Indian Act cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the Act. Where a person acquired a talukh by a bequest which took effect before the passing of Act I of 1869, he was not a “legatee” within the definition of that term in s. 2, and cannot therefore be considered as a person to whom property was bequeathed under the special provisions of the Act. *BALRAJ KUNWAR v. JAGATPAL SINGH* (1904). I. L. R. 26 All. 308

2. — s. 2 and ss. 13, 20, 22 (6)—*Will of talukhdar—Registration of will—Succession to talukhdari—Son of deceased elder brother preferred to younger brother.* A written statement by a talukhdar made in 1860 in reply to enquiries by the Government, issued in the districts under circular orders regarding the succession of talukhdars, may come within the definition of a talukhdar’s will in s. 2 of the Oudh Estates Act (I of 1869). The statement was described by the talukhdar in a letter to the authorities in 1877

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—contd.

s. 2—contd.

as “the will which has been submitted to the Lucknow District through the tahsil of Kursi on 6th April, 1860.” *Held*, that this showed that he intended the statement of 1862 to be his will, and that the statement, as was held with regard to a similar one in *Hurpurshad v. Sheo Dyal*, L. R. 3 I. A. 259, was a will within the definition in the above section. The talukhdar declared in a subsequent will, of 19th August, 1879, that no document purporting to be a will, the context whereof was repugnant to the will of the latter year, should be admitted as a will. But the instrument of 1860 was not repugnant to the will of 1879. Also the latter document was not registered in accordance with s. 20 of the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, and being inoperative as to the talukhdari estate, it could not revoke the will of 1860, which also was not rendered inoperative by any of the provisions of the Act. *Held*, that by the true construction of s. 22, sub-s. 6, brothers take in the same manner as sons are directed to take by the preceding subsections; and that the descendants of a deceased elder brother are preferred as heirs to the younger surviving brother. *HAIDAR ALI v. TASSAKDDU RASUL KHAN*. I. L. R. 18 Calc. 1  
L. R. 17 I. A. 82

3. — *Succession to a talukhdari—Effect of declaration by holder as to who should be his heir.* The official enquiries made of talukhdars at an early period of British Administration as to who were to be their successors, were not intended to derogate from the rights of talukhdars in their heritable and transferable estates. To such an enquiry an answer in 1862 made by a sanad holding talukhdar, since deceased, who was entered in lists I and II (under the Oudh Estates Act, 1869) stated that she appointed to be her heir the father of the present plaintiff, appellant. The father, however, died before the talukhdar, and the son now claimed that this nomination amount to a gift of the talukhdari estate, subject to a trust for the life of the then talukhdar. *Held*, that the answer of 1862 did not operate to confer any estate upon the person named. *BALBHADDAR SINGH v. SHEO NARAIN SINGH*.

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 344  
L. R. 26 I. A. 194

4. — s. 2 and ss. 16-19—*Summary settlement with member of joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law—Right of alienation—Will—Custom as to partition.* By the 8th paragraph of the Oudh proclamation of March, 1858, it was declared that C L (at that time deceased), zamindar of Mourawan, and others, were thenceforward the sole hereditary proprietors of the lands which they held when Oudh came under British rule and which form part of the subject of these suits. Summary settlements of the said lands were subsequently made with G S (one of the sons of C L) by the Government between the 1st April, 1858, and the 10th October, 1859; a talukhdari sanad was



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—*contd.*

## **s. 2—*contd.***

granted to him before the passing of Act I of 1869 ; and he entered into a kabuliati for the same. His name was not entered in the second schedule annexed to the Act, but *C L*'s was. By a document dated 7th February, 1860, relating to property in the district of Oonao, and by other documents similar in effect relating to property in other districts, *G S* directed as follows : " I have been requested by Government to submit an application on the subject of primogeniture, with a view that the talukh may not be split into pieces as I would wish. Now the custom that has been followed in my family for generations past is this : that the eldest member of the family continues to be the head while the others remain obedient to him ; but every one possesses a share in the talukh. Under the custom of the family, the other brothers are at liberty to have their shares separated should they wish it. The head has no power under the old custom to alienate the estate without consulting every sharer. I therefore wish that the old custom of maintaining the share of each share-holder be preserved, in opposition to the one in accordance with which one member of the family is allowed to succeed." In suits for partition amongst the descendants of *C L* and of his brother, who together constituted a Hindu joint family governed by the Mitakshara law, all the property the subject of the suits having been found to be the joint property of the said family, it was contended on behalf of the appellants in the first appeal that all the estates included in the sanad to their father *G S*, and summary settlements, whether previously joint property of the family or not, became the separate self-acquired property of *G S* ; that he was the sole malguzar thereof ; and that he and his sons were the sole beneficial owners of it, and that he had no power to transfer it by will or by alienation *inter vivos*. *Held*, that the sanad and summary settlements were a mere grant by the Government to one member of the family of property which belonged to the family jointly, and were not intended to enure to the sole benefit of the grantee, and did not affect the rights of the family. As regards such property granted to *G S* (if any) which was not previously part of the family estates, it was granted for services presumably rendered with the use of the joint family funds, and could not therefore be separate self-acquired property within the meaning of the Hindu law. *Held*, also, that, assuming any portion of such property to have been self-acquired by *G S*, he must, in consequence of Act I of 1869, be deemed to have acquired therein a permanent heritable and transferable right, and had power by will, or alienation *inter vivos*, to transfer the same. *Held*, further, that the document of the 7th February, 1860, and other similar documents, so far as they related to the property in Oudh, amounted to a will within the definition of Act I of 1869, s. 2. Taken in conjunction with other documents, and having regard to the acts of different members of the family under it, the same amounted to evidence

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—*contd.*

## **s. 2—*concl.***

of an alienation *inter vivos* which in *G S*'s lifetime transferred the property to the family to be held as joint family property. Ss. 16-19 of Act I of 1869 have no retrospective effect. *HURPURSHAD v. SHEO DYAL. RAM SAHOY v. SHEO DYAL. BALMOKUND v. SHEO DYAL. RAM SAHOY v. BALMOKUND. L. R. 3 I. A. 259 ; 26 W. R. 55*

## **ss. 3, 4, 8, and 22.—**

*See SANAD.*

**L. R. 5 I. A. 1 : 1 C. L. R. 318**

## **s. 6.—**

*See MORTGAGE. I. L. R. 28 All. 1*

1. ——— s. 8—*Talukhdar in the second list—Estate descending to single heir—Primogeniture.* In the Oudh Estates Act, I of 1869, rules were laid down as to the title of talukhdars whose estates the Government had created, and as to the mode of succession thereto. On a question whether or not a talukh, to which the Act was applicable descended according to the rules of lineal primogeniture :—*Held*, that where a talukhdar's name was entered in the second, but not in the third, of the lists maintained under the above Act, the estate, although it was to descend to a single heir, was not to be considered as passing according to the rules of lineal primogeniture. *ACHAL RAM v. UDAI PARTAB ADDIYA DAT SINGH*

**I. L. R. 10 Calc. 511 : L. R. 11 I. A. 51**

2. ——— and ss. 9 and 10—*Recognition of trust.* Notwithstanding the confiscation of land in Oudh following by its restoration under the Government order of 11th March, 1858, affirming the absolute title of those with whom summary settlements had been made, and the granting of sanads to the latter persons, with full power of alienation confirmed by the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, the legal owner may, either by express agreement or by his conduct, constitute himself a trustee for others as to the whole or part of the beneficial interest in the land the subject of such restoration, settlement, and sanad. *RAMANAND KUAR v. RAGHUNATH KUAR. ANANT BAHADUR SINGH v. RAGHUNATH KUAR*

**I. L. R. 8 Calc. 769 : 11 C. L. R. 149**

3. ——— and ss. 11 and 19—*Will of a talukhdar—Customary rule of succession in a family to impartible estate—Primogeniture.* However true it may be that, if there is absolutely nothing to guide to any other conclusion, impartible estate will descend in a family according to the rule of primogeniture, evidence may establish the usage in a family to be that, of several sons, one son, selected without reference to primogeniture, succeeds to the impartible estate. The eldest of three brothers had succeeded to an impartible family estate, and to a talukh, also impartible, which had been, during the lifetime of their father, entered in the first and second but not in the third, of the lists prepared in conformity with s. 8 of the Oudh Estates Act, I of 1869. Before



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—*contd.*

— s. 8—*contd.*

his death, his eldest brother made an instrument registered as a will, but using the word "tomlik," and stamped as a deed whereby he gave the talukh to the third brother, reserving an interest in the whole for his own life, and in half for any son that might be born to him, with maintenance to his wife on her becoming a widow. *Held*, with reference to the *indicia* of a testamentary character, there being provisions for contingencies which might not be ascertained till the death of the maker of the instrument as compared with the technical matters attending it, that this instrument was not a transfer *inter vivos*, but was a will, and within the above Act. *Held*, also, on the objection that a will or declaration made by the father had fixed a mode of descent which could not be altered by his successor, that s. 11 of the above Act, giving to every heir and legatee of a talukhdar power to transfer or to bequeath his estate, is not controlled by the proviso in s. 19, declaring that nothing in that section shall affect wills made before the passing of the Act. The impartible family property other than the talukh descending like the latter to a single successor, one of these brothers, the question as to which of them that one should be depended on the custom of the family. On the evidence adduced as to the custom in this respect, the plaintiff, who was out of possession, and on whom, in order to make out his title, was the burden of proving that the rule of primogeniture prevailed, failed to do so. *ISHRI SINGH v. BALDEO SINGH*.

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 792 : L. R. 11 I. A. 135

4. — and s. 22—*Descent of talukh*. A talukh entered in the lists I and 2, prepared in conformity with s. 8 of the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, descends, according to the rules pointed out in s. 22 as an impartible estate to the single heir determined by the Hindu law of inheritance. *Brij Indar Bahadur Singh v. Jankee Koer*, L. R. 5 I. A. 1, followed, *RAN BIJAI BAHADUR SINGH v. JAGAT PAL SINGH*. *BISHESHAR BAKSH SINGH v. RAN BIJAI BAHADUR SINGH*. I. L. R. 18 Calc. 111  
L. R. 17 I. A. 173

5. — ss. 8, 22—*Talukh descending to a single heir—Ascertainment of that single heir distinguished from the rule of primogeniture—Family custom*. An estate belonging to a talukhdar whose name is entered in the second, and not in the third, of the list of talukhdars in the six specified classes prepared under the Oudh Estates Act (I of 1869), ss. 8-10, is one which, according to the custom of the family, descends to a single heir, but not necessarily by the rule of primogeniture. If, as happened in the present case, where the estate descended to a single heir, the heir according to lineal primogeniture is more remote in degree from the ancestor than other persons, who may be collaterals, coming within the line of heirship, then according to the classification in the Oudh Estates Act, nearness in degree prevails over directness of line. But if two collaterals, or other persons in the line of heirship, are equal in degree,

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—*contd.*

— s. 8—*concl.*

then the person rightly entitled is indicated by the seniority of the line to which he belongs. S. 22, sub-s. 11 of the Act, referring to the law which would govern descent in default of any heirs who would come under the special provisions of the Act, include in that law family custom when established. In an attempt to prove a family custom to the effect that females should not inherit, no proof was afforded by the production of certain *wajib-ul-araiz*, as to which there was nothing to show that the villages of which they were recorded were the villages in suit, or belonging to the family which was disputing the succession. *BHAI NARINDAR BAHADUR SINGH v. ACHAL RAM*

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 649  
L. R. 20 I. A. 77

6. — ss. 8, 10—*List of talukhdar prepared under s. 8—Entry of name of deceased person in list, effect of—Succession—Evidence—Interpretation of Statutes—Retrospective effect*. It is not in accordance with sound principles of interpreting Statutes to give them a retrospective effect. Entries of the names of deceased persons in the lists mentioned in s. 8 were not contemplated by the Oudh Estates Act, and ss. 8 and 10 of the Act cannot be so construed as to deprive the successors of the estate of a person, who had died before these sections came into operation, of rights which they acquired on his death by reason merely of his name being entered in the lists after his death. *Achal Ram v. Udai Partab Addiya Dat Singh*, 11 I. A. 51, distinguished. *MAHOMED ABDUSSAMAD v. KURBAN HUSSAIN* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 26 All. 119  
s.c. 8 C. W. N. 201  
L. R. 31 I. A. 30

— ss. 8, 13, and 22.—

See HINDU LAW—WILL—CONSTRUCTION  
OF WILL—ESTATES ABSOLUTE OR  
LIMITED . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 725

s. 10—*Joint family under Mitakshara law—Grant to member of talukhdari—Declaration of trust*. In a suit by an adopted son against his father for a declaration of right with consequential relief in a share of a certain estate, the defendant pleaded that he was absolute owner thereof, and in regard to two of the talukhs named was entered in the talukhdar's list prepared under Act I of 1869. It appeared that under a number of family transactions the property in suit had been given to the defendant for such interest and with such right of succession to the plaintiff as by virtue of the law of the Mitakshara attaches to ancestral immoveable estate as between father and son. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to a declaration to that effect, and that s. 10 was no bar to his assertion of the interest declared to be vested in him. *SETH JAIDIAL v. SETH SITA RAM*

L. R. 8 I. A. 215



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—contd.

**s. 13—**

*See WILL—VALIDITY OF WILL.*

**I. L. R. 25 All. 121**

1. ————— *Will of talukhdar—Compulsory registration of will devising talukh—Deposit of will distinct from registration under Act VIII of 1871.* A will devising a talukh to a sister's son of a talukhdar in the lifetime of the talukhdar's brother is not excepted from the necessity of being registered under s. 13 of the Oudh Estates Act, I of 1869, such sister's son not being one of those who, in the event of the talukhdar having died intestate, would have succeeded to an interest in his estate, within the meaning of the exceptions made in s. 13, sub-s. 1, of that Act. It may be doubted whether the mere title to maintenance would be such an "interest" as would come within the meaning of the exceptions. The deposit of a will under Part IX of Act VIII of 1871 does not amount to the registration required by the above section of Act I of 1869. **ABDUL RAZZAK v. AMIR HAIDAR**

**I. L. R. 10 Calc. 976 L. R. 11 I. A. 121**

2. ————— *Registration in accordance with the rules of 1862, regulating the place and mode of it, in Oudh.* An Oudh talukhdar made a grant of a village, part of her talukhdari, to her adopted daughter; the instrument requiring, in order to be valid under Act I of 1869, s. 13, to be registered within one month after execution. With a view to its registration, she, being a pardanashin, sent for the neighbouring pargana registrar, who attended at her house for her convenience, took her acknowledgment of the document, recorded the registration, and filed a copy of the document in his office. *Held*, that this proceeding was a registration of the document, complete and effective, having been substantially a registration at the pargana office. **MAJID HOSSEIN v. FAZL-UL-NISSA**

**I. L. R. 16 Calc 468**

**L. R. 16 I. A. 19**

3. ————— *Meaning of "intestate" as there used—Written but unregistered authority to adopt—Registration Act (III of 1877), s. 17.* The Oudh Estates Act, 1869, requires the registration of the writing by which an authority to adopt is exercised; but not the registration of the authority, which is required by the Act to be in writing. The Indian Registration Act (III of 1877), which does require authorities to adopt to be registered, expressly excepts authorities conferred by will. The word "intestate," in s. 13, sub-s. 1, of the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, means intestate as to the talukhdari estate; and the use of the word does not exclude from the exception in that sub-section a son adopted under an authority conferred by a talukhdar's unregistered will. A talukhdar by his will authorized his senior widow to select and adopt a minor male child of his family to be the owner of

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the entire riasat. This power having been exercised, the following objections to the adoption were disallowed: first, one founded on the will not having been registered and, consequently, the authority not having been registered; secondly, one founded on the erroneous argument that the adopted son was not within the class excepted in s. 13, sub-s. 1, and therefore could not take under an unregistered will. **BHAIYA RABIDAT SINGH v. INDAR KUNWAR**

**I. L. R. 16 Calc 556**

**L. R. 16 I. A. 53**

ss. 13, 14, 22—*Statute, interpretation of—Marginal notes, not to be referred to—Construction which gives meaning to every part of section—Talukhdar—Succession—Construction, meaning of words "Brother," "Legatee"—Retrospective operation of Statute.* The marginal notes in an Indian Statute cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing it. The expression "a person who would have succeeded according to the provisions of the Act" in ss. 13 and 14 of the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, signifies the person or one of the persons to whom the estate would have descended according to the provisions of the special clause of s. 22, applicable to the particular case. This construction gives meaning to every part of the section. The word "brother" in cl. (6) of s. 22 includes a brother born of a different mother. A person, who benefited under a bequest, which came into operation before the Oudh Estates Act was passed, would not be a "legatee" within the definition of the term in the Act. **THAKURAIN BALRAJ KUNWAR v. RAE JAGATPAL SINGH (1904)** . **8 C. W. N. 699**  
**s.c. L. R. 31 I. A. 132**

1. ————— **s. 22—Conduct of talukhdar as indicating his successor—Daughter's son.** Where an Oudh talukhdar, not having male issue, is shown to have so exceptionally treated the son of a daughter as to give him in the family the place, consequence, and pre-eminence which would naturally belong to a son of his own if one existed, and would not ordinarily be conceded to a daughter's son and has thus indicated an intention that the person so treated shall be his successor, such person will be brought within the enactment of the 4th clause of s. 22, Act I of 1869. Circumstances affording evidence of such an intention considered. **PERTAB NARAIN SINGH v. SUBRAO KOOR**

**I. L. R. 3 Calc 626 : 1 C. L. R. 113**

**L. R. 4 I. A. 228**

2. ————— *Talukh inherited by a daughter's son—Succession or inheritance—Primogeniture.* The talukh to which the succession was in dispute was one of those entered in the first and second of the lists prepared in conformity with s. 8 of the Oudh Estates Act, 1869, descending to a single heir by primogeniture. The last talukhdar died without leaving a son, but left a widow, and by a former wife two daughters, of whom the elder had a son. The widow's claim to an estate for life, under sub-s. 17 of s. 22 of the above



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Act, was met by the defence that the daughter's son, having been treated by his maternal grandfather in all respects as his own son, was under sub-s. 4 entitled to inherit the talukh. The Courts below decided in his favour. *Held*, that the Courts below were right as to the treatment of the daughter's son, in regard to sub-s. 4. *Pertab Narain Singh v. Subhao Koor*, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 623; L. R. 4 I. A. 228, did not show that sub-s. 4 had been construed to require evidence on that point attaining to any special degree. *UMRAO BEGUM v. IRSHAD HUSAIN*.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 997  
L. R. 21 I. A. 163

3. ————— *Oudh talukhdari estate—Succession—Elder son born of younger wife—Younger son born of first wife—Oudh Estates Act (I of 1869), s. 22, cl. (11)—Nature of estate—Conflict between ambiguous and unambiguous texts of Hindu law—Interpretation, rule of—Communis error facit jus—Oudh Estates Act (I of 1869), list 2, ss. 8 and 22, Manu, Ch. IX, verses 122 to 125. An estate taken under cl. (11) of s. 22 of Act I of 1869 descends as an impartible estate under the provisions of Act I of 1869, list 2, ss. 8 and 22. *Dewan Ran Bijai Bahadur Singh v. Rao Jagatpal Singh*, L. R. 17 I. A. 173, followed. The eldest son, though born of a younger wife, is entitled to succeed, in preference to the younger son though born of the first wife. The principles, upon which the first born son has been held to be entitled to succeed, apply equally to a son of a first married wife and sons of other wives. *Ramalakshmi Ammal v. Sivanantha Perumal Sethurayar*, 11 Moo. I. A. 570, and *Pedda Ramappa Nayanivaru v. Bangari Seshamma Nayanivaru*, L. R. 8 I. A. 1, referred to and followed. In construing texts of Hindu law, where certain verses are inconsistent, and one is reasonably free from ambiguity and the meaning of the others is at the best ambiguous and doubtful, the plain language of the one ought not to be overridden or controlled by the obscure utterances of the others. Where it was alleged that the interpolation of the words "but of a lower class" in Manu, Ch. IX, verse 122, was by mistake attributed by Sir William Jones to Kalluka Bhatta, whereas it was interpolated by a later and inferior commentator, and the interpolation had been accepted by the Indian Courts: *Held*, that the maxim *communis error facit jus* is a sound maxim. Manu, Ch. IX, verses 122 to 125, discussed. *JAGDISH BAHADUR v. SHEO PERTAB SINGH* (1901)*

I. L. R. 23 All. 369; 5 C. W. N. 602;  
L. R. 28 I. A. 100

4. ————— cl. (7)—*Suit for declaratory decree—Cause of action to reversionary heir—Execution of will by Hindu widow as talukhdar—Adverse title set up as defence to suit for declaratory decree—Discretion of Court. The execution of a will by a limited owner, such as a Hindu widow, affords, as a general rule, no sufficient reason for granting a*

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—contd.

## **s. 22—contd.**

declaratory decree. But where such a decree had been granted by the lower Courts in a suit the defence to which made it clear that the defendants relied upon an alleged title in the widow inconsistent with any present or future rights of the plaintiff or any other reversionary heir, and the defendants had besides no legitimate interest in the appeal except in respect of costs which had been incurred only by the course taken by them throughout the case, the Judicial Committee, always slow to reverse the decisions of Courts below made in the deliberate exercise of a discretion entrusted to them by law, declined to interfere with the decree on appeal. *JAIPAL KUNWAR v. INDAR BAHADUR SINGH* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 26 All. 233

5. ————— ss. 22 and 23—*Evidence—Custom, proof of—Custom excluding daughters—Wajib-ul-arz—Evidence of custom of succession to impartible estate whether admissible in proving custom of succession to partible estate—Concurrent findings as to custom being established. effect of—Declarations by kanungo—Replies by talukhdars to Government inquiries as to succession—Oudh Land Revenue Act (No. XVII of 1876), s. 17. In a suit by the appellant claiming as daughter of a Hindu talukhdar whose name was entered in lists 1 and 4 prepared under the Oudh Estates Act (I of 1869), an estate, the succession to which was therefore regulated, under s. 23 of that Act, by the ordinary Hindu law of the Mitakshara School, the defendants, male collaterals of the appellant's father, set up a custom by which daughters were excluded from inheritance and both Courts in India found on evidence that the custom was proved. *Held*, by the Judicial Committee, that if and so far as it was a conclusion of fact the concurrent finding was though not absolutely binding on the Committee, entitled to the greatest weight. Technical objections to declarations made by kanungos, to entries in the wajib-ul-arzes by the officer charged by Government with that duty, and to answers given to official inquiries made under Government direction as to the rules of succession prevailing in particular families, were considered by their Lordships to be material rather to the weight than to the admissibility of the particular evidence which was *prima facie* admissible as purporting to be made by the proper officer in performance of a special duty, and presumably with due regard to the rules laid down for his guidance. Though under s. 17 of the Oudh Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1876), entries duly made and attested in wajib-ul-arzes are presumably correct records of the facts entered, their value as evidence varies according to circumstances. *Muhammad Imam Ali Khan v. Husain Khan*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 81, 92; L. R. 25 I. A. 161, 169, followed. It was contended that evidence of a custom regulating the succession to impartible estates where the rules of gaddi-nashini prevailed was inadmissible on a question as*



**ODDH ESTATES ACT (I OF 1869)—**  
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to the custom of succession to a partible estate governed by the ordinary Hindu law applicable to estates in list 4 of Act I of 1869. *Held* (referring to *Katama Natchier v. Rajah of Shivaganga*, 9 Moo. I. A. 539; *Jogendro Bhupati Hurrochundra Mahapatra v. Nityanand Man Singh*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 151, 154; *L. R. 17 I. A. 128, 131*, and *Subramanya Panday Chokka Talavar v. Siva Subramayana Pillai*, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 316, 325), that there was nothing in the mere fact of partibility to make evidence of a family custom excluding or postponing daughters to male collaterals in impartible estates necessarily inapplicable to partible estates. *Wajib-ul-arzes* therefore relating to the succession to impartible estates were held to have been rightly admitted as evidence of the custom set up in the present case. *Lekraj Kunwar v. Mahpal Singh*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 744; *L. R. 7 I. A. 63*, and two unreported cases referred to in the judgment of the Judicial Commissioners followed. *PARBATI KUNWAR v. CHANDRAPAL KUNWAR* (1909)

I. L. R. 31 All. 457

**s. 23—**

*See EVIDENCE* . 13 C. W. N. 1073

**ODDH LAND REVENUE ACT (XVII OF 1876).**

**s. 17—**

*See ODDH ESTATES ACT, 1869, ss. 22, 23.*

I. L. R. 31 All. 457

**ss. 52, 53—Claim to resume grant.**

A proprietor in Oudh claimed to resume a perpetual lease as having been granted by his ancestor at a favourable rent, without the sanction, but otherwise, under the circumstances, contemplated by s. 52 of the "Oudh Land Revenue Act," XVII of 1876, so that the grant was resumable. *Held*, that the claim failed. The undefined charges, expenses of management, and other payments incidental to the lease might have been such as to make the rent paid a reasonable one as between lessor and lessee; and that the favourable nature of the rate of rent had not been established. *PARTAB BAHADUR SINGH v. BADLU* . . . . . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 479

**s. 74—Compromise—Document signed by claimants in mutation proceedings—Acquiescence in partition proceedings—Suit to dispute title and recover possession of shares to which plaintiff was entitled by Hindu law—Estoppel—Suit in Civil Court on title after partition.** The plaintiff and defendants were claimants to the estate, consisting of 30 villages, of a deceased Hindu, and though by the ordinary Hindu law the plaintiff as brother of the deceased, was entitled to the whole property as against the defendants, who were nephews (sons of deceased brother) the three claimants in the mutation proceedings signed in 1896 a document which stated that the property was held, one moiety by the plaintiff and the other

**ODDH LAND REVENUE ACT (XVII OF 1876)—cont'd.**

**s. 74—cont'd.**

moiety by the defendants, and that "there is no other legal heir except the deponents; the mutation in respect of the deceased's share in all the villages should be allowed and nobody has any objection thereto;" and the revenue authorities effected mutation of names in that way. In 1902 partition, which left the parties in the same state as to possession, was effected in accordance with the provisions of the Oudh Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1876). In a suit brought in 1904 to recover possession as heir of the deceased of the half share held by the defendants, the latter pleaded (*inter alia*) that their possession was the result of a compromise come to between the parties in the mutation proceedings which was evidenced by the document of 1896, and that the plaintiff was estopped by such mutual arrangements from asserting his present claim. *Held* by the Judicial Committee (affirming the concurrent decisions of both the Courts in India on the evidence), that there was no proof of any compromise. The mutation of names by itself created no proprietary title. The document of 1896 contained no words that could be construed as amounting to an abandonment by the plaintiff of his legal rights. It was merely a statement of the facts as they existed as to the possession of the property, and by its silence as to a compromise tended to support the conclusion that no compromise was ever made. In the partition proceedings the plaintiff made no objection to the defendant's title under s. 74 of Act XVII of 1876; but he filed an application in which he asked that "the share of Mannu Singh (the deceased) should be decided at present according to possession, and a separate suit will be filed in a competent Court as regards the title in respect of the property of Mannu Singh." Both the Courts in India concurred in decreeing to the plaintiff the shares of the deceased in 29 of the villages, but as to one village they differed, the Judicial Commissioner holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the share in it because the partition in regard to that village had dealt with the shares of other persons besides the parties to the present suit and also because the plaintiff have raised the question of the defendant's title in the partition proceedings and was now estopped from recovering the share which had been allotted to the defendants at the partition.

*Held*, by the Judicial Committee, that the order of the Revenue Officer in the partition proceedings showed that the sharers of no other parties than the parties to this suit were affected by the partition of the shares in the one village as to which the Courts differed. The Revenue Court had clearly given effect to the plaintiff's application as to the question of title, for no inquiry under s. 74 of Act XVII of 1876 was made and the question of title was left to be decided by the Civil Court. The grounds of estoppel therefore failed and the plaintiff was entitled to the shares in all the



**ODDH LAND REVENUE ACT (XVII OF 1876)—*contd.***

———— s. 74—*concl'd.*

villages sued for. *CHOKHEY SINGH v. JOTE SINGH* (1908) . . . . . **I. L. R. 31 All. 73**

———— ss. 121, 123—*Transfer of share of under-proprietors in arrears of rent—Right to interest on rent from transferee—Oudh Rent Act (XXII of 1886), s. 141.* Under the Oudh Land Revenue Act, 1876, ss. 121, 123, the shares of defaulting under-proprietors were transferred to three of them who offered to pay. The present suit was brought by the superior proprietor, the talukhdar, in whose estate the mehal was comprised, against the whole body of under-proprietors for arrears of rent accrued, while the term of the above transfer was running. *Held*, that the provision in s. 123 of the Oudh Land Revenue Act, 1876, to the effect that such transfer shall not affect the joint liability of the co-sharers of the mehal, had not the effect of charging the co-sharers other than the three transferees with any liability for rent accrued during the term of the transfer. Interest was also claimed, but as to this it was *held*, that under-proprietors were not tenants within the meaning of the Oudh Rent Act, 1886, s. 141, providing for payment of interest on rents due from tenants. *MUHAMMAD MEHNDI ALI KHAN v. MUHAMMAD YASIN KHAN.*

**I. L. R. 26 Calc. 523**

**L. R. 26 I. A. 41**

**3 C. W. N. 218**

———— s. 158—

*See JURISDICTION OF REVENUE COURT—ODDH RENT AND REVENUE CASES.*

**I. L. R. 15 Calc. 515**

———— ss. 161, 166, 172—*Court of Wards, power of, to alienate wards' property—Award beyond the terms of reference—Ultra vires award.* The powers of a Court of Wards are those of a guardian, supplemented by certain additional powers given by the Statute, and it has no power to make a voluntary alienation of the ward's real estate in perpetuity. S. 172 of Act XVII of 1876 does not justify such an alienation where it is not for the benefit of the ward's property or to his advantage. An award that goes beyond the terms of reference to the arbitrators is to that extent *ultra vires*. *MOHAMMED MUMTAZ ALI KHAN v. SAKHAWAT ALI KHAN* (1901)

**I. L. R. 23 All. 394; 5 C. W. N. 881**

**s.c. L. R. 28 I. A. 169**

———— Ch. VIII (ss. 161 to 177 A)—

*See COURT OF WARDS.*

**I. L. R. 25 All. 195**

*See DISQUALIFIED PROPRIETOR.*

**10 C. W. N. 849**

———— ss. 175 and 176—*Suit against the Collector as agent for the Court of Wards—Disqualified owner—Act XXXV of 1858 (Care of the Estates of Lunatics), s. 11—Parties—Defendant—Civil Procedure Court, ss. 440 and 464.* A decree

**ODDH LAND REVENUE ACT (XVII OF 1876)—*concl'd.***

———— s. 175—*concl'd.*

was made against a Deputy Commissioner as Agent for the Court of Wards for a debt due from a proprietor, whose estate had come under the charge of that officer in virtue of an order made by the District Court under Act XXXV of 1858, the debtor having been found to be of unsound mind and incapable of managing his affairs. The Judicial Commissioner, having called for the record under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code, set aside the decree, which had been affirmed on appeal. He was of opinion that the suit should not have been brought against the Deputy Commissioner in the above character, but would only lie against a manager appointed as Act XXXV of 1858 directed, or else against a guardian. This judgment, having gone upon a technicality not well founded, was reversed, and the original decree was restored. *ASHARFI LAL v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF BARA BANKI.*

**I. L. R. 22 Calc. 729**

**L. R. 22 I. A. 90**

**ODDH, LAW OF.**

*See EJECTMENT, SUIT FOR.*

**I. R. 26 I. A. 169**

*See MAHOMEDAN LAW—DOWER.*

**I. L. R. 19 Calc. 689**

**I. L. R. 21 Calc. 135**

**L. R. 20 I. A. 144**

**ODDH LAWS ACT (XVIII OF 1876).**

*See PRE-EMPTION—RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION* . . . . . **I. L. R. 24 All. 420**

———— s. 5—

*See MAHOMEDAN LAW—DOWER.*

**I. L. R. 19 Calc. 689**

**I. L. R. 21 Calc. 135**

**L. R. 20 I. A. 144**

———— s. 9, cl. 2—*Co-sharer in mahal—Proprietor—Right of pre-emption—Act XVII of 1876 (Oudh Land Revenue Act), Chapter VII, ss. 108, 112, 121—Share in mahal consisting of separate chak—Non-residence in village.* The plaintiff was owner of a chak of 33 acres in a village which for revenue purposes constituted a mahal, and by the settlement, under which he held, he paid R40 a year as the revenue, that amount being paid through the lambardar; the plaintiff did not reside in the village. *Held*, by the Judicial Committee, that he was a co-sharer of the whole mahal within the meaning of s. 9, cl. (2) of the Oudh Laws Act (XVIII of 1876), and as such had a right of pre-emption under that section. Under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Oudh Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1876) relating to the "Collection of Land Revenue" every "proprietor" liable for the revenue of the mahal is a co-sharer. The plaintiff was a "proprietor" in the sense of s. 108, and the settlement of his land had been made with a lambardar in the sense of s. 112, and he was



**OUDH LAWS ACT (XVIII OF 1876)—**  
*concl'd.*s. 9—*concl'd.*

liable just as much as every other proprietor in the mahal for the whole arrear of the mahal in case of default. The fact that his share in the mahal consisted of a separate chak did not make him the less a co-sharer in the sense of this legislation ; and the circumstance that he was not a resident of the village was immaterial. *MUNNU LAL v. MUHAMMAD ISMAIL* (1904) . . . . . I. L. R. 26 All. 574  
s.c. L. R. 31 I. A. 212

ss. 9 to 13—

See PRE-EMPTION—RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—CO-SHARERS.  
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 496

**OUDH LOANS OF 1838 AND 1842, PAYMENTS DUE UNDER.**

See ATTACHMENT—SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—PENSION. I. L. R. 18 Calc. 216

**OUDH REDEMPTION ACT (XIII OF 1866).**

mortgage dated previous to—

See LIMITATION ACT, ART. 144—ADVERSE POSSESSION . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 483  
L. R. 23 I. A. 8

**OUDH RENT ACT (XIX OF 1868).**

ss. 41 and 83, cl. 4—

See JURISDICTION OF REVENUE COURT—OUDH RENT AND REVENUE CASES.  
I. L. R. 15 Calc. 515

s. 111—

See RES JUDICATA—MATTERS IN ISSUE.  
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 159

s. 141—

See INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES—ARREARS OF RENT.  
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 523

See OUDH LAND REVENUE ACT, ss. 121, 123 . . . . . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 523

**OUDH RENT ACT (XXII OF 1886).**

See DECLARATORY DECREE, SUIT FOR—SUITS CONCERNING DOCUMENTS.  
L. R. 29 I. A. 203

ss. 12, 141—*Interest—Liability for interest on arrears of rent—Under-proprietor—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 73—Interest Act (XXXII of 1839)—Suit for breach of contract—Damage—Time at which rent is payable—Statutes 3 and 4, Will. IV, C. XLII.* Although an under-proprietor is not liable for interest on arrears of rent under s. 141 of the Oudh Rent Act as not being a tenant within the meaning of that section—*Muhammad Mehendi Ali Khan v. Muhammad Yasin Khan*, L. R. 26 I. A. 41 ; I. L. R. 26 Calc.

**OUDH RENT ACT (XXII OF 1886)—**  
*concl'd.*s. 12—*concl'd.*

523—yet there is nothing in the Act or in that decision which excludes any liability for payment of such interest, which an under-proprietor might be under apart from the Act. Where a compromise containing an agreement to pay rent, come to between the predecessors in title of the present litigants, had been followed by a decree, which carried into effect the terms of the agreement. *Held*, in a suit for arrears of rent, that the agreement was merged in the decree by which, and not by the agreement, was established the status of under-proprietor from which the obligation to pay the rent was derived, and that the suit was therefore not one for breach of contract within the meaning of s. 73 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872), in which interest on the arrears could be given as damages. Nor could such interest be given under the provisions of the Interest Act (XXXII of 1839), it being necessary under those provisions for the plaintiff to show that the rent was payable "by virtue of some written instrument at a certain time," and in this case neither the deed of compromise nor the decree prescribed any time for the payment of the rent, nor contained any terms from which the time could be ascertained. The Interest Act of 1839 was passed for the purpose of extending the English Act (3 and 4 Will. IV, C. 42) to India, and its provisions in this respect being the same as those of the English Act, the English decisions may be referred to in construing the Indian Act. *Quære* : Whether under those decisions it was necessary that the actual date for payment should be fixed by the written instrument, or whether it would be sufficient if the instrument only contained the basis of the calculation, which made it certain. *Duncombe v. Brighton Club and Norfolk Hotel Co.*, L. R. 10 Q. B. 371 ; *London Chatham and Dover Railway Co. v. South Eastern Railway Co.*, [1891] 1 Ch. 120, and *Merchant Shipping Co. v. Armitage*, L. R. 9 Q. B. 99, referred to. *GANES BAKHSH v. HARIHAR BAKHSH* (1904) . . . . . I. L. R. 26 All. 299  
s.c. 8 C. W. N. 521  
L. R. 31 I. A. 116

s. 108 (S)—

See OUDH SUB-SETTLEMENT ACT (XXVI OF 1866). . . . . I. L. R. 31 All. 394

**OUDH, ROYAL FAMILY OF, PENSION TO.**

See TREATY, CONSTRUCTION OF.  
I. L. R. 17 Calc. 234  
L. R. 16 I. A. 175

**OUDH SUB-SETTLEMENT ACT (XXVI OF 1866).**

See JURISDICTION OF REVENUE COURT—OUDH RENT AND REVENUE CASES.  
I. L. R. 15 Calc. 515

See OUDH RENT ACT, s. 108.  
13 C. W. N. 1093

1. ———— **Right to sub-settlement—**  
*Under-tenures held under contract. Under-tenures*



**ODDH SUB-SETTLEMENT ACT (XXVI OF 1866)—contd.**

held under contract, or under any arrangements from which a contract may be inferred, are within the definition of sub-proprietary rights given in the rules annexed to Act XXVI of 1866, and their holders are entitled to a sub-settlement. **MAHARAJAH OF BULRAMPORE v. UMAN PAL SINGH**

**L. R. 5 I. A. 225**

2. ——— **Under-proprietary right in Oudh—Settlement—Circular Order, 29th January 1861—Birt sankalp and khushust sankalp tenure.** A provision in the Chief Commissioner's Circular Order of 29th January 1861 in effect declared that, to found a claim to a birt tenure in Oudh, possession must be shown to have existed in 1855, the year before annexation. This was assumed, for the purposes of this decision, to have had the force of law at the time when the Financial Commissioner ruled, in Circular Orders 5 and 6 of 5th June, 1868, that "a claimant who cannot prove possession of his sankalp holding in 1262-63 Fasli (1854-55) has no *locus standi* in Court." Whether rightly treated by the Oudh Courts as an enactment of limitation, or rather to be considered as a disability affecting title, this provision was repealed by the effect of Acts XVI of 1865, s. 5, and XIII of 1866, s. 1, the suit of a birtiah becoming thereupon cognizable, notwithstanding that he might not have been in possession in 1855. The words of limitation in the Circular Order apply to all birt tenures including those that are termed "sankalp," when the latter are in the nature of birts. Rules I and II in the Schedule of the Oudh Sub-Settlement Act, XXVI of 1866, held not to exclude the plaintiff, he having shown that he, and those through whom he claimed, did not, in the words of those rules, hold the land, "through privilege, or by favour of 'the talukhdar,' but held by an under-proprietary right, under contract 'pucka,' with some degree of continuance, since the village came into the talukh." **DRIG BIJAI SING v. GOPAL DAT PANDAY.**

**I. L. R. 6 Calc. 218 : 6 C. L. R. 146**

**L. R. 7 I. A. 17**

3. ——— **Right of tenant under talukhdari settlement—Tenancy-at-will—Right of resumption—Absence of under-proprietary right.** At the confiscation and restoration of Oudh lands in 1858, it was intended to settle and restore under regulation to the talukhdars, with certain exceptions, the talukhdars' rights, and also to protect as far as was necessary, by sub-settlement or otherwise, the existing rights of the occupiers; but there is nothing to show any intention to advance beyond what the rights were at the time. Where the relation of talukhdar and tenant at a rent of land within a talukh has been shown to have existed at that date, and since the tenant cannot defeat the talukhdar's right of resumption on due notice, notwithstanding a lengthened duration of tenancy, he is entitled to an under-proprietary right, either on the ground that, by reason of this state of things having brought him within the meaning of paragraph 2 of the Schedule to Act XXVI of 1866, or on the ground that time and undisturbed

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enjoyment have ripened his holding into a species of ownership. The issues between the parties raising only the question of some form of proprietary right, still if the tenant had shown any right whatever to remain undisturbed by the talukhdar, such right would have been considered on this appeal and would have received effect. The allegation of a grant in perpetuity in 1826 at a rent to be varied according to the amount of revenue payable by the talukhdar, not having been proved but the existence and origin of a tenancy having been shown at a rent, paid down to the commencement of the suit :—*Held*, that length of enjoyment, coupled with such payment of rent, could give no greater force to the tenant's right than it originally possessed. **ROHAN SINGH v. SURAT SINGH.**

**I. L. R. 11 Calc. 318 : L. R. 12 I. A. 25**

4. ——— **Construction of Rules in Schedule to Act—Rules 2, 3 and 13—Revision of decree granting under-proprietary rights made before passing of Act—Jurisdiction of Financial Commissioner—Construction of lease—Right of talukhdar to ejectment of lessee on expiry of lease—Oudh Rent Act (XXII of 1866).** The history of the Oudh Sub-Settlement Act (XXVI of 1866) together with its provisions and the rules in the Schedule attached to it show that the object and purpose with which it was passed were to revise and correct what had been hastily and imperfectly or loosely done and to secure that no person should enjoy under proprietary rights who could not establish his claim in the manner prescribed by those rules. "Claims which have been disposed of otherwise than in accordance with these rules," in rule 13, mean claims which have not been supported by the proofs prescribed by, amongst other provisions, rules 2 and 3, that is, proof that the claimant possesses an under-proprietary right in the lands of which sub-settlement is claimed; that such right has been kept alive over the whole area claimed within the period of limitation; and that he has by virtue only of his under-proprietary right held the land under contract with some degree of continuance since they came into the talukh. In 1864 the predecessor in title of the appellants brought a suit for under-proprietary settlement of a village within the respondent's taluq. On 15th March of that year a judgment was given in his favour for a "permanant lease" of the village with payment of a sum for malikana to the talukhdar, which was affirmed by the Settlement Commissioner, the Chief Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner. After the passing of Act XXVI of 1866 the talukhdar applied for a review of that judgment and the case was remanded to the Settlement Court for reinvestigation under the new rules, and eventually the Financial Commissioner, on 6th January 1869, decreed as follows :—"The provisions of the Sub-Settlement Act have not been complied with. . . . . As the original proprietary title has not been proved, the plaintiff is in no way entitled to sub-settlement, which actually restores him under our rules to proprietary possession, and makes the talukhdar who has been half



**ODUH SUBSETTLEMENT ACT (XXVI OF 1866)—concl'd.**

a century in possession, the mere recipient of malikana. I decree a farming lease to plaintiff, he paying the Government demand *plus* 25 per cent. to the talukhdar for a period of 30 years." *Held*, that the Financial Commissioner had jurisdiction under s. 13 of the rules under Act XXVI of 1866 to make the decree of 6th January 1869, and that it was a valid and binding decree. *Held*, also, that on the construction of the decree the lease was one for a term of 31 years from the date of the decree, and on the expiration of that period the lessee was liable to ejectment in a suit in the Revenue Court under the Oudh Rent Act (XXII of 1886). **MAHESHAH PARSHAD v. MUHAMMAD EWAZ ALI KHAN** (1909). I. L. R. 31 All. 394

**ODUH TALUKHDARS' RELIEF ACT (XXIV OF 1870).**

**s. 3—Hypothecation of lands under management.** A talukhdar, the management of whose talukh at the time was vested in an officer appointed under s. 3 of Act XXIV of 1870, made an instrument purporting to hypothecate the talukh to secure payment of money borrowed by him. *Held*, that, as the document contained no personal contract to pay out of personal estate, or any estate other than the talukh, it was unnecessary to consider whether a talukhdar, whilst his talukh is under management in pursuance of the provisions of the above Act, is competent to make a personal contract, this being only an hypothecation of the property falling within s. 4, cl. 3, of the Act, and invalid within its meaning. **NAROTAM DASS v. SHEO PAR-GASH SINGH**

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 740 : L. R. 11 I. A. 83

**s. 10—Appeal—Appeal allowed though presented after time.** Case in which, having regard to exceptional circumstances and exceptional legislation, an appeal to the Commissioner of Division against a decision of a manager appointed under the Oudh Talukhdars' Relief Act was held to have been rightly allowed, although preferred long after the period of six weeks prescribed by s. 10. It appeared that the appellant in the Court below was a minor and incapable of exercising his right to appeal except through the manager, who himself made the order appealed from, and that the respondents (present appellants) had, after the expiration of the said six weeks, themselves prayed for a judicial determination of substantially the same questions as were raised by the present appeal. **RAMJISDAS v. BHAGWAN BAX**. L. R. 5 I. A. 197

**s. 25—Manager not made party to suit—Effect on decree.** Where a manager of the estate had been appointed under the provisions of Act XXIV of 1870 (The Oudh Talukhdars' Relief Act), but had not been made a party to a suit relating to the right to succeed to the talukhdari : —*Held*, that the omission did not, under s. 25, affect the validity of the decree between the parties. **PERTAB NARAIN SINGH v. TRILOKINATH SINGH**.

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 186 : L. R. 11 I. A. 197

**OUSTER.**

See ADVERSE POSSESSION.

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 300

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 317

**OUTCASTS.**

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—DANCING GIRLS. I. L. R. 13 Mad. 133

property of—

See PROBATE—OPPOSITION TO, OR REVOCATION OF, GRANT.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 697

succession to—

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN.

I. L. R. 13 All. 573

**OVERCHARGE.**

See RAILWAYS ACT, 1890, ss. 77, 140,

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 534

**OWELTY MONEY.**

See MORTGAGE. 12 C. W. N. 373

See PARTITION. I. L. R. 35 Calc. 388  
s.c. 12 C. W. N. 373

**OWNER OR OCCUPIER OF LAND.**

See RIOTING. I. L. R. 12 All. 550

responsibility of—

See RIOTING. I. L. R. 28 Calc. 504

fine imposed on—

See BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT, III OF 1864,  
s. 67. 8 B. L. R. Ap. 9

**OWNERS OF ADJOINING ESTATES.**

See DECREE—FORM OF DECREE—POSSESSION. I. L. R. 17 Calc. 814

**OWNERSHIP.**

See KHOTI TENURE.

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 680

evidence of transfer of—

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—GIFT.

I. L. R. 19 All. 267

L. R. 24 I. A. 1

See REGISTRATION ACT, s. 49.

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 18

in the soil—

See PENSIONS ACT, 1871, s. 3.

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 523

presumption of—

See BOUNDARY. 9 W. R. 426

See ENDOWMENT. I. L. R. 16 All. 412

See ONUS OF PROOF—POSSESSION AND PROOF OF TITLE. I. L. R. 12 All. 46

See ROAD, OWNERSHIP OF.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 206



OWNERSHIP—*contd.*

## reputed—

See INSOLVENCY ACT (11 & 12 VICT., C. 21).  
s. 23 . . . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 659  
I. L. R. 25 Mad. 406

## right of—

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 26.  
I. L. R. 16 Bom. 592

## transfer of—

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 78.  
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 801  
See VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

1. ——— Ownership of tanks—*Possession sufficient to bring suit.* In a suit to recover possession of the beds of tanks which, though gradually reclaimed and made fit for cultivation by defendants, were situate within plaintiff's māl estate, and had been measured and recorded in the zamindari chittahs as the khas khamar and unfit for cultivation :—*Held*, that, plaintiffs being unable from the nature of the ground to show any direct acts of ownership, the presumption was that until the act of defendant dispossessing them they were sufficiently in possession to enable them to maintain their right of suit. *RUFATOOLLAH CHOWDHRY v. SHUSHEE SHIKHUR BANARJEE* . . . 14 W. R. 57

2. ——— Enjoyment of fruit on trees—*Disputed right to possession.* Where the question as to possession was doubtful, a Civil Court was held to have committed no error of law in presuming ownership from the fact of enjoyment of the fruits of trees growing on the disputed land. *DOLE GOBIND GOOPTO v. BATOO alias KISTO CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY* . . . 22 W. R. 405

3. ——— Uncultivated lands—*Possession—Title.* Lands which have never been occupied for cultivation, and which are of such a nature and description as that no one can be said to be in possession, may be presumed rightfully to belong to the parties with whom the title rests. *MOOCHEE RAM MAJHEE v. BISSAMBHAR ROY CHOWDHARY*. . . 24 W. R. 410

See SUNNUD ALI v. KURIMOONISSA.  
9 W. R. 124

LEELANUND SINGH v. BASHEEROONISSA.  
16 W. R. 102

4. ——— Act of ownership—*Suit for possession—Disputed possession.* In a suit for possession, where it was found not only that all the land in dispute was comprised within boundaries specified in documents admitted by both parties, but also that plaintiff had for a long time stored bamboos and wood on one portion and grazed his cattle on another :—*Held*, that these acts of ownership, taken in conjunction with the specification of boundaries, left no doubt that the lands concerned were the property of the plaintiff. *RAM NARAIN ROY v. NILMONEE ADHIKAREE* . . . 24 W. R. 144

OWNERSHIP—*contd.*

5. ——— *Measurement and mapping by Ameen.* Where an Ameen measured and mapped land, and altered his map on objection made, the proceedings, as being merely upon paper, and not interrupting the actual possession or occupation of the land, were held not to amount to an act of ownership by either of the parties concerned, or to affect the question of possession. *JANOKEE NATH CHOWDHRY v. BROJENDRO COOMAR ROY CHOWDHRY* . . . 25 W. R. 65

6. ——— Adjoining buildings—*Walls of adjoining building on same foundation.* Where the external walls of two adjoining houses which now belong to different owners, but which at one time were the property of the same person, have been erected wholly or partly on the same foundation wall, and there is an entire absence of evidence on either side as to the dates of the several purchases, or of the terms on which they were made, the presumption is that the line of demarcation of the two properties is that indicated by the superincumbent walls. *RADHA MOHUN ROY v. RAJ CHUNDER DASS* . . . 2 C. L. R. 377

7. ——— Diversion of road—*Right of owners of land adjoining old road—Public road.* There is a presumption that a highway, or waste land adjoining thereto belongs to the owners of the soil of the adjoining land. *NIHAL CHAND v. AZMAT ALI KHAN* . . . I. L. R. 7 All. 362

8. ——— Forest lands in Malabar—*Hindu law—Property in the soil—Right of Sovereign.* In the district of Malabar and the tracts administered as part of it, there is no presumption that forest lands are the property of the Crown. According to the Hindu law, a right to the possession of land is acquired by the first person who makes a beneficial use of the soil, the right of the Sovereign being to assess the occupier to revenue. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. VIRA RAYAN* . . . I. L. R. 9 Mad. 175

9. ——— Forest lands—*Acts of ownership—Property in the soil—Construction of istemrari sanad of 1803 as to lands granted—Evidence of possession—Questions of fact—Proof of zamindari title.* A zamindar claimed from the Government the proprietary possession of a tract of hill and forest, in virtue of an istemrari sanad of the year 1803, conferring upon the grantee, his heirs and successors a permanent property in the zamindari as then possessed. To the sanad, which was aptly worded to include the subject of this claim, the acts of the zamindar had been ascribed. But it did not contain any description of the lands which it was intended to carry, a marginal note only specifying three villages then comprising the zamindari. The plaintiff having proved that he and his ancestors had cut wood, pastured cattle, and gathered forest produce in certain forests for fifty years, the lower Court held that such acts of enjoyment were only evidence of an easement and not of adverse possession. *Held*, by the High Court, that these acts, as they had been done under the belief



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and assertion that the said tracts formed portion of the zamindari, and that the plaintiff and his ancestors were owners of the said tracts, were evidence of adverse possession. In principle, an act done is one of ownership or evidence of an easement according as the person doing it asserts general ownership or a particular right in another property. The enjoyment of any right of ownership over the soil is *prima facie* proof of ownership of the soil. Where, therefore, the lower Court found such an enjoyment of a forest as proved title to the profits thereof, and such enjoyment was accompanied with an assertion of ownership of the soil:—*Held*, that the Court was bound to find a title to the soil established. *SIVASUBRAMANAYA v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA*. I. L. R. 9 Mad. 285

*Held* by the Privy Council on appeal (affirming the decision of the High Court), that the grant was not confined to the villages so named, and to an area in their immediate vicinity, but that the whole tract of hill and forest was claimable on its being shown by direct evidence or reasonable inference, that it was in the possession of the zamindar when he obtained a permanent title from the Government. As to part of the tract, the zamindar's acts of possession, such as grazing cattle, cutting timber, and collecting forest produce, had been exclusive of the exercise of such rights by any other person; but as to another part of the tract, his acts of that character had been concurrent with a similar user of hill and forest by raiyats of neighbouring villages, not part of the zamindari and belonging to the Government. *Held*, as to both parts, that the acts of possession, which had been found by both the Courts below to have been done by the zamindar, did not fall short of proving his proprietary possession, and that the user by the villagers, not having taken place in the assertion of conflicting proprietary right and, whether or not they were sufficient to establish rights of easement, were neither in amount nor quality sufficient to displace the zamindar's proprietary title. The decision of the first Court that the exercise of the above-mentioned rights by the zamindar was evidence only of the right on his part to use the land of another for the purposes indicated had been rightly reversed by the High Court. Where the proprietary right in a tract of land had been constantly asserted all questions between the disputants as to the amount of the use of the tract by the claimant, and as to the sufficiency of such use to establish his possession over the whole extent, were *held* to be questions of fact. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. NELLAKUTTI SIVA SUBRAMANIA TEVAR*.

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 101  
L. R. 18 I. A. 149

10. ———— **Property in trees—Tree planted by mutwali of a shrine on land belonging to the shrine—Enjoyment of the fruit by mutwali—Attachment of tree in execution of money-decree against mutwali.** A tree having been planted by the predecessor of a mutwali of a shrine on land admittedly belonging to the shrine, and a judgment-

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creditor of the mutwali having sought to attach the tree under a money-decree against the mutwali:—*Held*, that, although the judgment-debtor's predecessor planted the tree while acting as mutwali, he could acquire no property in the tree by so doing nor could any benefit, which he or the present mutwali might have derived by taking the fruit of the tree, enable them to acquire any right of ownership in the tree as against the shrine. The land admittedly belonging to the shrine, the tree must have the same character until the contrary was proved. *NURBIBI v. MAGANLAL PARBHUDAS*.

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 547

11. ———— **Suit for declaration of ownership—Plaintiff's title proved—Defendant's use found to be not inconsistent with plaintiff's ownership—Presumption—Possession goes with title—Adverse possession.** Plaintiff sued for a declaration that he was the owner of the land in suit alleging that the defendant had taken wrongful possession thereof. It was found as a fact that the title to the land was in the plaintiff and that the defendant had made no permanent use of the land inconsistent with its being plaintiff's land. *Held*, that plaintiff was entitled to succeed. The said circumstances made out a case for the application of the presumption that possession goes with title. *Runjeet Ram Panday v. Goburdhun Ram Panday*, 20 W. R. 25 (Civ. Rul.) and *Agency Company v. Short*, 13 App. Cas. 793, followed *Framji Cursetji v. Goculdas Madhowji*, 16 Bom. 338, referred to. *GANPATI v. RAGHUNATH* (1909)  
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 712

**P****PACHIS SAWAL.**

See HINDU LAW I. L. R. 32 Calc. 158  
9 C. W. N. 330

See RIGHT OF SUIT.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 273.

**PAHARAJ.**

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE.  
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 6  
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 590.

**PAKKI ADAT SYSTEM.**

See CONTRACT. I. L. R. 30 Bom. 205

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 291

1. ———— **Contract—Incidents of the custom—Employment for reward.** The plaintiffs in Bombay bought and sold in Bombay cotton and other products on the orders of the defendant, who traded at Shahada in Khandesh. In respect of the transactions sued on the plaintiffs before due date had entered into cross contracts of purchase with the merchants to whom they had originally sold goods on the defendant's account. The transactions were entered into on *pakki adat* terms.



**PAKKI ADAT SYSTEM—concl'd.**

The contract of a *pakka adatia* in the circumstances of this case is one whereby he undertakes or guarantees that delivery should, on due date, be given or taken at the price at which the order was accepted or differences paid; in effect he undertakes or guarantees to find goods for cash or cash for goods or to pay the difference. The evidence in the case establishes the following propositions in connection with *pakki adat* dealings. (i). That the *pakka adatia* has no authority to pledge the credit of the up-country constituent to the Bombay merchant and that no contractual privity is established between the up-country constituent and the Bombay merchant. (ii). That the up-country constituent has no indefeasible right to the contract (if any) made by the *pakka adatia* on receipt of the order, but the *pakka adatia* may enter into cross contracts with the Bombay merchant either on his own account or on account of another constituent, and thereby for practical purposes cancel the same. (iii). The *pakka adatia* is under no obligation to substitute a fresh contract to meet the order of his first constituent. *Held*, that the defendant knew of the custom, which was not unreasonable, as it did not involve a conflict between the *pakka adatia's* interest and duty. *BHAGWANDAS v. KANJI* (1905).

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 205

2. ————— *Pakki adat agency*  
—Place of performance of contract by *pakki adaty*  
—Custom—Jurisdiction. *K*, a Bombay merchant, employed *S* as his agent at Akola on the *pakki adat* system. On *K's* instructions *S* entered as his agent into certain contracts at Akola. On an agency account being taken a sum of money was found to be due from *S* to *X*. On *K* suing for this sum *S* pleaded that the High Court at Bombay had no jurisdiction to hear the suit on the ground that no part of the cause of action had arisen in Bombay. *Held*, that in the case of *pakki adat* agency primarily the place of payment is the place where the constituent resides, but payment should be made in any other place if the constituent has chosen to give directions to that effect and that the High Court at Bombay had jurisdiction to try the suit. *Per CHANDAVAKAR, J.*:—A *pakki adaty's* liability ceases when hard cash has come into the hands of his constituent. *KEDARMAL v. SUBAJMAL* (1908). I. L. R. 33 Bom. 364

**PALA OR TURN OF WORSHIP.**

See HINDU LAW . 10 C. W. N. 825

**PALAYAM, NATURE OF.**See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE.  
I. L. R. 28 Mad. 508

— ancient estate of Udaipur—

See HINDU LAW . 10 C. W. N. 95

**PANCHALS.**See HINDU LAW.  
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 693**PANCHANNAGRAM.**

— tenure in—

See REVENUE SALE LAW, s. 2.

13 C. W. N. 633

**PANCHAYAT.**

1. ————— District panchayat—*Mad. Reg. XII of 1816—Mad. Reg. VII of 1816—Madras Civil Courts Act, III of 1873.* Neither the total repeal of Regulation VII of 1816 by Act III of 1813 (Madras Civil Courts Act) nor the partial repeal of Regulation XII of 1816, so far as it contained words of reference to Regulation VII of 1816, abolished the jurisdiction of district panchayats. A Collector cannot order a reference to a district panchayat under Regulation XII of 1816 unless there has been (i) an inquiry as to whether the parties will submit to the jurisdiction of a village panchayat; (ii) an objection from either party to such reference and a request in writing by one of the parties that the matter be referred to a district panchayat. *CHIKATI ZAMINDAR v. PEDDAKIMEDI ZAMINDAR* . I. L. R. 8 Mad. 569

2. ————— *Mad. Reg. XXXII of 1802—Mad. Reg. XII of 1816—Cases in which a district panchayat may be appointed—Finality of award—Notice of nomination of panchayatdars.* The applicability of the procedure provided in Madras Regulation XII of 1816 is not limited to cases in which a breach of the peace has taken place or is apprehended. When a district panchayat, appointed under that Regulation, has come to a decision, that decision is final and conclusive between the parties and cannot be impeached or set aside, except in the manner prescribed by the Regulation. Such decision is not invalid, because only one party consented to the reference of the matter in dispute to a panchayat, or because the other party, who protested against the proceedings, had not notice of the time when the nomination of the panchayatdars was to take place. *NARAYANA v. CHANDRA* . I. L. R. 15 Mad. 1

**PANCHNAMA.**

— refusal to attend to make—

See BOMBAY DISTRICT POLICE ACT, s. 53.  
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 970**PANNA MAHARAJAH OF.**See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL.  
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1**PAPER BOOKS.**

See PRACTICE.—CIVIL CASES—PAPER BOOKS.

— disallowance of cost of printing—

See PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—COSTS  
L. R. 29 I. A. 156

— failure to deposit costs of—

See LETTERS PATENT. HIGH COURT,  
CL. 15 . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 339See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 168.  
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 339



**PAPER-BOOKS—concl'd.**

failure to deposit costs of—concl'd.

See REVIEW—POWER TO REVIEW.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 339

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 350

**PAPER CURRENCY ACT XX OF 1882.**

s. 25—

See PROMISSORY NOTE—FORM.

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 689

**PARAMOUNT TITLE.**

claim of—

See MORTGAGE . . . 11 C. W. N. 284

See RES JUDICATA.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 868

**PARDANASHIN WOMEN.**

See APPELLATE COURT—ERRORS AFFECT-  
ING OR NOT MERITS OF CASE.

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 807

2 C. W. N. 568

See ATTACHMENT—ATTACHMENT OF PER-  
SON . . . I. L. R. 7 Calc. 19

17 W. R. 86

See COMMISSION—CIVIL CASES.

6 C. W. N. 927

See COMMISSION—CRIMINAL CASES.

I. L. R. 5 All. 92

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 775

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 551

See EVIDENCE—PAROL EVIDENCE—VARY-  
ING OR CONTRADICTING WRITTEN IN-  
STRUMENTS.

1 B. L. R. O. C. 28; 31 note

See INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS.

I. L. R. 8 All. 265

See LIMITATION—QUESTION OF LIMITA-  
TION . . . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 684

See ONUS OF PROOF—DECREES AND  
DEEDS, SUITS TO ENFORCE OR SET ASIDE.

10 B. L. R. 205

13 B. L. R. 427

L. R. 1 I. A. 192

See PAUPER SUIT—APPEALS.

I. L. R. 24 All. 172

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—AUTHORITY  
OF AGENTS . . . I. L. R. 7 Calc. 245

L. R. 8 I. A. 39

See REGISTRAR OF HIGH COURT.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 330

See UNDUE INFLUENCE.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 773

See WILL—ATTESTATION.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 19

deeds executed by—

See MAHOMEDAN LAW.

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 165

**PARDANASHIN WOMEN—cont'd.**

execution of documents by—

See EVIDENCE . . . 13 C. W. N. 370

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT. s. 59.

13 C. W. N. 40

**1. Dealings with parda women**

—*Onus of proof—Evidence of bona fides.* A Hindu parda woman is entitled to receive in the Courts of this country that protection which the Court of Chancery in England always extends to the weak, ignorant and infirm, and to those who for any other reason are specially likely to be imposed upon by the exertion of undue influence which is presumed to have been exerted unless the contrary be shown. In all dealings, therefore, with persons so situated, it is incumbent on the party interested in upholding the transaction to show that its terms are fair and equitable, the most usual mode of discharging such onus being to show that the lady had good independent advice in the matter, and acted therein altogether at arm's-length from the other contracting party. *RAKHUN v. AHMED HOSSEIN*

22 W. R. 443

**2. Execution of deed by par-**

*danashin—Registration of deed—Evidence of execution.* In cases of transactions by parda woman mere registration does not go far to corroborate the proof of their validity unless a mutation of names takes place, which, if done under a mooktearnama has not the same effect as against a parda woman as it has against a person capable of transacting his own business and acting for himself. Where the conveyance by a parda woman is impeached, there ought to be clear evidence, not of the mere signature by the party, but that the secluded woman had the means of knowing what she was about. *FUZZUL HOSSEIN v. AMJUD ALI KHAN*

17 W. R. 523

**3. Registration—**

*Evidence of genuineness.* The mere registration of a lease is no proof of its genuineness, especially in the case of a lease which was first produced as a valid instrument nearly nine years after its execution, and which was alleged to have been granted by a pardanashin lady, but no satisfactory evidence was given that she had put her signature and seal to it, and that she did so with a knowledge of the nature and contents of the instrument. *DOOLEE CHAND v. OONDA KHANUM*

18 W. R. 238

**4. Explanation of**

*deed.* In order to charge a pardanashin woman upon an instrument or power purporting to have been executed by her, it is requisite that the person relying on such a document should give satisfactory evidence that it has been explained to and understood by her. *SUDISHT LAL v. SHEOBHARAT KOER*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 245

**5. Onus probandi—**

*Evidence of deed being explained—Pardanashin without legal assistance.* Where the defendant, who was shown to be an illiterate pardanashin lady, denied on her oath that in executing a wakfnama she had any intention of creating an absolute wakf or that she understood the effect of the deed when



**PARDANASHIN WOMEN—contd.**

she executed it, the onus was on the plaintiffs to show that she was fully aware of the character of the document and its legal effect, and that she had proper professional advice at the time of its execution. In the absence of such proof:—*Held* that the deed was not binding on her. *DELROOS BANOO BEGUM v. ASHGAR ALLY KHAN*  
15 B. L. R. 167 : 23 W. R. 453

*Held*, in the same case on appeal to the Privy Council, who affirmed the judgment of the High Court: a Court, when dealing with the disposition of her property by a parda woman, ought to be satisfied that the transaction was explained to her and that she knew what she was doing, specially in a case where, without legal assistance, no consideration, and without any equivalent, she has executed a document, written in a language she does not understand, which deprives her of all her property. In the case of a pardanashin woman who has no legal assistance, the ordinary presumption that if a person of competent capacity signs a deed, he understands the instrument to which he has affixed his name, does not arise. *ASHGAR Ali v. DELROOS BANOO BEGUM*. I. L. R. 3 Calc. 324

See also the cases of *MANOHAR DASS v. BHAGABATI DASI* . . . . . 1 B. L. R. O. C. 28

*KANAILAL JOWHARI v. KAMINI DEBI*  
1 B. L. R. O. C. 31 note

*THAKOORDEEN TEWARY v. ALI HOSSEIN KHAN*  
13 B. L. R. 427 : 21 W. R. 340  
L. R. 1 I. A. 192

*SOONDUR KOOMAREE DEBIA v. KISHOREE LAL SEIN* . . . . . 5 W. R. 246

*ROOP NARAIN SINGH v. GUJADHUR PERSHAD NARAIN* . . . . . 9 W. R. 297

6. ———— *Death-bed disposition—Proof of bona fide intention.* Where a deed purports to have been executed by a parda woman, the Court should see that it was fairly taken from her, and that she was a free agent and duly informed of what she was about. When the disposition is in the nature of a death-bed disposition, the Court that upholds it ought, from whomsoever it proceeded, to be satisfied that it was the free voluntary act of the party by whom it purports to have been executed, and expressed her real intention. *GRISH CHUNDER LAHOREE v. BHUGGIBUTTY DEBIA*.  
14 W. R. P. C. 7 : 13 Moo. I. A. 419

7. ———— *Mooktearnamah, validity of.* The issue being as to whether a certain mooktearnamah, which purported to have been signed by the respondent, was valid or not, the validity of the mooktearnamah was pronounced against, as there was no legal proof of its execution, and the absence of legal proof was not compensated by any legitimate inference arising out of or by any of the facts disclosed by the other parts of the case, the whole of the transactions relative to the execution thereof being of a very questionable character. *SEETUL PERSHAD v. DOOLHIN BADAM KONWUR*. 8 W. R. P. C. 22 : 11 Moo. I. A. 268

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8. ———— *Document obtained by chief male member of family.* A document obtained by the chief male member of a family from a parda woman should receive a strict construction. *SOOKYABOYE AMMAL v. LATCHMI AMMAL*.  
13 W. R. P. C. 3

9. ———— *Contract with pardanashin woman—Proof as to knowledge of transaction before execution of document.* Where two Nambudri females—a mother and daughter (plaintiff)—executed a document in favour of defendant, a male relative (nephew of the former), which purported to divest the plaintiff and her mother of the entire property of the illom of which they were the sole proprietors, and to vest it in the defendant in consideration of his promise to marry and raise up heirs to the illom to which the plaintiff and her mother belonged, and to maintain the plaintiff and her mother till death, and it was proved that plaintiff was well aware of what she was doing, and had subsequently clearly recognised the defendant as absolute proprietor of the property and was contented with his having assumed the position pointed out in the document:—*Held*, that the transaction was valid, and could not be called into question on the suggestion that plaintiff was placed at a disadvantage and was not fully cognizant of the irrevocable nature of the deed; and that the rule laid down by the Privy Council in *Ashgar Ali v. Delroos Banoo Begam*, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 324, and in *Tacoordeen Tewarry v. Ali Hossein Khan*, L. R. 1 I. A. 192, had been complied with, and that defendant had discharged the burden of proof upon him. *TAMARASHERRI SIVITHIRIS ANDARJANOM v. MARANAT VASUDEVAN NAMBUDEIPAD*.  
I. L. R. 3 Mad. 215

10. ———— *Raising of unnecessary defence by legal adviser.* Observations regarding instructions by a pardanashin lady in a warrant of attorney to her pleader to do "necessary acts." *MONMOHINI DASSI v. KALIDAS AHIRI*.  
2 C. W. N. 292

11. ———— *Conditions necessary to the valid execution of a document by pardanashin—Suit to set aside deed—Onus probandi.* Where a deed executed by a pardanashin woman is sought to be set aside, it is for the party wishing to uphold the deed to show affirmatively that the transaction intended to be carried out by the deed was a reasonable one; that the executant was fully cognizant of the meaning and legal and practical effect thereof, and that she executed the same with her full and free consent, that is to say, that she had independent advice on the subject and was not otherwise as, e.g., by reason of bodily or mental infirmity or by reason of fraud or coercion practised upon her, incapable of giving a rational consent to the transaction. One M, a pardanashin lady of some 70 years of age, and more or less illiterate, executed on the 11th September 1883 a deed which purported to divest her immediately of all her property in favour of her son H who was dumb and imbecile, her daughter S who was named in the deed as guardian of H, and that daughter's



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son Y. Y was betrothed to a daughter of one F and one of S's daughters was married to one S H. Those two persons, viz., F and S H, were mainly instrumental in procuring the execution of the deed in question. The deed was drafted in very artificial language, and it was not shown that the executant ever understood its contents or effect. The executant was, moreover, at the time of execution in ill-health and great mental distress, owing to the death of her son, H, which had happened some months previously. The deed was also executed in the absence of the person who was at that time the executant's chief adviser and the manager of her property. Lastly, it appeared that, as soon as the executant came to know what the true nature of the deed was, and that proceedings had been initiated in the Revenue Department for mutation of names, she took immediate measures to show her dissent from the provisions of the deed and her disapproval of what had been done thereunder. *Held*, that under the circumstances above set forth the deed in question could not be considered as having been executed under the conditions necessary in such cases, and must be set aside. *Ashgar Ali v. Delroos Banoo Begum*, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 324; *Mahomed Baksh Khan v. Hosseini Bibi*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 684; *Behari Lal v. Habiba Bibi*, I. L. R. 8 All. 267, and *Kaniz Fatima v. Abbas Ali*, I. L. R. 8 All. 627, referred to. *MARIAM BIBI v. SAKINA*  
I. L. R. 14 All 8

12. ————— *Proof of explanation of deed—Gosha women, deed executed by—Onus of proof.* In a suit on a mortgage it was held that two gosha women, who had executed the instrument in conjunction with their son and brother respectively, were not, under the circumstances, entitled to have their shares exonerated for want of proof that the transaction had been explained to them. *Ashgar Ali v. Delroos Banoo Begum*, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 324, distinguished, *BADI BIBI SAHIBAL v. SAMI PILLAI*.

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 257

13. ————— *Proof of explanation of deed executed by pardanashin woman—Mortgage of ancestral property made by Hindu widow under power of attorney given by her to male relative.* It is absolutely necessary, before holding that a pardanashin lady or her property is liable on a contract alleged to have been made by her, or in consequence of an alleged execution by her of a general power-of-attorney, to be reasonably satisfied that the liability she was incurring and the nature of the transaction were explained to her; and more particularly is this the case, if it is sought by reason of her having executed a document, to fix her and her property with a liability to pay a debt, which, if the document had not been executed by her or by an agent appointed by her with adequate power, could not have been enforced against her property. *ACHHAN KUAR v. THAKUR DAS*.

I. L. R. 17 All. 125

Upheld by Privy Council in *SHAM SUNDER LAL v. ACHHAN KUNWAR* { . . . I. L. 21 All. 71  
L. R. 25 I. A. 183

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14. ————— *Dealings with pardanashin—Quasi-pardanashin—Proof of incapacity for business.* A woman cannot be held to be a quasi-pardanashin. If she is not actually a pardanashin, sufficient incapacity for business must be proved in order to throw upon those dealing with her the duty of taking special precautions. *HODGES v. DELHI AND LONDON BANK*.

L. R. 27 I. A. 168

15. ————— *Variance between pleading and proof.* Judgment of the High Court dismissing a plaintiff's suit confirmed on the evidence in a case in which plaintiff sought in the lower Court to set up a deed of alleged sale from a Mahomedan pardanashin lady in favour of her niece, which position he abandoned before the High Court, where he suggested that, although it was not good as a deed of sale, it would be good as a deed of bounty, the sale being colourable for the purpose of giving effect to a gift which otherwise it might be difficult to make under the Mahomedan law. *KUMEERONISSA BEGUM v. SYUFFOOLLAH*.

16 W. R. P. C. 32

Affirming s.c. *KUMEERONISSA BEGUM v. SYFOOLLAH KHAN* . . . 5 W. R. 198

16. ————— *Gift by Hindu lady to mooktear—Onus.* Where a mooktear sued his client, a Hindu widow, upon a purwannah bearing the clients' seal and purporting to give away valuable properties without any substantial consideration:—*Held*, that the onus was on the plaintiff to satisfy the Court fully as to the circumstances under which the clients' seal was obtained and to prove that the gift was made advisedly. *RAM PERSHAD MISSER v. PHOOLPUTTEE* . 7 W. R. 98

17. ————— *Gift by Mahomedan lady to one in a fiduciary position.* Where a Mahomedan lady conveyed to her confidential adviser and two other persons the house in which she dwelt by deed of gift, which (though read over and explained to her by a clerk who acted both for the donees and her) was executed by the lady without independent professional advice, and without the advice of the heads of her caste, it was decreed, at the instance of her heirs after her death, that the deed should be set aside. *RUJABAI v. ISMAIL AHMED* . . . 7 Bom. O. C. 27

18. ————— *Proof of execution—Evidence of knowledge of contents and of free agency.* A suit was brought upon a bond purporting to have been executed on behalf of two Mahomedan pardanashin ladies by their husbands, and to charge their immoveable property. The bond was compulsorily registerable, and it was presented for registration by a person who professed to be authorised by a power-of-attorney in that behalf. The only proof given by the plaintiff that this power-of-attorney was executed by the ladies, or with their knowledge and consent, was the evidence of a witness who deposed that he was not personally acquainted with them, nor did he know their voices; that he went to their residence; that there were two women behind a parda who the executants of the



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bond said were their respective wives, and that these women acknowledged they had made the power-of-attorney. There was nothing to show that the ladies had ever benefited in any way from the money advanced under the bond. *Held*, that, even if the ladies behind the parda were in fact the two defendants, this evidence would not be enough to bind them, and that it was for the plaintiff, who sought to bring their property to sale on the strength of a transaction with them, to show that they were free agents in the matter, and, having a clear knowledge of what they were doing, accorded their consent to it. *Buzloor Raheem v. Sumsoon-nissa Begum*, 11 Moo. I. A. 551; *Ashgar Ali v. Delroos Banoo Begum*, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 224, and *Sudisht Lal v. Sheobarat Koer*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 245, referred to by *MAHMOOD, J.* *BEHARI LAL v. HABIB-BA BIBI* . . . I. L. R. 8 All. 267

19. . . . . *Mahamedan law*  
—*Sale of an undivided share—Burden of proving validity of sale by a gosha woman.* Suit for partition and possession of an undivided share of property sold to plaintiff by an aged gosha lady of the class of Canarese Mahomedans called Navayats. The property sold was the vendor's share as heiress of her father, brother, and sister, who died in 1856, 1866, and 1871, respectively; but it appeared that the property of the family had been in the possession of one managing member since 1856. *Held*, that the plaintiff having discharged the burden of proving that the conveyance to him was voluntarily executed, and that the transaction evidenced by it was real and *bona fide*, the conveyance was operative. *KHATIJA v. ISMAIL*.  
I. L. R. 12 Mad. 380

20. . . . . *Sale of villages by a wife to her husband—Proof of execution of deed of sale.* The purchase-money had not been paid on what purported to be a deed of sale of villages by a Mahomedan wife to her husband for a price which, however, the deed acknowledged to have been paid. After her death, two of her relations, disputing the due execution of the sale-deed, sued the husband, who had obtained possession, claiming in the alternative either that they should obtain their shares in the property of the deceased, or, if the sale of the villages should be maintained, that they should receive their proportion of the price as due to the estate left by her. The two Courts below concurred in finding that the wife, a pardanashin, was capable of managing her own affairs, and that she had not received the price. The first Court inferred from the state of things that the wife had in a manner made a gift of the villages to the husband. The High Court reversed that judgment, and decided that, with regard to the probability of influence on the part of the husband, the absence of any independent advice for the wife and other circumstances, the transaction was without effect. The Judicial Committee found that there not being a case of undue influence exercised, either made by the plaintiff or raised by the issues, they found no evidence that the price stated was inadequate, or the sale an improvident one, or that the husband had been re-

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leased from having to pay the price. From the findings on the evidence the presumption was that the wife intended to pass the property for some purpose, and that the suggestion of a gift being excluded, the deed operated as a sale according to what it purported to be. They did not throw any doubt on the sound doctrine, laid down in numerous cases, as to the obligations upon persons taking benefits from pardanashin ladies. To the one surviving plaintiff was awarded a moiety of the price payable by the husband, who himself inherited the balance. *MUHAMMAD IKRAM-UD-DIN v. NAJIBAN* . . . I. L. R. 20 All. 447  
L. R. 25 I. A. 137  
2 C. W. N. 545

21. . . . . *Want of legal advice—Misapprehension.* A deed conveying the interest of a native married woman in land will not be set aside on the ground of want of legal advice or misapprehension, where the husband is aware of the alienation, and it is not shown that there is a gross inadequacy of price. *MONOHAR DOSS v. KHOOOLSUN BEGUM* . . . Cor. 121

22. . . . . *Loan for Mahomedan women on bond executed under mooktearnamah—Onus on lender—Necessity.* Where A wishes to charge Mahomedan ladies under a bond executed in their absence by B under a mooktearnamah, even if there was no collusion between A and B, A is bound to show that there was no negligence on his part; that the advance was made after satisfying himself that it was taken for their use, and was required by them for the purposes stated in the mooktearnamah (*viz.*, for the payment of their debts); and also that the money was applied to the use of the ladies. *GOLAM SOBHAN v. MUD-DUN MOHUN PAUL* . . . 18 W. R. 257

23. . . . . *Attendance of pardanashin in Court—Personal attendance of accused person—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 205.* *Held*, where a Magistrate had issued a summons to a "pardanashin" woman, alleged to be of good position, who was accused of an offence, that the Magistrate should have dispensed with the personal attendance of the accused and permitted her to appear by pleader, until such time as he had before him clear, direct and reliable *prima facie* proof that the accused had a real charge to answer. *In the matter of the petition of RAHIM BIBI* . . . I. L. R. 6 All. 59

24. . . . . *Examination of pardanashin—Witness—Right to be examined on commission.* A pardanashin woman, summoned as a witness in a criminal case, has a right to be exempted from personal attendance at Court, and to be examined on commission. *In the matter of the petition of HORRO SOONDERY CHOWDHRAIN*  
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 20 : 3 C. L. R. 93

25. . . . . *Privileges of, as witnesses—Attendance in Court.* Privileges of pardanashin ladies when attending Court in palanquins as witnesses considered. The general rule is that the lady should be admitted into Court in her palan-



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quin and give her evidence in it, after being properly identified. *QUEEN v. ROBERTS.*

**1 B. L. R. S. N. 5**

**26.** *Attendance in Court.* The Court will extend the privileges of parda to women who, though not parda, are not accustomed generally to appear before the public. *KISTOMOHUN MOOKERJEE v. ADARMONEY DABEE.*

**2 Hyde 88**

**27.** *Attendance in Court—Identification.* The examination by commission of a pardanashin woman is not necessary where she can be examined in Court in a palki or otherwise on a proper identification. *NUSRUT BANOO v. MAHOMED SAYEM*

**18 W. R. 230**

**28.** *Right of pardanashin lady to be examined on commission—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1822), s. 640.* The defendant applied for a commission to examine a Hindu pardanashin lady. The plaintiff objected on the ground that the lady had prior to this appeared in public and had also been examined in Court in a palki. *Held*, that the lady being a pardanashin, she was entitled to be examined on commission. *MOHESH CHUNDER ADDY v. MANICK LALL ADDY.*

**I. L. R. 26 Calc. 650**

**3 C. W. N. 751**

*CHAMATKAR MOHINEY DABEE v. MOHESH CHUNDER BOSE*

**I. L. R. 26 Calc. 651 note**

**3 C. W. N. 750**

**29.** *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 640—Commission to examine witnesses.* In an application to examine the plaintiff under commission, it was admitted that she had appeared personally in the Police Court and had been examined by the Magistrate. Ordered that a commission do issue to examine the plaintiff. *PROVAT KUMAREE DASSEE v. OPURBA KISSEN SETT.*

**3 C. W. N. 753**

**30.** *Privileges of, as witnesses—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 21.* In the case of an unmarried girl of some 12 years of age, without any distinguished rank or station, but belonging to that class of Hindu society the female members of which never go out in public, it was held that she was entitled to the privilege of Act VIII of 1859, s. 21, even though it was essential to have her testimony in a case recorded by the Judge himself and that her testimony should be taken out of Court under suitable precautions. *MAINATH SING v. MOORTA KOOR*

**24 W. R. 375**

**31.** *Irregularity in mode of examination prejudicing the accused.* Where the complainants were pardanashin ladies, and the Deputy Magistrate went to their residence and took their depositions in the presence of the accused, who had no opportunity of cross-examining inasmuch as the deponents were in a shut-up room:—*Held*, that the Deputy Magistrate's procedure was unusual and uncalled for, and the accused was prejudiced by the way in which the examination was taken; and that the

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complainants should have been called upon to make their charge through some one who knew the facts. *In the matter of the petition of JUDOO NUNDON LALL*

**24 W. R. Cr. 22**

**32.** *Personal appearance in Court—Practice.* Although there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code which protects pardanashin ladies from appearing in a Court of Justice, nevertheless it is very undesirable to compel the attendance of such persons. It cannot be admitted as a general principle that pardanashin ladies whose evidence is required in criminal trials are to be allowed to compel the Courts to examine them at some other place than the Court house itself. *In the matter of the petition of Din Tarini Debi, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 775, and In re Farid-un-nissa, I. L. R. 5 All. 92, referred to.* Where a Magistrate considered it necessary to take the evidence of a pardanashin lady, who objected to appear in Court, the High Court directed him to make arrangements so as to take her evidence either in an empty Court-room in the presence of himself, the accused, and the pleader for the prosecution, or, if no empty Court-room were available, in his own private room or some other room in the Court building. *In the matter of the petition of BASANT BIBI.*

**I. L. R. 12 All. 69**

**33.** *Attendance of pardanashin—Warrant case—Issue of summons—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 204, 205—Discretion of Court.* In a warrant case, the accused being a pardanashin, the Magistrate can dispense with her attendance under s. 205 of the Criminal Procedure Code, if he issues a summons in the first instance, and this he has a discretion to do under s. 204. *BASUMOTI ADHIKARINI v. BUDRAM KALITA*

**I. L. R. 21 Calc. 588**

**34.** *Exemption from arrest—Execution of decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 21.* Exemption from arrest on process of execution under s. 21, Act VIII of 1859, does not extend to all women of rank, but is limited to the women therein described,—women, that is, “who, according to the custom and manners of the country, ought not to be compelled to appear in public.” *DAVIS v. MIDDLETON*

**8 W. R. 282**

**35.** *Execution of decree.* Pardanashin women or women who, according to usage of the country, ought not to be compelled to appear in public, are not exempt from arrest in execution of a decree. *MAHARANI OF BURDWAN v. BARADASUNDARI DEBI.*

**1 B. L. R. F. B. 31: 10 W. R. F. B. 21**

*RAJCHUNDER ROY v. SHAMA SOONDURI DEBI.*

**I. L. R. 4 Calc. 583**

*See also KADUMBINEE DOSSEE v. KOYLASH KAMINEE DOSSEE. I. L. R. 7 Calc. 19: 9 C. L. R. 25*

**36.** *Execution of deed by—Execution of mortgage deed—Separate explanation necessary where executants are in separate interest.* Among the executants of a deed of mortgage of a



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testator's estate to secure debts for which it was liable were two pardanashin ladies, one an executrix of the will, the other a donee of villages from the testator in his lifetime which in her hands were not liable to the testator's debts. *Held*, that, to raise one issue as to the due execution of the deed as affecting both ladies, was an error in procedure. Even if the executrix was rightly held liable, there must nevertheless be clear evidence of a separate explanation of the deed to the donee of the villages, and a clear understanding by her that she was assuming liability for debts not her own, and was charging her villages therewith. *ANNODA MOHUN ROY CHOWDHARI v. BHUBAN MOHINI DEBI* (1901).

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 546 : s.c. 5 C. W. N. 489  
L. R. 28 I. A. 71

37. ———— *Non-production of mukhtarnama—Evidence—Insufficiency of evidence that deed was explained to her and that she understood it.* In a suit brought against a pardanashin lady on a mortgage bond which purported to be signed in her name "by the pen of Soonder Lal, son-in-law and am-mukhtar," under a mukhtarnama, which was not produced:—*Held*, that secondary evidence of the mukhtarnama was, on the facts put forward to account for its non-production, inadmissible, but, even if admissible, it was not sufficient to show that Soonder Lal had authority to execute the bond. Although the bond was said to have been read out to the lady, it was not shown that it was explained to her or that she understood its conditions and effect: *Held*, therefore, (affirming the decision of the High Court), that she was not bound by it. *Sudisht Lal v. Sheobarat Koer*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 245, followed. *SHAMBATI KOERI v. JAGO BIBI* (1902)

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 749 : s.c. 6 C. W. N. 682  
L. R. 29 I. A. 127

38. ———— *Will—Will of a Mahomedan lady—Rules applicable to the execution thereof—Undue influence—Indian Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 48—Will of a pardanashin lady—Onus probandi.* When dealing with the case of a will or a deed, executed by a pardanashin lady, a particular and peculiar onus rests upon those who come forward to support the document, to show that the executant thoroughly understood what she was doing, and was thoroughly and fully acquainted with the terms of the document she was executing. The presumptions as to the knowledge of the executant of the contents of the document she is executing do not equally apply in the case of a pardanashin lady as in the case of other persons. As to what constitutes undue influence in this country, a useful guide is afforded by s. 48 of the Indian Succession Act. It is true that that section does not apply to the wills of Mahomedans, but for all that it is a useful guide as to what does or does not constitute undue influence. *KHAS MEHAL v. ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL OF BENGAL* (1901)

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See APPROVER.

**PARDON—cont'd.**

See CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS TO MAGISTRATE . . . I. L. R. 2 All. 260  
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 50

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ss. 337.  
338 . . . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 611

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ss. 337 to 339.

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—EXAMINATION AND STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED.  
I. L. R. 1 Bom. 610  
I. L. R. 2 All. 260  
8 W. R. Cr. 53  
14 W. R. Cr. 10  
5 N. W. 217  
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 580  
I. L. R. 10 Bom. 190  
I. L. R. 23 Bom. 213

See SESSIONS JUDGE—JURISDICTION OF.  
I. L. R. 15 Mad. 352  
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 50

——— omission to state reasons for granting—

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT.  
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 629

1. ———— *Application for pardon—Prisoner duly convicted—Fresh evidence sufficient for acquittal—Procedure.* Where a prisoner has been duly convicted of a criminal offence, and afterwards there turns up fresh evidence, which would, in the opinion of the Judge, if it had been available at the trial, have produced an acquittal, the proper course to take is not to acquit the prisoner, but to apply to the proper authority for a pardon. *REG. v. HART* . . . 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 333

s.c. NUSSEER ALI v. HART . . . 6 W. R. Cr. 42

2. ———— *Application for pardon for political offence.* Application for pardon or mitigation of punishment for a political offence (e.g., for waging war against a Power in alliance with the Queen) should be made to the Executive Government. *QUEEN v. SAJOWPA*.

7 W. R. Cr. 100

3. ———— *Tender of pardon—Power of Magistrate—Witness.* A Magistrate is competent to tender a pardon to any person. The fact of such party being directly or indirectly concerned in the offence does not preclude him from being admitted as a witness for the Crown under s. 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861. *QUEEN v. CHUNDEE CHURN BANERJEE* . . . 6 W. R. Cr. 94

4. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 210.* A Sessions Judge was held to be not competent before a trial to instruct a Magistrate to tender a pardon under s. 210 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *In the matter of NISTARINEE DEBIA* . . . 7 W. R. Cr. 114

5. ———— *Tender of conditional pardon—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 209—Power of Magistrate.* The provisions of s. 209, Criminal Procedure Code, applied to cases



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triable by the Magistracy concurrently with the Court of Session. *ANONYMOUS*. 3 *Mad. Ap.* 2

6. *Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 209—Power of Magistrate.* The power given to a Magistrate by s. 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code could not properly be exercised, except with a view to the committal of a case for trial before a Court of Session. *ANONYMOUS*. 3 *Mad. Ap.* 4

7. *Power of Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 209.* On a reference by a Sessions Judge, where certain persons were found guilty of gaming by a full power Magistrate, solely on the evidence of a person supposed to have been concerned in the offence, whom the Magistrate had pardoned:—*Held*, that the Magistrate had no power to tender a pardon in a case which he tries himself, but only under s. 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in the case of an offence triable by the Court of Session. *REG. v. REMEDIOS*. 3 *Bom. Cr.* 59

8. *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882, s. 337, read with s. 338)—Offences not exclusively triable by Court of Session.* A Sessions Judge cannot tender a pardon to an accused under s. 338 of the Criminal Procedure Code, where the offence for which he has been committed is not "triable exclusively by the Court of Session." *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SADHEE KASAL*. I. L. R. 10 *Calc.* 936

9. *Prisoner—Witness—Procedure.* Procedure as to tendering a pardon to a prisoner before examining him as a witness discussed. *QUEEN v. GAGALU*. 4 *B. L. R. Ap.* 50: 12 *W. R. Cr.* 80

10. *Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 337, 389—Accomplice—Tender of pardon, Effect of—Subsequent trial of accomplice for connected offences.* A prisoner charged before a Magistrate at Benares with offences punishable under ss. 471, 472, and 474 of the Penal Code, made a confession to the Magistrate in respect of those offences. He was then sent in custody to Calcutta, and was there, together with other persons, charged before a Magistrate with offences punishable under ss. 467, 473, and 475. The conduct to which these charges related was closely connected and mixed up with that to which the charges first-mentioned had reference. Under s. 337 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate at Calcutta tendered a pardon to the prisoner upon the condition specified in that section, and the prisoner accepted the pardon and gave evidence for the prosecution. The Magistrate held that this evidence was not sufficiently corroborated, and accordingly discharged all the accused, but the pardon was not withdrawn, and there was nothing to show that the Magistrate was dissatisfied with the prisoner's statements or considered that he had not complied with the conditions on which the pardon was tendered. Subsequently the prisoner was committed by the Magistrate of Benares for trial before the Court of Session upon the charges under ss. 471, 472 and 474 of the

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Penal Code. He pleaded not guilty, but did not in terms plead the pardon as a bar to the trial, though he made some reference to the subject; and the Sessions Judge, having made a brief inquiry as to the proceedings at Calcutta, came to the conclusion that there was no sufficient proof of any conditional pardon, and convicted and sentenced the accused. *Held*, that, by the terms of the conditional pardon granted to the accused by the Calcutta Magistrate, the conditions of which were satisfied as was shown by its never having been withdrawn, the accused was protected from trial at Benares in respect of the offences under ss. 471, 472, and 474, and was not liable to be proceeded against in respect of them, and that the trial and conviction were therefore illegal. Although s. 337 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not in terms cover a case where a Magistrate holding a preliminary inquiry for committal against several persons, tenders a conditional pardon to one of them, examines him as a witness, and subsequently discharges all the accused for want of a *prima facie* case against them, the words "every person accepting a tender under this section shall be examined as a witness in the case" mean that for all purposes (subject to failure to satisfy the conditions of the pardon as provided for by s. 339) such a person ceases to be triable for the offence or offences under inquiry or (with reference to s. 339) for "any other offence of which he appears to have been guilty in connection with the same matter" while making "a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offences" directly under inquiry. The words last quoted refer to the importance, when a pardon is tendered, of encouraging the approver to give the fullest details, so that points may be found in his evidence which may be capable of corroboration. The question of how far the pardon protects him, and what portion of it should not protect him, ought not to be treated in a narrow spirit. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GANGA CHARAN*. I. L. R. 11 *All.* 79

11. *Criminal Procedure Code, s. 337—Trial of person who, having accepted a pardon, has not fulfilled the conditions on which it was offered.* Where a pardon has been tendered to and accepted by any person in connection with an offence, he should not be tried for any alleged breach of the conditions of his pardon, or for any offence connected with that for which he has received pardon, until the trial of the principal offence, and of any offence connected therewith, has been completed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SUDRA*. I. L. R. 14 *All.* 336

*QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BHAAU*. I. L. R. 23 *Bom.* 493

*QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NATU*. I. L. R. 27 *Calc.* 137

12. *Criminal Procedure Code (1882), s. 339—Tender of pardon by Magistrate inquiring into a criminal case—Pardon withdrawn after some of the witnesses for the prosecution had been examined—Effect of with-*



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*drawal of the pardon at that stage.* A Magistrate inquiring into a charge of dacoity tendered a pardon to one of the accused persons. The pardon was accepted, and the person to whom it was tendered was examined as a witness for the prosecution. Subsequently, and after certain other witnesses for the prosecution had been examined, the Magistrate, being of opinion that the person to whom pardon had been tendered had not made a full disclosure of the facts of the case, withdrew the pardon, put the person to whom it had been tendered back in the dock, and ultimately committed him along with the other accused to the Court of Session. *Held*, that the commitment of the person whose pardon had been withdrawn must be quashed, inasmuch as he had had no opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution who were examined before his pardon was withdrawn, but that it was not necessary that, if a fresh commitment could be made in time, his trial before the Court of Session should be postponed until the trial of his co-accused had completed. *Queen-Empress v. Sudra*, I. L. R. 14 All. 336, and *Queen-Empress v. Mulua*, I. L. R. 14 All. 502, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BRIJ NARAIN MAN.*

I. L. R. 20 All. 529

13. — *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 337, 529—Tender of pardon by a Magistrate having powers under s. 337 but not being the Magistrate before whom the inquiry was being held.* A dacoity was committed in the district of Muttra, and was being inquired into in that district. Pending such inquiry, one P appeared before the Magistrate of the neighbouring district of Etah and obtained from him a tender of pardon in respect of the said dacoity, on the strength of which pardon he was examined as a witness by the Magistrate of the Etah district and made a statement implicating himself and others in the dacoity. Subsequently, on the case being committed to the Court of the Sessions Judge of Agra, the tender of pardon made by the District Magistrate of Etah was ignored and P was tried and sentenced for the dacoity. *Held*, on appeal to the High Court, that the Magistrate of the Etah district had no jurisdiction under the circumstances to make the tender of pardon which he did and that his action in that respect was not covered by s. 529 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. CHIDDA* . . . I. L. R. 20 All. 40

14. — *Criminal Procedure Code (1882), s. 339—Approver—Withdrawal of conditional pardon—Practice.* The withdrawal of the conditional pardon granted to an approver should be made under s. 339 of the Criminal Procedure Code, by the authority that granted it, and not by the High Court. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MANICK CHANDRA SARKAR* . . . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 492

15. — *Withdrawal of—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 337, 339—Withdrawal of pardon and commitment for trial—Procedure.* R was charged with having committed the offence of dacoity with others. In consequence of a confessional statement made by R, pardon was

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tendered to him by the stationary Sub-Magistrate, under the District Magistrate's order. R was subsequently examined as a witness for the prosecution at a preliminary inquiry into the dacoity held by the Magistrate under Ch. XVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but he retracted his former statement (which he said had been made in consequence of police torture), and asserted that he knew nothing about the dacoity. The dacoity case came on for trial in the Sessions Court, but R was not called as a witness, and, in the end, the persons charged were acquitted. Upon the subsequent application of the police, the District Magistrate withdrew the pardon which had been tendered to R, on the ground that the latter had withdrawn and contradicted his first statement. R was in due course charged before the same Sub-Magistrate with having been one of the dacoits, and was committed for trial. *Held*, that the commitment was legal. The words "in the case," which occur in s. 337 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure include a preliminary inquiry, and do not refer to the trial alone. If there is reason to believe that a person to whom pardon has been tendered will give false evidence, there is no duty on the prosecution to put him forward as a witness. Pardon conditionally granted may be at once withdrawn as soon as good faith has been broken, and good faith is broken if the witness does not disclose the truth to the Magistrate. The proper authority to withdraw a pardon is the authority which granted it. *Queen-Empress v. Manick Chundra Sarkar*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 492, followed. *Semle*: That, when pardon is revoked, no steps should be taken against the person who so forfeits it until after the trial of the other accused is over; and that his trial should then proceed *de novo*. *Queen-Empress v. Brij Narain Man*, I. L. R. 20 All. 529, and *Queen-Empress v. Bhau*, I. L. R. 23 Bom. 493, considered. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAMASAMI* (1900).

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 321

16. — *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 337 and 339—Criminal Procedure—Pardon tendered and accepted—Evidence given and pardon withdrawn by Magistrate—Forfeiture of pardon must be proved—When forfeiture may be declared and pardon withdrawn—Practice.* A committing Magistrate, having under s. 337 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) tendered a pardon to one of three accused persons, examined him as a witness. Subsequently, however, the Magistrate, under s. 339 of the Code, withdrew the pardon on the ground that the accused had wilfully concealed a certain fact connected with the offence; and he committed him, along with the other accused, for trial at the Court of Session where he was found guilty. In giving judgment the Sessions Judge expressed his opinion that the withdrawal of the pardon by the Magistrate was illegal, (i) because such withdrawal could not be made until the close of the trial, and should be made by the Court of Session, and (ii) because the fact, the alleged concealment of which was the ground of the withdrawal, had not been proved. The accused, however, was found guilty and sentenced. On



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appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, that the conviction and sentence should be set aside, on the ground that it had not been proved that the pardon had been forfeited under s. 339 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898). The alleged fact, the concealment of which was the ground for withdrawing the pardon had not been proved. If the pardon which had been granted had not been forfeited under s. 339, it was still in force, and the accused should be discharged. As the law stands, the question in such cases is whether the accused has forfeited his pardon by some act of his own. The question is one of fact, in which the Magistrate may hold one opinion and the Sessions Judge another, as may happen in the case of any other question of fact in issue in the case. The Sessions Court has to determine for itself on the evidence whether the pardon has been forfeited; for, if not, the accused, who has accepted such pardon, cannot be tried. *Quære*: Whether the examination, at the committal proceedings before the Magistrate, of a person who has accepted a pardon satisfies cl. 2 of s. 337 of the Code, which provides that every such person shall be examined as a witness "in the case," or whether such person must be examined as a witness at the "trial." *Queen-Empress v. Bhau*, I. L. R. 23 Bom. 493, doubted. *KING-EMPEROR v. BALA* (1901) I. L. R. 25 Bom. 675

17. ————— *Pardon granted after accused has had an opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution—Withdrawal of pardon and subsequent commitment.* Where a pardon was tendered by a Magistrate to an accused person after he had had an opportunity, as an accused person, of cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution, and on its appearing that he had not made a full and true disclosure of the facts of the case, such pardon was withdrawn and he was committed along with his co-accused to the Court of Session:—*Held*, that the commitment was not open to objection. *Queen-Empress v. Brij Narain Man*, I. L. R. 20 All. 529, followed. *EMPEROR v. BUDHAN* (1906) I. L. R. 29 All. 24

18. ————— **Power of Local Government to tender conditional pardon—Withdrawal of prosecution—Accomplice's evidence—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 30, 494.** A Local Government in India has no power to tender a conditional pardon to an accomplice for the purpose of his being examined as a competent witness against others accused with him. An accomplice, if he is not an accused under trial in the same case, is a competent witness and may be examined on oath; the prosecution must be withdrawn and the accused discharged under s. 494 of the Criminal Procedure Code, before he would become a competent witness. But if the Court purporting to act under s. 494, Criminal Procedure Code, sanctions the withdrawal of the prosecution but omits to record an order of discharge and the accused continues to be kept in custody, his position is in no way changed from that of an accused. The utmost caution is necessary in admitting or using the evidence of an approver. It not only requires

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corroboration in material particulars for its use but its evidentiary value depends considerably upon the circumstances under which its evidence is tendered. *Reg. v. Hanumanta*, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 910, *Empress of India v. Asghar Ali*, I. L. R. 11 All. 260. *Queen-Empress v. Mona Puna*, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 661, *Empress v. Durant*, I. L. R. 23 Bom. 213, *Winsor v. Queen*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 289, *Queen v. Payne*, 1 C. C. R. 349, *Queen v. Behary Lall*, 7 W. R. 44, *Mohesh v. Mohesh*, 10 C. L. R. 553, *Queen-Empress v. Tirbeni Sahai*, I. L. R. 20 All. 426, *Reg. v. Remedios*, 3 Bom. H. C. 59, *R. v. Rudd*, (1775) Cowp. 331, and *Paban Singh v. Emperor*, 10 C. W. N. 847, referred to. *BANU SINGH v. EMPEROR* (1906) I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1353

**PARENT AND CHILD.**

See FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 169

**PARENTAGE, PROOF OF.**

See EVIDENCE ACT, s 9.

I. L. R. 18 All. 98

See LEGITIMACY.

**PARLIAMENT, PROCEEDINGS IN.**

See LIBEL

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 883

**PAROL EVIDENCE.**

See EVIDENCE—PAROL EVIDENCE.

**PARSI INTESTATE SUCCESSION ACT (XXI OF 1865).**

See PARSIS.

————— *Law governing Parsis in the mofussil before the introduction of the Act—Rules of equity and good conscience—Practice of English Equity Courts.* Before the passing of the Parsi Intestate Succession Act, 1865, the law governing Parsis in the mofussil was the ascertained usage of the community modified by the rules of equity and good conscience. It is true that in such cases the practice of the English Equity Courts would also be followed with necessary modifications, but the reference to these Courts would be not for the purposes of introducing special or peculiar doctrines of English law, but rather with the purpose of elucidating the principles of equity and good conscience and of giving uniform effect to them. Before the passing of the Succession Act a Parsi husband did not acquire that particular right which in English Law accrued to a husband over his wife's personality. *SHAPURJI v. DOSSABHOY* (1905)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 359

**PARSI MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT (XV OF 1865).**

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 35

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 644

See PARSIS.



**PARSI MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT (XV OF 1865)—contd.**

ss. 3 and 30—

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—  
BOMBAY—CIVIL.I. L. R. 13 Bom. 302  
I. L. R. 16 Bom. 136

s. 28—

See MARRIAGE . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 639

s. 30.—*Suit for divorce—Guardian ad litem—Minor—Age of majority—Husband and wife.* In a suit by a husband for divorce under s. 30 of the Parsi Marriage Act (XV of 1865), the defendant, if under the age of 21 years, although more than 18 must be deemed to be a minor, and a guardian of the defendant for the suit must be appointed. *SORABJI CAWASJI POLISHVALA v. BUCHOOBAI* . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 366

**PARSI RELIGION.**

See MUKTAD CEREMONIES.

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 122

**PARSI TOWER OF SILENCE.**

See GRANT . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 478

See NATIVE STATE.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 478

**PARSIS.**

See CHARITABLE TRUSTS.

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 509

See GRANT . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 478

See HUSBAND AND WIFE.

I. L. R. 2 Bom. 75

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 630

See LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 689

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 828

1. ——— **Laws applicable to Parsis—Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II, c. 3).** The Statute of Frauds (29 Car. II, c. 3), except so far as it has been repealed, applies to Parsis in India. *BAI MANECKBAI v. BAI MERBAI* I. L. R. 6 Bom. 363

2. ——— **Act IX of 1837—Immoveable property of Parsis.** Statement of circumstances which led to the passing of Act IX of 1837 relating to the immoveable property of Parsis. Application of English law to Parsis in Bombay. *NAOROJI BERAMJI v. ROGERS*. 4 Bom. O. C. 1

3. ——— **Suit for redemption—Parsi defendant—Bom. Reg. IV of 1827, s. 26.** In a suit brought by a Mahomedan to redeem from the defendant, who was a Parsi, certain property that had been conveyed by the ancestor of the latter by a by-al-wafa (deed of conditional sale):—*Held*, that the law to be applied was under s. 26 of Regulation IV of 1827, that of the defendant. That in the absence of any specific law for Parsis in the mofussil, the rule of justice, equity, and good conscience should be observed, and the Court should follow, with certain necessary modifications, the practice of the Courts of equity

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in England. *MANCHARSHA ASHPANDIARJI v. KAMRUNISA BEGAM* . 5 Bom. A. C. 109

4. ——— **Parsis in mofussil of Bombay Presidency—English law—Rule against perpetuities—Equity and good conscience—Gift to heirs of A from generation to generation.** The law applicable to Parsis in the mofussil of the Presidency of Bombay is, in the absence of evidence of any specific law or usage applicable to the particular case, "justice, equity, and good conscience alone." In applying "justice, equity, and good conscience" to the facts of any particular case, the Courts will be guided by the general principles of English law applicable to a similar state of circumstances, and so as, if possible, to give effect to the intentions of the parties concerned, where such intentions are clearly expressed, and are not repugnant to any general principle of English law. The Courts will not, in such a case, apply rules of English law which, though well established and binding on English Courts, are yet so special in their nature and origin as to be inapplicable to the different circumstances of this country. The members of a Parsi family, the heirs of one Framji Cowasji Banaji, deceased, entered into an agreement with one another, bearing date the 24th May 1851, by which they agreed that the remaining income, after paying the deceased's debts, of a certain estate which had belonged to the deceased, called the Poway estate, an estate situated in the Island of Salsette, and therefore in the mofussil of the Presidency of Bombay—should be apportioned "to the heirs mentioned in cl. 7 (of the agreement)"—i.e., among the various heirs of Framji Cowasji Banaji, deceased, the parties to the agreement—"but after their death, their shares are to be enjoyed and received by their heirs and children from generation to generation for ever." It was contended that Parsis being subject to English law, these words conferred an absolute estate in their respective shares upon the various parties to the agreement under the rule in *Shelley's Case*. *Held per BAYLEY J.*, that the plain intention of the parties to the agreement, appearing on the face of the agreement, was that they themselves should take only a life-estate to the extent of their respective shares in the remaining income of the Poway estate; and that the rule in *Shelley's Case* should not be applied so as to defeat that plain intention. *Held*, on appeal (affirming the order of BAYLEY, J.), that, even assuming English law to be applicable, the English law so to be applied could not include the rule in *Shelley's Case* which is a law of property or tenure based on feudal considerations, and unsuited to the circumstances of India; that the rule of construction to be applied to the agreement must in any case be to give effect to the intention of the parties according to the plain meaning of the language; and that to construe the agreement as given more than a life-interest to the parties thereto would be to defeat their obvious intention. *MITHIBAI v. LIMJI NOW-BOJI BANAJI* . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 506

s.c. on appeal . I. L. R. 6 Bom. 151



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5. ————— The same agreement came before the Court for its construction in a suit brought by the parties interested for the administration of the estate of Framji Cowasji Banaji. In that suit it was contended, and was held by the Division Court that the subsequent gift to the "heirs and children (of the signatories) from generation to generation for ever" was void as infringing the rule against perpetuities. On appeal:—*Held*, that the settlement in favour of the heirs and children of each signatory was in law a valid settlement and not void as creating a perpetuity. In the absence of words in the context showing that they were intended to take less, the respective heirs and children of the signatories took an absolute estate. A gift to the heirs of A from generation to generation confers on them, when ascertained, the same estate as if the gift were to X and Y, the heirs of A *nominatim*. **FERDUNJI MERWANJI BANAJI v. MITHIBAI** . . . **I. L. R. 22 Bom. 355**

6. ————— **Marriage of Parsis—Act XV of 1865, s. 30—Bigamy—Divorce.** A Parsi residing in Bombay after the passing of Act XV of 1865, but before it came into operation, contracted a second marriage during the lifetime of his wife, from whom he had not been divorced, and whom he, moreover wilfully deserted for two years. On appeal from an order by the Judge of the Parsi Chief Matrimonial Court rejecting a plaint for divorce by the first wife, on the ground that the subject-matter of the plaint did not constitute a cause of action under s. 30 of Act XV of 1865, and Act VIII of 1859, s. 32:—*Held*, that the facts alleged in the plaint did not amount to "bigamy coupled with adultery," nor to "adultery coupled with wilful desertion," within the meaning of s. 30 of Act XV of 1865, as a second marriage contracted by a Parsi husband during the lifetime of his first wife was not unlawful before the Act came into operation, nor did the provisions of the Act in any way affect the validity or the consequence of such a marriage. **AVABAI v. JAMASJI JAMSHEDJI**. **3 Bom. A. C. 113**

7. ————— **Husband and wife—Parsi Matrimonial Court—Act XV of 1865—Suit by wife for judicial separation—Alimony after decree dismissing wife's suit and pending appeal—Alimony pending petition for review of judgment—Practice in allotment of alimony—Discretion of Court.** A wife sued her husband for judicial separation in the Parsi Matrimonial Court. Alimony was granted to her by an order dated 11th July 1891, which directed the defendant to pay alimony to her from the 15th April 1891, "until the final decree herein be passed." On the 18th July 1891 the suit was dismissed, and after that date the defendant ceased to pay alimony. The plaintiff obtained a rule for review of judgment, which was discharged on the 27th January 1892, and on the 18th March 1892 she filed an appeal against the decree dismissing the suit and against the order refusing a review. She now applied for an order directing the defendant to pay her all the arrears of alimony *pendente lite* from the date of filing

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the suit, or so much as had not been paid, and that he should pay her further alimony until the final disposal of the appeal. *Held*, (i) dismissing the application, that the words "final decree herein," contained in the order of the 11th July 1891 by which alimony was granted, meant the decree in the suit, and not in the appeal; (ii) that the Parsi Matrimonial Court, constituted under Act XV of 1865, had no power to award alimony *pendente lite* after decree and pending appeal; (iii) an unsuccessful wife is not entitled to claim alimony after final decree and pending appeal, nor for the period during which she is seeking review of judgment. *Quære*: Whether the Court where a petition for review is pending before it has a discretion to allot or continue alimony *pendente lite*. The words, "during the suit" in s. 33 of Act XV of 1865 include the period up to the making of a final or absolute decree. **ELLIS v. ELLIS, L. R. 8 P. D. 188**, and **DUNN v. DUNN, L. R. 13 P. D. 91**, should guide the practice of the Parsi Matrimonial Court in allotment of alimony for the time following a decree *nisi*. **HIRABAI v. DHUNJIBHOY BOMANJI** . . . **I. L. R. 17 Bom. 146**

8. ————— **Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act (XV of 1865)—Alimony—Charge on husband's immoveable property—Widow—Distributive share.** By an order of the Parsi Matrimonial Court the deceased was directed to execute a proper instrument charging his immoveable property with the payment of R70 per mensem by way of permanent alimony to his wife during her life. The instrument was executed accordingly. On his death his widow was held entitled, in addition to the R70 per mensem charged on her deceased husband's immoveable property, to a distributive share in his estate. **MOTIBAI v. MOTIBAI**. **I. L. R. 24 Bom. 465**

9. ————— **Marriage—Husband and wife—Agreement for separation—Suit by husband for restitution of conjugal rights—Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act (XV of 1865), s. 36.** Under s. 36 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act (XV of 1865), a contract by which a husband has agreed to allow his wife to live separate is a good defence to a subsequent suit by him for restitution of conjugal rights. **KAWASJI EDULJI BISNI v. SIRINBAI** . . . **I. L. R. 23 Bom. 279**

10. ————— **Infant marriage among Parsis—Consent of father or guardian—Suit to declare an infant marriage null and void—High Court—Parsi Matrimonial Court—Jurisdiction—Act XV of 1865—Letters Patent, s. 12—English law—Subsequent consent or repudiation—Adoption of Hindu practice by Parsis.** In 1868 the plaintiff and defendant, then of the ages of seven and six years, respectively, went through the ceremony of marriage in the presence of their respective parents and according to the rites of their religion. The formal consent on behalf of the plaintiff was not given by his father but by his uncle, with whom he was living and by whom he had been adopted. Nineteen years afterwards the plaintiff filed this suit praying for



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a declaration that the pretended marriage was null and void, and did not create the status of husband and wife between the plaintiff and defendant. The defendant resisted the suit, and claimed to be the lawful wife of the plaintiff. The plaintiff and defendant never lived together as man and wife, nor was the marriage ever consummated. *Held*, that, under the circumstances, the formal consent of the uncle and the tacit consent of the father were enough to satisfy the requirements of s. 8 of Act XV of 1865, which requires the previous consent of the father or guardian to the marriage. *Held*, further, that, such a suit not being in the category of suits relegated to a special Court by Act XV of 1865, the jurisdiction to try it remained in the High Court, to which it had been given by s. 12 of the Letters Patent. *Held*, also, that the law to be applied was the English law (subject, however, to any well-established usage); that by the English law such a marriage would be an inchoate and imperfect marriage capable of repudiation by either party after arriving at years of discretion, but capable also of being made a valid and binding marriage by the consent of the parties thereto after they had arrived at such age. *Held*, further, that the circumstances of the case showed that there had been such acquiescence in, and acceptance of, the marriage by the plaintiff after arriving at years of discretion as to render the marriage valid and binding on him, and incapable of subsequent repudiation. Consummation is the best proof of consent to a marriage, but is not the only proof. *And Semble*: That, although the practice of infant marriages is one which finds no warrant in their own religious system, the Parsis in Western India, have in the course of centuries so generally adopted such practice from their Hindu neighbours as to give such marriages amongst themselves all the validity they possess amongst Hindus, making them independent of any question of subsequent consent or non-consent by the parties thereto. *PESHOTAM HORMASJI DUSTOOR v. MEHERBAI*. **I. L. R. 13 Bom. 302**

**11.** ———— *Infant marriage among Parsis—Custom—Suit for declaration of nullity of infant marriage—Age of majority applicable in case of such suit—Indian Majority Act (IX of 1875), ss. 2 and 3—Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act (XV of 1865), s. 3—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Art. 120.* A Parsi female within three years after she had attained the age of twenty-one, brought a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Broach for a declaration that a marriage ceremony performed in 1869, when she was not three years old, did not create the status of husband and wife between her and the defendant. She had never lived with the defendant as his wife. The Subordinate Judge held that the marriage was valid and binding, being of opinion that the custom of infant marriage among the Parsis was well established and recognized. On appeal the Judge confirmed the decree, holding that at all events in 1869, when the marriage took place, the custom was common and recognized as binding.

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On second appeal the High Court concurred with the opinion expressed in *Peshotam v. Meherbai*, **I. L. R. 13 Bom. 302**, that the Zoroastrian system did not contemplate marriage in infancy, but the lower Courts having found a custom had grown up among Parsis in India validating such marriages, and that the custom was in force in 1869, did not consider it open on second appeal to arrive at an independent finding as to whether the evidence established the existence of such a custom. *Held*, that a Parsi suing to have a marriage declared void is "acting in the matter of marriage," and therefore the Indian Majority Act (IX of 1875), which makes the age of eighteen the age of majority, does not apply to a question of limitation with regard to such suit. The age of majority in such a case is that prescribed by the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act (XV of 1865), *viz.* twenty-one years. *Held*, also that Art. 120 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877) was applicable to the above suit, and that the plaintiff having, for the purpose of bringing the suit attained her majority at twenty-one, the suit was not barred. Act XV of 1865 contains no provision as to the age at which a Parsi marriage can be validly contracted, the matter being left to the general law which governs Parsis in that particular, just as the English Marriage Act (4 Geo. IV. c. 76) leaves it to be dealt with by the common law of England. *BAI SHIRINBAI v. KHARSHEDJI NASARVANJI MASALAVALA*. **I. L. R. 22 Bom. 430**

**12.** ———— *Widower—Parsi Succession Act (XXI of 1865), s. 5—"Widower," meaning of word—A widower on second marriage is still a widower relatively to deceased wife.* In s. 5 of the Parsi Succession Act (XXI of 1865) the word "widower" means a widower relatively to the deceased wife only, and without consideration of the fact or possibility of the widower re-marrying. *D*, a Parsi, died intestate on the 19th September 1885, leaving a widow (the defendant) and two daughters and the heirs of a pre-deceased daughter *J* him surviving. *J* had been the wife of the plaintiff, and had died thirty-four years before the date of this suit, leaving, as her heirs her husband (the plaintiff) and one daughter, who was still living. After *J*'s death the plaintiff married again, and his second wife was living at the date of this suit. Letters of administration to *D*'s estate were granted to his widow, the defendant. The plaintiff claimed a share in *D*'s estate, contending that he was the widower of *J*, one of the daughters of the intestate, and entitled as such under s. 5 of the Parsi Intestate Succession Act (XXI of 1865). *Held*, that he was the widower of *J* within the meaning of the section, and as such was entitled to a share in *D*'s estate. *JEHANGIR DHANJIBHAI SURTI v. PEROZBAI*.

**I. L. R. 1 Bom. 11**

**13.** ———— *Intestate succession among Parsis—Parsi Succession Act (XXI of 1865), s. 7, Sch. II, cl. 2—Next-of-kin.* One *Jerbai*, a Parsi widow, died intestate and without issue, her father, mother, three brothers and two sisters having predeceased her. Two of her brothers



**PARSIS—cont'd.**

and one sister had left children. Some of these children had also predeceased her, leaving children (grand nephews and nieces of Jerbai). Two of this last mentioned class had also predeceased her, leaving children (great-grand-nephews and nieces of Jerbai). *Held*, that Jerbai's property should, in the first instance, be divided into three shares, i.e., one for each of the two predeceased brothers who left children, and one for the predeceased sister who left a child. Each brother's share to be two-fifths and the sister's one-fifth. These shares to be subdivided among the descendants of the two brothers and the sister, respectively, no descendant being entitled to share concurrently with his or her ancestor, and, on each division and sub-division, each male taking double the share of each female standing in the same degree of propinquity. In Art. 2 of the second Schedule of the Parsi Succession Act (XXI of 1865) the gift to lineal descendants is substitutional in the sense that they take nothing if the head of their branch of the family is living, whereas if he is dead they stand in his place and take the share which he would have taken. In distributing an estate, therefore, "among brothers and sisters and the lineal descendants of such of them as have predeceased the intestate," the primary division must be *per stirpes*. If there are surviving brothers and lineal descendants of a predeceased brother, then each surviving brother will take equal shares with the lineal descendants collectively. If all the brothers are dead, then the share which each would have taken, had he survived, will be taken by his lineal descendants. If in either case the predeceased was a sister, her lineal descendants will take her half-share only. In both ss. 6 and 7 of the Parsi Succession Act the words "next-of-kin" and "relatives" are synonymous, and are collective names for the persons mentioned in the first and second Schedules respectively. *HIRJIBHAI CURSETJI BHANDUPWALA v. BARJORJI SARABJI ASHBURNER*.

**I. L. R. 22 Bom. 909**

**14.** ————— *Act XXI of 1865, s. 8—Succession Act, s. 42—Advancement—Statute of distribution.* In excluding, by s. 8 of the Parsi Succession Act, from application to Parsis, s. 42 of the Succession Act, which repeals the English rule as to advancement contained in the Statute of Distribution, s. 5, it was not the intention of the Legislature to preserve the last-mentioned rule in force for the Parsi community. *DHANJIBHAI BOMANJI GUGRAT v. NAVAZBAI*.

**I. L. R. 2 Bom. 75**

**15.** ————— *Act XXI of 1865—Effect of wards excluding from inheritance. Heir-at-law.* A, a Parsi inhabitant of Surat, died there on the 13th February 1879, leaving him surviving the following relations, viz., a daughter J (the respondent) by his first wife, who had predeceased him; his second wife, Dhanbai, who lived apart from him; his third wife, who had been divorced by him, and whose son A did not recognize as his own; and his three sisters, D, S, and G, the first-named of whom had been married to K, and whose son E was the appellant. By his will A

**PARSIS—cont'd.**

expressly directed that neither his daughter J nor his widow Dhanbai should take any share of his property, the whole of which he bequeathed to his brother R, who, however, predeceased him. On the 6th September 1879 J applied to the District Court of Surat that letters of administration to A's estate might be granted to her husband as her attorney, alleging that A died intestate. Her application was opposed by E, D, and S (the nephew and two sisters of A), on the ground that J was expressly excluded by A from inheriting his property, and that neither she nor her husband resided permanently within the Presidency of Bombay. The District Judge granted limited letters of administration to J's husband as her attorney, under s. 214 of Act X of 1865. On an appeal to the High Court by E alone:—*Held*, that A had died intestate, not having made any bequest or devise of his property which could take effect, inasmuch as his sole devisee (R) had predeceased him, and that the estate must therefore go in accordance with the law of succession. The use of mere negative words, unaccompanied by any effective disposition of his property, could not exclude his daughter J or his widow Dhanbai from succeeding to their share of the estate. Under the Parsi Succession Act (XXI of 1865) widows and children rank before brothers and sisters. S. 7, Sch. II, Art. 2, of the Parsi Succession Act, is applicable only where the deceased leaves neither lineal descendants, nor a widow or widower. *ERASHA KAIKHUSRU v. JERBAI*.

**I. L. R. 4 Bom. 537**

**16.** ————— *Act XXI of 1865—Childless widow of intestate son of Parsi.* It is not a condition precedent to the application of s. 5 of Act XXI of 1865 that the predeceased son of an intestate Parsi shall have left a widow and issue. Where an intestate Parsi left him surviving a widow, sons, daughters, children of a predeceased son, and the widow of another predeceased son, who had died without issue and a posthumous daughter was afterwards born to the intestate:—*Held*, that such last-mentioned widow was entitled to one moiety of the share in the intestate's estate which her husband would have taken had he survived the intestate, and that the other moiety of such share devolved on the surviving issue of the intestate, including the posthumous daughter, and the children of his other predeceased son. *MANCHERJI KAWASJI DAVUR v. MITHIBAI*.

**I. L. R. 1 Bom. 506**

**17.** ————— *Parsi will, evidence of genuineness of—Adoption.* An adoption made by a Parsi immediately before his death would render extremely improbable the execution of a will by him a very short time previous thereto, and therefore calls for very clear proof to establish its existence. *HOMABHAE v. PUNJEABHAE DOSABHAE*.

**5 W. R. P. C. 102**

**18.** ————— *Usage among Parsis.* The will of a Parsi in favour of his wife and daughter upheld, notwithstanding a rule or usage set up by a brother of the testator to the effect that among Parsis no disposition could be made by will to the total disinheritance of the heir, such rule or usage



**PARSIS—concl'd.**

not being proved. *MODEE KAIKHOOSROW HORMUSJEE v. COOVEERBHAEE.*

4 W. R. P. C. 94: 6 Moo. I. A. 448

19. — *Atash Behram (Parsi fire-temple)—Parsi community of Udwada—Trust—Suit—Capacity to hold property—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 539—Mandatory injunction—Trespasser.* In this country a fluctuating body of persons, such as a village community, is capable of owning property. It is opposed to the notions of the Parsi community that the Iran Shah (sacred fire) should be regarded as capable of, or the subject of, ownership but even if there be difficulty or doubt as to its ownership, it is obvious that there must be some one entitled to protect from improper invasion the temple property; and those, who can predicate of themselves that they have exercised the management, authority and supervision as alleged in the plaint, are so entitled. The Parsi inhabitants of Udwada, as the Anjuman (that is a constituted council or assembly to which all questions regarding their peculiar customs are referred) of that town, are vested with the control, management and supervision of the Atash Behram at that place and all that appertain to it. A suit for the vindication of the right of management which is vested in, and actually being exercised by, the plaintiffs and those they represent at the date of the obstruction does not fall within s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), merely because those who cause the obstruction, happen to have been nominated trustees. A mandatory injunction should not be granted against a trespasser compelling him to come on the land, on which he had trespassed to remove an encroachment made thereon by him. *NAVROJI MANEKJI WADIA v. DASTUR KHARSEDJI MANCHERJI (1904).*

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1. PARTIES TO SUITS.

1. ——— Advocate General—Suit for account of endowed property on death of last surviving trustee. *Quære*: Whether the Advocate-General must not be made a party in all cases where an account is sued for of property left by will to a charitable institution of which the last surviving trustee has died. Notice of the decree directed to be given to the Advocate General in case he should think fit, on behalf of the Crown, to propose a scheme for the management of the charity. Powers of the Advocate General. *THAKOOR DOSS SETT v. HOGG* Cor. 68

2. ——— Suit to administer funds of Hindu charity. A suit to administer the funds of a Hindu charity is properly brought in the name of the Advocate General, who should, however, only exercise a general control over such suit, and not interfere in the minute details of the religious charity to be administered. *ADVOCATE GENERAL v. VISHVANATH ATMARAM* 1 Bom. Ap. 9



**PARTIES—contd.****I. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

3. ——— **Agents—Suit by agents brought in their own names.** All suits should be brought by the person or persons in whom the legal right of suit is vested, and not by agents in their own names. The objection that a suit is not so brought is an important one materially affecting the regularity of procedure. *LALA MANOHUR DASS v. KISHEN DYAL* **3 N. W. 175**

*LADLEE PERSHAD v. GUNGA PERSHAD.* **4 N. W. 59**

*FYAZOODDEEN v. PUDMEE* . **4 N. W. 68**

*NUBEEN CHUNDER PAUL v. STEPHENSON.* **15 W. R. 534**

4. ——— **Suit brought in agent's name—Suit by agent for principal.** Where an attorney sues for his principal, the suit should be brought in the name of the principal. *CHOONEE SOOKUL v. HUR PERSHAD* **1 N. W. Ed. 1873, 277**

*JUGUNNATH v. BECK* . **2 N. W. 60**

*HURSARUN SINGH v. PURSHUN SINGH.* **2 N. W. 415**

5. ——— **Suit as agent—Act X of 1859, s. 69.—Held (by MARKBY, J.), that no one can be plaintiff in a suit for rent except the person who has the right to recover, the only effect of s. 69, Act X of 1859, being to enable the person who is employed in the collection of rents to sue as agent.** *MODHOOSOODUN SINGH v. MORAN & Co.* . **11 W. R. 43**

*See MEAJAN KHAN v. AKALLY*  
**Marsh. 384 : 2 Hay 426**

6. ——— **Suit against agent—Liability of firm for act of gomashtha.** A gomashtha of a firm should not be sued in respect of a debt due from the firm even if he contracted it with authority. *PHOOL CHUND v. SHIVA PERSHAD.* **2 Agra Mis. 4**

7. ——— **Gomashtha—Recognized agent—Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 13.** A gomashtha holding a written authority from his employer, and suing for rent in the name and on behalf of the latter, should be admitted as the recognised agent of such employer within the meaning of s. 13, Beng. Act VIII of 1869. *RAM LALL KURFURMA v. RAM TARUN KOONDoo* . **16 W. R. 254**

8. ——— **Bengal Rent Act, 1869, s. 32—Principal and agent—Plaintiff—Gomashtha.** Under s. 32 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, a gomashtha has no right to bring a suit in his own name. He can only sue in the name of his employer, and conduct the suit for him like any other agent. *KOONJO BEHARY ROY v. POORNO CHUNDER CHATTERJEE.*

**I. L. R. 9 Calc. 450 : 12 C. L. R. 55**

9. ——— **Gomashtha—Plaintiffs.** Where a gomashtha sued on behalf of a firm, it was ordered that the parties themselves whom he represented should be made parties, and a guardian

**PARTIES—contd.****I. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

appointed for such of them as were minors. *GOBIND DASS v. JAYKISHEN DASS* . **2 Agra 101**

10. ——— **Suit by manager of indigo concern—Right to sue.** In an action brought by the manager of an indigo concern, on the basis of a contract executed by defendant and addressed to a previous manager, now deceased, it was held that, as the plaintiff did not disclose that the plaintiff had any interest of his own in the suit, and as the contract was not in terms with him personally, he could not maintain the action in his own name. *GLASCOTT v. GOPAL SHEIKH.* **9 W. R. 254**

11. ——— **Suit by Official Assignee—Agent of assignee.** In a suit by the Official Assignee of an Insolvent Court, such Official Assignee should be made the plaintiff, and the law then allows him to sue by his recognized agent; but the law does not allow the recognized agent to sue as plaintiff. In a suit so incorrectly instituted the plaint should be returned for amendment. *CARTER v. MISREE LAL* . **2 N. W. 179**

12. ——— **Agent suing instead of corporate body.** Where a corporate body—e.g., the East Indian Railway Company—is sued not in its corporate capacity, but through an agent, the suit is brought in a wrong form. *NUBEEN CHUNDER PAUL v. STEPHENSON.* . **15 W. R. 534**

13. ——— **Benamidars—Suit by benamidar—Acquiescence in, or waiver of, objection.** The real owner of property is the person who should institute a suit for it. A benami holder may sue as trustee on behalf of the beneficial owner, without disclosing the name of the real owner; and if the defendant does not object to the suit proceeding in that form, and raises no issue upon the real title of the plaintiff, the suit may proceed and be decided. *PROSUNNO COOMAR ROY CHOWDHRY v. GOOROO CHURN SEIN. GOOROO CHURN SEIN v. OOOJULMONEE CHOWDHRAIN* . **3 W. R. 159**

14. ——— **Right of suit—Suit for declaration of title to, and for possession of, immoveable property—Disclaimer of real owner.** In a suit for a declaration of the plaintiff's right by purchase to, and for possession of, certain immoveable property, it was found on the evidence that the plaintiff was merely a benamidar for one of the defendants, and had no right to the property. That defendant, in his evidence disclaimed any title to the property. *Held*, that the plaintiff had no right to sue, being a mere benamidar, and neither the disclaimer of the real owner, nor the fact that he was a party to the suit, was sufficient to enable the plaintiff to maintain the suit when instituted, or to entitle him to have the real owner added as a co-plaintiff. *Prosunno Coomar Roy Chowdhry v. Gooroo Churn Sein*, 3 W. R. 159, followed. *HARI GOBIND ADHIKARI v. AKHOY KUMAR MOZUMDAR.* **I. L. R. 16 Calc. 364**



PARTIES—*contd.*1. PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

15. *Suit for land sold in execution of decree—Actual purchaser.* In a suit for possession of land sold in execution of a decree by a person who claimed to have brought the right, title, and interest of the judgment-debtor in the land, but who, in fact, was not the real purchaser:—*Held* the suit must be dismissed because of the non-joinder as plaintiff of the real purchaser. *KALLY PROSONNO BOSE v. DINONATH MULLICK.*  
11 B. L. R. 56 : 19 W. R. 434

16. *Benami purchase—Suit for possession—Real purchaser.* A suit for possession of property, which has been purchased benami, cannot be maintained in the name of the nominal purchaser; the real purchaser should be made a plaintiff in the suit. *FUZEELUN BEEBEE v. OMDAH BEEBEE.*  
11 B. L. R. 60 note : 10 W. R. 469

*MEHEROONISSA BIBEE v. HUR CHURN BOSE.*  
10 W. R. 220

*TAMAOONNISSA v. WOJJULMONEE DOSSEE.*  
20 W. R. 72

17. *Suit on title for possession of immoveable property—Right of benamidar to sue in his own name.* A benamidar, suing for the recovery of immoveable property on title, can sue in his own name, and when such a suit is instituted by a benamidar, it must be held to have been instituted with the consent and approval of the beneficiary, against whom any adverse decision on the title set up will take effect as a *res judicata*. *Prossunno Koomar Roy Chowdhry v. Gooroo Churn Sein*, 3 W. R. 159, and *Hari Gobind Adhikari v. Akhoy Kumar Mozumdar*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 364, dissented from. *Fuzeelun Beebee v. Omdah Beebee*, 10 W. R. 469, and *Meheroonissa Bibee v. Hur Churn Bose*, 10 W. R. 220, distinguished. *Gopeekrist Gosain v. Gungapersaud Gosain*, 6 Moo. I. A. 53, explained. *Ram Bhurosee Singh v. Bissesser Narain Singh*, 18 W. R. 454; *Gopi Nath Chobey v. Bhugwat Pershad*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 697, and *Shangara v. Krishnam*, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 267, referred to. *NAND KISHORE LAL v. AHMAD ATA. ANMOLI BIBEE v. AHMAD ATA. BHOLE BIBI v. AHMAD ATA.* I. L. R. 18 All. 69

18. *Suit by benamidar.* A mortgage-bond was executed ostensibly in favour of R, but J was the real mortgagee. A suit was brought by R, the benamidar, to enforce the bond; J, the real mortgagee, made over the debt on a date previous to the suit but executed the formal deed of assignment on a date subsequent thereto. *Held*, that the benamidar might maintain the suit. *BHOLA PERSHAD v. RAM LALL.*  
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 34

19. *Suit or foreclosure of mortgage—Beneficial owner not made a party—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85—Right of suit.* A suit for foreclosure of a mortgage may be brought by the person named in

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the mortgage deed as the mortgagee, although he was, in fact, only the benamidar of the beneficial owner; and such a suit should not be dismissed because the beneficial owner is not added as a party. *SACHITANANDA MOHAPATRA v. BALORAM GORAIN.*  
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 644

20. *Suit for ejectment.* A mere benamidar cannot maintain a suit for ejectment, he having neither title to, nor possession of, the property. *Hari Gobinda Adhikari v. Akhoy Kumar Mozumdar*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 364, followed in principle. *Nand Kishore Lal v. Ahmad Ata*, I. L. R. 18 All. 69, dissented from. *ISSUR CHANDRA DUTT v. GOPAL CHANDRA DAS.*  
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 98  
3 C. W. N. 20

21. *Benami purchaser—Right of benamidar to sue for possession of immoveable property.* A benami purchaser of immoveable property has no right to sue for recovery of possession of the same. *Hari Gobind Adhikari v. Akhoy Kumar Mazumdar*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 364, and *Issur Chundra Dutt v. Gopal Chandra Das*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 98, followed. *Nand Kishore Lal v. Ahmad Ata*, I. L. R. 18 All. 69, referred to. *Gopi Nath Chobey v. Bhugwat Pershad*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 697, distinguished. *BARODA SUNDARY GHOSE v. DINO BANDHU KHAN.* I. L. R. 25 Calc. 874  
3 C. W. N. 12

22. *Suit for sale on a mortgage—Right of benamidar mortgagee to sue.* *Held*, that the mortgagee named in a deed of mortgage is competent to sue in his own name for sale on the mortgage, though he is admittedly only a benamidar from some third person. *Nand Kishori Lal v. Ahmad Ata*, I. L. R. 18 All. 69, followed. *Gopi Nath Chobey v. Bhugwat Pershad*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 697; *Bhola Pershad v. Ram Lall*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 34; *Sachitananda Mahapatra v. Baloram Gorain*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 644; *Shangara v. Krishnan*, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 267; *Ravji Appaji Kulkarni v. Mahadev Bapuji Kulkarni*, I. L. R. 22 Bom. 672; and *Dagdu v. Balvant Ramchandra Natu*, I. L. R. 22 Bom. 820, referred to. *Hari Gobind Adhikari v. Akhoy Kumar Mozumdar*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 364; *Issur Chandra Dutt v. Gopal Chandra Das*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 98; and *Baroda Sundari Ghose v. Dino Bandhu Khan*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 874, dissented from. *YAD RAM v. UMRao SINGH.*  
I. L. R. 21 All. 380

23. *Plaintiff found to be a mere name-lender without interest in suit—Redemption, suit for, by puisne mortgagee—Joinder of mortgagor on second appeal.* On second appeal against a decree dismissing a suit which had been brought by a puisne mortgagee to redeem a prior incumbrance, it was ordered that the mortgagor be brought on to the record. On its appearing that it had not been intended that the plaintiff should take any interest under the mortgage sued on:—*Held*, that the second appeal should be dismissed. *CHINNAN v. RAMACHANDRA.* I. L. R. 15 Mad. 54

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**PARTIES—contd.****I. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

**24.** ———— *Suit in name of benamidar.* Where a suit is brought in the name of a benamidar only, the Court ought to direct that the beneficial owners should be made parties, and not to dismiss the suit. *SITA NATH SHAHA v. NOBIN CHUNDER ROY* . . . . . **5 C. L. R. 102**

*See GOPI NATH CHOBEY v. BHUGWAT PERSHAD* . . . . . **I. L. R. 10 Calc. 697**

**25.** ———— *Suit by benami purchaser—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 260.* A purchased at a Sheriff's sale, in the name of his son, the interest of a mortgagee in certain property, and, before Act VIII of 1859 came into operation, instituted a suit in his own name to recover the possession of the mortgaged property. *Held*, that the suit was rightly brought, if the son's consent could be shown. *Quere*: What is the effect of s. 260 of Act VIII of 1859 on suits of this character? *BHAISHANKAR NARBHERAM v. HARIVALLABH* **1 Bom. 20**

**26.** ———— *Bonds, suits on—Suit by assignee of bond, after death of obligee—Representative of obligee.* In a suit by A on a bond in favour of B, the plaintiff may show by oral evidence that the money secured by the bond was his own; but where B has died A must either entitle himself as B's personal representative, or make B's personal representative a party to the suit. *DEVA RAU v. VENTESA ACHARIYAR* . . . . . **1 Mad. 452**

**27.** ———— *Indemnity bond.* A bond of indemnity was given to five persons to secure the fidelity of a naib. The naib was afterwards employed by three only out of the five obligees in the bond. *Held*, that, on the naib misconducting himself, the three obligees could not sue alone on the bond. *Semle*: Neither in such case could the five obligees have sued, as the faithful service intended to be secured by the bond was service to five persons, and not to three only. *PARBUTTINATH ROY v. TEJOMOY BANERJI*.  
**I. L. R. 5 Calc. 303**

**28.** ———— *Suit by assignee on bond—Liability of obligee.* The obligee of a common money-bond, of which a *bona fide* valid assignment has been made, is not liable to be made a defendant in a suit by his assignee to enforce payment of the bond, and to a decree against himself jointly with the obligor. *ANONYMOUS v. MUTTUSAMIYA PILLAI* . . . . . **1 Mad. 140**

**29.** ———— *Contracts, suits on—Suit for specific performance—Stranger to contract—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), ss. 28 and 45.* A stranger to a contract of which specific performance is sought, cannot be a party to the suit. Where, therefore, the plaintiff sued as against one defendant for specific performance of a contract to sell land and as against another for a declaration that he was not entitled to any charge upon the said lands:—*Held*, that the latter defendant was improperly made a party to the suit. *LUCKUMSEY OOKERDA v. FAZULLA CASSUMBHOY*.  
**I. L. R. 5 Bom. 177**

**PARTIES—contd.****I. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

**30.** ———— *Suit for specific performance—Receiver.* Where the receiver in a suit had, by order of Court, sold certain property in the suit, and had executed the contract of sale in his own name, a plaintiff praying for specific performance against the purchaser for refusing to complete the contract was admitted with the receiver as co-plaintiff, he having obtained leave to sue. *WILKINSON v. GANGADHAR SIKKAR* . **6 B. L. R. 486**

**31.** ———— *Suit for specific performance.* In a suit for specific performance of a contract:—*Held*, that the principle laid down in the cases of *De Houghton v. Money*, **L. R. 2 Ch. App. 166**, and *Luckumsey Ookerda v. Fazulla Cassumbhoy*, **I. L. R. 5 Bom. 177**,—viz., that a stranger to the contract cannot be a party to the suit,—is only applicable where from the plaintiff's case it appears that a third party, not a party to the contract, has a distinct interest from that of the other parties to the contract, which interest is sought to be declared null and void. *MOKUND LALL v. CHOTAY LALL*.  
**I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1061**

**32.** ———— *Suit by mortgagee without co-sharers.* Where a mortgage-bond was executed in favour of the plaintiff alone, the fact that there were other persons members of the joint family co-sharers with the plaintiff did not render it necessary to make them parties to a suit on the mortgage, as the plaintiff might be regarded as contracting on behalf of himself and the other members of the family as undisclosed principals. *BUNGSEE SINGH v. SOODIST LALL*.  
**I. L. R. 7 Calc. 739**  
**10 C. L. R. 263**

**33.** ———— *Agreement to share profits of trade—Suit for share under agreement.* Four persons each of whom owned a ginning factory, entered into an agreement, which (*inter alia*) provided that they should charge a uniform rate of R4-8-0 per palla for ginning cotton; that of this sum, R2-8-0 should be treated as the actual cost of ginning; and that the remaining R2 should be carried to a common fund, to be divided each year between the parties to the agreement in proportion to the number of ginning machines which each of them possessed. The agreement was to be in force for four years. The other parties had carried out the agreement but the defendant, although he had carried the R2 to a separate account, refused to pay the plaintiff his share of the amount. He also refused to pay the other two parties their share. The accounts had been duly made up, showing the sums which the defendant under the agreement had to pay both to the plaintiff and the two other parties to the agreement. The plaintiff sued the defendant for his share. The defendant contended that the plaintiff ought to have made the other parties to the agreement parties to the suit. *Held*, that the other parties to the agreement were not necessary parties to the suit. The accounts had been made up and were admittedly correct, and they showed that the defendant had nothing to receive from any of the parties to the agreement,



**PARTIES—contd.****1. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

but that he was indebted in a definite sum to the plaintiff. *HARIBHAI MANEKLAL v. SHARAFALI ISABJI* . . . . . **I. L. R. 22 Bom. 861**

**34. Co-contractors—**

*Right of some of several co-contractors to sue alone—Refusal to join in the suit as plaintiff, effect of.* Where two parties contract with a third party, a suit by one of them making the other a co-defendant ought not to be dismissed merely because the plaintiff has not proved that the co-defendant had refused to join as a co-plaintiff. *PYARI MOHUN BOSE v. KEDARNATH ROY*

**I. L. R. 26 Calc. 409**

*PYARI MOHAN BOSE v. NABIN CHUNDER ROY*  
**3 C. W. N. 271**

*TARINI KANT LAHARI v. NUND KISHORE PATRONOVIS* . . . . . **12 C. L. R. 588**

*BISSESSUR ROY CHOWDHRY v. BROJO KANT ROY CHOWDHRY* . . . . . **1 C. W. N. 221**

*(Contra) DWAREKANATH MITTER v. TARA PRONUNNA ROY* . . . . . **I. L. R. 17 Calc. 160**

**35. Co-sharers—Joinder of parties—**

*Right of co-sharer to sue alone.* Unless there is a special provision of the law, co-owners are not permitted to sue through some or one of their members, but all co-owners must join in a suit to recover their property. The defendant cannot be deprived of his right to insist on the other co-owners being joined on the record by the fact that they approve of the suit being brought by the plaintiff alone. *BALKRISHNA MORESHVAR KUNTE v. MUNICIPALITY OF MAHAD* . . . . . **I. L. R. 10 Bom. 32**

**36. Suit for arrears**

*of rent—Appeal, amendment on.* In a suit for arrears of rent of the plaintiff's share of a talukh, it appeared that in the year 1279 a batwara was effected of the zamindari in which the talukh was situated, and that the talukh ceased to be held exclusively by the plaintiff, but was divided between him and certain other persons, who were not made parties to the suit. *Held*, that all the co-sharers should have been joined as parties, and that, as this had not been done, the suit was bad. *OBHOY GOVIND CHOWDHRY v. HURYCHURN CHOWDHRY*

**I. L. R. 8 Calc. 277**

**37. Lease—Suit by**

*one of several joint lessors for his share of rent.* One of several joint lessors of certain land sued the lessee for his share of the rent payable under the lease to all the lessors, making the other lessors defendants. *Held*, that the suit was not maintainable, and the making of the other lessors defendants did not cure the defect in the suit. *MANOHAR DAS v. MANZUR ALI* . . . . . **I. L. R. 5 All. 40**

**38. Suit for ejectment**

*—Landlord and tenant—Possession, suit for, by one of several proprietors.* The owners of a 13-anna share of a julkur sued to eject a lease on his refusal to pay an enhanced rent. *Held*, that he could not be ejected by a suit brought by one only of

**PARTIES—contd.****1. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

several proprietors. A lease granted by all the proprietors cannot be varied or terminated at the suit of one. *BOLLYE SATEE v. AKRAM ALLI*  
**I. L. R. 4 Calc. 961**

**39. Suit for possession—Lessors.**

Plaintiff sued to recover possession of certain land said to have been included in a talukh pottah given him by the zamindars, alleging that defendants were obstructing his possession. For the defence it was averred that these lands fell within a 9-anna share which belonged to one D, and that by process of sale they became the right of other parties under whom defendants held as lessees. *Held*, that it was unnecessary to make the lessors on either side parties in the case. *NAGUR CHAND v. DOORGA DOSS CHOWDHRY* **11 W. R. 137**

**40. Suit by co-sharer**

*against mortgagee for share of profits—Act XIV of 1863, s. 1.* A co-sharer can only sue such persons in the Revenue Court, under cl. 2, s. 1, Act XIV of 1863, as are appointed or entitled by custom to make the collections of rent on behalf of the proprietary body of the estate or any part thereof and who are bound to pay the revenue and village expenses, and to account to co-parceners for receipts and expenditure as their representatives. *SREE KISHEN v. ESHREE PURTAUB RAI* . **2 Agra 299**

**41. Debtor and creditor, suits**

*between—Bond—Suit for a share of a debt.* A, B, and C were uterine brothers, Mahomedans, to whom jointly a sum of money was due on a bond. A, the elder brother, sued the debtor for recovery of the debt, and, after successfully resisting the claim of B's widow to be made a party to the suit obtained a decree for the principal and interest to the date of decree, together with subsequent interests and costs. A realized the decree for the principal and interest to the date of decree only. B's widow, on behalf of herself and two minor sons, sued A for the share of the decretal moneys which belonged to her husband's estate. She refused to join her daughters as parties. *Held*, that she was entitled to recover a third share of the amount realized under A's decree, minus the share of her two daughters. *NURUNNISSA v. ROUSHAN JAN*

**2 B. L. R. Ap. 1**

**42. Trustees for**

*benefit of creditors.* The creditor of an insolvent who has assigned all his property to trustees for the benefit of all his creditors generally sued him for his debt, joining the trustees as defendants, on the ground that they had refused to register his claim. *Held*, that they were rightly joined as defendants in the suit. *AJUDHIA NATH v. ANANT DAS* . . . . . **I. L. R. 3 All. 799**

**43. Suit by trustees**

*of deed for benefit of creditors to set aside attachment.* To a suit by the trustees of an assignment for the benefit of his creditors by an insolvent trader to set aside an attachment by an execution-creditor who did not assent to the assignment, it is not

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# **NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND ODDH MUNICIPALITIES ACT (I OF 1900)—concl'd.**

## **s. 183—concl'd.**

right to build the temple. *Held*, that the suit was not maintainable. *Held*, further, that the Civil Court had no power to disturb the order of the District Magistrate who acted within his jurisdiction and whose order had been duly confirmed by the Local Government. *Abdul Aziz v. Municipal Board of Pilibhit*, 2 All. L. J. 222, followed. *BULAKI DAS v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* (1909)

I. L. R. 31 All. 371

**s. 187—Rules framed by Local Government for the regulation of Municipal Elections—Procedure—Power to award costs—Suit to set aside order awarding costs—Jurisdiction.** A Magistrate trying a petition to set aside the election of a member of a Municipal Board is not empowered to award costs against the unsuccessful party, and if he does so, it is competent to the party against whom costs are awarded to sue in a Civil Court to have as much of the Magistrate's order as relates to costs set aside. *CHANDRA BHAN v. GIRWAR LAL* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 475

# **NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND ODDH WATER-WORKS ACT (I OF 1891).**

**ss. 34, 40 and 41—Construction of Statutes—Omission to give notice of re-occupation of house—Water rate paid during period of non-occupation.** *Held*, that the provisions of s. 41 of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh Water-Works Act, 1891, would not apply to the case of a person who had in fact regularly paid the water rate due in respect of the house during the period of its non-occupation. *EMPEROR v. SUMER CHAND* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 375

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I. L. R. 18 Bom. 59

See CLAIM TO ATTACHED PROPERTY.

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 700

See COMPANIES ACT, s. 169.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 576

See CUSTODY OF CHILDREN.

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 473

See DIVORCE ACT, s. 16.

4 B. L. R. O. C. 52

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 443; 539

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—STAY OF EXECUTION . I. L. R. 15 Bom. 536

See MORTGAGE—POWER OF SALE.

22 W. R. 47

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS CASES I. L. R. 26 Mad. 41

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—MORTGAGED PROPERTY.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 506

## of assignment—

See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 577

See MORTGAGE—REDEMPTION—RIGHT OF REDEMPTION.

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 505

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1877—

ss. 49 AND 50.

s. 50.

s. 50 AND s. 17.

See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—TRANSFER OF RIGHT . . . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 642

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 131

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 505

I. L. R. 10 All. 20

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 289

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 502

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 132

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 60

See VENDOR AND PURCHASER—NOTICE.



PARTIES—*contd.*I. PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

should be made parties, respondents. *Held*, that it was a mistaken view that a decree annulling the sale in this suit would be *res judicata* in any future question or proceeding, as between the Government and the unsuccessful purchaser. The Secretary of State for India, therefore, was not a necessary respondent. His position was correctly explained in *Bal Mokoond Lal v. Jirjudhun Roy*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 271, in the judgment of MITTER, J. BALKISHEN DAS *v.* SIMPSON . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 833  
L. R. 25 I. A. 151  
2 C. W. N. 513

63. ———— *Suit to recover chur lands claimed by Government as an island and settled with defendants.* Plaintiff brought a suit for recovery of possession of land which had been thrown up by a large navigable river, and which he alleged formed an accretion to his estate. The defendant who was in possession claimed to hold the lands under a settlement which the Government had made with his predecessors in title, the Government having three years previously taken up the lands as forming an island. *Held*, that the Government, as claiming a proprietary right in the disputed land, was a necessary party to the suit. CANNON *v.* BISSEONATH ADHICARI . . . 5 C. L. R. 154

64. ———— *Suit to set aside settlement.* In a suit by a person claiming certain lands which had been resumed by the Government and settled with another party, the Government should be made a party. MAHOMED ISRAILE *v.* WISE . 13 B. L. R. F. B. 118 : 21 W. R. 327

KRISHNO LALL NAG *v.* BHYRUB CHUNDER DEB  
22 W. R. 52

65. ———— *Suit for possession of land settled by Government with successive owners.* Where a piece of land has been surveyed and settled at one time as an accretion to the estate of A and at another as an accretion to the estate of B, in a suit by A against B for possession of the land it is not, as a rule, necessary that the Government should be made a party. MAHOMED ISRAILE *v.* WISE, 13 B. L. R. 118 : 21 W. R. 327, considered and explained. GIRDHAREE SAHOO *v.* HERA LALL SEAL . . . 2 C. L. R. 467

66. ———— *Suit for possession and declaration of right to participate in a permanent settlement of a mehal resumed under Reg. II of 1819.* Chur land was held by the proprietors of the adjoining estate. The chur was resumed by Government in 1835, and declared to be liable to assessment under Regulation II of 1819. The recorded proprietors of the adjoining permanently-settled estate, to which the chur was a contiguous accretion, refused to make a permanent settlement with Government at the rent demanded. The chur was then held khas by Government for some time, and subsequently leased out for temporary periods to strangers. In these temporary leases Government reserved the proprietor's rights to come in and take a permanent settlement on

PARTIES—*contd.*I. PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

the expiry of the temporary settlements, and also reserved an allowance of 10 per cent. on the rent as malikanah on their account, which sum had been kept in deposit in the Collectorate treasury. In 1867 the Government made a permanent settlement with the defendant, one of the recorded proprietors of the contiguous estate, of the entire chur, and refused the application of other shareholders in the estate to be joined in the settlement. The Collector, at the request of the defendant, applied the deposit in his treasury in satisfaction of the Government revenue. An unsuccessful shareholder brought a civil suit against the defendant for possession, and a declaration of his right to participate in the settlement. *Held*, that it was not necessary to make the Government a party. KRISHNA CHANDRA SANDYAL CHOWDHRY *v.* HARISH CHANDRA CHOWDHRY . . . 8 B. L. R. 524

S.C. KRISTO CHUNDER SANDYAL *v.* KASHEE KISHORE ROY CHOWDHRY . . . 17 W. R. 145

67. ———— *Political Agent—Superintendent of Raj.* A suit for property belonging to the Raja of Kota was brought in the name of the "Political Agent and Superintendent of the Kota State, on the part of the Government of India. *Held*, that, if the Raja was the proprietor of the property, he should have been the plaintiff, or, if his right and interest therein had passed to Government, the Government should have been the plaintiff, but the Political Agent and Superintendent of the Kota State was not entitled to sue for the property. GIRDHARY DAS *v.* POWLETT  
I. L. R. 2 All. 690

68. ———— *Suit against Government—Local Government.* In suits brought against the Government *eo nomine* under the Code of Civil Procedure, the Local Government must be considered as the party sued. SUBBARAYA MUDALI *v.* GOVERNMENT . . . 1 Mad. 286

69. ———— *Bombay Abkari Act (V of 1878), ss. 29 and 67—Suit for money illegally levied by a farmer of abkari revenue—Collector.* The Collector is not a necessary party to a suit brought against a farmer of abkari revenue for a refund of money illegally levied at his instance by the Collector under s. 29 of the Bombay Abkari Act (V of 1878). S. 67 of the Act expressly exempts the Collector from responsibility. NARAYAN VENKU *v.* SAKHARAM NAGU . . . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 519

70. ———— *Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 42—Obstruction to alleged highway.* To a suit by an owner of land under s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act against one of the public who formally claims to use such lands as a public road, and who thereby has endangered the title of the owner, it is unnecessary to make the Secretary of State a party. CHUNI LALL *v.* RAM KISHEN SAHU . . . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 460

71. ———— *Suit for declaration of title against a Municipality.* The plaintiff sued a Municipal Council, under the Madras



**PARTIES—contd.****1. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

District Municipalities Act, for a declaration of his title to a certain structure situated in the limits of the Municipality and of his right to put a roof over it. The structure was found to belong to the plaintiff. *Held*, that the Secretary of State was not a necessary party to the suit. **KRISHNAYYA v. BELLARY MUNICIPAL COUNCIL**  
I. L. R. 15 Mad. 292

**72. — Heirs.** The practice hitherto prevailing in the mofussil of making a dead man "by his heir" a party to a suit is erroneous, and should be discontinued. **GOVIND ABAJI JAKHADI v. MOHONIRAJ VINAYAK JAKHADI (1901)**  
I. L. R. 25 Bom. 494

**73. — Husband and wife—Right to sue—Hindu woman.** A Hindu woman may at all times sue either alone or jointly with her husband. **BHOYRUB CHUNDER DOSS v. MADHUB CHUNDER PARAMANICK** . . . . . 1 Hyde 281

**74. — Married Women's Property Act, 1874, s. 8—Suit for separate property.** In a suit against a woman married before 1865, in respect of her separate property, it is not necessary to make her husband a co-defendant. **STEPHEN v. STEPHEN** . . . . . 10 C. L. R. 536

**75. — Wife added as party—Portion of estate purchased with her separate property.** Wife made party to the suit, on the ground that a building on the estate was erected by her husband with money forming her separate estate. **GOURGOPAL DUTT v. BISHONATH GHOSE**  
Cor. 41

**76. — Practice—Wife having an English domicile suing without her husband.** Case in which it was held that a wife having an English domicile is capable of suing without joining her husband as a co-plaintiff. **HUGHES v. DELHI AND LONDON BANK**  
I. L. R. 15 Calc. 35

**77. — Hindu wife—Transaction in her own name—Wife's right to sue without joining husband.** A Hindu wife, living with her husband, brought a suit on a deed of mortgage executed in her favour. *Held*, that to enforce her rights under the deed she need not join her husband. **MANADA SUNDARI DABI v. MAHANANDA SARMA** . . . . . 2 C. W. N. 367

**78. — Idol—Shebait.** It is a settled rule of Hindu law that an idol is a juridical person who can take and hold property; and, when a suit is instituted in the name of an idol by the shebait, the idol must be regarded as a party to the suit, and not the individual shebait, who merely represents it and acts for it as its agent. **TULSIDAS MAHANTA v. BEJOY KISHORE SHOME (1901)**  
6 C. W. N. 178

**79. — Joint family—Suit by one member for specific share.** To a suit by one member of a Hindu joint family, living under the Mitakshara law, for a specific share of the joint family

**PARTIES—contd.****1. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

property, all the members of the family are necessary parties. **NATHUNI MAHTON v. MANRAJ MAHTON**  
I. L. R. 2 Calc. 149

*See PAHALADH SINGH v. LUCHMUNBUTTY*  
12 W. R. 256

**SUDABURT PERSHAD SAHOO v. LOTF ALI KHAN. PHOOLBAS KOOER v. LALLA JUGGESSUR SAHI**  
14 W. R. 339

s.c. on review, **PHOOLBAS KOOER v. LALLA JUGGESSUR SAHOY** . . . . . 18 W. R. 48

**GOKOOL PERSHAD v. ETWARI MAHTO**  
20 W. R. 138

**80. — Suit to establish right belonging to Hindu family—Necessary parties.** No member of an undivided Hindu family, except the manager of the family, as such, is entitled to bring a suit to establish a right belonging to the family without making the other members of the family parties to the suit. **ARUNACHALA PILLAI v. VYTHIALINGA MUDALIYAR** . I. L. R. 6 Mad. 27

**81. — Suit to set aside alienation of ancestral property—Mitakshara—Legal necessity.** *J L and H N*, brothers members of a joint Hindu family subject to the Mitakshara law, borrowed money by absolute and conditional sales of their joint estate. After the death of *J L*, his son *L. P* brought a suit against the alienees to recover possession of the lands by reversal of the deeds, as to one-half share thereof, which he claimed as the share of his father *J L*, on the ground that there had existed no legal necessity justifying *J L* and *H N* in alienating the property. Neither *H N*, nor any one representing him, had been made a party to the suit. There was nothing to show that the family had been separated, or the property partitioned. *Held*, that the suit should have been brought by all the joint members to set aside the deeds. If the other members refused to join as plaintiffs, they should have been made defendants. **RAJARAM TEWARI v. LACHMAN PRASAD**  
4 B. L. R. A. C. 118; 12 W. R. 478

**SHEO CHURN NARAIN SINGH v. CHUKRAREE PERSHAD NARAIN SINGH** . . . . . 15 W. R. 436

**82. — Manager of joint family—Suit by manager alone—Co-parceners whether necessary parties—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 30—Amendment of pleading—Plaint amended in second appeal by adding parties.** The plaintiff as manager of an undivided Hindu family sued to recover possession of certain lands from the defendant. The defendant contended that the plaintiff's minor brother and uncle who were his undivided co-parceners should be made parties to the suit. The Court of first instance held that the plaintiff as manager could sue alone and passed a decree for the plaintiff. The first Appellate Court reversed the decree, holding that the plaintiff could not sue alone, except under the provisions of s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code, which had not been complied with. On second appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, that the defendant was en-



**PARTIES—contd.****1. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

titled to have the plaintiff's uncle and minor brother placed on the record either as co-plaintiffs or as defendants. The right of a plaintiff to assume the character of manager and to sue in that character raises a question of fact and law which varies as the other members of the family are minors or adults and therefore the defendant is always entitled in such suits, when the objection is taken at an early stage, to have the other members of the family, when they are known, placed on the records to ensure him against the possibility of the plaintiff's acting without authority. The plaintiff was allowed on second appeal to amend his plaint by making the other members of the family parties to the suit. *HARI GOPAL v. GOKALDAS KUSHABASHET* I. L. R. 12 Bom. 158

**83.** ————— *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85—Suit for sale on mortgage by father without joining sons—Non-joinder of parties—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85—Notice of interest in mortgaged property—Liability of son to pay father's debt incurred during son's minority—Representative capacity of father—Antecedent debt—Mortgage—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 28, 42.* In the case of a joint Mitakshara family consisting of a father and a minor son where the father executed a mortgage-bond hypothecating ancestral family property during the minority of his son and the mortgagee with notice of the interest of the son in the mortgaged property brought a suit against the father alone to enforce the mortgage, without making the son a party to the suit, and obtained a decree declaring that the mortgaged property was liable to be sold in execution thereof, and where the debt was not proved to have been incurred for illegal or immoral purposes:—*Held per GHOSE, J.*, that the share of the son in the ancestral property was liable for the satisfaction of such decree notwithstanding the provisions of s. 85 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), the father having incurred the debt in his representative capacity and as managing member of the family and the son having been substantially a party to the suit in which the said decree was passed through the representation of his father. S. 85 of the Transfer of Property Act lays down only a rule of procedure; and the words "all person" in the section could have hardly been intended to include a Mitakshara son—much less a minor son—in a suit where the father is sued in his representative capacity. *Suraj Bansi Koer v. Sheo Pershad Singh*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 148; L. R. 6 I. A. 58; *Bissessur Lal Sahoo v. Luchmissur Singh*, L. R. 6 I. A. 233; 5 C. L. R. 477; *Nanomi Babuasin v. Modun Mohun*, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 21; L. R. 13 I. A. 1; *Doulat Ram v. Mehr Chand*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 70; L. R. 14 I. A. 187; *Pursid Narain Singh v. Honooman Sahai*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 845; *Bhagbut Persad v. Girja Koer*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 717; L. R. 15 I. A. 99; *Mohabir Prosad v. Maheswar Nath Sahai*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 584; L. R. 17 I. A. 11; *Jagabhai Lalubhai v. Bhukandas Jagjivandas*, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 37,

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relied on. *Bhawani Prosad v. Kallu*, I. L. R. 17 All. 537, dissented from. *Syud Emam Momtazuddin Mahomed v. Raj Coomar Dass*, 23 W. R. 187; *Ramasamayyan v. Virasami Ayyar*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 222; *Palani Goundan v. Rangayya Goundan*, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 207, referred to. *Semble*: (a) in the case of a joint Mitakshara family consisting of a father and minor sons, the father is "necessarily" the manager of the joint family, and, as such, for all purposes, is the representative of the family; (b) and where the father, the managing member, mortgages family property for an antecedent debt, and a suit is brought and decree obtained against the father, such suit and decree should be regarded as instituted and pronounced against him, in his representative capacity; (c) and that, if a son after a decree being obtained against the father upon a mortgage executed by the latter, sues to have it declared that his share is not liable to satisfy the said decree, or after a sale in execution thereof sues to recover possession of his share, he cannot succeed unless he proves that the debt was contracted for an immoral or illegal purpose, or that it was of an illusory character. *Per HARINGTON, J.*, that having regard to the provision of s. 85 of the Transfer of Property Act and those of ss. 28 and 42 of the Civil Procedure Code, the mortgagee was bound to make the plaintiff (the son) a party to the mortgage suit; and that, not having done so, he was not entitled to obtain a decree affecting the plaintiff's interest in the mortgaged property. *Bhawani Prosad v. Kallu*, I. L. R. 17 All. 537, followed. *Rothschild v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 142; *Ramasamayyan v. Virasami Ayyar*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 222; *Palani Goundan v. Rangayya Goundan*, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 207, referred to. *LALA SURJA PROSAD v. GOLAB CHAND*

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 724  
4 C. W. N. 701

**84.** ————— *Manager—Lease granted by manager—Suit for rent—Co-sharers.* A manager of a joint Hindu family, who, as such, has granted a lease, is, during his lifetime, the only person to sue for rent due under the lease, but after his death his son, who has not succeeded his father in the management, cannot sue without joining the other members of the joint family as parties. *Dada v. Bhau, P. J.* (1876) 11, and *Sayad Fatulla v. Bola, P. J.* (1884) 33, followed. *DAYABHAI LALLUBHAI v. GOPALJI DAYABHAI* . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 141

**85.** ————— *Suit on bond given in name of one member of joint family for loan made out of joint family funds.* A loan was made to the defendant out of joint family funds, and a bond for the amount was given in the name of one of the members of the joint family. He sued the defendant on the bond. *Held*, that the other members of the joint family were not necessary parties. *HARI VASUDEV KAMAT v. MAHADU DAD GAUDA* . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 435

**86.** ————— *Manager of joint family—Suit for possession under mortgage.* In



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a suit for possession under a mortgage where the managing member of the joint family was made a party, it was *held* not necessary to make another member of the family a party also. *DHAPI v. BARHAM DEO PERSHAD* . . . 4 C. W. N. 297

87. ————— *Contract made by member of joint family in individual capacity—Right to sue alone.* The firm of S & Co., the partners of which were W S and F E, took a contract from Government on 12th November 1877 to construct a barrel-house at the Gunpowder Manufactory at Kirkee; and on the 28th November 1877 the plaintiff agreed to advance money "up to R15,000" for the purpose of enabling the firm to carry out the contract. Under the agreement, the plaintiff was to receive all sums to become due from the Government on the contractor's bills, and to pay the balance to the firm after repaying himself all advances with interest. On the same day the firm executed a power-of-attorney to the plaintiff authorizing him to receive from the Government Engineer all such sums to become due to the firm under the contract, which power-of-attorney was deposited by plaintiff in the office of the Executive Engineer at Poona. In March or April 1878, W S left for England up to which time R34,900 had been advanced by the plaintiff, and a balance of R14,942-5-10 still remained due to him after giving credit for the sums received on the bills passed by the Executive Engineer. On 24th July 1878 the plaintiff entered into a fresh agreement with F E similar to the former one, to make further advances to the firm up to R16,000 in addition to R15,000 on the same terms as those mentioned in the previous agreement; and by means of these advances the contract was completed at the end of 1879. In 1878 the defendant obtained a decree against W S and attached the right, title, and interest of W S in a sum of R5,034-11-9 in the hands of the Executive Engineer, which was then due to the firm on the contract. The plaintiff, who alleged that R13,700-1-11 were due to him from the firm, applied to have the attachment removed, which application was refused on 30th September 1879, and the sum attached was paid to the defendant. The plaintiff sued the defendant to recover from him R5,034-11-9. *Held*, that, although the plaintiff might be a member of an undivided Hindu family, still, as the contract was entered into with the plaintiff in his individual capacity, and as there was nothing on the face of the contract to show that the plaintiff was acting on behalf of the family, the plaintiff was entitled to sue alone. *JAGABHAI LALLUBHAI v. RUSTAMJI NASARWANJI* . . . I. L. R. 9 Bom. 311

88. ————— *Partnership—Infant sons—Mitakshara law—Promissory note, suit on—Non-joinder of parties—Plea in bar of suit.* In a suit on a promissory note executed by the defendant in favour of a firm whose original partners were two brothers, one of whom had previously died leaving an infant son surviving, while the other, who also had infant sons, was at the date of the execution of the note, sole surviving partner

PARTIES—*contd.*1. PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

of the firm:—*Held*, that a Hindu infant, who by birth or inheritance becomes entitled to an interest in a joint family business, does not necessarily become a member of the trading partnership carrying on the business. There must be some consent act to that effect on the part of the infant and his partners. Even, therefore, where parties are governed by the Mitakshara law, an infant need not be joined as a co-plaintiff in a suit by the father to recover a trade debt. Decrees obtained in such suits by or against the managers of the business are presumed to have been obtained by or against them in their representative capacity and will be binding on the whole joint family. *Bissessur Lall Sahoo v. Luchmessur Singh*, L. R. 6 I. A. 233; *Petum Doss v. Ramdhone Doss*, 1 Taylor 279; and *Ramsebuk v. Ramall Koondoo*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 815, referred to. *LUTCHMANEN CHETTY v. SIVA PROKASA MODELAR*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 349  
3 C. W. N. 190

89. ————— *Suit for compensation for wrong—Member of joint family suing alone.* A member of a joint undivided Hindu family is not precluded from suing alone to obtain compensation in respect of a loss to himself personally caused by wrongful destruction of property in which he had a definite share. *GOPEE KISHEN GOSSAIN v. RYLAND*]. . . 9 W. R. 279

90. ————— *Bond in favour of one undivided brother for the benefit of himself and others—Suit by promisee alone.* In a suit on a bond executed by the deceased father of defendants, in favour of the plaintiff, the defendants, while admitting the bond and the consideration for which it had been given, contended that, inasmuch as plaintiff had four undivided brothers and the deed has been executed in his name for the benefit of himself and his brothers, the latter should have been joined as plaintiffs, and that plaintiff could not maintain the suit alone. *Held*, that plaintiff was entitled to sue for the family debt without joining his undivided brothers, the contract on which the suit was based being in plaintiff's sole name and not purporting to have been obtained on behalf of any others but himself. *ADAIKKALAM CHETTI v. MARIMUTHU* . . . I. L. R. 22 Mad. 326

91. ————— *Suit by managing member on behalf of his undivided family, other members not being joined—Maintainability of suit.* The managing member of an undivided Hindu family, sued in his own name for the recovery of certain land and asked for a declaration that it belonged to the plaintiff's family. Plaintiff had an undivided brother, and there was no evidence that he assented to or acquiesced in the institution of the suit. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not entitled to sue without making his brother, the other member of the undivided family, a party to the suit. *Alagappa Chetti v. Vellian Chetti*, I. L. R. 18 Mad 33, followed. *Mahabala Bhatta v. Kunhanna Bhatta*.



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*I. L. R. 21 Mad. 373*, distinguished. **ANGAMUTHU PILLAI v. KOLANDAVELU PILLAI**

**I. L. R. 23 Mad. 190**

**92.** ——— **Joint Hindu family—Letters Patent—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85—Hindu law—Mitakshara—Mortgage—Kurta—Decree—Statutes, interpretation of—Notice—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 437, 575—Joinder of parties—Redemption.** In a joint Mitakshara family, consisting of a father and minor son, the father, as kurta of the family, by a mortgage-bond hypothecated the joint property. The mortgagee sued the father alone on the mortgage-bond, without making the minor son a party, although he (the mortgagee) had notice of the son's interest in the mortgaged property at the time. The mortgage-debt was not found to have been contracted for illegal or immoral purposes. *Held* [dissenting from the judgment of GHOSE, J., and affirming that of HARRINGTON, J., in *Lala Surja Prosad v. Golab Chand*, *I. L. R. 27 Calc. 724*], that, the provisions of s. 85 of the Transfer of Property Act being compulsory, the minor son ought to have been made a party to the mortgage suit; and for the purposes of that suit he was not represented by his father, the mortgagor. *Held* further, that the issue whether the debt was incurred for illegal or immoral purposes having been decided on its merits between the plaintiff and the defendant in the present suit adversely to the minor plaintiff, it must now be taken as between him (the plaintiff) and the mortgagee to have been finally determined; and, under the circumstances, the validity of the mortgage ought not to be allowed to be contested in another suit, the plaintiff being in the same position in which he would have been had he been made a party to the mortgage suit. The only right the minor plaintiff now had was the right of redemption. *Bhawani Prasad v. Kallu*, *I. L. R. 17 All. 537*, distinguished. *Ramasamayyan v. Virasami Ayyar*, *I. L. R. 21 Mad. 222*; *Palani Goundan v. Rangayya Goundan*, *I. L. R. 22 Mad. 207*; *Devji v. Sambhu*, *I. L. R. 24 Bom. 135*, referred to. In interpreting a Statute, it should not be considered what the law was before the passing of that Statute, but what the Legislature has said is to be the law after the passing of the same. *Bank of England v. Vagliano*, [1891] *A. C. 107, 144*; *Narendra Nath Sircar v. Kamalbasini Dasi*, *I. L. R. 23 Calc. 563*; *Rajnarain Bhaduri v. Katayani Dabee*, *I. L. R. 27 Calc. 649*, referred to. **LALA SURAJ PROSAD v. GOLAB CHAND (1901)** . **I. L. R. 28 Calc. 517**  
s.c. **5 C. W. N. 640**

**93.** ——— **Hindu law—Joint Hindu family—Mortgage—Liability of non-executant members on a mortgage executed by some only of the members of a joint Hindu family—Burden of proof.** In a suit for sale on a mortgage of the joint family property executed by the father and three of his sons, the plaintiff made defendants, besides the executants, the fourth son, who was a minor, and four grandsons, also minors. *Held*, that the non-

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executant members of the family were properly arrayed as defendants to the suit, inasmuch as their own interests in the joint family property would be liable under the mortgage, unless they could show either that the mortgage-debt was never incurred, or that it no longer subsisted, or that it was tainted with immorality. *Jamna v. Nain Sukh*, *I. L. R. 9 All. 493*, held to be no longer law. *Badri Prasad v. Madan Lal*, *I. L. R. 15 All. 75*; and *Nanomi Babuasin v. Modhun Mohun*, *I. L. R. 13 Calc. 21*, referred to. **DEBI DAT v. JADU RAI (1902)** . **I. L. R. 24 All. 459**

**94.** ——— **Joint Hindu family—Liability of other members of the family under a mortgage executed by the manager.** Where a mortgage of joint family property has been executed by the managing members of a joint Hindu family, the remaining members of the family are proper parties to a suit for sale based on such mortgage. *Dharam Das v. Angan Lal*, *I. L. R. 21 All. 301*; *Muhammad Askari v. Radha Ram Singh*, *I. L. R. 22 All. 307*; and *Lachman Das v. Dallu*, *I. L. R. 22 All. 394*, referred to. **JAS RAM v. SHER SINGH (1902)** . **I. L. R. 25 All. 162**

**95.** ——— **Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 239—Partnership—Joint Hindu family—Rights and liabilities of a partnership composed partly of individual members of a joint Hindu family and partly of strangers.** In a suit for accounts and division of profits of a partnership alleged to have been previously dissolved such partnership having been composed of certain individual members of a joint Hindu family, and of one person who was a stranger to the family, it was held, on a plea taken as to non-joinder of necessary parties, namely, other members of the joint Hindu family,—(i) that a member of an undivided Hindu family may enter into a contract in his individual capacity, and, when suing to recover moneys due to him under that contract, he need not join the members of the joint family as plaintiffs, and (ii) that members of an undivided Hindu family who are minors, and who are not shown to have been admitted into the trading firm, or to have taken part in its business, need not be made parties as plaintiffs to a suit to recover moneys due to the family trading firm. *Kalidas Kevaldas v. Nathu Bhagvan*, *I. L. R. 7 Bom. 217*; *Imam-ud-din v. Liladar*, *I. L. R. 14 All. 424*; *Samalbhair Nathubai v. Someshwar*, *I. L. R. 5 Bom. 38*; *Alagappa Chetti v. Vellian Chetti*, *I. L. R. 18 Mad. 33*; *Jugal Kishore v. Hulasi Ram*, *I. L. R. 8 All. 264*; *Ramsebuk v. Ramlal Koondoo*, *I. L. R. 6 Calc. 815*; *Jagabhai Lalubai v. Rustomji Nasarwanji*, *I. L. R. 9 Bom. 311*; and *Luchman Chetty v. Siva Prokasa Modeliar*, *I. L. R. 26 Calc. 349*, referred to. **ANANT RAM v. CHANNU LAL (1903)**  
**I. L. R. 25 All. 378**

**96.** ——— **Landlord and tenant—Suit for possession.** Where a lessor, who had never been in possession, granted a pottah of lands to which his title was disputed, and the lessee was kept out of possession by the defendants who disputed



**PARTIES—contd.****1. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

the lessor's title :—*Held*, that the lessee could maintain his action for possession of the lands, and need not make his lessor a co-plaintiff.

PRANKRISHNA DEY v. BISWAMBHAR SEN

2 B. L. R. A. C. 207: 11 W. R. 80

97. ———— *Joint lease—Suit by one of joint lessors who has acquired interest of the other—Co-owners—Suit in ejectment by one co-owner—Parties—Oral agreement inconsistent with written contract—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 92.* K and P were co-owners of certain property in Bombay, and by a writing dated January 1883, they granted a lease of the whole of the said property to the defendant for a term of three years, from the 1st March 1883 to the 28th February 1886, at a monthly rent of R705. Subsequently to the granting of the said lease, viz., on the 1st September 1883, P conveyed her equal and undivided moiety of the said property to the plaintiff. On the 30th January 1886, i.e., a month before the expiration of the lease, the plaintiff gave the defendant notice to determine the tenancy, and required him to quit on the 1st March then next. The defendant refused, and the plaintiff brought this suit for possession and for occupation-rent from the 1st March 1886. The defendant pleaded that the plaintiff was not entitled to sue alone. *Held*, that the suit was maintainable by the plaintiff alone. EBRAHIM PIR MAHOMED v. CURSETJI SORABJI DE VITRE

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 644

98. ———— *Legacy, suit for—Act IX of 1850, s. 32—Suit for legacy or distributive share under intestacy—Deposit.* K died leaving a will directing a certain sum to be paid to M, his widow, the unexpended balance of such sum to go at the death of M to his heirs. M brought a suit against the executors of K's will, which was compromised on the payment by them to her of a certain sum. This sum she deposited with N, one of the members of a firm, to be invested in N's own name, he paying her such interest as it yielded him. On the dissolution of the firm, the sum deposited by M was made over to N alone, and on the death of N, his estate, and with it the sum deposited by M, came into the hands of the sons of N. On the death of M, the plaintiff and two others were the heirs of K. In a suit brought by the plaintiff against the sons of N for a third share of the sum deposited by M. *Held*, that such a suit was not a "suit for a distributive share under an intestacy, or of a legacy under a will," within s. 32, Act IX of 1850. All the parties claiming to be entitled to any interest in the sum deposited should have been made parties to the suit. HARAN CHANDRA MOOKERJEE v. NANDAGOPAL MUTTYLALL

13 B. L. R. 142: 22 W. R. 71

99. ———— *Executor—Legacy—Suit by one legatee for a legacy—Right of executor to have other legatees made parties to the suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 32 and 34—Form of suit—Practice—Procedure—Liability of executor for breach of trust—Trusts Act (II of 1882),*

**PARTIES—contd.****1. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

s. 23. A legatee is entitled to sue an executor for a legacy bequeathed to him by a Hindu testator in the mofussil. In case such a suit is brought by one legatee, the executor may apply, for his own protection, that other legatees shall be made parties, so that if any rateable abatement is requisite the extent of such abatement may be ascertained in a manner binding on all parties interested. But any such application must be made at the earliest possible opportunity, having regard to the provisions of s. 34 of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882); and in any case it is within the discretion of the Court to decide whether the addition of such parties is necessary "in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit" (s. 32). If an executor commits a breach of trust in respect of trust property that has come to his hands, he is liable, under s. 23 of the Indian Trusts Act (II of 1882), to make good the loss to the beneficiaries or legatees. PURSHOTTAM DEVJISHET THAKAR v. KALA GOVINDJI THAKAR (1901).

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 301

100. ———— *Maintenance, suit for—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 32—Suit for maintenance by member of Malabar tarwad—Necessary parties—Joinder of parties on appeal.* Where a member of a Malabar tarwad sued the karnavan for an increased rate of maintenance :—*Held*, that all the members of the tarwad were necessary parties to the suit. *Held*, also, the Appellate Court having reversed the decree on the ground of non-joinder of such persons and directed the plaint to be returned for amendment, that the proper course was for the Appellate Court to have added the necessary parties. MAMMALI v. PAKKI

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 428

101. ———— *Right of illegitimate son to maintenance.* The right of an illegitimate son to maintenance out of his deceased father's property cannot be decided in a suit which concerns a portion only of that property and to which all persons in possession of the rest of the father's property are not parties. NARAYAN BHARTHI v. LAVING BHARTHI . . . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 140

102. ———— *Malicious prosecution, suit for—Defendants not sued on same ground of action.* In a suit claiming damages for an unsuccessful criminal prosecution of the plaintiff by the first defendant, and sanctioned by the second defendant as a Subordinate Judge, it was doubted whether the first and second defendants could properly be joined in such an action. GIRDHARILAL DYALDAS v. JAGANNATH GIRDHARBHAI

10 Bom. 182

103. ———— *Minor, suit by—Suit on behalf of minor—Manager.* Where the trusts of manager and guardian are vested in different persons, an action instituted on behalf of the minor with the sanction of the Court of Wards is properly brought by the manager. MODHOO SOODUN SINGH v. PRITHEE BULLUB PAUL . . . 16 W. R. 231



PARTIES—*contd.*1. PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

104. ————— *Minor contesting will—Misjoinder of, as plaintiff.* A minor interested in contesting the execution and validity of an alleged will by her father, having been improperly joined with the alleged executors of the said will as co-plaintiff, the decrees of the Courts below were reversed and the suit remanded in order that the minor might be made a defendant, and a guardian *ad litem* appointed to protect her interests. KRISHNABAI v. SONUBAI

2 Bom. 327 : 2nd Ed. 310

105. ————— *Defendant improperly impleaded as a minor—No objection raised by defendant during suit—Subsequent suit for declaration that decree was not binding on defendant—Estoppel.* A certain defendant was impleaded in a suit as a minor under the guardianship of his mother, who was his certificated guardian. He and his mother jointly defended the suit, and at no period did the defendant raise the objection that he was not a minor when the suit was instituted. A decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff and no appeal was preferred either by the defendant or his guardian *ad litem*. Held, that it was not competent to the defendant to sue subsequently to have the decree declared not binding upon him, upon the ground that he was in fact of full age when it was instituted and that his mother had betrayed his interests. *Shoorania v. Bharat Singh*, I. L. R. 20 All. 90, and *Hanuman Prasad v. Muhammad Ishaq*, All. Weekly Notes (1905) 229, distinguished. GANGA RAM v. MIHIN LAL (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 416

106. ————— *Mortgages, suits concerning—Mortgage by agent—Suit for possession.* When a mortgage was made by the lambardar for himself and as agent for the other sharers:—Held, that in a suit for possession they should have been made parties as well as the lambardar. PUNCHUM SINGH v. MUNGLE SINGH . 2 Agra Pt. II, 207

107. ————— *Redemption, suit for—Co-heir having interest in the mortgaged property at the time of the suit.* A co-heir of the plaintiff having an interest in the mortgage at the time of the redemption suit is a necessary party to the suit, but not otherwise. TRIMBAK JIVAJI DESHAMUKHA v. SAKHARAM GOPAL

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 599

108. ————— *Suit for redemption—Third parties claiming redemption.* In a suit for redemption of a mortgage the plaintiff may implead other persons who claim the right of redemption in opposition to him. BHOOP SINGH v. NURSINGH RAI . . . . . 3 Agra 144

109. ————— *Suit for redemption—Suit by one co-sharer.* Where joint family property, though held in certain shares by the several co-parceners, was mortgaged as a whole and redeemable on payment of the whole sum:—Held, in a suit by one of the joint tenants, or tenants-in-common, to redeem the whole estate, that all persons in whom portions of the equity of redemp-

PARTIES—*contd.*1. PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

tion were vested must be made parties of the suit. NARO HARI BHAVE v. VITHALBHAT

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 648

110. ————— *Suit for redemption of share of estate.* Held, that any one of the mortgagors of his legal representatives is, if the mortgage-debt has been repaid, entitled to sue for redemption, and to be put in possession of his own share of the estate, whatever his co-pareeners may choose to do in the matter: and that the Judge should not have dismissed the suit merely on account of the majority of the mortgagors who disavowed their claim not being parties thereto, but should have proceeded to dispose of the case according to law. HURDEO v. GUNESHEE LALL

1 Agra 36

(*Contra*), All the mortgagors ought to be joined in such a suit. RAM BAKSH SINGH v. RAM LALL DOSS . . . . . 21 W. R. 428

And see CASES UNDER MORTGAGE—REDEMPTION—REDEMPTION OF PORTION OF PROPERTY.

111. ————— *Suit for redemption—Parties to such suit—Equity of redemption, Interest in, of person related to the mortgagor.* The plaintiff sued the defendant to redeem certain khoti lands mortgaged by the plaintiff's father to the defendant's uncle. The defendant objected that the separated uncle and cousins of the plaintiff should be made co-plaintiffs in the suit. These relations of the plaintiff were not joint members of the plaintiff's family at the time of the mortgage nor did they claim any interest in the equity of redemption. Held, that the plaintiffs uncle and cousins were not necessary parties. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must be presumed that the mortgage was made by the plaintiff's father in his individual capacity. If the defendant had shown that, at the date of the mortgage, the plaintiff's father and uncles were undivided, it might have been presumed that the mortgage was on their behalf as well as on his own. But this the defendant had failed to do. The mortgage did not purport to have been made by the plaintiff's father as manager of the family, nor did it appear that the plaintiff's uncle and cousins claimed any interest in the equity of redemption. The mere fact of their relationship gave them no interest in it. RAGHO VINAYAK v. DAUD . I. L. R. 13 Bom. 51

112. ————— *Suit for redemption or recovery of property on payment of a charge—Possession after redemption by one of several mortgagors—Adverse possession—Limitation.* The plaintiff sought to recover his father's share in two portions of family property, one of which had been mortgaged by the plaintiff's father and the father of the defendant No. 1 jointly; the other had been mortgaged by the plaintiff's father jointly with the father of defendant No. 1 and the husband of defendant No. 2. The first was redeemed by the father of defendant No. 1 alone in 1868; the second was redeemed by the defendant No. 1 more than twelve years before the suit. The parties



**PARTIES—contd.****1. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

were Mahomedans, and the plaintiff had a brother and three sisters, only one of whom (defendant No. 2) was a party to the suit. Defendant No. 1 contended that the suit was defective for want of parties, and that it was time-barred. The Subordinate Judge awarded the plaintiff's claim. The Assistant Judge on appeal held that the plaintiff's brothers and sisters were necessary parties, but that it was too late to join them, the suit with regard to them having become barred by limitation. He therefore dismissed the suit. On second appeal :—*Held*, by the High Court, that all persons interested in a property, which it is sought to redeem or recover on payment of a charge are necessary parties, as otherwise the possessor may be exposed to many suits upon the same cause of action. *Held*, also, that the plaintiff's brothers and sisters ought to have been joined as co-plaintiffs, the defendant No. 1's possession after redemption not being adverse to them. If it was adverse at all, it was adverse to the whole of the plaintiff's branch of the family, so as to bar the right of the group altogether. But that was no reason why the co-owners should not be admitted as co-plaintiffs, and the suit go on upon its merits. *BHAUDIN v. ISMAIL*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 425

113. ———— *Suit by mortgagee for share of mortgaged property.* A mortgagee cannot maintain a suit for khas possession of an undefined area of the mortgaged land without making his fellow-mortgagees parties to the suit. *MAHOMED ISMAIL v. LALLA DHUNDUR KISHORE NARAIN* . . . . . 25 W. R. 39

114. ———— *Suit for foreclosure against assignee of mortgaged property—Representatives of mortgagor.* In a suit for foreclosure :—*Held*, that it was necessary to make the personal representatives of the mortgagor parties. He who has the equity of redemption is the only necessary party. *BLAQUIERE v. RAMDHONE DOSS*  
Bourke O. C. 319

115. ———— *Suit for mortgage—Patnidar under mortgagor.* Where the mortgagee of a zamindari brings a suit on his mortgage against a mortgagor who, previously to the mortgage, has granted a patni lease of the zamindari to a third party, the latter should be made a defendant in order to give him an opportunity to redeem. *KASIMUNNISSA BIBEE v. NILRATNA BOSE*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 79 : 9 C. L. R. 173  
10 C. L. R. 113

116. ———— *Suit for possession by mortgagee against third party.* In a suit for possession as mortgagee against a third party, where the mortgagee's (plaintiff's) title is denied, it is necessary that the mortgage should show the extent of the rights and interests of the mortgagor in the property sued for. But it is sufficient for this purpose to make the mortgagor a defendant in the suit, and there is no necessity for a separate suit against such mortgagor. *DOOLAY SINGH v. GOOLAM HOSSEIN* . . . . . 2 N. W. 72

**PARTIES—contd.****1. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

117. ———— *Suit by mortgagee where property is alienated.* When a mortgagee sues to enforce his lien on property which has intermediately passed by sale into other hands, he is bound to bring his action not against the mortgagor alone, but also against the parties in possession. *RAM YAD SINGH v. LALLA SALIGRAM SINGH*

16 W. R. 98

118. ———— *Purchaser at sale of mortgaged property.* A mortgaged to his brother B his twelfth share in the immoveable estate of the family. C at B's request became surety for A to Government. A having become a defaulter, C became liable to Government in respect of his defalcations. B, with a view to indemnify C, transferred to him A's mortgage, C at the same time assigning to B a debt due by D to A which had been previously assigned by A to C. Government sold A's interest in the twelfth share, which was purchased at the sale by B's son, E. In a suit brought by C against B to obtain possession of A's share :—*Held*, that E, to whom only the equity of redemption passed by the purchase at the Government sale, was necessarily a party to the suit, which was accordingly remitted to the Court below, in order that he might be made a defendant, and a new decree passed upon the merits. *YASHAVANT SUBAJI KULKARNI v. GOPAL LADKO BHANDARKAR*  
2 Bom. 202 : 2nd Ed. 194

119. ———— *Purchaser under execution against assets of testator—Suit for foreclosure.* A creditor who purchases under an execution against the general assets of a testator's estate, takes subject to a mortgage created in pursuance of a power contained in the will; and in a suit to foreclose the purchaser is rightly made a party. *NILKANT CHATTERJEE v. PEARY MOHTY DAS*  
3 B. L. R. O. C. 7 : 11 W. R. O. C. 21

120. ———— *Suit by second mortgagee to recover premises when first mortgagee is paid off—Administrator General—Representative of deceased mortgagor—Act XXIV of 1867, s. 17.* In a suit brought by a second mortgagee against first mortgagees (admittedly overpaid) to compel the first mortgagees to convey to him the mortgaged premises, the heir or legal representative of the deceased mortgagor is, according to the balance of authority, a necessary party. Cases bearing on the above question collected and considered. Where it was uncertain who was the heir and legal representative of the deceased mortgagor, and the circumstances attending the execution of the second mortgage were not free from doubt, the cause was allowed to stand over, for the purpose of enabling the plaintiff to apply for an order to the Administrator General (under s. 17 of Act XXIV of 1867) directing him to apply for letters of administration to the estate and effects of the mortgagor; and the plaintiff was allowed (in the event of letters of administration being granted to the Administrator General) to amend his plaint by making the Administrator General a party to represent the deceased mortgagor. The plaintiff was, however,



**PARTIES—contd.****1. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

ordered to give security for the probable costs of the Administrator General in the suit. **VITHALDAS NAROTAMDAS v. KARSANDAS KESHAYDAS**

**5 Bom. O. C. 76**

**121.** *Right to sale—Death of sole mortgagee leaving several heirs—Sale of mortgagee's rights by one of such heirs—Suit by purchaser for sale of mortgaged property—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 67.* Upon the death of a sole mortgagee of zamindari property, his estate was divided among his heirs, one of whom a son, was entitled to fourteen out of thirty-two shares. The son executed a sale-deed whereby he conveyed the mortgagee's rights under the mortgage to another person. In a suit for sale brought against the mortgagor by the representative of the purchaser, it was found that the plaintiff acquired, under the deed of sale, only the rights in the mortgage of the son of the mortgagee, though the deed purported to be an assignment of the whole mortgage:—*Held*, by the Full Bench, that the plaintiff was not entitled, in respect of his own share, to maintain the suit for sale against the whole property, the other parties interested not having been joined. **PARSOTAM SARAN v. MULU**

**I. L. R. 9 All. 68**

**122.** *First and second mortgages—Second mortgagee not made party to suit by first mortgagee for sale of mortgaged property—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85—Notice.* Certain immoveable property was mortgaged in 1865 to *H*, in 1871 to *G*, and in 1873 again to *H*. In 1883 the property was purchased by *M*, the representative of *G*, in execution of a decree obtained in 1877 by *G* in a suit for sale brought by him upon the mortgage of 1871. To this suit and decree the mortgagee under the deeds of 1865 and 1873 was not a party. In 1885 *M* sued the representatives of *H* for redemption of the mortgage of 1865. One of the defendants pleaded that, as he was a puisne incumbrancer in the property in suit at the time of the plaintiff's suit against the mortgagors in 1877, he ought to have been made a party to that suit, and thus afforded an "opportunity of protecting his rights by payment of the mortgage-money." He did not in the Court below ask in express terms to be allowed to redeem the plaintiff's mortgage, but he did so in appeal to the High Court. *Held*, with reference to the terms of s. 85 of the Transfer of Property Act, that, inasmuch as the defendant was in possession of the mortgaged property at the time of the suit of 1877, and his mortgage was a registered instrument, it must be presumed that the plaintiff had notice of its existence and should therefore have made him a party, and that, under the circumstances, he should be placed in the same position as he would have held if the decree of 1877 had never been passed. **MUHAMMAD SAMI UDDIN v. MAN SINGH**

**I. L. R. 9 All. 125**

**123.** *Suit to determine rights of mortgagee—Representatives of mortgagors.* Case in which the representatives of certain mortgagors were held to be necessary parties

**PARTIES—contd.****1. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

to the suit, which was one to determine the rights of mortgagees (*inter se*) on the following grounds:—(a) that the rights of the mortgagees could not be determined without at the same time determining the liability of the mortgagors; (b) to avoid multiplicity of suits; (c) to give them an opportunity of being present at the taking of any account that might be ordered as between the mortgagees; and (d) to entitle the plaintiff or defendant to obtain costs out of the proceeds of the sale of the mortgaged property. **HUGHES v. DELHI AND LONDON BANK**

**I. L. R. 15 Calc. 35**

**124.** *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85—Parties to a mortgage-suit—Objection in written statement as to non-joinder.* In a suit by a mortgagee against two of his three mortgagors, the defendants objected in their written statement that the suit was bad for non-joinder of the third mortgagor, and also alleged that subsequent incumbrances on the mortgaged premises had been created with the concurrence of the plaintiff. It appeared that the third mortgagor, as a witness, renounced interest in the greater part of the mortgaged premises. On second appeal:—*Held*, that the third mortgagor and the subsequent incumbrancers should have been made parties as having an "interest" within the meaning of s. 85 of the Transfer of Property Act. **SUBBAN v. ARUNACHALAM**

**I. L. R. 15 Mad. 487**

**125.** *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85—Suit by puisne mortgagee on his mortgage—Suit by puisne mortgagee offering to redeem prior mortgage—Determination of validity of mortgage between co-defendants.* *Held*, (i) in a suit by a puisne mortgagee upon his mortgage, that a prior mortgagee is not a necessary party but is a party in such suit, if such puisne mortgagee offer to redeem his mortgage. When the validity of the prior mortgage is in question, the offer to redeem should be made conditionally upon the establishment of such mortgage; (ii) that the question of the validity of the prior mortgages can be determined in this suit, between the co-defendants. **RAJ COOMARY DASSEE v. PREO MADHUB NUNDY**

**1 C. W. N. 453**

**126.** *Prior and puisne incumbrancers—Puisne incumbrancer not made a party to suit upon prior incumbrance—Right to redeem.* To a suit on his mortgage by a prior incumbrancer, having notice of a puisne incumbrance, the puisne incumbrancer should be joined as a party. If he is not so joined, the puisne incumbrancer's right to redeem will not thereby be affected by the decree in the suit. **Mohan Manor v. Togu Uka**, **I. L. R. 10 Bom. 224**; **Muhammad Samiud-din, v. Man Singh**, **I. L. R. 9 All. 125**; and **Gajadhar v. Mul Chand**, **I. L. R. 10 All. 520**, referred to. **NAMDAR CHAUDHRI v. KARAM RAJI**

**I. L. R. 13 All. 315**

**127.** *Suit to bring mortgaged property to sale—Puisne incumbrancer—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85—Registration—Notice.* *A* and *B* jointly mortgaged



PARTIES—*contd.*1. PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

certain immoveable property to X by a simple mortgage-deed on the 10th September 1882. They again mortgaged the same property to X on the 23rd February 1884. On the 6th August 1885, A mortgaged a portion of the said property to Y. On the 12th August 1885 B mortgaged a portion of the same property to X. On the 21st August 1885, A mortgaged a portion of the same property to Z, and Z's mortgage was registered. On the 20th September 1886, A and B sold to X the property mortgaged to him, and with the proceeds of that sale X's three mortgages were paid off. On the 8th January 1887, Y sued A, B, and X for cancellation of the deed of sale of the 20th September 1886, and for sale of the property mortgaged to him under his deed of the 6th August 1885. Y did not make Z a party to this suit. He did not ask for redemption of X's mortgages nor for foreclosure of Z's mortgage. *Held*, that Z's mortgage of the 21st August 1885 having been registered, Y must be taken to have had notice of it, and, having had notice thereof, was bound to make Z a party to the suit for sale under his (Y's) mortgage. *Damodar Dev Chand v. Naro Mahadev Kelkar*, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 11, and *Dullabhdas Dev Chand v. Lakshmandas Sarup Chand*, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 88, referred to. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*—The provisions of s. 85 of Act IV of 1882 are not absolutely imperative, and though thereunder a subsequent incumbrancer ought to be made a party to a suit by a prior mortgagee on his mortgage, the non-joinder of such subsequent incumbrancer is not a fatal defect in the suit. Registration of a subsequent mortgage is not necessarily any notice to a prior mortgagee of the existence of such subsequent mortgage; it being no part of a mortgagee's duty to be on the watch for incumbrances subsequent to his own. *MATA DIN KASODHAN v. KAZIM HUSAIN* I. L. R. 13 All. 432

128. ———— *Suit by mortgagee and sale in execution of mortgage-decree—Grant of patni by mortgagor—Patnidar—Right of redemption—Notice—Constructive notice—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 3 and 85.* A mouzah, K, was mortgaged by D by bonds extending from 1867 to 1879, the last bond of 5th January 1879 including the amounts borrowed on the former bonds. On 7th January 1872, whilst it was so under mortgage, the same mortgagor D executed bonds whereby he mortgaged K to the defendants, and in suits brought on the basis of those bonds came to an amicable settlement with the defendants by which on 25th February 1879 he settled K in patni with them; the bonus for the patni going to satisfy the mortgage-debts. In 1885 a suit, to which the present defendants were not made parties, was brought by the mortgagees of the bond of 5th January 1879, and, in execution of the decree in that suit, K was put up for sale and purchased by the plaintiff on 21st June 1886. In a suit brought in 1890 against the defendants to set aside the patni and for khas possession of K, it was found that the plaintiff had notice of the patni. *Held*, that the defendants as patnidars had

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an interest in K within the meaning of s. 85 of the Transfer of Property Act, and should therefore have been made parties to the suit in 1885, and thereby given an opportunity of redeeming the mortgage on which that suit was brought. *Kokil Singh v. Duli Chand*, 5 C. L. R. 243, and *Kasimunnissa Bibee v. Nilratna Bose*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 79, referred to. If not as patnidars, they were entitled as second mortgagees to have an opportunity of redeeming the prior mortgage and to be parties to that suit. Not having been parties, the plaintiff was not entitled to khas possession as against them. *Nanack Chand v. Teluckdye Koer*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 265; 4 C. L. R. 358; *Dirgopal Lall v. Bolakee*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 269; and *Radha Pershad Misser v. Monohar Dass*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 317, referred to. *JUGUL KISSORE LAL SINGH DEO v. KARTIC CHANDER CHOTTOPADHYA* I. L. R. 21 Calc. 116

129. ———— *Suit for sale on mortgage—Non-joinder of parties—Joint Hindu family—Suit for sale on mortgage by father without joining sons—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85.* When a plaintiff mortgagee institutes a suit for sale under s. 88 of Act IV of 1882 against his mortgagor, who is the father of sons, in an undivided Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara, without joining as parties to the suit the sons of the mortgagor, of whose interests he has notice, and obtains a decree and an order absolute for sale against the father only, the sons can successfully sue for a declaration that the mortgagee decree-holder is not entitled to sell in execution of his decree for sale the interests of the sons in the property comprised in the mortgage given by the father, although the sole ground of their suit is that they were not parties to the suit by the mortgagee. So *held* by *EDGE, C.J.*, *KNOX*, *BLAIR*, *BURKITT*, and *AIKMAN, J.J.* (*BANERJI, J.*, dissenting). *Held* by *BANERJI, J.*, that where, under the circumstances above described, a decree has been obtained against the father alone without joining the sons, the sons cannot in the suit brought by them plead against the operation of the decree on their interests any pleas other than those which they could have urged against the claim of the mortgagee in order to relieve them from liability for their father's debt had they been made parties to the mortgagee's suit. *BHAWANI PRASAD v. KALLU* I. L. R. 17 All. 537

See *LACHMAN DAS v. DALLU*

I. L. R. 22 All. 394

and *HARI RAM v. BISHNATH SINGH*

I. L. R. 22 All. 408

130. ———— *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85—Mortgage suit against Hindu mortgagor and two sons—Sale of mortgage premises—Subsequent suit for share of a third son.* A Hindu, having three sons, executed a mortgage in favour of the defendants, who subsequently obtained a decree for sale on the mortgage and brought the property to sale in execution and purchased it themselves, the mortgagor and two



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only of his sons being brought on to the record. It did not appear whether the plaintiffs in that suit were aware of the interest of the third son, who now sued to recover his one-quarter share of the mortgage premises claiming that the previous proceedings were not binding on him and alleging that the mortgage was unsupported by consideration. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to have the question tried whether there was really a debt owing by the father to support the mortgage. *Querre: Whether Bhawani Prasad v. Kallu*, I. L. R. 17 All. 537, lays down the right rule with reference to Transfer of Property Act, s. 85. *RAMASAMAYYAN v. VIRASAMI AYYAR*. I. L. R. 21 Mad. 222

See *HIRA LAL SAHU v. PARNESHAH RAI*  
I. L. R. 21 All. 356

**131.** *Suit for payment of mortgage money or foreclosure—Non-joinder of person interested in the mortgaged property, Effect of—Transfer of Property Act, 1882, s. 85—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 32—Plea taken in appeal for the first time.* The non-joinder in a suit to which Ch. IV of Act IV of 1882 applies of a person interested in the mortgaged property within the meaning of s. 85 of that Act, and of whose interest the plaintiff has notice, is a fatal defect in the suit, unless cured by the action of the Court under s. 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and where such non-joinder is brought to the notice of the Court, the Court will give effect to the objection and dismiss the suit, even though such objection be raised for the first time in appeal. *Mata Din Kasodhan v. Kazim Husain*, I. L. R. 13 All. 432; *Janki Prasad v. Kishen Dat*, I. L. R. 16 All. 478; and *Bhawani Prasad v. Kallu*, I. L. R. 17 All. 537, referred to. *GHULAM KADIR KHAN v. MUSTAKIM KHAN*. I. L. R. 18 All. 109

**132.** *Prior and subsequent mortgagees—Effect of non-joinder in a suit on a mortgage of persons interested in the mortgaged property—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85.* Certain mortgagees holding a second mortgage obtained a decree against their mortgagor and a subsequent mortgagee, one *H L*, for sale of the mortgaged property. At the time of the suit there was subsisting on the same property a prior mortgage held by one *D P*. *D P* was not made a party to that suit. After the decree in that suit was passed, but before execution, *D P* brought a suit for sale on his mortgage, but did not make the second mortgagees parties to that suit. In that suit *D P* obtained a decree in execution of which he brought a portion of the mortgaged property to sale, and some of it was purchased by *H. L.* On application by the second mortgagees for an order absolute for sale in execution of their decree, it was *held* that the property purchased by *H. L.* in execution of *D P*'s decree on his prior mortgage could not be brought to sale in execution of the second mortgagees' decree. *Mata Din Kasodhan v. Kazim Husain*, I. L. R. 13 All. 432, referred to. *HIRA LAL v. KISHAN LAL*. I. L. R. 19 All. 543

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**133.** *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85—Foreclosure suit—Practice—Procedure.* In a suit for foreclosure by a puisne mortgagee, the prior mortgagee should be made a party to the suit under s. 85 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882). In a suit where a prior mortgagee was not a party, the Court at the hearing of the suit ordered that he should then be made a party. *Mata Din v. Kazim Husain*, I. L. R. 13 All. 432, followed. *SORABJI CURSETJI SETT v. RATTONJI DOSSABHOY*. I. L. R. 22 Bom. 701

**134.** *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85—Non-joinder of parties—Subsequent mortgage after suit upon prior mortgage filed.* *Held*, that s. 85 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, does not require the joinder in a suit on a prior mortgage of a subsequent mortgagee whose mortgage was only executed subsequently to the filing of such suit. *ISHAQ ALI KHAN v. CHUNNI*. I. L. R. 21 All. 149

**135.** *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85—Suit on a mortgage executed by a Hindu father—Sons not made parties—Notice—Onus of proof.* Where the sons in a joint Hindu family came into Court seeking to get rid of the effect, as against their interests in the joint family property, of a decree on a mortgage executed by their father obtained in a suit to which they were not made parties, the burden of proof lies on them to establish that the mortgagee, when he brought his suit, had notice of their interests in the mortgaged property. *RAM NATH RAI v. LACHMAN RAI*. I. L. R. 21 All. 193

*BIJAI BAHADUR SINGH v. MOWA LAL*  
I. L. R. 21 All. 195 note

**136.** *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 85, 88—Decree for sale on mortgage in suit against Hindu father—Suit by son for declaration that decree not binding on his share.* A decree having been obtained against a Hindu father in a suit on a bond hypothecating family property, the sons sued for a declaration that the decree was not binding on their share on the grounds that they had not been made parties to the suit, and that the debt had been contracted by the father for immoral purposes. *Held* (not following the decision of the majority of the Full Bench in *Bhawani Prasad v. Kallu*, I. L. R. 17 All. 537), that the true rule as to the effect of s. 85 of the Transfer of Property Act, in cases in which a decree is obtained against a Hindu father without making his sons parties to such a suit, is laid down in *Ramasamayyan v. Virasami Ayyar*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 222. *PALANI GOUNDAN v. RANGAYYA GOUNDAN*. I. L. R. 22 Mad. 207

**137.** *Mortgage by such guardian without Court's permission—Validity of such mortgage—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85.* A was the owner of the property in dispute. He mortgaged it with possession to defendant No. 1 in 1884. A died leaving an adopted son, Vithal, a minor. Thereupon one



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Vasudev was appointed by the District Court to be guardian of the person and property of the minor under Act XX of 1864. In September 1890, Vasudev mortgaged the same property to plaintiff with the sanction of the Subordinate Judge's Court obtained under s. 305 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882). In 1895 the plaintiff as second mortgagee brought this suit to redeem the earlier mortgage of 1884. *Held*, that such mortgage was only voidable under s. 30 of Act VIII of 1890 at the instance of any other person affected thereby. *Held*, further, that defendant No. 1, the original mortgagee, was not affected by the plaintiff's mortgage, and that the only person really affected by that mortgage was Vithal, the owner of the equity of redemption, who was a necessary party to the suit. **DATTARAM v. GANGARAM . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 287**

**138.** ———— *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85—Suit by puisne mortgagee without making prior mortgagee a party—Effect of non-compliance with s. 85.* A prior mortgagee, without making a puisne mortgagee a party to his suit, sued on his mortgage, obtained a decree for sale, sold the mortgaged property, and purchased it himself. Subsequently the puisne mortgagee holding a mortgage over the same property, brought his mortgage into suit without making the prior mortgagee a party and obtained a decree for sale. *Held*, that the puisne mortgagee could not bring the mortgaged property to sale in execution of such decree. **JANKI PRASAD v. KISHEN DAT, I. L. R. 16 All. 478, followed. MEHRBANO v. NADIR ALI . . . I. L. R. 22 All. 212**

**JANKI PRASAD v. KISHEN DAT**

**I. L. R. 16 All. 478**

**139.** ———— *Suit against mortgagee of administrator for property given by deceased.* Where *M H*, in consideration of *K N* carrying on litigation concerning a piece of land claimed by *M H* at his own expense, agreed that after he should have recovered the land they should jointly erect buildings on it, the rents and profits of which should be jointly enjoyed by them during the life of *M H*, after whose death the property was to be the sole and absolute property of *K N*:—*Held*, in a suit by *K N* claiming to recover the property from the mortgagee of the administrator of *M H* who was in possession of it, that the representatives of the mortgagor were not necessary parties to the suit. **DAMODHAR MADHAVJI v. KHANDAS NARANDAS**

**8 Bom. O. C. 1**

**140.** ———— *Suit on mortgage-bond—Alienation of property to different alienees.* In a suit on a single mortgage-bond, where part of the property concerned is conveyed or alleged to be conveyed, to different persons, all these are entitled to notice and to be made parties. Such a suit is not multifarious. **KRISHNA GOPAL GHOSE v. HURRY NATH DUTT . . . 25 W. R. 60**

**141.** ———— *Suit by Mahomedan heir of zur-i-peshgi mortgagee to recover advance.* In a suit between Mahomedans by the

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heirs of a zur-i-peshgi mortgagee to recover the amount advanced, all the heirs of the mortgagee must be represented either as plaintiffs or defendants, or those who sue must claim in proportion to what they are entitled to under the Mahomedan law. **MCJEEDOONISSA v. DILDAR HOSSEIN**

**14 W. R. 216**

**142.** ———— *Mortgages, suits concerning—Transferees from mortgagors—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85—Purchase with consent of mortgagee—Contribution—Frame of suit—Apportionment of debt—Redemption.* The heirs of a mortgagor, against whom a decree on the mortgage had been obtained by the mortgagee, in execution of which the mortgaged property was sold, a part being purchased by the mortgagee himself, and a person who purchased a portion of the mortgaged property with the consent of the mortgagee, are not necessary parties in a suit by the mortgagee for contribution or apportionment of the mortgage-debt. A suit by the mortgagee, framed improperly for a declaration of the rights of the purchasers of portion of the mortgaged property of redemption to the properties purchased by them, who were not made parties in the mortgage suit, and for declaration of the mortgagee's absolute right over those properties on the failure of such purchasers to redeem, and for *khas* possession, will not lie. The only relief to which the mortgagee in such a case is entitled is a decree for apportionment of the mortgage-debt on the property purchased by the purchasers, account being taken in that apportionment as well of the property transferred by the mortgagor to other parties with the consent of the mortgagee, as of the portion of the mortgaged property purchased by the mortgagee himself. **RAMMOY HAZRA v. PREM CHAND NASKAR (1901)**

**5 C. W. N. 423**

**143.** ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 437—Parties—Mortgage—Decree for foreclosure—Decree against executor—Application for redemption by beneficiary.* Where a decree for foreclosure was obtained against *S*, who was the executor of his father's estate, and subsequently *A*, a brother of *S*, and *M*, a purchaser of some of the mortgaged properties from *A*, made an application to be made parties and to redeem: *Held*, that they were not entitled to be made parties. **MOHANAND CHATTERJEE v. AKHOY KUMAR BARARI (1901) . . . 6 C. W. N. 488**

**144.** ———— *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85—Appeal—Parties—Practice.* A *jenmi*, having sued the *kanomdar* and his sub-tenants, obtained a decree for redemption and possession on certain terms. The sub-tenants, objecting to some of the terms, appealed, but they did not join the *kanomdar*, to whose prejudice the terms were modified on the appeal. *Held*, that the *kanomdar* was a necessary party, and that the decree made by the Appellate Court in his absence must be set aside, as no reasonable excuse was forthcoming for the omission to make him a party. **Ramunni Panikar v. Sankara Panikar, (1889) I. L. R. 25**

**13 L**



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*Mad. 571n.*, and *Vedapuratti v. Govinda Menon*, (1892) *I. L. R. 25 Mad. 571n.*, followed. *VEDAPURATTI v. AVARA* (1901) . *I. L. R. 25 Mad. 568*

**145.** ————— *Transfer of Property Act, s. 85—Confirmation of possession, suit for, by prior mortgagee—Redemption—Puisne mortgagee, right of, after sale by prior mortgagee—Parties.* A decree obtained by a prior mortgagee, who had no knowledge of puisne mortgagees, is not bad under s. 85 of the Transfer of Property Act because the latter were not made parties. Where a prior mortgagee, who had purchased the mortgaged property in execution of such a decree, brought a suit for confirmation of possession against the puisne mortgagees, who also had previously purchased that property in execution of their mortgage decrees:—*Held*, that the plaintiff ought to succeed against the puisne mortgagees, but subject to their right to redeem the prior mortgage. *Gopee Bundhoo Shantra v. Kaleepudo Banerjee*, 23 *W. R. 338*, distinguished. A purchaser under a prior mortgage may always shield his possession and protect his interest by setting up such prior mortgage, and it is not proper to allow him to be dispossessed simply on the ground that a third party has the right to redeem. *BUNWARI JHA v. RAMJEE THAKUR* (1902) **7 C. W. N. 11**

**146.** ————— *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85—Non-joinder—Apportionment of mortgage-debt—Purchaser of mortgaged property—Release.* When a purchaser from the mortgagor of one of the mortgaged properties (subsequently released by the mortgagee from his lien) is not made a party to a mortgage suit brought by the mortgagee, the proper course is, not to dismiss the suit for non-joinder, but to apportion the mortgage-debt between the property so purchased and released and the other mortgaged property. In such a case the mortgage should be treated as split up into two. *HARI KISSEN BHAGAT v. VELIAT HOSSEIN* (1903)

**I. L. R. 30 Calc. 755 : s.c. 7 C. W. N. 723**

**147.** ————— *Parties—Mortgage suit—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85.* Part owners of a mortgaged property, who did not execute the indenture of mortgage and did not receive the money and were not interested in the equity of redemption are not necessary parties to a suit to enforce the mortgage. *MON MOHINI GHOSE v. PARVATI NATH GHOSE* (1905)

**I. L. R. 32 Calc. 746**

**148.** ————— *Suit—Mortgage—Suit on mortgage-bond—Person claiming under paramount title—Misjoinder of parties—Multi-fariousness—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 44, 45—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85—“Property comprised in a mortgage”—Appellate Court—Other errors affecting merits of suit.* To a suit to enforce a mortgage, persons claiming under a title adverse to that of both the mortgagor and the mortgagee are not proper parties. The term “property comprised in a mortgage”

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in s. 85 of the Transfer of Property Act means not the physical object, but the interest therein which the mortgagor is competent to transfer by way of mortgage at the date of the transaction. The ordinary rule is that a plaintiff mortgagee cannot be allowed so to frame his suit as to draw into controversy the title of a third party, who is in no way connected with the mortgage and who has set up a title paramount to that of the mortgagor and mortgagee. Under ss. 44, 45 of the Civil Procedure Code causes of action of this description cannot be joined in a suit to enforce a mortgage. The rule is not one of convenience merely and the fact of the question of such title being determined by the Court of first instance in breach of the rule does not preclude a Court of appeal from reversing the decree. The question, however, is not one of jurisdiction, and where in a mortgage suit a question of paramount title raised by a defendant is tried without objection, neither party can ask for a reversal on the ground that the issue was not properly triable in the action. *JAGGESWAR DUTT v. BHUBAN MOHAN MITRA* (1906) . **I. L. R. 33 Calc. 425**

**149.** ————— *Nawab Nazim's Debts Act, suit under—Suit brought to recover property of nizamat.* *Held*, that a suit brought by a claimant against the Government and the grantee to recover property, which the commissioners appointed under the Nawab Nazim's Debts Act had certified to be nizamat property, but which had before the passing of the Act been conveyed by the Nawab to his son, could not proceed without the Nawab Nazim having been joint as a party. *ONIRAO BEGUM v. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA*

**I. L. R. 9 Calc. 704 : 12 C. L. R. 595  
L. R. 10 I. A. 39**

**150.** ————— *Negotiable instruments—Bill of exchange, suit on—Drawer and acceptor—Joinder—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 29.* The drawer and acceptor of bills of exchange can be joined as co-defendants in a suit brought by the holder of such bills. *PESTONJEE EDULJEE GURDUR v. MAHOMED ALI* . **I. L. R. 3 Calc. 541**

**151.** ————— *Bill of exchange—Drawer and payee.* Plaintiff, as payee of an order drawn by defendant at Ahmedabad where he (defendant) resided, on a firm at Bangkok in Siam, and dishonoured on presentation, sued defendant and an agent of the Bangkok firm, who resided at Surat, in the Subordinate Judge's Court at Surat. Permission to proceed with the suit against the defendant (the drawer) having been refused by the High Court, plaintiff withdrew his plaint and filed his suit in the Court at Ahmedabad against the drawer alone. *Held*, that plaintiff ought not to have joined the drawer (defendant) and the Bangkok firm as defendants in the same suit. *SHETH KAHANDAS NARANDAS v. DAHIABHAI*

**I. L. R. 3 Bom. 182**

**152.** ————— *Hundi, suit on—Endorser, acceptor, and drawer.* *Held*, that a purchaser of a hundi, on its being dishonoured, is at



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liberty to sue his endorser alone, and it is not absolutely necessary to implead the acceptor and drawer in the same suit; and if he does so, he does not lose his right of suing them so long as his action is within the period of limitation. **GOPAL DAS v. SEETA RAM** . . . . . **3 Agra 268**

**153.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 61—Suit on lost cheque.* The endorsee of a cheque sued the endorser, stating in their plaint that the cheque had been lost, and that the defendant refused to give them a duplicate of it, and claiming a duplicate of it or the refund of the money they had paid the defendant on the cheque. *Held*, that the plaint should be amended by joining the drawer of the cheque as a defendant in the suit. **BALDEO PRASAD v. GRISH CHANDRA BOSE**

**I. L. R. 2 All. 754**

**154.** ————— *Official Assignee—Insolvent Act (11 & 12 Vict., c. 21)—Official Assignee made a party defendant.* In a suit in the mofussil the defendant having been adjudicated an insolvent under the Insolvent Act (11 & 12 Vict., c. 21), the Official Assignee was placed upon the record as a defendant, and judgment was entered against him for the sum claimed to be paid out of the insolvent's estate. *Held*, that the Official Assignee was not a proper party, there being nothing in the Insolvent Act which enables a suit of this kind to be continued against the Official Assignee. **MILLER v. BUDH SINGH DUDHURIA** . . . . . **I. L. R. 18 Calc. 43**

**155.** ————— *Suit by heirs of insolvent for property acquired after insolvency.* *R* became possessed of certain properties in 1872 and 1881. In 1866 he had presented a petition of insolvency and a vesting order was made. No final order of discharge was ever made, and *R* died in 1888. In a suit by the heirs of *R* for their share of the property acquired after his insolvency:—*Held*, that the Official Assignee was not a necessary party to the suit, though in case of a decree in the plaintiff's favour notice should be given him by the Court. **FATMABIBI v. FATMABIBI**

**I. L. R. 16 Bom. 452**

**156.** ————— *Suit against widow of insolvent as his legal representative—Form of decree.* The husband of the defendant was adjudicated an insolvent in 1891, and the usual order was made vesting his estate in the Official Assignee. He subsequently died without having filed his schedule, and no schedule had ever been filed. After his death, a suit was brought by a creditor against the defendant as the "widow, heiress, and legal representative" of the deceased insolvent, in which suit a decree was made against her, "the amount to be levied out of the assets of the deceased in her hands." In an application by the defendant to have the decree set aside on the grounds that the Official Assignee was a necessary party to the suit, and that the decree should have been against him as her husband's representative as his estate was in his lifetime, and since had continued to be

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vested in the Official Assignee:—*Held*, that the Official Assignee was not a necessary party to the suit. The Official Assignee is not a necessary party to any suit to recover a money debt from a person who is either an insolvent at the time the suit is instituted or becomes insolvent pending the suit. But a decree made against an insolvent under such circumstances should be restricted in form so as not to allow the judgment-creditor by means of execution to obtain an advantage over the general body of creditors. *In re Hunt Monnet & Co.; Ex parte Gamble v. Bhola Gir*, 1 Bom. H. C. 251; and *Miller v. Budh Singh Dudhuria*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 43, referred to. In this case the decree was varied by the omission of the words "to be levied out of the assets of the deceased in her hands," and liberty was reserved to the judgment-creditor to prove for the amount of his decree in the Insolvent Court, with a note that execution of the decree is stayed pending the insolvency. **CHANDMULL v. RANEESOONDERY DOSSEE**

**I. L. R. 22 Calc. 259**

**157.** ————— *Partition, suit for—Shareholders in joint property.* A suit which is in the nature of a partition suit cannot be properly dealt with unless all who are admittedly shareholders in the joint property are before the Court. **PAHALADH SINGH v. LUCHMUNBUTTY** . . . . . **12 W. R. 256**

**SADABURT PERSHAD SAHOO v. LOTF ALI KHAN. PHOOLBAS KOORER v. LALLA JUGGESSUR SAHI** . . . . . **14 W. R. 339**

s.c. on review **PHOOLBAS KOORER v. LALLA JUGGESSUR SAHOY** . . . . . **18 W. R. 48**

**GOKOOL PERSHAD v. ETWARI MAHTO** . . . . . **20 W. R. 138**

**NATHUNI MAHTON v. MANRAJ MAHTON.** . . . . **I. L. R. 2 Calc. 149**

**158.** ————— *Joint family property—Assignee of member of family.* In a suit by the mother and guardian of two minors to obtain a partition of joint family property free from the encumbrances which the father and sons had put upon it, wherein a third party was co-plaintiff by virtue of an alleged conveyance from the plaintiff, the Court did not allow such party to remain on the record as co-plaintiff, holding that the mother and guardian could not give him a right of suit against the other members of the family, and that the proprietary interests of the minors might ultimately be prejudiced. **MUDDUN GOPAL LALL v. GOWRUBUTTY** . . . . . **21 W. R. 190**

**159.** ————— *Suit for partition after father's death—Son's wives.* In a suit for partition, after the father's death, between brothers, the sons of different wives, who are alive at the time when such suit is instituted, such wives are necessary parties to the suit, as they are entitled to share with their sons. **TORIT BHOOSUN BONNERJEE v. TARAPROSONNO BANERJEE**

**I. L. R. 4 Calc. 756: 4 C. L. R. 161**



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**160.** ———— *Share of joint zamindari.* The owner of a 12 annas share in a joint zamindari granted to the plaintiff a mokurari lease of his share in a small portion of land within the zamindari. The owners of the remaining 4 annas share granted a patni of his share in the whole zamindari to the defendants. The plaintiff brought a suit against the defendants for partition of the small plot of land. *Held*, that such a suit would not lie, because the zamindars were not made parties. *PARBATI CHURN DEB v. AIN-UD-DEEN*

**I. L. R. 7 Calc. 577; 9 C. L. R. 170**

**161.** ———— *Suit for joint property without joining other owners or sharers—Defect of parties—Suit for declaratory decree.* The plaintiffs based their claim to a goat sacrificed on the fourth day of each month on an alleged custom by which each of five families took certain goats in each month, and sued to establish their right without making the other families parties. *Held*, that to make any declaration in a suit to which they were not parties would be in effect to partition joint property, and to define the share of each without all the sharers being before the Court. *Pahaladh Singh v. Luchmunbutty*, 12 W. R. 256. *KALI KANTA SURMA v. GOURI PRASAD SURMA BARDEURI*

**I. L. R. 17 Calc. 908**

**162.** ———— *Suit for partition and to set aside order disallowing objection to attachment—Purchaser or mortgagee of a co-parcener's share.* In a partition suit all persons interested in the property to be divided must be brought before the Court. A purchaser or mortgagee of a co-parcener's share in the joint property is a proper, and even necessary, party to a suit for partition. *A, B and C* were members of a joint Hindu family. In execution of a decree against *B*, a portion of the family property was attached. Thereupon *A* intervened and objected to the attachment so far as his own share was concerned. The objection was disallowed, and the property was brought to sale and purchased by *D*. *A* then filed a suit (i) to set aside the order in the miscellaneous proceedings disallowing his objection to the attachment; and (ii) for a partition of the whole family property. In this suit he impleaded not only his co-sharers *B* and *C*, but also *D*, the auction-purchaser, and *E*, a mortgagee of *B*'s share in the joint property. The Subordinate Judge, holding that the suit was bad for misjoinder of parties as well as of causes of action, returned the plaint for amendment by striking out the prayer for partition. On appeal, this order was confirmed by the District Judge. On *A*'s application to the High Court under s. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure:—*Held*, that the suit was not bad either for misjoinder of parties or for misjoinder of causes of action. Treating the suit as one for partition, the auction-purchaser *D* and the mortgagee *E* were proper, and even necessary, parties. If *A* established his right to partition, he would be entitled to have the order in the miscellaneous proceedings set aside in the same suit. *SADU BIN RAGHU v. RAM BIN GOVIND*

**I. L. R. 16 Bom. 608**

PARTIES—*contd.*1. PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

**163.** ———— *Private partition—Patni of separate share—Subsequent partition under Beng. Act VIII of 1876, s. 128.* The plaintiffs were co-sharers in a certain estate, *T* being another co-sharer. In 1818 a private partition took place between the co-sharers, in the course of which certain specific lands were allotted to *T* in severalty, the rest remaining undivided. *T* granted a patni lease of her share to third parties who were thenceforth in possession, and subsequently there was a partition of the whole estate by the Collector under Bengal Act VIII of 1876, in the course of which the specific lands allotted to *T* in the private partition were allotted to the plaintiffs, who brought against the tenants of the land suits for rent to which they made the patnidars defendants. *Held*, that the patnidars were properly made parties to the suits in order to try the question of the right to receive the rent as between the plaintiffs and the patnidars. *Kashee Ram Dass v. Sham Mohinee*, 23 W. R. 227; *Ahamuleen v. Girish Chunder Shamunt*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 350; and *Mulan Mohan Lal v. Holloway*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 555, referred to. *HRIDOY NATH SHAHA v. MOHOBUTNESSA BIBEE*

**I. L. R. 20 Calc. 285**

**164.** ———— *Partition, suit for—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 32—Pending litigation—Addition of party after the decree, but before it is engrossed on stamp paper—Stamp Act (II of 1859), s. 2 (15), Sch. I, Art. 45.* A suit for partition, even when the report of the Commissioner is confirmed and a decree is directed to be drawn in accordance therewith, is a pending litigation, until the Court signs the final decree. A decree for partition, to be operative, must be engrossed on stamped paper as required by the Stamp Act, and until the Judge signs the decree so engrossed, it cannot be said that the suit has terminated; and an order directing a party to be added under s. 32 of the Civil Procedure Code can be made in such a suit before it has actually terminated. *Lingammal v. Chinna Venkattammal*, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 227; *Mihin Lal v. Imtiaz Ali*, I. L. R. 18 All. 332; *Oriental Bank Corporation v. Charriol*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 642; *Heard v. Borgwardt*, (1883) W. N. 173, and *Keith v. Butcher*, L. R. 25 Ch. D. 760, discussed. *JOTINDRA MOHAN TAGORE v. BEJOY CHAND MAHATAP* (1905)

**I. L. R. 32 Calc. 483**

**165.** ———— *Partnership, suits concerning—Death of old proprietors of firm—Suit by agent.* A firm becomes dissolved when the original proprietors die, and if somebody comes in their place and carries on the business of the firm, the business, whether carried on under the old name or not, is not that of the old firm, but of an entirely new firm. A suit brought on behalf of such new firm must be brought, in the names of the persons who are at the time of the institution of the suit carrying on its business. *GOSAIN GUNGA DUTTA BHARUTE v. DABEE DAS BABOO*

**25 W. R. 118**



**PARTIES—contd.****1. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

**166.** ———— *Suit by one member for debt due to family firm.* In a suit for money lent, brought by the father of a joint Hindu family who carried on jointly an ancestral money-lending business, the plaintiff stated, in examination, that he had ceased to take an active part in the management of the affairs of the firm, and that the control of its business was in the hands of his sons, whom he described as "maliks." *Held*, that, under the circumstances, the plaintiff could not maintain the suit in his individual capacity, and without joining his sons as plaintiffs with him, his sons being his partners in the ancestral business, and he not being the managing member or proprietor. **JUGAL KISHORE v. HULASI RAM . I. L. R. 8 All. 264**

**167.** ———— *Representatives of a deceased partner.* The representatives of a deceased partner are not necessary parties to an action for damages under a guarantee to the original firm. **BURKIN YOUNG v. BHOOBUN MOHUN BONERJEE . Cor. 90**

**168.** ———— *Suit for dissolution of partnership and account of dealings of deceased partner.* To a suit for an account of dealings and transactions of a deceased partner in a Hindu family bank, and for a dissolution of the partnership, the heir or legal representative of the deceased partner is a necessary party. **JANOKEY DOSS v. BINDABUN DOSS**

**3 Moo. I. A. 175**

**169.** ———— *Suit for dissolution on basis of compromise in absence of representative of deceased partner.* Where the surviving partners of a firm in the absence of a representative of a deceased partner, adjusted the partnership accounts and agreed to hand over a portion of the partnership property to one of the partners in compromise of his claim, and the partner whose claim was so agreed to be compromised prayed for a dissolution of the firm upon the basis of such compromise, it was held that a representative of the deceased partner was a necessary party to the suit. **RAMLAL THAKURSIDAS v. LAKHMICHAND MUNIRAM**

**1 Bom. Ap. 51**

**170.** ———— *Suit for the administration of the estate of a deceased partner.* The fact that surviving partners are made parties to an administration suit of the estate of a deceased partner does not of itself alone enable the Court to direct such surviving partners to render an account of the partnership estate. Surviving partners cannot be made co-defendants with the executors in such a suit merely by reason of their partnership. They can be made co-defendants in certain special cases, as where the relation between the executors or administrators of the deceased partner and the surviving partners is such as to present a substantial impediment to the prosecution by the executors or administrators of the rights of the parties interested in the estate against the surviving partners. **ELIAS v. HABOOB MOOSHEE MOOSHEE**

**Bourke O. C. 350**

**PARTIES—contd.****1. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

**171.** ———— *Plaintiff—Partnership-debt—Suit by sole surviving partner—Representatives of deceased partner—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 45—Civil Procedure Code, s. 25.* The rule of English law that, in trading partnerships, although the right of a deceased partner devolves on his representative, the remedy survives to his co-partner, who alone must enforce the right by action and is liable on recovery to account to the representative for the deceased's share, should be applied in India, in the absence of statutory authority to the contrary. The effect of s. 45 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872) is to extend the English law applicable to trading partnerships to all cases of partnership. There is nothing in that section nor in s. 46 of the Civil Procedure Code, read with it to show that the representatives of a deceased partner must be joined in an action for a partnership debt brought by the surviving partner, though it may be that they might be joined in such an action. **GOBIND PRASAD v. CHANDAR SEKHAR I. L. R. 9 All. 486**

**172.** ———— *Joinder of parties—Partnership-debt—Representatives of a deceased partner—Mitakshara family—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 45—Succession Certificate Act (VI of 1889).* In a suit by surviving partners for the recovery of a partnership-debt which became due during life of a deceased partner, the representatives of such deceased partner, having regard to s. 45 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872), are necessary parties; and the provisions of s. 4 of the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889) must be complied with in order that the suit may be properly constituted. *Quære*: Whether, in the case of a family partnership under the Mitakshara law a question might arise as to the applicability of s. 45 of the Contract Act and s. 4 of the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889). **Gobind Prasad v. Chandar Sekhar, I. L. R. 9 All. 486**, dissented from. **RAM NARAIN NURSING DOSS v. RAM CHUNDER JANKEE LOLL**

**I. L. R. 18 Calc. 86**

**173.** ———— *Suit by firm after death of a partner for a debt accrued due during his life—Representatives of deceased partner—Contract Act, s. 45.* The representatives of a deceased partner are not necessary parties to a suit for the recovery of a debt which accrued due to the partnership in the lifetime of the deceased partner. **MOTILAL BECHARDAS v. GHELABHAI HARIRAM. BHANA LALLA v. DADABHOY SAGUNBAKSH**

**I. L. R. 17 Bom. 6**

**174.** ———— *Suit by one member of an undivided Hindu family—Non-joinder of other persons interested in a family business—Amendment of plaint—Limitation.* In 1887 the plaintiff appointed the defendant to serve for three years as manager of a business in Moulmein, which was the business of the undivided Hindu family to which the plaintiff belonged. In 1893, the plaintiff, without joining the other members of his family, sued the defendant for damages for breach of the contract of service. *Held*, (i) that the suit was



PARTIES—*contd.*1. PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

not maintainable in the absence from the record of the other partners in the business; (ii) that, under the circumstances, the name of the plaintiff in the cause-title could not be taken as designating his partners also; (iii) that by reason of the fact that the amendment might deprive the defendants of the defence of limitation and of the other circumstances in the case, the plaintiff should not be allowed on appeal to amend the plaint by bringing his partners on to the record. *ALAGAPPA CHETTI v. VELLIAN CHETTI*. I. L. R. 18 Mad. 33

175. ———— *Suit for debt due to partnership after death of partner—Right of representative of deceased partner to sue for a specific asset—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 45.* On the death of a partner leaving a surviving partner still carrying on the business of the firm, the representative of the deceased partner may sue for and recover debts due to the firm, although the firm's assets in the hands of the surviving partner are already sufficient to answer all the claims made on behalf of the deceased partner, and although the surviving partner is willing to satisfy such claims and disapproves of, and refuses to join in, the suit brought by the representative of the deceased partner. *AGA GULAM HOSAIN v. SASSOON*. I. L. R. 21 Bom. 412

176. ———— *Suit for a partnership debt—Representative of partner who dies pending the suit not a necessary party—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 45.* In a suit to recover a debt due to a trading partnership in which it happens that a deceased person was a partner up to the time of his death, it is not necessary to join as a plaintiff any representative of the deceased partner. *Gobind Prasad v. Chandar Sekhar*, I. L. R. 9 All. 486; *Ram Narain Nursing Doss v. Ram Chunder Jankce Loll*, I. L. R. 18 Cal. 86; and *Motilal Bechardass v. Ghellabhai Hariram*, I. L. R. 17 Bom. 6, referred to. *DEBI DAS v. NIRPAT*. I. L. R. 20 All. 365

177. ———— *Suit against partners.* Where a suit was instituted against M and two others as constituting a certain firm, and it appeared that only M was a member with two persons other than those sued, it was not incumbent upon the plaintiff to sue all the partners in M's firm, and the plaintiff was entitled to proceed against M alone. *Per STANLEY, J., Lukimdas Khimji v. Purshotam*, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 700, and *Narayana Chetti v. Lakshmana Chetti*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 256, followed. *MOHIM LALL v. SRI GUNGAJI COTON MILLS CO.* 4 C. W. N. 369

178. ———— *Purchase of share by mortgagee.* In a suit in respect of a partnership, the rights and interest in which of T, one of the partners, had been purchased by the Delhi and London Bank, who had been mortgagees of some of the partnership property pledged to them by T for money borrowed for purposes of the property:—*Held*, that the Bank, as T's representatives by pur-

PARTIES—*contd.*1. PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

chase, had been properly joined as a defendant in the suit. *HARRISON v. DELHI AND LONDON BANK*. I. L. R. 4 All. 437

179. ———— *Partners—Refusal to join as plaintiffs.* A, B, and C, and others were partners in a firm, and had transactions as such partners with another firm in which also C was a partner. In a suit by the former firm against the latter, C and other partners in the former firm refused to join as plaintiffs. *Held* (reversing the decision of the Court below), that C and the other partners of the former firm were rightly made defendants. *BISSONATH RUCKITT v. GUNNESH CHUNDER DEY*. 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 203

*RUSTOM ALLY v. AMEER ALLY SOUDAGUR*. 10 W. R. 487

180. ———— *Practice—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 43.* In a suit brought upon a contract made by a firm the plaintiff may select as defendants those partners of the firm against whom he wishes to proceed, allowing his right of suit against those whom he does not make defendants to be barred. *LUKIMIDAS KHIMJI v. PURSHOTAM HARIDAS*. I. L. R. 6 Bom. 700

181. ———— *Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 43—Joint promissors—Suit for money against person carrying on business of a dissolved partnership—Non-joinder of parties.* In a suit for money due on account of dealings in clothes from 1889 to 1895 it appeared that the dealings had taken place between the plaintiff and the firm consisting of the defendant and another till 1894 when the firm was dissolved, since which date the defendant had carried on the business and dealt with the plaintiff. *Held*, that the suit was not bad for non-joinder of the late partner. *Per Curiam*: It is not incumbent on a person dealing with partners to make them all defendants in a suit. *NARAYANA CHETTI v. LAKSHMANA CHETTI*. I. L. R. 21 Mad. 256

182. ———— *Suit for contribution by one member of dissolved partnership against others—Adjustment of accounts.* In a civil action by one or more members of a defunct firm against another member for contribution to recover money paid in liquidation of a debt due by the firm, if there has been no adjustment of accounts, it is necessary to make all the partners parties to the suit. *PEAREE MOHUN ROY v. CHUNDER NATH ROY*. 18 W. R. 408

183. ———— *Principal and agent—Suit against principal for acts of agent.* Where a person sues another as liable for the acts of the accredited agent of the latter, it is not necessary that the alleged agent should be made a party to the suit. *HATHI RAM v. GOBIND RAM*. 3 Agra 131

184. ———— *Suit to recover possession under Specific Relief Act, s. 9—Necessary parties—Principal and agent—Suit for ejectment by party dispossessed.* The plaintiffs sued, under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), to recover



**PARTIES—contd.****1. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

possession of certain land which, they alleged, had been in their possession since 1856. They alleged that, while retaining possession of the said land through care-takers appointed by them, they had been in the habit of yearly selling the grass of the land to purchasers who themselves cut the grass so purchased; that in 1878 the grass of the land for the ensuing year was sold to *T*; that in the month of August 1879 the defendants forcibly dispossessed the plaintiffs of the said land, and prevented them and their servants and *T* from entering the same. Defendant No. 2 denied the dispossession, and disclaimed any interest in the land. Defendants Nos. 1 and 3 denied that the land in question belonged to the plaintiffs, and alleged that it was the property of *A*, of whom defendant No. 1 was manager, and No. 3 the lessee of the said land. They also alleged that the plaintiffs had tried to take forcible possession of the said land, and that defendant No. 1, acting on *A*'s behalf, prevented them. They submitted that *A* was a necessary party to the suit. *Held*, that the three defendants were properly made parties to the suit, and that *A* was not a necessary party. Defendant No. 1 (the lessee) had the physical occupation of the land sued for; but all three defendants, not having made any declaration, in taking possession, that it was taken for one or two of their number acquired it jointly, and handed on a derivative possession to the actual occupant, which as against third parties ranked as their own. If it was properly assumed, they all had a right to defend it; if not, they might all be called on for restitution. As to *A*, he was not actually in possession, and had taken no personal part in the dispossession. He was said to be owner, but that did not imply that he committed the alleged acts of defendants, or insisted on his ownership. As he had not the physical possession of the land, it could not be assumed that he had the jural possession merely on the assertion of the defendants. He, therefore, having done no palpable wrong, was not a necessary party. *Held*, also, that defendant No. 2 was properly made a defendant, and that, in case the dispossession should be established, he should be retained as a defendant notwithstanding his disclaimer. It was possible that No. 3 held the land on terms beneficial to No. 2, and the disclaimer in the present suit would not estop No. 2 from enforcing these terms in a subsequent suit against No. 3. Where under a contract between *A* and *B* an exclusive occupation of immovable property is given to *A* he is the proper plaintiff in a suit for possession brought under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877). If *B* desires to sue immediately on the possessory right, he should sue in *A*'s name, though for an injury to the reversion he (*B*) may properly sue in his own name. The intention of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 9, is not to be frustrated by any private arrangement under which the ejector has acted, or by which he may consent to hold on behalf of some other person. As between him and that person, his possession may be that of

**PARTIES—contd.****1. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

an agent, but to the former holder he is the dispossessor: possession derived from him cannot be superior to his and (the right of suit being given in general terms) is equally subject as his, to the result of proceedings taken within the prescribed six months. A person who has been ejected from his property, in suing to recover it under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), may sue the actual ejector, or the person under whose orders or by whose authority the actual ejector has acted, or he may sue both; but the wrong-doer who has taken possession is the one from whom primarily it is to be reclaimed. If a third party desire to maintain the expulsion as an act done on his behalf, it is for him to come forward and avow it. He may claim to be admitted as a defendant; but if he had himself a right to do what his agent had done, his right and his authority may be pleaded by the agent, and will be an effectual answer. The alleged owner or principal therefore is not a necessary party for the protection of the agent. The suit against the latter will fail if he acted on due authority where that authority is shown. *VIRJIVANDAS MADHAVDAS v. MAHOMED ALI KHAN* . . . . . **I. L. R. 5 Bom. 208**

**185.** ———— *Purchasers—Purchaser pendente lite.* A grantee or vendee of the defendant during the pendency of a suit need not be made a party to the suit. *GULABCHAND MANICKCHAND v. DHONDI VALAD BHAI* . . . . . **11 Bom. 64**

**186.** ———— *Purchaser pendente lite.* The purchaser *pendente lite* of property actually in litigation need not be made a party to the suit. The title acquired by the purchaser is subservient or subject to the right of the parties in litigation. *UMAMOYI BURMONEA v. TARINI PERSAD GHOSE* . . . . . **7 W. R. 225**

**187.** ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 108, 109—Whether an auction-purchaser is a necessary party to an application to set aside an ex parte decree.* An auction-purchaser of property sold in execution of an *ex parte* decree is not a necessary party to an application made by the judgment-debtor to set aside the said decree, inasmuch as the auction-purchaser does not come under the description of "opposite party" in s. 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *JATINDRA MOHAN PODDAR v. SRINATH ROY* . . . . . **I. L. R. 26 Calc. 267**  
**3 C. W. N. 261**

**188.** ———— *Suit for arrear of rent and ejectment after sale of raiyat's interest in execution of decree—Purchaser.* A talukhdar in executing a decree for rent sold his raiyat's right and interest in the tenure. He afterwards instituted a suit against the same raiyat for arrears and ejectment. *Held*, that the execution-purchaser should have been made a party to the latter suit. *PROSUNNO MOYEE DOSSEE v. BHUBO TARINEE DOSSEE* . . . . . **10 W. R. 494**

reversing on review *BHUBO TARINEE DOSSIA v. PROSUNNO MOYEE DOSSIA* . . . . . **10 W. R. 304**



PARTIES—*contd.*1. PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

189. — *Suit by auction-purchasers at sale for arrears of revenue to annul incumbrances—Act XI of 1859, s. 37—Suit to cancel under-tenures.* The right that is given by s. 37 of Act XI of 1859 to the auction-purchaser of an entire estate in the permanently-settled districts of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, sold for arrears of revenue, to avoid and annul an under-tenure, is a right that must be exercised by all the purchasers jointly where there are more purchasers than one. *JATRA MOHUN SEN v. AUKHIL CHANDRA CHOWDHRY*  
I. L. R. 24 Cal. 334

*AKHIL CHANDRA CHOWDHRY v. JATRA MOHUN SEN*  
1 C. W. N. 314

190. — *Suit by auction-purchaser at sale for arrears of revenue to annul incumbrance—Act XI of 1859, s. 37.* When an estate sold for arrears of revenue is recorded in a separate number in the Collector's rent-roll with a separate revenue assessed upon it and the specification in the sale certificate shows that the estate sold was an entire estate, the mere fact of a portion of the lands of that estate being joint with those of certain other estates cannot stand in the way of its having an entire estate within the meaning of s. 37 of Act XI of 1859. In a suit by a purchaser of such an estate at a sale for arrears of revenue to avoid an under-tenure:—*Held*, that the proprietors of the other estates to which the land in dispute partly appertained were not necessary parties, inasmuch as what the plaintiffs really asked for was not direct or actual possession of the land, but indirect or constructive possession by receipt of rent to the extent of their share from the cultivating tenants, upon a declaration that the intermediate tenure was cancelled by the sale for arrears of revenue. *KAMAL KUMARI CHOWDHURANI v. KIRAN CHANDRA ROY*  
2 C. W. N. 229

191. — *Receiver—Practice—Application for leave to sue a Receiver.* The Receiver is not a necessary party to a suit for possession of immovable property. *SUTTYA SUTTYA GHOSAL v. GOLAP MONI DEBI* (1897)  
5 C. W. N. 27

192. — *Registration, suits for—Suit to compel registration—Registrar.* To a suit to compel registration of a document under s. 77 of the Registration Act, 1877, after denial of execution, the Registrar is not a necessary party. *RADHA KISSEN ROWRA DAKNA v. CHOONEELOLL DUTT*  
I. L. R. 5 Cal. 445: 5 C. L. R. 172

193. — *Registration Act, III of 1877, ss. 72, 77—Suit to compel registration—Necessary party—Jurisdiction.* To a suit under s. 77 of the Registration Act (III of 1877) to obtain registration of a document, the registering officer or the Government is not a necessary party, and the proper forum for it is the Court of the lowest competent jurisdiction. *WISHWAMBHAR PANDIT v. PRABHAKAR BHAT*  
I. L. R. 8 Bom. 269

PARTIES—*contd.*1. PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

194. — *Rent, suits for, and intervenors in such suits—Suit by one of several dar-patnidars.* Where a tenant held lands in six villages under a patnidar at an admitted rent, and the patnidar subsequently granted dar-patnis to two different parties of two and four of the said villages, respectively, the tenant having admitted a certain sum to be the rent payable in respect of the lands situated in the two villages:—*Held*, that the dar-patnidar of the other four villages could sue the tenant for the rent payable in respect of the lands situated in the four villages comprised in his dar-patni, without joining as co-plaintiff in the action the dar-patnidar of the two villages. *BRAJA LAL ROY v. SAYAMA CHARAN BHUTTO*  
6 B. L. R. 529: 15 W. R. 20

195. — *Assignment of interest—Consent of assignees for assignors to sue.* In a suit by patnidars for arrears of rent, where parties who had subsequently acquired an interest in the patni appeared and petitioned the Court assenting to the suit being carried on in the names of the plaintiffs:—*Held*, that there was a sufficiently constituted suit and a sufficient array of parties to enable the Court to give a decree. *SREENATH MOOKERJEE v. WHITE*  
13 W. R. 126

196. — *Suit for rent of pattidari estate—Act XIV of 1863, s. 7.* In a suit for the rent of a pattidari estate, the lambardar is ordinarily the proper party to be sued as being the collector of the rents; but under s. 7, Act XIV of 1863, the several pattidars can be sued for their respective shares of rent instead of recovering it through the lambardar. *BHOLANATH v. BISHESHUR TEWAREE*  
2 Agra Pt. II, 165

197. — *Suit for rent of property surrendered to pre-emptor.* To a suit by a purchaser of land who had had to surrender it to a pre-emptor, for the rents accruing between the date of the purchase and the subsequent transfer, the pre-emptor ought to be made a party. *BULDEO PERSHAD v. MOHUN*  
1 Agra Rev. 30

198. — *Person preferring claim to rent opposed to plaintiff.* In any suit for rent against a tenant by a person claiming as landlord, the Court ought not to put on the record a person who prefers opposing claims to the plaintiff, unless it sees that his position, as such opponent, would be seriously compromised by the result of a decree in favour of the plaintiff, e.g., as when the opposing party claims to be in actual possession by receipt of rents. *CHOOHIE LALL v. KOKIL SINGH*  
19 W. R. 248

Nor where it would change the scope and character of the suit. *GOOROO PROSUNNO BANERJEE v. GUGUN CHUNDER DUTT*  
20 W. R. 383

*HUBEEBUL HOSSEIN v. MUNEEHAM*  
24 W. R. 357

*PROTAB CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHRY v. JOGENDRO CHUNDER GHOSE*  
4 C. L. R. 168



**PARTIES—contd.****1. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

and make it otherwise than a *bonâ fide* suit for rent.  
**RADHA MALAKAR v. SRISHTEE NARAIN SHAHA**

21 W. R. 88

**BYKUNT KYBURTO DOSS v. SHUSHEE MOHUN PAUL CHOWDHRY**

22 W. R. 526

**ISSUR CHUNDER SEIN v. BIPEEN BEHAREE ROY**

16 W. R. 132

**KATIYANEE DEBIA v. GIRISH CHUNDER BANERJEE**

23 W. R. 168

**199. Question of title.**

In a suit for rent against a raiyat, the defendant contended that the plaintiff had no interest in the tenure and had never received rent from him, but that he had paid rent to a third party. *Held*, that the third party might be added as an intervenor in order to try the question who was actually the beneficial owner of the tenure and entitled to the rent. **RADHAMONEE v. RAM NARAIN DEY**

22 W. R. 440

**200. Beng. Act VIII**

*of 1869, s. 31.* In a suit for rent, where an intervenor on his own account, who pleads a deposit in Court made under Bengal Act VIII of 1869, is made a defendant by the Court, the fact of his being a defendant does not give rise to any equity as between the plaintiff and the other defendants so as to allow them to have the advantage of s. 31, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, although, if the intervenor had been sued jointly with the other defendants, they might have had the benefit of it. **GIRDHAREE LALL SINGH PASBAN v. CHUNDEE PERSHAD**

21 W. R. 277

**201. Question of title.**

In a suit for rent, an intervenor who claims to have acquired a share of the property for which the rent is claimed, may be made a defendant at the discretion of the Court. If a question of title legitimately arises between the parties to a rent suit, the Court is not compelled to dismiss the suit, but is bound to determine the question for the purposes of the suit. **CHOWRASEE KOORER v. BOKHOOREE SINGH**

24 W. R. 350

**202. Title of third**

*party alleged by defendant—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 28. Per FIELD, J.*—Where a person sued for rent sets up the title of a third party, and alleges that he holds under and pays rent to him, such third party ought not to be made a party to the suit, so as to convert a simple suit for arrears of rent into one for the determination of the title to the property in respect of which the rent is claimed. Such a suit raises only two issues, *viz.*,—(i) Does the relation of landlord and tenant exist between the plaintiff and defendant? (ii) Are the alleged arrears of rent due and unpaid? And these are questions in which the plaintiff and defendant are alone concerned, and no third party claiming a title adverse to the plaintiff can properly be made a party to the trial of these issues. S. 28 of the Civil

**PARTIES—contd.****1. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

Procedure Code is not imperative, but allows a discretion to be exercised; and in such a suit it is better, both in the interests of Government and for the proper adjudication of the question of title, that it should be tried by a competent Court in a suit directly framed and brought for that purpose. **LODAI MOLLAR v. KALLY DASS ROY**

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 238: 10 C. L. R. 581

**203. Question of title.**

An intervenor in a suit for rent has no right to be made a defendant, or to introduce into the suit an entirely new issue, *e.g.*, one concerning title between himself and the plaintiff; still less is he entitled singly to appeal against the judgment in the case. **BIRESSUR PANREY v. JOGENDRO CHUNDER DEB**

24 W. R. 261

**204. Adding parties**

*in rent suits.* Where Act X of 1859, s. 77, was no longer in force, the effect of adding a party under Act VIII of 1859, s. 73, in a rent suit was the same as in any other kind of suit. Whatever be the class of suit, the party added cannot raise an issue which would entirely change the nature and scope of the suit; the Court being bound to limit its inquiry to the issues necessary in order to try the plaintiff's right to the special relief sought:—*e.g.*, where the relief sought is the recovery of arrears of rent, the intervenor is competent to raise all questions, whether of title or otherwise, which bear upon the issue, is the plaintiff entitled to recover the rent claimed? **TLESUREE KOORER v. ASMEDH KOORER**

24 W. R. 101

**205. Suit for arrears**

*of rent—Question of title.* In a suit for arrears of rent, in which an intervenor, alleging that plaintiff was merely his benamidar, was added as a defendant under the Code of Civil Procedure, s. 73:—*Held*, that it was wrong to introduce him into the case, and that any issue as to the alleged benami was foreign to the suit. **RUGHOO NATH PERSHAD SINGH v. BYJNATH SAHOY**

24 W. R. 349

**206. Question of**

*benami title.* Plaintiff, who derived title from A, who was the ostensible purchaser of certain immoveable property at an auction sale in execution of a decree against B, brought a suit to recover the rent of such property from the talukhdars. The appellant was allowed to intervene, alleging that A was the benamidar of a third person from whom he himself had purchased the property. The lower Court, however, refused to try the question of benami as not being admissible in a rent suit. On appeal:—*Held*, that the question of benami was properly raised in the suit, and ought to have been tried. **Rughoo Nath Pershad v. Byjnath Sahoy**, 24 W. R. 349, cited and distinguished. **TARINI KANT LAHIRI v. KRISHNA MONI CHOWDRANI**

5 C. L. R. 179

**207. Question of**

*title.* In a suit for rent in which an intervenor appeared, the Munsif raised the question, who had up to that time been in the actual and *bonâ fide* receipt



**PARTIES—contd.****1. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

and enjoyment of rent ? and, on deciding this question in favour of the intervenor, dismissed the suit. On appeal, the Judge tried the question of title. *Held*, that the Judge was wrong in raising the question of title at all, and thus proceeding on a basis other than that on which, whether right or wrong, the parties had chosen to litigate the matter, and which the original Court had accepted. *Quare*: Is the Munsif's procedure in this case the right one, now that Act X of 1859, s. 77, has been repealed, and not re-enacted in the new law? **AULUCK MONEE DEBEE v. DINO NATH GHOSE**

24 W. R. 421

*See* **WOOMA TARA v. BHURSA RAM DAS**

24 W. R. 409

**208.** ————— *Intervenor irregularly added in lower Court—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 73.* In a suit for rent before the Munsif, the special appellant petitioned and was irregularly admitted into the suit as intervenor, as if the suit were being tried under Act X of 1859 in a Revenue Court. Defendants having admitted their liability to plaintiff under a kabuliat set up by the latter, the suit was decreed in the lower Appellate Court. *Held*, on special appeal by the intervenor, that he was not entitled to be treated as a party added under s. 73, Act VIII of 1859. **CHUNDER KALEE GHOSE v. SHIBNATH BHUTTACHARJEE**

17 W. R. 176

*See* **OOGNEE CHOWDHRAIN v. KERAMUTOOLAH**

17 W. R. 219

**BIRESSUR PANREY v. JOGENDRO CHUNDER DEB**

24 W. R. 261

**209.** ————— *N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1881), s. 148—Landholder and tenant—Suit for rent where the right to receive it is disputed—Third person who has received rent made party—Jurisdiction of Rent Court to pass decree for rent against such party—Question of title.* In a suit by a landholder for recovery of rent, the defendants pleaded that they had paid the rent to a co-sharer of the plaintiff. The co-sharer made a deposition in which he alleged that he was entitled to the rent not only as a co-sharer, but also as the appointed agent of the plaintiff. The Court thereupon made him a party to the suit under s. 148 of the Rent Act, and passed a joint decree against him and the tenants for rent. *Held*, that the Court was justified in making him a party under s. 148 of the Rent Act, but was not competent to pass a decree for rent against him. A party, who is brought in under s. 148 of the Rent Act, cannot be made subject to the decree for rent so as to allow execution to be taken out against him, whether his *bona fide* receipt and enjoyment of the rent is proved or not. The only person against whom such a decree can be passed is the tenant. *Madho Prasad v. Ambar*, *I. L. R. 5 All. 503*, referred to. *Per* **EDGE, C.J.**—*Semle*: That the intention of the Legislature in allowing a third person who claims under s. 148 of the Rent Act to be made a party

**PARTIES—contd.****1. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

to the suit may possibly have been that, by bringing him in, he may be bound by a declaration in the suit that he had, in fact, received the rent so as to prevent him in the civil suit from denying the fact that he had received it. In a suit by a landholder for recovery of rent in which a third person alleged to have received such rent is made a party under s. 148 of the N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1881), the question of title to receive the rent cannot be determined between the plaintiff and such person, but can only be litigated and determined in a subsequent suit in the Civil Court. The only question between the plaintiff and the person so made a party which can be determined in the Rent Court under s. 148 is the actual receipt and enjoyment of the rent. **GOBIND RAM v. NARAIN DAS** . . . *I. L. R. 9 All. 394*

**210.** ————— *Intervenors in suit for registration of names as proprietors—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 73.* Plaintiffs having succeeded in a suit for a foreclosure of a mortgage, by a conditional bill of sale, of a share of two mouzahs, then sued for possession and registration of names as proprietors. Whilst this was pending, certain parties intervened and asked to be made parties under s. 73, Code of Civil Procedure, on the ground that plaintiff's vendors were not entitled to the full share claimed, as they themselves had purchased a portion thereof. *Held*, that the Court exercised a wise and proper discretion in allowing the intervenors to be made parties, for a decree in plaintiffs' favour, though not legally binding on them, would nevertheless have caused them great difficulty in all matters of rent. **SALIGRAM SINGH v. GHEENOO SINGH** . . . *16 W. R. 19*

**211.** ————— *Unregistered tenants.* Parties who have not been registered in the zamindari serishta are not entitled to intervene and question the decree passed against the registered tenants. **AMATUL FATIMA KHANUM v. TARANATH CHAND** . . . *24 W. R. 151*

**212.** ————— *Appeal—Reversal of whole decree on appeal by one defendant, D C S, the zamindar, brought a suit against B, a raiyat, for recovery of arrears of rent, value below Rs 100. B set up in defence that the rent was not payable to D C S, but to N C A, the mokuridar. N C A, who claimed under a mokurari title and alleged that he was in the receipt of the rents from the raiyat, was made a party under s. 73, Act VIII of 1859. The Munsif passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff. On appeal by N C A, which was heard and decided by the Subordinate Judge, on reference by the District Judge, the decree of the first Court was reversed, and the suit dismissed. On appeal to the High Court:—Held, that the only issue to be tried was whether the relationship of landlord and tenant subsisted between D C S and B, and that N C A was properly made a party defendant to the suit. **DOYAL CHAND SAHOY v. NABIN CHANDRA ADHIKARI***

*8 B. L. R. 180 : 16 W. R. 235*



PARTIES—*contd.*1. PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

KUNJAL SAHU v. GURU BAKSH KOER  
8 B. L. R. 184 note: 13 W. R. 362

KANHYE ROY v. HYDER BUKSH. 25 W. R. 29

213. ———— *Adding plaintiff—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 32.* In a suit for rent, where the defendant alleged that a person not on record had a joint interest with the plaintiff in the property in respect of which the rent was due:—*Held*, where the plaintiff disputed this and objected to such course being taken, that it was improper to add such person as co-plaintiff, and that, if added at all, it should be as defendant, in order that the issue between him and the plaintiff might be properly tried. *GOOGLEE SAHOO v. PREMLALL SAHOO*. I. L. R. 7 Cal. 148

214. ———— *Striking out name of intervenor, effect of, on record of suit.* Directly an intervenor's name has been struck off on the ground that he has no interest in the case, all the evidence he had put in should be removed from the record. *BUCHA SINGH v. MASHOOK ALI BEG*. 15 W. R. 572

215. ———— *Appeal—Defect of parties—Death of one of plaintiffs-respondents—Effect of not bringing in the heirs of the deceased on the record—Suit for arrears of rent by several plaintiffs—Joint decree in favour of all.* Where, in an appeal by the defendant against a decree for arrears of rent passed jointly in favour of all the plaintiffs, the heirs of one of the plaintiffs, who died subsequent to the date of the delivery of the judgment against which the appeal is preferred, were not made parties:—*Held*, that the appeal could not proceed, and must fail by reason of defect of parties. *BEJOY GOPAL BOSE v. UMESH CHANDRA BOSE* (1901). 6 C. W. N. 196

216. ———— *Act XII of 1881 (N.-W. P. Rent Act), s. 148—Landholder and tenant—Suit for rent—Plea of payment to third person—Suit by such third person for declaration of title and for possession—Limitation.* *Held*, that the proviso to s. 148 of the North-Western Provinces Rent Act, 1881, refers only to a suit to recover the rent in respect of which the suit mentioned in the first paragraph of the section has been brought, which rent has actually been paid to a third person. The proviso was not intended to abridge the period of limitation for a suit on title to obtain possession or a declaration of possession of the land out of which the rent in dispute issues. *Dasrat Rai v. Bhirgu Rai*, I. L. R. 23 All. 434, overruled. *Muhammad Salim v. Abdul Rahim*, All. Weekly Notes (1885) 261; *Ganga Prasad v. Baldeo Ram*, I. L. R. 10 All. 347; *Kishen Coomer Shaha v. Jeebun Singh*, 5 W. R. Act X Rulings 85; *Hurronath Ray v. Srishtee-dhur Das*, 7 W. R. 152; and *Ishur Chunder Sen v. Beepin Behary Roy*, 25 W. R. C. R. 481, followed. *Bhagmanee Kooncer v. Furzund Ali N.-W. P. H. C. Rep. 1866 R. C. A. 20*, referred to by *KNOX, J. RAM LAL v. MUNAWAR SHAH* (F.B. 1902)

I. L. R. 25 All. 83

PARTIES—*contd.*1. PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*

217. ———— *Reversioner—Declaratory suit by reversioner—Non-joinder of other reversioners.* A suit having been brought by a Hindu reversioner for a declaration that an adoption alleged to have been made by the mother of K, the owner of the estate after the estate had vested in the widow of K, was invalid:—*Held*, that the non-joinder of a reversioner of equal grade with the plaintiff was no bar to the suit. *THAYAMMAL v. VENKATARAMA*. I. L. R. 7 Mad. 401

218. ———— *Suit to recover property from Hindu widow—Reversioner.* In a suit to recover possession of property held by a widow, the reversioner was held to have been erroneously made a co-defendant. *KRISTO SUNKER DUTT ROY v. KOYLASH NATH DUTT ROY*. 15 W. R. 6

219. ———— *Right of reversioner to sue for declaratory decree.* A polliam was granted to a Hindu on service tenure, and the last male holder died in 1860 leaving him surviving a widow K, and a daughter C. In 1865 the Government discontinued the service, and in lieu thereof and of the reversionary interest of the Crown imposed a quit-rent, and an inam pottah was issued to K by the inam Commissioner by which her title to the estate was acknowledged by the Government, and the estate was confirmed to her as her absolute property subject to the quit-rent. In 1882 C and her minor son A sued K and others to whom K had alienated portions of the estate for a declaration that they were the reversionary heirs of K, and that the alienations made by K were good only during the lifetime of K. The District Judge held that there being no collusion between C and the defendants, A was not entitled to join in the suit:—*Held*, that A was entitled to join C as co-plaintiff. *NARAYANA v. CHANGALAMMA*. I. L. R. 10 Mad. 1

220. ———— *Sale in execution—Suit under s. 246, Civil Procedure Code, 1859, by owner against purchaser of property wrongly sold in execution—Execution-creditor.* In a suit under the latter portion of s. 246 of the Civil Procedure Code brought by the owner against the purchaser of property which has wrongfully been attached and sold in execution of a decree, the execution-creditor is properly made a party, the object being to restore all parties to the portion which they occupied previously to such attachment and sale. *BANK OF HINDUSTAN, CHINA, AND JAPAN v. PREMCHAND RAICHAND. AHMEDBHAI HABIBHAI v. PREMCHAND RAICHAND*. 5 Bom. O. C. 83

221. ———— *Sale-proceeds, suit for, after distribution—Suit by attaching creditor dissatisfied with share of sale-proceeds allotted to him.* Where an attaching creditor, dissatisfied with the share allotted to him on a distribution of sale-proceeds under Act VIII of 1859, s. 270, brings a suit against the other attaching creditors, and claims to have made the first attachment, he is bound to include as defendants all who have



**PARTIES—contd.****1. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

shared in the distribution. *BROJOKANTH CHUCKERBUTTY v. BANEE MADHUR DISCHIT*

**23 W. R. 434**

**222. — Secretary of State for India, if necessary party—Sale for arrears of revenue, suit to set aside—Public Demands Recovery Act (Bengal Act I of 1895), ss. 7, 8.** In a suit to set aside a sale held under the provisions of the Public Demands Recovery Act, the Secretary of State for India in Council is a necessary party. *Bal Mokoond Lall v. Jirjadhun Roy*, **I. L. R. 9 Calc. 271**, and *Balkishen Das v. Simpson*, **I. L. R. 25 Calc. 833**; **I. L. R. 25 A. 151**, distinguished. *GOBINDA CHANDRA SHAHA v. HEMANTA KUMARI DEBI* (1904) **I. L. R. 31 Calc. 159**

**223. — Specific performance—Suit for specific performance of single contract.** In a suit for the performance of a single contract the parties on each side must be marshalled as plaintiffs and defendants. *KAZI SHAFIA RAHAMAN v. MOHEEMUNNESSA BIBI alias KANU BIBI*

**2 C. W. N. 42**

**224. — Purchaser from party to contract of which specific performance was claimed.** The mother and guardian of a Hindu minor entered into a contract for the sale of his land. The vendee sued the minor by his mother and guardian *ad litem* for specific performance of the contract and for possession, and joined as a defendant a subsequent purchaser from the mother and guardian. *Held*, that, as the cause of action (the right to obtain a sale-deed and possession) concerned both the defendants, and entitled the plaintiff to relief against both, the purchaser was rightly joined as a party. *Luckamsey Ookerda v. Fazulla Cassumbhoy*, **I. L. R. 5 Bom. 177**, distinguished. *Mokund Lall v. Chotay Lall*, **I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1061**, referred to. *KRISHNASAMI v. SUNDARAPPAYYAR*

**I. L. R. 18 Mad. 415**

**225. — Suit for specific performance of agreement to partition—Civil Procedure Code, s. 28.** In a suit for specific performance of an agreement by the members of a joint family for partition:—*Held*, with reference to s. 28 of the Civil Procedure Code, that the third defendant, a minor, was properly included as a party to the suit, though he was not a party to the arrangement. *ALAGAPPA MUDALIAR v. SIVARAMASUNDARA MUDALIAR*

**I. L. R. 19 Mad. 211**

**226. — Vendor and purchaser—Suit by purchaser against vendor for specific performance of contract of sale—Covenant by purchaser to build a temple.** On the 16th November 1893, the first defendant agreed to sell a house to the plaintiff. The contract contained a covenant on the part of the plaintiff to build a temple and to secure an annuity to the vendor and his wife. On the 21st of the same month the first defendant sold and conveyed the same house to the second defendant and put him in possession. In a suit brought by plaintiff against defendants Nos. 1 and

**PARTIES—contd.****1. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

2 for specific performance of the contract of the 16th November:—*Held*, that the second defendant was a proper party to the suit. *RAMCHANDRA GANESH PURANDHAREE v. RAMCHANDRA KONDAJI*

**I. L. R. 22 Bom. 46**

**227. — Sureties—Act X of 1859—Arrears of rent—Benami lease.** Some of the defendants had taken a lease in the benami name of *C P B*, and were in actual possession of, and had paid rent for, the lands demised. The other defendants were sureties for *C P B*. A suit was brought in the Court of the Deputy Collector against those who were actually in possession of the land, together with the sureties for arrears of rent. It did not appear from the lease how far each defendant was interested in or entitled under it. *Held*, by both Judges, that the suit should be dismissed as against the sureties, who could not as such be sued under Act X of 1859. *ROY PRIYANATH CHOWDHRY v. BEPINBEHARI CHUCKERBUTTY*

**2 B. L. R. A. C. 237: 11 W. R. 120**

**228. — Tenants in common—Non-joinder of parties—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 31—Benami mortgage—Suit by some of the heirs of the real mortgagee—Joinder of causes of action.** In 1880 *A* and *B* jointly advanced moneys on the security of a usufructuary mortgage which was taken in the name of *B*. In 1884, *A* alone advanced moneys on the security of usufructuary mortgages which were likewise taken in the name of *B*. *A* died leaving three sons, of whom the plaintiffs were two. The plaintiffs, having become divided from their brother, now brought suits in 1894 against *B* and the mortgagors for a declaration of their rights to the mortgages and for possession of the documents and for rent of the land which had been collected by *B*. It appeared that there had been no denial of the plaintiff's rights before 1889 that no rent had been collected for several years before suit, the mortgagors who had remained in possession as lessees after the execution of the mortgages having refused to attorn to *B*. *Held*, that the suits were not bad for the non-joinder of the plaintiffs' brother. *MAHABALA BHATTA v. KUNHANNA BHATTA*

**I. L. R. 21 Mad. 373**

**229. — Trusts, suits relating to—Suit as to trust for specific purpose—Surplus after performance of trust.** Where a trust had been created for specific purposes, *viz.*, the performance of religious and other duties, and the trustee had duly appointed another trust in his place, the latter being entitled to hold the trust estate:—*Held*, that in a suit in which all the parties interested were not before the Court, there could be no decision as to the extent of the trusts nor as to whether any surplus profits of the trust estate would, or would not, after the performance of the trusts, belong to the trustee personally. *BISHEN CHAND BASAWAT v. NADIR HOSSEIN*

**I. L. R. 15 Calc. 329**

**I. L. R. 15 I. A. 1**

**230. — Suit for removal of trustees—Parties—Alienees of trustees.** In a



**PARTIES—contd.****1. PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.**

suit under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the removal of a trustee, it is not necessary to make the alienees from the trustee defendant parties to the suit. *Bishen Chand Basawat v. Nadir Hossein*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 329; I. L. R. 15 A. 1; *Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondo Ganesh Dev*, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 612; and *Attorney-General v. Port Reeve of Avon*, 33 L. J. N. S. Ch 172, referred to. *HUSENI BEGAM v. COLLECTOR OF MORADABAD*  
I. L. R. 20 All. 46

**231.** ————— *Trusts Act (II of 1882), s. 56—Suit by two out of eleven beneficiaries for possession of trust property—Maintainability of suit—Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 271.* Two daughters of a testator sued defendants Nos. 1 and 2, the testator's sons and his administrators with the will annexed, and other defendants, for a declaration that certain properties devised by the testator to be held in trust and the rents divided among his eleven children were trust properties, and to recover possession thereof. A decree had been obtained against plaintiff No. 2 and her right, title, and interest in the trust property brought to sale. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had filed a suit to set aside the sale, but afterwards compromised it on the terms that the sale should be cancelled on payment of a certain sum by defendant No. 1, but that, in default of such payment, the decree should take effect. Default having been made, the property was sold. *Held* (by the whole Court), that the decree of the Court below awarding the plaintiff's possession of the whole property on behalf of themselves and the other beneficiaries must be reversed. *Per* BODDAM, J.—That the alienations made in pursuance of the compromise entered into by the administrators were binding upon the plaintiffs, and that therefore neither of them had any cause of action. *Per* O'FARRELL, J.—That under all the circumstances the suit could not be treated as a suit to recover the plaintiffs' shares of the trust property. *Per* SUBRAHMANYA AYYAR, J. (*dissentiente*)—The fact that the plaintiffs had asked for a larger relief than they were entitled to did not warrant the dismissal of the suit altogether; and that the suit fell within the class of cases in which relief against a third party is such as a Court of equity will administer and a *cestui qui trust* may be entitled to sue the trustees and the third party jointly, but in which he will be bound to confine his suit to that specific matter in respect of which alone the third party is liable, and not to make it part of a suit for the general administration of the trust and that plaintiff No. 1 was not precluded from recovering her eleventh share. *PADMANABHA CHETTIAR v. WILLIAMS*  
I. L. R. 23 Mad. 239

**232.** ————— *Suit to set aside trust deed—Withdrawal of suit against trustee—Consent decree—Right of trustee to appear as a necessary party in application to set aside consent decree.* In a suit to set aside, *inter alia*, certain

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trust deed, the trustee, who was made a party, did not appear. The suit was afterwards withdrawn as against the trustee and a consent decree obtained, which, amongst other things, declared the trust deed to be not binding on any party. Subsequently an application was made to set aside the consent decree and notice of motion was given to the trustee. She appeared on the motion, but on some of the parties objecting, the lower Court refused to hear her. *Held*, that the trustee was entitled to appear and be heard on the motion as a necessary party. *NUNDA LAL BOSE v. NISTARINEE DOSSI*  
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 428  
4 C. W. N. 169

**2. SUITS BY SOME OF A CLASS AS REPRESENTATIVES OF CLASS.**

**1.** ————— *Suits on behalf of community—Some suing for whole body of persons—Decree, effect of.* Convenience requires that in suits where there is community of interest amongst a large number of persons, a few should be allowed to represent the whole; and if the whole body be represented in the suit, then it is proper that the whole body should be bound by the decree, though some members of the body are not parties named in the record. *Venkata Swami Nayakkan v. Subba Rau*, 2 Mad. 1, distinguished. *SRIKHANTI NARAYANAPPA v. INDUPURAM RAMALINGAM*  
3 Mad. 226

**2.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882 s. 30—Suit for right to worship in mosque.* S. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code applies only to case in which many persons are jointly interested in obtaining relief, and not to a case in which individual right has been violated. Every Mahomedan who is entitled to use a mosque for purposes of devotion is entitled to sue any one who interferes with his exercise of that right. *Zafaryab Ali v. Bakhtawar Singh*, I. L. R. 5 All. 197, referred to. *Jan Ali v. Ram Nath Mundul*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 32, dissented from. *JAWAHRA v. AKBAR HUSAIN*  
I. L. R. 7 All. 178

*See* THAKERSEY DEVRAJ v. HURBHUM NURSEY  
I. L. R. 8 Bom. 432

**3.** ————— *Suits by individuals for general public.* S. 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not intended to allow individuals to sue on behalf of the general public, but to enable some of a class having special interests to represent the rest of the class. *ADAMSON v. ARUMUGAM*  
I. L. R. 9 Mad. 463

**4.** ————— *Suit against Malabar tarwad.* If it is sought to make a decree in a suit binding on a Malabar tarwad, the procedure laid down in s. 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877, should be followed if the members are numerous. A decree against a person who happens to be the karnavan of a Malabar tarwad is not necessarily binding on the tarwad in the absence of fraud.



**PARTIES—contd.****2. SUITS BY SOME OF A CLASS AS REPRESENTATIVES OF CLASS—contd.**

ELAYACHANIDATHIL KOMBI ACHEN *v.* KENATUM-KORA LAKSHMI AMMA . I. L. R. 5 Mad. 201

5. ———— *Suit by legatees on behalf of themselves and other legatees—Costs against next friend.* A legatee cannot sue on behalf of himself and other legatees without an order of the Court obtained under s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code enabling him so to sue. Where a legatee, a minor, sued in that form by her next friend without such an order, the next friend was held liable for costs on his adducing no evidence to show that the suit was for the benefit of the minor. GEEREEBALLA DABEE *v.* CHUNDER KANTO MOOKERJEE

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 213

6. ———— *Suit to have land declared wakf.* In a suit to have certain property declared wakf alleging that it was dedicated as wakf, and the profits applied to lighting a mosque and shrine, the expenses of devotion, and the feeding of wayfarers and travellers, it appeared the plaintiff was not alone interested in the subject-matter of the suit. Held, therefore, that she could only sue on behalf of those interested after having first obtained leave of the Court and otherwise complied with the provisions of s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code. LUTIFUNNISSA BIBI *v.* NAZIRUN BIBI . . . . .

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 33

7. ———— *Non-joinder of parties—Civil Procedure Codes (Act VIII of 1859 and X of 1877), s. 30—Representatives of a certain caste—Chitpavans.* Four persons of the Chitpavan caste brought a suit in 1876, alleging that they and the members of their caste, in common with certain other castes, possessed the exclusive right of entry and worship in the sanctuary of a temple, and that the defendants, members of the Palshe caste, not being of the privileged castes, infringed that right in 1871 and thereafter by entering the sanctuary and performing worship therein. They prayed for a declaration of their right and an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with it. Held, that the plaintiffs could maintain the suit for the personal injury alleged to have been suffered by themselves by the pollution of their sanctuary, whether under the Civil Procedure Code of 1859 or that of 1877, s. 30 of the latter being merely regulative, not constitutive. Whether or not it could be contended that they and the defendants so represented their respective castes that the decree in this suit should bind all members of the two castes, would be open to argument in any future case; but it might well be consistent with general principles to hold that certain judicial proceedings taken by or against a select number as representing a large class might, if fairly and honestly conducted, bind or benefit the whole class. ANANDRAV BHIKAJI *v.* SHANKAR DAJI

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 323

8. ———— *Suit for dismissal of dharmakarta—Members of District Committee.*

**PARTIES—contd.****2. SUITS BY SOME OF A CLASS AS REPRESENTATIVES OF CLASS—contd.**

In a suit brought for the dismissal of a dharma karta all the members of the District Committee should join as parties. The District Committee cannot divest themselves of their rights in favour of a few of their number. VIRASAMI NAYUDU *v.* ARUNACHELLA CHETTI.

I. L. R. 2 Mad. 200

9. ———— *“Mahomedan Association”—Suit by some members for all.* The “Majlis Islama” or “Mahomedan Association” of Meerut instituted a suit in its own name by its secretary. Held, that, as such association had not, *per se*, any status in law so to sue, the suit was not maintainable. *Seemle:* Had such association empowered one or more of its members to act for it in the matter of the suit in the manner provided by s. 30, Civil Procedure Code, 1882, the permission mentioned in that section might have been granted. MAHOMEDAN ASSOCIATION *v.* BUKSHI

I. L. R. 6 All. 284

10. ———— *Malabar law—Joinder of parties—Suit for cancellation of deeds—Declaratory suit—Withdrawal of part of claim.* A and B, junior members of a Malabar tarwad, sued to cancel certain mortgages executed by their karnavan and senior anandravan, on the ground that the secured debt was not binding on the tarwad, and to appoint A to the office of karnavan. The last part of the prayer was withdrawn. The mortgages were executed to secure a decree-debt, the decree having been passed *ex parte* against the late karnavan of the tarwad. No fraud was alleged, but the lower Courts found that the karnavan had been guilty of fraud in allowing the decree to be passed *ex parte*. The plaintiffs had not been parties to the decree, and the other junior members of the tarwad, who had been joined, were exempted from liability. Held, *per Curiam*, that all the members of the plaintiff's tarwad should have been joined actually or constructively under s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code. MOIDIN KUTTI *v.* KRISHNAN

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 322

11. ———— *Irregularity in civil case.* The plaintiffs were fishermen belonging to the village of N. They claimed in this suit for themselves and the other fishermen of their village the exclusive right of fishing in the Negothna creek, between high and low water mark, within certain limits set forth in the plaint, and under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act they sought to recover possession of that right from the defendants, who, they contended, had dispossessed them within six months before suit. It was contended by the defendants that the plaintiffs, who claimed on behalf of other fishermen of the village, should have proceeded under s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). Held, that the objection was a good one; but, inasmuch as it was still open to the defendants to establish their right by a regular suit, the irregularity in the present suit was not such as to call for the exercise of the powers of



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the High Court under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code. *BHUNDAL PANDA v. PANDOL POS PATIL* . . . . . **I. L. R. 12 Bom. 221**

**12.** ————— *Representation of numerous plaintiffs—Advertisement—Community of interest—Decree for management of a Hindu temple—Application for execution by person interested.* In a suit by certain Tungalai Brahmans for declarations as to the mode of electing dharmakartas of a certain pagoda, etc., an order was made for a proclamation inviting "all persons interested to come in and be made parties, or see that others by whom they are content to be represented are made parties," and a decree was passed comprising a scheme to be carried out for such election, etc. A person not on the record and not a member of the Tungalai community, but claiming certain rights under the decree, now applied to compel the observance of the scheme. *Held*, that the above order did not invest the suit with a representative character and the applicant had no right to apply. *RAGAVA v. RAJARATNAM* . . . . . **I. L. R. 15 Mad. 57**

**13.** ————— *Suit to remove trustee of Mahomedan endowment.* The right of worship of each worshipper in a Mahomedan mosque or religious endowment is an independent right wholly irrespective of the right of the other worshippers, and therefore non-compliance by a worshipper with the provisions of s. 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not affect a suit for the removal of a trustee of a Mahomedan endowment. *Jan Ali v. Ram Nath Mundul*, **I. L. R. 8 Cal. 32**; *Jawahra v. Akbar Hussain*, **I. L. R. 7 All. 178**; *Lutifunnisa Bibi v. Nazirun Bibi*, **I. L. R. 11 Cal. 33**; and *Zafaryab Ali v. Bakhtawar Singh*, **I. L. R. 5 All. 497**, referred to. *MOHIUDDIN v. SAYIDUDDIN alias NAWAB MEAN* . . . . . **I. L. R. 20 Cal. 810**

*See KAMARAJU v. ASANALI SHERIFF*  
**I. L. R. 23 Mad. 99**

**14.** ————— *Joint suit by persons who have a common cause of action—Declaratory decree—Denial of right—Perpetual injunction—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), ss. 42 and 54.* The plaintiffs were the hereditary gors or priests, residing at Dakor, who ordinarily conducted their yajmans or patrons to the temple of Shri Ranchhod Raiji, performed worship there on their behalf, and received remuneration for their services. The defendants were the shevaks or ministers of the idol; it was their duty to remain in constant attendance on the idol, perform the daily services at the temple, collect the offerings, and apply the same to the purposes of the foundation. On 12th October 1883 the shevaks issued rules prohibiting people from entering the Nij Mandir and Saja Mandir, which were particularly sacred chambers in the temple, except on payment of certain fees. Every visitor was required to purchase a ticket of admission to the interior parts of the temple. The plaintiffs thereupon sued for a declaration of their right of free access to the Nij Mandir and

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*Saja Mandir* at all times and on all occasions when the temple was open for purposes of public worship. They alleged that the new rules framed by the shevaks constituted an infringement of their immemorial rights of going into the said mandirs without any let or hindrance, of worshipping the idol there for themselves and their patrons, and of receiving whatever their patrons gave them. They therefore sought for a perpetual injunction restraining the shevaks from interfering with their rights. The plaintiffs were 208 in number. Thirteen of them obtained leave to bring the suit on behalf of themselves and the rest under s. 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882). The defendants contended, *inter alia*, that the plaintiffs had each a separate cause of action; that they had no right to sue jointly; that they were not entitled to a declaratory decree under s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act; and that the plaintiffs, never having been obstructed in the exercise of their rights, had no cause of action. *Held*, that the suit was rightly constituted under s. 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The rules made by the shevak in 1883 interfered with the immemorial rights of the gors, and gave a common cause of action to all the plaintiffs. They were therefore entitled to sue jointly. *Held*, also, that the plaintiffs were entitled to a declaratory decree under s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), as their title to free access with their patrons to the sacred shrines and to receive presents from their patrons unfettered by the rules of 1883 was denied by those rules. *Held*, also, that the plaintiffs were entitled to further relief by way of perpetual injunction under s. 54 of 1877, as the defendants had threatened to invade their enjoyment of property, and the invasion was such that pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief. *Held*, also, that the shevaks had no authority to issue the rules of the 12th October 1883, or to levy fees from worshippers in respect of any public religious services held in the temple. *KALIDAS JIVRAM v. GOR PARJARAM HIRJI* . . . . . **I. L. R. 15 Bom. 309**

**15.** ————— *Suit to remove a mohunt—"Numerous parties."* The "numerous parties" mentioned in s. 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure mean parties capable of being ascertained. Two plaintiffs instituted a suit, on behalf of themselves and 42 other persons named in a schedule to the plaint, against a mohunt of an akhra to have certain alienations of property belonging to the idol set aside, and the mohunt removed on the ground that he was wasting the idol's property and setting up an adverse title to it, and to have another mohunt and trustee of the property appointed in his place. The plaintiffs alleged that they and the 42 others named in the schedule were in the habit of worshipping the idol or of contributing to the worship and expenses of it, but it was clearly established by the evidence that any Hindu who chose was at liberty to give puja or render service and worship, and that others than the



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plaintiffs and the 42 persons named in fact did so, and that the plaintiffs and the persons named were therefore not only persons interested in the suit. The plaintiffs applied for and obtained leave to institute the suit under the provisions of s. 30 of the Code. A decree having been made in their favour, on appeal:—*Held*, that the suit was not one to which the provisions of s. 30 were applicable, as the persons interested therein, not being the whole Hindu community, were incapable of ascertainment. *SAJEDUR RAJA v. BAIDYANATH DEB.*

**I. L. R. 20 Calc. 397**

**16. ————— Burial ground—**  
*Land belonging in common to all the Mahomedan inhabitants of a village—Encroachment by some of the Mahomedans—Right of suit of some members of a community.* Where certain Mahomedans of a village brought a suit against other Mahomedans of the same village for the removal of a wall built by the defendants upon land which was found to belong in common to all the Mahomedan inhabitants of the village for the purpose of a burial ground, the Judge, in appeal, dismissed the suit on the grounds that all the Mahomedans were not joined as parties to the suit, and that the plaintiff had not obtained the permission of the first Court to file the suit under s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). On second appeal:—*Held*, reversing the decree, that s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code was not applicable to the suit, which must be regarded as one in which the plaintiffs claimed to restrain the defendants from violating the common interest they all had in the land. *TANUDIN v. PANDU*

**I. L. R. 18 Bom. 699**

**17. ————— Suit by some of the tenants on an estate on behalf of all the tenants to enforce rights against purchaser.** S. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) authorizes some of the raiyats of a village to sue the proprietor of it for themselves and the other raiyats for a declaration of their general rights, and of an injunction restraining the proprietor from interfering with their enjoyment of those rights. *Phillips v. Hudson*, L. R. 2 Ch. 243; *Smith v. Earl Brownlow*, L. R. 9 Eq. 241; and *The Mayor of York v. Pilkington*, 1 Atk. 282, followed. *Hallows v. Fernie*, L. R. 3 Ch. 467, referred to and distinguished. *AMEDBHAY HABIBBHAY v. BALKRISHNA MUKUND*

**I. L. R. 19 Bom. 391**

**18. ————— Persons having the same interest in one cause—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 23 and 30.** In a suit for the removal of masonry structures raised by one member of a community of Hindu priests upon a certain platform, on which every member of the community had individual right to perform religious rights, praying also for a declaration and injunction in connection with such removal; the plaintiffs were seven persons claiming relief as the panch or committee representing the whole community,

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and also in their individual capacity. It was found by the Court that the plaintiffs did not constitute the panch, and that they did not in that character represent the community. *Held*, that s. 26 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, was only an enabling section, it allowed the plaintiffs to bring a joint action, and should not be read as though all persons of the community must be joined as plaintiffs. *Held*, also, that s. 30 of the Code is an enabling section, and did not debar the plaintiffs from suing in their own right in this case. *BAIJU LAL PARBATIA v. BULAK LAL PATHUK*

**I. L. R. 24 Calc. 385**

**19. ————— Suit against municipality—**  
*Misapplication of fund by municipality—Right of tax-payer to sue to restrain municipality from such misapplication—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 53, cl. (k).* A suit will lie at the instance of individual tax-payers for an injunction restraining a municipality from misapplying its funds. *VAMAN TATYAJI v. MUNICIPALITY OF SHOLAPURI*

**I. L. R. 22 Bom. 646**

**20. ————— Suit by worshippers—**  
*Religious endowment, suit relating to—Leave to sue—Non-joinder of Advocate-General—Maintainability of suit.* Four worshippers at a temple, who were also entitled to vote at the election of dharmakartas, filed a suit for a declaration that the election of certain persons to that office was void. Notice had not been given to the other worshippers, nor had leave of the Court been obtained prior to the institution of that suit. *Held*, that the suit was maintainable notwithstanding that the Advocate-General had not been joined as a party; that s. 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure being permissive and not prohibitive and dealing with procedure only, and not affecting substantive rights, the omission to state in the plaint that the suit was instituted on behalf of other worshippers having similar rights to sue as the plaintiffs was not fatal to the maintainability of the suit; that the Court was competent, with a view of adjudicating completely and definitively on the matter in dispute, to require an amendment of the plaint, and that the suit need not necessarily be dismissed; that the omission to apply for leave under s. 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not in itself ground for dismissing a suit, but, on objection being taken, the suit should not be allowed to proceed except on the terms of the plaint being amended and the requisite leave being obtained; and that the granting of leave under s. 30 is not a condition precedent, and may take place after the institution of the suit. *Jan Ali v. Ram Nath Mundul*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 32, and *Thakersey Dewaraj v. Hurbhum Nursey*, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 432, considered. *SRINIVASA CHARIAR v. RAGHAVA CHARIAR*

**I. L. R. 23 Mad. 28**

**21. ————— Leave to sue—Leave must be granted before suit.** In cases where leave under s. 30



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of the Civil Procedure Code is necessary, such leave must be obtained before the suit is brought, and cannot be given subsequently. *HARADHONE DASS v. RAMDOYAL RAI*. I. L. R. 21 Calc. 181 note

*NITYANUND GHOSE v. MOHENDRO KRISTO GHOSE*. I. L. R. 21 Calc. 181 note

**22.** ———— *Suit by numerous plaintiffs—Leave to institute suit—Right of suit.* S. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code does not require an "express" permission to be recorded by the Court, but if such permission can be well gathered from the proceedings of the Court in which the suit was instituted, an appellate Court may (where an objection that no permission was given is taken on appeal) infer from such proceedings that permission was really granted. The dictum of *STUART, C.J.*, in *Hira Lal v. Bhairon*, I. L. R. 5 All. 602, dissented from. *DHUNPUT SINGH v. PARESH NATH SINGH*.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 180

**23.** ———— *Leave to institute suit when to be given.* In a suit brought under s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code, the permission of the Court required by that section may be given subsequently to the filing of the suit. *FERNANDEZ v. RODRIGUES*. I. L. R. 21 Bom. 784

**24.** ———— *Numerous persons interested similarly in the result of a suit—Permission given to some to sue on behalf of all—Permission granted of the filing of suit by some only.* Held, that the permission required by s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be granted after the filing of a suit by some only of the persons interested therein. *Fernandez v. Rodrigues*, I. L. R. 21 Bom. 784, followed. *BALDEO BHARTI v. BIR GIR*. I. L. R. 22 All. 269

**25.** ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 30—Leave to sue given after commencement of action—Previous refusal—Validity of suit.* Leave to sue under s. 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure need not necessarily precede the commencement of the suit, but may be given after it has commenced. Where leave has been so given, it is immaterial that an application for permission to sue has been previously refused. *CHENNU MENON v. KRISHNAN* (1901)

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 399

**3. ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS.****(a) GENERALLY.**

**1.** ———— *Discretion of Court—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 73.* S. 73, Act VIII of 1859, was permissive, not imperative. Discretion is vested in a Court to make persons not before it parties to a suit. *PORAN MUNDUL MOLLAH v. SHAM CHAND GHOSE*. 1 W. R. 228

*GYARAM SEAL v. ISSUR CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY*. 2 W. R. 158

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**PARTIES—contd.****3. ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.****(a) GENERALLY—contd.**

**2.** ———— *Power of Court—Suit for share of estate of deceased—Power to change to one for administration.* Where one son of a deceased party sued in the Recorder's Court another son, who had obtained a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, for his share of the deceased's estate, it was held that the Recorder had no power to transform the suit into a general administration suit. The Court may, under s. 73, Act VIII of 1859, order all necessary parties who claim a share in the subject-matter of the suit to be made parties. *OH LING TEE v. AWKINIFEE*. 10 W. R. 86

**3.** ———— *Ground for adding party—Likelihood of being affected by result of suit.* A person cannot be made a party to a suit unless he is likely to be affected by the result of the suit. *JOY GOBIND DOSS v. GOUREESHAD SHAHA*.

7 W. R. 201

**4.** ———— *Likelihood of being affected by result of suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 73, construction of.* The words in s. 73 of Act VIII of 1859, "who may be likely to be affected by the result," construed to mean "likely to be affected, if added as parties." *NGA THA YA v. MI KHAN MHAW*

5 B. L. R. 371: 13 W. R. 443

**5.** ———— *Likelihood of being affected by result of suit—Interest in suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 73.* Under s. 73, Act VIII of 1859, a person was not liable to be added as a party to the suit, although he might be "likely to be affected by the result," unless he was also entitled to, or claimed some interest in, the subject-matter of the suit. *KOEGLER v. PROSONNO COOMAR CHATTERJEE*. I. L. R. 2 Calc. 472

**6.** ———— *Community of interest with plaintiff or defendant—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 28, 29, 32.* Held, reading ss. 28, 29, and 32 of Act X of 1877 together, that, where an application is made under s. 32 for the addition of a person, whether as plaintiff or defendant, such person should, as a general rule, be added only where there are questions directly arising out of and incidental to the original cause of action, in which such person has identity or community of interest with the original plaintiff or defendant. Two suits against *K* for possession of the property of *B*, deceased were instituted in the Court of a Subordinate Judge by parties claiming adversely to one another as heirs to *B*. The Subordinate Judge, on the application of the plaintiffs in these suits, under s. 32, Act X of 1877, added the plaintiffs in the first suit as defendants in the second, and the plaintiffs in the second suit as defendants in the first. Held, on appeal by the defendant *K* from the orders of the Subordinate Judge, applying the rule stated above, that such additions of parties, not being necessary to enable the Subordinate Judge "effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suits," were not proper. The principles on which s. 73 of Act

13 M



**PARTIES—contd.****3. ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.****(a) GENERALLY—contd.**

VIII of 1859 should be interpreted enunciated by SIR BARNES PEACOCK in *Joy Gobind Doss v. Gouree Proshad Shaha*, 7 W. R. 202; *Raja Ram Tewari v. Luchman Prasad*, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 731: 8 W. R. 15; and *Ahmed Hossein v. Khadija*, 3 B. L. R. A. C. 28; 10 W. R. 369; and the remarks of PONTIFEX, J., in *Mahomed Badsha v. Nicol*, 1. L. R. 4 Calc. 355, followed and applied. *NARAINI KUAR v. DURJAN KUAR*. *NARAINI KUAR v. PIAREY LAL*.

I. L. R. 2 All. 738

7. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 32*. The object of s. 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which enables a Court to add parties whose presence before the Court may be necessary to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, is to enable the Court to try and determine, once for all, material questions common to the parties and to third parties, and not merely questions between the parties to the suit. *VYDIANADAYYAN v. SITARAMAYYAN*.

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 52

8. ———— *Application to be added as a party—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 32*. S. 32 does not contemplate any application to the Court by the person proposed to be added. *MOHINDROBHOOSUN BISWAS v. SHOSHEEBHOOSUN BISWAS*.

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 882

9. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 32—Power of Court to add party*. A Court may, in the exercise of its discretion under s. 32 of the Civil Procedure Code, add a party to a suit upon his own application. *RABBABA KHANUM v. NOORJEHAN BEGUM alias DALIM SHAHIBA*.

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 90

10. ———— *Power to add parties—Adding parties after reference to Commissioner to take accounts*. After a decree has been made whereby a suit has been referred to the Commissioner's office to have accounts taken and property sold, the Court has still power (if it should be found necessary) to add as fresh parties to the suit persons who are interest in its subject-matter and are likely to be affected by its results. *VAKATCHAND LAKHMI-CHAND v. ADVOCATE-GENERAL* 8 Bom. O. C. 96

11. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 30, 32—Party added after decree*. A Subordinate Judge having permitted the junior widow of a Hindu to be made a party to the proceedings in execution of a decree obtained by the senior widow against a debtor of their deceased husband, the High Court declined to interfere under s. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Quare*: Whether s. 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not give a Court a discretionary power to add parties after adjudication of the question raised in the suit. *LINGAMMAL v. CHUNIA VENKATAMAL*.

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 227

12. ———— *Party added in appeal—Civil Procedure Code, s. 32—Party added*

**PARTIES—contd.****3. ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.****(a) GENERALLY—concl'd.**

*in appeal who was not a party to the suit nor a representative of such a party—Remand*. When a Court hearing an appeal is of opinion that a person not a party to the suit and not entitled to be brought on the record in a representative capacity should be a party to the record, its proper course is to remand the case to the Court of first instance, and to direct that Court to bring on the particular person as a defendant, or as a plaintiff if he consents, give him time to file his statement and opportunity to produce his evidence, and try the issues raised between him and the opposite side. *MIHIN LAL v. INTIAZ ALI*.

I. L. R. 18 All. 332

13. ———— *Parties, joinder of—Suit in ejectment—Persons in actual possession necessary parties*. In a suit in ejectment the persons in actual possession need be joined as parties. *BANUBI v. NARSINGRAO* (1906)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 250

14. ———— *Mortgage suit—Necessary party*. When a person who is not a proper party to a suit allows himself to be made a party defendant without any objection, and an issue relating to him is raised and decided in the suit, he cannot change front and insist on the Appellate Court that an error has occurred in making him a party and that the issue was not triable in the action. *BHAJU CHOWDHURY v. CHUNI LAL MARWARI* (1906)

11 C. W. N. 284

15. ———— *Limitation—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 32—Adding party to suit after period of limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 22*. Held (by the Full Bench), that a Court acting under the second paragraph of s. 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure is bound by the provisions of s. 22 of the Limitation Act. *Girish Chunder Sasmal v. Dwarka Nath Dinda*, 1. L. R. 24 Calc. 640, and *Fakera Pasban v. Bibi Azimunnissa*, 1. L. R. 27 Calc. 540, overruled. *Imam Ali v. Baij Nath Ram Sahu*, 10 C. W. N. 551, approved. *Oriental Bank Corporation v. Charriol*, 1. L. R. 12 Calc. 642, explained. *RAM-KINKAR BISWAS v. AKHIL CHANDRA CHAUDHURI* (1907)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 519

**(b) POWER OF REVENUE COURTS TO ADD PARTIES.**

16. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 32—Act XVIII of 1873 (N.-W. P. Rent Act)*. B and N, the mortgagees of a mehal, granted the mortgagors a lease of the mehal, the mortgagors agreeing to pay "the mortgagees" a certain rent half-yearly "on account of the right they held in equal shares," and that, on default of payment of such rent, "the mortgagees" should be entitled to sue for payment. The mortgagors having made default in payment of the rent, and N refusing to join in a suit against the mortgagors to enforce payment, B sued them alone for a moiety of the rent due. The Revenue Court of first in-



**PARTIES—contd.****3. ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.****(b) POWER OF REVENUE COURTS TO ADD PARTIES—concl'd.**

stance held, with reference to s. 106 of Act XVIII of 1873, that *B* could not sue separately. *Held*, by the High Court, that the order of the Revenue Court of first appeal directing, *inter alia*, that the Court of first instance should re-try the suit after making *N* a defendant in the suit, was not illegal, notwithstanding that the provisions of s. 32 of Act X of 1877 were not made applicable to the procedure of the Revenue Court by Act XVIII of 1873. *SHIB GOPAL v. BALDEO SAHAI*

I. L. R. 2 All. 264

**(c) PLAINTIFFS.**

17. ———— **Time for adding plaintiff—**  
*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 27, Exercise of power under.* *Per PONTIFEX, J.*—The power given by s. 27 of the Code, of substituting or adding a plaintiff, ought to be exercised before the first hearing of the case. *CHUNDER COOMAR ROY v. GOCOL CHUNDER BHATTACHARJEE* I. L. R. 6 Calc. 370

18. ———— **Right of plaintiff barred by limitation—***Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 73.* No person ought, under s. 73, to be added as a plaintiff whose right of action is barred by the law of limitation. *KISHEN LALL CHOWDHRY v. CHUNDER COOMAR ROY* W. R. 1864, 152

*GOPAL KASHI v. RAMABAI SAHEB PATVERDHAN.*  
12 Bom. 17

19. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 27 and 32—Limitation—Institution of suits—Change of parties.* The change of parties as plaintiffs, in conformity with the provisions of s. 27 of the Code, does not give rise to such a question of limitation as arises upon the addition of a new person as a defendant under s. 32. *SUBODINI DEBI v. GANODA KANT ROY* I. L. R. 14 Calc. 400

20. ———— **Joinder when too late—Rejection of plaint—Joint cause of action—***Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 22.* *A*, who with his three brothers composed a joint Hindu family, brought a suit in his own sole name to recover a joint debt. When the objection was taken to the form of the suit on the ground of the non-joinder of *A's* three brothers, it was too late to add them as co-plaintiffs by reason of s. 22 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877), a suit on the debt being by that time time-barred. The three brothers at the hearing expressed their willingness that *A* should sue alone. *Held*, that such assent did not obviate the necessity of joining all the proper parties as co-plaintiffs, and that the suit therefore, as framed, would not lie. *Held*, further, that *A* would have been in no better position had he joined his three brothers as co-plaintiffs after the suit was, as regards them, time-barred; since such a suit would have been virtually a suit by himself alone and therefore bad. *Boydonth Bag v. Grish Chunder Roy,*

**PARTIES—contd.****3. ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.****(c) PLAINTIFFS—contd.**

*I. L. R. 3 Calc. 26*, dissented from. *KALIDAS KEVALDAS v. NATHU BHAGWAN.*

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 221

21. ———— **Suit by members of joint Hindu family carrying on business in partnership—Joint co-contractors.** Two of the sons out of a joint Mitakshara family, consisting of a father and three sons and the widow and sons of a deceased son, and carrying on business in partnership, sued to recover money due on a hathchitta, dated the 11th December 1876; the last payment made and entered by the defendant being on the 20th July 1877. No time was fixed for payment of the money, so that it became payable on the date of the hathchitta. The suit was instituted on the 19th July 1880, and came on for hearing on the 26th July, when an objection was taken that all the parties who ought to sue were not on the record. On the application of the original plaintiffs, the names of the father and the third son were then added, and the plaintiffs were described as surviving partners of the deceased son. At the time the additional plaintiffs were made parties, the suit was, as regards them, barred by limitation. *Held*, that the additional plaintiffs were rightly made parties to the suit, notwithstanding that the suit was, as far as they were concerned, barred. In actions of contract it is the right of the defendant, if he takes the objection in proper time, to insist upon all the persons with whom he contracted being joined as plaintiffs; and if, after the objection has been raised, the plaintiff proceeds with the suit without taking steps to add the person or persons whose non-joinder has been objected to, and the Court finds that the objection is well founded, the suit must be dismissed. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the original plaintiffs could only enforce their claim in conjunction with the added plaintiffs, and the added plaintiffs were barred by s. 22 of Act XV of 1877, the claim of the original plaintiffs was also barred. *Boydonth Bag v. Grish Chunder Roy, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 26*, dissented from. There is no equity, but often much injustice, in allowing one joint contractor out of many to sue a defendant, notwithstanding an objection duly made by the latter; and the Court has no right to allow one contractor to recover under such circumstances, though he may, no doubt, afterwards adjust the sum which he recovers with his co-contractors. *RAM-SHEBUT v. RAMLALL KOONDOL.*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 815: 8 C. L. R. 457

22. ———— **Civil Procedure Code, s. 32—Suit by surviving partner for debts due to firm—***Limitation Act, 1877, s. 22.* Except possibly in the case of an assignment by the other surviving partner or partners, it is not competent to one only of two or more surviving partners to sue for a debt due to the firm. *Dular Chand v. Balram Das, I. L. R. 1 All. 453.* and *Gobind Prasad v. Chandar Sekhar, I. L. R. 9 All. 486.* referred to. A Court may, under s. 32 of the Code of Civil



PARTIES—*contd.*3. ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*(c) PLAINTIFFS—*contd.*

Procedure, add a party necessary to a suit, although it may be obliged by the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, to dismiss the suit after such party has been added. *Ramsebuk v. Ram Lall Koondoo*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 815, and *Kalidas Keval Dass v. Nathu Bhagwan*, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 217, referred to. *Oriental Bank Corporation v. Charriol*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 642, discussed. *IMAM-UD-DIN v. LILADHAR*.  
I. L. R. 14 All. 524

23. ———— *Non-joinder of parties—Application to join necessary parties refused by Court of first instance—Application granted by Court of Appeal—Order to add parties operating nunc pro tunc—Delay the act of the Court—Limitation.* The plaintiffs, as sharers in certain rent alleged to be due by the defendants, sued to recover their share. The defendants contended that all the co-sharers were necessary parties. At the hearing on the 24th January 1889, the plaintiffs' co-sharers applied to be made co-plaintiffs and to be allowed to adopt what the plaintiffs had done in the suit. The application was rejected, and the suit was dismissed for want of parties. On appeal, the District Court in July 1890, holding that the lower Court ought to have joined the co-sharers, passed an order making them co-plaintiffs, and then confirmed the lower Court's decree on the ground that at the time (3rd July 1890) the co-sharers were made plaintiffs the suit was barred by limitation. On appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, remanding the case, that the order of the lower Appeal Court of the 3rd July 1890, allowing the co-sharers' application, which had been made on the 24th January 1889, but had been refused by the Court of first instance, should be treated as operating *nunc pro tunc*, and that the co-sharers should be regarded as having been made parties to the suit when their application was made. The delay was attributable to the act of the Court, and the plaintiffs should not suffer from it. *RAMKRISHNA MORESHWAR v. RAMABAI*.  
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 29

24. ———— *Non-joinder of parties—Suit in name of a firm by its manager—Addition of name of other partner as co-plaintiff—Misdescription of plaintiff—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 27—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 22.* This suit was brought to recover a debt due to the firm of K S. The plaintiff was described as "the firm of K S by its manager S N." The defendants objected that one M was a partner in the firm and should be a party to the suit; he was joined as a co-plaintiff on the 27th January 1888. The defendants then contended that the suit was time-barred under s. 22 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877). *Held*, that the case was one of misdescription and not of non-joinder, for the action was brought in the name of the firm by its manager. The order of the words in the vernacular plaint showed that S, the manager, did not sue in his own name. The defendants were entitled to have

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the name of the other partner disclosed, but it being found as a fact that S was entitled to sue for the firm, the addition of M's name on the record came within the provisions of s. 27 of the Civil Procedure Code. *KASTURCHAND BAHIRAV-DAS v. SAGARMAL SHRIRAM*  
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 413

25. ———— *Suit by one partner on joint cause of action—Consent of other partners to suit proceeding—Refusal to amend plaint on appeal.* A suit was instituted by one only of the partners of a firm in respect of a cause of action which had accrued to all jointly. Notwithstanding that objection to the non-joinder of the other partners was duly taken, the plaintiff contented himself with putting in a petition on behalf of the other partners intimating their willingness that the suit should proceed in the sole name of the plaintiff, instead of applying to the Court to add the other partners as plaintiff. On appeal the High Court admitted the objection, and refused, under the circumstances, to add the other partners as plaintiffs. *DULAR CHAND v. BALRAM DAS*  
I. L. 1 All. 453

26. ———— *Addition of plaintiff where original plaintiff has no right to sue—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 32.* A sued as only son and heir of his father, B. C, the widow of B having with the concurrence of A, taken out letters of administration to B's estate, was on the application of A at a hearing of the suit, made a co-plaintiff under s. 32 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that C ought not to have been joined as a plaintiff in the suit, inasmuch as A had no right at all to sue. S. 32, as far as the addition of plaintiffs is concerned, only applies to those cases in which the original party who brought the suit had some title to sue. *CHUNDER COOMER ROY v. GOCOL CHUNDER BHUTTACHARJEE*.  
I. L. R. 6 Calc. 370

27. ———— *Joinder of a party co-plaintiff having interest in a suit in which original plaintiff is found to have no interest—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 32.* If a plaintiff at the time he brings his suit has no interest in the subject-matter thereof, the joinder of a person as co-plaintiff who has an interest cannot alter the plaintiff's position or confer on him any right of suit. *BHANU TUKARAM SHET v. KASHINATH PAND SHET*  
I. L. R. 20 Bom. 537

28. ———— *Adding as plaintiff a defendant who has assigned his interest in suit where original plaintiff has no right of suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 27 and 32.* A defendant who has assigned all his rights in the subject-matter of the suit, and has no longer any interest in it, has no right to be made a co-plaintiff. A plaintiff who has no right of action when he brings his suit cannot remedy the defect and acquire the



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right by joining with him persons who have the right of action. **ABDUL HAK v. GULAM JILANI.**

**I. L. R. 20 Bom. 677**

**29.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 32—Suit by benamidar.* A mortgage-bond was executed ostensibly in favour of *R*, but *J* was the real mortgagee. A suit was brought by *R*, the benamidar, to enforce the bond; *J*, the real mortgagee, made over the debt on a date previous to the suit, but executed the formal deed of assignment on a date subsequent thereto. The assignees were then added as plaintiffs to the suit. *Held*, that a benamidar may sue, and, distinguishing the case of *Chunder Coomer Roy v. Gocool Chunder Bhattacharjee*, **I. L. R. 6 Calc. 370**, that the assignees were rightly added as plaintiffs under s. 32 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, also, that s. 32 is wide enough to meet every case of defect of parties; and, further, that the power to add parties must be exercised with reference to the interests which those parties have at the time when the addition is being considered. **BHOLA PERSHAD v. RAM LALL. I. L. R. 24 Calc. 34**

**30.** *Action for slander.* Plaintiff sued first defendant for damages for slander of plaintiff's sister. The Court, regarding the suit as defective for want of parties, made plaintiff's sister a co-plaintiff under s. 73, Act VIII of 1859. *Held*, that the defect was one not to be remedied under that section and, that, as there was no right of suit in the plaintiff, the suit should have been dismissed. **SCBBAIYAR v. KRISTNAIYAR. I. L. R. 1 Mad. 383**

**31.** *Procedure.* In a suit by reversioners to set aside an alienation by the widow, where the Court finds that not the plaintiffs, but another reversioner not represented on the suit, had such right, it should not adjudicate on the propriety or otherwise of the alienation, but the suit should be dismissed. **GOSAIN SHIVA RAM v. RUGHO RAI. 2 Agra 44**

**32.** *Suit to cancel under-tenures—Act XI of 1859, s. 37.* On the 13th January 1871, *A* and *B* purchased an estate sold for arrears of Government revenue. The original proprietors asserted their right to collect the rents of a portion of the property by virtue of holding two shikmi talukhs and a howla tenure. This right was affirmed by the High Court in April 1875. *B* had previously sold his interest to *C*. On the 29th May 1876, *A* created a patni of his eight annas in favour of *D* and *E*, and on the 4th July 1876, *C* purchased all the rights of the original proprietors. On the 18th January 1877, *A* sued under Act XI of 1859, s. 37, to cancel or vary the tenures, making the original proprietors *C* and various tenants, defendants. *C* objected that *A* had no right of suit or cause of action, as he had parted with all his rights to *D* and *E*, and that, as his entire interest

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in the estate was only 8 annas, he could not sue to cancel a part only of the sub-tenures. *D* and *E* then applied to be added as parties, and were made plaintiffs. *Held*, that *A* had no cause of action, as he had previously parted with all his rights as zamindar to cancel these tenures in favour of *D* and *E*; nor could *D* and *E* sue, as they were not "purchasers of an entire estate." That *A* having no cause of action, it was not competent to the lower Court to add *D* and *E* as plaintiffs, and so introduce a right of action which did not previously exist. **DWARAKANATH PAL v. GRISH CHUNDER BANDOPHADYA. I. L. R. 6 Calc. 827**

**33.** *Consent to be added as plaintiff—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 32.* Under s. 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, no person can be added as a plaintiff unless he has previously consented thereto; and if a person objects to be added as a plaintiff, the proper course is to make him a defendant. **UMA SUNDARI DAS v. RAMJI HALDAR. I. L. R. 7 Calc. 242**  
**9 C. L. R. 13**

*See TARA CHUNDER BANERJEE v. AMEER MUNDUL. 22 W. R. 394*

where it was *held*, under s. 73 of Act VIII of 1859, that persons might be made co-plaintiffs without their consent.

**34.** *Application to add plaintiff—Suit for partition.* A party holding a miras or perpetual lease of some debutur lakhiraj property to the extent of 12 annas under co-sharers who covenanted in the pottah that he should be entitled to claim partition, sued the owner of the other 4 annas for a partition, making his lessors co-defendants. *Held*, that they might properly have been made co-plaintiffs, and that the Court of first instance should under Act VIII of 1859, s. 73, make them such. **GOUR CHURN SOOR v. JUGOBENDHOO SEN. 22 W. R. 437**

**35.** *Adoption after suit by widow—Co-plaintiff.* Where a Hindu widow instituted a suit in respect of rights inherited by her from her deceased husband, and then adopted a son: *Held*, that, under s. 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the adopted son might be made a co-plaintiff. **PARAVARTANI v. AMBALAVANA PILLAI. Ex parte PARAVARTANI. 1 Mad. 197**

**36.** *Widow as guardian and in her own right.* *Per KEMP, J.*—Where the son of a Hindu widow died after her re-marriage, and she sued as guardian of her daughter by her first husband claiming the estate of her son, an application by her to be joined as co-plaintiff in her own right was allowed. **OKHORA Soot v. BHEDEN BARIANEE. 10 W. R. 34**

**37.** *Suit for work done ignoring power given to another to sue.* *J M* executed in favour of *P* an instrument (authorizing



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*P* to recover, by suit or otherwise, from *Messrs. W and N* a sum of R22,500 or thereabouts) which contained this clause: "From whatever sum *P* may recover from *Messrs. W and N*, he is to pay himself the sum of RS,640, which is due to himself, and also the expenses he may incur in making recovery, and he is to hand over the surplus to me." *J M*, ignoring the above instrument, sued *N* for the R22,500 mentioned in it. *P* thereupon applied to be made a party to the suit under s. 73 of the Code. His application was granted, and he was joined as a co-plaintiff. *Held*, that *P* was properly made a party; but, as the validity of the instrument was disputed by *J M*, *P* should rather have been joined as a defendant than as a plaintiff. *PESTANJI MANCHARJI WADIA v. MATCHETT*. 7 Bom. A. C. 10

38. ———— *Suit on behalf of minor without certificate—Adding party—Costs.* A suit, having been instituted by a guardian in the name of an infant, without a certificate under Act XL of 1858, was dismissed by the lower Appellate Court. The minor, on coming of age, applied to have his name substituted on the record. The High Court, under s. 73, Act VIII of 1859, ordered that his name should be added as plaintiff, and that the suit should be proceeded with. But as the dismissal by the lower Court was correct so far as the materials before the Court enabled it to deal with the suit, the order of remand was not to take effect until all the costs of the defendant had been paid by the plaintiffs. *MADHUB CHUNDER CHOWDHURY v. BUKTESSUREE DEBEA*. 12 W. R. 102

39. ———— *Suit by father for joint property—Transportation of father—Sons added as plaintiffs.* I sued his brothers for his share of the estate of their deceased father, the father and sons being divided. I having been transported for life, his sons applied to be made plaintiffs in the suit, on the ground that they had a joint interest with their father in their grandfather's estate. *Held*, that, under the circumstances, the application was properly granted. *BYREDDI NARAKKA v. CHINNA NARAYANA REDDI*.

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 331

40. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 30—Joinder of parties—Suit for cancellation of deeds—Declaratory suit—Withdrawal of part of claim.* A and B, junior members of a Malabar tarwad, sued to cancel certain mortgages executed by their karnavan and senior anandravan on the ground that the secured debt was not binding on the tarwad, and to appoint A to the office of karnavan. The last part of the prayer was withdrawn. The mortgages were executed to secure a decree-debt, the decree having been passed *ex parte* against the late karnavan of the tarwad. No fraud was alleged, but the lower Courts found that the karnavan had been guilty of fraud in allowing the decree to be passed *ex parte*. The plaintiffs had not been parties to the decree, and the other junior

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members of the tarwad who had been joined were exempted from liability. *Held, per Curiam*: All the members of the plaintiffs' tarwad should have been joined actually or constructively under s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code. *MOIDIN KUTTI v. KRISHNAN*. I. L. R. 10 Mad. 322

41. ———— *Malabar Law—Non-joinder of plaintiff—Endowment—Suit by one of two co-uralans.* In a suit by one of two co-uralans of a Malabar devasom to recover land, the property of the devasom, the other uralan being joined as defendant, there was no evidence that the latter had repudiated the right of the plaintiff to sue in conjunction with himself, and it appeared that he had not been consulted as to the institution of the suit. *Held*, that the suit was bad for non-joinder of the co-uralan as plaintiff. *PARAMESWARAN v. SHANGARAN*. I. L. R. 14 Mad. 489

42. ———— *Property vested in three sabhas—Suit by members representing two—Maintainability of suit.* A temple was managed by three sabhas, and members representing two only of such sabhas brought a suit to recover land belonging to it, without alleging that the members of the third sabha had been consulted with reference to the suit, or that they had repudiated the right of the plaintiff to sue in conjunction with that sabha. Permission to sue as representing the whole of the members of the three sabhas had been refused. *Held*, that the suit was not maintainable. *PURAMATHAN SOMAYAJIPAD v. SANKARA MENON*. I. L. R. 23 Mad. 82

43. ———— *Malabar law—Suit by one of two uralans to recover property demised on kanom—Non-joinder of the only other uralan as co-plaintiff—Joinder as defendant—Evidence of adverse acts—Maintainability of suit.* One of two uralans sued to redeem property which had been demised to the defendants on *kanom*. He did not join the other uralan as a co-plaintiff, but impleaded him as a defendant. The other uralan had granted a renewal of the *kanom*, and plaintiff in his suit ignored that renewal and contended that it was invalid. On objection being raised that the suit was not maintainable by reason of the non-joinder of the other uralan as a co-plaintiff:—*Held*, that the suit was maintainable. In the circumstances, the plaintiff could not have joined the other uralan, nor could it be held that he was bound to have consulted him before the suit was filed, or asked him to join in bringing it. *Savitri Antaranam v. Raman Nambudri*, I. L. R. 24 Mad. 296, distinguished and doubted. *MARIYIL RAMAN NAIR v. NARAYANAN NAMBUDIRIPAD* (1902). I. L. R. 26 Mad. 461

## (d) DEFENDANTS.

44. ———— *Ground for adding defendants—Claims opposed to that of plaintiff.* Only persons whose claims must necessarily be taken into consideration before deciding on the plaintiff's



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title should be joined as defendants in a suit.  
**GOVERNMENT v. FERGUSON . 9 W. R. 158**

**45. ——— Prevention of unnecessary litigation—Discretion of Judge.** The object of s. 73, Act VIII of 1859, is to prevent needless litigation; and there are cases—e.g., as when it is necessary to make plaintiff's co-parceners defendants—when a Judge should exercise the discretion vested in him by that section, even if the plaintiff omits to ask him to do so. **MOTEE CHUND DOSS v. MURLEE DHUR DOSS . 15 W. R. 432**

**46. ——— Likelihood of being affected by result of suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 73—Raising unnecessary issues.** S. 73 of the Civil Procedure Code enables the Court to bring in as parties to the suit any person whose rights appear to be involved, and who may be affected by the result of the suit. It does not enable parties who are not liable to be affected by the result to come in and raise altogether new issues which do not properly arise. Where the parties, however, all acquiesced in the irregularity, and the suit went to trial on the issues raised by the added defendant, the High Court did not think it necessary to quash the proceedings. **PADMALOHAN SEN v. LAL CHAND GUPTA.**

**1 B. L. R. S. N. 26 : 10 W. R. 283**

**47. ——— Likelihood of being affected by result of suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 73—Discretion of Court—Suit for possession—Form of decree.** In a suit to recover possession of a certain mouzah claimed by the plaintiff as a portion of his dar-patni talukh, which was brought against several defendants, four other persons applied to be made defendants, on the ground that they were co-sharers with the defendants on the record in the property in dispute. The application was granted; the added defendants were found to be possessed of the share which they claimed, and on the proofs which they adduced the plaintiff's claim was dismissed. The plaintiff's claim as against the original defendants, who made no opposition was decreed. In special appeal, on the ground that they should not have been made defendants, and that the plaintiff was not bound to prove his case against anybody else but the person against whom he had brought the suit:—**Held** that the s. 73, Act VIII of 1859, leaves to the Courts of original jurisdiction a discretion in such cases; that the section is not limited entirely to cases where the suit as framed cannot proceed; that the words "persons who may be likely to be affected by the result" do not mean persons on whom the result would be legally binding. **KALIPRASHAD SING v. JAINARAYAN ROY.**

**3 B. L. R. A. C. 24 : 11 W. R. 361**

**48. ——— Application to add defendant—Suit to set aside certificate and for possession.** The plaintiff claimed to be entitled, as cousin of one M, to 12 annas of the estate left by M, and

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brought a suit against the two widows of M, to whom a certificate had been granted under Act XXVII of 1860, to set aside the certificate, and for possession of the estate with mesne profits from the death of M, to the institution of this suit. N and others, who claimed to be entitled to a portion of the property specified in the plaint, intervened, and asked to be made defendants under s. 73 of Act VIII of 1859. **Held**, that they were not parties likely to be affected by the result within s. 73 of the suit, and should not have been made parties to the suit. **AHMED HOSSEIN v. KHADIJA.**

**3 B. L. R. A. C. 28 note : 10 W. R. 369**

**49. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 73, 350—Act XXVII of 1860, s. 4—Certificate of administration—Suit by co-heir against holder of certificate.** In a suit against a co-heir, who had obtained a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, for an account of the estate of the deceased proprietor, a third party was added as a defendant under s. 73 of Act VIII of 1859, "it appearing from the accounts put in that a large portion of the assets had been disposed of by him as agent" of the holder of the certificate. On appeal:—**Held**, that a co-heir is entitled to follow property of the deceased into the hands of any person who has misappropriated it, and such right is not taken away by the certificate. Therefore any person who, with the consent of the holder of the certificate, has improperly possessed himself of property belonging to the deceased and, misappropriated it, may be joined as a co-defendant. The third party was rightly so joined in this case. **NGA THA YA v. MI KHAN MHAW . 5 B. L. R. 371 : 13 W. R. 443**

**50. ——— Corporate body, suit by an agent—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 73.** Where a corporate body—e.g., the East Indian Railway Company—is sued, not in its corporate capacity but through an agent, the corporate body is not likely to be affected by the result of the suit. A Court is justified in refusing an application to make such corporate body a party in the suit under s. 73, Act VIII of 1859. **NUBEEN CHUNDER PAUL v. STEPHENSON.**

**15 W. R. 534**

**51. ——— Adding defendant—Civil Procedure Code, 1859 s. 73—Suit for partition—Adverse title.** In a suit for a butwarra on the allegation that defendant had encroached upon certain ijmal lands, the latter urged that the said lands were not ijmal, but the self-acquired lands of his (defendant's) son, who ought to be made a party. **Held**, on review of a previous decision, that as the son's interest was not adverse both to himself and defendant, unless the point raised was cleared up, the butwarra could not stand, and the son must therefore be made a party under s. 73, Act VIII of 1859. **JOY KISHEN MOOKERJEE v. RAJ KISHEN MOOKERJEE . 16 W. R. 101**



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52. ———— *Suit for possession after foreclosure—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 73.* An intervenor claiming under a title adverse to that set up both by the plaintiff and the defendant might be made a defendant, under s. 73, Act VIII of 1859 if his interest in the subject-matter of dispute was likely to be affected by the decision between them, as in a suit for possession by foreclosure of a mortgage, in which the defendant admitted the fact of the mortgage, but the intervenor came in declaring the mortgage to be false and collusive between the alleged mortgagor and mortgagee, for the purpose of depriving him of a moku-rari tenure which he held in the alleged mortgagor's estate. SARODA PERSHAD MITTER *v.* KYLASH CHUNDER BANERJEE . . . 7 W. R. 315

53. ———— *Persons likely to be affected by result of suit—Intervenor—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 73.* A person could not be made a party to a suit under s. 73, Act VIII of 1859, unless he was likely to be affected by the result of the suit. Where an intervenor claimed a portion of the subject-matter of the suit, it was *held* that it would be most inconvenient and contrary to all principle if every person claiming a title adverse to those set up by the plaintiff and defendant in the suit should intervene and be introduced into the suit, so that, as soon as the plaintiff's title was determined against him, the intervenor might take up the case as a fresh claimant. JOY GOBIND DOSS *v.* GOUREEPROSHAD SHAHA . . . 7 W. R. 201

54. ———— *Intervenors—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 73.* Plaintiff sued to recover possession of a share of an estate which he alleged he purchased from the principal defendant, who denied plaintiff's title on the ground that the purchase-money had not been paid. Subsequently certain persons prayed to be made defendants, as they held a dar-mokurari, and were not liable to be turned out. They were accordingly added as defendants under s. 73, Civil Procedure Code. It then appeared that the possession sought by plaintiff was khas possession. *Held*, that, although it was *prima facie* necessary for these intervenors to be made defendants, yet, after the intention of the plaintiff became apparent, nothing would be gained by removing them from the record, even if the Court had power to do so in special appeal. KEWUL SAHOO *v.* ISSUR DYAL ROY . . . 12 W. R. 334

55. ———— *Suit for ejectment by landlord—Intervenor.* In a suit by a landlord to eject his tenant, persons alleging a title adverse to the landlord should not be made parties under s. 73, Act VIII of 1859. Their introduction could not change the character of the suit, and if they do wish to establish their own title otherwise than through the tenant, they should bring a separate suit. GANU BIN HANMANTRAY *v.* MORO GANESH . . . 10 Bom. 429

KARTICK NATH PARRAY *v.* CHUMMUN ROY  
21 W. R. 51

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56. ———— *Suit for declaration of title to portion of land.* In a suit for establishment of title to a portion of land with which defendants repudiated all connection, alleging the land to be in the possession of third parties, who were in consequence made defendants by an order of the Court under s. 73, Civil Procedure Code :—*Held*, that these parties were rightly made defendants as having been interested both in the subject-matter and in the result of the suit; and even if they had been wrongly made defendants, the onus would, under the circumstances, remain on the plaintiffs. RAM TARUCK GHOSAL *v.* RADHA BULLUB SIRCAR  
15 W. R. 97

57. ———— *Intervenor in application for attachment before judgment—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 86, 246.* Where a plaintiff applied for attachment of certain property before judgment under s. 81, and a third party intervened, claiming to hold the property by purchase on his own account. *Held*, that such intervenor ought not to have been made a party under s. 73 of the Code, but that his objection should have been entertained under ss. 86 and 246 of the Procedure Code. RAM RUTTUN DASS *v.* GOVIND DASS . . . 2 Agra 141

58. ———— *Intervenor—Suit for specific performance.* In a suit to enforce the performance of a contract on the allegation that defendant had received the consideration-money, but refused to execute the conveyance, a third party intervened alleging a subsequent conveyance of the same property by an instrument which had been registered. The first Court dismissed the plaint, but the lower Appellant Court gave plaintiff a decree against both parties. *Held*, that it was irregular to place an intervenor upon the record and decide an issue between him and the other parties to the suit. GUDADHUR CHATTERJEE *v.* RAJ KRISTO ROY . . . 13 W. R. 73

59. ———— *Joint creditor.* Where one of several joint creditors who has no rights separate from that of the others refuses to join in the suit as plaintiff, and there is no averment of collusion on his part with the defendants, he cannot rightly be made a defendant in the suit. KRISHNARAY RAMCHANDRA *v.* MANAJI BIN SAYAJI  
11 Bom. 106

GURU PRASHAD ROY *v.* RAS MOHUN MUKHOPADHYA . . . 1 C. L. R. 431

60. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), ss. 28 and 32—Judicature Act, Order XVI, rules 3 and 6.* The plaintiffs brought a suit to recover certain sums of money from the defendants due to them under certain contracts which they alleged had been entered into by themselves and one A D as agent of the defendants, and asked for an account. The defendants, in their written statement, contended that there was no privity of contract between themselves and the plaintiffs, and denied the alleged agency of A D. The plaintiffs before the hearing, applied to the



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Court to have *A D* added as a party defendant under ss. 28 and 32 of Act X 1877, asking to be allowed to amend their plaint so as to pray for relief in the alternative against the original defendants or the said *A D*, or both against the original defendants and the said *A D*. *Held*, that under s. 28 they were entitled to the order on the authority of the case of *Child v. Stenning*, L. R. 5 Ch. D. 695. *BUDDREE DOSS v. HOARE, MILLER & Co.*

I. L. R. 8 Cal. 170

61. *Vendor and purchaser—Joinder—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 32.* In a suit by the purchaser of goods by sample against the vendors for damages, on the ground that the bulk did not correspond with the sample, the vendors applied under s. 32 of the Civil Procedure Code, to add the vendor to them, on the same samples of the goods, as a defendant, alleging that the question between the plaintiff and themselves was the same as that between themselves and their vendor. *Held*, refusing the application, that the plaintiff "ought" not to have made the vendor to the defendants a party to the suit, and that his presence was "not necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit." *MAHOMED BADSHA v. NICOL, FLEMING & Co.*

I. L. R. 4 Cal. 355 : 2 C. L. R. 330

62. *Mortgagees of property—Suit to recover title-deeds.* In a suit by a father against a son to recover the title-deeds of certain property alleged to have been purchased by the plaintiff in the name of the defendant when the latter was about two or three years old, which title-deeds were said to be fraudulently retained by the son, the defendant did not appear, but two other persons, who alleged that they were mortgagees from the son, were made parties. *Held*, that they should not have been made parties under s. 73 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1859, simply on the ground that they had lent money to the son on the security of the property. *AKBUR ALI v. MAHOMED FAIZ BUKSH*

15 W. R. 12

63. *Suit for partition—Mortgagee of interest of co-owner—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 32.* In a suit for the partition of joint family property, the mortgagees of the right, title, and interest of the plaintiff applied under s. 32 of the Civil Procedure Code to be added as parties. *Held*, that their presence was not necessary in order "to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate and settle all the questions involved in the suit" within the meaning of s. 32. *MOHINDRO BHOOSUN BISWAS v. SHOSHEE BHOOSUN BISWAS.*

I. L. R. 5 Cal. 882

64. *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 32 and 372—Mortgagee added as party—Purchaser pendente lite—*

PARTIES—*contd.*3. ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*(d) DEFENDANTS—*contd.*

*Mortgage before suit of defendant's interest.* *A* sued *V* and *S* to establish his right to attach a certain house in execution of a decree obtained by him in a previous suit. In their written statement the defendants alleged that *A* had obtained the decree in question by fraud. Shortly before the present suit, *V* had mortgaged the house to *H* for R33,000. About three weeks after the suit had been filed, *H* advanced a further sum of R5,000 to *V* on the same security, and on the same day (12th December 1881) entered into an agreement with *V*, by which he agreed to buy the house for R45,000, the sale to be completed immediately after the decision of the present suit. The agreement provided that *V* should defend the suit; but if the result of the suit should be to establish the plaintiff's right to seize the house in execution, then that *H* should be at liberty to cancel the contract of sale. Subsequently *V* wrote to *H* declaring his intention of abandoning his defence. *H* thereupon applied to be made a defendant to the suit, in order to protect the house from the plaintiff. *Held*, that *H* was entitled to be made a party under ss. 32 and 372 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *AHMEDBHOY HUBIBHOY v. VULLEEBOY CASSUMBHOY. Ex parte HASSANBHOY VISRAM.*

65. *Suit for possession after rejection of claim under s. 246, Civil Procedure Code, 1859.* *M* divided her estate among her children, retaining for herself one-seventh, which was afterwards increased by a portion of what had been given to one of the sons, who died. *M*'s rights in the estate were sold in execution to *D*, who sold them to *N* who sold them to *K*. *K* brought a suit against certain parties, who held the estate in zur-i-peshgi from *M* and her family, for possession of the whole estate, but obtained a decree for one-seventh only, giving him possession conditionally on his paying to the zur-i-peshgidars *M*'s proportion of the loan. This decree was confirmed on appeal, and *K* made liable for the costs of those defendants in respect of whom his claim had been dismissed. Meantime *B*, an old judgment-creditor of *K*'s father, took out execution against *R*, and applied for sale of *K*'s rights in the estate, which were accordingly sold, the purchaser being *K* himself. Subsequently one of *M*'s daughters, a successful defendant in the suit brought by *K*, took out execution of her decree for costs, and put up *K*'s rights for sale. The sale was opposed, under s. 246, Civil Procedure Code, 1859, by *R*, a son of *B*, whose claim was summarily rejected, and *K*'s rights were bought by one *A*. *R* then brought a suit within one year to set aside the sale, and to have his own title declared. The suit was against the purchaser and against the representatives of the zur-i-peshgidars; but on the petition of *L*, one of *M*'s heirs, her name was added to the list of defendants. The first Court gave *R* a decree, but the lower Appellate Court found that his



PARTIES—*contd.*3. ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*(d) DEFENDANTS—*contd.*

claim was barred by limitation against L, on the ground of non-possession within twelve years, and in respect of the zur-i-peshgidar, because K's decree had lapsed by delay in execution. *Held*, that L was interested in the result of the suit, and the lower Courts committed no error in law in admitting her to be a defendant under s. 73, Civil Procedure Code, 1859. *RAM SURUN SINGH v. MAHOMED AMEER* . . . . . **13 W. R. 78**

**66.** *Official Assignee—Suits against insolvent pending at time vesting order is made.* The Official Assignee has no legal right under the Insolvent Act to apply to be made a party to suits against the insolvent pending at the time of a vesting order being made, nor has he the power, after judgment and decree have been pronounced in a suit against the insolvent prior to his vesting order, to get himself made a party to such suit with a view of setting aside the judgment or appealing therefrom. *In re HUNT. MONNET & Co. Ex parte GAMBLE v. BHOLAGIR MANGIR.*

**1 Bom. 251**

**67.** *Suit originally against owners—Amendment of plaint—Ship added as party defendant.* In a suit for collision originally filed against the owners of a ship:—*Held*, that the plaintiffs might amend the plaint by adding the ship as a party defendant. *BOMBAY AND PERSIA STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY v. SHEPHERD.*

**I. L. R. 12 Bom. 237**

**68.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 32—Joinder of new defendant against whom the plaint prays no relief.* Suit upon a bond of which the obligor was therein described as the manager of a certain muth. The defendants, who were the sons of the obligor (since deceased), pleaded that the debt was contracted by their father for the benefit of the muth and as manager of the muth. The Judge ordered that the representative of the muth be joined as defendant in the suit under, 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and subsequently a decree was passed against him. *Held*, that the order under s. 32 was right, although the plaint had prayed for no relief against the muth. *THIRTHASAMI v. GOPALA* . **I. L. R. 13 Mad. 32**

**69.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 437—Non-joinder of parties—Persons having interest in suit.* The holder of an impartible zamindari, governed by the law of primogeniture, having a son, executed a mining lease of part of the zamindari for a period of twenty years, by which no benefit was to accrue to the grantor unless mining operations were carried on with success, and the commencement of mining operations was left optional with the lessee. On the death of the grantor, his minor son and successor, by the Collector of the district as his next friend (authorized in that behalf by the Court of Wards), now sued the assignee of the lessee to have the lease set aside. The defendant had executed a declaration of trust

PARTIES—*contd.*3. ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*(d) DEFENDANTS—*contd.*

in respect of his interest in favour of certain persons who were not joined. *Held*, per MUTTUSAMI AYYAR and WILKINSON, JJ. (affirming the judgment of PARKER, J.), that the defendant's interests not having been shown to be hostile to those of the persons entitled under the declaration of trust, the suit was not bad for non-joinder. *BERESFORD v. RAMASUBBA.*

**I. L. R. 13 Mad. 197**

**70.** *Dismissal of suit for non-joinder of parties—Necessary party—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 28, 32, 295, and 315—English Judicature Act, 1875, Order XVI, rules 11 and 48.* On a suit brought by the plaintiff for the establishment of his right to and confirmation of possession to certain immoveable property, and for a declaration that it was not liable to attachment and sale in execution of certain decrees held by defendants 1 to 4 against defendants 5 to 7, the defence mainly was that it was not maintainable in the absence of certain persons, who, like the defendants 1 to 4, had obtained decrees against defendants 5 to 7 and had attached the property in dispute, and the plaintiff preferred claims against the said attachments, but they were rejected upon adjudication. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the absent decree-holders had applied for attachment and sale of the property in dispute in execution of their decrees and had successfully resisted the claim of the plaintiff, the plaintiff had a right to some relief against them (the absent decree-holders) in respect of the matter involved in the suit, and as their presence was necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, the absent decree-holders were necessary parties to it, and the plaintiff not having brought them on the record as defendants, the suit was not maintainable. *Mahomed Badsha v. Nicol Fleming & Co., I. L. R. 4 Calc. 355*, distinguished. *DURGA CHARAN SARKAR v. JOTINDRA MOHAN TAGORE* . . . **I. L. R. 27 Calc. 493**

**71.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 32—Powers conferred by s. 32, exercised after an order has been passed under s. 108.* The powers conferred by s. 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of the addition of parties are exercisable even after a suit had been reinstated on an application under s. 108 of the Code made by one of the defendants who had not been served with notice of the suit. *TIKAM SINGH v. KISHORE RAMANJI* . . . **I. L. R. 20 All. 188**

**72.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 32—Suit for property wrongly sold in execution—Person claiming under distinct title.* An order for sale was made in execution of a decree. A party claiming the property objected. His objection was overruled by the Court of first instance. He appealed to the High Court. The High Court held that the property ordered to be sold



PARTIES—*contd.*3. ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*(d) DEFENDANTS—*contd.*

was not the property included in the mortgage on which the decree for sale was made, and was not property which could be sold under that decree. In the meantime the sale had taken place. Thereupon the owner of the property, which the High Court had held on appeal, was not saleable, brought a suit and made the decree-holders and auction-purchaser parties to it, and claimed as against them his property. *Held*, that it was not competent to the Court, acting under s. 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to introduce into this suit as a defendant a person who claimed the property in suit by a title quite distinct from that under which any of the parties to the suit claimed. *KALIAN RAI v. RAM RATAN* . . . . . I. L. R. 18 All. 306

73. ———— *Application to file award and for consent decree—Application by creditor of defendant to be made a party to suit—Objection by creditor to filing award—Procedure—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 484.* The plaintiff applied to file an award and for a decree in terms thereof, to which the defendant consented. K, a creditor of the defendant, thereupon applied to be made a party to the suit and objected to the filing of the award and to the decree, alleging that the award was fraudulent and fictitious and had been made in order to save the defendant's property from his creditors. The Subordinate Judge made K a party to the suit, and refused the plaintiff's application. On application to the High Court:—*Held*, that K ought not to have been made a party to the suit. His remedy was to apply under s. 484 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) for an attachment before judgment of the defendant's property. *DUNGARSI DIPCHAND v. UJANSI VALSI* . . . . . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 727

74. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 28, 32—Party interested in decision—Suit for removal of a trustee.* Plaintiff brought the present suit to remove the present Sardar Panda of the temple of Baidyanath and to appoint some body else. It was alleged that the custom was that the Panda was elected in a certain way. The defendant denied this, and alleged that the succession to the office was by the rule of primogeniture. One of the issues was: "If the defendant is removed from his position, who should be appointed in his place? And should any scheme be framed for regulating the management of the debutter properties?" A petition was then made by the eldest son of the eldest son (now deceased) of the defendant to be made a party. *Held*, that he should be added as a party, and his presence was necessary in order to decide the matter effectually and completely between the parties. *SAILADANANDA DUTTA JHA v. UMESHANANDA DUTTA JHA* . . . . . 4 C. W. N. 462

75. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 372—Champertor,*

PARTIES—*contd.*3. ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*(d) DEFENDANTS—*contd.*

*Application by, to be made a party to the suit—Assignment to champertor, disputed—Compromise.* Case in which one K, who had advanced moneys to the plaintiff to enable her to carry on the suit and had obtained an assignment of half of her interest which assignment was disputed by the plaintiff, was made a party defendant on his own application. *RAJARANEE DASSEE v. DEBENDRA NATH SHAW*. . . . . 3 C. W. N. 754

76. ———— *Limitation—Power of Court—Limitation—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 23, 363, 364.* No question of limitation can arise with respect to the Court's power to make an order adding a party defendant to a suit. *ORIENTAL BANK CORPORATION v. CHARRIOL*. . . . . I. L. R. 12 Calc. 642

Nor a respondent. *MANICKYA MOYEE v. BORODA PROSAD MOOKERJEE* . . . . . I. L. R. 9 Calc. 355  
11 C. L. R. 430

77. ———— *Limitation—Suit for partnership-accounts—Joint contract—Necessary parties, omission of—Time of joinder, how material.* A suit was brought for partnership accounts. Upon the objection of the defendant it was found that a necessary party defendant had been omitted, and such party was afterwards added as a defendant at a time when the suit as against him was barred. *Held*, that the whole suit was rightly dismissed. *RAMDOYAL v. JUNMENJOY COONDOO* . . . . . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 791

78. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 32—Court adding a defendant—Limitation.* No question of limitation arises where a Court, of its own motion, under s. 32 of the Civil Procedure Code, adds a party defendant to a suit. *Oriental Bank Corporation v. Charriol*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 642, followed. *GRISH CHUNDER SASMAL v. DWARKA NATH DINDA*. . . . . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 640

*KHADIR MOIDEEN v. RAMA NAIK*. . . . . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 12

79. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 32—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 22—Adding party by a Court of its own motion.* No question of limitation arises, and s. 22 of the Indian Limitation Act does not apply when the Court of its own motion acts under s. 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure and orders that the name of any person be added as a defendant. *Girsh Chunder Sasmal v. Dwarka Nath Dinda*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 640, and *Oriental Bank Corporation v. Charriol*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 642, followed. *Khadir Moideen v. Rama Naik*, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 12, referred to; and *Imam-ud-din v. Liladhar*, I. L. R. 14 All. 524, dissented from. *FAKERA PASBAN v. BIBI AZIMUNNISSA* . . . . . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 540  
4 C. W. N. 459

80. ———— *Limitation—Debutter property—New defendant—Limitation Act*



PARTIES—*contd.*3. ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*(d) DEFENDANTS—*contd.*

(XV of 1877), s. 22—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 32—Sebit, right of, to be indemnified.* Where relief is originally claimed against a party, who had to be represented by some person, the proper representation of that party subsequently made has not the effect of adding a new "defendant" to the suit. Plaintiffs instituted a suit praying *inter alia* for a decree for a sum of money against a *debutter* estate, the defendants to the suit being, among other persons, P, who was impleaded as Receiver of the *debutter* estate and also in his personal capacity; no one of the defendants was impleaded as representing the *debutter* estate. Subsequently and after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for the suit, the plaint was amended and P was impleaded also as *sebit* and representing the *debutter* estate. *Held*, that this was not adding a new defendant to the suit, and that the claim against the *debutter* estate was not barred by limitation. *Khem Karan v. Har Dayal*, 1. L. R. 4 All. 37; *Prosunno Kumar Sen v. Mahabharat Saha*, 7 C. W. N. 575, approved. *Imam-ud-din v. Liladhar*, 1. L. R. 14 All. 524; *Weldon v. Neal*, 19 Q. B. D. 394; *Manni Kasaundhan v. Crooke*, 1. L. R. 2 All. 296, referred to. A *sebit*, who is obliged to pay money of his own for the benefit of the *debutter* estate, is entitled to have the same made good out of the estate. *PEARY MOHAN MUKERJEE v. NARENDRA NATH MUKERJEE* (1905).

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 582  
s. c. 9 C. W. N. 421

81. ———— *Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 22—Addition of party by Court after period of limitation—Effect—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 32—Mortgage suit—Remedy of mortgagee against purchaser of portion of mortgaged property, not made a party within time—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 167—Sale of portion of tenure or holding—Annulment of encumbrances.* When in a suit a person is added as a party defendant at the instance of the Court after the period of limitation applicable to the suit has expired, s. 22 of the Limitation Act applies and bars the plaintiff's remedy as against the added defendant. *Grish Chunder Sasmal v. Dwarka Nath Dinda*, 1. L. R. 24 Calc. 640; *Fakira Pasban v. Bibi Azimunnissa*, 4 C. W. N. 459; s. c. 1. L. R. 27 Calc. 540, overruled. *Oriental Bank Corporation v. Chariol*, 1. L. R. 12 Calc. 642, explained. *Imam Ali v. Baij Nath Ram Sahu*, 10 C. W. N. 551; s. c. 3 C. L. J. 576, approved. Where in the course of a suit to enforce a mortgage, but more than 12 years after the date fixed in the mortgage-bond for repayment of the mortgage-money, the Court directed that a purchaser of a portion of the mortgaged property be added as a party defendant:—*Held*, that the suit as against the added defendant was barred by limitation. *Quære*: Whether the portion of the mortgaged property in the hands of the added defendant was thereby exempted from liability under the mortgage.

PARTIES—*contd.*3. ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—*contd.*(d) DEFENDANTS—*concl.*

*RAMKINKAR BISWAS v. AKHIL CHANDRA CHOWDHURI* (1907) . . . 11 C. W. N. 350

82. ———— *Estoppel—Appeal—Procedure.* *Held*, that when a suit has been dismissed against one of two defendants by the Court of first instance and the defeated plaintiff has not appealed against that part of the decree, the addition of the defendant, against whom the suit has been dismissed, to the array of parties does not empower the appellate Court to pass against him a decree, which the Court of first instance declined to pass, and in the decision of which Court the plaintiff chose to acquiesce. *Ranjit Singh v. Sheo Prasad Ram*, 1. L. R. 2 All. 487, and *Atma Ram v. Bal-kishen*, 1. L. R. 5 All. 266, followed. *Rup Jan Bibee v. Abdul Kader Bhuyan*, 8 C. W. N. 496, dissented from. *FARZAND ALI KHAN v. BISMILLAH BEGAM* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 27 All. 23

83. ———— *Persons jointly interested with plaintiff may be made defendants without proof that they refused to join as plaintiffs.* Where some only out of several persons jointly interested in a cause of action bring a suit impleading the others as defendants, such suit is sustainable though it is not shown that the parties joined as defendants refused to join as plaintiffs. *Pyari Mohun Bose v. Kedar Nath Roy*, 1. L. R. 26 Calc. 409, followed. *Biri Singh v. Nawal Singh*, 1. L. R. 24 All. 226, followed. *PERIA KARUPPAN v. VELAYUTHAM CHETTY* (1906).  
I. L. R. 29 Mad. 302

84. ———— *Mutwalli—Suit for rent—Mutwalli—Effect of all mutwallis not being made parties to a rent-suit.* Where the persons liable to pay rent are *mutwallis*, it is essential that all the *mutwallis* should be brought before the Court as defendants, inasmuch as *mutwallis* stand in the position of trustees. *ABDUL RAB CHOWDHURY v. EGGAR* (1907) . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 182  
s. c. 12 C. W. N. 160

## (e) APPELLANTS.

85. ———— *Parties, addition of, on appeal.* An Appellate Court has a discretionary power to substitute or add a new appellant or respondent after the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal. *COURT OF WARDS v. GAYA PRASAD*.  
I. L. R. 2 All. 108

*See RANJIT SINGH v. SHEO PRASAD RAM*.  
I. L. R. 2 All. 487

86. ———— *Adding appellants—Persons not parties originally.* Persons not parties in the original suit are not entitled to have themselves added as appellants in the Appellate Court. *WATSON & CO. v. SHURNO MOYEE*. 9 W. R. 259

87. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 32, 382.* There is no power in the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882) to make a



**PARTIES—contd.****3. ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.****(e) APPELLANTS—concl'd.**

party to the suit a co-appellant. Ss. 32 and 582 of the Code give to an Appellate Court power only to strike out the name of a party, or to direct new parties to be added to the suit, whether as plaintiffs or defendants. *VASUDEB BALKRISHNA v. SALUBAI*. **I. L. R. 10 Bom. 227**

**88.** ———— *Adding assignee as party—Assignment of interest pending suit.* After the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit, and pending a regular appeal to the High Court, the plaintiffs applied for leave to add the name of a party to whom a share of their right in the subject-matter had been assigned subsequently to the dismissal of the suit in the Court below. The Court refused the application. *JAMEELA v. MAHOMED HOSSEIN*. **Marsh. 251 : 2 Hay 111**

**89.** ———— *Appeal by widow of judgment-debtor—Alleged adopted son.* A judgment-debtor died. His widow was thereupon placed on the record as his legal representative. In the execution-proceedings which followed the widow made an appeal to the High Court against a certain order passed by the Court executing the decree. To this appeal, a person, alleging himself to be the adopted son of the deceased judgment-debtor, applied to be made a party. The widow opposed the application denying the fact of the adoption. *Held*, that, whether the applicant was or was not the adopted son of the deceased judgment-debtor there was no objection to entering his name on the record if the decree-holder consented, as it tended to his security that this should be done. The applicant was accordingly made a co-appellant with the widow. *LAKSHMIBAI v. SANTAPA REVAPA SHINTRE* **I. L. R. 13 Bom. 22**

**(f) RESPONDENTS.**

**90.** ———— *Adding respondent—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 559—Limitation Act, 1877.* The discretionary power of directing a person to be made a respondent, conferred on the Appellate Court by s. 559 of the Civil Procedure Code, is not limited by any provision in the Limitation Act (Act XV of 1877). *MANICKYA MOYEE v. BORODA PROSAD MOOKERJEE*. **I. L. R. 9 Calc. 355**  
**11 C. L. R. 430**

Nor in the case of the addition of a defendant. *ORIENTAL BANK CORPORATION v. CHARRIOL*. **I. L. R. 12 Calc. 642**

**91.** ———— *Appellate Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 559.* The Court of first instance gave the plaintiff in a suit for money a decree against the defendant *B*, exempting the defendants *A* and *H*. *B* appealed, making the plaintiff the respondent to the appeal. The plaintiff did not appeal from the decree of the Court of first instance in respect of the exemption of *A* and *H*. The appellate Court made *A* a respondent to

**PARTIES—contd.****3. ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.****(f) RESPONDENTS—contd.**

the appeal, under s. 559 of the Civil Procedure Code, and, exempting *B*, gave the plaintiff a decree against *A*. *Held*, that, inasmuch as s. 559 does not empower an Appellate Court virtually to make an appeal for an appellant, who has refrained from availing himself of his privileges under the law, by introducing for him other respondents than those he has included in his petition of appeal, and it could not be said that *A* was "interested in the result of the appeal," as, having the unappealed decree of the Court of first instance behind him, his position was secure, the Appellate Court had improperly made *A* a respondent to the appeal and given a decree against him. *ATMA RAM v. BALKISHEN*. **I. L. R. 5 All. 266**

**92.** ———— *Practice—Parties to cross-appeals.* Suit by the adoptive son of the obligee (deceased) of a hypothecation-bond to recover principal and interest due on the bond against the land comprised in the hypothecation. Defendant No. 1, the obligor of the bond, had executed it as manager of a joint Hindu family, of which defendant No. 2 was a member, and for the rightful purposes of the family. The family subsequently became divided, and the hypothecated property was divided between defendants Nos. 1 and 2. Defendant No. 1 afterwards hypothecated part of his share for a private debt to defendant No. 3, who, having sued on his hypothecation and brought the land to sale in execution, became the purchaser. The District Munsif passed a decree for the plaintiff, against which defendants Nos. 2 and 3 preferred separate appeals, the plaintiff being the sole respondent to each appeal. The District Judge on appeal passed a decree directing that the plaintiff should first proceed against all the property which was not subject to the hypothecation to defendant No. 3, including the share of defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 2 preferred a second appeal joining all the other parties. *Held*, that, though both defendants Nos. 2 and 3 preferred separate appeals from the original decree, they only made the plaintiff respondent, and defendant No. 3 omitted to make the appellant (defendant No. 2) a party to his appeal, but the relief prayed for in each appeal was that the original decree might be set aside so far as it was in plaintiff's favour and against each appellant. Having regard to the relief claimed, there was no reason to hold that the appellant (defendant No. 2) was a necessary party to the appeal preferred by defendant No. 3. *GOPALA v. SAMINATHAYAN*. **I. L. R. 12 Mad. 255**

**93.** ———— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 559—Joinder of respondents on appeal.* In 1877 the plaintiff executed a deed of hypothecation to one of two partners to secure a loan obtained from them jointly. In 1881 the plaintiff sold, *inter alia*, the hypothecated property to defendants 2 to 4



**PARTIES—contd.****3. ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.****(f) RESPONDENTS—contd.**

and it was arranged that the secured debt should be paid off by the vendees. They failed to do this, but in 1882 they executed a mortgage for the amount due in favour of the other of the two partners, and he thereupon gave a written discharge to the plaintiff, who was found to have been acting in collusion with him to the disadvantage of his partner, the holder of the hypothecation-bond. The latter brought a suit in 1885 upon the hypothecation-bond, and obtained a personal decree against the present plaintiff, who did not appear and defend this suit, the amount of the decree being declared to be charged on the land in the possession of defendants 2 to 4. Meanwhile defendant 1, who was the assignee of the mortgage of 1832, had obtained a decree upon it against defendant 4. This decree not having been executed, he subsequently sued upon the mortgage again, and obtained a decree against defendants 2 to 4. The plaintiff now sued to have the last-mentioned decree set aside and recover the balance of the purchase-money from defendants 2 to 4. The Court of first instance passed a decree for the amount claimed, and declared it to be charged on the land. Defendant 1 preferred an appeal in which defendants 2 to 4 were joined by the Court of First Appeal which dismissed the suit. *Held*, that defendants 2 to 4 were rightly joined as respondents by the Court under the Civil Procedure Code, s. 559. **KANAGAPPA v. SOKKALINGA** . . . **I. L. R. 15 Mad. 362**

**94.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 559—Power of the Appellate Court to add parties as respondents—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), s. 559.* In a suit for contribution by the plaintiffs against the defendants, the Court of first instance gave the plaintiffs a decree against one defendant and exonerated the others. On an appeal by the defendant against whom the decree was passed, the Appellate Court directed the defendants exonerated by the first Court to be added as respondents, set aside the decree against the appealing defendant, and passed a decree against the defendants who were added as respondents, as representatives of one *S*, and ordered the amount so decreed to be recovered from the estate of her (*S's*) husband. On appeal to the High Court by the defendants, who were thus made liable, on the ground that they were wrongly made parties and no decrees could be passed against them:—*Held*, that there was nothing wrong in the course adopted by the lower Appellate Court, and by s. 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure the defendants, were rightly made parties. **Atma Ram v. Balkishen**, **I. L. R. 5 All. 266**, dissented from. **UPENDRA LAL MUKHERJEE v. GIRINDRA NATH MUKERJEE** . . . **I. L. R. 25 Cal. 565**  
**2 C. W. N. 425**

**95.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 559—Power of Appellate Court to add respondent—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 22.* The power of an Appellate Court to make a person a respondent, under s. 559 of the Civil Procedure

**PARTIES—contd.****3. ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—contd.****(f) RESPONDENTS—contd.**

Code, is not affected by the Limitation Act (XV of 1877). In exercising its powers under s. 559 of the Civil Procedure Code, an Appellate Court is competent to make a person a respondent who, in the original suit, was arrayed on the same side with the appellant. **SOHNA v. KHALAK SINGH**

**I. L. R. 13 All. 78**

**96.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 559—Power of Court to add respondent—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 22.* *Held*, by the Full Bench, that it is competent to a Court sitting under s. 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure to add a person as respondent in an appeal, though the time within which an appeal might have been preferred as against such person has expired. **BINDESHRI NAIK v. GANGA SARAN SAHU** **I. L. R. 14 All. 154**

**97.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 559—Addition of a party in second appeal.* A Court cannot, in a second appeal, act under s. 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and add a party as a respondent unless such party was a party to the appeal below, and this notwithstanding that he was a party to the suit in the Court of first instance. **CHUNNI v. LALA RAM**.

**I. L. R. 16 All. 5**

**98.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 32, 559, and 587—Addition of parties on second appeal—Appellate Court, Power of.* The Court on second appeal is competent to bring on the record persons who had been originally joined in the suit, but were not joined in the lower Appellate Court. **Chunni v. Lala Ram**, **I. L. R. 16 All. 5**, dissented from. **PAYA MATATHIL APPU v. KOVAMEL AMINA** . . . **I. L. R. 19 Mad. 151**

**99.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 372, 582—Attaching creditor of decree-holder seeking to be brought on to the record as a respondent.* *Held*, that a creditor of a decree-holder who had attached the decree pending an appeal against it was not entitled to be made a party respondent to the appeal under ss. 372 and 582 of the Code of Civil Procedure. **CHAIL BEHARI LAL v. RAKHMAL DAS** **I. L. R. 20 All. 38**

**100.** ————— *Power of the Appellate Court to add parties as respondents—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), s. 559.* *C*, owner of a factory, executed a hundi in favour of *B*, and purchased land from *B* from the proceeds thereof. *C* then sold his factory to *H*, who obtained possession of the land. In a suit brought by *B* upon the hundi, *C* and *H* were made defendants, but *C* did not appear in the first instance, and an *ex parte* decree was passed against him alone. *C* appealed against *B* without making *H* a party respondent to his appeal. The lower Appellate Court passed an order adding *H* as a respondent, and eventually passed a decree against *H*. On second appeal by *H* to the High Court:—*Held*, referring to s. 559 of the Civil Procedure Code (1882), that the lower Appellate Court was right in adding



**PARTIES—contd.****3. ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—concl'd.****(f) RESPONDENTS—concl'd.**

*H* as a party respondent to the appeal. *Atma Ram v. Balkishen*, I. L. R. 5 All. 266, dissented from. *Upendra Lal Mukerjee v. Girindra Nath Mukerjee*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 565, and *Manickya Moyee v. Baroda Prosad Mookerjee*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 355, referred to. **HUDSON v. BASDEO BAJPYE**  
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 109  
3 C. W. N. 76

**101.** *Persons interested in the result of the appeal—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 559.* In a suit for possession of land the Court of first instance decreed the plaintiff's suit in part against the defendants. Some of the defendants appealed to the High Court without making the other defendants party-respondents. The plaintiffs preferred a cross-objection under s. 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The non-appealing defendants were added as respondents by an order of the High Court to the effect that they might be made parties without prejudice to any objection that might be urged on their behalf at the hearing of the appeal. The non-appealing defendants at the hearing of the appeal contended that they were wrongly made parties. *Held*, that the non-appealing defendants were persons who were interested in the result of the appeal, within the meaning of s. 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that therefore they were rightly made parties. **BISHUN CHURN ROY CHOWDHRY v. JOGENDRA NATH ROY**  
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 114

**102.** *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) ss. 88, 89—Decree for sale—Decree assigned before the passing of an order absolute—Appeal—Assignee not made a party to appeal until after expiry of limitation—Civil Procedure Code, s. 372—Lis pendens.* A decree under s. 88 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, being only a decree *nisi* and not a final decree, the suit in which such a decree is passed does not terminate until an order absolute is made under s. 89. Where, therefore, such a decree is assigned before any order absolute is made, the assignee takes subject to all the liabilities resulting from the application of the doctrine of *lis pendens*. Such an assignee, for example, may properly be made a party, under s. 372 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to an appeal from the decree preferred against his assignors, and it is not competent to him to raise any defence, such as a plea of limitation, to the appeal which could not be raised by his assignors. **CHUNNI LAL v. ABDUL ALI KHAN** (1901) I. L. R. 23 All. 331

**4. STRIKING OFF PARTIES.****(a) DEFENDANTS.**

*Removal of name of defendant from record—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 32.* An order striking the name of a defendant off the record of a suit cannot be made under s. 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure at a period subsequent to the first hearing of the suit. **ABBASI BEGAM v. IMDADI JAN**  
I. L. R. 18 All. 53

**PARTIES—con'd.****5. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES.****(a) GENERALLY.**

**1.** *Substitution of parties in execution proceedings after appeal—Representatives of judgment-debtor—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 361 to 372.* The Civil Procedure Code does not contemplate the representatives of the judgment-debtor being placed on the record after the appellate decree has been passed. There is no express provision for it in the sections relating to execution. Ss. 361 to 372 relate to changes during suit, and speak only of "plaintiffs" and "defendants"—terms which seem to show that they were only intended to apply to proceedings up to final determination by the appellate decree and not to proceedings in execution between the judgment-creditor and judgment-debtor. **HIRACHAND HARJIVANDAS v. KASTURCHAND KASIDAS.**

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 224

**2.** *"Legal representative"—Civil Procedure Code, s. 365—Abatement of suit or appeal.* The words "the legal representative" in s. 365 of the Code of Civil Procedure must, where there are more than one legal representative, be read in the plural. Where only one has been added as a party, the suit or appeal would abate. In the case of an appeal, either all the representatives of the deceased appellant should have been brought upon the record as appellants, or if any had refused to be joined as appellants, they should have been brought on as respondents. **GHAMANDI LAL v. AMIR BEGAM.**

I. L. R. 16 All. 211

**3.** *Power of Court to substitute parties—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 73.* A court has no power under s. 73, Act VIII of 1859, to substitute one party for another, by striking one off and putting another on the record. **BAL GOBIND TEWAREE v. HUREENATH PERSHAD SAHOO.**

16 W. R. 183

*See JUDOOPTTE CHATTERJEE v. CHUNDER KANT BHUTTACHARJEE* . 9 W. R. 309

**(b) PLAINTIFFS.**

**4.** *Purchaser of plaintiff's interest.* The Court has no power to allow the purchaser of the rights of the plaintiff in a suit to be substituted for him on the record. **JUDOOPTTE CHATTERJEE v. CHUNDER KANT BHUTTACHARJEE**  
9 W. R. 309

**SAHEB ROY v. CHOONEE SINGH** . 9 W. R. 487

**BEER CHUNDER ROY v. TUMEEZOODEEN.**

12 W. R. 87

*See BAL GOBIND TEWAREE v. HUREENATH PERSHAD SAHOO* . 16 W. R. 183

**5.** *Substitution of plaintiff—Assignee of plaintiff—Waiver of objection—Ground of special appeal.* It is not correct to substitute the assignee of the original plaintiff as the plaintiff on the record, the proper course being to add him as a party plaintiff if he desires it. Where, however, the substitution is made before judgment in the first



**PARTIES—contd.****5. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—contd.****(b) PLAINTIFFS—contd.**

Court, and is not objected to, and there is no allegation that any party had been prejudiced thereby, the error will not be considered in special appeal. *Judooputtee Chatterjee v. Chunder Kant Bhattacharjee*, 9 W. R. 309; *Saheb Roy v. Choonee Singh*, 9 W. R. 487, considered and explained. *SHUSHEE BHOOSUN v. MUDDON MOHUN CHATTOPADHYA*.

2 C. L. R. 297

**6.** ————— *Consent of parties—Irregularity—Death of plaintiff.* During the pendency of a suit brought by a Hindu widow to recover possession of her husband's estate, the widow died, and two claimants (first a female on the strength of a will executed by the widow, and afterwards the heir of the deceased husband) were made co-plaintiffs. *Held*, that, although it was not strictly regular or usual to allow the two claimants to come upon the record as co-plaintiffs, the irregularity had been cured by the consent of the parties, it being for their advantage that the trial should proceed, and that the co-plaintiffs should be left in possession of any decision which they might obtain against the defendants, and allowed to settle the question arising between themselves in other proceedings. *PARBUTTY v. HIGGIN* 17 W. R. 475

S.C. PARBATTI v. BHIKUN . 8 B. L. R. Ap. 98

**7.** ————— *Making defendants plaintiffs after suit by them would be barred—Limitation—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 32—Suit to set aside sale.* A mitta held by tenants in common was sold for arrears of revenue at a time when the owners of a moiety thereof were minors. In a suit brought by the mother of these minors on their behalf against the Collector to set aside the sale, the plaintiffs impleaded also the other previous owners, of whom one was the purchaser at the sale. Two others, in their written statement, pleaded that the purchase had been made in fraud of their rights, and claimed to be still entitled to their shares in the mitta on the ground that the purchaser must be held to have purchased for their benefit (Indian Trusts Act, 1882, s. 90). They further claimed that, should the sale be set aside so far as the plaintiff's interests were concerned, the sale of their interests also should be held to be null and void. Before the suit came on for hearing, the District Judge *suo motu* ordered that these two defendants should be made plaintiffs in the suit under s. 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure. At the date when this order was made, the claim of these defendants, had they sued to set aside the sale in their own interest, was barred by limitation. *Held*, that the order was illegal. *KRISHNA v. MEKAMPURUMA*. *KRISHNA v. COLLECTOR OF SALEM*.

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 44

**8.** ————— *Death of plaintiff after judgment.* When a person desires to be added as representative upon the death of a plaintiff after judgment, he must satisfy the Court that he is the proper person to be so added. *MUHAMMAD HUSAIN v. KHUSHALO* . I. L. R. 9 All. 131

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**9.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 365, 367—Procedure when rival parties claim to be the representatives of deceased plaintiff—Rival claimants—Appeal—Appeal by one plaintiff against another.* Pending a suit for redemption, one of the plaintiffs died. Thereupon A, claiming as the adopted son, and B, as the daughter of the deceased, made separate applications under s. 355 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882) to be placed on the record. The Subordinate Judge ordered both claimants to be entered on the record as legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff, and proceeded with the suit. At the hearing he found that A's adoption was proved, and that B was not the legal heir of the deceased. He therefore passed a decree for redemption in A's favour. Against this decree B appealed, making A alone the respondent in the appeal. The Appellate Court held that B, and not A, was the heir of the deceased. It therefore passed a decree in B's favour and against A. On second appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, that the Subordinate Judge could not, under s. 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure, admit on the record both the rival claimants as legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff, or adjudicate by his decree between their rival claims. *Held*, also, that the Appellate Court ought not to have allowed one plaintiff to appeal against the other, or to have decided the rights of different plaintiffs *inter se*. *VITHU v. BHIMA*.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 145

**10.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 365 and 367—Representation of a deceased plaintiff.* S. 355 of the Code of Civil Procedure presupposes that the party claiming to represent a deceased plaintiff is his legal representative, but, if the representative character is denied, or when two or more persons claim it, the procedure prescribed by s. 377 of the Code should be followed. *OULA v. BEEPATHEE* . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 209

**11.** ————— *Dekkan Agriculturists' Act (XVII of 1879), ss. 49 and 74—Conciliation agreement forwarded to be filed in Court—Death of plaintiff—Substitution by the conciliator of the name of the deceased's heir on the return of the agreement by the Subordinate Judge—Practice.* A plaintiff applied to a conciliator appointed under the Dekkan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879) for an amicable settlement of a dispute between himself and the defendant, and came to an agreement disposing of the matter which was duly forwarded to the Subordinate Judge to be filed in Court. On receipt of the agreement, the Subordinate Judge issued notices to the parties to show cause why the agreement should not be filed, and was, on the day of hearing, informed that the agreement could not be filed owing to plaintiff's death. The agreement was then returned to the conciliator, who entered therein the name of the deceased plaintiff's heir and forwarded it to the Subordinate



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Judge. A question having thereupon arisen as to whether the conciliator could enter on the record the name of the heir of the deceased plaintiff:—*Held*, that, although there is no provision in the Dekkan Agriculturists' Relief Act empowering a conciliator to enter the name of the heir of a party, and Government have not apparently under s. 49 (a) of the Act made any rules regulating the procedure before conciliators in this respect, yet when a Subordinate Judge is seized of a conciliation agreement, there is a proceeding before him under the Act. He should therefore, under s. 74 of the Act, follow the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) in regard to placing on the record the heirs of the deceased parties. *NARAYANDAS SAKHARAM v. KONDI* . . . **I. L. R. 19 Bom. 202**

**12.** . . . *Representatives of deceased widow—Civil Procedure Code 1882, s. 365—“Legal representatives”—Reversionary heirs of husband.* On the death of a Hindu heiress, after institution of a suit to recover property belonging to her deceased husband, the reversionary heirs of the husband are her legal representatives to proceed with the suit within the meaning of s. 365 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Ramkishore Chuckerbutty v. Kallykanto Chuckerbutty* **I. L. R. 6 Calc. 479**, applied. *Katama Natchiar v. The Rajah of Shivagunga*, 9 *Moo. I. A.* 539, and *Hari Nath Chatterjee v. Mothurmohun Goswami*, **I. L. R. 21 Calc. 8**, referred to. **PREMMOYI CHOUDHRANI v. PREONATH DHUR** **I. L. R. 23 Calc. 636**

**13.** . . . *Legal representative of Hindu widow—Civil Procedure Code, s. 365—Reversioner.* A reversioner succeeding to the estate of a deceased person after the death of the widow of that person would be bound by a decree obtained against the widow, provided that there was a fair trial of the suit in which the decree was passed. Consequently the widow's right to sue survives to, and devolves on, the heir of her husband entitled to the estate, and such heir, and not her personal heirs, should be held to be her legal representative for the purposes of s. 365 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Katama Natchiar v. The Rajah of Shivagunga*, 9 *Moo. I. A.* 539; *Hari Nath Chatterjee v. Mothurmohun Goswami*, **I. L. R. 21 Calc. 8**, and *Premmoyi Choudhrani v. Preonath Dhur*, **I. L. R. 23 Calc. 636**, referred to. **TRIBHUVAN SUNDAR KUAR v. SRI NARAIN SINGH.** **I. L. R. 20 All. 341**

**14.** . . . *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 372—Application for revival of suit—Limitation—Application in a pending suit.* In a suit for a declaration of the rights of the parties and for partition a preliminary decree was made on the 12th July 1887, declaring the rights of the parties and directing partition. Since then no steps had been taken to carry out the decree. The plaintiff, the father of the petitioners,

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died in December 1891, leaving the petitioners, who now applied to have the suit revived in their name. One defendant opposed the application on the ground that it was barred by limitation under s. 372, Civil Procedure Code. He also alleged that he was an infant at the time the suit was instituted, and was not aware of any of the proceedings till notice of this application. *Held*, that the application was made in a pending suit, and, though falling within s. 372, Civil Procedure Code, was not time-barred, the right to apply being one which accrues from day to day. *Kedar Nath Dutt v. Harra Chand Dutt*, **I. L. R. 8 Calc. 420**, and *Baroda Kant Mitter v. Aghore Nath Neogy* (unreported). Suit No. 265 of 1882. (SALE, J.)—That the question as to whether the defendant was aware of the proceedings could not be considered at that stage of the case. **RAM NATH BHATTACHERJEE v. UMA CHARAN SIRCAR.**

**3 C. W. N. 756**

**15.** . . . *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 372, 588 (21)—Devolution of interest pending suit—Chota Nagpore Incumbered Estates Act (VI of 1876), s. 16—Manager of incumbered estate—Owner—Appeal from order disallowing objections to substitution—Reports of cases.* The words “devolution of interest,” in s. 372 of the Civil Procedure Code, do not mean only devolution by death, but are applicable to a case in which, pending a suit instituted by the Manager of a Chota Nagpore incumbered estate, the estate is released from management and restored to the owners. It is open in such a case to persons, alleging themselves to be owners of the estate, to apply to be made plaintiffs in the place of the Manager, under s. 372 of the Civil Procedure Code. On an application for substitution made under s. 372 of the Civil Procedure Code, it was objected that the application could not be granted, but the Court overruled the objection and ordered the substitution applied for. *Held*, that the order for substitution was practically the same as an order disallowing objections, and that there was nothing in the terms of s. 588, cl. (21), of the Civil Procedure Code to prevent an appeal from that order. **SOURINDRA MOHUN TAGORE v. SIROMONI DEBI** (1900).

**I. L. R. 28 Calc. 171 : s.c. 5 C. W. N. 307**

**16.** . . . *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 335, 367, 588, cl. (18), and 591—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 175 A—Suit to recover possession—Death of the plaintiff pending suit—Legal representative—Private Practice—Procedure.* On the 30th November, 1897, Mahadev Narayan sued to recover certain property from the defendants. He died on the 27th February, 1899, and his niece Balabai (his sister's daughter) applied to be put on the record as his heir and legal representative. It did not appear that the defendants had notice or knowledge of her application, and on the 5th June, 1899, her name

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was placed on the record, under s. 365 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). In July, 1899, Balabai applied to be allowed to prosecute the suit as a pauper. The defendants opposed this, but took no objection to her right to appear as Mahadev's representative. In August, 1899, the first defendant filed his written statement, in which for the first time he raised the question as to Balabai's right to represent the deceased plaintiff Mahadev. The case subsequently came on for hearing, and issues were raised on the pleadings, the first issue being whether Balabai was Mahadev's legal representative. Evidence was taken on all the issues, and the Court found all of them in Balabai's favour, and passed a decree accordingly. The defendant appealed, and the Appellate Court, being of opinion that other issues were unnecessary until the issue as to Balabai's right to represent Mahadev was decided, raised only one issue upon that point. It found that Balabai was not the nearest heir and legal representative of the deceased plaintiff Mahadev, and thereupon it reversed the lower Court's decree and dismissed the suit. On second appeal: *Held* by CHANDAVARKAR and BATTY, JJ. (ASTON, J., dissenting), reversing the decree and remanding the case for a decision on the merits, that the lower Appellate Court was wrong in going into the question as to Balabai's right to represent the deceased plaintiff Mahadev, and in dismissing the suit on finding that she had no such right. *Per* CHANDAVARKAR, J.—The Subordinate Judge acted rightly under s. 355 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) in placing Balabai on the record. It was doubtful whether he could afterwards re-open the question and consider it at the hearing under s. 377. But, assuming that he could, he decided it with the other issues. His decision on that point was an order appealable under cl. (18) of s. 588. But the defendant did not appeal against that order. He appealed against the whole decree, and in his appeal he objected to the order. Under s. 591, however, he could, in such case, only object to the order if it affected the decision of the case. It was not shown that the order made by the Subordinate Judge under s. 367 had affected the decision of the case. There is no provision in the Code that, if a person claiming as legal representative of a deceased plaintiff fails to prove that he holds that position, the suit must be dismissed. Inasmuch as the defendant had failed to show that the order under s. 377 had affected the decision, the lower Appellate Court ought not to have reversed the decree of the Court of first instance, *BALABAI v. GANESH SHANKAR PANDIT* (1912). . . . **I. L. R. 27 Bom. 162**

**17.** ——— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 375—Application to be brought on record in place of deceased plaintiff—Order—Continuance of suit—Objection by defendant at late stage of case—Procedure.* L instituted a suit

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to recover a debt, and died while the suit was pending, leaving no issue. Within two and-a-half months of his decease, his widow applied, under s. 355 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff, to have her name entered on the record in his place. She was brought on the record accordingly, and adjournments took place, and during several weeks thereafter the suit was partially heard. A defendant then, after a number of witnesses had been examined, presented a petition, purporting to be under ss. 365 and 367 of the Code, stating that it had become evident from the deposition of plaintiff's second witness that plaintiff's husband had left an undivided brother. The petitioner asked the Court to decide the question, under s. 367, as to who was the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff. The District Munsif heard the parties, and (without making an elaborate inquiry) held that the widow was the proper heir (and should produce a succession certificate before judgment should be delivered), but he also directed, in order to prevent future disputes, that the alleged undivided brother should be joined as a party. A petition signifying his consent to be so joined was filed by the last mentioned person. *Held*, that the order was right. Under s. 365 of the Code, the Court was bound to proceed with the suit after the name of the applicant had been entered on the record in place of the deceased. The right, if any, of the defendant, to object to the widow being added as legal representative in place of her deceased husband, arose on the death of the plaintiff, and the defendant was bound to have used all reasonable diligence in acquainting himself with the state of the family of the deceased, with a view to ascertaining whether his widow was entitled to prosecute the suit as his legal representative. Objection, if raised at all, should have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and failure to object then precluded the defendant from raising it, as he had done, at a late stage of the suit. *Oula v. Beepathee, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 209*, and *Subbayya v. Saminadayar, I. L. R. 18 Mad. 436*, distinguished. *MEE-NATCHI ACHI v. ANANTHANARAYANA AYYAR* (1902).

**I. L. R. 26 Mad. 224**

**18.** ——— *Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 22—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 437—Suit brought by executor—Beneficiaries, names of, subsequently substituted as plaintiffs.* Where a suit for recovery of possession was brought by an executor on the 14th September 1898, and the names of the beneficiaries who took possession of the estate during the pendency of the suit were substituted as plaintiffs on the 23rd November, 1900:—*Held*, that no new plaintiffs were substituted, within the meaning of s. 22 of the Limitation Act, and that the substitution of the names of the plaintiffs did not make a new suit. *JANHABI CHOWDHURANI v. BROJO MOHINI CHOWDHURANI* (1903). . . . **7 C. W. N. 817**



**PARTIES—contd.****5. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—contd.****(b) PLAINTIFFS—concl'd.**

**19.** ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 27—Court has power to order right persons to be substituted as plaintiffs even when original plaintiff had no right to sue.* Under s. 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure when a suit is instituted in the name of a wrong person as plaintiff by a *bonâ fide* mistake, the Court has power to substitute the names of right persons as plaintiffs and this power is not excluded in cases where the person originally suing has no right to institute the suit. *Chunder Coomar Roy v. Gocool Chunder Bhuttacharjee*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 370, referred to. *KRISHNA BOI v. THE COLLECTOR AND GOVERNMENT AGENT, TANJORE* (1907) . . . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 419

**20.** ———— *Parties, substitution of—Assignment—Assignee substituted after period of limitation—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 372—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 22.* In a suit brought within the period of limitation the name of the assignee of the original plaintiff was, after expiry of the period, substituted for that of the latter which was struck off the record. *Held*, that s. 22 of the Limitation Act was applicable and that if a person who has not been on the record is substituted as a plaintiff in the place of the original plaintiff under s. 372 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the person so substituted must be taken to be brought on the record subject to the law of limitation applicable to the case. That section does not exclude the operation of s. 22 of the Limitation Act and, except in the case of the legal representative of a deceased party, the person substituted as plaintiff must be regarded as a new plaintiff within the meaning of the latter section. *Harak Chand v. Deonath Sahay*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 409, approved. *Suput Singh v. Imrit Tewari*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 720, disapproved and distinguished. *ABDUL RAHMAN v. AMIR ALI* (1907) . . . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 612

**(c) DEFENDANTS.**

**21.** ———— *Substitution of defendant—Death of defendant.* As soon as it is shown that a defendant was dead at the time the plaint was filed the Court ought to refuse to proceed further in the suit, and to leave it to the plaintiff to begin *de novo* against the proper person. *SURNOMOYEE v. BYKUNT CHUNDER MUSTOFEE* . . . 25 W. R. 17

**22.** ———— *Death of defendant—Representative of deceased defendant.* Where the plaintiff in a suit prays that a person may be substituted on the record as the heir of a defendant who has died, the Judge should raise an issue as to whether the person sought to be substituted is the heir of the deceased defendant. *KANAI LALL KHAN v. SASHI BHUSAN BISWAS*.  
I. L. R. 6 Calc. 777  
8 C. L. R. 117

**23.** ———— *Procedure—Death of debtor after attachment and before sale—Repre-*

**PARTIES—contd.****5. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—contd.****(c) DEFENDANTS—contd.**

*sentatives not made parties—Sale illegal.* Where a judgment-debtor died after his land had been attached and the creditor brought the land to sale without making the representatives of the deceased parties to the proceedings:—*Held*, that the sale was illegal and must be set aside. *RAMASAMI AYYANGAR v. BAGIRATHI AMMAL*.  
I. L. R. 6 Mad. 180

**24.** ———— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 372, 647—Assignment after decree in Court of first instance—Assignee made party after appellate decree for purposes of execution.* S. 372 of the Civil Procedure Code cannot be applied to the assignment, creation, or devolution of an interest subsequent to the decree in a suit. The section has no application to proceedings in execution of decree; and a Court has no jurisdiction, reading s. 372 with s. 647, to bring in a party after decree and make him a judgment-debtor for the purposes of execution. *Gocool Chunder Gossamee v. Administrator-General of Bengal*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 723, and *Attorney-General v. Corporation of Birmingham*, L. R. 15 Ch. D. 423, referred to. Where a Court had so acted, by an order which might have been, but was not, made the subject of appeal under s. 588 of the Code:—*Held*, that, as there was no jurisdiction to make such an order, the party aggrieved was competent to object thereto on appeal from a subsequent order enforcing execution against him as a judgment-debtor. *GOODALL v. MUSSOORIE BANK* . . . I. L. R. 10 All. 97

**25.** ———— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 234, 332, 588—Death of judgment-debtor between order for possession in execution of decree and delivery of possession—Appeal against appellate order reversing an order under s. 332.* A decree-holder in a District Munsif's Court obtained an order for possession of land in execution of his decree on 20th August, on which day the judgment-debtor died. Possession was delivered on 28th August. The persons possessed presented a petition under s. 332 of the Code of Civil Procedure disputing his right to be put into possession, on the ground, *inter alia*, that the judgment-debtor was not represented on the record. On appeal against the appellate order of the District Judge:—*Held*, assuming that the order for possession was made prior to the death of the judgment-debtor, that there was no necessity for the decree-holder to bring any other person on to the record between the date of that order and the date on which the order was executed. *Ramasami v. Bagirathi*, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 180, distinguished. *BIYYAKKA v. FAKIRA*.  
I. L. R. 12 Mad. 211

**26.** ———— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 234, 368—Sale in execution of decree—Death of judgment-debtor after attachment and before sale—Representatives not joined.* A decree-holder attached land of the judgment-debtor in execution of his decree and a sale-proclamation was made;



**PARTIES—contd.****5. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—contd.****(c) DEFENDANTS—contd.**

the judgment-debtor died, and his legal representatives were not brought on to the record, but the execution proceeded to sale. *Held*, that the representatives should have been substituted as parties on the record, and, this not having been done, the sale should be set aside. *Ramasami Ayyangar v. Bagirathi Ammal*, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 180, followed. *KRISHNAYYA v. UNNISSA BEGAM*.

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 399

GROVES v. ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF MADRAS.

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 119

(Contra) SHEO PRASAD v. HIRA LAL.

I. L. R. 12 All. 440

27. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 368—Bringing one out of several legal representatives of a defendant on record—Effect of decree on the estate—Income Tax Act (II of 1886)—Sale of property for arrears of tax—Lis pendens—Purchase at sale for arrears of income-tax—Subsequent sale in execution of prior mortgage decree—Duty of purchaser at revenue sale to pay amount due under mortgage and prevent sale in execution.* Plaintiff, as the assignee of a mortgage executed by the father of first defendant, sued the mortgagor, in 1894, on the mortgage. During the pendency of the suit, and before the decree in it was passed, the mortgagor died. Plaintiff thereupon brought the first defendant on the record, as legal representative, under s. 368 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In December, 1894, a decree for sale was passed, which was never impeached as being fraudulent or collusive. As a fact, first defendant was not the sole legal representative of the mortgagor, who left two other sons and three daughters. The second son was, at a date subsequent to the decree, assessed to pay income-tax, for arrears of which the mortgaged property was sold (under the Revenue Recovery Act) and purchased by second defendant in 1896. In 1897 the mortgaged property was sold in execution of the decree in plaintiff's suit on the mortgage, and plaintiff became the purchaser, the sale being confirmed soon after, and plaintiff obtaining a sale certificate which purported to convey the whole of the mortgaged property to him, and obtaining delivery of the property, under s. 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in 1898. Plaintiff was subsequently dispossessed by defendants Nos. 2 to 5, and brought the present suit to recover possession of the property. *Held*, that the sale of the property for arrears of income-tax affected only the share of the second son, and not the shares of the other co-heirs; and that, in consequence, the whole of the mortgaged property had not passed to the second defendant under that sale. *Held*, also, that the second defendant, by his purchase, had acquired only the equity of redemption in respect of the second son's share in the mortgaged property. The effect of s. 30 of the Income Tax Act is not to convert income-tax into an arrear of land-revenue, due in respect of the land

**PARTIES—contd.****5. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—contd.****(c) DEFENDANTS—concl'd.**

which may be brought to sale for the realization of the income-tax, but merely to extend the procedure prescribed by the Revenue Recovery Act to the recovery of arrears of income-tax. *Held*, further, that the share of the second son was bound by the decree in the mortgage suit, notwithstanding that the second son was not joined in that suit as one of the legal representatives of the deceased mortgagor. Where a defendant in a suit dies, and the plaintiff, under s. 368 of the Code of Civil Procedure, brings a person on the record, whom he alleges to be the legal representative of the deceased defendant, such person sufficiently represents the estate of the deceased for the purposes of the suit, and, in the absence of fraud or collusion, the decree passed in the suit will bind the estate. *Held*, lastly, that the sale in execution of plaintiff's decree subsequently to the second defendant's purchase in the revenue sale extinguished second defendant's equity of redemption. *KADIR MOHIDEEN MARAKKAYAR v. MUTHUKRISHNA* (1902) . . . . . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 230

28. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 368 and 32—Application for substitution to deceased defendant—Substitution of heirs under s. 368—Will of deceased defendant—Probate—Substitution of executors in place of heirs—S. 32—Bonâ fides—Limitation.* Where an applicant obtained substitution of names of the heirs of a deceased defendant, under s. 368, Civil Procedure Code, through want of sufficient information that probate of the will of the said deceased had been granted, and subsequently applied, more than six months after the death, to have the names of the said heirs struck out and those of the executors substituted: *Held*, that the application was one under s. 32, Civil Procedure Code, and that, even under s. 368, Civil Procedure Code, it was not barred, as the applicant had throughout had a *bonâ fide* desire to effect substitution of the proper legal representatives, and had shown sufficient cause for delay. *HOSSEIN ALI v. ABDUR RAHIM* (1903) . . . . . 7 C. W. N. 529

**(d) APPELLANTS.**

29. ————— *Substitution of appellant—Right of lessor after lease has expired to represent lessee.* A lessor cannot, after the expiration of the lessee's lease, appeal from the dismissal of the lessee's suit concerning a boundary dispute. *COMMISSIONER OF THE SOONDERBUNDS v. CHUNDER COOMAR GHOSE* . . . . . 3 W. R. 175

"Plaintiff" was held to include an appellant in *RAJMONEE DABEE v. CHUNDER KANT SANDEL* . . . . . I. L. R. 8 Calc. 440 : 10 C. L. R. 437

30. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 365, 366, and 582—Administrator appointed under Bom. Reg. VIII of 1827, s. 10—Act XIX of 1841, s. 9—Administrator-General's Act (II of 1874), s. 18—Death of appellant—Abate-*



**PARTIES—contd.****5. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—contd.****(d) APPELLANTS—contd.**

*ment of appeal.* An administrator appointed under s. 10 of Bombay Regulation VIII of 1827 does not by such appointment become the legal representative of the deceased, or entitled to continue an appeal filed by him. *MALAPA SIDAPU DESAI v. DEVI NAIK* . . . **I. L. R. 21 Bom. 102**

**31.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code 1882, s. 365—Legal representative—Executor—Death of appellant.* A tarwad in Malabar subject to Marumakkatayam law was reduced in number to two persons, viz., the karnavan and his younger brother, the plaintiff. They quarrelled, and the former without the consent of the latter adopted as members of the tarwad his son and daughter and her children. On his death the plaintiff sued for possession of the tarwad property and for a declaration that the adoptions were invalid. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief asked for. After an appeal was presented by plaintiff, who had obtained a decree for possession but no other relief, he died leaving a will making certain dispositions of the property to which he was solely entitled on the assumption that the adoptions in question were invalid, and his executor was admitted as his legal representative for prosecuting the appeal. *PAY-YATH NANU MENON v. THIRUTHIPALLI RAMAN MENON* . . . **I. L. R. 20 Mad. 51**

**32.** ————— *Substitution of beneficiaries for trustees—Decree for possession with directions for mutual conveyances, effect of—Appeal filed in the name of a wrong person—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 27—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 5.* From an order made in execution of a decree against certain trustees, the latter filed an appeal on the 18th April 1898. In the meantime, in a suit instituted by the beneficiaries against the trustees, a decree had been passed on the 5th April 1898, declaring that the beneficiaries were entitled to possession of the trust estate from the 13th April and directing the trustees to make over possession to them. This decree further directed that proper conveyances should be executed by the trustees when required. On the 5th July 1898, the beneficiaries applied for substitution of their names in the place of the trustees in the appeal filed on the 18th April. *Held*, that, though the trustees were directed to execute proper conveyances when required, yet, having regard to the direction as to delivery of possession, the decree of the 5th April must be taken to have divested the property out of the trustees and vested it in the beneficiaries. The trustees therefore had not any estate left in them on the 18th April sufficient to justify their being appellants. That the beneficiaries can only be substituted in place of the trustees if they can bring the case within s. 5 of the Limitation Act. S. 27 of the Civil Procedure Code does not apply to an appeal filed in the name of a wrong person. *DWARKA NATH BISWAS v. DEBENDRA NATH TAGORE* . . . **4 C. W. N. 58**

**PARTIES—contd.****5. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—contd.****(d) APPELLANTS—concl'd.**

**33.** ————— *Practice—Procedure—Appellant dead at the date of hearing of appeal—Legal representative placed on record and appeal re-heard—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 571, 365.* At the date of the hearing of an appeal the appellant was dead, but neither his pleader nor the Court were aware of the fact. The Court heard and decided the appeal. Subsequently, the deceased appellant's son applied that his name should be placed on the record, and that the appeal should be re-heard. The lower Appellate Court rejected this application. *Held*, that, under the circumstances, and having regard to s. 571 of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), the decree of the lower Appellate Court was a nullity, and that, as the legal representative of the appellant applied within the prescribed period to have his name entered on the record, the Court was bound, under s. 365 of the Civil Procedure Code, to enter his name. In not doing so, the lower Court had failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law. The High Court, therefore, under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), directed the applicant's name to be placed on the record and the appeal disposed of. *JANARDHAN KRISHNA PADHYE v. RAM-CHANDRA VITHAL RANADE* (1901).

**I. L. R. 26 Bom. 317****(e) RESPONDENTS.**

**34.** ————— *Substituting respondent—Discretion of Court to add parties as respondents.* A Judge has discretion in the matter of adding a fresh respondent to the record, the latter having been a party to the original suit. *SHOWDAMINEE DOSSEE v. RAM ROODRO GANGOOLY*.

**8 W. R. 367**

**35.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code 1882, ss. 3, 368, 52—Respondent, death of—Practice.* Having regard to s. 3 of Act XIV of 1882, it is clear that the word "Code" in Sch. II, Art. 171B, of Act XV of 1877 applies to the present Code of Civil Procedure, Act XIV of 1882; and that therefore the word "defendant" in s. 368 of that Code, when read with s. 582, must be held to include "respondent." *In the matter of the petition of SOSHI BHUSAN CHAND. SOSHI BHUSAN CHAND v. GRISH CHUNDER TALUKHDAR.*

**I. L. R. 11 Calc. 694**

**36.** ————— *Co-sharer of plaintiff in suit.* When a co-defendant (a co-sharer with the plaintiff in the property in dispute) was thought by the Judge to be a necessary party as respondent in the appeal:—*Held*, that the Judge should, under s. 73, Act VIII of 1859, and otherwise, have caused him to be made a respondent, instead of dismissing the appeal. *ACHUMBAH PAUREY v. RAMSAHOY PAUREY* . . . **W. R. 1864, 136**

**37.** ————— *Procedure in case of the death of respondent pending an appeal*



**PARTIES—contd.****5. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—contd.****(e) RESPONDENTS—contd.**

—*Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), ss. 368, 582.* Procedure analogous to that laid down in s. 368 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X) of 1877 in respect of the death of a defendant must be applied in the case of the death of a respondent. Where therefore a respondent dies during the pendency of an appeal, it is for the appellant to take the initiative, and he is at liberty to select one or more persons to defend the appeal; and no person other than the person so selected has a right to force himself into the proceedings and to claim to have his name entered as representative of the deceased respondent against the appellant's consent. Persons so introduced on the record may or may not be the real representatives of the deceased respondent; but the merits of their claim to be such, on the ground of any right or status, such as that of adoption, is immaterial to the determination of the appeal. *LAJSMIBAI v. BALKRISHNA.*

**I. L. R. 4 Bom. 654**

*See RAJMOONEE DABEE v. CHUNDER KANT SANDEL* **I. L. R. 8 Calc. 440 ; 10 C. L. R. 437**

**38.** ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 365, 368, and 582—Deceased sole respondent—Practice.* Under s. 388 of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), a plaintiff may have the representatives of a deceased sole defendant placed on the record so that he may continue his suit against them, but there is no section which allows the representatives of a sole defendant who has died to be placed on the record at their own request. Consequently s. 582 gives no authority to a Civil Court to place on the record at their own request the representatives of a deceased sole respondent. Such an application cannot be entertained. *BAI JAVER v. HATHISING.*

**I. L. R. 9 Bom. 56**

**39.** ——— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 32, 368—Death of respondent in appeal—Rival claims to represent deceased.* Although a Court is bound by s. 368 of the Code of Civil Procedure to place on the record the name of the person alleged by the appellant to be the legal representative of a deceased respondent, nevertheless, where a person, other than the person alleged by the appellant to be such representative, claims, on good *prima facie* grounds, to be the representative of the deceased respondent, and the interests of the person entitled to the estate of the deceased may be prejudiced, the Court should, under s. 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, proceed to make such claimant also a party to the appeal. *ATHIAPPA v. AYANNA*

**I. L. R. 8 Mad. 300**

**40.** ——— *Purchasers of share in property after decree.* On appeal to the High Court from the decree of the Court of first instance, the plaintiff appellant made respondents certain persons who, after the passing of that decree,

**PARTIES—contd.****5. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—contd.****(e) RESPONDENTS—contd.**

had purchased at execution sales the rights and interests of the plaintiff in portions of the landed estate of the family. *Held*, that such persons not being affected by that decree, the Court could not make any order respecting their claims, and they had been unnecessarily made parties to the appeal. *RADHA KISHEN MAN v. BACHAMAN* **I. L. R. 3 All. 118**

**41.** ——— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 368, 369, and 372—Death of a respondent pending appeal—Right of assignee of his interest to be substituted in his place.* At an auction-sale held in execution of a decree passed against one *G A*, certain property put up for sale was purchased by one *K M*, the husband of the opponent. Subsequently *K A*, the brother of *G A*, brought a suit against the opponent to establish his right to the property purchased by the opponent's husband. On the 17th February 1882, he obtained a decree declaring that he (*K A*) was entitled to a half share of the property in dispute, and an order was made that he should have joint possession with the opponent of one moiety of the property. On the termination of the above suit, which had been brought by *K A*, *in forma pauperis*, he was required to pay the Court fees. For that purpose he procured an advance of Rs 200 from the applicant on the security of the moiety of the property which was awarded to him by the decree. He passed a deed of sale to the applicant, on the understanding that the property should be reconveyed to him by the applicant on the repayment of the advance with interest. In the meantime cross appeals were filed against the above-mentioned decree passed in favour of *K A*, and at the hearing of the appeal the lower Appellate Court varied the decree of the Subordinate Judge, holding that *K A* was entitled to the possession of the property as sought for. From this decree the opponent preferred a second appeal to the High Court, which, at the time of this application, was still pending. Before the hearing of the appeal, *K A* died and the applicant thereupon applied to have his name placed on the record as respondent. *Held*, that the applicant was entitled to be made a party. The analogy of s. 368 is to be extended generally to appeals, and the party appealing may choose his own respondent as representative of deceased. The more specific rule prescribed in that section must prevail in the cases to which it is exactly applicable, over the more general rule in s. 372. But the rule in s. 368 may well be intended for the case in which the death, and death only, of the defendant constitutes the change of circumstances for which it was thought necessary to provide; but where there has been not only the death of the respondent but an alleged prior conveyance to him of the property awarded by the decree appealed against, there is a fact in addition to the fact contemplated by s. 368, and the rule in s. 372, being alone sufficiently inclusive, must apply. An appellant may determine—



PARTIES—*contd.*5. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—*contd.*(e) RESPONDENTS—*contd.*

who shall be respondent, but not that any particular person shall not be a respondent. The choice of respondents made by the appellant may be defective through ignorance or fraud, and the real representative of the decree-holder cannot justly be refused an opportunity of maintaining the decision which it is sought to upset. *RAJARAM BHAGVAT v. JIBAI* . . . . . **I. L. R. 9 Bom. 151**

**42.** ———— *Death of respondent—Representatives not added—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 104.* A suit having been dismissed, plaintiff appealed from the decision; and although the defendant's death was notified to the Court, and the plaintiff did not attempt, under s. 104, Code of Civil Procedure, to bring in the heirs of the deceased or have deceased in any way represented, the Court tried the appeal and passed a decree. *Held*, that the decision of the lower Appellate Court was incorrect in law. *MONEE LALL v. FUZUL HOSSEIN.* **14 W. R. 337**

*See ROOP NARAIN SINGH v. RAMAYEE SINGH* . . . . . **3 C. L. R. 192**

**43.** ———— *Death of respondent before decree on appeal passed against him—Decree passed in ignorance of death of party.* Where a suit, which had been decreed in the first Court, was dismissed on appeal after the death of the plaintiff, and the representatives of the latter had not aided in keeping the defendant ignorant of his death, the High Court met the difficulty, as to executing a decree against a dead man, by directing the lower Appellate Court to try the appeal *de novo*, making the dead man's representatives respondents. *SHAMA PUDDO MOITRO v. DINONATH BAGCHEE.* **25 W. R. 108**

**44.** ———— *Death of plaintiff-respondent during pendency of appeal—Application by defendant-appellant for substitution of deceased's legal representative—Application by third person claiming to be such representative and to be substituted as respondent—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 32, 365, 367, 368.* During the pendency of an appeal, the plaintiff-respondent died, and, on the application of the appellant, the name of *H* was entered on the record as respondent in place of the deceased. Subsequently *K* applied to be substituted as respondent, alleging that he and not *H* was the legal representative of the plaintiff. The Court passed an order making *K* a joint respondent with *H*. To this *H* objected, but he did not appeal from the order. Ultimately the Court dismissed the appeal, and passed a decree that the money claimed in the suit was payable to the two respondents. *Held*, that s. 32 of the Civil Procedure Code did not apply to the case so as to authorize the Court below to add *K* as a respondent; that the only other section under which he might possibly have been brought in was s. 365; that even assuming s. 365 to apply to such a case, the Court had no power to make *K* a respondent jointly with *H*,

PARTIES—*contd.*5. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—*contd.*(e) RESPONDENTS—*contd.*

but should have taken one or the other of the courses specified in s. 367, so as to determine who was the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff; and that the course adopted by the Court was an exceedingly inconvenient one, which ought not to have been taken, even if the Court had power under the Code to take it. The "questions involved in the suit," referred to in the second paragraph of s. 32 of the Civil Procedure Code, are questions between the plaintiff and the defendant, and not questions which may arise between co-defendants or co-plaintiffs *inter se*. The section does not apply to questions which are not involved in the suit, but crop up incidentally during the pendency of an appeal, such as the question whether one person or another is the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff-respondent. *HAR NARAIN SINGH v. KHARAG SINGH* . . . . . **I. L. R. 9 All. 447**

**45.** ———— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 365, 366, 367, 368, 582, 587—Death of plaintiff-respondent pending appeal—Substitution of alleged legal representative on her own application—Application by defendants-appellants to substitute another person as true legal representative—Power of Court to determine which of such persons is the true legal representative.* In a suit for declaration of title to, and for possession of, a share in alleged ancestral property, with mesne profits, the plaintiff obtained a decree in the lower Appellate Court from which the defendants appealed to the High Court. Pending the appeal, the plaintiff died childless, and, on her application, his widow was substituted for him as respondent. Subsequently the defendants-appellants applied to the High Court to have the deceased's father brought upon the record as respondent alleging that he, and not the widow, was the deceased's legal representative and solely entitled to be placed on the record as such. The father made no objection to the proposed substitution. It was common ground that either the father alone or the widow alone was the deceased plaintiff-respondent's true legal representative. *Held*, by the Full Bench (*MAHOMED, J.*, dissenting), that, having regard to the words, "as nearly as may be" and "as far as may be" in s. 582 of the Civil Procedure Code, ss. 365, 366, and 367 might be applied, at all events analogically, to the case, so as to enable the real legal representative of the deceased plaintiff-respondent to be ascertained and brought upon the record; that the latter portion of s. 582 did not limit the earlier words of the section so as to make s. 368 the only provision applicable to the case; that a Court of record must have an inherent power to ascertain whether or not it has before it the proper parties to an appeal if the question be substantially raised; and that therefore the Court could and should, either before or at the hearing of the appeal, ascertain and determine, for the purposes of the prosecution of the appeal, the preliminary question whether the father or the widow was the legal representative of the deceased,



**PARTIES—contd.****5. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—contd.****(e) RESPONDENTS—contd.**

and should act accordingly. *Held*, also, by the Full Bench (MAHMOOD, J., dissenting), that s. 32 of the Code did not apply to the case, and that, if it did apply, it would be the duty of the Court to decide whether the father or the widow was the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff-respondent. *Held*, by MAHMOOD, J. (*contra*), that the effect of s. 582 read with s. 587 was to place the defendants-appellants in the position of plaintiffs and the deceased respondent in that of a defendant for the purposes of array of parties; that consequently the provisions of ss. 363, 364, 365, 366, and 367 had no application; that, applying s. 368, the Court was bound to implead the person named by the defendants-appellants as a respondent to the appeal; that, applying s. 32, the widow occupied a position which gave her a sufficient *prima facie* status to be impleaded as respondent; and that, as there existed no authority in the Court allowing the Court to hold an enquiry whether the father or the widow was the true legal representative of the deceased plaintiff-respondent, the Court should bring both upon the record as respondents and proceed to decide the appeal after hearing both. *Narain Dass v. Lajja Ram*, I. L. R. 7 All. 693; *Har Narain Singh v. Kharag Singh*, I. L. R. 9 All. 447; *Lukshmibai v. Bal Krishna*, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 654; *Rajmonee Dabee v. Chunder Kant Sandel*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 440; *Naraini Kuar v. Durjan Kuar*, I. L. R. 2 All. 738; and *Athappa v. Ayanna*, I. L. R. 8 Mad. 300, referred to. MUHAMMAD HUSAIN v. KHUSHALO.

I. L. R. 10 All. 223

46. ————— *Civil Procedure Code*, ss. 368, 582—*Appeal—Abatement—Death of plaintiff-respondent—Application by defendants-appellants for substitution—Application presented after the 1st July 1888—Limitation—Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act (VII of 1888)*, ss. 53, 66—*Limitation Act (XV of 1877)*, Sch. II, Art. 175C. The plaintiff-respondent in an appeal pending before the High Court died on the 17th September 1885. Subsequently *D* applied to the High Court to be brought on the record as legal representative of the deceased; on the 15th April 1886 he was referred to a regular suit to establish his title as such representative, and on the 25th February 1887 such suit was dismissed. On the 8th February 1886 the defendants-appellants applied to the High Court for judgment; but the application was dismissed under the decision of the Full Bench in *Chajmal Dass v. Jagdamba Prasad*, I. L. R. 10 All. 260. On 24th July 1888 they applied to the High Court to bring certain persons upon the record as the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff-respondent. *Held*, that the application, having been made subsequent to the 1st July 1888, when the Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act (VII of 1888) came into force, and being an entirely fresh application not in continuation of any former proceedings between the same parties, must be dealt

**PARTIES—contd.****5. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—contd.****(e) RESPONDENTS—contd.**

with under that Act, and not under the Civil Procedure Code as it stood before the amendment, and that, as it was made more than six months after the death of the deceased plaintiff-respondent, the appeal abated with reference to s. 368 of the Code and Art. 175C of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877). *Held*, also, that the petitioners had not shown "sufficient cause" within the meaning of s. 368 of the Code for not making the application within the prescribed period. *Ram Jiwan Mal v. Chand Mal*, I. L. R. 10 All. 587, referred to. CHAJMAL DAS v. JAGDAMBA PRASAD I. L. R. 11 All. 408

47. ————— *Death of Hindu wife while respondent in appeal—Legal representatives.* A Hindu wife obtained a decree against her husband for maintenance. He appealed, and, while the appeal was pending, the wife died, leaving two daughters. The question then arose whether her husband or his daughters should represent the deceased in the appeal. *Held*, that the daughters of the deceased were the legal representatives for the purposes of the appeal. MANILAL REWADAT v. BAI REWA . . . . . I. L. R. 17 Bom. 758

48. ————— *Devolution of interest during pendency of suit—Assignment of decree prior to appeal—Application to substitute name of assignee as respondent to appeal—"Suit"—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 372.* An application was made by an appellant to substitute for the name of the person originally named as respondent to the appeal the name of a person to whom the decree had been assigned before the filing of the appeal, such application being made more than two years after notice of the assignment had reached the applicant. The person whose name was so sought to be substituted as respondent objected to being placed upon the record of the appeal. *Held*, that the name of the proposed respondent should not be placed on the record. *Semble*: That s. 372 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to a case where the devolution of interest occurs between the time of the passing of a decree and the time of the filing of an appeal from that decree. COLLECTOR OF MUZAFFARNAGAR v. HUSAINI BEGAM.

I. L. R. 18 All. 86

49. ————— *Devolution of interest pending appeal—Array of parties in appeal—Civil Procedure Code 1882, ss. 372 and 382—Application for review.* *Held*, that s. 372 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies as well to the case of a devolution of interest pending an appeal as to the case of a devolution of interest pending a suit. *Held*, also, that a person may, under s. 372, be added or substituted as a party either on his own application or on the application of one of the parties already on the record. *Held*, also, that an application by a respondent to an appeal, whose interest had at one time been represented by an official receiver, to replace upon the record of the appeal as a party respondent the name of such official receiver, which



**PARTIES—contd.****5. SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—concl'd.****(e) RESPONDENTS—concl'd.**

had been struck off owing to a misrepresentation of fact, might be treated as an application for review of the order striking off the name of the official receiver. *In the matter of the petition of SARAT CNANDRA SINGH. GOKAL CHAND v. SARAT CHUNDER SINGH* . . . . . **I. L. R. 18 All. 285**

**50.** . . . . . *Devolution of interest pending appeal—Array of parties in appeal—Civil Procedure Code 1882, ss. 372, 582.* By virtue of the first portion of s. 582 of the Code of Civil Procedure, s. 372 of the Code applies to appeals in cases of assignment, creation, or devolution of any interest pending the appeal otherwise than by death, marriage, or insolvency. *In the matter of the petition of Sarat Chunder Singh, I. L. R. 18 All. 285*, followed. *Rajaram Bhagwat v. Jibai, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 151*, and *Ramji Morarji v. J. E. Ellis, I. L. R. 20 Bom. 167*, referred to. *Collector of Muzaffarnagar v. Husaini Begam, I. L. R. 18 All. 85*, distinguished. *In the matter of the petition of DURGA PRASAD* . . . . . **I. L. R. 22 All. 231**

**6. TRANSPOSITION OF PARTIES.**

**1.** . . . . . *Making a defendant plaintiff and making the plaintiff a defendant—Partnership suit—Civil Procedure Code (X of 1877), s. 32.* The plaintiff in a partnership suit to which there were twenty-one defendants, applied to the Court for leave to withdraw the suit, or that the suit might be dismissed. Ten of the defendants supported the plaintiff's application. Two of the defendants objected, and applied, under s. 32 of the Civil Procedure Code (X of 1877), that they might be made plaintiffs, and that the plaintiff might be made a defendant. The Court granted their application. *EDULJI MANCHERJI WACHA v. VULLEBHOY KHANBHOY* . . . . . **I. L. R. 7 Bom. 167**

**2.** . . . . . *Making parties defendants into plaintiffs against their consent.* In a suit for arrears of rent certain parties intervened alleging that they were co-sharers with the plaintiff. They were placed by the first Court on the record as defendants, and the suit was dismissed. The lower Appellate Court transferred the intervenors against their will to the side of the plaintiffs, and remanded the case for re-trial. *Held*, that this proceeding was without authority or jurisdiction, as a person cannot be made a plaintiff against his will, unless there is such an equity on the part of another as to compel him to be such. *BEHAREE LALL DOSS v. RADHA NATH DOSS* . . . . . **22 W. R. 229**

**3.** . . . . . *Making defendant a plaintiff—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 73—Adding parties after amendment of plaint.* A Court could, under s. 73, Act VIII of 1859, add parties to a suit, as well as transpose a party from his position as *pro forma* defendant, and array him

**PARTIES—contd.****6. TRANSPOSITION OF PARTIES—concl'd.**

amongst the plaintiffs after amendment of the plaint under s. 29. *PITAMBUR PYNE v. TOOLSEE DOSSEE.*

**7 W. R. 39**

*See KRISHNA v. MEKAMPERUMA. KRISHNA v. COLLECTOR OF SALEM*

**I. L. R. 10 Mad. 44**

**4.** . . . . . *Parties to suit—Practice—Suit by some only of several persons entitled to sue, the others being joined as co-defendants.* Where, out of several persons who apparently had a right to bring a suit as co-plaintiffs, some only appeared as plaintiffs and joined the others as co-defendants. *Held*, that the suit ought not to have been dismissed merely because the plaintiffs failed to show that the persons whom they joined as co-defendants refused to appear with them as plaintiffs *Pyari Mohun Bose v. Kedar Nath Roy, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 409*, followed. *Dwarka Nath Mitter v. Tara Prosunna Roy, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 160*, referred to. *BIRI SINGH v. NAWAL SINGH (1898).*

**I. L. R. 24 All. 226**

**7. PARTIES WITH VARYING RIGHTS.**

. . . . . *Joinder of parties with varying rights, effect of—Alteration of rights of parties.* When two or more parties have been joined in a suit with rights various in degree and kind, the mere fact of such joinder cannot confer on any of the parties so joined new rights, or rights adverse to those of the others. *PARBUTTEE v. KRISHAN PURTAB BAHADUR SAHIE*

**1 N. W. Ed. 1873, 44**

**8. PARTIES IN TWO CAPACITIES.**

. . . . . *One person party both as plaintiff and one of the defendants—Objection, validity of.* The plaintiff, as heir of his mother, sued a firm in which he was himself a partner to recover the amount of certain loans which he alleged that his mother in her lifetime had made to the said firm. It was objected that the suit was improperly framed, inasmuch as the plaintiff was also made a defendant. *Held*, that the objection was not maintainable, the plaintiff being a defendant in a different capacity. *PREMI LUDHA v. DOSSA DOONGERSEY.*

**I. L. R. 10 Bom. 358**

**9. DISABILITY TO SUE.**

. . . . . *Deaf and dumb person—Right to sue.* A deaf and dumb person is not, on that account alone, to be deemed incompetent to sue or to be sued. *BUGGEE RAM v. BULDEO SINGH*

**2 N. W. 414**

**10. OBJECTION AS TO DEFECT OF PARTIES.**

**1.** . . . . . *Effect of omission to join necessary parties—Civil Procedure Code, 1859,*



**PARTIES—contd.****10. OBJECTION AS TO DEFECT OF PARTIES—conc'd.**

s. 73. *Held*, that it was opposed to the spirit of the Civil Procedure Code to dismiss a suit merely on account of there being defect of parties,—the Court, under s. 73 of the Code, being vested with the power of making the persons, who seem to be interested in the subject-matter, parties to the suit. **RUCHPAUL v. JOHUREE** . . . . . **1 Agra 147**

By s. 31 of the Codes of Civil Procedure of 1877 and 1882 a suit is not to be dismissed for mere misjoinder of parties.

**2. ——— Objection by defendant to want of parties—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 34.** S. 34 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877) limits the time within which a defendant may object for want of parties, but it does not so limit the right of the plaintiff to add parties. In some cases s. 34 would not prevent even a defendant from objecting to the want of a proper party after the first hearing,—e.g., where, after the first hearing and before decree, a co-parcener or remainder-man or reversioner is born, or where a woman (who is a party) is married to a man who is not a party to the suit. The objection did not exist at or before the first hearing, and therefore could not have been made or waived by the defendant; and if he made it at the earliest opportunity after it came into existence, he would have satisfied the spirit of s. 34. **MODHE v. DONGRE** . . . . . **1. L. R. 5 Bom. 609**

**3. ——— Special appeal, objection taken on—Irregularity not affecting merits of case.** *Per PRINSEP, J.*—The objection as to the defect of parties after the case had passed through two Courts is not one affecting the merits of the case so as to be a ground of special appeal. **BOYDONATH BAG v. GRISH CHUNDER ROY** **1. L. R. 3 Cal. 26**

But see **SHIVRAM VITHAL v. BHAGIRTHIBAI**. **6 Bom. A. C. 20**

**11. PRIVILEGES OF PARTIES.**

See **ARREST—CIVIL ARREST.**

**1. ——— Non-attendance in Court—Appearance by agent.** A Rajah instituted a suit under Act X of 1859 through an agent appointed in that behalf. The Deputy Collector cited the Rajah himself to appear and be examined. He excused himself on the ground of the privilege under Act VIII of 1850, s. 22, and at the same time petitioned that the evidence of his general agent might be taken. The Deputy Collector, without examining the general agent, dismissed the suit, on the ground that the suit ought to have been instituted by the general agent; and that the Rajah himself was bound to obey his citation. *Held*, that the Deputy Collector was bound to receive the evidence of the general agent and to decide the case upon the evidence which was tendered; and that the refusal of the Rajah, who had the privilege which he claimed, and his appointment of a special agent or mukhtear for

**PARTIES—concl'd.****11. PRIVILEGES OF PARTIES—concl'd.**

the purposes of the suit, instead of his general agent, were no grounds for dismissing the suit. **JUGGUD-INDUR BUNWAREE v. SOORJCOOMAR CHOWDHRY**. **Marsh. 627**

**2. ——— Mahomedan lady of rank.** Where a Mahomedan lady of position residing within the town in which a Court held its sitting was willing to admit the Court to an interview at her own residence, the Judge was *held* to have done wrong in insisting upon her personal appearance in Court. **ZOHURUTOOLAH CHOWDHY v. ASALOODDEEN CHOWDHRY** . . . **15 W. R. 129**

**12. PARTIES TO CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.**

*Parties in conflict with one another cannot be dealt with in one enquiry—Such joinder illegal.* Two or more persons are not 'associated together in the matter under enquiry' within the meaning of s. 117 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code, when there is a conflict between them and they cannot therefore be dealt with in the same enquiry under the provisions of that section. Such a joinder is not a mere irregularity, but an illegality which will vitiate the proceedings. **GANAPATHI BHATTA v. EMPEROR (1908)** **1. L. R. 31 Mad. 276**

**PARTIES TO CONVEYANCE.**

See **RECEIVER** . . **6 B. L. R. 492 note**

**Mortgagor and mortgagee—Sale of mortgaged properties in execution of decree—Purchase by mortgagee.** Where a mortgagee becomes the purchaser of property sold under a decree for sale obtained by him on his mortgage, it is not necessary that the mortgagor should join in the conveyance of the property to the mortgagee. **JALEERAM v. CHUNDER COOMAREE DOSSEE**. **12 B. L. R. Ap. 7**

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22 W. R. 11; 333

**1. FORM OF PARTITION.**

1. ———— **Imperfect partition—Sanction to partition—Act XIX of 1853—Partition depending on consent of parties.** Courts in their judgments should bear in mind the very distinct character of the several kinds of partition, and until it has been ascertained with what description of partition they have to deal, the question of the sufficiency of the sanction or confirmation given to it cannot be determined. In certain cases the Commissioner's sanction is required, in others that of the Collector. There are partitions known as imperfect partitions depending upon the conduct of the parties, and effected from first to last only with their consent. *MUHUMDEE BEG v. HOSSEIN ALI.*

2 N. W. 26

2. ———— **Informal partition—Partition by finding of Court in suit.** Where plaintiff sued for certain land in dispute as his own, and the lower Court found that it was his share, and that defendant held his separately, no further formal partition was held to be necessary. *MODHOOSOODUN CHATTERJEE v. JUDDOOPUTTY CHUCKERBUTTY.*

9 W. R. 115

3. ———— **Declaration of title to continue to enjoy separate possession of land—Suit for partition.** The plaintiffs, having obtained a declaration of title to continue to enjoy separate possession of certain lands, sued the former defendants again for partition of the same lands. Held, that the suit was unnecessary, and should be dismissed. *ANDI v. THATHA.* I. L. R. 10 Mad. 347

**2. PRIVATE PARTITION.**

1. ———— **Effect of private partition—Effect of, on right of pre-emption.** A private parti-

**PARTITION—contd.****2. PRIVATE PARTITION—contd.**

tion, though not sanctioned by official authority will, if full and final as among the parties to it, have the same effect as the most formal partition on the right of pre-emption. *GOPAL SAHI v. OJODHEA PERSHAD* . . . 2 W. R. 47

2. ———— **Effect of, on survey proceedings.** A private partition of a joint estate is not inconsistent with subsequent survey proceedings, and does not take away their legal effect. *HUNOONMAN CHOWBAY v. BINDHOO TORABA.*  
10 W. R. 336

3. ———— **Effect of, on parties—Government and purchasers at revenue sale.** A private butwarra, though not binding against the Government or against a purchaser at a sale for arrears of Government revenue, who derives his title directly from Government, is binding as between the parties to the butwarra and persons claiming title under them. *TRIPOORAH SOONDAREE CHOWDHRAINEE v. KALI CHUNDRA ROY CHOWDHRY*  
18 W. R. 327

4. ———— **Right to subsequent partition under Act XIX of 1814.** Where an estate was divided by private agreement more than fifty years ago, and the division was subsequently maintained in a judicial decision, since which the co-sharers had for many years exercised rights of ownership independently of each other, a butwarra of the whole estate cannot afterwards be demanded, even though a regular separation of one share has been intermediately obtained by a suit in a Civil Court. *PERMESSUR DUTT SAHEE v. AUDH SAHAJEE* . . . 5 W. R. 40

5. ———— **Beng. Reg. XIX of 1814, s. 30.** A private partition is no bar to proceedings in the Revenue Courts under s. 30 of Regulation XIX of 1814. *JOYNATH ROY v. LALL BAHADUR SINGH*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 126; 10 C. L. R. 146

6. ———— **Beng. Reg. XIX of 1814, s. 30—Power of Collector—Jurisdiction of Civil Court.** It is not correct to say that, under s. 30 of Regulation XIX of 1814, the Collector is not at liberty to make any partition where the owners have already partitioned the lands amongst themselves. The true meaning of the section is that the Collector must be guided by the nature of the estate in applying the rules contained in the preceding sections of the Regulation; and that, where estates are not held in common tenancy, only a portion of those rules will apply. If the parties have divided the lands without agreeing as to the shares of the Government revenue to be paid by them, respectively, all the Collector has to do, when a partition has been applied for, is to make an assignment of the revenue in proportion to the interest of each shareholder. If they have divided the lands and arranged amongst themselves as to the portion of the Government revenue which each is to pay, it is open to the



**PARTITION—contd.****2. PRIVATE PARTITION—contd.**

Collector to accept or reject that arrangement. The Civil Court has nothing to do with the matter. **AJOODHIA LALL v. GUMANI LALL 2 C. L. R. 134**

**7.** \_\_\_\_\_ *N.-W. Provinces Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), s. 125.* S. 125 of Act XIX of 1873 does not apply to a partition by private agreement. *Gaya Singh v. Udit Singh, I. L. R. 13 All. 396*, referred to. *Ram Prasad v. Dina Kuar, I. L. R. 2 All. 515*, dissented from by KNOX AND BANERJI, JJ. **KASHI PRASAD v. KEDAR NATH SAHU . I. L. R. 20 All. 219**

**8.** \_\_\_\_\_ *Family arrangement among co-sharers—Partition among shareholders in zamindari villages—Construction of agreement—Custom.* On a dispute among proprietors of shares in zamindari villages as to the respective amounts of the holdings till then undivided to which they were entitled, a compromise made by their common ancestor's five sons, of whom the plaintiff's father was the eldest, had been filed in proceedings prior to this suit. This was construed to have assigned to the plaintiff's father an additional share, according to a custom recorded in the khewat at settlement, in virtue of which the eldest brother was entitled to a share greater than that allotted to the others,—a right termed "hak hetharnsi." **MANICK CHAND v. HIRA LAL. I. L. R. 20 Calc. 45**

**9.** \_\_\_\_\_ *Patni of separate share—Subsequent partition under Beng. Act VIII of 1876, s. 128.* The plaintiffs were co-sharers in a certain estate, *T* being another co-sharer. In 1818 a private partition took place between the co-sharers in the course of which certain specific lands were allotted to *T* in severalty, the rest remaining undivided. *T* granted a patni lease of her share to third parties who were thenceforth in possession; and subsequently there was a partition of the whole estate by the Collector under Bengal Act VIII of 1876, in the course of which the specific lands allotted to *T* in the private partition were allotted to the plaintiffs, who brought against the tenants of the land suits for rent to which they made the patnidars defendants. *Held*, that the patnidars were properly made parties to the suits in order to try the question of the right to receive the rent as between the plaintiffs and the patnidars. *Kashee Ram Dass v. Sham Mohinee, 23 W. R. 227; Ahameddeen v. Girish Chunder Shamunt, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 350; and Madan Mohan Lal v. Holloway, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 555*, referred to. *Held*, also, that, assuming that the patnidars were not parties to the partition-proceedings by the Collector, they were entitled to retain possession of the lands allotted to their lessor *T* in the private partition, by which partition the plaintiffs were bound, notwithstanding the subsequent partition by the Collector. *Ahmedoolah v. Ashruff Hossein, 13 W. R. 447; Obhoy Churn Sircar v. Huri Nath Roy, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 72; and Juggessur Doyal Singh v. Bissessur Pershad, 12 C. L. R. 281*, approved. *Byjnath Lal v. Ramodeen*

**PARTITION—contd.****2. PRIVATE PARTITION—concl'd.**

*Chowdhry, L. R. 1 I. A. 106*, distinguished. S. 128 of Bengal Act XIII of 1876 does not apply to a case in which there has been a prior private partition, the estate in such a case not being "held in common tenancy" within the meaning of that section. **HRIDOY NATH SHAHA v. MOHOBUTNESSA BIBEE. I. L. R. Calc. 285**

**10.** \_\_\_\_\_ *Stamp Act (II of 1899), s. 2, cl. 15—Undivided brothers—Documents purporting to be lists of properties—Each document signed by the brothers excepting the one retaining it—Each document formed the title of the brother retaining it with respect to his share—Instrument of partition—Stamp.* Four undivided brothers made four lists of the family property. Each list was signed by three brothers and not by the fourth, who retained it. A question having arisen whether the list constituted a partition between the brothers and required to be stamped as such under the Stamp Act (II of 1899):—*Held*, that the four documents formed, when read together, an instrument of partition within the meaning of s. 2, clause 15 of the Stamp Act (II of 1899). Each document formed the title of the brother retaining it against the other three brothers with regard to the property, which came to his share, when the partition was effected. **GANPAT v. SUPDU (1908) . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 509**

**3. RIGHT TO PARTITION.****(a) GENERAL CASES.**

**1.** \_\_\_\_\_ *Co-sharers—Effect of partition.* In cases of joint ownership each party has a right to demand and enforce partition. A shareholder of a patni talukh can claim and enforce a partition of such patni talukh as against his co-sharers, but such partition would not affect the liabilities of the parties under their contract with the zamindar. **SHAMASUNDARI DEBI v. JARDINE, SKINNER & CO. 3 B. L. R. Ap. 120 : 12 W. R. 160**

**2.** \_\_\_\_\_ *Joint owners in right of worship of idol—Performance of worship by turns.* The reasons for which one of several joint owners is entitled to a partition of the joint property apply also to the case of a joint right of performing the worship of an idol. The joint owners of such a right are entitled to perform their worship by turns. **MITTA KUNTH AUDHICARRY v. NEERUNJEN AUDHICARRY . 14 B. L. R. 166 : 22 W. R. 437**

**MANCHARAM v. PRANSHANKAR.**

**I. L. R. 6 Bom. 298**

**3.** \_\_\_\_\_ *Patnidars—Right to enforce partition—Patnidar of undivided share.* One patnidar of an undivided share of a zamindari held by joint proprietors has no right to sue to enforce partition against another patnidar where there is no contract between the two, or between the patnidar and his zamindar, to divide. **RIDAI NATH SANDYAL v. ISWAR CHANDRA SAHA.**

**4 B. L. R. Ap. 57 note**



**PARTITION—contd.****3. RIGHT TO PARTITION—contd.****(a) GENERAL CASES—contd.**

**4. ——— Co-parceners—Joint possession—Suit by subordinate tenure-holder for partition against superior landlord.** Joint possession alone is not a sufficient ground for compelling a partition. In order that persons may be co-parceners, and so have a right to partition, not only must they be in joint possession, but that joint possession must be founded on the same title. A subordinate tenure-holder therefore has no right of partition as against his superior landlord. *Ridai Nath Sandyal v. Iswar Chandra Saha*, 4 B. L. R. App. 57 note, and *Parbati Churn Deb v. Ainuddeen*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 577; 9 C. L. R. 170, referred to. The plaintiffs were proprietors of a 12-anna share and dar-talukdars of the other 4-anna share of talukh A, which consisted of a 7½-anna share of so much of the lands of three villages D, B and T as appertained to an estate in the Collectorate No. 23. Estate No. 23 with three other estates represented fractional shares in three parganas comprising about 500 villages. No partition had been made of these parganas, but by private arrangement certain lands in the village had been assigned to one estate, and certain other lands to another, some lands being kept joint and common to all four estates. In estate No. 23 there was another permanent tenure S, a talukh consisting of lands not only in the three villages D, B and T, but in nine others: of this talukh a 2-anna share belonged to L, one of the zamindars of estate No. 23, and a 7½-anna share of the remaining 14-anna share was held under the plaintiff. In a suit against L for partition of such of the lands of talukh A as appertained to estate No. 23 and were separate from the other estates, to which the other zamindars of estate No. 23 were made parties:—*Held*, assuming the plaintiffs were entitled to partition at all, that the suit would lie as regards the lands specified as belonging to estate No. 23 without reference to the lands held in common as belonging to all the four estates. *Hari Das Sanyal v. Pran Nath Sanyal*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 565, and *Padmamani Dasi v. Jagadamba Dasi*, 6 B. L. R. 134, referred to. *MAKUNDA LAL PAL CHOWDHRY v. LEHURAUX*.  
**I. L. R. 20 Calc. 379**

**5. ——— Estate held in separate possession—Suit by one of several shareholders—Beng. Reg. XIX of 1814, s. 39.** When an estate is held in separate possession, a batwara of the whole for the purpose of apportioning land according to the jummas of the shareholders, who had severally entered into engagements with the Government, cannot be insisted upon by one of the proprietors under s. 30, Regulation XIX of 1814. *BUJRUNGEE LALL v. VELAET HOSSEIN KHAN*. **5 W. R. 186**

**6. ——— Separate holders under private partition—Right to have partition by Collector after private arrangement and disagreement.** Parties holding separate portions of an estate according to a private arrangement previously made are not in a condition to apply to the Collector for a

**PARTITION—contd.****3. RIGHT TO PARTITION—contd.****(a) GENERAL CASES—contd.**

batwara when unable afterwards to agree among themselves. *AJOODHYA PERSHAD v. KRISTO DYAL*.  
**15 W. R. 165**

*See KHOOBUN v. WOOMA CHURUN SINGH*.

**3 C. L. R. 453**

**7. ——— Joint proprietors—Joint lands, each proprietor getting rent separately.** Lands held in joint possession, each proprietor receiving his proportion of the rent according to his interest in the land, cannot be divided under the batwara laws. *DOORGA KANT LAHOORY v. RADHA MOHUN GOOHO NEOGY*. **7 W. R. 51**

**8. ——— Division between zamindars—Beng. Reg. XIX of 1814.** One of the co-sharers of a joint estate suing conjointly with the others would, under Regulation XIX of 1814, be entitled to a separation of a mouzah from the rest of the zamindari, and an assessment upon it of a proper proportion of the total jumma, and having done this he would alone be entitled to have an order for partition of that mouzah as between himself and his co-sharers therein. If the zamindari which the plaintiff seeks to have divided is so intermixed with the neighbouring zamindaris that the line of boundary cannot be reasonably identified, he cannot call upon the Collector to make a new line. But if the Collector has the means of ascertaining where the boundary lies, he is bound to carry out a partition. *BHURRUT THAKOOR v. MURTAZA*. **21 W. R. 225**

**9. ——— Zamindars—Separate liability for payment of revenue—Arrangement for separate payment—Assent to, by maafidar.** A partition was made by the zamindars of their respective holdings and of their joint liability for the Government revenue, and though this partition was not carried out by the Revenue Court, but was acted upon by the zamindars, and the assignee of Government revenue also consented to such partition by accepting revenue from individual zamindars, and by holding them to be individually responsible for the amount due in respect of their several holdings:—*Held*, that there was nothing to prevent the maafidar, who is the assignee of Government revenue, from assenting to any arrangement which the zamindars may make for the conversion of their joint into separate liability. *SURNOMOYEE v. RAMCHURN SINGH*. **3 Agra 251**

**10. ——— Purchaser of specific portion of estate—Right to partition of whole estate.** The purchaser of a specific portion of the land of an estate separately registered with a separate jumma under s. 11, Act XI of 1859, is not entitled to claim a batwara of the whole estate, and to obtain a share of the whole land proportioned to the amount of the sudder jumma paid by him. *FUKEER CHUNDER SHAHA v. NOBODEEP CHUNDER SHAHA*.  
**W. R. 1864, 59**

**11. ——— Party with decree for partition which he fails to execute till barred—**



**PARTITION—contd.****3. RIGHT TO PARTITION—contd.****(a) GENERAL CASES—contd.**

*Act XIX of 1853, s. 47.* Where a person obtained a decree from the Civil Court, declaring his right to certain shares in the village, and directing a partition, but did not execute his decree within the prescribed period of limitation:—*Held*, that he was not entitled to partition under s. 47, *Act XIX of 1853.* **KISHEN SINGH v. DABEER SINGH** . . . **2 Agra 272**

**12. ——— Right in suit where title has been declared to have precept to Collector to partition—Beng. Reg. XIX of 1814, s. 5.** In a suit for declaration of title in which plaintiff also claimed an allotment of his share which had been refused him by the Collector in a batwarra then in progress:—*Held*, that, as it was found that plaintiff's title was established, he was also entitled under s. 5, Regulation XIX of 1814, to a precept to the Collector directing him to award to the plaintiff a share corresponding with that title. **ABDOOL REZA v. JEBUNNISSA BIBEE** . . . **16 W. R. 34**

**13. ——— Shikmi tenure—Rights of Government, the zamindars, and the shikmidars.** Partition of a shikmi tenure allowed on the ground that the order could not affect the rights of Government, of the zamindars, nor the plaintiff's co-shikmidars. **OOMESH CHUNDER SHAHA v. MANICK CHUNDER BONICK** . . . **8 W. R. 128**

**14. ——— Lakhiraj tenure—Beng. Reg. XIX of 1814.** Though a partition of a lakhiraj tenure cannot be effected under the provisions of Regulation XIX of 1814, yet a Civil Court in effecting such a partition may well be guided by the rules laid down in that Regulation so far as they are applicable. **JANOKEE BIBEE v. LUCHMUN PERSHAD** . . . **17 W. R. 137**

**15. ——— Common lands of mirasi villages—Pungavaly tenure. Semble:** The right to enforce a partition or allotment of the common lands of mirasi villages held in *pungavaly* tenure probably does exist. **SITARAMAIYAR v. ALAGIRY IYER** . . . **4 Mad. 285**

**16. ——— Co-parceners—Order binding whole estate.** There is no statutory bar against a raiyat's right to partition as between himself and his co-parcener where he does not ask for such a distribution of the patni rent as would bind the zamindar, or limit the latter's right over the whole tenure as a joint one. **GOUREE SUNKUR ROY v. ANUND MOHUN MOITRO** . . . **9 W. R. 487**

*See* **MOTHOOR CHUNDER KURMOKAR v. MANICK CHUNDER BUNGO** . . . **6 W. R. 192**

**17. ——— Hindu widow—N. W. P. Land Revenue Act, XIX of 1873, s. 108—Hindu widow—Reversioners.** A childless Hindu widow, who has succeeded to her deceased husband's share of a mehal, such share having been his separate property, and is recorded as a co-sharer of such mehal, is as much entitled, under s. 108 of Act XIX of 1873, as any other recorded co-sharer is, to claim a perfect

**PARTITION—contd.****3. RIGHT TO PARTITION—contd.****(a) GENERAL CASES—contd.**

partition of her share. The circumstance that she may after partition alienate her share contrary to Hindu law will not bar her right as a co-sharer to partition. If she acts contrary to the Hindu law in respect of her share, the reversioners will be at liberty to protect their own interests. **JHUNNA KUR v. CHAIN SUKH** . . . **I. L. R. 3 All. 400**

**18. ——— Revenue-paying estate—Beng. Act VIII of 1876, s. 10.** A Hindu widow who has succeeded to a share in a revenue-paying estate as heir to her deceased husband is not a person having a proprietary interest in an estate for the term of her life only, within the meaning of s. 10, Bengal Act VIII of 1876. Even if she were, a Civil Court would not be debarred from decreeing partition of a revenue-paying estate at her instance if a proper case for the passing of such a decree be made out by her. **Jadomoney Dabee v. Saroda-prosono Mookerjee**, 1 *Boulnois* 120; **Phool Chand Lall v. Rughoobuns Sahoy**, 9 *W. R.* 108; **Katama Natchiar v. Rajah of Shivagunga**, 9 *Moo. I. A.* 539; and **Bhagbutti Dae v. Chowdhry Bholanath Thakoor**, *L. R.* 2 *I. A.* 276, referred to. Principles on which Courts should order partition at the instance of a Hindu widow stated. **MOHADEAY KOOR v. HARUK NARAIN** . **I. L. R. 9 Calc. 244**

**19. ——— Partition between owners of separate shares in permanently-settled estate—Effect of, as against Government.** In the year 1226 F. (1819) a fourteen-anna eight-gunda share of a certain mouzah was permanently settled. The remaining one-anna twelve-gunda share was permanently settled in 1861. This share was sold for arrears of Government revenue in 1873, and purchased by the plaintiff, who subsequently applied to the Collector for partition under the Batwarra Act. The Collector refused to partition, upon the ground that the Act was not applicable to the partition of a mouzah held jointly by the proprietors of two separate estates. The plaintiff then brought the present suit, to which he made the Collector a party, to obtain a declaration that he was entitled to have his share separated from the 14-anna 8-gunda share by metes and bounds, and also for a decree directing a partition of the whole mouzah into two parts. *Held*, that, so far as the plaintiff on the one hand and the owners of the fourteen-anna eight-gunda share on the other were concerned, the mouzah could be partitioned, but that such partition would not be binding upon the Government unless by consent. **AJOODHYA PERSAD v. COLLECTOR OF DURBHUNGAH** . . . **I. L. R. 9 Calc. 419; 11 C. L. R. 550**

**20. ——— Grantees of inam village—Suit by co-sharer in melvaram of inam village for division of lands—Parties to suit—Liability to Government for quit-rent.** Where the grantees of an inam village, subject to a favourable quit-rent enjoy the rent payable by the permanent tenants in defined shares, any one of the grantees may sue his co-sharers for a partition of the lands of the village



PARTITION—*contd.*3. RIGHT TO PARTITION—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

to enable him the more easily to recover his share of the rent, although he cannot, without the consent of Government, put an end to his joint liability for the entire quit-rent. It is not necessary for the plaintiff in such suit to implead any raiyat whose rights are unquestioned. The partition in such a case must be carried out by the Collector after a preliminary decree, and, when partition is carried out by the Collector, a final decree should be passed *RAMANUJA AYYANGAR v. VIRAPPA TEVAN*

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 90

21. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 265—Revenue-paying estate—Beng. Act VIII of 1876, Part II, and s. 4, cls. (8) and (9)—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 265.* In 1851 an estate was brought under butwarra under the provisions of Regulation XIX of 1814. At such butwarra a portion of the estate being covered with water and unfit for cultivation was not divided, but left joint amongst all the co-sharers, the land-revenue payable on account of the whole estate being apportioned amongst the several estates into which the portion divided was split up. Subsequently, on the portion remaining joint becoming dry and fit for cultivation, an application was made by one of the co-sharers to the Collector to partition the same under the provisions of Bengal Act VIII of 1876, but that officer refused to do so, on the ground that the land "did not bear an assessed revenue and was not shown in the towzi." In a suit brought under the above circumstances to compel the Collector to make the partition and in the alternative to have it made by the Civil Court:—*Held*, that, though the reason given by the Collector for refusing was an erroneous one, he was not bound to make the partition under the provisions of Bengal Act VIII of 1876, as the land in suit was not liable for the payment of one and the same demand of land revenue and was therefore not a joint undivided estate within the terms of s. 4, cl. (9), of that Act. *Held*, also, that the word "estate," as used in s. 265 of the Civil Procedure Code, must not be construed in the same limited and defective sense in which it is used in Act VIII of 1876, but must be taken to be there used in its ordinary signification, and that consequently the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for partition under the provisions of that section. *Chundernath Nundy v. Hur Narain Deb*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 153, approved. SECRETARY OF STATE v. NUNDUN LAL

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 435

22. ———— *Suit in ejectment—Partition by Collector—Jurisdiction—Mortgage-sale—Hindu law—Undivided property—Possession.* V mortgaged to the plaintiff his house and certain undivided land in which H and others, Hindu co-parceners, had a share. R bought the interest of H in the land at a Court-sale, and let to H and V, who, failing to pay rent, were sued by R, who got a decree for possession. This decree was transferred for execution to the Collector, who

PARTITION—*contd.*3. RIGHT TO PARTITION—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

sold the land and rateably distributed the proceeds except to V, who declined to take the amount tendered as his share. The plaintiff sued V and the purchasers under R's decree to recover his mortgage-debt by a sale of the property mortgaged to him. *Held*, that R's decree, not being for partition of the family property or for the separate possession of a share, was not one contemplated by s. 265 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The proceedings of the Collector were without jurisdiction, and the plaintiff was entitled to ignore them and assert his claim under the mortgage. *NARAYAN NAGARKAR v. VITHU JAKHOJI* . . . I. L. R. 8 Bom. 539

23. ———— *Raiyatwari land.* S. 265 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877, does not apply to property held on raiyatwari tenure, but to permanently-settled estates. *MUTTU v. KUDALALAGA* . . . I. L. R. 6 Mad. 97

24. ———— *Partition of raiyatwari estates—Act VIII of 1859, s. 225.* In 1862 it was held by the Sudder Court that s. 225 of Act VIII of 1859 did not apply to raiyatwari estates. This ruling having always been acted on in the Madras Presidency:—*Held*, by the Full Bench, that a different construction should not, under these circumstances, be placed on s. 265 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. *Mutu v. Kudalalaga*, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 97, confirmed. *MUTTUCHIDAMBARA v. KARUPPA* . . . I. L. R. 7 Mad. 382.

25. ———— *Suit for partition by person in possession making a false claim.* B, a childless Hindu and a Brahman, adopted X, his sister's son, and subsequently, apprehending that the adoption was invalid, executed a will by which he left his estate to X. After B's death, X obtained possession, and remained in possession of the estate till his death, which occurred before he had attained majority. After this, joint possession of the estate was obtained by P and S, two widows of B, who set up a right of inheritance from X as being in the position of mothers to him, in consequence of his adoption by their deceased husband. In a suit brought by S against P for partition of the estate:—*Held*, that, inasmuch as the parties had set up a false claim to the estate, and had no estate in law which they could divide, the suit for partition was not maintainable merely by reason of the fact that they were in possession. *Armory v. Delamirie*, *Smith's L. C.* 313, and *Asher v. Whitlock*, *L. R.* 1 Q. B. 1, referred to. *PARBATI v. SUNDAR*

I. L. R. 8 All. 1.

26. ———— *Right of joint occupancy-tenants to partition—Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Parties.* *Held*, that a joint occupancy-tenant is entitled to sue for, and a Civil Court is competent to grant, a decree for partition of the joint occupancy-holding, though, if the zamindar is not made a party to the suit for partition, such decree will not affect the mutual rights and liabilities of the zamindar and the occupancy-tenants as they stood



**PARTITION—contd.****3. RIGHT TO PARTITION—contd.****(a) GENERAL CASES—contd.**

prior to the partition. *Sunder v. Parbati*, I. L. R. 12 All. 51; L. R. 16 I. A. 186; *Baring v. Nash*, 1 V. & B. 551; *Omesh Chunder Shaha v. Manick Chunder Bonick*, 8 W. R. 128; and *Bhagi v. Gir-dhari*, All. Weekly Notes (1895) 143, referred to. **MUHAMMAD BAKHS V. MANA**

I. L. R. 18 All. 334

**27. ——— Mortgagee's right of partition inter se—Mortgage of different shares in an undivided area to different mortgagees by usufructuary mortgage.** Two mortgagees held separate usufructuary mortgages, the one of a two-thirds share, the other of a one-third share, in an undivided area of muafi land granted by the owners of those shares, respectively. *Held*, that one mortgagee could not, in a suit to which neither of the mortgagors was a party, obtain partition of the share mortgaged to him. **MANGLI PRASAD V. ISHRI PRASAD**

I. L. R. 18 All. 476

**28. ——— Partition between zamin-dar and patnidars—Partition between parties, one of whom owns interest subordinate to the other.** The plaintiff was proprietor of an entire estate paying an annual revenue to Government of Rs. 2,444. In 1854 his father gave a patni lease of an undivided six annas share of the estate to the defendants' predecessors in title. The plaintiffs alleged that the land being held ijmali, although he and the defendants collected separately from the tenants their respective shares of the rent, difficulty and inconvenience had arisen in the management of the property, and he therefore sued to have his ten annas share of the land divided by metes and bounds from the six annas share of the patnidars, the land of the entire estate remaining liable as before for the entire amount of the Government revenue payable in respect of it. *Held*, by the Full Bench, that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for partition. **HEMADRI NATH KHAN V. RAMANI KANTA ROY**

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 575

1 C. W. N. 406

**29. ——— Right of co-sharers—Inam village—Right of management by co-sharers.** Property consisting of an ordinary inam village and a cash allowance payable out of the revenue of another village is liable to partition at the suit of a co-sharer, except when it is held on saranjam or other impartible tenure, or where the terms of the original grant impose a condition upon its enjoyment that the management shall rest with a particular branch of the family of the grantees; and possibly a long-continued practice from which a family custom may be inferred may operate to bring about the same result. **GOPAL HARI JOSHI V. RAMAKANT RANG-NATH JOSHI**

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 458

**30. ——— Grantees of inam village—Inam village granted by Peishwa—Right of management of Inam property—Claim that Inam village was impartible—Right of succession—Custom.** The defendant in a suit for partition alleged that his

**PARTITION—contd.****3. RIGHT TO PARTITION—contd.****(a) GENERAL CASES—contd.**

branch of a joint family to which an inam village had been granted by the Peishwa had, under the grant, acquired a right to the perpetual management of the village, and claim, on this and other grounds that the village was impartible. *Held*, by the Judicial Committee (affirming the decision of the High Court), that "neither by the terms of the original grant nor of the subsequent orders of the ruling power, nor by family custom, nor by adverse possession has the defendant's branch of the family acquired a right to perpetual management of the village of Ahire, or, in consequence, to resist its partition." *Adrishappa v. Gurushidappa*, L. R. 7 I. A. 162, referred to. **VINAYAK V. GOPAL** (1903)

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 353

s.c. L. R. 30 I. A. 77

7 C. W. N. 409

**31. ——— Right of person holding temporary or qualified interest—Partition, suit for—Right of suit—Division to be final.** Partition should not be allowed, when the interests of one or more of the persons owning interests in the property to be partitioned is of a temporary and qualified character, and when there may be apprehension that the division effected may not have an enduring effect. A *mokurari* lease, which was by its terms to become null and void on default of payment of three instalments of the *mokurari* rent, as also upon alienation by the *mokurari*dar, was not such a permanent or transferable interest as would ensure that any division that might be effected would be of enduring effect. **BEFIN BEHARI MITTER V. LALA BHAGWAT SAHAI** (1905)

9 C. W. N. 699

**32. ——— Suit for partition dismissed for default—Joint Hindu Family—Partition—Fresh suit not barred.** Where a suit for partition was dismissed for default and a fresh suit was instituted: *Held*, that the right to enforce partition is a legal incident of a joint tenancy and as long as such tenancy subsists so long may any of the joint tenants apply to the Court for partition of the joint property. *Nasratullah v. Mujibullah*, I. L. R. 13 All. 309, followed. **BISHESHAR DAS V. RAM PRASAD** (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 627

**33. ——— Partition suit—Preliminary decree—Execution struck off for default—Fresh suit, if lies.** A previous suit for partition brought by the plaintiffs having been compromised, an *Amin* was appointed to effect a partition in terms of the compromise. Subsequently the parties not appearing, the execution proceedings then pending were dismissed for default. *Held*, that a fresh suit for partition is not barred by s. 13 or s. 103 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Nasratullah v. Mujibullah*, I. L. R. 13 All. 309, 313, followed. *Soni v. Munshi*, I. L. R. 3 Bom. 94, distinguished. Section 103 of the Civil Procedure Code has no application to execution proceedings. **MADON MOHON MONDUL V. BAIKANTA NATH MONDUL** (1906)

10 C. W. N. 839



PARTITION—*contd.*3. RIGHT TO PARTITION—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

**34. ——— Suit in Civil Court for declaration of title—***United Provinces Land Revenue Act (Local III of 1901), ss. 110, 111, 233 (k) —Objections not raised before Revenue Court—Jurisdiction.* On the 12th of March 1904, defendants applied to the Revenue Court for partition of their share in two mahals. Proclamation was issued on that application calling upon the opposite party to appear on the 18th of April 1904, and state their objections, if any, to the partition. The opposite party did not appear in the Revenue Court, but on the 20th of April 1904 instituted a suit in a Civil Court against the applicants for partition asking for a declaration of their exclusive possession over part of the property, the subject-matter of the defendants' application for partition in the Revenue Court. *Held*, that the plaintiffs' suit was not maintainable, *Muhammad Sadig v. Laute Ram*, I. L. R. 23 All. 291, and *Khasay v. Jugla*, I. L. R. 28 All. 432, referred to. *NATHI MAL v. TEJ SINGH* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 604

**35. ——— Co-sharer—Partition, decree for.** A lessee held certain lands in a village under three separate temporary leases from three undivided co-sharers of the village. On the expiry of one of the leases, the lessor in question sued for *khas* possession on partition of his separated share. His other co-sharers who with the lessee had been made parties to the suit raised no objection. *Held*, that there was no bar to a decree for partition being made in the case. But the plaintiff ought to pay the entire costs of the partition as a fresh partition of the entire mouzah may be necessary on the expiry of the other leases. *RAM LOCHI KOERI v. HERBERT COLLINGRIDGE* (1907) 11 C. W. N. 397

**36. ——— Hindu Law—Partition—Expenses for ceremonies of brother's sons—Share of step-mother—Value of stridhan to be deducted from share—Expenses for ceremonies of grandchildren.** In a suit for partition brought by a Hindu against his father and brothers, the brothers are entitled to have set apart from the family property a sum sufficient to defray the expenses of their prospective thread, betrothal, and marriage ceremonies, such sum to be calculated according to the extent of the family property. A father's wife is on such partition entitled to a share equal to that of a son, but from her share must be deducted the value of any *stridhan* received by her as a gift from her father-in-law or husband. The children of a brother on such partition are not entitled to any sum for the performance of their prospective thread, betrothal or marriage ceremonies. *JAIRAM v. NATHU* (1906)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 54

**37. ——— Defendants' claim on dismissal of suit—Partition, suit for—Dismissal of suit—Defendants cannot claim partition of their**

PARTITION—*contd.*3. RIGHT TO PARTITION—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*concl'd.*

*shares in that suit.* Where a plaintiff brings a suit for partition and fails, it is not open to any of the defendants to claim that the partition suit should go on in order that the share of one or more of such defendants may be determined. *ASHIDBAI v. ABDULLA* (1906) I. L. R. 31 Bom. 271

**38. ——— Babuana grant—Ancestral property—Original grantee's power to dispose of by will—Rights of junior members.** Babuana grant of ancestral property does not change the ancestral character of the property and turn it into self-acquired property in the hands of the grantee or his direct male descendants. The original grantee has no power to dispose of the property by will, and the other members of the family have those rights in it, which they can claim under the Mitakshara law, viz., the right to restrain alienation, except in cases of legal necessity, and the right to claim partition. *Ram Chandra Marwari v. Mudheswar Singh*, I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1158, and *Rameswar Singh v. Jibender Sing*, I. L. R. 32 Calc. 683, followed. *LALITESWAR SINGH v. BHABESWAR SINGH* (1908) I. L. R. 35 Calc. 823

**39. ——— Parties—Partition suit—Talukdars and dar-talukdars—Allowing persons not made parties to watch proceedings—Practice.** In a suit for partition persons holding interests of an inferior degree are not necessary parties. A person holding a permanent interest, though an interest of an inferior grade, may bring a suit for partition as against persons, who hold interests of a superior grade. A patnidar may bring a suit for partition against his co-patnidars or against dar-patnidars under his co-patnidars; in the latter case the co-patnidars must be made parties. The question as to who are necessary and who are proper parties in a partition suit discussed. In the present suit, *held*, that the dar-talukdars should not be made parties as the suit would become highly complicated thereby. The course adopted in the lower Court, namely, of allowing the dar-talukdars to watch the partition proceedings, though not made parties, approved. *UPENDRA CHANDRA SINGHA ROY v. MUHOMED FAIZ CHOWDHURY* (1908)

12 C. W. N. 670

**40. ——— Compromise—Right of co-owners to partition—Effect of agreement to remain joint.** By a compromise entered into in the course of proceedings for partition it was agreed that the share of the applicant for partition alone should be partitioned, that of the non-applicants remaining joint. *Held*, that although such compromise might prevent the non-applicants from obtaining partition in the course of the proceedings during which it was entered into, it could not prevent either of them from subsequently making a fresh application for partition *inter se*. *CHANDAR SHEKHAR v. KUNDAN LAL* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 All. 3



**PARTITION—contd.****3. RIGHT TO PARTITION—contd.****(b) PARTITION OF PORTION OF PROPERTY.**

41. ———— **Partition of a portion of joint family property—Suit for partition of a portion of joint property.** A suit will not lie for partition of a portion only of joint family property. *JOGENDRO NATH MUKERJI v. JOGOBUNDU MUKERJI* I. L. R. 14 Calc. 122

42. ———— **Suit for partition of portion of property—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 265.** A suit will not lie for partition of portion only of a joint estate. Accordingly, where the plaintiff sued for partition of a portion of a joint estate and for khas possession of the share which might on the partition be allotted to him, alleging that he had been deprived of possession of that portion by his co-sharers in collusion with others, it was held the suit would not lie. Although under s. 265 of Act X of 1877 a decree may be made for partition of revenue-paying land, yet that decree must be carried into execution solely by the Collector. *RAMJOY GHOSE v RAM RUNJUN CHUCKERBUTTY* 8 C. L. R. 367

43. ———— **Partition of portion of joint estate without consent of co-sharers—Jurisdiction of Civil Court.** Where a co-sharer in a joint undivided estate sued to have his rights ascertained, and partition made in respect of an orchard which formed part of the joint estate:—*Held*, that the Civil Court was not entitled to decree partition or give possession of a separate share in the orchard, and there is no law which entitles a shareholder to obtain partition of a portion of an undivided estate against the will of the other co-sharers. *MITTHOO LALL v. GHOLAM NUSEER-OD-DEEN* 3 Agra 276

44. ———— **Suit by mokurari leaseholder of small part of estate—Suit against patnidars of whole estate.** The owner of a 12 annas share in a joint zamindari granted to the plaintiff a mokurari lease of his share in a small portion of land within the zamindari. The owner of the remaining 4 annas share granted a patni of his share in the whole zamindari to the defendants. In a suit brought for partition of the small plot of land:—*Held*, that a partition could not be enforced of a part of the estate held by the defendants, who, if the plaintiff's claim was allowed, might, in respect of the same estate, be subjected to many claims for partition at the suit of persons in the plaintiff's position. *PARBATI CHURN DEB v. AIN-UD-DEEN* I. L. R. 7 Calc. 577 : 9 C. L. R. 170

45. ———— **Suit for partition of portion of joint property—Partial partition.** The plaintiffs and the defendants being jointly entitled to and in possession of three khanabaris in a village and other immoveable property, the plaintiff sued for partition of one of the khanabaris only. *Held*, that the suit would not lie. *HARIDAS SANYAL v. PRAN NATH SANYAL* I. L. R. 12 Calc. 566

**PARTITION—contd.****3. RIGHT TO PARTITION—contd.****(b) PARTITION OF PORTION OF PROPERTY—contd.**

46. ———— **Portion of property out of, and portion within, jurisdiction—Parties.** A person suing for partition is not obliged to include in his suit the whole of the property, but may confine his suit to the portion of the property which he is desirous of having partitioned; therefore where in a suit for partition, it was shown that some portion of the property was out of the jurisdiction of the Court, objections that fresh parties would be necessary if the mofussil property were included, and that therefore the suit had not been properly brought, and that the leave of the Court had not been obtained previous to bringing the suit, were overruled. *PADMAMANI DAS v. JAGADAMBA DAS* 6 B. L. R. 134

47. ———— **Portion of property out of jurisdiction—Ancestral property—Rule as to property being brought into hotchpot—Property out of jurisdiction.** No doubt, the rule that every partition suit shall embrace all the joint family property has been held to be subject to certain qualifications, as, for instance, where different portions of it lie in different jurisdictions, or where a portion is not available for actual partition as being in the possession of a mortgagee; but there is no authority for the proposition that a member who sues for partition of property in the hands of the defendants can refuse to bring into hotchpot any undivided property held by himself, on the ground that it is situated within another jurisdiction. *Subba Rau v. Rama Rau*, 3 Mad. 376, referred to and distinguished. *HARI NARAYAN BRAHME v. GANPATRAV DASI* I. L. R. 7 Bom. 272

48. ———— **Partial partition—Jurisdiction of High Court, Original Side—Properties situate partly within and partly without jurisdiction.** On the Original Side of the High Court a suit for partition of joint estate, part of the property of which estate is situate within and part without the jurisdiction (there having been no leave granted under s. 12 of the Charter to sue concerning the portion outside the jurisdiction), is not liable to be dismissed on the ground that partial partition of a property cannot be granted, but may be decreed as far as the property within the jurisdiction is concerned. The ruling of JACKSON, J., in *Rattun Monee Dutt v. Brojo Mohun Dutt*, 22 W. R. 333, explained. *PUNCHANUN MULLICK v. SHIB CHUNDER MULLICK* I. L. R. 14 Calc. 835

49. ———— **Property in different jurisdictions—Suit for partial partition—Suit for land—Letters Patent, 1865, cl. 12.** The plaintiff sued for partition of certain property, alleging it to be joint family property. It consisted of a house in Bombay and certain fields at Vavla in the Thana District, outside the jurisdiction of the Court. The parties were all resident in Bombay. *Held*, that, as to the Vavla property, the Court had no jurisdiction, the plaintiff not having obtained leave to sue under cl. 12 of the Letters Patent, 1865,



**PARTITION—contd.****3. RIGHT OF PARTITION—contd.****(b) PARTITION OF PORTION OF PROPERTY—contd.**

but that the suit might proceed as regards the property in Bombay. *Punchanun Mullick v. Shib-Chunder Mullick*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 835, followed, *BALARAM BHASKARJI v. RAMCHANDRA BHASKARJI* I. L. R. 22 Bom. 922

**50. ——— Portion of land held under private agreement for exclusive use.** Where an applicant for the partition of a joint undivided estate holds any portion of it for his own private use under a private agreement:—*Held*, that the whole estate, including such portion of it as has been separately enjoyed, must be brought into account before the partition can be effected. *LALLJEET SINGH v. RAJ COOMAR* . . . **25 W. R. 353**

**51. ——— Rectification of portion of property—Suit to set aside partition.** Where a property had been divided, and one of the sharers was dissatisfied with the result, he could bring a suit to have the division entirely revised, but was not at liberty to ask for a rectification of a small portion of the divided property. *TRIPOORA SOONDUREE v. GOPAL NATH ROY* . **25 W. R. 358**

**52. ——— Omission of property in possession of one party—Ground for dismissal.** In a partition suit the fact that the plaintiff has not included, or has relinquished his share in property liable to division, affords no ground for dismissing the suit where the co-parcener, in whose possession it is, is a party to the suit, for it is competent to the Court, in disposing of the case, to make any order in respect of such property that may to it appear right. *JANARDAN VITHAL v. ANANT MAHADEV* I. L. R. 7 Bom. 373

**53. ——— Partition of mal raiyati land in Chota Nagpur—Reg. III of 1872—Partition of trees and land—Ghatwal.** As between two mal raiyats with whom a settlement has been made under Regulation III of 1872, there may be a partition of the waste and jungle lands, though such partition cannot be binding upon the superior landlord, the ghatwal, and will only subsist during the currency of the settlement. So far as regards the trees to which the superior landlord is exclusively entitled, they cannot be the subject of partition, but, as to the trees which belong to the mal raiyats, there may be a partition. *DOMAN PANDEY v. PANCHU KOLE* (1900) . . . **5 C. W. N. 185**

**54. ——— Putnidar—Partition, suit for—Right of a putnidar of a small share of an estate to claim partition.** In the absence of proof of inconvenience to other co-sharers a putnidar whose right extends over only a fractional share of one of many mouzahs in the zemindari, is entitled to maintain a suit for partition. *Radha Kanta Shaha v. Bipro Das Roy*, 1 C. L. J. 40, and *Barahi Debi v. Debkamini Debi*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 682, referred to. *UMA SUNDARI DEBI v. BENODE LAL PAKRASHI* (1907) . . . **I. L. R. 34 Calc. 1026**

**55. ——— Owelty—Partition—Allotment on partition—Mortgagee—Charge for owelty.** Where

**PARTITION—contd.****3. RIGHT OF PARTITION—concl'd.****(b) PARTITION OF PORTION OF PROPERTY—concl'd.**

co-sharers have been awarded certain sums of money as owelty on a partition decree, they are entitled to priority over the mortgagees of a portion of the property partitioned. *KAJIM SHAH v. HILLS* (1907) . . . **I. L. R. 35 Calc. 388**  
s.c. 12 C. W. N. 373

**56. ——— Co-owner of chaukidari chakran lands—Co-owners not members of joint family—Suit, if maintainable.** One of the co-owners of an estate sued the other co-owners for partition of chaukidari chakran lands of one village only of the estate: *Held*, that the reasons against the partial partition of joint family property did not apply to such a case and the suit was maintainable. *HABIBUR RASUL ABDUL FAIZ v. ASHITA MOHAN GHOSH* (1908) . . . **12 C. W. N. 640**

**4. APPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONER.**

**1. ——— Procedure—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 396.** *Per PONTIFEX, J.* (FIELD J. doubting)—In a suit for partition, it is competent to the Court, in its preliminary decree, to appoint any one person whom it thinks fit to be a Commissioner to make the partition under s. 396 of the Civil Procedure Code. The section uses the word "Commissioners," but it is not necessary for the purposes of partition that there should be more than one Commissioner, and by force of the General Clauses Act the word "Commissioners" may be read in the singular number. The intention of s. 396 is that upon the first hearing of a suit, the Court shall determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to a partition, and shall ascertain who the several persons entitled in the property are, and shall direct by a preliminary decree or order that Commissioners be appointed to make the partition. *GYAN CHUNDER SEN v. DURGA CHURN SEN* I. L. R. 7 Calc. 318 : 8 C. L. R. 415

**2. ——— Suit for partition of immoveable property—Commissioner appointed to make partition—Court not competent to modify Commissioner's report.** Where in a suit for partition of immoveable property a Commissioner has been appointed under s. 396 of the Code of Civil Procedure to ascertain the shares of the parties, the Court when passing its final decree, must either accept or reject the report of the Commissioner *in toto*, but is not competent to modify it. *Shah Muhammad Khan v. Hanwant Singh*, All. Weekly Notes (1898) 45. *JANKI PRASAD v. GAURI SAHAI* (1905) I. L. R. 28 All. 75

**3. ——— Commission to make partition—Issue of commission to one person only.** A Court issuing under s. 396 of the Code of Civil Procedure a commission to make partition of immoveable property not paying revenue to Government, cannot legally issue such commission to one commissioner only. *Per RICHARDS, J.*—But there is nothing to prevent the parties to partition proceedings agreeing that one commissioner only should



**PARTITION—contd.****4. APPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONER—concl'd.**

be appointed; nor does it follow that all the partitions that have been made are invalid by reason of the fact that only one commissioner has been appointed. *MULCHAND v. MUHAMMED ALI KHAN* (1906)

**1. L. R. 29 All. 235**

**5. JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT IN SUITS RESPECTING PARTITION.**

**1. ——— Suit to set aside partition—***Beng. Reg. XIX of 1814—Minor, right of.* A partition by the Collector under Regulation XIX of 1814, if consented to by all the parties, is final, and cannot be set aside by any party in the Civil Court; but where one of the parties was a minor at the time of partition, the Court remanded the suit for an enquiry whether his guardian acted in the partition proceedings *bonâ fide*, and with a due regard to the interests of the minor. *HARI PRASAD JHA v. MADDAN MOHAN THAKUR*

**8 B. L. R. Ap. 72 : 17 W. R. 217**

**2. ——— Suit for declaration of right to share larger than that allotted—***Beng. Reg. XIX of 1814.* Where a partition of an estate under Regulation XIX of 1814 has been carried out, and confirmed by the revenue authorities, it seems that one shareholder cannot maintain a suit in the Civil Court to have it declared that he is entitled to a share larger than he claimed in the partition proceedings. *RAMSAHAYA SINGH v. MUZHAR ALY*

**2 B. L. R. Ap. 40**

**3. ——— Suit for larger share than that allotted by Collector—***Beng. Reg. XIX of 1814, ss. 1 and 20, cl. 2.* S. 20, Regulation XIX of 1814, which says, "the determination of the Board of Revenue or Board of Commissioners on the paper of partition shall be final," refers to those questions only which can be legally determined by the revenue authorities, and will not prevent a regular suit being instituted to establish a right and title to the land, which a party has lost by a butwarra, notwithstanding that the plaintiff may have failed to make his objection before the Collector within fifteen days as required by cl. 2, s. 4, Regulation XIX of 1814. There is nothing in the butwarra law or in any other Regulation to prevent the Civil Court from entertaining a suit for a declaration of the plaintiff's right to a larger share than that recorded in his name in the paper of partition. Where a butwarra had been made, and the plaintiff had had a specific share allotted to him, but which share was less than his proper share in the estate, and the plaintiff brought his suit against the co-sharers generally, without specifying in whose share the quantity he had lost was included:—*Held*, that the Court could, in such suit, declare the plaintiff's title to the same, treating him as a shareholder to that extent only in the pottah in which it may have been included. *SPENCER v. PUHUL CHOWDHRY*

**6 B. L. R. 658 : 15 W. R. 471**

See also *KUNJ BEHARI SING v. NERU SING*

**6 B. L. R. 663 note : 15 W. R. 291**

**PARTITION—contd.****5. JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT IN SUITS RESPECTING PARTITION—cont'd.**

*SHEO PERSHAD SOOKOOL v. SHUNKUR SAHOY*

**16 W. R. 190**

**4. ——— Suit for declaration of title—***Beng. Reg. XIX of 1814—Jurisdiction of Collector—Title.* The Collector cannot try the question of title in butwarra proceedings under Regulation XIX of 1814. A suit for possession and declaration of *mekurrari* title to certain lands can be entertained in the Civil Court notwithstanding the butwarra proceedings. *AHMEDULLA v. ASHRUFF HOSSEIN*

**8 B. L. R. Ap. 73 note**

*S.C. AHMEDOOLLAH v. ASHRUFF HOSSEIN*

**13 W. R. 447**

**5. ——— Suit for partition—***Suit by purchaser of share of lakhiraj estate.* The purchaser of a share in an undivided lakhiraj, estate can sue his co-parceners for a partition of his share, and the Civil Court has jurisdiction to carry out the partition. *FATTEH BAHADUR v. JANKI BIBI*

**4 B. L. R. Ap. 55 : 13 W. R. 74**

**6. ——— Division to prevent encroachment where enjoyment is distinct.** The Civil Court has jurisdiction in a suit between joint owners of talukhs, who have been occupying and using separate and distinct parts of premises within the estate, where the object is to prevent encroachment by defendants upon the part occupied by plaintiffs, without any division of the Government revenue or alteration of joint liability to pay that revenue. *KALEE MOHUN SEN v. RAM SOONDER SEN*

**24 W. R. 243**

**7. ——— Dispute with regard to shares—Parties.** Where two or more proprietors of a joint estate held in common tenancy, desirous of having separate possession of their respective shares, apply each and all to have that estate divided in exactly the same proportionate shares, and no other sharers oppose the butwarra, the Collector may at once comply with the application; and if no objection is raised when the parties have opportunity of raising objection, the shares cannot again be re-united by a suit in a Civil Court. But if the Collector has judicial notice of a dispute with regard to a share, it is questionable whether he has jurisdiction to make a partition of that share. In any suit, however, to do away with the partition as regards that share, the Collector must be made a party. *JOYMOONEE DEBIA v. IMAM BUKSH TALOOKDAR*

**13 W. R. 471**

**8. ——— Suit for division of share of mouzah—***Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 225.* A suit for division of a share of a mouzah appertaining to a talukh paying revenue to Government will, according to s. 225, Civil Procedure Code, 1859, lie in the Civil Court. *SHOME DUTT CHOWDHRY v. SURB NARAIN CHOWDHRY*

**24 W. R. 242**

**9. ——— Partition of revenue-paying estate.** Partition of an estate paying revenue to



**PARTITION—contd.****5. JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT IN SUITS RESPECTING PARTITION—contd.**

Government cannot be effected in a Civil Court.  
**BADRI ROY v. BHUGWANT NARAIN DOBEY**

**I. L. R. 8 Calc. 649 : 11 C. L. R. 186**

**RUTTUN MONEE DUTT v. BROJO MOHUN DUTT**  
**22 W. R. 11**

s.c. affirmed on appeal . . . **22 W. R. 333**

**10. ————— Jurisdiction of Collector.** Revenue-paying estates must be partitioned by the Collector; they cannot be partitioned by metes and bounds by the Civil Court Ameen; and if the shares in such an estate are not separate estates, but are mere fractional shares of integral estates, they cannot be partitioned in the absence of the other co-sharers. **DAMOODUR MISSER v. SENABUTTY MISRAIN**

**I. L. R. 8 Calc. 537 : 10 C. L. R. 401**

**11. ————— Partition of mehal—Application by co-sharer for partition—Notice by Collector to other co-sharers to state objections upon a specified day—Objection raised after day specified by original applicant—Question of title—Distribution of land—Jurisdiction—Civil and Revenue Courts—Act XIX of 1873, ss. 111, 112, 113, 131, 132, 241 (f)—Civil Procedure Code, s. 11.** Reading together ss. 111, 112, and 113 of the North-Western Provinces Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), as they must be read, the objection contemplated in each of them is an objection to be made by the person upon whom the notice required by s. 111 is to be served, i.e., a person who is a co-sharer in possession, and who has not joined in the application for partition. So far as ss. 111, 112, 113, 114, and 115 are concerned, a Civil Court is the Court which has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon questions of title or proprietary right, either in an original suit in cases in which the Assistant Collector or Collector does not proceed to inquire into the merits of an objection raising such a question under s. 113, or on appeal in those cases in which the Assistant Collector or Collector does decide upon such questions raised by an objection made under s. 112. The remaining sections relating to partition do not provide for or bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to adjudicate upon questions of title which may arise in partition-proceedings or on the partition after the time specified in the notice published under s. 111. S. 132 is not to be read as making the Commissioner the Court of Appeal from the Assistant Collector or the Collector upon such questions, nor does s. 241 (f) bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to adjudicate upon them. Where, therefore, after the day specified in the notice published by the Assistant Collector under s. 111, and after an Amin had made an apportionment of lands among the co-sharers of the mehal, the original applicants for partition raised for the first time an objection involving a question of title of proprietary right, and this objection was disallowed by the Assistant Collector and the partition made and confirmed by the Collector under s. 131:—*Held*, that the

**PARTITION—contd.****5. JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT IN SUITS RESPECTING PARTITION—contd.**

objection was not one within the meaning of s. 13, that the remedy of the objectors was not an appeal from the Collector's decision under s. 132, and that a suit by them in the Civil Court to establish their title to the land allotted to other co-sharers was not barred by s. 241 (f), and, with reference to s. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, was maintainable. **Habibullah v. Kunji Mal, I. L. R. 7 All. 447**, distinguished. **Sundar v. Khuman Singh, I. L. R. 1 All. 614**, referred to. **MUHAMMAD ABDUL KARIM v. MUHAMMAD SHADI KHAN** . **I. L. R. 9 All. 429**

**12. ————— Proceedings under Bengal Act VIII of 1876, s. 31, effect of.** The jurisdiction of the Civil Court in matters of partition of a revenue-paying estate is restricted only in questions affecting the right of Government to assess and collect in its own way the public revenue. *Held*, accordingly, that the pendency of partition-proceedings before the Collector under s. 31 of Bengal Act VIII of 1876 was no bar to a suit for a declaration that under a partial partition effected between the co-sharers a portion of land had been separately allotted to the plaintiff. **ZAHRUN v. GOWRI SUNKAR** . **I. L. R. 15 Calc. 198**

**13. ————— Jurisdiction of Revenue Court—Suit for partition and possession of a share in a particular plot in a patti—N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), ss. 135, 241 (f).** A suit by a co-sharer in a joint zamindari estate for partition and possession of his proportionate share of an isolated plot of land is not maintainable in a Civil Court with reference to ss. 135 and 241 of the N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873). **Ram Dayal v. Megu Lal, I. L. R. 6 All. 452**, distinguished. **IJRAIL v. KANHAI**

**I. L. R. 10 All. 5**

**14. ————— Partition by Civil Court of a portion of a revenue-paying estate—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 265—Revenue-paying estate, partition of, into several revenue-paying estates.** The meaning of s. 265 of the Code of Civil Procedure is that, where a revenue-paying estate has to be partitioned into several revenue-paying estates, such partition must be carried out by the Collector. **Zahrn v. Gowri Sunkar, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 198**, approved. **DEBI SINGH v. SHEO LALL SINGH** **I. L. R. 16 Calc. 203**

**15. ————— Objection to partition—N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), ss. 111, 113, 241.** The procedure provided by s. 113 of Act No. XIX of 1873 does not become obligatory on a Collector or an Assistant Collector in partition proceedings unless an objection to the partition has been made by a co-sharer in possession, and unless such objection was made before the day specified in the notice which the Collector or Assistant Collector is bound to issue under s. 111, and not even then unless such objection raises a question of title. Unless, therefore, such objection has been made, a Civil Court is not empowered to exercise any jurisdiction in the matter of the distribution of the land



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or the allotment of the mehal by partition. **HARDEO SINGH v. NARPAT SINGH . I. L. R. 20 All. 75**

**16. — Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 265—Partition effected by Collector in execution of a decree.** When the Collector makes a partition under s. 265 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Civil Court has no power to examine his work or to direct him to make a fresh partition. *Dev Gopal Savant v. Vasudev Vithal Savant, I. L. R. 12 Bom. 371*, followed. **SHRINIVAS HANMANT v. GURUNATH SHRINIVAS I. L. R. 15 Bom. 527**

**17. — Sheri lands—Lease by Government for a certain number of years—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 265.** Under s. 265 of the Civil Procedure Code, a Civil Court cannot effect partition of lands paying revenue to Government. The Collector alone is empowered under that section to do so. **DATTATRAYA VITHAL v. MAHADAJI PARASHRAM . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 528**

**18. — Claim for partition of share of property—Decree for partition of defendants' share inter se—Subordinate Judge, Jurisdiction of.** In a suit instituted in the Court of a Munsif by a member of a Mahomedan family to have her share of the family property partitioned, the value of the plaintiff's share was found to be less than Rs. 1,000, and the value of the whole family property exceeded Rs. 1,000. The lower Appellate Court decreed partition not only of the plaintiff's share but also of the shares of the defendants *inter se*, though such partition was not asked for. *Held*, that the lower Appellate Court had no jurisdiction to partition as amongst the defendants the residue of the property left after the partitioning off of the plaintiff's share. **HIKMAT ALI v. WALI-UN-NISSA I. L. R. 12 All. 506**

**19. — Suit for partition of lands in different estates—Assam Land and Revenue Regulation (I of 1886), s. 154, cl. (e) and s. 96.** In a suit for partition, without division of revenue, of certain lands held jointly by the parties in four different estates governed by the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation (I of 1886):—*Held*, that, although the decision asked for may not include all the lands of each of the four estates, still such division would result in a division of each of those estates, the lands left out forming one portion and the lands sought to be divided forming another. The suit therefore was one for an "imperfect partition" within the definition in s. 96 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, and s. 154, cl. (e), of that Regulation barred the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in such a suit. **ABDUL KHALIQ AHMED v. ABDUL KHALIQ CHOWDHRY . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 514**

**20. — Suit for partition—"Perfect" and "imperfect" partition—Entire estate—Assam Land and Revenue Regulation (I of 1886), ss. 96, 97, and 154.** An estate does not cease

**PARTITION—contd.****5. JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT IN SUITS RESPECTING PARTITION—contd.**

to be an entire estate within the meaning of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation (I of 1886) because a few plots of land are common to it and some other estate or because they are brahmutter or debutter or because they are held in some undefined way jointly with other persons. Where a suit was brought for the partition of an estate, excluding certain portions as being brahmutter or debutter, or as being held jointly by third persons, how or in what capacity not being stated:—*Held*, that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts was barred by s. 154 of the Regulation. **SARAT CHANDRA PURKAYESTHA v. PROKASH CHUNDRA DAS CHOWDHURY . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 751**

**21. — Power of Civil Court to appoint Commissioner—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 265—Collector.** In a suit brought in the Civil Court for a partition of the lands in a revenue-paying estate, the Court has no power to appoint a Commissioner to make the partition; it is bound under s. 265 of the Civil Procedure Code to have the partition made by the Collector according to the law for the time being in force for partition of estates. *Debi Singh v. Sheo Lal Singh, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 203*, distinguished. **MEHERBAN RAWOOT v. BEHARI LAL BARIK . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 679**

**22. — Estates Partition Act (Beng. Act VIII of 1874)—Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, ss. 265 and 396.** S. 265 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to a suit for partition of a revenue-paying estate when no separate allotment of revenue is asked for. A Civil Court therefore has jurisdiction to decree partition in such a case; and a suit for possession, after partition of a share in part of an undivided estate, in which part alone the plaintiff has a share, is maintainable in a Civil Court if no division of revenue is sought. *Debi Singh v. Sheo Lal Singh, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 203*, approved and followed. *Meherban Rawoot v. Behari Lal Barik, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 679*, overruled. **JOGODISHURY DEBEA v. KAILASH CHANDRA LAHIRY . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 725 1 C. W. N. 374**

**23. — Transfer of decree for partition to Collector for execution—Partition by Collector—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 265—Jurisdiction of Civil Court to hear objections to the division ordered by Collector.** Where a decree for partition of an estate has been transmitted by the District Court to the Collector for execution under s. 265, Civil Procedure Code, the Court that made the decree is not deprived of its judicial power to hear and decide objections to the division of the estate made by the Collector. **CHINNA SEETAYYA v. KRISHNAVANAMMA . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 435**

**24. — Partition and accounts, suit for—Parties—Common manager, a necessary party if accounts for his period of managership claimed—Agreement to continue joint must be for consideration.** The plaintiff and the defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4, members of a joint Hindu family,



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agreed to remain joint, and appointed the defendant No. 1 as their common manager for a period of seven years, commencing from the 1st September, 1896. On the 7th of March, 1897, the plaintiff gave notice to the defendants, stating that he would no longer continue joint, and dismissed the defendant No. 1 from the managership of his share of the properties. The defendants denied the plaintiffs' right to be separate without a formal deed of partition, or suit in Court. The plaintiff thereupon brought this suit for partition and accounts against all the defendants. On objection being taken that all the joint properties were not included in the schedule to the plaint, the plaintiff applied for the appointment of a Commissioner to inquire and report whether there were any other joint properties. The Subordinate Judge did not grant the prayer of the application, but framed an issue for the purpose of deciding that question, and dismissed the suit on the ground that all the joint-properties were not included in the suit. On appeal, it was held that, before dismissing the suit, the Subordinate Judge ought to have acceded to the prayer of the plaintiff for the appointment of a Commissioner; that the common manager (defendant No. 1) and other defendants were rightly joined together in the same suit, because they made a common cause to defeat the plaintiff's claim for separation, and also because accounts were claimed for the period covered by the managership of the defendant No. 1, and the other defendants are intimately connected with, and interested in taking, such accounts and that, though it may be competent to the parties to enter into an agreement not to divide their joint properties for a limited period and not in perpetuity, yet such an agreement must be for sufficient consideration. *Radha Nath Mukerjee v. Tarruck Nath Mukerjee*, 3 C. W. N. 126, referred to. SRIMOHAN THAKUR v. MACGREGOR (1901)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 769

25. ——— Title, question of—Act XIX of 1873 (North-Western Provinces Land-revenue Act), ss. 112, 113, 241 (f)—Trees a proper subject of partition by the Revenue authorities—Question of title not raised at the time of partition, but subsequently by a suit in a Civil Court—Jurisdiction—Civil and Revenue Courts. If a party to a partition, which is being conducted by the Revenue authorities under Ch. IV of the North-Western Provinces Land-revenue Act, 1873, desires to raise any question of title affecting the partition, he must do so according to the procedure laid down in ss. 112 to 115 of the Act. If a question of title affecting the partition, which might have been raised under ss. 112 and 113 of the Act during the partition proceedings, is not so raised, and the partition is completed, s. 241 (f) of the Act debars the parties to the partition from raising subsequently in a Civil Court any such question of title. *Muhammad Abdul Karim v. Muhammad Shadi Khan*, I. L. R. 9 All. 429, and, so far as in conflict with the present case, *Nasrat-ullah v. Majibullah*,

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I. L. R. 13 All. 309, overruled. *Hardeo Singh v. Narpat Singh*, I. L. R. 20 All. 75, referred to. Held, also, that trees growing upon land the subject of partition by the Revenue authorities go with the land, and may properly be partitioned along with it by the Revenue authorities. *MUHAMMAD SADIQ v. LAUTE RAM* (1901)

I. L. R. 23 All. 291

26. ——— Bengal, N.-W. P. and Assam Civil Courts Act, s. 21—Act XII of 1887—Act XIX of 1873 (N.-W. P. Land-revenue Act), ss. 113, 114—Determination by Revenue Court of a question of title—Appeal—Jurisdiction. Held, that s. 21 of the Bengal, N.-W. P. and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, applies to partition cases in which, under s. 113 of the N.-W. P. Land-revenue Act, 1873, a Court of Revenue has determined a question of title, and that "the value of the original suit," if not the value of the entire property sought to be partitioned, is at any rate the value of the share which the applicant for partition seeks to have divided off. *SHEO SINGH v. BALDEO SINGH* (1903)

I. L. R. 25 All. 277

27. ——— Mesne profits—Joint family estate—Possession by one member—Partition—Mesne profits—Remand. Plaintiff No. 1 and defendant No. 1 were brothers. Plaintiff sued defendant for partition of the joint family property. Defendant was in possession of the whole of certain landed property, including plaintiff's share in it. Defendant's explanation that he held it for three years as a security for debt due to him from plaintiff was unsupported by evidence. The Judicial Commissioner decreed, *inter alia*, that plaintiff be given three years' enjoyment of defendant's share, to make up for losses caused to plaintiff by his being kept out of possession. Held, by the Judicial Committee, that the Judicial Commissioner had, under the circumstances, done justice between the parties, though in a somewhat rough manner, and it would not be to the interest of the parties to remand the case for a more precise determination of the amount of mesne profits. *GANGARAM v. SITARAM* (1902)

6 C. W. N. 698

28. ——— Order for sale—Partition Act (IV of 1893), s. 2—Preliminary decree—Order for sale—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 396. Where, in a suit for partition, a Commissioner, appointed under s. 396, Civil Procedure Code, to make a partition after the preliminary decree had been passed, submitted a report, and the Court on consideration of the report was of opinion that the property could not conveniently be partitioned, and then passed an order for sale of the property under the provisions of s. 2 of the Partition Act (IV of 1893):—Held, that the Court could pass an order under s. 2 of the Act for sale of the property and the fact that a preliminary decree had been passed was no bar to proceeding under that section. *HIRAMONI DASSI v. RADHA CHURN KAR* (1899)

5 C. W. N. 128



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**29.** ————— *Partition Act (IV of 1893), s. 2—Order for delivery of share in house to decree-holder—Application in execution—Order for sale under Partition Act.* S. 2 of the Partition Act of 1893, which empowers a Court to order a sale of property instead of a division, in partition suits, may be applied, though a preliminary order defining the share of a plaintiff and directing partition has been passed. *KADIR BACHA SAHEB v. ABDUL RAHIMAN SAHEB* (1901) . . . **I. L. R. 24 Mad. 639**

**30.** ————— *Trees—Act XIX of 1873 (N.-W. P. Land-revenue Act), ss. 112, 113, 241 (f)—Trees a proper subject of partition by the Revenue authorities.* Trees growing upon land the subject of partition by the Revenue authorities go with the land and may properly be partitioned along with it by the Revenue authorities. *MUHAMMAD SADIQ v. LAUTE RAM* (F.B. 1901) . . . **I. L. R. 23 All. 291**

**31.** ————— *Estate Partition Acts—Estate Partition Act (Beng. VIII of 1876), s. 63, and (Beng. V of 1897), s. 2, cl. (b)—Private Partition—Partition Proceedings commenced under Beng. Act V of 1876 whether governed by Beng. Act V of 1897—Partition by Collector, whether open to objection—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 14—Order Sheet, ex parte entry in—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) s. 42—Dispossession during pendency of suit—Plaint, amendment of.* Where a partition proceeding commenced under s. 63 of Beng. Act VIII of 1876 before Beng. Act V of 1897 came into operation, and the Subordinate Judge decided that the suit was not maintainable under the provisions of Beng. Act V of 1897:—*Held*, that under s. 2, cl. (b), Beng. Act V of 1897, where a suit had been instituted under Beng. Act VIII of 1876, all subsequent proceedings for partition must be carried on under Beng. Act VIII of 1876 as if Beng. Act V of 1897 had not been passed, and the question of the maintainability of the suit should have been determined with reference to the provisions not of Beng. Act V of 1897 but of Beng. Act VIII of 1876. Where an application for partition fulfilled the requirements of ss. 18 and 19 of Beng. Act VIII of 1876 and objection, under s. 12 of Beng. Act VIII of 1876 was disallowed by the Collector, and the order of the Collector was upheld by the Board of Revenue, and the partition was proceeded with:—*Held*, that under s. 12 of Beng. Act VIII of 1876 the Collector had no jurisdiction to make the partition. Where the Board of Revenue on appeal decided that the private partition set up was not established, and the Collector proceeded with the partition, and subsequently in a suit to set aside the partition by the Collector it was decided by the Subordinate Judge that the finding of the reality of the alleged partition by the Revenue Court was conclusive, and that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to investigate the competency of the Collector to make the partition in view of s. 12 of Beng. Act VIII of 1876:—*Held*, that the Civil Court was competent to decide the matter

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in controversy, and that, therefore, the suit was maintainable. Where in a partition suit commenced under Beng. Act VIII of 1876 the provisions of s. 25 of Beng. Act V of 1897 were applied, and it was decided that the suit was barred:—*Held*, that provisions of s. 25 of Beng. Act V of 1897 were not applicable but the corresponding section of Beng. Act VIII of 1876 and that the suit was not barred under that section or under Art. 14 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877). *Laloo Singh v. Purna Chander Benerjee*, **I. L. R. 24 Calc. 149**, *Raj Chandra Roy v. Faizuddin Hossein*, **I. L. R. 32 Calc. 716**, *Narendra Lal Khan v. Jogi Hari*, **I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1107**, and *Alimuddin v. Ishan Chandra Dey*, **I. L. R. 33 Calc. 693**, referred to. *Parbati Nath Dutt v. Rajmohun Dutt*, **I. L. R. 29 Calc. 367**, distinguished. An *ex parte* entry in the order-sheet of the Collector is no evidence of possession of a party. *Mir Tapurah Hossein v. Gopi Narayan*, **7 C. L. J. 251**, referred to. An amendment of the plaint would be allowed when the plaintiff had been dispossessed during the pendency of the suit, so as to make it appropriate to a suit for possession. *Jugdeo Singh v. Habibullah Khan*, **6 C. L. J. 612**, followed. *ANANDA KISHORE CHOWDHRY v. DAJE THAKURAIN* (1909) . . . **I. L. R. 36 Calc. 726**

**6. QUESTION OF TITLE.**

**1.** ————— *Power of Collector to try question of title—Beng. Reg. XIX of 1814.* The Collector cannot try the question of title in butwarra proceedings under Bengal Regulation XIX of 1814. *AHMEDULLA v. ASHRUFF HOSSEIN*

**8 B. L. R. Ap. 73 note**

*S.C. AHMEDOULLAH v. ASHRUF HOSSEIN*

**13 W. R. 477**

**2.** ————— *Decision by Collector of questions of title—Act XIX of 1863.* Act XIX of 1863 contained no provision for the judicial decision by the Collector of objections raising questions of title arising after the partition order in the course of partition. *CHOWDHRY ZALIM SINGH v. SEETLOO*

**2 N. W. 404**

**3.** ————— *Claim to right of occupancy for cultivation—Suit for partition under Act XIX of 1863—Partition of sir land.* *Held*, that a question involving a claim to cultivating right of occupancy was not one which could be properly decided in a suit for partition under Act XIX of 1863, under which only questions of conflicting proprietary title could be determined. *AMAN SINGH v. JOY-GOPAL SINGH* . . . **3 Agra 164**

**4.** ————— *Dispute as to title—Beng. Reg. XIX of 1814.* When, in the preparation of a butwarra under Regulation XIX of 1814, it is ascertained that the parties are at variance on a question of title, the Collector's proper course is to stay proceedings until all such questions are decided by competent Court, the revenue authorities not having



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authority under the law to decide them finally.  
**MUDDUN MOHUN v. KARTICK NATH PANDEY**  
 14 W. R. 335

**7. MODE OF EFFECTING PARTITION.**

**1. ——— Joint property in sole possession of sharer—Protection of sharers from liability for debts.** In effecting a partition, account must be taken of any joint property in possession of any sharer; and before transfer of shares, provision should be made for the protection of other sharers from an undue liability on account of debts. **ALLY HOSSEIN v. ALLY HOSSEIN alias CHOTAY MIRZA**  
 2 Agra 96

**2. ——— Mode of allotment of land—Land in exclusive possession of one party.** In a suit for partition, the land in dispute, being in the exclusive possession of a single co-sharer, should fall as a whole in the share of one or other of the co-owners, and not be subdivided among them. **PUDDOMONEE DOSSEE v. DWARKANATH BISWAS**  
 25 W. R. 335

**3. ——— Land varying in value.** Each party to a butwarra need not have the same quantity of land, nor should the land awarded be always in exact proportion to the jumma paid. The object of the butwarra being to divide the lands in as compact a form as possible, one party may have to pay the jumma on a smaller area than another, though on more valuable land. **AFTABOODDEEN v. SHUMSOODDEEN MULLICK**  
 18 W. R. 461

**4. ——— Convenience—Ground for objection to allotment on partition—Inconvenience.** Where a party concerned objects, in appeal, to a partition of land fairly allotted according to value, as not having consulted convenience, it is not enough to show that appellant's own convenience would have been better consulted by a different arrangement. He is bound to show some arrangement which would better satisfy all parties, and be more equitable for all. **SUMMUN JHA v. BHOOPUT JHA**  
 18 W. R. 498

**5. ——— Compensation for expenditure by certain members of joint family on joint property.** In a suit for partition, it appeared that the defendants, who were members of a joint family, had at their own expense enhanced the value of portion of the lands belonging to the joint estate. *Held*, that the partition should proceed on the basis of each co-sharer having an equal share of similar lands, compensation being allowed to each co-sharer for any private expenditure from which it could be shown the value of the partible property had been increased; and that, unless it could be shown that there were other lands of similar description out of which the share of the plaintiff could be made up, the plaintiff was entitled, on paying compensation to the defendants, to portion of the lands the value of which had been enhanced by the

**PARTITION—contd.**

**7. MODE OF EFFECTING PARTITION—cont'd.**  
 defendants. **KALLIAN BANERJEE v. MODHUSUDUN BANERJI**  
 8 C. L. R. 259

**6. ——— Principle of adjustment after partition between co-sharers—Beng. Reg. XIX of 1814.** After partition of an estate among share holders under Regulation XIX of 1814, one shareholder, *A*, claimed from another shareholder, *B*, 2½ bighas of land as having been allotted to him by *B* under a prior agreement, in lieu of certain lands originally held by him which fell into *B*'s putti. The Collector left the parties to settle the matter between themselves, and *A* brought a suit against *B* for his claim in the Civil Court. *Held*, that, in a case of this kind, the only principle that can be adopted is that the Court should ascertain the relative value of the lands originally made over by the defendant to the entire lands of the defendant, and that it should assign, out of the present share of the defendant, lands bearing the same relative value to the whole that the former lands bore: this to be done without interference with the proceedings of the Collector under the batwarra law, and the plaintiff (if successful) to be brought in as a co-sharer to a limited extent in the land assigned by the defendant. **OOMA DUTT CHOWDHRY v. HUNOOMAN CHOWDHRY**  
 22 W. R. 453

**7. ——— Land in separate possession by consent—Right of co-parceners on partition.** Co-parceners may on partition retain possession severally of such joint lands as they may have taken separate possession of, with the consent of at least a majority of the co-parceners. **SREENATH DUTT v. NANDKISHORE DOSS**  
 5 W. R. 208

**8. ——— Family dwelling-house—Consent of co-parceners—Execution of decree.** A decree directed partition of a family dwelling-house with its appurtenances, including a poojah dalan and courtyard adjoining it. In execution of that decree, the Civil Court Ameen, at the request and with the consent of two out of three co-parceners, did not partition the poojah dalan and courtyard. To this the third co-parcener objected, but her objection was overruled by the lower Courts, and it was directed that the property in question should remain undivided. *Held*, that the Court would be disinclined to order the property to be divided without giving the co-parcener or co-parceners who might wish to keep it entire an opportunity of doing so. *Held, per WHITE, J.*, that having regard to the form of the decree, it was not open to the Court executing it to order that any part of the property should remain joint, except with the consent of all the co-parceners who were parties to the suit. *Semle: per MITTER, J.*, that the lower Courts were not precluded by the decree from dealing with the property in the mode in which they had done. **RAJ-COOMAREE DASSEE v. GOPAL CHUNDER BOSE**  
 I. L. R. 3 Calc. 514

**9. ——— Property consisting of several houses—Principle of partition—Commission of partition—Act XIV of 1882, s. 396.**



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Where, in a suit for partition, possession was sought of a definite share of a property consisting of a number of houses:—*Held*, that the principle in such cases is that, if a property can be partitioned without destroying the intrinsic value of the whole property or of the shares, such partition ought to be made; but where partition cannot be made without destroying the intrinsic value of the property, then a money compensation should be given. *ASHANTUL-LAH v. KALI KINKUR KUR*. I. L. R. 10 Calc. 675

**10. ——— Power of Revenue Courts as to partition of buildings—N.-W.P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), ss. 107, 124.** In a partition under the North-Western Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1879, neither buildings nor the materials thereof can be partitioned; what is partitioned is the land in the mehal. Where such land is covered with buildings, the Court making the partition has to follow the provisions of s. 124 of the Act; but it can decide no question of right to the buildings, nor can it partition them. *ASHIQ HUSAIN v. MUHAMMAD JAN*. I. L. R. 22 All. 329

**11. ——— Suit by transferee for partition—Partition Act (IV of 1893), s. 4—Suit for partition by sharer against transferee—Procedure.** S. 4 of the Partition Act (IV of 1893) applies only where the transferee sues for partition. Where the suit is brought by the sharer against the transferee, s. 2 must be applied. In cases where s. 4 applies, the Judge should make a valuation of the share of the transferee only and direct its sale. *BALSHET GOPALSHET SONAR v. MIRAN SAHER*. I. L. R. 23 Bom. 77

**12. ——— Dwelling-house belonging to undivided family—Partition Act (IV of 1893), s. 4—Application of section—Re-acquisition by members of such family after it has been sold to a stranger does not give any right under the section as against such stranger.** A dwelling house belonged to four brothers, K, R, V, and P, joint members of a Hindu family. In 1874 the shares of K and P were sold in execution of decrees against them, and in 1877 the remaining shares were sold, and finally the house became the property of the plaintiff and one A in equal moities. The plaintiff sued A for partition and obtained a decree, but pending execution A conveyed his moiety back again to R and V. The brothers had continued to occupy the house notwithstanding the changes in ownership. V now applied under s. 4 of the Partition Act (IV of 1893) to be allowed to buy the plaintiff's moiety. *Held*, that he was not entitled to the advantage given by the section. It is ownership, not occupation, that gives the right. After the sales in 1877, the house no longer belonged to an undivided family. V and his brothers were then either tenants in the house or trespassers. The question was whether the dwelling-house at the time the shares therein, which had not been sold to A, were transferred to the plaintiff belonged to an undivided family. When the plaintiff purchased his moiety, he and A became the owners in common of the house and as between them

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s. 4 of the Partition Act had no operation. The subsequent purchase of A's interest by R and V did not confer upon them any rights which A did not possess. It was in their hands re-acquired ancestral property, but not property belonging to an undivided family within the meaning of s. 4. *VAMAN VISHNU GOKHALE v. VASUDEV MORBHAT KALE*. I. L. R. 23 Bom. 73

**13. ——— Mortgage by one owner of undivided share of estate—Rights of mortgagee and other sharers on partition.** Where the owner of an undivided share in a joint and undivided estate mortgages his undivided share, he cannot by so doing affect the interests of the other sharers, and the persons who take the security, i.e., the mortgagees, take it subject to the right of those sharers to enforce a partition and thereby convert what is an undivided share of the whole into a defined portion held in severalty. Where such a partition is effected under the provisions of Regulation XIX of 1814 before the mortgagees have completed their title by foreclosure and the consequential decree for possession, the mortgagees of the undivided share of one co-sharer who has no priority of contract with the other co-sharers would have no recourse against the lands allotted to such co-sharers, but must pursue their remedy against the lands allotted to the mortgagor, and, as against him, would have a charge on the whole of such lands. *BYJNATH LALL v. RAMOODDEEN CHOWDHRY*. 21 W. R. 233 : L. R. 1 I. A. 106

**14. ——— Easement—Partition of houses one of which has continuous easement over the other.** Where two houses are held jointly by several owners deriving their title from a common source, and one of such houses enjoys a continuous as distinguished from an occasional easement over the other, such easement will, upon a partition of the premises, pass to the dominant tenement, both by implication of law and under the usual general words contained in the deed of partition. *RATANJI HORMASJI v. EDULJI HORMASJI*. 8 Bom. O. C. 181

**15. ——— Partition of a joint family house—Effect of partition by a consent decree where the decree does not reserve any right to the use of light and air—Implied grant of easement upon severance of tenement.** On partition of a family dwelling-house by a consent-decree, the plaintiff claimed a right to the passage of light and air necessary for the enjoyment of his share of the building in the way in which it was enjoyed at the time of the partition, though no such right was expressly reserved in the decree. The defence was that the principle of an implied grant of easement upon severance of the tenement should not be applied to the case, but that the rights of the parties should be determined solely with reference to the decree made in the partition suit. *Held*, that the principles of justice, equity, and good conscience should be applied to the case, and that the plaintiff was entitled to the right claimed, even in the absence of any express provision in the decree reserving such right. *Quære* :



**PARTITION—contd.****7. MODE OF EFFECTING PARTITION—contd.**

Whether the principle of an implied grant of easement in severance of tenements would apply in the case where the partition was effected by a decree of the Court in a contested suit and not by a consent of parties. *KADAMBINI DEBI v. KALI KUMAR HALDAR* . . . **I. L. R. 26 Calc. 516**

**16. ——— Mode of division—Beng. Reg. XIX of 1814—Evidence of partition.** Proceedings for partition having been instituted under Regulation XIX of 1814, it was proposed in order to make, equality of partition, that three villages should be divided in unequal proportions, and a goshwara was accordingly prepared by the Ameen setting out in one column the extent of the shares to be allotted, and in another the assessed jumma of each share allotted. In a suit in 1873 by the representatives of one of the shareholders to recover portions of the three villages, the only evidence that the partition had been completed was an istahar of the Deputy Collector, dated October 1864, directing the Nazir to require the raiyats to pay their rents according to the extent of the shares as set forth in the first-mentioned column of the goshwara; that is, according to the quantity instead of according to the quality and value which were the basis of the partition. *Held* (affirming the judgment of the High Court), that the plaintiff having failed to prove any order for partition drawn out under s. 13 of the Regulation, by the Collector, was not entitled to recover according to the quantity of that land, but, if at all, according to its value as ascertained in the column of the goshwara in which the assessed jumma was set forth. *HURRO SOONDARI DEBIA v. KESHUB CHUNDER ACHARJEE* . . . **5 C. L. R. 257**

**17. ——— Decree for partition referred to Collector—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 265—Execution—Collector bound to partition and deliver over possession to several allottees under decree—Practice.** The duty of the Collector, to whom a decree has been referred under s. 265 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) for partition, is not confined to mere division of the lands decreed to be divided but includes the delivery of the shares to their respective allottees. *PARÉHUDAS LAKHMIDAS v. SHANKARBHAI* . . . **I. L. R. 11 Bom. 662**

**18. ——— Mortgage by one owner of undivided share of estate—Rights of mortgagee on partition where the undivided share is allotted to a sharer other than the mortgagor.** Where A mortgaged to the plaintiff his undivided share in certain land which he held jointly with B and subsequently to the mortgage, by a decree in a partition-suit to which the plaintiff was not a party, the mortgaged property was allotted to B, other property in substitution being allotted to A.—*Held*, in a suit against B and the representatives of A to recover the sum due on the mortgage by sale of the mortgaged property, that the plaintiff could not proceed against the mortgaged property which had been allotted on partition to B, but should be allowed to proceed against that which had been allotted in substitution to A, his mortgagor. *Byjnath Lall v.*

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*Ramoodeen Chowdhry, L. R. 1 I. A. 106: 21 W. R. 233*, followed in principle. *HEM CHUNDER GHOSH v. THAKO MONI DEBI* . . . **I. L. R. 20 Calc. 533**

**19. ——— Co-sharers—Mortgage by co-sharer of undivided share—Partition suit subsequently brought by other co-sharer to which mortgagee not a party—Mortgaged property allotted to a sharer other than mortgagor—Rights of such co-sharer—Partition re-opened—Fraud of mortgagor and mortgagee.** Four brothers, viz., D, L, B, and P, were joint owners of certain land. For purposes of convenience each was in possession of a certain portion, but there was no formal partition. The particular land in question in this suit (plots Nos. 1 and 2 of Survey No. 174) was a part of the land in possession of B. In 1867, without the knowledge of his brothers, B mortgaged these plots of land to the first defendant for R2,800. In 1886, L sued for partition of the whole property, and in 1891, L brought a similar suit. By the decrees in these suits, plot No. 1 was allotted to D and plot No. 2 was awarded to L. The mortgagee was not a party to either suit, the plaintiffs in these suits (as found by the High Court) having had no notice of the mortgage. D and L, on attempting to get possession of the lands allotted to them respectively by the partition decrees, were obstructed by the mortgagee, and now brought these suits against him and the heirs of B (defendants Nos. 2—9), claiming possession of the lands allotted to them free of the mortgage-debt, or that the partition should be re-opened, and that unencumbered land should be allotted to them and the mortgaged land given to B's branch of the family (defendants Nos. 2—9). *Held*, that the partition should be re-opened and the mortgaged land assigned to the defendants Nos. 2 to 9. Where a co-sharer of joint property has mortgaged his share without the knowledge of his co-sharers and there has subsequently been a partition suit to which, through the fraud of the mortgagor and the mortgagee, the latter has not been made a party, he (the mortgagee) will only be allowed to proceed for the recovery of his mortgage-debt against that portion of the property which has been allotted to his mortgagor. *Hem Chunder Ghose v. Thako Moni Debi, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 533*, approved. *LAKSHMAN v. GOPAL* . . . **I. L. R. 23 Bom. 385**

**20. ——— Incumbrance created by a co-sharer before partition—Estates' Partition Act (Beng. Act VIII of 1876), ss. 112 and 128—Effect of partition by Collector, where the land so incumbered fell exclusively into the share of another co-sharer.** On partition by Collector under the Estates' Partition Act (Bengal Act VIII of 1876) when any land of an undivided joint estate, which was incumbered by any co-sharer, is allotted to any other co-sharer, the latter takes it free from the incumbrance so created. *Khan Ali v. Pestonji Eduljee Gujdar, 1 C. W. N. 62*, distinguished. The cases of *Nuthoo Lall Chowdhry v. Saadat*



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*Lall, W. R. 1864, 271, and Ahmedoollah v. Ashruff Hossein, 13 W. R. 447 : 8 B. L. R. Ap. 73 note, have been overruled in effect by the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Bijnath Lall v. Ramoo-deen Chowdry, L. R. 1 I. A. 106. JOY SANKARI GUPTA v. BHARAT CHANDRA BARDHAN*

**I. L. R. 26 Cal. 434  
3 C. W. N. 209**

**21. Lease granted by co-sharer pending partition suit—***Land leased falling to share of another co-sharer—Lis pendens—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 52.* Plaintiff purchased a one-third share in an undivided estate and brought a suit for partition. During the pendency of the partition suit, the defendants, the two remaining co-sharers, granted a lease of a particular plot of land included in the undivided estate to the present defendant. By the decree for partition the plot of land under the lease was allotted to the plaintiff who brought the present suit to recover possession of the piece of land on the ground that he was not bound by the lease. *Held*, that s. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act does not apply to cases where the shares of the parties and their rights to those shares are not disputed. The mode in which the lands should be allotted between the ascertained sharers does not affect the right to any specific property. *Held*, also, that the tenant, not having been a party to the partition suit, was not bound by the decree, and the plaintiff was only entitled to khas possession of the one-third share of the plot leased out by his co-sharers. *KHAN ALI v. PESTONJI EDULJEE GUJDAR* . . . . . **1 C. W. N. 62**

**22. Partition without new wajib-ul-arzes being framed—***N. W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), s. 107.* When a mehal is divided by perfect partition into two or more separate mehals, a separate record-of-rights should be framed for each of the new mehals. *ABDUL HAI v. NAIN SINGH* . . . . . **I. L. R. 20 All. 92**

**8. EFFECT OF PARTITION.**

**1. Decree for partition—***Nature and effect of decree in partition suit.* A decree for partition is not like a decree for money or the delivery of specific property which is only in favour of the plaintiff in the suit. It is a joint declaration of the rights of persons interested in the property of which partition is sought, and such a decree, when properly drawn up, is in favour of each shareholder or set of shareholders having a distinct share. *KHOORSHED HOSSEIN v. NUBBEA FATIMA*

**I. L. R. 3 Cal. 551 : 2 C. L. R. 187**

**2. Effect of decree creating severance—***Appeal.* A decree for partition does not operate as a severance so long as it remains under appeal. *SHAKARAM MAHADEV v. HARI KRISHNA* . . . . . **I. L. R. 6 Bom. 113**

**PARTITION—contd.****8. EFFECT OF PARTITION—contd.**

**3. Finality of proceedings—***Beng. Reg. XIX of 1814.* A butwarra by revenue authorities under Regulation XIX of 1814 is final. *ZAKER ALI CHOWDHRY v. JUGDESSUREE*

**1 W. R. 323**

**4. Under-tenure-holders.** A butwarra is only conclusive between the shareholders themselves, but not between them and other parties holding under-tenures at the time. *WOMESH CHUNDER MOJOMDAR v. DWARKANATH ROY* . . . . . **4 W. R. 80**

**5. Beng. Reg. XIX of 1814, s. 20.** Butwarra proceedings under s. 20. Regulation XIX of 1814, are only final as to lands which are the subject of partition. *HURREE MOHTY THAKOOR v. ANDREWS* . . . . . **W. R. 1864, 30**

**6. Extinguishment of title—***Effect of partition on others than allottees.* The allotment of land to one person by partition extinguishes another's right altogether; his subsequent possession is either that of a trespasser or a tenant-at-will; his dispossession is not illegal, and he has no legal right of suit for recovery of possession. *NOWAB BEGUM v. RUSTUM KHAN* . . . . . **2 Agra 149**

**7. Effect of partition among co-sharers.** By partition a co-sharer's proprietary right to the land which has fallen in another putti becomes extinguished, and he becomes a mere cultivator in respect to that land and liable to rent. *ZALIM RAI v. DOORGA RAI*

**1 Agra Rev. 69**

**8. Extinguishment of rights—***Tenant rights, effect of partition on.* A butwarra does not extinguish rights of tenants, and the mere circumstance that one of the proprietors of the estate was himself the tenant does not destroy his tenant right, because another of the proprietors has had the land allotted as part of his share of the divided estate. *NUTHOO LALL CHOWDHRY v. SAADAT LALL* . . . . . **W. R. 1864, 271**

**9. Co-sharers—***Raiyati and proprietary rights.* Plaintiffs sued their co-heirs to recover huq-elagaun,—that is, the half share of the produce of trees planted on a portion of the land by their ancestor before his death,—on the ground that, although by a butwarra entered into by the heirs the trees fell to the share of the defendants, plaintiffs were entitled as succeeding to the raiyati rights of the person who planted them. *Held*, that, as the ancestor was the only proprietor, his heirs were co-proprietors, and the butwarra was a division of the proprietary right; and that no raiyati right existed. *AMEERUN v. SUNJEEDA* . . . . . **11 W. R. 226**

**10. Proprietary right in sir land.** When an estate in which the proprietors have sir land is partitioned, such partition among the co-sharers is no way affected by any cultivating rights which may be possessed by cultivators not co-sharers in the estate; but it is also a well-



**PARTITION—contd.****8. EFFECT OF PARTITION—contd.**

understood effect and consequence of partition that co-sharers retain no right of occupancy in respect of any *sir* land which may have passed under the partition into the share of other co-sharers, as a *sir*-hold proprietor has no cultivating right distinct from, and independent of, his proprietary character. When, therefore, by partition he loses his proprietary title to any particular land, any cultivating right which he had in virtue of his proprietary character necessarily ceases. *AMAN SINGH v. JEY-GOPAL SINGH* . . . . . **3 Agra 184**

**11. ————— Right of holder of mokurari lease.** A joint and undivided estate having been subjected to private partition, 4 bighas which were in the portion held by *A* were granted by him in mokurari. Subsequently, on the application of the parties, the Collector made a regular partition, by which two bighas of the mokurari land were allotted to the other sharers, who refused to recognize the grantee's mokurari rights for that portion of the land, contending that, as under the private partition all the 4 bighas were in the share of the grantor, the loss of rent should be on him, and that the Collector's butwarra could not transfer 2 bighas with the mokurari or smaller rental to the other sharers. *Held*, that the grantor's mokurari title could not be got rid of by the butwarra, and that he was entitled to recognition by the other sharers. *AHMEDOOLAH v. ASHRUFF HOSSEIN*

**13 W. R. 447 : 8 B. L. R. Ap. 73 note**

**12. ————— Re-distribution by Collector after private partition—Right of mokuraridar of co-sharer.** Subsequently to a private partition by which the land in dispute was allotted to *A*, one of the co-sharers, a butwarra re-distributing the shares was made by the Collector. In the meantime *A* had granted a mokurari to *B* in respect of the land allotted to him under the private partition. *Held*, that, although the co-sharers must be taken to have consented to the re-distribution, yet *A* could not by his consent affect the right of *B*, his mokuraridar. *Byjnath Lal v. Ramoodeen Chowdhry*, **L. R. 1 I. A. 106 : 21 W. R. 233**, and *Sharat Chunder Burmon v. Hurgobindo Burmon*, **I. L. R. 4 Calc. 510**, distinguished. *Ahmedoollah v. Ashruff Hossein*, **8 B. L. R. Ap. 73 note : 13 W. R. 447**, followed. *JUGGESSUR DOYAL SINGH v. BISSESSUR PERSHAD*

**12 C. L. R. 281**

**13. ————— Butwarra award, effect of—Intervenor.** A butwarra award is no absolute proof of title, and no estoppel in the way of an intervenor who can prove that he has received and enjoyed the rents claimed from a date subsequent to the butwarra. *SREENATH GHOSAL v. JOY NARAIN KAVAR* **3 W. R., Act. X, 11**

**14. ————— Family dwelling-house—Partition wall—Open space of ground—Easement.** Upon partition of joint property in Calcutta by mutual conveyances whether under the direction of a Court of law or otherwise, it is implied that the parties take their respective shares with easements

**PARTITION—contd.****8. EFFECT OF PARTITION—contd.**

of light and air as between themselves in accordance with the existing state of the premises. In a suit for the partition of a family dwelling-house it was directed that the parties should take their respective shares by mutual conveyances with liberty to the plaintiff to raise a partition wall. The shares were allotted, but no conveyances executed. *Held*, that in equity the parties must be deemed to have taken as if under mutual conveyances, in so far as concerned easements of light and air. *BOLYE CHUNDER SEN v. LALMONI DAS*

**I. L. R. 14 Calc. 797**

*See DWARKANATH PAUL v. SUNDER LALL SEAL*  
**3 C. W. N. 407**

and *KADAMBINI DEBI v. KALI KUMAR HALDAR*  
**I. L. R. 26 Calc. 516**  
**3 C. W. N. 409**

**15. ————— Partition of estates—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 188—Joint landlords.** A tenure was held under a zamindari, which originally formed one entire estate. The estate was subsequently partitioned by the revenue authorities into four several estates. The rent of the tenure was thereupon allotted proportionately to each of the four estates thus formed, although the land forming the tenure remained undivided. In a suit for enhancement of the rent of the tenure brought by the proprietor of some of the estates :—*Held*, that the effect of the partition of the parent estate was to create separate and distinct tenures out of the original single tenure under the proprietors of each of the estates; that the proprietors of the several estates were not joint landlords of the tenure within the meaning of s. 188 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and that therefore a suit for enhancement of rent would lie by a proprietor of one of the estates in respect of the rent allotted to his estate. *Sarat Soonduree Debia v. Someer-oodeen Talookdar*, **23 W. R. 530**, and *Sarat Soondary Debia v. Anunda Mohun Surma Ghuttack*, **I. L. R. 5 Calc. 273**, followed. *HEM CHANDRA CHOWDHRY v. KALI PRASANNA BHADURI*

**I. L. R. 26 Calc. 832**

**16. ————— Co-owners—Dispossession—Adverse possession—Constructive possession—Waste land—Limitation.** To effect a partition the property, if susceptible of division, must be transformed into estates in severalty and one of such estates assigned to each of the former occupants for his sole use and as his sole property. Although co-owners cannot enforce a partition of a part only of the common lands, leaving the rest undivided, and, although the entire property must be included in the partition, yet, if by mistake, or by consent of the co-owner, acting innocently and fairly, a partition of a portion only of their estate has been made, whether by order of the Court or otherwise, there is no reason why the Court should not grant a division of the remainder at the instance of one or more of the co-owners. The conclusion is, therefore, irresistible that the effect of a decree in



**PARTITION—concl'd.****8. EFFECT OF PARTITION—concl'd.**

the partition suit was to leave untouched the joint title and possession of the parties (in the remainder), and that the present suit for recovery of joint possession may well be maintained. *Barnes v. Boardman*, 157 Mass. 479; s.c. 32 N. E. 670, and *Cartmell v. Chambers*, 54 S. W. 362, referred to, and *Jagatjit Singh v. Sarabjit Singh*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 159, followed. The fundamental rule is that the entry and possession of land under the common title of a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the others but will ordinarily be held to be for the benefit of all. *Richard v. William*, 7 Wheaton 107; *Prescott v. Nevers*, 4 Mason 326; s.c. 19 Fed. Cas. 1286; *Doe v. Prosser*, 1 Cowper 217; *Doe v. Taylor*, 5 B. & Ad. 575; *McClung v. Ross*, 5 Wheaton 116, and *Clyner v. Dawkins*, 3 Howard 674, referred to and approved of; *Mahomed Ali Khan v. Khaja Abdul Gunny*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 774; *Baroda Sundari Debia v. Annoda Sundari Debia*, 3 C. W. N. 741; *Ujalbi Bibi v. Umakanta Karmokar*, I. L. R. 31 Calc. 970; *Ittappan v. Manavikrama*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 153; *Mahesh Narain v. Naubat Pathak*, I. L. R. 32 Calc. 837; s.c. 1 C. L. J. 437; *Jagar Nath Singh v. Jai Nath Singh*, I. L. R. 27 All. 88, and *Phani Singh v. Nawab Singh*, I. L. R. 28 All. 161, followed. To prove title to land by adverse possession for the statutory period it is not sufficient to show that some acts of possession have been done; the possession required must be adequate, in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that it is possession adverse to the competitor; in other words, the possession must be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued during the time necessary to create a bar under the Statute of Limitation. *Radhanani Debi v. The Collector of Khulna*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 943, followed; *Armstrong v. Monill*, 14 Wallace 145, and *Doswell v. Dela Lanza*, 20 Howard 32, referred to and approved of. *Leigh v. Jack*, 5 Ex. D. 264, and *Wali Ahmed Chowdhry v. Tota Meah Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 31 Calc. 397, referred to. The doctrine of constructive possession applies only in favour of a rightful owner and must not as a rule be extended in favour of a wrong-doer whose possession must be confined to lands, of which he is actually in possession. *Mohini Mohan Roy v. Promoda Nath Roy*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 256; *Radha Gobind Roy v. Inglis*, 7 C. L. R. 364; *Udit Narain Singh v. Golabchand Sahu*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 221; *Ananda Hari Basak v. Secretary of State*, 3 C. L. J. 316, and *Vithaldas Kanjishet v. Secretary of State*, I. L. R. 26 Bom. 410, followed; *Hunnicut v. Peyton*, 102 U. S. 369, referred to. **JOGENDRA NATH RAI v. BALADEO DAS** (1907)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 961  
s.c. 12 C. W. N. 127

**9. LIABILITY AFTER PARTITION.**

Liability to account for portion of property if in possession—*Co-sharers*. Every one who is entitled to a share in a joint family property in a suit for partition must

**PARTITION—concl'd.****9. LIABILITY AFTER PARTITION—concl'd.**

account for such portion as may have come into his hands. **GOUR PERSHAD MOOKERJEE v. KALEE PERSHAD MOOKERJEE** . . . 5 W. R. 121

**10. MISCELLANEOUS CASES.**

— **Beng. Reg. XIX of 1814, s. 20—**  
*Case where no partition takes place. Held*, that s. 20, Regulation XIX of 1814, had no reference to a case where no partition had been made and plaintiff was not a co-sharer. **FOOLBASHEE KOWAR v. ARZUN SAHOO** . . . 12 W. R. 134

2. — **Suit for confirmation of possession—Beng. Reg. XIX of 1814.** To a partition effected by the Revenue authorities under Regulation XIX of 1814 the plaintiff presented a petition of objection, in which he alleged that his share had been included in, and declared to be part and parcel of, the defendant's share. In a suit for a declaration of his right to the share claimed by him, and for confirmation of possession thereof, both the lower Courts gave a decree for the plaintiff. On special appeal, an objection was taken that the suit would not lie, no application having been made in it for the annulment of the partition proceedings by which the property sued for was included in the plaintiff's share. *Held*, that the suit would lie; that there was no necessity for the plaintiff, who claimed to be in possession of his proper share, and sued only for a declaration of his title thereto, to include in his plaint an application for the renewal of the partition proceedings: and that those proceedings were final. **INDRABATI KUNWARI v. MAHADEO CHOWDHRY** . . . 1 B. L. R. S. N. 6

3. — **Suit for house allotted on partition—Agreement to pay rent for house—Onus of proof.** Where on partition the defendant's house fell within the plaintiff's lot:—*Held*, the plaintiff was entitled to sue for possession of the house, and that it lay on the defendants to prove that under s. 38, Act XIX of 1863, they were entitled to retain possession by having agreed to pay an equitable rent for the ground, which rent had been determined by the officer making the partition, and had been stated in the paper of partition. **LAIKHRAM v. GHUMNEE** 3 Agra 298

4. — **Beng. Reg. XIX of 1814, s. 9. Dwelling-houses of co-sharers—Liability to assessment.** Suit for khas possession of land made over to plaintiff on a butwarra. The defendant pleaded twelve years' adverse possession, and that he was entitled to retain possession on payment of rent, as the lands were occupied by gardens made by his ancestor. *Held*, that s. 9, Regulation XI of 1814, did not apply to the lands made over to the plaintiff under the butwarra; that section referring to the dwelling-houses of co-sharers, and to offices, buildings, and ground immediately attached to those dwelling-houses, which the lands in suit were not proved to be. **LULEET NARAIN v. GOPAL SINGH** 9 W. R. 145



**PARTITION—contd.****10. MISCELLANEOUS CASES—contd.**

5. ———— **Mortgage by co-sharer—Incumbrance—Cause of action—Beng. Reg. XIX of 1814.** *A*, one of the shareholders of a talukh consisting of several mouzahs, mortgaged his share in one of the mouzahs named Kishoopore to *B*. Upon a partition being made under Regulation XIX of 1814, the mouzah Kishoopore was allotted to *C* and *D*, co-parceners in the talukh, and other mouzahs were allotted to *A*. In a suit by *C* against *B* for obtaining possession of his share in Kishoopore :—*Held*, that there was no cause of action. Upon a partition of a joint property, a co-parcener is bound by the incumbrances created by another co-parcener in respect of a portion of the property, if such portion be allotted to him upon a partition between the co-parceners. *NISHAN SING v. JUGDEO SING*

4 B. L. R. Ap. 97

6. ———— **Suit to set aside sale for arrears of revenue—Sanction of Board of Revenue—Completion of partition.** *Per* BAYLEY, J.—The completion of the partition was not necessary under Act XI of 1838 before the amount of unpaid expenses could become an arrear realizable by sale. *Semble* : The Government need not give its sanction in each case, but a "general" sanction will be sufficient. *HAR GOPAL DAS v. RAM GOLAM SAHI*

5 B. L. R. 155 : 13 W. R. 381

7. ———— **Objection to application for partition—Act XIX of 1863—Procedure.** When an objection was taken to an application for partition under Act XIX of 1863, the Collector might either decline the application until the question has been decided, or proceed to investigate it. If he adopted the latter course, he was bound to follow the procedure prescribed by Act VIII of 1859. But his failure to follow that procedure would not deprive the parties of their right of appeal to the Judge, who must dispose of the appeal in due course. *RAMESHUR RAI v. SUBHOO RAI*

1 N. W. 81 : Ed. 1873, 134

8. ———— **Application by co-sharer for partition—Objection by co-sharer in possession—N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), ss. 111-113.** Reading together ss. 111, 112, and 113 of the N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), as they must be read, the objection contemplated in each of them is an objection to be made by the person upon whom the notice required by s. 111 is to be served, i.e., a person who is a co-sharer in possession, and who has not joined in the joint application for partition. *MUHAMMAD ABDUL KARIM v. MUHAMMAD SHADI KHAN*

I. L. R. 9 All. 429

9. ———— **Order for partition by Assistant Collector confirmed by Collector—Objection subsequently made to mode of partition—Question of title—N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), s. 113.** Upon an application made under s. 108 of the N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873) for partition of a share in a mehal, no question of title or proprietary right of the nature contemplated by s. 113 was raised, nor any serious

**PARTITION—contd.****10. MISCELLANEOUS CASES—contd.**

objection made by any of the co-sharers, and the Assistant Collector recorded a proceeding setting forth the rules which were to govern the partition, and this proceeding was confirmed by the Collector under s. 138. An Amin was ordered to carry out the partition, and, in taking steps to do so, stated the principle upon which he proposed to distribute the common land. An objection was then for the first time raised by two of the co-sharers in the Court of the Assistant Collector to the inclusion of a particular piece of land in the partition, on the ground that it appertained exclusively to their share. This objection was disallowed by the Assistant Collector, and, on appeal, by the District Judge. *Held*, that, at the stage of the proceedings when objections were taken, it was too late to determine questions of title under s. 113 of the Act; that accordingly the Assistant Collector could not be said to have done so; that the objections could therefore only be regarded in the light of objections to the mode in which it was proposed to make the partition, and that consequently there was no appeal from the order of the Assistant Collector to the District Judge or from the District Judge to the High Court. *TOTA RAM v. ISHUR DAS*

I. L. R. 9 All. 445

10. ———— **Suit to stay partition by Collector—Bengal Act VIII of 1876, s. 26—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 42—Declaration of specific rights—Limitation.** A person bringing a suit under s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act to stay a partition directed by the Collector under Bengal Act VIII of 1876, on the ground that a private partition has already been come to, must prove not only that there has been a private partition, but also that under that partition, he is entitled to, and was in possession of, in severalty, some specific portion of the property again sought to be partitioned by the Collector; and such person is entitled to no declaration affecting the rights of other shares in the parent estate. *Khoobun v. Wooma Churn Singh*, 3 C. L. R. 453, distinguished. *Semble* : S. 26 of Bengal Act VIII of 1876 does not bar the right to bring an action, but merely limits the effect of the decree unless the action is brought within a certain time. *KALUP NATH SINGH v. LALA RAMDEIN LAL*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 117

11. ———— **Decree in suit for partition—Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, s. 39—Application for effecting partition—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Arts. 178 and 179.** Plaintiff obtained a decree for partition in 1885, and first made an application to have the partition effected by an arbitrator in 1886. This application was struck off, and a second application was made on the 23rd July 1888. The arbitrator then declined to act, and the application was struck off. The present application was made on the 1st August 1891, and an objection was raised that, more than three years having elapsed from the date of the previous application, the present one was barred under Art. 179 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act. The lower Court



**PARTITION—concl'd.****10. MISCELLANEOUS CASES—concl'd.**

of appeal held that Art. 178, and not Art. 179, applied to the case, but that, the plaintiff having applied within three years from the date when the arbitrator declined to act, the application was in time. *Held*, with reference to the provisions of s. 396 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that the proceedings for the purpose of effecting the partition were proceedings in the suit itself, and not proceedings in execution of the decree that no formal application was necessary, the Court being bound to proceed with the suit and make a final decree; and that the application made on the 1st August 1891 was not one to which limitation was applicable. *DWARAKA NATH MISSEER v. BARINDA NATH MISSEER*. I. L. R. 22 Calc. 425

See *MUHAMMAD KHAN v. HANWANT SINGH*.

I. L. R. 20 All. 311

**12. Interlocutory decree—Partition Act (IV of 1893), s. 10—Partition—Offer by a party to a partition suit of compensation—Decree in partition suit when final—Civil Procedure Code, s. 393.** *Held*, that s. 10 of Act IV of 1893 would apply to a suit for partition in the stage where an interlocutory decree for partition has been made, but that decree had not become final by the Court's acceptance of the lots prepared by the officer appointed for that purpose. *Muhammad Khan v. Hanwant Singh*, I. L. R. 20 All. 311, and *Zubaida an v. Muhammad Taieb*, All. Weekly Notes (1898) 9, referred to. *ABDUS SAMAD KHAN v. ABDUR RAZZAQ KHAN*. I. L. R. 21 All. 409

**13. Minor's share—Joint property—Minor co-parceners—Guardian's defalcations respecting joint property.** In a partition suit, the minor plaintiff's share ought not to be burdened with the liabilities of his guardian merely because his guardian committed defalcations in respect of the joint property of the parties to the suit, in the absence of any allegation or proof that the plaintiff had derived benefit therefrom. *SONU v. DHONDU* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 330

**14. Prior purchaser or incumbrancer—Priority not a right but an equity—Circumstances of each case—Account of past transactions—Death of a co-parcener pending appeal by him—Representation by the co-parcener's widow in and for purposes of appeal.** The principle laid down in *Andurang v. Bhaskar*, 11 Bom. H. C. 72, and *Madaram v. Ranu*, 11 Bom. H. C. 76, has settled the law governing decrees for partition. Prior purchasers or incumbrancers are, as far as possible, entitled to priority, but not as a matter of right. It is only an equity, and the question how and where the equity should be invoked in aid of a party must depend upon equitable considerations which, again, must depend on the circumstances of each case. In partition suit no co-parcener has any right to an account of past transactions. A co-parcener (who claimed the whole of the property in suit, but who

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was only allowed a share in that property by the lower Courts) having died pending second appeal by him, his widow was allowed to represent him in or for the purposes of the second appeal notwithstanding the application of the co-parceners of the deceased that they were entitled to his share. *NARAYAN BIN BABAJI v. NATHAJI DURGAI* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 201

**15. Appeal—Preliminary Decree—Final Decree—Appeal against preliminary decree after final decree, legality of—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 562—Practice.** Where in a partition suit a final decree had been made and an appeal was preferred against the preliminary decree only:—*Held*, that it was not open to the appellant to challenge the correctness of the preliminary decree without preferring an appeal against the final decree. *Madhu Sudan Sen v. Kamini Kanta Sen*, I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1023, referred to. *Baikunta Nath Dey v. Nawab Salimulla Bahadur*, 6 C. L. J. 547, followed. *Uman Kunwari v. Jarbandhan*, I. L. R. 30 All. 479, *Sheo Nath Singh v. Ram Din Singh*, I. L. R. 18 All. 19, not followed. *MACKENZIE v. NARSINGH SAHAI* (1909) . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 762

**16. Stay of proceedings—Civil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908), Order XLV, rule 13—Preliminary decree for partition—Appeal to Privy Council—High Court, if may stay further proceeding.** The High Court has no power to stay proceedings in a suit following a preliminary decree for partition against which it has granted leave to appeal to the Privy Council. The Privy Council which has seized of the appeal can alone do so. *LALITESUR SINGH v. BHABESUR SINGH* (1909)

13 C. W. N. 690

**PARTITION ACT (IV OF 1893).****s. 2—**

See **PARTITION—MISCELLANEOUS CASES.**

5 C. W. N. 128

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 639

**1. Decree for partition—Partition of a house in two divisions—The mode of division found inexpedient in execution of the decree—Power of Court to order sale of the house and to divide the sale proceeds.** A decree for partition of a house ordered its division into two equal moieties. In execution of the decree this mode of division was found inexpedient, and the Court, therefore, ordered the house to be sold and the sale proceeds to be equally divided between the parties under s. 2 of the Partition Act (IV of 1893). On appeal: *Held*, that the order was right, for s. 2 of the Partition Act (IV of 1893) applies, not only where the Court has to pass a decree in a suit for partition, but also where, after the Court has passed such a decree directing the partition to be effected in a particular mode, it is found that that mode is impracticable or

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**PARTITION ACT (IV OF 1893)—concl'd.**

———— s. 2—concl'd.

inexpedient and one of the parties asks the Court to modify the decree by passing an order under this section. *Kadir Bacha Saheb v. Abdul Rahiman Saheb*, I. L. R. 24 Mad. 639, and *Hiramonni Dasi v. Radha Churn Kar*, 5 C. W. N. 128, followed. *Bai HIRAKORE v. TRIKAMDAS* (1907)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 103

1. ————— s. 4—*Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 44*—"Undivided family"—S. 4 of the Partition Act applicable to Mahomedans. Held, that Mahomedans are not excluded from the benefit of s. 4 of the Partition Act (IV of 1893). *Kalka Parshad v. Bankey Lall*, 9 Oudh Cases 158, approved. *Amme Raham v. Zia Ahmad*, I. L. R. 13 All. 282, referred to. *Hashmat Ali v. Muhammad Umar*, I. L. R. 29 All. 308, overruled. *SULTAN BEGAM v. DEBI PRASAD* (1908)

I. L. R. 30 All. 324

2. ————— *Dwelling house belonging to an undivided family—Mahomedans.* Held, that the expression "a dwelling house belonging to an undivided family" as used in s. 4 of the Partition Act, 1893, is not applicable to a house belonging to a Mahomedan family. *Amme Raham v. Zia Ahmad*, I. L. R. 13 All. 282, referred to. *HASHMAT ALI v. MUHAMMAD UMAR* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 308

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**PARTNERSHIP.**

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**WHAT CONSTITUTES PARTNERSHIP.****Participation in profits—**

*Application of English law.* *M M & Co., merchants in London, carrying on business with W N W & Co., merchants in Calcutta, sought to make the defendant liable as a partner in the latter firm, under a particular memorandum of agreement between the members of the firm of W N W & Co., and the defendant. Held, that such agreement did not constitute the Rajah a partner in or with the said firm. Participation in profits does not constitute a partnership. The question is, not whether the person sought to be made liable participated in the profits, but whether the trade has been carried on by persons acting on his behalf. There is no rule of law which imposes partnership liability upon a man who advances to others money for the purpose of carrying on their business, and in return reserves to himself a share of the profits which may arise from the employment in the business of the money so advanced by him.* PRATAB CHUNDRA SINGH v. MOLLOW, MARCH & Co.

3 B. L. R. A. C. 238

C. COURT OF WARDS v. MOLLOW, MARCH &amp; Co.

12 W. R. 56

Appeal to the Privy Council:—Held, that

**PARTNERSHIP—contd.****1. WHAT CONSTITUTES PARTNERSHIP—contd.**

although a right to participate in the profits of trade is a strong test of partnership, and there may be cases where, from such participation alone, it may, as a presumption, not of law, but of fact, be inferred, yet whether that relation does or does not exist must depend on the real intention and contract of the parties. To constitute a partnership, the parties must have agreed to carry on business and to share profits in some way in common; but where a contract is entered into between partners and a third person for the protection of that person as a creditor, whereby it is agreed that he shall receive in consideration of advances commission on the net profits of the partnership business, and large powers of control over the business are given to him, but no power to direct transactions, the Court, if satisfied that the contract was one of loan and security, will not interpret it as constituting a partnership. In applying the English law of partnership to cases in India, the usages of trade and habits of business of the people of India, so far as they may be peculiar and differ from those in England ought to be borne in mind. MOLLOW, MARCH & Co. v. COURT OF WARDS

10 B. L. R. 312: 18 W. R. 384  
L. R. I. A. Sup. Vol. 86**2. Agreement to share profits—**

*Money paid as rent to one party.* The parties had entered into a contract of partnership to work certain supposed mines; plaintiff to receive a bonus and also six monthly payments as "rent" for the land, both parties to share the profits and bear the losses; it being stipulated that in case coal should not be discovered, the bonus and any sum paid as rent would be refunded. Held, that this was a partnership arrangement, and the payment of the money which went by the name of rent was not as by a tenant to a landlord, but as consideration-money for land forming a portion of the capital. SREEMUNJUREE DOSSEE v. POORSUTTUN DOSSE

9 W. R. 499

**3. Contract Act,**

ss. 239, 240—*Loan of money.* Held, on the construction of the agreement in this case, that such agreement did not create a "partnership" between the parties thereto, as defined in s. 239 of Act IX of 1872, but was an agreement of the kind mentioned in s. 240 of that Act. BHAGGU LALL v. DEGRUYTHIER . . . . .

I. L. R. 4 All. 74

**4. Joint Hindu family—**

*Separation among members of.* Circumstances under which the Court will infer a partnership between members of a Hindu family alleged to have separated. MISSRELOLL v. RAMNARAIN . . . . .

Cor. 63

**5. Account.**

There is no analogy in respect of the manager being liable to account between a joint Hindu family and a partnership. Where it was arranged amongst the members of a joint Hindu family that the accounts of a banking business carried on by them should be kept, on the understanding that the profits, when



**PARTNERSHIP—contd.****1. WHAT CONSTITUTES PARTNERSHIP—  
contd.**

realized, should be divided amongst the individual members in certain proportions, and that the expenses of each member should be credited and charged in the name of each member :—*Held*, that this was in the nature of a partnership, and an account was decreed. *RANGANMANI DASI v. KASINATH DUTT* . . . **3 B. L. R. O. C. 1**

**6. ——— Ancestral business—Account.**  
An ancestral trade may descend like other inheritable property upon the members of a Hindu undivided family. The partnership so created or surviving has many, but not all, of the elements existing in an ordinary partnership. For example, the death of one of the partners does not dissolve the partnership; nor, as a rule, can one of the partners, when severing his connection with the business, ask for an account of past profits and losses. *SAMALBHAI NATHUBHAI v. SOMESHWER*

**I. L. R. 5 Bom. 38**

But see *ABHAY CHANDRA ROY CHOWDHRY v. PYARIMOHAN GUHO* . . . **5 B. L. R. 347**

**7. ——— Document creating partnership—Determination of partnership.** Where a document creating a partnership for a particular business is silent as to the date at which the partnership is to commence and end :—*Held*, that the partnership is contemporaneous with the business for the purpose for which it was created. *BUDDREENATH v. ISREE PERSHAUD* . . . **Cor. 114**

**8. ——— Continuing firm—Partnership for a fixed term—Death of partner—Power of partner to nominate a successor—General device not an exercise of power—Effect of default in exercising power of nomination—Good will—Valuable asset.** *V, J, and S*, being large shareholders in the Great Eastern Spinning and Weaving Mills, Limited, entered into an agreement in October 1873 to cause the said company to be wound up and to form a new company to take over its assets and liabilities, and to cause themselves to be appointed agents of the new company under the firm of *V J S & Co.*, and under that name to act as agents of the new company, subject to the terms of the agreement. The agreement provided that the firm of *V J S & Co.*, should take the agency of the new company for a period of thirty years; that of the profits to be derived by the said firm out of the agency *V* should receive 39 cents, *J* 31 cents, and *S* 30 cents; that in case of a vacancy in the firm of *V J S & Co.*, caused by the death or retirement of any of the partners, the nominee of the dying or retiring partner should be admitted into partnership, and should receive the share of such partner, and should exercise all his authority. In pursuance of this agreement, the Great Eastern Spinning and Weaving Mills, Limited, was wound up, and a new company called "The New Great Eastern Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited," was formed and registered. Both the memorandum and articles of association of the said new company contained clauses providing that the firm of *V J S & Co.*, or

**PARTNERSHIP—contd.****1. WHAT CONSTITUTES PARTNERSHIP—  
contd.**

whatever member or members that firm for the time consist of, should be agents of the company so long as the said firm should carry on business in Bombay, or until they should resign. The firm of *V J S & Co.*, having been constituted under the said agreement, became the agents of the said company, and continued to act as such down to the date of the present suit. No other business was done by the firm, and the three partners divided the profits realized by the firm out of the agency business in the shares specified in the agreement as above mentioned. *V* died in 1874, leaving a will whereby, in exercise of the right vested in him by the agreement, he nominated and appointed his wife *K* as his successor in the firm, and she accordingly became and was recognized as a partner therein. In August 1875 she assigned her interest in the firm to *H*, and he thereupon became a partner and received 39 cents of the profits. In November 1876 *J* assigned his interest in the firm (31 cents), to *H* and *S*, of which 21 cents became the property of *H* and 10 cents the property of *S*,—the firm henceforth consisting only of these two partners, of whom the former received in all 60 cents of the profits and the latter 40 cents. In November 1882, *H* died, leaving a will whereby he appointed his wife *B* his executrix, and left all his property to her for life, and after her death to his son. The will did not refer to the firm, or nominate any successor in the partnership. In the present suit *B* as executrix claimed to be entitled to 60 cents or shares in the firm of *V J S & Co.* up to the date of the testator's death, and to a like share in the profits earned subsequently to his death, or to be earned by the firm so long as it continued to carry on the said agency business of the company. The defendant admitted the right of the plaintiff to the share claimed in the profits earned prior to the testator's death, but resisted her claim to any portion of the subsequent profit. *Held* (i), on the authority of *Beamish v. Beamish, Jr. Rep. 4 Eq. 120*, that the testator's will did not operate as an exercise of the power of nominating a successor in the firm so as to make the plaintiff a partner. (ii) That having regard to the nature of the duties of the firm as agents and to the language of the agreement constituting the firm, coupled with the fact that there was no capital employed in the business, it must have been intended that, in default of nomination of a successor by a retiring or deceased partner, the agency should be carried on by the continuing or surviving partners in the name of the firm, and that the interest of the testator in the firm upon his death therefore survived to the defendant. *Held*, also, that, although the plaintiff was entitled to an account up to the date of the testator's death, she was not entitled to a share of the good-will as an asset of the firm. The good-will of a firm is attached to the name, and in the present case, by the partnership agreement itself, the name was to be used by the surviving partners or partner for their own benefit. That arrangement took away all value from the good-will, if indeed it was consistent



**PARTNERSHIP—contd.****1. WHAT CONSTITUTES PARTNERSHIP—  
contd.**

with its being an asset at all. *BACHUBAI v. SHAMJI JADOWJI*. I. L. R. 9 Bom. 536

**9. ——— Intention of parties—Profits, participation in—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 242, 238—Broker.** A right to participate in profits is sometimes a strong test of partnership; but whether or not the relation of partners does or does not exist depends on the real intention and agreement of the parties, and not upon the mere fact of participation in profits. *Davis v. Davis*, [1894] 1 Ch. 393, referred to. The facts that B, an assistant in a firm of brokers, received, over and above his salary, a share in the profits; and that, with the knowledge of the partners, he occasionally signed, on delivery orders which came from buyers in favour of the firm, the signature "for Carritt & Co." (the name of the firm), with his own initials or name underneath; that he occasionally signed with his own signature letters dealing with mere matters of detail; and that he purported to make firm offers to buyers and sellers, and initialled alterations in some contracts, do not constitute him a partner in that firm. The duties and responsibilities of a broker discussed. *MORRISON v. VERSCHOYLE* (1901). 6 C. W. N. 429

**10. ——— Partnership, tests of—Participation in profits by lender—Taking active interest in business—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 240, 241—Holding out as partner to strangers—Estoppel—Intention—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 115.** The right to participate in the profits of trade is in itself a strong test of partnership, but participation in profits, although strong evidence, is not conclusive evidence of a partnership and the question of partnership must be decided by the intention of parties to be ascertained from the contents of the written instruments, if any, and the conduct of the parties. It being established in this case with regard to a person's relation towards a business carried on with his money, that he was a mere lender:—*Held*, that neither the fact of his participating in the profits nor that he took an active interest in the business were inconsistent with his position as a lender. *Mollou, March & Co. v. Court of Wards*, 10 B. L. R. 312, and *Badeley v. Consolidated Bank*, L. R. 38 Ch. D. 208, followed. Where the question was as to whether a person, though not in fact a partner, did by his acts and conduct hold himself out to strangers as such, so as to become liable by estoppel:—*Held*, that to establish such liability it was not essential to show that he acted fraudulently or negligently. Even want of knowledge on his part of the effect of his acts and conduct would not absolve him from liability, if his acts and conduct were such as would induce a reasonable man to believe that he was a partner and to act upon such belief. *Sarat Chandra Dey, v. Gopal Chandra Laha*, L. R. 19 I. A. 203. *Cornish v. Abington*, 4 H. & N. 549, *Carr v. London and North-Western Railway Company*, L. R. 10 C. P.

**PARTNERSHIP—contd.****1. WHAT CONSTITUTES PARTNERSHIP—  
contd.**

*216, Dickenson v. Valpy*, 10 B. & C. 128, referred to. *PORTER v. INCELL* (1905). 10 C. W. N. 313

**2. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PART-  
NERS.**

**1. ——— Construction of deed of partnership—Agreement to give managing partner commission—Dissolution of partnership—Loss of commission on dissolution.** By an agreement, made on the 10th of January 1857, between K N and several other persons, it was agreed that they should form a co-partnership for the purpose of erecting a mill for the manufacture of yarn. The capital of the partnership was fixed at Rs. 3,00,000, divided into 100 shares of Rs. 3,000 each. By the 4th clause of the agreement it was provided that, in return for the trouble K N had been at in establishing the factory, "whatever cotton had to be purchased for the factory K N was to purchase, and whatever yarn should be made in the factory K N was to sell, and for whatever he should sell on account of the factory he was duly to receive from the co-partnership his commission at the rate of 5 per cent. during his lifetime," and it was also provided that, though the purchases and sales by the co-partnership should not be made through K N, "yet upon the whole amount of the sales the co-partnership was duly to pay 5 per cent. to K N during his lifetime." The factory was built, and its machinery procured and set up by K N, and both financially and otherwise the factory was wholly managed by him. Shortly after it commenced to work, it was found that the co-partnership had expended all its capital and was heavily involved in debt—incurred by K N without the sanction of his co-partners,—and that the factory was working at a loss; and at the suit of some of them, but against the consent of K N and a minority of the co-partners, the co-partnership was ordered to be dissolved. K N then claimed to be entitled to compensation for the loss of the commission he should have earned upon the sale of the yarn of the factory during his lifetime. *Held*, that he was not so entitled; that as between his co-partners and K N there was no obligation on the former to subscribe more capital after the original capital of the co-partnership had been exhausted; and that there was no implied covenant on the part of co-partnership to continue to work the factory in order that K N should be in a position to earn his commission during his lifetime. Distinction between right to compensation for loss of fixed wages and right to compensation for loss of commission pointed out. When a partnership is wound up by the Court, all questions arising between the partners out of the partnership transactions should be disposed of in the winding-up suit. *LALBHAI VALLABHBHAI v. KAVASJI NANABHAI*. 8 Bom. O. C. 209



**PARTNERSHIP—contd.****2. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PARTNERS—contd.**

**2. ——— Payments made by partners—Presumption—Dissolution of partnership.** Payments made by the different partners of a firm are presumed to have been made out of the funds of the firm where the contrary is not proved by any satisfactory evidence; and when a firm consisting of two members is dissolved by the death of one partner, the presumption is that the deceased was entitled to a moiety of the existing assets. *KESHAV GOPAL GINDE v. RAYAPA* . . . **12 Bom. 165**

**3. ——— Dormant partner, liability of—Bond executed by one of several partners—Right of creditor.** The doctrine that a dormant partner, when discovered, is liable for every debt incurred for the partnership by the active partner, is not absolute in the Courts in England, and is not to be followed by the Courts of this country, unless found in particular cases to be consonant with justice, equity, and good conscience. Where money was lent on a bond to a "malik and mukhtear" of a factory on his personal credit and the security of the entire factory, and it was afterwards discovered that other parties had a share in the factory, it was held that the lender was not entitled to go beyond his contract and recover from those other parties personally. *NUNDEEPUT MAHATAH v. URQUHART* **9 W. R. 355**

**4. ——— Bill drawn by one partner.** Every one of the partners in a mercantile firm of ordinary trading partnership is liable upon a bill drawn by a partner in the recognized trading name of the firm for a transaction incident to the business of the firm, although his name does not appear upon the face of the instrument, although he be a sleeping and secret partner. In order to take a case out of these principles of the general law, it must be shown that the holder of the bill knew at the time he received it that the transaction was the private affair of a single partner. *BUNARSEE DOSS v. GHOLAM HOSSEIN* **13 W. R. P. C. 29: 13 Moo. I. A. 358**

**5. ——— Liability of partners on bond executed by managing partner.** Where a bond is executed by the managing partner in a firm within the ordinary scope of a manager's authority, to raise money for the joint purpose of the firm, it binds the remaining partners. *AHMED HOSSEIN v. KURNEEDAN* . . . **24 W. R. 60**

**6. ——— Liability of partner for purchases made by co-partner out of the scope of partnership business—Application of proceeds of sale to pay partnership debts.** C, the managing member in Calcutta of a firm of which B, the other partner, was absent in England, made, unknown to B and without authority from him, various purchases from the plaintiff of articles not within the scope of the partnership business. The purchases were made as for the firm, and were delivered on the partnership premises by the plaintiff. Subsequently, the goods were taken to C's house,

**PARTNERSHIP—contd.****2. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PARTNERS—contd.**

and, together with certain private property belonging to C, were sold by auction, and the whole proceeds of the sale were paid by C to a bank in Calcutta to the partnership account with that bank, and were eventually remitted to B in England as from the partnership funds, and applied in payment of certain bills of the firm then due. B, on coming to Calcutta, took over the management of the business from C. In a suit brought against B and C for the price of the goods purchased from the plaintiff:—Held, both in the Court below and on appeal, that B was not liable. *MARTIN v. BAKER* **15 B. L. R. 372**

**7. ——— Liability of person joining firm as partner.** Where one person joins a firm as partner in place of one of the partners, he is only liable for the debts of the firm contracted after he joined it, unless by special agreement. *GUJADHUR PERSHAD v. KUNHYA LALL* . . . **3 Agra 27**

**8. ——— Contract Act, s. 249.** S. 249 of the Contract Act has no application in cases where by arrangement between the parties a person becomes entitled to the profits and liable for the debts accruing to and incurred by the firm before his admission as a partner. *SHEWAK MAHTOON v. ST. JOSEPH* . . . **9 C. L. R. 21**

**9. ——— Partner dealing with Hindu joint family—Dealings among co-partners.** A co-partner dealing with an undivided Hindu family is, with reference to its component members, in the same position that a partner according to English law is placed in with respect to his co-partners and their representatives. *RAMLAL THAKURSIDAS v. LUCHMICHAND MUNIRAM* . . . **1 Bom. Ap. 51**

**10. ——— Lien of banian on goods under agreement with firm—Construction of agreement.** The plaintiff became banian to the defendants, under an agreement by which he had a lien upon all goods "belonging to" them in their godowns for balances that might be due by them. Some time after the date of the agreement, while there was a balance due, the defendants' firm took in a new partner. Held, that the words "belonging to" included all goods in the possession of the new firm that came to them in the way of business. Held, also, that the new firm, not having given notice to the contrary, must be taken to have engaged the plaintiff as banian upon the terms expressed in the agreement with the old firm, and to have taken over the balance due at the time when the new firm was constituted as a debt due by the new firm. *BALDEO DAS AGARWALLA v. KAICH.* **3 B. L. R. O. C. 80**

**11. ——— Power of partner to borrow money—Winding up—Account—Suit for dissolution—Power of partner to mortgage partnership land.** T, B, R, and W, the owners of a certain estate in equal shares, in 1863 entered into a partnership for "the cultivation of tea and other products" upon



**PARTNERSHIP—contd.****2. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PARTNERS**  
—contd.

such estate. In 1864 *H*, *E*, and *I* joined the firm. In 1870 *H* died; and in 1871 *T* purchased the shares of *E* and *I*, and in 1873 of *R*. In 1875, *T* gave the Delhi and London Bank a mortgage on such estate as security for the repayment of money which he had borrowed from the Bank ostensibly for the purposes of the estate. The Bank obtained a decree against him personally for the money, in execution of which his rights and interests in the estate were put up for sale on the 20th June 1877 and were purchased by the Bank, which obtained possession of the estate in August 1877. In August 1879 *B* and *W*'s executor sued *T* and the Bank, claiming a declaration that they were or had been partners with *T* in the estate; that if the partnership should be held to be subsisting, it might be dissolved, or that, if it had ceased to exist, the date of its termination might be fixed, and that in either event a liquidator might be appointed to take an account, and, after realizing assets and discharging liabilities, might be ordered to pay them each one-third of such balance as remained. *Held*, that, as the effect of the purchases by *T* in 1871 and 1873 was to relieve the estates of *H*, *E*, *I*, and *R* of all past and future liabilities of the partnership, in respect of which *B* and *W* still continued as liable as *T*, and to which they would have to contribute to discharge, such purchases should be regarded and treated as made on behalf of the partnership; and therefore, at the time of the execution of the mortgage of the estate, *B*, *W*, and *T* were interested in the estate to the extent of one-third each: that, although *T* was not authorized, either actually or impliedly, by *B* and *W* to mortgage the estate, and the mortgage therefore was not binding on them, yet, as they allowed him to conduct the business of the estate in such a manner as to make it appear that the control and management of it rested with him, and he was for all ordinary business purposes their representative, *B* and *W* were bound, in any accounting that might take place, to recoup the defendant Bank for such advances as were made to *T* for the necessary purposes of the estate, in the same proportion as they must discharge debts due to other creditors; that *T* was entitled to be reimbursed such moneys of his own as he had expended within the legitimate scope and for the proper purposes of the partnership as originally contemplated by the parties. Directions to the liquidator appointed how to proceed. *HARRISON v. DELHI AND LONDON BANK* I. L. R. 4 All. 437

12. ———— **Liability of partners—Joint contract—Joint liability—Judgment recovered against one partner.** The defendants were partners trading in the name of *V G & Co.* On 6th July 1895, at Ahmedabad, the first defendant borrowed from the plaintiff, for the purposes of the partnership business, a sum of Rs10,000 and passed a khata in the name of his firm. On 25th April 1896, at Baroda, he passed another khata to plaintiff, under which the plaintiff was to recover the debt due to him from the partners jointly and severally. On 2nd

**PARTNERSHIP—contd.****2. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PARTNER**  
—contd.

October 1896, plaintiff obtained a decree on an award against the first defendant in the Civil Court at Baroda for Rs13,909-4-0, and in execution of this decree he recovered a sum of Rs7,000. In 1897, plaintiff filed this suit in the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge at Ahmedabad to recover the balance, *viz.*, Rs6,909-4-0, from all the partners (defendants Nos. 1 to 8). The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit; the plaintiff appealed to the High Court. *Held*, that, the original liability of the partners being a joint liability, the first defendant had no authority, without the consent of his partners, to change the joint liability of each partner, which was the ordinary incident of the partnership, into a joint and several liability. *LAKSMISHANKAR DEOSHANKAR v. VISHNURAM* . I. L. R. 24 Bom. 77

13. ———— **Payment to a partner in fraud of his co-partners—Discharge of debt—Constructive notice—Lease taken by agreement in name of one partner.** The defendants, other than the first defendant, styling themselves the "agricultural association," entered into three rental agreements, two of them dated April 23rd, 1891, and the third dated June 21st, 1891, with the plaintiffs and the first defendant, for the cultivation of certain lands belonging to an undivided family, of which the plaintiffs and first defendant were members, and took possession of and cultivated the said lands. On the 17th June 1891, an agreement, of which the second defendant had notice, was entered into between the plaintiffs and first defendant to the effect that the first plaintiff should be the managing member of the family and should be entitled to receive the rent and give receipts for the same. Subsequently, disputes arising between plaintiff and first defendant, the other defendants made payments of rent to first defendant alone. *Held*, that these payments were not a valid discharge as against the claim of the plaintiffs on its being proved that second defendant had notice of the agreement of the 17th June, and that notice to him must be taken to be notice to his partners, the other defendants. By an agreement between the defendants any one partner was empowered to take a lease; such lease to be binding on all the partners as if executed by them. The leases were not signed by the 13th defendant (now represented by appellants 19, 20, and 21), who was admittedly a partner and took actual part in the management of the affairs of the firm after the leases were executed. *Held*, that it was intended that the leases should operate as if all the members had executed them, and that the representatives of 13th defendant were bound. *CHINNARAMANUJA AYYANGAR v. PADMANABHA PILLAIYAN; SORIMUTHU PILLAI v. PADMANABHA PILLAIYAN* . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 471

14. ———— **Authority of one partner to bind the firm by a submission to arbitration—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 21.** One partner, though entitled to bring a suit on behalf of the firm of which he is a member to recover a debt



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due to the firm, has no power, in the absence of special authority, to bind the firm by a submission to arbitration of the claim so brought. *Stead v. Salt*, 3 Bing. 101, and *Strangford v. Green*, 2 Mad. 228, referred to. *RAM BHAROSE v. KALLU MAL*  
I. L. R. 22 All. 135

15. ——— Abandonment of share—*Account ordered—Account ordered on dissolution decreed—No abandonment by plaintiff—Effect of managing partner's not having kept clear accounts—Mode of taking account.* However speculative the subject-matter of a partnership may be, it is a matter of inference, to be drawn from the facts of the case, whether there has or has not been an abandonment by a partner of his share; or loss thereof consequent upon his refusing or neglecting to take his part in the business, and allowing a length of time to elapse, in such circumstances. Where the evidence was that the plaintiff, now suing for a winding up of a partnership, and an account, had some years before his suit declined to advance more money for the business, and had left with some subsequent intervention by him, the management to his co-partner, now defendant: *Held*, that there was no sufficient ground for the inference that the plaintiff had abandoned, or lost by laches, his position as a partner before this suit was brought. The defendant, on the other hand, while managing partner, had been engaged in dealings in timber peculiar to himself, in the same quarter as the partnership dealings and on a larger scale. His agent in the timber district had expended largely, but on which of the accounts it was impossible for the Court to distinguish. It had been possible for the defendant to have given full accounts of certain of his transactions, but he had not done so. He had mixed up his own separate dealings with those of the partnership, and had not kept clear accounts. *Held*, that the Courts below acted rightly, in disallowing all charges made by the defendant that were disputed by the plaintiff and were unsupported by vouchers, notwithstanding that there might have been certain expenses disallowed which had been honestly incurred. *MOUNG THA HUYN MAH THEIN MYAH* (1900)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 53; s.c. 5 C. W. N. 114

16. ——— Broker—*Liability of principal—Scope of agent's authority.* The duties and responsibilities of a broker discussed. An undertaking by a broker to refund advances made by third parties to his constituents, and giving a guarantee for the repayment of advances, with profits, is altogether outside the scope of his ordinary business, and would not bind his partner unless the latter assented to it or subsequently ratified it. *Fowler v. Hollins*, L. R. 7 Q. B. 616, 623, referred to. *MORRISON v. VERSCHOYLE* (1901)

6 C. W. N. 429

17. ——— Conversion of stolen goods—*Managing partner receiving the goods—Evidence of conversion—Liability of firm—Damages, measure*

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—contd.

of. Where the managing partner of the defendant firm had, without the knowledge and consent of the other partner, received certain piece-goods belonging to the plaintiff knowing that they had been stolen and had, within the scope of his authority, sold some of the goods and where there were entries in the books of the firm showing that a portion of such sales was placed to the credit of the firm:—*Held*, the plaintiff can recover from the defendant firm as damages for conversion the value of all the goods belonging to him, which had come into the hands of the managing partner. *HURRUCK CHAND v. GOBIND LAL KHETRY* (1906)

10 C. W. N. 1053

18. ——— Dishonest conversion—*Partnership—Liability of a partner to account for partnership money—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 406.* A partner is entitled to be called upon for an account of the expenditure of the money, which he has received, and it is open to him to spend the money received by him and to account for it in dealing with the partnership. Where it was not satisfactorily made out that this was not done, and could not be made out in the absence of a proper demand for accounts, it was *held* that there was no dishonest conversion, which would justify his conviction under s. 406 of the Penal Code. *DEBI PRASAD BHAGAT v. NAGAR MULL* (1903)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1108

19. ——— Partner, power of single, to mortgage partnership property—*Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 251.* A single partner by objecting cannot vary articles of partnership—*Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 53—Transfer cannot be impeached by any but the creditors.* Where one of several partners has, under arrangement with the other partners, the sole management of the business, he has the power of borrowing as incidental to the power to trade, and the power to pledge partnership assets as incidental to the power of borrowing. *Obiter*: The English doctrine that a single partner cannot mortgage the immoveable property of the firm does not apply in India. It is not competent to a single partner to take objection to the exercise of any power conferred by the articles of partnerships. Where a partner has power to borrow or mortgage for the purpose of trade, he has power to give a mortgage for an antecedent debt. An objection that a transfer of property was made with intent to defeat or delay creditors must be taken by the creditors and it is not open to others to object to the transfer on that ground. *ASAN KANI RAVUTTAR v. SAMASUNDARAM CHETTIAR* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 206

20. ——— Conveyance on sale of property—*Stamp Act (II of 1899), Art. 23—Pressing factory—Partnership—Transfer of a share in consideration of a certain sum—Document—Release.* Where by a document, the executing party, purporting to be entitled to a share in a going pressing factory, transfers absolutely the



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whole of that share to the other person interested in the factory in consideration of a certain sum, the document is a conveyance on sale of property. *HIRALAL NAVALRAM, In the matter of.* (1908)  
I. L. R. 32 Bom. 505

**3. SUITS RESPECTING PARTNERSHIPS.**

**1. ———— Suit for account without asking for dissolution.** *Partnership dissoluble at will.* A member of an ordinary trading partnership, dissoluble at will, cannot, except under special circumstances, seek an account without praying for a dissolution. *GOLLA NAGABHU SHANAM v. KANA-KALA GANGAYYA* . . . 2 Mad. 28

**2. ———— Liability of partners to account—Suit for an account—Suit by partner to recover from co-partner share of losses and advances.** It is only in exceptional cases that a suit can be brought by one partner against another, which involves the taking of partnership accounts prior to dissolution. A suit was brought by the widow of a partner in an indigo concern against her deceased husband's co-partner in respect of certain alleged losses of the concern, and to recover a moiety of moneys expended by her husband in advances made to indigo cultivators on behalf of the partnership. At the time when the suit was brought, the partnership had not been dissolved. *Held*, that, the partnership not having been dissolved, the plaintiff was not entitled to an account, and the suit must therefore fail. *Brown v. Lapscott*, 6 M. & W. 119, and *Helme v. Smith*, 7 Bing. 709, distinguished. *KASSA MAL v. GOPI* . . . I. L. R. 9 All. 120

**3. ———— Suit for dissolution and an account—Partner seeking to remove attachment on partnership property.** The proper course for a partner seeking to remove an attachment on partnership property in execution of a decree against one partner only is to sue for a dissolution of the partnership and an account, with a view to ascertain the amount due to the partner in execution against whom the partnership property is attached. *KARIMBHAI v. CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS*  
I. L. R. 4 Bom. 222

**4. ———— Suit by partner against co-partner—Suit for share of profits.** A member of a subsisting partnership is not in a position to sue his partner, still less one of his alleged partners, for the profits which had up to a particular time accrued, but he must, if he desires relief, sue in the ordinary way for an account. *DOYARAM LUSKUREE v. SOOKHANUM* . . . 16 W. R. 141

**5. ———— Suit for general adjustment of account.** In disputes between partners respecting their accounts, the plaintiff should so frame his suit that there may be a general adjustment of the partnership accounts. A particular item or claim should not be made the subject of a distinct suit. *SOONDER BIBEE v. KHILLOO MULL alias RAM LALL* . . . 2 N. W. 90

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**6. ———— Suit against co-partners for money deposited and profits—Necessity for taking accounts.** In a suit against co-partners in a joint firm to recover money deposited as plaintiff's share, and to have accounts rendered of the profits, before any order can be made to the effect that the plaintiff is entitled to be paid by any one of his partners or out of the assets of the firm the actual money advanced, the whole accounts of the firm ought to be taken, and the ultimate liability of each of the partners ascertained. *KALLEE CHURN SAHOO v. RAM LALL SAHOO* 21 W. R. 300

**7. ———— Suit for contribution among partners—Transactions by some only of partners—Obligation to ask for account of partnership dealings.** Four members of a partnership consisting of seven persons borrowed certain sums on account of the partnership for which they gave their joint and several promissory notes on which decrees were afterwards obtained against them. In a suit for contribution brought by one of the four members against the others, as having paid more than his share under the joint decrees:—*Held*, that the giving of the promissory notes was not a partnership transaction so as to debar the plaintiff from a suit for contribution without asking for an account of the partnership dealings. *DOYAL JAIRAJ v. KHATAV LADHA* . . . 12 Bom. 97

**8. ———— Suit for contribution—Money borrowed by agreement by one partner and paid into partnership business—Decree against one partner—Suit for contribution by him against other partners—Adjustment of account whether necessary.** In a partnership business entered into between the plaintiff and the defendants, it was agreed that each member, together with the gomasthas of the business, should be at liberty to borrow money upon his individual credit and to pay into the firm the money so borrowed to carry on the business. The plaintiff conjointly with defendants 4 and 6, in accordance with that agreement, borrowed several sums of money upon promissory notes, and paid the amounts so borrowed into the business. After the loan, the partnership business came to an end, but no account was settled. Afterwards decrees were obtained upon those promissory notes, and the plaintiff was obliged to pay up the decretal amounts. To a suit for contribution by the plaintiff, for money so paid, against the members of the firm, the defence, *inter alia*, was that the suit was not maintainable, in the absence of adjustment of the accounts relating to the firm. *Held*, that the suit was maintainable, inasmuch as the money secured by the promissory notes did not become an item of the partnership account. *Doyal Jairaj v. Khataav Ladha*, 12 Bom. 97, and *Gada Kolita v. Joyram Das*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 262 note, referred to. *DURGA PROSONNO BOSE v. RAGHU NATH DASS* . . . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 254  
3 C. W. N. 299



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contd.**

9. ———— *Whether a suit for contribution by a partner against a co-partner would lie and in what cases—Adjustment of account whether necessary.* A suit for contribution by a partner against some of his co-partners, on account of money paid by him for the satisfaction of a debt contracted by him jointly with the said co-partners is maintainable in cases where the liability satisfied by the plaintiff is not a joint liability of the entire partnership, or where the said partners were some only of several persons comprising the partnership, and the bond was executed, not in the usual course of business of the partnership; it is also maintainable in a case where the co-partners expressly promised to contribute their share of debt after a decree had been passed upon the bond. *Doyal Jairaj v. Khatav Ladha, 12 Bom. 97*, referred to. *GUDA KULITA v. JOYRAM DAS*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 262 note

10. ———— *Suit on agreement in nature of partnership deed—Suit by one party for his share.* An agreement was entered into whereby the defendant undertook to pay to the plaintiff and two other co-creditors of an insolvent a share in any sums which he might recover from the insolvent in consideration of receiving a share in any sums which might be recovered by the other creditors. In a suit by one of the persons in whose favour the agreement was passed, without making the others parties, against the person who executed it, to recover his share, it was *held* that the suit was not maintainable, as it could only be brought as a suit between partners for an account, and the result of all the partnership transactions must be brought at once under the view of the Court. *BHAGTIDAS BHAGVANDAS v. OLIVER* . . . 9 Bom. 418

11. ———— *Suit based on rights of deceased partner—Adjustment of partnership accounts—Payments by partners, Presumption as to—Partnership property.* A suit based on the right of a deceased partner cannot be limited to a demand for his share in the proceeds of property alleged to have come into the possession of the partnership during its existence. The agreement on which the partnership was formed, the amounts advanced and drawn out by the several partners, and the subsisting liabilities and assets, if any, must all be taken into account, and the suit must demand such a sum, if any, as, on a general account, and an account between the deceased partner and the co-partnership, being taken, shall appear to be due. Principle on which the account of a dissolved partnership should be adjusted, explained. *KESHAV GOPAL GINDE v. RAYAPA* . . . 12 Bom. 165

12. ———— *Suit against one of several partners for money lent—Form of suit.* A was partner in an indigo concern in the name of his son. In his own name A lent moneys to the concern for the purpose of carrying on the business,

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contd.**

and each partner was to be separately liable for the moneys advanced in proportion to his share in the concern. In a suit against one of the partners for his proportion of the moneys so lent:—*Held*, that the plaintiff could not sue for those moneys on the footing of a mere creditor, and that the suit should be so framed as to determine, the profits or losses of the concern, and whether any and what assets would be available to each partner to liquidate the loan in proportion to his share. *CHUNDER SIKHUR BISWAS v. RAM BUKSH CHETLUNGEE*

I C. L. R. 545

13. ———— *Suit by representative of a deceased partner for a share of a specific asset of the partnership recovered after the right to a general partnership account is barred.* A suit may be brought by the representative of a deceased partner against the surviving partner of a firm to recover a share in a sum received by the surviving partner in respect of a partnership transaction within the period of limitation, although a suit to take partnership accounts generally would be barred. *H J*, the plaintiff's father, and the defendant *R* were partners in the firm of *Hormusji and Rustomji*, which carried on business in China. In the year 1862 the firm of *N K & Co.* was largely indebted to the firm of *Hormusji and Rustomji*. At the end of that year the latter firm ceased to do business but no formal dissolution of the partnership ever took place. In 1869 the defendant *R* filed a suit (No. 461 of 1869) in the High Court of Bombay in his own name and that of *H J*, his former partner, against the firm of *N K & Co.* for an account of the dealings of that firm with the firm of *Hormusji and Rustomji*, and by a decretal order, dated 19th March 1870, the suit was referred to the Commissioner to take the accounts as prayed for. On the 17th December 1872 *H J* died at Hongkong intestate. On 22nd February 1873 the defendant *R* assigned to the second defendant *W* for R20,000 the claim of the firm of *Hormusji and Rustomji* against the firm of *N K & Co.* The plaintiff did not know of this arrangements, and he only became aware of it in 1880. The plaintiff alleged that of the said sum of R20,000 the second defendant *W* paid to the first defendant *R* R10,000 in 1878, and for the remaining R10,000 gave a promissory note payable in July, or August 1881. The plaintiff took out letters of administration to his father *H J*, and brought this suit on 16th July 1880, claiming a moiety of the R10,000 already paid by the defendant *W* to the first defendant *R*, and praying that he might be declared entitled to a moiety of the remaining sum of R10,000 payable by the defendant *W*, and that the same might be paid over to him. The defendant *R* alleged that he had assigned the claim against the firm of *N K & Co.*, to the defendant *W*, and had received the consideration for such assignment in February 1873, and contended that if the plaintiff had ever any claim to any portion of the said money (which he



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denied), such claim was barred by limitation. He also alleged that he had carried on the suit No. 461 of 1869 without any assistance from the plaintiff's father *H J*, or from the plaintiff, who, although applied to, refused to assist him, and he submitted that under no circumstances was the plaintiff entitled to any of the moneys claimed by him without giving credit to the defendant for his (plaintiff's) share of the expense of prosecuting the said suit, and for the amount of proper remuneration to the defendant for the time and labour bestowed by him in the said suit. He also claimed that the partnership accounts of the firm of Hormusji and Rustomji should be taken, and alleged that on such accounts being taken a large sum would be found due to him from the partnership. The second defendant *W* paid into Court the Rs10,000 due on the promissory note abovementioned, and was dismissed from the suit. At the hearing the Judge found that, of the other moiety of the consideration for the assignment of February 1873, a sum of Rs1,000 was paid by the defendant *W* to the defendant *R* on January 23, 1878, and a sum of Rs6,000 on September 13, 1879. *Held*, that the suit was not barred by limitation in respect of the said sums of Rs1,000, Rs6,000, and Rs10,000, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover a half share of these sums from the defendant *R*, deducting all sums expended by the defendant in the prosecution of the suit No. 461 of 1869, no allowance, however, being made to him as remuneration for conducting the suit. *Held*, also, that the defendant might deduct the amount (if any) which might be found due to him on taking the partnership accounts although a separate suit for such account would be barred by limitation. *MERWANJI HORMUSJI v. RUSTOMJI BURJORJI*. I. L. R. 6 Bom. 628

**14. ——— Suit by sole surviving partner—Representatives of deceased partner—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 45—Civil Procedure Code, s. 26.** The rule of English law that, in trading partnerships, although the right of a deceased partner devolves on his representative, the remedy survives to his co-partner, who alone must enforce the right by action, and is liable on recovery to account to the representative for the deceased's share, should be applied in India, in the absence of statutory authority to the contrary. The effect of s. 45 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872) is to extend the English law applicable to trading partnerships to all cases of partnership. There is nothing either in that section nor in s. 26 of the Civil Procedure Code read with it, to show that the representatives of a deceased partner must be joined in an action for a partnership-debt brought by the surviving partner, though it may be that they might be joined in such an action. *GOBIND PRASAD v. CHANDER SEKHAR*. I. L. R. 9 All. 486

**15. ——— Suit by assignee of executors of deceased partner—Suit for declaration of right to share of partnerships and for an account.** *R*, prior to his death, was a partner with defendants

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contd.**

in the firm of *N C & Co.* He died on 8th November 1884. On the 9th November 1885, his executors passed a release to the defendants, which recited that *R*'s share in the firm and future business had ceased on his death; that the surviving partners had requested the executors to settle the account of their testator with the firm, and that, after examining the books and taking accounts, etc., a balance of Rs3,395-11-0 was found due, on payment whereof the executors released the defendants from all claims in respect of the share and interest of *R*. On the 7th April 1887, the executors assigned over to the plaintiff a one-anna share in the said firm, and the plaintiff, as assignee, brought the suit for a declaration of his right to the share and for an account. He alleged that there had been no accurate examination of the books at the time of the release; that the amount really due to the testator's estate by the firm had not been ascertained; and that it had been agreed on by the partners, at the time of the release, that in addition to the sum therein mentioned, the executors as representing the testator's estate, should receive a one-anna share in the partnership. *Held*, on the evidence, that it had not been proved that all the partners consented to the alleged new partnership, and that on this ground alone the plaintiff could not succeed in his suit. *COWASJI RUTTONJI LIMBOOWALLA v. BURJORJI RUSTOMJI LIMBOOWALLA*. I. L. R. 12 Bom. 335

**16. ——— Partnership shares—Interest.** The parties to the suit, the heirs and representatives of the original partners, a family carrying on a banking business, made and acted upon a new arrangement of their shares, the amounts of which were found in the first Court, and affirmed on appeal. A decree for an account, and an award of interest at 12 per cent on the amounts found to be due upon the shares from the date of the closing of the business, was maintained. *MUTIA CHETTI v. SUBRAMANIAM CHETTI*. I. L. R. 18 Cal. 616

**17. ——— Alleged agreement as to shares in partnerships—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 253.** In a partnership suit where one party does, but the other party does not, allege a specific agreement that the shares in the said partnership were unequal, the existing presumption as to the equality of the partner's shares casts the burden of proof on those alleging the agreement who must therefore begin. *JADOBRAM DEX v. BULLORAM DEX*. I. L. R. 26 Cal. 281

**18. ——— Assignment by Plaintiff's partners of their shares—Decree for winding up and for an account.** The plaintiff, as a partner in lending a sum of money upon security given, had a half share in the joint adventure with the first and second defendants. These two, without the plaintiff's exonerating them from liability to him, had assigned their shares to two other persons. The assignees were added as co-defendants after this suit had been filed, claiming a decree for a judicial winding up and for an account. It was



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not proved that the plaintiff had ever relinquished his claim upon the assignors as a partner, though he might have been aware of the assignment. The two added defendants appeared in the Court below, but not upon this appeal. *Held*, that the facts were sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to have the winding up of the partnership and the account decreed against all the four. The suit had been dismissed by the Recorder as having been prematurely brought before the complete execution of a decree, already obtained, before this suit was filed, by the plaintiff-appellant, against the borrowers of the money; that decree having followed upon an award of arbitrators which directed that all sums realized in the adventure should be divided in equal moieties between the plaintiff and the original defendants. *Held*, that this suit ought to have been allowed to proceed, and should not have been dismissed. The plaintiff having, on this appeal agreed to account for all money received by him in the transaction, an account should be directed with a declaration that the added defendants were jointly and severally liable to account with the first and second defendants for what had been received by them from the adventure. *DOMATY NURSIAM v. RAMEN CHETTY*. I. L. R. 26 Calc. 93 L. R. 26 I. A. 202

19. ——— Suits by different partners for specific sums of money on adjustment of accounts—*Accounts adjusted by Amin appointed in previous suits—Contract Act, s. 265—Plaint, amendment of, under s. 53, Civil Procedure Code, 1882.* After dissolution of a certain partnership, two separate suits were brought in 1889 by different partners for specific sums of money due to them, and, in the alternative, for such other amount as might be found due on an adjustment of accounts. Objections were raised against these suits on the grounds, *inter alia*, (i) that the suits were barred by the provisions of s. 265 of the Indian Contract Act; (ii) that separate suits for the same matter were not maintainable; (iii) that the suits would not lie in the Munsif's Court; and (iv) that accounts having been already adjusted, there was no cause of action. The Munsif overruled the first three objections, and held, as regards the fourth, that the adjustment pleaded had been ratified by the plaintiffs; he appointed an Amin, who examined the accounts and ascertained the respective claims of the partners, and the plaintiffs in those suits obtained decrees on the basis of the Amin's adjustment of account. The present suits were brought in 1891 by certain other partners, who were defendants in the suits of 1889, on the allegation that the partnership account had been already adjusted by the Amin appointed in the suits of 1889, and that the debts and dues of all parties had been determined by the Court. The plaintiffs prayed for recovery of the amount due to them under the Amin's adjustment and, in the alternative, for such other relief as might be deemed proper by the Court to

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grant them against any of the defendants. *Held*, by NORRIS and BANERJEE, JJ. (RAMPINI J., dissenting), that the suits were correctly framed, and that such defects as there were in the plaint, *viz.*, an incorrect statement as to the dues of all the partners having been determined in the former suit, and the omission of an alternative prayer for an account, were no bar to the maintenance of the present actions. *Taylor v. Shaw*, 2 Sim. & St. 12; *Stupart v. Arrowsmith*, 3 Sm. & G. 176; and *Lalla Sheoprosad v. Juggarnath*, L. R. 10 I. A. 74, referred to. *Prosad Doss Mullick v. Russick Lall Mullick*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 157, distinguished. *Held*, also, that an amendment of the plaint under s. 53 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be allowed. *Cropper v. Smith*, L. R. 26 Ch. D. 700, followed. *Weldon v. Neal*, L. R. 19 Q. B. D. 394; *Mohummud Zahoor Ali Khan v. Thakooranee Rutta Koer*, 11 Moo. I. A. 468; *Joseph v. Solano*, 9 B. L. R. 441; 18 W. R. 424; *Ramdoyal Khan v. Ajhoodhia Ram Khan*, I. L. R. 2 Calc. 4; 25 W. R. 425; and *Kurtz v. Spence*, L. R. 35 Ch. D. 770, referred to. *Held*, by RAMPINI, J., that the amendments proposed to be made in the plaint could not be allowed under s. 53 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *DHANI RAM SHAHA v. BHAGIRATH SHAHA*

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 692

20. ——— Advance made by one partner to another in respect of the latter's share of partnership debt—*Suit for contribution.* A and B were partners. A decree was passed against them for the payment of a certain debt, each partner being liable for the whole sum, and being bound to indemnify the other against the payment of more than his share. A paid B's share as well as his own and brought a suit against B for contribution. B contended that A's claim, being in respect of a partnership transaction, ought to be adjusted when the partnership account was settled and that the suit did not lie. *Held*, that the advance made by A to B by paying his share was not an advance to the partnership but to the other partner in respect of what he had to contribute, and that consequently A was entitled to contribution from B. *SUBBARAYUDU v. ADINARAYUDU*

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 134

21. ——— Advances—*Several firms—Common partner—Money lent by partner to his own firm—Practice—Same party cannot be plaintiff and defendant in one suit—Debtor and creditor—Death of plaintiff pending appeal—Defendant becoming plaintiff—Power of Court of appeal to vary decree on grounds arising subsequently to decree—Partnership accounts—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 264—Guarantee—Liability of surety—Right of surety to indemnity.* Where an individual is a common partner in two houses of trade, no action can be brought by one house against the other house upon any transaction between them while such individual is a common partner. This doctrine is founded on the rule that the same individual, even in two



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contd.**

capacities, cannot be both a plaintiff and defendant to one and the same action. One partner cannot sue for money lent by him to a firm of which he is a member. The advance is but an item in the partnership account. It is open to the Court of Appeal to vary a decree under appeal, not only for error, but also on grounds which have come into existence since it was passed. *Sakharam v. Hari, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 113*. The plaintiff, Purshotamdas Chaturdas, and his son, Nagindas, were members of a joint Hindu family, and were the owners of and equally interested in the firm of Gordhandas Bhagwandas. The son, Nagindas, was also a partner in another firm carrying on business in the name of Pathak Shanghavi and Company. The plaintiff, Purshotamdas, brought this suit against the latter firm, which consisted of four partners, including his son Nagindas (defendant 2), to recover Rs. 61,419-3-1 in respect of advances made by the firm of Gordhandas Bhagwandas to the defendants' firm. The fifth defendant was sued as a surety for one of the partners (defendant 4) in the defendants' firm. The lower Court passed a decree for the amount claimed, against all the defendants. One of the partners (defendant 4) and the surety (defendant 5) appealed. Pending the appeal the plaintiff died, and his son Nagindas (defendant 2) became sole owner of the family firm and was substituted for his father on the record, thus becoming both plaintiff and defendant in the suit. *Held*, (i) that, although Nagindas (defendant 2) was partly interested both as creditor and debtor, and could not have sued for his share, nevertheless, all parties interested being before the Court, either as plaintiff or defendants, the Court would adjust and determine their rights in accordance with the rule of justice, equity and good conscience; (ii) that, Purshotamdas and Nagindas being equally interested in the plaintiffs' firm, the lower Court should have made a declaration that they were entitled to the amount advanced in equal shares, and have passed a decree that one moiety thereof should be paid to Purshotamdas and the other moiety treated as an item to the credit of Nagindas in the partnership accounts; (iii) that, although, on Purshotamdas' death pending the appeal, Nagindas as his heir had become sole plaintiff, the Court of Appeal would not pass a decree in his favour, even in respect of Purshotamdas' half share, but would only declare that for this amount also Nagindas was entitled to credit in the partnership accounts. Under the circumstances, Nagindas could only get such relief as would have been permissible had he occupied the position of plaintiff at the institution of the suit; (iv) that Nagindas was entitled to credit in the partnership accounts, as against those who actually were his partners from time to time. S. 264 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872) only operates in favour of strangers to the partnership. As to the liability of defendant 5 as surety, the Court *held*, on the evidence, that defendant 5 had

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become a surety for the partnership debt. The partners were the principal debtors. But the liability of the surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor; therefore no decree could be now passed against defendant 5. Further, Nagindas, now the beneficial owner of the debt, was one of the principal debtors, and as such was bound to indemnify his surety and to repay any sum paid under the guarantee. He therefore could not be entitled to any relief against his surety. *RUSTOMJI ASPANDYARJI SETHNA v. SHETH PURSHOTAMDAS CHATURDAS* (1901) . **I. L. R. 25 Bom. 606**

**22.** ————— *Two firms—Common partners—Advances by one firm to the other—Suit to recover such advances—Partnership account necessary—Practice—Procedure.* The two plaintiffs were the owners and sole partners of the firm of Apaji Kasinath. They were also partners in the defendant firm of Ganesh Hari Narkar, in which there were three other partners besides themselves. Between 1891 and 1896 the firm of Apaji Kasinath advanced money to the firm of Ganesh Hari Narkar, which latter firm ceased to do any business in 1897, although the partnership was not formally dissolved. In 1899 the plaintiffs brought this suit against the firm of Ganesh Hari Narkar to recover their advance. Being partners in the firm, the plaintiffs appeared also as defendants (Nos. 3 and 4) in the suit, the real object of the suit being to recover from the other partners (defendants 1, 2 and 5) their share of the amount alleged to be due by the firm to the plaintiffs. *Held*, that the suit as framed was not maintainable. The money claimed was only one item in the partnership account between the plaintiffs and the defendants. Without taking a general partnership account it was impossible to say whether there was anything due by the defendants to the plaintiffs. *Rustomji v. Purshotamdas, I. L. R. 25 Bom. 606*, followed. *KASHINATH KEDARI v. GANESH HARI NARKAR* (1902) . **I. L. R. 26 Bom. 739**

**23.** ————— *Joint Hindu family—Partners—Co-partners not necessarily partners—Suit in the name of the owner of the firm—Parties—Adding parties—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 27.* The plaintiffs sued, as owner of a firm, to recover a debt. The defendants pleaded that the plaintiff was joint with his father and brother, and contended that the latter were therefore partners in the firm and ought to be joined as plaintiffs. The lower Appellate Court held that the plaintiff's father and brother were partners with him by reason of their being joint members of a Hindu family, and that they ought, therefore, to have been co-plaintiffs. It further held that it was too late to amend the plaint and to add them as parties, and it therefore dismissed the suit. On second appeal:—*Held* (reversing the decree, and remanding the case), that, although a person carrying on business is a co-partner in a joint family, it does not necessarily follow that all his co-partners are his partners in



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contd.**

that business, entitled with him to its rights and responsible with him for its liabilities. The fact of partnership must be proved by evidence showing that the persons alleged to be partners have agreed to combine their property, labour or skill in the business and to share the profits and losses thereof. *Held*, also, that if on remand it was found that the plaintiff's father and brother were partners, the Court ought to allow them to be brought on the record, and under s. 27 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) the plaintiff was entitled to amend. *Kasturchand v. Sagarmal*, I. L. R. 17 Bom. 413, followed. *VADILAL LALLUBHAI v. SHAH KHUSHAL DALPATRAM* (1902)

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 157

**24. ————— Mistake in settled accounts—Re-opening—Surcharge and falsification—General words of release—What passes.** B and S partners had the partnership accounts strictly adjusted and R39,645-7-0 was found due to B. By a deed of assignment B, in consideration of R34,000, assigned and released his share in the firm to S. By common mistake Government promissory notes for R7,000 were omitted from the accounts. On discovery of the mistake B sued for a share of the notes. *Held*, that either the whole account might be re-opened or leave given to B, to surcharge and falsify. The latter is the more proper course on the facts of this case. *McKellar v. Wallace*, 5 Moo. I. A. 372, *Pritt v. Clay*, 9 Beav. 503, *Gething v. Keighley*, 9 Ch. D. 547, referred to. General words of release in a deed can only operate to pass what the parties had in contemplation and not something with which they had no intention of dealing. *L. & S. N. R. Co. v. Blackmore*, L. R. 4 H. L. 610, *Turner v. Turner*, 14 Ch. D. 829, followed. *BANEX MADHUB MULLICK v. SUBAL CHUNDER LAW* (1907).

11 C. W. N. 776

**25. ————— Advance by one partner to the partnership—One partner taking a promissory note from other members, in respect of sums advanced to the partnership, can sue on the promissory note.** Where one of several partners takes a promissory note from other members in repayment of an advance made by him to the partnership, it is competent to him to bring a suit on the note against the members executing it. It is no answer to such a suit that the general accounts of the partnership were not taken at the time the promissory note was given, and that, if such account were taken it would appear that nothing was due to the plaintiff. Such a defence amounts to a set off of an unliquidated amount, which is not allowable. *VALLAMKONDU SUBBIA v. MALUPEDDI VENKATARAMIAH* (1908) . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 343

**26. ————— Fraud by co-partner—Hatchitta—Material alteration by a partner to set up exclusive title to debt—Suit on behalf of firm—Maintainability—Claim, if to be disallowed to the**

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contd.**

*extent of the interest of the fraudulent partner—Apportionment before dissolution.* A fraud committed by a partner, while acting on his own separate account and not as agent for the firm, is not imputable to the firm, although had he not been connected with the firm he might not have been in a position to commit the fraud. Where one of the partners of a firm sued to recover a debt, which was really due to the firm on the allegation that it was due to himself and not to the firm and his suit was dismissed on the ground that he had materially altered the *hatchitta* executed by the debtor by striking out the other partners' name without the debtor's consent:—*Held*, that the other partners were not precluded from suing for the debt on behalf of the firm, making the first-mentioned partner a defendant in the suit. *Master v. Miller*, 2 R. R. 390; 4 Term Rep. 320; *Gour Chandra v. Prasanno Kumar*, I. L. R. 33 Calc. 812, distinguished. That it was not open to the Court in such a suit to give them a decree for such portion only of the claim as represented their share in the firm. Questions regarding the share of the debt to be allocated to the partners' interest can only be decided, when the accounts of the partnership are taken. *BASIR- UDDIN MULLICK v. SURJA KUMAR NAIK* (1908).

12 C. W. N. 716

**27. ————— Limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 106—Suit for division of alleged partnership assets—Separate suits for property at different places.** The plaintiff sued for possession of one-half of certain property in the Moradabad district alleging that it had been purchased out of the profits of a partnership subsisting between himself and the defendant. Other similar property in Naini Tal was mentioned in the plaint, but the plaintiff said he would bring a separate suit in respect to that property. The first suit was withdrawn, but without permission being granted to bring a fresh suit. Subsequently a second suit was brought in Naini Tal respecting the property there. The plaintiff alleged himself to be in possession of this property, but it was found that he was not. *Held*, that the second suit was barred by the operation of s. 43 as well as of s. 373 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as also, on the finding that the partnership had been dissolved more than three years before suit, by Art. 106 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act. *NAIAZ AHMAD v. ABDUL HAMID* (1908) . I. L. R. 30 All. 279

**28. ————— Suit for contribution—One partner, compelled to pay the whole of a partnership debt after dissolution, may sue for contribution, although right to sue for account of, and share in, the partnership assets may be barred.** A partner who, after the dissolution of the partnership, has been compelled to pay a debt due by the partnership, can maintain a suit for contribution against his co-partners, even though a suit for general account of the partnership and a share therein is barred by



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limitation. The defendant, however, will, in such a case, be entitled to show that in a settlement of accounts he will not be liable, or that his liability would be reduced. *Sokkanadha Vannimunder, v. Sokkanadha Vannimunder*, I. L. R. 28 Mad. 314, principle applied. *Subbarayudu v. Adinarayudu*, I. L. R. 18 Mad. 131, considered. The principle will apply equally whether the party suing is a partner or his representative. *SADHU NARAYANA AIYANGAR v. RAMASWAMI AIYANGAR* (1908).

I. L. R. 32 Mad. 203

29. ——— Suit by one partner against another, without asking for general account when maintainable—*Suit for specific performance of one term of partnership or for partial account—Waiver of grounds in lower Appellate Court.* Where under the terms of a partnership, terminable at will, between A and B, A is bound to hand over to B who furnished all the capital, all moneys or cheques received by him in the course of the partnership business, irrespective of the state of the general accounts and A omits to deliver to B one of the cheques so received, B can maintain a suit against A to compel A to deliver such cheque or to pay him the amount of such cheque, whether such payment be regarded as a claim for damages or for partial account. In regard to suits by one partner against another for a partial account, the general rule, as applied in India, is that if the account is sought in respect of a matter, which, though arising out of partnership business, or connected with it does not involve the taking of general accounts, the Court will, as a rule, give the relief applied for. It will be for the Court to determine under what circumstances it will be equitable to order a partial account, having regard to the rights of the parties under the contract. There is no rule of law now in force that a partial account can be ordered only under exceptional circumstances. *Fairthorne v. Weston*, 67 Eng. Rep. 432, followed. *Golla Nagabushanam v. Kanakala Gangayya*, 2 Mad. H. C. R. 28, not followed. Although the Court will not, as a rule, enforce a contract to enter into partnership while it remains executory, it will, when the partnership has been constituted and when the ends of justice required it, enforce by injunction the performance of particular terms, though it may be incompetent to enforce all the terms, and the partnership is terminable at will. The development of the law in England on the point considered. *Subbarayudu v. Adinarayudu*, I. L. R. 18 Mad. 131, referred to. *Durga Prosunno Bose v. Raghu Nath Dass*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 254, referred to. A party who, in appealing from the decree of the Court of first instance, confines himself to one only of several grounds on which such Court had decided against him, cannot in second appeal, be heard on any of the grounds so abandoned. *KARRI VENKATA REDDI v. KOLLU NARASAYYA* (1908).

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1. ——— Ground for dissolution—*Adultery of partner with wife of co-partner.* Adultery of one partner with the wife of his co-partner is a sufficient ground for dissolution of the partnership. *ABBOTT v. CRUMP*. . . 5 B. L. R. 109

2. ——— Death of partner—*Deed of partnership—Contract Act, s. 253, cl. 10.* Where one party (A) advanced money to others to carry on business, and an instrument was executed whereby the latter agreed and bound themselves to account yearly to the former for a share of the profits, the transaction was held to amount to an agreement that A should be a party to the business *pro tanto*. Held, that by the operation of the Contract Act of 1872, s. 253, cl. 10, the partnership between A and the others was dissolved by the death of A, and that the representatives of A, by receiving, some six months after his death, an account with a portion of the money advanced and of the profits, did not reconstitute partnership, but rather indicated an opposite intention. *PEER MAHOMED v. NEKJAN BIBEE*. . . 25 W. R. 49

3. ——— Assignment of share in partnership—*Contract Act, ss. 253, cl. 6, and 265—Introduction of a new member into firm—Suit for an account.* The effect of cl. 6 of s. 253 of the Contract Act is not to render an assignment of a share in a partnership concern illegal or void as between the parties to the assignment, but only so far void as between those parties and the other partners as to cause an immediate dissolution of the partnership. If no assent is given by the other partners to the assignment, the assignee is on dissolution at liberty to sue for an account and for distribution, not as a partner, but as assignee of the right of his assignor in the partnership property. S. 265 of the Contract Act commented on. *JUGGUT CHUNDER DUTT v. RADA NATH DHUR*. . . I. L. R. 10 Calc. 669

4. ——— Right of co-partners to dissolve—*Renunciation of right.* A contract between a partner and his co-partners for remuneration to the former for the management of the partnership business by a commission on the sale, during his lifetime, does not, in the absence of any express agreement to that effect, imply a renunciation of the right of the co-partners to dissolve the partnership if they find that it cannot be carried on except at a loss; nor does it imply an obligation to pay the managing partner compensation in case the partnership is dissolved for that reason. *Rhodes v. Forwood*, L. R. 1 Ap. Ca. 256, referred to and approved. *COWASJEE NANABHOY v. LALBHOY VULLUBHOY*.

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5. ——— Notice of dissolution—*Liability of members for payment to partner retiring without notice.* Partners must, on dissolution of partnership, give full and fair notice to their customers of such dissolution, or otherwise be liable to them for all payments made by them to one partner



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in the belief that he represented the firm. *SHEWRAM v. ROHOMUTOOLLAH*. W. R. 1864, 94

6. ————— *Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 264.* S. 264 of the Contract Act is not intended to be an exhaustive exposition on the question of notice of a dissolution of partnership. The mode of notification of dissolution required in the case of old customers, who are known to the firm as having dealt with it, is an express or specific notice by circular or otherwise. But in the case of the general public the most effectual public notice which can reasonably be given is requisite. *Roop Chund Pundit v. Madhub Chunder Bose*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 681 note, overruled. *CHUNDEE CHURN DUTT v. EDULJEE COWASJEE BIJNEE*.

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 678: 11 C. L. R. 225

7. ————— *Effect of dissolution as against party without notice.* Held, that dissolution between the members of a carrier's firm or exclusion of one of the members thereof by others in virtue of a partnership agreement would not operate against a third party (a consignor) who had no knowledge of it, and who in his dealing with the firm, in the absence of any notification of change, supposed that the partnership continued unaltered as to its members; and that such dissolution or exclusion would not exempt the retired member of the firm from liability to the consignor's claim, unless it be shown that the latter was aware of the fact of the former having ceased to be a member thereof. *GUNGA RAM v. GUNGA DHUR*.

1 Agra 198

8. ————— *Contract Act s. 264—Sleeping partner.* A, B, and C traded together in partnership as B C & Co., A being a sleeping partner. After the partnership was dissolved B and C continued to trade together under the same name and incurred debts to the plaintiffs, who sued to recover the amounts from A, B and C. The plaintiffs had not dealt with the old partnership, nor received notice of its dissolution, and it was not alleged that they knew of A's previous connection with it. Held, that the suits did not lie against A. *RAMASAMI v. KADAR BIBI*.

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 492

9. ————— *Notice—Acknowledgment of debt by one partner—Indian Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 251 and 264—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 21.* The two defendants carried on business under the firm of Kalidas Sankhalchand. They owned two printing presses, one at Ahmedabad and one at Bombay. They had had dealings with the plaintiffs since 1878, and the accounts between them had been adjusted from time to time, and signed by one or other of the defendants on behalf of their firm, acknowledging the amount due to the plaintiffs. The last adjustment was signed in December, 1894, and this suit was filed in 1897 for R1,023 then admitted to be due. The first defendant admitted the claim. It appeared that in 1892 the defendants had quarrelled, and by arbitration the presses were divided, the Ahmeda-

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bad press being given to the first defendant and the Bombay press to the second defendant. At the time of this suit the books and outstandings still remained to be divided. The second defendant now alleged that the partnership had been dissolved in 1892 to the plaintiff's knowledge, and contended that he was not bound by the acknowledgment signed in 1894 by the first defendant and that the claim as against him was therefore barred by limitation under s. 21 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877). The lower Appellate Court held that the claim against the second defendant was barred, on the ground that at the date of acknowledgment in 1894 the partnership had ceased to be a "going concern" and that the partners no longer continued to be agents for each other. Held (reversing the decree, and remanding the case), that the questions to be decided by the Court were the following: (i) whether the partnership between the two defendants had been dissolved before the date of the acknowledgment in 1894; (ii) whether (if it was then subsisting) that acknowledgment was or was not an act necessary for or usually done in carrying on the business of the partnership (s. 251 of the Contract Act, IX of 1872); and (iii) if the partnership had been dissolved at the date of the acknowledgment, then, whether notice of such dissolution had been given, or whether as a matter of fact the plaintiff had notice of such dissolution. *Premji Ludha v. Dossa Doongersey*, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 358, distinguished. *DALSUKHRAM NAGINDAS v. KALIDAS SANKHALCHAND* (1901).

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 42

10. ————— *Dissolution of partnership—Appointment of Receiver—Debt of the firm—Decree against one partner—Satisfaction of the decree by the partner—Suit by the partner against his co-partners for contribution—Court—Practice and procedure.* The plaintiff and defendants traded in partnership from 1884 to 1894. In 1894 a suit for dissolution of the partnership was instituted with the result that on the 11th June 1897 a decree was passed appointing a Receiver with the usual directions for accounts and inquiry. In the meanwhile, J, a creditor of the partnership, sued the plaintiff and defendants for the debt due to him, but the Court passed a decree against the plaintiff alone, leaving his rights against the defendants to be settled in the accounts under the decree dated the 11th June 1897. The plaintiff satisfied J's decree, which was for R5,561 5-9, by means of a havala under which S and K paid on his account R5,400 to J. The balance R161 5-9 due under the decree was paid to J by plaintiff himself. The plaintiff then instituted a suit to recover from the defendants their share of the decretal debt. The Subordinate Judge awarded the plaintiff's claim. On appeal:—Held, (i) that, as J's decree had been satisfied by the plaintiff becoming liable to S and K, he was entitled to call upon the defendants to enable him to meet their share of the liability; (ii) that it was open to any creditor of the partnership to sue the partners and obtain a decree for the recovery of his



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debt, but no creditor, after the appointment of a Receiver, could execute any decree, obtained after that appointment, to the prejudice of the other creditors of the partnership. To obtain satisfaction of his decree the creditor was bound to go to the Court, which had appointed the Receiver, and take its directions; (iii) that the plaintiff's right to recover the amount he claims from the defendants depended, firstly, upon the result of the accounts as between him and the defendants as partners, directed to be taken in the decree, which declared the partnership dissolved and appointed a Receiver; and, secondly, upon whether *J* could, under that decree and upon the accounts consequent upon it, claim more than a rateable share of his money advanced to the partnership, as against the other creditors, if any, of the partnership. *SHIDLINGAPPA v. SHANKARAPPA* (1904)

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11. ———— *Expulsion of one member by others, if causes dissolution—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 253 (7)—Suit for account or dissolution by excluded partner—Limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Arts. 106, 120.* Under the the Indian law there is no dissolution of partnership, when one partner expels the other. A suit by the expelled partner for account or for dissolution of partnership and a share of the profits is not governed by Art. 106, but by Art. 120 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act, and is within time, if brought within 6 years of the date of expulsion. Under the Indian law a partner can be expelled only by an order of the Court. *DWARKA DAS KARNANI v. CHUNI LAL DAYA* (1908) . 12 C. W. R. 455

**5. PROCEDURE.**

1. ———— *Suit to close partnership transactions—Issues—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, Sch. IV, Forms 132, 133—Accounts, decree for.* In a suit for an account of partnership transaction the Subordinate Judge, in whose Court the suit was instituted, framed certain issues with the object of ascertaining who managed the business; with whom the partnership property was; whether the defendant ought to account; what was the capital, and what the expenditure and profits of the firm; and after taking evidence on these points, dismissed the suit. *Held*, that the Subordinate Judge should have followed the course pointed out in Forms 132 and 133 of Sch. IV of the Civil Procedure Code, and at the first hearing should have determined whether there had been a partnership; what were its conditions; was it dissolved; or ought it to be dissolved; and who were the parties interested, and in what shares; and upon determining these questions, should have directed accounts to be taken; and after the accounts had been taken, should have made a final decree. *RAM CHUNDER SHAHA v. MANICK CHUNDER BANIKYA*

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1. ———— *Theft—Fraudulent removal of—Penal Code, ss. 378, 405, and 424—Criminal misappropriation and breach of trust.* *K*, the servant *A* and others, partners, was coming out of the Small Cause Court with some books belonging to the partnership shop, when *A* took them from him and kept them, saying they were his, and refused to give them up. The Magistrate found *A* guilty of theft under s. 378. *Held*, that the conviction could not be sustained; the possession of *K* was the possession of *A* and the partners, and *A* could not therefore be convicted of theft. *QUEEN v. ALLAH BUKSH*

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2. ———— *Criminal misappropriation—Misappropriation of partnership property—Penal Code, s. 405.* A partner who dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use any of the partnership property with which he is entrusted, or which he has dominion over, is guilty of an offence under s. 405 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN v. OKHOY COOMAR SHAW. In the matter of the petition of NAGENDRA LAL CHATTERJEE*

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3. ———— *Criminal breach of trust—Removal of partnership property—Penal Code, s. 424.* Also a partner who fraudulently removes partnership property is guilty of an offence under s. 424, Penal Code. *QUEEN v. GOUR BENODE DUTT* . 13 B. L. R. 308 note: 21 W. R. Cr. 10

4. ———— *Dispute relating to management of partnership property—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Possession as managing partner.* A dispute between partners claiming exclusive possession of the partnership property as managers is outside the purview of s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *RADHA RAMAN GHOSE v. BALIRAM RAM* (1905)

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——— of debt—*Acknowledgment.* A part-payment of the principal of a debt must appear in the handwriting of the person making the part-payment and not in that of any other person, however, authorized. *Held*, also, that the mere crediting of interest in a banker's books cannot be regarded, for the purpose of saving limitation, as equivalent to a payment of interest. *DHARAM DAS v. GANGA DEVI* (1907)

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1. ——— Grazing—*Bom. Act I of 1865*, s. 32—"Village cattle." Plaintiff erected a hut on public ground in a village in the district of Thana, and lived there annually for a few months while his cattle grazed on the public grazing ground in that village. He was not the owner or lessee of any land in the village. On being prevented by the Collector of Thana from thus grazing his cattle, plaintiff brought a suit against that officer for a declaration of his right to graze his cattle within the limits, not only of that village, but of any other village in the district of Thana. *Held*, that plaintiff was not entitled to any such right. The phrase "village cattle" in s. 32 of Bombay Act I of 1865 does not include the cattle of any roving grazer who may choose to squat for a few months on the public ground of a village. That Act does not vest the right of sanctioning such a diversion of the village

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grazing ground in the villagers themselves, but in the Revenue Commissioner, whose consent must be obtained. *COLLECTOR OF THANA v. BAL PATEL*  
I. L. R. 2 Bom. 110

2. ——— Waste lands—*Cultivators—Indigo concern—Zamindars—Decree, form of.* The plaintiffs, resident cultivators of villages belonging to the defendants, the proprietors of an indigo concern, claimed a right of free pasturage over the waste lands of the villages, and the Subordinate Judge made a decree in accordance with the finding of the two lower Courts that the plaintiffs had enjoyed the right without interruption from time immemorial. The High Court, in second appeal, differing as to the nature of the right and the character in which it was claimed, set aside the decree and made an order of remand for the case to be decided in accordance with their remarks. On appeal the Judicial Committee discharged the order of remand as unnecessary, and restored the decree of the Subordinate Judge with the addition of a clause that the decree should not prevent the defendants or their successors in title from cultivating or executing improvements upon their waste lands, so long as sufficient pasturage was left for the plaintiffs. *Held* (agreeing with the judgment of the High Court), that the right claimed was not a right in gross. *BHOLA NATH NUNDI v. MIDNAPORE ZAMINDARI CO.* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 503  
s.c. 8 C. W. N. 425  
L. R. 31 I. A. 75

**PATENT.**

See INVENTIONS AND DESIGNS ACT, s. 29.  
I. L. R. 26 All. 96

— infringement of—

See INJUNCTION—SPECIAL CASES—TRADE-MARK . I. L. R. 17 Bom. 584

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 40 (1871, ART. 11) . I. L. R. 3 Calc. 17

— suit for account of profits of—

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 40 (1871, ART. 11) . I. L. R. 3 Calc. 17

1. ——— Licensee, application by, under s. 24 of Patent Act—*Act XV of 1859*, s. 24—*Petitioner under Patent Act and licensee having no separate interest.* A licensee under a patent cannot, as between himself and the patentee, challenge the soundness of the patent during the continuance of his license. Case in which the petitioner on the record in a proceeding under s. 24 of Act XV of 1859 was found to have had no real interest in the matter apart from that of the licensee; and in which the petition, having been taken to be in reality that of the licensee, was dismissed accordingly. *In the matter of ACT XV of 1859. In the matter of MOSES* . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 244

2. ——— Suit for infringement of patent—*Act XV of 1859*, s. 25—*Substantial difference in machinery—Injunction—Damages and account of profits.* The fact that a machine has been several times improved since the original patent



**PATENT—contd.**

was obtained is no argument against its being a useful invention within s. 25, Act XV of 1859. *Cannington v. Nuttal*, L. R. 5 H. L. 205, followed as to the test of "novelty" in an invention. In deciding whether a machine, patented as an entire invention, is an imitation and piracy of another machine previously patented as an entire invention the question is,—Is the later patented machine substantially the same as the earlier one? The fact of considerable differences existing in the several parts of the two machines will not prevent the latter machine from being, as a whole, a copy of the earlier one; even where an exclusive privilege might have been acquired had the alterations in the later machine been claimed as improvements on the earlier one. *Clark v. Adie*, 2 App. Cas. 315, followed. Where a patent has been obtained for a machine which the patentee subsequently somewhat improves, a subsequent specification claiming the improved machine as a novel combination is bad, though the improvement might be claimed and protected as such. Where a new arrangement of the parts of a machine is claimed as an improvement, the arrangement must be clearly described in the specification. The mere substitution of one mechanical equivalent for another already in use will not protect it. Where a case of infringement of a patent has been made out, an injunction will follow as a matter of course. A plaintiff cannot pray for an account of profits and for damages. He must elect between the two remedies. If the plaintiff elects to take an account of the profits, such accounts will only be carried back to the period of one year before the filing of the plaint, in accordance with Act IX of 1871, Art. 11. *KINMOND v. JACKSON*. *KINMOND v. LAWRIE* L. C. L. R. 66

3. ————— Act XV of 1859, s. 23—Measure of damages—Evidence of particulars. Held, by the Court, in a suit under Act XV of 1859 for the infringement of a patent, where the plaintiff had been in the habit of licensing the use of his invention, that the loss of the amount paid for such license was the measure of damages. *Per SPANKIE, J.*—The meaning of the words "publicly or actually used" in s. 23 of Act XV of 1859 discussed. Held, *per SPANKIE, J.*—That where the defendant did not allege in his written statement that the invention was publicly used at certain places prior to the date of the petition for leave to file the specification, but was allowed to give evidence that the invention was so used at such places, the plaintiff was not bound before trial to have called upon the defendant to supply the particulars as to such places, and such evidence was not admissible. *SHEEN v. JOHNSON*

I. L. R. 2 All. 368

4. ————— Particulars of infringements, Sufficiency of—Practice—Act XV of 1859, s. 34—Stat. 15 & 16 Vict., c. 95 (Patent Law Amendment Act, 1852), s. 41. In a suit for the infringement of certain inventions, the plaintiff did not, as required by s. 34 of Act XV of 1859, deliver with his plaint particulars of the breaches complained of in the suit. In his plaint, after describ-

**PATENT—concl'd.**

ing his inventions, he alleged generally that the defendant had made and used them at a certain place without his license. Held, that, as required by s. 34 of Act XV of 1859, the plaintiff should have delivered with his plaint particulars of the breaches complained of; that the general allegation as to infringement contained in the plaint did not amount to such particulars; and that under these circumstances the plaintiff came into Court with a case which could not be tried. *PETMAN v. BULL* . . . . . I. L. R. 5 All. 371

In the same case, on appeal to the Privy Council:—Held, the sole object of Act XV of 1859, s. 34, corresponding with s. 41 of the English Patent Law Amendment Act, 1852, is to give the defendant fair notice of the case which he has to meet, and it is quite immaterial whether the requisite information be given in the plaint itself or in a separate paper. *Talbot v. La Roche*, 15 C. B. 310, and *Needham v. Oxley*, 1 H. & M. 248, approved. Particulars of breaches must be distinguished from particulars of objections for want of novelty. In the latter case the particular instances may not be within the knowledge of the patentee and must be specified; in the former the defendant must know whether and in what respect he has been guilty of infringement. Where three patents of the plaintiff all related to one article,—a kiln for burning bricks,—and the second and third in date were for improvements upon the invention specified in the first, and the plaintiff alleged a particular kiln constructed and used by the defendant, and in his plaint not only referred to his patents, but indicated in the case of each of them the infringements of which he complained:—Held, reversing the decision of the High Court, that this was a sufficient compliance with the Act. *LEDGARD v. BULL*

I. L. R. 9 All. 191  
L. R. 13 I. A. 134

**PATENT ACT, 1859.**

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 40 (1871, ART. 11) . . . I. L. R. 3 Calc. 17

**PATERNITY.**

See HINDU LAW—MAINTENANCE.

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 32

**PATIA RAJ.**

See HINDU LAW—ALIENATION.

9 C. W. N. 330

**PATIL.**

See ILLEGAL GRATIFICATION.

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 517

See SUBORDINATE JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF . . . I. L. R. 21 Bom. 773

— duties of—

See BOMBAY VILLAGE POLICE ACT.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 612

— suit for declaration of right to officiate as—

See PENSIONS ACT, 1871, ss. 3, 4, 6.

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 531

13 q 2



**PATNI TENURE.**

See BENGAL REGULATION VIII OF 1819,  
s. 9 . . . . . 7 C. W. N. 111

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 244.  
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 103

See CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR.  
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 643

See LIMITATION . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 669  
9 C. W. N. 673

See LIMITATION ACT, s. 7.  
9 C. W. N. 795

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART.  
29 . . . . . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 440

See PATNIDAR.

See PUTNI LEASE.

See PUTNI TALUK.

See RENT . . . . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 140

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—RIGHTS  
AND LIABILITIES OF PURCHASERS.  
6 C. W. N. 794

1. ——— Hereditary interest—*Construction*. The words "patni tenure" *prima facie* convey an hereditary and transferable interest in land. *TARINI CHURAN GANGULI v. WATSON*  
3 B. L. R. A. C. 437: 12 W. R. 413

2. ——— Division or transfer of patni talukh. A patni talukh cannot be divided except by an act of the zamindar, or by an act recognized by him. A patnidar may generally transfer his tenure without the consent of his zamindar, but he can only do so *in solido*, and the transfer of a portion in no way affects the existence of the patni in its entirety or the rights of the zamindar. *JUDOO NATH SHAHANA v. JADUB CHURN THAKOOR*  
11 W. R. 294

3. ——— Transfer of patni right over a specific area, whether valid—*Regulation VIII of 1819, ss. 3 and 6—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 6*. Patni right over a specific area lying within a patni talukh is transferable. Sub-s. 1 of s. 72 of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not require that the notice therein contemplated should be given in any particular manner. *MADHUB RAM v. DOYAL CHAND GHOSE* . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 445

4. ——— Suit by grantor of patni pottah as ijaradar of share in zamindari—*Suit to set aside patni*. One of several grantors of a patni pottah cannot get rid of the patni as to a share in the patni by a suit, as ijaradar of that share, for rent against the raiyats. The patni must be upheld until set aside by a regular suit. *RAJ CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHRY v. UNNODA PERSHAD MOOKERJEE* . . . . . 17 W. R. 221

5. ——— Separate payments of rent and separate registration by patnidar—*Cancellation of lease*. The fact of a patnidar having made separate payments of rent, of having registered his name with each of the sharers, and of being prepared to enter into a fresh engagement with one of them, does not amount to a cancellation of

**PATNI TENURE—contd.**

the original lease and substitution of a new lease—*SHAM CHAND MITTER v. JUGGUT CHUNDER SIRCAR*  
22 W. R. 50

*MOHADEB MUNDUL v. COWELL* . 15 W. R. 445

6. ——— Suit by zamindar to set aside patni lease—*Effect as between patnidar and under-tenants of setting it aside with mesne profits*. Where a landlord (patnidar) and his tenant were defendants in a suit by the zamindar for setting aside the patni, and both were by the decree made liable for the mesne profits which the tenant eventually paid out of his own pocket:—*Held*, that the effect was to cancel all relation of landlord and tenant between them, and to give the tenant a right to receive back what he had paid. *RAKHAI MONEE DOSSEE v. BROJENDRO GOPAL ROY*  
23 W. R. 303

7. ——— Refusal of patnidar to give security—*Inability to collect rents owing to zamindar in consequence withholding amaldastak*. If, by reason of the patnidar not giving security, the zamindar withholds his amaldastak, and also abstains from availing himself of the power which the law gives him of collecting the rents himself, it would be inequitable to allow him to recover from the patnidar the rent which the withholding of the amaldastak has prevented his collecting. *BIDHOO-MOOKHI DEBI v. NILMONEY SING DEO*  
1 C. L. R. 464

8. ——— Merger—*Merger of patni interest in zamindar, who purchases it—Ben. Reg. VIII of 1819, sale held under—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 111, cl. (d), 117 and 2, cl. (d)*. A patni interest created after passing of the Transfer of Property Act is determined on a purchase of the same by the zamindar, even at a sale held in execution of a decree. *PROMOTHO NATH MITTER v. KALI PRASANNA CHOWDHRY (1901)*  
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 744

9. ——— Non-joinder of parties—*Misjoinder of causes of action—Res judicata—Putnis, successive grant of—Rights of putnidars inter se—Tenure intermediate between the zamindar and putnidar, if can be created*. *R* and *H* were each the proprietress of an 8 annas share in each of the mehals Nos. 5582 and 194, the lands of which were undivided. Plaintiff was the putnidar of *H*'s half share in mehal No. 5582 and was the purchaser of its other half, which belonged to *R*. The co-plaintiffs were the purchasers of the 8 annas share of the other mehal No. 194, which belonged to *H*. The other 8 annas share of this estate was purchased by *I* and *P*. The defendants held putnis in respect of certain specified lands within the mehals by virtue of two leases granted by *R* and *H*. The defendants' putnis were prior in date to the plaintiff's putni of the entire 8 annas share in mehal No. 5582. The plaintiff had formerly brought a suit in the Munsif's Court for arrears of rent against the defendants, which was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff being a putnidar had no right of suit for rent against a fellow



**PATNI TENURE—*concl'd.***

putnidar. The present suit was brought by the plaintiff in the Court of the Subordinate Judge against the defendants for arrears of rent. The co-plaintiffs were added because *H* was in the habit of collecting the rents due in respect of both estates jointly from the defendants, but *I* and *P* were not joint. *Held*, that there was no defect for non-joinder of parties: first because the law does not require that the owner of two different estates should sue for their rents jointly, if the rent due to each is known, and secondly because as a matter of fact *I* and *P* were found to have been collecting their rents separately from the defendants. That though the plaintiff's demand was based upon two separate leases, the plaintiff was not bound to bring two separate suits, since the plaintiff was entitled to collect the entire rent due from the defendants in one estate. He might sue for the entire rent in one suit, the two shares in the estate being undivided and the two leases alike. *Held*, further, that the decision of the Munsif in the former suit was not *res judicata* in the present suit, because the latter suit would not have been cognizable by the Munsif's Court, which tried the former suit. *Gopi Nath Chowbey v. Bhagwat Pershad*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 697; *Raghu Nath Panjah v. Issur Chunder Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 153; *Kailash Chandra De v. Tarak Nath Mandal*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 574, note; and *Bhugwanbutty Chowdhry v. Forbes*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 78, distinguished. That the grant of a putni lease to the plaintiff could not operate in derogation of the defendants' previously acquired rights as putnidars. Nevertheless the zamindar had the power to grant away a portion of his remaining rights and to create a tenure intermediate between himself and the defendants by granting the putni lease to the plaintiff. Therefore the plaintiff was entitled to demand the rent, which the defendants were bound to pay to their superior landlord. *RAJKUMAR MAJUMDAR v. PRABAD CHANDRA GANGULY* (1905) . . . . . 9 C. W. N. 656

**PATNIDAR.**

See PATNI TENURE.

See RENT . . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 140

liability of—

See ZAMINDARI DAKS.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 293

right of—

See ABATEMENT OF RENT.

1 W. R. 299

2 W. R. Act X, 30; 47

7 C. W. N. 130

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 70

See LAND REGISTRATION ACT, s. 38.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 404

See PARTITION—RIGHT TO PARTITION.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 575

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—

SETTING ASIDE SALE—PARTIES.

7 C. W. N. 377

**PATNIDAR AND BENAMIDAR.**

See LIMITATION . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 711

**PATTA.**

See POTTAH.

**PATWARI.**

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 74.

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 534

See NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES AND

ODDH KANUNGOS AND PATWARIS ACT.

I. L. R. 23 All. 505

**PAUPER.**

See PAUPER SUIT.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, ss. 380,  
410 . . . 12 C. W. N. 163

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, ss. 411,  
412. . . I. L. R. 31 Bom. 10

See HIGH COURT RULES.

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 163

**PAUPER-SUIT.**

Col.

1. SUITS . . . . . 9266

2. APPEALS . . . . . 9280

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—PRACTICE  
AND PROCEDURE—LEAVE TO APPEAL.

7 W. R. P. C. 29: 4 Moo. I. A. 114

8 W. R. 4

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 401.

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 593

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 407.

8 C. W. N. 70

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 411.

I. L. R. 29 All. 537

See COMPROMISE—CONSTRUCTION, EN-  
FORCING, EFFECT OF, AND SETTING  
ASIDE DEEDS OF COMPROMISE.

7 W. R. P. C. 29: 4 Moo. I. A. 114

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 4.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 427

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 5.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 790

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART.

171 . . . I. L. R. 7 Bom. 373

See REVIEW—ORDERS SUBJECT TO RE-  
VIEW . . . 5 B. L. R. Ap. 29

5 B. L. R. 318 note

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 414

See TRANSFER OF CIVIL CASE—GENERAL  
CASES . . . I. L. R. 24 All. 356

**1. SUITS.**

1. ——— Continuation in forma pau-  
peris of suit commenced in ordinary form  
—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 297-310.* The  
power of the Court to allow a suit to be instituted in  
*forma pauperis* includes the power to allow a suit to  
be continued as a pauper suit after it has been com-



**PAUPER-SUIT—contd.****1. SUITS—contd.**

menced in the ordinary form. **NIRMUL CHANDRA MOOKERJEE v. DOYAL NATH BHUTTACHARJEE**

**I. L. R. 2 Calc. 130**

**REVJI PATIL v. SAKHARAM**

**I. L. R. 8 Bom. 615**

**2. ———— Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 401-415.** A Court has power under Ch. XXVI of the Code of Civil Procedure to allow a suit instituted in the ordinary form to be continued *in forma pauperis*. **THOMPSON v. CALCUTTA TRAMWAY COMPANY**

**I. L. R. 20 Calc. 319**

**3. ———— Pauper defendant—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, Ch. XXVI, ss. 401-415.** Although Ch. XXVI of the Civil Procedure Code only provides for suits to be brought by a pauper, the Court has power to allow a defendant to defend *in forma pauperis*. **DOORGA CHURN DOSS v. NITTO-KALLY DOSSEE**

**I. L. R. 5 Calc. 819  
6 C. L. R. 120**

**4. ———— Suit by next friend—Next friend a pauper—Infant.** A suit can be brought *in forma pauperis* by a next friend who is also a pauper. **GOLAUPMONEE DOSSEE v. PROSONOMOYE DOSSEE**

**11 B. L. R. 373**

**5. ———— Minor—Next friend a pauper.** The rule of English practice which prevents a minor from instituting a suit *in forma pauperis* through his next friend, unless he gives proof not only that he is himself a pauper but that the next friend is a pauper, and that he cannot get any substantial person to act as his next friend, is not to be found in, or deduced from, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. **VENKATA-NARASAYYA v. ACHEMMA**

**I. L. R. 3 Mad. 3**

**6. ———— Representative of pauper—Right to carry on suit.** There is no necessity for an inquiry whether an alleged representative of an admitted pauper is a pauper or not. The Court if satisfied that he is the legal representative ought to admit him to carry on the suit. **BIAGBUT DOSS v. BULORAM DOSS**

**3 W. R. Mis. 20**

**7. ———— Pauper administrator—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 401.** The administrator of the estate of a deceased person may apply to sue *in forma pauperis* under the provisions of Ch. XXVI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. *In re BILL*

**I. L. R. 7 Mad. 390**

**8. ———— Presentation of petition to sue in forma pauperis—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 301, and s. 17.** Held, that s. 301 of Act VIII of 1859, requiring the petition for permission to sue *in forma pauperis* to be presented by the petitioner in person, is imperative, and must be held to control the provisions of s. 17 of the same Act. *Ex parte DEVGIR GURU SUMBHAGIR*

**4 Bom. A. C. 91**

**9. ———— Authorized agent—Vakil—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 301.** A vakil may be a "duly authorized agent" within the meaning

**PAUPER-SUIT—contd.****1. SUITS—contd.**

of s. 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. **KISHOREE MOHUN BOSE v. GOUR MONEE DOSSEE**

**15 W. R. 198**

**10. ———— Presentation of plaint—Limitation—Suit when to be considered as commenced.** In calculating the period of limitation in a case where it is sought to extend the time by reason of a pauper suit having been commenced, the suit is commenced for this purpose when the plaint is presented to the Court, and not merely at the date of its allowance. **SEETARAM GOWER v. GOLUCKNATH DUTT**

**Marsh. 174**

**GOLUCKNATH DUTT v. SEETARAM GOWER.**

**W. R. F. B. 53 : 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 66  
1 Hay 378**

**VINAYAK K. DHAYLE v. BHAI B. SAMVAT.**

**4 Bom. A. C. 39**

**11. ———— Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 308—Limitation.** Where an application for permission to sue *in forma pauperis* is numbered and registered, and deemed to be the plaint in the suit, not in consequence of proof of the plaintiff's pauperism, but in consequence of his abandoning his claim to sue as a pauper and paying for the stamps required for the institution of the suit, the date of such payment, and not the date of the application, must be taken, in computing the period of limitation to be the date of the presentation of the plaint and the institution of the suit. **SKINNER v. ORDE**

**I. L. R. 1 All. 230**

**12. ———— Enquiry into pauperism—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 310—Limitation Act, 1859, s. 14—Deduction of time—Presentation of plaint in wrong Court—Institution of suit.** The plaintiff applied by petition, on 20th February 1873, to the Subordinate Judge of Meerut for leave to sue *in forma pauperis*. The petition contained a statement of the claim and such particulars as are required in a plaint, and a prayer that, as part of the immoveable property claimed was situated in the Punjab, the Subordinate Judge would seek the necessary sanction to give him jurisdiction. The Subordinate Judge, considering that the suit should be instituted in the Delhi district, rejected the application. On 3rd March the plaintiff presented the petition to the Deputy Commissioner of Delhi, and was admitted by that officer to sue as a pauper. The Deputy Commissioner having applied for sanction to try the suit, the High Court, North-Western Provinces, and the Chief Court of the Punjab considered it advisable that the suit should be tried at Meerut; and on 10th June 1873 the Deputy Commissioner returned the petition for presentation in the proper Court in the North-Western Provinces. On 19th July the plaintiff presented it to the Subordinate Judge of Meerut, who received and registered it as a plaint. On 10th November the defendants filed written statements, wherein they agreed that the plaintiff ought not to be allowed to sue *in forma pauperis* until he had proved his pauperism in the Subordinate Judge's Court. Upon this the Sub-



PAUPER-SUIT—*contd.*1. SUITS—*contd.*

ordinate Judge threw out the suit, holding that he had no jurisdiction to admit it. *Held*, that the Subordinate Judge, if he regarded as ineffectual the order of the Deputy Commissioner admitting plaintiff to sue as a pauper, should himself have entered into an inquiry into the plaintiff's pauperism, and not have thrown out the suit. *Held*, also, that the provisions of s. 340 of Act VIII of 1859 were not applicable to the order of the Subordinate Judge refusing to allow the plaintiff to sue as a pauper, as he pronounced no opinion on the point. *Held*, also, with reference to the question of limitation, that the time during which the suit was pending in the Delhi Court should be deducted in computing the period of limitation. *Semble*: That the order admitting the plaintiff to sue as a pauper, which was made by the Delhi Court, became ineffectual when the plaint was returned by that Court; and that it became the duty of the Meerut Court, when the petition was again presented to it, to pass orders *de novo* on the subject. *SKINNER alias MIRZA v. ORDE*

6 N. W. 225

13. ——— Inquiry into pauperism—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 305, 306.* Inquiry under ss. 305 and 306 of the Civil Procedure Code should be made by the Judge himself, and not by the sherista of the Court. *In the matter of EKNATH BIN MADIBA* . . . . . 1 Bom. 102

14. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 306.* When a pauper petition comes on for hearing under s. 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Judge has no power to inquire into any other circumstances than the pauperism of the petitioner. *DIPSANJI JITSANGJI v. FATTLE-SANGJI JASVATSANGJI* . . . . . 5 Bom. A. C. 59

15. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 305, 306—Procedure.* Where a day was fixed, under Act VIII of 1859, s. 305, for receiving evidence of the pauperism of the plaintiff, the Court refused, under s. 306, to entertain any objection of the defendant other than on the single question of the pauperism of the plaintiff. *SHIP-ONESSA BIBEE v. KAMINEE BIBEE*

2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 121

16. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 304, 306—Procedure.* Where a petition in a suit *in formá pauperis* had been admitted, the usual order made under s. 305, Act VIII of 1859, and the case came on for hearing under s. 306, it was proposed for the defendant to show by examination of the plaintiff that, on the facts stated in the petition, she had no cause of action, and it was objected that no question except the pauperism of the plaintiff could be gone into under s. 306. The Court allowed the plaintiff to be examined to show that on her own evidence she had no cause of action, but refused to allow other witnesses to be called upon. From the plaintiff's evidence the defendant failed to show that there was no cause of action. *TARAMONEY DABEE v. HURRO MOHUN CHATTERJEE* . . . . . 11 B. L. R. Ap. 23

PAUPER-SUIT—*contd.*1. SUITS—*contd.*

But see *In GUNGA DASS ADHIKAREE*

11 B. L. R. Ap. 23 note : 14 W. R. 281 where it was held that where, on the day fixed for hearing evidence on the question of pauperism, the defendant brings to the notice of the Court any ground on which it would have been bound to refuse to admit the petition, it is in the discretion of the Court to admit or refuse to receive evidence of such ground. The Judge was *held* not to have been justified in finding on evidence other than that of the petitioner that the claim was barred by limitation. *PARKASH OJHA v. DUSRUTH OJHA*

25 W. R. 74

17. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 401, Explanation, and s. 407.* On an application to sue *in formá pauperis* the Court is required to deal with the question of the applicant's pauperism with reference to the definition of that word as given in the explanation to s. 401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in deciding it to ascertain the exact property, its market value, and the title thereto, and then to deal with the case under s. 407 of the Code, irrespective of any surmises as to the reason why the applicant has valued his claim at a high figure. *MUHAMMAD HUSAIN v. AJUDHIA PRASAD* . . . . . I. L. R. 10 All. 467

18. ——— *Application for leave to sue as a pauper—Property admitted by the respondent to be the property of petitioners not the "subject-matter of the suit" although claimed in the petition—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 401, 405, 509, 410.* The petitioners prayed to be allowed as paupers to sue the respondent for certain property specified in the schedule annexed to their petition. At the hearing of the petition under ss. 408 and 409 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) the respondent appeared and deposited in Court some of the articles claimed by the petitioners to which he admitted they were entitled. The value of the articles deposited was R100. The petitioners acknowledged that the articles were their property, but declined to take possession of them. *Held*, that the petitioners were not paupers as defined by s. 401 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), being possessed of property worth R100 other than the subject-matter of the suit, and that they could not therefore be allowed to sue as paupers. The inquiry into pauperism under ss. 408 and 409 takes place before any suit is in existence; for, until an application to sue as a pauper is granted, there is no plaint, and consequently no suit (see s. 410). Any property therefore found at such inquiry not to be really in dispute cannot be regarded as part of the "subject-matter of the suit," although it may be entered in the particulars of the application for leave to sue as a pauper. The ground for excluding the "subject-matter of the suit" under s. 401 is because such property is presumably out of the petitioner's reach, and cannot be made use of by him to carry on his litigation. In the present case the articles deposited in Court were freely at the disposal of the



**PAUPER-SUIT—contd.****1. SUITS—contd.**

petitioners and could not therefore be excluded from consideration. **DWARKANATH NARAYAN v. MADHAVRAV VISHVANATH I. L. R. 10 Bom. 207**

**19. ——— Ground for rejecting petition—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 407—Rejection of application to sue as a pauper.** The terms of s. 407 (e) of the Code must not be read as limiting the Court's discretion to merely ascertaining whether the "right to sue" arose within its jurisdiction, but have a more extended meaning, namely, that an applicant must make out that he has a good subsisting cause of action, capable of enforcement in Court, and calling for an answer; and not barred by the law of limitation or any other law. Also *per* **MAHMOOD, J.**—The provisions of s. 407 must be interpreted strictly, inasmuch as they operate in derogation of the right possessed by every litigant to seek the aid of the Courts of Justice; and an exercise of jurisdiction under that section, when such exercise of jurisdiction is open to the objection of illegality or material irregularity, would form a proper subject of revision by the High Court. *Har Prasad v. Jafar Ali, I. L. R. 7 All. 345, and Ammal v. Nayudu, I. L. R. 4 Mad. 323, referred to.* **CHATTARPAL SINGH v. RAJA RAM**

**I. L. R. 7 All. 661**

**20. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 403, 407—Procedure.** The Code of Civil Procedure does not authorize the rejection of an application for leave to sue *in formā pauperis* for want of merits when the applicant is found to be a pauper and his allegations disclose a right to sue. When an application for leave to sue *in formā pauperis* is made, the Court should not go into evidence as to the merits of the claim. **RANGANAYAKA AMMAL v. VENKATACHELLAPATI NAYUDU**

**I. L. R. 4 Mad. 323**

**21. ——— Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 407, cl. (d)—Vakil—Agreement—Subject-matter.** Two persons, being about to sue to redeem a certain jaghir village which they had mortgaged, applied for permission to sue as paupers. It appeared that they entered into an agreement with a vakil to pay him, as remuneration for his services as vakil in the case, a lump sum of R1,500 as soon as the case was decided. In default of payment, the vakil was authorized to recover the money out of the revenues of the said village. *Held*, that such an agreement was within the scope of cl. (d) of s. 407 of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), and their application to sue as paupers was rejected. **MANOHAR RAMCHANDRA v. LAKSHMAN MAHADEV.**

**I. L. R. 9 Bom. 371**

**22. ——— Obligation to try and raise funds to sue—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 401.** A person who applies for permission to sue as a pauper is not bound to try and raise funds by mortgaging his claims. Notwithstanding that he might do so, he may be a pauper under s. 401 of the Civil Procedure Code. **VEDANTA DESIKACHARYULU v. PERINDEVAMMA**

**I. L. R. 3 Mad. 249**

**PAUPER-SUIT—contd.****1. SUITS—contd.**

**23. ——— Civil Procedure Code, ss. 404, 406—Application for permission to sue as paupers, presented by several paupers jointly.** The mere fact that several persons jointly present an application for permission to sue as paupers does not authorize the Court to entertain it on behalf of applicants who do not appear in person. **BURGESS v. SIDDEN**

**I. L. R. 10 Mad. 193**

**24. ——— Petition for leave to sue as a pauper—Practice—Requisites for success of application—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 407.** The plaintiff applied for leave to sue as a pauper. She stated as her cause of action that a young girl had been left in her charge and had been maintained by her for a number of years; that in January 1888 arrangements had been made with a Bhatia to get this girl married, and that she (the plaintiff) was to receive R2,500 on the marriage; that the defendant had also agreed to pay her (the plaintiff) R2,000 if she would give the girl to him in marriage; that before the marriage ceremony could be performed, the defendant had induced the girl to quit the plaintiff's house for immoral purposes. She claimed R2,500 as damages and prayed leave to sue as a pauper. *Held*, following *Chattarpal Singh v. Raja Ram, I. L. R. 7 All. 661*, that the facts being clear and the law evident, the case might be finally disposed of on the plaintiff's application to sue as a pauper. **DULARI v. VALLABDAS PRAGJI**

**I. L. R. 13 Bom. 126**

**25. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 407—Application for leave to sue in formā pauperis—Applicant to make out that he has a good subsisting cause of action.** Cl. (c) of s. 407 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not refer solely to a question of jurisdiction, but the applicant must make out that he has a good subsisting *primā facie* cause of action capable of enforcement in Court and calling for an answer. *Chattarpal Singh v. Raja Ram, I. L. R. 7 All. 661; Dulari v. Vallabdas Pragji, I. L. R. 13 Bom. 126; and Vijendra Tirtha Swami v. Sudhindra Tirtha Swami, I. L. R. 19 Mad. 197, referred to.* *Koka Ranganayaka Ammal v. Koka Venkatachellapati Nayudu, I. L. R. 4 Mad. 323, dissented from.* *Venkubai v. Lakshman Venkoba Khot, I. L. R. 12 Bom. 617, distinguished.* **KAMRAKHANATH v. SUNDAR NATH**

**I. L. R. 20 All. 299**

**26. ——— Civil Procedure Code 1882, ss. 409 and 413—Application for leave to sue as pauper—Rejection of application—Extension of time granted for payment of Court-fees—Payment of fees after period of limitation for suit has expired—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 4.** On the 2nd February 1890, the plaintiff applied for leave to sue *in formā pauperis*. After investigation, the Court, on the 15th July 1890, refused leave, but on the plaintiff's application granted him time to pay the Court-fees. He paid the fees on the 12th August 1890. At this date the suit was barred, and the defendant pleaded



PAUPER-SUIT—*contd.*1. SUITS—*contd.*

limitation. The plaintiff contended that the suit should be taken as instituted at the date of his application for leave to sue as a pauper. The lower Court held the suit barred, and dismissed it. *Held*, confirming the decree, that the plaintiff's application to sue as a pauper having been disposed of under s. 409 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), there was no proceeding pending which could be continued and kept alive by the payment of Court-fees. On the rejection of an application for leave to sue as a pauper, the only course open to the applicant is that declared in s. 413, viz., to institute a suit; and the date of the institution of that suit for the purposes of limitation is the actual date thereof. The plaintiff could not then be regarded as a pauper and s. 4 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877) would have no application. *KESHAV RAMCHANDRA v. KRISHNARAO VENKATESH*. I. L. R. 20 Bom. 508

*NARAINI KUAR v. MAKHAN LAL*

I. L. R. 17 All. 526

*ABBASI BEGAM v. NANHI BEGAM*

I. L. R. 18 All. 206

27. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 409—Procedure—Res judicata—Limitation.* On hearing a petition under s. 409 for leave to sue *in formâ pauperis*, the Court must decide whether the petitioner has at the date of the petition a subsisting cause of action capable of enforcement, and where the cause of action is barred by *res judicata* or limitation, the petition must fail. *VIJENDRA TIRTHA SWAMI v. SUDHINDRA TIRTHA SWAMI*. I. L. R. 19 Mad. 197

28. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 409 and 413—Application for leave to sue in formâ pauperis—Refusal of such application a bar to subsequent application in the same right—Plea of jurisdiction taken for first time on appeal.* The plaintiff applied for leave to sue as a pauper for the redemption of a mortgage. As he did not proceed with the application, it was rejected with costs on the 29th November 1888. On the 4th February 1890, plaintiff again applied for leave to sue as a pauper for the redemption of the same mortgage. There being no opposition, the application was granted, and was registered as a suit. On the 20th September 1893, when the suit had been heard nearly to the end, the Government pleader intervened, and applied that it should not be allowed to proceed further until the plaintiff had paid the cost incurred by Government in opposing the first application, which had been rejected. But the plaintiff refused to do so and thereupon the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit with costs under s. 413 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), and ordered the plaintiff to pay the Court-fees under s. 412. *Held*, on appeal, (i) that the order rejecting plaintiff's first application was an order under s. 409 of the Code of Civil Procedure; (ii) that both the applications were made in respect of the same right to sue; (iii) that the order reject-

PAUPER-SUIT—*contd.*1. SUITS—*contd.*

ing the first application operated as a bar under s. 413 of the Code to the entertainment of the second application; and (iv) that such bar being one to the jurisdiction of the Court, the Subordinate Judge was not only competent, but bound to take notice of it at any stage of the suit. *RANCHOD MORAR v. BEZANJI EDULJI*. I. L. R. 20 Bom. 86

29. ———— *Revival of application—Act VIII of 1859, s. 310.* Where there has been no refusal of the application to sue as a pauper under s. 310, Act VIII of 1859, the applicant may revive his application for leave to sue. *BHOJ SINGH v. MAHA KONWER*. 3 Agra Mis. 1

30. ———— *Costs—Pauper suit in the mofussil—Pauper appeal—Unsuccessful plaintiff—Successful defendant—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 220, 412.* S. 412 and Ch. XXVI of the Code of Civil Procedure, of which s. 412 forms a part, do not deal with the costs of a successful defendant in a pauper suit. The costs of a defendant in such a case are to be dealt with under s. 220 of the Code, and the Court of original or appellate jurisdiction has full power to give and apportion costs in any manner it thinks fit. *JETHA MULCHAND v. GULRAJ JASRUP*. I. L. R. 8 Bom. 577

31. ———— *Guardian suing for minor—Dismissal of suit.* Where a guardian obtains permission to sue *in formâ pauperis* on behalf of a minor, the rejection of the suit supplies no ground for throwing the cost of the suit on the guardian. *BRIJESSUREE DOSSIA v. KISHORE DOSS*. 25 W. R. 316

32. ———— *Claim of Government for costs of suit—Stamps in pauper suit.* Where Government, after attaching a pauper plaintiff's decree in order to recover the value of stamps under s. 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, consents to the sale of the decree in execution of another decree against the pauper, and obtains an order by which it secures the chance of any surplus arising from such sale, it cannot afterwards, when the sale is found to yield no surplus, be heard to say, as against the purchaser, that the decree was sold subject to its claim for stamps. The amount of stamps in a pauper case cannot be claimed as a lien or charge upon the decree in favour of Government, but is recoverable in the same manner as the costs of suit; Government being as regards its claim in such a case in no higher position than an ordinary judgment-creditor. *FRANKRISTO ROY v. COLLECTOR OF MOORSHEDABAD*. 15 W. R. 205

33. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 309—Right of Government—Court-fees.* The Crown has the first claim to the proceeds of a pauper suit to the extent of the amount of the Court-fee that would have been payable at the institution of the suit had the plaintiff not been a pauper, and s. 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not preclude the Crown or its representative from urging its prerogative. *GANPAT PATAYA v. COLLECTOR OF KANARA*. I. L. R. 1 Bom. 7



PAUPER-SUIT—*contd.*1. SUITS—*contd.*

COLLECTOR OF MORADABAD *v.* MUHAMMAD DAIM KHAN . . . . . I. L. R. 2 All. 196

34. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 309 and s. 270—Attachment and sale in execution of decree—Right to proceed—Right of Government—Court-fees.* N was allowed to bring a suit as a pauper. His suit was dismissed, the decree directing that he should pay the costs of the defendant. On the defendant's application, certain immoveable property belonging to N was attached in execution of this decree, and was sold. *Held*, that the Crown was entitled to be paid first, out of the proceeds of such sale, the amount of the Court-fees N would have had to pay if he had not been allowed to sue as a pauper. The principle of the ruling in *Ganpat Pataya v. Collector of Kanara*, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 7, followed. *GULZARI LAL v. COLLECTOR OF BAREILLY* . . . I. L. R. 1 All. 596

35. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 412—Order for costs—Jurisdiction.* A Subordinate Judge admitted a plaint in *forma pauperis*, but, holding that he had no jurisdiction to try the suit, returned the plaint to the plaintiff for its presentation in the proper Court, and ordered each party to pay his own costs. After the presentation of the plaint in another Court and before the termination of the suit, the Collector applied to the Subordinate Judge for execution of the order as to costs, by seeking to recover the amount of the stamp duty from the plaintiff. The Subordinate Judge refused, to execute the order, on the ground that the pauper suit was still pending in another Court. His order was affirmed by the District Judge on appeal. On second appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, that, under s. 412 of Act X of 1877, the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to make the order for payment of Court-fees by the plaintiff. The High Court accordingly, in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction, annulled the Subordinate Judge's order about costs and all the subsequent proceedings consequent upon that order. *COLLECTOR OF RATNAGIRI v. JANARDAN KAMAT*

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 590

36. ————— *Right of Government to recover stamp fees—Limitation Act (XIV of 1859), s. 20—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 309.* A decree had been obtained by a party suing in *forma pauperis* against the appellant. The Government now sought to recover against the appellant the amount of stamps which would have been paid by the plaintiff if he has not been permitted to sue as a pauper. *Held*, that the right of Government to recover the stamp fees in question, under s. 309 of Act VIII of 1859, was not affected by the law of limitation laid down in s. 20 of Act XIV of 1859. *SHAMI MOHAMMED v. MOHAMMED ALI KHAN*

2 B. L. R. Ap. 22: 11 W. R. 67

37. ————— *Liability of pauper to pay stamp duty—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 308, 309—Defective stamp duty.* Under ss. 308 and 309 of Act VIII of 1859, a pauper cannot claim exemption from liability to pay any further stamp

PAUPER-SUIT—*contd.*1. SUITS—*contd.*

duty or penalty in respect of a document on which he relies, and which, owing to a defect in the stamp, is inadmissible as evidence in the suit. *GOLAM GUFFOOR v. EKRAM HOSSEIN CHOWDHRY*

10 W. R. 358

38. ————— *Court-fees, recovery of, by Government—Civil Procedure Code, s. 411—Subject-matter of suit—Cross-decrees under same decree.* A plaintiff suing in *forma pauperis* to recover property valued at Rs. 60,000 obtained a decree for Rs. 1,439. The Court, with reference to the provisions of s. 411 of the Civil Procedure Code, directed that the plaintiff should pay Rs. 1,196 as the amount of Court-fees which would have been paid by him if he had not been permitted to sue as a pauper. The Collector having applied under s. 411 to recover this amount by attachment of the Rs. 1,439 payable to the plaintiff, the defendant objected that (i) certain costs payable to her by the plaintiff under the same decree, and (ii) a sum of money payable to her by the plaintiff under a decree which he had obtained in a cross-suit in the same Court should be set off against the Rs. 1,439 payable by her to him, with reference to ss. 246 and 247 of the Code, and that thus nothing would remain due by her which the Government could recover. No application for execution was made by the plaintiff for his Rs. 1,439 or by the defendant for her costs. On appeal from an order allowing the Collector's application, it was contended that the 'subject-matter of the suit' in s. 411 of the Code meant the sum which the successful pauper-plaintiff is entitled to get as a result of his success in the suit; but that in the suit and the cross-suit taken together, the plaintiff ultimately stood to lose a small sum, the defendant being the holder of the larger sum awarded altogether. *Held*, that the contention had no force, as execution had not been taken out by the plaintiff or the defendant or both, and it could not be said that the Government had been trying to execute the plaintiff's decree or was a representative of the plaintiff as holder of the decretal order in his favour for Rs. 1,439, so as to bring into operation the special rules of ss. 246 and 247 of the Code between him and the defendant. *Held*, also, that the plaintiff was one who, in the sense of s. 411, had succeeded in respect of part of the "subject-matter" of his suit, and on that part therefore a first charge was by law reserved and secured to the Government, which was justified in recovering it in these proceedings from the defendant, who was ordered by the decree to pay it in the same way as costs are ordinarily recoverable under the Code. *Held*, that the decrees in the suit and the cross-suit not having reached a stage in which the provisions of ss. 246 and 247 of the Code would come into play, no questions of set-off and consequent reduction or other modification of the "subject-matter" of the suit decreed against the defendant as payable by her to the plaintiff had arisen or could be entertained. *JANKI v. COLLECTOR OF ALLAHABAD*

I. L. R. 9 All. 64



PAUPER-SUIT—*contd.*1. SUITS—*contd.*

39. ———— **Recovery of Court-fees by Government—Civil Procedure Code, s. 411—Sale of decree. *Semle*:** The provisions of s. 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not justify the Court in selling a decree upon the application of the Collector, inasmuch as that section provides that persons who have been successful as paupers shall, so far as the subject-matter of their success is concerned, be liable to satisfy out of what they recover the amount of the fees, which have been for a time, pending the decision of their suit, remitted to them. *Sultan Koor v. Gulzari Lal*, 1. L. R. 2 All. 290, and *Tiruvengada Chari v. Vythilinga Pillai*, 1. L. R. 6 Mad. 418, followed. JOTINDRO NATH CHOWDHRY v. DWARKA NATH DEY

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 111

40. ———— **Court's authority to make an order for payment of Court-fees—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 412, 622—Withdrawal and dismissal of suit—Power of Collector, though not a party to the suit, to move under s. 622—Superintendence of High Court.** The plaintiff, after having filed his suit *in formá pauperis*, came to an amicable arrangement with the defendants and asked the Court that the suit should be dismissed. The Court granted this application, but made no order as to the payment of Court-fees. Thereupon the Collector applied to the High Court, under s. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), to direct the lower Court to make an order for the payment of Court-fees under s. 412 of the Code. *Held*, that the Collector, though not a party to the suit, was entitled to move the High Court under s. 622 of the Code. *Held*, also, that s. 412 had no application to the present case, as there was no adjudication of the rights of the parties, and the plaintiff could not therefore be said to have failed in the suit. The Subordinate Judge had therefore no jurisdiction to make the order desired by the Collector. S. 412 of the Code applies only to cases of adjudicated failure and to the other cases specified, as where the plaintiff has been dispaupered, or where the suit has been dismissed under s. 97 or s. 98. COLLECTOR OF KANARA v. KRISHNAPPA HEDGE . . . . . I. L. R. 15 Bom. 77

41. ———— **Liability of plaintiff for Court-fee—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 412, 622—Dismissal of suit *in formá pauperis* without trial.** A plaintiff who sues *in formá pauperis* is liable to pay the stamp duty if his suit is dismissed without trial, and he may be ordered to do so under s. 622. COLLECTOR OF VIZAGAPATAM v. ABDUL KHARIM

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 113

42. ———— **Stamp duty on a pauper's plaint—Civil Procedure Code, s. 411—Decree for less than the amount of claim—Disreputable defence.** A pauper sued his sister for the partition of property valued at a large sum. The parties belonged to the Begam caste, residing in the Godavari district. The defendant pleaded that the property

PAUPER-SUIT—*contd.*1. SUITS—*contd.*

had been acquired by her as a prostitute, and denied the plaintiff's claim to it. The plaintiff obtained a decree for R100, being a moiety of the property found to have been left by their mother. *Held*, that the defendant was liable to pay Court-fees only on the sum decreed. CHANDRAREKA v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 163

43. ———— **Application for review of judgment in pauper suit—Court-fee—Court-fees Act (VII of 1870), Sch. 1, cl. (5)—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 410.** *Held*, that, when an application for review is presented in a suit *in formá pauperis*, that application, like the plaint in the suit, is not liable to any Court-fee. UMMA BIBI v. NAIMA BIBI . . . . . I. L. R. 20 All. 410

44. ———— **Court-fee payable out of the subject-matter of the suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 411—Suit *in formá pauperis*—Mode of realization of Court-fee by Government—Execution of decree.** In a suit brought *in formá pauperis* the plaintiff was successful, and the decree directed that the Court-fee which would have been payable had the suit not been *in formá pauperis* should be the first charge on the property the subject-matter of the suit, and should be recoverable from the defendant in the same manner as the costs of the suit. *Held*, that it was not necessary for Government to bring a separate suit to recover the Court-fee, but that the same might be realized from the property the subject of the suit by proceedings in execution. RAM DAS v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA . . . . . I. L. R. 18 All. 419

45. ———— **Charge of Government for Court-fees—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 411—Court-fees—First charge on subject-matter of suit—Purchase of portion of subject-matter at sale to recover Court-fees—Subsequent purchase in execution under another decree—Validity.** A suit was filed *in formá pauperis*, and a decree passed, in December, 1893, awarding the plaintiff therein certain land. A portion of that land was, in 1896, put up for sale in order to recover the amount due to Government as stamp fees in connection with the pauper suit, and the present plaintiff bought it. The same land was attached in 1899 in execution of another decree, which was passed in March, 1894. Plaintiff made a claim, which was rejected, and the land was sold to the second defendant in execution of that other decree, in September, 1899. Plaintiff now sued for a declaration that the land was not liable to be sold in satisfaction of the other decree. *Held*, that inasmuch as the amount of the stamp fees recoverable by Government in connection with the pauper suit was a first charge on the property, under s. 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the purchase by plaintiff prevailed as against the purchase by the second defendant. PUTHIA VALAPPIL BARGA v. VELOTH ASSENAR (1902) . . . . . I. L. R. 25 Mad. 733

46. ———— **Crown debt, priority of—Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), s. 309**



PAUPER-SUIT—*contd.*1. SUITS—*contd.*

—*Suit in formā pauperis*—*Successful petitioner*—*Charge of Government for Court-fees*. S. 411 of the Civil Procedure Code is an enabling section. Though it indicates the manner in which the Crown may proceed to realise Court-fees of a successful pauper plaintiff, which form a Crown debt, it does not preclude the Crown or its representative from urging its prerogative and insisting on its right to precedence over all other creditors. A successful pauper plaintiff, attached and sold for her costs certain property, other than the property in suit, belonging to the judgment-creditor. The sale-proceeds were paid into Court. The plaintiff's Solicitor applied to have his costs paid out of the sale-proceeds. The Government Solicitor also applied to have his certified Court-fees paid to him out of the fund in Court: *Held*, that the Government Solicitor was entitled to precedence and that it was not necessary for him to attach the fund before getting payment. *Secretary of State v. The Bombay Landing and Shipping Co., Ltd.*, 5 Bom. H. C. 23 (O. C. J.); *Gunput Putaya v. The Collector of Kanara*, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 7; *Gulzari Lal v. Collector of Bareilly*, I. L. R. 1 All. 596; *The Collector of Moradabad v. Muhammad Daim*, I. L. R. 2 All. 196; *Ramdas v. The Secretary of State*, I. L. R. 18 All. 419; and *Bell v. The Municipal Commissioners*, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 457, referred to. *GYANODA BALA DASEE v. BUTTO KRISHNA DASS BAIRAGEE* (1906) . . . 10 C. W. N. 857

47. — *Religious Endowments Act (XX of 1863), s. 18*—*Suit sanctioned for removal of trustees*—*Leave to sue in formā pauperis*—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 402, 407*. The provisions of Ch. XXVI of the Code of Civil Procedure do not preclude a person, who has obtained leave to sue under s. 18 of the Religious Endowments Act for the removal of the trustees of a temple, from being permitted to sue in formā pauperis. *GURUSAMI CHETTI v. KRISHNASAMI NAIKAR* (1901) . . . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 419

48. — *Withdrawal of suit*—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 373, 412*—*Suit*—*Withdrawal of a suit with permission to bring fresh suit*—*Failure in the suit*—*Adjudication*—*Court-fees, payment of*. Where a pauper plaintiff withdraws a suit with permission to bring a fresh suit he is liable to pay to the Government the Court-fees, which would have been paid by him, if he had not been permitted to sue as a pauper. The words "if the plaintiff fails in the suit" in s. 412 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) apply to the withdrawal of a suit under the provisions of s. 373 of the Code. *SECRETARY OF STATE v. NARAYAN BALKRISHNA* (1904)

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 102

49. — *Death of the applicant*—*Application for leave to sue in formā pauperis*—*Revival of the application*—*Personal right*—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 365, 403, 419, 413*—*Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 4*.

PAUPER-SUIT—*contd.*1. SUITS—*concl.*

Where there is only an application for leave to sue in formā pauperis, but no suit pending in Court, and the applicant dies before the leave is granted, the right to sue as a pauper, being a personal right, cannot survive in the legal representative of the deceased applicant. The legal representative may present a fresh application for leave to sue in formā pauperis, or may institute a suit for the same relief, which the deceased sought to recover, if the right to sue survives in him. *Chunder Mohan Roy v. Bhubon Mohini Debea*, I. L. R. 2 Calc. 389, *Aubhoya Churn Dey v. Bissesswari*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 889, and *Dwarkanath Narayan v. Madhavray Vishvanath*, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 207, referred to. *LALIT MOHAN MANDAL v. SATISH CHANDRA DAS* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1163

## 2. APPEALS.

1. — *Application for leave to appeal*—*Decision in suit in formā pauperis*—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 367-371*—*Inquiry into pauperism*. An appeal lies from a decision in a suit heard in formā pauperis. A separate formal application for inquiry into the pauperism of the applicant need not precede an application for leave to appeal in formā pauperis. *KAMOD POORY v. SHEO POORY* . . . 1 N. W. 167: Ed. 1873, 246

2. — *Admission of appeal*—*Authorised agent to sign and present petition*. The Court rejected a petition of appeal presented on behalf of a pauper by a vakil who was retained under an ordinary retainer, but was not duly authorized to sign as attorney for the appellant. *BHUGOBUTTY KOORER v. GUNESH DUTT* . . . 21 W. R. 308

3. — *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 592 and 404*—*Application by party not by pleader, necessary*. An application for leave to appeal in formā pauperis, under s. 592 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be made by the party in person, subject to the exemption contained in s. 404 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *In re NARISI* . . . I. L. R. 8 Mad. 504

4. — *Right of appeal by Government*—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 411, 412*—*Right of Government to appeal in respect of Court-fee on portion of plaintiff's claim dismissed*. In a suit in formā pauperis the District Judge decreed the plaintiff's claim in part and dismissed it in part but omitted to make any provision for payment to Government of the Court-fee on the portion which was dismissed. The Secretary of State, not having been a party to the litigation in the Court below, then preferred an appeal in respect of the Court-fee on that portion of the plaintiff's claim which had been dismissed. *Held*, that such an appeal would lie, though the more suitable procedure would have been for the Government to have applied, through the Collector, to the Court of first instance to review its judgment and to repair the omission in its decree. *Janki v. Collector of Allahabad*, I. L. R. 9 All. 64,



PAUPER-SUIT—*contd.*2. APPEALS—*contd.*

referred to. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA *v.* BHAGWANTI BIBI . . . I. L. R. 13 All. 326

5. ———— *Right of appeal by Government—Costs of plaintiff—Decree omitting to order plaintiff to pay Court-fees—Power of Collector to apply under the extraordinary jurisdiction of High Court—Amendment of decree.* The plaintiff's suit *in formā pauperis* was rejected by the Subordinate Judge. The decree, however, omitted to order the recovery from the plaintiff of the Court-fees payable on the plaint. The Collector applied to the High Court under its extraordinary jurisdiction for the rectification of the decree. It was contended that, as the omission might have been remedied by an appeal or on review, the Collector could not apply under the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court. *Held*, on the authority of the Collector of Ratnagiri *v.* Janardan, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 590, that no appeal by Government would lie in the case, and that, in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction, the High Court would rectify the decree by directing the plaintiff to pay the costs of Government. COLLECTOR OF KANARA *v.* RAMBHAT . . . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 454

See COLLECTOR OF TRICHINOPOLY *v.* SIVARAMARA KRISHNA SASTRIGAL . . . I. L. R. 23 Mad. 82 where it was held that s. 440 does not apply to the case of an order passed under s. 412.

6. ———— *Security for costs—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 342, 370.* An Appellate Court has no power under s. 370, Act VIII of 1859, to annex to its order the condition that the party allowed to appeal should give security for costs. The provisions in s. 342, which make it discretionary in the Appellate Court to demand security for costs, is not applicable to appeals *in formā pauperis*; and therefore the order of the Judge in this case requiring security for costs from the petitioner after his appeal had been admitted, and after the Judge on inquiry had found that the appellant was a pauper, was set aside. NUSSEERODDEEN BISWAS *v.* UJJUL BISWAS . . . 17 W. R. 68

7. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 549.* A suitor *in formā pauperis* may be called on to give security for costs under s. 549 of the Civil Procedure Code, but very special grounds must be shown to support such an application. Nusseerooddeen Biswas *v.* Ujjul Biswas, 17 W. R. 68, dissented from. SESHAYANGAR *v.* JAINTULAVADIN . . . I. L. R. 3 Mad. 68

See also MANECKJI *v.* GOOLBAI

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 241

8. ———— *Ground of appeal—Suit after rejection of claim to attached property.* N sued to set aside the sale of property which M had attached in execution of a decree against N's husband's brother, plaintiff alleging that it belonged to her husband (though the latter's objections under s. 246, Civil Procedure Code, had been rejected) and asking for a declaration of her right and title. N obtained a decree, and both M and the auction-

PAUPER-SUIT—*contd.*2. APPEALS—*contd.*

purchaser appealed to the Judge *in formā pauperis*. *Held*, that M had good ground of appeal if he could prove that the property belonged to the judgment-debtor. *In the matter of* MOSHAOLLAH KHAN

14 W. R. 445

9. ———— *Pauper respondent—Respondent allowed to proceed as a pauper—Power of High Court.* Where a respondent is allowed in the lower Court to sue *in formā pauperis*, the High Court will not set aside that order on motion, on the ground that it has been improperly obtained. *In the matter of* the petition of KHODEJOONISSA

7 W. R. 486

10. ———— *Filing objections—Payment of stamp duty—Court Fees Act, s. 16—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 348.* A pauper respondent is not entitled to present objections at the trial of an appeal without payment of stamp duty. BABAJI HARI *v.* RAJARAM BALLAL

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 75

11. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 561.* Objections by a respondent to a decree under s. 561 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be filed *in formā pauperis*. Babaji Hari *v.* Rajaram Ballal, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 75, followed. NARAYANA *v.* KRISHNA . . . I. L. R. 8 Mad. 214

BRJESHWARI DAS *v.* GUROO CHURN DAS

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 735

12. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 412 and 414—Costs—Appeal in formā pauperis—Withdrawal of appeal—Right of Government to costs—Compromise of suit pending appeal.* The plaintiffs filed a suit *in formā pauperis* to recover possession of certain property. The Court of first instance dismissed the suit. Thereupon the plaintiffs preferred an appeal *in formā pauperis* to the High Court. Pending the appeal the parties entered into a compromise, under which it was agreed (*inter alia*) that the appeal should be withdrawn, and that the respondent should pay to Government the Court-fees which the plaintiffs were liable to pay both in the first Court and in the Court of appeal. When the appeal came on for hearing, the appellants informed the Court of their intention to withdraw from the appeal. Thereupon the Government pleader intervened, and applied for an order directing the respondent to pay in accordance with the terms of the compromise, all the costs payable to Government on account of institution fees, etc., in the first Court as well as in the Appellate Court. This application was opposed by both parties. The Government pleader then moved the Court to dispauper the appellants under s. 414 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882). *Held*, that, the appeal having been withdrawn, no order could be made either under s. 412 or under s. 414 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, also, that it was not open to the Court to order the respondent to pay any fees on the strength of any agreement between the parties. BAI CHANDABA *v.* KUEVER SAHEB BAPU SAHEB

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 464



**PAUPER-SUIT—contd.****2. APPEALS—contd.**

**13.** ——— **Application for leave to appeal—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 404, 592—Presentation of application for leave to appeal in formā pauperis—Necessity for personal application—Application of rules in Ch. XXVI after presentation of application.** The provision in s. 404 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which requires an application for permission to sue in formā pauperis to be presented (except in certain circumstances) by the applicant in person, does not apply to an application under s. 592 to be allowed to appeal as a pauper. After an application has been presented under s. 592, all action taken subsequent to such presentation is, by the terms of s. 592, to be subject to the rules contained in Ch. XXVI of the Code, but the presentation of the application itself is not subject to those rules. *In re Narisi*. *I. L. R. 8 Mad. 504*, not followed. *MAILTHI v. SOMAPPA BANTA* (1902) . *I. L. R. 26 Mad. 369*

**14.** ——— **Presentation of appeal by agent of a pardanashin woman—Letters Patent, High Courts, 1865, cl. 8—Presentation of appeal by a person other than an advocate, vakil or attorney of the Court, or a suitor—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 640, 404, 592.** Where an appeal in formā pauperis by a parda nashin woman, who had sued as a pauper in the Court of first instance, was presented not by an advocate, vakil or attorney of the Court, nor by the appellant in person, but by her duly authorized agent, it was held that this was a good presentation, clause 8 of the Letters Patent notwithstanding. *Shiam Karan v. Raghunandan Prasad*, *I. L. R. 22 All. 331*, distinguished. *WAZIR-UN-NITSA v. ILAHI BAKHSI* (1901) . *I. L. R. 24 All. 172*

**15.** ——— **Death of plaintiff—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 401 et seqq.—Suit in formā pauperis—Decree passed in ignorance of plaintiff's death—Consent order for re-trial—Objection to plaintiff's representative suing in formā pauperis—Estoppel.** The plaintiff in a suit brought in formā pauperis died, but in ignorance of her death the Court passed a decree in her favour. The defendant appealed, making respondent to his appeal a lady whom he alleged to be the legal representative of the deceased plaintiff. On this appeal an order was passed, by consent of parties, sending back the suit to be re-tried on the merits as between the defendant and the person nominated by him as plaintiff, and it was so re-tried, and a decree was again passed in favour of the plaintiff. Held, that it was not thereafter open to the defendant to object that there had been no inquiry into the right of the representative of the original plaintiff to sue as a pauper. *AKBAR HUSAIN v. ALIA BIBI* (1902) *I. L. R. 25 All. 137*

**16.** ——— **Right of appeal—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 403, 409, 588—Suit in formā pauperis—Appeal—Propriety of order allowing plaintiff to sue in formā pauperis not a ground of appeal.** Where after consideration of an application for leave to sue as a pauper, the Court of first instance has allowed the suit to be instituted in formā pauperis, and has

**PAUPER-SUIT—concl'd.****2. APPEALS—concl'd.**

passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff, it is not open to the defendant in appeal to question the propriety of the first Court's order permitting the plaintiff to sue as a pauper. *MUMTAZAN v. RASULAN* (1901) . *I. L. R. 23 All. 364*

**17.** ——— **Letters Patent, High Courts, 1865, cl. 15, "Judgment"—Order refusing leave to appeal in formā pauperis.** There is no appeal, under cl. 15 of the Letters Patent, against an order, passed by a single Judge, under s. 592 of the Code of Civil Procedure, refusing leave to appeal in formā pauperis. By s. 592, a discretion is vested in the Judge to allow or disallow the application, and an order passed in the exercise of such a discretion is not a "judgment" within the meaning of cl. 15 of the Letters Patent. *Sriramulu v. Ramasam*, *I. L. R. 22 Mad. 109*; *Venkatarama Ayyar v. Madalai Ammal*, *I. L. R. 23 Mad. 169*; and *Srimantu Raja Durga Naidu v. Srimantu Raja Mallikarjuna Naidu*, *I. L. R. 24 Mad. 358*, followed. *APPASAMI PILLAI v. SOMASUNDRA MUDALIAR* (1902) *I. L. R. 26 Mad. 437*

**18.** ——— **Reasons for granting leave to appeal—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 592, proviso—Pauper appeal—Leave—Reasons for granting leave to be recorded.** In granting leave to appeal as pauper the Court should be careful to see that the proviso to s. 592 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) is satisfied. The Judge or Bench admitting a pauper appeal should express and record very briefly the reasons for granting leave so that the Bench, before whom the appeal ultimately comes, may have an assurance that the leave was properly given. *SAKUBAI v. GANPAT* (1904)

*I. L. R. 28 Bom. 451*

**PAWNEE.**

——— of medal or military decoration.

See DISCIPLINE—ARMY ACT, 1881, s. 156

*I. L. R. 10 Mad. 108*

**PAWNOR AND PAWNEE.**

See CONTRACT ACT, 1872, s. 178.

*I. L. R. 3 Calc. 264*

*I. L. R. 4 Calc. 497*

*I. L. R. 24 Bom. 458*

*I. L. R. 30 All. 165*

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, Sch. II, ART.

57 . *I. L. R. 24 All. 251*

See PAWNEE.

——— **Pawnor and pawnee—Pawnor not owner but having a right to possession—Suit by owner for declaration of his title.** A person, who had obtained possession of certain moveable property belonging to a minor in the capacity of a trustee, and who had been allowed to retain possession of such property after the minor came of age, pawned some of it to persons, who were found to have acted, negligently perhaps, but honestly and in good faith. Held, that the



**PAWNOR AND PAWNEE—concl'd.**

pledge was valid but the owner was entitled to a declaration of his right to redeem the articles so pawned. *SUNDAR DEO v. BHAGWAN DAS* (1908)  
I. L. R. 30 All. 165

**PAYMENT.**

See **INSTALMENTS.**

— evidence of—

See **BOND** . . . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 45  
8 W. R. 316  
3 W. R. Mis. 23

— in consideration of releasing person from prison—

See **CONTRACT ACT, s. 23—ILLEGAL CONTRACTS GENERALLY** 9 B. L. R. Ap. 38

— made under forged will—

See **WILL—VALIDITY OF WILL.**  
6 C. W. N. 787

— of whole debt by one debtor—

See **CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—PAYMENT OF JOINT DEBT BY ONE DEBTOR.**

— on account of debt—

See **LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 20.**

— place of—

See **PAKKI ADAT SYSTEM.**  
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 364

— specified time for—

See **LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 66 (1871, ART. 65)** . . . I. L. R. 5 Calc. 21

See **LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 179—ORDER FOR PAYMENT AT SPECIFIED DATES.**

**PAYMENT INTO COURT.**

See **BENGAL RENT ACT, 1869, s. 31.**  
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 714  
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 498  
L. R. 20 I. A. 25

See **BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 150.**  
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 947

See **CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 257.**  
I. L. R. 12 Mad. 121

See **COSTS—SPECIAL CASES—PAYMENT INTO COURT** . . . 1 Bom. 70  
14 W. R. 387  
I. L. R. 21 Bom. 502

See **DECREE—CONSTRUCTION OF DECREE—PAYMENT INTO COURT.**  
I. L. R. 8 Calc. 528  
I. L. R. 3 All. 775

See **EXECUTION OF DECREE—MODE OF EXECUTION—MORTGAGE.**  
I. L. R. 24 All. 479

**PAYMENT INTO COURT—concl'd.**

See **INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES—PAYMENT INTO COURT.**

3 B. L. R. Ap. 105 : 12 W. R. 50  
2 C. L. R. 183  
16 W. R. 297 ; 304

See **PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—SALE BY REGISTRAR** . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 566

See **RIGHT OF SUIT—SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE** . . . I. L. R. 13 All. 195

See **TENDER** . . . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 141

1. ——— **Payment of charge on estate under decree—Authority to make deposit.** Where a decree treats an estate as primarily liable to discharge a debt with interest, the proprietor (or his heir) has a right to pay the money into Court to protect himself from being made responsible to indemnify the sureties ; and if the money is deposited for the purpose of satisfying the decree, it is unnecessary for the Court to inquire whether it was deposited under authority from the proprietor or his heir. *BISSESSUR SINGH v. NIM CHAND BOSE*  
12 W. R. 505

2. ——— **Voluntary payment—Arrest under writ of attachment—Objection by judgment-debtor to money being taken out.** Payment of money into Court by a judgment-debtor, to prevent arrest under a writ of attachment, is not a voluntary payment ; and on application by the decree-holder to take the money out, the judgment-debtor is not limited to those objections only which he raised to the right of the decree-holder at the time of paying the money in. *PARESNATH MOOKERJEE v. BINADIRAM SEN*  
4 B. L. R. Ap. 25 : 13 W. R. 29

3. ——— **Legal necessity.** Where a person, in order to save his indigo factory from sale in execution of a decree against a third person, paid the amount of the decree into Court. Held, that the payment was not a voluntary payment, but one made under legal necessity. *RUMZAN ALI v. SOORUJBHAN* . . . 7 W. R. 403

4. ——— **Property unincumbered with mortgage lien.** Where a plaintiff suing to obtain property unincumbered by a previous mortgage pays into Court the amount due under the lien of the defendant as mortgagee, and states that he has an objection to the sum being appropriated to the payment of that lien, he has no cause of action against the defendant. *TOOLSEE DUTT MISSEER v. BROJOMOHUN THAKOOR*  
9 W. R. 323

5. ——— **Money paid under wrong order of Court.** Money paid over at the instance of a judgment-creditor or under a wrongful order of Court may be recovered by means of a suit in the Civil Court. *OMANATH ROY CHOWDHRY v. SCROOP CHUNDER BOSE* . . . 10 W. R. 485

6. ——— **Payment to stay sale in execution of decree—Suit to recover.** Certain property which had been mortgaged to the plaintiff by a bond executed by J D on 25th Feb-



**PAYMENT INTO COURT—contd.**

ruary 1867 was sold to him in execution of a decree passed upon that bond on 3rd September 1868. Before such sale, but after the above mortgage, the property was attached by the first defendant in execution of a decree of 1865 (i.e., *J D*'s equity of redemption was attached), and a part of the property was sold. The sale was set aside for irregularity, but the attachment remaining the first defendant resumed proceedings in execution and got an order for sale, when the plaintiff released it from liability to such sale by paying into Court the money due, which he now sought to recover. *Held*, that the first defendant had a right to sell the right and interest of *J D* in the property, and was therefore entitled to keep the money which saved the sale.

GOSSAIN MUNRAJ POOREE *v.* DEEN DYAL LALI.  
20 W. R. 20

7. ———— *Payment by auction-purchaser of mortgage-decree against his purchase.* Auction purchasers with notice of a mortgagee's lien are liable to pay off the mortgage, and to satisfy any decrees which the mortgagee may obtain in regard to the property in a suit pending at the time of the purchase. Such decree cannot be satisfied by payment into Court, unless the mortgagee has the means of immediately taking the money out of Court or acquiesces in such payment as payment to himself. LAND MORTGAGE BANK *v.* RAM RUTTUN NEOGY . . . 21 W. R. 270

8. ———— *Payment to protect property from sale.* *P* lent money to *S* upon a specially registered tumsook pledging immovable property, and afterwards obtained a decree under Act XX of 1866, s. 53, for principal and interest. More than four years later, he brought a further suit against *S* to recover the interest due under the same bond. Meanwhile plaintiffs also lent money to *S* under a bond by which the same property was pledged, and also recovered a decree in execution of which the property was sold. *P* then proceeded to attach the same property in execution of his second decree, when plaintiffs objected under Act VIII of 1859, s. 246, but ineffectually; and after that, to protect the property which they had purchased, they paid a sum of money into Court which was subsequently taken out by *P*. They now sued to recover that money. *Held*, that, under the circumstances, the payment of the money into Court was not a voluntary payment, and the plaintiffs were entitled to recover it. MUTHOORA MOHUN ROY CHOWDHRY *v.* PEAREE MOHUN SHAHA  
23 W. R. 344

9. ———— *Payment into Government treasury—Purchase-money—Civil Procedure Code, s. 308—Purchase in execution of decree—Rules of High Court of 21st June 1882.* Under the Rules of the High Court, dated 21st June 1882, a payment into the Government treasury is equivalent to a payment into Court for the purposes of s. 308 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. SRINIVASA BHATTA *v.* MALAYACHAN MANNADI  
I. L. R. 7 Mad. 211

**PAYMENT INTO COURT—contd.**

10. ———— *Payment by purchaser into the Post Office within time—Money not received by the Court until after expiration of time allowed by section—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 307.* A purchaser at an execution sale was bound under s. 307 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) to pay the balance of the purchase-money into Court on the 19th June 1896. On the 17th June he paid in the amount to the Post Office at Yellapur, and obtained a money order which he sent to the Nazir of the Court. The Nazir did not receive the money until the 22nd June. *Held*, that the payment was not in time. The Post Office is not the agent of the Court, and the purchaser was bound to see that the money reached the Court in time to satisfy the requirements of s. 307. RAM-CHANDRA KRISHNAPA *v.* BELYA  
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 415

11. ———— *Order in execution that defendant pay money into Court—Appeal by plaintiff against order—Payment into Court by defendant—Refusal of plaintiff pending appeal to take money out of Court—Attachment of the money so paid in by another creditor of defendant and payment to him—Subsequent application by plaintiff in execution for payment—Effect of his previous refusal.* In execution of a decree against the defendant obtained by the plaintiff, an order was made, directing the defendant (*inter alia*) to pay into Court the sum of R140-8-0. Both parties appealed against this order, but pending the appeals the defendant paid the amount into Court. The plaintiff, however, refused to take it, on the ground that he had appealed against the order under which it was paid in, and the Court subsequently passed an order that the money should be returned to the defendant. But before this could be done, the money was attached by a third person, in execution of his decree against the defendant and a few days afterwards the money was paid over to him. Shortly afterwards the appeal against the order directing the defendant to pay R140-8-0 to the plaintiff was heard and the order was confirmed. Thereupon the plaintiffs applied in execution (*inter alia*) for payment of the sum of R140-8-0. The defendant contended that he had already paid it. The Subordinate Judge directed the defendant to pay this sum into Court within one month. The defendant appealed to the District Court, who confirmed the order of the Subordinate Judge. The defendant then appealed to the High Court. *Held*, that the orders of the lower Courts should be reversed. When the defendant paid the R140-8-0 into Court in execution of the decree, the Court held the money on account of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff, who had not obtained a stay of execution, could not refuse to take it because an appeal was pending. The plaintiff's refusal, therefore, to take the money out of Court did not justify the Subordinate Judge in treating the money as the defendant's and in ordering it to be paid to another judgment-creditor of the defendant without his having in any way expressed his assent to



**PAYMENT INTO COURT—concl'd.**

the money being so treated. *LAKSHMAN DADAJI v. DAMODAR AMBADAS* I. L. R. 15 Bom. 681

12. ——— **Forfeiture of deposit—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1852), s. 307—Default of purchaser at Court-sale to pay full amount.** S. 307 of the Code of Civil Procedure is imperative, and must be given effect to. Where a purchaser at a Court-sale makes default in paying the full amount of the purchase-money, the deposit must be forfeited. The fact that the decree-holder and the judgment debtor do not ask for a re-sale, but consent to the original sale being allowed to stand, is no reason why the Government should forego the forfeiture. *SAMBASIVA AYYAR v. VYDINADASAMI* (1901) I. L. R. 25 Mad. 535

**PAYMENT TO STAY OR SET ASIDE SALE.**

See CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR—VOLUNTARY PAYMENT.

See CO-SHARERS—GENERAL RIGHTS IN JOINT PROPERTY . 14 B. L. R. 155  
I. L. R. 9 Calc. 377  
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 800

See MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED.  
8 B. L. R. 418

See PAYMENT INTO COURT.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—DEPOSIT TO STAY SALE.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—DEPOSIT TO STAY SALE.

See VOLUNTARY PAYMENT.  
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 305  
1 C. W. N. 458

**PEACE.**

See RECOGNIZANCE TO KEEP PEACE.

**PECUNIARY LOSS.**

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 144.  
13 C. W. N. 188

**PEDIGREE.**

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS—PEDIGREE.  
I. L. R. 10 Mad. 362  
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 84

——— proof of—

See EVIDENCE ACT (I OF 1872), s. 9.  
I. L. R. 18 All. 98

See EVIDENCE ACT, I OF 1872, s. 32.  
4 C. L. R. 173  
I. L. R. 9 All. 467  
I. L. R. 12 Calc. 219  
I. L. R. 13 Calc. 42  
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 265  
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 236  
L. R. 27 I. A. 183  
I. L. R. 17 All. 456  
L. R. 22 I. A. 139  
I. L. R. 30 All. 510

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860).**

See WHIPPING . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 357

——— application of—

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—GENERAL JURISDICTION—OFFENCE COMMITTED ON THE HIGH SEAS.  
I. L. R. 25 Bom. 636

——— exceptions in—

See CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—GENERAL CASES . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 124

See EVIDENCE ACT, 1872, s. 105.  
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 124

——— ss. 1, 2—

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.  
I. L. R. 13 Mad. 353

——— s. 4 (a)—*Information to police of taking away or detaining wife.* The word "complaint" referred to in s. 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure means a "complaint" as defined by s. 4 (a) of that Code. *Jatra Sheikh v. Reazut Sheikh*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 453, referred to. *TARA PRASAD LAHA v. EMPEROR* (1904) . 8 C. W. N. 17

——— s. 19—

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—WHERE SANCTION IS NECESSARY OR OTHERWISE . I. L. R. 23 Mad. 540

——— s. 21—

See PUBLIC SERVANT.  
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 344

——— *Rules framed under, by Chief Presidency Magistrate—Rule 8—Rule that in a Bench of two, the opinion of Chairman shall prevail—Inconsistency with Code—Ultra vires.* Rule 8 of the Rules framed by the Chief Presidency Magistrate in 1900, under s. 21 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is inconsistent with the provisions of the Code in so far as it directs that in a Bench composed of two members, the decision of the Chairman shall prevail. It is also arbitrary and not consonant with natural justice. *HENRY WAKEFIELD v. HARAN SARDAR* (1904) . 8 C. W. N. 862

——— s. 21 cl. (b)—

See LANDMARKS, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1084

1. ——— ss. 21 and 99—*Public servant—Gorait in the district of Gorakhpur.* Held, that a gorait is a public servant within the meaning of ss. 21 and 99 of the Penal Code. *EMPEROR v. SIDHU* I. L. R. 26 All. 542

2. ——— ss. 21, 161—*Clerk to a Sub-Registrar—Illegal gratification—Registration Act (III of 1877), ss. 6 to 14, 69, 84.* A clerk appointed by a Sub-Registrar, and paid out of an allowance given to the Sub-Registrar is not a "public servant" within the meaning of s. 21 of the Penal Code. *BHAGWATI SAHAI v. EMPEROR* (1905) I. L. R. 32 Calc. 664



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**3. — ss. 21, 186—Public servant—Obstruction to a public servant—Clerk in the cess-collection department of a District Municipality—Bombay District Municipal Act (Bom. Act III of 1901).** A clerk in the cess-collection department of a District Municipality constituted under the Bombay District Municipal Act (Bom. Act III of 1901) is a public servant within the meaning of s. 21, cl. 10, of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860); and any obstruction offered to him in execution of his duties is an offence punishable under s. 186 of the Code. *EMPEROR v. BABULAL* (1908) . . . **I. L. R. 33 Bom. 213**

— **ss. 22, 24—**  
*See THEFT* **I. L. R. 10 Mad. 186 ; 255**  
**I. L. R. 15 Bom. 702**  
**I. L. R. 22 Calc. 669 ; 1017**  
**I. L. R. 27 Calc. 501**

— **s. 23—**  
*See CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST.*  
**6 C. W. N. 203**

— **ss. 23, 24—**  
*See CHEATING* . . . **22 W. R. Cr. 82**

— **s. 24—**  
*See CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST.*  
**6 C. W. N. 203**

*See RIOTING* . . . **I. L. R. 15 All. 22**

— **ss. 24, 25—**  
*See FORGERY* . . . **I. L. R. 8 All. 653**  
**I. L. R. 10 Calc. 584**  
**I. L. R. 5 All. 217 ; 221**  
**I. L. R. 7 All. 403 ; 459**  
**I. L. R. 19 Calc. 380**  
**I. L. R. 15 All. 210**  
**I. L. R. 25 Calc. 512**  
**5 C. W. N. 897**

— **ss. 28, 231—Counterfeiting coin—Definition—Intention.** In order to constitute the offence defined by s. 231 of the Penal Code, it is not necessary that the counterfeit coin should be made with the primary intention of its being passed as genuine: it is sufficient if the resemblance to genuine coin is so close that it is capable of being passed as such. *EMPEROR v. QADIR BAKHSH* (1907) . . . **I. L. R. 30 All. 93**

— **ss. 29, 30—**  
*See FORGERY* . . . **2 B. L. R. A. Cr. 12**  
**4 Bom. Cr. 28**  
**2 Mad. 247**  
**11 W. R. Cr. 15**

— **s. 34—**  
*See ACCOMPLICE* **I. L. R. 14 Bom. 115**  
*See BENGAL EXCISE ACT (VII OF 1878), s. 53* . . . **I. L. R. 29 Calc. 496**  
*See MURDER* . . . **13 C. W. N. 680**  
*See UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.*  
**I. L. R. 8 Calc. 739**

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

— **ss. 34, 326—**  
*See DYING DECLARATION.*  
**I. L. R. 36 Calc. 659**

— **s. 35—**  
*See PENAL CODE, s. 71.*  
**8 C. W. N. 305 ; 483**

— **s. 41—**  
*See PLEADER—REMOVAL, SUSPENSION AND DISMISSAL .* **I. L. R. 17 All. 498**  
**L. R. 22 I. A. 19**

— **s. 44—**  
*See CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION.*  
**I. L. R. 30 Calc. 418**

— **s. 52—**  
*See CULPABLE HOMICIDE.*  
**I. L. R. 14 Calc. 566**

*See WRONGFUL RESTRAINT.*  
**I. L. R. 12 Bom. 377**

— **ss. 52, 499, Excep. (9)—**  
*See DEFAMATION.*  
**I. L. R. 36 Calc. 375**  
**13 C. W. N. 340**

— **s. 59—**  
*See SENTENCE—TRANSPORTATION.*

— **s. 62—**  
*See FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY.*  
**8 W. R. Cr. 35**  
**12 W. R. Cr. 17**

— **ss. 62, 124A—**  
*See CONFISCATION.*  
**I. L. R. 34 Calc. 986**

— **ss. 62, 406—Criminal breach of trust—Sentence.** Held, that the special sentence provided for by s. 62 of the Indian Penal Code is a sentence which should only be inflicted in rare cases—those in which crimes of an atrocious nature are exposed or in which offences have been committed under aggravated circumstances. *Queen v. Mahomed Akhbar*, 12 W. R. Cr. 17, followed. *EMPEROR v. AMRIT LAL* (1906) . . . **I. L. R. 29 All. 25**

— **ss. 64, 65, 67—**  
*See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT IN DEFAULT OF FINE.*  
**6 Mad. Ap. 40**  
**16 W. R. Cr. 42**  
**5 Bom. Cr. 61**  
**I. L. R. 6 All. 61**  
**I. L. R. 18 Bom. 400**  
**I. L. R. 18 Mad. 490**  
**I. L. R. 10 Mad. 165 ; 166 note**  
**I. L. R. 22 Mad. 238**

— **ss. 65, 67—**  
*See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—BENGAL ACT III OF 1863* . . . **10 W. R. Cr. 30**  
*See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT GENERALLY.*  
**I. L. R. 1 All. 461**



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.***s. 70—***See* APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASE—CRIMINAL  
PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 23 All. 497

*See* FINE . . . 5 Bom. Cr. 63  
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 478**s. 71—***See* SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES.

*Criminal trespass—Intention in one same as common object in the other—Separate sentences, if lawful—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 35, illustration.* Where an accused person was found with several others to have entered upon another person's land with the common object of cutting crops standing on it, and in prosecution of that common object hurt was caused:—*Held*, that the accused person could not be convicted and sentenced for criminal trespass under s. 447 of the Penal Code in addition to a conviction and sentence for rioting under s. 147 of the Penal Code, the common object of the riot and the intention in the criminal trespass being substantially the same in the case. *Illustration in s. 35, Criminal Procedure Code, referred to.* BHUP SINGH v. EMPEROR (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 305

**ss. 71, 147, 342—Rioting—Common object of unlawful assembly, wrongful confinement—Wrongful confinement—Separate sentences for rioting and wrongful confinement, if legal.** Separate sentences for wrongful confinement and rioting are not, having regard to the provisions of s. 71 of the Penal Code, legal when the common object of the unlawful assembly is the wrongful confinement of the complainant and is the essential ingredient in the constitution of the offence under s. 147 of the Penal Code. *Ramdihal v. Empress*, 3 C. W. N. 174, referred to. ALUM SHEIKH v. SHAHZADA SINGH BURKUNDAZ (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 483

**ss. 71, 147, 149, 362—Rioting and grievous hurt not committed individually by accused.** *Held*, that it is illegal to pass separate sentences for the offence of rioting and grievous hurt upon persons, who are not proved to have individually committed any acts to cause such grievous hurt, but are guilty of that offence under s. 149 of the Penal Code. *Nilmoni Poddar v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 442, followed. SAHADEV AHIR v. EMPEROR (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 344

**s. 72—***See* SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES.  
I. L. R. 12 Mad. 36*See* SENTENCE—GENERAL CASES.  
7 W. R. Cr. 13**ss. 73, 74—***See* SENTENCE—SOLITARY CONFINEMENT.  
I. L. R. 6 All. 83  
3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 49**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.***s. 75—***See* CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—GENERAL  
CASES . . . I. L. R. 9 Mad. 284*See* SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES.  
I. L. R. 11 All. 393*See* SENTENCE—SENTENCE AFTER PREVIOUS  
CONVICTION.**s. 78—***See* ARREST—CIVIL ARREST.  
3 W. R. Cr. 53**s. 79—***See* TRESPASS—GENERAL CASES.  
23 W. R. Cr. 4*See* WRONGFUL CONFINEMENT.  
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 95*See* WRONGFUL RESTRAINT.  
I. L. R. 12 Bom. 377  
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 885

**s. 81 and s. 323—Act likely to cause harm, done without a criminal intent and to prevent other harm—Causing hurt.** The accused was a sepoy in a native infantry regiment. On the occasion of a fire in the city of Ahmednagar, he and the rest of his company turned out to assist in extinguishing it. He with other sepoys was stationed by their officer with orders to keep clear a space in front of the burning house, and not to allow any one not in uniform to intrude on that space. The police under the city chief constable were also engaged at the fire, and on some one of them coming round from the rear, they were warned off by the sentries. A fracas between the soldiers and the police took place, and the chief constable was kicked by the accused. For this he was charged before the Magistrate, and fined for voluntarily causing hurt under s. 323 of the Penal Code. In evidence it appeared that the police attempted to force the military guard, which had been posted as above stated, and it was further proved that the chief constable was not in uniform, and that the accused did not know who he was. It was not alleged that the kick was unnecessarily violent. *Held*, that the conviction was bad. The Magistrate having found that the chief constable was not in uniform, and that the accused did not know who he was, the kick was justifiable as given in good faith for the purpose of preventing much greater harm under s. 81 of the Indian Penal Code, and as a means of acting up to the military order. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BOSTAN* . . . I. L. R. 17 Bom. 626

**s. 83—***See* STOLEN PROPERTY—OFFENCES RELATING TO . . . I. L. R. 6 Mad. 373

**1. Capacity for doing wrong—Malice.** In construing s. 83 of the Penal Code, the capacity of doing that which is wrong is not so much to be measured by years as by the strength of the offender's understanding and judgment. The circumstances of a case may



PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—  
*contd.*s. 83—*conc'd.*

disclose such a degree of malice as to justify the application of the maxim *malitia supplet aetatem*.  
QUEEN v. AIMONA . . . 1 W. R. Cr. 43

2. *Capacity of understanding to commit offence.* An objection that the accused is of such an age as not to have attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct is not one of a preliminary character, but rather a matter of defence to be considered with the other issues arising in the case. Where the accused is over seven years of age and under twelve, the incapacity to commit an offence only arises where the child has not attained sufficient maturity, etc. : such non-attainment would have apparently to be specially pleaded and proved. The "consequences of his conduct" mentioned in s. 83, Penal Code, are not the penal consequences to the offender, but the natural consequences which flow from a voluntary act. QUEEN v. LUKHIM AGRADANNIE . . . 22 W. R. Cr. 27

## s. 84—

See INSANITY . I. L. R. 10 Bom. 512  
I. L. R. 12 Mad. 459  
I. L. R. 14 Bom. 564  
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 817  
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 604  
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 613  
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 493

*Unsoundness of mind*  
—*Knowledge of the nature of the act.* Where the accused cut his wife's throat without any rational motive, and was captured at once without any attempt on his part to escape or offer resistance, and the evidence showed that before the commission of the offence he suffered from a failure of reasoning powers, and also that he entertained delusions as to dangers which threatened his wife :—*Held*, that the facts proved unsoundness of mind which prevented the accused from knowing the nature of his act, and that s. 84 of the Penal Code applied. DIL GAZI v. EMPEROR (1907)

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 686

## ss. 84, 85—

See INSANITY . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 493

## s. 88—

See CULPABLE HOMICIDE.  
I. L. R. 14 Calc. 566

## s. 94—

See ACCOMPLICE. I. L. R. 14 Bom. 115  
See OFFENCE UNDER THREAT.  
10 W. R. Cr. 48

## s. 95—

See CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST.  
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 489  
See HURT—CAUSING HURT.  
24 W. R. Cr. 67

PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—  
*contd.*s. 95—*concl'd.*

See OFFENCE RELATING TO DOCUMENTS.

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 148

See THEFT . . . 5 Bom. Cr. 35

ss. 96, 97, 99, 100, 304—*Private defence, right of—Limits of the right.* The deceased S and three others who formed his party attacked with lathies the accused B and his party, three in number, as the result of a quarrel. One of the party of the deceased struck a blow on the accused which felled him to the ground. The accused rose up and inflicted a blow on the head of S, which fractured his skull causing death within a short time. *Held*, that under the circumstances of the case the accused did not exceed his right of private defence by inflicting the blow on the head of the deceased, as the circumstances were such as reasonably caused the apprehension that grievous hurt would, but for his action, have been the consequence of the attack that was being made upon him. A man in the predicament of the accused could not be expected to judge too nicely. BHUT NATH DOME v. THE KING-EMPEROR (1909) . . . 13 C. W. N. 1180

## ss. 96, 104—

See PRIVATE DEFENCE, RIGHT OF.  
20 W. R. Cr. 36

## ss. 96 to 106—

See PRIVATE DEFENCE, RIGHT OF.  
See RIOTING . I. L. R. 24 All. 298

## ss. 97, 99, 147—

See PRIVATE DEFENCE, RIGHT OF.  
See RIOTING . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 686  
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 295

## s. 99—

See ABSCONDING OFFENDER.  
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 417

See THUMB IMPRESSIONS.  
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 97

See WRONGFUL RESTRAINT.  
I. L. R. 12 Bom. 377

*Right of private defence of body—Extent of right.* The view that a person should not exercise his right of self-defence if by running away he can avoid injury from his assailant, places a greater restriction on the right of private defence of the body than the law requires. The extent to which the exercise of the right will be justified will depend not on the actual danger, but on whether there was reasonable apprehension of such danger. ALINGAL KUNHINAYAN v. EMPEROR (1905) . . . I. L. R. 28 Mad. 454

## ss. 99, 101, 104, 147—

See RIOTING . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 103

ss. 99, 147—*Private defence, right of*  
—*Police-officer executing illegal order of Magistrate*  
—*Attachment of crops—Criminal Procedure Code*



PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—  
*contd.*s. 99—*concl'd.*

(*Act V of 1898*), s. 145. Although an order to the Police purporting to be made under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, directing them to take charge of some crop in dispute, may not be strictly legal, yet when in execution of such order the police went to the spot where the crop was stored and after announcing the order simply proposed to guard it. *Held*, that the accused in seizing several men of the police party and carrying them off into confinement had exceeded their right of private defence. *Bhai Lal Chowdhry v. Emperor*, 6 C. W. N. 680; s.c. *I. L. R. 29 Calc. 417*; *Queen-Empress v. Jogendra Nath Mukerjee*, *I. L. R. 24 Calc. 320*; *Adhar Middy v. The Empress*, 5 C. W. N. 391; *Uma Charan Singh v. The King-Emperor*, 6 C. W. N. 164, referred to. *BHOLA MAHTO v. EMPEROR* (1905)  
9 C. W. N. 125

## ss. 99, 147, 148, 362—

See RIOTING . *I. L. R. 36 Calc. 296*

ss. 99 and 353—*Assaulting public servant in the execution of his duty—Vaccinator attempting to vaccinate a child forcibly—Right of private defence.* A vaccinator attempted to vaccinate a child against the wishes of its father. The father and some of his relations intervened and assaulted the vaccinator, but did not do him any particular harm. *Held*, that the child's father and other relations were perfectly justified in interfering, and under the circumstances could not be said to have acted in excess of their right of private defence. *Mangobind Muchi v. Empress*, 3 C. W. N. 627, followed. *EMPEROR v. BAHAL* (1906)  
*I. L. R. 28 All. 481*

## ss. 103 (4), 141 (4), 147, 323, 324—

See RIOTING . *I. L. R. 36 Calc. 865*

## s. 105—

See PRIVATE DEFENCE, RIGHT OF.

13 W. R. Cr. 64

*I. L. R. 14 Bom. 441*

*I. L. R. 16 Calc. 206*

See UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.

12 W. R. Cr. 43

## ss. 107, 108, 109—

See ABETMENT.

See CONSPIRACY. *I. L. R. 28 Calc. 797*

## s. 108A—

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—  
OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN  
ONE DISTRICT—ABETMENT.

*I. L. R. 24 Bom. 287*

## s. 109—

See ABETMENT . 7 C. W. N. 556

*I. L. R. 24 Mad. 523*

See BIGAMY . 6 C. W. N. 343

PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—  
*contd.*s. 109—*contd.*

See CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—FORGERY . *I. L. R. 30 Calc. 822*

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

*I. L. R. 28 Calc. 104*

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—  
OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN  
ONE DISTRICT—ABETMENT.

*I. L. R. 19 Bom. 105*

See KIDNAPPING . *I. L. R. 8 Calc. 969*

See NUISANCE—PUBLIC NUISANCE UNDER  
PENAL CODE . *I. L. R. 14 Mad. 364*

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—NATURE, FORM AND SUFFICIENCY OF SANCTION . *I. L. R. 30 Calc. 905*

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—WHERE  
SANCTION IS NECESSARY OR OTHERWISE.  
*I. L. R. 20 Mad. 8*

## ss. 109, 114, 124 (a)—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ss. 196,  
200, 225, 287, 537.

*I. L. R. 32 Mad. 3*

## ss. 109, 183, 352, 403, 414, 420,

471—

See JOINT TRIAL, SANCTION.

*I. L. R. 31 Calc. 664; 1053*

ss. 109 and 366—*Kidnapping from lawful guardianship—Kidnapping not a continuing offence—Abetment.* One Musammatt Chunia, by making certain false representations to the mother of Jiwania, a married girl of eleven years of age, induced her to part with the custody of her daughter. Chunia took the girl away from her own village to a neighbouring village, where she was joined by one Tika. Thence Chunia and Tika took the girl about with them from place to place making unsuccessful attempts to dispose of her in marriage, until they were arrested by the chaukidar of Tiabpur, on his being informed that an attempt had been made to sell the girl in that village. Upon these findings Chunia was convicted of the offence punishable under s. 366 of the Penal Code and Tika of abetment of that offence, following the ruling in *The Queen v. Samia Kaundan*, *I. L. R. 1 Mad. 173*. On appeal to the High Court, that of Chunia was summarily rejected. As to Tika, it was *held*, dissenting from *The Queen v. Samia Kaundan* and agreeing with the view taken in *Queen-Empress v. Ram Sundar*, *I. L. R. 19 All. 109*, and *Rakhal Nikari v. Queen-Empress*, 2 C. W. N. 81, that the offence of kidnapping being completed as soon as the minor was actually taken out of the custody of her guardian, Tika could not properly be convicted of abetment on the hypothesis that the offence was a continuing one. But, inasmuch as there was evidence on the record that the assistance given by Tika in attempting to dispose of the girl Jiwania was the result of a conspiracy entered into before the kidnapping took



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

— s. 109—*concl'd.*

place, the conviction of Tika for abetment of kidnapping was sustained. *EMPEROR v. TIKA* (1904)  
I. L. R. 26 All. 197

— s. 114—

See *post*, s. 304A . 13 C. W. N. 362

See ABETMENT . 4 Mad. Ap. 37

7 W. R. Cr. 49

8 Bom. Cr. 164

10 Bom. 497

2 C. W. N. 49

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 566

4 C. W. N. 309

See BENGAL EXCISE ACT (VII OF 1878),

s. 53 . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 496

See THEFT . 8 W. R. Cr. 59

See UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.  
5 C. W. N. 250

— ss. 114, 119, 193, 210—

See PROSECUTION, ORDER FOR.  
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 133

— ss. 114, 149, 379—*Theft—Abettor present when act committed—Ingredient of offence—Theft committed in prosecution of common object of unlawful assembly—Separate sentences, when legal.* When an accused person is found to have been a member of an unlawful assembly, the common object of which was to commit trespass and theft, and it is found that theft was actually committed by certain members of the unlawful assembly, and it is not found that that person himself committed any theft by removing any property, or that he had made any preparation for committing any theft or aiding any one in the commission of theft:—*Held*, that the accused cannot be properly convicted of an offence under s. 379 read with s. 114 of the Penal Code. *Abhi Misser v. Lachmi Narain*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 566: s.c. 4 C. W. N. 546 referred to. Separate sentences might have been passed, however, under ss. 114, 144 and 379. Full Bench decision in *Nilmoney Poddar v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 442, discussed and distinguished. *HANSA PATHAK v. BANSI LAL DAS* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 519

— ss. 114, 199, 466—*False declaration*

—*Registrar of Mahomedan marriages if bound or authorised to take evidence—Forgery of public register*

—*Abetment—Jury—Misdirection.* Where one X, by personating P before the Mahomedan Registrar of Marriages, obtained the registration of P's divorce from his wife, and the appellant identified X as P before the Registrar:—*Held*, that the appellant was not guilty of an offence under s. 199 of the Penal Code, inasmuch as the Registrar was not bound or authorised by law to receive his statement in evidence. But whether he was guilty of an offence under s. 414 of the Penal Code would depend chiefly on whether he knew that X was not P or had

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

— s. 114—*concl'd.*

no knowledge whether he was P or not. *Held*, that the Judge had fairly put the evidence on this point to the jury. *YASIN SHEIKH (AKONDA) v. EMPEROR* (1905) . 9 C. W. N. 69

— s. 116—

See KIDNAPPING . I. L. R. 1 Mad. 173

See POLICE MAGISTRATE.  
1 B. L. R. O. Cr. 39

See PUBLIC SERVANT . 21 W. R. Cr. 9

— s. 118—

See INFORMATION OF COMMISSION OF OFFENCE . 1 Agra Cr. 37

— s. 120—

See FALSE EVIDENCE—FABRICATING FALSE EVIDENCE . 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 105

— s. 121—

See FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY.  
8 B. L. R. 83

See WAGING WAR AGAINST THE QUEEN.  
7 B. L. R. 63

— s. 124A—

See SEDITION.

1. — *Exciting disaffection towards Government—Disapprobation of doings of Government, expression of.* "Disaffection" and "disapprobation" explained, and s. 124A referred to and explained to the jury. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. JOGENDRA CHUNDER BOSE* I. L. R. 19 Calc. 35

2. — *Evidence—Writings showing intention or animus—Letters of contributors published in newspapers—Disaffection.* The accused, who was the editor, proprietor, and publisher of the "Kesari" newspaper, was charged under s. 124A of the Penal Code with exciting, and attempting to excite, feelings of disaffection to Government by the publication of certain articles, etc., in the "Kesari" in its issue of the 15th June 1897. In order to show the intention of such publications, counsel for the prosecution tendered in evidence a certain letter signed "Ganesh" which appeared in the issue of the "Kesari" of May 4, 1897. Objection was taken that it was not admissible, inasmuch as letters to newspapers often express opinions which are not the opinions of the editor and publisher. *Held*, that the letter was admissible to show intention and animus. S. 124A of the Penal Code explained. Meaning of the word "disaffection." *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BAL GANGADHAR TILAK* I. L. R. 22 Bom. 112

3. — *Seditious publication—Disaffection.* The word "disaffection" in s. 124A of the Penal Code is used in a special sense as meaning political alienation or discontent, a spirit of disloyalty to the Government or existing authority. An attempt to excite feelings of disaffection to



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 124A—contd.**

the Government is equivalent to an attempt to produce political hatred of Government as established by law, to excite political discontent, and alienate the people from their allegiance. This meaning of the word "disaffection" in the main portion of the section is not varied by the explanation. *Per PARSONS, J.*—The word "disaffection" used in s. 124A of the Indian Penal Code cannot be construed as meaning an absence of, or the contrary of, affection or love, that is to say, dislike or hatred, but is used in its special sense as signifying political alienation or discontent, that is to say, a feeling of disloyalty to the existing Government which tends to a disposition not to obey, but to resist and subvert the Government. *Per RANADE, J.*—"Disaffection" is not a mere absence or negation of love or good-will, but a positive feeling of aversion which is akin to disloyalty, a defiant insubordination of authority, or when it is not defiant, it secretly seeks to alienate the people and weaken the bond of allegiance and prepossesses the minds of the people with avowed or secret animosity to Government,—a feeling which tends to bring the Government into hatred or contempt by imputing base and corrupt motives to it, and makes them indisposed to obey or support the laws of the realm, and which promotes discontent and public disorder. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAMCHANDRA NARAYAN* . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 152

4. *Exciting disaffection—Meaning of the term "disaffection" explained.* Any one who, by any of the means referred to in s. 124A of the Penal Code, excites, or attempts to excite, feelings of hatred, dislike, ill-will, enmity, or hostility towards the Government established by law in British India, excites or attempts to excite, as the case may be, feelings of "disaffection" as that term is used in s. 124A. Such feelings are necessarily inconsistent with and incompatible with a disposition to render obedience to the lawful authority of Government and to support that Government against unlawful attempts to subvert or resist it. The term "disaffection" may be taken as synonymous with "disloyalty." The ordinary meaning of the term "disaffection" as used in s. 124A is not varied by the explanation appended to that section. When a person is charged with having committed the offence punishable under s. 124A of the Penal Code, his intention may be inferred from one particular speech, article, or letter, or from that speech, article, or letter considered in conjunction with what such person has said, written, or published on another or other occasions. Where it is ascertained that the intention of such person was to excite feelings of disaffection to the Government established by law in British India, it is immaterial whether or not the words spoken, written, or published could have the effect of exciting such feelings of disaffection, and it is immaterial whether the words were true or were false, and, except on the question of punishment, or in a case in which the speaker, writer, or publisher is charged with having excited such feelings of disaffection, it is immaterial

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 124A—contd.**

whether or not the words did in fact excite such feelings of disaffection. *Queen-Empress v. Jogendra Chunder Bose*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 35; *In re the petition of Bal Gangadhar Tilak*, I. L. R. 22 Bom. 112, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. AMBA PRASAD* I. L. R. 20 All. 55

5. *Sedition—"Swaraj," incitement to secure.* The incitement of the members of a public meeting to exert themselves to secure "swaraj" does not amount to the offence of sedition under s. 124A of the Penal Code, and is consequently not within the purview of s. 108 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *BENI BHUSHAN ROY v. EMPEROR* (1907) . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 991

6. *Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 225 and 537—Actual words used, need not be stated in charge or proved in prosecution under s. 124A of the Indian Penal Code—Evidence Act, ss. 159 and 160—Relevancy of notes of speeches.* *Held, per BENSON and WALLIS, JJ.*—The gist of an offence under s. 124A of the Indian Penal Code is the bringing or attempting to bring into hatred or contempt, or the exciting or attempting to excite disaffection towards His Majesty, etc. If an offence under s. 124A is committed by words spoken, the requirements of the law are satisfied if the charge gives such a description of the words used as is reasonably sufficient to enable the accused to know the matter with which he is charged, i.e., if the charge states the words used with substantial, though not absolute, accuracy; and it is enough if the substance of the words proved to have been used is the same as that of the words set out in the charge. Even if the words or the substance of the words used are not entered at all in the charge, this will be only an irregularity which, under s. 225 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, will not vitiate a conviction unless such omission has misled the accused and occasioned a failure of justice. *Chithambaram Pillai v. Emperor*, I. L. R. 32 Mad. 37, referred to. *Per SANKARAN-NAIR, J.*—Where a person is charged under s. 124A with exciting disaffection or bringing His Majesty into hatred or contempt, the exciting of disaffection, and not the utterance of seditious words, is the gist of the offence and the charge need not set out the words, nor need the words themselves be proved. It is, however, quite different where the person is charged with attempting to excite disaffection. Attempt implies intention, and a man's intention must be gathered from the words used by him and not from what others rightly or wrongly understood him to mean. In such cases the words themselves are the gist of the offence and they ought to be set out in the charge; and whether set out or not must be proved. Where the words, though not actually in the charge, are indicated with sufficient certainty and the accused knows the words for which he is tried, the defect in the charge can be cured under s. 225 or 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. What ought to be contained in a charge is a different



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860—**  
*contd.*

———— s. 124A—*contd.*

question from what ought to be proved to secure a conviction; and although the omission to state the exact words may not vitiate the charge, the words themselves must be proved to convict a person for attempting to excite disaffection. Where a person records, not the actual words used, but simply notes of the impression made on his mind by a speech, such notes are inadmissible under s. 160 of the Evidence Act to prove the actual words used. **MYLAPORE KRISHNASAMI v. EMPEROR (1909)**

**I. L. R. 32 Mad. 384**

**7.** ————— *Declaration under Act 25 of 1867, presumptive evidence of liability as printer and publisher—Criminal liability of proprietor of a newspaper—Authority of proprietor to publish, proof of—S. 14 of the Evidence Act.* A person, making a statutory declaration under Act XXV of 1867 that he is the printer and publisher of a newspaper, is presumably liable as such printer or publisher, but may rebut such presumption. **Ramasami v. Loganatha, I. L. R. 9 Mad. 387, 390.** The liability of a proprietor is not governed by the Act and depends upon different considerations. The ground of liability in his case is that he authorised the publication of the incriminating article. The authority may be established by direct proof or as a reasonable inference from all the facts of the case. Under s. 14 of the Evidence Act, it is open to the Court to presume that the proprietor, having the control of the paper, authorises the publication of the matter which appears in it. Such a presumption may be improper in the case of a large paper, with a separate editor responsible for the selection and publication of the literary matter; but in the case of a petty paper, with no responsible editor and published under the eye of the proprietor, the presumption might be reasonable though it would be open to him to rebut such presumption, by showing that the publication was in fact not authorised by him. Though no authority to publish libellous matter may have been originally given, such authority may be inferred from the conduct of the parties, such as the publication of other libellous matter without any remonstrance or interference from the proprietor when it has come to his knowledge. Other issues of the same paper containing libellous matter are relevant as evidence to prove such authority. Mere absence of the proprietor at the time of the publication of the libel will not rebut such presumption if during such absence he exercises complete control over the paper. The English law on the subject discussed. **Queen v. Holbrook, 1 Q. B. D. 42, referred to. HARISARVOTHAMA RAO v. KING-EMPEROR (1909).** . . . **I. L. R. 32 Mad. 338**

**8.** ————— **ss. 124A, 153A—Sedition—Promoting enmity, etc., between classes—Publication, what constitutes—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 225, 233, 234, 235, 236 and 237—Charges—Joinder of charges—Misjoinder of charges.** The accused was charged at one trial with having committed offences punishable under ss. 124A and 153A

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

———— s. 124A—*concl'd.*

of the Indian Penal Code, on two charges, one with respect to each of the two articles he published on different dates in his newspaper called the "Hind Swarajya." At the trial there was no other evidence of the publication of the newspaper in Bombay except the declaration made by the accused under the Press Act, and the depositions of witnesses who received the newspaper in Bombay as Government servants in their capacity as such. The accused was convicted on both the charges and sentenced separately on each of them. It was contended in appeal that there was no evidence of the publication of the newspaper in Bombay, and that there was a misjoinder of charges vitiating the trial. *Held*, that the evidence on record was sufficient to prove the publication of the newspaper in Bombay. *Held*, further, that the trial was not bad as there had been no misjoinder of charges. **EMPEROR v. TRIBHOVANDAS (1908)** . . . **I. L. R. 33 Bom. 77**

———— **ss. 124A, 499, Excep. 4—**

*See* SEDITION . **I. L. R. 35 Calc. 141**

———— **s. 141—**

*See* BENGAL EXCISE ACT, s. 4.

**I. L. R. 24 Calc. 324**

*See* RIOTING . **I. L. R. 16 Calc. 206**

*See* UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.

———— **clause second—**

*See* WARRANT OF ATTACHMENT.

**I. L. R. 29 Calc. 244**

———— **ss. 141, 302, 149—**

*See* CHARGE . **I. L. R. 36 Calc. 281**

———— **s. 143—**

*See post*, s. 186 . **I. L. R. 30 Calc. 285**

*See* ABSCONDING OFFENDER.

**I. L. R. 29 Calc. 417**

*See* SECURITY TO KEEP THE PEACE.

**I. L. R. 35 Calc. 315**

*See* UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.

**I. L. R. 9 Calc. 639**

**7 N. W. 209**

**I. L. R. 14 Mad. 126**

**5 C. W. N. 368**

**I. L. R. 25 Mad. 624**

———— *Order for security to keep the peace on conviction under ss. 143, 379, Penal Code—Finding, but not conviction, of criminal intimidation—Legality of order.* A conviction under s. 143 or 379 of the Penal Code is not of itself sufficient to sustain an order under s. 106 of the Criminal Procedure Code, although such conviction, coupled with findings bringing the case within the scope of s. 106, may sustain an order thereunder. But in such case these findings must be clear and explicit, and, moreover, if the finding be that the



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

———— s. 143—*concl'd.*  
accused was guilty of criminal intimidation, the section expressly requires that the conviction must also be for that offence in order to sustain an order under the section. *KISHORE SIRCAR v. KING-EMPEROR* (1904) . . . . . 8 C. W. N. 517

———— ss. 143, 144, 147 to 149—  
See SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES.

———— s. 144—  
See UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.  
5 C. W. N. 250  
I. L. R. 24 Mad. 124

———— s. 146—  
See RIOTING . . . I. L. R. 13 Mad. 148

———— s. 147—  
See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE. s. 437.  
5 C. W. N. 72

See KIDNAPPING . . . 6 C. W. N. 208

See POLICE ACT (V OF 1861), ss. 17, 19.  
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 411

See PRIVATE DEFENCE, RIGHT OF.  
I. L. R. 16 Calc. 208  
I. L. R. 24 All. 143

See RIOTING . . . I. L. R. 16 Calc. 208  
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 574  
I. L. R. 15 All. 22  
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 686  
W. R. 1864, Cr. 61  
I. L. R. 24 All. 298

See WARRANT OF ATTACHMENT.  
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 244

———— ss. 147, 148, 149—  
See UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.

———— ss. 147, 149, 326—  
See RIOTING . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 827

———— ss. 147, 447—*Separate sentences, if lawful.* Illustration in s. 35 of the Criminal Procedure Code, referred to. *BHUP SINGH v. EMPEROR* (1904) . . . . . 8 C. W. N. 305

———— s. 148—  
See HURT—GRIEVOUS HURT.  
6 C. W. N. 98  
See UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.  
7 C. W. N. 512

———— Lathi—"Deadly weapon." The question whether or not a lathi is a "deadly weapon" within the meaning of s. 148 of the Penal Code is a question of fact to be determined on the special circumstances of each case as it arises. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NATHU* . . . I. L. R. 15 All. 19

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

———— s. 149—  
See CHARGE TO JURY—MISDIRECTION.  
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 379

See HURT—GRIEVOUS HURT.  
6 C. W. N. 98

See POLICE ACT (V OF 1861), ss. 17, 19.  
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 411

See UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.  
7 C. W. N. 512

———— s. 150—  
See UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.  
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 214

———— s. 151—  
See UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.  
I. L. R. 7 Bom. 42

———— s. 152—  
See SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES.  
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 105

———— *Assaulting or obstructing public servant in discharge of his duties—Charge, form of—General charge.* S. 152 of the Penal Code contemplates an assault or obstruction to some particular public servant, and where the charge against accused persons as framed was merely to the effect that they assaulted and obstructed "members of the Police force" in the discharge of their duties, etc.:—*Held*, that a conviction under that section could not be supported. *FERASAT v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*  
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 105

———— s. 153—  
See RELIGION, OFFENCES RELATING TO.  
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 554

1. ————— *Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot—Abetment of riot by the public—Penal Code, s. 117.* In August 1893 a riot took place in Bombay between Hindus and Musalmans. The excitement caused by the riot had not entirely subsided, when the accused composed and published a poem, giving an account of the outbreak, and, incidentally, extolling certain classes of the Hindu community, namely, the Ghatris and Kamatis, for the brave resistance which they had offered to the Mahomedan rioters. The poem extolled the Ghatris and Kamatis, and then followed these lines: "May God give glory to you, confer joy on you, night and day! Fight again for your country's good! Brave, brave are the Kamatis! Why fear for dying, brother, why fear for dying? Sooner or later, but only once, a man has to die." The poem was written in Gujarati, a language not ordinarily spoken by the Ghatris and Kamatis, or even by the Mahomedans. It did not appear that any copies of the work were distributed among the people who had taken part in the riot, nor did any fresh riot take place subsequently to the publication of the work. The accused were prosecuted and convicted under ss. 117 and 153 of the Penal Code (XLV of 1860) on the ground that the lines quoted



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

— s. 153—*concl'd.*

above, specially the words "Fight again," were a direct instigation to the Ghaties and Kamatis to renew the disturbances. *Held*, that the meaning of the passages complained of was to be gathered from the whole poem. The general spirit of the poem was clearly in favour of peace and reconciliation. It consisted from beginning to end of a lamentation over the riots and the destruction and death they had caused, and of repeated counsel to peace and harmony between Hindus and Mahomedans. And there was nothing to indicate that the author's intention was to instigate the Hindus or provoke the Mahomedans to renew the disturbances. The words "Fight again" were no doubt objectionable, but it would not be a proper construction of the words to allow them to override the whole context of the work. The composition could not be regarded as an "illegal act," and its publication was not "malignant" or "wanton" within the meaning of s. 153 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KAHANJI*. . . . **I. L. R. 18 Bom. 758**

2. ————— "Wantonly"—*Police Act (V of 1861) s. 30—Disobedience to orders of police as to conduct of a procession.* Where certain persons taking part in a religious procession gratuitously disobeyed the orders of the police concerning the manner in which such procession was to be conducted, with the result that a riot was only averted by bringing armed police upon the scene, it was *held* that the persons concerned acted—though not "malignantly"—yet "wantonly" within the meaning of s. 153 of the Indian Penal Code, and were properly convicted under that section. *Held*, also, that a conviction under s. 153 of the Indian Penal Code does not warrant the taking of action under s. 106 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *EMPEROR v. HUSAIN BAKSH* (1907) . . . . **I. L. R. 29 All. 569**

— s. 154—

*See* RIOTING . . . **I. L. R. 28 Calc. 504**

— ss. 154, 155—

*See* RIOTING . . . **7 C. W. N. 245**

*See* SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF—  
ORDER FOR RE-TRIAL ON APPEAL. . . . **7 C. W. N. 301**

— ss. 154, 155, 157—

*See* RIOTING . . . **7 C. L. R. 289**

**4 C. W. N. 691**

**I. L. R. 12 All. 550**

— s. 155—*Rioting—Landholder's liability—Conviction of non-resident co-sharer—Active part in management.* When there is no evidence to shew that an absentee co-sharer in a zamindari takes an active part in the management and a resident co-sharer has been sentenced to pay a fine under s. 155 of the Penal Code. *Radha Nath Chowdhury*, **7 C. L. R. 289**, and *Kazi Zeanuddin's*

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

— s. 155—*contd.*

*Case, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 504: s.c. 5 C. W. N. 771, referred to. HARENDRA LAL ROY v. EMPEROR* (1904) . . . . **8 C. W. N. 908**

— s. 156—

*See* RIOTING . . . **I. L. R. 13 Calc. 338**

— s. 157—

*See* UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.

**I. L. R. 29 Calc. 214**

— ss. 159 and 160—*Affray—Public place—Chabutra.* *Held*, that a *chabutra* which was neither a place to which the "public" had a right of access, nor a place to which the public were ever permitted to have access, was not, though it adjoined a public road, a "public place" within the meaning of s. 159 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SRI LAL* . . . **I. L. R. 17 All. 166**

— s. 160—

*See* SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT IN DEFAULT OF FINE.

**I. L. R. 1 Mad. 277**

— s. 161—

*See* ACCOMPLICE . . . **I. L. R. 27 Calc. 144**

**I. L. R. 26 Bom. 193**

*See* CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—GENERAL CASES. . . **1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 43**

1. ————— *Demand of dusturi by Civil Court peon.* A demand of *dusturi* by a Civil Court peon from the plaintiff, as a motive or reward for serving the summonses on his witnesses without an identifier, amounts to an attempt to obtain an illegal gratification within s. 161 of the Penal Code. *Empress of India v. Baldeo Sahai*, **I. L. R. 2 All. 253**, followed. *Queen-Empress v. Ramakka*, **I. L. R. 8 Mad. 5**, distinguished. *RATAN MONI DEY v. EMPEROR* . . . **I. L. R. 32 Calc. 292**  
**s.c. 9 C. W. N. 547**

2. ————— *Bribe—"In the exercise of official functions"—Motive or reward—Essentials of the offence.* S. 161 of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) requires proof that an official has obtained, as a motive or reward for official conduct, an illegal gratification for himself or another. That other may or may not be an official, and therefore may be wholly unconnected with the official conduct. The conduct which is contemplated as the consideration for the bribe must be that of the official obtaining it. This is clear from the phrase "in the exercise of his official functions." To obtain a bribe as a motive or reward for another's conduct does not fall within the section though it may be an abetment of that offence or cheating. The performance of the act which is consideration for the bribe is not essential. But it is essential that the bribe should be obtained "as a motive or reward." That phrase evidently means on the understanding that the bribe is given in



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.***s. 161—concl'd.**

consideration of some official act or conduct. Such an understanding need not be proved by explicit evidence of any precise agreement. It may be inferred from circumstances. *EMPEROR v. BHAGWANDAS* (1907) . . . **I. L. R. 31 Bom. 335**

**ss. 161, expl., 163—**

*See* KIDNAPPING . . . **13 C. W. N. 754**

**ss. 161, 162, 165—**

*See* ILLEGAL GRATIFICATION.

**I. L. R. 2 All. 253**

**2 N. W. 148**

**3 W. R. Cr. 10, 19**

**I. L. R. 21 Bom. 517**

**9 C. W. N. 292**

*See* PUBLIC SERVANT . . . **5 C. W. N. 332**

**ss. 161, 165, 166—**

*See* PUBLIC SERVANT.

**I. L. R. 4 Calc. 376**

**I. L. R. 1 All. 530**

**I. L. R. 15 Mad. 127**

**s. 170—Personating a public servant**

—*Definition.* Held, that to constitute the offence provided for by s. 170 of the Penal Code it is not necessary that the act done or attempted to be done should be such an act as might legally be done by the public servant personated. *Queen-Empress v. Wazir Jan*, **I. L. R. 10 All. 58**, referred to. *EMPEROR v. AZIZ-UD-DIN* (1905)

**I. L. R. 27 All. 294**

1. — **s. 172—Absconding to avoid service of summons—Evidence.** In order to prove the commission of an offence under s. 172 of the Penal Code, the prosecutor must show that a summons, notice, or order has been issued and that the accused knew, or had reason to believe, that it had been issued. To abscond to avoid the service of process which has not issued is no offence under s. 172 of the Penal Code. Absconding does not necessarily imply change of place, but may be effected by concealment. If a person, having concealed himself before process issues, continues to do so after it has issued, he absconds. *SRINIVASA AYYANGAR v. QUEEN* . . . **I. L. R. 4 Mad. 393**

2. — **Warrant of arrest—Absconding offender.** A warrant addressed to a police officer to apprehend an offender and bring him before the Magistrate is not a "summons, notice, or order" within the meaning of s. 172 of the Penal Code, and the offence of absconding by an offender against whom a warrant has been so issued is not punishable under that section. *QUEEN v. WOMESH CHUNDER GHOSE* . . . **5 W. R. Cr. 71**

**QUEEN v. AMIR JAN** . . . **7 N. W. 302**

**QUEEN v. HOSSEIN MANJEE** . . . **9 W. R. Cr. 70**

3. — **Warrant addressed to Nazir—Warrant of arrest in execution of decree.**

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.***s. 172—concl'd.**

A warrant addressed to a Nazir by a Civil Court for the arrest of a defendant in execution of a decree is not a notice, summons, or order within the meaning of s. 172 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN v. ZAHOR ALI KHAN* . . . **4 N. W. 97**

1. — **s. 173—Refusal to give receipt for summons.** A refusal to give a receipt for a summons is not an offence under s. 173 of the Penal Code. *In re BHOOBUNESWAR DUTT*

**I. L. R. 3 Calc. 621; 2 C. L. R. 80**

**REG. v. KALYA BIN FAKIR** . . . **5 Bom. Cr. 34**

**QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KRISHNA GOBINDA DAS.**

**I. L. R. 20 Calc. 358**

2. — **Refusal to receive summons.** A refusal to receive a summons is not an offence under s. 173 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN v. PUNAMALAI* . . . **I. L. R. 5 Mad. 199**

**QUEEN v. ARUMUGA NADAN**

**I. L. R. 5 Mad. 200 note**

3. — **United Provinces Land Revenue Act (Local III of 1911), ss. 147, 195 and 196—Citation to appear—Refusal to accept citation or to sign duplicate.** Held, that the refusal to accept a citation issued under s. 147 of the Land Revenue Act or to sign the duplicate thereof is not an offence under s. 173 of the Indian Penal Code. *The Queen v. Punamalai Nadan*, **I. L. R. 5 Mad. 199**; *Reg. v. Kalyabin Fakir*, **5 Bom. H. C. Rep. Cr. C. 34**; *In the matter of Bhoobun- eswar Dutt*, **I. L. R. 3 Calc. 621**; *Queen-Empress v. Hira Lal*, **All. Weekly Notes, (1883), 222**; and *Queen-Empress v. Krishna Gobinda Das*, **I. L. R. 20 Calc. 358**, referred to. *EMPEROR v. AHMAD HUSAIN KHAN* (1909) . . . **I. L. R. 31 All. 608**

**s. 174—**

*See* COMMISSION—CIVIL CASES.

**6 C. W. N. 927**

*See* CONTEMPT OF COURT—PENAL CODE, s. 174.

*See* HOLIDAY . . . **8 B. L. R. Ap. 12**

*See* MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—  
POWERS OF MAGISTRATES.

**I. L. R. 18 Bom. 380**

*See* MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—  
SPECIAL ACTS—PENAL CODE.

**8 W. R. Cr. 61**

*See* WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—SUM-  
MONING WITNESSES.

**I. L. R. 24 Calc. 320**

— **Escaping from custody of peon.** Complainant, a batta peon, arrested defendant on a warrant and asked him to follow him. Defendant promised to do so, and went into his house on the pretext of getting a turban, and absconded. Held, that a conviction under s. 174 of the Penal Code was illegal. *ANONYMOUS*

**7 Mad. Ap. 44**



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

ss. 174, 175—

See PUBLIC SERVANT.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 236

s. 175—

See CONTEMPT OF COURT—PENAL CODE,  
s. 175 . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 63  
I. L. R. 13 Mad. 24

See PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 63

See WITNESS—CIVIL CASES—DEFAULT-  
ING WITNESSES . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 63

s. 176—

See INFORMATION OF COMMISSION OF  
OFFENCE.

ss. 176, 177—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT  
V OF 1898), s. 565 (4).

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 548

s. 177—

See COMPLAINT—INSTITUTION OF COM-  
PLAINT AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES.  
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 985

See CONTEMPT OF COURT—PENAL CODE,  
s. 174 . 5 C. W. N. 131

1. ——— Giving false in-  
formation to police. S. 177 of the Penal Code does  
not apply to the case of any person who is examined  
by a police officer making a false statement, but to  
cases where, by law, landholders or village watch-  
men are bound to give information, and to other  
analogous cases of the same description. QUEEN  
v. LUCKHEE SINGH . 12 W. R. Cr. 23

2. ——— Giving false in-  
formation—Legally bound—False entry in diary—  
Obeying departmental order. To make a false entry  
in a diary kept by a Government servant and sent  
to his official superior in pursuance of a department-  
al order is an offence within the meaning of s. 177  
of the Penal Code. VIRASAMI MUDALI v. QUEEN  
I. L. R. 4 Mad. 144

3. ——— Furnishing false  
information for the purpose of preventing the com-  
mission of an offence, meaning of. The informa-  
tion which, under the second branch of s. 177 of the  
Penal Code, a person is legally bound to give "for  
the purpose of preventing the commission of the  
offence" relates not to the commission of offences  
generally, but to the commission of some particu-  
lar offence. In the matter of the petition of PAN-  
ATULLA. PANATULLA v. QUEEN-EMPRESS  
I. L. R. 15 Calc. 386

4. ——— and s. 43—Giving false infor-  
mation to police—"Legally bound." On 22nd  
November 1890 the accused, who was a Deputy  
Tahsildar, submitted to his official superior a false  
"nil" return of lands in his enjoyment, and also on

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

s. 177—*contd.*

5th December 1890 made a false statement to the  
same effect in a revenue enquiry before the Principal  
Assistant Collector. He was convicted of an offence  
under Penal Code, s. 177. Held, that, inasmuch as  
he was not "legally bound" within the meaning of  
s. 43 of the Code to give the information, the con-  
viction was wrong. VIRASAMI MUDALI v. QUEEN,  
I. L. R. 4 Mad. 144, dissented from. QUEEN-  
EMPRESS v. APPAYYA . I. L. R. 14 Mad. 484

5. ——— False information  
—Police officer recording a false report. Held, that  
a police officer at a police station, who, being as  
such officer bound to enter all reports brought to  
him of cognizable or non-cognizable offences in  
the station diary, refused to enter a report made  
to him concerning the commission of an offence,  
and entered instead in the diary a totally different  
and false report as that which was made to him,  
had thereby committed the offence punishable  
under s. 177 of the Penal Code. QUEEN-EMPRESS  
v. MUHAMMAD ISMAIL KHAN I. L. R. 20 All. 151

6. ——— and ss. 182, 415—Furnishing  
false information—Cheating. A person attempt-  
ed to obtain his recruitment in the police of  
a district by giving certain information which he  
knew to be false to the District Superintendent  
of Police. Held, that such person had not thereby  
committed an offence punishable under s. 177 or  
s. 188 of the Penal Code, or the offence of attempting  
to "cheat" within the meaning of s. 415 of that  
Code. EMPRESS v. DWARKA PRASAD  
I. L. R. 6 All. 97

7. ——— False returns fur-  
nished by vaccinators. Certain vaccinators were  
charged with furnishing false returns to their official  
superior. The Magistrate found as a fact that the  
returns furnished were false, but acquitted the  
defendants on the ground that they were not  
"legally bound" to furnish information within the  
meaning of s. 177 of the Penal Code. Held, that  
s. 177 embraces every case in which a subordinate  
may seek to impose false information upon his  
superior. The defendants in the present case were  
public servants, and part of the duties which they  
undertook was to make true returns to their  
official superior. To make false returns was there-  
fore an offence. ANONYMOUS 6 Mad. Ap. 48

8. ——— Duty of police  
officer—Police Act (V of 1861), s. 44. Under Act  
V of 1861, a police officer is bound to communicate  
information to his superior officer regarding the  
commission of a riot affecting the public peace,  
and to make an entry thereof in the diary which  
he is required by s. 44 of that Act to keep; and  
the omission to give such information brings him  
within the purview of s. 177 of the Penal Code. In  
the matter of the petition of FUTTEH MAHOMED.  
21 W. R. Cr. 30

9. ——— and s. 416—Cheating by false  
personation. A gave B four annas to purchase  
a stamp for him (A). When the stamp vendor



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.***s. 177—concl'd.**

asked *B* his name, he gave *A*'s name instead of his own. *Held*, not to be cheating by personation under s. 416, Penal Code, but giving false information under s. 177. *REG. v. RAGHOJI BIN KANOJI*

3 Bom. Cr. 42

10. *False information in a Road-cess return—Road-cess and Public Works Cess Act (IX, B. C. of 1880), ss. 14, 94, 95—Object of—Return submitted under s. 14 of the latter Act—False information in return.* The object of s. 94 and other sections of the Road-cess and Public Works Cess Act (IX, B. C. of 1880) was to secure that the person submitting a return should not submit one in which he under-valued his property for the purposes of the Road-cess and Public Works Cess. Where the petitioner in a return submitted under the Road-cess and Public Works Cess Act stated that certain lands of his were held by a tenant, one *R*, at a rental of Rs. 2, but the Deputy Magistrate on evidence found that those lands were held by another tenant under him at a rental of as. 8 and that the object of the petitioner in submitting the false return was to create evidence for his success in a civil suit instituted by him:—*Held*, that, under the circumstances of the case, the petitioner could not be held guilty of an offence under s. 177, Indian Penal Code. *MOHAMED WASIL v. THE EMPEROR* (1908) . . . 13 C. W. N. 191

**ss. 178, 179—**

See MISJOINDER OF CHARGES.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 161

1. *s. 179—Evidence—Witness—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 165.* Under s. 165 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872), a Judge has the power of asking irrelevant questions to a witness, if he does so in order to obtain proof of relevant facts; but if he asks questions with a view to criminal proceedings being taken against the witness, the witness is not bound to answer them, and cannot be punished for not answering them, under s. 179 of the Penal Code. *EMPRESS v. HARI LAKSHMAN*

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 185

2. *Witness refusing to answer—Complainant—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 185. Semble:* A complainant is not a witness punishable for refusal to answer under s. 185 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or under s. 179 of the Penal Code. *In re GANESH NARAYAN SATHE*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 600

3. *Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, s. 161—Refusal to answer questions of police officer.* A refusal to answer questions asked by a police officer under s. 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) is not punishable under this section. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SANKARALINGA KOUR* . . . I. L. R. 23 Mad. 544

1. *s. 180—Refusal to sign statement made before Magistrate—Code of Criminal Procedure (X of 1872), ss. 122 and 346.* An accused

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.***s. 180—concl'd.**

cused person who refuses to sign a statement made at his trial in answer to questions put by the Court commits no offence punishable under s. 180 of the Penal Code. *EMPRESS v. SIRSAPA*

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 15

2. *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 69, 71—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872), s. 154—Refusal to sign receipts for summons.* A mere refusal to sign a receipt for a summons is not an offence under s. 180 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KRISHNA GOBINDA DAS* . . . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 358

**s. 181—**

See FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERAL CASES.

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 252

8 Bom. Cr. 21

4 Mad. Ap. 18

I. L. R. 5 All. 17

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT GENERALLY. 4 Mad. Ap. 18

**s. 182—**

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASE—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 25 All. 534

See BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT, 1884, s. 133.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 131

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 517.

9 C. W. N. 597

See FALSE CHARGE . . . 8 W. R. Cr. 67

I. L. R. 5 All. 36, 387

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 184

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 184

4 C. L. R. 134

7 C. L. R. 382

5 C. W. N. 727

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 640

See MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 717

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—NATURE, FORM, AND SUFFICIENCY OF SANCTION . . . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 474

9 C. W. N. 180

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—

POWER TO GRANT SANCTION.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 130

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 452

4 C. W. N. 386

POWER TO QUESTION GRANT OF SANCTION . . . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 869

REVOCATION OF SANCTION.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 130

WHERE SANCTION IS NECESSARY OR OTHERWISE . . . I. L. R. 8 All. 382

13 W. R. Cr. 67



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 182—contd.**

1. *False information to the police—Charge made against no specific person—Specific charge.* S. 182 of the Penal Code must be read as an entire section, and, when so read, it applies to those cases in which the police are induced, upon information supplied to them, to do or omit to do something which might affect some third person, and which they would not have done had they known the truth of the matter laid before them. *In the matter of the petition of GOLAM AHMED KAZI* . . . **I. L. R. 14 Calc. 314**

2. *Giving false information to a public servant.* Under s. 182 of the Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), the giving of false information to a public servant is penal, when either of two consequences is intended to be caused or is known to be likely to be caused by the false information, the first being the causing the public servant "to use the lawful power of such public servant to the injury or annoyance of any person," the second being the causing the public servant "to do or omit anything which such public servant ought not to do or omit, if the true state of facts respecting which such information is given were known to him." To constitute an offence under the latter part of the section, it is not necessary to show that the act done would be to the injury or annoyance of any third person. A personated B at an examination, called the Vernacular Sixth Standard Examination. A passed the examination, and obtained a certificate from the educational authorities in B's name. B thereupon applied to the Assistant Collector to have his name entered in the list of candidates for service in the Revenue Department. He attached to this application the certificate issued in his name, as it was a rule of Government that only those who had passed the Sixth Standard Examination were eligible for employment in the Revenue Department. On receipt of this application, the Assistant Collector ordered B's name to be entered on the list of candidates. *Held*, that B was guilty of the offence of giving false information to a public servant within the meaning of the latter part of s. 182 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GANESH KHANDERAO* . . . **I. L. R. 13 Bom. 506**

3. *Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 342, 428, 540—Examination on affirmation of one preferring a criminal appeal—Verification of petition of appeal.* In a petition of appeal from a conviction, the appellant falsely stated that the convicting Magistrate declined to summon his witnesses. The Magistrate to whom the appeal was preferred called upon the appellant to verify the allegations in the petition of appeal on solemn affirmation, and he did so. *Held*, that the appellant had not committed an offence under s. 181 or 182 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SUBBAYYA* **I. L. R. 12 Mad. 451**

4. *Giving false information to public servant—Definition of offence pro-*

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 182—contd.**

*vided for in s. 182 explained.* In order to constitute the offence defined in s. 182 of the Penal Code, it is not necessary that the public servant to whom false information is given should be induced to do anything or to omit to do anything in consequence of such information. The gist of the offence is not what action may or may not be taken by the public servant to whom false information is given; but the intention or knowledge (to be inferred from his conduct) of the person supplying such information. *In the matter of the petition of Golam Ahmed Kazi*, **I. L. R. 14 Calc. 314**, dissented from. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BUDH SEN*

**I. L. R. 13 All. 351**

5. *False information to a public servant—False complaints to police.* Where as the result of a police investigation it appears that a complaint made to the police of the commission of an offence punishable under the Penal Code is false, it is not necessary that the complainant should be given any further opportunity of establishing the truth of his allegation before his prosecution under s. 128 of the Penal Code is ordered. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAGHU TIWARI*

**I. L. R. 15 All. 336**

6. *and s. 189—Right of person against whom information has been falsely given to institute criminal prosecution—Consent of public servant.* A person against whom information has been falsely given with a view to his injury has a right to bring a civil action for damages, with or without the consent of the public servant against whom the offence was committed; but he cannot bring a criminal charge under s. 189, or any other section of Ch. X of the Penal Code, without the permission of such public servant; the law looking upon the conduct of the person who gives the false information as an offence, not against the individual charged, but against the public servant to whom the false information was given. To constitute an offence under s. 182 of the Penal Code, the information given must be information which the informer knew or believed to be false, and it must be proved that he gave it with such knowledge. *In the matter of the petition of ABDOL LUTEEF*

**9 W. R. Cr. 31**

*See QUEEN v. RAM GOLAM SING.*

**11 W. R. Cr. 22**

7. *Statements made by prisoner for his defence.* Statements made by a prisoner for the purposes of his defence cannot be held to be "information given to a public servant" within the meaning of s. 182 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN v. DARIA KHAN* . . . **2 N. W. 128**

8. *Giving false information to public servant.* S. 182 of the Penal Code does not apply where the public servant misinformed is only competent to pass and passes on the information, and the power to be exercised by him cannot tend to any direct or immediate pre-



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

s. 182—*contd.*

judice of the person against whom the information is levelled. *QUEEN v. PERIANNAN*

**I. L. R. 4 Mad. 241**

9. ————— *Furnishing false information—Cheating.* A person attempted to obtain his recruitment in the police of a district by giving certain information which he knew to be false to the District Superintendent of Police. *Held*, that such person had not thereby committed an offence punishable under s. 177 or s. 182 of the Penal Code, or the offence of attempting to "cheat" within the meaning of s. 415 of that Code. *EMPRESS v. DWARKA PRASAD*. **I. L. R. 6 All. 97**

10. ————— *Giving false "information" to a public servant.* M falsely informed the Collector of a district that certain zamindars had usurped possession of certain land belonging to Government, with the intent "to give trouble to such zamindars and waste the time of the public authorities." *Held*, that, inasmuch as such information was no more than an expression of a private person's belief that the Collector might, if he chose, sustain a civil suit with success against such zamindars, and as, had the Collector agreed with the informant, the result would not have been that he would have used his lawful power as a Collector or as a Magistrate to the injury or annoyance of such zamindars, or that he would have done anything he ought not to have done, M had not committed an offence under s. 182 of the Penal Code. *EMPRESS v. MADHO*. **I. L. R. 4 All. 498**

11. ————— *Public servant—Forest Act (VII of 1878).* Under s. 172 of the Forest Act (VII of 1878), a forest officer is a public servant within the meaning of the Penal Code. Any information given to him with the intent mentioned in s. 182 of the Penal Code is punishable under that section whether that information is volunteered by the informant or is given in answer to questions put to him by that officer. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAMJI SAJABARAO*. **I. L. R. 10 Bom. 124**

12. ————— *Complaint of giving false information, prosecution of.* No ground for a complaint of giving false information to a public servant under s. 182 of the Penal Code exists on the part of any one but the public servant against whom the offence was committed. *QUEEN v. HURREE RAM*. **3 N. W. 194**

13. ————— and s. 211.—*Prosecution under s. 182—Complaint—Rejection with reference to police report.* K made a report at a police station accusing R of a certain offence. The police having reported to the Magistrate having jurisdiction in the matter that in their opinion the offence was not established, the Magistrate ordered the case to be "shelved." K then preferred a complaint to the Magistrate again accusing R of the offence. The Magistrate rejected the complaint with reference to the police report. Subsequently R, with the sanction of the police authorities, instituted criminal proceedings against K under s. 182 of the Penal

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

s. 182—*concl'd.*

Code, in respect of the report which he had made at the police station, and K was convicted under that section. *Held*, that K's conviction under s. 182 of the Penal Code was illegal, as the Magistrate had no power to entertain a complaint under that section at the instance of R, the application of s. 182 and the institution of prosecutions under it being limited to the public servant against whom the offence has been committed or to his official superior, as mentioned in s. 467 of Act X of 1872, and it is not being intended that those provisions should be enforced at the instance of private persons. Moreover, if K's complaint was false, his offence was against R, and not against the public servant to whom the complaint was made, and fell within s. 211 of the Penal Code. *EMPRESS v. RADHA KISHAN*. **I. L. R. 5 All. 36**

14. ————— *Prosecution, sanction to—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 195.* A prosecution under s. 182 of the Penal Code may be instituted by a private person, provided that he first obtains the sanction of the public officer to whom the false information was given, or of his official superior. *Empress v. Radha Kishan, I. L. R. 5 All. 36*, overruled. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. JUGAL KISSORE*. **I. L. R. 8 All. 382**

15. ————— *False information to a public servant, charge of—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 195—Sanction to prosecution—Separate convictions for one statement, illegality of.* An information was given to a police officer in the course of which two persons were named in whose houses stolen property belonging to a certain individual would be discovered: on complaint the information was found to be false, and the accused was convicted and punished for two offences under s. 182 as affecting two different persons. *Held*, that, although the information related to two different persons, the accused could be charged with having made only one false statement, and punished for one offence under s. 182. S. 195, Criminal Procedure Code, clearly shows that a complaint directly made by a public servant mentioned therein is quite as sufficient as his sanction. *Empress v. Radha Kishan, I. L. R. 5 All. 36*, dissented from. *POONIT SINGH v. MADHO BHOT*. **I. L. R. 13 Calc. 270**

16. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 154, 162—False information to a village Magistrate.* An offence under s. 182 of the Penal Code is committed by a person giving false information to a village Magistrate charging another with having committed an offence. Where such information is given with the view of its being passed on to the Station-house Officer, who, on receiving the information, takes a complaint in writing, from such informant, the complaint is one taken under s. 154 and not under s. 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *Queen v. Perriannan and Queen v. Naraina, I. L. R. 4 Mad. 241*, distinguished. *EMPEROR v. JONNALAGADDA VENKATRAYUDU (1905)*. **I. L. R. 28 Mad. 565**



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*15. DECREES AND DEEDS, SUITS TO ENFORCE OR SET ASIDE—*contd.*

minor adopted by his deceased brother, to succeed to the estate of the deceased. To induce the defendant to acknowledge the validity of the adoption, the adoptive mother of the plaintiff, as his guardian, executed a conveyance of one moiety of the family house to the defendant. *Held*, in a suit to cancel the conveyance, that the burden of proving that the defendant's objection to the validity of the adoption was groundless, and the conveyance therefore without consideration, was upon the plaintiff. *SUBRAMANIA AYYAN v. VENKATA RAYAR*

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 254

17. ——— Suit to set aside sale—*Allegation of fraud*. *N*, as reversionary heir of the former proprietor, and as now entitled to possession on the death of that proprietor's mother, sued for land in the possession of *C*, who obtained by it purchase at a sale in execution of a decree passed on a bond granted by *O*, which bond and decree were alleged by *N* to be fraudulent and collusive transactions. *Held*, that the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that the decree was fraudulently obtained. *GREESH CHUNDER CHATTERJEE v. MOHESH CHUNDER NYALUNKAR* . . . . . 10 W. R. 173

18. ——— Transfer of interest in joint family by one member to the other members. Where one brother of a joint undivided family transferred his interest in the joint property to the other brothers after a decree had been passed against him, although before attachment:—*Held*, that, when a question arose in such a case, the onus was on the brothers to whom the transfer was made to prove the *bonâ fide* character of the transaction. *BROJO LALL SANDYAL v. BHOBO SOONDUREE DEBIA CHOWDRAIN* . . . . . 17 W. R. 499

19. ——— Suit to set aside collusive decree—*Suit by judgment-debtor on allegation of decree being fraudulent and collusive*. *A*, having obtained a decree in a suit instituted on a bond, purporting to have been executed by plaintiff's father and one *D*, proceeded to execute it by putting up for sale certain rights and interests of plaintiff as the legal representative of her father. Plaintiff sued on the allegation that the decree was fraudulent and collusive, and that she had not been served with notice of proceedings taken in execution. *Held*, that it was for the plaintiff to make out her case of fraud, and that it was not for defendant to show that the decree obtained from a competent Court was not collusive, or that notice had been actually served. *MOHIMA CHUNDER MULLICK v. BURODA SOONDUREE DOSSEE* . . . . . 12 W. R. 147

20. ——— Suit to have deed declared a forgery—*Setting up forged lease*. *D* sued *T* for arrears of rent on the allegation that he held a khusra jumma. *T* admitted only a lower rent alleging that he held a jumma under a miras howladari pottah. *D*, failing in that suit, brought another suit for a declaration that the deed put forward by *T* was a false document. *Held*, that the

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*15. DECREES AND DEEDS, SUITS TO ENFORCE OR SET ASIDE—*contd.*

plaintiff was bound to make out a *primâ facie* case before the onus could be thrown upon the defendant of proving the genuineness of his pottah. *JOY CHUNDER TUPPADAR v. RAM CHURN DOSS*

15 W. R. 117

21. ——— Deed conveying property to other than legal heir—*Suit by Mahomedan widow for share of property*. In a suit by a Mahomedan widow against the brother of her deceased husband for her share of the property of her husband, the defendant set up a tumliknamah by which the deceased conveyed the property away to the son of the defendant. *Held*, that the burden of proof was on the defendant, and that he was bound to adduce the very strictest proof of the conveyance, as it cut away property from the natural heir. The tumliknamah was rejected, having regard to its terms and to the probabilities and facts of the case. *SADUK ALI KHAN v. PEAREE* . . . . . 9 W. R. 142

22. ——— Voluntary deed—*Suit by settlor to set aside his deed*. One *M* (the original plaintiff) was priest in the family of the first and second defendants, and was treated with much kindness by the first defendant (*N*), upon whom he chiefly relied for advice in worldly matters. A sum of R30,000, which was the bulk of his property, was in deposit in the defendants' firm at interest. Early in 1887 he became ill, and in June 1887 he expressed a wish to execute a trust-deed and an English will. He gave instructions to *N* for the trust-deed. By this deed, which contained no power of revocation, he settled R30,000 upon the first and second defendants (who were uncle and nephew), as trustees to perform his funeral ceremonies and to carry out certain religious observances and to pay two annuities, each of R25, and with the residue to found a Sanskrit class. The deed provided for the payment during his lifetime, of a sum of R100 per mensem for his maintenance and expenses, or such larger sum as he might require for such purposes, but in other respects it was not to come into operation until after his death. The will of even date gave certain property to his wife, and subject to this bequest gave the residue of his property to his sister. After receiving instructions for these documents, *N* took them to an attorney. From these instructions drafts were prepared, which were read over to *M* in his room by the attorney's managing clerk. Neither drafts, nor instructions, nor the documents themselves were, however, left with *M*. The drafts were then engrossed, *M* having made some trifling corrections in them. On the 23rd June 1887 he attended at the house of the attorney. The documents were explained to him by the attorney, and were interpreted to him by a High Court interpreter. *M* was then examined by a medical man with a view to ascertain whether he was capable of understanding what he was doing. *M* then executed the trust-deed and the will, and both were then duly attested. At the same time *M* signed the accounts in the defendants' books,



ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*15. DECREES AND DEEDS, SUITS TO ENFORCE OR SET ASIDE—*contd.*

and the balance of the money, which stood to his credit over and above the ₹30,000 comprised in the deed, was produced and made over to him, and he made it over to N to be kept by him personally. Shortly after this, M's sister and her son came to Bombay, and he fell under their influence. He became dissatisfied with what he had done with the ₹30,000, and on the 21st November 1887 he executed a will by which he purported to remove the deed and the will of the 23rd June, and he left the whole of his property to his sister. On the 2nd September 1888 his nephew took him to Surat, and on the 14th September 1888 at Surat he executed a deed revoking the trust-deed of the 23rd June 1887. He also signed instructions and a power-of-attorney under which this suit was filed. He died subsequently to the filing of the suit, and his sister and executrix became plaintiff. The plaintiff prayed that the deed of the 23rd June 1887 should be set aside on the ground of undue influence, etc., but the personal charges against the defendants were abandoned at the hearing. *Held*, that the deed must be set aside on the ground that the circumstances of the case threw upon the defendants the burden of showing that M understood the effect of the settlement and its finality. This they had failed to do. The facts of the case brought it within the principles deducible from *Anderson v. Elsworth*, 3 Giff. 154; *Forshaw v. Welsby*, 30 Beav. 243; and *Wollaston v. Tribe*, L. R. 9 Eq. 44. *BAI MANI-GAVRI v. NARONDAS CALLIANDAS*

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 549

23. ——— Suit for cancellation of instrument—*Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 39—Fiduciary relationship—Undue influence—Gift to spiritual adviser—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 111.* In a suit under s. 39 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) for cancellation of a deed of gift executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant, the plaintiff was a Chatri by caste, well advanced in years, and the defendant was his guru or spiritual adviser, a Brahman held in high consideration in the locality where he resided. The gift comprised the whole of the plaintiff's property and the only reason for its execution was the plaintiff's desire to secure benefits to his soul in the next world, and his having heard the defendant recite the holy book called Bhagwat. Almost immediately, after execution of the deed the plaintiff repudiated it, and sued for its cancellation on the ground of fraud. *Held*, that, having regard to the fiduciary relation subsisting between the parties, the improvidence of the gift, the absurdity of the reason alleged for it, and the principle recognized by s. 111 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872), the burden rested upon the defendant to show that the transaction was made without undue influence and in good faith; and, in the absence of such proof, the plaintiff was entitled to obtain cancellation of the deed. *Sital Prasad v. Parbhu Lal*, I. L. R. 10 All. 535, referred to. *MANNU SINGH v. UMADAT PANDE*  
I. L. R. 12 All. 523

ONUS OF PROOF—*contd.*15. DECREES AND DEEDS, SUITS TO ENFORCE OR SET ASIDE—*contd.*

24. ——— Deed of gift and endowment executed by Mahomedan widow in favour of agent—*Fiduciary relationship—Burden of proving absence of undue influence.* An instrument executed by a widow, after setting apart the rental of villages belonging to her as her patrimony to defray the expenses of her and her deceased husband's tombs, gave to her managing agent, who was her sole adviser, the management of the endowment in perpetuity with the residue, after the above expenditure should have been met, for himself, so that a large surplus would have remained each year in his hands and he would have been the person substantially interested. *Held*, that this transaction was within the well-recognized principle that every onus is thrown upon a person filling a fiduciary character towards another of showing conclusively that he has acted honestly and *bona fide*, without influencing the donor who has acted independently of him. In a suit by the agent's representative to have the gift enforced against the widow's successor in the estate, this burden had not, in the opinion of the Courts below, with which their Lordships concurred, been sustained, and it was held that the gift had been rightly set aside. *WAJID KHAN v. EWAZ ALI KHAN* . . . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 545  
L. R. 18 I. A. 144

25. ——— Power of revocation in a voluntary deed—*Onus of proof—Mahomedan Law—Relinquishment of share—Voluntary settlement—Document whereby heirs give up their rights in the property in favour of one heir—Deed supported by valuable consideration.* In a suit to impeach a deed to which he has been a party, the onus lies on the plaintiff to make out a case for setting aside on equitable grounds a deed duly executed for valuable consideration. *Melbourne Banking Corporation v. Brougham*, 7 App. Cas. 307, 311, followed. *ASHIDBAI v. ABDULLA* (1906)  
I. L. R. 31 Bom. 271

## 16. DEED, EFFECT AND OPERATION OF.

1. ——— Deeds of gift between joint brothers of part of family estate—*Deeds of partition—Subsequent partition between them of residue.* Two brothers, the only members of a joint Hindu family, executed and registered mutual deeds of gift to one another of their interests in specified portions of their family estate. In after years the younger brother sued the elder for partition of the estate excepting so much of it as had already been the subject of the above gifts. The elder defended the suit on the ground that the deeds of gift had not been intended to operate, not representing any real transaction. To negative their effect, the burden of proving that the transaction was not real, but only a pretence, was laid upon the defendant who failed to adduce that proof. *SHAM CHAND PAL v. PROTAP CHUNDER PAL* . . . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 78  
L. R. 24 I. A. 186  
1 C. W. N. 594



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 186—contd.**

joint owners and in joint occupation of the land in dispute. Finding himself unable to execute the decree, the Mamlatdar referred the matter to the Collector for advice. The Collector, on looking into the papers of the case, ordered a surveyor to execute the decree by dividing the land in dispute and putting the decree-holder in possession of his share. The surveyor, in attempting to execute the decree, was obstructed by the accused, who was thereupon tried and convicted of the offence of voluntarily obstructing a public servant in the discharge of his public functions under s. 186 of the Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860). *Held*, reversing the conviction, that, as the Collector had no legal authority to issue the order to the surveyor in execution of the Mamlatdar's decree, the surveyor acting under that order was not discharging a public function, and the act of the accused was not an offence against s. 186 of the Penal Code. *Held*, further, that the Collector's order was so entirely *ultra vires* as to leave no room for the operation of either the first or the second clause of s. 99 of the Penal Code. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. TULSIRAM** . . . **I. L. R. 13 Bom. 168**

**8.** *Public servant—Ameen appointed under Bengal Tenancy Act* (VIII of 1885), s. 69—*Bengal Tenancy Act*, s. 89. A person nominated by the Collector under s. 69 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, for the purpose of making a division of crops between the landlord and the tenant, is not a public servant within the meaning of s. 186 of the Penal Code. **CHATTER LAL v. THACOR PERSHAD** . . . **I. L. R. 18 Calc. 518**

**9.** *Obstructing a public servant—Public vaccinator.* To spread a false report and thereby prevent persons from bringing their children for vaccination to the public vaccinator is not an offence under Penal Code, s. 186. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. THIMMACHI**  
**I. L. R. 15 Mad. 93**

**10.** *and s. 183—Obstructing public servant—"Voluntarily."* A District Judge ordered that the house of the defendant in a suit pending before him be searched and certain property brought to the Court, and appointed a commissioner to carry out this order. The commissioner went to the house, but the defendant shut the doors and would not admit him. A crowd collected, and the commissioner felt it would be unsafe to proceed to carry out the order by force, and was unable to do so otherwise. The defendant was prosecuted and sentenced under Penal Code, s. 186. *Held*, that the facts disclosed no offence under that section. The use of the word "voluntarily" in that section seems to contemplate some overt act of obstruction, and not that mere passive conduct should be penal. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SOMMANNA**  
**I. L. R. 15 Mad. 221**

**11.** *Voluntarily obstructing public servant in discharge of his duties—Im-*

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 186—contd.**

*peding railway servant—Railways Act (IX of 1890), ss. 121, 122.* Before a person can be convicted of wilfully obstructing or impeding a railway servant in the discharge of his duties as provided in s. 121 of the Railways Act (IX of 1890) or of voluntarily obstructing a public servant in the discharge of his public functions as provided by s. 186 of the Penal Code, it must be shown that the obstruction or resistance was offered to the railway or public servant in the discharge of his duties or public functions as authorized by law. The mere fact of a public servant or railway servant believing he was acting in the discharge of his duties or public functions is not sufficient to make resistance or obstruction to him amount to an offence. *In the matter of the petition of BARODA KANTO PRAMANICK*  
**1 C. W. N. 74**

**12.** *Obstructing public servant in discharge of his public functions—Ameen, power of, to measure lands in butwarra proceedings—Public functions—Estates Partition Act (Bengal Act VIII of 1876), ss. 112 and 116.* The public functions contemplated by s. 186 of the Penal Code mean legal or legitimately authorized public functions, and were not intended to cover any act that a public functionary might choose to take upon himself to perform. A butwarra Ameen, in proceeding to measure certain lands in the course of proceedings connected with the partition of an estate under Bengal Act VIII of 1876, was obstructed by certain persons who claimed the lands and objected to their being measured. The lands were stated in the report of the Ameen to be the common land of estate No. 546 and of certain other estates. The persons who obstructed him were not co-sharers in that estate, and contended that the land sought to be measured had been divided amongst the maliks of the different estates, and different portions of it had been held separately by them. The persons so obstructing the Ameen were charged with an offence under s. 186 of the Penal Code, the Deputy Collector in charge of the butwarra proceedings being of opinion that s. 112 of the Act applied, and that the Ameen was entitled to measure the land. The accused were convicted. *Held*, that s. 112 is limited to cases where the community of interest in the land in dispute between the proprietors of the estate under partition as a body and the proprietors of other estates is admitted. When this is not admitted, the provisions of s. 116 apply. *Held*, further, that, as there was no evidence to show that such community of interest was admitted, the accused were entitled to the benefit of the doubt and to have the case treated as one under s. 116, and that, as the procedure laid down in that section had not been followed, the Ameen had no power to measure the lands, and could not be said to be a public servant acting in discharge of his public functions, and that the conviction must consequently be set aside. **LILLA SINGH v. QUEEN-EMPRESS**  
**I. L. R. 22 Calc. 286**



PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—  
contd.

s. 186—contd.

13. ———— Obstructing public servant in discharge of his public functions—Public servant acting under warrant of arrest not in legal form—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 75 and 80—Warrant of arrest without signature of Magistrate and notification of substance of warrant—Discharge of public functions. A public servant executing a warrant of arrest which is not signed by the Magistrate as required by s. 75 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but only bears his initials, and the substance of which is not notified to the person to be arrested as required by s. 80 of the Code, cannot be said to be acting in the discharge of his public functions in a manner authorized by law. A person obstructing him cannot be convicted under s. 186 of the Penal Code. *ABDUL GAFUR v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*  
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 896

14. ———— and s. 21—Obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions—Court peon—Nazir's power of delegation of service of warrant to peon—Civil Procedure Code 1882, s. 251—Court-fees Act (VII of 1870), s. 22—Service of warrant of attachment. The petitioner was convicted under s. 186 of the Penal Code of obstructing a Civil Court peon, who was attaching his property in execution of a decree; the warrant of attachment was addressed to the Nazir of the Court, who delegated its execution to a peon by an endorsement of the peon's name. *Held*, that the Nazir had authority thus to delegate the execution of the warrant to the peon. The words "to be executed" in s. 251 of the Code of Civil Procedure would seem to imply that it was not intended that the "proper officer" should himself execute all warrants sent to him. And there is nothing in the Code which indicates in any way that warrants being either warrants of arrest or of attachment, or for distress and sale, are to be executed by the "proper officer," in any manner different from the service of summonses. The Court-fees Act (VII of 1870) distinctly contemplates that the peons are to be employed, not only for the service of summonses, notices, or orders, but also for the execution of other processes, such as warrants of arrest, or of attachment and distress. Though the authority may well be conferred in more clear and explicit terms than are expressed by a mere endorsement by the Nazir of the peon's name, still it is impossible to say that that is not sufficient evidence of the delegation. *DHARAM CHAND LAL v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 596

15. ———— and s. 21—Nazir's power of delegation—Public servant—Peon—Escape from arrest. A Nazir has authority to delegate the execution of warrants of arrest. *Dharam Chand Lal v. Queen-Emress*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 596, followed. A peon acting under such delegation is a public servant within the meaning of the definition in s. 21, cl. 4, of the Penal Code. *Quære*: Whether the escape of a prisoner from arrest is an obstruction of a public servant within the meaning of s. 186 of the Penal Code. *SHEO*

PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—  
contd.

s. 186—contd.

*PROGASH TEWARI v. BHOOP NARAIN PROSAD PATAK*  
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 759

18. ———— Illegal issue of warrant of arrest—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882, ss. 76, 81, 90, and 160—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 143 and 174—Justifiable assault—Investigation by police—Power of Magistrate to issue warrant of arrest for production of witness. Where a District Magistrate issued a warrant for the arrest and production of a witness for the purpose of giving evidence at an investigation held by the police, and in attempting to execute such warrant the police arrested the wrong person and were assaulted in the attempt:—*Held*, that, apart from the fact that the attempt to arrest was made on the wrong person, a District Magistrate has no authority to issue a warrant for the production of a witness at an investigation by a police-officer, but only before his own Court under ss. 76 and 81 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Held*, also, that, as the investigation was held by a police-officer under Ch. XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code, the proper course was for the Sub-Inspector of Police to require the attendance of the witness under s. 160 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and, on failure by her to comply with such order, prosecute her under s. 174 of the Penal Code. *Held*, further, that the accused were justified in their resistance, and that no offence either under s. 143 or s. 186 of the Penal Code was committed, and that they should be acquitted. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. JOGENDRA NATH MUKERJEE*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 320  
1 C. W. N. 154

17. ———— and ss. 99 and 353—Madras Local Boards Act (Madras Act V of 1884), ss. 77, 78, 81, 94, 163—Service of notice of demand of house-tax—Omission to fill up the house-register completely—Illegal distraint—Resistance to distraining officer. A notice of demand of a house-tax under the Local Boards Act, V of 1884 (Madras), was affixed to the house. The owner, who was a potter and cultivator by occupation, was in the village at the time. He did not pay the tax. A warrant of distress was issued, the house-register not having been completely filled up, and a bucket and spade belonging to the defaulter were attached. The defaulter successfully resisted the distraint. *Held*, that the provisions of the Act had been sufficiently complied with as regards the preliminary steps for making the demand and the service of notice, and the fact that the spade and the bucket were protected from attachment under s. 94 did not justify the resistance, and accordingly that the defaulter was guilty of offences under Penal Code, ss. 186 and 353. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. POOMALAI UDAYAN*

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 296

18. ———— Survey Act (Ben. Act V of 1875), s. 45—Kanungo appointed by a Settlement officer, whether a public servant—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 186—Obstructing a public officer in the discharge of his duties as such. Obstruc-



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 186—concl'd.**

tion offered to a *Kanungo* appointed by a Settlement Officer for the purpose of demarcating the boundary line of certain *khas mahal* lands, but who cannot be regarded as properly discharging any of the functions mentioned in s. 45 of the Survey Act (Ben. Act V of 1875), would not amount to an offence under s. 186 of the Penal Code. *MOULA BUX v. KING-EMPEROR* (1901) . 6 C. W. N. 120

**19. ————— Public servant—Obstruction—Distrain—Crops—Sanction—Unlawful assembly—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 123 and 126—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 4 and 195—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 143 and 186.** A peon was ordered by the Civil Court, under the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act, to cut certain crops, which had already been distrained. The peon, with some labourers, cut a portion of the crops, when they were forcibly stopped by the petitioners and a mob of men. The *peon* lodged information of the occurrence at the *thana*. The petitioners were convicted under ss. 143 and 186 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that, as there was in this case no complaint, as defined by s. 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code, of the public servant concerned, the conviction under s. 186 of the Penal Code should be set aside. *KAILAS KURMI v. EMPEROR* (1902)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 285

**20. ————— Northern India Canal and Drainage Act, VIII of 1873, ss. 45 and 47—Mode of collection of canal dues—Distrain.** Where under a written order signed by a *Tahsildar* the *Naib Nazir* was directed to realize certain canal dues, and he, on attempting to do so by attachment and sale of the defaulter's property, was resisted by the owners of the property, it was *held* that the conviction of the persons offering resistance under s. 186 of the Penal Code was good. The *Tahsildar's* order, though not of a formal nature, was sufficient evidence that the *Naib Nazir* was acting as a public servant in the discharge of his duty. *Held*, also, that the appointment of *lambardars* does not preclude the Revenue authorities, if they think fit, from realizing canal dues from the persons, by whom the dues are actually payable. *Queen-Empress v. Poomalai Udayan*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 296, referred to. *EMPEROR v. ABDULLAH* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 496

**s. 187—**

See FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERAL CASES.  
I. L. R. 23 Mad. 544

See FOREST ACT, s. 78.

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 769

See PUBLIC SERVANT.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 419

**s. 188—**

See BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT,  
s. 73 . . . I. L. R. 14 Bom. 180

See BREACH OF THE PEACE.

9 C. W. N. 793

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860);—**  
*contd.*

**s. 188—cont'd.**

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 144.

9 C. W. N. 392

See NUISANCE—UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE . 2 B. L. R. A. Cr. 45.

I. L. R. 10 All. 115

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 9

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 165

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 464

I. L. R. 20 All. 501

2 C. W. N. 70

5 C. W. N. 329

See PUBLIC SERVANT.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 236

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—WHERE SANCTION IS NECESSARY, OR OTHERWISE.

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 70

See UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 42

**1. ————— Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 62.** An order in writing under s. 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is necessary to sustain a charge under s. 188 of the Penal Code of disobeying an order under the former section. *In the matter of PITAMBUR DEY* 17 W. R. Cr. 57

**2. ————— Evidence of promulgation of lawful order.** To support a conviction under s. 188 of the Penal Code, there must be evidence that the order has been promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate it. *QUEEN v. SUBUN SINGH* . 23 W. R. Cr. 57

**3. ————— Knowledge of promulgation of order.** Before a conviction can be had under s. 188, Penal Code, it must be proved that the accused knew that an order had been promulgated by a public servant directing such accused person to abstain from a certain act. *QUEEN v. RAMTONOO SINGH* . 12 W. R. Cr. 49

*ABELAKH SINGH v. SIRMAM SINGH*

15 W. R. Cr. 50

**4. ————— Injunction in civil suit—Disobedience of order.** S. 188 of the Penal Code applies to orders made by public functionaries for public purposes, and not to an order made in a civil suit between party and party. The proper remedy for disobedience of an order of injunction passed by a Civil Court is committal for contempt. *In the matter of the petition of CHANDRAKANTA DE*  
I. L. R. 6 Calc. 445 : 7 C. L. R. 350

**5. ————— Requisites for conviction under.** A conviction under s. 188 of the Penal Code, of disobedience of an order duly promulgated by a public servant, will not stand where the evidence fails to show that the disobedience caused or tended to cause obstruction, annoyance, or injury, or risk of obstruction, annoyance, or injury, to any person lawfully employed, or that it caused or tended to cause danger to human life, health, or safety, or caused or tended to cause a riot or affray. *ANONYMOUS* . 4 Mad. Ap. 6



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*s. 188—*contd.*

6. *Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 62—Order of Assistant Magistrate.* Ss. 62 (Criminal Procedure Code, 1861) and 188 of the Penal Code should be read together. **GOVERNMENT v. MAHOMED BUKSH.**

**1 Agra Cr. 23**

7. *Issue of summons and warrant.* A Magistrate has no authority to issue simultaneously a summons and a warrant under s. 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861, unless he has reason to believe that the witness will not attend in obedience to a summons. **QUEEN v. CHUNDER SEEKUR ROY**

**12 W. R. Cr. 18**

8. *Illegality of order—Order under consideration of Appellate Court.* Where a Magistrate had made an improper order requiring the petitioner to pull down his house as an obstruction in fifteen days, and the Sessions Judge, on application of the petitioner, called for the proceedings under s. 434 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, the Magistrate wrote and questioned the Judge's authority to interfere, and without waiting for a reply proceeded to try the petitioner for disobedience to an order duly promulgated by a public servant and sentenced him to twenty-five days' imprisonment under s. 188 of the Penal Code. *Held* (reversing the conviction), that the Magistrate ought at once to have complied with the precept of the Sessions Judge under s. 434, and that he was not warranted in convicting and imprisoning the petitioner for disobeying an order the legality of which was then properly under the consideration of an Appellate Court. **REG. v. DALSUKRAM HARIBHAI.** **2 Bom. 407; 2nd Ed. 384**

9. *Order of Magistrate under s. 518, Criminal Procedure Code, prohibiting payment of rents—Illegal order.* In a case of a dispute between rival parties as to the payment of rents by tenants, a Magistrate has no power, under s. 518 of Act X of 1872, to make an order that no rents should be collected until such time as the right and title of both parties should have been established by order of a competent Court, and conviction under s. 188 of the Penal Code for disobeying such an order cannot be sustained. **PROSONO COOMAR CHATTERJEE v. EMPRESS**

**8 C. L. R. 231**

10. *Order of Magistrate under s. 133, Criminal Procedure Code, Act X of 1882, made without jurisdiction.* The accused was convicted under the Penal Code of disobedience to a general order of the Magistrate directing the public not to frequent the roads and public places at the village of P between certain hours. *Held*, that the conviction was bad. *In the matter of KOMUL KRISTO BONICK.* **12 C. L. R. 231**

11. *Plying boat for hire near public ferry—Disobedience of order promulgated by public servant.* If, when directed by the

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*s. 188—*contd.*

order of a public servant, duly promulgated to him, to abstain from plying a boat for hire at or in the immediate vicinity of a public ferry, a person disobeys such direction, he renders himself liable to punishment under the Penal Code. **MUTHRA v. JAWAHIR.** **I. L. R. 1 All. 527**

12. *Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861, s. 62—Trespass by cattle.* A Magistrate issued an order warning owners of cattle to take proper care of them, and that in case of disobedience or neglect they would be punished according to law, and did punish them for disobedience under s. 188 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that the conviction under s. 188 of the Penal Code was illegal. *In the matter of AMIRADDI*

**3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 45****S.C. QUEEN v. AMEERUDDIN****12 W. R. Cr. 36**

13. *Landholder, duty of—Neglect to aid a public servant—Disobedience to order by public servant—Act X of 1882 (Criminal Procedure Code), ss. 90, 91.* A Magistrate directed a landholder "to find a clue" in a case of theft "within fifteen days, and to assist the police." *Held*, that such order was not authorized by ss. 90 and 91 of Act X of 1872, and the conviction of such landholder, under ss. 187 and 188 of the Penal Code, for disobedience to such order was not maintainable. **EMPRESS OF INDIA v. BAKHSI RAM**

**I. L. R. 3 All. 201**

14. *Act XXXI of 1860, s. 26—Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), ss. 250, 251—Carrying fire-arms without license—Disobedience of an order promulgated by a public servant.* A Magistrate issued a notification that all persons desirous of carrying arms should take out a license enabling them to do so under s. 26 of Act XXXI of 1860; and certain persons were, in consequence of his notification, arrested and brought before him charged in a police report with carrying arms without license. No summons or warrant had been applied for, nor any complaint lodged before the Magistrate previous to the arrest of the prisoners. No charge in writing was framed as required under ss. 250, 251 of the Criminal Procedure Code. No evidence was taken, but the prisoners admitted carrying the fire-arms. The Magistrate convicted them, under s. 188 of the Penal Code, of disobedience of an order duly promulgated by a public servant. There was no evidence that the disobedience would cause, or tend to cause, annoyance, obstruction, or injury to human life, health, or safety. *Held*, the convictions must be quashed. Necessity of observing the rules laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code remarked on. **QUEEN v. NANDKUMAR BOSE**

**3 B. L. R. Ap. 149**

15. *Order under s. 530, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872.* In the absence of evidence that an order under s. 530 of the



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 188—contd.**

Criminal Procedure Code was in fact directed to the accused, he cannot legally be convicted under s. 188 of the Penal Code for disobeying such order. *In the matter of* NOBO KISHORE CHUCKERBUTTY

7 C. L. R. 291

16. *Order declaring land in dispute not to be public.* An order which declares that as between the parties to a contention certain land in dispute does not belong to the public is not one the contravention of which can form the subject of an order under the Penal Code, s. 188. *UNNODA PROSHAD DUTT v. SHAMA SOONDUREE*

24 W. R. Cr. 20

17. *Order on report of jury under Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 521, 526—Disobedience of order.* A jury having been applied for and duly appointed under s. 521 of Act X of 1872, one of the jurors appointed by the Magistrate fell sick, and the foreman of the jury, unknown to the Court, substituted another man in his place. The Magistrate accepted the report of the majority of the jury so constituted and made an order under s. 526. The order having been disobeyed proceedings were taken under s. 188 of the Penal Code against the person to whom it was directed, and he was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. *Held*, that, the report upon which action was taken not being the report of a regularly constituted jury, the order and the conviction and sentence passed on disobedience thereto were illegal. *EMPRESS v. BHOIRUB CHANDER DUTT*

10 C. L. R. 193

18. *Disobedience to order of public servant—Enquiry as to possession—Parties to enquiry.* In May 1883 the District Magistrate of Tipperah held an enquiry as to the possession of certain lands claimed by A and B, and having found on the evidence taken by him that A was in possession, he passed an order on the 21st of May 1883, declaring that A was entitled to hold possession of the disputed land until evicted in due course of law, and forbidding B and all others to disturb A's possession until such disturbance should be effected in due course of law. Previously to November 1885, B sold an 8-anna share of his interest in the disputed land to C, who at the time of his purchase had notice of the order of the 21st of May 1883. In November 1885 B and others went to the disputed lands, and attempted to turn A out of possession by force, and to compel the tenants of the lands to pay rent and give kabuliats to B and C. At the time that B and his companions went to the disputed land, the latter were aware of the order of the 21st of May 1883, though none of them was a party to the enquiry then made by the District Magistrate. In December 1885 they were all tried and found guilty of disobedience to an order duly promulgated by a public servant. *Held*, that the conviction was right. *GOLUCK CHANDRA PAL v. KALI CHARAN DE*

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 175

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 188—contd.**

19. *Disobedience to order of public servant—Order of Magistrate under Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 318.* Where an order was made under s. 318 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, between A on the one side and B and the three tenants of B on the other:—*Held*, that the order was only binding on the actual parties to the case, and subsequent tenants of B could not be punished for disobeying the order. *In the matter of* GOPAL BURNAWAR

3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 13

20. *Omission or neglect of zamindar to obey call under s. 21, Beng. Reg. XX of 1817.* An omission or neglect by a zamindar when called upon under s. 21 of Regulation XX of 1817 to nominate some one to fill the office of village watchman which had become vacant is not an offence under either s. 187 or s. 188 of the Penal Code. *In the matter of* KALI PROSONO GHOSE

7 C. L. R. 575

21. *Chairman of Municipal Committee under Act XXVI of 1850—Public servant.* The Chairman of the Municipal Committee appointed under Act XXVI of 1850, though a public servant, has no power to make an order for the attendance of any one before him, and therefore there can be no conviction for disobedience of it. *REG. v. PURSHOTAM VALJI*

5 Bom. Cr. 33

22. *Conviction for disobeying order made without jurisdiction.* Convictions and sentences for disobeying an order promulgated by a public servant reversed, as the mamlatdar who stated that he proceeded under Bombay Act V of 1864 was not thereby empowered to make the order. *REG. v. BHAI BIN VITHU*

3 Bom. Cr. 53

*REG. v. KHANDOJI BIN TANAJI*

5 Bom. Cr. 21

23. *Order to abate nuisance—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 133, 134—Notice of order and subsequent disobedience.* The terms of s. 134 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and the notification made by Government thereunder as to promulgation and issue of an order, are directory, but an omission to follow strictly such direction, though it is an irregularity, does not invalidate the order: where therefore it is shown that the order has been brought to the actual knowledge of the person sought to be affected by it, such omission does not prevent the case coming within s. 188 of the Penal Code. *In the matter of the petition of* PARBUTTY CHARAN AICH. *PARBUTTY CHARAN AICH v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 9

24. *Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 133, 134, 135, 136—Service of notice of order under s. 133—Disobedience of order where notice was affixed to house of accused.* A Magistrate made an order under s. 133 of the Code of Civil Procedure requiring N to fence a certain well in a public street or to appear before him and move to



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 188—contd.**

have the order set aside; a copy of this order was affixed to the house of N, but he did not appear. The Magistrate then adopted the procedure prescribed by ss. 136, 140, and made an order requiring N to fence the well by a certain date. N, who was personally served with notice of the above order, did not comply with it. The Magistrate then sanctioned the prosecution of N under s. 188 of the Penal Code. N appeared and produced evidence to prove that he was not liable to fence the well. *Held*, that the accused was guilty of the offence of disobedience to an order duly promulgated by a public servant, and was not entitled to go behind the order and show that it was one which ought not to have been made. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NARAYANA*

**I. L. R. 12 Mad. 475**

**25.** *Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 133, 140.* A person against whom an order under s. 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is passed who neglects to take any steps whatever in respect of such order within the time therein specified either by way of compliance therewith or by way of objection thereto in the manner prescribed by law, renders himself liable to be proceeded against under s. 188 of the Penal Code without its being necessary to wait until the order has been made absolute. If such order is made absolute under s. 140 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, further proceedings can then be had under s. 188 of the Penal Code against the person disobeying the order absolute. When an order under s. 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been made absolute under s. 140, its validity cannot subsequently be questioned. *Queen-Empress v. Narayana*, **I. L. R. 12 Mad. 475**, approved. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BISHAMBAR LALL*

**I. L. R. 13 All. 577**

**26.** *Madras Local Boards Act (Madras Act V of 1884), ss. 98 and 100—Disobedience to notice given by President of Local Board.* The President of a Local Board, acting under Madras Act V of 1884, issued a notice calling upon a person to remove certain encroachments on a public road within ten days. *Held*, that such a notice was not an order within the meaning of s. 188, Penal Code, and a person neglecting to obey it could not be convicted under that section. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SUBRAMANIAN*

**I. L. R. 20 Mad. 1**

**27.** *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 144—Disobedience of an order lawfully passed and promulgated by a public servant—Elements necessary to constitute an offence under s. 188—Evidence as to the likely result of such disobedience.* To constitute an offence under s. 188 of the Penal Code, it is necessary to show, first, a lawful order promulgated by a public servant; second, a knowledge of the order and disobedience of it; and thirdly, the result that is likely to follow such disobedience. A conviction under s. 188,

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 188—concl'd.**

Penal Code, for the disobedience of an order under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, in the absence of evidence as to the likely result of the disobedience of such order is bad in law. Although the establishment of a rival hât at a place near to an old hât and held on the same day may lead to a breach of the peace, it would not be safe or proper that that should alone form a sufficient ground for a conviction under s. 188 of the Penal Code. *Brojonath Ghose v. Empress*, **4 C. W. N. 226**

**28.** *Breach of the peace, likelihood of, necessary to support conviction.* Disobedience to a Magistrate's order directing a party to hold his hât on certain specified days of the week cannot be punished under s. 188 of the Penal Code. To support a conviction under s. 188 of the Penal Code some evidence that the disobedience is likely to cause a breach of the peace is necessary. *Brojo Nath Ghose v. Empress*, **4 C. W. N. 226**, followed. *SHAMANAND DAS PAHARAJ v. EMPEROR* (1904) **8 C. W. N. 781**

**29.** *Disobedience of order—Evidence—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 144.* To constitute an offence under s. 188 of the Penal Code of disobedience to an order issued under s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, there must be definite evidence on the record to show that such disobedience is likely to lead to a breach of the peace. *Brojo Nath Ghose v. Empress*, **4 C. W. N. 226**. *RAM GOPAL DAW v. EMPEROR* (1905) **I. L. R. 32 Calc. 793**

**s. 189—Threat of injury to public servant—Necessity of proving actual words used.** In a prosecution for an offence under s. 189 of the Penal Code, the witnesses differed as to the exact words used by the prisoner in threatening the public servant, though they agreed as to the general effect of those words. The Magistrate, however, considered that the offence was clearly proved, and convicted the prisoner. The Sessions Judge on appeal affirmed the conviction, observing that it was immaterial what the words used were, and that the intention and effect of the words were plain. *Held*, that the Judge was mistaken in regarding it as immaterial what the words used actually were, and that, on the contrary, it was most material that those words should be before the Court to enable it to ascertain whether in fact a threat of injury to the public servant was really made by the accused. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MAHESHRI BAKHSI SINGH*

**I. L. R. 8 All. 380**

**s. 190—**

*See CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION.*

**I. L. R. 8 Mad. 140**

**s. 191—**

*See BANKERS.* **I. L. R. 16 All. 88**

*See FALSE EVIDENCE.*

*False evidence—False evidence not necessary on a point material to the case. Semble:* That to constitute the offence



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.***s. 191—concl'd.**

defined by s. 191 of the Penal Code it is not necessary that the false evidence should be concerning a question material to the decision of the case, in which it is given; it is sufficient if the false evidence is intentionally given, that is to say, if the person making that statement makes it advisedly knowing it to be false, and with the intention of deceiving the Court and of leading it to be supposed that the matter, which he states, is true. *The Queen v. Mahomed Hoosain*, 16 W. R. 37, and *The Queen v. Shib Prosad Giri*, 13 W. R. 37, referred to. *Emperor v. Ganga Sahai*, All. Weekly Notes (1903) 68, discussed. But if the false evidence does not bear directly on a material issue in the case being relative to incidental or trivial matters only, that would be a matter to be taken into consideration in fixing the sentence. *EMPEROR v. BABU RAM* (1904) . I. L. R. 26 All. 509

**ss. 191, 192—**

See CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS TO MAGISTRATE . . . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 702\*

**ss. 191, 193, cl. (2)—***Proceeding under Land Registration Act (Bengal Act VII of 1876), ss. 52, 83, 84: Witness if "bound to state truth" in such proceeding—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 195—Sanction to prosecute.* In a proceeding held by a Sub-Deputy Collector under ss. 52 and 84 of the Land Registration Act, a witness is "bound to state the truth" within the meaning of s. 191 of the Penal Code, and a person, who made a false statement before the Sub-Deputy Collector, would be rightly convicted under the latter part of s. 193 of the Penal Code, even if the proceeding was not a judicial proceeding within the meaning of that section. *Quære: Whether the Sub-Deputy Collector was a "Court" within the meaning of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the proceeding was a "judicial proceeding" within the meaning of s. 193 of the Penal Code.* *HIRANAND OJHA v. EMPEROR* (1905) 9 C. W. N. 983

**ss. 191—199—**

See FALSE EVIDENCE.

**s. 192—**

See FORGERY . . . I. L. R. 6 Calc. 482  
7 C. L. R. 356

*Fabricating false evidence—Definition.* One Cheda Lal, whose brother Debi was an accused person, applied to the Court on behalf of the accused asking that the witnesses for the prosecution might first of all be made to identify Debi. The Court assenting to this request, Cheda Lal produced before the Court ten or twelve men, none of whom could be identified as Debi by any of the prosecution witnesses. Upon being asked by the Court where Debi was, Cheda Lal pointed out a man who, upon further investigation, was discovered to be wearing a false mous-

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.***s. 192—concl'd.**

tache and to be not Debi at all, but one Chimman. Held, upon these facts, that Cheda was rightly convicted of fabricating false evidence having regard to the definition contained in s. 192 of the Indian Penal Code. *EMPEROR v. CHEDA LAL* (1907) I. L. R. 29 All. 351

**ss. 192, 193—**

See FABRICATING FALSE EVIDENCE.

**s. 193—**

See CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—FALSE EVIDENCE AND PERJURY.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 434

See COMPENSATION—CRIMINAL CASES—TO ACCUSED ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT . . . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 586

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ss. 133, 342, 488 . . . 9 C. W. N. 983

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 195. 9 C. W. N. 321

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 487 (1872, s. 473) . I. L. R. 1 All. 625

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS. I. L. R. 24 Mad. 675

See FALSE EVIDENCE.

See MARRIAGE ACT, s. 18. I. L. R. 16 All. 212

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION. I. L. R. 36 Calc. 808  
13 C. W. N. 422

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT GENERALLY. 3 C. L. R. 527

See STAMP ACT, 1879, s. 51. I. L. R. 5 All. 17

See STOLEN PROPERTY—OFFENCES RELATING TO . . . I. L. R. 1 All. 379

1. ——— Giving false evidence—*Deposition of witness upon which assignment of perjury based not taken in manner required by law—Conviction—Unsustainability of.* A was convicted of giving false evidence in a judicial proceeding. It was proved that after his evidence had been recorded, his deposition, upon which the assignments of perjury were based, was read over to him by the Court clerk, in a place where neither the Judge nor vakils were present. Held, that the conviction could not be sustained. The deposition upon which the prosecution was based not being properly taken in accordance with law, should not have been admitted in evidence. *KAMATCHI NATHAN CHETTY v. EMPEROR* (1905) . I. L. R. 28 Mad. 306

2. ——— "Judicial proceedings"—*Oaths Act (X of 1873), ss. 4, 5—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 164—Magis-*



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 193—concl'd.**

*trate empowered to administer oath when taking statements under s. 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code.* A Magistrate taking statements under s. 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is acting in discharge of duties imposed on him by law and is empowered to administer an oath under ss. 4 and 5 of the Oaths Act. An investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a stage of a judicial proceeding and a person making on oath a false statement in the course of such investigation commits an offence under s. 193 of the Penal Code. *Queen-Empress v. Alagu Kone*, 1 L. R. 16 Mad. 421, followed. *SUPPA TEVAN v. EMPEROR* (1905) 1 L. R. 29 Mad. 89

**3. — ss. 193 and 203—False evidence**  
*—Accused person giving or fabricating false evidence for the purpose of concealing his own guilt.* Held, that an accused person cannot be charged either with giving or fabricating false evidence with the sole object of diverting suspicion from himself and concealing his guilt in regard to a crime with which he is charged. *EMPEROR v. RAM KHILAWAN* (1906) 1 L. R. 28 All. 705

**4. — ss. 193, 210—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 195, 476—Sanction to prosecute—Refusal by Subordinate Judge—District Judge on appeal may institute proceedings under s. 476—Court—Interpretation.** An application was made to a Subordinate Judge for sanction to prosecute *L* for offences punishable under ss. 193 and 210 of the Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860). The Subordinate Judge refused to grant the sanction. On appeal, the District Judge varied the order and directed the lower Court to prosecute *L* for an offence under s. 210 of the Penal Code. Held, that the District Judge had jurisdiction to pass an order under s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898); that it was not competent to him to direct the Subordinate Judge to prosecute *L* for an offence under s. 210 of the Penal Code, and that he should himself have proceeded according to clause (b) of s. 195 read with s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *In re LAKSHMI-DAS LALJI* (1907) 1 L. R. 32 Bom. 184

**s. 194—**

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

1 L. R. 24 Mad. 675

**s. 196—**

See SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.

1 L. R. 16 Calc. 766

**s. 199—**

See BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT, 1884, s. 133.

1 L. R. 22 Calc. 131

**s. 201—**

**1. — and s. 218—Belief and intention of accused.** Where a person is charged (s. 218, Penal Code) with framing a report incorrectly or (s. 201, Penal Code) giving false information, with intent to save offenders from punishment, the

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 201—cont'd.**

issue to be tried is, not whether such alleged offenders were in fact guilty or not, but merely the belief and intention of the prisoner in respect to their guilt. *QUEEN v. HURDUT SURMA*

8 W. R. Cr. 68

**2. — Abetment of offence by concealment.** S. 201 of the Penal Code refers to prisoners other than the actual criminals who, by their causing evidence to disappear, assist the principals to escape the consequences of their offences. But the person who commits an offence and afterwards conceals the evidence of it, cannot be punished on both heads of the charge. *QUEEN v. SHAM SOONDER SHOOTAR* 7 W. R. Cr. 52

**3. — Causing evidence of crime committed by oneself to disappear.** *Semble* 1 A person cannot be convicted, under s. 201 of the Penal Code, of causing evidence of the commission of an offence by himself to disappear, nor can he be convicted of the abetment of such an act (*per LLOYD and KEMBALL, JJ.*). *REG. v. KASHI-NATH DINKAR* 8 Bom. Cr. 126

**4. — Causing disappearance of evidence of offence.** *K* and *B*, having caused the death of *J* in a field belonging to *B*, removed *J*'s dead body from that field to his own field with the intention of screening themselves from punishment. *K* was convicted on these facts of an offence under s. 201 of the Penal Code. Held, that that section referred to persons other than the actual offenders, and *K* could not therefore properly be punished under that section for what he had done to screen himself from punishment. Also that, as a matter of fact, he did not, by removing *J*'s corpse from one field to another, cause any evidence of *J*'s murder, which that corpse afforded, to disappear, and his act, although his object may have been to divert suspicion from himself and *B*, did not constitute the offence defined in that section. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. KISHNA*

1 L. R. 2 All 713

**5. — False information—Exculpatory statements inculcating another.** A woman who, with her infant child, eloped from her husband's house, was afterwards arrested on a charge of murdering the child which was missing. She made three different statements: (1) that she had left it with her husband; (ii) that she had been enticed away by one *R*, who had taken the child from her; (iii) that one *H* had drowned the child. The Sessions Judge believed the last statement, and convicted her under s. 201 of the Penal Code. Held, that the conviction was wrong, and must be set aside. S. 201 of the Penal Code does not apply to a case where the person, who is the probable or possible offender, makes statements exculpating himself by inculcating another. *In the matter of the petition of BEHALA BIBI*. *EMPRESS v. BEHALA BIBI* 1 L. R. 6 Calc. 789; 8 C. L. R. 207

**6. — Concealing evidence of crime—Secondary offence, conviction of.** In



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 201—contd.**

a trial upon a charge under s. 201 of the Penal Code, the accused made a statement to the effect that he was present at the commission of a murder by two other persons; that he himself took no part in the act; that before the murder was committed, one of the persons named pulled off a razai from the bed on which the deceased was sleeping; and that, in his presence, the razai was subsequently concealed in a stack. It was proved that the razai belonged to the deceased, that it was found concealed in a stack, and that it was pointed out by the accused to the police. The accused was convicted of concealing evidence of the murder, with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment, under s. 201 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that the conviction must be quashed, inasmuch as, if the razai had not been concealed or destroyed, its presence or existence would have been no evidence of the murder. A person who is concerned as a principal in the commission of a crime cannot be convicted of the secondary offence of concealing evidence of the crime. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. LALLI** I. L. R. 7 All. 749

**7.** *Concealing evidence of crime—False information.* S. 201 of the Penal Code does not apply to the case of a criminal causing disappearance of evidence of his own crime, but only to the case of a person who screens the principal or actual offender. *Queen v. Ram Soonder Shootar*, 7 W. R. Cr. 52; *Reg. v. Kashinath Dinkar*, 8 Bom. Cr. 126; *Empress v. Kishna*, I. L. R. 2 All. 713; *Empress v. Behala Bibi*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 789; and *Queen-Empress v. Lalli*, I. L. R. 7 All. 749, referred to. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. DUNGAR** . . . I. L. R. 8 All 252

**8.** *Disappearance of evidence—Intention to screen offender.* A person cannot be punished under s. 201 of the Penal Code, where the act which caused the disappearance of the evidence of the commission of an offence was not done with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment. It is not sufficient that the disappearance of evidence was likely to have the effect of screening the offender. **QUEEN v. TOOLSHEE RAI** . . . 5 N. W. 186

**9.** *Giving false information of offence.* Prisoner was charged, under s. 201 of the Penal Code, "for that he, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence punishable with death had been committed, with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment, gave information respecting the offence which he knew or believed to be false." *Held*, that the proper order of proof on the part of the prosecution in the case was to prove (i) that A N was murdered; (ii) that the prisoner gave information respecting the offence; (ii) that such information was false and known by him to be so; (iv) that he then knew of the commission of the murder; and (v) that his intention was to screen the murderer. *Held*, also, that it was essential to the completeness of the case for the prosecution to show, not only

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 201—contd.**

that the information was given, but also that it was false, and known to be so by the prisoner. Further enquiry directed under s. 422, Criminal Procedure Code, 1861. **QUEEN v. SUBBRAMANYA PILLAI** . . . 3 Mad. 251

**10.** *Causing disappearance of evidence of crime—Proof of commission of crime.* A conviction on a charge of causing the disappearance of evidence of an offence which amounted to culpable homicide not amounting to murder may be good, though there be no proof of who committed the culpable homicide. **QUEEN v. MUDDUN MOHUN BOSE** . 7 W. R. Cr. 22

**11.** *Causing disappearance of evidence of an offence.* *Held*, that it is necessary, in order to justify a conviction under s. 201 of the Penal Code, that an offence for which some person has been convicted, or is criminally responsible, should have been committed. **EMPRESS OF INDIA v. ABDUL KADIR** I. L. R. 3 All. 279

**12.** *Causing disappearance of evidence of an offence—Omitting to report a sudden, unnatural, or suspicious death.* Before an accused can be convicted of an offence under s. 201 of the Penal Code, it must be proved that an offence, the evidence of which he is charged with causing to disappear, has actually been committed, and also that the accused knew or had information sufficient to lead him to believe that the offence had been committed. *Empress of India v. Abdul Kadir*, I. L. R. 3 All. 279, followed. **MATUKI MISSER v. QUEEN-EMPRESS** I. L. R. 11 Calc. 619

**13.** *Abetment of murder—Causing disappearance of evidence of offence.* Prisoner was present at a murder without being aware that such an act was to be committed. Through fear he not only did not interfere to prevent the commission of the crime, but joined the murderers in concealing the body. *Held*, that he was guilty, not of abetment of murder, but of causing the disappearance of evidence of a crime under s. 201 of the Penal Code. **QUEEN v. GOBURDHUN BERA** . . . 6 W. R. Cr. 80

**14.** *Causing disappearance of evidence.* The accused was attacked by a man whom he found by a hole cut in his house for the purpose of committing a burglary, and struck out at the man a blow which caused his death. *Held*, that the accused simply exercised his right of private defence, and was guilty of no offence. Two other men who helped him to remove the dead body, and were accused of causing the disappearance of evidence, knowing that an offence had been committed under s. 201, Penal Code, were also acquitted, for that section contemplates a belief that an offence has been committed, and as the first prisoner was acquitted of all offence, it may be presumed that the other prisoners did not



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 201—concl'd.**

believe that any offence had been committed.  
**QUEEN v. PELKOO NUSHYO** **2 W. R. Cr. 42**

**15.** *Causing disappearance of evidence of supposed murder—Want of proof of commission of offence.* S. 201 of the Penal Code applies merely to the person who screens the principal or actual offender, and not the principal or actual offender himself. The accused were charged with murder and also with causing the disappearance of the corpse of the deceased with the intention of screening the murderer from punishment under s. 201 of the Penal Code. Evidence for the prosecution pointed conclusively to one or other of them being the actual murderer; but it was impossible upon the evidence to say which of them caused the death. They were acquitted on the charge of murder, but convicted on the charge under s. 201. *Held*, that the conviction could not stand. **TORAP ALI v. QUEEN-EMPRESS** . **I. L. R. 22 Calc. 638**

**s. 203—**

*See INFORMATION OF COMMISSION OF OFFENCE* . **20 W. R. Cr. 66**

**s. 204—**

*See THEFT* . **I. L. R. 3 Mad. 261**

**s. 205—**

*See FALSE PERSONATION.*  
**1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 123**  
**1 Mad. 450**  
**4 Mad. 18**  
**8 W. R. Cr. 80**

**s. 206—**

*See EVIDENCE ACT, ss. 14, 15.*  
**I. L. R. 16 Bom. 414**

**1.** *Absence of fraudulent intent.* To bring a case under s. 206 of the Penal Code, there must be a fraudulent removal, sale, or transfer of property, or of some interest therein, intending thereby to prevent that property from being taken as a forfeiture or in satisfaction of a fine. *In the matter of the petition of BALMO-KOOND BROJOBASI* . **18 W. R. Cr. 65**

**2.** *Fraudulent removal of property to prevent seizure in execution—Act X of 1859, s. 145.* Certain persons were convicted by the Deputy Magistrate, under s. 206 of the Penal Code of having fraudulently removed property to prevent its being taken in execution of a decree under Act X of 1859. The Judge was of opinion that the offence was one provided for by s. 145 of Act X of 1859, and was not therefore triable by the Magistrate. *Held*, that the prisoner was rightly tried and convicted under s. 206. **GAUR-CHANDRA CHUCKERBUTTY v. KRISHNA MOHUN SINGH** . **2 B. L. R. S. N. 4 : 10 W. R. Cr. 46**

**3.** *Attachment of crops in execution of certificate under Public De-*

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 206—concl'd.**

*mands Recovery Act—Want of sanction not occasioning failure of justice—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 195, 438 and 537—Public Demands Recovery Act (Bengal Act I of 1895), ss. 7, 8, 19 and 22.* The cutting and carrying off crops which the accused knew to be under attachment in execution of a certificate under the Public Demands Recovery Act of 1895, is an offence under the latter part of s. 206 of the Penal Code. The amount due under the certificate cannot be regarded as a forfeiture or fine, but is money due under a decree, the certificate having the force and effect of a decree of a Civil Court. Where such an offence was taken cognizance of by a Magistrate without sanction for the prosecution being given, as should have been the case, but there was nothing in the proceeding to show that the want of such sanction had in fact occasioned a failure of justice:—*Held*, that the conviction was not bad only on that account. **SUNDER DASADH v. SITAL MAHTO (1900)** . **I. L. R. 28 Calc. 217**  
**s.c. 5 C. W. N. 291**

**s. 209—**

*See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 476.*  
**13 C. W. N. 1038**

**s. 210—**

*See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 258.*  
**I. L. R. 9 Mad. 101**  
**I. L. R. 10 Bom. 288**  
*See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 487.*  
**I. L. R. 16 Calc. 121 ; 766**  
*See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION.*  
**I. L. R. 33 Calc. 193**

**1.** *“Satisfied” — Decree not certified to Court.* In s. 210 of the Penal Code the word “satisfied” is to be understood in its ordinary meaning, and not as referring to decrees the satisfaction of which has been certified to the Court. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BAPUJI DAYARAM** . **I. L. R. 10 Bom. 288**

**2.** *and s. 209—Fraudulently applying for execution of decree.* Where a person applies for the execution of a decree which has already been executed, his offence falls, not under s. 209, but s. 210 of the Penal Code. S. 209 relates to false and fraudulent claims in Court of Justice, and is confined to the Civil Court in which the original suit was brought. **QUEEN v. BEEGUN MAHTOON** . **12 W. R. Cr. 37**

**3.** *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 258—Satisfaction of decree—Execution of decree—Fraudulently executing decree after it has been satisfied when satisfaction has not been certified to Court.* A decree-holder having proceeded to execute his decree, against his judgment-debtor, the latter objected, stating that the decree had been already satisfied although the adjustment thereof had not been certified to the Court as required by s. 258 of the



PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—  
contd.

s. 210—concl'd.

Code of Civil Procedure. The judgment-debtor, being under the circumstances compelled to deposit the amount of the decree in Court, applied for and obtained sanction to prosecute the decree-holder for an offence under s. 210 of the Penal Code. It was contended that the case did not fall within that section, as the satisfaction, not having been certified to the Court, could not be recognized by the Court executing the decree, and that consequently no offence had been committed. *Held*, that the words "after it has been satisfied," used in s. 210 of the Penal Code, indicate only the fact of the satisfaction of the decree. The fact that the satisfaction is of such a nature that the Court executing the decree could not recognize it, does not prevent the decree-holder from being properly convicted of an offence under that section. *MADHUB CHUNDER MOZUMDAR v. NOVODEEP CHUNDER PUNDIT*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 126

Overruled by *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SARAT CHANDRA RAKHIT* . I. L. R. 16 Calc. 766

See *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BAPUJI DAYARAM*.  
I. L. R. 10 Bom. 288

4. ————— *Sanction to prosecution—Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882, s. 195—Execution of decree which has been satisfied.* A decree-holder applied for execution of his decree against the judgment-debtor. The application was dismissed on the ground that the decree had been satisfied out of Court. The judgment-debtor then applied for and obtained sanction to prosecute the decree-holder under s. 210 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that such sanction must be revoked, because the decree had not been caused to be executed and therefore no offence under s. 210 of the Penal Code had been committed. *SHAMA CHARAN DAS v. KASI NAIK* . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 971

s. 211—

See *COMPLAINT* . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1

See *FALSE CHARGE*.

See *MALICIOUS PROSECUTION*.

I. L. R. 3 Mad. 6

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 717

See ss. 182, 211 . 13 C. W. N. 398

1. ————— *Preferring a false charge—"Charge" made to Village Magistrate—Sustainability.* An accusation of murder made to a Village Magistrate who, under s. 13 of Regulation XI of 1816, has authority to arrest any person, whom he suspects of having committed the murder of a person whose body is found within his jurisdiction, is a "charge" within the meaning of s. 211 of the Penal Code, even though it does not amount to the institution of criminal proceedings and even though no criminal proceedings follow it owing to the police referring it as false on investigation. *CHENNA MALI GOWDA v. EMPEROR* (1904)  
I. L. R. 27 Mad. 129

PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—  
contd.

s. 211—contd.

2. ————— *Preferring a false charge—Statement not reduced to writing by police officer.* A person was convicted, under s. 211 of the Penal Code, of having preferred a false charge. It appeared that the accused had stated to a police officer that certain of the prosecution witnesses had stolen his goats, and that he had made this statement intending to set the criminal law in motion against those persons. The statement had not been reduced to writing in accordance with the requirements of s. 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On its being contended that there was no evidence of a false charge within the meaning of s. 211:—*Held*, (i) that the test is—did the person, who makes the charge, intend to set the criminal law in motion against the person against whom the charge is made; (ii) that (it being clear from the evidence that the accused did so intend) the fact that the statement made by the accused to the police officer had not been reduced to writing in accordance with s. 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not prevent the statement made from being a false charge within the meaning of that section. *MALLAPPA REDDI v. EMPEROR* (1904)  
I. L. R. 27 Mad. 127

3. ————— *False charge—Improper order for prosecution.* It is not in every case, which a Magistrate considers to be false, that he should direct under s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code a prosecution under s. 211, Penal Code. Each case must be judged by its own facts. Where, therefore, the Magistrate and the Judge came to different conclusions upon the evidence which was of a doubtful character and the complainant was a boy of 12 years of age, it was *held* that the Magistrate should not have directed his prosecution, and his order was accordingly set aside. *EMPEROR v. GOPAL BARIK* (1906)  
I. L. R. 34 Calc. 42

4. ————— *False charge—Practice—Opportunity to be given to prove charge before prosecuting.* Where it is intended to prosecute any person under s. 211 of the Indian Penal Code such person ought to be given an opportunity of substantiating, if he can, the charge which he has brought before he is prosecuted. *Queen-Empress v. Ganga Ram*, I. L. R. 8 All. 38, and *Queen-Empress v. Raghu Tiwari*, I. L. R. 15 All. 336, followed. *EMPEROR v. TULA* (1907)  
I. L. R. 29 All. 587

5. ————— *False charge must be to one having authority to set criminal law in motion—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 162—Statement made under, cannot be the basis of prosecution for false charge.* A statement made under s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in answer to questions put by a police officer making an investigation under s. 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be made the basis of a prosecution under s. 211 of the Penal Code. Information of an alleged dacoity was given to a village munsif, who sent a report to the police. The



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 211—contd.**

police thereupon investigated the case and rejected it as false. The informant was prosecuted under s. 211 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that there was no institution of criminal proceedings by the informant, as the village munsif had no power to investigate in cases of dacoity. The informant had made no "false charge" within the meaning of s. 211, as it was not made to one having power to investigate and send up for trial. The subsequent investigation was not the result of the information given, but of the report sent by the village munsif. *Karim Buksh v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 17 Cal. 574, followed. *CHINNA RAMANA GOWD v. EMPEROR* (1908). I. L. R. 31 Mad. 508

6. *Complaint to Village Magistrate is a charge and an institution of criminal proceedings within the meaning of s. 211, Indian Penal Code, if it is his duty to forward such complaint for action by the police—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 45, 154, 161 and 162.* On the question raised by a reference from the Sessions Judge whether a person giving false information about an alleged offence to a Village Magistrate can be prosecuted for an offence under s. 211 of the Indian Penal Code:—*Held*, per BENSON and MUNRO, JJ. (*SANKARAN-NAIR, J.*, dissenting), that a false complaint to a Village Magistrate of an offence, when the information is one which, under s. 45 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Village Magistrate is bound to pass on to the higher constituted authorities, will amount to an offence under s. 211 of the Indian Penal Code. The words "false charge" in s. 211 must not be understood in a technical or restricted sense, but in its ordinary meaning of a false accusation made to any authority bound by law to investigate it or to take any steps in regard to it, such as giving information of it to superior authorities; and institution of criminal proceedings includes the setting of the criminal law in motion. The complaint to the Village Magistrate, in such a case, amounts to a "charge" and is also an institution of criminal proceedings within s. 211 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It would be otherwise, if the offence complained of is one in regard to which the information need not, under s. 45 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, be passed to the higher authorities. *Chinna Ramana Gowd v. Emperor*, I. L. R. 31 Mad. 506, dissented from. *Obiter*: The taking of a complaint to any of the other persons who, under s. 45 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, are bound to pass such information to higher authorities, may also fall within s. 211, Indian Penal Code. Per *SANKARAN-NAIR, J.*—Where information of an offence, "given to a Village Magistrate," is forwarded by him to a police officer and the latter takes a written statement from the person giving such information, such statement is not one taken under s. 154 but under ss. 161 and 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is not a complaint but a statement by a witness in an investigation under s. 157,

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 211—concl'd.**

and no charge under s. 211, Indian Penal Code, can be founded on such statement. To constitute a "false charge," it must be made to a Court or officer, who has powers to investigate and send up for trial. S. 45 of the Code of Criminal Procedure imposes the duty of forwarding information to superior authorities on a number of persons other than Village Magistrates and the Legislature could not have intended to constitute all such persons authorities before whom criminal proceedings may be instituted. S. 45 does not impose the duty of reporting in the case of bailable offences, and if the duty to report is taken as the determining test, it will follow that the information is to be considered as a proceeding in some cases and in others not. *SESSIONS JUDGE OF TINNEVELLY DIVISION v. SIVAN CHEITI* (1909). I. L. R. 32 Mad. 258

**s. 212—Harbouring an offender.** To justify a conviction under s. 212 of the Penal Code, it is necessary that there should be an offence committed, and consequently an offender who has been harboured or concealed. *Empress v. Abdul Kadir*, I. L. R. 3 All. 279, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. FATEH SINGH*. I. L. R. 12 All. 432

**s. 213—**

*See COMPOUNDING OFFENCE.*

6 C. L. R. 392

*See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—PENAL CODE.*

6 W. R. Cr. 90

**s. 214—**

*See COMPOUNDING OFFENCE.*

*Screening an offender.* S. 213 of the Penal Code is applicable only when it is proved that the person screened or attempted to be screened from legal punishment has been guilty of an offence, and not when there is merely a suspicion of his having committed some offence. *Queen-Empress v. Saminatha*, I. L. R. 14 Mad. 400, followed. *GIRISH MYTE v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*. I. L. R. 23 Cal. 420

1. **s. 215—Agreeing or consenting to take illegal gratification—Nature of agreement or consent.** In order to constitute the offence punishable under s. 215 of the Indian Penal Code, it is necessary that the person who is willing to take and the person who is willing to give the illegal gratification must agree not only as to the object for which the gratification is to be given, but also as to the shape or form the gratification is to take. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. CHITTAR*. I. L. R. 20 All. 389

2. *Theft—Receiving gratification to help the owner to recover stolen property—S. 215 not intended to apply to the actual thief.* S. 215 of the Indian Penal Code was not intended to apply to the actual thief, but to some one who being in league with the thief, receives some gratification on account of helping the owner to recover the stolen property without at the same time using



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 215—***concl'd.*

all the means in his power to cause the thief to be apprehended and convicted of the offence. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MUHAMMAD ALI* (1900)

**I. L. R. 23 All. 81**

**s. 216B—***Definition—Meaning of term "harbouring."* Held, with regard to the definition contained in s. 216B of the Indian Penal Code, that the words "assisting a person in any way to evade apprehension" are meant to point out some method *ejusdem generis* with those specified in the earlier portion of the section. They will not include the assisting of an accused person to escape by merely telling lies to the police as to his whereabouts. *EMPEROR v. HUSAIN BAKSHI* (1903) .

**I. L. R. 25 All. 261**

**s. 217—**

*See CHARGE—ALTERATION OR AMENDMENT OF CHARGE*

**I. L. R. 2 Bom. 142**

**1.** *Direction of law*  
*—Disobedience of public servant—Omission to give information of offence.* The direction of law mentioned in s. 217, Penal Code, means a positive direction of law such as those contained in ss. 89 and 90 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, and cannot be made to extend to the more general obligation on every subject not to stifle a criminal charge. *In the matter of RAMANIHI NAYAR*

**I. L. R. 1 Mad. 266**

**2.** *Public servant*  
*disobeying direction of law with intent to save person from punishment—Evidence of such person's offence.* It is sufficient for the purpose of a conviction under s. 217 of the Penal Code that the accused has knowingly disobeyed any direction of the law as to the way in which he is to conduct himself as a public servant, and that he has done this with the intention of saving a person from legal punishment; it is not necessary to show that in point of fact the person so intended to be saved had committed an offence or was justly liable to legal punishment. *EMPRESS v. AMIRUDDIN*

**I. L. R. 3 Calc. 412 : 1 C. L. R. 483**

**3.** *Proof of offence under.* It is only necessary for a conviction under s. 217 of the Penal Code to show that the prisoner knew that the person he released was in danger of punishment, and that the prisoner released such person with the intention of saving him. *QUEEN v. ABDOL JALEEL* .

**W. R. 1864, Cr. 5**

**s. 218—**

*See FALSE EVIDENCE—FABRICATING FALSE EVIDENCE.*

*See FORGERY* .

**I. L. R. 5 All. 553**

**I. L. R. 8 All. 653**

*See POLICE OFFICER* .

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 220—**

*See ARREST—CRIMINAL ARREST.*

**I. L. R. 10 Bom. 506**

*See WRONGFUL CONFINEMENT.*

**9 Bom. 346**

**s. 221—***Village watchman—Chowkidar—Police officer—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 92—N.-W. P. Village and Road Police Act (XVI of 1873), s. 8.* A chowkidar or village watchman is not legally bound as a public servant to apprehend a person accused of committing murder, outside the village of which he is chowkidar, such person not being a proclaimed offender, and not having been found by him in the act of committing such murder; and consequently such chowkidar, if he refuses to apprehend such person on such charge at the instance of a private person, is not punishable under s. 221 of the Penal Code. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. KALLU* .

**I. L. R. 3 All. 60**

**s. 223—**

*See PUBLIC SERVANT* .

**7 W. R. Cr. 99**

*Criminal Procedure Code, s. 54—Escape from lawful custody—Chaukidar.* The police of an adjoining Native State arrested in British territory one Paran Singh suspected of having committed an offence in the the Native State, and made him over to one Debi, a chaukidar, from whose custody he escaped. Held, that neither the original arrest nor the subsequent custody by the chaukidar were lawful, and therefore that the chaukidar could not properly be convicted under s. 223 of the Indian Penal Code. *Empress of India v. Kallu, I. L. R. 3 All. 60, Kalai v. Kalu Chowkidar, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 356, and King-Emperor v. Johri, I. L. R. 23 All. 266, referred to.* *EMPEROR v. DEBI* (1907) .

**I. L. R. 29 All. 377**

**s. 224—**

*See ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY.*

*See SENTENCE—GENERAL CASES.*

**8 W. R. Cr. 65**

*See WARRANT OF ARREST—CRIMINAL CASES* .

**5 C. W. N. 447**

**ss. 224, 225, 226—**

*See ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY.*

*See SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES.*

**3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 14, 15 note**

**s. 225—**

*See JOINDER OF CHARGES.*

**I. L. R. 29 Calc. 385**

*Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 59 and 60—Rescue from lawful custody—Definition.* A private person lawfully arrested a thief in the act of committing theft and made him over to a village chaukidar to be taken to the nearest police station. On the way to the police station three persons seized the chaukidar, and the thief made his escape. Held, that the



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 225—concl'd.**

rescuers were rightly convicted under s. 225 of the Indian Penal Code. The arrest of the chief having been in the first instance lawful, the requirements of s. 39 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were sufficiently complied with by the person arresting sending him to the police station in the custody of the chaukidar. *Queen-Empress v. Potadu*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 33, followed. *King-Emperor v. Johri*, I. L. R., 23 All. 366, referred to. *EMPEROR v. PARSIDDHAN SINGH* (1907) . I. L. R. 29 All. 575

**ss. 225, 353, 379—**

See RESCUE FROM LAWFUL CUSTODY  
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 361

**s. 225B—**

See WARRANT OF ARREST—

CIVIL CASES . 5 C. W. N. 843  
6 C. W. N. 845

CRIMINAL CASES.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 399

1. ——— *Offence under section committed, when a prisoner escapes, while the peon having custody of him is asleep.* A man legally arrested for an offence must submit to be tried and dealt with according to law. A prisoner who escapes after he is arrested and before he is delivered by due course of law, owing to the neglect or consent of the person having him in custody is guilty of an offence under s. 225-B of the Penal Code. *Queen-Empress v. Muppan*, I. L. R. 18 Mad. 401, followed. *PUBLIC PROSECUTOR v. RAMASWAMI KONAN* (1908) . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 271

2. ——— **ss. 225B, 353—Rescue from lawful custody—Legality of warrant—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 82, 174.** An Assistant Collector issued warrants for the arrest of certain witnesses, for whose attendance summonses had been issued, but who had not appeared in obedience thereto. The serving officer had not been able to effect personal service of the summonses, but had affixed copies to the houses of the persons to be served. The Court previous to issuing warrants did not comply with the provisions of s. 82 of the Code of Civil Procedure, though it was apparently of opinion that there had been due service of the summonses. The officers charged with the execution of the warrants arrested one of the witnesses, but they were attacked by N and others, and the man they had arrested was rescued. N was convicted under ss. 225B and 353 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that, even if s. 225B was not applicable, the conviction under s. 353 of the Code was perfectly justified. *EMPEROR v. NARBADESHWAR* (1905) . I. L. R. 27 All. 491

**s. 227—**

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—  
OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN  
ONE DISTRICT—THEFT . 9 Bom. 356

**s. 228—**

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE 4 Mad. 146

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 228—concl'd.**

See CONTEMPT OF COURT—PENAL CODE,  
s. 228.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ss. 480,  
481, 482 (1872, ss. 435, 436).

13 B. L. R. Ap. 40

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—  
POWERS OF MAGISTRATES.

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 131

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT GENERALLY . 10 W. R. Cr. 47

**ss. 230, 231, 239, 241—**

See COUNTERFEITING COIN.

1. ——— **ss. 230, 235 and 243—Definition—Queen's coin—Murshidabad rupees—Practice—Duty of subordinate Courts to follow decisions of superior Courts—Maxim—Stare decisis.** Murshidabad rupees stand on the same footing as Farrukhabad rupees and fall within illustration (e) to s. 230 of the Penal Code, these rupees having been stamped and issued by the authority of the Government of India or at least of the Government of the Presidency, and issued as money under the authority of the Government of India as were Farrukhabad rupees. They are therefore "Queen's coin" within the meaning of the section. *Emperor v. Gopal*, All. Weekly Notes (1903) 115, followed. It is the duty of every subordinate Court, where it finds a decision of the High Court, to which it is subordinate, applicable to a case before it, to follow such decision without question. *EMPEROR v. DENI* (1905) . I. L. R. 28 All. 62

2. ——— **ss. 230, 420—"Coin"—Uttering false coin—Cheating.** Where the offence charged consisted of selling or pawning as genuine gold mohars of the reign of Shahjahan, silver rupees of that reign which had been gilt or in some way covered over with gold, it was held that the offence would be that of cheating and not that of uttering false coin. A gold mohar of the reign of Shahjahan cannot be deemed to be "coin" within the meaning of s. 230 of the Indian Penal Code, as it is not used for the time being as money. *Regina v. Bapu Yadav*, 11 Bom. H. C. 172, followed. *Queen v. Kunj Beharee* 5, N.-W. P. 187, distinguished. *EMPEROR v. KHUSHALI* (1906).

I. L. R. 29 All. 141

**s. 232—**

See COUNTERFEITING COIN.

I. L. R. 23 All. 420

**ss. 232 and 235—Search of premises of suspected coiners—Evidence—Prosecution, duty of, to examine persons present at search.** The fact that the prosecution believed that some persons, who were present at a search had formed an opinion unfavourable to the prosecution story regarding it, is no reason why those persons should not be called by the prosecution, inasmuch as what those persons would be required to state in their depositions was what they observed and not what they thought.



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

— **s. 232—concl'd.**

The prosecution is in duty bound to call the persons, who were present, unless they were of opinion that those persons would misrepresent facts and would misstate what happened. *MUNUI SONAR v. EMPEROR* (1905) . . . **9 C. W. N. 438**

— **s. 240—**

*See* **JOINT TRIAL. I. L. R. 31 Calc. 1007**

— **ss. 240, 243—Same transaction—Previous conviction—Counterfeit coin—Possession, delivery of—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 235, 239, 403.** *C* gave the appellant 50 counterfeit rupees to pass for him. These rupees were stolen and the appellant on the discovery of the theft gave certain information to the police, which led to the discovery of 64 of other counterfeit coins in *C*'s house. *C* was separately tried and convicted under s. 243 of the Penal Code of being in possession of the latter coins. *C* and the appellant were also tried jointly and were convicted; *C* under s. 240 of the Penal Code with reference to the 50 counterfeit rupees he had made over to the appellant and the appellant under s. 243 of the Code of being in possession of the said rupees. On appeal it was contended that *C* could not be tried for an offence under s. 240 after he had been previously convicted of the possession of base coin under s. 243 of the Penal Code, and further that the joint trial was bad in law. *Held*, that the joint trial was valid, that the trial of *C* under s. 240 of the Penal Code was legal, it being for an offence distinct to that for which he had been previously convicted. *EMPEROR v. PRASANNA KUMAR DAS* (1904) **I. L. R. 31 Calc. 1007**

— **s. 241—Right of way, interference with—Order to remove obstruction, legality of—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 522.** *Held* by the Full Bench (*AMEER ALI, J.*, and *BRETT, J.*, dissenting), that a Magistrate, while convicting an accused under ss. 341 of the Penal Code for wrongfully restraining a person by the erection of a hut or by similar act of obstruction, has no jurisdiction to order that the hut or other means of obstruction should be removed. *Debendra Chandra Chowdhury v. Mohini Mohan Chowdhury*, 5 C. W. N. 432, overruled. *Held*, further, by the Full Bench, that whereas in this case criminal force has been used by the accused to the complainant when the latter objected to the obstruction, which interfered with his right of way over a path, and this constituted the offence of wrongful restraint, of which offence the accused had been convicted, an order for the removal of the obstruction could be passed under s. 522 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *MOHINI MOHAN CHOWDHURY v. HARENDRA CHANDRA CHOWDHURY* (1904) . . . **I. L. R. 31 Calc. 691**

— **s. 260—**

*See* **COUNTERFEITING GOVERNMENT STAMP. 2 W. R. Cr. 65**

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

— **ss. 264, 266—**

*See* **WEIGHTS AND MEASURES, FRAUDULENT USE OF . . . 1 Bom. 181**  
**18 W. R. Cr. 7**

— **s. 268—**

*See* **GAMBLING . . . 7 Rom. Cr. 74**  
**7 C. W. N. 710**

*See* **NUISANCE—PUBLIC NUISANCE UNDER PENAL CODE.**

— **Public nuisance.** In order to constitute an offence under s. 268 of the Penal Code it is not necessary that the alleged nuisance should produce smells injurious to health, it is sufficient if they be offensive to the senses. *Rex v. Neil*, 2 C. & P. 485, approved of. To allow a large stack of bones to remain uncovered in the open for a long time so as to become rotten and to emit a smell noxious to people living in or passing by the vicinity is not an act which a bone-mill manager is entitled to do in carrying on his trade in a reasonable way, and by allowing such act to be done he would be guilty of committing a public nuisance. *BERCKEFELD v. EMPEROR* (1906). **I. L. R. 34 Calc. 73**

— **s. 269—**

*See* **CONTRACT ACT, s. 56.**

**I. L. R. 14 Bom. 147**

*See* **PUBLIC HEALTH, OFFENCE AFFECTING.**  
**I. L. R. 7 Mad. 276**  
**I. L. R. 11 Bom. 59**  
**I. L. R. 24 Calc. 494**

1. — **s. 273—Sale of noxious food.** Before a person can be convicted under s. 273 of the Penal Code, it must be shown that the article which he has sold or exposed for sale was, to his knowledge or belief, noxious as food or drink. *EMPEROR v. SHEO LAL* (1904). **I. L. R. 26 All. 387**

2. — **Sale of noxious food—Definition—Sale of grain in bulk in a closed pit.** Where, as a matter of trade, the owner of a grain pit sold the contents of the pit before it was opened at a certain sum per maund whether the grain was good or bad, and on the pit being opened it was found that a large proportion of the grain was unfit for human consumption, it was *held* that the vendor could not be convicted under s. 273 of the Penal Code. *EMPEROR v. SALIG RAM* (1906) **I. L. R. 28 All. 312**

1. — **s. 277—Public spring—Reservoir—Strewing branches in river for fishing purposes.** The words "public spring or reservoir" used in s. 277 of the Penal Code do not include a public river. The strewing of branches in a river for fishing purpose *held*, therefore, to be no offence under that section. *EMPRESS v. HALODHUR POROE.* **I. L. R. 2 Calc. 383**

2. — **Continuous stream in river bed.** The term "public spring" in s. 277



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860) —**  
*contd.***s. 277—concl'd.**

of the Penal Code does not include a continuous stream of water running along the bed of a river. **QUEEN v. TITTI CHOKKAN . I. L. R. 4 Mad. 229**

**1. — s. 279—Rash driving or riding on public way.** The actual driver, and not the owner of a carriage, is liable, under s. 279 of the Penal Code, in case of a collision and injury to another arising out of rash driving. **LARRYMORE v. PERNENDOO DEO RAI . 14 W. R. Cr. 32**

**2. — Rash riding on a public way.** The accused was convicted of rash riding on a public way under s. 279 of the Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860). He contended that his conviction was bad, on the ground that there was no proof that any person was on the road in question at the time when he was alleged to have ridden in a rash or negligent manner. *Held*, that, though there was no such proof, it was competent to the Court to take into its consideration the probability of persons using the public way being placed in danger by the act of the accused. The accused's act came within the mischief struck at by s. 279 of the Penal Code, and was included within its terms. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. HORMUSJI NOWROJI LORD. I. L. R. 19 Bom. 715**

**s. 282—**

*See* CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—SPECIAL CASES—PUBLIC SAFETY, OFFENCE AFFECTING . . . **1 Bom. 137**

**s. 283—**

*See* NUISANCE—PUBLIC NUISANCE UNDER PENAL CODE . **I. L. R. 14 Calc. 656**  
**I. L. R. 20 Calc. 665**  
**I. L. R. 20 Mad. 433**

**1. — Obstructing public way—Failure to prove injury.** The accused were charged generally with obstruction in a public way, no danger, obstruction, or injury being alleged to have been caused to any person, and were summarily convicted. *Held*, that the conviction could not be sustained under s. 283 of the Penal Code. *In the matter of* **EMPRESS v. RAM SINGH. 11 C. L. R. 642**

**2. — Obstructing public road—Spreading fishing-nets by roadside.** To spread fishing nets by the side of a thoroughfare in a town is not, without proof of obstruction caused to any particular person or class of persons, an offence under s. 283 of the Penal Code. **QUEEN v. KHADER MOIDIN . I. L. R. 4 Mad. 235**

**3. — and ss. 268 and 290—Obstruction on tidal navigable river.** Persons placing a bamboo stockade across a tidal navigable river for the purpose of fishing, although leaving in such stockade a narrow opening for the passage of boats, which passage was, however, kept closed except on the actual passage of a boat, were charged at the instance of a sub-divisional officer with causing an obstruction under s. 283 of the

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**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860) —**  
*contd.***s. 283—concl'd.**

Penal Code. *Held*, that, although it was doubtful whether s. 283 applied to the case, they had committed an offence under s. 268 of the Penal Code and were punishable under s. 290 of that Code. *In the matter of the petition of* **UMESH CHANDRA KAR. I. L. R. 14 Calc. 656**

**4. — Obstruction in a public way.** The accused was charged generally with obstructing a public way, no danger, obstruction, or injury being alleged to have been caused to any person, nor was there any clear evidence that the way was a public way. *Held*, that the conviction under s. 283 of the Penal Code could not be sustained. **QUEEN EMPRESS v. BENI MADHAB CHAKRAVARTI. I. L. R. 25 Calc. 275**

**5. — Obstruction causing in a public way—Erection of hut encroaching upon public thoroughfare—Exposing goods for sale by lessee thereof—Lessee, if liable.** Where obstruction was caused to a public way by the erection of a hut and not by the exposing of goods for sale in the said hut by the accused, who had rented it from the person, who had raised the hut:—*Held*, that the accused could not be convicted of an offence under s. 283 of the Penal Code. **NARAIN ADHIKARI v. EMPEROR (1904) . 8 C. W. N. 369**

**s. 285—Injury—Injury to property.** The word "injury" (rashly caused by fire, etc.) in s. 285 of the Penal Code includes any harm illegally caused to the property of any person, and is not confined to injury to the person only. **REG. v. NATHA LALA . 5 Bom. Cr. 67**

**ss. 286, 289—**

*See* NEGLIGENCE . **3 Mad. Ap. 33**  
**19 W. R. Cr. 1**  
**I. L. R. 8 Mad. 421**

**ss. 286 and 337—Definition—Causing hurt by means of a gun—Evidence of negligence.** *Held*, that the causing of hurt by negligence in the use of a gun would fall within the purview of s. 337 rather than of s. 286 of the Penal Code. But where all the evidence against the accused was that he went out shooting in the month of July when people were likely to be about in the fields and that a single pellet from his gun struck a man, who was sitting in a field, it was *held*, that this was not sufficient evidence of rashness or negligence to support a conviction under s. 337 of the Code. **EMPEROR v. ABDUS SATTAR (1906) I. L. R. 28 All. 464**

**s. 289—**

*See* NUISANCE—UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODES . **9 B. L. R. Ap. 36**

**ss. 290, 291—**

*See* NUISANCE—PUBLIC NUISANCE UNDER PENAL CODE.

*See* SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT IN DEFAULT OF FINE.

**5 Bom. Cr. 45**  
**I. L. R. 5 Mad. 157**

13 T



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

— **s. 292**—*Distributing obscene pamphlet*  
*—Definition—Intention.* The test of obscenity, with reference to a charge of distributing obscene literature, is whether the tendency of the matter is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication of this kind may fall. If a publication is detrimental to public morals and calculated to produce a pernicious effect in depraving and debauching the minds of the persons into whose hands it may come, it will be an obscene publication, which it is the intention of the law to suppress. *Empress v. Inderman*, I. L. R. 3 All. 837, *Queen-Empress v. Pareshram Yesvant*, I. L. R. 20 Bom. 193, and *The Queen v. Hicklin*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 300, referred to. The question whether a publication is or is not obscene is a question of fact. If a publication is in fact obscene, it is no defence to a charge of selling or distributing the same that the intention of the person so charged was innocent. *Reg. v. Gathercole*, 2 Lewin C. C. 237, and *The King v. Dixon*, 3 M. & S. 11, referred to. **EMPEROR v. HARI SINGH (1905)** . . . I. L. R. 28 All. 100

— **ss. 292, 293**—  
*See* OBSCENE PUBLICATION.  
 I. L. R. 3 All. 837  
 I. L. R. 20 Bom. 193

— **ss. 292, 294**—  
*See* TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASE—  
 GENERAL CASES I. L. R. 1 Calc. 356

— **s. 294A**—  
*See* CONTRACT—WAGERING CONTRACTS.  
 I. L. R. 22 Mad. 212  
*See* LOTTERY . I. L. R. 10 Bom. 97

— **s. 295**—  
*See* STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF.  
 I. L. R. 17 Calc. 852

— **ss. 295, 296, 297**—  
*See* RELIGION, OFFENCES RELATING TO.

— **s. 296**—  
*See* RELIGION, OFFENCES RELATING TO.  
 I. L. R. 26 Mad. 554

— **s. 297**—  
*See* TRESPASS—GENERAL CASES.  
 I. L. R. 3 Mad. 178

— **s. 298**—  
*See* MISCHIEF . I. L. R. 24 All. 155

— **s. 299**—  
*See* CULPABLE HOMICIDE.  
 11 W. R. Cr. 3  
 I. L. R. 2 All. 522  
 I. L. R. 3 All. 776

— **ss. 299, 300**—  
*See* ATTEMPT TO COMMIT OFFENCE.  
 4 Bom. Cr. 17

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

— **s. 299**—*concl'd.*  
*See* CULPABLE HOMICIDE.  
 I. L. R. 1 Bom. 342

— **s. 300**—  
*See* CHARGE TO JURY—SPECIAL CASES.  
 —CULPABLE HOMICIDE.  
 9 W. R. Cr. 72

*See* CULPABLE HOMICIDE.  
*See* MURDER.

— **ss. 300, 302, 304, 304A**—  
*See* MURDER.

— **s. 302**—  
*See* ATTEMPT TO COMMIT OFFENCE.  
 I. L. R. 15 Bom. 194

*See* INSANITY . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 493  
*See* MURDER.

*See* JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—  
 OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN  
 ONE DISTRICT—ABETMENT.  
 I. L. R. 19 Bom. 105

1. ————— *Murder—Poisoning by dhatura—Intention—Knowledge.* Dhatura was administered with the usual object of facilitating robbery, but in such quantity that the person to whom it was given died in the course of a few hours. *Held*, that the person so administering dhatura was rightly convicted under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code. **EMPEROR v. GUTALI (1908)** . . . I. L. R. 31 All. 148

2. ————— *Murder—Punishment—Motive—Unfounded suspicion as to wife's chastity—Grounds for not passing death sentence.* When an accused person was found to have murdered his wife, under a mistaken impression that she was unchaste to him, the High Court set aside the sentence of death passed upon him and sentenced him to transportation for life. **EMPEROR v. DINA BANDHU MOITRA (1904)**  
 8 C. W. N. 218

3. ————— **ss. 302, 411—Murder—Receiving stolen property—Proof of murder—Evidence.** The accused who was charged with the murder of a boy and with having committed an offence under s. 411 of the Penal Code in respect of certain ornaments which the boy had been wearing at the time of his death, admitted that the boy was at his house immediately before his death and declared that he had fallen from the roof and his respiration had stopped. He also admitted that he had subsequently thrown the body in a tank where it was afterwards found. It was further proved that the accused had produced the ornaments from a hole near the tank. But there was no evidence to prove that the accused had anything to do with the death of the boy and the medical evidence was to the effect that the boy might have been either intentionally or accidentally strangled. *Held*, that there was not sufficient legal evidence that the accused had killed the boy and the accused could only be



**PENAL CODE (ACT XVI OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 302—concl'd.**

found guilty of an offence under s. 411 of the Penal Code. *EMPEROR v. RAJANI KANTO KOER* (1904) 8 C. W. N. 22

4. **ss. 302, 304, 325, 328, and 329**  
*—Administration of dhatura for the purpose of facilitating robbery—Death of person to whom dhatura is so administered—Offence not murder, but causing grievous hurt.* Where, for the purpose of facilitating robbery, dhatura was administered by two persons to certain travellers in consequence of which one of the travellers died and others were made seriously ill, it was held that in respect of the traveller, who died, the offence committed was that punishable under s. 325 of the Penal Code, viz., grievous hurt; and in respect of the travellers, who did not die, the offence committed was that defined by s. 328 of the Code. *Queen-Empress v. Tulsha*, I. L. R. 20 All. 143, not followed. *EMPEROR v. BHAGWAN DIN* (1908) I. L. R. 30 All. 568

**s. 304—**

See CHARGE TO JURY—SPECIAL CASES—  
 CULPABLE HOMICIDE.

6 B. L. R. Ap. 86, 87 note

See CULPABLE HOMICIDE.

See HURT—GRIEVOUS HURT.

6 C. W. N. 98

See JOINDER OF CHARGES.

I. L. R. 2 All. 349

See MURDER.

See ss. 96 to 100, 304.

13 C. W. N. 1180

**ss. 304, 304A.**

See HURT—GRIEVOUS HURT.

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 49

**ss. 304, 325—Assault by three persons armed with lathis—Intention—Culpable homicide—Grievous hurt.** Three persons attacked a fourth with lathis, and one of the assailants struck a blow which fractured the skull of the person attacked and caused his death, but the evidence left it in doubt as to which of the three assailants struck that blow. Held, that the offence of which the three assailants were guilty was grievous hurt rather than culpable homicide not amounting to murder. *Queen-Empress v. Duma Baidya*, I. L. R. 19 Mad. 483, followed. *EMPEROR v. BHOLA SINGH* (1907) I. L. R. 29 All. 282

**304A.**

See CAUSING DEATH BY NEGLIGENCE.

I. L. R. 16 All. 472

See CULPABLE HOMICIDE.

See RAILWAY COLLISION 9 C. W. N. 73

1. **—Rash and negligent act causing death—Railways Act (IX of 1890), s. 101—Breach of general rules endangering safety of travellers—Line clear and caution message system—**

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*—contd.*

**s. 304A—concl'd.**

*Conditional line clear certificate—Collision—Remote cause—Contributory negligence.* The Bengal Nagpur Railway is worked on the line clear and caution message system so that no train can be started from any station without a line clear certificate, which in terms is a copy of a telegram to that effect from the next station. B, an assistant station master at a station G, had in anticipation of receiving such a telegram and against rule (and in order, as he explained, to save time) written out in the prescribed form book a conditional line clear message (which further did not contain all the necessary particulars) to the effect that on the arrival at G of a down train then due from a station S, the line would be clear for a certain up train at G to start for S. The guard of the latter train thereafter without the knowledge of B and also against rules, entered the station master's room in his absence, tore this imperfect certificate from out of the book and without reading it as he ought to have done, signed and passed it on to the driver and gave the signal for the train to start, but without taking the permission of the station master, as the rules required. The driver also without examining the certificate started the train and a collision took place in which several persons, including the driver, were killed. B and the guard were both convicted under s. 304A of the Penal Code and s. 101 of the Railways Act. Held, that B was not liable. The consequences were too remote to have been caused by B's writing out the certificate in disobedience of the rule. *BAL KRISHNA v. EMPEROR* (1904) 8 C. W. N. 645

2.

*Administering poison believing it to be a charm—Rash and negligent act—Liability.* Where the accused received a powder from an enemy of her relative; took no precaution to ascertain whether it was noxious, and mixed it with his food believing that by doing so she would become rich. Held, that the conduct was wanting in that prudence and circumspection which every human being is supposed to exercise, and as by her rash and thoughtless act she caused death she was guilty of an offence under s. 303A, Indian Penal Code. *Emperor v. Nagawa*, 4 Bom. L. R. 425, distinguished. *Q.-E. v. Bhakhan*, P. R. (1887) Cr. J. 60, followed. *EMPEROR v. JAMNA* (1909) I. L. R. 31 All. 290

**ss. 304A, 336—338—**

See DEATH BY RASH OR NEGLIGENT ACT.  
 I. L. R. 36 Calc. 302

**s. 306—**

See ABETMENT

3 N. W. 316

1 Agra Cr. 21

**s. 307—**

See ATTEMPT TO COMMIT OFFENCE.

4 Bom. Cr. 17

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 194

I. L. R. 14 All. 38

I. L. R. 20 All. 143

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**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

- s. 307—*concl'd.*  
See SENTENCE—TRANSPORTATION. 7 W. R. Cr. 41
- s. 309—  
See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT AND FINE. 1 Bom. 4  
See SUICIDE. I. L. R. 8 Mad. 5
- s. 312—  
See MISCARRIAGE. 15 W. R. Cr. 4  
19 W. R. Cr. 32  
I. L. R. 9 Mad. 369
- ss. 314, 317—  
See MURDER. 10 W. R. Cr. 52 ; 59
- s. 317—  
See ABANDONMENT OF CHILDREN.  
16 W. R. Cr. 12  
I. L. R. 18 All. 364  
I. L. R. 24 Mad. 662
- s. 318—  
See CONCEALMENT OF BIRTH.  
4 Mad. Ap. 63
- ss. 319, 338—  
See HURT.
- s. 323—  
See COMPOUNDING OFFENCE.  
10 Bom. 68  
See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 437.  
5 C. W. N. 72  
See CULPABLE HOMICIDE.  
I. L. R. 2 All. 522, 766  
I. L. R. 3 All. 597  
See RIOTING. I. L. R. 26 Calc. 974
- s. 324—  
See CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—SPECIAL CASES—HURT. 4 Mad. Ap. 5  
See SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES.  
7 W. R. Cr. 60  
I. L. R. 6 Calc. 718  
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 349  
I. L. R. 12 Calc. 495  
I. L. R. 16 Calc. 442  
See UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY.  
7 C. W. N. 512
- s. 325—  
See JURY, TRIAL BY.  
I. L. R. 34 Calc. 698  
See WARRANT OF ATTACHMENT.  
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 244
- ss. 325, 326—  
See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—COMMITMENT. I. L. R. 16 Bom. 580  
See RIOTING. I. L. R. 24 Calc. 686

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

- s. 325—*concl'd.*]  
See SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES  
I. L. R. 6 All. 121  
I. L. R. 7 All. 29 ; 414 ; 757  
I. L. R. 9 All. 645  
I. L. R. 16 Calc. 725  
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 260
- s. 326—  
See HURT—GRIEVOUS HURT.  
6 C. W. N. 98  
See ante, s. 149. 13 C. W. N. 827
- s. 328 and s. 81—*Causing unwholesome thing to be taken with intent to injury.* Held, that a person who placed in his toddy-pots juice of the milk-bush, knowing that if taken by a human being it would cause injury, and with the intention of thereby detecting an unknown thief who was in the habit of stealing the toddy from such pots, and which toddy was drunk by, and caused injury to, certain soldiers who purchased it from an unknown vendor, was rightly convicted under s. 328 of the Penal Code, of "causing to be taken an unwholesome thing with intent to injure ;" and that s. 81, which says that "if an act be done without any criminal intention to cause harm," it is not an offence, did not apply to the case. REG. v. DHANIA DAJI. 5 Bom. Cr. 59
- s. 330—  
See ABETMENT. I. L. R. 20 Bom. 394
- s. 332 and ss. 99, 147, and 323—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 55, 56, and 114—Public servant in the execution of his duty as such—Arrest without sufficient authority, but in good faith—Assault on police making arrest—Right of private defence.* A warrant was issued by a Magistrate for the arrest of one D under s. 114 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The warrant was sent to a certain thana to be executed. It was there, after being copied into a book kept for that purpose at the thana, made over to a particular constable for execution. When the constable to whom the warrant had been made over had left the thana, it was discovered that D was in a village other than that in which he had been supposed to be. Thereupon the officer temporarily in charge of the thana made a copy from the book at the thana, endorsed on the back the names of one N and some other constables and having signed the endorsement, sent N and the others out with this paper to arrest D. N and his companions arrested D ; but, as they were returning with him in custody, some of D's friends aided by D himself attacked them, rescued D, and caused hurt to the police. Held, that the police officers concerned in arresting D under the circumstances above described were not acting in the lawful discharge of their duty within the meaning of s. 332 of the Penal Code, so as to render the accused liable to conviction under that section ; but, inasmuch as they were acting in good faith under the colour of their office, s. 99 of the Penal Code applied, and D and his associates



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—***—contd.***s. 332—*concl'd.***

might be properly convicted under ss. 147 and 323 of the Code. The words "in the discharge of his duty as such public servant" in the earlier portion of s. 332 of the Penal Code mean in the discharge of a duty imposed by law on such public servant in the particular case, and do not cover an act done by him in good faith under colour of his office. *Queen v. Roxburgh*, 12 Cox. C. C. 8, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. DALIP* . I. L. R. 18 All. 246

**ss. 332, 333—**

See SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES.  
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 105

**s. 336—**

See CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—SPECIAL CASES—PUBLIC SAFETY, OFFENCE AFFECTING . . . 1 Bom. 137

See RASH AND NEGLIGENT ACT.  
5 C. W. N. 376

**ss. 336, 337, 338—**

See CULPABLE HOMICIDE.  
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 764

See *ante*, s. 304 A. . 13 C. W. N. 362

**ss. 339 to 342—**

See WRONGFUL RESTRAINT.  
10 W. R. Cr. 20 ; 35  
24 W. R. Cr. 51  
I. L. R. 12 Bom. 377  
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 885  
4 C. W. N. 49

**ss. 339, 340, 342, 346—**

See WRONGFUL CONFINEMENT.  
I. L. R. 9 Calc. 221  
I. L. R. 13 Bom. 376  
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 72

**s. 342—**

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 437.  
5 C. W. N. 72

See WRONGFUL CONFINEMENT.  
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 95  
I. L. R. 30 Mad. 179

**s. 344—**

See SENTENCE—FINE . . . 1 Bom. 39

See UNLAWFUL COMPUSSION.  
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 572

**s. 347—**

See EXTORTION . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 710

**s. 350—**

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 522.  
5 C. W. N. 250

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—DISPOSSESSION BY CRIMINAL FORCE . I. L. R. 25 All. 341

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—***contd.***s. 351—**

See THUMB IMPRESSIONS.  
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 97  
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 550

**s. 352—**

See ASSAULT ON PUBLIC SERVANT.  
I. L. R. 9 Bom. 558  
6 C. W. N. 202

See COMPLAINT—WITHDRAWAL OF COMPLAINT AND OBLIGATION OF MAGISTRATE TO HEAR IT . I. L. R. 5 Mad. 378

See HURT—CAUSING HURT.  
7 B. L. R. Ap. 25

See SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES.  
I. L. R. 12 Mad. 36

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT IN DEFAULT OF FINE.  
16 W. R. Cr. 42

See UNLAWFUL COMPUSSION.  
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 572

**s. 353—**

See ASSAULT ON PUBLIC SERVANT.  
13 W. R. Cr. 49  
I. L. R. 9 Bom. 558  
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 630  
3 C. W. N. 627  
6 C. W. N. 202

See BENGAL EXCISE ACT, 1878, s. 4.  
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 324

See POLICE ACT (V OF 1861), ss. 17, 19.  
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 411

See SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES.  
3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 14, 15 note  
14 W. R. Cr. 19  
I. L. R. 12 Calc. 495  
3 C. W. N. 174

See SUMMARY TRIAL . 23 W. R. Cr. 3

See THUMB IMPRESSIONS.  
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 97

See UNITED PROVINCES LAND REVENUE ACT (III OF 1901), ss. 147, 227, 228.  
I. L. R. 29 All. 272

See UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY 7 N. W. 209

See WARRANT OF ARREST—  
CIVIL CASES . 5 C. W. N. 843  
CRIMINAL CASES 5 C. W. N. 447  
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 399

**s. 353—***Using Criminal force to deter a public servant—Entry by police on premises of suspected person at night—Assault on police.* A police constable, at midnight, entered upon the premises of a person, who was regarded by the police as a suspicious character, and knocked at his door to ascertain if he was there, whereupon he came out and abused and pushed the constable and lifted a stick as if he were about to hit the constable



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.***s. 353—concl'd.**

with it. On a complaint being preferred under s. 353 of using criminal force to deter a public servant in the execution of his duty :—*Held*, that the offence had not been committed. The constable was not engaged in the execution of his duty as a public servant and was technically guilty of house trespass, and his action was calculated to cause annoyance to the inmates of the house, and was insulting to the accused, who was justified in causing the slight harm which he had inflicted on the constable. The latter could not be regarded, under s. 99, as acting in good faith under colour of his office, as his action was not authorised by any police circular or order. *DORASAMY PILLAI v. EMPEROR* (1904)

**I. L. R. 27 Mad. 52**

**s. 354—**

*See RAPE* . . . **I. L. R. 5 Bom. 403**

**ss. 361 and 363—Kidnapping—**  
*Motive—Punishment.* For a conviction under s. 363, Indian Penal Code, it was sufficient to prove that the minor was taken away from the custody of a lawful guardian without his consent. Motive had nothing to say to the offence of kidnapping though it might have much to say to the punishment. Consent given by the guardian after the commission of the offence would not cure it. *EMPEROR v. GANESH* (1909)

**I. L. R. 31 All. 448**

**ss. 361, 363, 366, 368—**

*See KIDNAPPING.*

*See KIDNAPPING FROM LAWFUL GUARDIANSHIP* . . . **9 C. W. N. 444**

**ss. 363, 366, 498—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 227, 228, 199, 238, 537—Charge—Addition of a charge—Irregularity—**  
**—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 363, 366, 498.**  
The accused was tried on charges under ss. 363 (kidnapping from lawful guardianship) and 366 (kidnapping a woman) of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860). At the conclusion of the evidence to establish those charges and after the evidence for the defence had been recorded, the Court added a charge under s. 498 (enticing a married woman) of the Code notwithstanding the objection by the accused's counsel. The trial ended in conviction of the accused on all the three charges. The accused appealed contending that the procedure adopted was contrary to the provisions of s. 199 of the Criminal Procedure Code and to the spirit of s. 238 of the Code. *Held*, (i) that the procedure adopted in the case was not regular. The additional charge framed at the stage it was framed, notwithstanding the objection by the accused's counsel, was prejudicial to the accused; (ii) that the conviction under s. 498 of the Indian Penal Code should be set aside and further investigation be made into the remaining charges. *EMPEROR v. ISAF MAHOMED* (1906)

**I. L. R. 31 Bom. 218**

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.***ss. 365, 366—**

*See CHARGE TO JURY—SPECIAL CASES—*  
**KIDNAPPING . . . I. L. R. 14 All. 25**

*See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 238.*  
**I. L. R. 20 Calc. 483**  
**I. L. R. 22 Calc. 1006**

**ss. 366, 368—**

*See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—*  
**OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN**  
**ONE DISTRICT—KIDNAPPING.**  
**I. L. R. 18 All. 350**

**s. 369**

*See SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES.*  
**7 Mad. 375**

**s. 370—**

*See SLAVERY—CRIMINAL CASES.*

**s. 372—**

*See JOINDER OF CHARGES.*

**I. L. R. 12 Mad. 273**

1. **Selling or hiring minor for purpose of prostitution.** To constitute an offence under s. 372 of the Penal Code, it is not necessary that there should have been a disposal tantamount to a transfer of possession or control over the minor's person. *REG. v. ARUNACHELLAM*  
**I. L. R. 1 Mad. 164**

2. **Disposing of and receiving girls for purpose of prostitution.** The prisoners were convicted, the one of disposing of, and the other of receiving, two children, females under the age of sixteen years, with intent that such females should be used for the purposes of prostitution. The evidence showed that the children were disposed of and registered as dancing girls of a pagoda for the purpose of being brought up as dancing girls. *Held*, that offences under ss. 372 and 373 of the Penal Code had been committed, and that the prisoners were properly convicted. *Ex parte PADMAVATI* . . . **5 Mad. 415**

3. **Dedication of minor girl to service of temple.—Disposal for purposes of prostitution.** *Held*, that the dedication of a minor girl under the age of sixteen years to the service of a Hindu temple, by the performance of a religious ceremony, where it was shown that it was almost invariably the case that girls so dedicated led a life of prostitution, was a disposing of such minor knowing it to be likely that she would be used for the purpose of prostitution within the meaning of s. 372 of the Penal Code. *REG. v. JAILI BHAVIN*  
**6 Bom. Cr. 60**

4. **Illegal disposal of minor.—Dedication of dancing-girl to temple.** A dancing-woman of a temple applied to the manager of the temple for the appointment of a minor girl, whom she falsely described as her daughter, to her kothu miras; the manager ordered that the girl be placed on the pay abstract like other dancing-girls,



PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—  
contd.

## s. 372—contd.

and she was employed about the temple, though the ceremony of tying the bottu (after which the girl could not be married) did not take place. *Held*, that the above facts constituted *prima facie* evidence that an offence under Penal Code, s. 372, had been committed by the dancing-woman, the manager abovenamed, and the parents of the girl. *SRINIVASA v. ANNASAMI* . I. L. R. 15 Mad. 41

5. ————— *Disposal of a minor—Dedication of a girl in a temple.* The accused dedicated his minor daughter as a Basivi by a form of marriage with an idol. It appeared that a Basivi is incapable of contracting a lawful marriage, and ordinarily practises promiscuous intercourse with men, and that her sons succeed to her father's property. *Held*, the accused had committed an offence under Penal Code, s. 372. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BASAVA* . I. L. R. 15 Mad. 75

6. ————— *Illegal disposal of a minor—Dedication of girl to temple as dancing-girl—Revision.* A dancing-woman (fourth accused) of a temple applied to the manager (first accused) of the temple for the appointment of a girl under the age of sixteen, whom she had adopted as her daughter, to her kothu mirasi office, to which duties more or less connected with the preparation of provisions of the temple were attached. The manager, before whom the girl had sung and danced, ordered that she be placed on the pay abstract like other dancing-girls, and she was employed in the abovementioned duties about the temple for about five months. It appeared that the dancing-women of the temple lived partly at least by prostitution, and there was evidence that the girl sang and danced in the temple, received wages and wore a bottu (an emblem of marriage). The Magistrate upon these facts refused to frame a charge against the manager of the temple and the adoptive mother of the minor under the Penal Code, s. 372. *Held per COLLINS, C. J.* (PARKAR, J., dissenting), that the Magistrate should have framed a charge. On a petition under the Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 435, 439, preferred by the complainant, who was a dismissed servant of the temple, after the prosecution had been pending for two years, it appeared that the girl had suffered no harm. *Held*, that, whether or not the Magistrate should have framed a charge, the High Court was not bound to send the case for re-trial. *SRINIVASA v. ANNASAMI* . I. L. R. 15 Mad. 323

7. ————— *Minor, illegal disposal of—Dedication of a minor to the service of a temple with the knowledge that she was likely to be used for immoral purposes—Dancing-girls.* The accused dedicated his minor daughter, five or six years of age, to the service of a temple as a dancing-girl. The evidence showed that dancing-girls attached to a temple, as a rule, led immoral lives. *Held*, that these facts were sufficient to constitute an offence under s. 372 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. TIPPA* . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 737

PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—  
contd.

## s. 372—contd.

8. ————— and s. 373—*Obtaining possession of minor for purpose of prostitution.* The prisoner was tried upon a charge of having obtained possession of Dowlat Bee, a minor aged ten years, with intent that she should be used for an unlawful and immoral purpose,—that is to say, for the purpose of illicit intercourse,—and having thereby committed an offence under s. 373 of the Penal Code. The evidence showed that the prisoner met Dowlat Bee, a girl, eleven years old, in a street at Triplicane, and promised to give her a pice if she would accompany him into an uninhabited house close by and allow him to have sexual intercourse with her. The girl went willingly with the prisoner, and both were detected in the act having sexual intercourse. The girl had gone out without permission, had not attained the age of puberty, and the evidence tended to show that the girl had not before had sexual connexion. The jury convicted the prisoner. *Held*, by the High Court, that the case proved against the prisoner did not make out the offence charged. *QUEEN v. SHAIK ALI* 5 Mad. 473

9. ————— *Obtaining a minor for prostitution—Dancing-girl caste—Adoption.* A woman, being a member of the dancing-girl caste, obtained possession of a minor girl and employed her for the purpose of prostitution; she subsequently obtained in adoption another minor girl from her parents, who belonged to the same caste. She and the parents of the second girl were charged together under ss. 372, 373 of the Penal Code. The charges related to both girls. *Held*, that ss. 372, 373 of the Penal Code may be applicable in a case where the minor concerned is a member of the dancing-girl caste. *Per MUTTUSAMI AYYAR, J.*—It would be no offence if the intention was that the girl should be brought up as a daughter, and that, when she attains her age, she should be allowed to select either to marry or follow the profession of her prostitute mother. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAMANNA* . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 273

10. ————— *Letting to hire a girl under sixteen for immoral purpose for one occasion—Prostitution for a course of life—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 273.* A young prostitute under 16 years of age was brought to a house of assignation by the accused at the request of the complainant and for his supposed use on that one occasion, it not being contemplated that the girl should be sold or let out for a period of employment, or for the purpose of being employed by the complainant as a prostitute, or for the purpose of being disposed of by him for that course of life. *Held*, that such a letting out by the accused was not within the meaning of s. 372 of the Penal Code, which on the authorities contemplates a case of letting or hiring or other similar transaction by which the possession of a girl is obtained with the intention of employing her habitually for the purpose of indiscriminate sexual intercourse. *Dowlat Bee v. Shaik*



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 372—*contd.***

*Ali, 5 Mad. 473, followed. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SUKEE RAUR . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 97*

**11. ————** *Obtaining possession and disposing of minor for purposes of prostitution.* *S*, a married Mahomedan girl under sixteen, while living with *N*, her grandmother, and in the absence of her husband, formed an adulterous intrigue with two Hindus with the knowledge of *N*. *S* and *N* were then induced by the Hindus to remove to another village, that *S* might take up the trade of a prostitute; they there met *J*, a public woman, with whom they went to reside, and who introduced visitors to *S*, and received the money paid by them in exchange for the board and food supplied to *S* and *N*. *N* was convicted, under s. 372, Penal Code, of disposing of a minor for the purpose of prostitution, and *J* was convicted under s. 373, Penal Code, of obtaining possession of a minor for the purpose of prostitution. *Held per JACKSON, J.*, that on the facts proved no offence was committed under the Penal Code. *Per GLOVER, J.*—*N* and *J* were both guilty under ss. 372 and 373, respectively, and their appeals should be dismissed. *QUEEN v. NOURJAN*

**6 B. L. R. Ap. 34: 14 W. R. Cr. 39**

**11. ————** *Buying or selling minor for the purpose of prostitution, etc.* Certain persons, falsely representing that a minor girl of a low caste was a member of a higher caste, induced a member of such higher caste to take her in marriage and to pay money for her in the full belief that such representation was true. *Held per STUART, C.J.*, that such persons could not be convicted on these facts of offences under ss. 372 and 373 of the Penal Code. *Per OLDFIELD, J.*, and *STRAIGHT, J.*, that if such girl was disposed of for the purpose of marriage, it could not be said, because the marriage might be invalid under Hindu law, that such persons acted with the intention that she should be employed or used for the purposes of prostitution or for any unlawful and immoral purpose, or that they knew it to be likely that she would be employed or used for such purpose, and consequently they could not be convicted of an offence under those sections. *Per PARSON, J.*, and *SPANKIE, J.*, that such girl having been disposed of for the purpose of marriage although the marriage might be objectionable under Hindu law, it did not appear that it was wholly invalid, and therefore such intent or knowledge could not certainly be presumed, and such persons could not be convicted of offences under those sections. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. SRI LAL I. L. R. 2 All. 694*

**13. ————** *Abetment—Disposing of a minor for immoral purposes—Offence committed out for British India.* A minor girl under the age of sixteen years was taken by accused No. 1, under the direction of accused No. 2, from Sholapur to Tuljapur (in the Nizam's territory), and there dedicated to the goddess Amba, with intent or knowing it to be likely that the minor would be used

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 372—*concltd.***

for purposes of prostitution. The District Magistrate of Sholapur convicted accused No. 1 of an offence under s. 372 and accused No. 2 of abetment of the offence under ss. 372 and 108A of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced them each to six months' rigorous imprisonment. *Held*, that there was no offence committed in British India, and therefore the accused No. 2 was not guilty of abetment, and s. 108A of the Penal Code had no application to the present case. Mere intention not followed by any act cannot constitute any offence, and an indirect preparation which does not amount to an act which amounts to a commencement of the offence does not constitute either a principal offence or an attempt or abetment of the same. The intention of either of the accused while they were staying at Sholapur did not constitute any offence, and their removal with the girl to Tuljapur did not by itself constitute an abetment. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BAKU. I. L. R. 24 Bom. 287*

**s. 373—**

*See CHEATING BY PERSONATION.*

**7 W. R. Cr. 55**

*See HINDU LAW—CUSTOM—ADOPTION.*

**I. L. R. 19 Mad. 127**

**I. L. R. 21 Mad. 229**

**1. ————** *Obtaining minor for purpose of prostitution—Soliciting a girl to sexual intercourse.* S. 373 of the Penal Code is not applicable to a case where a man solicits a girl to have sexual intercourse with him and having no other intention or purpose in view. *QUEEN v. BHUTIA*

**7 N. W. 295**

**2. ————** *Obtaining possession of minor for purposes of prostitution—Offence defined by above section explained.* To constitute the offence provided for by s. 373 of the Penal Code, it is necessary, first, that a minor under sixteen years of age shall be bought, hired, or otherwise obtained possession of, and, secondly, that the minor shall be bought, hired, or otherwise obtained possession of, with the intent that the same minor, while still under the age of sixteen years, will be employed for the purposes of prostitution, or with the knowledge that it is likely that the said minor, while still under the age of sixteen years will be employed or used for an unlawful and immoral purpose. The offence is complete so soon as the obtaining possession, with the requisite intention or knowledge, of the minor is accomplished, though the minor may not enter upon prostitution until years after she has attained maturity, or may never enter upon such a profession at all. *Deputy Legal Remembrancer v. Karuna Baistobi, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 164, approved. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. CHANDA. I. L. R. 18 All. 24*

**3. ————** *and s. 372—Buying minor for purpose of prostitution—Intention, proof of—Onus of proving guilty intention in case of sale of minor for purpose of prostitution—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 106.* In order to constitute an offence



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 373—*contd.***

under s. 373 of the Penal Code, it is not necessary that the intention or knowledge of likelihood as to the employment of the minor for purposes of prostitution should be with reference to employment either immediate or at some definite and not very remote future period; but an offence under the section is complete as soon as a girl is purchased with the guilty intention or knowledge of likelihood that she will, while still a minor under the age of sixteen years, be employed for that purpose, although the point of time for such employment may be remote by reason of her physical incapacity for the purpose. *H.* the father of two girls, twins about a year old, sold one of them to *K.* a prostitute, for R9, and within ten days of such sale also sold her the other for R14. *K.* was shown to have previously purchased another child whom she had brought up from her infancy, and who was then living with her and leading the life of a prostitute. Both *H.* and *K.* made confessions as to the guilty knowledge and intention with which the sale of the two children was made. *K.*'s confession was made within two hours after her arrest, and immediately thereafter she was committed to *hajat* for seven days. On the seventh day, on being brought up for trial before the Deputy Magistrate, she retracted her confession and assigned an innocent reason for her purchase of the girl. *H.* and *K.* were tried jointly, *H.* being charged with an offence under s. 372, *viz.*, selling the girls for the purpose of prostitution, and *K.* with an offence under s. 373, *viz.*, buying for the same purpose. Neither was charged with abetting the other. The two confessions were used as evidence, and there was other evidence tending to prove the intention and guilty knowledge. The Deputy Magistrate convicted each of the offence with which they were charged. On appeal the Sessions Judge acquitted *K.* on the ground that the offence under s. 373 could not be committed unless the intention was that the minor was to be used for the purpose of prostitution at some definite future time, and that it would be carrying the law too far to hold that the intention had reference to a period some twelve or fourteen years after the purchase when the minor became capable of being used for that purpose. *Held*, for the reason above stated, that the acquittal on that ground was erroneous. *Held*, further, that having regard to the circumstances under which the confession of *K.* was given and retracted, it was open to suspicion, and could not safely be acted upon, and that the confession made by *H.* was not legally admissible against her, as they were not being tried jointly for the same offence. *Held*, also, that, having regard to the provisions of s. 106, ill. (a) of the Evidence Act, and to the fact that there was evidence apart from the confessions, which tended to show the knowledge and intention which the character and circumstances of the act suggested, the onus lay on *K.* to show that the intention was other than that which the act suggested, or that the employment of the girls as prostitutes was

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 373—*concl'd.***

not intended till after they had attained the age of sixteen years, and that as she had failed to show this, and the evidence all tended the other way, the acquittal was erroneous, and must be reversed. **DEPUTY LEGAL REMEMBRANCER v. KARUNA BAISTOBI** . . . **I. L. R. 22 Calc. 164**

**4.** . . . . . *Obtaining a girl under the age of 16 for purposes of prostitution—Evidence of intent.* In a charge against a dancing-girl under s. 373 of the Indian Penal Code for having purchased a young girl with intent that she would be used for the purpose of prostitution or knowing it to be likely that she would be so used, evidence was given of the fact of purchase for a consideration, and that numerous other dancing-girls residing in the neighbourhood were in the habit of obtaining girls and bringing them up as dancing-girls or prostitutes, and that there were no instances of girls brought up by dancing-girls ever having been married. On its being contended that there was no evidence of intent to support a conviction under s. 373 of the Indian Penal Code:—*Held*, that there was evidence before the Court to support the conviction. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PAPA SANI**  
**I. L. R. 23 Mad. 159**

**s. 374—**

*See UNLAWFUL COMPULSION.*

**I. L. R. 19 Calc. 572**

**s. 375—**

*See RAPE* . . . **I. L. R. 5 Bom. 403**

**s. 376—**

*See ADULTERY* . . **I. L. R. 29 Calc. 415**

*See SENTENCE—TRANSPORTATION.*

**1 B. L. R. A. Cr. 5**

**s. 377—**

*See UNNATURAL OFFENCE.*

**I. L. R. 6 All. 204**

**s. 378—**

*See PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY.*

**13 B. L. R. F. B. 307, 308 note, 310 note**

*See POST OFFICE ACT, 1866, s. 48.*

**I. L. R. 14 Mad. 229**

*Theft—Charge of stealing chanks—Shell-fish taken from beds in sea—Fæ naturæ—“ Possession ” of complainants—Subject of theft.* “ Chanks ” (popularly included among shell-fish, but really large molluscs) are found buried in beds of sand or in the sandy crevices of coral reefs in Palk's Bay, a large bay landlocked by British dominions for eight-ninths of its circumference and containing numerous islands, which form part of the districts, to which they are adjacent on the shores of India and Ceylon. It was shown by evidence that this bay (as well as parts of the adjacent Gulf of Mannar) had been effectively occupied for centuries by the inhabitants of India and Ceylon, respectively; that the “ chanks ” found therein had for centuries



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.***s. 378—concl'd.**

been the monopoly of the rulers of the country, both in India and Ceylon, and that licenses to gather them had been granted by the sovereign; and that "chank royalty" was one of the heads of revenue on which permanent assessment of an adjacent zamindari was fixed in 1802. Petitioner, who had leased from the Rajah of Ramnad "the chank beds" five miles off the coast of his zamindari, charged the counter-petitioners with having committed the offence of theft of "chanks" from these beds. On the defence being raised that "chanks" were fish, and were *feræ nature* and that those in question had been taken from beds in the open sea and had therefore not been taken from the possession of the complainant and could not be the subject of theft:—*Held*, that the "chanks" in question were capable of being the subject of theft. *ANNAKUMARU PILLAI v. MUTHUPAYAL* (1904)

**I. L. R. 27 Mad. 551****ss. 378 to 381—***See THEFT.***s. 379—**

*See CHARGE—ALTERATION OR AMENDMENT OF CHARGE* . **I. L. R. 17 Bom. 369**  
**I. L. R. 27 Calc. 660, 990**

*See THEFT.*

1. *Theft—Dishonestly quarrying and removing stones from land in possession of another.* Stones, when quarried and carried away, are "things severed from the earth" (within the meaning of s. 378, explanation 1, of the Penal Code) and are "moveable property" (within the meaning of s. 22) and as such are capable of being the subject of theft. A person, who quarries and carries away stones from land in the possession of another, commits theft. *Queen-Empress v. Kottayya*, **I. L. R. 10 Mad. 255**, dissented from. *VENKATAPPAYYA SASTRI v. MADULA VENKANNA* (1904) . **I. L. R. 27 Mad. 531**

2. *Theft—Claim of title—Bonâ fides—Jurisdiction of Criminal Court—Servant, act committed by, at master's bidding—Guilty knowledge, proof of—High Court—Jurisdiction in revision—Finding of fact of lower Court, interference with.* Although, as a rule, the findings of fact of the lower tribunal are accepted by the High Court in revision cases, there are exceptions. One must be careful to see that the criminal law is not put in motion with a view to assistance in the prosecution of a civil claim. The Criminal Courts should not convict of theft any person, who asserts a claim of right, unless it is in a position to say that that claim is a mere pretence. A servant should not be held guilty of the offence of theft, when what he did was at his master's bidding, unless it should have been shown that he participated in his master's knowledge of the dishonest nature of the acts. There must be some evidence before the Court from which such knowledge on the part of the servant

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.***s. 379—concl'd.**

can be inferred. *HARI BHUMALI v. EMPEROR* (1905) . **9 C. W. N. 974**

3. *Theft—Dishonest taking—Bonâ fide claim of ownership by accused over property in possession of third party—Disputed ownership of land—Possession summarily taken by Revenue authorities—Province of Civil Courts to decide question of ownership between Government and private persons.* The petitioner was convicted of theft of certain bamboos, which he said he cut on his own patta land, but which the prosecution alleged he cut on Government poramboke land adjacent to his own. Prior to his conviction, disputes had arisen between the Revenue authorities and the petitioner regarding the ownership of the land. The petitioner contended that he *bonâ fide* believed the bamboos to be his property at the time he cut and removed them. The Magistrate, finding that the Revenue authorities had taken possession of the land at the time the bamboos were removed, convicted the petitioner. *Held*, that the conviction was wrong. The questions to be considered were, (i) whether the bamboos did in fact belong to the petitioner or to Government; (ii) whether, if they did not belong to the petitioner, he *bonâ fide* believed they did. It is the province of the Civil Courts to decide questions of ownership of land between Government and private parties, and if the Revenue authorities take summary possession of land as in the present case, they become mere trespassers and there is nothing dishonest in the owner taking possession of his own property. *ALGARASAWMI TEVAN v. EMPEROR* (1905)

**I. L. R. 28 Mad. 304****ss. 379, 380—**

*See SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES.*  
**3 W. R. Cr. 19**

**1 Bom. 87****9 Bom. 172****I. L. R. 1 Bom. 214****I. L. R. 10 All. 146****ss. 379, 405—***See THEFT* . **I. L. R. 36 Calc. 758****ss. 379, 430—***See THEFT* . **I. L. R. 35 Calc. 437****s. 380—**

*See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—SENTENCES* . **B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 488**

*See SENTENCE—FINE* . **16 W. R. Cr. 17****ss. 383 to 387—***See EXTORTION.***s. 390—***See ROBBERY* . **5 C. W. N. 372****s. 391—***See RIOTING* . **I. L. R. 15 All. 22**



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

ss. 392, 411—*Criminal Procedure Code, s. 181—Jurisdiction—Robbery committed outside British India—Stolen property brought into British territory.* Two persons, Baldewa, who was not a British subject, and Radhua, who was, were committed to the Court of Session at Jhansi it being alleged against them that they had committed a robbery in an adjoining Native State and had brought the stolen property into British territory. *Held*, that though neither could be tried by the Sessions Judge of Jhansi for the robbery, Baldewa, because he was not a British subject, and Radhua, because the certificate required by s. 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was wanting, yet both might be tried for the offence of retaining stolen property under s. 411 of the Penal Code. *King Emperor v. Johri, I. L. R. 23 All. 266*, distinguished. *Queen-Empress v. Abdul Latib, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 186*, followed. *EMPEROR v. BALDEWA (1906)*  
**I. L. R. 28 All. 372**

## s. 394—

See SENTENCE—TRANSPORTATION.  
**7 W. R. Cr. 41**

## ss. 395, 398—

See CHARGE—ALTERATION OR AMENDMENT OF CHARGE.  
**I. L. R. 17 Bom. 369**

See CHARGE TO JURY—SPECIAL CASES—DACOITY . **I. L. R. 25 Calc. 711**  
**2 C. W. N. 369**

## ss. 395 to 397, 402—

See DACOITY.

s. 397—*Dacoity with use of deadly weapons—Applicability of section.* *Held*, that s. 397 of the Penal Code applies only to the actual person or persons who at the time of committing robbery or dacoity may use any deadly weapon, or may cause grievous hurt to any person, or may attempt to cause death or grievous hurt to any person. *Queen-Empress v. Senta, All. Weekly Notes (1899) 186*, followed. *Queen-Empress v. Mahabir Tewari, I. L. R. 21 All. 263*, referred to. *EMPEROR v. NAGESHWAR (1906)*  
**I. L. R. 28 All. 404**

s. 400—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1895), s. 423 (2)—When verdict of jury can be interfered with—Evidence necessary to prove offence under s. 400, Indian Penal Code—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 54.* The Court will not, on appeal, interfere with the verdict of a jury, under s. 423 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code unless it is satisfied that the verdict is erroneous, and that such error was caused by a misdirection by the Judge or misunderstanding on the part of the jury of the law as laid down by him. In a case under s. 400, Indian Penal Code, the prosecution is bound to prove that the accused belonged to a gang, which was consciously associated for the purpose of habitually committing dacoity. The associating and the purpose of the association may be proved by direct evidence or by proof of facts from which

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*s. 400—*concl.*

they can be reasonably inferred. Evidence of the commission of other offences than dacoity is only evidence of bad character and is inadmissible under s. 54 of the Evidence Act. Evidence that the accused or groups of them had been concerned in a large number of dacoities in a comparatively short space of time may be sufficient evidence of such association. *PUBLIC PROSECUTOR v. BONIGIRI POTTIGADU (1908)* . **I. L. R. 32 Mad. 179**

## s. 401—

See CHARGE TO JURY—SPECIAL CASES—BELONGING TO GANG OF THIEVES.  
**6 Mad. 120**  
**I. L. R. 27 Calc. 139**

See THEFT . **I. L. R. 27 Calc. 139**  
**4 C. W. N. 97**

## s. 403—

See CRIMINAL MISAPPROPRIATION.  
**6 C. W. N. 34**

See POST OFFICE ACT, s. 48.  
**I. L. R. 14 Mad. 229**

See STOLEN PROPERTY—OFFENCES RELATING TO . **I. L. R. 11 Mad. 145**

## See THEFT.

**I. L. R. 15 Calc. 388, 390 note, 392 note**  
**I. L. R. 22 Mad. 151**  
**I. L. R. 17 Calc. 852**

## ss. 403 to 409—

See CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST.

See CRIMINAL MISAPPROPRIATION.

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN ONE DISTRICT—CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST . **I. L. R. 13 Bom. 147**

## ss. 404, 405 to 408—

See COMPOUNDING OFFENCE.  
**7 Mad. Ap. 34**  
**6 C. L. R. 392**  
**I. L. R. 1 Mad. 191**

## s. 405—

See COURT OF WARDS . **5 C. W. N. 248**

See CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST.  
**6 C. W. N. 203**

See PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY.  
**13 B. L. R. 307, 308 note, 310 note**

1. *Criminal breach of trust—Definition.* A clerk in a record-room made over a document forming part of a record in his custody to a person, who was entitled to the document, but who would otherwise have had to present an application on stamped paper in order to secure its return in a legal manner. *Held*, that the clerk was under the above circumstances rightly convicted under s. 409 of the offence of criminal



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.***s. 405—concl'd.**

breach of trust by a public servant. *EMPEROR v. GANGA PRASAD* (1905) . I. L. R. 27 All. 260

2. *Criminal breach of trust—"Property"—Cancelled cheques.* A cancelled cheque falls within the meaning of the term "property" as used in s. 405 of the Penal Code, even if it is worth no more than the value of the paper upon which it is written. In the matter of a conviction for criminal breach of trust the question of the value of the property in respect of which the breach of trust is committed is, except so far as s. 95 of the Code is concerned, quite immaterial. *EMPEROR v. MAULA BAKHSH* (1905) . I. L. R. 27 All. 28

**s. 406—**

See CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 362

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1108

See JOINDER OF CHARGES.

I. L. R. 24 All. 254

**s. 408—**

See CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—SPECIAL CASES—CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 193

See CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST.

8 C. W. N. 203

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 489

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN ONE DISTRICT—CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST . I. L. R. 19 All. 111

**s. 409—**

See BANKERS . I. L. R. 16 All. 88

See CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—SPECIAL CASES—CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST AND MISAPPROPRIATION.

I. L. R. 17 All. 153

I. L. R. 18 All. 116

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 193

2 C. W. N. 341

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 27 All. 69

See VERDICT OF JURY—POWER TO INTERFERE WITH VERDICTS.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 749

**ss. 409 to 414—**

See STOLEN PROPERTY—OFFENCES RELATING TO.

**s. 411—**

See CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—SPECIAL CASES—STOLEN PROPERTY . 1 Bom. 95

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)**  
*contd.***s. 411—concl'd.**

See CHARGE TO JURY—SPECIAL CASES—STOLEN PROPERTY.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 369

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 467

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 104

See JOINDER OF CHARGES.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 387

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—COMMITMENT TO SESSIONS COURT.

I. L. R. 11 All. 393

See STOLEN PROPERTY, OFFENCES RELATING TO . I. L. R. 23 All. 266

*Possession of stolen property—Joint Hindu family—Liability of head of the family or managing member.* Stolen property consisting of a considerable quantity of cloth, weighing about five maunds, was discovered on search by the police in a locked room in a house belonging to, and inhabited by, a joint Hindu family composed of a father, son and grandson. The son was found to be the managing member of the family, and the key of the room in which the stolen property was found was produced by him. The circumstances were such that it was very improbable that the cloth could possibly have been placed where it was found without the connivance of some or all of the members of the family. *Held*, that under the above circumstances the conviction of the managing member of the family under s. 411 of the Indian Penal Code was a proper conviction. *Queen-Empress v. Sangam Lal*, I. L. R. 15 All. 129, referred to. *EMPEROR v. BUDH LAL* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 598

**s. 411, 414—**

See SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES.

4 Mad Ap. 14

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 393

**s. 414—**

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 104

**s. 415—**

See CHEATING .

9 C. W. N. 941

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 50

1. *Deception—False representation—Conduct.* To constitute the offence of cheating under s. 415 of the Penal Code, it is not necessary that the deception should be by express words, but it may be by conduct, or implied in the nature of the transaction itself. *Queen v. Sheodurshun Dass*, 3 All. H. C. 17, referred to. *KHODA BUX v. BAKHEYA MUNDARY* (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 941

s.c. 9 C. W. N. 1006

2. *Cheating—Definition—Sale of immoveable property without mentioning incumbrances.* The vendor of immoveable property cannot be convicted of cheating because he omits to



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.***s. 415—concl'd.**

mention that there is an incumbrance on the property, unless it is shown either that he was asked by the vendee whether the property was incumbered and said it was not, or that he sold the property on the representation that it was unincumbered. *Horsfall v. Thomas*, 3 I. L. J. Ex. 322, referred to. **EMPEROR v. BISHAN DASS** (1905)

**I. L. R. 27 All. 561****ss. 415, 416, 417, 419—***See* CHEATING BY PERSONATION.**ss. 415, 417, 419, 420—***See* CHEATING.**ss. 415, 417, 511—Attempt to cheat—**

*Coolie recruiting—Attempt under s. 511.* The accused, a coolie recruiter, induced the complainant to come to a coolie depôt and promising him domestic service entered his name in the books of the depôt and wrote a letter to a coolie contractor in Calcutta offering the complainant as a coolie; on the same day the accused persuaded the complainant to go to the railway station to fetch a parcel and there the accused bought a railway ticket for Calcutta for the complainant and tried to get him to enter the train, but the complainant refused to go. The object of the accused was to get the complainant to go to Calcutta that he might be sent from there to Assam as a tea garden coolie. *Held*, that the acts of the accused amounted to an attempt to cheat and therefore the conviction under ss. 417 and 511 of the Penal Code was right. **KISHORI LAL CHATTERJI v. EMPEROR** (1905) . . . . . **9 C. W. N. 764**

**ss. 415, 419—Cheating by personation—Personation—Minors.**

On an application by the *kurta* of a joint Hindu family, in his representative character, to withdraw certain surplus sale-proceeds standing to their credit in the Treasury, the Collector directed him either to file a power of attorney or to cause all the other members to appear and admit his authority to sign on their behalf. They all appeared in person before the sheristadar, except two minors, who were personated by other persons, and signed receipts for the money and caused the personators to sign in the names of the minors. Thereupon the Collector, after inspecting the signatures, issued a bill in their favour for the amount due, which they withdrew. *Held*, that, upon the facts, the offence of cheating was not made out. *Reg. v. Longhurst*, unreported. *In re Loothy Bewa*, 11 W. R. Cr. 24, referred to. **BABURAM RAI v. EMPEROR** (1905)

**I. L. R. 32 Calc. 775****s.c. 9 C. W. N. 807****ss. 415, 419, 420—***See* FORGERY . . . **I. L. R. 19 Calc. 380**  
**I. L. R. 13 Mad. 27****PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.***ss. 416, 419—***See* FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERAL CASES.**1 Bom. 89****s. 417—***See* BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT, 1884, s. 133.**I. L. R. 22 Calc. 131***See* CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—FORGERY . . . **I. L. R. 30 Calc. 822***See* CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST.**4 Bom. Cr. 16***See* CRIMINAL MISAPPROPRIATION.**3 W. R. Cr. 32***See* FORGERY . . **I. L. R. 25 Mad. 726****ss. 417, 420—Cheating—Definition—**

*Pre-emption—Failure to disclose existence of mortgage subsequent to purchase.* The vendee defendant in a suit for pre-emption compromised the suit, the plaintiff agreeing to pay a certain sum in cash and to discharge certain incumbrances on the property in suit. It was subsequently discovered that the vendee had, after his purchase but before suit, mortgaged the property, which was the subject of the suit for pre-emption. *Held*, that the vendee could not, on account merely of his omission to disclose the existence of this subsequent mortgage, be held guilty of the offence of cheating. **GENDAN LAL v. ABDUL AZIZ KHAN** (1905).

**I. L. R. 27 All. 382****s. 419—***See* FALSE PERSONATION.**s. 420—***See* CHARGE, ADDITION TO OR ALTERATION OF . . . **9 C. W. N. 22***See* MISCHIEF . . **I. L. R. 24 All. 155**

*Addition to or alteration of subject-matter of indictment—Cheating—Property—Money—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 226, 227.* The Sessions Court is not a Court of original jurisdiction, and though vested with large powers for amending and adding to charges can only do so with reference to the immediate subject of the prosecution and committal, and not with regard to matter not covered by the indictment. The accused was put upon his trial before the Sessions Court on charges under ss. 471 and 471½ of the Penal Code. Upon motion to the High Court it was held that a previous acquittal covered the charge under s. 471, and that the accused could be tried only under s. 471½. When the case came to trial the Sessions Judge amended the charge to one under s. 471½:—*Held*, that the Judge had full power under the law to amend the charge, and that the High Court did not "intend to fetter his discretion." The word "property" in s. 420 of the Penal Code includes money. **BIRENDRA LAL BHADURI v. EMPEROR** (1904)

**I. L. R. 32 Calc. 22****s.c. 8 C. W. N. 784**



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

1. s. 422—*Compromise of debt.* Where *A* entered into an agreement with *B* not to compromise a case with *C* because he had assigned the benefit of the suit to *B* as a security for the due payment of some monthly instalment of money, and *A* notwithstanding did afterwards compromise the suit with *C*, it was held that *A* could not be convicted under s. 422 of the Penal Code, unless the compromise with *C* was made dishonestly or fraudulently towards *B*. *In the matter of the petition of NOBIN CHUNDER MUDDUCK*. 22 W. R. Cr. 46

2. Mortgage—*Dishonestly or fraudulently preventing debt being available for creditors—Debt—Attempt—Application to withdraw money paid into Court—Penal Code, ss. 422 and 511.* The petitioners mortgaged their property, and under the terms of the agreement certain persons were appointed managers of the estate under certain conditions in regard to payment of the money realised by them. In execution of a decree obtained by the managers in a suit brought in the names of the petitioners, a certain *patni talukh* was sold for R3,000. The debtor settled with the petitioners that, on payment of R1,000, the sale was to be set aside. The money was paid into Court, and an application was made by the petitioners for the withdrawal of this money. The Court, however, made no order on this application. The petitioners were convicted of an attempt to commit an offence under s. 422 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that, having regard to the relation between the petitioners and their managers, at whose instance the proceedings were taken, it could not properly be said that an attempt to commit an offence under s. 422 of the Penal Code was made. Also, that the interference of the petitioners and their application to obtain the money paid into Court might have been breaches of their contract with the mortgagees, but such conduct could not necessarily be regarded as dishonest or fraudulent so as to render them liable to punishment. Their attempt to get this money was more to put an end to the management than to prevent the money from being available for payment of their debt under the mortgage. *Nobin Chunder Mud-duck*, 22 W. R. Cr. 46, referred to. *HARA KUMARI CHOWDHURANI v. SAVI* (1900)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 314 : s.c. 5 C. W. N. 174

s. 423—

See FALSE STATEMENT.

I. L. R. 25 All. 31

s. 424—

See CRIMINAL MISAPPROPRIATION.

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 151

See PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY.

13 B. L. R. 307, 308 note, 310 note

See THEFT . I. L. R. 22 Mad. 151

1. Dishonest removal of property to avoid distraint—*Distraint for arrears of rent under the Rent Recovery Act—Absence of presumption in favour of its legality—Onus of proof on prosecution to prove legality—Conviction in*

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

s. 424—*concl'd.*

*absence of such proof—Illegality.* Where a distraint is made under the Rent Recovery Act for arrears of rent there is no presumption that it is legally made; and, if persons are charged with having dishonestly removed property to avoid it, the prosecution must prove that it was a legal distraint. In the absence of such proof, persons who have resisted the distraint or have removed their property to avoid it, cannot be convicted of an offence, inasmuch as they had a right of private defence of their property unless the distraint was legal. *KING-EMPEROR v. GOPALASAMY* (1902) . I. L. R. 25 Mad. 729

2. Dishonest removal by tenants of crops—*Raiyats holding on varam tenure—Crops in possession of raiyats—No taking out of possession—Offence.* If raiyats holding land on varam tenure remove crops for the purpose of protecting them from injury or damage owing to delay or refusal on the part of the zamindar to perform his part in the harvesting or division, such a removal would not be dishonest, within the meaning of s. 424 of the Indian Penal Code. But, where it is proved that the crops have been removed dishonestly, or fraudulently, an offence is committed under s. 424, even though the zamindar, under the terms of the tenancy, acquires no property in the share due to him until the raiyats have delivered it to him. *SUBUDHI RANTHO v. BALARAMA PUDI* (1902) . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 481

3. Illegal attachment—*Fraudulent concealment of property.* The legality or formality of the mode of attachment allowed by a Civil Court is not a matter for a Deputy Magistrate's consideration. Where a Deputy Magistrate, considering that the attachment of a carriage in execution of a decree of a Civil Court was illegal, because it was placed in the custody of the judgment-debtor's husband, and that the husband had acted fraudulently in removing and concealing the wheels and axles of the carriage on its subsequent distraint for arrears of municipal tax, convicted him of an offence under s. 424 of the Penal Code, the conviction was set aside. *QUEEN v. BROJO KISHORE DUTT*

8 W. R. Cr. 17

s. 425—

See THEFT . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 852

ss. 425, 426—*Mischief—(N.-W. P. and Oudh Municipalities Act (I of 1900), s. 167.* Certain cattle belonging to one *M H* upon various occasions when in charge of a servant of *M H* strayed, or were driven, into the Government gardens at Saharanpur and there caused damage. *Held*, that *M H* could not on these facts be convicted of the offence of mischief. *Forbes v. Grish Chunder Bhattacharjee*, 14 W. R. 31, and *Empress v. Bai Baya*, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 126, followed. *Held*, also, that s. 167 of the Municipalities Act, 1900, did not apply, that section being one dealing with offences against the person. *King*



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 425—concl<sup>d</sup>.**

*Emperor v. Patan Din, All. Weekly Notes (1905)*  
19, followed. *EMPEROR v. MEHDI HASAN (1907)*  
**I. L. R. 29 All. 565**

**ss. 425 to 430—**

See MISCHIEF.

*Mischief by injury to works of irrigation—Cutting up a dam put up across a river—Diminution of supply of water for agricultural purposes—Wrongful loss or damage—Intention—Act done to save property, if an offence. Where the accused cut a dam erected by the complainant, not to take a supply of water but to save their own crops and it was not proved that the act of the accused caused a diminution of the supply of water for agricultural purposes or that the accused knew that it was likely to cause such diminution in future:—Held, that the accused could not be convicted of an offence under s. 430 of the Penal Code. NAFAR CHANDRA BHATTACHARJEE v. HELALUDDIN MONDOL (1904)* . . . . .  
**8 C. W. N. 370**

**s. 426—**

See MISCHIEF.

See OFFENCE RELATING TO DOCUMENTS.

**I. L. R. 12 Mad. 54**

See SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES.

**I. L. R. 12 Mad. 36**

See THEFT.

**I. L. R. 15 Calc. 388, 390 note, 392 note, 402**

*Mischief—Definition—Fishery—Draining off water from river to the detriment of the fishing rights therein. D, as lessee of Government, held rights of fishery in a particular stretch of river C, by diverting the water of that river, converted the bed of the river for a considerable distance into dry land, or land with a very shallow covering of water upon it, and by so doing he was enabled to destroy, and did destroy, very large quantities of fish both mature and immature. Held, that when C deliberately changed the course and condition of the river in the manner described to the detriment of D, he was guilty of the offence of mischief mentioned in s. 426 of the Penal Code. Bhagiram Dome v. Abar Dome, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 388, distinguished. EMPEROR v. CHANDA (1905)* . . . . .  
**I. L. R. 28 All. 204**

**s. 429—"Bull" and "Cow," Definitions of—"Any other animal," meaning of.** The words "bull" and "cow" in s. 429 of the Penal Code, include the young of those animals. The section specifies the more valuable of the domestic animals, without any regard to age, but in respect of other kinds of animals not so specified, the section would not apply unless the particular animal in question was shown to be of the value of fifty rupees or upwards. *HARI MANDLE v. JAFAR*  
**I. L. R. 22 Calc. 457**

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 434—**

See LANDMARK. **I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1084**

*Boundary marks fixed by authority of public servant—Definition—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 145. A Magistrate making an order under s. 145 has no authority to cause the property, which is the subject of a dispute likely to occasion a breach of the peace, to be demarcated by boundary pillars, and consequently, if he does so, a person destroying or removing such boundary pillars is not liable to conviction under s. 434 of the Penal Code. EMPEROR v. RAMESHAR (1905)*  
**I. L. R. 27 All. 300**

**1. s. 441—Criminal trespass—Intent—Dispossession of tenant under a false pretext.** When a zamindar, under the pretext that one of his tenants had left the village and abandoned his holding took possession of the tenant's holding wrongfully, it was held that in the absence of evidence of one of the objects specified in s. 441 of the Penal Code, the zamindar could not properly be convicted of criminal trespass, his intention apparently being merely to get possession of the land. *King-Emperor v. Nandon, All. Weekly Notes (1902)* 42, distinguished. *EMPEROR v. JANGI SINGH (1904)*  
**I. L. R. 26 All. 194**

**2. Criminal trespass—Definition—Occupation by zamindars of house left by deceased tenant.** A tenant of village S, who owned a house there, but was temporarily residing in a neighbouring village, died and on his death the zamindars of S took possession of the house in S, adversely to the tenant's widow, alleging that they were entitled to it. Held, that the action of the zamindars could not be taken as amounting to criminal trespass within the meaning of s. 441 of the Penal Code. *Emperor v. Jangi Singh, I. L. R. 28 All. 194*, referred to. *EMPEROR v. BAZID (1905)*  
**I. L. R. 27 All. 298**

**ss. 441, 448—**

See CRIMINAL TRESPASS.

**I. L. R. 26 Bom. 558**

**ss. 441, 442, 443, 447, 448, 451, 456, 457—**

See CRIMINAL TRESPASS.

**s. 442—**

See PRISONS ACT, s. 45.

**I. L. R. 2 All. 301**

See THEFT . . . . .

**16 W. R. Cr. 63**

**ss. 442, 452, 456, 457—**

See TRESPASS—HOUSE TRESPASS.

**6 N. W. 301; 307**

**I. L. R. 2 All. 301**

**12 W. R. Cr. 33**

**I. L. R. 2 Mad. 30**



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

— s. 447—

*See* CRIMINAL TRESPASS.

*See* THEFT.

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 388, 390 note,  
392 note, 402

— s. 451—

*See* CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—SPECIAL  
CASES—HOUSE TRESPASS.

16 W. R. Cr. 63

— s. 454—

*See* SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES.

3 W. R. Cr. 19

I. L. R. 10 All. 146

— s. 456—*Lurking house-trespass by night—Intention—Burden of proof.* The accused was found inside the house of the complainant at midnight, and his presence was discovered by the wife of the complainant crying out that a thief was taking away her *hansli*. The evidence of the complainant clearly showed that the accused was not there with the consent, or at the invitation, or for the pleasure, of the complainant. *Held*, that the accused was properly convicted under s. 456 of the Indian Penal Code, it being for him to show that his intention was under the circumstances innocent. *Brij Basi v. The Queen-Emperor*, I. L. R. 19 All. 74, distinguished. *Balmakund Ram v. Ghanasamram*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 391, followed. *EMPEROR v. ISHRI* (1906) . I. L. R. 29 All. 46

— ss. 456, 457—

*See* REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—SENTENCES . B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 488

— s. 457—

*See* BENCH OF MAGISTRATES.

23 W. R. Cr. 6

*See* CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODES, ss.  
436, 438 (1872, s. 296).

I. L. R. 1 All. 413

2 B. L. R. S. N. 2

7 C. L. R. 168

*See* CRIMINAL TRESPASS.

I. L. R. 23 All. 82

*See* SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES.

1 Bom. 87

5 W. R. Cr. 49

6 W. R. Cr. 49, 92

8 W. R. Cr. 31

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 214

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 493

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 36

*See* SENTENCE—SENTENCE AFTER PRE-  
VICUS CONVICTION.

I. L. R. 3 All. 773

I. L. R. 17 All. 120

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

— ss. 458, 459—

*See* MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—  
SPECIAL ACTS—PENAL CODE.

1 W. R. Cr. 34

9 W. R. Cr. 5

— ss. 459, 460—

*See* HURT—GRIEVOUS HURT.

I. L. R. 8 All. 649

— ss. 463, 464, 471.

*See* FORGERY.

1. — ss. 464, 465, 415, 417, 511—  
*Forgery—Intention to cause it to be believed that document was made at a time at which it was not made—Proof of.* On 25th of Jaista a bill was presented to the accused in his shop by B, a servant of H, for payment of money due by the accused to H. On the bill was printed a stipulation that any payment on account of the bill, unless endorsed on its back, would not be admitted. The prosecution alleged that the accused took the bill from B and (in the presence of B and several other persons) wrote on its back the endorsement, 17th Jaista through B, R501, whereupon B snatched the bill away from the accused and asked for payment of the amount thus entered on the bill, to which the accused answered "go away, I have paid." Upon these allegations the accused was convicted on charges of forgery and attempt to cheat. The defence was that R501 had in fact been paid to B on the 17th Jaista and had accordingly been entered in the books of the accused (which were produced) on 17th Jaista, but that the payment had not been endorsed on the bill on 17th Jaista as B had not brought the bill with him on that date, that the bill was endorsed by the accused in the manner mentioned on 25th Jaista and that B took it away without protest or altercation of any kind. *Held*, on the facts generally that there was no evidence to go to the jury in respect of either of the charges. *Held*, as to the charge of forgery, that the circumstances of the case did not justify an inference that the endorsement was made by the accused with the intention of causing it to be believed that it was made on the 17th and not on 25th of Jaista when in fact, it was made. *Held*, as to the charge of attempting to cheat, that the bill having been snatched away from the accused before he had given any indication of what he meant to do with it, the acts of the accused did not constitute an attempt to cheat, supposing that it was cheating that the accused intended and was prepared to commit. *Railway v. Cheeseman*, L. & C. 112, 145, referred to. *Quære*: Whether the case was one which could be brought within the definition of cheating in s. 415, Penal Code. An attempt to deceive by a false representation of fact involves that the person charged should have taken some steps towards the communication of the representation to the person whom it was his intention to deceive. *EMPEROR v. IMAM ALI SIRCAR* (1904)  
8 C. W. N. 278.



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

2. — ss. 464 and 467—*No false document where executant simply sets up a false claim but has no intention of causing belief that document was executed by another.* *A*, who was not the son, natural or adopted, of the deceased *B*, executed a deed of mortgage of certain properties of *B* in favour of *C*. In the body of the document *A* was described as the son of *B*, though no such description appeared in the signature. *A* was known to *C* for a long time and *A* had no intention of causing it to be believed that the document was executed by any other person than himself. *Held, per MUNRO and ABDUR RAHIM, JJ.*, that *A* was not guilty of making a false document within the meaning of s. 464, Indian Penal Code. The assertion of a false claim in a document will not constitute the document false, when it is executed by the party who purports to execute it and there is no intention of causing a belief that it was executed by some other person, real or fictitious. *Per PINHEY, J.*—The document was a 'false document' as it contained a false description. *A* wanted to cause it to be believed that such a person as the son of *B* existed and his intention was to defraud the real heir, i.e., the widow of *B*. *A* had thus committed the offence of 'forgery' within section 467, Indian Penal Code. *ADAIKALAMMAI v. RAMAN (1908)* . . . **I. L. R. 32 Mad. 90**

s. 465—*Forgery—Definition—Fraudulently.* One Piari, the wife of Amir, left her husband's house. Amir put in a petition at the police station asking that a search might be made for the missing woman, and he also employed a pleader, one Ali Zohad, to assist him in discovering the whereabouts of Piari. Ali Hasan, the son of Ali Zohad, and a clerk employed in the office of the District Superintendent of Police, forged two orders purporting to be orders of the District Superintendent of Police, the first intimating that the woman Piari was with one Sibni, the wife of Ghisu weaver, and that the Sub-Inspector should be directed to hand her over to the petitioner (Amir), and the second directing the Sub-Inspector of Kydganj to hand the woman over to the petitioner. *Held*, that in fabricating these two documents, Ali Hasan had acted fraudulently and had committed the offence punishable under s. 465 of the Penal Code. *Queen-Empress v. Soshi Bhushan, I. L. R. 15 All. 210. Queen-Empress v. Abbas Ali, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 512, and Kotamraju Venkatarayadu v. Emperor, I. L. R. 28 Mad. 90, referred to. EMPEROR v. ALI HASHAN (1906)* **I. L. R. 28 All. 358**

ss. 465, 471—*Forgery and using as genuine a forged document.* In order to obtain admission to the Matriculation Examination of the Madras University as a private candidate, *V* was required to produce to the Registrar a certificate signed by the headmaster of a recognized high school that he was of good character and had attained his twentieth year. *V* fabricated the headmaster's signature to such a certificate and forwarded it to

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

s. 465—*concl'd.*

the Registrar. *Held* (SUBRAHMANIA AYYAR and DAVIES, JJ. dissenting), that *V* was guilty of forgery. *Per SIR ARNOLD WHITE, C.J.*—The offence of forgery is complete if a document, false in fact, is made with intent to commit a fraud, although it may not have been made with any one of the other intents specified in s. 463. It was not necessary having regard to the wording of s. 24 that the accused should have intended to cause both wrongful gain to himself and wrongful loss to the University. Both intentions, however, were present in this case. Moreover, the false document had been made with intent to support a "claim or title" within the meaning of those words as used in s. 463. A claim to be admitted to a University examination is a claim within the meaning of s. 463. It was more clearly so in the present case as the accused had a "claim" to be exempted from the production of an attendance certificate, upon satisfying certain conditions precedent. An intended deprivation of property is not an essential element of an intention to defraud. *Per BENSON, J.* Those decisions, which proceed on the ground that an act is not fraudulent, unless it causes or is intended to cause loss or injury to some one, would seem to take too narrow a view of the meaning of the word "fraudulently" as used in the Code. The act of the accused was fraudulent not merely by reason of the advantage, which he intended to secure for himself by means of his deceit, but also by reason of the injury, which must necessarily result to the University, and through it to the public, from such acts, if unrepressed. *Per SUBRAHMANIA AYYAR.*—The document was not made fraudulently within the meaning of ss. 464 and 463 of the Code. Deprivation of property, actual or intended, does not constitute an essential element in regard to offences falling under ss. 465 and 471 of the Penal Code; but the deception must involve some loss or risk of loss to an individual or to the public. It is not enough to show that the deception was intended to secure an advantage to the deceiver. *Per DAVIES, J.*—It had not been shown that the accused in making the document had either the intention necessary to constitute it a false document within the meaning of s. 464. A mere intention to deceive does not necessarily imply an intention to defraud or to cause wrongful loss to one person or wrongful gain to another. A person to be defrauded must suffer some harm or damage or injury and there was no evidence that the Registrar, as representing the University, had suffered in any of these respects. The University had been deprived of nothing and, on the other hand, had profited by the application by the accused. Moreover, the intention of the accused was to subject himself to examination, which could not be deemed a thing of value. If he failed, it ended in nothing. If he passed, he became entitled to a certificate not in consequence of the false writing, but on his own merits. *KOTAMRAJU VENKATRAYADU v. EMPEROR (1905)* . . . **I. L. R. 28 Mad. 90**



PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—  
*contd.*

ss. 465, 471, 477A—

*See* FORGERY . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 955

s. 466—

*See* CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—FALSE  
EVIDENCE AND PERJURY.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 434

*See* FORGERY . I. L. R. 23 All. 84

s. 466—*Registration—Divorce—Mahomedan marriage—Evidence.* Where one X by personating P before the Mahomedan Registrar of Marriages, obtained the registration of P's divorce from his wife, and the appellant identified X as P before the Registrar. *Held*, that the appellant was not guilty of an offence under s. 199 of the Penal Code inasmuch as the Registrar was not bound or authorized by law to receive his statement in evidence, but whether he was guilty of an offence under s. 471 of the Penal Code would depend chiefly on whether he knew that X was not P or had no knowledge whether he was P or not. *Held*, that the Judge had fairly put the evidence on this point to the jury. *YASIN SHEIKH (AKONDA) v. EMPEROR (1905)* . . . . . 9 C. W. N. 69

ss. 466 and 471—*Definition—Using as genuine a forged document—Copies of a forged original.* Where a person, knowing or having reason to believe that the entries in certain village khasras were forged, took copies of those khasras and used them as evidence in his favour in a civil suit, it was *held* that he might be properly convicted of fraudulently or dishonestly using as genuine the khasras which he knew or had reason to be forged, and punished under s. 471 read with s. 466 of the Penal Code. *EMPEROR v. MULAI SINGH (1906)*

I. L. R. 28 All. 402

s. 467—

*See* ATTEMPT TO COMMIT OFFENCE.

I. L. R. 16 All. 409

*See* CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—FORGERY . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 822*See* FORGERY . 5 C. W. N. 897  
6 C. W. N. 382*See* LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT, CL. 26.  
3 Bom. Cr. 20*See* SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—WHERE  
SANCTION IS NECESSARY OR OTHERWISE.

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 36

s. 468—

*See* FORGERY . I. L. R. 25 Mad. 726

s. 471—

*See* CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—FALSE  
EVIDENCE AND PERJURY.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 434

*See* FORGERY . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 822  
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 820

11 C. W. N. 838

PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—  
*contd.*s. 471—*concl'd.**See* FORGERY . 5 C. W. N. 897  
I. L. R. 23 All. 84

*Using as genuine a forged document.* The offence imputed against an accused, who, in a civil suit, is alleged to have used as genuine a document which he knew to be a forged document, is one cognizable under s. 471 of the Penal Code. Such accused should therefore be charged under that section, and not under s. 196 of the Code. *EMPRESS v. KHERODE CHUNDER MOZOOMDAR*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 717 : 6 C. L. R. 118

s. 473—

*See* FORGERY . 2 W. R. Cr. 5  
13 W. R. Cr. 16

s. 474—

*See* FORGERY . 6 C. W. N. 392

*Possession of forged document—Intention.* It is not sufficient for a conviction under s. 474 of the Penal Code to say that the prisoner might possibly have used an altered document. The guilty intent must be proved, not inferred. *QUEEN v. LOKENATH SHAHA* . . . . . W. R. 1864, Cr. 12

ss. 474, 475—

*See* CHARGE TO JURY—SPECIAL CASES—  
POSSESSION OF FORGED DOCUMENT.

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 165

1. s. 475—*Possession of papers bearing counterfeit marks or devises—Charge under s. 475, how to be framed—Misdirection—Evidence.* During the course of a police investigation into a complaint of theft, the house of the accused was searched and a bundle of papers, about 58 in number, were found, which were alleged to be forgeries or preparations for forgeries. The accused was thereupon committed to the Court of Session on a charge under s. 475 of the Penal Code. A few days before the trial of the accused, the police searched the house of one S, who was a witness for the defence, and there discovered a batch of suspicious papers which were produced at the trial, and put in as evidence against the accused. The accused was convicted of the offence under s. 475 of the Penal Code and sentenced to transportation for life. *Held*, reversing the conviction and sentence, that the suspicious papers found in S's house were not admissible in evidence against the accused. *Held*, further, that the Judge's direction to the jury regarding those papers, that they established a connection between the accused and many of the witnesses belonging to the same faction, and that they showed the extent to which the practice of forgery had gone in the village, and that in this way they were relevant to the question of guilty knowledge and intention, was a misdirection which prejudiced the accused. In the trial of an accused person on a charge under



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*concl.***s. 475—concl.**

s. 475 of the Penal Code, the charge should be so framed as to specify distinctly that part of the section which is applicable to the case, and should distinctly specify the particular papers bearing a counterfeit mark or device which the accused was alleged to have had in his possession with the intent mentioned in the section. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ABAJI RAMCHANDRA* . I. L. R. 15 Bom. 189

2. **and s. 467—Counterfeiting device or mark.** In order to a conviction under s. 475 of the Penal Code, the document which the accused has in his possession must have some counterfeit device or mark upon it, and it must be proved that the accused has the document in his possession with the intent of using such device or mark for the purpose of giving the appearance of authenticity to the document. The document must be of the nature mentioned in s. 467 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN v. RUGHONUNDUN PUTTRONVEES* 15 W. R. Cr. 19

**ss. 477, 477A—**

See OFFENCE RELATING TO DOCUMENTS.

**s. 477A—**

See CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—SPECIAL CASES—FALSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS. I. L. R. 26 Calc. 560

See FALSIFICATION OF ACCOUNTS.

**I. L. R. 35 Calc. 450**

**ss. 478, 480—Offence of using false trade mark—No acquisition of the trade mark in the sense used in the English Act necessary under s. 478 of the Penal Code—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 227, 233, 234—Joinder of more than three offences in one trial illegal—Trial not validated by striking out charge to cure such defect after case closed, though before judgment.** A person selling soap not manufactured by P in a box which bears the name of P as a soap manufacturer, uses a false trade mark and is guilty of an offence under s. 480 of the Penal Code. It is not necessary to constitute an offence under s. 478 that a trade mark in the sense in which the word is used in the English Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Acts should have been acquired; and a mark is none the less a false mark because it appeared on the box and not on the goods. Under ss. 233, 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a person cannot be charged with more than three offences at one trial and the defect cannot be cured after the accused had pleaded and the case had closed, by amending the charges so as to reduce it to three offences. Although the words in s. 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are wide enough to warrant a Court in altering a charge by striking out one of the charges at any time before judgment, the section does not warrant the striking out of a charge for the purpose of curing an illegality already committed, and after the mischief, which the Legislature intended to guard against, had been done. *Subrahmania Ayyar v. King*

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*concl.***s. 478—concl.**

*Emperor, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 61*, referred to and explained. *MANAVALA CHETTY v. EMPEROR* (1906) I. L. R. 29 Mad. 569

**ss. 478, 482—**

See TRADE MARK . I. L. R. 26 Bom. 289

**s. 482—**

See MERCHANDISE MARKS ACT (IV OF 1889) . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 512

See TRADE MARK I. L. R. 22 Mad. 488

**ss. 482, 486—**

See TRADE MARK . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 411  
9 C. W. N. 43: 969  
11 C. W. N. 887

1. **False trade mark; using—Property in mark, proof of—Bonâ fides—Onus.** The complainants, the Holland Bombay Trading Company, used for years past to import from Holland white shirtings bearing the mark *H. B. T. C.* 4000, a label with the design of one lion and a snake and an oval stamp containing written in it the words: Sole Importers, Holland Bombay Trading Company, Limited, and a buff heading. The accused had in their possession for purposes of sale some packages of white shirtings bearing the mark *H. P. F. C.* 4000, a label with two lions and two snakes and an oval stamp containing written on it: Sole Importers, Holland Export Company and a buff heading. The letters *H. B. T. C.* in the complainants' and *H. B. F. C.* in the accused's marks were printed in similar types and were similar in size and colour. The colour and size of the labels, as also the colour, size and type of the oval stamps in both were similar. *Held* (where it was proved that complainants had a property in their mark), that the accused had used a false trade mark and were liable to conviction under ss. 482, 486 of the Penal Code. Under s. 486 of Penal Code the onus is not on the complainant to show that the accused acted dishonestly, but on the accused to bring himself within the exception to that section. *HOLLAND, BOMBAY TRADING COMPANY v. BUKTEAR MULL* (1904)

**8 C. W. N. 421**

2. **Selling goods marked with a counterfeit trade mark—Penal Code, as amended by the Merchandise Marks Act (Act IV of 1889 as amended by Act IX of 1891), ss. 6 and 7—Applying a false trade description to goods.** *Held*, that a person may to some extent appropriate to his own use a name suggested by his trade, without infringing the law relating to trade marks or trade descriptions. *Held*, also, that the appellants, who sold fish-hooks in boxes similar to the respondents with a design of one fish with its head and tail turned up, cannot be held to have infringed the trade mark of the respondents, who also sold fish-hooks with the design of two fish crossed, with their heads and tails turned up. *Held*, where the public



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 482—concl'd.**

has chosen a name for its own use such as "mach marka" (fish mark), that fact cannot be held to prevent other persons from applying a mark to fish-hooks, which may be generally known by the same term. *EMPEROR v. BAKAULLAH MALLIK* (1904)

**I. L. R. 31 Calc. 411**

**s. 486—**

*See* MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—PENAL CODE, s. 486.

**I. L. R. 25 Calc. 639**

*See* TRADE MARK.

**s. 489C—**

*See* JOINDER OF CHARGES.

**I. L. R. 29 Calc. 387**

**s. 490—**

*See* CRIMINAL BREACH OF CONTRACT.

**6 W. R. Cr. 80**

**9 W. R. Cr. 12**

**Ch. XX (ss. 493 to 498)—**

*See* ADULTERY . **7 C. W. N. 143**

**s. 494—**

*See* ABETMENT . **I. L. R. 4 Calc. 10**

*See* BIGAMY.

**ss. 494, 495—**

*See* BIGAMY.

**s. 496—False marriage.** Proof of dishonest or fraudulent intent is necessary for a conviction, under s. 496 of the Penal Code, of falsely going through the ceremony of marriage. *QUEEN v. KUDUM* . **W. R. 1864, Cr. 13**

**s. 497—**

*See* ADULTERY.

*See* MAINTENANCE, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO . **I. L. R. 17 Mad. 260**

**s. 498—**

*See* ADULTERY . **7 C. W. N. 143**

*See* COMPLAINT—INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT, AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARY.

**I. L. R. 25 Ali. 209**

*See* CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODES, s. 238.

**I. L. R. 20 Calc. 483**

**1. Enticing away married woman—Enticing or taking away wife temporarily living alone.** Enticing or taking away, with a criminal intent, a wife living in her husband's house, or in a house hired by him for her occupation and at his expense, during his temporary absence, is punishable under s. 498 of the Penal Code, provided the seducer knew, or had reason to know, that she was the wife of the man from

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 498—cont'd.**

whose house he took her. *MUTTY KHAN v. MUNGLOO* . **5 W. R. Cr. 50**

**2. Enticing away married woman—Presumption of marriage—Onus probandi.** In a charge under s. 498 of the Penal Code, the proof that the woman and man other than the accused were living together is sufficient to throw the burthen of proof on the accused that they were not man and wife. *QUEEN v. WAZIRA*

**8 B. L. R. Ap. 63 : 17 W. R. Cr. 5**

**3. Enticing away wife—Proof of marriage.** S and G having been convicted of enticing away the wife of the complainant, the conviction was quashed on appeal, on the ground that strict proof of marriage being necessary for a conviction under s. 498 of the Penal Code, the evidence adduced (*viz.*, of the complainant, the woman and her mother, who swore to the fact of the marriage) was not sufficient to enable the Court to form an opinion whether the marriage took place as a fact, and if it did take place, whether it was according to law. The accused did not cross-examine the witnesses as to the fact or validity of the marriage or otherwise impugn it. *Held*, that the marriage was sufficiently proved. *Empress v. Pitambur Singh*, **I. L. R. 5 Calc. 566**, discussed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SUBBARAYAN*

**I. L. R. 9 Mad. 9**

**4. Enticing away a married woman—Evidence of marriage—Mere statement of the complainant and the woman.** Where a charge is made under s. 498 of the Penal Code of enticing away a married woman, the Court should require some better evidence of the marriage than the mere statement of the complainant and the woman. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. DAL SINGH* . **I. L. R. 20 All. 166**

**5. Enticing and taking away.** Upon an indictment under s. 498 of the Penal Code, charging that the prisoner took away one A, who was then, and whom he then knew to be, the wife of one M, with the intent that he might have illicit intercourse with the said A :—*Held*, that there was a taking within the meaning of the section, although the advances and solicitation had proceeded from the woman, and the prisoner had for some time refused to yield to her request. *QUEEN v. KUMARASAMI* **2 Mad. 331**

**6. Enticing away married woman—Finding in words of section.** A finding exactly in the words of s. 498 of the Penal Code, that the prisoner took or enticed away a married woman from her husband, or some person having the care of her on his behalf, with intent that she should have illicit intercourse with some person, or concealed or detained such woman with a like intent, though not actually illegal when it is doubtful which of the several offences has been committed is a finding which ought not to be resorted to if it can be avoided,



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 498—contd.**

and it can be determined under which part of the section the prisoner is guilty. *QUEEN v. MOTHORA NATH ROY* . . . . . **22 W. R. Cr. 72**

**7. ——— Alyasantana law—Marriage—Custom.** In the absence of very clear evidence of custom, which, if well founded, must be a matter of general notoriety, the cohabitation of a man and a woman under the Alyasantana system cannot be considered marriage so as to render punishable, under s. 498 of the Penal Code, a person who entices away the woman with the intents specified in that section. *KORAGA v. QUEEN*

**I. L. R. 6 Mad. 374**

**8. ——— Detaining enticed woman.** A conviction cannot be had under the latter part of s. 498 of the Penal Code for detaining an enticed woman, until the enticing has been proved. *EMPRESS v. TIKA SINGH*

**I. L. R. 3 All. 251**

**9. ——— Concealing or detaining.** In a charge under s. 498 of the Penal Code, the words of the section, "conceals or detains," must be taken to extend to the enticing or inducing a wife to withhold or conceal herself from her husband, and assisting her to do so, as well as to physical restraint or prevention of her will or action. Depriving the husband of proper control over his wife for the purpose of illicit intercourse is the gist of the offence, and a detention occasioning such deprivation may be brought about simply by the influence of allurements and blandishments. *QUEEN v. SUNDARA DASS TEVAN*

**4 Mad. 20**

**10. ——— Detaining with criminal intent married woman.** The words "such woman" in s. 498 of the Penal Code do not mean such a woman as has been so enticed as mentioned in that section, but mean such woman whom the accused knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of any other man; the detention of such a woman with the particular intent defined in the section is one of the offences made punishable under that section. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NIADAR* **I. L. R. 10 All. 580**

**11. ——— Charge of abetment against the woman enticed—"Enticing away" a woman—Validity.** Where a man has been convicted of enticing away a woman, under s. 498 of the Penal Code, the woman who was enticed away by him cannot be guilty as an abettor. *Quære*: Whether a woman could be convicted of abetting the taking away of herself, within the meaning of s. 488. *In re BALAMBAL* (1902) . **I. L. R. 26 Mad. 463**

**ss. 499, excep. 3, 6, 9; 500—Defamation—Comment—Right of fair comment—Comment should be suggested by and confined to the work under review—Good faith, tests of—Malice, interpretation of the term.** The word "malice" in the legal use of that term is not limited to hostility of feeling, but by

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 499—contd.**

virtue of its etymological origin, extends to any state of the mind which is wrong or faulty (whether evidenced in action by excess or defect), such as would be unjustifiable in the circumstances and incompatible with thoroughly innocent intentions. It is not necessary that such impropriety of feeling should in all cases be established by evidence extrinsic to the comment which is the subject of the complaint. For, whether fair comment is to be regarded as falling under a branch of the law of privilege or not, it cannot excuse an injury arising not from the mere act of criticism, but from a state of mind in the critic which is in itself unjustifiable and the excuse may be so forfeited either by reason of an evil intent in him, or by reason of mere recklessness in making an unwarrantable assertion. For then the comment would not be fair comment at all. Apart from extrinsic evidence of malice, protection must be withheld even from what purports to be criticism, if it states as a fact to be inferred from the book criticised, an imputation for which the book itself contains absolutely no foundation whatever. The right of fair comment involves two essentials, first that the imputation should be comment on the work criticised, and second that it should be "fair,"—that is to say, that if it professes to be an inference drawn from the contents of that work, it must be an inference which it is possible to draw therefrom. "Good faith" requires not, indeed, logical infallibility, but due care and attention. But how far erroneous actions or statements are to be imputed to want of due care and caution must, in each case, be considered with reference to the general circumstances and the capacity and intelligence of the person whose conduct is in question. It is only to be expected that the honest conclusions of a calm and philosophical mind may differ very largely from the honest conclusions of a person excited by sectarian zeal and untrained to habits of precise reasoning. At the same time it must be borne in mind that good faith in the formation or expression of an opinion, can afford no protection to an imputation which does not purport to be based on that which is the legitimate subject of public comment. The object of exception 6 to s. 499 of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) is that the public should be aided by comment in its judgment of the public performance submitted to its judgment. Comment otherwise defamatory is justified on this ground alone. The comment must, therefore, make it clear to the public that decision is invited only on such evidence as is supplied by the public performance. It follows that an imputation on an author made by a critic without reference, express or implied, to the work under criticism, if in terms so general as to be capable of conveying an unfavourable impression of him apart from what appears in his work, cannot be justified by the critic on the ground that his intention was to base his imputation solely on the work reviewed, and that he had in his mind passages therein supporting the imputation. The responsibility of the critic is to



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

— s. 499—*concl'd.*

be gauged by the effect which his comment is calculated to produce and not by what he says was his intention. It is not enough that he should intend to form his opinion on the work before him. He is also bound in the words of the exceptions to express his opinion with due care and caution, and to give the public no ground for supposing that he is speaking of anything but the performance submitted to its judgment. *EMPEROR v. ABDOL WADOOD* (1907)

**I. L. R. 31 Bom. 293**

— s. 499, exc. 9. ill. (a)—

*See* DEFAMATION . **9 C. W. N. 195**

— s. 499, expln. I—

*See* DEFAMATION—IMPUTATION ON A WIFE.  
**I. L. R. 25 Bom. 151**

— ss. 499, 500—

*See* DEFAMATION.

1. ———— *Defamation—*  
*Statements made in an affidavit, if privileged.* A person would be rightly convicted under s. 500 of the Penal Code for making a defamatory statement in an affidavit, if the statement made was wholly irrelevant to the enquiry to which the affidavit related. *Palu Gunesh Dutt Singh v. Mugneeram Chowdhry*, 11 B. L. R. 321, referred to. *GIRIBALA DAS v. PRAN KRISTO GHOSE* (1904)  
**8 C. W. N. 292**

2. ———— *Statement made*  
*by a person in answer to a query of his pleader shortly after the disposal of the case, whether amounts to an offence under—Legal adviser and client, relationship of, how long lasts.* Where the accused shortly after the disposal of a criminal case against him, brought by one B, stated openly in answer to a query of his pleader in that case that the origin of the criminal case was due to the fact that some one of the accused's party had said at a social gathering that B's daughter-in-law had eloped, and he was subsequently prosecuted for an offence under s. 500, Indian Penal Code, for making a statement of defamation of B:—*Held*, that the statement of the accused did not constitute an offence of defamation under s. 500, Indian Penal Code, as it was not made with the intention of harming the reputation of anybody. That the statement was made in answer to a natural question, put to him by his legal adviser at a time when the relationship of legal adviser and client cannot be said to have ceased. *DEBENDRA NATH SAHA v. BHAGIRATH SHAHA* (1909)

**13 C. W. N. 1087**

— s. 500—

*See* APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASE—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

**I. L. R. 25 All. 534**

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

— s. 500—*concl'd.*

*See* DEFAMATION.

**I. L. R. 26 Mad. 43; 464**

**I. L. R. 32 Calc. 756**

**11 C. W. N. 390**

*See* PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.

**7 C. W. N. 246**

——— *Defamatory statement in the course of a deposition, when privileged—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 132.* The accused, while deposing before a Magistrate, was asked by the cross-examining pleader "whether Kanu had asked pardon of Haidar Ali in a *punchayet*" and in the course of his answer he made the following statement, which was false, *viz.*, "Haidar Ali admitted in the *punchayet* that Kanu beat with a wooden shoe." *Held*, that the statement of the accused was defamatory under s. 500, Penal Code, and was not privileged under s. 132, Evidence Act, as it was a voluntary statement not relevant to the issue in the case in which he deposed and was not elicited by the pleader putting questions, and further, the accused was actuated by malicious motives against Haidar Ali. *HAIDAR ALI v. ABRU MIA* (1905).

**I. L. R. 32 Calc. 756**

**s.c. 9 C. W. N. 971**

— ss. 503, 505 to 508—

*See* CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION

— s. 504—

*See* INSULT . **I. L. R. 10 Mad. 353**

— s. 505 (b)—*Penal Code Amendment Act (IV of 1898), s. 6—Statements conducing to public mischief—Report alleging impending war and massacre—Fear or alarm inducing commission of offence against the State or the public tranquillity—Vague or remote possibility.* The mere causing of fear or alarm to the public or to a section of the public does not constitute an offence under s. 505, but it is necessary that the fear or alarm should be caused in such circumstances as to render it likely that a person may be induced to commit an offence against the State or against the public tranquillity. Account cannot be taken in a case of this kind of a vague possibility that the state of mind which is caused by alarm may easily induce a person to commit an offence against the public tranquillity. This would depend on the circumstances of a particular case. The accused, a daffadar of a tea estate in Darjeeling, who had recently returned from Nepal, circulated a report among the garden coolies that a war was impending between the British Government and Nepal, that Nepalese soldiers were stationed on the frontier, and that the coolies would be killed by the British. The effect of the report was that about 150 coolies immediately ran away. *Held*, that the accused could not be taken to have intended more than the probable result of the report he circulated, the result which, in fact, did take place. *In the matter of the petition of MANBIR* . . . **3 C. W. N. 1**



**PENAL CODE (ACT [XLV OF 1860)—**  
*concl'd.*

s. 508—

*See* DEFAMATION . I. L. R. 6 Mad. 381

s. 509—

*See* CRIMINAL TRESPASS.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 391; 994

*See* MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—  
SPECIAL ACTS—PENAL CODE, s. 509.

7 W. R. Cr. 52

s. 511—

*See* ATTEMPT TO COMMIT OFFENCE.**PENAL CODE AMENDMENT ACT**  
(VIII OF 1882).

s. 4—

*See* SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES.

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 349

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 495

I. L. R. 6 All. 121

I. L. R. 7 All. 29

I. L. R. 9 All. 645

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 442

**PENAL CODE AMENDMENT ACT**  
(IV OF 1898).

s. 6—

*See* PENAL CODE, s. 505 . 3 C. W. N. 1**PENAL SERVITUDE.***See* SENTENCE—GENERAL CASES.

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 483

**PENALTY.***See* COMPOUND INTEREST—DECREE.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 150

L. R. 34 I. A. 9

*See* CONTRACT ACT.

10 C. W. N. 640, 1010

*See* DAMAGES—MEASURE AND ASSESS-  
MENT OF DAMAGES.*See* INTEREST—STIPULATIONS AMOUNTING  
OR NOT TO PENALTIES.*See* STAMP ACT, 1869, s. 34.*See* STAMP ACT (II OF 1899), ss. 35 AND  
42 . I. L. R. 24 All. 374

payment of—

*See* STAMP ACT, s. 39.

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 473

relief against, in execution pro-  
ceedings—*See* EXECUTION OF DECREE—EXECUTION  
OF DECREE ON OR AFTER AGREEMENTS  
OR COMPROMISES.

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 265

tender of—

*See* APPELLATE COURT—REJECTION OR  
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE ADMITTED OR  
REJECTED BY COURT BELOW.

7 W. R. 439

I. L. R. 2 All. 554

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 213

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 449; 493

**PENALTY—concl'd.**

1. ————— Interest, rate of  
—Exorbitant rate—Mortgage—Compound interest—  
Date of payment—Transfer of Property Act (IV of  
1882), s. 86—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 74—Act  
VI of 1899. Simple or compound interest at a high  
rate is not in itself a penalty within the meaning of  
s. 74 of the Contract Act. *Pardhan Bhukhan Lal v.*  
*Narsing Dyal*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 300, and *Satish*  
*Chunder Giri v. Hem Chunder Mookhopadhyaya*, I.  
L. R. 29 Calc. 823, distinguished. The mortgagee is  
ordinarily entitled to interest at the rate stipulated  
in the bond, until the date fixed in the mortgage  
decree for payment. He is also entitled to recover  
reasonable interest from that date, until the date of  
realisation. *Rameswar Koer v. Mahomed Mehdi*  
*Hossein Khan*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 39; L. R. 25 I.  
A. 179, and *Maharaja of Bharatpur v. Rani Kanno*  
*Dei*, I. L. R. 23 All. 181; L. R. 28 I. A. 35, followed.  
*PRAYAG KAPRI v. SHYAM LAL* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 138

2. ————— Agreement to pay  
a sum certain, breach of—Deposit, forfeiture of—  
Forfeiture, no relief against, if amount reasonable—  
Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 74. Where there is  
a stipulation to deposit a sum specified as security  
for performance of an agreement, the forfeiture of  
such deposit, on breach of the agreement, is not in  
the nature of a penalty if the sum deposited is  
reasonable in amount. *Manian Patter v. The*  
*Madras Railway Co.*, I. L. R. 29 Mad. 118, referred  
to. *SINGER MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. RAJA*  
*PROSAD* (1909) . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 960

**PENDENTE LITE.***See* ADMINISTRATOR PENDENTE LITE.**PENSION.***See* ACT XXI OF 1871, s. 6.

I. L. R. 28 All. 104

*See* ATTACHMENT—SUBJECTS OF ATTACH-  
MENT—ANNUITY OR PENSION—POLI-  
TICAL PENSIONS.*See* INSOLVENCY—PROPERTY ACQUIRED  
AFTER VESTING ORDER.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 232

*See* PENSIONS ACT.*See* TREATY, CONSTRUCTION OF.

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 234

L. R. 16 I. A. 175

1. ————— Pensions Act  
(XXIII of 1871), ss. 3, 11, 12—S. 12 applies only to  
pensions as stated in s. 11 and does not extend to grant  
of land revenue as defined in s. 3. S. 12 of the Pen-  
sions Act prohibits only the assignment of any  
money payable on account of any such pension,  
pay or allowance as is mentioned in s. 11, and the  
pensions referred to in s. 11 are periodical allow-  
ances made by Government on political considera-  
tions, or an account of past services or present  
infirmities or as a compassionate allowance.  
Payments of money for purposes other than those  
stated may be 'grants of money or land revenue'



**PENSION—concl'd.**

within the meaning of s. 3, but the provisions of s. 12 will not apply to them. *The Secretary of State for India v. Khemchand Jeychand*, 1. L. R. 4 Bom. 432, followed. *SUBRAYA MUDALI v. VELAYUDA CHETTY* (1906) 1. L. R. 30 Mad. 153

2. ————— *Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871), s. 4—Suit for maintenance under an agreement by which claim to pension and other properties is relinquished not a suit relating to pension and is cognisable by Civil Courts.* Where a widow entitled to a portion of a pension and other properties, relinquished such right in consideration of a maintenance allowance, which is not made payable out of the pension and is not dependent on it, a suit by her to recover such allowance is not a suit relating to pension, within the meaning of s. 4 of the Pensions Act and is cognisable by Civil Courts. There is nothing in the Pensions Act which prohibits such relinquishment by the widow or the agreement to pay her maintenance. *RAJA VENKATANARASIMHA RAMACHANDRA ROW v. RAJA LAKSHMINARASAMMA ROW* (1906) 1. L. R. 30 Mad. 266

**PENSIONS ACT (VI OF 1849).**

1. ————— *Arrears of pension, succession to—Heirs—Succeeding grantee.* Arrears of pension due to the deceased at the time of her death form part of her estate, and the person who is legal heir to the deceased is entitled to recover them. The grantee of the pension formerly enjoyed by the deceased has no right to such arrears which formed part of the deceased's estate. *NOUSHABAH SOOLTAN BEGUM v. NUBEERAH SOOLTAN BEGUM* . . . . . 3 Agra 44

2. ————— *Agreement to pay portion of pension.* A pension having been granted by Government to *B P* in lieu of a *saranjam* held by his grandfather, a claim to share the same by *M P* and his brothers was compromised by *B P*, agreeing to pay them a certain proportion thereof yearly. The Agent for Sardars, affirming the decree of the Assistant Agent, found the agreement to be null and void as an assignment of a future interest in a pension. *Held*, that, as the pension was not granted "in consideration of past service and present infirmities or old age," the case did not come within the terms of Act VI of 1849, and that the agreement was a valid one. *MADHAVRAV PANSE v. BAPURAV PANSE* 4 Bom. A. C. 62

3. ————— *Liability to attachment—Deshmukh allowance.* As the holder for the time being of a *deshmukhi watan* (an hereditary office) has only a life interest in the allowances pertaining to that watan, such allowances accruing due subsequently to his death cannot be attached as part of his estate. *HANMANTRAV KHANDERAV v. BHAVANRAV BAJIRAV* . . . . . 10 Bom. 299

4. ————— *Political pension.* An order made by District Judge, rejecting an application to attach a pension, on the ground that being a political pension it could not be

**PENSIONS ACT (VI OF 1849)—concl'd.**

attached under Act VI of 1849, was reversed on petition by the High Court, which directed the pension to be attached. *In the matter of the petition of HARBHAT BIN RAM CHANDRABHAT* 4 Bom. A. C. 67

5. ————— *Requisite proof for exemption from attachment.* On a petition praying that an attachment placed on a pension, of which petitioner was the recipient, might be removed under Act VI of 1849, the High Court declined to interfere, as it had not been shown that the pension was one enjoyed in consideration of past services and present infirmities or old age. *Ex parte VITHALRAV ESHWANTRAV* 4 Bom. A. C. 65

**PENSIONS ACT (XXIII OF 1871).**

*See DEKKHAN AGRICULTURISTS' RELIEF ACT (XVII OF 1879), s. 44.*

1. L. R. 30 Bom. 101

*See HINDU LAW—ALIENATION—ALIENATION BY FATHER.*

1. L. R. 14 Bom. 320

*See PENSION.*

1. ————— *Operation of Act—Retrospective operation.* The Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871) is not retrospective. *JAMNADAS v. LALITARAM* 1. L. R. 2 Bom. 294

2. ————— *Construction of Act—Grant by Government—Ownership in the soil.* Though as stated in *Kishnarav v. Rangrav*, 4 Bom. A. C. 1, "sanadi grants in inam, *saranjam*, etc., are, generally speaking, more properly described as alienations of the royal share in the produce of the land (i.e., of land revenue) than grants of land, although in popular parlance occasionally so called," yet such is not invariably the case. If words are employed in a grant which, expressly or by necessary implication, indicate that Government intends that, so far as it may have any ownership in the soil, that ownership shall pass to the grantee, neither Government, nor any person subsequently to the date of the grant deriving under Government, can be permitted to say that the ownership did not so pass, unless there are in the grant such detailed provisions as show that such words are limited in their operation. An enactment of a character so arbitrary as Act XXIII of 1871 ought to be construed strictly, and the Courts should not extend its operation further than the language of the legislature requires. *RAJVI NARAYAN MANDLIK v. DADAJI BAPUJI* 1. L. R. 1 Bom. 523

3. ————— *Suit for declaration of right to officiate as patil of village—Jurisdiction of Civil Court.* A suit for a declaration of the plaintiff's eligibility to officiate as patil of a village is not prohibited by Act XXIII of 1871. That Act should receive a strict construction, as being in derogation of the right of the subject to resort to the ordinary Civil Courts. *Babaji v. Rajaram*, 1. L. R. 1 Bom. 75, distinguished.



**PENSIONS ACT (XXIII OF 1871)—**  
*contd.*GURUSHIDGAVDA BIN RUDRAGAVDA v. RUDRA-  
GAVDATI KOM DYAMANGAVDA

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 531

4. ———— *Political pension in lieu of grant of land resumed—Impartible property.* A saranjam is ordinarily impartible, and *semble* that a political pension granted in substitution of a resumed saranjam is so likewise. The Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871) prevents a Civil Court from declaring such a pension to be partible, unless the Collector should authorize it to do so; and the fact that the Collector authorizes a suit for maintenance out of such a pension affords no ground for presuming that he authorizes a suit for the partition of the pension. *RAMCHANDRA SAKHARAM v. SAKHARAM GOPAL*

I. L. R. 2 Bom. 346

1. ———— s. 3—"Grant of money or land revenue"—*Grant of proprietorship of soil.* The meaning of the expression "grant of money or land revenue," extended by s. 3 of Act XXIII of 1871 to include "anything payable on the part of Government in respect of any right, privilege, perquisite, or office," is not of so wide a range as to include a grant of the proprietorship of the soil, or any suit involving the rights of a proprietor of the soil. *Krishnarav v. Rangrav*, 4 Bom. A. C. 1; *Vaman Janardhan v. Collector of Thana*, 6 Bom. A. C. 191; and *Ruttonji Eduvi v. Collector of Thana*, 11 Moo. I. A. 295, distinguished. *RAJVI NARAYAN MANDLIK v. DADAJI BAPUJI*

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 523

2. ———— and s. 6—"Right," meaning of—*Toda garas haks—Mortgage of hak.* Toda garas haks are within the scope of the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871); and a suit in respect of them cannot be instituted without the certificate required by s. 6 of the Act. Where a mortgagee of such haks had, before the date on which the Act came into operation, obtained a decree for the recovery of his mortgage-debt from the mortgaged haks and from the mortgagor personally, and a fresh suit was necessary to enforce execution of that decree against these haks:—*Held*, that the Act did not apply to such fresh suit. *Semble*: That the word "right" in s. 3 of Act XXIII of 1871 is equivalent to the word "hak" in its restricted sense of "allowance" or "fee." *PARBHUDAS RAYAJI v. MOTIRAM KALYANDAS*

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 203

3. ———— ss. 3 and 11—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 266—Pension—Zamindari granted as a reward for services rendered to Government.* *Held*, that a zamindari granted—not revenue free—by Government as a reward for services rendered is not a pension, and its alienation by the grantee is not prohibited either by Act XXIII of 1871 or by s. 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Secretary of State for India v. Khemchand Jeychand*, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 432; *Bal Krishna Bhao v. Govind Rao*. *All. Weekly Notes* (1902) 161, and *Bishambhar Nath v. Nawab Imdad Ali Khan*,

**PENSIONS ACT (XXIII OF 1871)—**  
*contd.*s. 3—*concl'd.*L. R. 17 I. A. 181, referred to. *LACHMI NARAIN v. MAKUND SINGH* (1904) . I. L. R. 26 All. 617

ss. 3, 11, 12—

See PENSION . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 153

1. ———— s. 4—*Toda garas hak, suit for money in lieu of—Jurisdiction of Civil Courts.* Act XXIII of 1871, s. 4, prohibits the Civil Courts from entertaining a suit against Government upon an alleged agreement by it to pay moneys from its treasury in lieu of toda garas haks. *MANSANG v. GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY*

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 443

2. ———— *Toda garas hak, suit for money in lieu of.* In part of Western India annual payments, known as toda garas hak, made by village communities and commuted by them into liabilities to garasias, have been recognized as a species of property, however unlawful their origin. In 1862 a resolution of the Government of Bombay described the position of the garasias at that time, and gave them the option of resuming the collection of the toda garas hak formerly levied resorting only to legal proceedings to enforce their claims, or of receiving from the Government allowances of an equivalent amount, the collections in the latter case being discontinued on all hands. The ancestors of the adoptive father of the plaintiff formerly levied toda garas hak; and after 1862 the Government in respect thereof made payments, under the resolution, to three brothers, of whom one was the plaintiff's father; the latter receiving a one-third share, which on his death in 1865 was no longer paid. *Held*, that a suit against the Government for payment of this third share with arrears fell under the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871), s. 4, which prohibits cognizance, save as in the Act provided "of any suit relating to any pension or grant of money or land revenue conferred or made by the British or any former Government, whatever may have been the consideration for such pension or grant, or whatever may have been the nature of the payment, claim, or right for which such pension or grant may have been substituted." *Held*, that there was no reason, either in the language of the Act itself or in any antecedent legislation, for construing these words as applicable only to rights in the nature of pensions. *MAHARAVAL MOHAN-SINGHJI JEYSINGHJI v. GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY*

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 408

L. R. 8 I. A. 77

Affirming the judgment of the High Court in the same case . . . I. L. R. 4 Bom. 437

3. ———— *Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Deshmukh.* A suit in a Civil Court by a hereditary deshmukh relating to a grant of land revenue is prohibited by the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871). *NARO DAMODAR GHUGRI v. COLLECTOR OF POONA* . I. L. R. 6 Bom. 209



**PENSIONS ACT (XXIII OF 1871)—**  
*contd.*— s. 4—*contd.*

4. *Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Suit relating to grant of money or land revenue.* A plaintiff, alleging that, as the hereditary deshmukh of certain mehals, he was entitled to be paid directly by the raiyats of these mehals a percentage on the revenue thereon assessed, sued to recover a portion of such percentage which had been collected along with the revenue and retained by the Government. *Held*, that the claim was “a suit relating to a grant of money or land revenue,” and as such excluded from the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts by s. 4 of the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871). **VASUDEB SADASHIV MODAK v. COLLECTOR OF RATNAGIRI**

**I. L. R. 2 Bom. 99**  
**L. R. 4 I. A. 119**

5. *Rent-free grant of land from Government.* S. 4 of the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871) debars the Civil Court from taking cognizance of any suit, whether the Government is a party to it or not, which relates to any pension or grant of money or land revenue conferred or made by the British or any former Government, without a certificate from the Collector or other authorized officer. S. 5 prescribes a remedy for the claimant of such pension or grant, and s. 6 enables the Revenue officer to refer the parties to the Civil Court for the determination of their respective interests in the income or other benefits, which the executive will, however, still, as against either or both of the litigants, be at liberty to allow or withhold. Lands held free of assessment under a grant from Government which bestows on the grantee the lands themselves, and not merely the Government revenue arising from them, do not fall within the provision of the Pensions Act. **BABAJI HARI v. RAJARAM BALLAL**

**I. L. R. 1 Bom. 75**

6. *Grant of land revenue—Former suit for money.* The plaintiffs formerly sued for a sum of money, and, obtaining a decree, attached in 1861 two villages the land revenue of which had been granted in inam. The attachment continued down to 1875, when the last holder of the villages died, and the Government having resumed the villages, the attachment was raised. The plaintiffs now sued to have their right declared to satisfy their decree from the revenues of the villages. *Held*, that the former suit was not a suit in respect of a pension or grant of money of land revenue, and that an attachment placed in pursuance of an ordinary money-decree before the date of the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871) could not be treated as a suit in respect of a pension, grant of money, or land revenue instituted before such date, so as to exclude the operation of the Act under s. 1. **SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. JAMNADAS**

**I. L. R. 6 Bom. 737**

7. *Inam—Grant of land free of revenue—Specific Relief Act, s. 42.* A grant of lands free of revenue does not come within

**PENSIONS ACT (XXIII OF 1871)—**  
*contd.*— s. 4—*contd.*

the purview of the Pensions Act, 1871. **PANCHANADAYAN v. NILAKANDAYAN**

**I. L. R. 7 Mad. 191**

8. *Gratuitous pension.—Suit for share of annual grant made by Government.* One S, a servant of the Delhi Emperor, having been killed in Burdwan while fighting for his master, the Emperor built a tomb over his remains, and made a grant of land (five mouzahs) to his family for the purpose of maintaining it in the manner usual amongst Mahomedans. This grant was subsequently confirmed to a descendant of S and his heirs. Some years later the land came into the possession of the Raja of Burdwan, who paid to the grantees a certain sum of money annually. When the perpetual settlement was made, the British Government continued the payment on account of the Raja, in whose zamindari four of the five mouzahs were incorporated. Owing to disputes in the family, a reference was made to Government, who reduced the money payment and appointed a mutwalli for the tomb. One of the descendants of S then sued the Government and the mutwalli for a share of this annual payment. *Held*, that the grant to S's family was not a gratuitous pension or allowance, and that the money payment by the zamindar of Burdwan was rent justly due to them for the use and occupation of their land, and that the fact of the payment being continued by Government did not alter its nature. Accordingly the suit was not barred by Regulation XXIV of 1793 or Act XXIII of 1871. **HAZARA BEGUM v. COLLECTOR OF BURDWAN**

**23 W. R. 378**

9. *Grant by Nawab of Carnatic, resumption of—Substitution of money payment—Suit to recover share of money.* A jaghir, having been granted by the Nawab of the Carnatic for the support of the grantee and his relatives, was resumed by Government, and a money payment, equivalent to the rent, substituted. *Held*, that a suit by a relative of the original grantee to recover, as arrears of his share, money received by the representative of the grantee, was barred by s. 4 of the Pensions Act, 1871. **MAHOMMED ISAACK MUSHYACK v. AZEEZPOON NISSA BEGUM**

**I. L. R. 4 Mad. 341**

10. *Suit to recover matam service inam lands granted for support of temple.* A suit by a lessee of the holders of a matam service inam (religious endowment for the support of the family of the grantees and of a temple) to recover the inam lands from strangers is not barred by the provisions of the Pensions Act, 1871. **KOLANDAI MUDALI v. SANKARA BHARADHI**

**I. L. R. 5 Mad. 302**

11. *Religious endowment—Personal grant.* When the object of the endowment was to provide for certain religious and pious purposes:—*Held*, that the provisions of the Pensions Act were not applicable to it. “Pension and grants” in that Act meant personal grants,



**PENSIONS ACT (XXIII OF 1871)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 4—contd.**

and not grants to endowments. **SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. ABDUL HAKKIM KHAN**

**I. L. R. 2 Mad. 294**

**12.** ————— *Yaumia granted to mosque—Jurisdiction of Civil Court.* S. 4 of the Pensions Act, 1871, provides that no Civil Court shall entertain any suit relating to any pension or grant of money or land-revenue conferred or made by the British or any former Government, whatever may have been the consideration for any such pension or grant and, whatever may have been the nature of the payment, claim or right for which such pension or grant may have been substituted. *Held*, that a *yaumia* allowance granted to a religious institution did not fall within the purview of the Pensions Act. **ATHAVALLA v. GOUSE** . . . **I. L. R. 11 Mad. 283**

**13.** ————— *Grant of villages enabling grantee to receive the land-revenue.* Suit to recover a moiety at two villages granted as a jaghir. *Held*, that, as the original grant was not of the free-hold or full ownership in the soil, the suit was barred by s. 4 of the Pensions Act, 1871. **RAMA v. SUBBA** . . . **I. L. R. 12 Mad. 98**

**14.** ————— *Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Suit against Government for inam lands and mokasa amals—Bom. Reg. XXIX of 1827, s. 6—Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876), s. 4—Mokasa amals, meaning of.* In 1826 A obtained a decree on a mortgage, awarding him possession and enjoyment of certain inam property, consisting of lands and of cash allowances annually paid from the Government treasury, called *mokasa amals*. A and his successors continued in possession down to 1852, when the inam was attached on behalf of Government pending an inquiry, under Bombay Act XI of 1852, into the title of the holder of the inam. The attachment remained in force till 1865, when Government finally decided that the inam property, with the exception of a certain portion, should be restored to those from whose possession it had been taken in 1852. Thereupon D, the successor in interest of A, applied to the Collector to be restored to possession. The Collector refused. D therefore sued him for arrears of the *mokasa amals*, and obtained a decree in 1868. Thereafter D did not receive any payment from the Government treasury. In 1883 D filed the present suit against Government to recover possession of the inam lands together with arrears of the *amals*. *Held*, that the suit against Government was not cognizable by the Civil Courts both under the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871), s. 4, and under the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876), s. 4. Both these Acts, though not retrospective in their operation, still do not create rights to relief against the Government where none subsisted before. Accordingly, the suit, being barred under Bombay Regulation XXIX of 1827, was equally barred under the later Acts XXIII of 1871 and X

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*contd.*

**s. 4—contd.**

of 1876. **SIVRAM DINKAR GHARPURAY v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA** **I. L. R. 11 Bom. 222**

**15.** ————— *Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Abkari revenue—Inamdar, right of, to abkari revenue under grant from Peshwa.* The Peshwa's Government granted in inam to the plaintiff's ancestor, by sanad, the villages of Golap and Randpar. The sanad granted "water, trees, grass, wood, quarries, mines, buried treasure, present and future cesses and taxes and assessments." The plaintiff brought the present suit to recover from the defendant a part of the abkari revenue for 1884-85 and 1885-86. He contended that the revenue derived by the Government for tapping trees in the villages aforesaid was a tax within the contemplation of the grant. *Held*, that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit under the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871). The tax in question was a money tax, and as soon as it was imposed, the grant, if it entitled the inamdar to the tax, operated as a grant of the money to be derived from the tax, and was therefore within the spirit, if not the letter, of the Pensions Act, the object of which was to reserve to the Government the determination of all questions affecting grants of money, the bestowal of which was an act of grace or State policy on the part of the ruling power. **JANARDHAN BHASKAR v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA**

**I. L. R. 14 Bom. 573**

**16.** ————— *"Civil Court"—Claim to percentage of forest income—Forest Settlement officer.* A Forest Settlement officer has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit in which a claim to a percentage of forest income is made, and such a suit brought by discharged forest karnams is barred by s. 4 of the Pensions Act. A Forest Settlement officer is a Civil Court for the purposes of the Pensions Act. **SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. VYDIA PILLAI**. **I. L. R. 17 Mad. 193**

**17.** ————— *Kulkarni vatan—Suit for partition and declaration of right to a specific share in the vatan and to officiate—Money grant—Vatan consisting exclusively of cash allowance.* A suit for a declaration that the plaintiffs are vatandars of a share of a moiety of a kulkarni vatan consisting exclusively of a cash allowance from Government is not a suit relating to a "money grant" within the contemplation of s. 4 of the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871). **GOVIND SITARAM v. BAPUJI MAHADEO** **I. L. R. 18 Bom. 516**

**18.** ————— *and s. 6—Suit for malikana without certificate of Collector.* In a suit against the Raja of Palghat and other members of his family for a declaration of the plaintiff's status as the third Raja, and to recover a sum of money payable to him as such on account of his share of malikana, it appeared that the plaintiff had obtained no certificate under the Pensions Act, 1871, s. 6. *Held*, that the suit was not maintainable. **ANDI ACHEN v. KOMBI ACHEN** . **I. L. R. 18 Mad. 187**



**PENSIONS ACT (XXIII OF 1871)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 4—contd.**

19. ——— and s. 3—*Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Certificate of Collector to precede suit for malikana payable by Government.* A village, part of an estate, had been made over to the Government by parties, who in consideration received a malikana in perpetuity, or, in other words, a grant of a portion of the revenue in lieu of their proprietary right. *Held*, that the right to the malikana was on the construction of ss. 3 and 4 of the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871), in the absence of a certificate obtained under that Act, excluded from judicial cognizance in this suit. *Vasudev Sada Shiv Nodak v. Collector of Ratnagiri*, I. L. R. 2 Bom. 99 : L. R. 4 I. A. 119, and *Naharaval Mohan Singji Joysingji v. Government of Bombay*, I. L. R. 5 Bom. 408 : L. R. 8 I. A. 77, referred to and approved. *DEO KUAR v. MAN KUAR*

I. L. R. 17 All. 1  
L. R. 21 I. A. 148

20. ——— *Meaning of the word "pension"—Suit for a cash allowance payable by an inamdar—Necessity of Collector's certificate.* Plaintiff sued, as the trustee of a devasthan, to recover the amount of a cash allowance attached to the worship of certain idols in the village of Ankli. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, who was the inamdar of the village, received its revenues subject to the payment of the allowance in question, and that he had wrongfully appropriated the latter for the three years preceding suit. *Held*, that the allowance in question was "a grant of money" within the meaning of s. 4 of the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871), and that the suit would not lie in the absence of the Collector's certificate, though Government was not a party to the suit. *VYANKAJI v. SARJARAO APAJIRAO*

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 537

21. ——— *Suit relating to right of management of saranjam lands.* Where a suit was brought in relation to the management of saranjam lands:—*Held* that the suit was *prima facie* one not included in the Pensions Act. *KESHAYRAV v. GANPATRAO NILKANTH NAGARKAR*

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 596

22. ——— *Collector's certificate—Execution of decree—"Suit"—Desaigiri hak, sale of.* The word "suit" in s. 4 of the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871) does not include execution proceedings. The Collector's certificate is not necessary to validate the sale of a desaigiri hak in execution of a decree. *VAJIRAM BHAGVAN v. RANCHORDJI GOPALJI* . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 731

23. ——— *Cash allowance allowed to worship of idol—Personal grant.* A plaintiff claimed to be a co-trustee of certain dargas and entitled to a share in the management and in the profits thereof, which consisted of a certain cash allowance from Government. He sued the defendants for an account and for the recovery of his share. *Held*, that the suit, so far as it related to the cash allowance from Government, required a certificate

**PENSIONS ACT (XXIII OF 1871)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 4—contd.**

under s. 4 of the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871). A cash allowance attached to the worship of an idol is a grant of money within the meaning of s. 4 of the Pensions Act, 1871. The Pensions Act applies to religious endowments as well as to personal grants. *Vyankaji v. Sarjarao Apajirao*, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 537, concurred in. *NIYA VALI ULLA v. BAVA SAHEB SANTI MIYA* . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 496

24. ——— *Suit relating to inam land granted before the time of the British Government—Confirmation of inam.* Early in the eighteenth century two villages were granted by the zamindars of Sivaganga and Guntamanaikanur to the last of the Naik rulers of Madura for the maintenance of the rank and dignity of his family which was now represented by the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 1 to 23. The property was long managed by the representative, for the time being, of the senior line. In 1844 one of the junior members instituted a suit for partition, which terminated in a decree declaring the corpus of the property to be indivisible and the annual produce to be divisible in certain shares. Subsequently in 1857 a compromise was entered into, by which the parties agreed to vary the distribution of the sharers, but they agreed that the management of the estate, indivisible and inalienable, should continue to be vested in the eldest line subject to certain supervision on the part of the other members. The compromise was long acted upon by the family; but in 1892 the representative of the senior line died, leaving only his widow and infant sons. The widow, as guardian of the elder son, then entered on the management, and being gosha, delegated it to a stranger. The plaintiffs, representing a junior line, now sued for the removal of these persons from management and the appointment of another manager, alleging both that they had no right to the management and that they had been guilty of mismanagement. All the members of the family were made parties to the suit. It appeared that the plaintiffs had not received their proper share of the produce, and the defendants in management denied in the pleadings their right thereto. The plaintiffs had not obtained a certificate from the Collector under the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871), and it appeared that the grant of the villages had been confirmed as an inam by the British Government. *Held*, that the suit did not fall within the provisions of Pensions Act, s. 4, and a certificate of the Collector was accordingly unnecessary. *TIRUMALAI NAIK v. BANGARU TIRUMALAI SAURI NAIK* . I. L. R. 21 Mad. 310

25. ——— and s. 6—*Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Omission to obtain, previous to suit, certificate enabling Court to entertain suit—Effect of certificate granted after the hearing.* Part of the property in suit consisted of land which was assumed in the Courts below to be held on terms bringing it within the Pensions Act, 1871. After the judgment, which disposed of the principal questions in the case, had been given, final judg-



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contd.**

s. 4—contd.

ment was suspended upon an objection that no certificate had been obtained under the Act. The certificate having been then obtained and delivered to the Court:—*Held*, that the original defect did not prevent the suit proceeding. **MAHAMMAD AZMAT ALI KHAN v. LALLA BEGUM** **I. L. R. 8 Calc. 422**  
**L. R. 9 I. A. 8**

**26.** ————— *Collector's certificate—Certificate not obtained when suit filed—Certificate not produced at hearing—Adjournment asked for and refused—Certificate accepted in appeal and placed on record—Practice.* A suit under the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871) is not bad *ab initio* by reason of its being filed without a Collector's certificate. Where at the hearing of such a suit the necessary certificate was not produced:—*Held*, that the Judge ought to have granted the plaintiffs' application for an adjournment, in order that the certificate might be obtained and produced. **JIJAJI PRATAPJI RAJE v. BALKRISHNA MAHADEO**  
**I. L. R. 17 Bom. 169**

**27.** ————— *and s. 9—Grant of land-revenue—Suit by assignees, zamindars, for arrears—Right of plaintiffs admitted by Government—Want of Collector's certificate, effect of.* The sections of the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871) restricting the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain suits relating to pensions of grants of money or land-revenue must be construed strictly. *Held*, that a suit by the assignees from Government of land-revenue, whose rights were admitted by Government, to recover arrears from persons admittedly liable to pay revenue to somebody, but who disputed plaintiff's right thereto, came within s. 9 of the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871) and was not barred by ss. 4 and 6 by reason of no certificate having been obtained as therein provided. **NAGAR MAL v. ALI AHMAD** . **I. L. R. 10 All. 396**

**28.** ————— *Suit in Court of Agent for Sirdars in the Deccan—Bom. Reg. XXI of 1827, ss. 4 and 6—Bom. Reg. II of 1827—Certificate of Collector.* A suit brought against a sirdar in the Court of the Agent for Sirdars in the Deccan, of the class specified in s. 4 of the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871), requires a Collector's certificate as provided by s. 6 of that Act. **DAJI NILKANTH NAGARKAR v. GANPATRAO NILKANTH NAGARKAR** . **I. L. R. 17 Bom. 224**

**29.** ————— *"Relating to," construction of—Grant—Civil Courts—Jurisdiction.* S. 4 of the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871), construed strictly as it must be, is entirely silent as to suits to recover possession of land, the revenue of which has been remitted. The words "no Civil Court shall entertain any suit relating to any pension or grant of money or land revenue," occurring in the section, cannot, without a manifest strain of words, cover a suit to recover the possession of land or to obtain a declaration of a right to hold land. The phrase "relating to," as occurring in

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contd.**

s. 4—contd.

an enactment restrictive of the right to sue, must be construed strictly, *i.e.*, in favour of the right to proceed. **BALVANT RAMCHANDRA v. SECRETARY OF STATE (1905)** . **I. L. R. 29 Bom. 480**

**30.** ————— *"Suit"—Execution proceedings—Payment of annuity charged on Saranjam lands—Liability of the son of the grantor to make the payment—Partition of family property—Income of a Saranjam village—Conciliation agreement—Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879), s. 44—Decree.* A conciliation agreement was filed in Court on the 16th June 1882, under s. 44 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879). It effected partition of family property between the brothers A and N. Under the agreement A undertook to pay to N R456-0-6 every year, and for the convenience of the parties this was to come out of the Saranjam lands, which had fallen to the share of A. The payment was regularly made during the lifetime of A, and after his death T, the son of A, continued to make the payment till 1899, when he stopped making any more payments. B, the son of N, who had died, then filed a *darkhast* to enforce the payment of 1889-1900. T objected to this *darkhast* on two grounds: (i) that a certificate under the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871) was necessary; and (ii) that A's interest having terminated with his death, the Saranjam must be considered as a fresh grant to the son, who was not liable to continue the payment. *Held*, (i) that a certificate under the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871) was not necessary, for the word "suit" in s. 4 of the Act does not include execution proceedings. **Vajiram v. Ranchordji**, **I. L. R. 16 Bom. 731**, followed; (ii) that A was a trustee in respect of the R456-0-6 for Narayan, the obligation to pay which would attach to the succeeding holders of the Saranjam and it followed that N and his descendants would have the right to call upon A and his descendants to account for their management of the Saranjam and pay to them R456-0-6 per annum. A consent decree can only be set aside upon the same grounds as an agreement can be set aside, *e.g.*, fraud or mistake or misrepresentation. *Per BATTY, J.*—"A Court executing a decree cannot question the jurisdiction of the Court, which passed it." "The present application in no way affects property falling within the purview of the Pensions Act, but seeks enforcement against the general assets of the judgment-debtor, whose liability under the decree is not made a charge on the Saranjam or cash allowance at all." That liability appears to have been imposed and accepted not as effecting any partition of the Saranjam property, but for the purpose of effecting equality in the partition of non-saranjam property, the Saranjam property being merely indicated as a fund available to the defendant for the purpose of discharging that liability. **TRIMBAKRAO v. BALVANTRAO (1905)**  
**I. L. R. 30 Bom. 101**



**PENSIONS ACT (XXIII OF 1871)—**  
*contd.*

— s. 4—*concl'd.*

31. ———— *Cash allowance from Government—Suit to recover a sum of money from the cash allowance—Suit based upon an agreement.* The plaintiff sued to recover a sum of money as the amount of her maintenance. She claimed under an agreement whereby the defendants agreed to pay her R52 every year for her maintenance out of a cash allowance which was received by the latter from Government. It was objected to the suit that it was bad in absence of a certificate from the Collector under s. 4 of the Pensions Act, 1871. *Held*, that the suit could not be taken cognizance of without a certificate under s. 4 of the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871). The words of the section were wide enough to include any suit to enforce such a claim provided it related to a pension or grant of money or of land revenue; it was immaterial whether the claim was based on an agreement between the parties or arose out of any other legal right or liability and whether it was a claim for a share by way of partition or maintenance or otherwise. *DAMODAR v. SATYABHAMA BAI* (1907) . . . **I. L. R. 31 Bom. 512**

32. ———— *Act does not apply to endowment for pious or religious purposes.* Endowments for religious or pious purposes do not fall within the purview of s. 4 of the Pensions Act and Civil Courts have jurisdiction to entertain suits in respect of such grants made by Government. *Subrahmaniam v. Secretary of State for India*, **I. L. R. 6 Mad. 361**, referred to. *Athavulla v. Gouse*, **I. L. R. 11 Mad. 283**, referred to. *Miya Vali Ulla v. Sayad Bava Santi Miya*, **I. L. R. 22 Bom. 496**, dissented from. *VENKATESWARA AIYAR v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* (1907)

**I. L. R. 31 Mad. 12**

33. ———— **ss. 4 and 6—Pension—Right to receive land-revenue granted by Government as a reward—Mortgage of right—Suit for foreclosure—Certificate of Collector not forthcoming—Procedure.** S. 4 of the Pensions Act, 1871, applies to a heritable right to receive land-revenue granted by the Government as a reward for services rendered. Where, therefore, such a right to receive land-revenue was included along with other property in a mortgage upon which a suit for foreclosure was brought, it was *held*, that, as regards the right to receive land-revenue the suit would not lie in the absence of the certificate required by s. 6 of the Pensions Act; and, time having been granted for the production of the necessary certificate, which was not produced, the dismissal of the suit *quoad hoc* was sustained. *Jijaji Pratabji Raje v. Balkrishna Mahadeo*, **I. L. R. 17. Bom. 169**, followed. *IHTISHAM ALI v. SHAM SUNDAR* (1902)

**I. L. R. 25 All. 73**

— ss. 4, 11—

*See ATTACHMENT* . . . **8 C. W. N. 665**

1. ———— **s. 6—Suit for a declaration of title to stanom of fifth Raja of Palghat.** Suit to declare plaintiff's title to the stanom of fifth Raja of

**PENSIONS ACT (XXIII OF 1871)—**  
*contd.*

— s. 6—*concl'd.*

Palghat; the first Raja (defendant No. 1) received a malikhana allowance from Government payable to the various stanomdars, but had refused to pay to plaintiff the fifth Raja's share. *Held*, that the suit was not one relating to any pension or grant of money or land revenue conferred by Government, but was merely a suit for a declaration as to the plaintiff's status; and the Pensions Act, s. 6, was therefore not applicable to the case. *KOMBI v. AUNDI* . . . **I. L. R. 13 Mad. 75**

2. ———— *Mortgage of desaigiri hak—Suit by mortgagee without certificate of Collector—Sale in execution of decree passed in such suit—Title of purchaser—Jurisdiction—Res judicata—Estoppel.* Where the mortgagee of a desaigiri hak, without obtaining the Collector's certificate under s. 6 of Act XXIII of 1871, sued the representative of the mortgagor to enforce the mortgage-debt by a sale of the hak, and obtained a decree without jurisdiction:—*Held*, that the proceedings in the suit were without jurisdiction, and that the decree could not constitute the basis of any title, or estop the representative from suing for a declaration of his right to the hak as a life-holder as against the purchaser at the auction sale held in execution of the decree. *Radhabhai v. Anantram Bhagvant*, **I. L. R. 9 Bom. 198**, followed. *VASANJI HARIBHAI v. LALLU AKHU* . . . **I. L. R. 9 Bom. 285**

3. ———— *Collector—Certificate—Civil Court—Suit to recover share of allowance for particular years—Certificate referring only to some years.* A certificate granted by the Collector under the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871) authorized the plaintiff to recover his share in the allowance for the years 1889-90 to 1896-97. On the strength of this certificate, the plaintiff brought a suit to recover his share of the allowance for the years covered by the certificate and also for the year 1897-98. The lower Appellate Court disallowed plaintiff's claim so far as it related to the year 1897-98, on the ground that that year was not mentioned in the certificate. *Held*, that the certificate given by the Collector might refer only to the plaintiff's share in the allowance for particular years, but if the Collector permitted the plaintiff to establish his right to a share in a Civil Court, the plaintiff was not bound under the Pensions Act to get a certificate for each year's allowance before suing for it. The general right being allowed and established, the right to each year's share follows as consequent upon it. *KRISHNAJI SAKHARAM v. ANANT* (1904)

**I. L. R. 28 Bom. 241**

4. ———— *Pension—Definition—Grant of village upon payment of a quit rent—Construction of document.* The common ancestor of the parties to a suit for partition of immoveable property had obtained one of the villages, which were the subject of the suit by grant from the Maharaja Scindhia in 1866. In 1861 this grant had been confirmed by the British Government by means of a *sanad* which contained the following material provision.



**PENSIONS ACT (XXIII OF 1871)—**  
*contd.***s. 6—concl'd.**

There was a declaration that the village in question shall be continued by the British Government to the grantee and his heirs inclusive of all lands, allowances and rights belonging to others, so long as he and his heirs shall continue loyal to the British Government and shall pay Rs800 to Government as quit rent. The *sanad* further contained a guarantee against any further payment by the holder on account of Imperial Land Revenue beyond the amount specified, and a declaration that the village and its holder shall be liable for any local taxation, which may be imposed in the district generally. *Held*, that these provisions did not amount to a grant of land revenue and the grant did not therefore fall within the purview of the Pensions Act, 1871. *Rarji Narayan Mandlik v. Dadaji Bapuji Desai*, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 523, referred to. *GANPAT RAO v. ANAND RAO* (1905) I. L. R. 28 All. 104

**s. 7—**

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—GIFT—VALIDITY.

**I. L. R. 9 All. 213**

1. ——— **s. 11—Toda garas hak—Liability to attachment—Attachment.** A toda garas hak is not exempted from attachment under a decree of a Civil Court by s. 11 of the Pensions Act of 1871. The word "pension" in s. 11 of the Pensions Act is used in its ordinary and well-known sense, viz., that of a periodical allowance or stipend granted, not in respect of any right, privilege, perquisite, or office, but on account of past service or particular merits, or as compensation to dethroned princes, their families, and dependants. A toda garas hak does not come within the meaning of the word "pension" which denotes something different from "a grant of money or revenue" as defined in s. 3 of the Act. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. KHEMCHAND JEYCHAND*

**I. L. R. 4 Bom. 432**

2. ——— **Attachment of bonus—Liability to attachment.** A bonus granted by Government in addition to a pension to an officer compulsorily retired on account of reductions in the public service is not a pension within the meaning of the Pensions Act, 1871, s. 11, and was liable to attachment in execution proceedings begun prior to June 1, 1882. *KHASIM v. CARLIER*

**I. L. R. 5 Mad. 272**

3. ——— **Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 266 (g)—Attachment of pensions payable to descendants of reigning family in Ceylon—Pensions payable in British India—Validity of attachment.** Certain descendants of the family which formerly reigned in Ceylon resided in British India, where the Collector of the district, on behalf of the Government of India, paid them pensions. Apparently, though this was not proved, the cost of these pensions was ultimately defrayed by the Government of Ceylon. These pensions were attached in execution of certain decrees. Upon application being made by the pensioners to have the attachments set aside:—*Held*,

**PENSIONS ACT (XXIII OF 1871)—**  
*contd.***s. 11—concl'd.**

that the pensions were exempt from attachment, as being "political pensions" within the meaning of s. 266 (g). *Per* Sir ARNOLD WHITE, C.J.—If the Government of India were to be regarded as merely the agent of the Ceylon Government for the purpose of paying the pensions, the Courts of British India would have no jurisdiction to proceed by way of attachment, since the rights of the pensioners (assuming them to be enforceable at law) would only be enforceable in Ceylon. *Ghansham Lal v. Bhansali*, I. L. R. 5 Bom. 249, and *Bishambhar Nath v. Imdud Ali Khan*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 216, referred to. *MUTHUSAMI NAIDU v. ALAGIA MANAVALA SIVIMALA RAJA* (1902)

**I. L. R. 26 Mad. 423**

4. ——— **Immoveable property granted in lieu of pension—Not a pension—Liable to attachment—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 266 (g).** Where certain immoveable property was granted in lieu of a pension and the *sanad* provided that upon the death of the original grantee the estate would be continued in perpetuity in the manner of an hereditary holding (*zamindari mauroosi*) and at the desire of the grantee revenue was assessed and the members of the family had treated it as ordinary *zamindari* property, subject simply to the payment of Government revenue, *held*, that the *zamindari* so granted was not a pension within the meaning of s. 11 of the Pensions Act, and was liable to attachment and sale in execution. *Lachmi Narain v. Makund Singh*, I. L. R. 26 All. 617, and *Secretary of State for India v. Khemchand Jaychand*, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 432, followed. *AMNA BIBI v. NAJUMUNNISSA* (1909)

**I. L. R. 31 All. 382**

1. ——— **s. 12—Assignment of pension before passing of Act.** On the 12th February 1865, A, who was in receipt of a *zihakhi* pension from Government, assigned by deed a portion thereof to his wife in lieu of her dower. After his death, disputes arose between the wife and the heirs of A in regard to a portion of the amount thus settled on her; and she instituted a suit, on a certificate granted by the Collector under s. 6 of the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871), in which she prayed for a declaration of her proprietary right in respect of the said money, and of her power to transfer the same. *Held*, that the assignment of the 12th February 1865, having been made before the passing of the Pensions Act, was not invalidated by s. 12 of that Act, which had no retrospective operation. *IMTIAZ BEGAM v. LIAKAT-UN-NISSA BEGAM*

**I. L. R. 7 All. 886**

Reversing on a re-hearing of the case (the first hearing having been *ex parte*). *IMTIAZ BEGAM v. LIAKAT-UN-NISSA BEGAM* . I. L. R. 6 All. 630

2. ——— **Political pension of Zamorin of Calicut—"Payable"—Power of disposition by will.** The Zamorin of Calicut, whether he be or not a member of a *kovilagam*, is entitled to dispose of the separate property by a will. The Zamorin, by his will, bequeathed to the plaintiff



**PENSIONS ACT (XXIII OF 1871)—**  
*concl'd.*s. 12—*concl'd.*

the malikana due to him from the Government which might be in arrears at the time of his death. The malikana was a political pension of R6,000 a month, payable quarterly. The Zamorin died on the 6th of August 1892. The plaintiff, having obtained a certificate under Pensions Act, s. 6, now sued the new Zamorin to recover the proportionate amount of the pension for the current quarter up to the time of the Zamorin's death. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the amount sued for. *SRIDEVI v. KRISHNAN*

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 105

s. 14—*Rule (6) framed under the Act—Suit for recovery of varshusan allowance—Collector's certificate—Cancellation of certificate by Revenue Commissioner.* When a certificate is granted by the Collector under s. 6 of the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871), the presumption is, until the contrary is shown, that the order for granting the certificate was made, as is contemplated by the 6th rule framed under the Act, with the previous sanction of the Revenue Commissioner by the Collector himself. But the Revenue Commissioner has no power vested in him to cancel a certificate granted by the Collector, and there is no rule which provides for the revision by the Revenue Commissioner of the Collector's action in granting certificates or for the cancellation by him of the certificates granted by the latter. *BHIMBHAT GOTKHANDI v. BHIKAMBHAT*

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 676

**PEON.**

See ARREST—CRIMINAL ARREST.

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 457

See PENAL CODE, s. 186.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 596 ; 759

See PUBLIC SERVANTS.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 344

1. ———— *Appointment of—Nazir, power of—Beng. Act V of 1863, ss. 3, 12.* By Bengal Act V of 1863 the appointment of peons was vested in the Nazir, subject to the approval of the Judge, by whatever title designated (ss. 3 and 12), and no superior authority was competent to control such appointment or to restrict the choice of the Nazir. *In the matter of the petition of GOOROO DYAL SINGH*

9 W. R. 333

2. ———— *Officers of Munsif's Court—Power of Judge.* All officers of a Munsif's Court are appointed by him, subject to the approval of the Judge, who should hear what any person aggrieved has to say, and determine whether the Munsif has rightly exercised his authority. *In the matter of GOOROODASS BHUTTACHARJEE*

11 W. R. 158

3. ———— *Appointment of officers in Munsif's Court—Power of Judge—Beng. Act V of 1863.* A Judge is not warranted in interfering with the appointment of peons made in a Munsif's Court under Bengal Act V of 1863 and approved by the Munsif. *In the matter of SOMEROODDEEN*

11 W. R. 159

**PERIM, ISLAND OF.**

law in force in—

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—  
OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTY IN  
ONE DISTRICT—MURDER.

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 258 ; 263

**PERJURY.**

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—PROCE-  
DURE . B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 426

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ss. 133,  
342, 488 . 9 C. W. N. 983

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 729

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 581

See FALSE EVIDENCE.

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—WHEN  
SANCTION MAY BE GRANTED.

3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 10

13 C. W. N. 422

assignment of—

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 808

Charges relating to several false statements in the same deposition—*Misjoinder—Reading deposition to witness in the presence of a pleader for one of several accused—Interpreter, omission to administer oath to—Admissibility of deposition and proof of statement of the witness on a subsequent trial for perjury.* The making of any number of false statement in the same deposition is one aggregate case of giving false evidence, and such charges cannot be multiplied according to the number of false statements contained in a deposition. *Mad. H. C. Pro., 1st May 1871, 6 Mad. H. C. XXVII*, followed. S. 361 (1) is sufficiently complied with if the deposition of a witness is read over to him in the presence of a pleader for one out of twenty-seven accused. A deposition so read over is admissible against the witness on his trial subsequently for giving false evidence. *Kamatchinathan Chetty v. Emperor, I. L. R. 28 Mad. 308*, and *Mohendra Nath Misser v. Emperor, 12 C. W. N. 845*, distinguished. The omission to administer an oath to an interpreter under s. 5 (d) of the Oaths Act (X of 1873), does not, by reason of s. 13, render the evidence of a witness whose evidence was interpreted by him inadmissible against the latter on his subsequent trial for giving false evidence. The only effect of the omission is to make it incumbent on the prosecution to prove the accuracy of the translation. *Queen v. Ramsodoy Chuckerbutty, 20 W. R. Cr. 19*, approved. *RAKHAL CHUNDER LAHA v. EMPEROR (1909)*

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 808

**PERMANENT RESIDENCE.**

See DIVORCE . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 964

**PERMANENT SETTLEMENT.**

See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—EXEMPTION  
FROM ENHANCEMENT BY UNIFORM PAY-  
MENT OF RENT, AND PRESUMPTION.



**PERMANENT SETTLEMENT—contd.**

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MAPS.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 291  
7 C. W. N. 849

See REVENUE SALE LAW, s. 37.

10 C. W. N. 503

\_\_\_\_\_ districts to which it has not  
been extended—See BENGAL RENT ACT, 1869, ss. 16 AND  
17 . . . . . 8 B. L. R. 280\_\_\_\_\_ grant of incorporeal right at the  
time of—

See BETTIAH RAJ . . . 13 C. W. N. 454

1. \_\_\_\_\_ Date of settlement. The date  
of the permanent settlement was March 22nd, 1793.  
RAJESSUREE DEBIA v. SHIBNATH CHATTERJEE

4 W. R., Act X, 42

DHUNPUT SINGH v. GOOMAN SINGH

W. R. 1864, Act X, 61

PORAN BEBEE v. ALLY KHAN

W. R. 1864, Act X, 61

2. \_\_\_\_\_ District of Jessore. The date of the permanent settlement for  
the district of Jessore was April 11th, 1790. HURO  
NATH ROY v. AMEER BISWAS . . . 1 W. R. 2313. \_\_\_\_\_ Permanent settlement, reference to, in Act X of 1859—*Subsequent settlements*. The words "Permanent Settlement" in Act X of 1859 refer to the permanent settlement of 1793, and not to permanent settlements subsequently made. SHEOBURN LALL v. RAM PURTAP SINGH . . . 3 W. R., Act X, 204. \_\_\_\_\_ Adverse possession by Government of permanently-settled estate—*Limitation—Adverse possession—Limitation Act of 1859 (XIV of 1859), s. 1, cl. 6—Award of Revenue Courts—Judicial award—Permanent-settlement Regulations, effect of—Reg. I of 1793—Thak or survey, binding effect of*. There is nothing in the Regulations to which the permanently-settled estates of Bengal owe their origin to indicate that the Government intended to guarantee to the proprietors the absolute preservation of their estates. By the Regulations the Government declared that, as regards the estates that came within the scope of the permanent settlement, it withdrew its sovereign right to vary the assessments; beyond that, they did not go; they do not constitute a contractual relationship between the Government and the owners of permanently-settled estates, or any such relationship as would debar Government from claiming and exercising against those owners the rights of an ordinary proprietor. Although therefore Government continues to receive the full revenue from the proprietor of a permanently-settled estate for the entire estate, the former is not precluded from claiming title by adverse possession in respect of any portion thereof. When a person is let into possession of a particular property by another claiming it to be his own, the former cannot contend, after the expiration of his tenancy**PERMANENT SETTLEMENT—concl'd.**that the latter (*i.e.*, the person alleging himself to be the owner) cannot acquire an adverse title against him as well as others by efflux of time. *Kally Churn Sahoo v. Secretary of State*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 725, referred to. KRISTO MONI GUPTA v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA . . . 3 C. W. N. 99**PERMANENT TENANCY.**See BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885),  
ss. 50, 106 . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 287

See BHAGDARI AND NARWADARI ACT.

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 183

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—NATURE OF  
TENANCY—PERMANENT TENANCY.

\_\_\_\_\_ presumption as to—

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 902

\_\_\_\_\_ *Permanent tenure, proof of—Origin of grant not known—Grant for residential purposes—Substantial structures*. Where the original nature of the grant was unknown and it was found that the predecessors in interest of the defendants who were purchasers in execution of a decree were tenants on the land and were in occupation for nearly sixty years, and that they raised substantial structures on the land and the grant was for the purpose of residence: *Held*, that the lower Courts were justified in drawing the inference that the holding was permanent. GRANT v. ROBINSON (1906) . . . 11 C. W. N. 242**PERMIT.**

\_\_\_\_\_ failure to obtain—

See CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CONSOLIDATION  
ACT, 1888, s. 412.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 605

**PERPETUAL INJUNCTION.**

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 260.

10 C. W. N. 297

See INJUNCTION.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 944

See SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, s. 55.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 944

**PERPETUITIES.**See HINDU LAW—WILL—CONSTRUCTION  
OF WILLS—PERPETUITIES, TRUSTS, ETC.  
See JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1065

See LIFE ESTATE . . . 5 C. W. N. 569

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—ENDOWMENT.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 666

See PARSIS . . . I. L. R. 6 Bom. 151

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 355

See WILL—CONSTRUCTION.

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 441

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 424; 448

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 112



**PERPETUITIES—concl'd.**

rules against—

*See* LEASE . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 675

Application of rule against perpetuities—*Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 101—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 14—Moveable property.* The rule against perpetuities [Indian Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 101, and Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 14] applies to moveable as well as immoveable property. *COWASJI NOWROJI POCHKHANAWALLA v. RUSTOMJI DOSSABHOY SETNA* . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 511

**PERSONA DESIGNATA.***See* HINDU LAW—WILL—CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS—ADOPTION.*See* WILL—CONSTRUCTION. I. L. R. 15 Mad. 448**PERSONAL COVENANT.***See* LIMITATION . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 672**PERSONAL DECREE.***See* DECREE EX PARTE. I. L. R. 35 Calc. 767*See* HINDU LAW—WIDOW—DECREES AGAINST WIDOW AS REPRESENTING THE ESTATE OR PERSONALLY.*See* HUSBAND AND WIFE. 8 B. L. R. 372**PERSONAL SERVICE.***See* CONTRACT . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 354**PERSONALTY, LAW RELATING TO.***See* ENGLISH LAW I. L. R. 24 Calc. 216**PERSONS NOT PARTIES TO SUIT.***See* COSTS—SPECIAL CASES—THIRD PERSONS.

right of, to question order in execution

*See* LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 179—LAW APPLICABLE TO APPLICATION IN EXECUTION OF DECREE.

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 491

**PETITION.***See* COMPLAINT . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1*See* COMPROMISE . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 837*See* EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS—PETITIONS.

Marsh. 75

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 334

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*See* EVIDENCE ACT, s. 35.

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 19

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*See* EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS—PETITIONS.**PETITION—concl'd.**

amendment of—

*See* EXECUTION OF DECREE—APPLICATION FOR EXECUTION AND POWER OF COURT.

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 67

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 631

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*See* GUARDIAN—APPOINTMENT.

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 357

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*See* PRACTICE—CRIMINAL CASES—PETITION FOR BAIL I. L. R. 15 Bom. 488

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*See* ADMINISTRATION . 3 B. L. R. Ap. 3

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*See* BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 158.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 602

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 197

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*See* ESTOPPEL—ESTOPPEL BY DEEDS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS.

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 304

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*See* INSOLVENT ACT, s. 7 . 6 B. L. R. 558  
I. L. R. 7 Bom. 411

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*See* INSOLVENT ACT, s. 7 . 6 B. L. R. 310

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*See* CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 548 (1859, s. 341). 4 B. L. R. Ap. 103  
8 W. R. 141

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*See* PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 879

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 491

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 404

**PETROLEUM ACT (VIII OF 1899).**

ss. 1 (3), 11 and 15—*Also the repealed Act (XII of 1886), ss. 2 (2), 10, 15—Kerosine oil, possession of, exceeding statutory quantity—Notification in Gazette extending repealed Act to Cuttack—New Act not expressly preserving same—General Clauses Act (X of 1897), ss. 8, 24, notification preserved by—Fresh notification, if necessary—Notification, if "order."* The accused had been convicted under ss. 11 and 15 of the Indian Petroleum Act, 1899, for being in possession of 148 tins of kerosine oil at Cuttack, a place to which similar provisions of the



**PETROLEUM ACT (VIII OF 1889)—**  
*concl'd.*

Petroleum Act of 1886 had been extended by a notification in the Calcutta Gazette, dated 7th April 1891. *Held*, that the notification of 1891 made the present Act applicable to Cuttack, and the conviction was right. That notification has been preserved by the operation of ss. 8 and 24 of the General Clauses Act, although the Act of 1886 itself was repealed and there is no provision in the present Act expressly preserving the notifications issued under the provisions of the repealed Act. The notification was an "order," within the meaning of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act, and a second notification in the Gazette under the new Act, on the repeal of the old Act, was unnecessary. *PADAN SAHA v. EMPEROR* (1903) . . . . . 7 C. W. N. 658

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\_\_\_\_\_ photographic facsimile of will attached to probate—

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**PHULKAR, RIGHT OF—**

\_\_\_\_\_ *Proprietorship in soil.*  
Phulkar, or the right of gathering fruits, is a right indicative of a certain dominion over the soil. *LEELANUND SINGH v. MOHESHUR SINGH* 3 W. R. P. C. 19 : 10 Moo. I. A. 81

**PILGRIMS.**

\_\_\_\_\_ contract to carry—

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 56.  
I. L. R. 14 Bom. 147

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See RIGHT OF SUIT—PUBLIC WORSHIP, SUITS REGARDING RIGHT OF.

**PILOTS.**

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**PIN MONEY.**

See MAHOMEDAN LAW.  
13 C. W. N. 153

**PITRIDATTA AYAUTUKA STRI-DHAN.**

See HINDU LAW—SUCCESSION.  
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 86

**PLAINT.**

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| 1. GENERAL CONSTRUCTION OF PLEADINGS . . . . . | 9424 |
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1. GENERAL CONSTRUCTION OF PLEADINGS.
1. \_\_\_\_\_ Pleadings in Courts in India.  
 Pleadings in Indian Courts should not be construed with the same strictness as they are in the English Courts. NAWAB NAZIM OF BENGAL *v.* AMRAO BEGUM . . . . . 21 W. R. 59  
*See* GIRDHAREE SINGH *v.* KOOLAHUL SINGH.  
 6 W. R. P. C. 1 : 2 Moo. I. A. 344  
 MOKUDDIMS OF MOUZAH KUNKUNWADY *v.* ENAMDAR BRAHMINS OF MOUZAH SOORPAL.  
 7 W. R. P. C. 8 : 3 Moo. I. A. 383  
 MOHESH CHUNDER MOOKERJEE *v.* RAMDHUN PAL.  
 13 W. R. 248
2. \_\_\_\_\_ Primary and secondary relief. *Z* and his three minor sons were joint owners of a village which *Z* hypothecated by deed of simple mortgage to *J*. Subsequently *Z* executed another deed of mortgage to *J*, part of the consideration whereof was the cancellation of the former bond, which was paid off and extinguished accordingly. *J*, however, fraudulently caused it to appear from the novating document that the former mortgage was still alive, and, after the death of *Z*, put the bond in suit against *Z*'s widow, who, being ignorant of the fraud, confessed judgment as guardian of her minor sons; and the entire right and interest of *Z*'s heirs were sold in execution of the decree obtained by *J*. Subsequently the fraud was discovered and *Z*'s sons brought a suit to set aside the execution sale and to recover possession of the property first mortgaged. In regard to three-fourths of this property, they prayed that “possession might be awarded to them by establishment of their right and share by amendment of the revenue papers.” In regard to the remaining one-fourth, they prayed for possession “by right of inheritance to *Z*” by cancelment of the execution sale and of the fraudulent decree. *Held*, that pleadings in the



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Indian Courts must be not construed with the same strictness as in English Courts; that although in an informal and loose way, what the plaintiff substantially set out, as the primary relief sought, was the entire avoidance of the decree and the proceedings resulting therefrom as vitiated by fraud, and, as secondary relief, to be granted, if the Court should not see its way to setting aside those proceedings, a declaration that they took effect only as regards one-fourth of the property. *Nawab Nazim v. Amrao Begum*, 21 W. R. 59, referred to. *NATHU SINGH v. JODHA SINGH* . I. L. R. 6 All. 406

3. ———— *Pleadings—Reliefs of a nature different from the case made out in the plaint.* No declaration ought to be granted where the case upon which the declaration is sought to be obtained not only is not the case made in the plaint but is one that is wholly inconsistent with it. *Eshen Chunder Singh v. Shama Churn Bhutto*. 11 Moo. I. A. 7, referred to. *RAI JATINDRA NATH CHAUDHURI v. AMRITA LAL BAGCHI* (1900)

5 C. W. N. 20

## 2. ADMISSION OF PLAINT.

——— *Holiday—Stamp duty.* The reception of a plaint for arrears of rent by the Collector on Good Friday, although by the Circular Order of the Board of Revenue such day is an authorized holiday, is not illegal. There is no legality in the reception of a plaint engrossed on insufficient stamp paper, if the full amount of the stamp duty has been paid at the time. *GOBIND KUMAR CHOWDHRY v. HARGOPAL NAG*

3 B. L. R. Ap. 72 : 11 W. R. 537

## 3. FORM AND CONTENTS OF PLAINT.

## (a) CAUSE OF ACTION.

1. ———— *Limitation—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 26.* In a suit to recover possession plaintiff is bound, under s. 26, Act VIII of 1859, to give the date on which he was dispossessed as accurately as possible, especially where one of the issue is whether he has been in occupation of the land within twelve years of suit. *BOYDONATH SURMA v. OJAN BIBEE* . . . 11 W. R. 238

2. ———— *Plaint not showing when cause of action arose.* A plaintiff is bound by the Civil Procedure Code to show on the face of the plaint that his cause of action accrued within the period of limitation. Where an assignment to himself is a material part of a plaintiff's cause of action, he ought to allege the fact in his plaint. *BROOKE v. GIBBON* . . . 21 W. R. 47

3. ———— *Objection to cause of action being barred.* S. 32 of Act VIII of 1859 imposes upon the Court of first instance the duty of taking any legal objection apparent on the face of the plaint; see *Balava kom Basangouda v. Shigouda valad Kadapa*, 7 Bom. A. C. 99, and

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the fact that a portion of the claim is evidently barred by the law of limitation from which no ground of exemption is stated, is an objection which ought to be noticed by the Court when receiving the plaint or if not taken notice of, then it may be at any subsequent stage of the suit. *SALUJI KESRAJI v. RAJSANGJI JALMSANGJI*

2 Bom. 169 : 2nd Ed. 162

4. ———— *Taking plaint off the file—Indefiniteness—Omission to show suit not barred.* A plaint which merely stated that the cause of action arose previous to 21st August 1869, and which did not show that the suit was not barred by limitation, was ordered to be taken off the file. *SONAMULL v. SUNARAM ROTTI* 8 B. L. R. Ap. 23

5. ———— *Plaint not showing when cause of action arose.* The fact of A's plaint not showing when the cause of action arose is ground for rejecting the plaint, but no ground for finding on the trial that the suit is barred upon an issue raised as to limitation. *KALLYNATH SHAW v. RAJEEBLOCHUN MOZOOMDAR*

2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 343

6. ———— *Omission to state when cause of action arose in plaint—Amendment of plaint.* A suit in which the plaint discloses a cause of action falling within the period of limitation should not be dismissed after the framing of issues merely because the Court considers that an erroneous date has been assigned in the plaint as the cause of action. The plaint should be amended. *SHEORAJ SINGH v. NUR KHAN* . 7 N. W. 354

7. ———— *Multifariousness.* A plaintiff's cause of action is every fact which a plaintiff must prove to support his case. A cause of action arises when a legal right is infringed, and the date and place of its accrual must be inserted in the plaint. Where the plaintiff claimed the ownership of the properties in suit through her late husband, and alleged that her rights had been infringed at different times and by different sets of defendants, and it was found that the latter did not act in concert and did not combine together to dispossess the plaintiff: *Held*, that there were separate causes of action against separate sets of persons, and the trial could not proceed as upon a single cause of action. *RAM PROSAD v. SACHI DASSI* (1902)

6 C. W. N. 585

## (b) FRAME OF SUITS GENERALLY.

8. ———— *Paper referred to in plaint.* A paper referred to in a plaint is not a part of the plaint. *TOULTON v. GWYTHER*

Bourke O. C. 273

9. ———— *Schedule to plaint—Statement of cause of action.* The schedule appended to a plaint cannot disclose a cause of action not revealed in the plaint. *MUZHUR HOSSAIN v. DINO-BUNDO SEN* . . . Bourke O. C. 8 : Cor. 94



**PLAINT—contd.****3. FORM AND CONTENTS OF PLAINT—contd.****(b) FRAME OF SUITS GENERALLY—contd.**

**LUCKEY MONEY DOSSEE v. KHETTER COOMARY DOSSEE** . . . . . **2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 117**

**10. ——— Defects in plaintiff—Plaint showing good cause of action—Ground for dismissal of suit.** A suit should not be dismissed for mere defects in the plaintiff, if the evidence shows there is a good cause of action. **GOLAM ALI CHOWDHRY v. FUTTICK CHUNDER** . . . . . **10 W. R. 460**

**11. ——— Plaintiff showing good cause of action—Ground for dismissal of suit.** If a plaintiff discloses a cause of action, a Judge on appeal ought not to dismiss the suit, on the ground merely of defect in the allegations in the plaintiff. **KASEENAUTH MOOR v. REEJOONISSA**  
**Marsh. 198 : 1 Hay 467**

**12. ——— Inaccuracy of language—Ground for dismissal of suit—Construction of plaintiff.** A plaintiff's suit should not be dismissed because, in describing his cause of action, strictly accurate language has not been used. A plaintiff should not be construed literally, but according to the plaintiff's real meaning, unless such meaning is inconsistent with the words used in the plaintiff, so as to deceive the defendant and prejudice his defence. **INGLIS v. RAM SINGH**  
**W. R. F. B. 159**

**PITAMBUR MOOKERJEE v. HUREE NARAIN THAKOOR** . . . . . **W. R. 1864, 50**

**13. ——— Want of distinctness in plaintiff—Ground for dismissal of appeal.** A suit should not be dismissed at the last stage of the proceedings in regular appeal for want of sufficient distinctness in the plaintiff, but such defect may be cured by examining the plaintiff or his pleader on that point. **JUGMOHUN TEWAREE v. BULDEO NAIK** . . . . . **3 Agra 162**

**ABDOOLLAH v. SHAHA MUJEESOODDEEN.**  
**15 W. R. 286**

**14. ——— Indistinctness and obscurity of plaintiff—Ground for refusal to give decree.** A Court is justified in refusing to give a decree upon a plaintiff which it deems to be intentionally indistinct and obscure. **MAHOMED HOSSEIN v. KRISHNO CHURN MISSEER** . . . . . **20 W. R. 147**

**See RAM DAYAL DUTT v. RAM DOOLAL DEB** . . . . . **11 W. R. 273**

**15. ——— Charges of fraud—Pleading.** A plaintiff charging fraud must set forth particulars; general allegations, however strong the words, not even amounting to an averment of fraud of which a Court can take notice. **GUNGA NARAIN GUPTA v. TILUCKRAM CHOWDRY**  
**I. L. R. 15 Calc. 533**  
**L. R. 15 I. A. 119**

**16. ——— Mistake in plaintiff—Ground for dismissal of suit.** A suit should not be dismissed for what is obviously a mere mistake in the plaintiff,

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*viz.*, the erroneous statement of the date of a mortgage made many years before the plaintiff acquired an interest in the property, where all the parties to it were dead, and the deed itself lost. **LALLA DABEE PERSHAD v. BEHAREE LALL** . . . . . **3 Agra 33**

**MOHUN LALL v. NOOR KHAN** . . . . . **3 Agra 218**

**17. ——— Return and amendment of plaintiff—Ground for dismissal of suit.** A suit cannot be dismissed merely on the ground that the plaintiff did not contain a specification of the land in the defendant's possession, and that there was an error in the plaintiff in the description of the defendant's residence. **REZA ALI v. PURNANAND CHUCKERBUTTY**  
**6 B. L. R. Ap. 84 : 14 W. R. 474**

**18. ——— Suit for account—Principal and agent.** Discussion as to form of plaintiff in suits for an account. **GOBIND MOHUN CHUCKERBUTTY v. SHERIFF I** **L. R. 7 Calc. 169 : 8 C. L. R. 357**

**SHOOSHI BHOOSUN PAL v. GURU CHURUN MOOKHOPADHYA**  
**I. L. R. 7 Calc. 89 : 8 C. L. R. 285**

**19. ——— Money, suits for—Suit for sums due on taking accounts—Civil Procedure Code, s. 50.** Under s. 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), if a plaintiff seeks the recovery of money, the plaintiff must state the precise amount so far as the case admits; while in a suit for the amount which will be found due on taking unsettled accounts, the plaintiff need only state approximately the amount sued for. As in the former instance the precise amount, so in the latter the approximate amount stated in the plaintiff, must be taken to be the amount of value of the subject matter of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction. **KHUSHALCHAND MULCHAND v. NAGINDAS MOTICHAND** . . . . . **I. L. R. 12 Bom. 675**

**20. ——— Partnership suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, Sch. IV, form 113.** The plaintiff in a partnership suit ought to be framed on the lines of form 113 in Sch. IV of the Code, and the accounts should be taken as prayed in that form. **RAM CHUNDER SHAHA v. MANICK CHUNDER MANIKYA**  
**I. L. R. 7 Calc. 428 : 9 C. L. R. 157**

**21. ——— Suit by sole surviving partner to recover partnership debt.** In a suit brought by a sole surviving partner to recover a partnership debt, the plaintiff, if properly framed, ought to allege that the debt of which recovery is prayed was a partnership debt, that the deceased partner had died before the suit, and that the suit was brought by the plaintiff as surviving partner for his own benefit and that of the estate, but the suit should not be dismissed merely because the plaintiff did not contain these averments. **Jell v. Douglas, 4 B. & Ald. 347.** **GOBIND PRASAD v. CHANDAR SEKHAR** . . . . . **I. L. R. 9 All. 486**



**PLAINT—contd.****3. FORM AND CONTENTS OF PLAINT—contd.****(b) FRAME OF SUITS GENERALLY—contd.**

**22. ——— Suit to remove bunds on river—Interruption to flow of water.** How a plaint should be framed in a suit for removal of certain bunds which interrupted the plaintiff's right to a flow of water from a river, considered. *COURT OF WARDS v. LILANTUND SINGH*

4 B. L. R. Ap. 30 : 13 W. R. 48

**23. ——— Suit for fishing in tank without permission—Suit for damages and trespass.** Where the owner of a tank wishes to bring a suit against a person for fishing in the tank without his permission, the plaint should be framed for the recovery of damages for trespass, and should not be based on an alleged dispossession by reason of the defendants fishing in the tank. *LUKHIMONI DASI v. KORUNA KANT MOITRO* . 3. C. L. R. 509

**24. ——— Suit to set aside deed of sale—Civil Procedure Code, s. 50—Inconsistent causes of action—Inconsistency in pleading the suit.** In a suit for cancellation of a sale-deed by the person whose name appeared on it was executant, it was alleged in the plaint that it was a forgery, and that if it was not a forgery, its execution had been obtained by fraud, and that it was, moreover, void for want of consideration. *Held*, that the gist of the plaintiff's charge against the defendant being that she had never executed a sale-deed in his favour, and that the document set up by him was a forgery. It was not competent to the plaintiff to combine with this charge as an alternative the wholly inconsistent charge that, if she did execute the document, no consideration was received by her or that fraud had been practised upon her. *Mahomed Buksh Khan v. Hosseini Bibi*, I. L. R. 15 Cal. 684 ; L. R. 15 I. A. 81, followed. *IYYAPPA v. RAMALAKSHMAMMA* . I. L. R. 13 Mad. 549

**25. ——— Suit for reliefs inconsistent with each other—Ground for dismissing suit.** *Held*, that the fact that a plaintiff claims in his plaint two alternative reliefs which are inconsistent with each other is no ground in itself for the dismissal of the suit. *Iyyappa v. Ramalakshamma*, I. L. R. 13 Mad. 549, dissented from. *Mahomed Buksh Khan v. Husseini Bibi*, I. L. R. 15 Cal. 684 ; L. R. 15 I. A. 81, referred to. *JINO v. MANON*

I. L. R. 18 All. 125

**26. ——— Cause of action—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 116—"Contract in writing, registered," signed by one party thereto—Sufficient disclosure of cause of action.** During the course of certain litigation in which B was suing A on a promissory note, a compromise was arrived at under which A undertook to execute a mortgage in favour of B, and, in consideration thereof, B undertook to withdraw an appeal which was pending at the time. The mortgage was executed, and the undertaking to withdraw the appeal was embodied in the mortgage deed, which was registered, but signed only by A. B, in breach of his undertaking, permitted the appeal to proceed and obtained a

**PLAINT—contd.****3. FORM AND CONTENTS OF PLAINT—contd.****(b) FRAME OF SUITS GENERALLY—concl'd.**

decree on 20th November, 1891, which he subsequently executed against A, recovering the value of the promissory note upon which he had originally sued. He also retained the mortgage which had been executed in the compromise. A now sued to recover from B the amount which B had collected under the decree, stating the cause of action as having arisen on the date of that collection, namely, 29th October, 1893, when it was contended that the suit was not maintainable inasmuch as the decree had not been set aside, and that, even if treated as a suit for damages for breach of the undertaking to withdraw the appeal, it was barred as the date of the breach was the date of the decree (*viz.*, 20th November, 1891), which had been wrongly obtained and this suit had not been brought within three years from that date, the plaint having been filed on 14th September, 1896. *Held*, that, inasmuch as all necessary allegations were made in the plaint, the contract and its breach being alleged, and as the defendant understood what the claim against him was, the plaint sufficiently disclosed a cause of action for damages for the breach of contract. *Held*, also, that the undertaking in the mortgage was "an agreement in writing, registered," within the meaning of Art. 116 of Sch. II to the Limitation Act, and that consequently the claim was not barred. The fact that the instrument was not signed by B did not take the case out of the operation of that article. *KOTAPPA v. VALLUR ZAMINDAR* (1901) . . . I. L. R. 25 Mad. 50

**(c) PLAINTIFFS.**

**27. ——— Suit by a firm.** *Per PEACOCK, C.J.*—A suit by a firm should not be brought in the name of the firm, but in the names of the members who constitute the firm. *PULIN BEHARI SEN v. WATSON* . . . B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 904

S.C. POOLIN BEHAREE SEN v. WATSON

9 W. R. 190

*GOSSAIN GUNGA DUTT BHARUTEE v. DABEE DASS BABOO* . . . 25 W. R. 118

**28. ——— Suit by Club—Goods supplied to a member—Parties.** An action to recover the price of goods supplied to a member of a non-proprietary club or on his responsibility cannot be brought in the name of the secretary of the club. *MICHAEL v. BRIGGS* . I. L. R. 14 Mad. 362

**29. ——— Suit by Company—Corporation, Suit by—Plaintiff, Misdescription of—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 435—Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 41.** A plaint was filed in which the plaintiff was described as J, manager of the X Company, Limited, and in the body of the plaint several allusions were made to the "plaintiff company," and the claim made in the plaint was a claim made on behalf of the company. It was not suggested that the X Company was a company authorized to sue or be sued in the name of an offi-



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cer or trustee nor was it shown that it was registered as a corporation under s. 41 of the Indian Companies Act. *Held*, that the suit was badly framed, and that it should be dismissed. *CAMPBELL v. JACKSON* . . . **I. L. R. 12 Calc. 41**

**30.** ———— *Form of plaint in suit by company in liquidation—Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 144.* *Held*, that a plaint in a suit by a bank in liquidation in which the plaintiff was described as "The Official Liquidator, Himalaya Bank, Limited, in liquidation," and which was also subscribed and verified in the same terms, was not a valid plaint, having regard to the terms of s. 144 of the Indian Companies Act, 1882, and that the defect could not be cured by amendment. *In re Winterbottom, L. R. 18 Q. B. D. 416*, referred to. *GHULAM MUHAMMAD v. HIMALAYA BANK* . . . **I. L. R. 17 All. 292**

**31.** ———— *Suit by Official Liquidator—Description of plaintiff—Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 144—Civil Procedure Code, s. 53—Amendment of plaint—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 22.* In a suit to recover a debt to a company which had gone into liquidation, the plaintiff was described in the plaint as "The Official Liquidator, Himalaya Bank, Limited, in liquidation," and the plaint as signed and verified in the same terms. On objection taken by the defendant the plaint was allowed to be amended, but after the period of limitation prescribed for the suit had expired, so as to read "The Himalaya Bank, Limited, in liquidation, plaintiff." *Held* by the Full Bench, that the plaint as originally filed was in substantial compliance with the provisions of Act VI of 1882; and that, even if it might be considered that the amendment made was necessary, such amendment did not introduce a new plaintiff into the suit so as to let in the operation of s. 22 of Act XV of 1877. *Ghulam Muhammad v. Himalaya Bank, I. L. R. 17 All. 292*, overruled. *In re Winterbottom, L. R. 18 Q. B. D. 416*, distinguished. *MUHAMMAD YUSUF v. HIMALAYA BANK* . . . **I. L. R. 18 All. 198**

**32.** ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 435—Company—Corporation—Unincorporated society.* The corporation contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure is a corporation as known in English law, that is, a corporation created with the express consent of the Sovereign, or of such antiquity that the consent of the Sovereign may be presumed. In a suit by an unregistered and unincorporated society the names of the members of the company must be disclosed. If this is not done and if the society is neither a corporation nor a company authorized to sue or be sued in the name of an officer or of a trustee, so as to make the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, s. 435, applicable, the plaint is a bad plaint. *Kylash Chandra Roy v. Ellis, 8 W. R. 45*; *Muhammadan Association of Meerut v. Bukhshi Ram, I. L. R. 6 All. 284*; and

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*Yusuf Beg v. The Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church of New York, I. L. R. 16 All. 420*, referred to. *PANCHAITI AKHARA KALAN UDASI v. GAURI KUAR* . . . **I. L. R. 20 All. 167**

**33.** ———— *Suit on behalf of minor—Suit by mother as guardian—Description of plaintiff.* It is not absolutely necessary for the mother to describe herself as guardian in the plaint, when the suit is evidently brought by her as mother of her minor son. *GOONO MONEE DEBIA v. RAM KUMOL SANDLE* . . . **17 W. R. 144**

**34.** ———— *Description of plaintiff—Objection to frame of suit.* In a suit brought on behalf of a minor by his next friend it is not necessary for the next friend to have a certificate under Act XL of 1858, provided he has, in fact, permission of the Court to sue. Where a suit was brought in the name of A for self and as guardian of her daughter B, a minor, and it was objected that it should have been brought in the names of A and of B, a minor, by her next friend and guardian, *Held*, that, as no one was misled or injured by the improper form of the plaint, the objection ought not to be held fatal, but the decree must be taken to be in favour of A and of B suing by A as if the suit had been properly framed. *ALIM BUKSH FAKIR v. JHALO BIBI* . . . **I. L. R. 12 Calc. 48**

**35.** ———— *Suit by manager of minor's property—Beng. Act IV of 1870.* A suit brought by minors through the manager of their property as next friend must follow the form prescribed by Bengal Act IV of 1870. *JOYRAM LALL MAHTOON v. STEWART* . . . **20 W. R. 453**

**36.** ———— *Suit against administrator of minor for an account—Minors Act (Bombay) XX of 1864—Misconduct.* A plaint under Act XX of 1864 by a relative of a minor against his administrator must specify one or more facts of misconduct, or assign some satisfactory reason for apprehending an injury to the estate of the minor by the administrator; otherwise it will be held to contain no cause of action. *DAMODARDAS MANIKLAL v. UTAMARAM MANIKLAL* . . . **10 Bom. 414**

**37.** ———— *Suit brought in name of idol of temple.* A suit relating to property alleged to belong to a temple cannot be in the name of the idol of the temple; the manager is the proper person to be plaintiff in the suit. *THAKUR RAGHUNATHJI MAHARAJ v. SHAH LAL CHAND* . . . **I. L. R. 19 All. 330**

**38.** ———— *Misdescription of plaintiff—Suit for rent.* Plaintiff sued for rent, describing herself as holding a dar-mirasi jote, and the lower Appellate Court treated that description of her jote as misdescriptive, because the jamma-wasil-baki papers called her a mirasi ijaradar, and other papers showed her to be a dar-mirasi talukhdar. *Held*, on special appeal, that the misdescription, if there were any, was an utterly insufficient ground for throwing



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out plaintiff's claim. *BHOOBUN MOYEE DASSEE v. RUFFICK MUNDLE* . . . 17 W. R. 17

39. ————— *Residence—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 50-52—Description of defendant.* To describe the plaintiff as residing in Chitpore Road in the town of Calcutta is not a sufficient description, under s. 550 of the Civil Procedure Code, of his place of abode; nor is it sufficient under that section to describe the defendant as formerly of Calcutta without alleging that the plaintiff has been unable to ascertain his place of residence more definitely. *SOLOMON v. ABDOOL AZIZ*

4. C. L. R. 366

## (d) DEFENDANTS.

40. ————— *Description of defendant—Act VIII of 1859, s. 26—Titles of honour.* Where the Government has recognized a person as having right to bear particular titles, a plaint in a suit against such person does not contain "the description of the defendant" in accordance with s. 26 of Act VIII of 1859 if such titles are omitted. In such a case the plaintiff should, on the objection being taken by the defendant, be ordered to amend the plaint; and if such order is not complied with, the plaint should be rejected. *MAHARAJA OF VIZIANAGRAM v. LAKSHMI CHALLAYA*

12 B. L. R. P. C. 443 : 18 W. R. 301

Reversing decision of High Court in *SETA RAMA KRISHNA RAYUDAPPA RANGA RAO v. VIJAYA RAMA GAJAPATY* . . . 3 Mad. 31

41. ————— *Act VIII of 1859, s. 26—Title of honour.* The object of s. 26, Act VIII of 1859, is to identify the parties to the suit; and where it was clear on the defendant's own admission that the right party was sued, an objection by the defendant that the plaint was bad, as it omitted to style him "Roy Bahadoor," was overruled. *KISSEN CHAND GOLACHA v. MEGRAJ KUTURIA ROY*

12 B. L. R. 445 note : 12 W. R. 450

42. ————— *Suit against firm—Partners.* In an action against a firm the names of the partners should be specified in the plaint, and a summons served on one or more of its members if resident within the jurisdiction. *YEKNATH BABAJI v. CHAND KAHANJI* . . . 1 Bom. 85

43. ————— *Suit against a corporation or company—Act VIII of 1859, s. 26.* A plaint described the defendants as *C S*, Deputy Agent of the East Indian Railway Company, and *W B L*, District Engineer of Rajmehal and Beerbhoom, who were made joint defendants. The real defendants were the East Indian Railway Company. *Held*, that the plaint did not contain the description of the defendants under s. 26, Act VIII of 1859. The Company should be sued in its corporate name. *RAMDAS SEN v. COLLECTOR OF MOORSHEDABAD*

2 B. L. R. S. N. 6

PLAINT—*contl.*3. FORM AND CONTENTS OF PLAINT—*contd.*(d) DEFENDANTS—*contd.*

*S. C. RAM DOSS SEN v. STEPHENSON* . . . 10 W. R. 366

*NUBEEN CHUNDER PAUL v. STEPHENSON* . . . 15 W. R. 534

44. ————— *Bom. Act III of 1867, s. 11—Cantonment Committee—Contracts entered into a corporate character—Liability to be sued on such contracts as a corporation.* The plaintiffs sued the Poona Cantonment Committee to recover damages for breach of a conservancy contract. The Committee was created by rules made by the Local Government under s. 11 of Bombay Act III of 1867. The Committee ordinarily consisted of certain officials acting *ex-officio*. It was part of their duty to provide for the management and regulation of public roads, of conservancy, and drainage within the cantonment. They defrayed the expenses of such management out of the cantonment fund placed at their disposal. The defendants contended that the suit was not properly framed, and that all the members of the Committee should be made parties. *Held*, that the suit was properly constituted. The rules by which the Committee was created did, by implication, though not by express words, create the committee a corporation for the purposes of the conservancy of the cantonment. It could therefore sue and be sued in its own name on contracts entered into in its corporate character. *CANTONMENT COMMITTEE, POONA, v. BARJORJI BAMANJI* . . . I. L. R. 14 Bom. 286

45. ————— *Suit against company—Ignorance of names of persons forming company.* In the case of an unincorporated or unregistered company, the plaintiff, if he does not know of what persons the company is composed, may sue the company by the name under which they are carrying on business, stating in his plaint his inability to describe them better. *KOYLASH CHUNDER ROY v. ELLIS* . . . 8 W. R. 45

46. ————— *Suit by Bank for money against executrix—Description of parties—Order returning plaint for amendment.* A suit was brought by the manager of M Bank against the executrix of B to recover a sum of money as due upon a bond executed by B in favour of the Bank. The plaint described the defendant as "Mrs. Sarah G. Barlow, of Mussoorie," and stated that she was executrix of the deceased B. The Court of first instance returned the plaint for amendment under s. 53 of the Civil Procedure Code, because the defendant was not properly described. *Held*, that this ground failed, because it was clear that the defendant was stated to be the executrix of the deceased, and the suit was brought against her in that capacity. *MUSSOORIE BANK v. BARLOW*

I. L. R. 9 All. 188

47. ————— *Liability of the Secretary of a club in respect of a contract entered into for the benefit of the members of the club.* *Held*, that the secretary of a club could not,



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unless he specially accepted a personal liability, be sued personally, on a contract entered into on behalf of the members of the club by his predecessor in office; nor could the members of a club collectively be sued through their secretary as their representative. *NORTH-WESTERN PROVINCES CLUB v. SADULLAH* . . . **I. L. R. 20 All. 497**

**48. ——— Suit against unregistered company—Form of suit—Parties.** When a company is not registered under Act VI of 1882, a plaintiff bringing a suit against such company must make each individual member of the company a defendant to the suit, and he cannot escape from this obligation by stating in his plaint that he has been unable to discover who the individual members of the company are. *Koylash Chunder Roy v. Ellis*, 8 W. R. 45, considered. *North-Western Provinces Club v. Sadullah*, I. L. R. 20 All. 497, followed. *GANESHA SINGH v. MUNDI FOREST CO.* . . . **I. L. R. 21 All. 346**

**(e) BOUNDARIES.**

**49. ——— Omission to specify boundaries—Suit for land.** A suit to recover land without defining boundaries cannot be maintained, because, if decreed, the decree could not be executed. *MAHOMED ISMAIL v. LALLA DHUNDUR KISHORE NARAIN* . . . **25 W. R. 39**

**50. ——— Effect of omission on execution of decree.** The mere omission from the schedule annexed to a plaint of the boundaries of other specifications of land will not exclude from the operation of the decree matters which are by name strictly claimed in the plaint and referred to as such in the decree, and which do not need any further specification. *SHIB NARAIN BANERJEE v. RAM NARAIN LUSHKUR* . . . **20 W. R. 142**

**51. ——— Want of identification of the land in dispute—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 53, 54, and 566.** There is no provision in the Civil Procedure Code authorizing the dismissal of a suit on the ground that the land in dispute, as described in the plaint, cannot be identified, and that therefore the decree will be incapable of execution. *KAZEM SHEIK v. DANESH SHEIK* . . . **1 C. W. N. 574**

*See RAJNARAIN DAS v. SHAMA NANDO DAS CHOWDHRY* . . . **I. L. R. 26 Calc. 845**

**52. ——— Specification of boundaries—Suit to prevent infringement of rights over land.** Where the object of a suit is to prevent the plaintiff's rights over certain lands from being infringed upon, the boundaries of the lands should be given in the plaint. *AJODHIA LALL v. GUMANI LAL* . . . **2 C. L. R. 134**

**53. ——— Description of immoveable property—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 26, cl. 5—Suit for land.** Under Act VIII of 1859, s. 26, cl. 5, all that it is necessary for plaintiff to do is to

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describe the property in such a manner as may suffice for identification; it is not absolutely necessary to set forth the boundaries. *AFTABOODDEEN v. SHUMSOODDEEN MULLICK* . . . **18 W. R. 461**

**54. ——— Description of estate—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 26, cls. (4) and (5)—Boundaries, specification of.** From cls. (4) and (5) of s. 26 of Act VIII of 1859, it would appear that where a whole estate bearing a name is sued for the boundaries need not be given. *RAMDOYAL KHAN v. AJODHIA RAM KHAN* . . . **I. L. R. 2 Calc. 1 : 25 W. R. 425**

**55. ——— Description of property—Indistinctness of boundaries—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 26.** The indistinctness of boundaries is, under Act VIII of 1859, not a cause of non-suit. *JANOKEE CHOWDHURANEE v. DWARKANATH CHOWDHRY* . . . **1 Hay 555**

**56. ——— Effect of misdescription—Misdescription of area and boundaries—Suit for enhancement.** As to the effect of misdescription of area and boundaries in a suit for enhancement of rent. *TARINEE CHURN SANNYAL v. MOHIMA CHUNDER SHAHA* . . . **22 W. R. 426**

**57. ——— Procedure on omission to specify boundaries—Amending plaint.** In a suit in which the plaintiff claimed several plots of land, but did not specify the boundaries in respect of one of them, it was held that the proper course was for the Court to call upon the plaintiff to amend his plaint. *JONAB ALI MOLLAH v. GOLAM ASSAD CHOWDHRY* . . . **21 W. R. 187**

**58. ——— Procedure in case of irregularity in form of plaint—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 26, cl. 5—Amendment of plaint.** If a plaint be drawn not in accordance with the provisions of cl. 5, s. 26, Act VIII of 1859, the plaintiff ought to be allowed to amend the plaint without the suit being at once dismissed. *BISSUNDEN NARAIN SHAHEE v. GUNGERKISSEN SHAHEE* . . . **2 Hay 351**

**59. ——— Contents of plaint—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 26, 27.** Under s. 26, Act VIII of 1859, the plaint is intended to be a statement of facts, and not merely a prayer for relief. The words "cause of action" in that section, as distinguished from the "relief sought for" and the "subject of the claim," mean the grounds entitling the plaintiff to the remedy he seeks. *HURCHURN DOSS v. HAZAREEMULL* . . . **1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 12**

**60. ——— Suit for breach of contract—Sale and delivery of goods—Omission to allege readiness and willingness to pay on delivery.** In a suit by the plaintiffs to recover damages from the defendant, a surety upon a contract to deliver coffee to the plaintiffs, the plaintiff did not allege the willingness of the plaintiff to pay on delivery. Held, on special appeal, that such allegation was not neces-



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sary, its absence not having prejudiced the defendant. *PIERCE v. OPENDRA SHETTI GANAPATHY*  
7 Mad. 364

**61. ——— Suit for contribution—Requisites of claim.** A claim for contribution should distinctly set forth the amounts due by each party sued, failing which the plaint should be rejected. *BHOLANATH CHATTERJEE v. Inder Chand Doogur*  
14 W. R. 373

**(f) SPECIAL CASES.**

**62. ——— Suit for damages for tort—Rules of English law.** Plaints must state the relief sought for, the subject of the claim, the cause of action, and when it accrued; and in suits for damages for injury done, the nature of the injury ought to be set out. The strict rules of English law do not necessarily apply to plaints in this country. *MOHESH CHUNDER MOOKERJEE v. RAMDHUN PAL*  
13 W. R. 248

In every such plaint, plaintiff should name the amount of damages which he seeks to recover as compensation for the injury of which he complains. *GIRDHARLAL DAYALDAS v. JAGANNATH GIRDHARBHAI*  
10 Bom. 182

**63. ——— Suit for declaration of title and to have sale set aside—Amendment of plaint.** Where a person, by right of inheritance, sued for a declaration of his title to a share in a certain sum of money to which the defendants laid claim, and the defendants met that allegation by setting up a sale which the plaintiff admitted:—*Held*, that the plaintiff was bound to mention in his plaint the fact that he had parted with his title, and to allege the particular circumstances—misrepresentation, undervalue, or fraud—on which he relies to have the sale set aside; also that the cause of action arose at some time within the period of limitation applicable to the case. If sufficient cause exists, the Court may require the plaintiff to amend the plaint. *AZIMUDIN KHAN v. ZIA-UL-NISSA*  
I. L. R. 6 Bom. 309

**64. ——— Suit for possession and mesne profits—Question raised in plaint.** In a suit to recover, with mesne profits and other incidents, a jirayati village alleged by the plaintiff to form part of his zamindari and to be wrongfully held by defendant by virtue of the execution of a decree of the late Commissioner of the Northern Circars passed in 1854, the defendant pleaded that he held on a permanent lease, subject to a fixed quit rent; that he and his ancestors had held on that tenure since and previously to the permanent settlement. *Held*, that, as the plaint praying for the recovery of possession proceeded on the ground, amongst others, of the validity of the grant relied on by the defendant, the question as to the validity of the permanent kuttubandi tenure claimed by the defendant was properly open for determination in the present

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suit. *VAIRICHARLA SURYA NARAYANA v. NADIMINTI BHAGAVAT PATANJALI SHASTRI*  
3 Mad. 120

**65. ——— Suit for redemption of mortgage—Title,—Existence and proof of—Limitation.** In a suit for possession of land by redemption of a mortgage, the very nature of which presupposes that the possession of the defendant or his predecessor was lawful, the plaintiff must in his plaint show the title upon which he relies, and therefore a title subsisting at the date of suit. Unless he gives *prima facie* evidence to show that his suit is within time, he fails to prove his title or subsisting right to the property. *Phillipps v. Phillipps*, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 127; *Dawkins v. Lord Penrhyn*, L. R. 4 Ap. Cas. 51; *Radha Gobind Roy Sahab v. Inglis*, 7 C. L. R. 364; *Rao Karan Singh v. Bakar Ali Khan*, L. R. 9 I. A. 99; *Rajah Kishen Dutt Panday v. Narendar Bahadur Singh*, L. R. 3 I. A. 85; *Ram Chandra Apaji v. Balaji Bhaurav*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 137, and other cases referred to. *PARMANUND MISR v. SAHIB ALI*  
I. L. R. 11 All. 438

**4. VERIFICATION AND SIGNATURE.**

**1. ——— Inability to verify—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 28.** Generally plaints should be verified by the plaintiff. The exception under s. 28, Act VIII of 1859, in favour of persons unable to verify, should be separately pleaded and considered in each case. *In the matter of the petition of MCHESUR BUKHSH SINGH*  
5 W. R. Mis. 33

**2. ——— Ground for not verifying personally—Duty of Court on presentation of plaint.** It is incumbent on all Courts, without regard to rank or station, to see that plaints and written statements are subscribed and verified by the parties in person, except when unable to do so by reason of absence or other good cause, when they may be allowed to be subscribed and verified by competent persons only. *KEENOO SINGH ROY v. ESHAN CHUNDER ROY*  
6 W. R. 213

**3. ——— Duty of Court on presentation of plaint.** A Court ought never to allow a person other than the plaintiff to verify the plaint, save strictly under the exception which the law permits, namely, where the plaintiff, by reason of absence or other good cause, is unable to subscribe it (see Act VIII of 1859, s. 28). When ever the plaint is not presented by the plaintiff in person, the Court should satisfy itself that the verification is actually signed by the plaintiff. *NURSING DEB v. RAM MOHUN MOOKERJEE* Marsh. 176

*RAM MOHUN MOOKERJEE v. NURSING DEB*  
W. R. F. B. 54: 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 63  
1 Hay 379

**4. ——— Discretion of Court—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 28.** When an application is made to a Court to permit a plaint



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to be subscribed and verified on behalf of the plaintiff, by a person other than the plaintiff, the Court must exercise the power vested in it by s. 28, Act VIII of 1859, and must decide whether or not the plaintiff, by reason of absence or other good cause, is unable to subscribe and verify the plaint himself. *MOHESUR BUKSH SINGH v. SHEO NARAIN SINGH* 6 W. R. Mis. 59

5. ———— *Absence on other good ground.* Plaintiff may be excused from verifying his plaint, not only by reason of his absence, but also for any other good cause to the satisfaction of the Court. *In the matter of the petition of LEELA NUND SINGH* 7 W. R. 168

6. ———— **Verification by person other than plaintiff—Notice.** When a plaint is subscribed and verified by a person other than the plaintiff, notice should be given to the defendant; nothing more formal need be done by way of notice to support an application for the admission of the plaint, if the person verifying is qualified in other respects according to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. *PUDDOMOKEY DOSSEE v. SHAMA CHURN CHUCKERBUTTY* 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 226

7. ———— **Improper verification—Plaint alleging matter not personally known.** Where the plaint alleges matter which cannot be personally known to the person making the verification, and which is not stated to be on information and belief, a verification which does not distinguish how much is true to the knowledge of the person making it, and what is alleged to be true on information and belief, does not fulfil the requirements of s. 52, Act X of 1887. *SOLOMON v. ABDOL AZIZ* 4. C. L. R. 366

8. ———— **Personal knowledge of facts—Information and belief—Personal knowledge—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), ss. 50, 51—Act XII of 1879, s. 11.** In all cases whether a plaint is verified by the plaintiff or by some other person, the party verifying should state shortly what paragraphs he verifies of his own knowledge, and what paragraphs he believes to be true from the information of others. *In the matter of UPENDRO LALL BOSE* 1. L. R. 6 Calc. 675 : 7 C. L. R. 413

9. ———— **Civil Procedure Code, s. 52—Form of verification of plaint.** In order to constitute a proper verification of a plaint within the meaning of s. 52 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is necessary for the person verifying, if all the facts are within his knowledge, to state distinctly that they are to his knowledge true; and if he has knowledge as to some and only information and belief as to others, to state to which he speaks from his knowledge and to which from his information and belief. A verification in the form—"To the limit (or extent) of my knowledge the purport of this is true," is not such a verification as satisfies the requirements of s. 52 of the Code. *In the*

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*matter of Upendro Lal Bose, 1. L. R. 6 Calc. 675, referred to.* *GIRDHARI v. KANHAIYA LAL* 1. L. R. 15 All. 59

10. ———— *Allegation of fraud—Practice.* In a case where the plaintiffs set up gross fraud, and where the case depends mainly upon the personal knowledge of the plaintiffs, it is imperative on the plaintiffs, or one of them, to verify the plaint. *PROTAP CHUNDER BANERJEE v. KRISHTO KISHORE SHAHA* 1. L. R. 8 Calc. 885

*See JARDINE, SKINNER & Co. v. SHURNO-MOYEE.* 24 W. R. 215

11. ———— *Allegation of fraud.* Where a plaint contained numerous allegations of fraud, some of which must have been true or false to the plaintiff's own knowledge, and was signed and verified on the plaintiff's behalf by his general attorney:—*Held*, that the defendants must reasonably require the plaintiff to subscribe and verify the plaint himself, and that he should so subscribe and verify. *RAJAH OF TOMKUHI v. BRAIDWOOD* 1. L. R. 9 All. 505

12. ———— **Effect of non-verification by real plaintiff—Benami mortgage.** In a suit for possession after foreclosure, defendants urged that C (and not A and B, the plaintiffs) was the actual mortgagee. This was denied by A and B who obtained a decree. In a subsequent suit brought by the representatives of A and B for mesne profits, they, in conjunction with C, urged that C was the real mortgagee, and C was made a co-plaintiff, but he did not verify the plaint. A decree was given for mesne profits in favour of C, the plaintiff. *Held*, that the fact that C had not verified the plaint was no sufficient ground for dismissing the suit. *ROY MOHANLAL MITTRA v. BISHNU CHUNDRA CHATTERJEE* 1 B. L. R. A. C. 100

*S. C. ROY MOHUN LAL MITTER v. BUHOO SOONDURE DEBIA* 10 W. R. 145

13. ———— **Partners—Suit by firm.** Where the plaintiffs described themselves as lately carrying on business under the name of C & Co.:—*Held*, that there was no irregularity in the plaint being signed by C & Co. and verified only by A B, one of the partners. *LACHLAN v. ABDULLA* 5 B. L. R. Ap. 89

14. ———— *Signature by one partner of the firm—Act VIII of 1859, s. 27—Practice.* By the practice of the Court, in a suit brought by a firm, one partner can, without having obtained special leave, verify the plaint on his own behalf and also on behalf of his co-partners. *Quære*: Whether such a practice is correct or ought to be allowed to continue. *RAMCHUNDER v. CHOONEE LALL* 12 B. L. R. 35

15. ———— **False verification—Verification by mooktear—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 21.** The verification of a plaint signed with the name of the plaintiff by her mooktear, and which does not aver what is false, but attempts to do what the law estops her from doing, is not a false verification



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within the meaning of s. 24, Act VIII of 1859.  
**ROSHUN JEHAN v. ENAYET HOSSEIN**

**W. R. F. B. 41 : Marsh. 127**  
**1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 44**

**16. ——— Subscription by agent—**  
*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 51.* Under s. 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act X of 1877), the Court may in its discretion admit a plaint which has been subscribed by an authorized agent of the plaintiff. **SURNOMOYEE v. POOLIN BEHARY MUNDUL** . . . . . **3 C. L. R. 15**

**17. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 36, 51.** S. 36, read along with s. 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act X of 1877), shows that a plaint which may be presented by an authorized agent may in like manner be subscribed by him, and that subscription would be a compliance with s. 51. **DHUNPUT SINGH, BAHADOOR v. JHOMUK KHAWAS** . . . . . **3 C. L. R. 579**

**18. ——— Signature and verification by agent—***Civil Procedure Code (X of 1877 as amended by Act XII of 1879), ss. 51 and 52.* A plaint, signed by a person holding a general power-of-attorney to sue on behalf of the plaintiff, is properly signed within the meaning of the proviso in s. 51 of the amended Civil Procedure Code. The Court must be satisfied, under s. 52, that a person, other than the plaintiff, verifying the plaint, is acquainted with the facts of the case; but in the case of a person holding a general power-of-attorney or of any other recognized agent, the Court will not insist on any extreme stringency of proof. S. 52 does not require the verification of a plaint to be made in the presence of an officer of the Court, but, having regard to the necessity of satisfying the Court that the person, other than the plaintiff, who verifies the plaint, is acquainted with the facts of the case, it is desirable that a verification by such a person should be made in the presence of the Court unless the Court be satisfied that there is sufficient ground for dispensing with his attendance. **KASTALINO v. RUSTOMJI DADABHOY**

**I. L. R. 4 Bom. 468**

**19. ——— Plaint signed and verified by the pleader of the guardian—***Right of the minor to sue for possession in Mamlatdar's Court.* A minor may sue or be sued in a Mamlatdar's Court, he being represented by a properly appointed guardian. A guardian mother having on behalf of her minor son brought a possessory suit in a Mamlatdar's Court. *Held*, that the pleader appointed by her could sign and verify the plaint. **SAIFULLA v. HAJI MIYA** **I. L. R. 24 Bom. 238**

**20. ——— Verification by unauthorized person—***Removal from file—Practice.* When a plaint has been verified by a person who has not shown to the Court that he is a person competent to verify it, the Court will order the plaint to be removed from the file. **OVEREND, GURNEY & Co. v. STEELE** . . . . . **1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 39**

**PLAINT—contd.****4. VERIFICATION AND SIGNATURE—contd.**

**21. ——— Irregular verification—***Dismissal on ground of improper verification after admission of plaint.* The Judge on appeal dismissed a suit on the ground that the plaint was verified by an agent, when it might and ought to have been verified by the plaintiff himself. *Held*, that, the plaint having been admitted, the suit ought not to be dismissed for this defect, but the Judge might properly have required the verification of the plaintiff to be supplied. **GOKUL CHUNDER v. BUREEK BEGUM** . . . . . **Marsh. 344 : 2 Hay 325**

**22. ——— False verification—***Waiver of objection.* A case having come on for hearing, the verification of the plaint was found to be false. Upon this plaintiff applied to withdraw the suit with permission to bring a fresh suit. The Munsif rejected the application and dismissed the suit with costs. *Held*, that, as the defendant had filed a written statement and had not objected to the verification, it was the duty of the Munsif to dispose of the case on its merits dealing afterwards as he thought fit with the party making the false verification. **SHAMA SOONDUREE DEBIA v. ROHMOOD-DEEN SIRDAR** . . . . . **24 W. R. 71**

**23. ——— Objection to verification—***Verification of plaint by agent.* It is not competent to a Judge of a Small Cause Court to raise any objection to the verification of a plaint by an agent, after such verification has been expressly sanctioned by him at the commencement of the suit. **SUTTOCHURN GHOSAL v. SUTOOP CHUNDER DOSS**  
**12 W. R. 465**

**24. ——— Signature of plaint by one of several co-plaintiffs—***Parties named as co-plaintiffs—Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), ss. 30 and 34—Limitation.* It is not necessary that all the persons named in the plaint as co-plaintiffs should sign and verify the plaint, there being no rule that a person named as a co-plaintiff is not to be treated as a plaintiff unless he signs and verifies the plaint. Three suits for money were filed by one of three joint creditors, the others being named as co-plaintiffs with him in the plaints, which he alone signed and verified. An order was made by the Court after the filing of the plaints (and at a time when he could not have been added as a plaintiff, the debt being barred by limitation) that one of these joint-creditors should be added as a co-plaintiff, as if he had not been on the record already. *Held*, that all the joint creditors became plaintiffs when the plaints were filed, the order adding parties being inoperative, and that the suits when instituted were not defective for want of parties. **MOHINI MOHUN DAS v. BUNGSHI BUDDAN SAHA DAS**  
**I. L. R. 17 Calc. 580**

**25. ——— Sufficiency of verification—***Civil Procedure Code, s. 53.* A suit was brought by the manager of the M Bank against the executrix of B to recover a sum of money as due upon a bond executed by B in favour of the Bank. The plaint began thus: "George Henry Webb, Manager of the abovenamed plaintiff's business, states as



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follows," and proceeded to state that the deceased was, at the time of his death, "indebted to the plaintiff," and to set forth the cause of action in detail. It was signed and verified thus: "For the M Bank, Limited, G. H. Webb, manager." The Court of first instance returned the plaint for amendment under s. 53 of the Civil Procedure Code, because the plaint was set out as made by George Henry Webb as manager, and not as on the part of the Bank. *Held*, that this ground did not come within s. 53 of the Code, as it was clear that the circumstances set out in the plaint applied to the case of the plaintiff Bank, and the plaint sufficiently fulfilled the requirements of the Code that the facts which the plaintiff considers essential should be concisely and clearly set out, and that the verification should be made by some one acquainted with these facts. **MUSOORIE BANK v. BARLOW**  
I. L. R. 9 All. 188

**26. ——— Verification of plaint by acting manager—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 51 and 435—Principal officer of a Corporation or Company.** The Manager at Lucknow of the local branch of the Delhi and London Bank was authorized by a power-of-attorney under seal of the company in London, to sue for debts due to the Bank, and to substitute any person for himself, besides doing other acts of management. A power-of-attorney, executed by him as manager, appointing the accountant of the Bank to be its attorney in Lucknow, did not contain express authority to the person so empowered to sue for debts due to the Bank. The accountant conducted, under this power, the chief business of the branch, and, while he was so conducting it, this suit was instituted against defendants, of whom some objected that he was not authorized to sign and verify the plaint. *Held*, that s. 51, Civil Procedure Code, regulating proceedings by or on behalf of ordinary plaintiffs, did not apply, but that s. 435 was applicable, the acting manager appointed as abovementioned being a principal officer of the Bank Corporation within the meaning of that section. **DELHI AND LONDON BANK v. OLDHAM** . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 60  
L. R. 20 I. A. 139

**27. ——— Suit by agent of an unincorporated society—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 435—Corporation.** A suit in ejectment as against a trespasser was brought by a person signing the plaint as "for and as Superintendent and Principal Officer of the Estate of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church of New York." The plaintiff was not shown to be a member of the Board, nor did he set up any possessory title of his own. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church of New York was not a corporation or company authorized to sue and be sued in the name of an officer or trustee within the meaning of s. 435 of the Code of Civil procedure, and also as the person signing the plaint in the manner above described did not profess to be suing on his own possessory title to the land in

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respect of which ejectment was claimed, the suit must be dismissed. **Jaigopal v. Kauleshar Roy, All. Weekly Notes (1882) 132; Muhammad Yusuf v. Sukhnath, All. Weekly Notes (1887) 55; and Asher v. Whitlock, L. R. 1 Q. B. 1**, distinguished. **YUSUF BEG v. BOARD OF FOREIGN MISSIONS OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF NEW YORK IN AMERICA**  
I. L. R. 16 All. 420

**28. ——— Result of defective verification—Amendment—Procedure—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 52, 53, and 578—Irregularity not affecting merits.** If the verification of a plaint is discovered to be defective at any time whilst the suit is before the Court of first instance, the plaint may be amended by the Court. If such defect be not discovered until the suit comes on appeal before an Appellate Court, such Court may, if it thinks fit, return the plaint to the Court of first instance to be amended by it. But where the defect is such that it is covered by the provisions of s. 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure, there is no necessity for the Appellate Court to take any steps to procure the amendment of the plaint. In any event, a defect in the verification of a plaint will not of necessity result in the dismissal of the suit. **Balgobind Das v. Ganno Bibi, All. Weekly Notes, (1896) 75**, referred to. A plaint filed by three joint plaintiffs was verified by each in the form: "The contents of the petition of plaint are true to the best of my knowledge and belief." *Held*, that this form of verification, though not free from ambiguity, was in substantial compliance with the provisions of s. 52 of the Code of Civil Procedure. **RAJIT RAM v. KATESAR NATH**  
I. L. R. 18 All. 396

**29. ——— Plaint verified when in an incomplete state—Amendment of plaint to correct defective verification.** The substantial portion of a plaint, consisting of the statement of the claim of the plaintiffs and the prayer, was written upon two sheets of plain paper and verified by the plaintiffs. Subsequently to the affixing of the plaintiff's signatures, a front sheet, consisting of a piece of stamped paper with the name of the Court and the names and addresses of the parties, was added, and the plaint thus composed filed in Court. *Held*, that the verification was defective, but that the suit ought to have been dismissed. The plaintiff ought to have been allowed an opportunity of amending the plaint by making a proper verification. **FATEH CHAND v. MANSAB RAI**  
I. L. R. 20 All. 442

**GANGA SAHAI v. MUHAMMAD ALI JAN KHAN.**

I. L. R. 20 All. 444 note

**FAKIR CHAND v. MUHESH DAS.**

I. L. R. 20 All. 445 note

**30. ——— Plaint not signed by plaintiff or his authorized agent—Effect of such want of signature—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 51, 578.** The mere fact that the plaint in a suit has not been signed by the plaintiff named therein or by any person duly authorized by him in that



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behalf as required by s. 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure will not necessarily make the plaint absolutely void. A defect in the signature of the plaint, or the absence of signature, where it appears that the suit was in fact filed with the knowledge and by the authority of the plaintiff named therein, may be waived by the defendant, or, if necessary, cured by amendment at any stage of the suit, and having regard to s. 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is not a ground for interference in appeal. *Rajit Ram v. Katesar Nath*, I. L. R. 18 All. 396, and *Mohini Mohun Das v. Bangsi Buddan Shaha Das*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 580, referred to. *Marghub Ahmad v. Nihal Ahmad*, All. Weekly Notes (1899) 55, overruled. *Mahabir Prashad v. Wahid Alam*, All. Weekly Notes (1891) 152, distinguished. *Katesar Nath v. Aggyan*, All. Weekly Notes (1894) 95, and *Badri Prasad v. Bhagwati Dhar*, I. L. R. 16 All. 240, discussed. *BASDEO v. SMIDT* . . . I. L. R. 22 All. 55

31. ———— *Verification—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 435—Verification on behalf of Corporation—Defective verification of plaint, effect of, on appeal.* Where a petition by the Bank of Bengal was verified by a person described as the Officiating Inspector of Branches, Bank of Bengal, and there was nothing to show that he was not the officer authorised to sue or verify the petition on behalf of the Bank at Chittagong, or that he was not able to depose to the facts of the case:—*Held*, that the petition was properly verified under s. 435, Civil Procedure Code. Defective verification, if there is no reason to suppose that anyone is prejudiced thereby, is no ground, at an appellate stage, either for returning the plaint for amendment or for refusing relief on the basis of the alleged defect in the plaint. *Rajit Ram v. Katesar Nath*, I. L. R. 18 All. 396, and *Basdeo v. John Smidt*, I. L. R. 22 All. 55, followed. *RAM KOMAL SAHA v. BANK OF BENGAL OF AKYAB* (1900)

5 C. W. N. 91

32. ———— *Foreign Corporation, suit by—Foreign Company not registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1882—Plaint, verification of, by the Manager of an unregistered company—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 430, 435—Indian Companies Act (VI of 1882), ss. 6, 41, 224.* A Foreign Corporation is entitled to sue in its corporate character in this country, without being registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1882, or an Act of Parliament; and a plaint in such a suit can be verified on behalf of the Corporation by one of its principal officers, under s. 435 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A Corporation duly created according to the law of one State may sue and be sued in its corporate name in the Courts of other States. *Campbell v. Jackson*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 41, and *Yusuf Beg v. The Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church of New York*, I. L. R. 16 All. 420, distinguished. *SINGER MANUFACTURING CO. v. BAIJNATH* (1902)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 103

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## 5. AMENDMENT OF PLAINT.

1. ———— *Power to amend—Appellate Court.* A plaint cannot be amended in an Appellate Court. *ABDUL GUFFOOR v. NUR BANTU*  
1 B. L. R. A. C. 78 : 10 W. R. 111

2. ———— *Appellate Court—Objection to plaint.* An Appellate Court is competent at any stage to allow objections to be taken to an apparent defect in the plaint. *COLVIN, COWIE v. ELIAS* . . . 2 B. L. R. A. C. 212 : 11 W. R. 40

3. ———— *Act VIII of 1859.* The Court has power to amend a plaint after it has been filed, although no express power to do so is given by Act VIII of 1859. Under Act VIII of 1859, the Court has power to make all such amendments, first in the plaint and afterwards in the issues, as may be necessary, in order to bring about a fair and proper trial of the matter which the plaintiff comes into Court to have tried. *GABIND CHANDRA DUTT v. GANGA DHYE. NALIT MOHUN DAS v. GANGA DHYE* . . . 7 B. L. R. 333

SAHIJI KESRAJI v. RAJSANGJI JALMSANGJI.

2 Bom. 169 : 2nd Ed. 162

4. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 42, 45, and 53.* On the question of amending a plaint, s. 53 of the Civil Procedure Code should be read with ss. 42 and 45; that it is the intention of the Legislature that all matters in dispute should be disposed of in the same suit. The proviso to s. 53 is not intended to interfere with this. *SARAL CHAND MITTER v. MOHUN BIBI* . . . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 371  
2 C. W. N. 18 ; 201

5. ———— *Discretion of Judge—Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, s. 53.* The amendment of a plaint under s. 53 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882) is in the discretion of the Judge, and is not the right of the suitor in all circumstances. It is not enough for a plaintiff to show that the amendment does not alter the character of the suit. *TAPIRAM v. SADU*  
I. L. R. 21 Bom. 570

6. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 53—Limitation—Area of property claimed in suit for pre-emption described as less than the true area.* A Court is not precluded from returning a plaint for amendment because at the time it is returned for amendment the period of limitation for the suit may have expired. The plaintiff in a suit for pre-emption, after filing his plaint, discovered that the property in suit had been described by mistake as being of a slightly less area than it was in reality. *Held*, that the Court had power and ought to have allowed the plaint to be amended, and that the amendment was not precluded by the fact that, at the time when the application for amendment was made, the limitation for the suit had expired. *Held*, also, that such misdescription would not render the suit liable to the objection that the plaintiff had sought to pre-empt only a part of



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the property sold. *BARKAT-UN-NISSA v. MUHAMMAD ASAD ALI* . . . I. L. R. 17 All. 288

7. ——— Right to amend—*Altering case in appeal.* A plaintiff was not allowed to alter his case on second appeal. *DASSORATHY HURI CHUNDER MAHAPATRA v. RAMKRISHNA JANA* . . . I. L. R. 9 Calc. 526  
13 C. L. R. 114

8. ——— Ground for amendment at final hearing. *Semble:* A defect which appears on the face of the plaint, which would have rendered it inadmissible, is not a matter for amendment at the final hearing of the suit. *RAMASAMI AYYAN v. RAMU MUPAN* . . . 3 Mad. 372

9. ——— Application to amend with reference to objection taken at filing of plaint. A plaint may be amended upon subsequent application, with reference to an objection taken when it was filed. *TOULTON v. GWYHER* . . . Bourke O. C. 273

10. ——— Time for amendment—*Amendment after settlement of issues.* Amendment of a plaint is not allowable after issues are fixed. *AMUR NARAIN alias NERPUT SUHAYE v. RUGHOOBUNSEE KOONWUR* . . . 5 W. R. 234

11. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 53—Amendment subsequently to first hearing.* The words in paragraph 1 of s. 53 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act X of 1877) "at or before the first hearing" are merely directory and not mandatory, and therefore a plaintiff may, subsequently to the "first hearing," amend his plaint, provided such amendment does not alter the original character of his suit. The plaintiffs (mortgagors in a suit against their mortgagees) sought only for production of the mortgage-deed or for an account, although the averments in the plaint warranted a prayer for redemption. Subsequently to the first hearing of the suit, they applied to be allowed to amend the plaint by adding a prayer for redemption. *Held*, that the provisions of s. 53 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877) did not preclude the Court from permitting the amendment to be made. *MODHE v. DONGRE* . . . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 609

12. ——— *Amendment after return for amendment in fixed time—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 53.* *Semble:* That where at the first hearing of a suit the plaint is returned for amendment within a fixed time under the provisions of s. 53 of Act X of 1877, and it is amended accordingly, it cannot afterwards be again returned for amendment. *BADR-UN-NISSA v. MUHAMMAD JAN* . . . I. L. R. 2 All. 671

13. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 53—Practice—Amendment of plaint at a date subsequent to first hearing.* *Held* (OLD-FIELD, J., dissenting), that under s. 53 of the Civil Procedure Code, a plaint can be rejected, returned for amendment, or amended by the Court of first in-

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stance only at or before the first hearing of the suit, and not after the first hearing thereof. *Modhe v. Dongre*, I. L. R. 5 Bom. 609, dissented from. *Soorj-mukhi Koer's Case*, I. L. R. 2 Calc. 272; *Burjore v. Bhagana*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 557. L. R. 11 I. A. 7; and *Fazul-un-nissa Begam v. Mulo*, I. L. R. 6 All. 250, distinguished by MAHMOOD, J. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*—The plaint may, for causes other than those mentioned in s. 53, be amended by the Court after the first hearing. *DAMODAR DAS v. GOKAL CHAND* . . . I. L. R. 7. All. 79

14. ——— *Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), s. 54—Leave obtained to amend plaint within a certain time—Failure to amend within time allowed—Application for extension of time originally allowed.* On the 6th April 1891 the plaintiffs obtained an order giving them leave to amend the plaint and proceedings in the suit. By the order this amendment was to be made on or before the 30th April, 1891. On the 18th August, 1891, the plaintiffs obtained a summons calling on the defendants to show cause why the time allowed for amendment should not be extended for a month, and why the hearing of the suit should not be postponed. *Held*, making the summons absolute, that although the time originally fixed for amendment had expired, the Judge had a discretion to extend the time, and that under the circumstances the plaintiffs were entitled to the order asked for. *BHAGWANDAS BAGLA v. ABU AHMED* . . . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 263

15. ——— *Mode of amendment—Alteration of plaintiff's case.* The Court is not to make a case for a plaintiff which he has not made for himself. *PROSUNNO CHUNDER BANERJEE v. GOUREE DASS BHATTACHARJEE* . . . 7 W. R. 478

16. ——— *Alteration of plaintiff's case—Variance between pleading and proof.* *Semble:*—The Court will not add an issue or amend the plaint so as to raise a wholly different question to that upon which the parties have come into Court. *BIZJIE BIBEE v. MONOHUR DOSS* . . . 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 118

*See NEHORA ROY v. RADHA PERSHAD SINGH.* . . . I. L. R. 5 Calc. 64: 4 C. L. R. 353

17. ——— *Allowing new cause of action—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 29 and 31.* Ss. 29 and 31 of the Civil Procedure Code empower the Court to permit such amendment in the plaint as may enable the Court to give relief in respect of the wrong originally complained of, but not to allow totally new causes of action to be added by a supplemental plaint. *RAILOO MULL v. NANUK* . . . 1 N. W. 171: Ed. 1873, 250

18. ——— *Ground for amendment—Insufficient disclosure of cause of action.* Where the plaint does not sufficiently disclose the cause of action, and a cause of action exists, the plaintiff should have been allowed to amend it under s. 32, Code of Civil Procedure, 1859; not being so allowed,



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he is at liberty to prove any cause of action which is not inconsistent with the plaint. *LUCKHEE PRADEBIA v. BRINDABUN DEY* . . . 12 W. R. 313

19. ————— *Misstatement of cause of action.* The plaintiff, having failed in an application under s. 441 of the Penal Code, brought a suit in a Civil Court for possession and for the demolition of a wall or fence put up by the defendant, dating his cause of action from his failure in the Criminal Court. In the Court of first instance, he obtained a decree for possession. The Judge on appeal dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground that he had no power to set aside a Magistrate's order under the law cited. *Held*, that, if the Judge was of opinion that the plaintiff had misstated his cause of action, he ought to have directed him to amend his plaint. *DABOO JHA v. LUWA JHA* . . . 11 W. R. 223

20. ————— *Rejection of plaint for prolixity—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 29.* If a plaint not only asks for relief which a Court can afford, but seeks to open up matters already adjudicated upon in another suit, the Judge (instead of rejecting the plaint for prolixity under s. 29, should entertain the suit and adjudicate upon the matters not adjudicated upon in the former suit, amending the plaint by striking out the issues relating to the matters adjudicated upon. *ROSUN JEHAN v. ENAYUT HOSSEIN*

W. R. F. B. 41: Marsh. 127  
1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 44: 1 Hay 269

21. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 53—Alteration of the relief prayed for.* The restriction as to amendment of a plaint is only as to the nature of the suit: the law prohibits any such amendment as would change the fundamental character of a suit, but an alteration in the relief does not change the character of a suit. Where a purchaser of a mortgage-bond at a sale in execution of decree sued to enforce the bond, but did not pray for sale of the mortgaged property, *Held*, that he might properly have been allowed to amend his plaint and add a prayer for that relief. *KASINATH DAS v. SADASIV PATNAIK*

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 805

22. ————— *Amendment transforming claim—Suit for rent converted into suit for ejectment—Variance between pleading and proof—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 53 and 562.* An amendment of a plaint which materially transforms the nature of the claim cannot be made under s. 53 of the Civil Procedure Code, and certainly not in appeal. S. 53 permits amendment of the plaint before judgment, and not after. The larger powers conferred on Appellate Courts by s. 562 do not authorize such a material transformation of a suit in appeal. *BAI SHRI MAJIRAJBA v. MAGANLAL BHAISHANKAR* . . . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 303

23. ————— *Altering character of suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 53—Adding prayer for possession to suit for declaration of title.* S. 53

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of the Civil Procedure Code, which provides that a plaint cannot be amended so as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of another and inconsistent character, does not prevent a plaintiff who has been ousted after suit brought for declaration of title, from amending his plaint by adding a prayer for possession. *MELLUS v. VICAR APOSTOLIC OF MALABAR* . . . I. L. R. 2 Mad. 295

24. ————— *Suit for possession and mesne profits—Resumption.* Where in the plaint the relief sought for was possession and mesne profits, and the plaint was in the course of the suit amended, and an additional stamp paid so that the suit became one for resumption:—*Held*, that the amendment was improperly made, and the suit must proceed as a suit for possession and mesne profits. *GOBINDO MAHAPATRO v. GOPPENATH PUNDIT*

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 581: 6 W. R. 211

25. ————— *Suit by manager to set aside deeds—Suit for redemption by minors.* Where the plaint, on the face of it, is one in which a manager suing on behalf of minors is himself plaintiff and which seeks to set aside deeds constituting a mortgage transaction, the Court cannot, by amending the plaint, turn the suit into a redemption suit on the part of the minors. *JOYRAM LALL MAHTOON v. STEWART* . . . 20 W. R. 453

26. ————— *Suit on mortgage payable on demand—Amendment of suit for interest by making it one for account.* Where a mortgage debt is payable on demand, the suit ought to be brought not for interest only, but for an account and payment of what remains due on the mortgage for principal and interest up to the filing of the plaint. This amendment was allowed in this case. *ANNAPA v. GANPATI* I. L. R. 5 Bom. 181

27. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 53—Suit for restoration of land to its former condition—Suit for declaration of right.* By the amendment of the plaint, a suit for the restoration of a bond, which it was alleged the defendants were wrongfully filling up to its original condition, was altered into one for the protection of the plaintiffs from any infringement of, or for a declaration of, their right to a share in the produce, and the use of the water, by way of easement. *Held*, that the alteration in the plaint was a material one. *FARZAND ALI v. YUSUF ALI*

I. L. R. 2 All. 669

28. ————— *Plaintiff asking for relief he is not entitled to—Suit for enhancement.* Where a suit for a kabuliati at an enhanced rate of rent was dismissed on the ground that it was not for enhancement of plaintiff's share of the rent, but for a kabuliati at an enhanced rate for the rent of a specific portion of land, although plaintiff's agent in his examination deposed that the suit had reference not to a specific portion of land, but to a certain jumma:—*Held*, that the Court below might permit plaintiff to amend or explain his plaint, or

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if he had asked too much, might give him what he was entitled to under the law. **POORNO CHUNDER ROY v. STALKARTT** . . . . . **10 W. R. 362**

**29. — Giving plaintiff more relief than he prays for—Suit for redemption.** The Court should not give the plaintiff more than he claims in his plaint; therefore, where a mortgagor brings a suit to redeem mortgaged land on payment of such sum as shall be found due to the mortgagee, the Court is not justified in decreeing possession without payment in favour of the mortgagor, merely because the mortgagee denies the existence of the mortgage. **DADA VALAD VALLI v. BAVASHA VALAD KASAM** . . . . . **6 Bom. A. C. 9**

**30. — Amendment by Appellate Court—Omission of lower Court to return plaint for misjoinder.** When a plea of misjoinder has been allowed and the suit decided and an appeal brought, the Court of Appeal should dispose of the suit in the mode in which the lower Court ought to have disposed of it, by returning the plaint for amendment. **Farzand Ali v. Yusuf Ali, I. L. R. 2 All. 669**, dissented from. **LINGAMMAL v. CHINNA VENKATAMMAL** . . . . . **I. L. R. 6 Mad. 239**

**31. — Amendment of plaint—Multifarious suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 5'—Malabar law—Stanom.** A suit was brought by the junior members of a tarwad, which consisted of three stanoms and three tavaries, against the karnavan and others, including certain persons to whom he had alienated some tarwad property. The plaint, as originally framed, prayed (i) for the removal of the karnavan; (ii) for a declaration that defendants Nos. 2 to 8, the senior anandravans, had forfeited their right of succession to him; (iii) for the appointment of the plaintiff in his place; (iv) for a declaration that these alienations were invalid as against the tarwad; and (v) for possession of the property alienated. Subsequently, the plaint was amended by the order of the Court by striking out items (i) and (v) of the prayer, and finally the plaintiffs further amended the plaint and sued only for a declaration that the alienations in question were invalid. The lower Court passed the declaratory decree prayed for. *Held*, that the lower Court was wrong in allowing the plaint to be amended after the first hearing, because the case on which the decree was passed was essentially different from that disclosed in the plaint; and that the appeal must be allowed accordingly. **MAHOMED v. KRISHNAN** . . . . . **I. L. R. 11 Mad. 106**

**32. — Suit on promissory notes—Variance between pleading and proof—Addition of issue as to items of account.** Where a suit was instituted under Act V of 1866 for the sum due on two promissory notes, and the defendant was afterwards allowed to come in and defend, and written statements were filed, and the plaintiff's written statement set out all the facts under which the notes were given, it was found that the items of the account were not properly in issue. The Court al-

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lowed the plaint to be amended and an issue to be framed as to the amount due in respect of the consideration for the note. **JOSEPH v. SOLANO**  
**9 B. L. R. 441; 18 W. R. 424**

**33. — Suit for breach of contract—Variance between pleading and proof.** The plaintiff alleged a contract to deliver on the 2nd March, and the evidence showed an extension of time to the 31st March, but the pleading alleged that the breach was on 2nd March. *Held*, that an amendment might be allowed, as the defendant would not be prejudiced thereby, he having been perfectly aware of the case he had to meet on this point. **PIERCE v. OPENDRA SHETTI GANAPATHY** . . . . . **7 Mad. 364**

**34. — Relief in respect of tort—Variance between pleading and proof.** The plaintiff sued the defendant, overseer of or for the municipal office, for the recovery of money due on a contract under which the plaintiff had done certain work, the defendant contracting for the municipality, and for the performance of work known by the plaintiff to be municipal work. The municipality ignored the contract, and the Court held the defendant could not be made personally liable. *Held*, that the plaintiff could not be allowed to amend his plaint so as to make the defendant liable in tort for misrepresentation of his authority. **MODHOOSOODUN DEY v. MOHENDRONATH MOOKERJEE** . . . . . **9 W. R. 206**

**35. — Plaint disclosing no cause of action—Contract Act, s. 22—Wagering contract—Suit to recover deposit paid on such contract—Bom. Act III of 1865, s. 1—Deceit—Unilateral mistake.** On the 21st of January, 1883, the plaintiff contracted to purchase from the defendant the right to receive dividend on 50 shares of the Empress Mill at R37 per share, the plaintiff being under an impression that the dividend was to be declared on some subsequent day. The plaintiff deposited R100 with the defendant as part payment of the purchase money. Subsequently it was ascertained that the dividend had been already declared on 17th January, 1883 (*i.e.*, four days before the contract) at R25. The plaintiff thereupon sued the defendant to have the contract declared cancelled, and sought to recover the deposit of R100, with interest. The Judge of the Court of Small Causes at Broach, being of opinion that the contract was in its nature a sutta or wagering contract, rejected the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff applied to the High Court under its extraordinary jurisdiction to set aside the lower Court's decision. *Held*, that, in the first instance, the plaint, as framed, not disclosing any cause of action, ought to have been returned for amendment. It should either have alleged a mistake common to both parties to the contract, or should have contained an allegation of fraud, on the defendant's part, inducing the plaintiff to enter into the agreement. The mere circumstance that the contract was "caused by one of the parties to it being under a mistake as to a matter of fact" would



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not, under s. 22 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872), have made the contract voidable. The High Court reversed the lower Court's decision in order that the plaintiff might be given an opportunity to amend his plaint so as to show that his action was one for deceit. *DAYABHAI TRIBHOVANDAS v. LAKHMICHAND PANACHAND*. I. L. R. 9 Bom. 358

36. ——— Suit for pre-emption—*Right to relief on different ground from that relied on—Raising new issue—Pre-emption.* Where a plaintiff claimed in his plaint a right of pre-emption as co-partner of the vendor:—*Held*, that he could not be entitled to a decree on the ground of vicinage. *KUNJABEHARI LAL v. GIRIDHARI LAL*

1 B. L. R. S. N. 12: 10 W. R. 189

*SHIU SUHAI MULLICK v. LALA HARI SUHAI SING*  
3 B. L. R. Ap. 142

37. ——— *Conditional decree.* Where the plaintiff in a suit to enforce the right of pre-emption sued alleging that the actual price of the property was not the price entered in the sale-deed, but a smaller price, and claimed the property on payment of such smaller price, and did not allege in his plaint that he was ready and willing to pay any price which the Court might find to be the actual price, and on the day that his suit was finally disposed of presented an application to the Court stating that he was ready and willing to do so:—*Held*, that the Court was not bound to allow him to amend his plaint and bring into Court the larger sum. *DURGA PRASAD v. NAWAZISH ALI*

I. L. R. 1 All. 591

38. ——— *Alteration of claim on appeal—Special agreement—Custom.* The plaintiff in a suit to enforce a right of pre-emption in respect of certain shares in certain villages founded his claim on a special agreement contained in the village administration papers and such claim was tried and determined in the lower Court as so founded. *Held*, that the plaintiff could not on appeal set up a claim to enforce such right founded on custom. *CHADANI LAL v. MUHAMMAD BAKSH*

I. L. R. 1 All. 563

39. ——— *Alteration of claim on appeal—Right founded on agreement—Custom.* Where the existence in a certain village of the right of pre-emption was recorded in the village administration paper as a matter of agreement and not of custom, and a suit was brought to enforce such right founded on the agreement, and was tried and determined in the lower Court as so founded, the plaintiff could not on special appeal claim such right as a matter of custom in virtue of the entry. A claim to the right of pre-emption founded on a special agreement does not exclude a claim to such right founded on Mahomedan law. *MARATIB ALI v. ABDUL HAKIM*

I. L. R. 1 All. 567

40. ——— Suit for property misappropriated—*Omission of allegation of demand and refusal.* In 1874 plaintiff sued to recover certain property, or its value, "dishonestly misappro-

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priated" on the 21st January 1872 by first defendant, assisted by the other defendants. The lower Court held that the right to sue did not accrue until the property had been demanded and refused; that the plaint contained no allegation of such demand and refusal; that the plaint could not be amended by the insertion of such an allegation after answer filed; and that therefore the suit could not be maintained. *Held*, reversing the decree, that even if the present case were one in which the provision as to demand could have any application at all, still the suit ought not to have been dismissed on that technical ground, when the defendant by his answer traversed the whole of the allegations in the plaint and pleaded the statute of limitation. *MANIKYA ROW LAKSHMAYAH v. MANIKYA ROW GOPAL ROW*  
7 Mad. 400

41. ——— Suit to set aside sale for arrears of revenue and for possession—*Purchase by fraud—Forfeiture of tenancy—Trustee of owner in equity.* The plaintiff sued to recover possession of certain land, and prayed to set aside the sale of it by the revenue authorities for arrears of assessment due on the land. He alleged that he had let the land to the defendant, on condition of the latter paying the Government assessment and certain rent in cash and kind to the plaintiff; that the defendant, having intentionally made a default in payment of the assessment, fraudulently caused the land to be sold by the revenue authorities and purchased it himself. The defendant traversed the plaintiff's allegations, and stated that he was in possession of the land as purchaser at the revenue sale. The Subordinate Judge rejected the plaintiff's claim, holding that he failed to prove either the defendant's liability to pay the assessment, or any fraud on his part with respect to the sale of the land, and that the sale could not be set aside. His decree was affirmed on appeal by the Assistant Judge on the sole ground that the sale could not be set aside. He did not go into the merits of the case. On appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, that the plaint ought not to have contained any prayer for setting aside the sale, but that as it contained a prayer for possession, it might be read as praying (or at least that the plaintiff might have been permitted to amend it so that it might simply pray) that the defendant should, under the circumstances alleged by the plaintiff, be declared a trustee of the land for the plaintiff. *Held*, also, that, if the plaintiff's allegations were true, the plaintiff would be entitled to such a declaration, and the defendant would be discharged of his sub-tenancy in consequence of his conduct which worked a forfeiture of any right to be continued as tenant. *BALKRISHNA VASUDEV v. MADHAVRAV NARAYAN*. I. L. R. 5 Bom. 73

42. ——— Suit for possession on ground of exclusive right—*Appellate Court, Power of—Variance between pleading and proof.* When a plaintiff sues to recover possession of property on the allegation that he had purchased it with his own money, and the suit is dismissed in the Court of first instance, the Court of Appeal is not



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justified in giving the plaintiff a decree for a portion of the property, on the ground that the whole was the property of a joint Hindu family in which the plaintiff was a co-sharer. *MUKHODA SOONDURY DASI v. RAM CHURN KARMOKAR*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 871 : 11 C. L. R. 194

43. ——— Suit for possession of share of joint Hindu family before partition—*Suit for partition*. A, one of three members of an undivided Hindu family, mortgaged his share in the immoveable family property to B. The mortgage recited that the money was raised in order to enable A to sue his co-parceners for partition of the family property and possession of his share therein. A subsequently did bring a suit with that object against his co-parceners, but allowed it to be dismissed against him for default. B now brought a suit against A and his co-parceners for possession of A's share in such family property. *Held*, that B's suit, being a suit for possession, was wrongly framed and was not maintainable, there never having been any partition of the joint family property. Leave, however, was given to B, on certain terms, to amend his plaint, so as to make his suit a suit for partition. *KRISHNAJI LAKSHMAN RAJVADE v. SITARAM MURARRAV JAKHI* . . . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 498

44. ——— Suit for money received for plaintiff—*Addition of prayer for account—Amendment of plaint on appeal—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 54*. Plaint allowed by the High Court, on a regular appeal to be amended by insertion of a prayer for an account. *BAI ANOPE v. MULCHAND GIRDHAR* . . . I. L. R. 9 Bom. 355

45. ——— Alternative case—*Omission to put case in alternative*. Where the plaintiff has not put forward an alternative case as he might have done, he may have leave to amend his plaint and to state his case correctly therein if the Court thinks that he has rested his claim upon wrong grounds from misinformation, ignorance of law or fact, mistake or misconstruction of documents. *LAKSHMIBAI v. HARI EIN RAVJI* . . . 9 Bom. 1

46. ——— *Omission to put case in alternative—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 53*. Where a plaintiff's claim as originally stated in his plaint was based on the allegation of the invalidity of a will, an application at the hearing of the case to amend the plaint by inserting a clause submitting that, even if the will were valid, it did dispose of the whole of the testator's property, was refused,—the Court holding, under s. 53 of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), that the case made by the proposed amendment would be inconsistent with the case made in the plaint as originally framed. *DAMODAR MADHOWJI v. PURMANANDAS JEEWANDAS*

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 155

47. ——— *Omission to ask for alternative relief—Frame of suit—Account and discovery*. After parties have come to trial to determine which of two stories is true, the plaintiff

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cannot be allowed to amend his plaint by abandoning his own story and adopting that of the defendant, and asking relief on that footing : for the question, whether on that footing the plaintiff is entitled to relief, is one to which the defendant's attention has not been called and which he has had no opportunity of answering. In a suit to recover a specified sum for the hire of cargo boats and not asking for any other relief, the defendant alleged and proved that he was merely the agent of the plaintiff to find hirers for the boats, and that he was not liable for the hire of the boats. *Held*, that, although *prima facie* a principal is entitled to an account and discovery from his agent, the plaintiff could not obtain such relief in the suit as framed, and that he could not, after coming to a hearing, be allowed to amend his plaint by inserting an alternative prayer for relief, upon the footing of the case set up by the defendant. *SHIBKRISTO SIRCAR v. ABDOL HAKEEM*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 692 : 5 C. L. R. 455

48. ——— Withdrawal of part of claim—*Suit brought for amount in excess of jurisdiction of Munsif—Suit to declare land liable to be sold in execution of decree—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 50 and 373*. In a suit brought in a District Munsif's Court to declare certain land liable to be sold in execution of a decree for more than R2,500, the defendants pleaded that the Court had no jurisdiction. The Munsif allowed the plaintiff to amend the plaint by stating that he abandoned his claim to execute the decree against the land for more than R2,500. On appeal, the District Judge held that the plaint could not be amended after the first hearing. *Held*, on appeal to the High Court, that the claim was not one which could be amended, so as to bring the suit within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Munsif. *ANNAJI v. RAMA KURUP* I. L. R. 10 Mad. 152

49. ——— Allegation of fraud—*Alteration of nature of fraud charged*. Where in a suit for repayment of a certain sum which had after a compromise made by the Official Assignee been paid to a person who had assisted in taking the accounts, such payment being unauthorized by the Court, the plaint, as presented, alleged the fraudulent concealment of the payment from the assignee and afterwards, when all the evidence had been taken, and it had been established that the assignee, knew of the payment, this was amended to the statement that if he did know of it he had no power to consent to it, and that his consent would not be binding, the payment being a fraud upon the Court :—*Held*, that the amendment at the stage when it was made was not permissible. *ABDUL HOSSEIN ZENAIL v. TURNER*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 620

L. R. 14 I. A. 111

50. ——— Charges of fraud—*General allegations of fraud—Amendment of plaint on appeal—Objection taken for first time on appeal*. Where a plaintiff seeks relief on the ground of



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fraud, and the plaint contains general allegations but no specific instances of the alleged fraud, it ought to be immediately, on presentation, rejected or returned for amendment, as it does not disclose a cause of action. The plaintiff sued to recover damages caused by the defendant's fraud during his management of the plaintiff's estate from 1870 to 1884. The plaint disclosed no specific instances of the fraud imputed to the defendant. The Court of first instance, without going into evidence, rejected the plaintiff's claim on the preliminary ground that the plaintiff had no right to sue during the lifetime of his adoptive mother. In second appeal, the respondent objected that the plaint was defective. The plaintiff's pleader asked for leave to amend it by specifying certain instances of the alleged fraud. *Held*, that the amendment could not then be allowed and the suit must fail. **KRISHNAJI V. WAMNAJI**

**I. L. R. 18 Bom. 144**

**51. ——— Suit by Bank for money against executrix—Civil Procedure Code, s. 53—Order returning plaint for amendment—Form of suit.** A suit was brought by the manager of the M Bank against the executrix of B to recover a sum of money as due upon a bond executed by B in favour of the Bank. The plaint described the defendant as "Mrs. Sarah G. Barlow, of Mussoorie," and stated that she was executrix of the deceased B. It began thus: "George Henry Webb, Manager of the abovenamed plaintiff's business, states as follows," and proceeded to state that the deceased was, at the time of his death, "indebted to the plaintiff," and to set forth the cause of action in detail. It was signed and verified thus: "For the B Bank, Limited, G. H. Webb, Manager." The Court of first instance returned the plaint for amendment under s. 53 of the Civil Procedure Code, because the suit should not have been brought in the form in which it was brought, but in the form referred to in s. 213 and No. 105 of Sch. IV of the Code. *Held*, with reference to this ground, that the plaintiff was at liberty to bring a suit for money against any person administering to or representing the estate; and if such suit should be found with reference to the facts in evidence not maintainable, it should be dismissed; but there was no authority for returning a plaint for amendment, when it was found that the suit was not maintainable in the form in which it was brought, in order to amend it so as to convert the suit into one of a different character. **MUSSOORIE BANK V. BARLOW**

**I. L. R. 9 All. 188**

**52. ——— Suit to restrain interference with private right—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 31, 53.** A sued for an injunction to restrain interference with his right to graze cattle on the bed of a certain tank. The other raiyats of the village in whom the same right vested were originally joined as plaintiffs, but the plaint was amended

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under s. 53 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and their names struck off the record. A proved no special damage. *Held*, (i) that the fact that the other raiyats of the village had similar rights did not make A's right a public right in the sense that no action could be brought upon it unless special damage was proved; (ii) that the right claimed vested in A severally as well as jointly with the other raiyats and the amendment of the plaint was not contrary to the provisions of s. 31 or 53 of the Code of Civil Procedure. **VENKATACHALA V. KUPPUSAMI**

**I. L. R. 11 Mad. 42**

**53. ——— Change in form of suit, the cause of action being unchanged—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 53.** The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had encroached on the bed of a tank, raised embankments, and cultivated crops which interfered with the plaintiffs' supply of water; and they prayed for a decree ejecting the defendants from the land encroached on and restraining them from interfering with it. *Held*, that the Court was not precluded by s. 53 of the Code of Civil Procedure from passing a decree declaring the plaintiffs' right to the water of the tank, directing the defendants' embankments, etc., to be removed and regulating the cultivation of their lands; but that the defendant's liberty of cultivation should not be restricted more than was necessary to secure the plaintiffs' supply of water. **PULAMADA V. RAVUTHU**

**I. L. R. 11 Mad. 94**

**54. ——— Joint family—Mortgage by a father—Decree against father on mortgage giving possession with interest and costs—Son's liability to satisfy the decree as to interest and costs.** The plaintiff's father mortgaged certain ancestral property for a limited term. A suit was brought on the mortgage against the father, and a decree was passed, directing the mortgaged property to be handed over to the mortgagee for a certain time, and awarding payment of interest and costs by the father. In execution of this decree, the mortgagee sought to recover the costs by sale of the property in question. Thereupon the plaintiffs sued for a declaration that the property was not liable to be sold in execution of the decree against the father on the ground that the debts contracted by the father were for immoral purposes, and that therefore the estate could not be bound by the decree at all. The Court of first instance found that the debts had not been incurred for any immoral purpose, and dismissed the suit. At the hearing of the appeal to the High Court it was alleged that the plaintiffs had separated from their father before the mortgage decree was passed against him, and an application was made on their behalf that the plaint in this case should be amended by inserting an allegation to that effect. *Held*, that the amendment could not be allowed. Such an amendment would entirely alter the points of contention between the parties. In suing in the form adopted by the plaintiffs they doubtless intended to take the chance of getting a greater



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advantage than they would have obtained if they had sued merely as separated sons. They sought to liberate the property altogether from liability on the ground that the debt was immoral and that the estate could not therefore be bound by the decree at all. That being so, and the plaintiffs having omitted to allege partition, they could not now ask the Court to put their suit on a new footing. **NARAYANRAV DAMODAR v. JAVERVAHU.**

**I. L. R. 12 Bom. 431**

**55. ——— Suit to declare alienation by Hindu widow invalid—Specific Relief Act, s. 42—Civil Procedure Code, s. 53—Amendment of plaint—Death of widow pending appeal by plaintiff—Right of appellant to proceed with appeal—Plaint not to be amended by claim for possession.** The proviso to s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, that "no Court shall pass a declaratory decree where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so" refers to the position of the plaintiff at the date of suit: where a suit was brought for a declaration that certain alienations of land made by a Hindu widow to the defendants were not binding on the plaintiff, her reversionary heir, and pending appeal by the plaintiff, the widow died:—*Held*, (i) that the plaintiff was entitled to proceed with his appeal; (ii) that the plaintiff could not be permitted to amend his plaint and claim possession. **GOVINDA v. PERUMDEVI.**

**I. L. R. 12 Mad. 136**

**56. ——— Suit in Civil Court to enforce exchange of pottah and muchalka—Civil Procedure Code, s. 53—Madras Rent Recovery Act (Madras Act VIII of 1865)—Declaratory decree.** A suit in the Court of a District Munsif to enforce acceptance of a pottah and execution of a muchalka by defendant in respect of a holding in a village to which the plaintiff claimed title, was dismissed as not being maintainable. *Held*, that the suit should not have been dismissed, but the plaint should have been amended by the addition of a prayer for declaration of the plaintiff's title, and that the Court then would have had jurisdiction to grant by way of consequential relief the relief originally sought. **NARASIMMA v. SURYANARAYANA.**

**I. L. R. 12 Mad. 481**

**57. ——— Plaint for declaratory decree without consequential relief—Objection to plaint not taken—Ground for dismissal of suit.** A suit should not be dismissed by an Appellate Court on the ground of its being one asking merely for a declaratory decree and no consequential relief, where that objection has never been taken by the defendants to the suit. The plaintiffs should in such a case be allowed an opportunity of amending their plaint. **LIMBA BIN KRISHNA v. RAMA BIN PIMPLU.**

**I. L. R. 13 Mad. 548**

**58. ——— Suit for rent, decree for use and occupation in—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 53—Variance between pleading and proof.**

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A suit was brought for rent of a hat on the basis of a verbal settlement for three years at an annual jama of R370. The defendants denied the settlement. The first Court found for the plaintiff; but on appeal, an objection having been raised by the defendants that the verbal lease was illegal under the Transfer of Property Act, the suit was dismissed. The plaintiffs contended on appeal that the suit should not have been dismissed, but that they were entitled to a decree for use and occupation. *Held*, that a decree for use and occupation of the land by the defendants could not be granted in this case, as that would amount to an amendment raising issues of an entirely different character from those on which the trial was held in the Courts below as a suit for rent, and necessitating a trial upon fresh evidence. Such amendment could not be allowed under s. 53 of the Civil Procedure Code. **Lukhee Kanto Dass Chowdhury v. Sumeer-uddin Lusker, 13 B. L. R. 243; 21 W. R. 208; Eshan Chunder Singh v. Shama Churn Bhutto, 11 Moo. I.A. 20; Narainee Dossee v. Nurrokhury Mohanto, Marsh. 70, referred to. SURENDRA NARAIN SINGH v. BHAI LAL THAKUR.**

**I. L. R. 22 Calc. 752**

**59. ——— Amendment in respect of parties—Striking names out of plaint—Amending issues.** Four plaintiffs sued as partners, but it was found during the trial that they were not all partners at the time the cause of action accrued; and the Judge thereupon amended the issue which had been raised on that point, and raised the question whether the plaintiffs were or were not partners; and it being decided in the negative, the Judge ordered two of the plaintiffs' names to be struck out of the plaint, and gave a decree in favour of the other plaintiffs. *Held*, that the Judge acted rightly in amending the issue, but that he should have done so without striking the names of the plaintiffs out of the plaint. **EAST INDIAN RAILWAY COMPANY v. JORDAN.**

**4 B. L. R. O. C. 97; 14 W. R. O. C. 11**

**60. ——— Hindu widow—Joinder of plaintiffs, one of whom has no right to sue for pre-emption.** The plaintiffs in a suit to enforce a right of pre-emption based on the *wajib-ulurz* of a village, which gave the right to "co-sharers," alleged themselves to be jointly interested in the village, and in their plaint claimed relief jointly. One of the two plaintiffs was the widow of a co-sharer in the village, who, at the time of his death, was a member of a joint Hindu family, and it was held she could not claim pre-emption. *Held*, with reference to the manner in which the plaint was framed, that the other plaintiff could not claim pre-emption entirely on his own account without amending the plaint, but that it was too late for him to take such a course. **Damodar Das v. Gokal Chand, I. L. R. 7 All. 79, referred to. KARAN SINGH v. MUHAMMED ISMAIL KHAN.**

**I. L. R. 7 All. 860**



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61. ————— *Joinder of causes of action*—Same parties suing in different capacities—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 26 and 31. By the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the New Dhurumsey Poonjabhoy Spinning and Weaving Company, the plaintiffs' firm of *M F & Co.* were appointed agents of the company for twenty-five years, and it was provided that they should have the general control and management of the company. Cl. 98 of the articles provided that the said firm, as such agents, should have full power and authority (*inter alia*) to appoint and employ, in or for the purposes of the transaction and management of the affairs and business of the company such solicitors as they should think proper. An agreement, dated 26th August 1874, was also entered into between the company and the partners in the firm of *M F & Co.*, their executors, administrators, and assigns, for the time being constituting the partnership firm of *M F & Co.*, whereby it was agreed that the said firm should be agents to the company for twenty-five years to buy and sell, etc., and particularly to exercise all the powers contained in cl. 98 of the Articles of Association. *Messrs. C & B* were duly appointed solicitors to the company, and acted as such for a considerable time. *M*, one of the members of the said firm of *M F & Co.*, died in the middle of March 1876. The plaintiffs complained that *G*, one of the shareholders in the company, became desirous of ousting the plaintiffs from the position of agents of the company, and of becoming the managing director of the company; that in July 1881 he procured his own election and that of certain nominees of his as directors of the company, and on the 8th August 1881 procured the passing of a resolution at a Board meeting to the effect that as *Messrs. C & B*, the company's solicitors, were also the solicitors of the agents, it was desirable for the interests of the company, that a change should be made and that *Messrs. H C & L* be appointed solicitors of the company. The plaintiffs alleged that the only object of passing the said resolution was to facilitate the design of *G*, of ousting the plaintiffs from their agency, and getting the management of the company for himself; that *Messrs. H C & L* had been for a long time the solicitors of *G*, and had been advising him in his designs upon the company and upon the plaintiffs, and they contended that the resolution was a breach of the contract between the company and the plaintiffs and a violation of the Articles of Association of the company. The plaintiffs sued *G* and two other directors of the company and the company itself, and prayed for an injunction against the defendants to restrain them from committing any breach of the agreement of 26th August 1874 and in particular from carrying into effect the resolution appointing *Messrs. H C & L* as solicitors for the company, and to restrain them from doing anything inconsistent with the Memorandum and Articles of Association. The defendants con-

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tended that the contract of the 26th August 1874 had been determined by the death of *M*, and that the powers conferred on the agents by cl. 98 of the Articles were, subject to the general powers of management, vested in the directors by the Articles, and that the case was not one in which an injunction could be granted. Counsel on behalf of the plaintiffs sought to obtain the injunction on the ground that the resolution of the 8th August 1881 appointing *Messrs. H C & L* solicitors of the company was contrary to the Memorandum of Association, and therefore *ultra vires*; and, in order that this point might be pressed against the defendants, it was proposed that the plaintiff should be amended by alleging a cause of action in two of the plaintiffs as shareholders as well as a cause of action in all the plaintiffs as parties contracting with the company. *Held*, that under the provisions of ss. 26 and 31 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877) the amendment could not be allowed. The plaintiffs, as shareholders and contractors, had not the same cause of action, by which words were meant not only the act complained of, but also the right violated by that act. The rights of the plaintiffs as contractors, alleged to be violated by the resolution, were rights given to them by their agreement but the rights of the plaintiffs as shareholders were rights secured to them by the Articles of Association. *NUSSERWANJI v. GORDON*

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 266

62. ————— *Amendment of plaint on appeal—Adding parties*. In a suit for arrears of rent of the plaintiff's share of a talukh it appeared that, in the year 1279, a partition was effected of the zamindari in which the defendant's talukh was situated, and that the talukh ceased to be held exclusively by the plaintiff, but was divided between him and certain other persons, who were not made parties to the suit. *Held*, that the plaint could not be amended by making the co-sharers parties at the hearing of the appeal. *OBHOY GOBIND CHOWDHRY v. HURYCHURN CHOWDHRY*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 277

63. ————— *Suit by one member of an undivided Hindu family—Non-joinder of other persons interested in a family business*. In 1887 the plaintiff appointed the defendants to serve for three years as manager of a business in Moulmein, which was the business of the undivided Hindu family to which the plaintiff belonged. In 1893 the plaintiff, without joining the other members of his family, sued the defendant for damages for breach of the contract of service and it was held that the suit was not maintainable in the absence from the record of the other partners in the business. *Held*, that by reason of the fact that an amendment of the plaint might deprive the defendants of the defence of limitation and of the other circumstances in the case, the plaintiff should not be allowed on appeal to amend



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the plaintiff by bringing his partners on to the record. *ALAGAPPA CHETTI v. VELLIAN CHETTI*.  
I. L. R. 18 Mad. 33

64. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 27 and 53—Amendment of plaintiff by bringing on a new plaintiff on second appeal.* Plaintiffs sued in 1894 to recover property belonging to the estate of a testator, claiming to be his executors under a will. The property was alleged to have been entrusted by the testator in 1893 to the defendant. The will contained no express appointment of executors, but it provided that the plaintiffs should take care of the estate during the minority of a son who was to be adopted by the testator, and imposed upon them the duty of providing for the maintenance of persons therein named. The adoption having taken place after the institution of the suit:—*Held*, that, under the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff should be amended on second appeal by substituting the adopted son as plaintiff with one of the present plaintiffs as his next friend. *SESHAMMA v. CHENNAPPA* I. L. R. 20 Mad. 467

65. *Suit brought in the name of the idol of a temple—Amendment allowed to name of manager of temple—Practice.* A suit relating to property alleged to belong to a temple cannot be brought in the name of the idol of the temple. Where such a suit was so brought, the Court in second appeal allowed the plaintiff to be amended, on certain conditions, by substituting the name of the person alleged to be the manager of the temple, but without prejudice to any question which might subsequently be raised as to such person's *locus standi* in the suit. *THAKUR RAGHUNATHJI MAHARAJ v. SHAH LAL CHAND*  
I. L. R. 19 All. 330

66. *Addition of parties on second appeal.* In a suit by the manager of a Hindu joint family to recover possession of certain lands from the defendants, the plaintiff was allowed on second appeal to amend his plaintiff by making other members of the family parties to the suit. *HARI GOPAL v. GOKALDAS KUSHABASHET*  
I. L. R. 12 Bom. 158

67. *Addition of parties—Suit originally against owner—Ship added as party defendant.* In a suit for collision originally filed against the owners of a ship:—*Held*, that the plaintiffs might amend the plaintiff by adding the ship as a party defendant. *BOMBAY AND PERSIA STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY v. SHEPHERD*  
I. L. R. 12 Bom. 237

68. *Suit by parties for title to partnership property.* Where a partner sued to establish his exclusive title to the partnership property attached and seized in execution of a decree against another partner, the High Court on appeal allowed the plaintiff to amend his plaintiff by converting that suit into one for a dissolution of partnership and an account, and remanded the case, with a direction to the lower Court to make

PLAINT—*contd.*5. AMENDMENT OF PLAINT—*contd.*

he other partners parties to it and to take an account. *KARIMBHAI v. CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS*  
I. L. R. 4 Bom. 222

69. *Amendment on appeal.* Under the circumstances, the plaintiff was allowed to amend his plaintiff on appeal, so as to make it a plaintiff against one debtor alone, he having sued others who as he framed his cause of action were not liable, while he would be prejudiced by the dismissal of the suit as against them. *MAHOMED ZAHOR ALI KHAN v. RUTTA KOER*  
11 Moo. I. A. 468 : 9 W. R. P. C. 9

See *PROBY v. BELL* 20 W. R. 6

70. *Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 416—Procedure—Substitution of parties—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872), s. 521—Order by Magistrate for removal of obstruction from a public thoroughfare. Suit against Magistrate to establish right.* Under s. 521 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872), a first class Magistrate in charge of a talukh made an order declaring certain land to be part of a public thoroughfare, and directing the plaintiff to remove the obstruction caused by him to it. The plaintiff sued the Magistrate to establish his right to the land, alleging that it was his private property and that the Magistrate's order was wrong. The Assistant Judge who tried the suit dismissed it, holding that it did not lie against the Magistrate. On appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, that the Assistant Judge might have properly permitted the plaintiff to amend his suit by striking out the name of the first class Magistrate as defendant, and substituting in that capacity the Secretary of State for India in Council. The High Court accordingly reversed the decree of the Assistant Judge, and remanded the suit for re-trial on the merits, after making the amendment directed. *NILKANTHAPA v. MAGISTRATE OF SHOLAPUR*  
I. L. R. 6 Bom. 670

71. On the 11th August 1879 the defendant, as a Magistrate in charge of a talukh, made an order under ss. 523 and 526 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872) directing the plaintiff to remove a certain "ota" on the ground that it had been built upon a public thoroughfare. The plaintiff thereupon sued the Magistrate for a declaration that the "ota" and site belonged to him, and prayed for a reversal of the Magistrate's order. The Assistant Judge who tried the suit dismissed it, holding that it did not lie against the defendant. On appeal, the High Court, following the decision in *Nilkantthapa Malkapa v. Magistrate of Sholapur*, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 670, reversed the decree of the Assistant Judge, and remanded the case, in order that the plaintiff might amend his suit by striking out the name of the first class Magistrate as defendant, and substituting in that capacity the Secretary of State for India in Council, and directing the lower Court to determine the suit upon its merits after the above amendment



PLAINT—*contd.*5. AMENDMENT OF PLAINT—*contd.*

and due service of process. **BALARAM CHATRUKLAL v. MAGISTRATE OF IGATPUR** **I. L. R. 6 Bom. 672**

**72.** ———— *Allowing substitution of parties and new cause of action.* The plaintiff brought a suit against the Secretary of State, which the Judge dismissed; on the petition of the plaintiff he allowed the plaint in the suit so disposed of to be amended, and the name of a new defendant to be substituted, and a different cause of action to be stated. *Held*, that the Judge acted illegally, and that the plaintiff should have been referred to a new suit. **SETH DHUNRAJ v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA**

**1 N. W. 118 : Ed. 1873, 204**

**73.** ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XLV of 1882), s. 53—Amendment of plaint on appeal—Substitution of legal representative for deceased defendant—Limitation Act, s. 22.* A suit was brought to recover arrears of rent. The persons whose names were entered on the record as defendants were, in fact, dead when the suit was instituted. The suit was dismissed. The plaintiffs appealed and sought leave to amend the plaint by substituting for the names of the dead men those of their legal representatives, as against whom the suit would then have been barred by limitation. *Held*, that the amendment should not be allowed. **MALLIKARJUNA v. PULLAYYA.**

**I. L. R. 16 Mad. 319**

**74.** ———— *Substitution of parties as defendants.* In an application to amend a plaint by substitution of the name of a firm for the Official Assignee as defendants, it was shown that the firm had been adjudicated insolvents, and one of them had obtained his permanent discharge; that the cause of action arose prior to the insolvency; and that no written statements had been filed. The application was granted, the costs to be paid by the plaintiff. **DELHI AND LONDON BANK v. MILLER.**

**7 B. L. R. Ap. 65**

**75.** ———— *Amendment by striking out name of defendant—Suit for damages for wrongful acts of Government servant—Distinct averments against each party.* The plaintiff had purchased at a Government auction a license to vend spirituous liquors, paid the first instalment of the purchase-money, and demanded a license, but did not receive it until six days later. Meantime he opened a shop and sold "tari" for three days, when the sale was stopped by the Extra Assistant Commissioner, notwithstanding the plaintiff represented that he was a license-holder. The present suit was brought against the Government represented by the Deputy Commissioner for damages on account of wrongful acts of the Extra Assistant Commissioner, who was made second defendant. The Judge, holding that where a servant does a wrongful act maliciously he is personally liable and the master is free, left it to the plaintiff to say against whom he would proceed. The plaintiff elected to proceed against Government

PLAINT—*contd.*5. AMENDMENT OF PLAINT—*contd.*

and obtained a decree for a part of his claim. In the lower Appellate Court the Judges were divided in opinion, the Recorder holding that the first Court was justified in allowing the plaintiff to abandon his suit against the second defendant, to whom malice had been imputed, and that the suit was still maintainable against the Government; and the Judicial Commissioner, considering it irregular to allow this action, inasmuch as the claims for damages on account of the illegal and malicious acts of the second defendant and for damages for non-issue of license by the first defendant were inconsistent with each other. *Held*, by the High Court, that the view of the Recorder was correct. Nevertheless, the plaintiff ought not to have been put to the option of abandoning his suit against one or other defendant, but the suit should have been tried out. *Held*, also, that the allegations against the two defendants were distinct, but not inconsistent, and that the Judicial Commissioner had taken too strict a view of the plaint. **VYTHEELINGUM v. GOVERNMENT** **21 W. R. 199**

**76.** ———— *Suit brought under wrong Act—Suit erroneously brought under Rent Act.* Where a suit had been erroneously brought under Bengal Act VIII of 1859, s. 30, and the plaintiff applied to have it amended in that respect, whereupon the Munsif dismissed the suit, the case was returned by the High Court with directions to allow the plaintiff to amend the plaint on payment of the costs. *In the matter of the petition of* **GOBIND CHUNDER GHOSE.** **GOBIND CHUNDER GHOSE v. BYKUNT NATH GHOSE** **19 W. R. 61**

**77.** ———— *Relinquishment of claim for sale—Civil Procedure Code, s. 53—Suit on a mortgage for sale or "any other relief to which the plaintiff might be entitled"—Subsequent prayer for money decree, relinquishing claim for sale.* The plaintiff, a mortgagee, came into Court asking for a decree for a sale on his mortgage, or "any other relief to which the plaintiff might be entitled." The mortgage sued upon contained the usual covenant for payment, in addition to the further covenant that in default of payment proceedings might be taken against the mortgaged property. *Held*, that there was nothing to prevent such plaintiff in the course of the suit relinquishing his claim for sale of the mortgaged property, and asking merely for a simple money decree. Such an amendment of the pleadings did not amount to a conversion of the suit into a suit of another and inconsistent character. **SUKHDEO PRASAD v. LACHMAN SINGH (1902)** **I. L. R. 24 All. 456**

**78.** ———— *Mistake—Limitation—Power of Receiver to sue—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 19—Acknowledgment of liability.* By an order of the Court, the plaintiff was appointed Receiver in a certain suit, with authority to sue for and recover an attached debt. Through some mistake in the office of the attorneys of the plaintiff in that suit, the money sought to be attached was wrongly described in the Tabular Statement as money due



**PLAINT—contd.****5. AMENDMENT OF PLAINT—contd.**

under the agreement of the 25th October, 1895, whereas it should have been the agreement of the 26th August 1895; and the Court, acting on this representation, made the order, which applied to the alleged agreement of the 26th October, 1895. On application to amend the order and the plaint, or in the alternative to read the existing order as if it were in reality applicable to the right agreement:—*Held*, that no order for amending the plaint or the order could be made; the amendment of the order would operate only as a new order, taking effect from the date on which it is made, and could not therefore operate as the basis or authority for the present suit. The plaintiff's authority to maintain this suit depends solely upon the order appointing him Receiver: if it has been made under any mistake, it cannot by any course of construction be regarded as applying to any thing other than the subject-matter specified by the order itself, the intention of the parties being immaterial. *Way v. Hearn*, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 292, 304, distinguished. In order to satisfy the requirements of s. 19 of the Limitation Act, though a promise to pay need not be made out, it is necessary when the right claimed is a debt that an unequivocal and unqualified admission of the debt or a part of it, or of the subsisting relationship of debtor and creditor, should be established. There is a distinction in this respect between the law of limitation applicable in England and that in force in this country. *Fink v. Buldeo Dass*, 1 L. R. 26 Calc. 715, distinguished. *Venkata v. Parthasaradhi*, 1 L. R. 16 Mad. 220, approved of. *Quere*—Whether, having regard to the terms of s. 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff can be allowed to take advantage of any ground of exemption from the ordinary law of limitation which has not been pleaded in the plaint. *BENODE BEHARI MOOKERJEE v. RAJ NARAIN MITTER* (1903).

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 699 : s.c. 7 C. W. N. 651

**79. ——— Limitation—Civil Procedure Code, s. 54.** When a Court fixes a time under cl. (a) or (b) of s. 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it must be a time within limitation, and s. 54 does not give a Court any power to extend the ordinarily prescribed period of limitation for suits. *Jaini Prasad v. Bachu Singh*, 1 L. R. 15 All. 65, followed. *Moti Sahu v. Chhatra Das*, 1 L. R. 19 Calc. 780, referred to. *DURGA SINGH v. BISHESWAR DAYAL* (1898) I. L. R. 24 All. 218

**80. ——— Rejection of plaint—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 54, cl. (c)—Plaint, when may be rejected.** Where the plaintiff sued to establish a *mul-raiyati* right which by a Government order was not granted, and also sought for the position of a *mustagir* and to set aside the executive orders of the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner, and the lower Courts rejected the plaint under s. 54 of the Civil Procedure Code:—*Held*, that, upon the allegations made in the plaint, the suit ought to have been tried, and the plaint could not be rejected

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on the ground of the suit being barred by any positive rule of law. *NAWAB SINGH v. CHARAN RANA* (1901) . . . 6 C. W. N. 411

**81. ——— Court fee—(Act VII of 1870) (Court-fees Act), ss. 7, cls. 5 and 6 (c), 28—Suit undervalued—Power to extend time for payment of deficiency in Court-fee—Civil Procedure Code, s. 54—Limitation.** A suit for pre-emption of zamindari property was filed one day before the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation. The plaint stated the profits of the property to be RS-4-0, and should therefore have borne Court-fee stamps to the amount of the proper Court-fee on R123-12-0; but the valuation given in the plaint was only R108-12-0 and the plaint was stamped accordingly. The plaint was reported by the officer of the Court to be properly stamped on the valuation; but, when the case came on for hearing, the defendant objected that the relief had been undervalued. On this objection the Court found that RS-4-0 was the correct amount of profits, disallowing the plaintiff's application to be allowed to reduce the amount of profits stated in the plaint to R6-14-10, and rejected the plaint under s. 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, that this was not a case falling within s. 28 of the Court-fees Act, 1870; but one to which s. 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure applied. The Court had no power to extend the time for making up the deficiency in the Court-fee beyond the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation, and the plaint was rightly rejected. *MUHAMMAD AHMAD v. MUHAMMAD SIRAJUDDIN* (1901)

I. L. R. 23 All. 423

**82. ——— Consequential relief—Amendment of plaint—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 42—Suit for declaration—Construction of documents—Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876), s. 4.** The plaintiffs filed a suit against the Secretary of State for India in Council for a declaration that they were entitled to hold certain lands free from assessment. The defendant objected that the suit was barred under s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877). After the settlement of the issues in the case, the plaintiffs applied for leave to amend the plaint by adding thereto a prayer for injunction by way of consequential relief. The lower Court refused to grant the prayer. *Held*, that the lower Court should have exercised its discretion in plaintiff's favour, although the prayer for amendment was made very late, as it was a mere matter of form which could not affect the merits of the claim or transform the nature of the suit. *KALABHAI v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 19

**6. RETURN OF PLAINT.**

**1. ——— Form of order of return—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 29.** Where a plaint is returned for amendment under s. 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the order of return should specify a time for such amendment. *ISMAIL SAHIB v. ARUMUGA CHETTI* . . . 1 Mad. 427



**PLAINT—contd.****6. RETURN OF PLAINT—contd.**

**2. ———— Time for return—Presentation of plaint—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 57.** Although s. 57 of Act X of 1877 contemplates the return of the plaint, should error be patent when it is first presented, yet there is nothing in the wording of that section which forbids the return of the plaint at a later stage in the suit. **ABDUL SAMAD v. RAJENDRA KISHORE SINGH** I. L. R. 2 All. 357

**3. ———— Grounds for return—Irregular plaint—Plaint in language not that of the Court.** A plaint drawn up in what is, practically, Persian ought not to be admitted on the file, but should be rejected or returned for amendment and presentation in Urdu, the ordinary language of intercourse and business in use in the district (Patna). **AMEER KOOLEE KHAN v. RUSSICK LALL SINGH** 8 W. R. 495

**4. ———— Schedule to plaint—Irregular plaint—Filing fresh plaint—Costs.** A plaint which in the first count did not sufficiently disclose the subject of claim, without reading the schedule annexed as part of the plaint or when the action accrued, and in the second count did not show any right to sue in the plaintiff, was rejected by the Court as irregular, but with liberty to the plaintiff to bring a fresh suit. *Semle:* The Court will not make the payment of costs in respect of the former plaint a condition precedent to filing a fresh plaint, where there is no suggestion of *malâ fides*. **LUCKHEY MOONEY DOSSEE v. KHETTER COOMARY DOSSEE** 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 117

**5. ———— Prolivity—Argument—Irrelevancy.** A plaint which is unnecessarily prolix, or argumentative, or which contains irrelevant matter, ought to be rejected by the Court to which it is presented, or ought to be returned to the plaintiff for amendment. A plaint which contains a prayer that the defendant may be criminally prosecuted for forgery should be rejected. **BISHEN SUHAYE SINGH v. BEER KISHORE SINGH** 8 W. R. 295

**6. ———— Civil Procedure Code, s. 57—Plaint presented in a wrong Court.** In all cases where no option as to the selection of the Court is allowed by law to the plaintiff, a plaint presented in a wrong Court must be returned for presentation in the proper Court. **MUTTIRULANDI v. KOTTAYAN** I. L. R. 10 Mad. 211

**7. ———— Want of jurisdiction.** Where there is want of jurisdiction in the Court in which a plaint is presented to try the cause of action mentioned in it, the plaint should be returned to the plaintiff. **KHANDU MORESHVAR v. SHIVJI BIN GORKOJI** 5 Bom. A. C. 212

**KHOOSHAL CHUND v. PALMER** 1 Agra 280

**SURNOMOYEE v. DOORGA MONEE DOSSEE** 10 W. R. 335

**8. ———— Civil Procedure Code, s. 57—Return of plaint when Court has no jurisdiction.** An Appellate Court is not bound to

**PLAINT—contd.****6. RETURN OF PLAINT—contd.**

return the plaint under all circumstances where defect of jurisdiction appears. **YACOOB v. MOHAN SINGH** I. L. R. 11 Mad. 482

**9. ———— Amendment of plaint by Subordinate Judge and return for presentation in Small Cause Court—Jurisdiction of Subordinate Judge.** A plaint praying for a declaration that a certain tax was illegal and also for damages for illegal entry into the plaintiff's house was presented to the Court of the first class Subordinate Judge of Surat. The Judge amended the plaint by striking out the portion "regarding the reliefs other than the relief for damages," and then holding that the claim for damages would lie only in the Small Cause Court, returned the plaint for presentation in that Court. *Held.* that the Subordinate Judge was not justified in returning the plaint at that stage of the proceedings. The shape in which the suit was originally instituted is the test of jurisdiction. **MOTABHAI MOTILAL v. SURAT CITY MUNICIPALITY** I. L. R. 20 Bom. 675

**10. ———— Want of jurisdiction.** If a party bring a suit in a Court which on his own showing has no jurisdiction to try it, he cannot, after failing in that Court, have the plaint returned to him in order that he may file it in proper Court. *In re TUFANI SINGH* 6 B. L. R. Ap. 141

**11. ———— Court having no jurisdiction—Procedure—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 30.** Where the Appellate Court decides that the lower Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, it should return the plaint to the plaintiff in order that it may be presented to the proper Court. **BAI MAKHOR v. BULAKHI CHAKU** I. L. R. 1 Bom. 538

**DHERAJ MAHTAB CHUND v. DAMOODER SINGH.** W. R. 1864, 65

**SHRUT SOONDUREF DEBIA v. KHEMUNKUREE DEBIA** 5 W. R. Act X, 87

**12. ———— Case found to be entertained without jurisdiction—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 3.** Where a Subordinate Judge, after registering a plaint and allowing the parties to go to issue on the question of jurisdiction, found that he had no jurisdiction, it was held that he did wrong, under Act XXIII of 1861, s. 3, in dismissing the suit. He ought to have returned the plaint to the plaintiff. **KARTICK NATH PANDAY v. ROY NUNDEPT MAHATAB** 23 W. R. 263

**13. ———— Return for amendment and presentation to the proper Court—Misjoinder of Government officer as defendant.** Where a plaint is presented to the Judge of a district in which plaint an officer of Government is added as a nominal defendant, no cause of action being alleged against him, the proper course for the District Court to adopt is either to reject the plaint or to call upon the plaintiff to amend it by striking out the name of the officer improperly added as a defendant, and, upon the plaintiff consenting to do



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so, to return the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation to the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it. Where the District Judge did not adopt this course, but proceeded to try the cause, the High Court annulled his decree and (the plaintiff consenting to amend his plaint) returned it to him for amendment and presentation to the proper Court. *SHRIDHAR HARI v. CHIMA VALAD LADU*

**10 Bom. 17**

**14.** ———— *Suit or appeal filed in a wrong Court—Return of plaint or memorandum of appeal for presentation in proper Court—Practice of the High Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 373—Cancellation of court-fee stamps.* The Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882) does not allow of a plaint or memorandum of appeal being returned to the plaintiff, or appellant, after a case has been heard on its merits, and just as the plaintiff or appellant discover that the Court is about to pronounce an adverse decision. There is no provision in the Court for the return of a plaint to a plaintiff after it has been admitted, and the court-fee stamps thereon cancelled. Even if the Code allowed the High Court to return a plaint after the court-fee stamps have been cancelled, the plaint could not be again legally presented in any Court without new stamps being affixed to it. The executive Government alone have power to remit court-fees, and no Court or Judge has legal authority to admit a plaint which bears only cancelled stamps, or to direct a subordinate Court to admit such a document. *JAGJIVAN JAVHERDAS SETH v. MAGDUM ALI*

**I. L. R. 7 Bom. 487**

**15.** ———— *Return of plaint for presentation to proper Court—Jurisdiction—Construction—Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), ss. 30 and 32—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 53 and 57.* Where, after a trial has begun, or even after it has concluded, it appears that the Court has not jurisdiction to hear the case, the plaint should be returned in order that it may be presented to the proper Court, and no additional court-fees are payable. *Jagjivandas Javerdas Seth v. Magdum Ali, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 487*, overruled. *PRABHAKARBHAT v. VISHWAMBHAR.*

**I. L. R. 8 Bom. 313**

**16.** ———— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 57—Decree passed on plaints.* The ruling in the case of *Pravakurbhat v. Vishambhar, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 313*, which approves of the practice of returning the plaint for presentation to the proper Court when the trying Court has no jurisdiction prevailing in the mofussil Courts and on the Appellate Side of the High Court of Bombay, does not govern, and is distinguishable from cases in which there have been decrees passed on the plaint. *Per BAYLEY, J.*—The practice in the Original Side of the High Court of Bombay has always been to retain a plaint, unless it has been returned on presentation. *In the matter of the application of BAI AMRIT*

**I. L. R. 8 Bom. 380****PLAINT—contd.****6. RETURN OF PLAINT—contd.**

**17.** ———— *Return of plaint on second appeal.* The plaintiff sued three defendants on a bond alleged to have been executed by them to the plaintiff. Two of the defendants did not appear or make any defence to the suit. The second defendant only appeared, and objected to the jurisdiction of the Court; but his objection was overruled, and a decree was made against all three defendants. On appeal the lower Appellate Court reversed the decree, holding that the Court of first instance had no jurisdiction. *Held*, that, on finding that the Court of first instance had no jurisdiction, the lower Appellate Court ought to have ordered the plaint to be returned. It not having done so, the High Court on second appeal ordered the plaint to be returned, in order that it might be presented to the proper Court. *BABAJI v. LAKSHMIBAI*

**I. L. R. 9 Bom. 266**

**18.** ———— *Return on second appeal—Suit in wrong Court.* Where a suit cognizable by a Small Cause Court was brought in the ordinary Civil Court and tried there, on second appeal the High Court declared the proceedings in the lower Courts null and void, and directed the plaint to be returned for presentation in the proper Court. *KALIAN DAYAL v. KALIAN NARER*

**I. L. R. 9 Bom. 259**

**19.** ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 57—Want of jurisdiction.* The defendants, who resided and carried on business at Bombay, acted as the agents of the plaintiff for the sale, purchase, and despatch of goods to Tellicherry, where the plaintiff resided. To the claim arising out of the agency transactions the plaintiff joined a claim on account of a partnership transaction, which claim was triable by the Court of the District Munsif at Tellicherry. The Subordinate Judge held that he had no jurisdiction to try the claim arising out of the agency transaction, found that nothing was due to the plaintiff on account of the partnership transaction, and dismissed the suit. *Held*, that the plaint ought to have been returned to the plaintiff with the proper endorsement as required by s. 57 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882. *KHIMJI JIVRAJU SHETTU v. PURUSHOTAM JUTANI.*

**I. L. R. 7 Mad. 171**

**20.** ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 57—Court—Jurisdiction—Procedure when suit filed in wrong Court—Suit under Dekkan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879)—Defendants not agriculturists within meaning of s. 11.* Under s. 11 of the Dekkan Agriculturists' Relief Act, a suit in which there are several defendants who are agriculturists may be instituted and tried in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any one of such defendants resides, and not elsewhere. Where a suit was brought in the Court at Haveli, the plaintiffs alleging that some of the defendants who held lands within the jurisdiction of that Court were agriculturists, and the suit was dismissed because those defendants were found not to be agriculturists:—*Held*, that the proper procedure to be adopted in such a case



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was not to dismiss the suit, but to return the plaintiff for presentation to the proper Court. *LADHAJI NATHAJI v. HARI*. I. L. R. 23 Bom. 679

21. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 57—Suit found to have been brought in wrong Court situate outside the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit is filed—Practice—Procedure.* The proviso to s. 16 of the Civil Procedure Code requires not only that the relief sought should be entirely obtainable through the personal obedience of the defendant, but also that the defendant should reside within the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit is filed. Where a suit for the determination of an interest in immoveable property was filed in a Court within the jurisdiction of which the property was not situate and was held not to lie in that Court as all the defendants did not reside within the jurisdiction of that Court even though the relief sought could have been obtained through their personal obedience:—*Held*, that in such a case the Judge ought not to dismiss the suit, but return the plaintiff to be presented to the proper Court under s. 57 of the Civil Procedure Code. *ISAK v. KHATIA* I. L. R. 23 Bom. 756

22. ———— *Return of plaintiff to be presented to the proper Court—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 57—Rejection of plaintiff—Cause of action—N. W. P. Rent Act (XVIII of 1873), s. 29.* The plaintiff in this suit claimed in a Civil Court (i) a declaration of his right to certain land; (ii) that certain leases of such land, so far as their terms exceeded the term of settlement, should be cancelled; and (iii) arrears of rent for such land. The Court held as regards claim (i) that the plaintiff did not disclose a cause of action, as it was not alleged that the defendant had disputed the plaintiff's right; as regards claim (ii) that, with reference to the term of s. 29 of Act XVIII of 1873, the plaintiff's cause of action had not yet arisen; and as regards claim (iii) that it was cognizable in a Court of revenue;—and it directed that under s. 57 of Act X of 1877 the plaintiff should be returned to the plaintiff to be presented to the Revenue Court. *Held*, that, under the circumstances, the plaintiff should have been rejected and not returned. *NAGAR MAL v. MACPHERSON*. I. L. R. 3 All. 766

23. ———— *Return for undervaluation.* Where it appears that the relief sought in a suit has been undervalued, and that the Court is not competent, by reason of the real value of the relief sought, to try the suit, the plaintiff must be returned to the plaintiff under s. 57 of the Civil Procedure Code, although the defendant may have been called upon to enter upon his defence and has filed his written statement. An order dismissing a suit on the ground that, by reason of the value of the relief sought, the Court has no jurisdiction, is an order affecting the merits, and an appeal lies from such order. See *Muzhur Ali v. Basoo*, 8 W. R. 47. *KHOGENDRO NARAIN CHOWDHARY v. GOURI KANT NATH*. . . . . 11 C. L. R. 300

PLAINT—*contd.*6. RETURN OF PLAINT—*concll.*

24. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 57—Suit filed in wrong Court.* In a suit filed in a District Munsif's Court to recover certain land, the defendants alleged that the value of the land was understated by the plaintiff and exceeded by far the pecuniary limit of the Court's jurisdiction. Upon inquiry the Munsif found this allegation to be true, and directed the plaintiff to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation in a superior Court. The plaintiff having been presented in the Subordinate Judge's Court, the Subordinate Judge, on the authority of *Jagjivan Javherdas Seth v. Magdum Ali*, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 487, dismissed the suit. *Held*, that the procedure adopted by the Munsif was correct. *KANDU v. KONDA* I. L. R. 8 Mad. 62

25. ———— *Suit for ejectment—Mortgage exceeding pecuniary limit of jurisdiction.* If in a suit for ejectment in which the defendant shows he is a mortgagee, the defendant consents to a decree for redemption, and the amount secured by the mortgage exceeds the limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court, the Court should not proceed further, but return the plaintiff to be presented in a superior Court. *CHANDU v. KOMBI* I. L. R. 9 Mad. 208

26. ———— *Undervaluation of suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 57—Dismissal of suit.* A Munsif, after hearing the evidence on both sides, found that the suit had been undervalued; but, instead of returning the plaintiff under s. 57 of Act X of 1877, he dismissed the suit. *Held*, that the provisions of s. 57 were imperative, and might be put into force at any stage of the hearing; and that such dismissal of the suit was a matter which affected the merits of the case, and formed a proper subject for an appeal. *BHADESHWAR CHOWDHRY v. GOURIKANT NATH* I. L. R. 8 Cal. 834

27. ———— *Undervaluation of suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 30, 31, 32—Dismissal of suit.* If at the hearing of a suit it proves to be undervalued, and if the Court would not have jurisdiction to entertain it if properly valued, the suit ought to be dismissed. *MUZHUR ALI v. BASOO* . . . . . 8 W. R. 47

*KOYLASHNAUTH ROY v. BODUN MONEE DABEA.* 2 Hay 386

It is only at the time of presentation of the plaintiff that the plaintiff in a suit which has been brought in a Court in which, with reference to its proper valuation, it should not have been brought, can claim the benefit of ss. 30, 31, and 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859. *MUZHUR ALI v. BASOO*

8 W. R. 47

But see (*contra*) *JADU v. HIFAZAT HOSSEIN.*

5 B. L. R. Ap. 15

S.C. *EDOO v. HEFAZAT HOSSEIN.*

13 W. R. 358



PLAINT—*contd.*

## 7. REJECTION OF PLAINT.

1. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 54.* S. 54 of the Civil Procedure Code may be applied at any stage of a suit. **KISHORE SINGH v. SABDAL SINGH** . . . **I. L. R. 12 All. 553**  
**KARAMAN SINGH v. COCKELL** . . . **1 C. W. N. 670**

2. ———— **Duty of Court—Allowing additional stamp—Undervaluation of suit.** Where the Court is of opinion that the suit is undervalued, it is the duty of the Court in which such suit was preferred to give the suitor the option of supplying such additional stamp as is thought necessary before rejecting the plaint. **THAKOOR PATUCK v. RAMSOOMRUN LALL** . . . **1 N. W. 17 : Ed. 1873, 16**

3. ———— **Ground for rejection—Undervaluation of suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 31.** In a suit in a Munsif's Court it was found after issues had been fixed and some evidence recorded, that the claim had been undervalued, and that the proper valuation would carry it beyond the jurisdiction of the Munsif. The plaint was accordingly returned, and additional stamps having been filed, the case was tried by the Principal Sudder Ameen. The Judge on appeal held that the plaint had been illegally returned by the Munsif, and that the act of the Principal Sudder Ameen in proceeding to try the case was illegal. He accordingly dismissed the suit. *Held*, that the Munsif was right under s. 31, Act VIII of 1859, in not dismissing the suit, but rejecting the plaint; and that, when the same plaint was filed with the proper amount of stamp duty in the Court of the Principal Sudder Ameen, that Court had jurisdiction to try the case. **RAM GUTTY v. GOONOMONEE DABEE**. . . **11 W. R. 177**

4. ———— **Undervaluation of suit—Allowing additional stamp—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 54—Court-fees Act (VII of 1870), s. 12.** The decision of the Court of first instance, that a plaint is undervalued, is binding upon the Court of appeal, reference, or revision; but the Court of first instance is not justified in rejecting the plaint without giving to the plaintiff an opportunity of affixing the proper stamp. **BAI ANOPE v. MULCHAND GIRDHAR** . . . **I. L. R. 9 Bom. 355**

5. ———— **Undervaluation of suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 31.** Where the lower Court rejected a plaint on the ground of an improper joinder of causes of action, and also that the suit was not sufficiently valued, and the High Court was of opinion that there had been no improper joinder of causes of action, the order of the lower Court was reversed, and the Civil Judge directed to deal with the case in accordance with s. 31, Act VIII of 1859. **KRISTNA AYYANGAR v. PERUMAL NADAN** . . . **2 Mad. 436**

6. ———— **Subordinate Judge's power to make valuation—Court-fees Act (VII of 1870), s. 7, cl. iv (f)—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 54, cls. (a) and (b).** The plaintiffs brought a suit for an account, and approx-

PLAINT—*contd.*7. REJECTION OF PLAINT—*contd.*

imately valued their claim at R16-15-0. The Subordinate Judge was of opinion that the claim was for recovery of money, and should have been valued at R1,000. He therefore called on the plaintiffs to make up the stamp to that required on this valuation; and the plaintiffs refusing, he dismissed their suit under s. 54 (b) of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *Held*, that in any case the Subordinate Judge was wrong. If the suit was really one for an account, the plaintiffs were entitled to value the relief they sought approximately, as they had done; if it were not one for an account, but for recovery of money, still the Subordinate Judge had no power himself to value the relief sought, but should have called on the defendant to value the relief he sought, and then if he had thought such relief was undervalued, he could have applied s. 54 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), and rejected the suit. **BALVANTRAO v. BHIMASHANKAR** . . . **I. L. R. 13 Bom. 517**

7. ———— **Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 32—Ground for rejecting plaint.** A plaint will not be rejected, under s. 32 of Act VIII of 1859, if the subject-matter alleged raises a fair question of claim or right for trial and determination between the parties. The mere unlikelihood of the plaintiff's success is not enough to justify the rejection of his plaint. **LAKSHMI AMMAL v. TIKARAM TOVAJI** . . . **1 Mad. 240**

8. ———— **Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 39—Document sued on not produced with plaint.** *Held*, that the Court to which a plaint is presented has no authority to reject it, merely because the document upon which the plaintiff sues is not produced with the plaint, as directed s. by 39 of Act VIII of 1859, and that the High Court has power to set aside an order of rejection, as well as the decision of the District Court confirming it on appeal, and to direct that the plaint be received. *Ex parte* **RAYCHAND AMICHAND**. . . **2 Bom. 391 : 2nd Ed. 369**

*See* **GOPAL GUNDAPA NAIK v. VISHNU KRISHNA NAIK** . . . **I. L. R. 22 Bom. 971**

9. ———— **Reference to document not in plaint—Claim for damages for malicious prosecution.** A Judge, in considering under s. 32 of the Civil Procedure Code, whether he should admit or reject a plaint, is wrong in referring to documents and facts not stated in, or annexed to, the plaint, nor ascertained by him by interrogation of the plaintiff, although such documents and facts may have been on record in other proceedings in the Judge's Court. In a plaint claiming damage for an unsuccessful criminal prosecution of the plaintiff by the first defendant, and sanctioned by the second defendant as a Subordinate Judge, the plaintiff (though stating in the plaint that the second defendant "maliciously and without authority" sanctioned the prosecution, and that the Magistrate before whom it was brought held that there was no cause whatever for the charge) did not allege in the plaint that the first defendant



PLAINT—*contd.*7. REJECTION OF PLAINT—*contd.*

prosecuted him (plaintiff) maliciously and without any reasonable or probable cause, or that the prosecution was sanctioned by the second defendant without reasonable or probable cause. *Held*, that the plaint was properly rejected, and that there was no good ground for allowing the plaint to be amended, the plaintiff having delayed the filing of it until the last day but one allowed by the law of limitation. *GIRDHARLAL DAYALDAS v. JAGANATH GIRDHARBHAI* . . . . . 10 Bom. 182

10. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 32—Omission of specific statement of time cause of action arose.* Where the plaint, in a suit to establish a right to landed property and to recover arrears of rent, alleged no specific acts of ownership since 1845, but contained a statement general enough to let in evidence of such acts, and it did not appear that the plaintiff had been questioned:—*Held*, that the plaint should not have been rejected under s. 32 of Act VIII of 1859, on the ground that it appeared to the Court that the right of action was barred by lapse of time. *UDAYA VARMA v. NAYAR CHAMBEITHU* . . . 1 Mad. 322

11. ————— *Plea of misjoinder when suit-able—Suit against the several persons claiming under different titles, effect of—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 31 and 53.* A, as auction purchaser at a revenue-sale, brought a suit against a number of persons for possession of some chur land. The defendants claimed portions of the land under different titles, and pleaded misjoinder. The Courts upon the Amin's report gave A the option to amend the plaint by withdrawing the suit against any particular sets of defendants. A elected to go to trial on the suit as brought, and it was dismissed. *Held*, that, having regard to the provisions of ss. 31 and 53 of the Civil Procedure Code, the proper order of the Court should have been to reject the plaint and not dismiss the suit on the ground of misjoinder. *SUDHENDU MOHUN ROY v. DURGA DAS* . . . . . I. L. R. 14 Cal. 435

12. ————— *Suit brought different from suit sanctioned—Religious Endowments Act (XX of 1863), s. 18.* A and B, being worshippers at a Hindu temple, obtained sanction under s. 18 of the Religious Endowments Act to sue for the removal of the managers of the temple on the ground of breach of trust and for damages. A and B sued to remove the managers, but claimed no damages in their plaint. *Held*, that, as the suit instituted differed from the one for which sanction was given, the plaint was properly rejected. *SRINIVASA v. VENKATA* . . . . . I. L. R. 11 Mad. 148

13. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1852, ss. 50 and 53, sub-s. (d)—Amendment of plaint—Rejection of plaint.* After an examination of the plaintiff's pleader by the Court to discover whether there were grounds, which did not appear, for an amendment, a suit was dismissed on the defects of the plaint, which, charging fraud, did not set forth a good cause of action in regard to the above. *Held*, that dismissal was not the proper

PLAINT—*contd.*7. REJECTION OF PLAINT—*contd.*

mode of disposal of the suit; but the plaint should have been rejected, a course which would have enabled the plaintiff, if he found himself at a future time in a position to make averments giving relevancy to an action, to present a fresh plaint. *GUNGA NARAIN GUPTA v. TILUCKRAM CHOWDHRY*

I. L. R. 15 Cal. 533  
L. R. 15 I. A. 119.

14. ————— *Time for rejection—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 54.* A plaint can only be rejected under s. 54 of Act X of 1877 before it is registered. *HUBBUL HOSSEIN v. MAHOMED REZA*  
I. L. R. 8 Cal. 192; 10 C. L. R. 385

15. ————— *Rejection of plaint after registration.* Though a plaint has been registered, the Court may reject it under Act VIII of 1859, s. 32, as barred by the Act of Limitation. *CHETTI GAUNDAN v. SUNDARAM PILLAI* 2 Mad. 51

16. ————— *Civil Procedure Code 1882, s. 54—Rejection of plaint already registered.* Certain traders, having failed in business and being indebted to the defendant under a decree of the District Court of Trichinopoly, entered into a composition with their creditors, and a deed was executed to which the defendant became a party in respect of his judgment-debt. The defendant subsequently applied for execution of this decree. The trustees, to whom the debtor's assets were made over under the deed, together with the debtors, now brought a suit in the same Court for an injunction restraining the defendant from executing or proceeding to execute his decree. The plaint was rejected by the District Judge after it had been registered and numbered, and a written statement had been filed. *Held*, that the Court had jurisdiction to reject the plaint under the Civil Procedure Code, s. 54, at that stage of the suit. *VENKATESA TAWKER v. RAMASAMI CHETTIAR*  
I. L. R. 18 Mad. 338

17. ————— *Effect of rejection—Right to sue on same cause of action—Limitation.* Where a plaint is rejected under s. 32, Act VIII of 1859, the plaintiff can bring a suit on the same subject-matter, provided he is not barred by lapse of time. *KADUMBINEE DOSSIA v. UNNOOPORNA DAYE* . . . . . 14 W. R. 289

18. ————— *Plaint not to be rejected in part—Civil Procedure Code, s. 54—Procedure.* *Held*, that under s. 54 of the Code of Civil Procedure a Court cannot reject a plaint in part. *RAGHUBANS PURI v. JYOTIS SWARUPA* (1907)  
I. L. R. 29 Ail. 325

19. ————— *Deficient Court-fee—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 54, cl. (b)—Plaint filed with insufficient Court-fee—Extension of time by Court—Payment of deficient Court-fee after the time allowed—Registration of plaint, effect of—Subsequent rejection.* *Held*, by the Full Bench, that it is competent to a Court to reject a plaint under s. 54, cl. (b) of the Civil Procedure Code, after the plaint has been admitted and duly registered. *Per*



**PLAINT—*conc'd.*****7. REJECTION OF PLAINT—*concl'd.***

MACLEAN, *C.J.*, as a general rule, when once the Court has admitted and registered a plaint, it cannot subsequently reject it. A plaint was filed with insufficient Court-fees. The Court directed the plaintiff to put in the deficit Court-fees within a time fixed by it. He failed to do so, but put in the Court-fee on a subsequent date, and the plaint was admitted and duly registered. At the time of the hearing of the suit on the objection of the defendant the plaint was rejected. *Held*, by the Full Bench (RAMPINI, *J.*, dissenting), that in the circumstances of the present case, the plaint might well be regarded as presented and filed on the date it was registered, with all the consequences that would follow in regard to limitation or otherwise from its being filed on that date. PADMANUND SING *v.* ANANTLAL MISSEER (1906)

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 20

**8. PROCEDURE.**

1. ———— **Assumption of facts as stated in plaint—*Decision on issues of law.*** Where a plaintiff on certain alleged facts seeks relief and is unable to obtain a trial of the facts by reason of certain conclusions of law which the Judge forms on the case in its then condition, the Courts are bound to proceed upon the facts as they are stated by the plaintiff, and upon the assumption of the truth of those facts. The assumption of the truth of the facts alleged in the plaint must, however, be limited to the consideration of the legal effect of the facts alleged on the bars raised against the trial of those facts. SIDHEE ALI KHAN *v.* OJOODHYARAM KHAN . . . . . 5 W. R. P. C. 83

10 Moo. I. A. 540

2. ———— **Jurisdiction—*Allegation in plaint believed to have been falsely made in order to avoid jurisdiction of Small Cause Court—Procedure by Court.*** Where an allegation is made in a plaint, which appears to a Court of first instance to be false and to have been made for the purpose of avoiding the jurisdiction of the Small Cause Court, the plaintiff may be required to satisfy the Court that the allegation is *bona fide* and not merely colourable in order to change the venue. APPA RAO *v.* SOBHANADRI RAO (1899)

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 158

**PLAINTIFF.**

See COSTS —SPECIAL CASES—PLAINTIFFS.

See MISJOINDER I. L. R. 26 Mad. 647  
I. L. R. 34 Calc. 662

See PARTIES—

ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—PLAINTIFFS

SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—PLAINT-  
IFFS.See PLAINT—FORM AND CONTENTS OF  
PLAINT—PLAINTIFFS.**PLAINTIFF—*concl'd.***——— **appeal between—**

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—APPEAL.

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 264

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 145

——— **death of—**

See ABATEMENT OF SUIT—SUITS.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 424.

I. L. R. 25 All. 187

See PARTIES—SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES

—PLAINTIFFS . I. L. R. 27 Bom. 162

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 224

See REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEASED PER-  
SONS.

A declaration affecting the plaintiff in a suit which is dismissed is not legal. CHHOTU MAHTON *v.* SHEOBARTI KOER (1901) . . . . . 5 C. W. N. 445

**PLAN.**

Se BUILDING . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 287

**PLEA.**

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 115.

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 440

——— **estoppel—**

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——— **of guilty on one of two contra-  
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STATEMENTS . . . . . 8 B. L. R. Ap. 25——— **record of—**See PRACTICE—CRIMINAL CASES—AFFI-  
DAVIT . . . . . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 209

1. ———— **Plea of not guilty—*Procedure—Plea by counsel.*** An accused should plead by his own mouth and not through his counsel or pleader though his counsel or pleader may at the proper time address the Court on his behalf. QUEEN *v.* ROOPA GOWALLA . . . . . 15 W. R. Cr. 42

2. ———— **Nature of plea—*Charge of grievous hurt—Illegal conviction—Misconstruction of statement of accused.*** In a case of causing grievous hurt to B, the prisoner, on having the charge read to him, stated that he had had a quarrel with B, and struck him twice with a stick in anger. *Held*, that the Sessions Judge was wrong in treating this statement as a plea of guilty and in convicting thereon, and the conviction was quashed and the case remanded for trial. QUEEN *v.* JAIPAL KOIRIEE

11 W. R. Cr. 6

3. ———— **Penal Code, s. 211—*False charge—Irregular procedure.*** A prisoner, charged under s. 211 of the Penal Code with having brought a false charge with intent to injure, by accusing A of having caused the death of a person by doing a rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide under s. 304A, stated at the trial that the original complaint made by him was false, and that he made it unthinkingly. The



**PLEA—contd.**

Sessions Judge treated this statement as a plea of guilty, and sentenced the prisoner to rigorous imprisonment. No record of the prisoner's plea, as required by s. 237 of the Criminal Procedure Code, appeared on the proceedings, nor did it appear that the charge had been explained as well as read to the prisoner, and the Judge considered that the original complaint did not amount to a false charge of an offence under s. 304A. *Held*, that the conviction was bad. *EMPRESS v. GOPAL DHANUK*  
I. L. R. 7 Calc. 90 : 8 C. L. R. 471

4. ——— **Qualified plea—Denial of commission of offence.** When a prisoner pleads guilty, but goes on to say that he did not commit the offence with which he is charged, the plea is really one of not guilty. *QUEEN v. MITTUN CHOWDHRY* . . . . . 11 W. R. Cr. 53

*QUEEN v. SONAOOLLAH* . . . . . 25 W. R. Cr. 23

5. ——— **Charge of murder, Statement by the accused in answer to—Penal Code, ss. 302, 300, exc. 1, and expl.—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X 1882), ss. 271, 299.** An accused person, in answer to a charge of murder, stated that he had killed his wife, but that he had done so in consequence of his having discovered her in an act of adultery on the previous day. *Held*, that such a statement did not amount to a plea of guilty on the charge, and that it was the duty of the Court to try whether the provocation therein disclosed was sufficiently grave and sudden to reduce the offence. *NETAI LUSKAR v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*  
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 410

6. ——— **Qualified plea of guilty—Capital charge—Procedure—Practice.** In capital cases where there is any doubt as to whether an accused person fully understands the meaning and effect of a plea of guilty, it is advisable for the Court to take evidence, and not to convict solely on the plea of the accused. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BHADU* . . . . . I. L. R. 19 All. 119

7. ——— **Plea of guilty—Murder—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 302—Confession—Procedure.** The accused, who was a habitual ganja-smoker, was charged with the murder of his wife and infant son. In his confession he stated that he had killed his wife, because she quarrelled with him and objected to go to another village where he proposed a change of house on account of their poverty. He adhered to this statement when placed for trial before the Court of Session. The Sessions Judge treated this statement as a plea of guilty on the charge of murder, convicted the accused, and sentenced him to death, subject to confirmation by the High Court. *Held* (per JARDINE and CANDY, JJ.), that the accused's statement did not amount to a plea of guilty on the charge of murdering his wife. He alleged a sudden provocation: he ought therefore to have been put on his trial, in order that the Court might ascertain whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SAKHARAM*  
I. L. R. 14 Bom. 564

**PLEA—concl.**

8. ——— **Plea of lapse of time—Defendant entitled to plead fraud—Fraud—Voidable contract—Undue influence—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 16.** The plaintiff sued in 1900 to recover from the defendant the amount due for interest on a mortgage-bond, dated the 15th April 1893, by sale of the mortgaged property. The defendant contended that he did not execute the bond with free consent and that it was obtained from him under pressure of criminal proceedings. *Held*, that, under the circumstances, he was not precluded from urging that plea by lapse of time. *Jugaldas v. Ambashankar*, I. L. R. 12 Bom. 501, distinguished. *RANGNATH SAKHARAM v. GOVIND NARASIM* (1904)  
I. L. R. 28 Bom. 639

**PLEADER.**

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### PLEADER—*contd.*

### 1. APPOINTMENT AND APPEARANCE—*contd.*

to appoint pleaders by vakalatnamas. *In the matter of* NUBEE BUKSH . . . 7 W. R. 481

2. \_\_\_\_\_ Vakalatnama,  
signature of. The acceptance of a vakalatnama by a  
leader of the High Court should in all cases  
be unconditional. *In the matter of* GOPEENATH  
MUDDUK . . . . . 14 W. R. 7

3. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 36 and 37—Ben. Reg. XXVII of 1814, ss. 1 and 321—Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), ss. 16, 17, and 18—Pleadings and Proceedings Act (XX of 1865)—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 39—Vakalatnama—Vakalatnama authorizing pleader to present an appeal signed by person having only a verbal authority from the appellant to do so. Under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), the appointment of a pleader to make or do any appearance, application or act in or to a Civil Court must be in writing, and that writing must be executed by the party or by a person acting on his behalf and acting under the authority of a general power of attorney or mukhtarnama, unless the person making the appointment is the “recognized agent” of the party within the definition of s. 37 of the Code. **BADRI PRASAD v. BHAGWATI DHAR***

I. L. R. 16 All. 240

4. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 39—Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act (VI of 1892), s. 4—Application for execution of decree—Proceedings in the suit—Vakalatnama.* Applications for execution of the decree are proceedings in the suit within the meaning of s. 39 of the Civil Procedure Code. A vakalatnama remains in force until all proceedings in the suit are ended. *SADASHIV GANPATRAO v. VITHALDAS NANCHAND* . . . **I. L. R. 20 Bom. 198**

5. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 39—Delegation of authority by duly appointed pleader—Ex parte decree—Application for new trial.* The applicant (defendant No. 2) was one of two defendants in a suit in the Court of Small Causes in Bombay. He and his co-defendant (defendant No. 1) appointed separate pleaders (*K* and *W*) to conduct their case. On the day of hearing the applicant was unavoidably unable to be present, and his pleader (*K*), being also engaged elsewhere, requested *W*, the pleader of the other defendants in the suit, to hold his brief and to conduct the case for both defendants. *W* did so. A decree was passed against both the defendants. The applicant subsequently applied to the Full Court under s. 37 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1882) for a new trial on the ground that he had not been represented at the hearing, and that the decree had been passed against him *ex parte*. The Full Court refused the application, holding that the applicant had been represented by a pleader, and that the decree against him was not *ex parte*. The appellant then applied to the High Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction. *Held*, discharging the order of the Full Court, that the

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**PLEADER—contd.****1. APPOINTMENT AND APPEARANCE—contd.**

decree against the applicant was an *ex parte* decree. *K*, who was the applicant's duly appointed pleader, could not delegate his authority to *W*, and, as the applicant was not himself present, the decree was *ex parte*. *W* was not the duly appointed pleader of the applicant, and could not therefore represent him at the hearing: see s. 39 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). The High Court sent back the case to the Small Causes Court to deal with the application for a new trial on its merits. *SHIVDAYAL RAMCHARAN v. KHETU GANGU*.

**I. L. R. 20 Bom. 293**

6. ———— *Appointment by pleader of another without client's authority—Bom. Reg. II of 1827, s. 54—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 36, 39, and 652—Charter Act (24 & 25 Vict., c. 104), s. 15—Bombay High Court's Civil Circular Orders, cl. 18 (i)—Proviso as to the appointment of another pleader.* The proviso to sub-cl. (i) of cl. 18 of the Civil Circular Orders of the High Court, namely, that a pleader may appoint another pleader on his behalf, and that in such case the hearing will proceed, unless the Court see reason to the contrary, is not *ultra vires*. *In re SHIDAPA*.

**I. L. R. 22 Bom. 654**

7. ———— *Rule of Court of 22nd May 1883—Practice—Vakalatnama—Pleader handing over his brief to another—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 36, 37, 39, 635.* The Rule of Court, dated the 22nd May 1883, and authorising legal practitioners in certain cases to appoint other legal practitioners to hold their briefs and appear in their place, was passed to facilitate the work of the Court and for the convenience of the pleaders practising before it, and was fully within the powers conferred upon the High Court by s. 635 of the Civil Procedure Code. *MATADIN v. GANGA BAI*.

**I. L. R. 9 All. 613**

8. ———— *Pleaders and their clients, their rights and obligations inter se—Bom. Reg. II of 1887—Confidential communications made in the course of professional employment.* The rules prevailing in England with regard to the rights and obligations of solicitors in relation to their clients apply, with slight difference, to pleaders practising in India. The principles deducible from the English cases are as follows: (i) A party to a judicial proceeding is entitled to such professional assistance as he thinks will best suit him. (ii) A pleader is free to place his services at the disposal of any such party upon such terms as he may think most advantageous to himself consistently with the honour of his profession and the due administration of justice. (iii) A pleader who receives any confidential information from his client in the course of his professional employment is not at liberty to carry that information into the service of his antagonist, or any one who in that very litigation or in any subsequent litigation may be opposed to the client furnishing the information. (iv) Under Regulation II of 1827, pleaders receive certain fees, in return for which

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they are not at liberty to act against those retaining them, whether they are retained by one client singly or by two or more clients jointly. A pleader who has acted for several persons will not be restrained from afterwards acting for some of them only as against the others, unless it be shown that he is possessed of knowledge arising from his previous employment which might be prejudicial to his other clients. As a general rule, the Court will require a very strong case to be made out before it will interfere by way of injunction, restraining a pleader from appearing for a client, and there must be clear affidavits made to show that special knowledge was acquired by the pleader during his employment by the former client. In case of his possessing such knowledge, he will not be allowed to throw up the conduct of the case and transfer his services. He will never be allowed to discharge himself from the conduct of the case if the case raises even a probability of prejudice to his former employers. *K*, a pleader, was at first retained by *P* and *N* jointly to defend a suit on their behalf. At a later stage of the case, *P* and *N* quarrelled. Thereupon *K* applied to the Court for leave to withdraw from the conduct of the case, on the ground that he could not attend to the interests of both *P* and *N*. The Court allowed him to withdraw. A few days afterwards *K* appeared in Court, and filed a vakalatnama, or warrant of attorney, signed by *N*, and claimed to conduct the case on behalf of *N* alone. *P* objected to this, but the Court disallowed this objection. Thereupon *P* made an application to the High Court for an injunction restraining *K* from acting on behalf of *N* alone. *Held*, that, as it was not made out that *K* was in possession of any confidential information either from *P* or from *P* and *N* together, such as would give him an unfair advantage when acting on behalf of *N*, the Court would not interfere or restrain *K* from serving *N* alone. *Held*, further, that a pleader in such circumstances should take the direction of the Court as to which of two or more clients he is to serve, and as to the disposal of the fees he has received from them jointly. *PALLONJI MERWANJI v. KALLABHAI LALLUBHAI*. **I. L. R. 12 Bom. 85**

**REG. v. BEZONJI NOWROJI.**

**I. L. R. 12 Bom. 91 note**

9. ———— *Pleader's absence from Court owing to his temporary appointment as a Subordinate Judge—"Necessary cause"—Bom. Reg. II of 1827, s. 54.* On the day fixed for the hearing of a suit, neither the plaintiff nor his pleader was present; the defendant, not having been served, was also absent. Plaintiff's pleader, however, sent intimation to the Court in writing that he had been appointed to act as a Subordinate Judge, and as he was going that day to join his appointment, he was unable to attend the Court. He therefore requested that the case should be adjourned till his return, or that a notice be issued to his client to enable him to make the necessary arrangements for the conduct of his case. *Held*, that the



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pleader, having been temporarily appointed to act as a Subordinate Judge, was unable to attend the Court in consequence of a "necessary cause" within the meaning of s. 54 of Regulation II of 1827; and as he had sent the necessary notification in writing to the Court, the suit should not be dismissed, but adjourned for a reasonable time. *In re NARAYAN SADASHIV KALE*

**I. L. R. 23 Bom. 657**

**9A.** ————— *Vakalatnama, acceptance of, in writing, by pleader not necessary.* *Per BANERJEE, J.*—The appointment of a pleader must be in writing and filed in Court, but his acceptance of the vakalatnama need not be in writing. *SHAMA PROSAD GHOSE v. TAKI MULLIK (1901)*

**5 C. W. N. 816**

**10.** ————— *Appearance—Filing vakalatnama—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 186.* An authorized pleader appearing in defence of an accused person under s. 186, Criminal Procedure Code, should not be required to file a vakalatnama. *ANONYMOUS*

**7 Mad. Ap. 41**

**11.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 18—Right of pleader to appear in Appellate Court and subsequent stages of suit.* When a pleader appears in a regular appeal before the High Court, he is competent under that vakalatnama, unless it is revoked, to appear for the client in the subsequent stages of that case, and in the appeal if preferred to the Privy Council, s. 18 of Act VIII of 1859 applying to Appellate as well as Original Courts. *MUKHUN LALL v. SREEKISHEN SINGH*

**8 W. R. 92**

**12.** ————— *Vakil—Claim under s. 246, Act VIII of 1859—Fresh vakalatnama.* The vakil retained by the plaintiff in a suit in which a decree has been given for the plaintiff is competent to plead for his client in answer to a claim advanced (under the first portion of s. 246 of the Civil Procedure Code) to property attached in execution of such decree, without the production of a fresh vakalatnama. *GOPAL JAYACHAND v. HARGOVIND KHUSHAL*

**5 Bom. A. C. 83**

**13.** ————— *Fresh vakalatnama—Application for new trial.* A fresh vakalatnama is not necessary to enable a pleader to appear in an application for a new trial before a Small Cause Court, when the pleader presenting the application is one who was employed in the original suit. *SUTTO CHURN GHOSAL v. SUROOP CHUNDER DOSS*

**12 W. R. 465**

**14.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 39—Pleader retained by a Collector as agent of Court of Wards—Validity of vakalatnama after the Collector's death.* The Collector of a district, who was agent for the Court of Wards, filed a suit on behalf of a ward of the Court of Wards and executed a vakalatnama to a pleader whom he retained to conduct it. The Collector died before the suit was determined. *Held*, that it was not necessary for a new vakalatnama to be executed

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to enable the pleader to proceed with the conduct of the suit. *KRISHNA VIJAYA PUCHAYA NAICKER v. MARUDANAYAGAM PILLAI* **I. L. R. 15 Mad. 135**

**15.** ————— *Application for restoration of an appeal dismissed for default—Vakalatnama.* Where a vakil had been duly empowered by a vakalatnama drawn in the customary form to file and conduct an appeal in the High Court and that appeal had been dismissed for default:—*Held*, that such vakil was competent, without filing a fresh vakalatnama, to present an application for the restoration of the said appeal to the list of pending appeals. *RAGHUNATH SINGH v. RAGHUBIR SAHAI*

**I. L. R. 15 All. 55**

**16.** ————— *Vakalatnama executed in favour of two vakils accepted by only one—Presentation of appeal under such vakalatnama—Principal and agent—Civil Procedure Code, s. 541.* An intending appellant executed in favour of two vakils a vakalatnama; it was accepted only by one of the vakils, and he presented the appeal. The appeal was placed on the file by the District Judge, but on its coming on for disposal before the Subordinate Judge, he held that it had not been duly presented and made an order rejecting it. *Held*, that the appeal had been duly presented. *AYYANNA v. NAGABHOOSHANAM*

**I. L. R. 16 Mad. 285**

**17.** ————— *Legal Practitioners' Act (XVIII of 1879), Sch. II, Pt. I, cl. (d)—Pleader holding certificate on R 5 stamp—Right to practise.* A pleader who holds a certificate on a 5-rupee stamp is entitled to practice before a Munsif when exercising Small Cause Court powers. *In the matter of RAKAL CHUNDER TEWARY*

**1 C. W. N. 118**

**18.** ————— *Remand of case—Vakil changing sides on remand—Mad. Reg. XIV of 1816, s. 22.* When a suit is remitted by order of an Appellate Court for re-hearing or finding on an issue, the proceedings are in the trial of the suit, and consequently, under s. 22 of Regulation XIV of 1816 a vakil cannot change sides and hold a vakalatnama for the party opposed to the one for whom he appeared at the first hearing. *ANONYMOUS*

**4 Mad. Ap. 43**

**19.** ————— *Act XX of 1865.* There is nothing in the provisions of Act XX of 1865 which restrains any person from coming into the presence of the Judge and supplying information to the vakils. The word "appearance" does not mean actual presence before the Judge in Court, e.g., of a mooktear standing behind the pleader. *In the matter of GUGRAJ SINGH*

**10 W. R. 355**

**20.** ————— *Act XX of 1865, s. 20—Appearance of party by pleader.* *Held*, in a case under Act X of 1859, in which the plaintiff had appeared at the preliminary hearing when the issues were framed, and where he was not required to appear in person on the day of the trial, that the presence of the plaintiff's pleader and revenue agent



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was an appearance within the meaning of the law having reference to s. 20, Act XX of 1865. *SONATUN DOSS v. KALEE PERSHAD DOSS*. 13 W. R. 146

**21.** ————— *Vakil of High Court—Right to plead in Small Cause Court.* A vakil of the High Court in Calcutta is entitled to practise as a pleader in the Calcutta Court of Small Causes. *In re TOOLSEE DOSS SEAL*. 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 133 : 7 W. R. 228

**22.** ————— *Act XX of 1865, s. 12—Small Cause Court, Calcutta.* A pleader holding a certificate under s. 12 of Act XX of 1865 is not thereby entitled to be admitted to practise in the Court of Small Causes at Calcutta. *In re SHASHI BHUSHAN BHADURY*. 1 B. L. R. A. C. 45 : 10 W. R. 82

**23.** ————— *Barristers—Attorneys—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 2 and 36—Presidency Small Cause Court Act (XV of 1882), ss. 38 and 76—Right to practise—Rules—Power to make rules.* *Per BAYLEY, WEST, and LATHAM, JJ.*—None but barristers and attorneys have a legal right to practise in the Bombay Court of Small Causes. Neither ss. 2 and 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882) nor ss. 38 and 76 of the Presidency Small Cause Court Act (XV of 1882) give the pleaders of the Bombay High Court that right. The provisions of s. 47 of Regulation II of 1827, authorizing persons holding sanads from the High Court to practise in the mofussil Courts, are still in force. *Per BAYLEY, WEST, PINHEY, and LATHAM, JJ.*—S. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, does not give every pleader a title to appear and plead; it only enacts that "pleader" means every person entitled to appear and plead for another in Court, and includes an advocate, a vakil, and an attorney of a High Court. Consequently, if pleaders or vakils, who are the same class of practitioners, are not entitled by law to appear or plead for another in Court, the definition of "pleader" gives them no new right or status. The words in s. 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882) "by a pleader duly appointed to act on his behalf," do not simply mean a person duly appointed by the party in the suit, but a pleader duly appointed according to the law regarding pleaders in force in particular Court. *Per PINHEY, SCOTT, and LATHAM, JJ.* (WEST, J., *dissentiente*).—The High Court has the power of making rules for the admission of pleaders to practise in the Bombay Court of Small Causes; and the Bombay Court of Small Causes, under s. 9 of the Presidency Small Cause Court Act (XV of 1882) also has power of making similar rules with the sanction of the High Court. *In re PLEADERS OF THE HIGH COURT, BOMBAY*. I. L. R. 8 Bom. 105

**24.** ————— *Practice of Privy Council—Admission to practise in the Privy Council—Rules of 31st March 1871—Vakil of High Court.* The words of ss. 2 and 3 of the Rules of 31st March 1871 are such that classes of persons to be ad-

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mitted to practise in the Privy Council must be either solicitors or others practising in London, or solicitors admitted by the High Court in India or in the Colonies, respectively, and have not left an undefined class admissible at the discretion of the Judicial Committee. *In the matter of the petition of TWIDALE*. I. L. R. 16 Calc. 636  
L. R. 16 I. A. 163

**25.** ————— *Practice—Second Appeal—Vakil, right of, to be heard without certified grounds of appeal or without any order admitting the appeal—Rules and Orders of Court (Appellate Side), 86 and 162.* A vakil will not be heard on behalf of an appellant on second appeal when neither duly certified ground or grounds of appeal have been filed, nor the appeal been admitted by order of Court under Rules 86 and 162 of Court. *Kishen Chunder Roy v. Hurrish Chunder Bose*, 3 W. R. 216, followed. *OLIULLAH v. BACHU LAL KHOTTA*. I. L. R. 15 Calc. 706

**26.** ————— *Prosecution—Right to appear in Criminal Courts.* A counsel or pleader is entitled to appear and act on behalf of the prosecution in the Criminal Courts. *CHANDI CHARAN CHATTERJEE v. CHANDRA KUMAR GHOSE*. 5 B. L. R. Ap. 70 : 14 W. R. Cr. 23

**27.** ————— *Admitting vakils to defend in Criminal Courts.* The practice of admitting private vakils to defend parties in Criminal Courts is not illegal. It was discretionary with the Magistrate to hear such agents or not under s. 186 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872. *ANONYMOUS*. 7 Mad. Ap. 37

**28.** ————— *Right of pleader to appear—Inquiry under Criminal Procedure Code, s. 180.* At an inquiry held by a Magistrate under s. 180 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, a complainant has no right to be represented by a pleader. *BINDACHARI v. DRACUP*. 8 Bom. A. C. 202

**29.** ————— *Private prosecutor—Criminal reference to High Court—Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), s. 434.* Private prosecutor not allowed to appear by pleader on a reference to the High Court under s. 434 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861. *QUEEN v. RAMJAI MAZUMDAR*. 6 B. L. R. Ap. 46

*S.C. SUDDURUDEEN SIRCAR v. RAM JOY MOZUMDAR*. 14 W. R. Cr. 51

*Quære*: Whether they could appear at all in such cases. *LALOO v. ADAM SIRCAR*. *GOVERNMENT v. SURJAKANT ACHARJIA*. 17 W. R. Cr. 37

**30.** ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 340—"Accused," meaning of—Right to be heard by pleader.* Under the provisions of s. 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a Sessions Judge is bound to hear the pleader appointed by a person who (though not accused of any offence) is ordered to give security for good behaviour under s. 118 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The word



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"accused" means a person over whom the Magistrate or other Court is exercising jurisdiction. *Queen-Empress v. Mona Puna*, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 661, followed. *JHOJA SINGH v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 493

*QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MUTASADDI LAL*.

I. L. R. 21 All. 109

*QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MONA PUNA*.

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 661

**31.** ———— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, s. 123, Reference to Sessions Judge under.* A Sessions Judge is bound to hear pleader who may appear on behalf of a person in a case referred to him under s. 123, cl. 2, of Civil Procedure Code. *Jhoja Singh v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 493, referred to. *ABINASH MALAKAR v. EMPRESS* . . . . . 4 C. W. N. 797

**32.** ———— *Act XX of 1865, s. 5—"Act"—Acting as private agent.* The word "act" in s. 5 of the Pleaders and Mooktears Act (XX of 1865), means the doing something as the agent of the principal party which shall be recognized or taken notice of by the Court as the act of that principal. There is nothing in the words of the Act or in its spirit to prevent a person as private agent from going between the prisoner and the duly authorized vakil upon whom the real responsibility of the defence rests. *In the matter of the petition of FUZZLE ALI* . . . . . 19 W. R. Cr. 8

**33.** ———— *Inability to go on with appeal—Duty of Judge.* When one of the pleaders for an appellant states his inability to go on with an appeal the Judge is not bound to send for any other pleader for the appellant and ask him if he is ready to proceed with the case, but may at once dismiss the appeal. *BROJO SOONDUREE DOSSIA v. GILMORE* . . . . . 7 W. R. 336

**34.** ———— *Non-appearance—Neglect of pleader—Absence for reasonable cause—Discretion of Court.* Neglect on the part of a pleader should not be visited on an innocent client when it is within the power of the Court to mitigate the result by the exercise of a little indulgence. A case having been fixed for hearing at a particular time, the pleader for the defendant was unable to attend, by reason of the sickness of a friend. The plaintiff's pleader was willing that the case should be postponed, but the Subordinate Judge insisted upon the case being proceeded with *ex parte*. *Held*, that there had been a failure on the part of the Court to exercise a proper judicial discretion. *ACHUMBIT JHA v. JEWUN* . . . . . 11 C. L. R. 11

**35.** ———— *Control of case—Senior pleader—Arguments.* The senior pleader who is present has the entire control of a case in the High Court, and it is not open to the junior pleader to take any ground of appeal which his senior has not thought fit to argue, except only when the senior has obtained the permission of the Court that the course should be taken. *SREENEE-BASH ROY v. UMBIKA CHURN ROY* 12 W. R. 375

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**36.** ———— *Adjournment—Senior Pleader.* Where, of two pleaders engaged by a respondent, the leader fell ill and transferred his brief to a senior pleader, but the Judge refused to hear the latter on the ground that his name did not appear on the vakalatnama, and the junior asked for one day's adjournment to prepare himself for conducting the case:—*Held*, that the Judge was wrong in refusing an adjournment. He should either have heard the pleader, who offered to argue the case, or granted the adjournment prayed for. *HARE KRISHNA MAHANTI v. BHUSAN CHUNDER MAHANTI* (1908) . . . . . 12 C. W. N. 888

**2. AUTHORITY OF, TO BIND CLIENT.**

**1.** ———— *Statement by pleader—Admissions made in conduct of suit.* When a pleader in the conduct of a suit makes admissions on behalf of a client, the client is bound by such admissions. *BERKELEY v. CHITTUR KOOAR* . . . . . 5 N. W. 2

**2.** ———— *Admission by pleader in conduct of case.* A party is bound by the admission of his duly constituted vakil, when the admission is one of a fact which, but for such admission, the opposite party would have had an opportunity of proving. *NARAIN ROY v. SREENATH MITTER* . . . . . 9 W. R. 485

**3.** ———— *Admission of vakil in criminal case.* Admissions of a vakil cannot bind his client in a criminal case. *QUEEN v. KAZIM MUNDLE* . . . . . 17 W. R. Cr. 49

**4.** ———— *Mofussil Courts—Questions of law and fact, admissions in respect of.* *Per JACKSON J.*—A vakil in the Courts of the mofussil is not empowered to make admissions on points of law on behalf of his client although he may make admissions on points of fact. *JUSODA KOONWAR v. GOUREE BYJNATH PERSHAD* 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 365

*ABDOOL GUNNEE v. GOUR MONEE DERIA*.

9 W. R. 375

**5.** ———— *Opinion expressed by vakil in argument.* The opinion expressed by a vakil in the course of argument adversely to a claim which he undertook to advocate is not binding on his client. *KRISHNASAMI AYYANGAR v. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR* . . . . . I. L. R. 18 Mad. 73

**6.** ———— *Admission by pleader erroneous in law.* An admission by a pleader, if it is erroneous in law, is not binding on his client. *KRISHNAJI NARAYAN PARKHI v. RAJMAL MANIKCHAND MAMADI* . . . . . I. L. R. 24 Bom. 360

**7.** ———— *Erroneous consent of vakil.* Where a vakil upon a mistaken view of the law goes beyond and contravenes his instructions, his erroneous consent cannot bind his client. *RAM KANT CHOWDHRY v. BRINDABUN CHUNDER DOSS* . . . . . 16 W. R. 246



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8. ————— *Statements by vakil out of ordinary scope of his authority.* Greatest caution should be exercised by the Courts before acting upon statements out of the ordinary scope of the vakil's authority in the particular matter for which he was employed. *VANKATA-RAMANNA v. CHAVELA ATCHIYAMMA.* 6 Mad. 127

9. ————— *Verbal admission made by pleader.* In a suit to set aside a sale in execution on the ground of fraud:—*Held*, in reference to the terms of certain statements made by the plaintiff's pleader, from which the lower Appellate Court had inferred that the plaintiffs must have become aware of the fraud at a date earlier than that alleged by them, that verbal admissions made by the pleader of a party to a suit must be received with caution, must be taken as a whole, and must not be unduly pressed. *NATHA SINGH v. JODHA SINGH* I. L. R. 6 All. 406

10. ————— *Power to make admissions or statements to bind client—Relinquishment of part of defence.* In a suit to recover possession, where defendants' pleader stated before the Munsif that if the thak map (which was not at the time in Court) could show that the lands in dispute had been surveyed as part and parcel of the plaintiff's talukh, his client would give up his claim:—*Held*, that the statement was not one which was within the scope of the pleader's authority to make and was not binding upon the client. *CHUNDER COOMER DEO v. SUDAKUT MAHOMED KHAN* 18 W. R. 436

11. ————— *Consent of pleader—Effect of admission.* The admission of a vakil made with due authority will bind his client, though not present at the time of making it. Where, therefore, an order was made for the payment of a certain sum, being the moiety of the profits of an estate founded on the amount for which security had been taken, as the rental of a zamindari when possession was given up, and that amount was admitted and assented to by the vakil in Court, and the order made accordingly:—*Held*, by the Judicial Committee, affirming the judgment of the Court below, that such consent was binding on the client, and precluded him from afterwards opening the account. *RAJINDER NARAIN RAO v. BIJAI GOVIND SINGH* 2 Moo. I. A. 253

12. ————— *Consent—Dekkan Agriculturists' Relief Act, s. 3, cl. 3—Consent to proceeding under Act, withdrawal of.* If a party or his pleader gives consent under cl. 3 of s. 3 of the Dekkan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879) to the disposal of a suit according to the provisions of Ch. II of the Act, the consent so given cannot be withdrawn after the hearing has begun and the suit has proceeded on the footing of such consent. *RUPCHAND KHEMCHAND v. BALVANT NARAYAN* I. L. R. 11 Bom. 591

13. ————— *Admission of liability by vakil.* A distinct admission of liability

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made by a vakil, who represented the defendant and whose authority was not questioned, was *held* to be sufficient to warrant a decree in favour of the plaintiff. *DOSSEE v. PITAMBUR PUNDAH* 21 W. R. 332

14. ————— *Admission by vakil—Evidence of receipt of money.* The admission of a defendant's vakil in Court was *held* to be legal evidence of the receipt of money, and to do away with the necessity for other proof. *KALEEKA-NUND BHUTTACHARJEE v. GIREEBALA DEBIA* 10 W. R. 322

15. ————— *Power of pleader—Power to compromise case.* Ordinarily a vakil who is employed to conduct the case on behalf of his client has no implied authority to compromise it. In the absence of any express provision in the vakalatnama, he can make no compromise which will be binding upon his client, except with his consent. *PREM SOOK v. PIR-THÉE RAM* 2 Agra 222

16. ————— *Power to compromise suit.* Pleaders, unless specially empowered so to do, have no authority to compromise cases conducted by them. *SIRDAR BEGUM v. IZZUT-OOI-NISSA* 2 N. W. 149

*JAGAPATI MUDALIAR v. EKAMBARA MUDALIAR.* I. L. R. 21 Mad. 374

17. ————— *Consent to matter beyond scope of suit.* A consent by the vakil of a party to a decree being made binding on property other than what the parties to the suit may have an interest in, is a consent to what is beyond the scope of the suit, and can neither be binding on the party nor acted upon by the Court. *AVUL KHADAR v. ANDHU SET* 2 Mad. 423

18. ————— *Relinquishment of defence.* Where a pleader authorized only to conduct the defence in the usual way pledged his client to relinquish his defence if the plaintiff would assert on oath that the defendant was not the owner of the property in dispute, it was *held* that he had exceeded his power, and that his client was not bound by his act. *HAKEEMOONNISSA v. BULDEO* 3 Agra 309

19. ————— *Unauthorized relinquishment by pleader.* It is not within the ordinary scope of a pleader's duties to relinquish any portion of his client's case without express authority from the client, who is not bound by such relinquishment, unless it was authorized by himself. *GOTB PERSHAD DOSS v. SOOKDEB RAM DEB* 12 W. R. 279

20. ————— *Relinquishment of part of claim.* A vakil has no authority under an ordinary vakalatnama to give up a portion of the claim already decreed, and any such abandonment will not be binding on his client. When a case is remanded with the specific declaration that the plaintiff shall obtain "possession of the disputed property," the lower Court has no jurisdiction to debar



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the plaintiff from any portion thereof by reason of a relinquishment made by the vakil. **ABDUL SABHAN CHOWDHRY v. SHIBKISTO DAW** 3 B. L. R. Ap. 15

21. ————— *Authority of counsel, vakils, or other agents—Abandonment of issue—Scope of authority in conduct of litigation—Compromise—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 462.*  
A vakil appointed to conduct a case on behalf of a client has power to ask for an issue to be framed, or to abandon one that has been framed, and, in the absence of fraud or misconduct or of express instructions prohibiting the adoption of such a course, his action will be binding on his client. There is no distinction in this respect between the acts of counsel, vakils, and other agents. The abandonment of an issue does not amount to a compromise, and if the suit is being conducted by a guardian on behalf of the minor, leave of the Court is not necessary under s. 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure for such abandonment. **VENKATA NARASIMHA NAIDU v. BHASHYAKARLU NAIDU.**

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 538

22. ————— *Withdrawal from suit—Vakalatnama.* A vakalatnama given by a plaintiff, and couched in general terms suffices *prima facie* to authorize the vakil to apply on behalf of the plaintiff for leave to withdraw from the suit; and in the absence of anything to show that the vakil acted contrary to his instructions, or otherwise was guilty of misconduct in making the application, the client is bound by the act of his vakil. **RAM COOMAR ROY v. COLLECTOR OF BEERBHOM**

5 W. R. 80

23. ————— *Power of vakil to transfer decree.* A vakil by his ordinary employment as vakil enjoys no authority authorizing him to transfer a decree. **NOHUR v. JAFFER HOSSEIN**

2 N. W. 195

24. ————— *Powers of vakil—Abandonment of issue as to impartibility—Practice—Issue as to limitation.* A vakil's general powers in the conduct of a suit include the abandonment of an issue which, in his discretion, he thinks it inadvisable to press. So held, where the issue abandoned was as to the impartibility by family custom of the zamindari in suit. Where an issue of limitation is not raised, either by the pleadings or the evidence, it is not obligatory on the Judge to direct it, though he may have a discretion so to do. **BOMMADEVERA VENKATA NARASIMHA NAIDU v. BOMMADEVERA BHASHYAKARLU NAIDU** (1902)

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 367

L. R. 29 I. A. 76

s.c. 6 C. W. N. 641

25. ————— *Oral admission.* Where the mukhtear of one of the parties in a proceeding under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, orally denied their claim to the disputed land though no such denial had been made in their written statements:—Held, that admission by the legal practitioner conducting the case was sufficient

**PLEADER—contd.**

2. **AUTHORITY OF, TO BIND CLIENT—concl'd.**  
in a quasi-civil proceeding of this nature, and the Magistrate was justified in passing an order in favour of the other party; the fact that such admission was not recorded did not invalidate the order. **HARO MOHAN SARDAR v. GOBIND SAHU** (1902) . . . . . 7 C. W. N. 351

**3. REMUNERATION.**

1. ————— *Amount of remuneration—Vakil.* Although a vakil is entitled to whatever charge his client agrees to, yet if he acts under an engagement constituting him his client's mooktear and legal adviser, he is bound by the same rules as an attorney, and is therefore entitled only to such reasonable remuneration as the law allows. **USMUT KOOWAR v. TAYLER** . . . . . 2 W. R. 307

2. ————— *Suit for fees—Costs between party and party.* In a suit by a pleader for the balance of vakil's fees where it was found that there was no contract:—Held, that in considering the proper fee to be allowed, the lower Appellate Court had nothing else to guide it but what, according to the practice of the Court, was allowed as costs between party and party. **JUDOO-NATH DUTT v. RUSHAD ALI** . . . . . 19 W. R. 105

3. ————— *Suit by vakil for fees—Act I of 1846, s. 7—Beng. Reg. XXVII of 1814, s. 25—Costs.* In a suit brought by a vakil against his client for the amount of his fees, and instituted after the passing of Act I of 1846, but before the Pleaders and Mooktears Act (XX of 1865) came into operation.—Held, that, where the services in respect of which the fees were claimed consisted of the conduct of a suit which was dismissed for a deficient plaint, under s. 29 of Act VIII of 1859, the vakil is not entitled to the full amount of costs under Act I of 1846, s. 7, or the scale fixed by Regulation XXVII of 1814, s. 25; but in the absence of an express agreement, he is only entitled to a reasonable sum as remuneration for his work and labour as a pleader. So much of Regulation XXII of 1814 as was before January 1866 unrepealed, and the whole of Act I of 1864, are repealed by Act XX of 1865, which came into operation on January 1st, 1866. **AMEERUNNISSA v. CHAPMAN**

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 334 : 6 W. R. 108

4. ————— *Costs as between pleader and client—Bom. Reg. II of 1827, s. 52—Act I of 1846, ss. 6 and 7.* The provisions of Regulation II of 1827, s. 52, cls. 1 and 2, and of Act I of 1846, s. 7, regarding the award of pleaders' costs by way of a percentage, relate only to costs as between party and party, and (inasmuch as s. 52 of Regulation II of 1827 is, by s. 6 of Act I of 1846, expressly rendered inoperative for any purpose except for the purposes of s. 7 of the latter Act) there is not any statutable provision for costs as between pleader and client, so that, in the absence of an agreement between them, the pleader is left



PLEADER—*contd.*3. REMUNERATION—*contd.*

to his remedy on a *quantum meruit*. **GANGJI VITHAL v. SITARAM SHRIDHAR** . 9 Bom. 33

5. ———— *Costs between pleader and client—Act I of 1846, s. 6—Quantum meruit.* In a suit brought by *R* in *forma pauperis* against the defendant, he had engaged the services of the plaintiff as his pleader, but no express agreement for the remuneration of the plaintiff was made. The suit was numbered, and, after the evidence on either side had been gone into, the trying Court made an order dispaupering *R*. On an application by *R*, who offered to pay the Court-fees, the High Court under its extraordinary jurisdiction made an order directing the lower Court to receive the fees and to proceed with the suit. *R* paid the fees, but the suit was compromised. The plaintiff did not attend to the suit after remand. The plaintiff having sued the defendant for his fees, the Subordinate Judge was of opinion that one-fourth fee under s. 6 of Act I of 1846 should be awarded to the plaintiff. On reference to the High Court:—*Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to a *quantum meruit*, which was to be determined with reference to all the circumstances of the case, there being no express agreement in the case. **KESHAV GOVIND JOSHI v. JAMSETJI CURSETJI**

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 557

6. ———— *Right of suit for fees—Cause of action—Uncompleted case.* Where a vakil has undertaken the conduct of a suit, he is bound to proceed with it, and cannot sue for his fee, in the absence of a special agreement, until the suit is completed, unless where the client has dispensed with his services. **BUCKAPATNAM THATHACHARLU v. KAJAMIYA** . 6 Mad. 265

7. ———— *Right to additional fee—Fees of vakil for applications in suit when he is bound to carry suit to its conclusion.* Where, under the practice existing in the Courts, a vakil receiving a fee for prosecuting or defending a suit is bound to carry the suit to an end, and to make all necessary applications in the execution department without further fee, no second fee is allowable to a vakil for applications presented in the execution department unless it can be shown that the services of the vakil originally employed were not available. **TAKEE ALI KHAN v. GOOL MAHAMED KHAN**

1 N. W. 69 : Ed. 1873, 123

8. ———— *Agreement for further remuneration in successful case—Inam patras—Act I of 1846, s. 7.* Inam patras or agreements, oral or written, made contemporaneously with the vakalatnamas by clients with their pleaders for the payment of rewards in addition to the regulation fees, provided their cases are decided in their favour are not *nudum pactum*, and, having regard to s. 7 of Act I of 1846, cannot be considered as illegal. **PARASHRAM v. HIRAMAN** . I. L. R. 8 Bom. 413

9. ———— *Suit by pleader for fees.* An application was made for leave to sue defendant in *forma pauperis*, and he agreed with

PLEADER—*contd.*3. REMUNERATION—*contd.*

certain vakils to give them full fees, according to the valuation of the claim, in case they should succeed in having the application rejected. *Held*, that this was a valid agreement, and that the vakils, having performed their part, were entitled to recover upon it. **RAM KANT NANDI v. SHIB NANDA RAI** . 2 C. L. R. 166

10. ———— *Right to recover fee—Legal Practitioners' Act, ss. 27, 28, 30—Suit by pleader to recover fee from client—Contract Act, s. 70—Civil Procedure Code, s. 622.* The Legal Practitioners' Act does not debar a pleader from recovering a fee from his client when no contract in writing is made. **RAMA v. KUNJI** . I. L. R. 9 Mad. 375

11. ———— *Promissory note made by a party in favour of his pleader in respect of the fee agreed upon—Legal Practitioners' Act (XVIII of 1879), ss. 28, 29—Agreement not filed in Court.* A party to a suit made and delivered to his pleader in respect of the fee agreed upon a promissory note which was not filed in Court in that suit. In a suit by the pleader upon his promissory note:—*Held*, that the promissory note was invalid, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover only the amount to which he was found to be entitled for his labour. **KRISHNASAMI v. KESAVA**

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 63

12. ———— *Suit by pleader to recover fee from client—Legal Practitioners' Act (XVIII of 1879), ss. 27, 28, 29, 30—Agreement for fee—Agreement not in writing and filed in Court.* Ss. 27, 28, and 29 of the Legal Practitioners' Act (XVIII of 1879) do not relate to any arrangements or agreement made between a litigant and his own pleader as to the receipt of his fees which are actually allowed upon taxation. They do not provide as to matters which relate to the opposite party, or the fees that he has to pay to the legal practitioner of the opposite party, but provide what as between the pleader and his client, shall be the method in which certain special arrangements are to be entered into. They make provision for arrangements between pleaders and their clients, which relate to the payment of remuneration in excess of and apart from the amount allowed in the taxation, and were framed upon the principle which regards with jealous scrutiny contracts brought about by persons holding positions of active confidence towards others, such as a pleader necessarily occupies in reference to his client. They were intended to protect necessitous, improvident, or careless litigants from being taken advantage of by unscrupulous legal advisers. **Rama v. Kunji**, I. L. R. 9 Mad. 375, approved and followed. **RAZI-UD-DIN v. KARIM BAKHSI** . I. L. R. 12 All. 169

13. ———— *Agreement between pleader and person retaining him—Legal Practitioners Act (XVIII of 1879), s. 28—Promissory note, suit on—Quantum meruit.* The defendants' brother engaged a vakil (since deceased) to defend certain suits on their behalf and made and delivered



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 188—contd.**

Criminal Procedure Code was in fact directed to the accused, he cannot legally be convicted under s. 188 of the Penal Code for disobeying such order. *In the matter of* NOBO KISHORE CHUCKERBUTTY

7 C. L. R. 291

16. *Order declaring land in dispute not to be public.* An order which declares that as between the parties to a contention certain land in dispute does not belong to the public is not one the contravention of which can form the subject of an order under the Penal Code, s. 188. *UNNODA PROSHAD DUTT v. SHAMA SOONDUREE*

24 W. R. Cr. 20

17. *Order on report of jury under Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 521, 526—Disobedience of order.* A jury having been applied for and duly appointed under s. 521 of Act X of 1872, one of the jurors appointed by the Magistrate fell sick, and the foreman of the jury, unknown to the Court, substituted another man in his place. The Magistrate accepted the report of the majority of the jury so constituted and made an order under s. 526. The order having been disobeyed proceedings were taken under s. 188 of the Penal Code against the person to whom it was directed, and he was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. *Held*, that, the report upon which action was taken not being the report of a regularly constituted jury, the order and the conviction and sentence passed on disobedience thereto were illegal. *EMPRESS v. BHOIRUB CHUNDER DUTT*

10 C. L. R. 193

18. *Disobedience to order of public servant—Enquiry as to possession—Parties to enquiry.* In May 1883 the District Magistrate of Tipperah held an enquiry as to the possession of certain lands claimed by A and B, and having found on the evidence taken by him that A was in possession, he passed an order on the 21st of May 1883, declaring that A was entitled to hold possession of the disputed land until evicted in due course of law, and forbidding B and all others to disturb A's possession until such disturbance should be effected in due course of law. Previously to November 1885, B sold an 8-anna share of his interest in the disputed land to C, who at the time of his purchase had notice of the order of the 21st of May 1883. In November 1885 B and others went to the disputed lands, and attempted to turn A out of possession by force, and to compel the tenants of the lands to pay rent and give kabuliats to B and C. At the time that B and his companions went to the disputed land, the latter were aware of the order of the 21st of May 1883, though none of them was a party to the enquiry then made by the District Magistrate. In December 1885 they were all tried and found guilty of disobedience to an order duly promulgated by a public servant. *Held*, that the conviction was right. *GOLUCK CHANDRA PAL v. KALI CHARAN DE*

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 175

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—**  
*contd.*

**s. 188—contd.**

19. *Disobedience to order of public servant—Order of Magistrate under Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 318.* Where an order was made under s. 318 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, between A on the one side and B and the three tenants of B on the other:—*Held*, that the order was only binding on the actual parties to the case, and subsequent tenants of B could not be punished for disobeying the order. *In the matter of* GOPAL BURNAWAR

3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 13

20. *Omission or neglect of zamindar to obey call under s. 21, Beng. Reg. XX of 1817.* An omission or neglect by a zamindar when called upon under s. 21 of Regulation XX of 1817 to nominate some one to fill the office of village watchman which had become vacant is not an offence under either s. 187 or s. 188 of the Penal Code. *In the matter of* KALI PROSONO GHOSE

7 C. L. R. 575

21. *Chairman of Municipal Committee under Act XXVI of 1850—Public servant.* The Chairman of the Municipal Committee appointed under Act XXVI of 1850, though a public servant, has no power to make an order for the attendance of any one before him, and therefore there can be no conviction for disobedience of it. *REG. v. PURSHOTAM VALJI*

5 Bom. Cr. 33

22. *Conviction for disobeying order made without jurisdiction.* Convictions and sentences for disobeying an order promulgated by a public servant reversed, as the mamlatdar who stated that he proceeded under Bombay Act V of 1864 was not thereby empowered to make the order. *REG. v. BHABU BIN VITHU*

3 Bom. Cr. 53

*REG. v. KHANDOJI BIN TANAJI*

5 Bom. Cr. 21

23. *Order to abate nuisance—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 133, 134—Notice of order and subsequent disobedience.* The terms of s. 134 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and the notification made by Government thereunder as to promulgation and issue of an order, are directory, but an omission to follow strictly such direction, though it is an irregularity, does not invalidate the order: where therefore it is shown that the order has been brought to the actual knowledge of the person sought to be affected by it, such omission does not prevent the case coming within s. 188 of the Penal Code. *In the matter of the petition of* PARBUTTY CHARAN AICH. *PARBUTTY CHARAN AICH v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 9

24. *Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 133, 134, 135, 136—Service of notice of order under s. 133—Disobedience of order where notice was affixed to house of accused.* A Magistrate made an order under s. 133 of the Code of Civil Procedure requiring N to fence a certain well in a public street or to appear before him and move to



**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—  
contd.****s. 188—contd.**

have the order set aside; a copy of this order was affixed to the house of N, but he did not appear. The Magistrate then adopted the procedure prescribed by ss. 136, 140, and made an order requiring N to fence the well by a certain date. N, who was personally served with notice of the above order, did not comply with it. The Magistrate then sanctioned the prosecution of N under s. 188 of the Penal Code. N appeared and produced evidence to prove that he was not liable to fence the well. *Held*, that the accused was guilty of the offence of disobedience to an order duly promulgated by a public servant, and was not entitled to go behind the order and show that it was one which ought not to have been made. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NARAYANA**

**I. L. R. 12 Mad. 475**

**25.** *Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 133, 140.* A person against whom an order under s. 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is passed who neglects to take any steps whatever in respect of such order within the time therein specified either by way of compliance therewith or by way of objection thereto in the manner prescribed by law, renders himself liable to be proceeded against under s. 188 of the Penal Code without its being necessary to wait until the order has been made absolute. If such order is made absolute under s. 140 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, further proceedings can then be had under s. 188 of the Penal Code against the person disobeying the order absolute. When an order under s. 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been made absolute under s. 140, its validity cannot subsequently be questioned. *Queen-Empress v. Narayana*, **I. L. R. 12 Mad. 475**, approved. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BISHAMBAR LALL**

**I. L. R. 13 All. 577**

**26.** *Madras Local Boards Act (Madras Act V of 1884), ss. 98 and 100—Disobedience to notice given by President of Local Board.* The President of a Local Board, acting under Madras Act V of 1884, issued a notice calling upon a person to remove certain encroachments on a public road within ten days. *Held*, that such a notice was not an order within the meaning of s. 188, Penal Code, and a person neglecting to obey it could not be convicted under that section. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SUBRAMANIAN**

**I. L. R. 20 Mad. 1**

**27.** *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 144—Disobedience of an order lawfully passed and promulgated by a public servant—Elements necessary to constitute an offence under s. 188—Evidence as to the likely result of such disobedience.* To constitute an offence under s. 188 of the Penal Code, it is necessary to show, first, a lawful order promulgated by a public servant; second, a knowledge of the order and disobedience of it; and thirdly, the result that is likely to follow such disobedience. A conviction under s. 188,

**PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860)—  
contd.****s. 188—concl'd.**

Penal Code, for the disobedience of an order under s. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, in the absence of evidence as to the likely result of the disobedience of such order is bad in law. Although the establishment of a rival hât at a place near to an old hât and held on the same day may lead to a breach of the peace, it would not be safe or proper that that should alone form a sufficient ground for a conviction under s. 188 of the Penal Code. **BROJONATH GHOSE v. EMPRESS. 4 C. W. N. 226**

**28.** *Breach of the peace, likelihood of, necessary to support conviction.* Disobedience to a Magistrate's order directing a party to hold his hât on certain specified days of the week cannot be punished under s. 188 of the Penal Code. To support a conviction under s. 188 of the Penal Code some evidence that the disobedience is likely to cause a breach of the peace is necessary. *Brojo Nath Ghose v. Empress*, **4 C. W. N. 226**, followed. **SHAMANAND DAS PAHARAJ v. EMPEROR (1904)** **8 C. W. N. 781**

**29.** *Disobedience of order—Evidence—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 144.* To constitute an offence under s. 188 of the Penal Code of disobedience to an order issued under s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code, there must be definite evidence on the record to show that such disobedience is likely to lead to a breach of the peace. *Brojo Nath Ghose v. Empress*, **4 C. W. N. 226**. **RAM GOPAL DAW v. EMPEROR (1905)** **I. L. R. 32 Calc. 793**

**s. 189—Threat of injury to public servant—Necessity of proving actual words used.** In a prosecution for an offence under s. 189 of the Penal Code, the witnesses differed as to the exact words used by the prisoner in threatening the public servant, though they agreed as to the general effect of those words. The Magistrate, however, considered that the offence was clearly proved, and convicted the prisoner. The Sessions Judge on appeal affirmed the conviction, observing that it was immaterial what the words used were, and that the intention and effect of the words were plain. *Held*, that the Judge was mistaken in regarding it as immaterial what the words used actually were, and that, on the contrary, it was most material that those words should be before the Court to enable it to ascertain whether in fact a threat of injury to the public servant was really made by the accused. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MAHESHRI BAKHSI SINGH**

**I. L. R. 8 All. 380**

**s. 190—**

*See CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION.*

**I. L. R. 8 Mad. 140**

**s. 191—**

*See BANKERS.* **I. L. R. 16 All. 88**

*See FALSE EVIDENCE.*

*False evidence—False evidence not necessary on a point material to the case. Semble:* That to constitute the offence



**PLEADER—contd.****4. PRIVILEGES OF PLEADERS—concl'd.**

in this second and ministerial capacity are, on their own responsibility, entitled to work through any number of clerks or *taids* properly selected and paid by them; and no Court other than a High Court as established by Charter has the right to make rules defining the ministerial duties to be performed by them as distinct from the duties of their *bonâ fide* *taids* or clerks, nor does the Legal Practitioners' Act of 1879 control in any way the privileges which have always existed in them or restrict their powers, the Act being one passed to bring mooktears under the control of the Court. *In the matter of the petition of KHODA BUX KHAN*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 638

**5. REMOVAL, SUSPENSION, AND DISMISSAL.**

1. ———— **Removal—Power to remove vakil—District Judge.** A District Judge has no power to remove a vakil against his will from a Court to which he has once been allotted, except for a criminal offence, misbehaviour, or neglect of duty. *In the matter of VAMANJI KONERA* . . . 1 Bom. 136

2. ———— **Removal of pleader from one Court to another.** A Zillah Judge has no authority to oblige a pleader to leave a Court in which he has been practising and to proceed to another. *In the matter of the petition of MAHOMED MANAFF* . . . 10 W. R. 332

3. ———— **Suspension—Act XX of 1865—Power to suspend pleader.** A Zillah Judge has no power, under Act XX of 1865, to suspend a pleader of the High Court from practising in the Courts of his district on the ground of incompetency. His proper course is to make a representation to the High Court. *In the matter of KISHOREE LALL SIRCAR* . . . 14 W. R. 217

4. ———— **Act XX of 1865—Improper conduct.** The omission of a pleader to examine the record of the case before making an application to stay execution proceedings upon the ground of a compromise was *held* not to amount to grossly improper conduct; and his not verifying the statement of the parties who came to him and made their statements (one of them being a mooktear) was considered at the most to amount to carelessness, but not grossly improper conduct; whilst his omission to obtain the authority or concurrence of the senior pleader in the case could not be said to be improper conduct within the meaning of Act XX of 1865—certainly not such grossly improper conduct as to call for the punishment of suspension for six months. *In the matter of the petition of SREENATH ROY.* . . . 17 W. R. 405

5. ———— **Unprofessional conduct—Commission to mooktears—Act XX of 1865—Criminal offence.** A, a pleader, was engaged by B, who was acting on behalf of C, to defend certain persons charged with the offences of rioting and of having caused grievous hurt. Two of the accused persons were relatives of C. A agreed with B

**PLEADER—contd.****5. REMOVAL, SUSPENSION, AND DISMISSAL—contd.**

that, if all the accused were acquitted, his fee was to be R500; if the two who were the relatives of C were acquitted, then he was to receive R250; but in the event of none of the accused being acquitted, he was to receive only R40. Before the trial B paid A R475; this having come to the knowledge of C, he telegraphed, saying that the fee was exorbitant, and A, upon being remonstrated with, handed over R250 to a banker to be placed to his (A's) credit. A alleged that, out of R225 which remained with him, he paid R140 to B as commission, and that R25 were paid to his mohurir. *Held*, that A was guilty of fraudulent and grossly improper conduct. He was suspended from practising for the period of one year. *Per PONTIFEX, J.*—If a mooktear, paid for his services by his employer, were to receive in addition, without the knowledge of his employer, a percentage or commission from the pleader, he would be answerable, not only in the Civil Court, but also in the Criminal Court, to a charge of obtaining money improperly from his employer. *In the matter of PEARY MOHUN GOOHO*

11 B. L. R. 312

6. ———— **Power of interim suspension—Legal Practitioners' Act (XVIII of 1879), s. 14, cl. 5, and s. 40.** The power of interim suspension given under s. 14 (cl. 5) of Act XVIII of 1879, when read with s. 40 of the same Act can only be exercised after the pleader has been heard in his defence and pending the investigation and orders of the High Court. *In the matter of the petition of KRISTO LALL NAG*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 256

7. ———— **Legal Practitioners' Act (XVIII of 1879), s. 13—Grounds for suspension.** A pleader's professional misconduct having amounted to "reasonable cause," within the meaning of s. 13 of the Legal Practitioners' Act (XVIII of 1879), for suspending him from practice, their Lordships declined to interfere with the decision of the High Court as to the punishment, it not being clearly shown that the *quantum* awarded was unreasonable and excessive. *In the matter of QUARRY* . . . I. L. R. 13 All. 93

L. R. 17 I. A. 199

8. ———— **Letters Patent High Court, N.-W. P., cl. 8—"Reasonable cause"—Offer to give a gratification, contrary to s. 36 of the Legal Practitioners' Act (XVIII of 1879)—Abetment—Penal Code (Act XLV. of 1860), ss. 41 and 116.** A vakil of the High Court signed and sent a letter to another vakil of that Court, who practised in District Courts subordinate thereto. The purport of this, which was one of several printed forms prepared for circulation to vakils practising in districts was to the effect that the vakil, to whom it was addressed, "could easily send his clients cases, both civil and criminal," to the writer, who would conduct them in that Court. And, "as a remuneration," the fees paid by the clients would be shared between the writer and the vakil who had sent the



**PLEADER—contd.****5. REMOVAL, SUSPENSION, AND DISMISSAL**  
*contd.*

cases. The Judicial Committee concurred substantially in the conclusions of the High Court that this was an incitement within s. 116 (abetment) of the Penal Code to commit an offence made penal by s. 36 (which was a special law within s. 41 of that Code) of Act XVIII of 1879, the Legal Practitioners' Act. This misconduct had been aggravated by the appellant having denied to the Vakils' Association, North-Western Provinces, and caused evidence to be called to negative, his having signed the printed letter, which he had signed. Thus, there was "reasonable cause" within s. 8 of the Letters Patent of March 17th, 1866, establishing the High Courts, for his suspension, to which, for four years from the date of that Court's order, his punishment was reduced. *In the matter of PARBATI CHARAN CHATTERJI* . . . **I. L. R. 17 All. 498**  
L. R. 22 I. A. 193

**9. — Misconduct of pleader—Legal Practitioners' Act (XVIII of 1879), ss. 10, 32—Mooktear—Illegal practising.** A pleader or mooktear practising in contravention of the provisions of s. 10 of Act XVIII of 1879 is punishable under s. 32 of that Act only by the Court before which he has so practised. *In the matter of the petition of GANGA DAYAL* . . . **I. L. R. 4 All. 375**

**10. — Refusal to argue case after signing memorandum of appeal. Semble:** Where a pleader who has signed the memorandum of appeal refuses to argue the case on the ground of being unable and unprepared, he is liable to be either dealt with by the Court for neglect of duty, or sued by the client for neglect of his interests. *BUL-DEO MISSER v. AHMED HOSSEIN* . . . **15 W. R. 143**

**11. — Omission to examine record before certifying appeal.** A pleader is not guilty of grossly improper conduct, but substantially and sufficiently complies with the 2nd of the Rules of 23rd May 1871, if he examines copies of the record, and not the original record, before he draws the grounds of appeal and certifies them. *In the matter of NOOR AHMED* . . . **17 W. R. 338**

**12. — Legal Practitioners' Act (XVIII of 1879), ss. 15 and 40—Interim suspension—Police papers.** Depositions of witnesses, or confessions taken at a police investigation, are not, as far as their subject-matter is concerned, any more the property of the police than the property of the prisoners, and a pleader is not guilty of misconduct of any kind in making use of such documents for the benefit of his client, when delivered to him by the client however improperly the client may have become possessed of such documents provided the pleader is neither party nor privy to obtaining them. *In the matter of the petition of KRISTO LALL NAG* . . . **I. L. R. 10 Calc. 256**

**13. — Legal Practitioners' Act (XVIII of 1879), s. 14—Legal Practitioners' Amendment Act (XI of 1896), s. 2, cl. (b)**

**PLEADER—contd.****5. REMOVAL, SUSPENSION, AND DISMISSAL**  
*contd.*

—"Grossly improper conduct"—*Filing of petition containing grounds legally untenable.* The mere fact that a legal practitioner has filed a petition which may ultimately turn out to be based on grounds which are untenable in point of law, does not constitute on his part, improper conduct within the meaning of s. 14 of Act XVIII of 1879 as amended by cl. (b), s. 2 of Act XI of 1896. *In the matter of SARAT CHANDRA GUHA* **4 C. W. N. 683**

**14. — Unauthorized statement.** It having appeared that, without any instructions to that effect, the pleader conducting a suit in the lower Appellate Court had suggested, of his own motion, that the mother was a frail woman and being in improper intimacy with the defendant had executed the kobalas for him:—*Held*, that the pleader had acted with gross impropriety, and should be called up and censured by the District Judge. *GUNGA RAM SADHOOKHAN v. PANCH COWREE PORAMANICK* . . . **25 W. R. 366**

**15. — Striking pleader off the rolls—Act XX of 1865, s. 16.** Case in which the High Court declined on the facts to strike a pleader off the rolls for using improper expressions during the argument of a case before a Zillah Judge, who recommended, after observing the requirements of s. 16, Act XX of 1865, that such punishment should be awarded. The Zillah Judge should have called the pleader to order, and required him to apologize. *In the matter of CRUISE* . . . **14 W. R. Cr. 53**

**16. — Power to suspend pleader—Act XX of 1865.** A Zillah Judge had no power after the 1st January 1866 to make an order under Act XVIII of 1852 dismissing a pleader. He should have proceeded under s. 10, Act XX of 1865, and referred the matter, with his report, to the High Court. Even under Act XVIII of 1852, under which the Judge erroneously acted in this case, a pleader was liable to dismissal only on proof of conviction of a criminal offence by a competent Court, or on proof of a declaration or finding by a competent Court (in a suit or proceeding to which the pleader was a party) that he was guilty of a breach of trust, or for fraudulent or dishonest conduct in the discharge of his professional duty, and this also after notice and adjudication as prescribed by s. 4. *In the matter of the petition of AHMEENOODDEEN AHMED* . . . **6 W. R. Mis. 5**

**17. — Procedure—Pleader or mooktear, charge of misconduct against.** Any charge of misconduct against a pleader or mooktear holding a certificate under Act XX of 1865, other than a recorded conviction of a criminal offence, must be made and substantiated, and a report submitted to the High Court, as provided by s. 16. *In the matter of SUDEROODDEEN MAHOMED* **7 W. R. 316**

**18. — Misconduct of pleader.** When conduct is charged against any pleader of a subordinate



**PLEADER—contd.****5. REMOVAL, SUSPENSION, AND DISMISSAL—contd.**

Court, which, if proved, would amount to an offence, that conduct should be inquired into not simply as improper conduct, but as an offence to be made the ground, if established, of his dismissal under s. 14, Act XX of 1865. *In the matter of GUNESH CHUNDER GANGOOLY* . . . **13 W. R. 456**

**19.** ————— *Act XX of 1865, s. 16—Power of Zillah Judge.* A Zillah Judge has no authority to initiate proceedings against a pleader of the lower grade under s. 16, Act XX of 1865, which requires that the inquiry should be made by the Court in which the pleader committed the act of misconduct. *In the matter of the petition of KOMLAKANT DEGHAL* **11 W. R. 127**

**20.** ————— *Act XX of 1865—Report to Judge on acquittal of pleader by subordinate Court.* In a case tried under the provisions of s. 16, Act XX of 1865, where the subordinate Court is of opinion that the pleader should be acquitted, it is not necessary that there should be any report to the Judge. *In the matter of RAM KINKUR SEIN* . . . **13 W. R. 67**

**21.** ————— *Legal Practitioners' Act (XVIII of 1879), s. 12—Conviction of pleader of criminal offence—Case reported to the High Court—Argument allowed to show that conviction was illegal.* A District Judge reported to the High Court for orders the case of a pleader who had been convicted of cheating under s. 417 of the Penal Code, and who, in the opinion of the District Judge, was unfit to be allowed to practise. Upon the hearing of the case, counsel was permitted to go behind the conviction in order to show that the acts of the pleader did not amount at law to the offence of cheating. *In the matter of DURGA CHARAN* . . . **I. L. R. 7 All. 290**

**22.** ————— *Letters Patent, High Court, North-Western Provinces, cl. 8—Conviction of vakil for criminal offence—Vakil called upon to show cause why he should not be struck off the roll—Argument not allowed to show that conviction was wrong.* A vakil practising in the High Court was convicted by Court of Session of the offence punishable under s. 471 of the Penal Code, and the conviction was affirmed by the High Court on appeal. The vakil was subsequently called upon to show cause why he should not, in consequence of such conviction, be struck off the roll of vakils of the Court. On appearance in answer to this rule, it was held that the vakil was not entitled to question the propriety in law or in fact of the conviction, but that it was open to him to show, if he could, that his conduct in the matter in respect of which he had been convicted was not such as to render him an unfit person to be retained on the roll of vakils of the Court. *In the matter of RAJENDRA NATH MUKERJI* . . . **I. L. R. 18 All. 174**

*Held* (on appeal to the Privy Council), that, in the present case the conviction, followed by the sentence, was sufficient, without further inquiry, to

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justify the High Court in making that order. The appellant could not be allowed to have an indirect appeal against the judgment of the Sessions Judge confirmed by the High Court. The judgment of Lord Mansfield in *ex parte Brounsall*, 2 *Cowp. Rep.* 829, referred to as well explaining the disqualification of a member of the legal profession that attends such a conviction and sentence. *In re Weare*, [1893] 2 *Q. B.* 439, where the Court of Appeal looked to see what was the nature of the offence, and would not, as a matter of course, strike a solicitor off the roll because he had been convicted, distinguished from the present case. *In re Durga Charan*, **I. L. R. 7 All. 290**, dealt with under s. 12 of Act XVIII of 1879, referred to as a case where the nature of the offence admitted of further inquiry and also distinguished. In regard to the finality of the judgment of the High Court in deciding the appeal from the conviction and sentence, *In re the petition of Macrea* **L. R., 20 I. A. 90**; **I. L. R. 13 All. 310**, referred to. *In the matter of RAJENDRO NATH MUKERJI* **I. L. R. 22 All. 49**  
**L. R. 26 I. A. 242**  
**3 C. W. N. 736**

**23.** ————— *Legal Practitioners' Act (XVIII of 1879), ss. 13, 14, 40—Suspension from practice without opportunity to defend.* Two charges were, on 30th December, 1899, framed by a District Judge against a pleader, under s. 14 of the Legal Practitioners' Act, and it was directed that they should be heard on 24th January, 1900. On the day on which the charges were framed, namely 30th December, 1899, the District Judge passed an order suspending the pleader from practice as from 1st January, 1900, pending the disposal of the charges. With regard to one of the charges, no opportunity was given to the pleader to defend himself before the order of suspension was made. With regard to the second charge, the Judge had, prior to the date upon which the charges were framed, made an observation, in the course of a judgment, reflecting in general terms upon the conduct of the pleader, in consequence of which the pleader had written a letter and filed an affidavit by way of explanation. *Held*, that the order suspending the pleader was irregular, and must be set aside. *In the matter of a SECOND-GRADE PLEADER* (1900) . . . **I. L. R. 24 Mad. 83**

**24.** ————— *"Other reasonable cause"—Legal Practitioners' Act (XVIII of 1879), s. 13—"Other reasonable cause" for suspending a pleader—Writing an anonymous letter to influence.* A pleader wrote a letter, which he did not sign, to an officer who was conducting an inquiry into a charge of bribery against a Revenue Inspector, the letter containing allegations which were intended to prejudice the mind of the officer in connection with the matter which he was investigating. On a charge being preferred against the pleader under the Legal Practitioners' Act:—*Held*, that these facts showed "other reasonable cause" for sus-



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*concl'd.*

Pending the pleader, within the meaning of s. 13 cl. (f), of the Act. *In the matter of Purna Chundur Pal, Mukhtar, I. L. R. 27 Cal. 1023*, followed. *In the matter of a PLEADER* (1902)

**I. L. R. 26 Mad. 448**

**25. ———— Bombay Regulation of 1827, s. 56—Misbehaviour—Suspension of Sanad—High Court's disciplinary jurisdiction.** Pleaders are a privileged class enrolled for the purpose of rendering assistance to the Courts in the administration of justice. Their position, training and practice gives them influence with the public and it is directly contrary to their duty to use that influence for the purpose of bringing the administration of justice into contempt. A pleader who presides at a public meeting and therein procures the passing of a resolution contemptuously denouncing or protesting against the conduct of a High Court Judge in passing sentence at a trial at the Criminal Sessions, is guilty of misbehaviour (under 56 of Regulation II of 1827). **GOVERNMENT PLEADER v. JAGANNATH** (1908)

**I. L. R. 33 Bom. 252**

**6. PURCHASE BY PLEADER AT SALE IN**  
**EXECUTION OF DECREE.**

**1. ———— Purchase by pleader of decree in suit which he has conducted—Right to execute decree.** It is not expedient that pleaders should by purchase become the persons entitled to execute decrees in suits in which they have been engaged. **GOSHAIN JUG ROOP GEER v. CHINGUN LALL** . . . . . **2 N. W. 46**

**2. ———— Sale in execution of decree—Collusion of vakil of judgment-debtor with decree-holder.** The conduct of a vakil who, having acted in that capacity on behalf of a judgment-debtor in certain proceedings in execution of a decree, subsequently became partner with the decree-holder in the purchase of the property, remarked upon. *Quære*: Whether, under such circumstances, the purchase by the vakil, or the purchase by the decree-holder in conjunction with him, could not be set aside. **ROY NANDIPAT MAHATA v. URQUHART**

**4 B. L. R. A. C. 181 : 13 W. R. 209**

**WAJED HOSSEIN v. AHMED REZA**

**17 W. R. 480**

**3. ———— Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 292—Pleaders not officers of the Court within the meaning of that section.** Pleaders of parties to a suit are not debarred by s. 292 of the Code of Civil Procedure from purchasing property sold in execution of the decree. **ALAGIRISAMI v. RAMANATHAN** . . . . . **I. L. R. 10 Mad. 111**

**4. ———— Civil Procedure Code, ss. 292, 311—Suit to set aside sale in execution of decree—Duty of vakil purchasing at Court-sale—Fraud.** A mortgagee, having obtained a decree

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on her mortgage, brought the mortgage-property to sale; and her vakil bid through an agent at Court-sale and became the purchaser. It appeared that the vakil had not informed his client that he intended to bid nor obtained the sanction of the Court, but he had been instructed by his client and had obtained the permission of the Court to bid on her account, and he was found to have acted in an underhand manner towards her. In a suit to set aside the sale brought by the mortgagor, who had sought unsuccessfully to obtain the same relief by means of a petition under s. 311 in which fraud was not alleged against the purchaser:—*Held* (on its appearing that the vakil had not discharged the burden which lay on him of proving that the transaction was free from suspicion), that the sale should be set aside. **SUBBARAYUDU v. KOTAYYA** . **I. L. R. 15 Mad. 389**

**7. PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.**

**1. ———— Disciplinary jurisdiction—Pleader making use in later proceedings against A of information obtained by him in an earlier case in which A was his client.** With regard to its disciplinary jurisdiction over pleaders, the High Court of Bombay will follow the rule laid down by **BLACKBURN, J.**, in the case of *Re Cutts*, **16 L. T. (N. S.) 715**, which was as follows: "Those things which an attorney earns from his client, or in consequence of his employment by his client, he is forbidden to disclose, and any betrayal of his confidence would be visited by the Court as gross misconduct. But if he learns matters relating to his client under such circumstances that, if questioned about them in a Court of justice, he could not refuse to answer them, he is not within our jurisdiction." This rule should not be taken by pleaders as the standard by which to regulate their professional behaviour. It serves only to indicate the extreme low-water mark of professional conduct. **DAMODAR VENKATESH v. BHAVANISHANKAR MANGESH** (1902) . . . . . **I. L. R. 26 Bom. 423**

**2. ———— Legal Practitioners' Act (XVIII of 1879)—Pleader appropriating client's money—Grossly improper conduct in the discharge of professional duties.** A party in a suit gave his pleader a power-of-attorney to draw out a sum of money which he had recovered in that suit. The pleader drew the money out of Court, appropriated it to his own purposes, and, when asked, failed to hand it over to his client. *Held*, that the pleader had acted in a grossly improper manner in the discharge of his professional duties. *In the matter of PURNA CHANDRA DUTT* (1903)

**7 C. W. N. 373**

**PLEADERS AND MOOKTEARS ACT**  
**(XX OF 1865).**

*See MOOKTEAR.*

*See PLEADER.*



**PLEADERSHIP EXAMINATION.**

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT—APPEALABLE ORDERS . I. L. R. 6 All. 163

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8 C. W. N. 695

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9 C. W. N. 460

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I. L. R. 24 Calc. 306

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13 C. W. N. 518

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5 C. W. N. 515

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882, s. 95. . I. L. R. 28 All. 482

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882, s. 116 . 12 C. W. N. 587

See VARIANCE BETWEEN PLEADING AND PROOF.

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9 C. W. N. 265

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1. Rules of pleading in India—The Courts in India are not governed by the technical rules of pleading which obtain in Courts administering English law. PITUMBUR PYNE *v.* TOOL-SEE DOSSEE . 7 W. R. 39

2. Object of pleadings—Issue not in terms fixed, but afterwards raised—Appointment of the religious superior of a Mahomedan institution—Custom as to such appointment. The object of any system of pleading is that each side may be made fully aware of the questions that are about to be argued, in order that each may bring forward evidence appropriate to the issues. The claim here made was that the last preceding sajjadanashin, acting according to the custom of the institution of which he was the religious superior and manager, had appointed the plaintiff to succeed him on his decease. The finding of the first Court that he had this power by the custom was affirmed on this appeal. As to the fact of the appointment, it was not apparent at what stage of the suit the question had first been raised, whether the deceased had been of sound and disposing mind at the time of making it. The first Court found that he had been of sound mind at the time; but the Chief Court on appeal reversed this finding, and added that he had been in their opinion, unduly influenced. As these questions, though not formally stated in the issues, had been sufficiently open upon the proceedings to give to each Court a right to form a judgment upon them, the Judicial Committee, decided which was correct, and affirmed the finding of the first Court as to the soundness of mind of the deceased. SAYAD MUHAMMAD *v.* FATTEH MUHAMMAD

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 324  
L. R. 22 I. A. 4

3. Alternative plea of limitation and tenancy—Limitation. It is open to a party to plead tenancy and limitation in the alternative. Jonardon Mundul *v.* Sambhu Nath Mundul, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 806, explained. Dinomonee Debia *v.* Doorga Pershad Mojoomdar, 21 W. R. 70, relied upon. KEAMUDDI *v.* HARA MOHAN MONDUL (1903) . 7 C. W. N. 294

4. Plea of pre-emption—Usufructuary mortgage—Purchase of equity of redemption—Suit by purchaser for redemption—Plea of right to pre-empt sale to plaintiff. The plaintiffs sued as



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purchasers of part of the equity of redemption of a usufructuary mortgage to redeem the mortgage and recover possession of a proportionate part of the mortgaged property. One of the mortgagees defendants pleaded that he had a right of pre-emption in respect of the sale, which formed the basis of the plaintiff's title and was ready and willing to exercise such right. *Held*, that this plea could not be admitted as an answer to the plaintiffs' suit for redemption. *Ajudhia Bakhsh Singh v. Arb Ali Khan* I. L. R. 7 All. 892, and *Ram Chand v. Durga Prasad*, I. L. R. 26 All. 61, referred to. *IDARAT KHAN v. ILAHI BAKHSH* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 78

5. ——— Partial decree—A plaintiff ought not, by reason of his having claimed too much, to be precluded from recovering a proportionate amount, to which he is entitled, if the pleadings are sufficient to cover such a claim. The question as to whether a partial decree ought to be made in such a case, is not one of indulgence to be granted or refused at the Court's discretion. *AHMAD WALI KHAN v. SHAMSI JAHAN BEGAN* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 482

s.c. L. R. 33 I. A. 81

6. ——— Pleading and proofs. Although the rule is that proofs must correspond with the allegations in the pleadings the requirement in that behalf is fulfilled if the substance of the declaration is proved. No variation ought to be regarded as material, where the allegation and proof substantially correspond. *Nash v. Towne*, 5 Wallis 689; 6 Rose's Notes 758, followed. *BELBHADAR PERSHAD SINGH v. SHEIKH BARKAT ALI* (1906)

11 C. W. N. 85

7. ——— Suit on title—Declaratory decree—No relief on the ground of adverse possession. A declaration cannot be given on a title neither stated in the plaint nor raised on the issues. A plaintiff, who comes into Court alleging title without more, cannot be allowed to succeed on the basis of title by adverse possession. *SOMASUNDARUM CHETTY v. VADIVELU PILLAI* (1908)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 531

8. ——— Where a statement by a plaintiff is not admitted by the defendant, the plaintiff, if he ignores the point, does so at his peril, for the defence puts him to prove his title. *ULLMAN & Co. v. CESAR LEUBA* (1908)

13 C. W. N. 82

**PLEDGE.**

See LIMITATION . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 218

See STAMP ACT, 1879, SCH. I, ART. 44.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 241

## ——— of goods—

See BAILMENT . 5 B. L. R. Ap. 31

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 178.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 497

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 458

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## ——— of moveable property, suit on—

See LIMITATION ACT, ART. 57.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 21

I. L. R. 17 All. 284

## ——— suit to redeem—

See DEKKAN AGRICULTURISTS' RELIEF

ACT, s. 3 . I. L. R. 15 Bom. 30

Suit for money lent

—Money secured by a pledge—Limitation—Three years from the time of the loan. A suit for the recovery of money secured by a pledge is a suit for money lent. The period of limitation is three years from the time the loan is made. *YELLAPPA v. DESAYAPPA* (1905)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 218

**PLEDGOR AND PLEDGEE.**

——— Pledgee taking over the property pledged crediting the value as if it had been sold to him—Wrongful conversion—Absence of proof of damages to pledgor—Account—Interest. Where a pledgee, having power to sell for default, takes over, as if upon a sale to himself, the property pledged without the authority of the pledgor, but crediting its value in account with him, this act, though an unauthorized conversion, does not put an end to the contract of pledge, so as to entitle the pledgor to have the property back without payment. Government paper having been deposited by a borrower from a Bank as security, part was legally sold upon his failing to comply with the terms between them. As to the rest, the borrower, afterwards on redeeming a part, was led to believe that the paper returned was the whole of that which remained unsold in the bank's possession. The bank, however, had taken over part, as if sold to itself, crediting the price. *Held*, that the bank could not after this treat the securities as still subject to the pledge; although this transaction had not put an end to the contract of pledge, so as to entitle the pledgor to have back the paper without payment of the loan and interest. The bank was no longer a pledgee of this paper, but, having converted it to the bank's own use, might have been liable in damages for the value, including the interest thereon. However, had this liability been enforced, the pledgor could not have had credit in the loan account for the proceeds of the paper. The cessation of interest on the loan was more to his advantage than to receive the interest on the paper, the market value of which was also falling, so that the longer the account had been kept open, the greater the balance would have been against the pledgor. It followed that there was no evidence of damage to him resulting from the conversion. The first Court decreed an account, wrongly deciding that interest could not run upon the loan, which the amount of the paper transferred by the bank to itself purported to wipe off, from the date of the transfer. On this point, as well as because there was no proof of damage to the pledgor, the High Court, reversing that decree, had rightly dismissed the pledgor's suit. *NECKRAM DOBAY v. BANK OF BENGAL* . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 322

L. R. 19 I. A. 60



**POISONOUS DRUGS ACT (BOMBAY).**

See MAGISTRATE JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—BOMBAY ACT VIII OF 1866.  
I. L. R. 4 Bom. 167

**POLICE.**

See BOMBAY CITY POLICE ACT.  
I. L. R. 31 Bom. 480

See CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.  
9 C. W. N. 402

See COMPLAINT . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1

See CONFESSION . 13 C. W. N. 861

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ss. 160,  
202, 203 . 9 C. W. N. 199

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ss. 528  
537 . I. L. R. 28 All. 421

See FALSE CHARGE I. L. R. 33 Calc. 30

See POLICE ACTS.

— application of Criminal Procedure Code to Police in Calcutta—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ss. 1 (2),  
4 (h), (s), 55 (b), 109 (b).  
7 C. W. N. 661

— custody—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 164.  
13 C. W. N. 861

— evidence given before, if admissible—

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 157.  
13 C. W. N. 197

— papers, value of, as evidence against accused—

See EXPLOSIVE SUBSTANCES ACT, ss. 4,  
4A . 13 C. W. N. 861

**POLICE ACT (XIII OF 1856).**

— s. 27—

— See SENTENCE—WHIPPING.  
Bourke O. C. 269

— s. 35—

— See STOLEN PROPERTY, OFFENCES RELATING TO. I. L. R. 20 Bom. 948

— s. 57—

— See GAMBLING . 8 Bom. Cr. 1

— ss. 57 and 58—

See WARRANT OF ARREST.  
8 Bom. Cr. 1

— s. 111—

See CERTIORARI, WRIT OF.  
10 Bom. 102 ; 109 note

**POLICE ACT (XXIV OF 1859).**

See MADRAS POLICE ACT.

**POLICE ACT (XLVIII OF 1860).**

— s. 2—

— See POLICE MAGISTRATE.  
Bourke O. C. 186

— s. 8—

See ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY.  
6 Bom. Cr. 15

— s. 10—

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—DIVORCE.  
8 Bom. Cr. 95

— s. 11, cl. (2)—License—Tea and Soda-water shops. The words “hotel, tavern, shop, or place” in the second clause of s. 11 of the Police Act (XLVIII of 1860) are wide enough to include every place mentioned in the first clause of that section. Tea and sodawater shops are required to be licensed under the Act. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SHERIAR ARDESEER ERAN*

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 530

— ss. 11, 12—License—Eating-house—Commissioner of Police—Discretion to refuse license—Construction—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 45. The petitioner applied to the Commissioner of Police of Bombay, under ss. 11 and 12 of Act XLVIII of 1860, for a license for an eating-house in a specified locality in Bombay. The license was refused on the ground that no more shops of the description were required in that locality. On petition to the High Court under s. 45 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877):—*Held*, that, under ss. 11 and 12 of Act XLVIII of 1860, the Commissioner of Police had no discretion to refuse the license. *RUSTOM JAMSHED IRANI v. HARTLEY KENNEDY* (1901)

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 396

— s. 21—

See PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS ACT (XI OF 1890), s. 3.  
I. L. R. 26 Bom. 609

**POLICE ACT (V OF 1861).**

— See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 424.  
I. L. R. 26 All. 220

— See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—POLICE ACT, 1861.  
14 W. R. Cr. 41

— See SPECIAL CONSTABLES.  
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 454

— s. 4—

— See TRESPASS I. L. R. 36 Calc. 433

— s. 4 (2)—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 195—Sanction to prosecute—Sanction to prosecute given by the District Magistrate as head of the Police—Revision. *Held*, that the High Court has no power to interfere in revision where a District Magistrate has granted sanction for a prosecution under s. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code acting therein as head of the police of the district. *Ramasonry Lall v. Queen-Emress*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 452 dissented from. *EMPEROR v. SHIB SINGH* (1905).  
I. L. R. 27 All. 292



**POLICE ACT (V OF 1861)—contd.**

**s. 13—Cost of constable.** A Magistrate has no power, under the Police Act, 1861, to realize the cost of a police constable from an individual. *QUEEN v. ROHIMKANT GHOSE*

1 W. R. Cr. 15

**ss. 17, 19—Special constables—Refusal, by persons appointed, to accompany police-officer to obtain authority of appointment and arms, whether refusal to serve as such—Arrest—Arrest on refusal, legality of—Public servant—Obstructing him from discharge of his duty—Rioting—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 147, 149 and 353.** N, S and G were appointed special constables under s. 17 of the Police Act. A Police Inspector accompanied by some police went to their village and informed them that they had been so appointed, and requested them to accompany him to the police station of B, which they declined to do. The Inspector then had N arrested, whereupon N shook himself free, and N, S and G, with other persons who had assembled, abused and threatened the police and compelled them to withdraw from the village. N, S and G were convicted under s. 17 of the Police Act, and they were also convicted with other persons under s. 353, read with s. 149 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that the refusal of N, S and G to accompany the Inspector constituted no offence under s. 19 of the Police Act, as the order was intended, not for any purpose of police duty, but simply that they might obtain the authority of their appointment and the necessary arms. *Held*, further, that the refusal of N to accompany the Inspector was not an offence for which N could be arrested, and, as the police when obstructed were not acting in lawful discharge of their duty, none of the persons concerned could be convicted of an offence under s. 353 of the Penal Code, but that they were guilty of rioting under s. 147 of that Code. *Empress v. Dalip*, 1. L. R. 18 All. 246, approved of. *Chunder Coomar Sen v. Queen-Empress*, 3 C. W. N. 605, distinguished. *RAMAN SINGH v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* (1900)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 411; s.c. 5 C. W. N. 134

**s. 23—Arrest—Duty of police officer.** Under s. 23, Act V of 1861, a police officer is not bound to arrest a person against whom no proceedings have been directed if he believes that he has not sufficient ground for apprehending him. *In the matter of the petition of GRISH CHUNDER NUNDEE*

26 W. R. Cr. 8

**s. 25—Unclaimed property—Timber.** Timber claimed by a landowner as having been washed on his estate by a river is not unclaimed property within the meaning of s. 25 and following sections of Act V of 1861. *CHUTTER LALL SINGH v. GOVERNMENT*

9 W. R. 97

**s. 29—**

See CANTONMENT MAGISTRATE.

1 Agra Cr. 24

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—GENERAL JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 22 All. 340

**POLICE ACT (V OF 1861)—contd.****s. 29—contd.**

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—POLICE ACT, 1861.

4 W. R. Cr. 2

1 W. R. Cr. 5

**1. —European British subjects—Magistrate.** In a prosecution under the Police Act, V of 1861, the Magistrate is bound to take into consideration and determine the prisoner's plea that he is a European British subject. S. 29 of Act V of 1861 does not give to the Magistrate jurisdiction over European British subjects. *QUEEN v. HEARN*

3 N. W. 128

**2. —Persons not police officers.** S. 29 of Act V of 1861 is not applicable to persons who are not police officers. *In the matter of RAMKUMAR*

10 C. L. R. 521

**3. —Rashness or negligence of police officers—Search for stolen property.** Mere rashness or negligence on the part of a police officer before ordering the search of a man's house for stolen property does not constitute an offence amounting to a violation of duty under s. 29, Act V of 1861. The violation there intended must be wilful, intentional violation of some clear duty or other. *QUEEN v. BOLAKI LALL*

19 W. R. Cr. 7

**4. —Police officer—Overstaying leave without permission.** The failure of a police constable to resume his duty on the expiration of his leave does not constitute an offence under s. 29, Act V of 1861. *In the matter of the petition of JANOKINATH GUPTA*

*EMPRESS v. JANOKINATH GUPTA*  
I. L. R. 6 Calc. 625; 8 C. L. R. 56

**5. —Police officer with-drawing from the duties of his office without permission—Police officer overstaying leave.** A police officer obtained leave of absence for one month, a substitute being appointed, and overstayed his leave twenty-nine days. *Held*, that such absence without leave did not amount to "withdrawal from the duties of his office without permission" within the meaning of s. 29 of Act V of 1861. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SALIG RAM*

I. L. R. 6 All. 495

**6. —Submitting incorrect report—Penal Code, s. 218.** A police officer negligently or improperly submitting an incorrect report of a local investigation may be punished under s. 26 of Act V of 1861, in cases where the proof is insufficient to bring the case under s. 218 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN v. BORODA KANT MOOKHOPADHYA*

15 W. R. Cr. 17

**7. —Offence committed by police officer while under suspension.** A police officer was suspended by the District Superintendent and ordered to remain in the police lines, which he did not do. He was arrested and convicted under s. 29, Act V of 1861, for disobeying the orders of his superior officer, and withdrawing from his duties without permission. *Held*, that his conviction was illegal; after suspension, he was no longer a police officer under s. 8 of the Act, and therefore

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**POLICE ACT (V OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 29—contd.

could not be legally convicted under s. 29. *QUEEN v. DINANATH GANGOOLY*

8 B. L. R. Ap. 58 : 17 W. R. Cr. 12

8. ——— Neglect to act on information while on other duty. A police officer charged under s. 19, Act V of 1861, with a violation of his duties in not acting on information given to him of the likelihood of a breach of the peace, which afterwards actually occurred set up in defence that he was, when he received the information, engaged *bona fide* in duties as a police officer in regard to another offence. He was, however, found guilty and convicted. *Held*, the conviction was illegal. For a conviction under s. 29, more than mere neglect of duty must be shown; a deliberate and intentional violation of his duty is necessary. *QUEEN v. RADHU SINGH*

8 B. L. R. Ap. 60 : 17 W. R. Cr. 34

9. ——— Power to depute subordinate—Police officer—Neglect of duty. Police officer, being authorized by law to depute his subordinate to proceed to a place where a crime is reported to have been committed, cannot be supposed to have contravened the law by not proceeding to the spot himself; and therefore the conviction of the prisoner on the charge of wilful violation of duty was illegal. *GOVERNMENT v. KARAMUT KHAN*

1 Agra Cr. 1

10. ——— Extra drill. Police constable—"Neglect of duty"—"Lawful order." A District Superintendent of Police directed his constables to cut down the jungle in the vicinity of their lines, and on their refusal to comply ordered them extra drill every day. One of such constables not turning out to such extra drill was thereupon prosecuted and convicted of neglect of duty under s. 29, Act V of 1861. *Held*, that s. 29 provided for no such offence, and that any neglect of duty short of a violation of duty does not amount to an offence under that section. *Held*, further, that the omission to attend such extra drill did not amount to an offence under that section, as the words "lawful order" used in the section mean an order which the authority mentioned therein is competent to make, and it did not appear that a District Superintendent of Police was competent to order his constables to cut down the jungle in the vicinity of their lines, and, on their refusal to do so, to order them extra drill. *In the matter of the petition of BHOLA NATH DAS*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 427

11. ——— Acts of omission—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 148—Summons cases. Acts or omissions punishable under Act V of 1861, s. 29, come within the category of "offences punishable under any law other than the Penal Code" (Code of Criminal Procedure, s. 8) and those offences likewise fall within the terms of s. 148 of the same Code. *QUEEN v. GOLAM ARABEE*

25 W. R. Cr. 20

12. ——— Rule or regulation, and lawful order—Power to make rules under Act V of 1861—District Superintendent of Police, power

**POLICE ACT (V OF 1861)—contd.**

s. 29—concl'd.

of—A rule or regulation and a lawful order distinguished. There is no express power given by Act V of 1861 to any officer save the Inspector-General of Police to make rules; therefore the violation of a general rule alleged to have been made by a District Superintendent of Police to the effect that constables are to be within the lines at a particular time or at roll-call is not punishable under s. 29 of the Act. *Semble*: The violation of a special order made by a District Superintendent of Police requiring the presence of an officer or of certain officers within the police lines and issued expressly to him or each of them would come within s. 29 of the Act as being not "a rule or regulation," but a "lawful order" made by a competent authority and relating to the duties of the officer or officers. *In the matter of the petition of ABDUL HOSSEIN. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ABDUL HOSSEIN*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 194

13. ——— and s. 8—Suspension, effect of—Police officer—Breach of order. A police constable was suspended and ordered to remain in the lines during suspension. Despite the order, he absented himself therefrom without leave. He was convicted under s. 29 of Act V of 1861. *Held*, s. 29 of Act V of 1861 contemplates that the person to be charged with an offence under it must have been, at the time of his doing the act in respect of which the charge is preferred, a police constable within the meaning of that Act. When a police officer is suspended, he ceases to be a police officer; the conviction was therefore wrong. *Queen v. Dinonath Gangooly, 8 B. L. R. Ap. 58*, followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. DURGA*

I. L. R. 10 All. 459

s. 30—

See PENAL CODE, s. 153.

I. L. R. 29 All. 569

1. ——— s. 34—Slaughter of cow—Police Act Amendment Act (VIII of 1895), s. 13—Slaughter of cow—Open verandah—Annoyance to residents of locality—"Open place," meaning of—General police. The slaughtering of a cow in an open verandah, so as to cause annoyance to the residents of the locality, and in spite of their remonstrances, is a breach of the law, being an act in an "open place" within the terms of s. 34 of Act V of 1861 as amended by Act VIII of 1895. The words "open place," coupled with "road, street, or thoroughfare," should not be interpreted *ejusdem generis*. It seems rather that the addition of these words was intended to have a wider significance, and this is shown by another amendment in the same section made at the same time in which the annoyance, etc., caused must be not to the residents and passengers, but to the residents or passengers. The intention of the Legislature was to extend the Act not only to passengers who would not be on such a road, street or thoroughfare, but to residents, who are not passengers. *KHAN BAPUTI DEWAN v. BISPATI PUNDIT*

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 655



**POLICE ACT (V OF 1861)—concl'd.**

s. 34—concl'd.

2. *Placing tanbans in public road.* Placing tanbans in a public thoroughfare is an offence under s. 34, Act V of 1861. *QUEEN v. AMEER* . . . 2 N. W. 5

s. 42—

See APPELLATE COURT—OBJECTIONS  
TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—  
SPECIAL CASES—NOTICE OF SUIT.

2 W. R. 425

1. *Objection to want of notice of action.* A suit against a police officer under Act V of 1861 should not be dismissed merely because notice under s. 42 has not been given, unless the objection be taken in the first Court. *NARAIN DEEN TEWAREE v. RAM DASS*

8 W. R. 425

2. *and s. 29.* S. 42 of Act V of 1861 has no bearing on, or connection with, s. 29 of the Act. *QUEEN v. HAZAR MIR KHAN*

7 N. W. 237

3. *Suit against Police officer for damages for wrongful confinement—Notice—Action of Police officer malicious.* One Panna Lal brought a suit against a Sub-Inspector of Police claiming damages for wrongful confinement and other matters. It was found that the Sub-Inspector did not purport to act in good faith in pursuance of the law, but that he took advantage of his position as a Police officer to commit illegal and tortious acts, maliciously and without cause. Held, that under these circumstances the defendant was not entitled to receive notice of suit either under s. 42 of the Police Act, 1861, or under s. 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the plaintiff's suit was not liable to dismissal for lack of such notice. *Shahebzadee Shahunshah Begum v. Ferguson*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 499, and *Jogendro Nath Roy, Bahadur v. Price*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 584, referred to. *MUHAMMAD SADIQ AHMAD v. PANNA LAL* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 220

s. 44—

See PENAL CODE, s. 177.

21 W. R. Cr. 30

**POLICE ACT AMENDMENT ACT (VIII OF 1895).**

See POLICE ACT (V OF 1861), s. 34.

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 655

**POLICE CONSTABLE.**

See MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 136

threat to obtain dismissal of—

See CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION.

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 794

**POLICE CUSTODY.**

See DETENTION OF ACCUSED BY POLICE.

7 C. W. N. 457

**POLICE CUSTODY—concl'd.**

*Detention in police custody—Duration of detention—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 167 (3)—Order for such detention.* S. 167 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by requiring a Magistrate to record his reasons for authorising detention in police custody contemplates that the Magistrate shall consider whether on the facts placed before him there are good grounds for allowing such detention. There should at least be something to satisfy the Magistrate that the presence of the person arrested while the police investigation was being held would assist in some discovery of evidence and that his presence was indispensable for this purpose, as, for instance, when he had confessed before the Magistrate and had pointed out some of the property stolen in the offence and was wanting to do more but was unable to do so because the police were by law unable without a special order to detain him. In ordering further detention in police custody when there are good reasons for such an order a Magistrate should invariably limit the term as much as possible to what may be necessary for the object in view. *EMPEROR v. KAMPU KUKI* (1902)

11 C. W. N. 554

**POLICE DIARIES.**

See ACCUSED PERSON, RIGHT OF.

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 14

I. L. R. 19 All. 390

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 189

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT V  
OF 1898), ss. 162, 172.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1023

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—  
POLICE EVIDENCE, DIARIES, PAPERS  
AND REPORTS.

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—STATE-  
MENTS TO POLICE OFFICERS.

**POLICE DUTIES.**

See SERVICE TENURE 12 C. W. N. 193

**POLICE INQUIRY.**

See COMPLAINT—POWER TO REFER TO  
SUBORDINATE OFFICERS.

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 282

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 161

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 387

See DEFAMATION I. L. R. 28 Calc. 794

See DETENTION OF ACCUSED BY POLICE.

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 98

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—STATE-  
MENTS OF WITNESSES.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 483

magistrate taking part during—

See TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASE—  
GROUND FOR TRANSFER.

5 C. W. N. 864

1. *Power of Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), ss. 133, 180.* Held per GLOVER, J.—Under s. 133, Act XXV



**POLICE INQUIRY—contd.**

of 1861, a Magistrate may order a police inquiry "into any offence punishable under the Penal Code." *Held per* LOCH, J.—The Magistrate had no authority to order a police inquiry in a case under Ch. XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code, s. 180 not having been extended to cases under that chapter. *QUEEN v. FOKTU SHAH*

2 B. L. R. S. N. 6 : 10 W. R. Cr. 49

2. ——— Order for further detention in custody—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, ss. 152, 146—Offering inducement to disclosures.* Circumstances may exist in which a special order of the nature contemplated in s. 152 of the Criminal Procedure Code may properly be passed : for instance if in the case into which the police are inquiring, the suspected or confessing parties have voluntarily offered to conduct the police to a place where the stolen property will be found, and such offer cannot be carried into execution within the limited period of twenty-four hours, the power which the above-mentioned section confers on a Magistrate may be rightly exercised. But to return accused persons to the police that they may be forced to give a clue to the stolen property is to abuse the provisions of s. 152, with a view to the breach of the injunctions of s. 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *QUEEN v. RUGONATH PERSHAD*

3 N. W. 275

3. ——— Irregular inquiry—*Cases under Ch. XIV, Criminal Procedure Code, 1861.* An inquiry by the police into complaints falling under Ch. XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not warranted by law. *QUEEN v. HARRAKCHAND NOW-LAKA*

8 W. R. Cr. 12

S. 155 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) enacts that, when a police officer in charge of a police station receives information of the commission of a non-cognizable offence within the limits of his station, he shall enter the substance of such information in a book and refer the informant to the Magistrate; and no police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate of the first or second class having power to try such case and commit it for trial, or of a Presidency Magistrate.

4. ——— Investigation by police officer—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 160—Summons to answer complaint.* S. 160 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes a police officer making an investigation under Ch. V of the Code to require the attendance before himself of any person (within certain limits) who appears to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case, does not empower such officer to require the attendance of an accused person to answer the complaint made against him. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SAMINADA*

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 274

5. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 155, 202 and 203—Magistrate's power to direct a local investigation by the police.* S. 155 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882) deals only with the powers of police officers. It confers no power or authority on Magistrates

**POLICE INQUIRY—concl'd.**

to direct a local investigation by the police or call for a police report. *In re JANKIDAS GURU SITARAM*

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 161

6. ——— Basis of police inquiry—*Criminal Procedure Code (1898), ss. 157, 159—*An inquiry can be made under s. 159, Criminal Procedure Code, only on a report submitted within the terms of s. 157. *MOULI DURZI v. NAURANGI LALL*

4 C. W. N. 351

**POLICE MAGISTRATE.**

*See* TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASE—GENERAL CASES . 15 B. L. R. Ap. 14  
12 Bom. 217

1. ——— "Police office"—*Clerk of Magistrate of Police—Act XLVIII of 1860, s. 2.* A clerk in the police Magistrate's office having been convicted under s. 2 of Act XLVIII of 1860 as a person employed in a police office, a rule for quashing the conviction was made absolute. *Held*, that the words "Police Office" in s. 2, Act XLVIII of 1860, did not apply to a Police Magistrate. *In re JUDOO NATH MOOKERJEE*

Bourke O. C. 186

2. ——— Power of Magistrate—*Beng. Act IV of 1866, s. 26—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 116.* A police Magistrate had power to convict summarily, under Bengal Act IV of 1866, s. 26, for an offence punishable under s. 116 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN v. MAHBUB KHAN*

1 B. L. R. O. Cr. 39

**POLICE OFFICER.**

*See* ARREST—CRIMINAL ARREST.

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 457

*See* ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY.

6 C. W. N. 337

*See* GAMBLING—BOM. ACT IV of 1887.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 533

*See* MADRAS ABKARI ACT, s. 26.

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 97

*See* MALICIOUS SEARCH.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 590

*See* PENAL CODE, s. 221.

I. L. R. 3 All. 60

— confessions and statements to—

*See* CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS TO POLICE-OFFICERS.

*See* DEFAMATION I. L. R. 28 Calc. 794

*See* EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—POLICE EVIDENCE, DIARIES, PAPERS AND REPORTS . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 348

*See* EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—STATEMENTS TO POLICE OFFICERS.

*See* FALSE EVIDENCE—FABRICATING FALSE EVIDENCE.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 348



**POLICE OFFICER—contd.**

## detention by—

See CALCUTTA POLICE ACT (BEN. ACT IV OF 1866), s. 99 (1) . 7 C. W. N. 883

## duty of—

See ABETMENT . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 394

## liability of—

See COMPENSATION—CRIMINAL CASES—TO ACCUSED, ON DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT . I. L. R. 26 Bom. 150

See CAPM ACT, s. 9. I. L. R. 24 Calc. 891

See WRONGFUL CONFINEMENT. I. L. R. 19 Bom. 72

## resistance and obstruction to—

See BENGAL EXCISE ACT, 1878, s. 4. I. L. R. 24 Calc. 324

See PENAL CODE, s. 186. I. L. R. 24 Calc. 320

See PENAL CODE, s. 332. I. L. R. 18 All. 246

See SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES. I. L. R. 19 Calc. 105

See THUMB IMPRESSIONS. I. L. R. 30 Calc. 97

See WRONGFUL RESTRAINT. I. L. R. 12 Bom. 377

## search by—

See TRESPASS . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 433

## special—

See POLICE ACT (V OF 1861), ss. 17, 19. I. L. R. 28 Calc. 411

## trespass by—

See TORT . 13 C. W. N. 485

1. ——— Powers of arrest—Torture—Detention of prisoners. Exposition of a police officer's power of arrest and detention of accused persons and witnesses, with a view to the suppression of the practice of torture. *QUEEN v. BEHARY SINGH* . 7 W. R. Cr. 3

2. ——— Powers in discharge of his duties—Rioting. Where a man is grievously wounded in a riot, the police are bound to act without taking into consideration who was the aggressing party. In the discharge of their duties and in the absence of any proof that they exceeded their duty, the police were held entitled to the protection of the Court. *QUEEN v. DAMOO SINGH* 8 W. R. Cr. 36

3. ——— Liability of Police officer—Penal Code, s. 79—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 100, cl. 5—Illegal arrest by police officer. The general exception provided by s. 79 of the Penal Code, and the power conferred by cl. 5, s. 100 of the

**POLICE OFFICER—concl'd.**

Code of Criminal Procedure, was held not to protect a police officer who did not act in good faith, that is, with due care and intention. Cl. 5, s. 100, Code of Criminal Procedure, refers to property which is proved to have been stolen, and not to anything which a police officer may choose to imagine has been stolen. *SHEO SURUN SUHAI v. MAHOMED FAZIL KHAN* . 10 W. R. Cr. 20

**POLICE REPORT.**

See COMPLAINT—INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT, AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES. I. L. R. 14 Calc. 707  
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 410  
26 Bom. 150  
5 B. L. R. 274  
8 Bom. Cr. 113  
4 C. W. N. 242

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 145. 11 C. W. N. 835

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—POLICE EVIDENCE, DIARIES, PAPERS AND REPORTS.

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 74. I. L. R. 20 Mad. 189

See MAGISTRATE—POWERS OF MAGISTRATE . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 885

See NUISANCE—UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE . 3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 4

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH OF THE PEACE . I. L. R. 7 Calc. 46  
I. L. R. 13 Calc. 175  
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 513; 520  
6 C. W. N. 340

See RECOGNIZANCE TO KEEP PEACE—CREDIBLE INFORMATION. 10 W. R. Cr. 41  
4 B. L. R. F. B. 46  
12 W. R. Cr. 60  
21 W. R. Cr. 28

**POLICY OF INSURANCE.**

See BILL OF LADING. I. L. R. 30 Calc. 565

See INSOLVENCY—PROPERTY ACQUIRED AFTER VESTING ORDER. I. L. R. 18 Mad. 24

See INSURANCE.

See MARINE INSURANCE. I. L. R. 36 Calc. 516

See STAMP ACT, 1869, ss. 34, 41. I. L. R. 3 Calc. 347

See STAMP ACT, 1879, s. 3, CL. 15. I. L. R. 19 Calc. 499  
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 130



**POLITICAL AGENT.**

\_\_\_\_\_ certificate of—

See CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION—  
EFFECT OF CERTIFICATE.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 145

See CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION—  
RIGHT TO SUE OR EXECUTE DECREE  
WITHOUT CERTIFICATE.

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 14

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—  
GENERAL JURISDICTION.

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 423

I. L. R. 24 All. 256

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—  
OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN  
ONE DISTRICT—KIDNAPPING.

I. L. R. 19 All. 109

\_\_\_\_\_ Court of—

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—APPLICATION  
FOR EXECUTION AND POWER OF COURT.

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 162

\_\_\_\_\_ order made by, in his executive  
capacity—

See JUDICIAL OFFICERS. LIABILITY OF.

7 B. L. R. 452 note

**POLITICAL JURISDICTION.**

See PRIVY COUNCIL.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 219

**POLITICAL PENSION.**

See PENSIONS ACT, 1871, s. 11.

I. L. R. 31 All. 382

**POLITICAL RESIDENT AT ADEN,  
COURT OF.**

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—  
OFFENCES COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN  
ONE DISTRICT—MURDER.

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 258, 263

See TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASE—GENE-  
RAL CASES . I. L. R. 10 Bom. 274

**POLL.**

See COMPANY—MEETINGS AND VOTING.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 164

**POLYGAMY.**

See BRAHMO SAMAJ.

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 597

**PORAMBOKE LANDS.**

\_\_\_\_\_ Water in poramboke  
lands not Sircar water. Water in poramboke  
lands belonging to *mirasidars* cannot be said to be  
Sircar water and taxed as such. NATESA GRAMANI  
v. VENKATARAMA REDDI (1907)

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 510

**PORT COMMISSIONERS ACT (BENG.  
V OF 1870).**

\_\_\_\_\_ ss. 5, 6, 31, 38, 39—Land Acquisi-  
tion Act (X of 1870)—Phrase “public purpose”

**PORT COMMISSIONERS ACT (BENG.  
V OF 1870).—concl'd.**

\_\_\_\_\_ explained—Highway—Statutory Road—Dedication  
—Public user—Animus dedicandi—Power to dedi-  
cate, whether the Port Commissioners have any.  
Certain lands acquired in 1874 for “a public  
purpose” under the Land Acquisition Act of 1870 in  
conjunction with the Port Commissioners’ Act of  
1870, were conveyed to the Port Commissioners  
for value in 1876. A road constructed on a portion  
of these lands was used by the general public from  
the date of its completion in 1875 till 1881. On  
the Port Commissioners erecting a fencing in 1903,  
obstructing access from adjoining premises to the  
road, a suit was instituted by the owners of the  
adjoining premises for the declaration of a private  
right of access to the road as a public highway and  
for incidental relief. Held, that a public right of  
way may be created either by Act of the Legisla-  
ture or by dedication, express or presumed by the  
owner of the land, to the general public. The  
acquisition in suit did not create any public  
statutory road. The declaration of a “public  
purpose” did not make the road a public road.  
The “public purpose” was under s. 38 of the  
Port Commissioners’ Act of 1870, for the pur-  
poses of that Act. By the conveyance the land  
became vested in the Port Commissioners. In  
order to constitute a valid dedication to the  
public of a highway, by the owner of the soil,  
there must be an *animus dedicandi*, of which user  
by the public is evidence and no more. *Poole v.*  
*Huskinson*, 11 M. & W. 827, followed. *Quære* :  
Whether the Port Commissioners had, having  
regard to the terms of their Act, power to dedicate.  
*The Grand Junction Canal Company v. Petty*,  
21 Q. B. D. 273, referred to. AKSHOY KUMAR  
GHOSE v. COMMISSIONERS OF THE PORT OF  
CALCUTTA (1906) . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1243

**PORT OF CALCUTTA.**

\_\_\_\_\_ Limits of port—Act XXII of 1855—  
Suit for damages for breach of contract. P. & Co.,  
agents for the ship *F A*, contracted by a shipping  
order with *G* for freight, with option to *G* to can-  
cel the contract if the *F A* should not arrive at the  
port of Calcutta by the 15th of January. On that  
day she anchored at Atcheepore, and remained there  
till the morning of the 16th. *G* refused to fulfil the  
contract, and *P & Co.* sued him thereupon. Held,  
that there is no custom governing the construction  
of the words “the port of Calcutta” in shipping  
orders; and that an arrival at Atcheepore is not an  
arrival at the port of Calcutta. POTTER v. GENTLE  
Bourke O. C. 41

**PORT RULES (BOMBAY).**

See SHIPPING LAW—COLLISION.

6 Bom. O. C. 98

**PORT RULES (CALCUTTA), 1856.**

See SHIPPING LAW—COLLISION.

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**PORT TRUSTEES, BOMBAY.**

See SALE OF GOODS.

**I. L. R. 17 Bom. 62****PORTS ACT (XII OF 1875), s. 22.**

See MASTER AND SERVANT.

**I. L. R. 9 Calc. 849****PORTS ACT (X OF 1889).**

1. ——— s. 6, cl. (k)—*Rules made by Local Government—Boats plying and not plying for hire—Ultra vires.* It is only with regard to boats plying for hire that s. 6 of Act X of 1889 gives the Local Government authority to make rules. Rules purporting to make it obligatory on boat owners to ply for hire are *ultra vires*. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. THOMMAYYA CHETTI*

**I. L. R. 17 Mad. 397**

2. ——— ss. 6, 8—*Order purporting to be under the Act by Conservator of Port—Public body authorized by Legislature to make rules, powers of—Delegation of power—Rules made by Local Government.* The Conservator of the Port of Negapatam, purporting to act under the Indian Ports Act, s. 8, made and published an order that when a certain flag was flying at the signal station, all boats returning from the sea should cast anchor and not come inside the river. The Local Government had made a rule with reference to s. 6 (k) of the above Act requiring boat owners to "carry out at all times all orders issued by the Conservator in connection with the plying of their boats, and which are not inconsistent with the regulation issued by Government." A charge was brought against two persons, being the owner and tindals of licensed cargo boats, for neglecting to obey the aforesaid order, and they were convicted, under the Indian Ports Act, s. 8 (2), by the Conservator in his capacity as special first class Magistrate. *Held*, that the order was *ultra vires*, and the conviction was accordingly illegal. *Per Curiam*:—A public body, whether the Executive Government or a corporation, being entrusted by the Legislature with the duty of making rules, cannot relieve itself of the responsibility and depute other agencies to discharge the duty. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MARIAN CHETTI*

**PORTS, AND PORT DUES.**See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—  
SPECIAL ACTS—ACT XXII OF 1855.**5 Bom. Cr. 14****PORTUGUESE CONVENTION ACT (IV OF 1880).**

See OFFENCE ON THE HIGH SEAS.

**I. L. R. 14 Bom. 227****PORTUGUESE SUCCESSION.**

See ENGLISH LAW—PRIMOGENITURE.

**5 Bom. O. C. 172****POSSESSION.**

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13 C. W. N. 677; 801
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## —discontinuance of—

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5 C. W. N. 846

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## —suits for—

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7 C. W. N. 11  
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See REMAND . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 996

See RESISTANCE OR OBSTRUCTION TO  
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I. L. R. 27 Bom. 302

See RIGHT OF SUIT—POSSESSION, SUIT  
FOR.

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—  
SETTING ASIDE SALE—GENERAL CASES.  
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 682

See SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, 1877, s. 9.

See TITLE—MISCELLANEOUS CASES.  
I. L. R. 25 Mad. 448

See VARIANCE BETWEEN PLEADING AND  
PROOF—SPECIAL CASE—POSSESSION,  
SUIT FOR.

## —without lease—

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.  
I. L. R. 31 All. 276



POSSESSION—*contd.*

## 1. EVIDENCE OF POSSESSION.

1. ——— Statement as to fact of possession—*Evidence*. A statement by a witness that a party was in possession is, in point of law, admissible evidence of the fact that such party was in possession. *MANIRAM DEB v. DEBI CHARAN DEB*  
4 B. L. R. F. B. 97: 13 W. R. F. B. 42

2. ——— Acts of ownership. A witness's statement that a party "is in possession" is no evidence of the fact. The question of possession is a mixed one of law and fact, and the evidence produced must give the various acts of ownership which go to constitute possession so that the Court may arrive at its own conclusion. *ISHAN CHANDER BEHARA v. RAM LOCHAN BEHARA*  
9 W. R. 79

3. ——— Visiting and making use of house—*Possession as of right*. Occasionally visiting and making use of a house is ample evidence of possession, unless shown to have been done by the claimant in the capacity of a visitor, and not in his own right. *UNUNTO RAM SEAL v. BROJO BULLUB SEAL*  
11 W. R. 136

4. ——— Acts of ownership—*Omission to show acts of ownership*. In special appeal, the High Court held that evidence which did not allude to any specific acts of ownership was not sufficient evidence to prove possession. The finding of the fact of possession by the lower Appellate Court upon such evidence reversed on special appeal. *JAGABANDHU DAS GAJENDRA MAHAPATRA v. DINABANDHU DAS GAJENDRA MAHAPATRA*  
2 B. L. R. Ap. 30

5. ——— Suit for recovery of forest land from Government. Where a tract of land with a defined boundary has been throughout claimed by a person as owner, and acts of ownership have been done on various portions of it, such acts may be accepted as evidence of the possession of the whole tract. *Bhaskarappa v. Collector of North Kanara*, I. L. R. 3 Bom. 452, distinguished. *SIVASUBRAMANYA v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA*  
I. L. R. 9 Mad. 285

6. ——— Thakbust award—*Boundary, question of*. A thakbust award of boundary would in any case be material evidence of possession. *PRAHLAD SEN v. RAJENDRA KISHORE SINGH*  
2 B. L. R. P. C. 111, 137: 12 W. R. P. C. 6  
11 Moo. I. A. 293

7. ——— Survey proceedings—*Survey by revenue authorities—Records in Government maps*. Plaintiff sued in 1876 to recover certain alluvial lands which had been in existence over twelve years, together with recent accretions thereto which he alleged, appertained to his talukh. The alluvial land had been surveyed by the revenue authorities in 1863 as appertaining to no permanently-settled estate, and claimed by the Government. The plaintiff's predecessor, however, subsequently in 1864 laid claim to the lands; and the Collector, abandoning the claim of Government recorded him in the Government maps and papers as proprietor

POSSESSION—*contd.*1. EVIDENCE OF POSSESSION—*contd.*

in possession. Held, that, although the fact of the land having been measured by the revenue authorities as appurtenant to a certain talukh is *prima facie* evidence of possession of that land at the time of the survey, no presumption from the survey proceedings could arise in favour of the plaintiff in 1863. *KUSSESSUR ROY v. JOGGODISHURY*  
7 C. L. R. 269

8. ——— Measurement of land by Government officers. The evidence of Government having sent its officers to measure the land and to surround it with pillars is the very best evidence of possession of a lately-formed chur. *COLLECTOR OF FURREEDPORE v. KALEE DOSS HAZRAH*  
17 W. R. 195

9. ——— Decree for rent—*Subsequent suit for possession*. A decree against the registered tenant, in a suit for rent against him and another, is not conclusive evidence of the possession of such tenant, as between him and the other, in a subsequent civil action. *HURRO NATH BHUTTACHARJEE v. HARVEY*  
25 W. R. 23

10. ——— Receipt of rent—*Failure to show collection of rent for portion of property*. Receipt of rent is good evidence of possession, but it does not necessarily follow that a party in possession has been disturbed because he cannot prove that he has collected rent of a particular portion of the property. *PUDAR BINDOO MAHANJEE v. MOHESH CHUNDER SEN*  
20 W. R. 183

Receipt of rent is only evidence of possession. *ABDOOL ALI v. ABDOOR RUHMAN*  
21 W. R. 429

11. ——— Receipt for revenue. Possession of receipts for Government revenue, though evidence of possession does not prove it. *LALLEE SINGH v. AMRIT KOOR*  
17 W. R. 490

12. ——— Registration of tenure—*Suit for possession—Registration under Beng. Act VIII of 1876*. *Quære*: Whether, in a suit founded upon possession alone, or in which the relief sought depends solely upon possession, registration under Bengal Act VII of 1876 ought not to be treated as *prima facie* evidence of actual possession at the date when the registration was effected. *RAM BUSHAN MAHTO v. JEBLI MAHTO*  
I. L. R. 8 Calc. 853

13. ——— Decision of Collector—*Beng. Act VII of 1876, s. 55*. Per GARTH, C.J.—*Semble*: That s. 55 of Bengal Act VII of 1876 constitutes the Collector a competent Court under particular circumstances for determining as between two disputants the question of possession, and his recorded decision upon that question in the register might be evidence of the fact of possession as between those to parties. *Ram Bushan Mahto v. Jebli Mahto*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 853, explained. *SARASWATI DAS v. DHANPAT SINGH*  
I. L. R. 9 Calc. 431: 12 C. L. R. 12

14. ——— Finding as to possession—*Mamlatdar—Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530—Irregularity in taking possession*. A Mamlatdar's finding as to the point of actual



POSSESSION—*contd.*1. EVIDENCE OF POSSESSION—*contd.*

possession is not conclusive. A Magistrate's finding is conclusive under s. 530 of Act X of 1872. *LILLU v. ANNAJI PARASHRAM*

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 387

15. ————— *Dispute as to possession between purchaser from heir and grantees from widows—Effect of decision of Magistrate as to possession.* In a former suit appellant sought as purchaser from the heir to a former proprietor to establish her mokurari right to certain lands as against the grantees from the widows of such proprietor, upon the death of the last surviving widow. She obtained a decree establishing such right, and, on proceeding to take out execution, was opposed by the respondents, who claimed the lands as being a patni tenure which had been sold by auction for arrears of rent due by *B S*, the former patnidar, and which had been purchased by *K B* and *H B*, who had granted a dar-patni of the same to the respondents in 1849. In 1841 there was a proceeding before the Magistrate as between the grantees of the dar-mokurari right under the widows and *B S*, the patnidar, the result of which investigation was that the Magistrate quitted the former in possession as dar-mokuraridars under the widows, and ordered the patnidar to institute a suit in the Civil Court to enforce his claim, which suit was never brought. The claim of the respondents was tried as a regular suit between the objectors (respondents) as plaintiffs and the decree-holder (appellant) as defendant, and was decided in favour of the respondents in the lower Courts. On appeal to the Privy Council, their Lordships held that the proceeding in 1841 was conclusive of the present case, as showing that the actual possession then was in the grantees of the widows; that it was in the highest degree improbable that they, having established their possessory right against *B S*, would, without a struggle, have allowed themselves to be turned out of possession by their relatives as purchaser of the same *B S*'s right; that the possession of the grantee was obtained and continued under the widow's title, and was referable solely to the title which was now vested in the appellant; and that the right of the appellant should in nowise be affected by the acquisition of the patni title in 1849. *SHEROO COOMAREE DEBIA v. KESHUB CHUNDER BOSOO*

18 W. R. P. C. 1

16. ————— *Presumption of possession—Evidence of possession of certain specific property treated as evidence of possession as regards an appendage to such property, though no definite acts of possession were proved as regards the appendage—Limitation.* Where, on the right to the produce of certain trees being called in question, it was found that the plaintiffs had not, for twelve years previous to the filing of the suit, done any specific acts indicating directly their possession of the trees, but that the trees nevertheless grew out of a wall which surrounded a garden in possession of the plaintiffs, it was held that the possession of the garden imported possession of the garden wall and of the trees spring-

POSSESSION—*contd.*1. EVIDENCE OF POSSESSION—*concl.*

ing out of the wall, and that the suit was not barred by limitation. *Rajkumar Roy v. Gobind Chunder Roy*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 660; *Asghar Reza v. Mehdi Hossein*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 560; and *Mohima Chunder Mozoomdar v. Mohesh Chunder Neoghi*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 473, referred to. *IQBAL HUSEN v. NAND KISHORE* (1902). I. L. R. 24 All. 294

## 2. EVIDENCE OF TITLE.

1. ————— *Evidence of possession and enjoyment.* Evidence of possession and enjoyment for a series of years is of itself, if unanswered, cogent evidence of title. *BAGRAM v. COLLECTOR OF BHULLOOA. COLLECTOR OF RUNGPORE v. RAM JADUB SEIN* . . . W. R. 1864, 243

*COLLECTOR OF BAREILLY v. GHUSEE RAM*

1 Agra 260

*KIRPA SHUNKUR v. PAL PANDEY*

1 Agra Rev. 47

*RUNG LALL MISSER v. RUGOOBUR SINGH*

9 W. R. 169

*DINOBUHDHOO SUHAYE v. COURT OF WARDS*

11 W. R. 347

*RAMRUDEEGOWDA v. DESSAI SAHIB*

17 W. R. P. C. 8

2. ————— *Onus of proof—Person out of possession.* Possession is evidence of title, and is primarily exclusive. It is for him who impugns this exclusive title to show that the possession arose in some way which has preserved his own right. In every case the person who has been out of possession for more than twelve years must make out some *prima facie* title, and some agreement or acknowledgment of that title, such that possession is deprived of its ordinary effect through being held on a joint right or a subordinate right. *RAMCHANDRA NARAYAN v. NARAYAN MAHADEV*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 216

*See TATYA v. ANAJI*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 220 note

and *VITHOBA v. NARAYAN*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 221 note

3. ————— *Length of possession.* Possession need not be long in order to be some evidence of title. *PURAN CHUNDER MOOKERJEE v. PROTAP NARAIN PAUL* . . . 9 W. R. 120

4. ————— *Proof of possession and forcible dispossession—Onus of proof.* Possession is evidence of title, and if a plaintiff proves that he had possession and that the possession has been forcibly disturbed by defendant, he makes out a *prima facie* title which it is for defendant to rebut. *AYESHA BEEBEE v. KANHYE MOLLAH* . . . 12 W. R. 146

5. ————— *Effect of possession as evidence of title—Onus of proof.* Possession, except where it is of such a length and character as of



POSSESSION—*contd.*2. EVIDENCE OF TITLE—*contd.*

itself to constitute title, is merely evidence of title and is so only because undisturbed possession without anything more is presumed to be referable to rightful title and to absolute ownership: it is open to the other side to show that such *prima facie* presumption is ill-founded. *KALEE CHUNDER SEIN v. ADOO SHAIKH* . . . . . 9 W. R. 602

6. ————— *Presumption.* A person in possession of property ought to be presumed to be in lawful possession until the contrary be shown. Beyond this, possession is only evidence to be taken conjointly with other evidence to establish or impugn a title. *SELAM SHEIKH v. BAIDONATH GHATAK* . . . . .

3 B. L. R. A. C. 312: 12 W. R. 217

7. ————— *Ejectment.* Possession is evidence of title, and gives a good title against a wrong-doer; but a person who has not had possession cannot, without proof of title, turn another out of possession, even though that other may have no title; for possession is a good title against any one who cannot prove a better. *CLARKE v. BINDABUN CHUNDER SIRCAR* . . . . .

Marsh. 75: W. R. F. B. 20

1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 97: 1 Hay 137

8. ————— *Title by possession—Right to retain possession.* In India the title of possession must prevail until a good title is shown to the contrary. *PEDDA VENKATAPA NAIDOO v. AROOVALA ROODRAPA NAIDOO* . . . . .

6 W. R. P. C. 13: 2 Moo. I. A. 504

WISE v. BROJENDRA COOMAR ROY

18 W. R. P. C. 91

9. ————— *Right to retain possession.* A person in possession with a bad title is entitled to remain in possession until another person can disclose a better title. *GOPEE NATH DOSS v. DYANIDHEE SUNDURA MOHAPATTUR* . . . . .

7 W. R. 485

'SOODUKHINA CHOWDHRAIN v. RAJ MOHUN BOSE

11 W. R. 350

10. ————— *Right of person in possession against wrong-doer.* When a plaintiff's evidence fails to show title in him, but does not show title in another, the plaintiff may recover upon his possession against a defendant wrong-doer. *DOE D. KULAMMAL v. KUPPU PILLAI* . . . . .

1 Mad. 85

11. ————— *Mere possession on the one side and unjustifiable dispossession on the other—Right of the possessor dispossessed by a wrong-doer, as against the latter.* Lawful possession of land is sufficient evidence of right as owner, as against a person who has no title whatever, and who is a mere trespasser. The former can obtain a declaratory decree, and an injunction restraining the wrong-doer. *ISMAIL ARIFF v. MAHOMED GHOS* . . . . .

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 834

L. R. 20 I. A. 99

12. ————— *Suit for damages for value of fruit taken from garden—Right of suit.*

POSSESSION—*contd.*2. EVIDENCE OF TITLE—*contd.*

A suit for damages for the value of fruit crops taken away by the defendant from a garden alleged to be in the plaintiff's possession can be sustained on the finding that the plaintiff was in possession up to the date of the institution of the suit: it is not necessary for him to prove his title to the land, unless the defendant shows a better title. In this case, there being no sufficient findings of the plaintiff's possession to the date of suit, nor that the defendant had failed to show the better title, the suit was remanded for such findings. *LEP SINGH KHASIA v. NIMAR KHASIA* I. L. R. 21 Calc. 244

13. ————— *Suit by person in possession for declaration of title—Burden of proof—Failure of plaintiff or defendant to prove title—Effect of plaintiff's possession.* The plaintiff, who was in possession of certain land, sued for a declaration that the defendant had no title to it, and that it belonged to him. The plaint also contained a prayer for general relief. At the trial both plaintiff and defendant failed to prove any title to the land, but the plaintiff proved that he had been for ten years in possession and had built a shed on it. *Held*, that no declaration of the plaintiff's title could be made; but *held*, on the authority of *Ismail Ariff v. Mahomed Ghous*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 834: L. R. 20 I. A. 99, that the plaintiff was lawfully entitled to the land and to the shed thereon. *GANGARAM CHIMNA PATEL v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* . . . . .

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 798

14. ————— *Possession commencing in wrong.* A possession on the part of one party, which is not shown to have commenced in wrong, can only be disturbed by distinct proof of a superior title in another party. *ARUMUGAM CHETTY v. PERRIYANNAN SERVAI* . . . . .

25 W. R. P. C. 81

15. ————— *Right to sue for ejectment—Failure to prove title.* Possession is a good title against all persons except the rightful owner, and entitles the possessor to maintain ejectment against any other person than such owner who dispossesses him. The above rule *held* to be applicable where the plaintiff alleged title by conveyance and also relied upon possession, but failed to prove his title while his possession was held proved. *PEMRAJ BHAVANIRAM v. NARAYAN SHIVARAM KHISTI* . . . . .

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 215

KRISHNARAV YASHVANT v. VASUDEV APAJI

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 371

16. ————— *Undisputed and continuous possession.* Evidence of possession and enjoyment is good evidence of title as against the real owner only where it has been undisputed and continuous. *GOOROO PERSHAD ROY v. BYKUNTO CHUNDER ROY* . . . . .

6 W. R. 82

RUTTUN BEBEE v. MAKARUM ALI 2 Agra 309

17. ————— *Long possession.* A long possession would not confer any title on the occupant if it be proved that the possession was



POSSESSION—*contd.*2. EVIDENCE OF TITLE—*contd.*

a permissive one. GUNGA DEEN CHOWDHRY v. HUR SAHAI SINGH . . . 3 Agra 261

TOOLSEERAM v. NAHUR SINGH . . . 3 Agra 271

ALI BUX v. ROOF KOORER . . . 2 N. W. 106

18. *Limitation—Unoccupied and uncultivated land.* Where land, the right to which is disputed, has been uninhabited and uncultivated, and no acts of ownership by any person can be proved to have been exercised over it, it is often necessary, for the purpose of deciding the question of limitation, to rely upon slight evidence of possession, and sometimes possession of the adjoining land, coupled with evidence of title, such as grants of leases; and the Courts are justified in presuming, under such circumstances, that the party who has the title has also the possession. But where the land has been occupied it is generally proper, for purposes of limitation, to deal with the question of possession as distinct from the question of title; for while the title may be in one person, a twelve years' possession may have barred that title. MOHIMA CHUNDER DEY SIRCAR v. HURRO LALL SIRCAR

I. L. R. 3 Cal. 768 : 2 C. L. R. 364

19. *Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Arts. 143, 144—Conflicting evidence of possession—Presumption of title.* Where two adverse parties are each trying to make out a possession of twelve years, and the evidence is conflicting and not conclusive on either side:—*Held*, that the presumption that possession goes with the title must prevail. DHARM SINGH v. HUR PERSHAD SINGH . . . I. L. R. 12 Cal. 38

20. *Conflicting evidence of possession—Presumption of possession from title—Title and possession—Onus probandi.* It is only when the evidence of possession is strong on both sides and apparently equally balanced that the presumption that possession goes with title should prevail. The principle does not apply where the evidence of possession is equally unworthy of reliance on both sides. Dharm Singh v. Hur Pershad Singh, I. L. R. 12 Cal. 38, explained. THAKUR SINGH v. BHOGERAJ SINGH

I. L. R. 27 Cal. 25

21. *Long possession.* Uninterrupted possession for a long time is *prima facie* sufficient proof of title, and the security which being in possession affords should not be weakened. RUGHOO NATH RAI v. CHUNDOL LALL

2 Agra Pt. II, 195

22. *Mokurari title—Evidence.* Mere proof of possession for more than twelve years does not amount to proof of a mokurari title. SHIU DAYAL PURI v. MAHABIR PRASAD

2 B. L. R. Ap. 8

23. *Long possession—Omission to give notice.* Long possession itself does not give a title to a settlement if the parties asking for the settlement have not complied with

POSSESSION—*contd.*2. EVIDENCE OF TITLE—*contd.*

the requirements of the law. GOLUCK CHUNDER CHOWDHRY v. ALI MOLLAH . . . 11 W. R. 378

24. *Onus of proof.* In a suit for possession of property the plaintiff relied on his previous twelve years' possession, and gave no further evidence of his title. *Held*, that a previous possession for twelve years of the property sought to be recovered did not dispense with the necessity which lay on the plaintiff to prove his title to that property. He is not on that fact alone entitled to be replaced in possession of the property without regard to any right which may be alleged by the defendant. LAKHI KUMAR v. RAM DUTT CHOWDHRY . . . 3 B. L. R. Ap. 44 : 11 W. R. 447

25. *Long possession.* A brought a suit under Act X of 1859 to recover arrears of rent in respect of certain lands. B was made a party under s. 77, but A obtained a decree and ousted B. B therefore sued A in the Civil Court for possession and declaration of his right to the lands, alleging that they were his lakhiraj and devatra lands. The High Court *held* that proof by B of possession for twelve years was sufficient and gave him a decree. BISWANATH v. BRAJAMOHAN CHUCKERBUTTY

1 B. L. R. S. N. 1 : 10 W. R. 61

26. *Onus of proof—Suit for possession.* Where a plaintiff seeks to recover possession upon a title recently acquired, he is not invariably required to prove the origin of his vendor's title. Long and undisturbed possession on the part of the vendor, when positive evidence of title cannot be had, may in many cases constitute proof of title. In a suit to recover immoveable property in the possession of the defendant, a plaintiff cannot ordinarily succeed merely by showing that the title has accrued to him. JOYKISHEN MOOKERJEE v. RAJKISHEN MOOKERJEE

12 W. R. 315

27. *Limitation Act, 1859, s. 15—Wrong-doer.* In considering the subject of possession as creating title, irrespective of s. 15 of Act XIV of 1859:—*Held*, that possession for a period of sixty years and upwards is sufficient to create a title in the possessor which no one in the world can question or repudiate; that adverse possession for any period sufficient under the Limitation Act is itself a title, even against the rightful owner himself; that prior possession, however short, is itself a title against a mere wrong-doer. ENAETOOLLAH CHOWDHRY v. KISHEN SOONDER SURMA

8 W. R. 386

28. *Previous possession, short of the statutory period of limitation—Dispossession—Suit brought more than six months after dispossession, effect of—Failure to prove title.* Mere previous possession for any period short of the statutory period of twelve years will not entitle a plaintiff to a decree for recovery of possession in a suit brought more than six months after dispossession, even if the defendant could not establish any title to the disputed land. WISE v. AMEERUNNISSA



POSSESSION—*contd.*2. EVIDENCE OF TITLE—*contd.*

*Khatoon, L. R. 7 I. A. 73*, referred to. *Ismail Ariff v. Mahomed Ghous, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 834 : L. R. 20 I. A. 99*, distinguished. *Enaetoollah Chowdhry v. Kishen Soondur Surma, 8 W. R. 386*, and *Mohabeer Pershad Singh v. Mohabeer Singh, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 591*, dissented from. *NISA CHAND GAITA v. KANCHIRAM BAGANI . . . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 579 3 C. W. N. 579*

29. . . . . When a person who has been in possession is dispossessed, and brings his suit beyond six months from the date of dispossession, he is bound to prove his title, and cannot merely rely upon his previous possession for recovering in the action, although defendant may not prove his title. *Purmeshur Chowdhry v. Brij Lal Chowdhry, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 256*, and *Ertaza Hossein v. Bany Mistri, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 130*, referred to. *SHAMA CHURN ROY v. ABDUL JABEER . . . 3 C. W. N. 158*

30. . . . . *Lost records—Proof of long possession.* The plaintiff claimed a right of pre-emption as safee-sharikh, or partner in the thing sold. The Court of first instance gave him a decree on the ground of long possession as proprietor. The lower Appellate Court reversed the decision on the ground that the plaintiff's title depended on a deed of purchase, which it was admitted had been set aside in a former suit in 1855, and that the plaintiff had failed to show that the decision in that suit had been reversed. The plaintiff proved that he had preferred an appeal from that decision, and alleged that it had been overruled; but there was no proof of the result of the appeal, as the records of that suit had been burnt in the Mutiny. *Held*, on appeal to the High Court, that, under the circumstances, proof of long possession as proprietor was sufficient. *TUFANI SINGH v. DURGABAN . 4 B. L. R. Ap. 21*

31. . . . . *Undisturbed possession.* *Held*, on the evidence in the case, that defendants' long possession was confirmatory of their title based on mortgage-bond of old date, and that plaintiff's suit for possession was rightly dismissed. *DEVAJI GAYAJI v. GODABHAI GODBHAI 2 B. L. R. P. C. 85 : 11 W. R. P. C. 35*

32. . . . . *Limitation—Act XIV of 1859, s. 15—Dispossession.* In a suit for recovery of possession of certain brahmatter land, of which the defendant had dispossessed the plaintiffs by virtue of an award passed under s. 15, Act XIV of 1859, declaring his right by purchase, the defence set up was that the deed of purchase was a forgery, and that the suit was barred by lapse of time. *Held*, that, although the plaintiffs failed to prove their title-deeds, yet their title was sufficiently established by oral evidence of long possession prior to their dispossession two or three years previous to suit. *RAM CHANDRA CHOWDHRY v. BRAJANATH SARMA . . . 3 B. L. R. Ap. 109*

33. . . . . *Long possession—Limitation Act (IX of 1871), s. 29—Limitation*

POSSESSION—*contd.*2. EVIDENCE OF TITLE—*contd.*

*Act (XIV of 1859)—Bom. Reg. V of 1827, s. 1—Prescription—Adverse possession.* Some lands in the village of Shirasgam in the Puna Collectorate commonly called "Kholhati Bawas Inam," originally belonged to His Highness Scindia. Plaintiff's family were proved to have been in actual possession of them from 1841 to 1854, and in constructive possession during their attachment by the Inam Commission from 1854 to 1863, when, by a mistake in carrying out the orders of the British Government, the lands passed into the possession of Scindia and remained with His Highness till 1872, in which year the British Government, by exchange of lands, came into possession. In a suit brought on 29th July 1872:—*Held*, that the plaintiff's possession, not extending over thirty years, gave him no proprietary title under s. 1 of Regulation V of 1827, which, as a law of positive prescription, was not repealed by Act XIV of 1859. Under the former Limitation Act twelve years' adverse possession barred the suit without extinguishing the title: so that, if a proprietor who had been out of possession for more than twelve years happened to regain it the person who had been in adverse possession must fail in any suit to eject the proprietor, unless he sued within six months under s. 15 of the Act. The effect of Act IX of 1871, s. 29, however, is not merely to bar the remedy, but to extinguish the title of the original proprietor after twelve years of a possession adverse to him. *RAMBHAT AGNIHOTRI v. COLLECTOR OF PUNA . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 592*

34. . . . . *Mirasidars—Long possession—Local inam and custom—Sanad.* Where a plaintiff claimed to hold certain lands in miras and under a right of perpetual cultivation by the custom of the country, and sought to recover the lands from the defendant, who claimed as purchaser, at a Court sale, of the right, title, and interest of the inamdar of the said lands, and the lower Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to prove any right of perpetual cultivation, the District Court, on appeal, observing that no term of occupation as a tenant of inam land would confer a right of perpetual cultivation, and that nothing short of a regular sanad would confer on the plaintiff his alleged right in the lands, the High Court on special appeal reversed the decrees of the Courts below, and remanded the case for a new trial on the point whether the plaintiff as a mirasidar or by local usage in virtue of his long possession and uniformity of payment of rent or assessment or otherwise, previously to the Court sale to defendant, had acquired the right to hold the lands in perpetuity on payment of a fixed or other rent ascertainable by local usage. *BABAJI v. NARAYAN . . . I. L. R. 3 Bom. 340*

35. . . . . *Long possession as evidence of title—Pottah found to be forged—Permanent tenure—Service tenure—Presumption of title.* The plaintiff purchased a mirasi talukh at a sale in execution of a decree obtained against the talukhdar for arrears of rent of the talukh, and then



POSSESSION—*contd.*2. EVIDENCE OF TITLE—*contd.*

sued to recover possession of certain lands held by the defendants within the talukh. The defence was that the lands in question were held by the defendants under a pottah which had been granted to their ancestor in 1733 by the then talukhdars in respect of certain services to be performed by the grantees and their descendants. The Court of first instance found that the pottah was genuine, and dismissed the plaintiff's suit. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge found that the pottah was a forgery; and that, although the lands had been granted to the defendants' ancestor in respect of services, yet the plaintiff was entitled to khas possession, as he did not require the services to be performed. He therefore decreed the plaintiff's claim. *Held*, that the decree was right, for having found that the pottah on which the defendants chiefly relied was a forgery, the Subordinate Judge was not bound, as a matter of law, to presume that the tenure was a permanent one merely from the fact of long possession of the lands. **NOBIN CHUNDER DUTT v. MODUN MOHUN PAL**

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 677 : 9 C. L. R. 233

36. ————— *Mal and lakhiraj cases—Suit for possession.* In mal cases of title the question of possession is dependent on the question of title; whereas in lakhiraj cases the title may fail, and yet if possession as lakhirajdars—that is to say, possession without paying rent—is proved, it may be sufficient to give a lakhiraj title. **RADHAGOBIND DASS v. PROKASH CHUNDER DASS**

14 W. R. 108

37. ————— *Finding by Mamlatdar as to possession—Subsequent contrary finding by Civil Court—Onus of proof.* The plaintiff brought this suit to recover possession of certain land which had belonged to her nephew, and of which, after his death in 1878, she had assumed the management. In 1881 she brought a possessory suit against the first defendant in the Mamlatdar's Court, which suit was dismissed in January 1885, the Mamlatdar holding that she had not been in possession. In a civil suit, however, which (pending the proceedings in the Mamlatdar's Court) she had filed against the first defendant in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Haveri, the Judge found that she had been in possession since 1880, and awarded her damages against the first defendant (who was held to be her farm servant) for crops which had been taken away by him. In 1887 the second defendant as mortgagee from defendant No. 1 obtained a decree against plaintiff in the Mamlatdar's Court awarding him possession of the land, and in execution of that decree the plaintiff was dispossessed in December 1887. In 1890 the plaintiff filed this suit to recover possession and for mesne profits since 1887. The defendant pleaded that the plaintiff had no title to the land, and that the suit was barred by limitation, inasmuch as the plaintiff had not brought a suit to establish her right within three years after the Mamlatdar's order in 1885 dismissing her posses-

POSSESSION—*contd.*2. EVIDENCE OF TITLE—*concl.*

sory suit. *Held*, that the plaintiff's possession prior to 1887, confirmed as it was by the decree of the Civil Court in 1885 and by the finding of the lower Court of appeal in the present case, must prevail against the defendant, who claimed through plaintiff's farm servant only, and whose possession commenced with the disturbance which compelled the plaintiff to bring the suit. Possession is *prima facie* evidence of title, and is primarily exclusive, and it is for him who impugns this exclusive title to show that the possession originated in a way not to affect his own right. **KRISHNACHARYA v. LINGAWA**

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 270

38. ————— *Buildings on land occupied under zamindars without evidence of grant—Evidence of reservation of interest.* Where there was no evidence of any grant, and the owner of buildings had been for upwards of twelve years in possession of the plots of land on which the buildings were situated without in any way paying rent to or acknowledging the title of the zamindars, he was *prima facie* entitled to the sites, and the mere fact that the sites were situated within the area of a permanently-settled mehal did not justify the presumption that the zamindars reserved to themselves reversionary right in the sites. **GUR PARSHAD v. UMRAO SINGH**

7 N. W. 218

39. ————— *Possession, suit for—Onus of proof—Nature of evidence to be adduced by either party—Title, proof of, effect of—Presumption of possession—Constructive possession—Survey map, value of, as evidence.* In respect of jungle and hilly land possession must be presumed to be with the rightful owner. Plaintiff in an action for ejectment must not only prove his title, but also his possession, actual or constructive, within 12 years of suit. When the plaintiff has established his title it is not necessary for the defendant to prove a better title or establish that he has acquired a good title by adverse possession, which has extinguished the title of the plaintiff, but the plaintiff must prove his possession also within twelve years. Nature of evidence required in such cases discussed. Revenue Survey Maps are evidence of title and possession. They are not conclusive and may be shown to be wrong, but in the absence of evidence to the contrary they may be properly and judicially received in evidence as correct when made. The doctrine of constructive possession applies only in favour of the rightful owner, and must not, as a rule, be extended to the wrong-doer, whose possession must be confined to land, of which he is actually in possession. **MIRZA SHAMSHER BAHADUR v. KUNJ BEHARI LAL (1907)**

12 C. W. N. 273

## 3. NATURE OF POSSESSION.

1. ————— *Possession under deed afterwards set aside as fraudulent—Effect of decree setting it aside.* Where a person was in actual possession of property from the time when a deed conveyed it to him, a decision which declared



POSSESSION—*contd.*3. NATURE OF POSSESSION—*contd.*

that deed to be fraudulent did not have the effect of putting another claimant in possession; nor could possession be considered as having ceased in consequence of the decree, unless the holder were actually dispossessed under it; for the fact of the decree did not prevent the statute of limitation from running, and, in the particular case under consideration, the decree in question was still under appeal. *MURBOOL ALI v. WAJED HOSSEIN*

25 W. R. 249

2. ———— *Possession in execution of decree—Possession otherwise than by Court—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 230, 264.* Act VIII of 1859, s. 230, did not limit the applicant to any particular manner of obtaining possession; and s. 264 contained nothing to prevent the purchaser at an execution sale from obtaining possession if he could without the assistance of the Court. *OBHOYA CHURN DEY v. RAJENDRO COOMAR GHOSE*

22 W. R. 406

3. ———— *Possession without executing decree for possession.* So long as a plaintiff obtains possession after a decree establishing his right to it, it is immaterial for the purpose of limitation whether he obtained it by executing his decree, or whether possession was yielded to him. If afterwards dispossessed, his cause of action does not date from the decree, but from his dispossession. *SALIG RAM v. MEHEEN LALL*

2 Agra 235

4. ———— *Possession irregularly taken.* Possession actually taken by a person having a right to it is not the less effective, as perfecting his title, by reason of an irregularity in taking it. Subsequent ouster will give rise to a new cause of action. *LILLU v. ANNABI PARASHRAM*

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 387

5. ———— *Decree for possession, non-execution of—Title—Possession taken by rightful owner without Court's intervention—Trespass—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 9.* B purchased land from M and subsequently brought a suit against M to obtain possession. He got a decree, but did not execute it within three years. M died, and after his death and while his daughter (the plaintiff) was a minor, B took forcible possession of the land. Eight years afterwards the plaintiff attained her majority, and she then filed this suit to recover the land. The lower Court held that B, having failed to execute his decree for possession, was wrong in taking possession during the minority of the plaintiff, without the intervention of a Court; that in so doing he was trespasser; and that the plaintiff as M's heir was entitled to have possession given to her, until ousted in due course of law. *Held* (reversing the decree), that, subject to the provision of s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) there is no reason for holding that in India the rightful owner dispossessing another is a trespasser, and may not rely for the support of his possession

POSSESSION—*contd.*3. NATURE OF POSSESSION—*contd.*

on the title vested in him, as he clearly may do by English law. *BANDU v. NABA*

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 238

6. ———— *Possession in execution of decree—Proclamation of sale—Suit for possession—Limitation.* In a suit for possession of certain lands purchased by plaintiff at a sale in execution of a decree of the Sudder Ameen's Court, the lower Court held that "possession by proclamation of sale, through the Sudder Ameen's Court, was possession through the Court," and that the suit, being brought within twelve years of that proclamation, was in time. *Held*, on appeal, that such imaginary possession was no possession at all, and that the suit was barred by limitation. *JOWHER ALY v. RAM CHAND*

2 B. L. R. Ap. 29: 24 W. R. 419

7. ———— *Proclamation of sale—Possession of auction-purchaser.* The possession of an auction-purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree runs from the date of delivery, as provided by s. 246, Act VIII of 1859,—i.e., by publication of sale certificate and proclamation by beat of drum,—and not from the date of his possession. *ASUDOLAH v. AKBUR ALI*

7 W. R. 60

8. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 264—Certificate of sale.* It was not incumbent on the Court, under the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 264, to put a purchaser into possession until he had his certificate of sale. *Quere*: Whether a purchaser who, without a certificate of sale, has been put into possession, could be lawfully ejected because he has not such a certificate. *TUKARAM v. SATVAJI KHANDUJI*

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 206

See also *BASAPPA v. MARYA*

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 433

9. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 224.* In order to a legal possession being given under s. 224, Act VIII of 1859, it was essential that all the requirements of that section be carried out. *COURT OF WARDS v. BURRA LALL OPENDRONATH DEO*

15 W. R. 99

10. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 224.* Where compliance with the formalities prescribed by s. 224, Act VIII of 1859, and a legal receipt for possession were found as facts, they were *held* to give such a right under a Civil Court's decree as would prevail over one founded on mere actual receipt of rent. *KHETTUNATH ROY v. DURBESH MOONSHEE*

9 W. R. 358

11. ———— *Possession, suit for—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 224.* A suit for possession of immoveable property is not barred by the law of limitation if the suit be brought within twelve years of possession having been delivered to the plaintiff under s. 224, Act VIII of 1859, or if possession by the plaintiff has been admitted within twelve years by the party through whom the defendant claims. *BINDUBASHINI DAS v. RENNY (RAINEY)*

7 B. L. R. Ap. 20: 15 W. R. 307



POSSESSION—*contd.*3. NATURE OF POSSESSION—*contd.*

12. ————— *Decree for possession, effect of—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 223.* Where plaintiff sued defendant as a trespasser, the prayer in the plaint being for khas possession, and the defendant set up an adverse title, the decree given against the latter for possession was held to give the judgment-creditor the possession sued for,—i.e., legal possession as provided by s. 223, Act VIII of 1859. *RAJ MANGUL ROY v. ANUNDMOYEE* 11 W. R. 63

13. ————— *Ameen, possession given by—Partition proceedings—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530.* The possession given by an Ameen in a batwara proceeding is simply one of ownership and not of occupancy. Such possession cannot therefore, in proceedings under s. 530 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, be held to oust tenants occupying lands previous to such delivery of possession. *In the matter of the petition of MACKENZIE v. SHERE BAHADOOR SAHI*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 378

14. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 223, 224.* A person who has obtained symbolical possession under s. 224 of Act VIII of 1859 may subsequently ask for actual possession under s. 223, if the terms of his decree warrant such possession being given. *ROBSON v. MASEYK* 3 W. R. Mis. 2

15. ————— *Formal possession—Fresh period of limitation—Act VIII of 1859, s. 224.* Delivery of possession by going through the process prescribed by s. 224 of Act VIII of 1859 is the only way in which the decree of the Court awarding possession to the plaintiff can be enforced; and as, in contemplation of law, both parties must be considered as being present at the time when the delivery is made, such delivery must, as against the defendant, be deemed equivalent to actual possession. As against third parties, such symbolical possession is of no avail, because they are not parties to the proceedings. But if the defendant subsequently dispossesses the plaintiff by receiving the rent and profits, the plaintiff will have twelve years from such dispossession to bring another suit. *JUGGOBUNDHU MUKERJEE v. RAM CHUNDER BYSACK* I. L. R. 5 Calc. 584 : 5 C. L. R. 548

*MOZUFFER WAHID v. ABDUS SAMAD*

6 C. L. R. 539

*DHAPI v. BARHAM DEO PERSHAD*

4 C. W. N. 297

16. ————— *Formal possession—Transfer of possession—Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), ss. 223, 224.* In a suit for possession, it appeared that in 1863 the plaintiff had sued some of the present defendants for khas possession of the same land. In that suit the defendants pleaded that they were tenants of the plaintiff and entitled to hold under a pottah, which they failed to prove, and the plaintiff obtained a decree. Three years afterwards the plaintiff was put into formal possession by the Court under s. 224

POSSESSION—*contd.*3. NATURE OF POSSESSION—*contd.*

of Act VIII of 1859, instead of under s. 223. *Held*, that, as the plaintiff was put in possession under his decree by the officer of the Court, the form in which execution was given was immaterial. The formal possession given by a Civil Court under an execution operates, in point of law and fact, as between the parties as a complete transfer of possession from one party to the other. *LOKESUR KOER v. PURGUN ROY* I. L. R. 7 Calc. 418

*See DHONDIBA KRISHNAJI PATIL v. RAMCHANDRA BHAGAT* I. L. R. 5 Bom. 554

17. ————— *Symbolical possession—Obstruction or resistance to possession.* Symbolical possession, such as may be given by the Nazir of a Court by sticking a bamboo into the ground, or the like, of a dwelling-house, or of a share in a dwelling-house, of which actual possession might have been granted, is not such a *bona fide* possession as will save limitation. *SHOTEENATH MOOKERJEE v. OBHOY NUND ROY*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 331

18. ————— *Symbolical possession—Limitation—Fresh cause of action.* Symbolical possession given under a decree does not, as against third parties, entitle the person to whom such possession has been given to count a fresh period of limitation from the date of the possession. A person who prefers a claim to property attached under a decree, but whose claim is disallowed, is not a party to the decree; and the decree-holder, on obtaining symbolical possession, will not be entitled to count a fresh period of limitation as against him. *DOYANDIHI PANDA v. KELAI PANDA*

11 C. L. R. 395

19. ————— *Symbolical possession, effect of.* Where in execution proceedings symbolical possession is given to a person, such possession amounts to an actual transfer of possession as between the parties to the suit; but such possession has no such operation against third persons who are not parties to the suit. *JUGGOBUNDHU MUKERJEE v. RAM CHUNDER BYSACK* I. L. R. 5 Calc. 584, explained. *RUNJIT SINGH v. BUNWARI LALL SAHU* I. L. R. 10 Calc. 993

20. ————— *Formal possession—Limitation.* Where a plaintiff, who has obtained a decree for possession of immoveable property, undergoes the mere ceremony of receiving formal possession on the spot by beat of drum and posting of bamboos, and then allows twelve years to elapse without taking any steps to acquire and assert actual possession, he loses the title conferred by the decree. *PEAREE MOHUN PODDAR v. JUGOBUNDHOSEN* 24 W. R. 418

21. ————— *Formal possession—Cause of action—Possession under decree barred by limitation.* Where a decree declared that plaintiff was to get possession of a certain quantity of land on a batwara being made, and the decree-holder, after allowing his right to be barred by lapse of time, applied to the Collector, had a batwara

14 B 2



POSSESSION—*contd.*3. NATURE OF POSSESSION—*contd.*

effected, and obtained merely formal possession :—*Held*, that such possession gave him no fresh cause of action. *KISHORE SINGH v. GOBIND SINGH*

24 W. R. 33

22. ———— *Formal possession—Limitation—Cause of action—Actual possession.* Formal possession given to a decree-holder by an officer of the Court in execution of his decree is sufficient to give him a fresh cause of action, and notwithstanding that he may never have obtained actual possession, he or his assigns may sue to recover possession at any time within twelve years from the time when such formal possession was given. *UMBICKA CHURN GOOPTA v. MADHUB GHOSAL*. I. L. R. 4 Calc. 870 : 4 C. L. R. 55

23. ———— *Suit for possession after delivery of formal possession to defendant. Semble:* That the delivery of formal possession in execution of a decree for possession gives a cause of action, against a defendant who remains in occupation of the premises, which may be enforced in a regular suit. *SHAMA CHARAN CHATTERJI v. MADHUB CHUNDRA MUKERJI* I. L. R. 11 Calc. 93

24. ———— *Subsequent continuance in possession of judgment-debtor—Right to fresh execution of decree.* When a formal possession of immoveable property has been delivered according to law to a person holding a decree for the delivery of the same, the subsequent continuance in actual possession of the judgment-debtor does not give the decree-holder a right to a fresh order for delivery of possession in execution of the decree, but gives him a right to institute a fresh suit for possession of such property. *GOPAL DAS v. THAN SINGH* I. L. R. 4 All. 184

*RAM NEWAZ SINGH v. KISHUN RAI*

6 N. W. 137

25. ———— *Formal and actual possession—Limitation—Sale in execution of decree.* A purchased the right, title, and interest of B, a judgment-debtor, in certain lands, at an auction-sale in execution of a decree in October 1863, was put in formal possession in January 1865, and died without ever having obtained actual possession. After his decease, a suit was filed in September 1875 on behalf of his minor son C against the defendants, who obstructed his taking actual possession. *Held*, that, if B was in possession at the time of the sale—that is to say, within twelve years before the institution of the suit—C was not barred by limitation. *KOONJO MOHUN DASS v. NOBO COOMAR SHAHA*. I. L. R. 4 Calc. 216

26. ———— *Decree of Civil Court—Magistrate, duty of—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 145.* Where, in execution of a decree, a Civil Court had given symbolical possession of the lands in dispute to the first party, on the 9th September 1900, and proceedings under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were instituted between the parties to the decree in the following December, and the Magistrate found and

POSSESSION—*contd.*4. NATURE OF POSSESSION—*concl.*

maintained the possession of the second party :—*Held*, that the Magistrate was bound to give effect to the decree of the Civil Court, and to maintain in possession the party who under the decree had already been put in possession of the property in dispute. *Doulat Koer v. Rameswari Koeri*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 625, referred to. *KUNJA BEHARI DAS v. KHETRA PAL SINGH* (1901)

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 208 : s.c. 6 C. W. N. 38

## 4. ADVERSE POSSESSION.

1. ———— *Effect of adverse possession—Limitation—Title.* Adverse possession for more than twelve years not only bars remedy, but extinguishes right, and confers title on the party holding such adverse possession. *BARODAKANT ROY v. PRANKRISHNA PAROI*

3 B. L. R. A. C. 343 : 12 W. R. 192

*RAM SAHOY SINGH v. KOOLDEEP SINGH*

15 W. R. 80

2. ———— *Title by length of possession—Limitation—Unexecuted decree.* In 1859 A obtained a decree for possession of land against B, but no proceedings in execution were taken, and B continued in possession. In 1869 C, having purchased the right and interest of A in the decree, forcibly dispossessed B, who had been twelve years in possession. B now brought this suit against C to recover possession. *Held*, that, the execution of the decree of 1859 being barred, and B having been twelve years in possession, he was entitled to recover. Adverse possession which bars the remedy also transfers the right. *AMIRUNNISSA BEGUM v. UMAR KHAN*. 8 B. L. R. 540

*AMIRUNNISSA BEGUM v. AMIR KHAN*

17 W. R. 119

3. ———— *Presumption as to possession—Proof as to nature of possession.* Possession must be presumed to be of right and adverse until that presumption is rebutted by evidence. *BIRESUR BANERJEE v. ONODA CHURN BANERJEE*

3 W. R. 12

4. ———— *Onus of proof.* When parties are in possession of an estate, it is generally to be presumed that they are in possession as owners; and it lies on the party alleging that possession is of a different nature, such as that of an under-tenant, to prove the allegation. *SHAHABOODEEN CHOWDHRY v. RAM GUTTY CHUCKERBUTTY*. . . . . 9 W. R. 556

5. ———— *Possession originally permissive.* Where occupation was originally permissive, its conversion into an occupation of a wholly adverse nature is not to be presumed in the absence of evidence to establish this change. *WAHEE-OD-DEEN v. JHUNGOREE*. 2 N. W. 16

*AMMUR SINGH v. MURDUN SINGH*

2 N. W. 31



POSSESSION—*contd.*4. ADVERSE POSSESSION—*contd.*

OOPENDRONATH ROY *v.* KALEE CHURN ROY  
8 W. R. 394

6. ———— *Limitation—Suit for possession.* To make out a complete legal bar, the occupation should be proved to be adverse during the whole of the twelve years before suit, and it should be ascertained with what persons the actual possession has been during that time. WAHEE-OD-DEEN *v.* JHUNGOREE . 2 N. W. 16

7. ———— *Possession obtained by fraud—Suit for ejectment.* The defendant in an action of ejectment cannot claim the benefit of the statute of limitations upon a possession obtained by fraud, actual or constructive, unless the plaintiff have been guilty of such laches as to disentitle him to the interference of the Court. HEERA LOLL SHAHA *v.* JADUB CHUNDER CHENCHKEY . . . . . Cor. 119

8. ———— *Dishonesty in getting possession.* Dishonesty in obtaining possession will not prevent the possessor from availing himself of the law of limitation, which, however, cannot relieve him from the charge of dishonesty. PORESH NARAIN ROY *v.* WATSON . 5 W. R. 283

9. ———— *Title by long possession—Purchaser under fraudulent sale.* Where a person has been long in possession under a deed of conveyance which was subject to an undertaking to recovery on repayment within a period long elapsed, he is entitled to establish his right to possession against a hostile purchaser whose claims are based on a fraudulent sale. TOMMINISSA *v.* NUJEEMA BANOO . . . . . 8 W. R. 340

10. ———— *Conversion of permissive into adverse possession—Cause of action.* Where a party in permissive possession of land sets up his own absolute title by suing the tenant for rent, he converts his permissive possession into an adverse one, which, as wrongful possession, is a cause of action. KHURUCKDHAREE SINGH *v.* REWAT LALL SINGH . . . . . 12 W. R. 167

11. ———— *Temporary possession—Possession under decree afterwards set aside—Limitation.* A brief possession for a few weeks, under a decree subsequently set aside or modified, so as not to have effect against the persons who were previously in possession, and to whom possession was restored, is not such possession as entitles the plaintiff to calculate limitation from that time. DEGUMBERY DOSSEE *v.* ANUNDNATH ROY  
W. R. 1864, 43

12. ———— *Possession under erroneous order—Limitation.* Possession under an erroneous order of a Magistrate does not constitute such *bonâ fide* possession as will prevent the law of limitation from running. MOOKTAKASHY *v.* LUCKEE . . . . . 2 Ind. Jur. O. S. 4

13. ———— *Possession under Magistrate's order.* Possession under the order of a Magistrate, which is set aside by a decree of a Civil

POSSESSION—*contd.*4. ADVERSE POSSESSION—*contd.*

Court, is of no effect against a plea of limitation. FIRINGEE SAHOO *v.* SHAM MANJHEE 8 W. R. 373

14. ———— *Attachment of property—Limitation.* The attachment of a property is adverse possession causing limitation to run as against the party in possession of the property. BROJO RAJKISHOREE *v.* BISHONATH DUTT  
W. R. 1864, 305

15. ———— *Possession of purchaser—Mortgagor and mortgagee.* The possession of a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree without notice of a mortgage of the property is adverse to the mortgagee. ANAND MAYI DAS *v.* DHARENDRA CHANDRA MOOKERJEE  
8 B. L. R. 122 : 14 Moo. I. A. 101  
16 W. R. P. C. 19

Affirming same case in High Court, DHURENDRO CHUNDER MOOKERJEE *v.* ANNUND MOYEE DOSSEE  
1 W. R. 103

16. ———— *Foreclosure—Purchaser from mortgagor—Adverse possession.* Where a party *bonâ fide* purchased from another, as his own property, land in fact mortgaged, and obtained possession and mutation of names, his title was held to be adverse to that of the mortgagee. BRAJANATH KUNDU CHOWDHRY *v.* KHILAT CHANDRA GHOSE 8 B. L. R. 104 : 14 Moo. I. A. 144  
16 W. R. P. C. 33

17. ———— *Entry of names in Collector's records—Absentee holders.* Mere continued entry in the Collector's records of the names of absentees cannot of itself avail to alter the character of an otherwise adverse holding by persons really in possession. DOORJUN *v.* CHAINA . 2 N. W. 43

18. ———— *Decree affirming proprietary title—Limitation—Declaration of title—“Relief.”* In 1868 *B* made, it was alleged, a gift of a zamindari estate to *K*. In 1869 *B* died and *K*'s name was recorded in the revenue registers in the place of *B*'s name in respect of the estate. In 1870 *K* died, and her daughter *S* applied to have her name recorded in the revenue registers in respect of the estate. *M*, the illegitimate son of *B*, objected, claiming to have his name recorded. His objection having been disallowed and *S*'s name having been recorded, *M* in 1876 sued *S* for a declaration of his proprietary right to the estate, and on the 20th July 1878 obtained such declaration. In January 1880 *M* sold a moiety of the estate, and in December 1880 *S* sold the entire estate. In February 1881 *M*'s transferees sued *S* and her transferee for possession of the moiety of the estate transferred to them by *M*. Held (STUART, C.J., dissenting), that the possession of *S* and her transferee could be considered adverse only from the date of the decree of the 29th June 1878, declaring *M*'s proprietary title to the estate. Radha Gobind Roy *v.* Inglis, 7 C. L. R. 364, referred to. SARSUTTI *v.* KUNJ BEHARI LAL  
I. L. R. 5 All. 345



POSSESSION—*contd.*4. ADVERSE POSSESSION—*contd.*

19. ——— Possession of beneficial owner—*Benami purchase at sale for arrears of revenue.* Where property purchased benami at a sale for arrears of revenue remains for more than twelve years from the date of the sale in the adverse and undisturbed possession of the beneficial purchaser, such possession is not only sufficient to extinguish the title of the nominal purchaser, but it creates a title in the former capable of devolving upon his legal heirs and representatives. *BOOA RUSSOOLEE v. NAWAB NAZIM OF BENGAL* 11 W. R. 382

20. ——— Possession settled with persons paying arrears of revenue—*Limitation—Suit for possession.* Held, that the mere fact of property in dispute being settled with defendants, by reason of their paying up the arrears of revenue, does not constitute adverse possession from which limitation can be reckoned. *BHEEMA v. PAHLAD* 2 Agra 38

21. ——— Settlement of land with mortgagee—*Mortgagor and mortgagee.* Held, that, as the settlement of rent-free land belonging to plaintiff's ancestor was made with the defendant in the character of mortgagee, his (defendant's) possession of the land was not adverse to the plaintiffs, the mortgagors. *RAM DIAL v. SHAH BAZ KHAN* 1 Agra 15

22. ——— Chur land—*Limitation.* Limitation or adverse possession as to chur land may commence directly the land is in existence, and not from the time at which it becomes culturable. Any proof of ownership would be sufficient to show possession. *LUCKHEE DEBIA CHOWDHRAIN v. COLLECTOR OF MYMENSING* 7 W. R. 231

23. ——— Encroachment—*Rent-free land-holder.* Where a rent-free holder has encroached on the adjoining land and has enjoyed it rent-free and adversely to zamindari right for more than twelve years:—*Held*, that he cannot be dispossessed of it, nor assessed with rent in respect of it. *BHAGOUTEE CHARUN v. SHIVA PERSHAD* 1 Agra Rev. 38

24. ——— Occupation of vacant land—*Temporary occupation—User.* A small piece of land being of no present use to its owner and being convenient in many ways to his neighbour, the latter made use of it, in various ways, without objection for more than twelve years. A privy and sheds for cows, goats, fowls, etc., and a hut for a gharivallah—all, however, structures of a flimsy and purely temporary character—were said to have been constructed and maintained for many years on the said piece of land. Such user, it was contended, amounted to adverse possession. *Held*, that such user as this was insufficient to give a title to the land by adverse possession. User of this sort, under similar circumstances, is common in this country and excites no particular attention. It is neither intended to denote, or understood as denoting—on the one

POSSESSION—*contd.*4. ADVERSE POSSESSION—*contd.*

side or the other—a claim to the ownership of the land, and where this, and no more, is the case, it would be wrong to hold that a claim by adverse possession has been made out. *FRAMJI CURSETJI v. GOCULDAS MADHOWJI* I. L. R. 16 Bom. 338

25. ——— Accreted lands—*Possession under temporary settlement by Collector.* Where one co-sharer managed the property, and, in the absence or during the minority of the other co-sharer, obtained from the Collector a temporary settlement in his own name of chur lands accreting to the parent estate:—*Held*, that the latter was entitled to participate in the temporary settlement, and that the possession of the former under that settlement was not adverse to the latter. *BISSESSUREE DOSSEE v. KALEE COOMAR ROY* 18 W. R. 198

*CALLY CHUNDER CHOWDHRY v. MONIKURNIKA CHOWDHRAIN* W. R. 1864, 149

26. ——— Co-sharer—*Evidence of title—Possession by one co-sharer.* Possession of ancestral property is good evidence of title against a co-sharer if shown to be exclusive, and to be inconsistent with the co-sharers having any right in the portion claimed. *HURROJ NARAIN SINGH v. BYKUNT NARAIN SINGH* 14 W. R. 51

27. ——— Occupation of, and acts of, ownership on vacant land—*Limitation.* The defendant had used as a backyard a small piece of land situated between his house and that of the plaintiff, who was his brother, for a period of more than twelve years. In 1894 the defendant began to build on it, whereupon the plaintiff protested and now sued for possession. *Held*, that the suit was not barred by limitation. *CHOKKALINGA NAICKEN v. MUTHUSAMI NAICKEN* I. L. R. 21 Mad. 53

28. ——— Possession by one co-sharer. Possession of a plot of land does not constitute adverse possession in relation to a co-sharer unless the latter claims or asserts some right in the land which is denied by the sharer in possession. *SHURUFUNNISSA BIBEE CHOWDHRAIN v. KYLASH CHUNDER GUNGOPADHYA* 25 W. R. 53

29. ——— Co-sharer obtaining by arrangement exclusive possession of a portion of property still remaining joint. Where two parties have from time to time, according to their respective means, broken up or otherwise obtained possession of lands invariably recorded as joint property, and have exclusively enjoyed the profits of them, such exclusive possession and enjoyment on either side cannot, under the circumstances, be deemed to be of an adverse nature, and destructive of the rights of the other party. *YUSAF ALI KHAN v. CHUBBEE SINGH* 5 N. W. 122

30. ——— Manager of a Hindu temple—*Shevaks or servants of an idol—Rights of manager and servants inter se.* The plaintiff was the hereditary manager of the temple of Shri Ranchord Raiji at Dakor. The defendants,



**POSSESSION—contd.****4. ADVERSE POSSESSION—contd.**

were the shevaks or ministers of the deity. The plaintiff sued to oust the defendants from a certain piece of land attached to the temple, alleging that the defendants had erected shops on the land, and appropriated the rents to their own use, although it had been already decided in a suit between the parties that the land was always to be kept open and unoccupied for the use of the temple. The shevaks contended that they had been in exclusive and uninterrupted possession of the land in dispute for more than twelve years, and that by reason of such user they had acquired a quasi-proprietary title at least as against the manager of the temple. They therefore pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation. *Held*, that the defendants had not by occupation and user acquired any title as against the plaintiff who was the manager of the temple estate. They had come into occupation originally as servants and representatives of the deity, and during their occupation they could not by a wish change the nature of their possession. Both they and the plaintiff held the land for the same deity, and their rights could not be adverse to each other so as to give rise to a title by prescription. The only question then was as to which of them was the proper representative of the deity for the particular purpose of this suit, and that question had already been decided in a former suit in favour of the plaintiff. *MULJI BHULABHAI v. MANOHAR GANESH*

**I. L. R. 12 Bom. 322**

**31. ——— Manager of joint family—**  
*Possession of manager.* The possession of the managing member of a joint Hindu family is not adverse possession against the other members. *CHOWDHRY AJRAWAL SINGH v. CHOWDHRY BHUGWAN SINGH*

**2 Hay 311**

**32. ——— Members of joint family—**  
*Female living with male relatives—Presumption as to management and possession.* Where a female lives with her male relatives, the ordinary presumption is that they manage her property for her, and do not hold it adversely. *ASAD ALI MIRDHA v. TOYFAN BIBI*

**13 C. L. R. 328**

**33. ——— Excluded member.** The general rule that the possession of one member of a joint Hindu family is the possession of all other members, does not apply where the party claiming has been clearly excluded from the family. In such a case the possession is adverse, and under the general law of limitation time will run from such adverse possession. *JOWALA BUKSH v. DHARUM SINGH*

**10 Moo. I. A. 511**

**34. ——— Absence of one member.** Where two brothers, members of the same family, succeeded to equal shares in the paternal estates, the mere fact of one brother being absent, and the home-staying brother being in possession, does not deprive the former of his rights of inheritance, unless it is clearly shown that the possession by the latter was adverse to the absent brother. *WOOZEERTUN v. NOORUL JAN*

**9 W. R. 98**

**POSSESSION—contd.****4. ADVERSE POSSESSION—contd.**

**35. ——— Separation in living and separation by partition.** In a suit to recover a share in certain land, it was contended that there had been a separation between the plaintiff and the defendant, and that the suit was barred by limitation. *Held*, that the suit was not barred, as the separation, even if proved, was only a separation in living and not a separation by actual partition, and therefore the defendant's possession was not adverse to the plaintiff. *NARAYAN BABAJI DABHOLKAR v. PANDURANG RAMCHANDRA DABHOLKAR*

**12 Bom. 148**

*SOOKH LALL BHOOWALLA v. GOOLZAR BHOOWALLA*

**14 W. R. 228**

*See KRISTAYYA v. NARASIMHAM.*

**I. L. R. 23 Mad. 608**

**36. ——— Title set up by member of tarwad.** When a member of a tarwad, in possession of lands acquired by former members of his taverai (branch), openly sets up an independent title to those lands, his possession becomes hostile to the tarwad, and limitation begins to run against the tarwad from that time. *KANARA PANIKER v. RYRAPPA PANIKER*

**I. L. R. 3 Mad. 212**

**37. ——— Possession by one member of family—Neglect by plaintiff to take possession of his share notwithstanding request that he would do so—Limitation.** The plaintiff and the defendant were brothers and members of an undivided family. The plaintiff was in Government service, and had been for a long time absent from his native place on duty, the family property remaining under the management of the defendant. In 1863 the defendant wrote to the plaintiff, requesting him to return and manage his share of the property, or to employ some one to manage it for him. Nothing, however, was done by the plaintiff in the matter, and the defendant continued in possession. In 1882 the plaintiff sued the defendant for partition. The defendant pleaded that the suit was barred, contending that he had been in adverse possession from the date of the letter. The Court of first instance awarded the plaintiff's claim. The defendant appealed, and the lower Appellate Court reversed the lower Court's decree, holding that the suit was barred. On appeal by the plaintiff to the High Court:—*Held*, that the suit was not barred. The above-mentioned letter of the defendant showed that, up to the date at which it was written, the defendant had not been in possession of the property as his own property to the exclusion of the plaintiff, and the mere circumstance that subsequently to the date of the letter the plaintiff had not participated in the profits would not, in the absence of other evidence, justify the inference that the plaintiff was then excluded. *DINKAR SADASHIV v. BHIKAJI SADSHIV*

**I. L. R. 11 Bom. 365**  
**38. ——— Decree and execution against father—Subsequent possession by sons—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 263—Limita-**



POSSESSION—*contd.*4. ADVERSE POSSESSION—*contd.*

*tion.* One *A* formerly owned the house and land in dispute. He sold it to *G*, who sold it to the plaintiff. *A*, however, continued in occupation of the property. In 1879 the plaintiff sued *A* and *G* for possession and obtained a decree. On the 6th April 1880, in execution of the decree, he was put in formal possession by the Court under s. 263 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877) in the presence of *A*, who made no objection. At the time of these proceedings *A*'s sons (the present defendants) were living with him in the house and they continued to do so subsequently. *A* died in 1885, and his sons continued in possession of the property and cultivated it. On the 4th April 1892 the plaintiff brought this suit to eject them. They pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation, contending that the execution-proceedings in 1880 did not bind them, as they were not parties to that suit. *Held*, that, as the present suit would not have been barred against *A* had he survived, it was not barred against the defendants, whose rights were derived from him. The defendants living with their father had no independent juridical possession of the premises. The father *A* was the only person in possession. The possession which the plaintiff obtained through the Court from *A* in 1880 operated as well against the defendants (*A*'s sons) as against *A* himself. *PANDHARINATH v. MAHABUBKAN*

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 98

39. ———— *Limitation—Possession under gift making valid title.* Of two brothers of a Mitakshara family, the younger who had been born deaf and dumb was disqualified from inheriting, but the action of the elder to the younger was such as to recognise for some years that the younger had a joint interest in the family property, although it was found that there was no intention shown by the acts of the elder brother to waive the rights accruing to him in consequence of his brother's disqualification. The brothers died and also a daughter of the elder brother, who was their only descendant. This daughter had an only son, who died before her, after taking, however, the whole family estate under a gift made to him with his mother's assent by his maternal grandfather in 1867. In 1882 the plaintiff, a collateral relation, sued the widow of the donee to obtain the estate of the younger of the brothers. The widow made title under the gift to her deceased husband, followed by his possession, and hers afterwards, since the date of the gift. Upon the facts found, the suit was *held* to be barred by limitation. *LALA MUDDUN GOPAL LAL v. KHIKINDA KOER*. I. L. R. 18 Calc. 341  
L. R. 18 I. A. 9

40. ———— *Transfer of interest by widow—Life-tenancy—Reversioner.* A widow (a life-tenant of an ancestral estate), having executed an *ikrar* transferring a share to *N*, her granddaughter, afterwards sued to set it aside on the ground that *N* had not conformed to its terms. While the suit was in the appeal stage, the widow

POSSESSION—*contd.*4. ADVERSE POSSESSION—*contd.*

died and her reversioner applied to be made and was admitted as her *kaem mukam* to carry on the appeal on her behalf. He afterwards sued to recover possession of the share as reversioner, alleging that the succession opened out to him on the death of the widow. *Held*, that the life-tenancy having been made over to *N* with the widow's consent to enure during the grantor's lifetime, *N*'s possession was not adverse to the reversioner. *DEORANEL KOOWAR v. INDURJEET KOOWAR*

12 W. R. 234

41. ———— *Landlord and tenant—Possession of tenant—Evidence of nature of holding.* Possession by a tenant does not in itself lead to any inference as to the character of the tenancy: the fact of his having occupied the land and paid rent twelve or even twenty years being equally consistent with his being a tenant-at-will, a farmer, or a *mokuridar*. *SHEO DYAL POOREE v. MOHABEER PERSHAD* . . . . . 10 W. R. 477

42. ———— *Possession of tenant.* The possession of a tenant is in the eye of the law the possession of his landlord. *GRISH CHUNDER ROY v. BHUGWAN CHUNDER ROY*

13 W. R. 191

43. ———— *Settlement.* The possession of a sub-lessee of the tenant cannot be adverse to the superior landlord. *BUNGSRAJ BHOOKTA v. MEGH LALL POOREE GOSSAIN*

20 W. R. 398

44. ———— *Person holding adversely to tenant.* Possession adverse to a lessee is also adverse to the lessor. *PROSUNOMOYI DAS v. KALI DAS ROY* . . . . . 9 C. L. R. 347

*See BRINDABUN CHUNDER SIRCAR v. BHOOPAL CHUNDER BISWAS* . . . . . 17 W. R. 377  
and *LEKRAJ ROY v. COURT OF WARDS*

14 W. R. 395

45. ———— *Adverse possession—Possession of tenant paying rent to stranger.* In December 1853 certain lands were let by the plaintiff to be under a *kabuliat* by the terms of which the lease expired in December 1863. In March 1875, less than twelve years from the expiration of such lease, the plaintiffs brought a suit for possession against *B* and the talukhdars of the estate of which the lands in dispute formed part. The latter alleged that the *lakhiraj* title of the plaintiff was invalid; that although no proceedings, as required by the Rent law, had been taken to invalidate the plaintiff's title, they, the talukhdars, had resumed possession of the land by receiving the rents from *B* from 1859; and that the suit was barred by reason of their possession since that date. *Held*, that the suit was not barred, inasmuch as nothing had occurred to determine the tenancy which existed between the plaintiff and *B*, and that the possession of the latter was in law the plaintiff's possession. *PARBUTTI DASSI v. RAM CHAND BHUTTACHARJEE* . . . . . 3 C. L. R. 576



POSSESSION—*contd.*4. ADVERSE POSSESSION—*contd.*

46. ———— *Assertion of adverse title—Adverse possession—Landlord and tenant.* The assertion of an adverse title by a person claiming to be an owner under a permanent lease does not make his possession adverse so as to save limitation, unless made to the knowledge of the landlord. *GANGABHAI v. KALAPA DARI MUKRYA* . . . . . I. L. R. 9 Bom. 419

47. ———— *Possession of lessee, and proprietor under miras leases.* In a suit for possession against a mirasdar, who pleaded limitation, the Judge was held to have been in error in adding to the time for which the defendant had been holding under the miras lease the period of possession by the lessor, because the one is not in continuation of the other; the holding of the proprietors being quite a different thing from the holding of the lessee. *DHUN MONEE CHOWDHRAIN v. GOLAM KASOM* . . . . . 23 W. R. 331

48. ———— *Occupation of house by heirs of tenant-at-will—Intention of parties.* About twenty-five years before suit, *R* being possessed of a house allowed *K* to occupy it without paying rent, on condition that *K* would keep it in repair and restore it to *R* on demand. Nine years afterwards, and without any demand having been made by *R*, *K* died, and his heirs continued to occupy the house apparently on the same terms as *K* had done. In a suit brought by *R* against the heirs of *K* to recover possession of the house:—*Held*, that *K* occupied the house as tenant-at-will of *R*; that such tenancy was, on the death of *K*, as of course, converted into an adverse occupation by the heirs of *K*, in the absence of proof of the intention of the parties to that effect, and in the absence of anything to show that *R* did not assent to the heirs of *K* continuing to hold on the same terms as *K* had done. *RADHABHAI v. SHAMA* . . . . . 4 Bom. A. C. 155

49. ———— *Continued possession by heirs of tenant—Non-payment of rent, effect of, after expiration of lease—Permissive possession—Limitation.* In 1840 the land in dispute was leased to *R* for life. *R* died in or about 1871, and after *R*'s death his heirs (the defendants) continued in possession without obtaining a fresh lease or paying any rent to the landlord. In 1888 the landlord sued to eject the defendants. The defence was that the suit was barred by limitation. *Held*, that the suit was not barred. After *R*'s death, the defendants, though not in possession as tenants, were not trespassers. Their possession was permissive, and not adverse until they expressly set up a title of ownership in the property. *KRISHNAJI RAMCHANDRA v. ANTAJI PANDURANG* . . . . . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 256

50. ———— *Madras Rent Recovery Act (Mad. Act VIII of 1865), effect of—Omission by inamdar to obtain registration of title under Madras Regulation XXVI of 1802.* An inamdar had not obtained registration of his title under the registered landlord, and could not there-

POSSESSION—*contd.*4. ADVERSE POSSESSION—*contd.*

fore sue to enforce acceptance of pottahs, and had not collected rent from the tenants for more than twelve years. *Held*, that the tenants had not by reason of these facts acquired rights against the inamdar by adverse possession. *SRINIVASARAGAVA AYYANGAR v. MUTTUSAMI PADAYACHI* . . . . . I. L. R. 20 Mad. 6

51. ———— *Adverse possession of a partial interest (e.g., a tenant's) in land—Title by adverse possession asserted by a plaintiff against the true owner as well as alleged as a defence—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 28 and Art. 144.* Adverse possession for more than twelve years by one claiming to hold land as its full owner not only extinguishes the title of the true owner to the land so held and debars him from suing for its recovery, but creates a title by negation in the occupant which he can actively assert, if he loses possession, even against the true owner. A partial interest in land may be lost by adverse possession as well as the whole interest, and the right to such partial interest may be asserted by suit. So, where a landlord seeks to recover from his tenant possession of land in his tenant's occupancy, and the latter alleging a perpetual tenancy successfully resists on that ground the landlord's attempt to dispossess him, the tenant may, after the statutory period has expired, plead limitation in bar of a subsequent suit in ejectment by the landlord. A landlord allowing the tenant to assert the validity of an invalid lease for the statutory period of more than twelve years may be debarred from subsequently questioning the right of the tenant to hold under its terms. *BUDESAB v. HANMANTA* . . . . . I. L. R. 21 Bom. 509

52. ———— *Bhagdari estate—Alienation by a bhagdar of his share—Bom. Act I of 1862, s. 3—Collector setting aside sale of share—Subsequent suit to recover share—Limitation.* In the year 1871 the plaintiff, a co-sharer in a bhag, alienated his share to a stranger. In the year 1882 the Collector declared the alienation to be illegal, and in the year 1883 ordered that the plaintiff should be reinstated in the possession of his share. At plaintiff's request, his share was given into the possession of the defendant, who was the plaintiff's brother and khatedar of the entire bhag. In the year 1892 the plaintiff brought this suit against the defendant to recover possession of his share. The defendant contended that the suit was time-barred, the plaintiff not having been in possession since the year 1871. *Held*, that the suit was not barred, the possession of plaintiff's alienee being the possession of the plaintiff himself, and the defendant not being entitled to tack to the period of his own possession that of the plaintiff's alienee. *MAHAMAD DASU v. AMANJI DASU* . . . . . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 710

53. ———— *Adverse possession by Government of permanently-settled estate—Limitation—Permanent-settlement Regulations, effect of—Beng. Reg. I of 1793.* There is nothing in the regulations to which the permanently-settled



POSSESSION—*contd.*4. ADVERSE POSSESSION—*contd.*

estates of Bengal owe their origin to indicate that the Government intended to guarantee to the proprietors the absolute preservation of their estates. By the regulations the Government declared that, as regards the estates that came within the scope of the permanent settlement, it withdrew its sovereign right to vary the assessments; beyond that they did not go; they do not constitute a contractual relationship between the Government and the owners of permanently-settled estates, or any relationship as would debar Government from claiming and exercising against those owners the rights of an ordinary proprietor. Although therefore Government continues to receive the full revenue from the proprietor of a permanently-settled estate for the entire estate, the former is not precluded from claiming title by adverse possession in respect of any portion thereof. When a person is let into possession of a particular property by another claiming it to be his own, the former cannot contend, after the expiration of his tenancy, that the latter (*i.e.*, the person alleging himself to be the owner) cannot acquire an adverse title against him as well as others by efflux of time. *Kally Churn Sahoo v. The Secretary of State*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 725, referred to. *KRISTO MOHUN GUPTO v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* . . . 3 C. W. N. 99

54. ———— *Abandonment by tenants.* A landlord having obtained a decree declaring that certain homestead land was liable to assessment, the occupants, owing to certain criminal proceedings against them, abandoned the land, and the landlord leased it out to others who held possession paying rent for upwards of twelve years, after which they were ousted by the original occupants who claimed the land rent-free. *Held*, in a suit by the lessees, that they were entitled to recover possession. *MONEEROODDEEN MOJOMDAR v. PARBUTTY CHURN GHOSE* . 15 W. R. 121

55. ———— *Possession in two capacities—Possession as farmer and purchaser—Decree declaring sale valid.* *R* obtained, on 7th January 1862, a decree declaring a deed of sale of an estate in his favour, dated 7th January 1854, to be a genuine, authentic, and valid instrument. In the meantime he had acquired possession of the estate under a farm from Government. *Held*, that from the date of the decree *R*'s possession became adverse possession as far as the vendors and their representatives were concerned, although he continued to hold possession of the estate as a farmer. *DHUNDI v. RAM LALL* . . . 7 N. W. 149

56. ———— *Possession as patil—Separate branches of family—Acquiescence.* *J* held the office of patil more than fifty years ago as representative of two branches descended from a common ancestor and then united in interest, there being two other branches descended from the same ancestor, but severed in interest from those represented by *J*. *J*, having died in 1824, was succeeded by his son *T* without any opposition from the two other branches. *T* was temporarily displaced

POSSESSION—*contd.*4. ADVERSE POSSESSION—*contd.*

from the office by *G*, who represented the two other branches, but recovered it in 1850. *Held*, that the presumption arising against *T* having been a nominee of all the branches of the family, not having been rebutted by any evidence of an assertion and admission of the rights of the other branches, *T*'s occupation of the patilship was adverse to the plaintiff's right, and being adverse at its beginning, it was equally adverse when, after a temporary displacement by *G* (whom the plaintiff now represents), *T* recovered it in 1850. An interval of more than twelve years therefore having passed between 1850 and the institution of the present suit in 1873, the claim was barred, and the possession of the office obtained by *T*'s representatives could not be disturbed. *GIRIAPA v. JAKANA* . 12 Bom. 172

57. ———— *Effect of service tenure—Non-performance of service.* Where lands are held as remuneration for services, the fact that no services have been performed does not of itself make the holding adverse. To make the holding adverse, there must be a refusal to perform service or a claim to hold the lands free of service. *KOMARGOWDA v. BHIMAJI KESHAV* . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 602

58. ———— *Possession after redemption by one of several mortgagors—Mortgage—Suit for redemption or recovery of property on payment of a charge—Limitation.* The plaintiff sought to recover his father's share in two portions of family property, one of which had been mortgaged by the plaintiff's father and the father of the defendant No. 1 jointly; the other had been mortgaged by the plaintiff's father jointly with the father of defendant No. 1 and the husband of defendant No. 2. The first was redeemed by the father of defendant No. 1 alone in 1868; the second was redeemed by the defendant No. 1 more than twelve years before the suit. The parties were Mahomedans, and the plaintiff had a brother and three sisters only, one of whom (defendant No. 2) was a party to the suit. Defendant No. 1 contended that the suit was defective for want of parties, and that it was time-barred. *Held*, that the plaintiff's brothers and sisters ought to have been joined as co-plaintiffs, the defendant No. 1's possession after redemption not being adverse to them. If it was adverse at all, it was adverse to the whole of the plaintiff's branch of the family, so as to bar the right of the group altogether. But that was no reason why the co-owners should not be admitted as co-plaintiffs, and the suit go on upon its merits. *BHAUDIN v. ISMAIL* . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 425

59. ———— *Purchase by mortgagee of share in mortgaged property—Limitation—Mortgagee.* A mortgagee of an entire undivided estate does not, by a subsequent purchase of a certain share therein from one not in actual possession at the time of conveyance, thereby change his character from a mortgagee to that of an owner, but his possession continues as a mortgagee. *B* held an entire undivided estate under a mortgage



POSSESSION—*contd.*4. ADVERSE POSSESSION—*contd.*

(usufructuary) from *C* since 1273 (1866), and as such mortgagee in 1282 (1875) *B* purchased a share therein from *D*, who had not been in actual possession since the date of the mortgage. On the 20th January 1885 *B* brought a suit to recover possession of his purchased share. *Held*, that the subsequent purchase did not change the character of *B* from that of a mortgagee to that of an owner, and that his suit was barred by twelve years' limitation. *NUNDO LAL ADDY v. JODU NATH HALDAR*. I. L. R. 14 Calc. 674

60. — Denial by mortgagee in possession of mortgagor's right to redeem. Denial by a mortgagee in possession of the mortgagor's right to redeem is not sufficient to convert such possession into adverse possession. *MUSSAD v. COLLECTOR OF MALABAR*. I. L. R. 10 Mad. 189

61. — Possession of one co-sharer when adverse—*Limitation*—*Co-sharer*—*Mortgage*—*Mortgage by three co-sharers*—*Redemption by one of several mortgagors*—*Right of the other mortgagors to sue for redemption*—*Period of limitation for such suit*. In 1847 the property in dispute was mortgaged by three co-shares, *D*, *A*, and *R*. In 1859 *R* alone redeemed the property, and mortgaged it again to a third person. In 1882 the heirs of *D* and *A* brought a suit to redeem the whole of the property, or their portions of it. The defence to the suit was that it was barred by limitation, being brought more than twelve years after *R* had redeemed the property, and *R*'s possession subsequently to such redemption having been adverse to the plaintiffs and their predecessors in title:—*Held*, that the suit was not barred by limitation. When *R* redeemed the property, he held it, as regards his co-sharers' interests in it, as a lienor, and as such his possession was not adverse to them. It did not contradict, but rather implied and preserved their ultimate proprietary right. In the case of a co-sharer holding after redemption, limitation is computed only from the date when the possession becomes adverse by the assertion of an exclusive title and submission to the right thus set up, in analogy to the provision which bars an excluded sharer generally after the lapse of twelve years from the time when he becomes aware of his exclusion. As long as possession can be referred to a right consistent with the subsistence of an ownership in being at its commencement, so long must the possession be referred to that right, rather than to a right which contradicts the ownership. *RAM-CHANDRA YASHVANT SIRPOTDAR v. SADASHIV ABAJI SIRPOTDAR*. I. L. R. 11 Bom. 422

62. — Equity of redemption—*Mortgage*—*Limitation*. In 1845 the plaintiff's grandfather *A* mortgaged the house in dispute to *D* with possession. *A* died in 1849, leaving him surviving his daughter *K* (the plaintiff's mother) and a daughter-in-law *N*, the widow of his predeceased adopted son. In 1856 the mortgagee *D*

POSSESSION—*contd.*4. ADVERSE POSSESSION—*concl.*

brought a suit on his mortgage against *N* and obtained a decree against her, directing *inter alia*, a sale of the house in the event of the non-payment of the mortgage-debt. *N* in consequence sold the house in the same year (1856) to *R*, and paid off the mortgagee, who thereupon at her instance gave up the house to *R*. He held possession from 1856 to 1884. In 1881 the defendant *P* obtained a decree against *R* for Rs. 2,000. In execution of this decree the house was sold, and *P* bought it himself and obtained possession on 17th January, 1884. While that suit was pending, the plaintiff *T*, the grandson of *A*, brought a suit (No. 247 of 1881) against the son of *D* (the original mortgagee) and *R* to redeem the mortgage of 1845 and recover possession. The plaintiff obtained a decree against *D*'s son for redemption, and proceeded to execute the decree. He was obstructed by *R*'s son, who, however, in a suit (No. 205 of 1882) was found to have no right to the house. The present suit was brought in 1884 by the plaintiff to recover the house from the defendant. *Held*, that the suit was barred. The defendant in 1884 purchased the house from *R*, who had bought it in 1856 from *N*. *R*'s possession since that time had been adverse to the plaintiff. There can be adverse possession of the equity of redemption, and *N*'s possession had been adverse up to the sale in 1856. *PUTTAPPA v. TIMMAJI*. I. L. R. 14 Bom. 176

63. — One of several co-mortgagees obtaining possession of the whole property—*Usufructuary mortgage satisfied out of usufruct*—*Limitation*. In the case of a usufructuary mortgage by several co-mortgagors when such mortgage is satisfied out of the usufruct, each co-mortgagor is not entitled to recover possession of more than his share of the mortgaged property. Consequently where in such a case one of several co-mortgagors gets possession of the whole of the mortgaged property, he does not occupy the position of a mortgagee to his co-mortgagors, but his possession is adverse to them. *Fakir Bukhsh v. Sadat Ali*, I. L. R. 7 All. 376, followed. *GOBARDEAN v. SUJAN*. I. L. R. 16 All. 254

64. — Possession of usufructuary mortgagees—*Burden of proof*. The possession of a usufructuary mortgagee being the possession of all the persons who have the right of redemption, that is, of all the persons entitled to the estate, it is only when after redemption possession is taken by some of the persons so entitled that their possession can become adverse as against the others. In a suit for possession of immoveable property it is for the plaintiff to show by some *prima facie* evidence that he has a subsisting title not extinguished by the operation of limitation before the defendant can be called upon to substantiate a plea of adverse possession. *Parmanand Misr v. Sahib Ali*, I. L. R. 11 All. 438, and *Jafar Husain v. Mashuq Ali*, I. L. R. 14 All. 193, referred to. *ISAYAT HUSEN v. ALI HUSEN*. I. L. R. 20 All. 182



**POSSESSION—contd.****5. SUITS BASED ON ALLEGATION OF POSSESSION.**

1. ———— **Suit by party out of possession—Dismissal of suit—Evidence.** A suit based upon an allegation of possession must be at once dismissed if the plaintiff be shown to be out of possession. *SUKRAM v. KALA KAHAR*  
3 B. L. R. A. C. 105

2. ———— **Confirmation of possession—Possession of part of land sued for.** A suit for confirmation of possession must be dismissed if the allegation of possession is found to be wholly unfounded, but not if the plaintiff is found to be in possession of a part of the land in dispute. *ROOPA KOONWAR v. JUGGOOLALL OOPADHYA*  
11 W. R. 257

*BUSHEERUDDEEN v. DAL CHUND* . 3 Agra 236

*RAM CHURN PATUCK v. KHOOR PANDEY*  
10 W. R. 176

3. ———— **Suit for confirmation of possession—Evidence.** A plaintiff suing for confirmation of possession must prove that he was actually in possession. *LUTEEFOONISSA BIBEE v. RAJAOR RUHMAN* . . . . . 8 W. R. 84

*GOBINDNATH SEIN v. GOBIND CHUNDER SEIN*  
10 W. R. 393

*RASH BEHAREE ROY v. EZUD BAKSH*  
11 W. R. 276

*SHEO SURUN LALL v. CHUMUN LALL*  
24 W. R. 220

*RASH DHAREE SINGH v. NUTHONEE SINGH*  
24 W. R. 301

*SANSAR ROY v. INDRASUN ROY* . 25 W. R. 6

4. ———— **Failure to prove possession.** *Held* (MOOKERJEE, J., dissentiente), that the rule that in suits for confirmation of possession by adjudication of title the plaintiff is bound to prove that he was in possession at the time he preferred the suit, is not so inflexible a rule that it cannot be departed from; as, for example, where plaintiff sues for confirmation of possession and proves that he was in possession for many years, and until within a few months of the institution of the suit, he should not be required to bring a fresh suit, merely changing the prayer for confirmation of possession into one for recovery of possession. *ABDOULLAH v. SHAHA MUJESOODDEEN* . . . . . 15 W. R. 286

On this point confirmed on appeal  
16 W. R. 27

*KASHEE NATH MOOKERJEE v. MOHESH CHUNDER GOOPTO* . . . . . 25 W. R. 168

5. ———— **Proof of legal possession under decree.** The legal principle which holds that no suit for confirmation of possession will lie if possession at the time of the institution of the suit is not shown, refers to cases where no possession of any kind is shown within a reasonable time before suit, and not (as in this case) where legal

**POSSESSION—contd.****5. SUITS BASED ON ALLEGATION OF POSSESSION—concl'd.**

possession under a decree has been found. *BEEGOO ROY v. BAL MOKUND MISSEER* . 17 W. R. 421

6. ———— **Failure to show possession.** In a suit in which the plaintiff claimed confirmation of possession, it appeared on the face of the plaint that, although the suit was in form a suit for confirmation of possession, it was in substance a suit for recovery of possession. It was found that the plaintiff, while he had proved his title, was not in possession. *Held*, that, under the circumstances, the suit ought not to have been dismissed. *AMIR HOSSEIN v. IMAMBANDI BEGUM*  
11 C. L. R. 443

7. ———— **Plaintiff found to be out of possession.** In a suit, in form, for confirmation of possession, it was alleged that the Collector had refused to register the plaintiff's name in respect of the property claimed, but had registered the defendant's name. The plaintiff having been found to be out of possession, the lower Court dismissed the suit. The plaint bore a stamp sufficient to cover a suit for recovery of possession. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the effect of the refusal of the Collector to register the plaintiff's name under s. 78 of the Land Registration Act (Bengal Act VII of 1876) was to prevent the plaintiff recovering the rent of the estate, and that such refusal was alleged in the plaint, the suit might be taken to be in substance a suit for recovery of possession, and ought not to have been dismissed. *Amir Hossein v. Imambandi Begum*, 11 C. L. R. 443, followed. *CHAMPU DAI v. UMA DAI* . . . . . 11 C. L. R. 451

8. ———— **Suit against trespasser—Appointment of a Committee for management of property—Appointment acquiesced in by owner—Committee in management for a long time—Suit by Committee against a trespasser in ejectment—Title.** The Parsi Panchayat at Bombay appointed a Committee to manage the property of the Parsi Anjuman at Surat. The Committee managed the property for a very long time—sixty years—with the authority and acquiescence of the Parsi Anjuman. Subsequently the defendant having trespassed on the property, the Committee sued him in ejectment. The defendant contended that the plaintiffs had no right to sue for the recovery of the property as they were neither the owners nor the nominees of the Anjuman. *Held*, that the plaintiffs being in possession for a long time with the authority and acquiescence of the owners, namely, the Parsi Anjuman at Surat, were entitled to recover possession from a trespasser. *JIVANJI JAMSHEDJI v. BARJORJI NASSERVANJI* (1909) . . . . . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 499

**6. SUITS FOR POSSESSION.****(a) PROOF OF PARTICULAR TITLE.**

1. ———— **Failure to prove particular title—Evidence.** Unless a plaintiff can prove the particular title set up by him, he is not entitled to a



**POSSESSION—contd.****6. SUITS FOR POSSESSION—contd.****(a) PROOF OF PARTICULAR TITLE—contd.**

decree for possession. **RAMDHAN CHUCKERBUTTY v. KOMALTARA**

**3 B. L. R. A. C. 99 note : 11 W. R. 301**

**ABDOOLLAH v. SHAHA MUJEESSOODDEEN**  
**16 W. R. 27**

**JANOOBEE CHOWDHRAIN v. GENDOO TURRUFDER**  
**12 W. R. 203**

**RUNG LALL MISSEER v. ROGHOOBUR SINGH**  
**9 W. R. 169**

**HURO SOONDUREE DEBIA v. UNNOPORNA DEBIA**  
**11 W. R. 550**

**2. ———— Plaintiffs**

brought a suit for recovery of possession on the allegation that they had a mokurari title, but no title of any kind was established. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a decree merely on the ground that the defendants were trespassers and the plaintiff had long prior possession. That on the failure of the plaintiffs to prove the title set up, it was not necessary to put the defendants to any proof of the title which they set up. **KEDAR NATH SANYAL v. RAJ NATH NEOGI**

**3 C. W. N. 497**

**3. ———— Suit for possession under mirasi lease.** Where a plaintiff sued to recover possession of certain lands under a mirasi pottah which had been lost, and proved ten years' possession :—*Held*, that such possession alone would not entitle him to recover possession of the land, but that he must prove the specific title set up by him. **BHOLAI MANDAL v. JARIF GAZI**

**3 B. L. R. Ap. 93**

**RAM COOMAR SHOME v. GUNGA PERSHAD SEIN**

**14 W. R. 109 note**

**4. ———— Suit for declaration of title—Adverse possession.** Where a person claims possession of property under a specific title, coupled with an allegation that he has been in possession of that property for more than twelve years under that title, he is entitled to a decree on the strength of his twelve years' possession, even though he fail to make out his specific title. *Aliter* :—Where a declaratory decree by virtue of some particular title is sought for. **GOLUCK CHUNDER MASANTA v. NUNDOOCOOMAR ROY**

**I. L. R. 4 Calc. 699 : 3 C. L. R. 450**

**5. ———— Claim under deed of sale in lieu of dower.** The plaintiff, having alleged a distinct title under a deed of sale in lieu of dower, was *held*, in a suit for possession, bound to prove her title and not entitled to claim the benefit of a decision to which she was not a party, nor of an admission by her husband as binding on the defendants. **SOBRATUN v. TOOVA** . **7 W. R. 273**

**6. ———— Suit on sanad—Evidence.** In a suit for recovery of possession of certain land which the plaintiff claimed under and

**POSSESSION—contd.****6. SUITS FOR POSSESSION—contd.****(a) PROOF OF PARTICULAR TITLE—contd.**

by virtue of a sanad (grant) from the zamindar, and from which he had been dispossessed by the defendants, the lower Appellate Court held that the execution of the sanad was not satisfactorily proved, but that it was not a forgery, and that there was the corroborative evidence (such as the dakhilas produced before it) to prove the case of the plaintiff. *Held*, that, when a claim is based upon a sanad, and the plaintiff fails to prove the execution of the sanad itself, he may prove his claim by other means. In a suit for mere possession, it is unnecessary to state or prove a particular title. **RASH BEHARI LAL SINGH v. NABAYI PODDAR**

**3 B. L. R. A. C. 99 : 11 W. R. 465**

**7. ———— Suit for confirmation of possession and to recover possession.** When a suit is brought for confirmation of possession upon a certain title, the plaintiff is bound by the title which he sets up in his plaint, except when he sues to recover immoveable property from which he has been ousted. **UMBICA CHURN BANERJEE v. DIGUMBUREE DABEE** . **12 W. R. 429**

**8. ———— Alternative claim—Adverse possession.** Suits for possession distinguished from suits for declaration of a particular title. Where a plaintiff seeks to recover possession of property of which he has been dispossessed, and bases his claim on the ground of purchase, and also upon the ground of a twelve years' possessory title, he is entitled to succeed if he proves his possession, even if he fails to prove his purchase. **GOSAIN DASS CHUNDER v. ISSUR CHUNDER NATH**

**I. L. R. 3 Calc. 224**

**9. ———— Lakhiraj title—Suit for possession on forcible dispossession.** In a suit to recover possession on the allegation that the plaintiff, having been in possession, was suddenly and recently ejected, the sole question for decision is the right to possession, apart from any question of the validity or otherwise of the lakhiraj title under which the plaintiff claims. **BOODHA MIRDHA v. KHYRUT ALI MIRDHA** . **5 W. R. 269**

**10. ———— Suit for declaration of right—Right to possession—Right of person with good title ousted by person who had none.** Plaintiff sued to establish his right to a dharmakartaship and to the hereditary office of pooja stanika in a pagoda. He alleged that he held the office of pooja stanika hereditarily, and that the dharmakartaship was assigned to him by the original dharmakartas by deed (No. I), but that he was afterwards forcibly dispossessed by defendants. Defendants denied plaintiff's hereditary right to the office of pooja stanika, and declared that he was removed from the dharmakartaship for neglecting his duties, and that they were appointed instead by document (No. IV). The District Judge gave judgment in favour of plaintiff. The defendants appealed. An issue was sent to the lower Court



POSSESSION—*contd.*6. SUITS FOR POSSESSION—*contd.*(a) PROOF OF PARTICULAR TITLE—*contd.*

whether, assuming exhibit I to be revocable, did the persons who executed exhibit IV constitute the collective body entitled to revoke it. The lower Court found this issue in the negative. *Held* (by the High Court), that this was not properly a suit for a declaration. The object of the suit and the effect of the declaration would have been to put the plaintiff in possession of that from which he had been ousted; that as to the claim to the dharmakartaship, document I showed that the plaintiff was a mere appointee as agent, and that, as the authority given by it was not revoked by IV, the case was that of one ousted from a possession which he held upon a good title by those who had shown none; that on the principle of such cases as *Asher v. Whitlock*, *L. R. 1 Q. B. 1*, the plaintiff had a right to the restoration of that possession. *NARAYANASAMI MUDALI v. KUMARASAMI GURUKAL*. . . . . 7 *Mad.* 267

11. . . . . *Proof of joint possession.* In a suit to recover possession it was proved that plaintiffs had purchased shares in a joint property and had held possession. The lower Appellate Court, thinking they had done so separately without being at the time aware of their *ijmal* rights, held that it could not decree to them the joint possession sought for. *Held*, that it matters not what position plaintiffs considered themselves to have occupied originally whilst in possession. If they can establish their right, they are entitled to recover possession, whether that possession were originally joint or separate. *RAJBULLUB SHAMMEE v. WARIS MAHOMED*

8 *W. R.* 450

12. . . . . *Possession as title—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) Amendment Act (XII of 1891), s. 9—Possession as title against all but true owner—Effect of Specific Relief Act even where suit is brought more than six months after dispossession.* Possession is, under the Indian, as under the English, law, good title against all but the true owner. S. 9 of the Specific Relief Act is in no way inconsistent with the position that, as against a wrong-doer, prior possession of the plaintiff, in an action of ejectment, is sufficient title, even if the suit be brought more than six months after the act of dispossession complained of, and that the wrong-doer cannot successfully resist the suit by showing that the title and the right to possession are in a third person. The only effect of s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act is that a person who has been dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law, and who brings a summary suit within the time prescribed by that section, is entitled to be reinstated, even if the defendant by whom he was dispossessed be the true owner or a person authorized by or claiming under him. But a decree passed in such a suit will not have the force of *res judicata* on the question of title. *Nisa Chand Gaita v. Kanchiram Bagani*, *I. L. R. 26 Calc.* 579, dissented from. *NARAYANA ROW v. DHARMACHAR* (1902) *I. L. R.* 26 *Mad.* 514

POSSESSION—*contd.*6. SUITS FOR POSSESSION—*contd.*(a) PROOF OF PARTICULAR TITLE—*conclld.*

13. . . . . *Suit for possession based on possessory title of plaintiff's predecessor—Plaintiffs never themselves in possession—Cause of action.* Musammam Wazir Jan, the owner of certain zamindari property, died on the 18th of December 1889, leaving no direct heirs. After her death the property was taken possession of by the four nephews of Musammam Wazir Jan's deceased husband. One of these nephews, Bisharat, died on the 7th of August 1890, whereupon the share of which he had been in possession was appropriated by his son Kasim to the exclusion of Kasim's two sisters, Ayesha Begam and Kudrat Begam. While in Kasim's possession the property, or part of it, was sold in execution of a decree against Kasim and purchased by Shi Gopal and others. On the 7th of August 1902, Kasim's sisters sued to recover their shares of the property as heirs of Bisharat. *Held*, by KNOX J. (*AIKMAN, J. dissentiente*), that inasmuch as the plaintiffs had never at any time been in possession of the property claimed by them, their suit would not lie. *Asher v. Whitlock*, *L. R. 1 Q. B. 1*; *Govind Prasad v. Mohan Lal*, *I. L. R. 24 All.* 157; *Narayana Row v. Dharmachar*, *I. L. R. 26 Mad.* 514; *Pahlwan Singh v. Ram Bharose*, *I. L. R. 27 All.* 169; *Sunder v. Parbati*, *I. L. R. 12 All.* 51, and *Ismail Ariff v. Mahomed Ghous*, *I. L. R. 20 Calc.* 834, distinguished. *Hodson v. Walker*, *L. R. 7 Exch.* 55, and *Butcher v. Butcher*, 7 *B. & C.* 399, referred to. *AIKMAN, J. (Contra)*:—The plaintiff's father Bisharat having held a possessory title heritable and transferable good as against all except the true owner, there was nothing to prevent his heirs bringing the recent suit. *Wali Ahmad Khan v. Ajudhia Kundu*, *I. L. R. 13 All.* 537; *Govind Prasad v. Mohan Lal*, *I. L. R. 24 All.* 157; *Asher v. Whitlock*, *L. R. 1 Q. B. 1* *Doe v. Pritchard v. Jouncey*, 8 *C. & P.* 99; *Pahlwan Singh v. Ram Bharose*, *I. L. R. 27 All.* 169; *Babu Ram v. Banke Bihari Lal*, *All. Weekly Notes* (1906) 184; *Narayana Row v. Dharmachar*, *I. L. R. 26 Mad.* 514; and *Sundar v. Parbati*, *I. L. R. 12 All.* 51, referred to. *SHI GOPAL v. AYESHA BEGAM* (1906) *I. L. R.* 29 *All.* 52

14. . . . . *Failure of cause of action—Practice—Possession, suit for—Proper decree to be made—Collateral issues—Courts power to decide and pass declaratory decree.* Where the plaintiffs asked for possession of their mother's property on the ground that she was dead and the Court held that it was not proved that the lady was dead, the only decree that could be made was that the suit be dismissed. The mere circumstance that some of the *media concludendi* might be the same in other actions did not vest the Court with any right or duty to pronounce upon them. *WALIHAN v. JOGESHWAR NARAYAN* (1907)

*I. L. R.* 35 *Calc.* 189  
s.c. 12 *C. W. N.* 227  
*L. R.* 35 *I. A.* 38



POSSESSION—*contd.*6. SUITS FOR POSSESSION—*contd.*

## (b) OTHER SUITS FOR POSSESSION.

15. ———— *Onus probandi—Necessity to prove title against party in possession.* In a suit in which the plaintiff claimed alluvial land in the possession of the Government as being his by right of accretion to his own estate, though the churs had re-formed on the original sites of lands belonging to other persons:—*Held*, that the case could not be decided on the principle that, inasmuch as those other parties were not before the Court, the plaintiff had the better title as between himself and Government. The land was in the possession of Government, and the plaintiff could not succeed by establishing a better title. *COLLECTOR OF DACCA v. KALEE CHURN PODDAR* . . . 21 W. R. 446

16. ———— *Necessity to prove title—Wife suing by permission of husband.* In a suit to recover property in the enjoyment and possession of defendant, a female plaintiff can only succeed on the strength of her own right, not merely because it is the property of her husband, who does not object to her recovering it. There is no necessary presumption that property in the possession of a respectable female's husband, brother and son, respectively, is possession on her behalf, and not on theirs. *KAFATOULLAH v. ARIZA BIBEE* . . . 23 W. R. 264

17. ———— *Suit under Act X of 1859—Proof of title.* If a person evicted without legal process from land in his occupation sued for possession under Act X of 1859, he was bound to prove his title. *MADUR KHAN v. WOOMA MOYEE DABEE* . . . Marsh. 389; 2 Hay 434

*SHUSTEE DHUR MOZUMDAR v. NUTEEJA BIBI* . . . 7 W. R. 36

18. ———— *Suit under Act X of 1859.* In an ordinary civil suit not brought under cl. 6, s. 23, Act X of 1859, or under s. 15, Act XIV of 1859, a plaintiff could not recover possession as against the undisputed owner merely by proving his previous possession and dispossession. But he might claim damages for the value of crops taken away which had been raised by him on the land whereof he was at the time in lawful possession. *RAM MOHUN DOSS v. JHUPPROO DASS* . . . 14 W. R. 41

19. ———— *Presumption of title—Right of suit.* In a suit for possession of land claimed as part of a mouzah which plaintiff held under a mokurari lease and a bill of sale, and which he alleged had been taken possession of by defendant under colour of an order of the Criminal Court under s. 318, Code of Criminal Procedure, relating to a different land, defendant objected that plaintiff was not the real owner of the mouzah, and therefore not entitled to bring the suit. *Held*, that the *prima facie* title which the plaintiff had under the lease and bill of sale was sufficient to enable him to bring the suit, and the defendants was not at liberty in a suit of this description to raise the

POSSESSION—*contd.*6. SUITS FOR POSSESSION—*contd.*(b) OTHER SUITS FOR POSSESSION—*contd.*

question whether plaintiff was only the nominal owner. *RAM BHURROSSEE SINGH v. BISSESSUR NARAIN MAHATA* . . . 18 W. R. 454

*JOGMAYA CHOWDHRAIN v. HUREE MOHUN ROY* . . . 24 W. R. 99

20. ———— *Possession after resumption—Right of zamindar to sue talukhdar for possession.* A zamindar cannot sue a dependant talukhdar (the possessor of resumed lakhiraj lands) for confirmation of possession, and for an injunction to prevent him from committing waste. The only possession that a zamindar can obtain after a decree for resumption is a constructive one derived from the receipt of rent from the tenant. *MUGNEE RAM CHOWDHRY v. GONESH DUTT SINGH* . . . W. R. 1864, 275

21. ———— *Suit for possession by under-tenure-holder against zamindar—Unregistered tenant.* No suit for possession will lie against a zamindar, or any one holding a title under the zamindar, until the plaintiff has been recognized by the zamindar as tenant, or has been registered as such in the zamindar's *serishta*. *MOOKTAKESHEE DOSSEE v. PEAREE CHOWDHRAIN* . . . 7 W. R. 158

22. ———— *Suit by prior mortgagee against subsequent mortgagee in possession—Sale in execution of decree under second of two mortgage-bonds—Right to possession.* An estate having been sold by auction on two occasions in satisfaction of two distinct bonds, and the person who had proceeded on the later-dated of the two bonds, but who represented the earlier auction-purchaser, having actually taken possession of the estate:—*Held*, that though, in a properly brought suit between the two parties to declare the property liable for the amount of the first mortgage, the party in possession would have to pay to secure his possession, yet he could not be ousted by the opposite party. *AJOODHYA PERSHAD v. MORACHA KOOR* . . . 25 W. R. 254

23. ———— *Suit by mortgagee for possession—Covenant for possession—Suit for possession after expiration of term of mortgage.* A mortgagor covenanted to give the mortgagee possession of the mortgaged property, but did not do so, and the mortgagee consequently sued him for possession, but not until the term of the mortgage had expired. The mortgagor set up as a defence to such suit that it was not maintainable after the expiration of the mortgage term. This defence was rejected on the ground that the mortgagor had, by his breach of the mortgage contract, put himself out of Court. *HAR SAHAI v. CHUNI KUAR* . . . I. L. R. 4 All. 14

24. ———— *Dispossession of second mortgagee by prior mortgagee without right of possession by means of illegal order of Court in execution of a money-decree against mortgagor.* S mortgaged land to R in 1861. R pledged the mortgage-deed to H to secure repayment of a



**POSSESSION—contd.****6. SUITS FOR POSSESSION—contd.****(b) OTHER SUITS FOR POSSESSION—contd.**

loan of R500. *P.*, being entitled on partition with *H* to half of the debt due by *R*, got a decree against *R* in the Small Cause Court for his moiety in 1870. *R* sued *S* on the mortgage-deed (obtained from *P* and *H* for that purpose), got a decree to enforce the mortgage, and in July 1872 bought the land in execution of the decree. In December 1872 *R* mortgaged the land to *V* and put him into possession. *V* had no notice of the prior pledge to *P*. In 1876 *P*, in execution of his Small Cause Court decree, attached and sold the right, title, and interest of *R* in the land, became the purchaser at the Court sale, and was put into possession by an order of the Court executing the decree. *V*'s claim under s. 269 of Act VIII of 1859 was rejected. *Held*, in a suit by *V* against *P*, that *V* was entitled to recover the lands in dispute. *Per* TURNER, C.J.—*Quære*: Whether the decision in *Ramu Naikan v. Subbaraya Mudali*, 7 Mad. 229, is sound. VENCATACHELLA KANDIAN v. PANJANADIEN. I. L. R. 4 Mad. 213

**25. — Suit between purchasers under mortgage-decrees—Priority of mortgage—Rival mortgage decree-holders—Priority of possession.** In a suit for possession between two purchasers, who had bought the same property at two several auction-sales under decrees obtained on two several mortgage-bonds:—*Held*, that no question could arise as to which mortgage was prior in point of time, but that the real question to be decided was which of the parties could prove a prior title to possession. NANACK CHAND v. TELUCKDYE KOER. I. L. R. 5 Calc. 265 : 4 C. L. R. 358

**26. — Several mortgages of the same property—Decrees on the mortgage-bonds—Priority of purchase—Priority of possession.** *A*, on the 11th March 1868, took a mortgage-bond of certain property, and obtained a money-decree on the bond on the 23rd January 1869. Under this decree, the mortgagor's interest was put up for sale and purchased by *A* on the 29th April 1870. *B*, on the 3rd November 1868, took a mortgage-bond on the same property, and obtained a decree thereon on the 31st May 1869. Under this decree, the mortgagor's interest was sold, and purchased by *B* on the 22nd April 1870. *B* took possession of the property on the 18th May 1872. In a suit by *A* for recovery of possession:—*Held*, that *B* was entitled to retain possession as against *A*, although his own interest might be merely that of a trustee for the mortgagor, and might be subject to *A*'s mortgage-lien if he took proper proceedings to enforce it. DIRGOPAL LALL v. BOLAKEE. I. L. R. 5 Calc. 269

**27. — Title, proof of—Suit to set aside order of Magistrate under Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 318.** To set aside the effect of an order made by a Magistrate under s. 318 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, the plaintiff cannot sue for restoration of possession only on the sole ground of previous possession, without proof of title. RAJESSUREE DEBIA v. BRINDABUTTY DEBIA. 7 W. R. 212

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ACHUMANDE AGATH KUNHI PATHUMAH v. MAKACHINDE AGATH MAKACHI. 4 Mad. 478

**28. — Act IV of 1840—Julkur.** *A* originally owned two zamindaris between which lay a bil, or marsh, of which he also owned the fisheries. One of the zamindaris was sold and purchased by *B*, but the bil fisheries still continued with the remaining zamindari held by *A*. After the sale certain lands reclaimed from the bil were for some years held by *B* as part of his purchased zamindari. *A* instituted a summary suit under Act IV of 1840, and was by an order of the Magistrate put in possession of these lands. *B* brought a regular suit against *A* to recover the lands and set aside his order. *Held* (reversing the decisions of the Courts below), that it was necessary for *B* to show a better title to the land than *A* could produce. It was not enough for him to prove possession anterior to the Magistrate's order under Act IV of 1840. The presumption was that the land of the bil belonged to *A*, who had admittedly owned both estates before, and had retained the fisheries of the bil after the auction sale. *B* ought to have shown when and how, if at all, the right to the fisheries and the right to the soil were severed. BARADA KANT ROY v. CHUNDRA KUMAR ROY. 2 B. L. R. P. C. I : 11 W. R. P. C. 1

12 Moo. I. A. 145

**29. — Effect of previous suit—Previous suit on the basis of possession without title, dismissal of—Dispossession by plaintiff in the previous suit—Previous decree, effect of—Title, want of, of plaintiff in subsequent suit.** Defendants brought a suit in 1886 for a declaration of their title and to recover possession of the lands in suit against the plaintiff. The suit was dismissed, defendants having failed in that suit to prove their title. Defendants subsequently dispossessed the plaintiff in 1890; and plaintiff instituted the present suit in 1896 but could not prove his title. *Held*, that the effect of the decree in the previous suit was to declare, as against the present defendants, that plaintiff's possession was lawful; and, such being the case, and the defendants being wrong-doers and having no title, the plaintiff in the present suit, on the basis of the decree in the previous suit and his previous lawful possession, is entitled to recover possession if the lands are the same. NISU CHAND GAITA v. KANCHIRAM BAGANI, 3 C. W. N. 568; Gobind Chunder Koondoo v. Taruk Chunder Bose, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 145; Ismail Ariff v. Mahomed Ghous, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 834, distinguished. FAZLAR RAHMAN CHOWDHRY v. RAJ CHUNDER SEN (1900). 5 C. W. N. 234

**30. — Limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 116—Breach of contract in writing registered—Lease of villages—Failure by lessee to put lessor in possession—Executory contract to deliver such possession as the nature of the property admits—Mere execution of lease of villages not a delivery of possession.** By a



**POSSESSION—contd.****6. SUITS FOR POSSESSION—contd.****(b) OTHER SUITS FOR POSSESSION—contd.**

registered document, dated 11th November, 1893, defendant leased certain villages to plaintiff for a term of seven years and eight months. On 5th December, 1893, plaintiff applied to be put into possession of the villages, but never obtained possession. On 11th November, 1899, plaintiff brought this suit for possession, and in the alternative for the damages which he had sustained by the failure on the part of defendant to put him into possession. On the plea of limitation being set up:—*Held*, that the claim for damages was not barred, it being governed by Art. 116 of Sch. II to the Limitation Act. Both in the case of a sale and of a lease, the registered instrument by which such sale or lease is effected not only operates as a grant, but, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, is also construed and operates as an executory contract to deliver to the vendee or lessee such possession of the property as its nature permits; and the breach of such an obligation is a breach of a contract in writing registered, within the meaning of the article referred to. It was also contended by the defendant that, inasmuch as the raiyats were in actual occupation of the villages which formed the subject matter of the lease, the defendant had, in fact, by the mere execution and delivery of the lease, given plaintiff such possession as the subject-matter of the lease permitted, and that plaintiff could have collected the rents without any further act on the part of the defendant. *Held*, that possession had not been given. **ZAMINDAR OF VIZIANAGRAM v. BEHARA SURYANARAYANA PATRULU (1901)** I. L. R. 25 Mad. 587

**31. ——— Mortgage—Mortgage of non-transferable occupancy holding—Objection of landlord that holding is non-transferable—Subsequent suit for possession—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244.** Plaintiff, to whom a non-transferable occupancy holding was mortgaged, brought a suit upon the mortgage against the mortgagor, the occupancy raiyat; the landlords, who objected that the holding was not transferable, were made parties in the mortgage suit. The Court declined to decide this question, and passed a decree for the sale of the property, which, being sold, was purchased by the plaintiff, who, not being able to obtain possession, brought the present suit for recovery of possession. *Held*, that the objection of the landlord defendants that the holding was not transferable could be gone into in the present suit, and that s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, was no bar to the determination of the question, as it was made by the defendants in the suit. *Bhiram Ali Sheikh v. Gopi Kant Saha*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 355; and *Nil Kamal Mukerjee v. Jahnnabi Chowdhurani*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 946, relied upon. **DURGA CHARAN AGRAHANI v. KARAMAT KHAN (1903)** . . . 7 C. W. N. 607

**32. ——— Landlord's suit.** A suit for recovery of possession by a lessor is maintainable, if the lessee is a party and does not object.

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**7. EFFECT OF POSSESSION.**

**1. ——— Nature of interest in immovable property acquired by virtue of mere possession.** A person in possession of land without title has an interest in the property which is heritable and good against all the world except the true owner—an interest which, unless and until the true owner interferes, is capable of being disposed of by deed or will, or by execution sale, just in the same way as it could be dealt with if the title were unimpeachable. *Asher v. Whitlock*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 1; *Sunder v. Parbati*, I. L. R. 12 All. 51; and *Brindaban Chunder Rao v. Tara Chand Banerjee*, 20 W. R. 114, referred to. **GOBIND PRASAD v. MOHAN LAL (1901)** . . . I. L. R. 24 All. 157

**2. ——— Title—Nature of merely possessory title.** A person whose title to immovable property rests upon mere possession is competent to deal with such property as if he were the owner, and his acts will be good as against all persons other than the true owner. If such a possessor executes a registered deed of gift of the property, he is subject to the rule that no one can derogate from his own grant. *Govind Prasad v. Mohan Lal*, I. L. R. 24 All. 157, followed. *Phul Chund v. Lakkhu*, I. L. R. 25 All. 358, referred to. **PAHLWAN SINGH v. RAM BHAROSE (1905)** I. L. R. 27 All. 169

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**1. CASES WHICH MAGISTRATE CAN DECIDE AS TO POSSESSION.**

1. ———— **Dispute as to possession—**  
*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 320.* A Magis-  
trate has no ground for proceeding, under Ch. XXII  
of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, where there  
is no dispute as to the fact of actual possession  
of either the land or crop. ANONYMOUS  
4 Mad. Ap. 12

2. ———— **Dispute as to right to col-  
lect rents—***Order of Criminal Court as to—Re-  
port of police officer.* Where a dispute between par-  
ties was not concerning land or its boundaries, or  
concerning houses, water, fisheries, or produce of  
land, but simply as to what collections one of the  
parties had made and what rents he was entitled to  
collect under a decree of Court, the case was held

**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.****1. CASES WHICH MAGISTRATE CAN DECIDE AS TO POSSESSION—contd.**

not to come under the provisions of Act X of 1872,  
s. 530, but under the ruling in *Ramrungle Dos-  
see v. Gooroodass Roy*, 18 W. R. Cr. 36. PUDDO-  
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25 W. R. Cr. 2

3. ———— *Per PRINSEP, J.—*  
That constructive possession through the collection  
of rents is the actual possession which may be deter-  
mined in proceedings under s. 145 of the Criminal  
Procedure Code, under sub-s. (2) of that section.  
LALDHARI NARAIN SINGH v. SUKDEO NARAIN  
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4 C. W. N. 613

4. ———— *Criminal Proce-  
dure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 145—Tangible im-  
moveable property, Act X of 1872, s. 530.* A dis-  
pute as to the right to collect rents is a dispute con-  
cerning tangible immovable property within the  
meaning of s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Pro-  
cedure, 1882. PRAMATHA BHUSANA DEB ROY v.  
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5. ———— *Criminal Procedure  
Code (Act X of 1882), s. 145—Tangible immoveable  
property.* A dispute as to the right to collect rents  
is a dispute concerning tangible immovable prop-  
erty within the meaning of s. 145 of the Criminal  
Procedure Code. *Harak Narain Singh v. Luchmi  
Bux Roy*, 5 C. L. R. 287, and *Sutherland v.  
Crowdy*, 18 W. R. Cr. 11 : 9 B. L. R. 229, referred  
to. *Pramatha Bhusana Deb Roy v. Doorga Churn  
Bhattacharji*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 413, followed.  
Where a dispute arose as to the right to collect  
the rents of certain land, the ownership of which  
was claimed by both A and B, and the tenants  
who had been paying rent to A refused to pay  
rent to A and attorned to B.—*Held*, that the  
conduct of the tenants in attorning to B was not  
an assertion of possession adverse to A such as to  
put an end to the relation of landlord and tenant  
between them and A and to A's right to collect  
the rents. Such attornment therefore did not  
deprive A of his right to have recourse to s. 145  
in case of a likelihood of a breach of the peace, so  
as to have his possession of the right to collect the  
rents maintained pending proceedings in a civil suit.  
SARBANANDA BASU MOZUMDAR v. PRAN SANKAR  
ROY CHOWDHURI . . . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 527

6. ———— *Criminal Proce-  
dure Code, s. 145.* A dispute between two persons  
as to the right to collect rent from the tenants of an  
estate is cognizable under s. 145 of the Code of Cri-  
minal Procedure. RAMASAMI v. DANAKOTI AMMAL  
I. L. R. 12 Mad. 88

7. ———— *Criminal Proce-  
dure Code, 1898, s. 145—Jurisdiction of Magis-  
trate—Appointment of Receiver of a joint estate—  
Joint owners governed by Mitakshara Law.* There  
is no want of jurisdiction in a Magistrate to proceed



**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.****1. CASES WHICH MAGISTRATE CAN DECIDE AS TO POSSESSION—contd.**

under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, because the dispute is one regarding the right to the collection of rents between joint owners governed by the Mitakshara school of Hindu law. Nor can the appointment of a Receiver of the joint estate, subsequent to the passing of the order by the Magistrate, affect the question of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate at the time when he passed the order.

**SRI MOHAN THAKUR v. NARSING MOHAN THAKUR**  
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 259; 261 note  
4 C. W. N. 420, 421 note

**8. Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 145—Tangible immovable property.**

A dispute as to the right to collect rents is a dispute concerning tangible immovable property within the meaning of s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and the operation of that section cannot be limited by any rule which would depend upon the area of the property in dispute. Where, in such a dispute which related to two pergunnahs comprising more than three hundred distinct villages, it was admitted by the petitioner that the opposite party had been in possession by receipt of rent from the tenants up to a period some three months anterior to the institution of the proceeding, but she alleged that she had succeeded in inducing the tenants to attorn to her by payment of rent to the officers appointed by her since such period; and where the Deputy Commissioner, after recording a certain amount of evidence, refused to examine any more witnesses on the ground that the enquiry would extend to an inordinate length and be extremely expensive, and passed an order under the section:—*Held*, that, even though it might be established that the Deputy Commissioner's action in excluding evidence was illegal, it did not follow, having regard to the circumstances of the case, that the High Court would be justified in exercising its revisional powers. *Held*, further, that a payment of rent for a short time to the petitioner, even if proved, would not amount to dispossession of the opposite party. *Sarbananda Basu Mozumdar v. Pran Sankar Roy Chowdhuri*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 527, followed. *ABHAYESSARI DEBI v. SHIDHESSARI DEBI*  
I. L. R. 16 Calc. 513

**9. Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 145—Share in joint undivided property—Tangible immovable property.**

A dispute as to the right to realize rent in respect, not of the whole sixteen annas, but only of an undivided share of any tract of land, is not a dispute concerning tangible immovable property within the meaning of s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *Ramrungle Dossee v. Gooroodass Roy*, 18 W. R. Cr. 36, and *Beni Narain v. Acharj Nath*, I. L. R. 5 All. 607, approved of. *Pramatha Bhusana Deb Roy v. Doorga Churn Bhattacharji*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 413; *Sarbananda Basu Mozumdar v. Pran Sankar Roy Chowdhuri*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 527; and *Abhayessuri Debi v. Shidhessari Debi*, I. L. R.

**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.****1. CASES WHICH MAGISTRATE CAN DECIDE AS TO POSSESSION—contd.**

16 Calc. 513, distinguished. **SURB NARAIN SINGH v. BIRJ MOHUN THAKUR** . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 80

**10. Dispute regarding right of fishery—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 145—“Tangible immovable property.”** A dispute concerning the right to fish in a julkur is not a dispute concerning any “tangible immovable property” within the meaning of s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Inquiries under s. 145 should be directed to the question as to which party is in possession of the subject of dispute before any proceedings in the Court have been taken in the matter. **KRISHNA DHONE DUTT v. TROILOKIA NATH BISWAS** . I. L. R. 12 Calc. 537

**11. Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 145—Julkur right—Tangible immovable property.** A dispute concerning a julkur right is not a dispute concerning “tangible immovable property” within the meaning of s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and cannot be inquired into by a Magistrate under the provisions of that section. **ANUND MOYI DABIA v. SHURNOMOYI**  
I. L. R. 13 Calc. 179

**12. Dispute concerning ferry including land and water over which it plies—Right of ferry—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145.** The right to a ferry, i.e., the right to carry passengers to and fro, cannot be treated apart from the possession of the lands used on either side of the stream for the purpose of landing them. It is a proper case to be dealt with under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) where the subject-matter of dispute is a ferry, including the land and water upon which the right of ferry is exercised. **HURBULLABH NARAIN SINGH v. LUCHMESWAR PRASAD SINGH**  
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 188

See **LALDHARI SINGH v. SUKDEO NARAIN SINGH**  
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 892; 4 C. W. N. 613

**13. Ferry—Tangible immovable property—Offence—Jurisdiction of Magistrate.** A ferry does not come within the description of “tangible immovable property” as used in s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1882. Disputes regarding ferries come within the scope of s. 147. S. 182 relates only to cases of offences, that is acts which are punishable by law, and a case under s. 145 is not a case relating to an offence. **HARBULLABH NARAIN SINGH v. BAJRANG DASS** . 3 C. W. N. 148

**14. Dispute as to alluvial land—Land left by drying up of river.** A Magistrate had jurisdiction, under s. 308, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861, to prevent breaches of the peace in places where the rivers have dried up. The jurisdiction that was once there, under s. 30, was not taken away by reason of the land having appeared, and the



# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 1. CASES WHICH MAGISTRATE CAN DECIDE AS TO POSSESSION—*contd.*

water disappeared. *EMAMBANDEE BEGUM v. TEK BAHADOOR* . . . . . **17 W. R. Cr. 53**

**15.** ———— **Standing crops—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 145**—"Tangible immoveable property." Standing crops are "tangible immoveable property" within the meaning of s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Cheda Lal v. Mul Chand*, *I. L. R. 14 All. 3*, and *Madayya v. Yenkata*, *I. L. R. 11 Mad. 193*, followed. *GANGA PRASAD v. NARAIN* **I. L. R. 15 All. 394**

**16.** ———— **Dispute about right to perform service in a public temple—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 144, 145.** A dispute relating to the right of performing religious service in a public temple when it is likely to cause a breach of the public peace falls under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898). *Muhammad Musaliar v. Kunji Chek Musaliar*, *I. L. R. 11 Mad. 323*, referred to. A dispute arose between certain classes of priests attached to a Hindu temple about the right of performing a certain religious service. On the complaint of one of the parties, the Magistrate of the district purporting to act under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), passed an *ex parte* order prohibiting the other party from taking any part in the said service although both parties had been previously declared by the Civil Court to be entitled to officiate at the service. *Held*, that the order was illegal and opposed to the provisions of s. 145 of the Code. The High Court ordinarily has no jurisdiction to interfere with an order under Ch. XII of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), which is not a proceeding within the meaning of s. 435 of the Code; but when the Magistrate exceeds his jurisdiction under s. 144 or s. 145, the High Court has power to interfere under its revisional jurisdiction (s. 439). *In re PANDURANG GOVIND* . . . . . **I. L. R. 24 Bom. 527**

**17.** ———— **Dispute as to right in burial ground—Possession of manager—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530.** A case in which several persons dispute about the proprietary right in a burial ground should be tried in a Civil Court, and does not properly come under s. 530 or s. 532 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and an order of the Magistrate that he found the manager in possession on behalf of one of the proprietors was set aside. *KASSIM HASSIM SOORTY v. ABRAHIM SOLEMAN* **25 W. R. Cr. 24**

**18.** ———— **Dispute as to a number of plots of land governed by same circumstances—Action of Magistrate only as regards some plots—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530.** A dispute having arisen as to the possession of 109 plots of land to which a claim to possession was made by the raiyats of village A on the one hand and by the raiyats of village B on the other, the Magistrate instituted a proceeding under s. 530 of the Criminal Procedure Code in respect of all the

# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 1. CASES WHICH MAGISTRATE CAN DECIDE AS TO POSSESSION—*contd.*

109 plots, but having taken evidence, dealt in his order with twelve only, directing that the raiyats of village B should be kept in possession. *Held*, that, it appearing that all the 109 plots were covered by the same state of circumstances, the Magistrate had exercised a sound discretion in acting as he did. *AZIM MOLLA v. SATOO PORAMANICK* **10 C. L. R. 523**

**19.** ———— **Dispute as to property of which each of two persons claimed the whole without allegation of joint possession—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530.** Where each of two parties claimed the same share of certain property as a whole estate, neither alleging that the other was joint with him in any way, and the Magistrate, without reference to the right of possession, went into the question of who was in possession and maintained the possession of the party found in possession, the High Court *held* that the case fell under Act X of 1872, s. 530, and saw no necessity to interfere with the decision. *BYJNATH SAHOO v. RUGHOONATH PERSHAD* **25 W. R. Cr. 16**

**20.** ———— **Dispute regarding joint property—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 318.** The decision of the Deputy Magistrate was quashed, because the property in dispute being *ijmali* he had no jurisdiction to try the dispute under s. 318, Code of Criminal Procedure, but ought to have proceeded in the manner laid down in Circular Order No. 10, dated 16th April 1863. *GOLUCK CHUNDER ROY v. RAJ MOHUN BOSE* **17 W. R. Cr. 33**

*See RAMRUNGINEE DOSSEE v. GOOROO DASS ROY* **17 W. R. Cr. 9**

**21.** ———— **Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Joint possession—Jurisdiction of Magistrate.** S. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not apply where two parties are in joint possession of the property in dispute and one of them tries to evict the other so as to endanger the public peace. S. 145 of the Code contemplates a dispute between two parties each of which asserts the right to hold actual possession of property as against the other and not a dispute between a party claiming to hold joint possession and another contesting such right. *TARIYAN BIBEE v. ASAMUDDI BEPABI* . . . . . **4 C. W. N. 426**

**22.** ———— **Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 145, 147—Dispute as to immoveable property—Collection of rent.** A dispute existing between one of the co-sharers of an undivided estate and the lessee of another co-sharer as to the right of the latter to collect rent, such right being denied on the ground that the lessor was not in possession of her share, an inquiry was made under Ch. XII of the Criminal Procedure Code, and the lessor was declared to be in possession of her share. *Held*, that the provisions of that



# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 1. CASES WHICH MAGISTRATE CAN DECIDE AS TO POSSESSION—*contd.*

chapter were not applicable to the dispute in question. *BENI NARAIN v. ACHRAJ NATH*

**I. L. R. 5 All. 607**

**23.** ———— *Land held by co-sharers—Dispute on erection of edifice by one without consent of other—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872), s. 530.* A, a joint owner of a parcel of land, erected on it an edifice without the consent and against the will of B, another joint owner. A dispute having arisen in consequence, the Magistrate held an inquiry, and made an order under s. 530 of the Criminal Procedure Code, awarding to A exclusive possession of the part of the land on which the edifice had been erected. *Held, per JACKSON, J.,* that such order was erroneous, as the matter was not one to which s. 530 could apply. *EMPRESS v. RAJCOOMAR SINGH*

**I. L. R. 3 Calc. 573; 1 C. L. R. 352  
2 C. L. R. 62**

**24.** ———— *Dispute as to building site—Persons not parties to proceedings—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 145, 147.* In a suit to recover a building site, an injunction was issued by the Court restraining the defendants from building on the land pending the decision of the suit. On appeal, the injunction was dissolved on the ground that the defendant was in possession. Subsequent to this order, the District Magistrate, on the complaint of the plaintiff against the defendant, passed an order under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, declaring that K and V were in possession, and forbidding all disturbance of their possession until the decision of a Civil Court. *Held, that,* K and V not being parties to the proceedings, the order was illegal. *Held, also, that,* if a breach of the peace appeared likely to occur, the proper course was for the Magistrate to take security from the party from whom a breach of the peace was apprehended, but that it was not illegal for the Magistrate to proceed under s. 145 or s. 147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *SUBBA v. TRINCAL*  
**I. L. R. 7 Mad. 460**

**25.** ———— *Complaint as to dispossession of land not involving likelihood of breach of peace—Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, s. 145.* Where a proceeding under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898) was instituted upon a complaint of the commission of various offences, none of which necessarily involved a breach of the peace, but included dispossession of land:—*Held, that* the Magistrate was not justified in taking proceedings, under s. 165, Criminal Procedure Code, but the proper course for him was to try the complaint of the offences charged, and in the event of the complainant establishing his case, sufficient to secure the conviction of the accused of an offence attended by criminal force, the Magistrate could, under s. 522 of the Code, order the restoration of the land to the complainant. *KESU alias KESHWAR SINGH v. MOTI MOLLAH*  
**4 C. W. N. 57**

# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 1. CASES WHICH MAGISTRATE CAN DECIDE AS TO POSSESSION—*contd.*

**26.** ———— *Dispute as to possession of land—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 145, 146—Joint possession—Attachment of land and crops—Jurisdiction.* Where two rival zamindars claimed to hold certain alluvial lands, and where it was admitted that they were joint-proprietors of mauza G, but the question also in dispute was whether those lands belonged to mauza G or to mauza N, one of the parties claiming that if they belonged to N he had absolute right in it, and the Magistrate, in a proceeding under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, passed an order under s. 146, Criminal Procedure Code, attaching the lands and also the crops grown upon the lands by the tenants of one of the contending parties:—*Held, that,* the lands not being in the joint possession of the contending parties, the Magistrate had jurisdiction in taking action under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code:—*Held, also, that* there being no dispute between the tenants *inter se*, the order of the Magistrate as to the attachment of the crops on the land, which belonged to the tenant who grew them, was a bad order for want of jurisdiction, and must be set aside. *DENOMONI CHOWDHURI v. MOZAFAR ALI KHAN (1900)*  
**5 C. W. N. 105**

**27.** ———— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Joint property—Definite piece of land in dispute—Jurisdiction.* Where a dispute related to a definite plot of land, but the question was whether this plot was included in a piece of land which was in the exclusive possession of one of the parties, or in another which was the joint property of both the parties in dispute:—*Held, that* the Magistrate had jurisdiction to proceed under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. A Magistrate cannot proceed under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, where the disputed property is itself an undivided share in land, or rent or profit issuing from an undivided share, because in such a case the subject-matter of the dispute is uncertain and its boundaries undefined, and s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, only contemplates disputes as to the possession of definite pieces of land or the rents and profits issuing from definite piece of land. *Tarujan Bibee v. Asamuddi Bepari, 4 C. W. N. 426; Krista Alhadini Dasi v. Radha Syam Panday, 7 C. W. N. 118; Surb Narain Singh v. Birj Mohan Thakur, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 80,* explained. *Quære:* Whether an order by a Magistrate giving a party to a proceeding under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, possession of a greater extent of land than is claimed by him, can be questioned as made without jurisdiction. *MON MOHAN GHOSE v. RAJENDRA COOMAR GHOSE (1903)*

**7 C. W. N. 462**

**28.** ———— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Dispute as to possession of land—Civil suit brought by one party to recover possession from the other, how it affects Magistrate's jurisdiction—Duty of Magistrate to*



**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.****1. CASES WHICH MAGISTRATE CAN DECIDE AS TO POSSESSION—contd.**

*ascertain land in dispute—Order passed in respect of lands in excess of those referred to in the proceedings, if proper.* Under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, a Magistrate has power to intervene and pass a temporary order in regard to the possession of the land in dispute, only until one or other of the parties applies for or obtains a determination of his rights in a Civil Court. Where one of the parties, by bringing a civil suit for recovery of possession, has admitted that the other party are in possession, there is no question as to possession for the Magistrate to decide in a proceeding under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. If he still considers necessary that steps should be taken to preserve the peace, it is open to him to take proceedings under provisions of law other than s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. He has no jurisdiction to proceed under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. When in a proceeding under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, a question is raised as to the identity of the land in dispute, the Magistrate is bound, before going further, to ascertain and identify the lands, so that neither party may be in doubt as to the specific land in respect of which proceedings are taken. A Magistrate has no jurisdiction to decide a dispute as to the lands in excess of those referred to in his proceedings. *AMRITESHWARI DEBI v. DARPA NARAIN DAS* (1903) . . . . . **7 C. W. N. 558**

**29. ——— Evidence of possession—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Order passed *ex parte*—Evidence, necessity of taking.** A Magistrate can proceed *ex parte* in a proceeding under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. But it is not competent for him to pass an order in favour of the party present, without some evidence that such party is in possession. *RAM KRISTA PATRA v. AGHORE NASKAR* (1902) . . . . . **6 C. W. N. 925**

**30. ——— “Subject-matter of dispute”—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 145, 146—“Subject-matter of dispute,” meaning of; whether it refers to whole subject-matter or to component parts—Magistrate, jurisdiction of, to make an order under s. 145 in regard to some, and an order under s. 146 in regard to the remaining, plots—Separate and distinct subject-matter—Divisibility of subject-matter—One proceeding in regard to several plots—Irregularity—Prejudice.** The expression “subject-matter of dispute,” used in ss. 145 and 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, refers to the whole or to any component part or parts thereof. If that component part is distinct and separable from the rest, it cannot rightly be held that, because a magistrate cannot find possession of one of the component parts of the subject-matter in dispute with either party, he is bound to attach the whole, although that component part is distinct and separable from the rest. If the subject-matter in dispute is indivisible and must be dealt with as a whole, it must be dealt with in such a way as to make, in regard to it, one order under either s. 145 or s. 146 of the Code, as the circumstances may require.

**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.****1. CASES WHICH MAGISTRATE CAN DECIDE AS TO POSSESSION—concl.**

*Katras Jherriah Coal Company v. Sib Krishta Daw & Co., I. L. R. 22 Calc. 297*, explained and distinguished. *Rakhal Dass Singh v. Sheo Pershad Singh*, 24 W. R. Cr. 73, referred to. *Per TAYLOR, J.*—In this case each separate plot may be regarded as a separate subject-matter of dispute, and, in that case, each separate plot might form a separate, independent proceeding; and the joint trial in one proceeding of several such matters of dispute would at most amount to an irregularity, which, in the absence of prejudice shown, would not vitiate the inquiry. *Iswar Chunder Chowdhry v. Ambica Churn Majumdar*, 5 C. W. N. 544, relied upon. *SADAR ALI v. ABDUL KARIM* (1901) . . . . . **5 C. W. N. 710**

**2. LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH OF THE PEACE.**

**1. ——— Disputes concerning land—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 145, and s. 107—Procedure.** Where a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning possession of land, proceedings under s. 145, and not under s. 107, of the Criminal Procedure Code, should be instituted. *DOLEGOBIND CHOWDHRY v. DHANU KHAN* . . . . . **I. L. R. 25 Calc. 559**  
*In the matter of the petition of EKRAM SINGH* . . . . . **3 C. W. N. 296**

*BEJOY SINGHA NEOGI v. EMPRESS* . . . . . **3 C. W. N. 463**

**2. ——— Inquiry—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 318.** No inquiry should be made nor order passed giving possession to one side or the other, under s. 318 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, save on the supposition that the dispute is likely to cause a breach of the peace. *QUEEN v. SONACOLAH* . . . . . **2 W. R. Cr. 44**

**3. ——— Order not made after judicial inquiry—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530.** An order of a Magistrate retaining parties in possession of land can only be passed after due judicial inquiry, as required by the Code of Criminal Procedure, s. 530. *SHOINDOO NOSHYO v. RUNG LALL JHAH* . . . . . **25 W. R. Cr. 21**

**4. ——— Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, Ch. XXII.** The inquiry contemplated by Ch. XXII of the Code of Criminal Procedure was a personal inquiry by the Magistrate who makes the order. *ANONYMOUS* . . . . . **4 Mad. Ap. 20**

*ANUNDEE KOOR v. SOONAET KOOR* . . . . . **9 W. R. Cr. 64**

**5. ——— Power of Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530.** The power given to a Magistrate to make a binding declaration as to the possession of any property is an exceptional one, and s. 530 of the Criminal Procedure Code limits the exercise of that power to cases in which the Magistrate is satisfied that a dispute, likely



**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.****2. LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH OF THE PEACE—contd.**

to induce a breach of the peace, exists; it is this likelihood, with the consequent necessity for immediate action, which alone warrants action by the Magistrate. *In the matter of the petition of KUNUND NARAIN BHOOP*

**I. L. R. 4 Calc. 650 : 3 C. L. R. 551**

**ANONYMOUS CASE . . . 4 Mad. Ap. 49**

**6. ———— Ground for action of Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872), s. 531.** In order to justify a magistrate in interfering under s. 530 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is necessary that he should be satisfied that there exists a dispute concerning land which is likely to induce a breach of the peace, i.e., there must be a reasonable apprehension that a disturbance of the peace is likely to occur, rendering it necessary for him to take immediate steps to prevent it, and not merely that it is probable a breach of the peace may occur if proceedings under s. 530 be not taken. **DAMODUR BIDDYADHUR MOHAPATRO v. SYAMANUND DEY . I. L. R. 7 Calc. 385 : 8 C. L. R. 514**

**7. ———— Dispute likely to cause breach of the peace—Duty of Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 145.** It is the duty of a Magistrate, before taking proceedings under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to satisfy himself whether there is any dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, and that the suggested apprehension of a breach of the peace is not merely colourable, and made to induce him to deal with matters properly cognizable by the Civil Court. *In the matter of OBHOY CHANDRA MOOKERJEE. OBHOY CHANDRA MOOKERJEE v. MOHAMED SABIR . I. L. R. 10 Calc. 78 : 13 C. L. R. 410*

**8. ———— Future breach of peace.** There being no present danger of a breach of the peace, the fact that such a breach is likely to take place at a future time will not justify a Magistrate in making an order under s. 530 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872. **UMA CHURN SANTRA v. BENI MADHUB ROY . . . 7 C. L. R. 352**

**(Contra) QUEEN v. MOHESH CHUNDER ROY 24 W. R. Cr. 67**

**9. ———— Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530—Order made on insufficient material—Order without jurisdiction.** Where the proceeding recorded by a Magistrate, under s. 530 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is based on materials which do not disclose sufficient ground for considering that a breach of the peace is imminent, an order calling upon the parties concerned in the dispute to attend in Court, and give in a written statement of their respective claims, in respect of the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute, may be set aside as made without jurisdiction. **CHUNDER MADHUB GHOSE v. JUGGUT CHUNDER SEN 4 C. L. R. 483**

**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.****2. LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH OF THE PEACE—contd.**

**10. ———— Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 318—Grounds for belief in likelihood of breach of peace.** Under the provisions of s. 318 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate should specify the nature of the information received by him, and state the principal facts which by the exercise of a judicial discretion he derives therefrom and which in his judgment constitute grounds for believing that a dispute concerning certain land exists which is likely to induce a breach of the peace; and the roobokari which s. 318 prescribes should plainly set out, without reference to any other documents at all, the actual facts which constituted the ground for such belief on the part of the Magistrate. *In the matter of the petition of Sutherland, 9 B. L. R. 229 : 18 W. R. Cr. 11, explained. In the matter of the petition of KISHOREE MOHUN ROY . . . 19 W. R. Cr. 10*

**11. ———— Requisite evidence.** There is nothing which defines on what grounds the Magistrate shall be satisfied, or limits him to being satisfied by evidence given before him. *In the matter of the petition of SUTHERLAND 9 B. L. R. 229*

**S.C. SUTHERLAND v. CROWDY . 18 W. R. Cr. 11**

Under the Code of 1861, the Magistrate had "to be satisfied that a breach of the peace was likely," and it was formerly held he must be satisfied by evidence. **ANONYMOUS CASE . 4 Mad. Ap. 49**

**TARAFDI MUNDUL v. CHUNDER BHOOSUN BANERJEE . . . 16 W. R. Cr. 74**

A police report was held, both under that Code and under the Code of 1872, not to be sufficient evidence. *In the matter of the petition of BHADRESWARI CHOWDHRAIN . . . 7 B. L. R. 329*

**S.C. BHUDRESSORY CHOWDHRAIN v. GOBERDHUN MAJHEE . . . 16 W. R. Cr. 17**

**ELAHEE NEWOZ KHAN v. SUBURUNNISA 5 W. R. Cr. 14**

*In the matter of the petition of SHAMA-SANKAR MAZUMDAR . . . 9 B. L. R. Ap. 45*

**S.C. SHAMASUNKUR MOZOOMDAR v. ANUNDO-MOYEE DOSSEE . . . 18 W. R. Cr. 64**

**ABHAYA CHOWDHRY v. BRAE 6 B. L. R. Ap. 148 15 W. R. Cr. 42**

**QUEEN v. BHYRO DAYAL SING 3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 4 11 W. R. Cr. 46**

*See also PUDDOMONEE DASSEE v. JUGGODUMBA DASSEE . . . 25 W. R. Cr. 2*

And under the Code of 1872, the report of an Ameen was held not to be sufficient to base an order upon. **QUEEN v. SOUMBER AHIR 20 W. R. Cr. 57**



**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.****2. LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH OF THE PEACE—contd.**

Under the Code of 1872, an explanation was added that the Magistrate might be satisfied as to the likelihood of a breach of the peace on a report or other information, but as to the fact of possession on evidence. The following, however, was a later holding under the Code of 1872 with regard to a police report.

**12.** *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530—Record of grounds—Police report, incorporation of—Evidence of possession—Evidence of title.* In proceedings under s. 530 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate recorded the following words: "Whereas from the police report a breach of the peace is probable" and found that certain persons were in possession:—*Held*, that, although the record of grounds was unsatisfactory, as the initial proceeding did not contain within itself all which the law requires to be recorded, *viz.*, in the first place, that the Magistrate is satisfied that a dispute likely to induce a breach of the peace exists, and in the second place, the ground upon which he is so satisfied, yet that, as the police report from which the grounds for apprehending a breach of the peace appeared was incorporated by reference, the final order was not defective. *In the matter of the petition of KALI KRISTO THAKUR v. GOLAM ALI CHOWDHRY*

**I. L. R. 7 Calc. 46 : 8 C. L. R. 245**

And under the Code of 1882, the Magistrate is now to be "satisfied on a police report or other information."

**13.** *Police report setting out probability of breach of peace. Semble:* That a reference by a Magistrate to a police report which clearly sets out the probability of a breach of the peace is a sufficient statement of the reasons for the Magistrate's being satisfied of the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, within the meaning of s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882. *GOLUCK CHUNDER PAL v. KALI CHARAN DE*

**I. L. R. 13 Calc. 175**

**14.** *Examination of parties—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 318—Land dispute.* When both the disputing parties are examined and state that men were collected by their opponents for the purposes of committing a breach of the peace, a Magistrate is justified, without inquiring who was the aggressor or the aggrieved party, to proceed under s. 318 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and to take whatever steps are in his opinion necessary to prevent a breach of the peace. *GUNGA NARAIN MITTER v. GOUR SOONDER CHOWDHRY*

**15 W. R. Cr. 85**

In cases under the Codes of 1861 and 1872 it was generally ruled that a proceeding stating the grounds for his belief in the likelihood of a breach of the peace must be recorded by the Magistrate. *ANONYMOUS CASE*

**4 Mad. Ap. 49**

**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.****2. LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH OF THE PEACE—contd.**

*TARAFDI MUNDUL v. CHUNDER BHUSUN BANERJEE*

**16 W. R. Cr. 74**

*In the matter of the petition of KUNUND NARAIN BHOOP*

**I. L. R. 4 Calc. 650  
3 C. L. R. 551**

*GRIJAMONEE v. ISHUR CHUNDER*

**W. R. 1864, Cr. 2**

*In re SABHEE SINGH*

**6 W. R. Cr. 50**

*GOVERNMENT v. GHOLAM MAHOMED*

**1 Agra Cr. 33**

*In the matter of KASHEE KISHORE ROY v. TARINI KANT LAHORI*

**3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 76  
15 W. R. Cr. 42 note**

*QUEEN v. RUNJEET MOLLA*

**2 W. R. Cr. 31**

*MUKHODA DOSSEE v. QUEEN*

**18 W. R. Cr. 4**

*In the matter of OKHIL CHUNDER BISWAS*

**1 C. L. R. 48**

*REG. v. OMIRTO NAUTH JHA*

**1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 399**

**6 W. R. Cr. 61**

and that the omission to do so was fatal to the Magistrate's proceedings. *EMAMBANDEE BEGUM v. TEK BAHADOOR*

**17 W. R. Cr. 53**

*HARVEY v. BRICE*

**4 W. R. Cr. 26**

*MUNGLO v. DURGA NARAIN NAG*

**25 W. R. Cr. 74**

In certain cases it was ruled that the recording of a proceeding was unnecessary. *DURIAO SINGH v. UMA PROSHAD*

**24 W. R. Cr. 16**

*GOUR MOHUN MAJEE v. DOOLLUBH MAJEE*

**22 W. R. Cr. 81**

and in one it was doubted whether it was necessary or not. *DAMODUR BIDDYADHUR MOHAPATRO v. SYAMANUND DEY*

**I. L. R. 7 Calc. 385  
8 C. L. R. 514**

No form of proceeding was necessary. *JOYRAM SINGH v. JUGNARAIN DOOBAY*

**10 W. R. Cr. 16**

**15.** The provisions of s. 318 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were held to be substantially complied with when the Magistrate stated that he was satisfied that the disputes between the parties were likely to induce a breach of the peace, and recorded his opinion that the only way of bringing those disputes to a satisfactory settlement was by proceeding under the section quoted. *In the matter of the petition of BISSESHUR NARAIN MAHTAH*

**8 W. R. Cr. 83**

Under the present Code, it is not necessary to record any proceeding, but the order for the attendance of the parties must show the grounds which satisfied the Magistrate.

**16.** *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Procedure—Dispute about right to perform service in a public temple.* A Magistrate professing to act under s. 145



**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.****2. LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH OF THE PEACE—contd.**

of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) is bound to follow the proper procedure. He must set forth the grounds on which he is satisfied that there is a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. *In re PANDURANG GOVIND* I. L. R. 24 Bom. 527

17. *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 145—Breach of the peace—Police report—Duties of Magistrate acting under s. 145—Record of grounds.* Before instituting proceeding under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Magistrate is bound to satisfy himself, on grounds which are reasonable, that a breach of the peace is imminent in regard to properties of the description specified in that section, and that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning them; and the grounds stated by him must be such as to satisfy a Court of revision before which such case may be brought by any of the parties concerned. Where a Magistrate, in consequence of the institution of various cases relating to breaches of the peace between the partizans of two rival zamindars, had directed the police to enquire and report whether there were sufficient grounds for proceeding under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, and having received a report which both suggested the necessity for such proceedings and set forth substantial reasons in support of the suggestion, made such report the foundation for the proceedings which he instituted, it was contended among other things, that the Magistrate had not complied with the provisions of the Code in omitting to state the grounds of his being so satisfied of the imminence of a breach of the peace. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the police report contained abundant evidence of the likelihood of a breach of the peace, it was sufficient, for the purpose of notice to the parties, for the Magistrate to cite it as the ground of his proceeding on which he was satisfied that a dispute within the terms of s. 145 existed, and that it would be open to the parties during the proceedings, if they disputed the necessity for them, to show before the Magistrate that no such dispute existed, or, if so advised, to move the Court of revision to set aside the proceedings, on the ground that the Magistrate had proceeded on grounds which were not reasonable or which could not be held to be sufficient to satisfy him that such a dispute existed. *DHANPUT SINGH v. CHATTERPUT SINGH*

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 513

18. *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 145, 537—Breach of the peace—Record of grounds for Magistrate taking proceedings under s. 145—Police report—Sessions Judge not empowered to order proceedings under s. 145—Invalidity of proceedings so instituted.* To justify the initiation of proceedings under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, it is not sufficient that in course of a trial, it should appear from the statement of a witness examined that a breach of the peace is likely to ensue in consequence of a dispute regard-

**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.****2. LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH OF THE PEACE—contd.**

ing land. Before taking action, the Magistrate is bound to be satisfied from a police report or other information on this point, and he is also bound to make an order in writing stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and this must be served on the parties to the dispute; for it is the intention of the law, not only that Magistrate should have sufficient grounds for proceeding under s. 145, but that they should inform the parties concerned of the grounds on which they are proceeding. A Sessions Judge is not competent to order a Magistrate to take action under s. 145. He should rather draw his attention to the nature of the dispute in the trial before him, so that the Magistrate may exercise his own discretion as to the necessity of proceedings. Proceedings so initiated, when there is nothing in the police report or elsewhere to justify them, would be void, and s. 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code would have no application. *Gour Mohan Majee v. Doollubh Majee*, 22 W. R. Cr. 81, dissented from. *Dhanput Singh v. Chatterput Singh*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 513, followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GOBIND CHANDRA DAS* I. L. R. 20 Calc. 520

19. *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 145—Authority of District Magistrate—Sub-Divisional Magistrate.* In a case where a District Magistrate made an order stating that in his opinion it was the duty of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to institute proceedings under s. 145 of Criminal Procedure Code:—*Held*, that the District Magistrate had no authority in law to direct the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to institute such proceedings. A Magistrate proceeding under this section must himself be satisfied by a police report or other information that there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace, and he has a discretion as to whether to institute proceedings or not. *Queen-Empress v. Govind Chandra Das*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 520, followed. *KAILASH CHANDRA PAL v. KUNJA BEHARI PODDAR* I. L. R. 24 Calc. 391  
1 C. W. N. 393

20. *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Likelihood of breach of the peace arising from act of aggressive party.* Where the Magistrate found that the persons who attempted to do *bastu puja*, which is said to have provoked the petitioners, were not entitled to perform this *puja*:—*Held*, that, if the petitioners acted properly and within their rights, there was no reason to suppose that any breach of the peace was likely to be committed by them. *Held*, also, that, if the Magistrate were to find that there was likely to be some dispute regarding the possession of the waste land on which the *puja* was attempted to be performed, the proper course for him to take would be to institute proceedings under s. 145. *BEJOY SINGHA NEOGI v. EMPRESS*

3 C. W. N. 463

21. *Order not stating that Magistrate was satisfied that there was likeli-*



**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.****2. LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH OF THE PEACE—contd.**

hood of breach of the peace—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, s. 145*. Where the order instituting proceedings under s. 145, *Criminal Procedure Code*, did not state that the Magistrate had satisfied himself that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed concerning any land, and there was nothing to indicate a likelihood of a breach of the peace in the petition of complaint on which the proceedings were based:—*Held*, that the proceedings were without jurisdiction, and as such must be set aside. *KESU alias KESHWAR SINGH v. MOTI MOLLAH* . . . . . **4 C. W. N. 57**

**22.** ———— *Order instituting proceedings under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898)—Contents of such order—Irregularity in order, making proceedings without jurisdiction*. Unless a Magistrate complies strictly with the terms of s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by stating in his written order all the particulars necessary to enable him to act under that section, his proceedings are without jurisdiction. It is not sufficient that the Magistrate should have before him a police report, and that he should have given orders thereon that a written order be drawn up within the terms of s. 145. It is his duty to draw up or have drawn up, an order which in all respects satisfies the requirements of the law. It is absolutely necessary that the written order should be correct and complete in its terms. *MOHESH SOWAR v. NARAIN BAG* . . . . .

**I. L. R. 27 Calc. 981**

**23.** ———— *Dispute as to possession—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 107, 145—Dispute as to land—Security to keep the peace, order for—Procedure*. Where a dispute, which is likely to cause a breach of the peace, relates to the possession of land, the Magistrate should proceed under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, and not under s. 107. Where, in such a case, proceedings were drawn up under s. 107, Code of Criminal Procedure, and only one of the parties was bound down to keep the peace, the order was set aside as bad. *Dole Gobind Chowdry v. Dhanu Khan*, **I. L. R. 25 Calc. 5:9**, followed. *BIDHU BHUSAN CHATTERJI v. ANNODA CHURN KANANGUI* (1902)

**6 C. W. N. 883**

**24.** ———— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 107, 145, 146—Possession of immoveable property, dispute as to—Order requiring security for keeping the peace, if proper—Procedure*. When the apprehension of a breach of the peace is found to be contingent upon an attempt by either of the parties in dispute to exercise acts of possession upon a disputed piece of land, the Magistrate should proceed under ss. 145, 146, Code of Criminal Procedure, and not under s. 107. *BALAI MAHTO v. NOBIN MANJHI* (1902)

**7 C. W. N. 29**

**25.** ———— *Grounds for action of Magistrate—Immoveable property, dispute as to—*

**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.****2. LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH OF THE PEACE—contd.**

*Order of Magistrate, contents of—Breach of the peace—Opportunity to produce evidence—Sessions Judge, power of revision or reference—High Court, powers of—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 145 and 435—Charter Act (24 & 25 Vict., c. 104), s. 15*. Proceedings under Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not proceedings with regard to which a Sessions Judge has any power of revision or reference, nor has he the power to call for the records in such proceedings. The High Court only can interfere, under the power of superintendence conferred upon it by the Charter Act. The order of a Magistrate instituting proceedings under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should set out the grounds on which he is satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed, and the parties to the proceedings should be given an opportunity of adducing their evidence. *JAGOMOHAN PAL v. RAM KUMAR GOPE* (1901)

**I. L. R. 28 Calc. 416**

**26.** ———— *Non-joinder of necessary parties—Jurisdiction—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 145—High Court—Subordinate Criminal Courts—Circumstances under which they have jurisdiction*. The High Court has power to set aside a proceeding under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the non-joinder of parties, whose presence is essentially necessary for the proper and effectual decision of the case. *Laldhari Singh v. Sukdeo Narain Singh*, **I. L. R. 27 Calc. 892**, followed. Under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a special jurisdiction is vested in the subordinate Criminal Courts under special circumstances and for a special purpose. When the special circumstances do not exist or when the order made under s. 145 does not attain the purpose for which the jurisdiction is created, then the special jurisdiction vested under that section falls to the ground. The circumstances under which the jurisdiction springs up are circumstances which give rise to an apprehension of a breach of the peace, and, if there is no apprehension of a breach of the peace, there is no jurisdiction to make the order. The purpose the Legislature had in view was the prevention of a breach of the peace. If that object is not attained by an order purporting to be made under s. 145, it must be taken to have been without jurisdiction. *ANESH MOLLAH v. EJA HARUDDI MOLLAH* (1901)

**I. L. R. 28 Calc. 446**

**s.c. 5 C. W. N. 428**

**27.** ———— *Initiation of proceedings—Recording of order under s. 145 (1), Criminal Procedure Code*. The recording of a proper order under sub-s. (1) of s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, is necessary, to give a Magistrate jurisdiction to take proceedings under that section. Such order should state the information upon which the Magistrate has reason to suppose that a breach of the peace



**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.****2. LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH OF THE PEACE—contd.**

is probable or imminent. *MANIK v. AZIMUDDI* (1902) . . . . . **6 C. W. N. 923**

**28. ——— Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Dispute as to possession of land—Inquiry by Magistrate before institution of proceedings—Source of information, if to be stated in order starting proceedings—Reason for making such statement.** The object of drawing up a proceeding prior to the issue of notice under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, can only be to inform the parties of the grounds or the information which satisfied the Magistrate that a dispute existed. Where, before instituting proceedings under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate himself held an inquiry in the presence of the parties, and satisfied himself by that inquiry that there was a likelihood of a breach of the peace, and thereupon made an order directing the institution of the proceedings:—*Held*, that the proceedings were not invalid merely because the Magistrate in his order did not state the source of his information, the parties having already become aware of that in the course of the inquiry. *Manik v. Azimuddi*, **6 C. W. N. 923**; *Mohesh Sowar v. Narain Bag*, **I. L. R. 27 Calc. 981**, referred to and distinguished. *SABID MONDAL v. LAKSHMI MONDUL* (1902)

**7 C. W. N. 599**

**29. ——— Jurisdiction—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 107, 145—Proceedings under s. 145 of the Code, initiation of—Security for keeping the peace.** The making of a formal order under sub-s. (1) of s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code is absolutely necessary, to give the Magistrate jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under that section. Where a notice was issued on the parties, under s. 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to show cause why they should not execute a bond to keep the peace; and the Magistrate at the hearing recorded an order wherein he stated that it appeared to him that, on the facts, the case was one for the application of s. 145 of the Code, and not of s. 107, and he then proceeded to "bind down" the first party under sub-s. (6) of s. 145:—*Held*, that the expression "bind down" was not correct, and that the order was entirely bad. *SUKRU DOSADH v. RAM PERGASH SINGH* (1902) . **I. L. R. 30 Calc. 443**  
**s.c. 7 C. W. N. 174**

**30. ——— Stay of proceedings—Jurisdiction—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Magistrate, power of, to stay proceedings and cancel order passed by him under sub-s. (1)—Revision—High Court, interference by.** A Magistrate has jurisdiction to cancel an order passed under sub-s. (1) of s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code and to stay proceedings if he becomes satisfied, whatever the source of information may be, that the state of things does not exist, which alone would

**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.****2. LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH OF THE PEACE—contd.**

give jurisdiction to proceed with the inquiry. Where, therefore, a Magistrate having instituted proceedings and passed an order under sub-s. (1) of s. 145, received information, which he believed, that there no longer existed a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, and, before any written statement had been filed by either side, cancelled his order and stayed the proceedings:—*Held*, that the High Court could not interfere, as the Magistrate had not acted without jurisdiction. *Tarini Charan Chowdhry v. Amulya Ratan Roy*, **I. L. R. 20 Calc. 867**, referred to. *Hurbullubh Narain Singh v. Luchmeswar Prosad Singh*, **I. L. R. 26 Calc. 188**, distinguished. *MANINDRA CHANDRA NANDI v. BARADA KANTA CHOWDHRY* (1902)

**I. L. R. 30 Calc. 112**  
**s.c. 6 C. W. N. 417**

**31. ——— Successive police reports—Procedure—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Possession of immovable property, dispute as to—Irregularity of proceedings.** When proceedings taken under s. 145 on a police report, which was defective in not showing the boundaries of the lands in dispute, were dropped, and fresh proceedings were instituted on a later report which did not state that there was any apprehension of a breach of the peace, and the Magistrate in his judgment referred to both reports:—*Held*, that only the latter report, on which he purported to act, was to be considered, and that report was not sufficient to give jurisdiction under the section. *RADHA GOBIND v. GOSSAIN MOHENDRA GIR* (1901)  
**6 C. W. N. 340**

**32. ——— Police report, contents of—Breach of the peace—Chur—Extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Charter Act (24 & 25 Vict., c. 104), s. 15.** A reference by the Magistrate in the initiatory order to a police report, which clearly sets out the likelihood of a breach of the peace, is a sufficient statement of his reasons for being satisfied of the existence of a dispute likely to cause such breach of the peace. *Khosh Mahomed Sircar v. Nazir Mahomed*, **9 C. W. N. 1065**, followed. The police report on which the Magistrate founds the initiatory order should contain a statement of facts from which he may be satisfied of the existence of a likelihood of a breach of the peace. It is essential for the assumption of jurisdiction by a Magistrate that he should be satisfied, from a police report or other information that there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace: the mere fact that there is a dispute concerning land is not sufficient by itself to give him jurisdiction. *Gobind Chunder Moitra v. Abdool Sayed*, **I. L. R. 6 Calc. 835**, and *Anesh Molla v. Ejaharuddi*, **I. L. R. 28 Calc. 446**, referred to. The Magistrate should exercise his own judgment in arriving at a conclusion as to the likelihood of a breach of the peace from the mate-



**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—***contd.***2. LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH OF THE PEACE**  
—*concl'd.*

rials before him or the circumstances within his knowledge, and he ought not to act upon a mere expression of opinion by the police not accompanied by a statement of facts sufficient to satisfy him and to enable him to form his own opinion. But it is not necessary that the police report should show an actual assembly of men or other specific overt acts. *Puddomonee Dassee v. Jugodumba Dassee*, 25 W. R. Cr. 2, and *Rajah Run Bahadur v. Rane Tilessuree Koer*, 22 W. R. Cr. 79, dissented from. The High Court should not ordinarily examine whether the grounds on which the Magistrate was satisfied as to the likelihood of a breach of the peace afford a reasonable foundation for his conclusions. *Dhunput Singh v. Chatterput Singh*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 513, dissented from. The "imminence" of a breach of the peace, as indicating a higher degree of the chance of the event happening than is denoted by the "likelihood" of it is not essential for the exercise of jurisdiction by the Magistrate. *Gobind Chunder Moitra v. Abdool Sayad*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 835; *Kali Kishen Tagore v. Anund Chunder Roy*; I. L. R. 23 Calc. 557, and *Janu Manjhi v. Maniruddin*, 8 C. W. N. 590, dissented from. *Uma Churn Santra v. Beni Madhub Roy*, 7 C. L. R. 352, and *Damodur Bidyadhar Mohapatra v. Syamanund Dey*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 385, approved of. Under s. 15 of the Charter Act the Court will not interfere, unless it is satisfied that the party seeking the interference has been prejudiced by the proceedings in the Court below. *Sukh Lal Sheikh v. Tara Chand Ta*, 9 C. W. N. 1046, followed. *Sheikh Munglo v. Durga Narain Nag*, 25 W. R. Cr. 74, *Chunder Madhub Ghose v. Juggat Chunder Sen*, 4 C. L. R. 483, *Queen-Empress v. Gobinda Chundra Das*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 520, and *Kali Kissen Tagore v. Anund Chunder Roy*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 557, explained. *Gour Mohan Majee v. Doollubh Majee*, 22 W. R. Cr. 81, referred to. Where a party chooses to wait and take the chance of a judgment in his favour he cannot be heard to complain of an excess of jurisdiction and to claim, as a matter of right, that the proceedings should be set aside. *Marsden v. Wardle*, 3 E. & B. 695, followed. *Farquharson v. Morgan*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 552, not followed. There is no inflexible rule of law that a Magistrate, in deciding the question of possession under s. 145 of the Code, is concluded by every previous order of a Civil or Criminal Court relating to the subject of dispute, and the weight to be attached to any such previous order depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. *Gobind Chunder Moitra v. Abdool Sayad*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 835, *Sims v. Johurry Lal*, 5 C. W. N. 563, and *Doulat Koeri v. Rameswari Koeri*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 652, distinguished. *Lowsen Santal v. Kali Churn Santal*, 8 C. W. N. 719, and *Gulraj Marwari v. Sheikh Bhatoo*, I. L. R. 32 Calc. 796, approved of. *KULADA KINKAR ROY v. DANESH MIR* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 33

**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—***contd.***3. PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS.**

1. ——— Parties claiming to be in possession of land, the subject of dispute, right of, to appear in proceedings—*Criminal Procedure Code*, s. 145. Before taking action under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate is bound to be satisfied from a police report or other information as to the likelihood of a breach of the peace, and he is also bound to make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and this must be served on the parties to the dispute; for it is the intention of the law, not only that Magistrates should have sufficient grounds for proceeding under s. 145, but that they should inform the parties concerned of the grounds on which they are proceeding. Parties who, though not actually involved in the dispute, claim to be in possession of lands which are the subject of proceedings under s. 145, should not be shut out from giving evidence in support of their claims. To do so would undoubtedly occasion very serious prejudice and interference with any possession which they might be able to establish. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GOBIND CHUNDRA DAS*

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 520

2. ——— Parties concerned in proceedings—*Criminal Procedure Code*, s. 145. The words "parties concerned" in s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code do not necessarily mean only the persons who are disputing, but include also persons who are interested in, or claiming a right to, the property in dispute. *RAM CHANDRA DAS v. MONOHUR ROY* . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 29

3. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code* (Act V of 1898), s. 145—"Parties concerned," meaning of. The words "concerned in the dispute," as used in s. 145, *Criminal Procedure Code* (Act V of 1898), are not limited to the parties actually concerned in the dispute, but include parties concerned in the subject-matter of the dispute, who would be affected by the Magistrate's order maintaining the possession of any third party in their absence. *GANESH JALIA v. AYABALI CHAUDHURI* . . . 4 C. W. N. 753

4. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code* (Act X of 1882), s. 145—"Parties concerned in dispute"—*Death of one of original parties—Substitution of party without fresh proceeding under s. 145—Possession at time of institution of proceeding or at time of final order—Criminal Procedure Code*, s. 537. In a proceeding under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure recorded on the 27th April 1893, A and B were respectively made first and second parties, and were ordered to put in statements of their claims to the land in dispute, which they accordingly did. B died on 24th May 1893. In his statement filed on the 31st May, A disclaimed any interest in the land, but stated that his mother, D K (who had been a party concerned in the dispute which led to the original proceeding), was the owner and in possession of it. On 1st June B S applied to be substituted as



# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 3. PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS—*contd.*

a party in place of his father *B. D K* and *B S* were made parties without any fresh proceeding under s. 145 of the Code. The case was heard on 27th June and 7th July, and on 17th July the Magistrate found as regards the possession in favour of *D K. Held*, by *PETHERAM, C.J.*, and *TREVELYAN, J.* (*RAMPINI, J.*, dissenting), that since the possession to be enquired into was the possession at the time of the initiation of the proceedings, the words "parties concerned in the dispute" meant parties concerned at that time: there was no power in such a proceeding to introduce parties who were not concerned in the original dispute. No order could therefore be made against *B S*, and the proceedings were bad as against him. *Per RAMPINI, J.*—The preliminary proceeding under s. 145 of the Code may, and in many cases must, partake of the character of a general citation to all the parties concerned in the dispute to appear, and it is not necessary for the Magistrate to confine his final order as to possession to the parties whom he may have named in the preliminary proceeding. The Magistrate had power to substitute the name of *B S* for that of his father without commencing the proceedings *de novo*. The alteration in s. 145 of Act X of 1882, the present Criminal Procedure Code, of the language of s. 530 of the old Code, Act X of 1872, implies, that the Magistrate is to decide on the possession not at the time of the initiation of the proceedings, but at the time of recording the evidence. If there was any error in the proceedings, it was one cured by s. 537 of the Code. *BECHU SHEIKH v. DEB KUMARI DAS*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 404

5. ——— Adding parties—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Jurisdiction—Breach of the peace—Joint trial of several cases, whether legal.* A Magistrate must deal with a case under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, as it is originally instituted. If he finds that he cannot do so in respect to one side because they are not parties to the dispute or because it has been shown that no breach of the peace is likely to occur from any action of theirs, he should put an end to the case. A Magistrate is not competent to add parties after the institution of proceedings. Where a Magistrate tried together three cases under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, by consent of parties:—*Held*, that the parties in all the cases not being the same, the procedure adopted by the Magistrate was bad in law. That the evidence already taken might be accepted in one of the cases, but the other cases must be separately tried. *RAJ KUMAR SINGH v. MAHADEO SINGH*

4 C. W. N. 748

6. ——— Manager of company—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 145—Right to notice.* Where proceedings under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were instituted by a Magistrate regarding a dispute as to the right to dig for coal in a certain mouzah which was claimed by a

# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 3. PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS—*contd.*

company to the exclusion of those in possession of the surface rights of a portion of the mouzah, and the Magistrate made the manager of the company only a party to the proceedings, and not the company itself, and an order was made under the section in favour of the manager:—*Held*, that the order was bad and must be set aside, as the parties interested were not properly before the Court. The manager had no interest, except as such, or possession except as representing the company, and such possession is not the kind of possession contemplated by the section. *BEHARY LALL TRIGUNAIT v. DARBY*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 915

*NEWAZ ALI v. RAM BALLABH CHAKRAVARTI*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 916 note

*See BATHOO LALL v. DOMI LALL*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 727

*DUKHI MULLAH v. HALWAY*

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 55

7. ——— Manager in possession—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 145—Possession, order of criminal Court as to.* A person who is in possession of land merely as manager for the actual proprietor should not be made a party to proceedings under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *Behary Lall Trigunait v. Darby, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 915*, followed. *BROWN v. PRITHIRAJ MANDAL*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 423

8. ——— Parties bound by order—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 145.* Orders passed under the Criminal Procedure Code, s. 145, are binding only on the actual parties to the cases in which they are made. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KUPPAYAR*

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 51

9. ——— Parties concerned—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 145—Initial proceedings—Adding parties during the course of the proceeding.* Before initiating proceedings under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is the duty of the Magistrate not only to be satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists, but also to ascertain, as far as possible, who are concerned in the dispute. The Magistrate has no power to add parties during the course of the proceeding unless in the initial proceeding he is satisfied that they are concerned in the dispute. If in the course of the proceedings it appears to the Magistrate that it is absolutely necessary that other parties should be required to attend, the only course open to him is to initiate a new proceeding. *Ram Chandra Das v. Monohur Roy, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 29*, discussed. *PROTAP NARAIN SINGH v. RAJENDRA NARAIN SINGH*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 55

1 C. W. N. 3

10. ——— Parties concerned, meaning of—*Collection of rents—Zamindars and tenants versus rival zamindars and tenants—Necessary parties to proceedings under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure—Omission to add necessary parties—*



# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 3. PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS—*contd.*

*Addition of parties during proceedings.* The words in s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure “parties concerned” in a dispute do not necessarily mean only the parties who are disputing, but include also persons who are interested in or claiming a right to the property in dispute. It is the duty of the Magistrate on the materials before him to ascertain, so far as he can, who are the persons interested in or claiming a right to the property in dispute and to give notice to them all, so that the whole matter, so far as his Court is concerned, may be disposed of in one proceeding. *Ram Chandra Das v. Monohur Roy*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 29, and *Protap Narain Singh v. Rajendra Narain Singh*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 55, followed. Where there was a dispute as to the ownership of lands between certain zamindars and their tenants on the one side and other zamindars and their tenants on the other, and the real matter for determination was not merely which of the two parties of zamindars were entitled to collect the rents of the lands, but also which set of rival tenants was entitled to hold actual possession of the lands, and in a proceeding under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the zamindars only were made parties and not the tenants. *Held per* (AMEER ALI and STANLEY, JJ.), that the tenants were necessary parties to the proceeding, and the omission to make them parties went to the root of the case and was an illegality affecting jurisdiction which would justify the High Court in setting aside the order. *PRINSEP, J.*—The omission to join the tenants could not vitiate an order as between the zamindars on an objection that it was without jurisdiction, and that no question of jurisdiction arose in the matter. The High Court’s powers are under the Charter Act, and these could be exercised only in respect of jurisdiction. *LALDHARI SINGH v. SUKDEO NARAIN SINGH*. I. L. R. 27 Calc. 892 4 C. W. N. 613

11. ——— Party coming in and showing that there is no likelihood of breach of peace—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, s. 145, cl. (5)—Necessary parties.* S. 145, cl. 5, of Act V of 1898 does not enable a Magistrate to add parties to the proceedings, but permits a stranger to come in and show that no such dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace concerning any land or water exists or has existed, and the latter does not become, nor can he be made, a party to the dispute which he seeks to show has never existed. *Semble*: Where it appeared from the police report that the petitioners were also concerned in the dispute, and the Magistrate found that they were brothers of the first party living in joint mess and belonging to a joint undivided family, such persons ought to have been made parties to the proceedings under s. 145. *JANOKI NATH ROY v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*. . . . . 3 C. W. N. 329

12. ——— Addition of parties—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Dispute as to possession of land—Parties, adding of—Previous*

# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 3. PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS—*contd.*

*proceeding—New proceeding with new parties added, whether it can be treated as continuation of previous proceeding—Jurisdiction—Procedure.* In a proceeding under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is the duty of the Magistrate to find out in the first instance which parties are concerned in the dispute that has arisen, and to serve his order upon such parties; and, when the matter comes before him for trial, he should determine which of such parties, namely, the parties mentioned in the first paragraph of s. 145 of the Code, is in actual possession. A Magistrate is entitled to allow a third party to come in in the course of the proceeding only for the purpose of showing that no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace really existed or exists. *Quære*: Whether such third party should be made a party to the proceeding. A Magistrate has not the power, after recording the proceeding as he is required to do under the first paragraph of the section, to add, in the course of the investigation, any new party as concerned in the dispute. *Protap Narayan Singh v. Rajendra Narayan Singh*, 1 C. W. N. 3; *Janoki Nath Roy v. The Queen-Empress*, 3 C. W. N. 329; *Laldhari Singh v. Sukhdeo Narain Singh*, 4 C. W. N. 613, followed. A Magistrate cannot treat a subsequent proceeding as a continuation of an earlier one, and he cannot refer back to the possession held by one or other of the parties upon the date of the earlier proceeding in determining which of them should be declared to be in possession on the date of the subsequent proceeding. *BENI SINGH v. UMRAO MAHTO* (1900) . . . . . 5 C. W. N. 900

13. ——— Jurisdiction—“Parties concerned in such dispute,” meaning of—*Addition of parties during proceedings, effect of—Fresh Proceedings, if necessary—Omission to add necessary parties—Dispute as to separate plots of land—Separate proceedings, if necessary—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145.* Proceedings under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code are not without jurisdiction because the Magistrate on information before him has made parties thereto only those actually in dispute and likely to cause a breach of the peace, although it is brought to his notice that another party is interested in the subject-matter of the dispute; nor is the Magistrate bound to stay such proceedings. The words “parties concerned in such dispute” are intended to indicate all persons claiming to be in possession at the time of the initial orders under sub-s. (1), s. 145, of the Code. A claim merely to a right to possession, as distinguished from a claim to be in possession, would be outside the scope of the inquiry. Where there has been an addition of a party after the initiation of the proceedings, there is no necessity for fresh proceedings, if the party added was concerned originally in the dispute which is the foundation of the proceedings. Up to the time the enquiry begins, parties may be added. If they are added after, it is an irregularity, but it is not necessary to initiate fresh proceedings, although evi-



# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 3. PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS—*contd.*

dence previously taken ought, if the parties added require it, to be again taken in their presence. Proceedings under s. 145 are not without jurisdiction because some person claiming possession in some way of the lands or a portion of the lands in dispute has not been made a party, he not being one of the parties in the dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, so far as appeared to the Magistrate; such person not having appeared and raised any objection. Proceedings under s. 145 are not without jurisdiction because some of the parties are concerned only with possession of a portion of the lands in dispute. *Protap Narain Singh v. Rajendra Narain Singh*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 55, declared obsolete. *KRISHNA KAMINI v. ABDUL JUBBAR* (F.B. 1902) . . . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 155 s.c. 6 C. W. N. 737

14. ——— **Manager—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Order in favour of the manager of the proprietors of an indigo concern—Jurisdiction.** An order under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code was passed in favour of the manager who was an employee of the proprietors of an indigo concern. *Held*, that the order was without jurisdiction. *JHABU SINGH v. RUTHERFORD* (1902)

7 C. W. N. 208

15. ——— **Manager or agent—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Dispute as to possession of land—Manager or agent, if order can be made in favour of—Possession—Actual possession—Possession as proprietor.** There is jurisdiction in the Court under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, to make an order in favour of a person who claims to be in possession of the disputed land as agent to, or manager for, the proprietors, when the actual proprietors are not residents within the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. *Jhabu Singh v. Rutherford*, 7 C. W. N. 208, overruled. *DHONDHAI SINGH v. FOLLET* (1903)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 48

7 C. W. N. 825

16. ——— **Necessary parties—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Object of the section—Magistrate, duty of, to ascertain necessary parties—Necessary parties, omission of, to bring in, whether vitiates proceeding—Jurisdiction of Magistrate—Names of parties disclosed in written statements and police-report—Persons interested in, or interested in claiming, possession of land, and person alleged to be in de facto possession of portion of land, whether necessary parties.** The principal object which a proceeding under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, aims at is the prevention of a breach of the peace, and such object cannot be achieved if persons who are interested in, or at any rate interested in claiming, possession of the land in dispute, and persons who are alleged to be in de facto possession of a portion of such land, are not made parties to it; and an order made under the section in the absence of such parties is made without jurisdiction. *Laldhari Singh v. Sukdeo Narain Singh*,

# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 3. PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS—*concl.*

4 C. W. N. 613, and *Anesh Mollah v. Ejahar Uddi Mollah*, 5 C. W. N. 428, referred to. It is the duty of a Magistrate, before he institutes proceedings under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, not only to be satisfied that a dispute exists, but also to ascertain, so far as is possible, who are the parties concerned in the dispute. *Protap Narain Singh v. Rajendra Narain Singh*, I C. W. N. 3, followed. *MANGAL HALDAR v. NAIMUDDI FAKIR* (1901) . . . 6 C. W. N. 101

17. ——— **Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Claims made by two sets of tenants—Parties, necessary—Landlords, if necessary parties—Omission to make them parties, if it vitiates proceedings—Separate plots of lands—Separate proceedings if absolutely necessary—Jurisdiction.** Where, in a proceeding under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, two sets of tenants who claimed possession of the disputed lands were made parties and their landlords were not, though the latter were persons interested in the dispute, still, when they had never moved in the matter themselves, an objection as to want of necessary parties made by the tenants, was considered not *bona fide*, and was not entertained. Although it may be desirable, in proceedings under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, to deal with each separate dispute separately it is impossible to apply to such proceedings the strict rule of procedure which has to be observed in civil actions. *Kutuhul Singh v. Uma Singh*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 31; *Abhayessari Debi v. Shidhessari Debi*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 513, and *Azim Mollah v. Satoo Paramunick*, 10 C. L. R. 523, referred to. *In the matter of MANIK MANDAL v. GOVIND MANDAL* (1901) . . . 6 C. W. N. 206

18. ——— **Persons disclaiming interest—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Order in favour of persons, some of whom disclaim all interest in subject-matter of dispute, if legal—Jurisdiction.** An order under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, made in favour of four persons, two of whom claim no interest in the property in dispute, is not warranted by law, and is bad for want of jurisdiction. *RAMESWAR PERSAD NARAIN SINGH v. HARBANS SINGH* (1901) 6 C. W. N. 104

## 4. NOTICE TO PARTIES.

1. ——— **Obligation of Magistrate to give notice.** A Magistrate professing to act under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) is bound to issue notices to all the parties concerned, so as to give them an opportunity to put in their respective claims. *In re PANDURANG GOVIND* . . . I. L. R. 24 Bom. 527

2. ——— **Right to notice—Parties to proceedings—Service of notice—Co-sharers.** In a proceeding under s. 318, Act XXV of 1861, there is nothing in the law which makes it necessary for the Magistrate to serve notice on all the co-sharers in an estate which may form the subject of the dis-



# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 4. NOTICE TO PARTIES—*concl'd.*

pute. *In the matter of the petition of* GABINDA CHANDRA GHOSH . . . **9 B. L. R. Ap. 39**

S.C. GOBIND CHUNDER GHOSE V. ANUNDO CHUNDER SIRCAR . . . **18 W. R. Cr. 54**

3. ———— **Service of notice—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 318—Service of notice to attend.** The mere service of a notice upon a mofussil naib who takes no steps whatever to consult his employer or act under his directions is not such a notice as is contemplated by s. 318, Code of Criminal Procedure, in a case of dispute regarding possession of land. *RAMRUNGINEE DOSSEE v. GOOROO DOSS ROY* . . . **17 W. R. Cr. 9**

4. ———— **Order under s. 530, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, to whom addressed.** *Quære*: Whether an order under s. 530, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, can be directed to others than the unsuccessful party to the proceedings under the section; or whether such an order could properly be directed to the public at large. *In the matter of NOBO KISHORE CHUCKERBUTTY* . . . **7 C. L. R. 291**

5. ———— **Nature and form of notice—Intervenor.** Although no particular mode of giving notice, calling upon parties to attend under this section before the Magistrate, has been provided, yet the language of the section indicates that the notice shall be addressed to known individuals, and not be in the form of a public proclamation or citation. There is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code for allowing an intervenor to come in in the middle of proceedings held by a Magistrate under s. 530 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872. *In the matter of the petition of KUNUND NARAIN BHOOP* . . . **I. L. R. 4 Calc. 650: 3 C. L. R. 551**

6. ———— **Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Possession, dispute relating to—Notice to party of place of trial to be given in sufficient time to enable him to produce evidence—Magistrate moving about from place to place.** In a proceeding under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, the second party failed to ascertain where the Magistrate, who had been moving about from place to place, was holding his camp, and so failed to procure the attendance of his witnesses at the trial:—*Held*, that an order passed by the Magistrate, directing the first party to continue in possession, was bad, inasmuch as the second party had no notice of the place of trial in sufficient time to procure the attendance of his witnesses. *KALI NATH MISTRI v. ABHOY BEPARI* (1903) . . . **7 C. W. N. 705**

## 5. EVIDENCE, MODE OF TAKING, ETC.

1. ———— **Oral evidence—Determination of question of possession.** Oral evidence is the principal matter upon which Magistrates can proceed in determining a question of possession under the

# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 5. EVIDENCE, MODE OF TAKING, ETC.—*contd.*

Code of Criminal Procedure. *GOBIND NAUTH RAI v. ANUND NAUTH RAI* . . . **5 W. R. Cr. 79**

2. ———— **Witnesses—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 318—Examination of witnesses.** A Magistrate, proceeding under s. 318 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is bound to examine any witnesses tendered in support of the respective claims to actual possession of the land in dispute before passing an order. *ANONYMOUS* . . . **6 Mad. Ap. 4**

*ANUNDER KOORER v. SONAET KOORER* . . . **9 W. R. Cr. 64**

3. ———— **Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 145—Procedure under that section—Attendance of witnesses—Process to enforce attendance.** Proceedings under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code should on all points of procedure be regarded as summons cases; and although it is discretionary with a Magistrate to issue a summons on a witness in such a case, yet, when any one of the parties applies at a proper time for process to secure the attendance of his witnesses, the Magistrate should not arbitrarily refuse his assistance; and where such refusal is made, it is incumbent on the Magistrate to record his reasons for such refusal. *In the matter of the petition of HURENDRO NARAIN SINGH CHOWDHRY* . . . **I. L. R. 11 Calc. 762**

4. ———— **Criminal Procedure Code, s. 145—Issue of summons to witnesses—Magistrate, duty of—Process to enforce attendance of witnesses.** Though in a proceeding under s. 145, the evidence is to be recorded as in a summons case, it is the duty of the Magistrate to issue processes for the attendance of such witnesses as the parties may desire to call, unless he can show good reasons for not doing so. *Hurendro Narain Singh Chowdhry v. Bhobani Prea Baruani*, **I. L. R. 11 Calc. 762**, followed. *RAM CHANDRA DAS v. MONOHUR ROY* . . . **I. L. R. 21 Calc. 29**

5. ———— **Evidence on oath—Actual possession.** In a proceeding under s. 318 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, to determine the right of actual possession, it is necessary that the evidence should be taken upon oath. *QUEEN v. KALI CHANDRA SHAH* . . . **7 B. L. R. 322: 16 W. R. Cr. 13**

But it appears not to be absolutely necessary to examine witnesses at all. *Semble*: If examined, the evidence should be on oath. *QUEEN v. BALABH KANT BHATTACHARJEE* . . . **7 B. L. R. 324 note: 11 W. R. Cr. 36**

6. ———— **Recording evidence—Omission to record evidence—Inquiry.** Taking the statements of both parties without recording evidence in proof of either is not an "inquiry." *QUEEN v. SONAOOLLAH* . . . **2 W. R. Cr. 44**

7. ———— **Mode of recording evidence—Dispute likely to cause breach of the**



# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 5. EVIDENCE, MODE OF TAKING, ETC.—*contd.*

*peace.* In an inquiry under s. 530, Act X of 1872, as a preliminary to an order relative to land about which there is a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace, the evidence should be recorded by the Magistrate in the manner provided by s. 334. *KHETTERMONEE DOSSEE v. SREENATH SIRCAR*

11 B. L. R. Ap. 5

8. ——— Neglect to obey order to put in statements—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 318.* When, in a case under s. 318, Code of Criminal Procedure, a Magistrate had taken any evidence, he was held to be not justified in refusing to proceed with the case because the parties neglected to file written statements on the day fixed for filing the statements. *In the matter of GULUCK CHUNDER MYTEE* . . . 11 W. R. Cr. 9

9. ——— Irregularity in taking evidence—*Taking evidence in two cases together—Right to separate inquiry.* Two investigations under s. 318, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861, were before a Magistrate, who, after deciding one of the cases remarked on the other that, because the lands adjoined, he had taken the evidence in the two cases together, and found it unnecessary to continue the inquiry further. *Held*, under s. 404, that the parties kept out of possession were entitled to a full inquiry. *WATSON & Co. v. SURNOMOYEE*

8 W. R. Cr. 63

10. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 145, 537—Proceeding in respect of several plots of lands—Separate proceedings, if necessary—Prejudice.* Where a Magistrate drew up one proceeding in respect of several plots of land claimed to be in the possession of different persons, and the parties were not prejudiced by the Magistrate not taking separate proceedings but dealing with the matter in one and the same proceeding; and where the course taken by the Magistrate did not preclude any of the parties from adducing evidence in the case concerning the different plots of land:—*Held*, that the procedure taken by the Magistrate did not vitiate the inquiry or the order made therein. *ISWAR CHUNDER CHOWDHRY v. AMBICA CHURN MAJUMDAR* (1901) . . . 5 C. W. N. 544

11. ——— Oral admission by mooktear—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Case given up by one side—Recording of the admission if indispensable.* Although it is ordinarily necessary to record evidence in a case under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, before passing final orders, it is not indispensable to do so when the case is completely given up by one side. Where the mooktear of one of the parties in a proceeding under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, orally denied their claim to the disputed land, though no such denial had been made in their written statements:—*Held*, that admission by the legal practitioner conducting the case was sufficient in a quasi-civil proceeding of this nature, and the Magistrate was justified in passing an order in

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## 5. EVIDENCE, MODE OF TAKING, ETC.—*concl'd.*

favour of the other party: the fact that such admission was not recorded did not invalidate the order. *HARO MOHAN SARDAR v. GOBIND SAHU* (1902) . . . 7 C. W. N. 351

## 6. DECISION OF MAGISTRATE AS TO POSSESSION.

1. ——— Objection to decide question of possession—*Procedure by Magistrate.* In a case of disputed possession likely to lead to a breach of the peace, the Magistrate, instead of merely binding down the parties to keep the peace, and declining to interfere further, is bound to dispose of the question of possession under s. 318, Criminal Procedure Code, 1861. *In the matter of the petition of ANUNDNATH ROY* . . . 4 W. R. Cr. 12

2. ——— Power to decide question of possession—*Recognizance to keep peace.* If a Magistrate is satisfied that the circumstances require it, he may make an order under s. 318 of the Code of 1861, notwithstanding that he has taken recognizances under s. 282. *In the matter of the petition of SUTHERLAND*

9 B. L. R. 229: 18 W. R. Cr. 11

3. ——— Question for decision—*Possession—Title.* In a case of disputed possession of land, the Magistrate should look to possession, not to right, i.e., maintaining in possession the party in possession, and forbidding disturbance of possession. *GRJAMONEE v. ISHUR CHUNDER*

W. R. 1864 Cr. 2

*In re SABHEE SINGH* . . . 6 W. R. Cr. 50

*GOVERNMENT v. GHOLAM MAHOMED*  
1 Agra Cr. 33

*REG. v. OMIRTONAETH JHA*  
1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 399  
6 W. R. Cr. 61

4. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 318—Duty of Magistrate.* A Magistrate, under s. 318 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is to inquire into the question who is in actual possession of the property in dispute, without considering how that possession had been obtained. *DUSTUR HUSANG JAMASJI v. FELL*

6 Bom. Cr. 30

*BAPUJI JAGJIVAY v. MAGISTRATE OF KHEDA*  
4 Bom. A. C. 153

5. ——— Duty of Magistrate to maintain possession even when contrary to former order of another Magistrate. Where a Magistrate found that an order of his predecessor made two years previously with regard to possession of certain land had not been complied with, he enforced the order and changed the possession in accordance with that order:—*Held*, that the Magistrate ought to have maintained the possession which he found, even if it was inconsistent with his predecessor's order, and that he ought not to have taken

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# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 6. DECISION OF MAGISTRATE AS TO POSSESSION—*contd.*

any steps in the matter, unless some one actually in possession, and guaranteed possession by that order, came to complain to him that his possession was threatened or that he had just been forcibly turned out, and asked in pursuance of that order to be maintained in possession. *QUEEN v. PROTAP CHANDRA BAROAH* . . . 21 W. R. Cr. 2

6. ———— *Nature of order—Illegal dis-possession.* A Magistrate has no authority to restore to possession a person who has been illegally dispossessed. He must declare the party in actual possession entitled to retain possession until ousted by due course of law and forbid all disturbance of such possession in the meantime. *RAMJEEBUN DOOBAY v. LUCHMANEE DABEA*

W. R. 1864, Cr. 5

*DOORJUN SINGH v. SHIBBA* . . . 3 N. W. 171

*QUEEN v. IMAMBANDEE* . . . 7 W. R. Cr. 26

7. ———— *Jurisdiction of Magistrate—Order made by a Civil Court—Power of revision by the High Court.* It is the duty of the Magistrate when the right to possession has been declared within a time not remote from his taking proceedings under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code to maintain any order which has been passed by any competent Court; and therefore to take proceedings which necessarily must have the effect of modifying or even cancelling such orders is to assume a jurisdiction which the law does not contemplate. The power of revision to be exercised by the High Court is limited to matters of jurisdiction, that is to say, to cases in which it is found that the Magistrate by taking proceedings under s. 145 has acted without jurisdiction. *DOULAT KOER v. RAMESWARI KOERI alias DULIN SAHEBA*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 625

3 C. W. N. 461

8. ———— *Procedure—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530—Death of one of the parties before termination of proceedings.* On the death of one of the persons concerned in a matter under s. 530, Code of Criminal Procedure, just before those proceedings terminated in favour of that person and another, though it would be more regular for the Magistrate to postpone the proceedings and make his representative a party in his place, the proceedings are not necessarily bad, since the death has prejudiced no one. *In the matter of ANNONDOMOYEE DEBEE v. LUCHMAN PERSHAD GOGO*

2 C. L. R. 264

9. ———— *Dispossession—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530—Illegal dispossession—Ouster without authority of Civil Court.* Ouster by one person of another lawfully in possession of property confers no rights on the former which can be recognized in proceedings taken under s. 530 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court should refer back to a time previous to the quarrel when such possession was peacefully enjoyed by one or

# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 6. DECISION OF MAGISTRATE AS TO POSSESSION—*contd.*

other of the disputants. *In the matter of the petition of MOHESH CHUNDER KHAN*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 417

10. ———— *Onus Probandi—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530, effect of order under.* The effect of an order under s. 530 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872) is to declare the person in whose favour it is made to be in possession at the time of the proceedings had under the section, and to cast the burden of proof upon his adversary in an ejectment suit; but such an order can decide nothing as to how that possession was obtained or as to antecedent possession. *Boolee Singh v. Hurobuns Narain Singh*, 7 W. R. 212, commented upon. *NOBO COOMAR DASS v. GOBIND CHUNDER ROY* . . . 9 C. L. R. 305

11. ———— *Keeping person in possession to reap crop—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530.* A Magistrate cannot, under s. 530, Code of Criminal Procedure, order that a person be kept in possession until he has reaped the crop standing on the ground, and then that he shall give way to another. When there have been long-pending disputes in the Courts, he should determine who was in peaceable possession when they commenced. *In the matter of BUNWARI LAL MISER v. RADHA PERSHAD SINGH* . . . 1 C. L. R. 136

12. ———— *Nature of required possession—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530—Possession at time of dispute.* The possession regarding which parties are required to give proof in a case under s. 530, Act X of 1872, relating to a dispute for land in respect of which a breach of the peace is apprehended, is possession at the time the proceedings are instituted by the Magistrate, and not possession at the time the Magistrate comes to his decision. *In the matter of the petition of PIRTHIRAM CHOWDHRY* . . . 20 W. R. Cr. 51

13. ———— *Actual possession—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 145.* Under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate has to find which of the parties is in possession of the subject-matter of the dispute at the time when he is inquiring into the matter, which in the contemplation of the law is identical with the time of the institution of the proceedings, and not at any time previous thereto; and he has no concern as to how the party then in actual possession obtained possession, but has only to pass an order retaining him in his possession. *AMBLER v. PUSHONG* . . . I. L. R. 11 Calc. 365

*CHUNDER COOMAR PODDAR v. CHUNDER KANTA GHOSE* . . . I. L. R. 12 Calc. 521

14. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 145—Possession, inquiry into—Time at which Magistrate has to determine who was in possession—Undisturbed possession immediately before dispute.* In an enquiry under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code where



**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.**

**6. DECISION OF MAGISTRATE AS TO POSSESSION—contd.**

the property in dispute was forest land, the right to possession of which was exercised by cutting and removing timber from time to time, the Magistrate found that the men of the first party had been driven away by those of the second, and had been unable to enter the forest and remove the timber alleged to have been cut by them; that this happened before the time of the initial proceedings, and continued to the date of the hearing; and that the men of the second party had been able to bring out of the forest the timber which had been cut. Upon these findings he came to the conclusion that the possession of the second party had been established, and made an order under the section in their favour. *Held*, that, having regard to the nature of the property in dispute, these facts could not constitute legal possession of the second party at the time the proceedings were instituted. *Held*, further, that in like cases, having regard to the nature of the property in dispute, and the mode in which possession may be exercised over it, in order to find which party was in possession when the proceedings were instituted, it is necessary to inquire which party was in undisturbed possession of the land in dispute by felling timber and removing the same without objection on the occasion immediately preceding the one on which the dispute arose; and whichever party be found to have been in possession on that occasion should be presumed to have possession at the time when the proceedings were commenced. **JAGAT KISHORE ACHARJYA CHOWDHURI v. KHAJAH ASHANULLAH KHAN BAHADUR**

**I. L. R. 16 Calc. 281**

**15.** *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 145—Magistrate to determine who was in possession at what time.* Under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882), a Magistrate is required to decide which of the parties between whom a dispute exists is in possession of the subject of the dispute at the time when the Magistrate decides the question of possession, and not at any time previous thereto. *In the matter of HUCHAPA*

**I. L. R. 15 Bom. 152**

**16.** *Criminal Procedure Code, s. 145—Order for interim possession—Point of time at which possession is to be looked at in determining which party is entitled to an order under s. 145.* The possession which a Magistrate acting under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has to find and support is possession at the time of the Magistrate's proceedings. Hence where a Magistrate decided a question of possession under s. 145 upon evidence taken six months previously:—*Held*, that such order was irregular and unsustainable. *In the matter of the petition of JAI LAL*

**I. L. R. 13 All. 362**

See **BECHU SHEIKH v. DEB KUMARI DASI**

Per **PETHERAM, C.J.**, and **TREVELYAN, J.** (**RAMPINI, J.**, dissenting)

**I. L. R. 21 Calc. 404**

**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.**

**6. DECISION OF MAGISTRATE AS TO POSSESSION—contd.**

**17.** *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 145 and 146—Possession inquiry as to—Time at which Magistrate is to determine who was in possession—Order passed under s. 146 on proceedings taken under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code—Attachment of property.* In setting aside an order passed by a Magistrate under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court has power itself to pass such order as should have been made by the Magistrate in the case. It is impossible to lay down any hard-and-first rule which may be applicable to all cases as to the exact point of time to which an inquiry under s. 145 must be directed, and the time at which possession must be found in one party or the other must be governed by the facts of each particular case. To hold that the Magistrate is precluded from inquiring into anything before the date when he actually commenced his own proceedings might in some cases lead to a person who has been acting in an unwarrantable manner misusing the process of the law to enable him to carry out a high-handed and improper scheme, which could never have been the intention of the Legislature. In a proceeding under s. 145 regarding a dispute between two parties concerning certain collieries, it appeared that the first party were certainly in possession of the buildings which contained the office where the business of the collieries was transacted, and where all the cash books and papers of the business were kept, and that the second party had during a period of about fourteen days prior to the commencement of the proceedings succeeded in obtaining possession of the pits, wharves, tramways, etc., of the colliery by what the Court considered to be a high-handed and improper scheme, and acting in an unwarrantable manner. The Magistrate, considering himself bound to find who was in actual possession at the date of the commencement of the proceedings by himself, passed an order in favour of the second party. *Held*, that such order was bad, and that, as the second party was undoubtedly not in possession of the whole of the property in dispute, and the effect of it was to place them in possession of the portion that was in the possession of the first party, the proper order to make under such circumstances was one under s. 146, attaching the property. **KATRAS JHERRIA COAL CO. v. SIBKRISHTA DAW & CO.**

**I. L. R. 22 Calc. 297**

**18.** *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 145 and 146—Possession, inquiry as to—Time at which Magistrate is to determine who is in possession—Presumption.* A Magistrate, in making an order under the Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 145 and 146, must inquire into the question which party was in actual possession at the time of the institution of the proceedings, and not at the time when the order is made. In making this inquiry, the Magistrate may presume that, when a vendor sells part of a property, he retains all that he does not sell. **AGRA BANK v. LEISHMAN**

**I. L. R. 18 Mad. 41**



# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 6. DECISION OF MAGISTRATE AS TO POSSESSION—*contd.*

19. ————— *Final order against persons not made parties—Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, ss. 145, 146.* A final order under s. 146, Criminal Procedure Code, cannot be made against persons who were not made parties to the proceedings, under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, or who were in the case regarded by the Magistrate as such, though notices had been issued upon them to file written statements and they had only entered appearance, but had done nothing else. *JANOKI NATH ROY v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

3 C. W. N. 329

20. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530—Parties in possession through raiyats.* The Criminal Court has jurisdiction, under Act X of 1872, s. 530, to determine questions of contested possession between parties who are not in immediate possession of the subject-matter of dispute, but claim rent from tenants who actually occupy it. *NOBIN CHUNDER KOONDOL v. JOGENDRONATH BHUTTACHARJEE*

25 W. R. Cr. 18

21. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872), s. 530—Intermediate holders—Constructive possession.* In a case of disputed possession between two rival zamindars, constructive possession through intermediate holders (ticcadars), to whom the raiyats pay rents, is not such possession as is contemplated by s. 530 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *EMPRESS v. THAKOOR DYAL SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 3 Calc. 320

22. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530—Possession by raiyats.* In a case of dispute regarding land of a considerable area in which both parties contended that they held possession of the area through the means of raiyats, it was held that the Magistrate, instead of making an order under s. 530 of the Criminal Procedure Code that the land should remain in the possession of one of the parties until the decision of a competent Civil Court, should have proceeded to consider the question which party was in possession of the constituent portions of the land, piece by piece, in the hands of his raiyats. *MUDHOOSUDUN SHAHA v. BEJOY GOBIND CHOWDHRY* . 21 W. R. Cr. 55

23. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530—Dispute between owners of land—Constructive possession.* S. 530 of the Code of Criminal Procedure contemplates disputes between owners as well as occupiers. *Per JACKSON, J.*—Where a zamindar has let his lands in farm, he, his farmers, and the occupying raiyats, are all in their degree concerned in any dispute as to possession which may arise, and they ought to be maintained in possession of the interests which they severally enjoy. *Sutherland v. Crowdy*, 18 W. R. 11, cited. *Empress v. Thakoor Dyal Sing*, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 320, commented upon as having gone too far. *HARAK NARAIN SINGH v. LUCHMI BUX ROY*

5 C. L. R. 287

# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 6. DECISION OF MAGISTRATE AS TO POSSESSION—*contd.*

24. ————— *Occupation of trespasser—Possession.* The actual possession intended by Ch. XXII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861, does not include the occupancy of a mere trespasser. *ANONYMOUS* . 6 Mad. Ap. 13

25. ————— *Breach of the peace—Actual possession—Recognizance to keep peace.* The possession of a master by his servant,—of a landlord by his immediate tenant, the person who pays rent to him,—of the person who has the property in the land by the usufructuary,—come within the meaning of the words “actual possession” in s. 318 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861. Their meaning is not limited to bodily possession. But a person is not in “actual possession” where the rents are paid by the actual occupier, not to him, but to an intermediate holder. *In the matter of the petition of SUTHERLAND*

9 B. L. R. 229

S.C. SUTHERLAND v. CROWDY . 18 W. R. Cr. 11

26. ————— *Claim to possession by one acting as servant of owners—Parties.* Where there is a dispute likely to lead to a breach of the peace concerning lands and proceedings are recorded and had under s. 350 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, no order should be made against one who is acting as the servant of another person who claims to have possession of the land, unless that other person is made a party to the proceedings. *In the matter of JITBAHAN v. BANSRUP DHOB* . . . 6 C. L. R. 193

27. ————— *Symbolical possession.* Held (KEMP, J., dissenting), that, although symbolical possession is not entitled to weight as against a party proved to be in possession, yet, in the absence of evidence, it is in itself deserving to be taken into consideration. *MUNGLO v. DURGA NARAIN NAG* . . . 25 W. R. Cr. 74

28. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 145—Possession—Title—Symbolical possession.* A Magistrate trying a case under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in determining the question of possession, took into consideration the question of title. Held, that he had a right to discuss the question of title, if in his opinion it was material upon the question of possession, and that the mere fact that he had considered and discussed the question of title would not invalidate his decision on the point of possession, provided that there was evidence before him as to who was in possession. *Semble*: In the absence of any other evidence of possession, a Magistrate would be justified in finding possession to be with a person to whom symbolical possession has been shown to have been given in execution of a decree, although possibly slight evidence would be sufficient to rebut such evidence of possession. *RAJA BABU v. MUDDUN MOHUN LALL*

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 169



**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.****6. DECISION OF MAGISTRATE AS TO POSSESSION—contd.**

**29.** ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530—Symbolical possession under decree of Court.* A certain mouzah having been sold in execution of a decree obtained upon a mortgage, the purchaser claimed a right under the sale to a hât appurtenant to the mouzah, and was put by the Nazir of the Civil Court into symbolical possession of the hât as well as of the mouzah. The judgment-debtor refused to give up actual possession of the hât, maintaining that it was debutter property of which he was the shebait. A breach of the peace being imminent in consequence of the rival claims, proceedings were taken under s. 530 of the Criminal Procedure Code; and the Magistrate, finding that the judgment-debtor was in actual possession of the hât, made an order maintaining him in such possession until ousted by a Civil Court. *Held* (setting aside that order), that the Magistrate had no power, under s. 530 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to direct the judgment-debtor to be retained in possession until ousted by a Civil Court, but was bound to see that the possession as given by the Nazir, was maintained, leaving it to the debtor to substantiate his claim as shebait in a Civil Court. The Court accordingly directed that the purchaser be restored to possession, and that the Magistrate do see that he is kept in possession until ousted by due course of law. *In the matter of CHETRAPUT SINGH*  
5 C. L. R. 200

**30.** ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530—Actual possession—Possession of wife or agent.* In an inquiry under s. 530 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the only thing to be determined is the fact of actual possession. In a dispute between the wife of a lunatic and the manager of his estate with regard to the possession of certain property, the Magistrate attached the property, under s. 531 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the ground that he was unable to satisfy himself as to who was in possession. It had been proved before him that the wife was in actual possession, but there was a doubt as to whether she was not in possession merely as the agent of her husband. *Held*, that s. 530 has only to do with actual possession, and that the Magistrate should have decided that the wife was in possession. *In the matter of JUGGODESHARY CHOWDHRAIN*  
3 C. L. R. 94

**31.** ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530—Real right to possession.* The possession in regard to which the Magistrate's jurisdiction under s. 530 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised, must be of a real and tangible character. When a party claims under a document or agreement the right of doing certain things over a large extent of territory, the performance of acts under such alleged right in one portion of the ground over which the right extends, although it may be good and sufficient for the purpose of keeping alive that right so as to be an answer to the plea of limitation raised in a civil suit, is not of itself

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a sufficient possession on which the Magistrate's order under s. 530 may be based for the purpose of forbidding in a distant locality acts not necessarily in conflict with such possession, though at variance with the right. *BEJOY NATH CHATTERJEE v. BENGAL COAL COMPANY* . 23 W. R. Cr. 45

**32.** ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530—Manager in joint possession—Question for Civil Court.* A mooktear holding and managing a burial ground for several joint proprietors cannot make himself out to be in possession for one more than for another. *KASSIM HASSIM SOORTY v. ABRAHIM SOLEMAN*  
25 W. R. Cr. 24

**33.** ————— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), s. 318—Act X of 1872, s. 530—Certificate of administration—Act XXVII of 1860.* A and B had a dispute about possession of a certain muth. A was declared by the Magistrate, under s. 318 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to be in possession. Subsequently, B got a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, and applied to the Magistrate for possession, which was given to him. *Held*, that the Magistrate's order giving possession to B was irregular, and must be set aside. *DHUNRAJ GIRI GOSWAMI v. SRIPATI GIRI GOSWAMI*  
2 B. L. R. A. Cr. 27

S.C. *QUEEN v. SRIPUTTI GIRI GOSSAIN*

11 W. R. Cr. 24

*See ANTRAGEE KOOWAR v. RAMRUCHYA DASS*

25 W. R. Cr. 16

**34.** ————— *Decision based on evidence of title—Right to possession.* No sufficient evidence of possession was produced before the Magistrate, but evidence as to the title of the person in whose favour the Magistrate found was given, and the Magistrate based his decision upon the latter evidence, and determined the case with reference to the merits of the claims of the parties to the right of possession. *Held*, that, although the Magistrate would have been justified in looking to the evidence of title in corroboration of the evidence of possession, he was wrong in basing his decision on the evidence of title, and his order was set aside. *In the matter of the petition of KALI KRISTO THAKUR v. GOLAM ALI CHOWDHRY*  
I. L. R. 7 Calc. 46: 8 C. L. R. 245

**35.** ————— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 145—Joint hearing of the case of several claimants—Number of plots, dispute as to—Practice.* A Magistrate, proceeding under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in a case in which one party (thirty-nine in number) claimed to be the tenants of 708 bighas of land belonging to one T H, and the members of the other party (seventeen in number) claimed to hold the same land in separate parcels as their maurasi jote, tried the question of possession as between the two parties in one case notwithstanding the pro-



**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.****6. DECISION OF MAGISTRATE AS TO POSSESSION—contd.**

test of the maurasi claimants to this mode of procedure, and decided that possession was with the party of thirty-nine, directing that they as a body should remain in possession until ousted by the order of a Civil Court. *Held*, that the course pursued by the Magistrate at the hearing was prejudicial to the case of the maurasi claimants; and that the form of his order was open to the objection that it would render it necessary for the party out of possession to make all the persons declared to be in possession defendants in any civil suits brought to recover possession of the land. *Azim Mollah v. Satoo Poramanic*, 10 C. L. R. 523, distinguished. *KUTUHL SINGH v. UMA SINGH*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 31

**36.** *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 145—Order passed under s. 146 on proceedings taken under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code—Power of Court on revision.* Where a Magistrate has passed an order under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, whereas the proper order in the case should have been one under s. 146, the High Court on revision will make the order which the lower Court ought to have made. *Raja Babu v. Muddun Mohun Lall*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 169, explained. *REID v. RICHARDSON*

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 361

**37.** *Arbitration—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Possession, dispute as to—Arbitration, reference to—Magistrate's jurisdiction.* The parties to a proceeding under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, asked to refer their dispute to an arbitrator, who was to decide which of them was in possession. The Magistrate consented, and, pending the decision of the arbitrator, attached the properties in dispute, under s. 146, Code of Criminal Procedure. On an award being made by the arbitrator, deciding the question of actual possession:—*Held*, that the Magistrate ought to take the finding of the arbitrator as to the fact of possession into consideration in bringing the proceedings to a legal termination. *TARAMONI CHAUDHURANI v. GYANENDRA MOHAN CHAUDHURI* (1902) . . . . . 7 C. W. N. 461

**38.** *Attendance of parties—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 145, 438—Summary finding of possession by Magistrate in proceeding under s. 145—Written statement in such proceeding, proof of—Warrant, issue of, for attendance of parties, legality of—Sessions Judge, power of, on application for redress of irregularity under s. 145, to report to High Court under s. 438, Code of Criminal Procedure, for orders.* In a case under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a Magistrate cannot, on the failure of one party to file a written statement, summarily pass an order declaring possession with the party who has filed a written statement, without taking evidence in proof of such statement. He has no jurisdiction to issue a warrant to compel the attendance of a party in such proceeding. On

**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.****6. DECISION OF MAGISTRATE AS TO POSSESSION—contd.**

application to the Sessions Judge for redress against such illegality, he should report the matter, under s. 438 of the Code, for orders of the High Court, if he is of opinion that the order is illegal and without jurisdiction. *KEFATULLAH v. FERUZUDDIN MIAH* (1900) . . . . . 5 C. W. N. 71

**39.** *Claim of undivided share—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 146—Decree of Civil Court—Jurisdiction.* The 1st party obtained a decree against the mother of the 2nd party, in a suit in which the 2nd party were also defendants; the 1st party purchased the property at the sale held in execution of the decree, and obtained possession thereof through the Civil Court. The 2nd party not being the debtors, the sale certificate, which originally contained their names, was subsequently amended by those names being struck off. The Magistrate found that the 2nd party now claimed an undivided share, and passed an order under s. 146, Code of Criminal Procedure. *Held*, that, if the claim of the 2nd party was to an undivided share, the order of the Magistrate was wrong inasmuch as s. 145 contemplates a dispute between two parties, each of whom asserts the right to hold actual possession of the property as against the other, and not a dispute between parties claiming to hold joint possession and neither contesting such right. *Tarujan Bibee v. Asamuiddi Bepari*, 4 C. W. N. 426, followed. *Held*, also, that, taking it that there was a claim on each side to exclusive possession, the 1st party being actually put in possession of the property by the Court as the result of the sale, it was the duty of the Criminal Court to uphold the status of the 1st party as established by the Civil Court. *S. Gordon Sims v. Johurry Lal*, 5 C. W. N. 563, followed. *KRISTA ALHADINI DASI v. RADHA SYAM PANDAY* (1902) . . . . . 7 C. W. N. 118

**40.** *Joint family—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 145, 146—Decree against member of joint family—Possession granted of whole property to auction-purchaser—Dispute as to possession between other members of the joint family and the auction-purchaser—Jurisdiction of Magistrate to adjudicate upon rights of parties—Possession by Civil Court, effect of.* Where, in execution of a decree against a member of a joint *Mitakshara* family, possession of the whole property, was given to an auction-purchaser thereof:—*Held*, that, in a proceeding under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, between the other members of the joint family and the auction-purchaser, it is not open to the Court to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties and to decide that the auction-purchaser was entitled to possession of only the share of the judgment-debtor. For the purposes of that section, it is sufficient that possession of the whole property was made over by the Civil Court to the auction-purchaser, and the latter should continue in possession thereof until evicted by due course of law. *MADHOLAL*



**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*****6. DECISION OF MAGISTRATE AS TO POSSESSION—*concl.***

BITHUL GAYAWAL v. JUG LAL SINGH (1902)

6 C. W. N. 841

41. ———— **Specification of land—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Dispute as to land—Specification of land, if and when necessary—Civil Court decree for possession—Decree, effect of—Magistrate, duty of—Procedure.** Although, in a proceeding under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, the disputed land should be thoroughly ascertained by both parties, yet, where the parties were not at issue upon the question as to what the disputed lands were, and neither the Court nor anybody concerned in the dispute was under any misapprehension as to that point, there is no ground for holding that the Magistrate who tried the case had no jurisdiction to make an order under the section for want of proper specification of the lands in dispute. The duty of a Criminal Court, in a case under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, where there is a decree of a Civil Court for possession in respect of the disputed land, is to find which party held such Civil Court decree, and then to maintain that party in possession; it is not necessary that such decree should be a decree for possession as between the parties to the proceeding under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code. *Daulat Koer v. Ramessuri Koeri*, I. L. R. 26 Cal. 625, followed. *GORDON SIMS v. JOHURRY LAL* (1901) . . . 5 C. W. N. 563

42. ———— **Transfer of case—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 145 and 526—Criminal case—Bias of Judge—Magistrate's powers under s. 145—Breach of peace—Right of the parties.** The provisions of s. 526 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) do not give any power to direct the transfer of any proceedings initiated under s. 145 of the Code. Such proceedings do not constitute a "criminal case," within the meaning of s. 526 of the Code. A criminal case means a case arising out of, and dealing with, some crime already committed. It does not include proceedings taken for the prevention of crime. Under s. 145 of the Code, a Magistrate is not at liberty to go into the merits of the claims, of any of the parties to the dispute, to a right to possess the subject thereof. He can decide only the fact of possession at the date of the order requiring the parties to put in their statements. The parties cannot be called upon to furnish a statement of their rights, nor can the Magistrate take, as the basis of any action he may finally decide upon, any conclusion at which he may arrive, or at which he may have arrived, as to the respective titles of the parties. *In re PANDURANG GOVIND PUJARI* (1900) . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 179

**7. NATURE AND EFFECT OF DECISION.**

1. ———— **Effect of order as regards rights of parties as determined by a Civil Court—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145.** The order of a Magistrate dealing with a

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case under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) should not interfere with the rights of the parties as determined by previous decisions of the Civil Court. *In re PANDURANG GOVIND* I. L. R. 24 Bom. 527

2. ———— **Finding as to possession—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530.** A Magistrate's finding under s. 530 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, is conclusive as to the question of actual possession. A Mamlatdar's finding on such a point is not conclusive. *LILLU v. ANNAJI PARASHRAM* . . . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 387

3. ———— **Fouzdari Court, jurisdiction of—Possession—Question of title.** The jurisdiction of the Fouzdari Court was confined to cases of possession, and it was beyond its province to inquire into, and ascertain titles to, landed property. *MOHESHUR SINGH v. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA* 3 W. R. P. C. 45 : 7 Moo. I. A. 283

4. ———— **Effect of order as to possession—Right and title of party under order.** The effect of the order of the Criminal Court giving possession of real estate is merely to prevent the occupation being disturbed by violence, and confers no right or title on the party put in possession. *KADIR BUKSH KHAN v. FUSSEEH-OO-N-NISSA* 5 Moo. I. A. 413

5. ———— **Prevention of breach of peace—Adjudication of title—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, Ch. XXII, ss. 318-321.** The object of Ch. XXII of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861 (ss. 318-321), is to prevent breaches of the peace likely to be occasioned, and not the adjudication of title. *In the matter of the petition of RAM DUTT MISR* . . . 1 Agra Cr. 29

*GOVERNMENT v. GHOLAM MAHOMED* 1 Agra Cr. 33

6. ———— **Question of title.** In a simple question of possession, all that a Criminal Court can dispose of is the necessary right not the proprietary title. *KASHEE NATH KOOR v. DEB KRISTO RAMANOOJ DOSS* . 16 W. R. 240

*GRIJAMONEE v. ISHUR CHUNDER* W. R. 1864, Cr. 2  
*In re SABHEE SINGH* . . . 6 W. R. Cr. 50  
*GOVERNMENT v. GOLAM MAHOMED* 1 Agra Cr. 33

*PORESH NARAIN ROY v. WATSON* 17 W. R. Cr. 3  
*GOVERNMENT v. SREEPUTTEE ROY* 17 W. R. Cr. 59

*REG v. OMRITO NAUTH JHA* 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 399 : 6 W. R. Cr. 61  
*BAPUJI JAGJIVAY v. MAGISTRATE OF KHEDA* 4 Bom. A. C. 153

*DOORJUN SINGH v. SHIBBA* . 3 N. W. 171  
*QUEEN v. IMAM BANDEE* . 7 W. R. Cr. 29



**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—***contd.*

**7. NATURE AND EFFECT OF DECISION—***contd.*

**7. ——— Third parties—***Disobedience of order.* Where an order under s. 318 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, was made between A on the one side and B and the three tenants of B on the other, declaring that A was in possession of the property in dispute:—*Held*, that this order was only binding on the actual parties to the case before the Magistrate, and that subsequent tenants of B could not be criminally punished for disobeying the order in question. *In the matter of GOPAL BURNAWAR* 3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 13

**8. ——— Nature of Magistrate's order—***Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 318—Execution of decree by Civil Court.* A Magistrate is not competent to interfere, under s. 318 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, with the execution of a decree of the Civil Court. When a Civil Court decree has been passed regarding the whole or any portion of disputed land, it is the Magistrate's duty to maintain that decree, and he cannot again institute, under s. 318, proceedings regarding the land covered by it. *RAI MOHUN ROY v. WISE* 16 W. R. Cr. 24

**9. ——— Decree of Civil Court for possession.** A Magistrate ought not to interfere, under s. 318, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861, with the execution of a decree of the Civil Court. If called on to interfere at all, because he is apprehensive of a breach of the peace, he should, under s. 319, maintain in possession the person who has been actually put in possession by a decree of the Civil Court. *SHAMA SOONDERY DEBIA v. JARDINE, SKINNER & Co.* 6 W. R. Cr. 10

**10. ——— Resistance to execution of decree.** A Criminal Court ought not to interfere in cases where a purchaser under a decree is resisted in getting actual possession of the property which he has bought, the procedure to be adopted in such cases being that provided in Ch. XIX of the Civil Procedure Code, 1861. *PRAYAG SINGH v. FUZOOL HOSSEIN* 6 C. L. R. 206

**11. ——— Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530.** The object of Act X of 1872, s. 530, is to prevent a breach of the peace by retaining in possession the party already there until such time as the Civil Court can pronounce on the two conflicting claims. When a Civil Court decree is once passed, the right as between the litigants is decided, and there is no more place for a summary order which proceeds, not upon title, but on mere possession. *RANEENGUNGE COAL ASSOCIATION v. HEM LALL* 24 W. R. Cr. 17

**12. ——— Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530—Duty of Magistrate as to enforcing decree of Civil Court.** Where a decree has been passed by a Civil Court determining the rights of the parties to a suit to disputed land, it is a Magistrate's duty to uphold that decree, and he cannot, as between such parties, proceed

**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—***contd.*

**7. NATURE AND EFFECT OF DECISION—***contd.*

under s. 530 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to decide afresh upon the question of possession. *Rai Mohun Roy v. Wise*, 16 W. R. Cr. 24, and *Raneengunge Coal Association v. Hem Lall*, 24 W. R. Cr. 17, followed. *In the matter of BHOLA NATH GHOSE v. MOTHOR MUNDLE* 7 C. L. R. 516

**13. ——— Power of Magistrate—***Delivery of possession in execution of decree of Civil Court.* The act of a process peon, delivering over possession of the disputed land to the purchaser as part of a tenure sold in execution, does not take away the power of a Magistrate to inquire into the question of possession between the parties under s. 530, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872. *NOBIN CHUNDER KOONDOL v. JOGENDRONATH BHUTTA-CHARJEE* 25 W. R. Cr. 18

**14. ——— Civil Court, decree of—***Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 530.* A Magistrate acting under s. 530 cannot interpret the meaning of a decree of a Civil Court. He can determine only the fact of actual possession. *In the matter of LEELA NUND SINGH* 1 C. L. R. 273

**15. ——— Suit in Civil Court for possession—Proof of title—***Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 318.* S. 318 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not mean that any party who can show in the Civil Court a possession prior to the Magistrate's award shall be entitled to have the award set aside and to be put in possession, but only that the party out of possession must prove title. *SHIB PERSAD ROY v. RUGHOONATH SINGH* W. R. 1864, 295

**16. ——— Tenant dispossessed by order of Magistrate under s. 318, Criminal Procedure Code, 1861—Obligation to sue for reversal of order.** A tenant dispossessed by order of a Magistrate under s. 318 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not bound to sue for the reversal of that order in order to recover possession. *LUCKHEE DEBEA CHOWDHRAIN v. GOOROO DOSS SEIN* W. R. 1864, Act X, 54

**17. ——— Award of possession under s. 318, Criminal Procedure Code, 1861—Effect of, on subsequent suit for possession.** An award under s. 318 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, is no bar to a possessory action under Act XIV of 1859, s. 15. *In the matter of CHYTUN CHUNDER ROY. CHYTUN CHUNDER ROY v. BROJO KANT ROY* 20 W. R. 12

**18. ——— Order under Act IV of 1840 as to possession, omission to set aside.** *Held*, that, the plaintiff having failed to set aside an award as to possession made by the Criminal Court under Act IV of 1840 within the limitation period, his claim in opposition to that award was not maintainable. *GOPAL NATH v. ABDOL GHANEE* 1 Agra 120



**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.****7. NATURE AND EFFECT OF DECISION—concl'd.**

**19.** ————— *Suit for declaration of title.* A plaintiff in a civil suit brought for confirmation of his possession by a declaration of his title to certain land obtained, pending his suit, an order from Magistrate under s. 318 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, that he should be maintained in possession until ousted by due course of law. The suit was dismissed, the plaintiff failing to prove his title; and the defendants then applied to the High Court under s. 404 of the Criminal Procedure Code to set aside the Magistrate's order and put them in possession. *Held*, that their proper course was by a suit in the Civil Court for possession and the application under the Criminal Procedure Code was rejected. **JUGGESH PRAKASH GANGULI v. NILKAMAL MOOKERJEE**

3 B. L. R. A. C. 57

S.C. *In re JOGESH PROKASH GANGOLEE*

11 W. R. Cr. 43

**20.** ————— *Obstructing road—Suit for exclusive possession.* The Magistrate had, on the complaint of the defendant, passed an order under s. 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, forbidding the plaintiff to retain possession of a piece of land to the exclusion of the public until he had obtained the decision of a competent Court adjudging him to be entitled to such exclusive possession. The plaintiff accordingly brought his suit in the Munsif's Court to recover possession of the land. The Munsif gave him a decree for exclusive possession of the land. On appeal, the Judge *held* that the Munsif had no jurisdiction to try the question whether the public had a right of way over the land. The Judge's decision was reversed on special appeal, and the case remanded to the Judge to try the issue whether the plaintiff was entitled to the exclusive use of the land. **MAHES CHANDRA MOOKERJEE v. RAMUTAM PALIT**

5 B. L. R. Ap. 68

S.C. **MOHESH CHUNDER MOOKERJEE v. RAMOOTUM PALIT**

14 W. R. 163

**8. ATTACHMENT OF PROPERTY.**

**1.** ————— *Preliminaries to order for attachment—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 531.* It is only when, after recording a proceeding made under s. 530, Code of Criminal Procedure, and taking evidence, a Magistrate decides that neither party is in possession, or is unable to satisfy himself as to which party is in possession, that he can, under s. 531, attach land in dispute. He is not competent summarily to order attachment without such preliminary proceedings. *In the matter of RAM SOONDAREE DABEE*

1 C. L. R. 86

**2.** ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 53—Proceedings before attachment.* The doubt upon which a Magistrate can act under s. 531, Code of Criminal Procedure, must arise from his inability to decide on evidence offered

**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.****8. ATTACHMENT OF PROPERTY—contd.**

by the contending parties as to their possession, and not on a doubt entertained without such inquiry. *In the matter of LEELANUND SINGH*

1 C. L. R. 273

**3.** ————— *Power to attach land—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 318—Zamindari in possession by raiyats.* The power of attaching land regarding which there is a dispute, conferred on a Magistrate by s. 318 of the Code of Criminal Procedure extends to disputes as to possession of land of which rival zamindars are in possession by their raiyats. *In the matter of MASSEYK*

15 W. R. Cr. 1

**4.** ————— *Ground for order of attachment—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 531.* Sufficiency of evidence to justify proceedings under s. 531 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872) considered. **DEO SARUN SINGH v. TULSI KANT**

12 C. L. R. 221

**5.** ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 531—Ijmali property.* Where an Assistant Magistrate, acting under Act X of 1872, s. 531, found one of the proprietors of an ijmali talukh in actual possession of a 12-anna share which was all that he claimed, and it was in evidence that the rents had till the commencement of the dispute been collected in distinct and separate shares, he was *held* to have committed an error in law in attaching the whole estate as involved in the dispute. The words "institution of proceedings" in s. 531 mean the commencement of the action which results in the application to the Magistrate's Court; and the possession to be determined is possession at the time the dispute arose, i.e., at the time the police reported that a breach of the peace was likely to take place. **RAKHAL DASS SINGH v. SHEO PERSHAD SINGH**

24 W. R. Cr. 73

**6.** ————— *Second attachment, power to issue—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 531—Attachment of land in dispute and release—Re-attachment.* Where a Magistrate, being in doubt as to which of two persons was rightful owner of some disputed property, attached it in order to prevent a breach of the peace, and released it on their coming to an agreement, but subsequently re-attached it on the appearance of a third claimant, from whose attempt to obtain possession a breach of the peace was apprehended:—*Held*, that the Magistrate was only competent to order a fresh attachment after taking the preliminary steps under s. 530, if, on completion of the inquiry, he found himself in the position described in s. 531; and that, if there was any new dispute, he ought to have proceeded *de novo*; but that the best course to pursue would be to exert his powers under Ch. XXXVII. **QUEEN v. KALY KISHORE ROY**

25 W. R. Cr. 68

**7.** ————— *Dispute between rival raiyats—Attachment of estate—Criminal Procedure Code, 1871, s. 319.* Where there was a dispute as to the actual possession of land, not between two co-proprietors, but between rival raiyats:—*Held*,



# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 8. ATTACHMENT OF PROPERTY—*contd.*

that, instead of attaching the whole estate under s. 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861, the Magistrate ought to have settled the dispute as between the raiyats. *RAMDYAL v. CHINTA MOONEE* . . . **W. R. 1864 Cr. 23**

8. ———— **Dispute as to boundaries—Contiguous estates.** When the dispute is as to a common boundary between two contiguous estates, the Magistrate, instead of attaching the boundary land, should find for one party or the other, with reference to the point of possession. *HARVEY v. BRICE* **4 W. R. Cr. 26**

*AMRITHNATH JHA v. AHMED REZA* **6 W. R. Cr. 61**

9. ———— **Dispute in respect of colliery—Order under s. 144—Prohibition to both parties from exercising right of possession—Proceedings under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure—Date of possession—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 144, 145, 146.** On the 10th of November 1899, the Magistrate passed an *ex parte* order under s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by which both parties to a dispute were prohibited from exercising any right of possession in respect of a colliery. Subsequently proceedings under s. 145 of the Code were instituted in respect of the same colliery and between the same parties. On the 29th of January 1900, the Magistrate, having found that the second party had been in possession on the 10th of November 1899, passed an order declaring them to be in possession. *Held*, that the proper way of dealing with this case in interpreting the Magistrate's order was to hold that, whereas by reason of the operation of his order under s. 144 of the Code of the 10th of November 1899 no evidence could be offered to show the possession of either party from that date up to the 29th of December, he was consequently obliged to ascertain the possession immediately before this order and to regard his intervention as an attachment suspending the previous possession, whatever it might be; but that, at the same time, the former possession continued, and although the lawful exercise of its rights had been forbidden for a time, the possession had never ceased to exist. That the order of the Magistrate was correct. *JOYANTI KUMAR MOOKERJEE v. MIDDLETON* . . . **I. L. R. 27 Calc. 785 4 C. W. N. 562**

10. ———— **Power to deal with land under attachment—Power to lease—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 319.** A Magistrate may lease land attached under s. 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861. *In the matter of GREESH CHUNDER DOSS* . . . **17 W. R. Cr. 38**

11. ———— **Withdrawal of order for attachment—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 531.** A Deputy Magistrate, after notice issued under the Code of Criminal Procedure, s. 530, to two parties, finding himself unable to determine who was in possession, attached the property in dispute.

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## 8. ATTACHMENT OF PROPERTY—*concl'd.*

Upon this, a third party represented that he, as landlord, had taken possession of the land on the death of the person to whom it had been leased. But the Deputy Magistrate refused to remove the attachment, holding that the landlord's possession was without colour of law. *Held*, that the duty of the Deputy Magistrate, under the circumstances, was to withdraw his order. *In the matter of the petition of JOY KISSEN MOOKERJEE. In the matter of the petition of PEARY MOHUN MOOKERJEE* **24 W. R. Cr. 40**

12. ———— **Rights determinable by Revenue Court—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 146.** S. 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not give jurisdiction to pass an order of attachment in a dispute between parties whose rights regarding such dispute would have to be determined by a Revenue Court. *GANGA PRASAD v. NARAIN* **I. L. R. 15 All. 394**

13. ———— **Crops—Jurisdiction—Attachment of "crops" cut and stored—"Crops or other produce of land," meaning of—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 145 and 146.** The words "crops or other produce of land" in sub-s. (2) of s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, mean crops or other produce of land attached to the land. A Magistrate therefore has no jurisdiction, under s. 146 of the Code, to attach crops which have been severed from the land and stored. *RAMZAN ALI v. JANARDHAN SINGH* (1902) . . . **I. L. R. 30 Calc. 110; s.c. 6 C. W. N. 881**

14. ———— **Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Suit in Civil Court, dismissal of—Finding as to title—Order of Magistrate giving possession—Jurisdiction—Jurisdiction of High Court.** In a proceeding under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, crops growing on the land in dispute were cut by the Magistrate's order, sold, and the money deposited in Court. One of the parties then sued the other for damages. The Civil Court found that the crops belonged to the plaintiff, but dismissed the suit on the ground that the cutting was by the Magistrate's order and there was no cause of action against the defendant. Upon this finding, the Magistrate ordered the deposit to be made over to the plaintiff. *Held*, that, as in passing this order the Magistrate was not exercising any judicial power, no question of his jurisdiction arose, and the High Court could not interfere. *ANNADA PERSAD PAL v. KHODA BOX MALLIK* (1902) . . . **6 C. W. N. 882**

## 9. TRANSFER OR WITHDRAWAL OF PROCEEDINGS.

1. ———— **Power of a District or Sub-divisional Magistrate to transfer or withdraw cases—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 145, and ss. 192 and 528.** A proceeding under Ch. XII of the Criminal Procedure Code is an "inquiry" within the meaning of s. 4 of the Code. The general power conferred by ss. 192 and 528 of



# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 9. TRANSFER OR WITHDRAWAL OF PROCEEDINGS—*concl'd.*

the Code upon a District or Sub-divisional Magistrate to transfer or withdraw any case for inquiry or trial by any Magistrate subordinate to him is not taken away or cut down by anything in s. 145. The words of s. 192 are wide enough to include cases under Ch. XII. **SATISH CHANDRA PANDAY v. RAJENDRA NARAIN BAGCHI** **I. L. R. 22 Calc. 898**

**2. ——— Transfer—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 145, 148, 192, sub-s. (2), 528, 529 (f), 530 (j)—Transfer of case under s. 155 by District Magistrate to another Magistrate, to try it himself or make it over to another—Valid or invalid transfer—Jurisdiction, local—Prejudice—Local inquiry by trying Magistrate.** In a proceeding under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, the second party moved the District Magistrate for the transfer of the case to his own file, and the Magistrate transferred it accordingly to the file of the senior Deputy Magistrate at the *Sudder*, with instructions to "try it himself or make it over to another Magistrate at *Sudder*;" and the senior Deputy Magistrate made over the case to a subordinate Magistrate, who tried the case and made an order after holding a local inquiry himself: *Held*, that the fact that the subject-matter of the dispute was not within the local jurisdiction of the subordinate Magistrate who tried the case would not oust his jurisdiction or render him incompetent to try the case, provided that he was vested with the powers of a proper class; and that the order made by him would not, on that account, be bad. S. 530 (j) refers to a case where a Magistrate is not competent, by virtue of the position he holds or powers vested in him, to try a case of the character referred to in s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code. S. 148, Criminal Procedure Code, does not necessarily imply that the Magistrate, before whom the case is, may not himself hold the local inquiry provided for in the section. Any mistake made erroneously and in good faith by one Magistrate in transferring a case under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, to another, under s. 192, is cured by the provisions of s. 529 (f). **RAJ MOHAN ROY CHOWDHURY v. PROSUNNO CHANDRA CHATTERJI** (1901)

**5 C. W. N. 686**

## 10. STRIKING OFF PROCEEDINGS.

**1. ——— Striking off proceedings under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, effect of—New proceeding.** Proceedings under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be renewed after the dispute has been settled and an order has been made that the case be struck off. Under such circumstances, a new proceeding would not be justified only on the materials upon which the proceeding, which was struck off, was based. **TARINI CHARAN CHOWDHRY v. AMULYA RATAN ROY** . . . **I. L. R. 20 Calc. 867**

**2. ——— Recording of order under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code—Revival of**

# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 10. STRIKING OFF PROCEEDINGS—*concl'd.*

*proceedings—Fresh materials, if to be recorded.* Where proceedings taken under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, have been struck off, and it is intended to take fresh proceedings upon new materials, it is necessary for the Magistrate to record such new materials in his order renewing the proceedings. **Tarini Churn Chowdhry v. Amulya Ratan Roy**, **I. L. R. 20 Calc. 867**, followed. Where proceedings under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, have once been started, such proceedings should be brought to a termination in one or other of the ways contemplated by law. It is improper for a Magistrate, after starting proceedings under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, to record an order "Parties absent, case filed." **MANIK v. AZIMUDDI** (1902) . . . **6 C. W. N. 923**

## 11. DISPUTES AS TO RIGHT OF WAY, WATER, ETC.

**1. ——— Jurisdiction of Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 320 and s. 62.** S. 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code gives special jurisdiction to Magistrates with full powers and in the cases provided for by it, the general power given to any Magistrate by s. 62 is barred. **ANONYMOUS** . . . **3 Mad. Ap. 23**

**2. ——— Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 532.** In order to found the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to take action under s. 352 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is necessary that a dispute exists between two persons concerning the right to the use of any land or water, or any right of way; the jurisdiction is intended for the purpose of preserving the public peace. **ROSIK LAL NUNDI v. KARLIK SHAUT** . . . **22 W. R. Cr. 48**

**3. ——— Procedure—Dispute as to right of water.** In deciding a dispute as to a right of water, the Magistrate must follow strictly the course pointed out by Ch. XXII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861. **QUEEN v. RAMNATH** **7 W. R. Cr. 45**

**QUEEN v. MADHOO CHURN** . **13 W. R. Cr. 51**

**4. ——— Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 147—Easement—Procedure to be observed by Magistrate when dispute exists regarding an easement—Parties entitled to notice.** The inquiry contemplated under s. 147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a judicial inquiry, and the opinion formed by a Magistrate must be a judicial one based on evidence legally recorded by him in the manner provided by s. 356, and on due notice to the persons who respectively claim or deny the right, the subject of the dispute. Notice to servants of such persons is not equivalent to notice to them, and in such cases actual notice should be given to all the persons claiming or denying the right and interested in the subject-matter of the inquiry. Magistrates should not institute proceedings under s. 147 unless they are satisfied that a real danger of the evil, for



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the prevention of which the procedure was devised, does in fact exist. Such inquiries may lead to injustice being done from defective procedure, and a Magistrate would be wise not to use the section in cases where it must involve a long and complicated inquiry and the presence of a large number of people, when the remedy of binding down a few persons to keep the peace is ready to his hand. *BATHOO LAL v. DOMI LAL* **I. L. R. 21 Calc. 727**

**5.** ——— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 147—Necessity of recording order before process—Proper parties to the proceedings under the section—Manager.* S. 147 does not require the Magistrate, as s. 145 does, to formally record a proceeding stating the grounds of his being satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists, before he can institute proceedings under that section, though it requires the Magistrate to be satisfied upon proper materials before him that such dispute exists. The proper parties to a proceeding under s. 147 are the persons claiming a proprietary right in the tangible immoveable property in question. Where, therefore, an order under the section was made against a manager of a Coal Syndicate, and it was not shown or alleged that he had any interest in the land upon which the disputed right of way was claimed:—*Held*, that such manager was not a proper party, and that the order was bad. *Bathoo Lal v. Domi Lal*, **I. L. R. 20 Calc. 727**, followed. *Dukhi Mullah v. Halway*, **I. L. R. 23 Calc. 55**, referred to. *MILLAR v. RAJENDRA NATH CHOWDHRY* . **2 C. W. N. 670**

**6.** ——— *Right of way, dispute as to—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 320—Obligation of Magistrate in case of right of way.* A Magistrate is bound, under s. 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to investigate a case in which the complainant alleged that his right of way had been interfered with, and ought not to refer the complainant to the Civil Court. *In the matter of the petition of BHOIRO MUNDUL* . **14 W. R. Cr. 28**

**7.** ——— *Obstructing a road.* Where A complained merely to the Magistrate that “a certain road had been obstructed by B and others:”—*Held*, that the Magistrate was not bound to inquire into the matter under s. 320 of Act XXV of 1861. *QUEEN v. RASSUL NUSHY*

**2 B. L. R. Ap. 9**

*s.c. In re RUSSOOL NUSHYO* . **11 W. R. Cr. 3**

**8.** ——— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 320.* In a case of dispute concerning a right of way, the Magistrate, instead of deciding against the complainant, on the ground that he has another way of approach to his house ought to inquire whether or not the disputed road has been in the use and occupation of the complainant, and for how long; and if he holds him to be in possession, to retain him in it, leaving the owner of the land to determine the question of right to

**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.****11. DISPUTES AS TO RIGHT OF WAY, WATER, ETC.—contd.**

the easement in the Civil Court. S. 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not require that there should be an apprehended breach of the peace before the authorities can interfere to decide a right of way. *QUEEN v. TOYLUCKONATH SIRCAR* **2 W. R. Cr. 64**

**9.** ——— *Questions of right of user—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 320.* The jurisdiction given by s. 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to decide for a time the right to enjoyment of property should not be exercised except on clear and satisfactory proof. Where the only evidence is that of user, it should be such as to show satisfactorily acts of enjoyment exercised as a matter of right and permitted uninterruptedly for some considerable length of time. *ANONYMOUS*

**4 Mad. Ap. 24**

**10.** ——— *Dispute as to use of land—Order to fill up ditch—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 320.* A Deputy Magistrate has no jurisdiction under s. 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to order a ditch which was once a pathway, but afterwards filled up, to be opened out, and a wall to be pulled down which had been built upon it before any complaint was made about filling up the ditch. Even if he had jurisdiction, no such order should be passed without legal proof that the ditch and pathway had been opened to the use of the public and of the prosecutor. *SREEMUNTO DULOUI v. RAMCHAND ADUCK* . **5 W. R. Cr. 57**

**11.** ——— *Dispute as to use of road—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 532—Declaratory order.* Gates having been placed at one end of a private road by a person claiming to be its sole proprietor, with the intention of preventing the use of such private road by the public between the hours of sunset and sunrise, and the Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling, acting for the public, having obtained from the Magistrate an order under s. 532 of the Criminal Procedure Code “that possession of the private road be not taken by the person claiming to be proprietor to the exclusion of the public . . . until he shall have obtained the decision of a competent Civil Court adjudging him to be entitled to exclusive possession:”—*Held*, that, there being no evidence of any one having exercised or claimed to exercise the right of passing over the road between sunset and sunrise, there was no dispute under s. 532 of the Criminal Procedure Code; and that the order of the Magistrate was made without authority, and must be set aside. S. 532 does not enable a Magistrate to make a purely declaratory order. It only enables him to prevent arbitrary interruptions by any person of rights actually enjoyed, which have been exercised by the public or a person or class of persons. *In the matter of the MAHARAJA OF BURDWAN v. CHAIRMAN OF THE DARJEELING MUNICIPALITY*

**I. L. R. 5 Calc. 194 : 4 C. L. R. 324**



**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.**

**11. DISPUTES AS TO RIGHT OF WAY, WATER, ETC.—contd.**

**12.** ———— *Right of way, Obstruction to—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 532.* Where a complaint was made to a Magistrate that an obstruction had been raised and existed on land reserved by Government and dedicated as a public road :—*Held*, that an *ex parte* order, purporting to be made under s. 532 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, directing the party in possession not to retain possession of the land until he should obtain the decision of a competent Civil Court adjudging him to be entitled to exclusive possession, with a further direction to remove the obstruction, was bad in law. *In re LINDSAY*

**I. L. R. 4 Mad. 121**

**13.** ———— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 532—Public street—Funerals.* A dispute having arisen between the Mahomedan and Hindu inhabitants of a town as to the right of the latter to carry corpses along a certain public street to the burning-ground, the Magistrate passed an order, purporting to be under s. 532 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872, directing that the Hindus should carry corpses by the nearest route to the burning ground, and not by the street, to the use of which for such purposes the Mahomedans objected. *Held*, that the order of the Magistrate was illegal. *In re NARAYANA* . . . **I. L. R. 7 Mad. 49**

**14.** ———— *Reasonable likelihood of a breach of the peace—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 147—Police report.* The lessee of certain grass land in a village disputed the right of the villagers to graze their cattle on his land during the rainy season. On 26th August 1886 he prosecuted twenty-one villagers before the second class Magistrate for having unlawfully brought their cattle on his land, and committed mischief on the 5th September 1886, and pending this prosecution, the villagers assembled on the land in question and there was a riot. The offenders were convicted and punished. On appeal, the Sub-divisional Magistrate, on the 11th October 1886, upheld the conviction. On the same day, finding from the police report that there existed a dispute between the lessee and the villagers as to the right of the latter to graze cattle on the grass land, and that the dispute was likely to lead to a breach of the peace, the Sub-divisional Magistrate thought it necessary to hold an inquiry into the matter, under s. 147 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882). He, however, postponed the inquiry until the decision of the second class Magistrate in the mischief case. In that case the Magistrate found that the villagers had no right to graze cattle on the land in question, and that the lessee was in exclusive possession of it. He therefore held that the villagers had unlawfully entered upon the land; but as the damage done was inappreciable, he acquitted the accused on the 19th October 1886. The Sub-divisional Magistrate, being of opinion that after this decision a breach of the peace was probable, held the

**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—contd.**

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enquiry under s. 147 of the Criminal Procedure Code. He found that the villagers had the right of grazing cattle on the land in question during the autumn, and that they had exercised this right in the last preceding season. He therefore made an order allowing the right of grazing to the villagers. On application by the lessee to the High Court under s. 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code :—*Held*, that the order was illegal. Though the police report afforded some justification for entering upon an inquiry under s. 147, still after the rights of the parties had been judicially pronounced upon by the second class Magistrate in the sense that the villagers had no right of grazing cattle on the land in question, there was no reasonable ground for apprehending any further violence, and therefore no necessity for holding the inquiry under s. 147. *In re BALKRISHNA AMRIT PRADHAN*

**I. L. R. 11 Bom. 584**

**15.** ———— *Dispute concerning right to officiate in a mosque—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 147.* Where a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace is shown to exist concerning the right to perform a religious ceremony in a mosque, the Magistrate may exercise the powers conferred by s. 147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *MUHAMMAD MUSALIAR v. KUNJI CHEK MTSALIAR* . . . **I. L. R. 11 Mad. 323**

*See In re PANDURANG GOVIND*

**I. L. R. 24 Bom. 527**

**16.** ———— *Dispute about the right of performing worship and other religious rites in temples—Jurisdiction of Magistrates to interfere in cases where Civil Courts cannot grant relief—Procedure to be adopted where breach of the peace is apprehended—Right of suit.* A Magistrate, first class, made an order under s. 147 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), forbidding certain persons from taking part in the worship and other religious ceremonies connected with certain temples. As to the right to perform these ceremonies, the High Court had previously held that Civil Courts could not determine trivial questions of mere dignity or privilege. *Held*, that, the matters in dispute not being adjudicable by a Civil Court, s. 147 did not give the Magistrate jurisdiction to forbid the persons named in the order from taking part in the ceremonies in question. *Held*, also, that the order was bad in form, as it contained no restriction of the time during which it was to operate. *Held*, further, that, in cases where a Magistrate apprehends a breach of the peace, his proper course is to act under the provisions of Ch. VIII of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882). *In re ATMARAM NARAYAN PARAB*

**I. L. R. 14 Bom. 25**

**17.** ———— *Dispute concerning the use of land or water—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 145, 147—Right to build upon land, whether a use of land—Proceeding*



# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 11. DISPUTES AS TO RIGHT OF WAY, WATER, ETC.—*contd.*

under s. 147, whether legal—Summary disposal of case upon written statements, without taking any evidence, whether proper. In a matter under s. 147 as under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Magistrate is bound to hear the evidence tendered by the parties, and he cannot summarily deal with it after inspection of the locality. The right of use of land contemplated by s. 147 is one of an entirely different description resembling a right of easement, not one arising from the terms of a contract between landlord and tenant. A dispute between the landlord and tenant regarding the right of the latter to erect or re-erect a gola which has fallen down is not a matter properly coming within s. 147 of the Code. The settlement of such a dispute, involving issues of right, can be properly determined by a Civil Court. *EMPRESS v. GANPAT KALWAR* . 4 C. W. N. 779

18. ———— Right of fishing—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 147—Easements—Profits à prendre—Parties to the inquiry.* The words "right to do anything in or upon tangible immovable property" in s. 147 of the Criminal Procedure Code include the right of fishing. The term "easements" includes profits à prendre; it has not been used by the Legislature of this country in the restricted sense in which it is used in English law so as to exclude profits à prendre. For the purposes of an inquiry contemplated under s. 147 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is sufficient if the persons who claim for themselves the right, though that right is derived from others, are made parties. The proprietors are not necessary parties. *Ram Chandra Das v. Monohur Roy, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 29, and Bathoo Lal v. Domi Lal, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 727, distinguished. DUKHI MULLAH v. HALWAY* . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 55

19. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 147—Dispute concerning right of fishery—Grounds for Magistrate taking proceedings under s. 147—Procedure.* The words "right to do anything in or upon tangible immovable property" in s. 147 of the Criminal Procedure Code include julkur right. A Magistrate is competent to take action under that section in the case of a dispute concerning the exercise of a julkur right. *Dukhi Mullah v. Halway, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 55, followed.* If the materials upon which the proceedings are based do not disclose the fact that there is an imminent danger of a breach of the peace, then the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to take action under s. 147 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Any evidence that he may take in the course of the trial cannot give him a jurisdiction which he does not otherwise possess. *Queen-Empress v. Govind Chandra Das, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 520.* The proper course to be adopted by the Magistrate, when a dispute concerning easements, etc., arises, is to bind down, under s. 107 of the Code, such of the persons as are likely to disturb the peace. *Bathoo Lal v.*

# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 11. DISPUTES AS TO RIGHT OF WAY, WATER, ETC.—*contd.*

*Domi Lal, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 727, followed. KALI KISSEN TAGORE v. ANUND CHUNDER ROY*  
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 557

20. ———— *Jalkar—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 145—Jalkar, dispute as to possession of —Boundary dispute—Decree of Civil Court, defining such boundary—Magistrate, duty of—Interpretation of decree of Civil Court, effect of—Interpretation by trying Magistrate, if proper.* When a dispute as to the boundaries of a jalkar gives rise to a likelihood of a breach of the peace, and a proceeding under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, is drawn up by a Magistrate to settle the dispute, subsequent to civil litigation in which such boundaries were defined and laid down, the duty of the trying Magistrate is to follow the Civil Court's decree and to give effect to the same, and not to attempt an explanation of such a decree. *FANI BHUSAN SINGH v. JAMIRUDDIN MUNDUL (1901)*  
6 C. W. N. 161

21. ———— Dispute as to right to use water—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 532—Right to use of water.* A Deputy Magistrate was held to have been authorized by Act X of 1872, s. 532, in inquiring into the matter of a dispute between two parties concerning the use of the water of a certain pyne, and, when he found that the water was open under certain restrictions to the use of one of the parties, he was justified in restraining the other from a course of action which had the effect of keeping that water exclusively in his own possession, provided the right of use had been exercised within three months if capable of being exercised throughout the year; or during the last season, if it existed at particular seasons. *CHOWDHREE ZUHOORUL HUQ v. KURUM CHAND SINGH*  
24 W. R. Cr. 15

22. ———— Water—*Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 147—Construction and meaning of the section—Comparison of the language used in s. 147 of Act V of 1898, s. 147 of Act X of 1882 and s. 532 of Act X of 1872—Previous law bearing on the subject—Meaning of the term "such thing shall be done," etc.—Form of the order—Whether order affects persons not parties to the proceedings—Magistrate, power of, to order removal of obstruction to the enjoyment of right of easement—Parties, adding of, in proceeding under s. 147, Criminal Procedure Code, legality of.* Where it was found that the first party had a right to the flow of water for purposes of irrigation from a certain channel passing through the village of the second party, who obstructed such flow by erecting certain bunds:—*Held*, that, under s. 147 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate is competent to direct that the obstruction be removed. A Magistrate is not competent to add parties to a proceeding under s. 147, Criminal Procedure Code, any more than he is in proceedings under s. 145 of the Code. The order of the Deputy Magistrate, so far as it purports



**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*concl'd.*****11. DISPUTES AS TO RIGHT OF WAY, WATER, ETC.—*concl'd.***

to affect the persons not parties to the proceedings under s. 147, is null and void, but that does not render the whole order bad, and, so far as persons who are parties to the proceedings are concerned, it is binding on them. The finding of the Deputy Magistrate "that the first party have proved an uninterrupted user of water of the channel for twenty years, which they have enjoyed as an easement and as of right, and that the erection of the *bunds* led to the dispute" is a sufficient finding that the right in dispute had been exercised within either of the periods mentioned in the proviso to s. 147, Criminal Procedure Code. *PASUPATI NATH BOSE v. NANDO LAL BOSE* (1900)

5 C. W. N. 67

**23. ———— Right of way—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 147—Easement, right of, obstruction to—Right of way, likelihood of breach of the peace concerning—Exercise of right within statutory period—"Such thing shall be done," etc., meaning of—Order, form of.** Where one party has a right of way over the land of another, who obstructs such right by erecting certain huts, and there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace in consequence of such obstruction:—*Held*, that a Magistrate is competent, under the provisions of s. 147, Criminal Procedure Code, to direct that the obstruction be removed. *Pasupati Nath Bose v. Nando Lal Bose*, 5 C. W. N. 67, followed. *LALIT CHANDRA NEOGI v. TARINI PERSAD GUPTA* (1901)

5 C. W. N. 335

**24. ———— Right to restrain exercise of easement—Burden of proof—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 147.** The right to restrain another from exercising ordinary proprietary rights over his own land is of the nature of an easement different from the ordinary rights of owners of land; the burden of proof would therefore lie upon the party alleging such rights. *HARI MOHUN THAKUR v. KISSEN SUNDARI* . . . I. L. R. 11 Calc. 52

**12. LOCAL INQUIRY.**

**1. ———— Nature and object of inquiry—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 530, 533.** In a proceeding under s. 530 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate must decide the fact of possession on evidence taken by himself, and not according to the result of a local inquiry made under s. 533, unless the parties have consented to be bound thereby. *Per PRINSEP, J.*—The local inquiry referred to in s. 533 should be restricted solely to some question relating to the features of the property about which the dispute has arisen, and should not be directed to any matter which can be proved before the Magistrate by oral evidence. *In the matter of BAIKUNT KUMAR* . . . 3 C. L. R. 134

**2. ———— Person to make local inquiry—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 533.**

**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*concl'd.*****12. LOCAL INQUIRY—*concl'd.***

The duty of making an inquiry under s. 533 of the Criminal Procedure Code should be deputed to a Magistrate, not a Canungoe. *In the matter of UMA CHURN SANTRA v. BENI MADHUB ROY*

7 C. L. R. 352

**3. ———— Effect of inquiry as evidence—Right to rebut evidence—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 533.** When a local inquiry under s. 533 of the Criminal Procedure Code is instituted, it becomes part of the proceedings in the case, and the party affected by it is entitled to be acquainted with the results of it, and to have an opportunity of rebutting the deputed Magistrate's report if he thinks necessary so to do. *DHUNOO v. BROWN*

21 W. R. Cr. 25

**4. ———— Discretion of Magistrate as to local inquiry—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 533—Security to keep peace.** The holding of an inquiry under Ch. XL of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a matter entirely within the discretion of the Magistrate of the district or of a division of a district, and the High Court has no authority to require him to proceed under that chapter. The taking of security for keeping the peace is also a matter within the discretion of the Magistrate, provided that he has materials upon which to proceed. *In the matter of the petition of KALI PROSUNNO ROY* . . . 23 W. R. Cr. 58

**13. DISPOSSESSION BY CRIMINAL FORCE.**

**1. ———— Order as to person dispossessed from immovable property by criminal force—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 534.** An order under s. 534, Criminal Procedure Code, must be founded on a finding that the person in whose favour it was made was dispossessed of specific immovable property by the use of criminal force, which formed a material ingredient in the matter of a criminal conviction, and it must in terms restore such person to the property from which he had been dispossessed. *LUCHMI DASS v. PALLAT LALL* . . . 23 W. R. Cr. 54

**2. ———— Restoration of possession of immovable property—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 522.** The words "an offence attended by criminal force" in s. 522 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882) mean an offence of which criminal force forms an ingredient. S. 522 is not applicable to cases where there has been no conviction for criminal force, either separately or as an ingredient of the offence, of which there is a conviction, and where there is no finding that any person has been dispossessed of any immovable property by criminal force. *Luchmi Dass v. Pallat Lall*, 23 W. R. Cr. 54, and *Soshi Bhusan Dutt v. Pyari Kishore Biswas*, 1 C. W. N. 256, followed. *RAM CHANDRA BORAL v. JITYANDRIA* . . . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 434

2 C. W. N. 305



# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 13. DISPOSSESSION BY CRIMINAL FORCE—*contd.*

3. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 522, 523, 524—Order to restore possession of immoveable property.* An order made under s. 522 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), restoring possession of immoveable property to a person who has been dispossessed of it by criminal force, is an independent order and may be made subsequently to the date of the conviction of the offender. It need not be made at the same time as the conviction. The case contemplated by s. 522 is that of a person in possession (the complainant) being dispossessed by force by another person (the accused), and the latter being in possession at the date of conviction. In such a case the section gives the Magistrate power to order possession to be restored to the complainant. In the case of a proper order, third persons could not be affected; if they are, the order is not thereby necessarily invalid. Cl. 2 of the section gives them a remedy by civil suit. On 27th September 1897 complainant charged one R with criminal trespass under s. 447 of the Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860). He alleged that in the previous July R had entered into possession of the land and sowed rice upon it, and that, when in the month of September 1897 he (the complainant) went to the field, R had turned him out by force and refused to vacate the land. On the 17th November 1897 the case was heard by the Third Class Magistrate, who convicted R of the offence charged. On the following day (18th November 1897) the complainant applied to the Magistrate under s. 522 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882) to be restored to possession of the land and of the standing crops. The Magistrate ordered possession of the land to be restored to the complainant, but attached the crops under Ch. XLIII of the Criminal Procedure Code. Thereupon one V intervened, and claimed the crops as having been sown by himself. His claim was disallowed, and the crops were ordered to be sold and the proceeds credited to Government under ss. 523 and 524 of the Code. *Held*, that the order made by the Magistrate under s. 522 restoring possession of the land to the complainant was bad, because it did not appear that the offence of which the accused was convicted was attended with criminal force, and that the dispossession was due to the use of such force. The illegal entry complained of had taken place in July 1897. The accused then took possession, and in September, being then still in possession, forcibly resisted the complainant when he attempted to enter upon the land. The complainant, however, did not charge the accused with this assault, but with the trespass which had taken place in July. It is only when the actual use of criminal force leads to dispossession that an order under s. 522 can be made. *Held*, also, that the order passed under ss. 523 and 524 with reference to the crops were illegal. The crops were not property in respect of which the

# POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—*contd.*

## 13. DISPOSSESSION BY CRIMINAL FORCE—*contd.*

offence was committed, nor were they used in the commission of the offence. They were not such property as is referred to in s. 517, 523, or 524 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *Held*, further, that the Third Class Magistrate as such had no authority to make an order under s. 524. *NARAYAN GOVIND v. VISAJI* . . . . . **I. L. R. 23 Bom. 494**

4. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 522—Restoration of possession of property—Use of criminal force—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 350.* In order to support an order under s. 522 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), there must be a finding that the dispossession was by the use of criminal force as defined in s. 350 of the Penal Code. *Ram Chandra Boral v. Jityandria*, **I. L. R. 25 Calc. 434**, approved of. *ISHAN CHANDRA KALLA v. DINA NATH BADHAK* . . . . . **I. L. R. 27 Calc. 174**  
**4 C. W. N. 307**

5. ————— *Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 522—Order for restoration of possession of immoveable property to complainant—Order passed not simultaneously with the order of conviction but subsequent thereto.* An order under s. 522 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, restoring possession of immoveable property to a complainant, can only be made simultaneously with the order of conviction, and not subsequent thereto. *Ram Chandra Boral v. Jityandria*, **I. L. R. 25 Calc. 434**; **2 C. W. N. 305**, referred to. *MOHAN THETA v. RAICHAND BASNI* . . . . . **4 C. W. N. 308**

6. ————— *Restoration—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 522—Possession of immoveable property, restoration of—Object and scope of the law—Jurisdiction of Criminal Court.* The object of the provisions of s. 522 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to enable the Criminal Court, by a summary order, to restore the state of things which existed at the time of the dispossession by the convicted person or persons, and the Criminal Court cannot go behind the state of affairs at the time of the forcible ejection which led to the criminal prosecution. Sub-s. (2) of s. 522 provides that any right or interest which a third party may have in the property cannot be affected; and such third party, in case of eviction under an order under s. 522, must seek his remedy in the Civil Court. *Narayan Govind v. Visaji*, **I. L. R. 23 Bom. 494**, referred to and explained. *RAMESWAR MARWARI v. BISWA NATH BANERJEE* (1900) . . . . . **5 C. W. N. 374**

7. ————— *Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 522—Order for restoration of possession of immoveable property—Conviction of accused on charge of criminal trespass—No finding of use of criminal force—Legality of order for restoration.* Certain persons were convicted of having committed criminal trespass on a piece of land, under s. 447 of the Indian



**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—concl'd.****13. DISPOSSESSION BY CRIMINAL FORCE—concl'd.**

Penal Code. There was no finding that they had used criminal force, or that the complainant had been dispossessed of the land by such force. An order was subsequently made, which purported to be under s. 522 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, directing the accused to restore possession of the land. On a revision petition being preferred against this order:—*Held*, that, as there was no finding that criminal force had in fact been used, or that complainant had been dispossessed of the land by it, and as criminal force was not an ingredient of the offence for which the accused had been convicted, the order was made without jurisdiction. **BATAKALA POTTIAVADU (1902)**

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 49

**8.** *Criminal Procedure Code, s. 522—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 350—Restoration of possession of immovable property—Use of criminal force.* To support an order under s. 522 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, restoring possession of immovable property, it is necessary for the Court to find as a fact not only that the person in whose favour such order is made was deprived of possession by an offence, but that such offence was attended by the use of criminal force. *Ram Chandra Boral v. Jityandria*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 434, and *Ishan Chandra Kalla v. Dina Nath Badhak*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 174, followed. **CHURAMAN v. RAM LAL (1903)** . I. L. R. 25 All. 341

**14. COSTS.**

**1.** *Order for costs—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 148—Assessment of such costs by successor in office—Magistrate, power of.* When a Magistrate passed an order for costs under s. 148, Criminal Procedure Code, but did not state what the amount was to be:—*Held*, that his successor in office had no jurisdiction to pass an order assessing such costs. **BHOJAL SONAR v. NIRBAN SINGH**

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 609

**2.** *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 148—Assessment of costs by Magistrate other than the Magistrate passing the decision and making the order for costs—Application within reasonable time.* Where a decision has been given in a case under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and an order for costs has been made at the same time and by the same Magistrate, there is no objection to the amount of such costs being afterwards assessed by a different Magistrate if an application for that purpose is made to him within a reasonable time. *Bhojal Sonar v. Nirban Singh*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 609, distinguished. **GIRIDHAR CHATTERJEE v. EBADULLAH NASKAR**

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 384

**3.** *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 148—“Magistrate passing decision,” Meaning of—Magistrate, power of—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 218—Criminal*

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**POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—concl'd.****14. COSTS—concl'd.**

*Procedure Code, 1882, s. 439—Revision.* The award of costs under s. 148 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a quasi-civil proceeding, and should be made by the Magistrate at the time of passing his decision under s. 145, in the same manner as under s. 218 of the Code of Civil Procedure the order for costs of any application should be made when the application is disposed of. Where, however, the decision under s. 145 was passed on the 19th December 1893, and the application for costs was made on the 21st December, but owing to delay arising from the action of the objectors the order for costs was not made until the 16th June 1894, but then by the same Magistrate who passed the order under s. 145:—*Held*, that the order was not void for want of jurisdiction, and there being no suggestion that it was unjust or improper on the merits, the Court declined to interfere with it in the exercise of their discretionary power of revision under s. 439. **BINODA SUNDARI CHOWDHURANI v. KALI KRISTO PAL CHOWDHURY** . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 387

**4.** *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 148—Assessment of costs by Magistrate other than the Magistrate passing the decision and making the order for costs.* When an order to pay costs under s. 148 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882) has been made by the Magistrate who decided the case, another Magistrate has jurisdiction to assess the amount of costs. *Giridhar Chatterjee v. Ebadullah Naskar*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 384, followed. *Bhojal Sonar v. Nirban Singh*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 609, referred to. **MAHOMED ERSHAD ALI KHAN CHOUDHRY v. SARODA PROSAD SHAHA** . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 37

**5.** *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 148—Order for, and assessment of, costs—Power of Magistrate—Delay—Notice to parties.* An order for, and the assessment of, costs under s. 148 of the Criminal Procedure Code should be made at the time of passing the decision under s. 145 of the Code in the presence of the parties. Such costs should not be ordered and assessed by the Magistrate after a long interval, and without allowing all the parties affected an opportunity to appear and show cause. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. TOMIJUDDI** . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 757

**6.** *Jurisdiction—Costs—Order for assessment of, without notice to party affected thereby—Revision by High Court—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 148.* A Magistrate has no jurisdiction to pass an order, under s. 148 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, making a party liable for a certain sum as costs, without notice to him so that he may have an opportunity of contesting the same. **PROKASH CHUNDER SARKAR v. RAM PRASAD PATTAK (1900)** I. L. R. 28 Calc. 302 s.c. 5 C. W. N. 291

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**POST CARDS.**

See OBSCENE POST CARDS.  
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 247

**POST MORTEM REPORT.**

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—MEDICAL EVIDENCE . 6 C. W. N. 98

**POST OFFICE ACT (XVII OF 1854).**

— s. 49—*Liability of Government for loss in conveyance.* Under s. 49 of the Post Office Act, 1854, the Indian Government, like Post Master General, is not responsible for loss or damage occurring to anything entrusted to the Post Office for conveyance. WINTER v WAY . 1 Mad. 200

## — s. 50—

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—  
SPECIAL ACTS—POST OFFICE ACT.  
3 Bom. Cr. 8

— *Conviction for fraudulently secreting letter—Subsequent charge of fraudulently making away with letter.* Where a prisoner was convicted and sentenced, under s. 50 of Act XVII of 1854, upon the charge of fraudulently secreting a post letter and on appeal such conviction and sentence were confirmed:—*Held*, that he could not subsequently be convicted under the same section of having fraudulently made away with the same letter upon the same occasion, both acts being connected and substantially a part of one criminal transaction. QUEEN v. DALAPATI RAU . 1 Mad. 83

**POST OFFICE ACT (XIV OF 1866).**

See ABETMENT . 7 W. R. Cr. 54

See CARRIERS . 3 N. W. 195

## — s. 5—

See ATTACHMENT—SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—LETTERS IN POST OFFICE.  
I. L. R. 13 Mad. 242

## — ss. 47, 48—

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—  
SPECIAL ACTS—POST OFFICE ACT.  
3 Bom. Cr. 8  
5 Bom. Cr. 36

— *Opening newspaper and replacing it in envelope—Offence.* Per KEMP, J. (GLOVER, J., doubting), that the opening of a newspaper by a person employed in the Post Office and replacing it in its envelope does not constitute an offence under s. 48, Act XIV of 1866, as it could not be said that the accused stole, fraudulently appropriated, wilfully secreted, destroyed, or threw away any letter or other article sent by post. Per

**POST OFFICE ACT (XIV OF 1866)—  
concl'd.**

— ss. 47, 48—*concl'd.*

KEMP and GLOVER, JJ.—There must be a fraudulent intention in the act of the accused before he can be convicted under s. 48. QUEEN v. PANNA LALL MOOKERJEE . 19 W. R. Cr. 4

— s. 48—*Secreting and fraudulently appropriating letters—Theft—Dishonest misappropriation—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 378, 493.* The accused, being in the employ of Government in the Post Office Department, while assisting in the sorting of letters, secreted two letters with the intention of handing them to the delivery peon, and sharing with him certain moneys payable upon them. He was charged under the Indian Post Office Act, s. 48. *Held*, (i) that since the intention of the accused was not to prevent the delivery of the letters to the addressees, he was not guilty of the offence of secreting them within the meaning of that section; (ii) that he was guilty of the offence of stealing and of fraudulently misappropriating the letters within the meaning of that section, and of the offence of theft and of attempt to commit dishonest misappropriation of property within the meaning of the Penal Code. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. VENCATASAMI . I. L. R. 14 Mad. 229

**POST OFFICE ACT (VI OF 1898).**

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See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL.  
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OF 1865.

Grant of pottah by  
Collector—Conditional grant—Effect of reversal of  
grant—Appeal to Board of Revenue. The grant of a  
pottah by a Collector is conditional on the result  
of an appeal against such grant to the Board of  
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Will—Appointment by  
general bequest—Power created subsequently to the  
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Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 527,  
case stated under. A general power of appointment  
may be well exercised by a will executed previously  
to the creation of the power and that too by a  
mere residuary gift. DINSHAW SORABJI v. DIN-  
SHAW SORABJI (1907) . I. L. R. 31 Bom. 472

**POWER-OF-ATTORNEY.**

See CHARGE . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 854

See EVIDENCE ACT, SS. 85, 114.

9 C. W. N. 986

See PARDANASHIN WOMAN—EXECUTION  
OF DOCUMENT BY.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 744

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—PROBATE  
AND LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 776

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 491

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 492

See STAMP ACT, 1879, SCH. I, ART. 50.

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 146 ; 358

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 386

1. Construction of power—  
Power to sell or mortgage ship. In construing  
power-of-attorney, the special purpose for which the  
power is given is first to be regarded, and the most  
general words following the declaration of that spe-  
cial purpose will be construed to be merely all such  
powers as are needed for its effectuation. Where  
the owner of a ship by power-of-attorney constituted  
the master his agent, and authorized him to raise or  
borrow upon the ship's papers such sums of money  
as he should deem necessary for the repair of the  
ship, "and to act in the premises as fully and effec-  
tually to all intents and purposes as I might or could  
do if personally present." In a suit for the amount  
of a mortgage-bond upon the ship executed by the  
master:—*Held*, that the master had no authority to  
sell or mortgage the ship. JUDAH v. ADDI RAJA  
QUEEN BIBI . . . 2 Mad. 177

2. Power to refer to  
arbitration. T, having frequent occasion to prose-  
cute and defend suits in different Courts and being



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unable to give his personal attention to them, executed a power-of-attorney in S's favour, whereby he authorized S to watch the cases on his behalf, to appoint any pleader or mooktear, to receive, after giving a receipt for the same, any money deposited for, and due to, him from the Courts, to act on his behalf in cases of dakhil-kharaj, and obtain the entry of his name after getting the names of other persons expunged, to purchase villages with the money due under decrees, to file on his behalf receipts, acquittances, raji-namahs, and other documents, and to get back deeds and decrees and give receipts and acquittances. *Held*, that the terms of the power-of-attorney did not authorize S to refer questions to arbitration. **THAKOOR PERSHAD v. KALKA PERSHAD** . . . . . **6 N. W. 210**

3. ————— *Power to sue given to an agent, extent of—Vakil, Reasonable remuneration to, under such power.* A mere power to sue does not authorize an agent to do more than employ a vakil on the terms of paying him a reasonable remuneration. **KESHAV BAPUJI v. NARAYAN SHAMRAV** . . . . . **I. L. R. 10 Bom. 18**

4. ————— *Authority to enter into special agreement with vakil—Agreement to remunerate according to proportion recovered.* The defendant, on behalf of her minor son, gave to S M a power-of-attorney by which she authorized S M, "for her and in her name and on her behalf to appear in or sue or defend . . . any suit, appeal, or special appeal, . . . and to act in all such proceedings in any way in which she might, if present, be permitted or called on to act." *Held*, that the above power did not authorize S M to enter into a special agreement with a vakil, under which the vakil (in an appeal which he was employed to conduct for the defendant on behalf of her minor son) was to receive for his services a minimum reward of R4,000, and, in cases of success, a reward proportional to the amount awarded by the Appellate Court. **RAV SAHEB V. N. MANDLIK v. KAMALJABAI SAHEB NIMBALKAR** . . . . . **10 Bom. 26**

5. ————— *Power to execute bond.* Under a power-of-attorney executed by twenty proprietors of a joint estate, empowering their general manager to raise loans for the purposes of the estate upon bonds, and to sign their names or his name in their behalf, and to pledge the whole or any part of the estate by such bonds, the attorney executed a bond on behalf of three of the proprietors. *Held*, that under the power-of-attorney the manager was not authorized to execute a bond on behalf of any one or more of the proprietors making him or them responsible for the whole money borrowed to the exclusion of the rest. *Held*, further, that in a suit upon a bond so executed, the plaintiffs were not entitled to rely upon the general power which the manager might have, as the manager's authority must be considered as strictly confined to the terms of the power-of-attorney. **BUDH SINGH DUDHURIA v. DENENDRA NATH SANCUL** . . . . . **11 C. L. R. 323**

6. ————— *Mooktearnama—Execution of bond to secure barred debt—Contract*

**POWER-OF-ATTORNEY—contd.**

*Act, s. 25.* A mooktearnama empowering the mooktear to execute bonds in lieu of former debts does not authorize the mooktear to execute a bond to secure a debt already barred by limitation. Where, however, a suit is brought upon a bond executed to secure a former debt, it must be shown by the person alleging it that such debt was barred. **HUBLAL SUGU v. RAM GOTI DEY ROY** . . . . . **11 C. L. R. 58**

7. ————— *Mooktearnama—Authority of agent—Power to make gift.* A mooktearnama merely gave the mooktear power to grant ticca ijara leases and, when advisable, to sell, mortgage, and make gift of the whole or portion of the property of the principal. *Held*, that the mooktear had no power to create a permanent tenure. The power of making a gift given by the mooktearnama authorized the mooktear formally to execute a deed of gift only when the disposing power had been exercised by the principal. **TYEBUNNESSA v. KANIZ FATIMA** . . . . . **13 C. L. R. 247**

8. ————— *Power to dispose of property—Authority to pledge.* A power-of-attorney authorized the holder "to dispose" of certain property in any way he thought fit. *Held*, that the holder of such power had no authority to mortgage the property. A power-of-attorney must be construed strictly. **MALUKCHAND BIN GYANMAL v. SHAN MOGHAN VARDRAJ** **I. L. R. 14 Bom. 590**

9. ————— *Power to "sell, endorse, and assign" negotiable securities.* The payee of promissory notes of the East India Company, by a power-of-attorney, authorized his agents at Calcutta to "sell, endorse, and assign" the notes. These notes were transferable by endorsement payable to bearer. The agents, in their character of private bankers, borrowed money of the bank of Bengal, offering, as security, these promissory notes. The Bank made the advance, and the agents endorsed the notes, such endorsement purporting to be as attorney for their principal, and deposited them with the Bank, by way of collateral security for their personal liability, at the same time authorising the Bank, in default of payment, to sell the notes in reimbursement of the advances. The agents afterwards became insolvent, and default having been made in payment, the Bank sold the notes and realized the amount of their loan. *Held*, that the endorsement of the notes by the agents of the payee to the Bank was within the scope of the authority given to them by the power-of-attorney, and that the payee could not recover in detinue against the Bank. The rule laid down in the case of *Gill v. Cubitt*, 3 B. & C. 466, and *Down v. Halling*, 4 B. & C. 330, that the negligence of a party taking a negotiable instrument fixes him with the defective title of the party passing it, observed upon, and those cases declared to be no longer law. **BANK OF BENGLA v. MACLEOD** . . . . . **5 Moo. I. A. 1**

**BANK OF BENGLA v. FAGAN** . . . . . **5 Moo. I. A. 27**

10. ————— *Power to sell or mortgage.* Under a power-of-attorney containing a clause empowering A to sell or mortgage the donor's property for the payment of his debts, A executed a



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simple money-bond to one of the donor's creditors, for payment of the sum due and interest. *Held*, that the act was *extra vires*, and did not bind the donor. **POORNA CHUNDER SEN v. PROSUNNO COOMAR DASS**

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 253; 8 C. L. R. 433

11. — *Principal and agent—“Purchase, sell, endorse, and transfer”*—*Meaning of “Power to sell.”* N & Co. having a joint and several power-of-attorney from the plaintiff, authorising them “to purchase, sell, endorse, and transfer for the plaintiff, and in the plaintiff's name and on the plaintiff's behalf,” all shares standing in his name in the books of any public company or society, entered into a contract embodied in bought and sold notes, agreeing to sell by order and on account of N & Co. to the defendant, twenty-five Muir Mill Cotton shares, and agreeing to buy, by order and for account of N & Co., from the defendant, twenty-five Muir Mill Cotton shares in three months' time at an advanced rate; the bought and sold notes bearing the same date and being one transaction. The transfer deeds were signed by a partner in the firm of N & Co. as attorney for the plaintiff; and N & Co. received the purchase-money of the shares. Previous to the time fixed for the sale of twenty-five Muir Mill Cotton shares by the defendant to N & Co., the latter became insolvent. The plaintiff then brought a suit to recover the shares from the defendant. *Held*, by GARTH, C.J., that the transaction between N & Co. and the defendant was not justified by the power-of-attorney, the contract not having been entered into “for and on behalf and in the name of the plaintiff” within the meaning of the power; and that the transaction was either an actual loan or a transaction in the nature of a loan for the purpose of raising money. *Per* WILSON, J., that the defendant took no title to the shares for two reasons, *viz.*: (i) because a power to sell is only a power to sell in the ordinary course of business, *i.e.*, for a money price; (ii) because it was the duty of the defendant, seeing that the shares were sold to him under a power, to see that he paid the price to the plaintiff by his attorney. **JUMNA DOSS v. ECKFORD**

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 1

12. — *Meaning of the word “negotiate” with reference to Government securities.* W gave to A and B a power-of-attorney authorizing them jointly and severally to “negotiate, make sale, dispose of, assign, and transfer,” amongst other things, certain Government securities standing in his name. B pledged the securities for an advance of Rs19,000, and at the same time executed a promissory note for the amount of the loan, a promissory note being signed “B, as attorney for W.” In a suit by W to recover the Government security held, in the Court below, that the power-of-attorney was sufficiently wide to cover the transaction; that the transaction was a fraud on the part of B, but that the transferee (the defendant) had no knowledge of the fraud, and therefore the plaintiff was entitled to succeed. *Held*, on appeal, *per* GARTH, J.—(i) That the words of the power were to

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be read disjunctively, and the powers conveyed by the words were to be treated as joint and several; (ii) that even supposing the word “negotiable” to be applicable to transactions with Government securities (which was doubtful), and that such Government securities stood in the same position as ordinary commercial notes, the word “negotiate” did not authorize B to do more than put the Government securities in the market, or to put them in circulation in the ordinary way in which such a transaction takes place in the market, and if necessary to endorse them in the name of W; (iii) that the loan, which was the principal transaction, being irrecoverable from W, because unauthorized, the defendant could not return the Government securities, which were deposited as security for the loan, he not having taken the precaution to ascertain whether B had authority to enter into that transaction. *Per* GARTH, C.J.—That although, on the authority of *The Bank of Bengal v. Fagan*, 5 Moo. I. A. 27, a power to negotiate Government securities would authorize the negotiation of Government securities by way of pledge, yet W was entitled to a decree on the ground that A and B had no power, under the power-of-attorney, to borrow money in the name of W; and that therefore the defendant was not entitled to retain the security given for the advance (*viz.*, the Government promissory note). **WATSON v. JONMENJOY COONDOD**

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 934

On appeal to the Privy Council:—*Held*, that, with regard to the general objects of the power, B had under it no authority to pledge, and that the lender of the money acquired no title to the note as against W. The power-of-attorney was not in the same form as that in the *Bank of Bengal v. Macleod*, 5 Moo. I. A. 1, and *Bank of Bengal v. Fagan*, 5 Moo. I. A. 27, not containing, in express words, power to endorse. Had it done so, the question would have been whether there was anything to prevent it from being a power, in the discretion of the donee of it, to endorse the note, and convert it into one payable to bearer, whenever he thought fit to do so, for any purpose. It was not laid down in the judgment in those cases that the words used in a power-of-attorney, to express its objects, are always to be construed disjunctively, though they may be so construed; and there is no reason why a rule of construction, intended to aid in arriving at the meaning of the parties, should not be applied in construing a power-of-attorney as much as any other document. **JONMENJOY COONDOD v. WATSON**

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 901

13. — *A power-of-attorney contained, amongst others, the power to sell and convert into money “the goods, effects and things belonging to” the principal:—Held*, that the word “things” in the power included mortgages as being *things in action*, there being nothing in the deed which suggested that the things were to be limited to *choses in possession* and not to *choses in action*. *Held*, further, that the mortgages were capable of being transferred by the attorney. *In re Dawson & Jenkin's Contract*, [1904], 2 Ch. 219



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referred to. An executrix is not competent to exercise the power of sale given by statute or will by an attorney: there is no distinction between a power given by statute and a power given by a will. A power-of-attorney, in so far as it delegates to an attorney power to exercise the discretion vested in an executrix, is void. But where the executrix granting the power was actually present when certain deeds of transfer were executed and her attorney had consulted her in all the dealings and she approved of the same, and thereafter, the attorney executed the documents under her approval and where the documents executed did not express whether they were executed under a power given in writing or under verbal instructions:—*Held*, that the case fell within the legal maxim of *ut res magis valeat quam pereat* and that it must be taken that the attorney executed the document under the express verbal authority given to him by the executrix principal. *JOGENDRACHUNDER DUTT v. APURNA DASSI* (1908). **13 C. W. N. 1191**

**14. — Principal and agent—Bank manager acting as private agent—Transaction for benefit of Bank.** *A*, being in uncontrolled management of the National Bank in Calcutta and purporting to act under a power-of-attorney intended to be given to him in his private capacity, but addressed to him as "acting manager of the National Bank" by *B*, a constituent of the Bank, without drawing any cheque on *B*'s account, and simply by means of transferring in the books of the Bank Rs. 15,000 from *B*'s deposit account with the Bank to the account of one *C* who was indebted to the National Bank, purported to make an advance of Rs. 15,000 from *B* to *C*, whereas, in fact, the real transaction amounted only to transferring the liability of *C* to that extent from the Bank to *B*. *Held*, that, so far as this transaction was concerned, *A* could not divest himself of his character of Bank manager, and that, acting as the agent of both parties, he acted to the prejudice of *B* and to the advantage of the Bank, and that there was, in fact, a breach of his duty to *B* to which the Bank was a party. *Held*, also, that *A* was not able under the power-of-attorney to bind *B* by consenting to any dealings by the Bank or *C* with goods in the Bank's godowns which would prejudice *B*. *BEER v. NATIONAL BANK OF INDIA*. **19 W. R. 67**

**15. — Stamp law—Operation of power confined to British India—Stamp Act (I of 1879), s. 5.** It is not necessary for the Courts in India to consider whether a power-of-attorney issued in England, but which is intended to operate in British India, complies with the fiscal requirements of the stamp laws in England. It is sufficient if such power-of-attorney is stamped according to the stamp laws of British India. *Bristow v. Sequeville*, 5 Ex. 275, and *James v. Catherwood*, 3 D. & R. 190, followed. *Clegg v. Levy*, 3 Camp. 166, not followed. *Semble*: If such a power-of-attorney was intended to operate in England, as well as in British India, it would not be invalid, so far as it was intended to operate in British India,

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because the requirements of the stamp laws in England had not been fulfilled. It would be sufficient if it complied with the requirements of the Indian law. *In the goods of McADAM*

**I. L. R. 23 Calc. 187**

**16. — Identity, affidavit of—Notary Public—Administration—Affidavit—Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 85 and 114—Presumption of regularity—Rules and Orders of the High Court of Calcutta—Rule 748—Direction of Court in particular case to require further evidence of identity.** On an application for grant of letters of administration with copy of the will annexed to the constituted attorney of the sole executor of deceased:—*Held*, that s. 85 of the Evidence Act is mandatory. In the case of a document purporting to be a power-of-attorney and to have been executed before and authenticated by a Notary Public, the authentication of the Notary is to be treated as the equivalent of an affidavit of identity of the executant, and no affidavit of identity is necessary. In any particular case, if the Court is not satisfied, it may, under Rule 748 of the Rules and Orders of the High Court of Calcutta, require further evidence of the verification of the power-of-attorney. *In the Goods of MYLNE* (1905). **I. L. R. 33 Calc. 625**

**17. — Registration—Charge on immoveable property—Registration Act (III of 1877), ss. 17, 21, 49, 80—Non-compliance with provisions of Registration Act.** Where a power-of-attorney purporting to create a charge on immoveable property did not sufficiently describe the property, and was stamped and registered as a power-of-attorney, and entered in Book IV (the Miscellaneous Register):—*Held*, that the document was not registered in accordance with the provisions of the Registration Act, and, therefore could not, under s. 49 of the Act, affect any immoveable property comprised therein. *Najibulla Mulla v. Nasir Mistri*, **I. L. R. 7 Calc. 196**, referred to. *INDRA BIBI v. JAIN SIRDAR AHIRI* (1907). **I. L. R. 35 Calc. 854**  
**s.c. 12 C. W. N. 316**

**POWER OF COURT TO RECTIFY MISTAKE.**

*Power of Court to correct its own mistake—Inherent power—Amendment of sale certificate—Sale certificate including a property not sold—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244.* A Court committing a blunder has power to rectify it of its own motion. Where two properties were advertised for sale and one property was sold, but the sale certificate included both the properties and the purchaser got possession of both:—*Held*, that the Court had inherent power to rectify the mistake by amending the sale certificate and to direct that the delivery of possession of the second property be cancelled. That the matter would also come under s. 24 of the Civil Procedure Code, the question being one between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor, and relating to the satisfaction or discharge of the decree. *GOBINDA CHANDRA CHANDA v. ABHOY CHARAN BACCHI* (1908). **12 C. W. N. 1027**



**POWER OF DISPOSAL.**

*See* STRIDHAN . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 229

**POWER OF SALE.**

*See* MORTGAGE—CONSTRUCTION OF MORTGAGES . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 303  
I. L. R. 13 All. 28  
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 425  
I. L. R. 20 Bom. 296  
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*See* MORTGAGE—POWER OF SALE.

*See* STAMP ACT, 1879, SCH. I, ART. 44.  
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**PRACTICE.**

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| <i>See</i> CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, ss. 371, 596 . . . . .               | 9 C. W. N. 369; 370       |
| <i>See</i> CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 526 . . . . .                     | I. L. R. 33 Calc. 757     |
| <i>See</i> CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 539 . . . . .                     | I. L. R. 30 Bom. 603      |
| <i>See</i> CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT V OF 1908), O. VI, R. 17 . . . . .     | I. L. R. 33 Bom. 644      |
| <i>See</i> CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908, s. 2 . . . . .                       | I. L. R. 31 All. 545      |
| <i>See</i> COMMISSION . . . . .   | I. L. R. 35 Calc. 28      |
|   | I. L. R. 36 Calc. 566     |
| <i>See</i> CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1898, ss. 206 <i>et seqq.</i> . . . . . | I. L. R. 26 All. 564      |
| <i>See</i> CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1898, s. 439 . . . . .                  | I. L. R. 30 All. 116      |
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| <i>See</i> GROUND OF APPEAL . . . . .                                       | 9 C. W. N. 636            |
| <i>See</i> GUARDIANS AND WARDS ACT, ss. 47, 48 . . . . .                    | I. L. R. 31 Bom. 590      |
| <i>See</i> HIGH COURT RULES . . . . .                                       | I. L. R. 32 Bom. 262; 428 |
| <i>See</i> HINDU LAW . . . . .  | 10 C. W. N. 95            |
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## I. CIVIL CASES.

1. \_\_\_\_\_ Account—No specific direction as to accounts in the decree—Court cannot direct accounts to be taken before the Commissioner when parties have arrived at an agreement after the decree—Appeal against such an order. A decree of the High Court on the Original Side contemplated an account being taken between the parties, but it was silent on the question as to how that account was to be taken, whether by the Commissioner or by some person selected by both the parties. The Court of first instance decided that where a direction as to account ought to have been incorporated in a decree when passed it was competent to the Court at any stage of proceedings to direct necessary inquiries or accounts to be made or taken. *Held*, on appeal, that as some account was taken under the decree by a person appointed jointly by the parties, a new agreement had come into existence superseding the decree, and the Court was not competent to make the order appealed against. An appeal lies



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against an order of a Judge sitting on the Original Side if that order decides a question of some right between the parties. *JEHANGIR COWASJI v. THE HOPE MILLS, LIMITED* (1908)

**I. L. R. 33 Bom. 216**

**2. ———— Adjournment—Failure to procure sufficient evidence—Costs.** A plaintiff failed in an *ex parte* suit to bring forward sufficient evidence to entitle him to a decree, and asked for an adjournment in order to obtain further evidence; the Court granted an adjournment on the terms that the plaintiff should bear the whole costs of the hearing. *SHANKS v. SAVAGE* **I. L. R. 7 Calc. 177**

**3. ———— Administration suit—Further directions—Advocate-General—By consent, added as party—Right to question validity of legacies—Estoppel—Laches—Stale demand—Will—Khoja Mahomedan will—Gift to a class—Construction.** M, a Khoja Mahomedan, died in 1864. By his will and codicil he left his property to trustees upon trust, *inter alia*, to pay his daughter, L, a monthly sum during her life, and, after her death, to pay it to her children. M's residuary estate was charged in favour of certain charitable objects. In 1868 the Advocate-General commenced a suit (962 of 1868) for the administration of M's estate. In 1869 L died, leaving four children surviving her. In 1871 a decree for the administration of M's estate was granted to R, the husband of L, in another suit (370 of 1870). In 1873 a decree for administration was passed in the Advocate-General's suit (962 of 1868). By the decree the Advocate-General was given liberty to join in taking the accounts and making the enquiries directed in suit 370 of 1870. In 1899 the Commissioner made his final report in suit 370 of 1870, to which, however, exceptions were filed. In 1902 the case came before TYABJI, J., for further directions. Up to this date the validity of the gift to L's children had not been questioned by the parties and the Commissioner's report was based on the assumption that it was valid. The Advocate-General was now by consent of the parties joined as a co-defendant, to simplify and regularize the suit. He thereupon contended that the gift to L's children was bad as transgressing the rule laid down in the Tagore case and claimed that the fund was applicable to the charitable purposes indicated in the residuary gift. The Division Court ruled that the Advocate-General was not entitled at this stage to raise the point. *Held* (reversing TYABJI, J.), that the Advocate-General was not precluded, even at this stage, from questioning the validity of the gift to L's children. Where the accounts actually taken and completed in one suit are adopted in another, the ordinary practice is to allow the result of those accounts and enquiries to be questioned in the suit wherein they are adopted. A beneficiary is generally taken as sufficiently represented by his trustees; but this does not hold good where the contest lies between the beneficiaries themselves. *Held*, on further hearing, on the construction of the will, that such

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of L's children as were in existence at the death of the testator were entitled to an annuity at L's death. *ADVOCATE-GENERAL v. KARMALI* (1905)

**I. L. R. 29 Bom. 133**

**4. ———— Admiralty Court—Consolidation of salvage claims—Civil Procedure Code, 1882—Rules and Regulations under Stat. 2 & 3 Will. IV, c. 51—Procedure.** On an application by the impugnant for the consolidation of three separate salvage claims made by three different promovents for salvage services rendered by them:—*Held* (following the more recent English practice), that the claims should not be consolidated against the will of the promovents, but should be heard one after the other successively, subject, however, to one set only of costs being allowed to them in the event of the Court finding at the hearing that the application for consolidation was resisted without sufficient grounds. In such a case (as there is no procedure for such an application prescribed by the Rules and Regulations made in pursuance of 2 and 3 Will. IV, c. 51, nor any procedure for consolidation in the Civil Procedure Code), the practice of the Court of Admiralty in England ought to be followed so far as such practice can be applied to this country by analogy. *In the matter of the BRITISH SAILING SHIP "FALLS OF ETTRICK," THE "CHUSAN" v. FALLS OF ETTRICK*

**I. L. R. 22 Calc. 511**

**5. ———— Application for consolidation of salvage claims—Application for commission to take evidence before written statements are filed.** On an application by the impugnant for the consolidation of two separate salvage claims made by two different promovents for salvage services rendered by them and for the issue of a commission to examine the witness of the impugnant *de bene esse*:—*Held*, that it is within the discretion of the High Court to consolidate the actions without regard to the consent of the parties, each of the promovents being allowed to appear separately through their own attorney and counsel. *Held*, further, that, though no written statements had yet been filed, the application for consolidation and for a commission to examine *de bene esse* was not premature. *In re the "Falls of Ettrick,"* **I. L. R. 22. Calc. 511**, referred to. *The "Strathgarry,"* [1895], **P. D. 264**, followed. *In the matter of the "DRACHENFELS," "RETRIEVER" v. "DRACHENFELS"* **3 C. W. N. 67**

**6. ———— Affidavits—Entitling affidavits.** In showing cause against a rule nisi for a mandamus in proceedings under the Calcutta Municipal Act to obtain compensation from the Justices, the affidavits should be simply entitled "In the High Court." The affidavits, though wrongly entitled, were admitted. *JUSTICES OF THE PEACE FOR CALCUTTA v. ORIENTAL GAS COMPANY*

**8 B. L. R. 438 : 17 W. R. 364**

**7. ———— Affidavit on application to take documents out of Court.** An affidavit in support of an application for taking docu-



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ments out of the custody of the Court for the purposes of another suit should state in what way they are material to that suit. *MOLLOW, MARCH & Co. v. PERBAT CHUNDER SINGH*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 283

8. ———— *Affidavit on showing cause against motion or petition.* An affidavit intended to be used to oppose or show cause against a motion or petition is filed in time, if filed, on or before the sitting of the Court, on the day that cause is in fact shown, although not filed before the sitting of the Court on the day for which notice was given. *In re HURRUCK CHUND GOLICHA*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 605 ; 6 C. L. R. 382

9. ———— *Affidavits on motion—Affidavits filed after adjournment for convenience of counsel.* The Court refused, without the consent of the other side, to allow an affidavit in support of a motion to be read, which had been filed after an adjournment granted for convenience of counsel. *COURJON v. COURJON* 9 B. L. R. Ap. 10

*NEERUNJUN MOOKERJEE v. OOPENDRO NARAIN DEB* . . . . . 10 B. L. R. 57

10. ———— *Act XVIII of 1863—Verification of affidavit.* When an individual, who is unable to read and write, presents himself to affirm solemnly or make oath to the truth of an affidavit, it will be sufficient, in order to meet the requirements of s. 9, Act XVIII of 1863, in obtaining his verification, to allow him to affix his "mark" in lieu of his "signature," and, in affirming or swearing him, to vary the usual words by saying "mark instead of signature," in lieu of "signature." ANONYMOUS . . . . . 9 W. R. 357

11. ———— *Use of affidavits in motions—Rule to show cause.* The practice is in motion to stay execution, and others, to put in a verified petition, or affidavit, the costs of which is allowed in taxation; but where a rule to show cause had been obtained on the facts set out in the plaint, *WHITE, J.*, declined to refuse the hearing of the rule simply because no verified petition or affidavit had been filed. *KRISTO MOHINEY DOSSEE v. KALLY PROSONNO GHOSE*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 485 ; 8 C. L. R. 43

12. ———— *Non-production of affidavit—Withdrawal of suit.* The plaintiff's attorney being under the misapprehension that one of the plaintiffs, who was a material witness, was in Bombay, when in fact he was in England, and an application to consent to a commission had been made to the defendant's attorney, and refused on the eve of the hearing, an application was made to the Judge in Chambers on the morning of the day fixed for the hearing, and supported by an affidavit for the issuing of a commission and for an adjournment of the suit; and the Judge declining to make an order in Chambers, the application was renewed in Court, when the Judge refused to take notice of what occurred before himself in Chambers, and made note that the application for a commission

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was made upon no affidavit; and as the affidavit (presented in Chambers), having been sent to the office of the plaintiff's attorneys for a copy to be made and served upon the defendant, was not then in Court, the application for a commission and to adjourn the hearing was refused, and plaintiff's counsel not being instructed to proceed with the hearing and leave to withdraw the suit having been also refused, the suit was dismissed. *Held*, that the Judge was wrong in refusing to postpone the case for the production of the affidavit in Court, and that there was no legal ground whatever for the refusal to withdraw the suit, which was accordingly restored to its place in the list and remanded in order to be tried. *DADABHAI NAOROJI & Co. v. SORABJI COWASJI* . . . . . 3 Bom. O. C. 55

13. ———— *Application for decree on terms of agreement to compromise suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 375.* After the hearing of the suit had begun, the plaintiffs and defendants came to an agreement by which they settled all the matters in dispute between them in the suit. The agreement was in writing, and dealt in one clause with the dispute, the subject-matter of the suit, and in a second clause, with another dispute of long standing between the parties, with which the suit had nothing to do. The plaintiff subsequently objecting to consent to a decree being taken in terms of the first clause of the agreement, the defendants took out a *rule nisi*, calling on the plaintiffs to show cause why the agreement should not be recorded in Court and why the Court should not pass a decree in accordance therewith, under the provisions of s. 375 of the Civil Procedure Code. The rule was argued on affidavits on either side, the plaintiffs objecting that in any case the matter could not be decided on affidavits, but evidence must be gone into. *Held*, that, in the circumstances of the case, no definite procedure having been enjoined by the Code, the matter might properly be decided on affidavits. *RUTTONSEY LALJI v. POORIBAI* . . . . . I. L. R. 7 Bom. 304

14. ———— *Petition—Affidavit, necessity of—High Court Rules 1, 3 and 4—Ch. XII—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 17, 20, 57, and 522—Cause of action—Plaint, return of—Jurisdiction, illegal exercise of.* When a petition to the High Court states facts, which are matters of record and which are supported by copies of the order passed by the Court below, such a petition need not be supported by an affidavit. A brought a suit for dower in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Saran alleging that the marriage as well as the divorce took place in that district. The defendant objecting to the suit on the ground that he worked and resided at Calcutta, the Subordinate Judge returned the plaint to be presented in the Presidency Small Cause Court. The District Judge, on appeal, declined to interfere with the order of the first Court. *Held*, that s. 17, cl. (a), of the Civil Procedure Code, applied to the case; and the order



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returning the plaint was bad in law, the cause of action having arisen in the district of Saran. *Held*, further, that, inasmuch as the Subordinate Judge had failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in him by law by refusing to accept the plaint, and that the District Judge erred in law in confirming the decision of the first Court, the High Court had authority to interfere, under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code. *ZAMIRAN v. FATEH ALI* (1905)

**I. L. R. 32 Calc. 146**

15. ———— *Affidavit of documents by order of the Prothonotary against Advocate-General—Power of the Court—Prerogative of the Crown—High Court Rule 80a—Civil Procedure Code, s. 129.* The position of the Advocate-General in India corresponds by statutory enactments to the position held by the Attorney-General in England and there is ample authority for the view that, generally speaking, the Attorney-General is not called upon to make discovery on oath. An order by the Prothonotary calling upon the Advocate-General to show cause why a suit instituted by him should not be dismissed for want of prosecution is not one which is within the jurisdiction of the Prothonotary to make. *ADVOCATE-GENERAL OF BOMBAY v. ADAMJI* (1905)

**I. L. R. 30 Bom. 474**

16. ———— *Appeal—Appeal against a complaint—Consent of parties.* By consent of parties the High Court allowed an appeal by one plaintiff against another plaintiff, and adjudicated upon their rights. *BHAGIRTHIBAI v. BAYA*

**I. L. R. 5 Bom. 264**

17. ———— *Appeal by one plaintiff against another—Rival claimants put on the record as representatives of deceased plaintiff.* In a suit for redemption one of the plaintiffs died. A, the adopted son, and B, the daughter, made separate applications under s. 365 of the Civil Procedure Code to be placed on the record. The Judge ordered them both to be put on the record and proceeded with the suit, and finding that A's adoption was proved, and that B was not the legal heir of the deceased, he gave a decree for redemption in favour of A. B appealed making A alone respondent. The Appellate Court held that B, and not A, was heir of deceased, and passed a decree in B's favour against A. On second appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, that the Judge had no power under s. 367 of the Code to admit on the record both rival claimants as legal representatives or adjudicate by his decree between their rival claims; and that the Appellate Court ought not to have allowed one plaintiff to appeal against another or to have decided the rights of different plaintiffs *inter se*. *VITHU v. BHIMA* . . . . .

**I. L. R. 15 Bom. 145**

18. ———— *Appeal between co-defendants—Right of appeal.* Where a Subordinate Judge dealt with a case at the hearing as raising not only a question between the plaintiff and defendants, but also as between the defendants:—

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*Held*, that one of the defendants could appeal against the decree as between himself and the other defendants. *Gudadhar Banerjee v. Mun Mohinee Dossea*, 7 W. R. 366, and *Atma Ram v. Balkishen*, I. L. R. 5 All. 266, distinguished. *SOIRU PADMANABH RANGAPPA v. NARAYANRAO BIN VITHAL RAO*

**I. L. R. 18 Bom. 520**

19. ———— *Respondent not appearing in lower Court—Right of appeal.* An appellant who was respondent in a lower Court of Appeal is not precluded by reason of his non-appearance in such Court, from preferring an appeal to the High Court. *KALIKISHORE ROY v. DHUNUNJOY ROY* . . . . .

**I. L. R. 3 Calc. 228**

20. ———— *Right of respondent, who has filed cross-objections to appeal, where appellant withdraws his appeal.* No leave to appeal should be granted to a respondent who has filed cross-objections, unless the Court is thoroughly satisfied upon affidavit that he was ready to appeal, and would have appealed within the proper time if the other side had not done so. *GOUR HARI SANYAL v. PREM NATH SANYAL*

**I. L. R. 9 Calc. 738 : 12 C. L. R. 395**

21. ———— *Decision showing grounds of judgment appealed from.* The copy of a decision to which reference is made by the lower Appellate Court for the grounds on which an appeal is disposed of is not necessary at the time of filing a special appeal. *ANONYMOUS*

**1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 50**

22. ———— *Pleadings certifying grounds of appeal.* Pleadings should see that the grounds of appeal they certify to are full and need no addition. *RAM KRISTO DEB v. RAJ CHUNDER SURMAH* . . . . .

**11 W. R. 246**

23. ———— *Certificate of grounds of appeal—Vakil a party to suit.* Where a party appealing to the High Court is himself a vakil of the Court, he is not at liberty to certify his own grounds of appeal. *THAKOOR DOSS MOOKERJEE v. AMEER MUNDUL* . . . . .

**14 W. R. 168**

24. ———— *Certifying that ground of appeal taken was omitted from his notice by Judge—Affidavit.* In order to satisfy the High Court that a point which the Judge omitted to notice was actually taken in the oral pleadings, a party may put in either an affidavit of some person who heard the point raised, or a copy of the petition to the Judge drawing attention to the omission with his orders thereon. *YUSOOF ALI CHOWDRY v. FYZOONISSA KHATOON CHOWDRY* . . . . .

**15 W. R. 296**

25. ———— *Grounds of appeal argued not in memorandum of appeal.* Although, as a rule, the Court will not permit grounds of appeal to be taken in argument which have not been taken in the memorandum of appeal, yet where a decree comes before it, which is upon its very face illegal, the Court is bound to take up the point itself and rectify the mistake. *PORAN SOOKH CHUNDER v. PARBUTTY DOSSEE*

**I. L. R. 3 Calc. 612 : 1 C. L. R. 404**



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**26.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 558—Application to restore an appeal dismissed ex parte—Evidence—Practice.* When an application is made to restore an appeal which has been dismissed *ex parte* for default of appearance, the applicant must produce all his evidence in support of the application before the Court to which it is made. If he does not do so and the application is dismissed, he cannot be allowed to supplement such evidence in a Court of Appeal on appeal from the order dismissing his application. *Hari Das Mukerji v. Radha Kishen Das, All. Weekly Notes (1890) 196, followed.* MUZAFFER ALI KHAN v. KEDAR NATH . . . I. L. R. 20 All. 266

**27.** ————— *Arguments on appeal under Letters Patent, High Court, North-Western Provinces, cl. 10—Points on which appellant may be heard.* In appeals under the Letters Patent, s. 10, an appellant is not entitled to be heard on points which he has not raised before the Judge against whose decree he is appealing. BRIJ BHU-KHAN v. DURGA DAS . . . I. L. R. 20 All. 258

**28.** ————— *Rules of Court, 30th November 1889—Memorandum of appeal—Misdescription in—Appeal described as “first appeal from order” instead of “first appeal from decree.”* It is not a fatal objection to an appeal that the same is described in the memorandum as “First appeal from Order,” being in reality a first appeal from a decree, it not being shown that the respondent was in any way prejudiced by such misdescription or that by reason thereof an insufficient stamp was placed on the memorandum. *Kedar Nath v. Lalji Sahai, I. L. R. 12 All. 61, quoad this point, distinguished.* SANT LAL v. SRI KISHEN . . . I. L. R. 14 All. 221

**29.** ————— *Necessity for copy of decree appealed against accompanying a memorandum of appeal—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 541.* A memorandum of appeal is not a good memorandum of appeal in law unless it is accompanied by a copy of the decree appealed against. *Gulab Debi v. Sankar Lal, All. Weekly Notes (1892) 47, followed.* CHAMELA KUAR v. AMIR KHAN . . . I. L. R. 16 All. 77

**30.** ————— *Appeal, hearing of, when records have been accidentally destroyed—New trial, right of.* Where, in the interval between the original hearing of a case and the appeal, the record or the greater part of it was destroyed in an earthquake, and the Appellate Court set aside the judgment of the first Court and directed the suit to be tried *de novo*:—*Held*, that the mere fact that the record was accidentally destroyed cannot give the appellant a right of re-trial of the original suit, and that it is open to the Court of Appeal to try the case upon any materials proved to have been used at the hearing of the first Court, and it is for the appellant to put those materials before the Court. HAR KUMAR PAL CHOWDRY v. ASIATULLAH . . . 3 C. W. N. 150

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**31.** ————— *Decree awarding costs as against two defendants—Payment by one defendant—Appeal by both defendants jointly to High Court against decree—Decease of defendant who paid during pendency of appeal—Prosecution of appeal on behalf of survivor alone—Reversal of decree by High Court—Claim by legal representative of deceased defendant for restitution of amount paid as costs.* A decree was obtained in a District Court against two defendants, by which they were ordered to deliver up certain property and to pay the costs of the suit. These costs were in fact paid by the first defendant. An appeal was preferred by both defendants jointly to the High Court, but the first defendant died while it was pending. The legal representative of the deceased defendant was not brought on the record, and when the appeal came on for hearing it was proceeded with by the second defendant on his own behalf. The result was that the High Court reversed the decree of the District Court, but the High Court decree recited that the appeal had been prosecuted on behalf of the surviving defendant alone. The son and legal representative of the first defendant now prevented a petition in execution, and claimed that the whole decree of the District Court had been reversed and that in consequence he was entitled to restitution of the costs which had been realised by the plaintiffs (counter-petitioners) from the deceased first defendant. *Held*, that, as it was expressly recited in the High Court decree that the appeal had been prosecuted on behalf of the surviving defendant alone, the decree must be construed as limited to his interests. *Held*, also, that the decree of the original Court must be regarded as still in force against the first defendant; and his heir, the petitioner, was therefore not entitled to restitution of the costs levied from his father under that decree until he had successfully prosecuted the appeal of his father which was still pending. NATESA AYYAR v. ANNASAMI AYYAR (1901) . . . I. L. R. 25 Mad. 426

**32.** ————— *Appeal—Privy Council—Practice—Concurrent judgments on facts—Disagreement on subordinate points.* The Judicial Committee does not ordinarily entertain an appeal from concurrent judgments on a mere question of fact. The mere fact that the two Courts do not agree on all the steps which lead to one and the same conclusion, is no reason for disregarding the above well-known rule. That rule, however, is not an absolute rule, it presses upon the appellant with more or less weight according to the circumstances of the case, and the fact that the Courts have differed on some important, but subordinate questions is a matter to be taken into consideration in determining whether the evidence before the lower Courts should be reviewed in detail. CHITPAL SINGH v. BHAIRON BAKSH SINGH (1905) . . . I. L. R. 28 All. 219

.c. 10 C. W. N. 225

**33.** ————— *Appeal—Privy Council—Practice—Concurrent findings of fact on*



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*questions relating to Indian manners and customs—Succession—Family custom.* When the question upon which there are concurrent findings of the Lower Courts is not only a question of fact, but is one which embraces a great number of facts, whose significance is best appreciated by those who are familiar with Indian manners and customs, the Judicial Committee is specially unwilling to depart from the general rule, which forbids a fresh examination of facts for the purpose of disturbing such concurrent findings. *Umrao Begum v. Irshad Husain*, L. R. 21 I. A. 163, referred to. *KUNWAR SANWAL SINGH v. SATRUPA KUNWAR* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 All. 215  
s.c. 10 C. W. N. 230  
L. R. 33 I. A. 53

34. ————— *Suit for damages for injuries on railway—Appeal decided not on evidence at trial but on observations of Judges at presentation of scene and events of accident on another night than that on which accident occurred.* The plaintiff sued the defendants, a Railway Company, for damages for injuries sustained by him when alighting from a carriage which overshot the platform of a station at night, and the evidence on the question of what light there was either natural or artificial, on the night in question being conflicting, it was suggested during the hearing of the case on appeal and agreed to by the counsel for the parties that the Judges should visit the scene of the accident under conditions approximating as nearly as possible to those which prevailed when the plaintiff met with his injuries. This was done, the Judges and the legal advisers of the parties went to the station where a presentation of the scene and events of the accident was gone through by which the Judges were enabled to make a thorough investigation of the material conditions accompanying the accident. They formed their own opinion on the question of the sufficiency or otherwise of the light and gave judgment in accordance with them, reversing the decision of the Court which tried the case. *Held*, that such procedure was illegal. The result of it was that the appeal was decided not on the testimony given at the trial as to what took place on the night of the accident, but by the Judges' observation of what they saw on another night altogether; and the decision based on it was set aside, the judgment of the first Court being restored. *KESROWJI ISSUR v. GREAT INDIAN PENINSULA RAILWAY COMPANY* (1907)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 381; L. R. 34 I. A. 115

35. ————— *Appeal—Point—Court.* A point not taken by a party before either of the lower Courts was not open to it at the time of the hearing of the appeal before their Lordships. *MAHOMED NASEEM v. MIRZA MUHAMMAD ABBAS ALI KHAN* (1907) . . . 12 C. W. N. 345

36. ————— *Allegations by parties at trial—Case determined on those allegations—Making a new case in appeal.* A litigating party can only succeed *secundum allegata et probata*, and

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the Courts should check the tendency of defeated litigants to evade their defeat by devising a new case which was never set up when it should have been set up. A Court of appeal is not justified in exposing a party after he has obtained his decree to the brunt of a new attack of which he had never had notice during the hearing of the suit. *NATHU PIRAJI v. UMEDMAL GADUMAL* (1908)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 35

37. ————— *Application after refusal—Making application to another Judge, after refusal by one Judge to make it.* It is irregular, when an application has been made to one Judge of the High Court and refused, that the same application should be made to another Judge without stating the facts of the former refusal. *VYTHELINGA MUDELLY v. CUNDASAWMY MUDELLY* . . . 8 Mad. 21

38. ————— *Application to another Judge after refusal of application by one Judge of High Court—Review—Appeal.* If an interlocutory order is wrongly refused by one Judge the proper course is to apply for a review or to appeal from it, not to seek to obtain the order by resorting to another Judge, even though arguments should then be forthcoming which were not put before the first Judge. *MOTIVAHU v. PREMVAHU*

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 511

39. ————— *Application by person not party to suit—Lessors—Receiver.* Case in which persons not parties to a suit in which a receiver had been appointed were permitted to apply, by motion or notice in the suit for the purpose of establishing their rights to obtain an order directing the receiver to make over to them certain properties of which he was holding possession after expiry of the lease under which those properties had been held by him, and which had been granted to his predecessor in title by certain persons through whom the applicants claimed as representatives. *Neale v. Pink*, 15 Sim. 450, as explained by *FRY, J. in Brocklebank v. East London Railway Company*, L. R. 12 Ch. D. 839, referred to. *MAHOMED MEDHI GALISTANA v. ZOHARRA BEGUM*

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 285

40. ————— *Arbitration—Written statement—Application for extension of time—Stay of proceedings—Step in proceedings—Arbitration Act (IX of 1899), ss. 4, 19.* The Calcutta Corporation applied for further time to file their written statement and obtained a fortnight's time. Subsequently they applied to the Court for a reference to arbitration and stay of proceedings. The plaintiffs objected on the ground that an application for further time amounted to a step in the action within s. 19 of the Indian Arbitration Act:—*Held* that such an application was a step in the proceedings within s. 19 of the Arbitration Act and that the application for reference to arbitration could not be maintained. *Ford's Hotel Company, Limited v. Bartlett*, [1896] A. C. 1, followed. *SARAT KUMAR ROY v. CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA* (1907)

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 443



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41. — Attachment—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 266 (c)—House—Sale in execution—Exemption from liability to attachment or sale—Facts to be taken to exist, which are proved.* Only those facts can be taken to exist, which are proved. In the absence of proof the exemption from liability to attachment for sale does not exist for the purposes of execution proceedings. "Strangers to a suit are justified in believing that the Court has done that which by the direction of the Code it ought to do." *PANDURANG BALAJI v. KRISHNAJI GOVIND* (1904) **I. L. R. 28 Bom. 125**

42. — Cause list—*Transfer of case from undefended to defended board—Costs.* A case entered on the undefended board can only be transferred to the defended board on payment of the costs of the adjournment, if any, thereby occasioned. *BINDOOMADHUB MITTER v. WOOMESH CHUNDER PAUL* . . . . . **2 Hyde 86**

*BHOYRUB CHUNDER DOSS v. CHUNDI CHURN MITTER* . . . . . **Bourke O. C. 238**

43. — Setting down case in general cause list—*Entering appearance.* The Court has power to order a case to be set down at once in the general cause list, if the defendant enters appearance by his attorney before the time for appearance fixed in the summons has expired. When a defendant so appears, the Registrar ought so to set down the case as a matter of course, or at least ask the Judge in Chambers whether he should do so or not. *CUMMING v. GREEN*

**4 B. L. R. Ap. 75**

44. — Cases to be entered in the list of suits for liquidated claims—*Rules 281 and 284 of the Calcutta High Court, Original Jurisdiction—Removal of cases improperly entered in that list—Ordinary mortgage suit—Notice of transfer of case.* Held, that the practice of the Court having been for many years to place ordinary mortgage suits on the list of suits for liquidated claims in the view that the incidental relief sought in such suits did not prevent them from being regarded as suits in which the claim was in substance a claim only for a liquidated demand in money, the practice should be adhered to. Held, also, that when a suit is transferred from the general list of causes (at the instance of the plaintiff), it is desirable that this should be done on notice to the defendant, so that he may not be taken by surprise. *BENODE LALL ROY v. BUSSUNTO KUMARI DEBI*

**I. L. R. 27 Calc. 355**

45. — Certificate of sale—*Unregistered certificate of sale—Fresh certificate of sale.* On 10th July 1883 the applicant bought at a Court-sale a portion of a house for R385, and on confirmation of the sale on the 10th October 1883 obtained the sale certificate, which, however, he did not register. On attempting to obtain possession, the applicant was obstructed. He applied for removal of the obstruction to the Subordinate Judge, and submitted with his application the unregistered

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certificate. The Subordinate Judge rejected the application, on the ground that the certificate was not registered. The applicant then applied for a fresh certificate, which was refused. On application to the High Court:—*Held*, that a fresh certificate dated the day on which it might be granted, reciting the fact of the sale and the date thereof, should be given to the applicant, the original certificate being returned. *In the matter of the application of LAKSHMAN* . . . . . **I. L. R. 9 Bom. 472**

46. — Grant of fresh certificate of sale to auction-purchaser while one already granted is in existence—*Insufficient stamp.* A Court having once granted a certificate of sale to an auction-purchaser is under no obligation to give him another, in order that he may escape the penalty which he has incurred by reason of the certificate being insufficiently stamped. *NANDRAM MOTIRAM v. KACHA BHAI* **I. L. R. 9 Bom. 526**

47. — Commission—*Commission to examine witnesses—Non-attendance of witnesses—Mode of enforcing attendance—Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, ss. 399 and 400, and Sch. IV, No. 156.* On an application to the High Court to authorize a commissioner to issue process for the purpose of compelling the attendance of witnesses before him:—*Held*, that the commissioner should return the commission to the High Court. The High Court may then send the commission to a Civil Court, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the witnesses to be examined reside. *MAHOMED ALI v. WAZID ALI* . . . . . **I. L. R. 28 Calc. 404**

48. — Examination of witness on commission—*Prolonged and unnecessary cross-examination.* Where the Court is satisfied that the cross-examination of any witness on commission is being unnecessarily prolonged, it will order such cross-examination to be concluded within a certain time. *SURAJ PROSAD v. STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY* (1903)

**I. L. R. 30 Calc. 625**

49. — Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 387, 399—*Oaths Act (X of 1873), s. 13—Evidence, taken by commission, of foreign subject in foreign territory—Admissibility.* Evidence of a foreign witness taken in foreign territory outside the jurisdiction of this Court, under a commission rightly issued under s. 387 of the Civil Procedure Code, and executed in accordance with the provisions of s. 399 of the same, is admissible, and s. 13 of the Oaths Act has no application. *KADAMBINI DASSI v. KUMUDINI DASSI* (1903)

**I. L. R. 30 Calc. 934  
s.c. 7 C. W. N. 806**

50. — Commissioner for taking accounts—*Certificate of, power to grant—Mode of taking accounts.* The general nature of a certificate or report—whether general or separate—by the commissioner for taking accounts is that it should, in the case of a general certificate, comprise the result of all the proceedings under the decree or order



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of reference, or, in the case of a separate certificate or report, that it should comprise the result of some or one of such proceedings, and the Court is not bound to consider a certificate granted by the commissioner unless he has certified what may be regarded as the result either of the whole enquiry referred to him or of some branch or part of it. The power of the commissioner to grant certificates, and of the Court to deal with motion made with reference thereto, considered. *Quære*: Whether, where a suit has been referred to the commissioner for the purpose of having account taken, such accounts, in the absence of any direction in the decree or order of reference that stated or settled accounts are not to be disturbed, should not be taken without regard to any previous accounts stated or settled between the parties. *RUSTOMJI BURJORJI v. KESSOWJI NAIK*. . . . . **I. L. R. 3 Bom. 161**

**51.** ———— *Report of Commissioner—Motion to discharge or vary—Affidavits, filing of—Memorandum of objections.* In moving to discharge or vary the report of the commissioner for taking accounts, the right practice is to move on a memorandum of objections filed on the Prothonotary's office, and upon the evidence taken by, and the proceedings before, the commissioner, and not on affidavits made for the purpose of the motion. In such a motion affidavits should only be filed (a) when ordered by the Court, if it desire fresh evidence; or (b) by special leave of the Court for the purpose of advancing a fact which does not appear on the face of the proceedings before the commissioner. *SUMAR AHMED v. ISMAIL HAJI HABIB*. . . . . **I. L. R. 1 Bom. 158**

**52.** ———— *Notice to vary final report—Limitation—Rule of Court, Ch. 6, cl. 6 (ed. 1867).* Held, that under the rule, which requires that a notice to vary the report of the commissioner for taking accounts (Rule of Court, Ch. 6, rule 6, ed. 1867) is to be made within twenty days after the filing of the report, the Court has discretion to extend the time for making such motion. *HORMASJI CURSETJI ASHBURNER v. BOMANJI CURSETJI ASHBURNER*. . . . . **I. L. R. 9 Bom. 250**

**53.** ———— *Commissioner's report, Application to vary time for—Extension of time—High Court Rules, Ch. VI, Rule 6.* A party desiring to move to vary a report made by the commissioner must not only file his exceptions to such report, but must also make his motion to vary it within twenty days after the filing of the report; or if the Judge or the Court have allowed him further time for such application, then within the further time so allowed. *NARROTTAM VIZBHOOKANDAS v. HARICHAND RAMCHAND*. . . . . **I. L. R. 13 Bom. 368**

**54.** ———— *Disobedience of order made by commissioner for taking accounts—Attachment, issue of.* An attachment will issue to compel a party to a suit to obey an order made by the commissioner for taking accounts upon the certificate of the commissioner that such order has been made and disobeyed, without, in the

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first instance, making such order a rule of Court. *DHURANDHARDAS SAKHARAM v. BHADU GOVIND*. . . . . **10 Bom. 4**

**55.** ———— *Consent decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 375.* According to the practice of the High Court, a consent decree upon a compromise will not be granted, unless the suit be entered in the cause list of the Court. *PELL v. VALETTA*. . . . . **5 C. L. R. 464**

**56.** ———— *Mode of consent.* The practice of the High Court at Calcutta on its original side in the case of decrees by consent is to require the defendant in person, or some one instructed by him, to appear in Court to consent. *SAUNDERS v. ROMANATH PAUL*. . . . . **1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 395**

**57.** ———— *Setting aside consent decree—Motion—Separate suit—Allegation of fraud—Affidavits.* A consent decree cannot be set aside on motion on the ground that it was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. A separate suit must be brought for that purpose. Charges of fraud cannot properly be tried upon affidavits. *Gilbert v. Endean*, **L. R. 9 Ch. D. 259**; *Huddersfield Banking Company v. Lister & Son*, **11 Ch. 273**; and *Ainsworth v. Wilding*, [1896] **1 Ch. 673**, applied. *FOOLCOOMARY DASI v. WOODOY CHUNDER BISWAS*. . . . . **I. L. R. 25 Calc. 649**

**58.** ———— *Costs—Partition proceedings—Form of order for costs—Order for execution on non-payment.* Where one of the parties to a partition-suit bears all the costs of the proceedings subsequent to decree, and the other parties make default in payment to him of their respective shares of the costs, he is not entitled to embody in his order against them for payment an order for execution. He must first obtain an order for payment, and, if payment be not obtained, application for execution may be made. *BROJOLALL SEN v. MOHENDRO NATH SEN*. . . . . **I. L. R. 18 Calc. 199**

**59.** ———— *Counsel—Hearing counsel—Hearing of preliminary issue.* Two counsels for the same party may be heard in argument of a preliminary issue. *FATMABAI v. AISHABAI*. . . . . **I. L. R. 12 Bom. 454**

**60.** ———— *Insolvent Debtors Act (11 & 12 Vic., c. 21), s. 36—Right of witness to be represented by Counsel.* Where witnesses have been ordered to attend Court for the purpose of examination under s. 36 of the Insolvency Act:—Held, that, on special circumstances being shown, Counsel may properly be allowed to attend on behalf of such witnesses. *In re Nursey Kessowji*, **I. L. R. 3 Bom. 270**, followed. Held, further, that the attending of Counsel includes acting as Counsel in the ordinary way. *In the matter of CHUNI LAL OSWAL* (1902). . . . . **I. L. R. 29 Calc. 507**

**61.** ———— *Certifying Counsel—Chamber proceedings.* In certifying for Counsel in chamber matters the Court ought to have regard to the following circumstances: (i) Whether



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notice has been given by either side of the intention to employ Counsel. (ii) Whether the matter to be dealt with involves the consideration of complicated facts or merely of simple facts. (ii) Whether there arises any substantial question of law, which has to be argued and discussed. *Per CURIAM* :—The rule as to certifying for Counsel has been interpreted as meaning that Counsel should be certified, unless it is not a fit case for Counsel. *ZULEKABAI v. AYESHABAI* (1905). **I. L. R. 30 Bom. 196**

**62.** ————— *Rule allowing costs of two Counsel—Junior Counsel should return brief if neither Counsel able to be present.* The rule of allowing the costs of two Counsel on each side in taxation was introduced by the Judges in order to obviate the dislocation of the business which might result from cases being called on at the same time in two or more Courts in which the same Counsel was engaged. This rule has always been supplemented by the unwritten rule of the Bar that one or other Counsel must return his brief in good time, if there is a chance of neither being able to attend when the case is called on, and that in case of dispute it is the duty of the junior to return the brief or to make arrangements for some other Counsel to attend until he can come in. *ESMAIL EBRAHIM v. HAJI JAN MAHOMED* (1908)

**I. L. R. 33 Bom. 475**

**63.** ————— *Counsel's fees—Costs—Attorney and client—Taxation—Refreshers to counsel—Rules of Court, 707, 708.* Refreshers are not, as a general rule, to be allowed on motion heard by affidavit; but the Court hearing the motion can, in its discretion, and if applied to for the purpose, give special directions allowing costs as on the hearing of a case. In the absence of such special directions, refreshers should not be allowed. *GARDEN REACH SPINNING AND MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. EMPRESS OF INDIA COTTON MILLS COMPANY*

**I. L. R. 12 Calc. 551**

**64.** ————— *Court-fees—Remission of process fees—Rules of High Court, Calcutta, Ch. XIV—Process fees—Remission of fees in analogous appeals by the same appellants.* Where twenty-nine appeals were presented by certain appellants, and an application was made for remission of process fees, and that only 5 sets of process fees instead of twenty-nine should be charged under Ch. XIV of the Rules of High Court, on the ground that the appeals were analogous and on behalf of the same appellants, the Court (*GHOSE and RAMPINI, JJ.*) refused the application. *Held*, by *RAMPINI, J.*, that the High Court has no power to grant the remission, and that the fees prescribed by the rules must be levied. *In the matter of the application of STUDD*

**I. L. R. 26 Calc. 124  
3 C. W. N. 82**

**65.** ————— *Courts of Justice—Object of Courts of Justice—Shortening litigation.* The object of Courts of Justice, under the Code of Civil Procedure, is, if possible, to decide at one and the same time all questions which can justly be so de-

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cided, and not to assist in unnecessarily prolonging litigation. *FIDAYE SHIKDER v. OZEEODDEEN*

**7 W. R. 87**

**66.** ————— *Damages, assessment of—High Court, Original Side.* Practice of Original Side as to assessing the amount of damages discussed. *MANIRAM v. BIBI MASHIHAN*

**4 B. L. R. Ap. 66**

**67.** ————— *Decision by single Judge—How far binding on his successors.* A Judge sitting on the original side is bound ordinarily to follow the judgment of another Judge when he has decided a point of law, or laid down certain principles of practice or procedure or judicially construed any provision of the law prevailing in the country. But a single Judge is not bound to follow another Judge's findings of fact based on the evidence recorded by him, when the evidence that may be available before a Judge in a later case may be fuller or more reliable and may tend to lead him to a different conclusion. *JAMSHEDJI C. TARACHAND v. SOONABAI* (1907)

**I. L. R. 33 Bom. 122**

**68.** ————— *Default—Suit for account against executor—Account on footing of wilful default—Limitation.* Modern practice allows of an order charging wilful default being made at any time during the action on a proper cause being shown. *AYESHABAI v. EBRAHIM* (1908)

**I. L. R. 32 Bom. 364**

**69.** ————— *Erroneous Judgment—Judgment based upon an assumption or hypothesis subsequently ascertained to be erroneous—Re-opening the portion of the case affected by the error—Grant by Government of the revenue of a village as a unit assessment—Cultivation by grantee of uncultivated or unassessed land—Grantee can do so and profit thereby.* The High Court on appeal delivered an interlocutory judgment remanding the case for a finding on a certain issue. On the case coming again before a differently constituted Bench of the High Court for final disposal :—*Held*, that the remanding judgment was conclusive on all points therein specifically decided beyond possibility of revision, but that it was otherwise with regard to any part of the judgment, which could be shown to be based on such mistake or error as it would have been the duty of that Bench to correct, if it had been brought to its notice, when the judgment was delivered. *Per BATCHELOR, J.*—In so far as any part of the remand judgment is based on an assumption or hypothesis, which is now ascertained to be erroneous, it is, we think, competent to us—or rather it is incumbent on us—to disregard it, and to re-open that part of the case affected by the error. When Government grants the revenue of a village considered as a unit of assessment, and in course of time the grantee is able to bring under cultivation land which had previously been uncultivated or even unassessed, it is open to him under the grant to do so and to profit by the new cultivation. *BALVANT RAMCHANDRA v. SECRETARY OF STATE* (1908)

**I. L. R. 32 Bom. 432**



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70. ——— Evidence taken in particular way—*Consent of parties—Jurisdiction of the Court.* In a suit to recover damages for wrongful diversion by the defendants of the course of a brook, the Subordinate Judge, at the desire of both the parties, proceeded to the spot of the diversion, made inspection and examined witnesses on the spot. The position of the witnesses were taken down in vernacular by a clerk of the Court. On going through the evidence the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit holding that the defendants had not diverted the course of the brook and the plaintiff had not suffered any damage. The plaintiff appealed and raised a preliminary objection to the procedure of the Subordinate Judge. The Judge in appeal held that the Subordinate Judge's procedure vitiated the decision and reversed the decree and remanded the suit for trial on the merits. On second appeal by the defendants against the order of remand:—*Held*, reversing the decree of the Judge and restoring the appeal to the file, that the parties if so minded, may ordinarily agree that evidence shall be taken in a particular way and it is a common experience that parties do agree that evidence in one suit shall be treated as evidence in another. That is not a matter which can be said to affect the jurisdiction of the Court. It is merely that parties allow certain materials to be used as evidence, which apart from their consent cannot be so used. *RAMAYA v. DEVAPPA* (1905)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 109

71. ——— Recording evidence in English—*Suit for ejectment—Irregularity—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 578.* In a suit for ejectment, the recording of evidence in English—which not being the language of the Court—is merely an irregularity, which may be cured by the application of s. 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *RATAN LAL GIR v. FARSHI BIRI* (1907)

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 396

72. ——— Execution of decree, application for—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 212.* An application for execution of a decree need not be accompanied with either the original decree or a copy. *GUNGA GOBIND GOOPTOO v. MAKHUN LALL HATTEE*

9 W. R. 362

*KHETTUR MOHUN CHUTTOPADHYA v. ISHUR CHUNDER SURMA*

11 W. R. 271

*MODHGO DOSSIA v. NOBIN CHUNDER ROY*

16 W. R. 25

73. ——— Copy of judgment. A Court in executing a decree in a case which has been appealed to the Privy Council should not receive a mere copy of the printed judgment of the Privy Council as if it were a decree. *JOY NARAIN GIREE v. GOLUCK CHUNDER MYTEE*

20 W. R. 444

74. ——— Execution of decree, application for—*Execution of decree—Declaratory decree erroneously construed as a decree capable of*

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*execution—Orders in execution after notice to judgment-debtor and without contest by him—Subsequent objection that the decree was not capable of execution—Judgment-debtor bound by previous orders.* A decree, which was in form declaratory, was construed as being capable of execution, and on several occasions execution of it was ordered (after notice to the judgment-debtor, and without contest by him), attachments of the judgment-debtor's property were made, and amounts alleged to be due were paid. Upon a subsequent application for execution being made, it was objected that the previous orders had been erroneously passed under the decree and that no further order could be made. *Held*, that the judgment-debtor was bound by the previous orders, as the Court which had passed them must be held, rightly or wrongly, to have determined that the decree was capable of execution. *Venkatanarasimha Naidu v. Papammah*, I. L. R. 19 Mad. 54, and *Mungul Pershad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri Chowdhry*, L. R. 8 I. A. 123, followed. *SUBBARAMA AYYAR v. NAGAMMAL* (1901)

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 683

75. ——— Execution of deed—*Motion to compel execution by infant of conveyance of land.* Motion to compel the execution, by an infant, of a conveyance of land, refused on the ground that such an order on such motion was virtually a decree for specific performance. *MONOMATHONAUTH DAY v. AUSHOOTOSH DAY*

Cor. 8

76. ——— Execution proceedings—*Jurisdiction—Decree cannot be varied in the execution department.* A decree of the High Court declared the title of the plaintiffs to share in all the properties described in the schedules thereto, excepting in two *mauzas*, which were declared to belong to the defendants. In execution, the objection was taken that certain parcels sued for and decreed as *kasht*, or *jote*, lands were in reality *kamat* lands, which necessarily, from the character of that holding, must have belonged to the proprietors of the *mauzas* within the limits whereof those parcels were situated, the proprietors of the *mauzas* being declared in the decree to be the defendants. The executing Court disallowed this objection, as distinctly involving a variation of the decree. But the objection was allowed by the High Court's decree now appealed from. *Held*, reversing the order of the High Court, that it was beyond the jurisdiction of the executing Court to vary the decree, which plainly awarded the parcel as *jote* or *kasht* lands lying within the villages and defined by measurements, so that there was no doubt as to their identity. To re-open the decree because the defendants raised a new question regarding the nature of the relation of these parcels to the *mauzas*, would be to re-hear the suit on that matter. That would be an error of procedure of a substantial kind, calculated to cause great irregularity in the conduct of suits. *UDWANT SINGH v. TOKHAN SINGH* (1901)

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77. ———— *Execution of decree—Transfer of decree from one district to another—Rules of execution different in the two districts—Procedure.* Where in different districts different modes of execution are prescribed, and where the question is how a decree passed in one, but of which the execution is sought in another of such districts, is to be executed, the executing Court must be guided by the rules in force in its own district. *MARTAND v. VINAYAK* (1906)

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78. ———— *Decision on a point not raised by the defendant—Execution of decree—Agreement—Khata.* It is not open to a Judge to decide a case in defendant's favour on a point not raised by him with the result that, if the decision be upheld, it will cast upon the defendant a far higher liability than if he had made the order which the plaintiff had asked for. *RAICHAND v. NARAN* (1904)

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79. ———— *Ex parte decree or order—Suit set down for hearing before the date fixed in the summons—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 68, 69, 96, 100, 101, 112 and 113—High Court Rules, Nos. 111 and 112.* It is not open to a plaintiff to obtain an *ex parte* decree before the returnable date mentioned in the summons. *DHIRAJLAL v. HORMUSJI* (1908)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 534

80. ———— *Ex parte order—Defence.* No order can be passed against a person without allowing him to be heard and to adduce evidence in his defence. *SATO KOER v. GOPAL SAHU* (1907)

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81. ———— *Ex parte order—False representation—Suit for relief inconsistent with order—Set-off claimed in written statement—Omission to frame issue—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 111, 146, 561, 566—Company—Liquidation—Companies Act (VI of 1882), ss. 149, 214.* Per JENKINS, C. J.:—In the conditions which prevail here, the practice of passing *ex parte* orders, involving the person affected in serious liability, is much to be deprecated. *AHMEDABAD ADVANCE SPINNING AND WEAVING CO. v. LAKSHMISHANKER* (1904)

I. L. R. Bom. 173

82. ———— *Extraordinary jurisdiction of High Court, application in—Copies of orders of lower Courts.* All applications to the High Court, in the exercise of its extraordinary civil jurisdiction, should be accompanied by a copy of the orders of the lower Courts made in respect of the matter of such application, and should be presented within the time allowed for the presentation of special appeals. *In the matter of the petition of NAGAPPA BIN HULGAPPA*

5 Bom. A. C. 215

83. ———— *Fraud, allegation of—Particulars constituting fraud should be given—Issue in cases of fraud.* It is an elementary rule of law that where fraud is set up, particulars of it must be given and it must be based upon a specification of the acts relied upon as constituting fraud. Per CHANDA-

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VARKAR, J.—It is a matter of supreme importance and necessity that a case of fraud should not be the subject of a mere vague allegation in the plaint or written statement; but that it shall be supported by particulars; and that, if that condition is not complied with, the party relying on a case of fraud shall not be allowed to raise that case in the form of an issue. It is generally advisable, indeed, when framing an issue on the point of fraud, to set forth in the issue itself a brief statement of the fraud alleged, or at least to refer to the passage in the pleadings, where it is specified. If this be made an invariable practice, the door will be closed to vague and indiscriminate allegations. *BALAJI v. GANGADHAR* (1908)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 255

84. ———— *Fund in Court—Costs—Attorney's lien—Lien—Attaching creditor—Fund in Court attached.* A sum of money had been paid into Court as admittedly due to the plaintiff in a certain suit; the plaintiff not having satisfied in full his attorney's taxed bill of costs, the attorney applied for payment out of the fund in Court; previously to this application, the fund had been attached by a third party. *Held*, that the attorney was entitled to enforce his lien as against the attaching creditor for all costs incurred up to the date of attachment; that the attaching creditor was then entitled to be satisfied before the attorney could claim payment out of the balance in Court of any sum remaining due to him on account of his costs. *SUPRAMANYAN SETTY v. HURRY FROO MUG*

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 374

85. ———— *High Court Jurisdiction—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 20, 24—Two suits in two Courts under different High Courts—Stay of proceedings.* Where two suits between the same parties are pending in two Courts under two different High Courts:—*Held*, that the High Court under the conjoint operation of ss. 20 and 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure can direct proceedings to be stayed in one Court pending trial in the other Courts. *VENKATA SA BAROD v. MAKSDAN DAS* (1908)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 541

86. ———— *Inspection and production of documents—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 136—Non-compliance with order for production of documents—Defence struck out.* Where a defendant neglects to comply with an order for production and inspection, the Court will, although in the last resort, order his defence to be struck out. *ASSENOLLA JOO v. ABDOL AZIZ*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 923

87. ———— *Filing list of documents—Suit for land—Title-deeds—Affidavit.* In a suit for possession of land, the order that the party in possession do set forth a list of documents, is to be confined to documents other than title-deeds. Where the title-deeds are required by the plaintiff on special grounds, as, or instance, where it is alleged that the defendant is a trustee for the plaintiff, those special grounds on which they are



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required should be set forth by affidavit. **HEERA-LOLL SAHA v. JADHUB CHUNDER CHENCHKEY**

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**88.** ————— *Discovery—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 131, 134, and 136.* If a notice under s. 131 of the Civil Procedure Code be not answered as provided by s. 132, the party seeking the inspection of documents may apply for an order under s. 133, and his application must be supported by an affidavit. The Court has no jurisdiction to pass an order under s. 136, unless the provisions of s. 134 are strictly complied with. **DHAPI v. RAM PERSHAD . . . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 768**

**89.** ————— *Affidavit of documents—Sealing up immaterial parts—Sufficiency of affidavit.* A defendant in his affidavit of documents objected to allowing inspection of such portions of certain account books as did not contain entries relating to the matters in question in the suit, and claimed the right to seal up such portions but did not state what portions of the books or which particular entries did not relate to the matters in dispute. Upon the plaintiff asking for inspection, only certain entries were disclosed, but inspection of the rest was refused. Thereupon the defendant took out a summons to consider the sufficiency of the affidavit. It was objected that this was not the proper mode of procedure, and that the plaintiff should have, under s. 269, Belchambers' Rules and Orders, applied for production and inspection. *Held*, that in matters of this kind the application should be made in proper form by applying for production and inspection. Ordered that the defendant do give inspection of his books of account to the plaintiff with liberty to the defendant to seal up such parts, as, by an affidavit to be made by him, do not relate to the matters in question in this suit. **HORENDRO NATH MUKERJEE v. GIRINDRA KUMAR DUTT 3 C. W. N. 495**

**90.** ————— *Affidavit of documents—Sealing up immaterial parts—Sufficiency of affidavit.* A plaintiff in his affidavit of documents objected to allowing inspection of such portions of certain account books as he stated did not contain entries relating to the matters in question in the suit, and claimed the right to seal up such portions. Upon that affidavit being filed, the defendant took out a summons to consider the sufficiency thereof. It was objected that this was not the proper mode of procedure, and that the defendant should take steps when inspection was refused. *Held*, that, though technically the better way of raising the question would have been to take out a summons for production, the course taken by the defendant might, if preferred, be adopted, and that he was entitled to an order that the plaintiff should make a better and further affidavit showing what parts of the documents he claimed to seal up, and the grounds upon which the claim was based. **JADUB LOLL SHAW v. KANAI LOLL SHAW**

**I. L. R. 20 Calc. 587**

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**91.** ————— *Insufficient affidavit of documents, meaning of—Application for further affidavit of documents—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 129, 130, 134, 135.* When the affidavit of documents is not insufficient in its terms and does not fail to comply with the requirements of the Code and a further affidavit of documents is demanded by a party alleging that his opponent has documents in his possession which he has failed to disclose in his affidavit of documents, the proper course for him is to apply on affidavit stating what documents ought to have been disclosed and that such documents are relevant to the issues. The proper time for making such application is at the hearing of the suit, and not before. **AMARENDRA NATH CHATTERJEE v. KALLY KISSEN TAGORE 2 C. W. N. 17**

**92.** ————— *Inspection by agent of a party.* When under an order giving liberty to a party to a suit, his attorneys and agents, to inspect and peruse the documents produced by the opposite party, inspection by an agent is contemplated, the order should be read in such a way as would give the Courts some control over the persons to be appointed to inspect the documents. Such an order contemplates that the agent will be a person standing in the position of the party for the purposes of the suit. *Held*, therefore, that the Court ought not to permit a person formerly in the service of the defendant to inspect as the plaintiff's agent the defendant's books which had been in his charge. **ENAMUL HUQ v. EKRAMUL HUQ**

**I. L. R. 25 Calc. 294**

**93.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 59, 140—Madras High Court Rules, Nos. 39, 43, 44, and 47.* A defendant is entitled under the High Court Rules, to be furnished with a copy of documents sued on, which are deposited with the plaintiff. **MAHOMED ABDUL AZIZ v. SUBBA NAIDU . I. L. R. 21 Mad. 490**

**94.** ————— *Inspection and production of documents—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 130.* Where inspection of documents is objected to on the ground of immateriality, the Court will, if necessary, order them to be produced for its own inspection, in order to judge of their materiality. **GURMUK ROY v. TULARAM (1901) . . . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 424**

**95.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 59—High Court Rule 162—Inspection of document not referred to in the plaint—Right of defendant to inspect last documents before filing his written statement.* S. 59 of the Civil Procedure Code requires a plaintiff to annex to his plaint a list of documents on which he intends to rely at the hearing. It has heretofore been the practice not to order inspection of documents other than those referred to in the plaint or relied on in the list annexed to the plaint till after the written statement is filed. This is not an inflexible rule in all cases, for there may be many cases where it would be imperative to order the plaintiffs to pro-



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duce and give inspection to the defendant before he has filed his written statement a document or documents, which they may not have mentioned in their plaint or enumerated in the list of documents annexed thereto. **KHETSIDAS v. NAROTUNDAS (1907)** . . . **I. L. R. 32 Bom. 152**

**96. Interrogatories—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 121—Ex parte order for interrogatories.** S. 121 of the Code of Civil Procedure contemplates (1) leave to interrogate, and (2) the service of the interrogatories through the Court. It is the duty of the Court under that section to determine whether the applicant should be allowed to interrogate the other side, but not to determine at that stage what questions the party interrogated should be compelled to answer. Where an *ex parte* order is made in chambers giving leave to interrogate, the party ordered to answer has a right to come into Court to have the order set aside if the case is one in which interrogatories should not have been allowed. When an order for the administration of interrogatories is properly made, a party objecting to the interrogatories administered may, at his peril, omit to answer the interrogatories to which he objects; but the more prudent course is to file his affidavit in answer, stating in it his objection to answer such questions as he objects to. Where interrogatories are scandalous, or in any way an abuse of the process of the Court, the Court may interfere at any stage. The powers given to the Court by s. 136 should not be exercised except in extreme cases. **SHAM KISHORE MUNDLE v. SHOSHIBHOOSUN BISWAS**

**I. L. R. 5 Calc. 707 : 5 C. L. R. 509**

**97. Failure to answer within the time limited—Dismissal of suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Ch. X, ss. 121, 126, and 136.** The question as to whether the Courts below have exercised a proper discretion in dismissing a suit under s. 136 of the Civil Procedure Code is one into which the High Court will not enter on special appeal. When interrogatories are delivered with the leave of the Court under s. 121 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the Court orders such interrogatories to be answered within ten days under s. 126, there is virtually an order passed under the provision of Ch. X of the Code; and consequently upon the party interrogated failing to comply with such order, the Court has the power to pass an order under s. 136. **LALLA DABEE PERSHAD v. SANTO PERSHAD** **I. L. R. 10 Calc. 505**

**98. Discovery—Guardian ad litem—Party for purposes of discovery.** Where a guardian ad litem of a lunatic defendant was made a party defendant for purposes of discovery:—**Held**, that the discovery was not intended to include the right to administer interrogatories to him. **WAGHJI THACKERSEY v. KHATAO ROWJI**

**I. L. R. 10 Bom. 167**

**99. Cross-interrogatories.** Where interrogatories have been adminis-

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tered for the examination of a witness by one party, and the other party delivers cross-interrogatories, the latter must, if he objects to any of the other party's questions, make his objections on the face of his cross-interrogatories, and such objections shall be argued at the hearing. **GOBIND CHUNDER ROY v. SIB NATH SHAW** . . . **5 C. L. R. 171**

**100. Evidence.** A party at whose instance interrogatories have been administered must put in the answers as part of his evidence if he wishes to use them at the hearing. **GOSTO BEHARI PAL v. JOHUR LAL PAL**

**I. L. R. 4 Calc. 836 : 4 C. L. R. 164**

**101. Refusal to answer—Particulars of damage—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 125, 127.** The plaintiff alleged that the defendant bank improperly and without notice, and in violation of an agreement, sold some Government promissory notes, which had been deposited as security for certain loans, and claimed a specified sum as damages or in the alternative a decree for an account. The defendant bank denied the alleged agreement, and asserted that the notes had been sold after due notice and on failure of the plaintiff to comply with the terms on which the loans were made. Interrogatories were administered for the examination of the plaintiff, and amongst them one in the following terms: "State how your estimate of damages to the amount of Rs. 30,000 mentioned in the eighth paragraph of the plaint is arrived at?" Upon the plaintiff declining to answer that interrogatory, the defendant bank applied on notice for an order under s. 127 of the Code of Civil Procedure requiring him to answer it fully. **Held**, that the plaintiff was not bound to answer it. If, on the one hand, it was intended to elicit the principle on which the damages were estimated by the plaintiff, the defendant was not entitled to discovery on that point. If, on the other hand, it was sought to elicit an account of the transactions between the parties, it was unnecessary, as the transactions were within the knowledge of the defendant bank; and if it were not, then the enquiry was premature, as the question whether there had been any wrongful act committed and whether the plaintiff was entitled to any damages should be first determined. **NECKRAM DOBAY v. BANK OF BENGAL** **I. L. R. 14 Calc. 703**

**102. Issues.** The fact that no issue raised as to matters which the plaintiff is bound to prove does not justify the inference that the defendant intends to admit them. The duty of raising issues rests, under the Civil Procedure Code, with the Court. **GANOO v. SHRI DEV SIDHESHWAR (1901)**

**I. L. R. 26 Bom. 360**

**103. Leave to sue or defend—Leave to sue—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 19—Immoveable property situate in different districts—Letters Patent, cl. 12—Plaint, admission of.** Under s. 19 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is not necessary to obtain the leave of the Court to sue in respect



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of immoveable property situate partly within and partly without the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High Court. *NARAIN SINGH v. RAM LALL MOOKERJEE* . . . **I. L. R. 3 Calc. 370**

**104.** ———— *Leave to sue—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 30—Suit by one creditor on behalf of others.* A suit by one or more creditors on behalf of other creditors cannot be entertained without the leave of the Court being obtained for its institution. Such leave cannot be granted at the hearing. *ORIENTAL BANK CORPORATION v. GOBIND LALL SEAL*

**I. L. R. 9 Calc. 604 : 13 C. L. R. 142**

**105.** ———— *Suit brought without leave—Costs.* Where a suit was brought by one legatee on behalf of himself and others without leave of the Court and the plaintiff was a minor suing by his next friend, the next friend was made to pay the costs of the suit. *GEEREEBALLA DABEE v. CHUNDER KANT MOOKERJEE*

**I. L. R. 11 Calc. 213**

**106.** ———— *Leave to defend—Promissory note, summary procedure on—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 533—Power to extend time to defendant to come in and defend.* The High Court has power to extend the time within which a defendant, in a suit brought under Ch. XXXIX (summary procedure on negotiable instruments) of the Civil Procedure Code, can come in and obtain leave to defend : therefore, in a suit in which it appeared that the defendant resided at Peshawar, the time for the defendant to obtain leave from the Court to appear and defend was extended to twenty-eight days. *GROOM v. WILSON* . **I. L. R. 3 Calc. 539**

**107.** ———— *Application to take plaint off the file after leave given—Summons to rescind leave given.* Where leave to bring a suit has been given to a plaintiff under s. 12 of the Letters Patent, and a defendant objects and asserts that the Court has no jurisdiction, he is not bound to wait until the case comes on for hearing, but may take out a Judge's summons calling on the plaintiff to show cause why the leave given should not be rescinded and the plaint taken off the file. *Ismail Hadjee Habbeeb v. Mahomed Hadjee Joosub*, 13 B. L. R. 91, referred to. *KESOWJI DAMODAR JAI-RAM v. LUCKMIDAS LADHA*

**I. L. R. 13 Bom. 404**

**108.** ———— *Lunatic—Suit by next friend—Plaintiff a person of unsound mind not so found—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 463—Not exhaustive—Landlord and tenant—Abandonment—Transfer by tenant of non-transferable holding—Usufructuary mortgage.* The provisions of s. 463 of the Civil Procedure Code are not exhaustive, and a lunatic may sue through a next friend, even though not adjudged a lunatic under any law. When a tenant of a non-transferable holding executes a usufructuary mortgage of it, places the mortgagee in possession, abandons the holding and leaves the village, the landlord is en-

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titled to treat the mortgagee as a trespasser and to ask for his ejection. *Per MOOKERJEE, J.*—The Code of Civil Procedure is not exhaustive. A Court in which a suit has been instituted by or against a lunatic not so found has an inherent power to determine whether he is a lunatic and, if he is found to be so to make an order for the appointment of a next friend or guardian *ad litem*. *RASIK LAL DATTA v. BIDHUMUKI DAS* (1906)

**I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1094**

**109.** ———— *Minor Co-parcener—High Court—Original Side—Suits by manager of joint Hindu family having minor co-parceners—Minors' names should be added as parties—Will—Construction—Rule against perpetuity—Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 101.* As a matter of practice suits are not file on the Original Side of the Bombay High Court by managers representing their minor co-parceners, the practice is to join all persons interested, but it would seem that even if on the face of the plaint there were an allegation of a sole plaintiff, that he sued as manager on behalf of a co-parcenary, the minor co-parcener would not be bound by the proceedings unless by judicial sale under the decree rights had been created in innocent third parties and no prejudice were shown to the absent minor. Cl. 13 of the will produced in this case was as follows :—"As to my other property which there is, that is the property situated on the east side of the house of my step-brother, I give the same to my younger son Chiranjiv Mahadev for his life. He shall have no authority either to mortgage or to sell the said property. He shall only receive the income of the said property and I give the property after his death to his son or to his sons in equal shares should there be any such son or sons. In case he leaves no sons behind him my Mukhtyars shall get a son adopted by his wife and thus perpetuate his name. And they shall give the said property to him on his attaining the age of 21 years." *Held*, on a construction of the above clause, that the bequest in favour of a son of Madhadev, who might be adopted at any time after Mahadev's death by a widow, who might not have been living at the testator's decease, was void under s. 101 of the Indian Succession Act (X of 1865). *KASHINATH CHIMNAJI v. CHIMNAJI SADASHIV* (1906)

**I. L. R. 30 Bom. 477**

**110.** ———— *Motions—Hearing two counsel.* It is not the practice to hear more than one counsel or vakil in support of original motions or applications against which no cause is shown in the first instance. *In the matter of the petition of BARODA SOONDREE DASSEE*

**B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 609 : 6 W. R. Mis. 114**

**111.** ———— *Taking further evidence on hearing of motions—Oral evidence—Adjournment.* There is nothing in the practice of the Court on the Original Side to prevent a Judge taking further evidence on the hearing of a motion either by affidavit, or *vivâ voce*, and the Court may



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adjourn the hearing for that purpose. **BAMASUNDARI DAS v. RAMNARAYAN MITTER**

**8 B. L. R. Ap. 65**

**112.** ————— *Motions—Decree passed without the suit appearing on the list for hearing.* There is a fixed practice in Bombay which prevents a decree being obtained on motion without the suits appearing on the list for hearing. **PRAGDAS SAGURMALL v. GIRDHARDAS MATHURADAS (1901)** . . . **I. L. R. 26 Bom. 76**

**113.** ————— *Next friend—Minor defendant, application by next friend of, for transfer of case when no guardian ad litem has been appointed—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 410, 441, 443, 449.* A suit was instituted in a Mofussil Court against two defendants, one of them being a minor. Before a guardian ad litem had been appointed for the minor defendant, an application was made to the High Court to transfer the case from the Mofussil Court to the High Court in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction by the minor defendant through the next friend. It was contended that the application was informal, and could not be granted, and that no such application could be made on behalf of the infant defendant until a guardian ad litem had been appointed, and then it should be made by him. *Held*, that the objection should not prevail, and that this application could be made through the next friend. **JOTENDRONATH MITTER v. RAJ KRISTO MITTER**

**I. L. R. 16 Calc. 771**

**114.** ————— *Attorney and client—Change of attorneys on record—Application for change of attorney by next friend—Right of next friend of minor plaintiff to change attorney—Groundless charges against solicitors—Costs.* The next friend of an infant plaintiff is just as much entitled to change his attorney as any other plaintiff who is sui juris, as long as he continues to act in that capacity. **Manick Lal Seal v. Sarat Kumari Dussee, (1883) unreported; Ram Chander Roy v. Poorno Chunder Roy, 4 C. W. N. 175 (notes); and Sarat Chunder Dawn v. Kristo Dhone Dawn, 5 C. W. N. 83 (notes),** dissented from. **Brown v. Brown, 11 Beav. 562,** referred to. The rights and obligations of next friend discussed. *Semble*: If the next friend of an infant plaintiff is not doing his duty, and is acting in a manner detrimental to the interests of the infant, the proper course under such circumstances would be to apply for his removal and for the substitution of a new next friend. **Peyton v. Bond, 1 Sim. 390,** approved. *Semble*: An appeal lies from an order refusing change of attorney. **DINENDRA NATH DUTT v. WILSON (1901)** . . . **I. L. R. 28 Calc. 264**  
**s.c. 5 C. W. N. 434**

**115.** ————— *Non-appearance of plaintiff—Suit by mortgagee on mortgage—Plea by defendant of absence of consideration—Plaintiff summoned as witness by defendant to prove non-payment of consideration—Non-appearance of plaintiff at hearing*

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—*Presumption arising from such non-appearance—Duty of parties to suit to come forward as witnesses in their own case—Circular No. 1750—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 120.* A mortgagee sued his mortgagor for possession to which he was entitled under the provisions of the mortgage. The defendant (mortgagor) admitted execution of the mortgage, and pleaded that he had received no consideration for the mortgage. The defendant summoned the plaintiff as a witness, intending apparently to support his case by cross-examining him as to the alleged consideration. The plaintiff, however, did not appear, and the defendant himself did not go into the witness-box at the hearing. Under these circumstances the Court of first instance passed a decree for the plaintiff, holding that the inference which might be made against the plaintiff by reason of his non-appearance would not supply the want of positive proof which the defendant was bound to give of his allegation that he had received no consideration for the mortgage. The lower Appellate Court presumed from the absence of the plaintiff that his accounts did not contain entries showing the payment of consideration to the defendant, but held that such presumption did not relieve the defendant from the obligation of proving that no such consideration had been paid. It therefore confirmed the decree. On second appeal: *Held*, that the decree should be reversed and the case re-tried. The plaintiff should have been compelled, if possible, to attend and give evidence and produce the mortgage-deed and accounts, and the defendant also should have given evidence on his own behalf and have submitted to cross-examination. **SCBBAJI NARSINGH KULKARNI v. SHIPDAPA BIN KALLYANAPA HUSBI (1901)**

**I. L. R. 26 Bom. 392**

**116.** ————— *Notice, re-issue of—Notice on respondents.* Before a notice on a respondent can be re-issued, and application must be made to the Court detailing the grounds on which it is preferred. **RAM LOCHUN SIRCAR v. PRITHEE RAM CHOWDHRY**  
**2 W. R. Mis. 37**

**117.** ————— *Objections—Objection taken at hearing that application made to Court was not the application of which notice had been given to opposite party—Preliminary point.* In a motion made by the defendants for rectification of a decree for specific performance, counsel for the plaintiffs contended that the defendants were not entitled to ask for a rectification of the decree, inasmuch as their notice of motion did not intimate that the point would be raised. *Held*, that such an objection ought to be taken at once as a preliminary point. As it was not made until the argument of counsel for the defendants was concluded, it should be taken that the form of the motion as made to the Court was acquiesced in. The objection was then too late. **KARIM MAHOMED v. RAJOOMA**

**I. L. R. 12 Bom. 174**

**118.** ————— *Omission to argue question of law or abandoning a point—Counsel—*



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*Power of Court to go into question.* Omission by a counsel either to argue a question of law, or his abandoning a question of law is not sufficient to disentitle Court to go into the question. *Beni Pershad Koeri v. Dudh Nath Roy*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 151, followed. *RAMSARAN SINGH v. KHAKHAN SING* (1906) . . . . . 11 C. W. N. 340

119. ——— Opening case for defendant—*Suit—Plaintiff's case closed—Both defendants with same interest—Right of second defendant to open case before or after evidence has been gone into on behalf of first defendant.* Held, that, when there are two sets of defendants and their interests are the same, both should address the Court before any evidence is taken. *In re DUKSHINA MOHUN ROY* (1902) . . . . . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 32

120. ——— Orders—Order “to file with the record.” The practice of making the order that an application “be filed with the record” condemned as meaningless. *NILMONEE BANERJEE v. SHURBO MUNGALA DEBEE* . . . . . 7 W. R. 193

*LUCHMEE NARAIN SAHEE v. KOSHUKKEE DUTT JHA* . . . . . 8 W. R. 107

121. ——— Practice of Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction as to considering orders binding. A District Judge has no authority, when hearing an appeal from a Munsif's decision to vary or ignore the directions made by an Appellate Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, such as that of the Subordinate Judge. In such cases he should be guided by the practice in the High Court, where, when one Division Bench sees fit to give certain directions, any other Bench before which the case may afterwards come on has to keep itself within those directions. *BROJO SOONDUR GOSSAMEE v. JUGGUT CHUNDER DEY* . . . . . 21 W. R. 199

See *VYTHELINGA MUDELLY v. CUNDASAWMI MUDELLY* . . . . . 8 Mad. 21

122. ——— Paper-books—Preparation of paper-books—*Appeals to High Court.* In appeals to the High Court, where the subject-matter is more than R10,000, the appellant is bound to put the whole case (and not merely his own particular case) fully before the Court in his paper-book so far as the documents and depositions are concerned. And if he fails to do so without very good reason, he ought not to be allowed to read at the hearing anything which is not in the paper-book. *KULIAN DOSS v. GOBIND KOORER* . . . . . 24 W. R. 143

123. ——— Untranslated accounts not in paper-books—*Special leave.* Under the rules of the High Court, account books which are not translated and are not therefore a part of the paper-book cannot be referred to in a trial without special leave. *MADHUB PERSHAD v. FOOL COOMAREE BIBEE* . . . . . 19 W. R. 121

124. ——— Costs of translation of papers not included in list for paper-book. The petitioner in a regular appeal to the High Court should not be called upon to deposit the costs of

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translating, etc., any papers of which he has not furnished a list with a view to their inclusion in the paper-book. What papers a party requires or ought to print is a matter which he or his vakil must, in the first instance, determine, the Deputy Registrar preparing his estimate and demanding payment according to the requirements made on him. *LALLA BHOOP NARAIN v. ABASEE BEGUM* . . . . . 23 W. R. 458

125. ——— Omission to furnish list of papers—*Notice of estimate of cost of printing.* If the petitioner in a regular appeal to the High Court does not furnish the Deputy Registrar with a list of papers which he desires to have prepared and placed in the paper-book, that officer ought not to serve him with an estimate of the cost of printing. *BHOGOBUTTY KOONWAR v. ANURAGEE KOONWAR* . . . . . 23 W. R. 459

126. ——— Appeal—*Delivery of paper-book—Costs—Rule 49 of Original Side.* Where the respondent has not delivered paper-books, as he is allowed to do by rule 49 of the Rules of the High Court, Original Jurisdiction, on default of the appellant to deliver them, and the appellant does not appear at the hearing, the appeal will be dismissed without costs. *HURROSOONDERY DOSSEE v. CALLYPUDO DUTT* . . . . . 14 B. L. R. Ap. 11 : 23 W. R. 136

127. ——— Rules of Original Side, High Court—*Appeal—Paper-book, Delivery of—Costs.* When an appeal is filed, but no paper-books are delivered by the appellant, the respondent is entitled, without taking upon himself to deliver paper-books, to have the appeal dismissed with costs. *Hurroosoondery Dossee v. Callypoddo Dutt*, 14 B. L. R. App. 11, not followed. *KABULI v. BHULI* . . . . . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 289

128. ——— Filing paper-books for appeal—*Application for enlargement of time to file paper-books—Subsequent application at the hearing of the appeal to file paper-book then ready—Discretion of Court—Sufficient cause—High Court Rules, Appellate Side, Ch. 7, Rule 11.* An extension of time for filing paper-books in an appeal will not be granted unless “sufficient grounds” be shown for granting the application. Where the appellants waited from the 13th August 1898, the date of filing their memorandum of appeal, till the 2nd September 1898, before applying for office copies of the necessary papers to enable them to prepare their paper-books, and an application was made by the appellants on the 12th December 1898 for two months' further time to file their paper-books, the delay between the 13th August and the 22nd September 1898 being unexplained:—*Held*, that no sufficient cause had been shown for extension of time, nor was the case altered by the fact that the paper-books were ready when a subsequent application was made on the appeal being called on for hearing, and an application for leave to file them consequently dismissed. *MOTI CHAND v. FOOL CHAND* . . . . . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 57



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I. L. R. 27 Calc. 60 note

129. ——— Parties—Error in title of appeal—Party on record by mistake—Objection to his appearance by party who caused error. A suit was brought by a minor, who appeared by her next friend, and a decree was given in her favour. The defendant appealed, making the next friend alone respondent, and had the decree of the Court of first instance modified in his favour. The next friend appealed to the High Court, where the respondent objected to the next friend being heard, on the ground that she was no party to the suit. *Held*, that the Court would not entertain the objection at the instance of the party through whose fault the error occurred, but that the judgment of the Court below should be set aside, and that of the Court of first instance restored. BHOBOTARINI DEBI v. SREE RAM PAUL . . . I. L. R. 9 Calc. 629

130. ——— Adding party as co-appellant—Notice. A party should not be added as co-appellant without notice to the appellant. JANKIBAI v. ATMARAM BARAKAV  
8 Bom. A. C. 241

131. ——— Suit instituted on behalf of minor by next friend—Application for execution of decree by plaintiff on attaining majority and after death of next friend without complying with requirements of s. 451, Civil Procedure Code—Title of suit. Unless there is an absolute bar created by positive enactment, a person who has attained his full age is *prima facie* entitled to proceed with a suit instituted on his behalf during his minority, or to make any application therein, and, if necessary, the Court will, as a matter of course, give him leave to proceed or act in his own name. When a person, on whose behalf a suit had been revived and carried on by his next friend, made, after attaining his majority, and long after the death of the next friend, an application in his own name for execution of the decree in the suit without having complied with the requirements of s. 451 of the Civil Procedure Code, as to electing to proceed with the suit and obtaining leave of the Court to do so, and the application was admitted and notice of execution given to the defendant:—*Held*, under the circumstances, that such omission to comply with the requirements of s. 451, though an irregularity, was not a bar to the application being allowed to proceed. An application under s. 451 for leave to proceed with a suit, does not require any notice, but may be made *ex parte* at any time. Even if the application in this case therefore were not itself a sufficient indication that the applicant elected to proceed with the suit, and that the Court in allowing him to proceed in his own name gave him the required leave (and *semble* that would be the case), the Court could give such leave at the hearing of the application *nunc pro tunc*. The provision of s. 451, which requires the title of a suit to be corrected in such a case,

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applies to a pending suit, and not to a suit after final decree in which it only remains to proceed in execution. DOORGA MOHUN DASS v. TAHIR ALLY. TAHIR ALLY v. KOORSOMBOO  
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 270

132. ——— Appearance of parties—Appearance where party is represented by attorney on the record—Consent decree. A defendant who has an attorney on the record cannot appear to consent to a decree even if the plaintiff makes no objection to his doing so. PANCHANON SING v. JEEBUN KISTO BOSE  
1 C. W. N. 303

133. ——— Application for payment of money by receiver—Consent order. A plaintiff who has an attorney on the record cannot appear in person to consent to an application for payment of money by the Receiver. CHAITAN CHARAN MULLICK v. GOCOL CHANDRA MULLICK  
1 C. W. N. 303

134. ——— Deposit by defendant of money in Court in satisfaction of claim—Right of plaintiff to draw out such money and prosecute suit for balance claimed—Discretion of Court—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 377, 375. Suit for recovery of Rs. 500 on three promissory notes. Defendant pleaded minority at the date of the transactions, denied all liability, also denied receiving Rs. 500, but admitted receipt of Rs. 1500, which sum together with the interest he tendered to the plaintiff in full satisfaction of his claim. On refusal by the plaintiff to accept that sum, it was paid into Court. The plaintiff then applied to the Court for payment to him of the said amount. The defendant contended that the amount should be kept in Court pending the hearing as all liability was denied, and offered to pay interest if plaintiff succeeded in his suit. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to take the money out of Court. DWARKA DASS AGURWALLAH v. GIRISH CHUNDER ROY . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 766

135. ——— Revival of suit—Substitution of parties—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 368, 372—"Pending suit"—Right to apply, accrual of—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 178. On directions to take an account in a suit, the suit is still "pending," within the meaning of s. 372 of the Code of Civil Procedure, until the final order on the taking of the account is made; and the right to apply in such a suit to have the death of a certain defendant recorded, and the names of his heirs substituted on the record, accrues from day to day, and is not barred under Art. 178, Sch. II, of the Limitation Act. The provisions of s. 368 of the Code have no application to a case like this. Gocol Chunder Goswamee v. The Administrator-General of Bengal, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 726; Kedarnath Dutt v. Harra Chand Dutt, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 420, and Ram Nath Bhattacharjee v. Uma Charan Sircar, 3 C. W. N. 756,



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relied upon. *SURENDRA KESHUB ROY v. KHETTER KRISTO MITTER* (1903) . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 609  
s.c. 7 C. W. N. 517

136. ———— *Parties—Issues*  
—*Case.* Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee declined to entertain a point urged by the appellants as being covered by the language of one of the issues raised in the case, when it appeared that the parties by their conduct of the case had construed it in a narrower sense. *MA WUN DI v. MA KIN* (1907) . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 232  
s.c. L. R. 35 I. A. 41  
12 C. W. N. 220

137. ———— *Payment out of money deposited in Court—Petition without suit—Payment out of Court of moneys on petition without suit.* Case in which an order was made on a petition without suit directing the payment out of certain moneys paid into Court under an order entitled, "In the matter of Florence Emily Brownlow, and Lilian Kate Brownlow, infants." *In the matter of the petition of BROWNLOW*  
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 219

138. ———— *Execution of decree—Receipt and paying over of money in satisfaction of decree.* If money is brought into Court under process of execution, and the party entitled to it or his vakil is present to receive it, the Court shall cause it to be paid over immediately. *MUTTUVELU PILLAY v. SAMU PILLAY* . 5 Mad. Ap. 2

139. ———— *Payment into Court of money due under a bond bearing interest—Appropriation of such payments first to satisfaction of interest.* It appears to be a well-settled practice of the Courts to appropriate payments made upon a bond first to the interest due thereon, and thereafter, if any balance remain, to the principal. *Luchmeswar Singh Bahadur v. Syed Lutf Ali Khan*, 8 B. L. R. 110, and *Gooroo Das Dutt v. Ooma Churn Roy*, 22 W. R. 525, referred to. *MAHARAJA OF BENARES v. HAR NARAIN SINGH* (1905)  
I. L. R. 28 All. 25

140. ———— *Plaintiff, meaning of—Judicature Acts 36 and 37 Vict., ch. 66, s. 100—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 26, 179, 180—Right to begin—Some of defendants supporting plaintiff's case—Order in which to address the Court.* The word "plaintiff" means "every person asking relief against another person." The plaintiff and such of the defendants as support the plaintiff's case, wholly or in part must address the Court and call their evidence in the first place, and then, following the words of s. 180 of the Civil Procedure Code, the other party, namely, the persons opposed to the plaintiff's case and that of the other defendants supporting the plaintiff, must address the Court and call their evidence. *HAJI BIBI v. SULTAN MAHOMED KHAN* (1908) . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 599

141. ———— *Pleader, appearance of—Second appeal—Vakil, right of, to be heard without certified grounds of appeal or without any order*

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*admitting the appeal—Rules and Orders of Court (Appellate Side), 86 and 162.* A vakil will not be heard on behalf of an appellant on second appeal, when neither duly certified ground or grounds of appeal have been filed, nor the appeal been admitted by order of Court under Rules 86 and 162 of Court. *Kishen Chunder Roy v. Hurish Chunder Bose*, 3 W. R. 216, followed. *OLIULLAH v. BACHU LAL KHOTTA* . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 706

142. ———— *Pleader's Fees—Taxation—Pleader's fees—Appeals in Probate Proceedings—Scale of costs—Act I of 1846, s. 7.* The taxation of pleader's fees in appeals from probate proceedings should, according to a long standing practice of the High Court of Bombay, be valued at Rs. 30. *SUNDRABAI v. THE COLLECTOR OF BELGAUM* (1908)  
I. L. R. 33 Bom. 256

143. ———— *Possession of land—Suit to ascertain area of land to which plaintiff is entitled—Confusion of boundaries—Court no power to fix boundaries—No equity shown by plaintiff.* Where the plaintiff sued for recovery from the defendants of possession by severance and demarcation of a certain area of land out of the area described in the plaint, allowing the defendants to retain possession of as much land thereout as they could possibly retain consistently with it, the Judge in appeal dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants. The plaintiff preferred a second appeal. When the assistance of the Court is sought for the purpose of ascertaining the boundaries, which the plaintiff himself is unable to point out by reason of some confusion in them, and to recover possession, when those boundaries have been ascertained by the Court: *Held*, following *Wake v. Conyers* (1759), 1 W. & T. L. C. 170 at p. 172, that "the Court has no power to fix the boundaries of legal estates, unless some equity is superinduced by the act of the parties as some particular circumstance of fraud or confusion." *KAVASJI v. HORMASJI* (1905)  
I. L. R. 29 Bom. 73

144. ———— *Probate and letters of administration—Withdrawal of letters of administration—False representation.* When letters of administration have been granted to the Administrator-General, and subsequently withdrawn on a false representation, the Court will grant a rule calling on the executors to show cause why the rule should not be extended to the Registry of the Court. *In the goods of SREEMUNTO BENAICH RAO IMRIT*  
[1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 10]

145. ———— *Contentious matter—Duty of Registrar—When a petition for probate or letters of administration becomes contentious—Non-appearance of caveator—Form of order.* So long as a petition for probate or letters of administration is "non-contentious," it is to be dealt with by the Registrar. As soon as it becomes "contentious," it is to be treated as a plaint in a suit, and the suit is governed, as far as practicable, by the procedure prescribed by the Civil Procedure



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**Code.** The petition becomes contentious not upon the entry of a caveat, but upon the filing of the affidavit in support of the caveat. Where, in consequence of the filing of the affidavit, the matter becomes a suit, the whole suit must be disposed of by the decree of the Court. Where therefore, at the hearing of the suit, the defendant does not appear in support of the caveat, it is not a correct procedure for the Court merely to dismiss the caveat, leaving it to the Registrar to dispose of the petition as a non-contentious matter. The proper form of order is that the caveat be dismissed and that probate or letters of administration issue, provided that the Court is satisfied that the papers are in order.

*CHHOTALAL CHUNILAL v. BAI KABUBAI*  
**I. L. R. 22 Bom. 261**

**146.** *Power-of-attorney—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 85—Letters of administration, application for.* On an application for letters of administration to the estate of a deceased, who was domiciled in Scotland, and to whose estate one *P* had been appointed executor *dative qua father*, the application being made by one *K* under a power-of-attorney granted by *P*, such power not having been executed and authenticated in the manner provided by s. 85 of the Evidence Act:—*Held*, that the application must be refused. *In the goods of PRIMROSE*. **I. L. R. 16 Calc. 776**

**147.** *Petition by Administrator-General for letters of administration—Prayer for remission of Court-fees where estate is of small value—Rule of High Court, 697—Verification of petition—Administrator-General's Act (II of 1874), ss. 12, 16, 17.* A petition by the Administrator-General for letters of administration containing a statement as to the value of the estate, followed by a prayer for the remission of Court-fees under rule 697 of the Rules of the High Court (Belchambers' Rule and Orders, p. 278), is sufficiently verified by the signature of the Administrator-General in accordance with s. 12 of Act II of 1874. The effect of that Act is to do away with the requirements of the rule in such a case, so far as it makes verification by affidavit necessary as to the value of the assets. *In the goods of McCOMISKEY*. **I. L. R. 20 Calc. 879**

**148.** *Administrator-General's Act (II of 1874), s. 12—Verification of petition—Court-fees Amendment Act (XI of 1899).* The Administrator-General as a public officer is exempted from verifying otherwise than by his signature any petition presented by him under the provisions of Act II of 1874. *In the goods of McComiskey*, **I. L. R. 20 Calc. 879**, followed. The form of affidavit prescribed by Act XI of 1899 indicates that it does not apply to an application by the Administrator-General. *In the goods of AYDALL*. **I. L. R. 26 Calc. 404**  
**3 C. W. N. 298**

**149.** *Application for letters of administration by constituted attorney—Power-of-attorney executed in Glasgow—Verifica-*

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*tion—Declaration as to execution of power.* The Chief Magistrate of the city of Glasgow being a person lawfully authorized to administer oaths, a declaration as to the execution of a power-of-attorney taken before him and authenticated by his certificate and the common seal of the city of Glasgow, and by a notarial certificate, is sufficient proof of the execution of the power. *In the goods of HENDERSON*. **I. L. R. 22 Calc. 491**

**150.** *Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 85—Power-of-attorney—Declaration before notary public in proof of power-of-attorney.* On an application for letters of administration with the will annexed, made by the attorney of the executors therein named, it appeared that the applicant's power-of-attorney was not executed in the presence of a notary public; but with regard to the execution by each of the executors, one of the attesting witnesses had made a declaration before a notary public to the effect that he witnessed the execution of the power-of-attorney by one of the executors, and that the signature of the other attesting witness was the proper signature of the person bearing that name, and each declaration was signed, sealed, and certified by a notary public. *Held*, that the power-of-attorney was sufficiently proved. *In re SLADEN*. **I. L. R. 21 Mad. 492**

**151.** *Court-fees Act (VII of 1870), s. 3, Sch. I, Art. II, s. 19H—Court Fees Amendment Act (XI of 1899)—Payment of ad valorem fee on probate or letters of administration.* In an application for probate or letters of administration the *ad valorem* fee prescribed by statute should be prepaid to the satisfaction of the Court. Such payment must be made to the Registrar and certified by him or by the Taxing Officer where an exemption is claimed and allowed. This certificate should be produced to the Court with the application and affidavit of valuation. *In the goods of OMDA BIBEE*. **I. L. R. 26 Calc. 407**  
**3 C. W. N. 392**

**152.** *Bond, form of—Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 256.* The Indian Succession Act, s. 256, requires that an administration bond should be taken in every case. It may, however, be varied by special order of the Court, in the case of a limited or special administration, and follow the English form. *In the goods of GUBBOY*. **I. L. R. 26 Calc. 408**  
**3 C. W. N. 384**

**153.** *Probate, application to recall—Citation—Proof of will—Genuineness of will.* On an application by a Hindu widow for an order that the probate obtained by her husband's brother of a will alleged to have been made by her husband be recalled, she not receiving any intimation of the application for probate, and that the will be proved in her presence: *Held*, that such an application ought to be granted, and that the probate of the will must be recalled and kept



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in the record until the case is decided. *ELOKESHI DASSI v. HARI PROSAD SOOR* (1903)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 528 ;  
s.c. 7 C. W. N. 450

154. ———— *Grant of letters of administration—Scope of enquiry prior to grant.* On the hearing of a petition for issue of letters of administration to the estate of a deceased person, it is not the province of the Court to go into questions of title to the property, to which the letters of administration refer. *OCHAVARAM NANABHAI v. DOLATRAM JAMIETRAM* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 644

155. ———— *Record, documents forming—Documents not proved.* Documents which have not been proved, but simply filed in accordance with a usage in the mofussil, should not be put up with the record. It is the duty of a Judge to pass over such documents as unproved, but it is also the duty of the pleader of the party against whom they are intended to be used to insist that they should not remain on the record at all. *KALLIDA PERSHAD DUTT v. RAM HARI CHUCKERBUTTY*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 317

156. ———— *Remission of case by Privy Council for enquiries—Record to be forwarded with decree.* When the Privy Council remits a case with directions that the Zillah Court may arrive at certain results by certain inquiries, the objects and reasons of those inquiries, as set forth in the judgment of the Privy Council, are part of the judicial record, and should be forwarded to the Zillah Court with the decree of the Privy Council. *GOLOCK CHUNDER DUTT v. MOHUN LOLL SOOKUL*

5 W. R. 271

157. ———— *Redemption—Interpleader suit—Suit to redeem mortgage against two parties claiming mortgage money—Appropriate relief.* When a mortgagor was about to pay off the mortgage amount to an assignee of the mortgage, the mortgagee disputed the assignment and also claimed to be paid the mortgage amount. The mortgagor thereupon filed a suit impleading both the mortgagee and assignee as defendants. The plaint contained, in substance, a claim for redemption, but it also prayed that the defendants should be required to interplead concerning their claims to the mortgage amount and that the mortgagor should be indemnified in consequence of the loss of the original mortgage-deed. Prior to the hearing the defendants agreed that the assignee was entitled to receive the mortgage amount. The suit was dismissed on the grounds that no interpleader suit could lie, as the plaintiff sought an indemnity from one of the defendants, which gave him a personal interest in the suit. *Held*, on appeal, that it was erroneous to treat the suit as only one of interpleader. Inasmuch as the plaint also contained in substance a claim for redemption, that was the appropriate relief under the circumstances. *Vyvyan*

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*v. Vyvyan*, 4 DeG. F. & J. 183, followed. *JAGGA-NATH HIRALAL v. TULKA KERA* (1908)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 592

158. ———— *Reference to High Court—Reference by Collector of decision under Mamlatdar's Courts Act—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 622—Practice.* The High Court will not interfere on a reference by the Collector with a Mamlatdar's Courts decision in a possessory suit. The aggrieved party can himself apply to the Court. *Satu v. Shivrambhat*, P. J. 1894, p. 52, followed. *PANDU v. BHAVDU*

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 806

*See VORA ISABALLI v. DAUDBHAI MASABHAI*

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 371

159. ———— *Reference to Registrar—Statement of facts, filing of, after appointed time—Right of party failing to appear and support such statement—Rules of High Court, Calcutta, Nos. 522, 537.* On the 4th February 1899 one G was granted a month's time to file his statement of facts in a reference which was pending before the Registrar, and in default thereof it was ordered that the reference should be heard *ex parte* against him. The statement of facts was filed before the Registrar seven days after the proper time. The Registrar refused to deal with the statement of facts without an order of Court. G then applied to the Court for an order that the Registrar might be at liberty to refer to the statement of facts, and that G might be permitted to appear and support them. The party opposing contended that G ought not to be allowed to file his statement of facts, that he might appear in person, but had no right to employ counsel or attorney. *Held*, that G was entitled to file his statement of facts, and that the reference should be proceeded with in the usual course. *TARAK MOHINEY DASSEE v. GREES CHUNDER DASS*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 585

160. ———— *Remand—Remand on point raised as issue in lower Court.* A case ought not, as a rule, to be remanded upon a point which has been framed as an issue by the Court below and brought to the attention of the parties, and where they have failed at the trial to give any evidence upon it. *RAM PRASAD v. ABDUL KARIM*

I. L. R. 9 All. 513

161. ———— *Remand.* Case where, on objection being taken at a late stage that a mortgage-bond was not attested, as the law required, by two witnesses, the suit, instead of being dismissed, was sent back to enable plaintiff to adduce further evidence to prove that at least two of the persons whose names appeared on the face of the document were attesting witnesses. *DINAMOYEE DEBI v. BON BEHARI KAPUR* (1902)

7 C. W. N. 160

162. ———— *Remand—Examination of witness on commission.* On remand by the High Court for the determination of certain issues the District Court sent down the case to the first Court in order that the evidence might be



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taken there. The evidence of the plaintiff was taken on commission. *Held*, that the defendant was in nowise aggrieved by the procedure followed. **KHASHABA v. CHANDRABHAGABAI (1908)**

**I. L. R. 32 Bom. 441**

**163.** ——— **Report of Registrar—Exceptions to report—Notice—Rule 565 of Belchambers' Rules and Orders of the High Court, Original Side.** In making an application to discharge or vary a report, it is necessary that notice should be given within the time required by rule 565 of the Rules and Orders of the High Court, Original Side, and that such notice should be accompanied with the grounds of exceptions relied on by the party objecting to the report. **LUTCHMEE NARAIN v. BYJANATH LAHIA . . . . . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 437**

**LUTCHMEE NARAIN v. RUNGO LAL LOHEA**  
**2 C. W. N. 57**

**164.** ——— **Report of Registrar—Application to discharge or vary report—Exceptions to report—Notice of motion—Time for such notice—Belchambers' Rules and Orders of High Court, Original Side (1900), Rules 615, 617—Solitor's mistake as to course of procedure—"Fraud, surprise or mistake, or such other special ground" under rule 617.** If a party to a suit desires to discharge or vary a report, he must adopt the procedure laid down by Rule 615 (Belchambers' Rules and Orders of the High Court, Original Side, 1900), and must apply by motion upon notice to be given within the time prescribed therein. Mere filing of exceptions to the report cannot be deemed to be notice under Rule 615. The words "fraud, surprise or mistake, or such other special ground" in Rule 617 refer to fraud, surprise, or mistake or some other special ground incident to, connected with, or which resulted in the making of, the certificate or report itself; and not to something which has occurred quite outside and independent of the certificate or report. A mistake in not complying with the procedure laid down in Rule 615 is not a "special ground," within the meaning of Rule 617, or re-opening the report. **ROYAL INSURANCE CO. v. AUKHOY COOMAR DUTT (1901)**  
**I. L. R. 28 Calc. 272**  
**s.c. 5 C. W. N. 337**

**165.** ——— **Review—Certifying review without good grounds.** Junior pleaders of the High Court should be cautious how they certify for a review when they find that the case has been in the hands of members of the bar, and of pleaders more experienced than they, who, they ought to consider, have declined to certify to the review. **ROUSSEAU v. PINTO . . . . . 10 W. R. 54**  
**TOOG OUNG v. BRITISH INDIA STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY . . . . . 24 W. R. 430**

**166.** ——— **Second appeal—Discovery of fresh evidence—Withdrawal of second appeal—Review petition—Practice.** When on coming to the High Court under second appeal it is discovered that there is evidence which ought to

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have been placed before the lower Courts, the proper practice to pursue is to allow the second appeal to be withdrawn in order that a review petition may be presented to the lower Appellate Court. But this course cannot be pursued when the review petition has been already presented to and rejected by the lower Court. **RAMCHANDRA v. KRISHNAJI (1904) . . . . . I. L. R. 24 Bom. 4**

**167.** ——— **Revision—Recovery of Rent Act (X of 1859), s. 153—Final order of Collector—Appellate order—High Court's power to interfere in revision—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 622—Charter Act, s. 15—Analogous appeals in superior and inferior Courts—Duty of inferior Court to await decision of superior Court.** S. 153 of Act X of 1859 does not preclude revision by the High Court of an order of a Collector which is final within the meaning of that section. The High Court has power either under s. 622, Civil Procedure Code, or if not, under s. 15 of the Charter Act, to interfere in cases where the lower Courts have not acted correctly in accordance with law. Where a plaintiff failed to secure the production of an important document from the records of another Court though he took all reasonable steps for that purpose and the suit was disposed of by both the Courts of first instance and the Appellate Court without reference to that document, the High Court in revision set aside the judgments of both the Courts. When appeals preferred in analogous cases are pending, some in an inferior and others in a superior Appellate Court, the inferior Court of Appeal would exercise a wise discretion to await the decision of the superior Appellate Court. **GOBIND RAMANUJA DAS v. LAKHUN PARIDA (1906) . . . . . 11 C. W. N. 112**

**168.** ——— **Revival of suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 372—Plaint taken as petition to revive.** A suit was instituted by the trustee appointed under a will, against the executrix, for the purpose of having the trusts of the will carried into execution. A decree was made, and certain directions were given for the purpose of having a scheme settled, by which the trusts were to be carried out; but before the scheme was finally settled and approved, and while the proceedings were pending, the case was struck out of the board for want of prosecution. Subsequently, both the plaintiff and defendant died. The heirs of the plaintiff then instituted a suit against the Administrator-General as representing the estate of the defendant, for carrying the trusts into execution, and prayed that their suit might be considered as supplemental to the original one. *Held*, that the original suit, though no longer upon the board, was capable of revival, and that, if no person were living whose consent might be obtained or to whom notice might be given, the Court might give leave without any such consent or notice, and that the proper course to pursue was to allow the plaintiffs to amend their plaint by putting it in the form of a petition under s. 372 of the Civil Procedure Code, the defendant being at liberty to put in any answer which he might have done if the proceeding had been by petition in



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the first instance. *Per* PONTIFEX, J.—The words “pending the suit” in s. 372 relate to a suit in which no final order has been made. *GOCOL CHUNDER GOSSAMEE v. ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 726 : 5 C. L. R. 569

169. ————— Rule to show cause—*Rule nisi to show cause why a person should not be made a party defendant—No grounds stated in or served with the rule—Rule granted during hearing of suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 32.* During the hearing of a suit for recovery of immoveable property it appeared from the evidence and certain documents put in that the plaintiff had mortgaged his right, title, and interest to a third person, by whom the suit was practically being carried on. On an application by the defendant for the mortgagee to be added as a party defendant, under the provisions of s. 32 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court directed a rule to issue calling on him to show cause why he should not be added as a party defendant or give security for costs. The rule was not applied for on petition or affidavit, and set out no grounds for the application at all. On an objection taken by the mortgagee at the hearing of the rule :—*Held*, that the grounds should have been stated on affidavit or have appeared on the face of the rule, and that the mortgagee was entitled to know what he had to answer, and consequently, the rule being informal, it was discharged with costs. *RAMNARAIN KALLIA v. MONEE BIBEE. RAMNARAIN KALLIA v. GOPAL DOSS SING*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 735

170. ————— Rulings of High Court—*Different rulings of different High Courts—Judge, what rulings to be followed by.* Where there are different rulings of the different High Courts on a particular point, a Judge should follow the rulings of the High Court to which he is subordinate. *SWAMIRAO NARAYAN DESHPANDE v. KASHINATH KRISHNA MUTALIK DESAI*

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 419

BALAJI GANESH v. SAKHARAM PARASHRAM ANGAL . . . . . I. L. R. 17 Bom. 555

171. ————— Sale by Receiver—*Obstruction of possession—Purchaser, rights of—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), Ch. XIX, and s. 647—Costs.* Practice of the Original Side of the Court followed in recognizing the right of a purchaser at a Receiver's sale to obtain the assistance of the Court in obtaining possession under the provisions of the Court relating to sales in a suit. *MINATOONNESSA BIBEE v. KHATOONNESSA BIBEE*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 479

172. ————— Sale by Registrar—*Purchase money, payment of, into Court—Conditions of sale—Interest—Costs.* Where the purchaser of a property at a Registrar's sale is out of time in paying into Court the balance of his purchase-money, the practice of the Original Side of the High Court is that payment of interest shall follow as a

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matter of course. But if there has been delay on the part of the party having the carriage of the proceedings, and if that party appears on the summons taken out by the purchaser for the purpose of paying into Court the balance of such purchase-money, he shall not be allowed his costs against the purchaser. *KANYE LALL DASS v. SHAMA CHURN DAWN* . . . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 566

173. ————— Conditions of sale—*Deficiency in area—Compensation—Annulment of sale—Costs.* Where there is a substantial deficiency in the area of property sold at a Registrar's sale, so that the purchaser would not have offered the price that he did if he had been aware of such deficiency, the Court will not compel the purchaser to take the property with compensation, but will discharge him from the sale. *Kissory Mohan Roy v. Kali Charan Ghosh, 1 C. W. N. 106*, distinguished. *Jacobs v. Revell [1900], 2 Ch. 858*, referred to. The purchaser so discharged from his sale is entitled to repayment of the purchase-money, with interest from the date of payment into Court, and the costs, charges and expenses, incurred by reason of his bidding for and being declared the purchaser of the property, and of and incidental to the application to be discharged from his purchase. *Quære*: Whether he is entitled to the costs of a survey made by him to ascertain the area of the property. *BANK OF BENGAL v. AKHOY KUMAR MUKERJEE (1901)*

6 C. W. N. 385

174. ————— Sale notification—*Misdescription of property—Remedy of purchaser—Compensation—Annulment of sale.* Where the misdescription of property in the sale notification does not go to the essence of the contract, the remedy which the purchaser can claim is compensation, and not annulment of the sale. *ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL v. AGHORE NATH MOOKERJEE (1902)* . . . . . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 420

s.c. 6 C. W. N. 873

175. ————— Security for costs—*Bond to secure costs of appeal—Rule nisi against obligor—Sureties.* The proper mode of proceeding to put a bond to secure the costs of an appeal in suit is to move upon affidavits, showing a breach of the condition of the bond, for a *rule nisi*, calling upon the obligor and sureties to show cause why the Court should not order that the bond be assigned to some person named in the rule. *POYNOR BIBEE v. NUJJOO KHAN*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 437 : 5 C. L. R. 524

176. ————— Appeal—*Poverty.* Mere poverty is no ground for requiring an appellant to give security for the costs of the appeal. *MANECKJI v. GOOLBAI*

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 241

See *SESHAYANGAR v. JAINULAVADIN*

I. L. R. 3 Mad. 68

177. ————— Filing copy of Judge's notes—*Certificate of payment of security for costs.* A certified copy of the Judge's notes not



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having been filed, and there being no certificate from the Prothonotary that security had been given for costs, the appeal was dismissed for non-compliance with the rules of the Court. **BHIMJI GRIDHAR v. MORGAN** . . . **3 Bom. O. C. 63**

**178.** ————— *Time for objecting to appeal for non-compliance with rules of Court.* Appeal dismissed, as the appellants had not given security for costs, and as the appeal had not been filed within the time required by the rules of the Court. It is sufficient for the respondent to object at the hearing of the appeal in the case of non-compliance with the rules of Court, and he need not apply specially to have the appeal rejected, when the memorandum of appeal is preferred. **MUHAMMADBAI DHARAMSI v. BHANJI TOPAN**

**3 Bom. O. C. 64**

**179.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 549—Dismissal of appeal—Practice.* The last paragraph of s. 549 of the Civil Procedure Code seems to contemplate that, on failure to furnish security within the time fixed, an order for rejecting the appeal should be obtained from the Court that gave the order to furnish security. Upon the application of the respondent in a second appeal pending before the High Court, an order was passed requiring the appellant to furnish security for the costs of the appeal, and to lodge such security at any time before the hearing. This order purported to be made under s. 549 of the Civil Procedure Code, but neither the application nor the order stated the amount of the security required. At the hearing of the appeal, no security having been lodged, the respondent objected that, with reference to the terms of s. 549, the Court had no option but to dismiss the appeal. *Held*, that the proper course was to have applied to the Judge who passed the order for security, at any time before the case came on for hearing, for the rejection of the appeal, and that it was too late at the hearing to ask the Court to reject the appeal. **THAKUR DAS v. KISHORI LAL**

**I. L. R. 9 All. 164**

**180.** ————— *Delay in applying for security.* An application for security for costs already incurred, and estimated costs of appeal, should be made promptly. **Pooley's Trustee v. Whetham**, **L. R. 33 Ch. D. 76**, referred to. **BHOONATH LAHIRI v. RADHAPROSAD LAHIRI** (1900) . . . **5 C. W. N. 119**

**181.** ————— *Setting down case for hearing—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 135—Trial of particular issue.* It should be a rule of practice that when an order is made under s. 135 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877) by the Judge in chambers, the suit should be set down for the trial of the particular issue as well as of the cause itself when it comes to a hearing before the same Judge. **AHMEDBOY HUBIRBOY v. VULLEEBOY CASSUMBHOY** . **I. L. R. 6 Bom. 572**

**182.** ————— *Small Cause Court cases—Transfer to High Court—Revival of claim aban-*

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*done in Small Cause Court—Amendment of plaint.* Where the plaintiff having a claim against the defendant for R2,500 brought his suit in the Small Cause Court for R2,000, abandoning R500, and on the application of the defendant the case was transferred to the High Court, the plaintiff, on application by summons in chambers, was allowed to amend his plaint, so as to include the R500 abandoned in the Small Cause Court. **RAM LALL v. BRAJAHARI PAUL** . . . **1 C. W. N. 32**

**183.** ————— *Court invested with small Cause Court powers—Decision—Reasons—Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (IX of 1887), ss. 17 and 32.* The judgment of a Court invested with Small Cause Court powers need not contain more than the points for determination and the decision thereupon; the practice and procedure of such Courts being determined in the matter of judgments by paragraph (1) of s. 203 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). **Ramchandra v. Ganesh**, **I. L. R. 23 Bom. 382**, dissented from. **NARAYAN v. BHAGU** (1907) **I. L. R. 31 Bom. 314**

**184.** ————— *Stay of proceedings—Suit between same parties and for same property before Privy Council—Stay of suit.* A suit should not be allowed to go on while an appeal relating to the same property and between the same parties is pending before the Privy Council. **SHEOPROSUN MISSEER v. RAJENDERKISHORE SINGH**

**W. R. 1864, 100**

**185.** ————— *Procedure—Staying suit until costs of a previous suit in a foreign Court have been paid.* The Courts in India have no power to stay proceedings in a suit instituted therein because the costs of a previous suit between the same parties brought in the High Court of Justice in England have not been paid. **BOWLES v. BOWLES** . . . **I. L. R. 8 Bom. 571**

**186.** ————— *Dismissal of suit, effect of—Application to restrain receiver parting with funds, pending appeal—Power of Court.* Under the Code of Civil Procedure, once a suit has been dismissed, the Court dismissing it is *functus officio*, save that it may stay execution of its own decree or order for costs. An application therefore made to a Court of first instance after dismissal of the suit, but before appeal filed, asking that the receiver may be restrained from parting with funds in his hands pending an appeal, cannot be granted. **YAMIN-UD-DOWLAH v. AHMED ALI KHAN**

**I. L. R. 21 Calc. 561**

**187.** ————— *Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 134—Winding up company—Stay of proceedings when petition to wind up is pending—High Court Rule No. 10, cl. (r).* The plaintiff sued the defendant company to recover R10,000. The claim was not disputed, but shortly after the suit was filed another creditor filed a petition to wind up the company. This petition was pending when the suit came on for hearing, but no order to stay



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proceedings had been obtained by the defendants, and the plaintiff contended that under the circumstances he was entitled to obtain a decree, having regard to the fact that no such order had been made, and that by the rules of the Court [Rule No. 10, cl. (r)] such order could only be made in chambers. *Held*, on application by the defendants at the hearing, that the proceedings must be stayed. *VIRBAIJI v. WADIA MILLS Co.* I. L. R. 18 Bom. 65

188. ———— *Application for stay of execution—Costs.* Where the defendants in an original suit applied to the Appellate Court for stay of execution of the decree pending the appeal:—*Held* (BANERJEE, J., dissenting), that the applicant who asked for the indulgence must pay the costs of the application. *CHUNI LAL v. ANANTRAM* I. L. R. 25 Calc. 893

189. ———— *Stay of proceedings in Small Cause Court—Transfer of suit on a promissory note—Suit for an account in the High Court—Procedure—Matter of convenience rather than of right—Costs.* As a general rule, it would be no answer, as regards a suit in the Small Cause Court upon a promissory note, for the defendant in that suit to say that the claim is a matter of account. But if, subsequently, a suit is instituted in the High Court by the defendant in the Small Cause Court suit, in which all transactions between the parties can be dealt with, and if he gives security for the total amount of his indebtedness, then it is desirable that there should not be a separate proceeding in respect of the promissory note, though *prima facie* it does not constitute an item in a running account between the parties. The question of procedure becomes a matter of convenience rather than of right, and justice can be done between the parties by apportionment of costs after the account has been taken in the High Court suit. *ISSUR SINGH v. BERGMANN* (1903) I. L. R. 30 Calc. 627

190. ———— *Summons for directions—High Court Rules, Chapter VIII—Claim of indemnity—Embarrassing pleading—Refusal to give directions, effect of.* In deciding whether the Court should give directions on a summons for directions, the Court has to see that nothing is done which would put the plaintiffs to additional expense or difficulty, and also to see that they are not embarrassed by the introduction of third parties in their suit. In giving leave to serve notice of claim for contribution or indemnity on a third party the Court will not consider whether the claim is a valid one, but only whether the claim is *bona fide* and whether, if established, it will result in contribution or indemnity. *Carshore v. North-Eastern Railway Company*, 29 Ch. D. 344, followed. The effect of a refusal by the Judge to give directions is to dismiss the third party from the action. *Baxter v. France*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 591, referred to. *SHIVLAL v. SHRIKISSONDAS AND MITCHELL* (1907) I. L. R. 31 Bom. 465

191. ———— *Test case—Stay of proceedings until trial of test case—Court-fees—Court-fees*

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*Act (VII of 1870), s. 17, Sch. I, Art. 1—Consolidation of appeals.* The petitioners, who were the appellants in 44 references under the Land Acquisition Act, obtained an order directing the trial of one of them as a test case, with a stay of proceedings in the remaining appeals until the decision of the test case. The test appeals having been decided adversely to the appellants, they next applied to have the decision of the Court on the remaining appeals, offering to pay the proper court-fees leviable thereon. *Held*, that, having regard to the terms of the order, the appellants were not precluded from requiring the consideration of the Court with regard to the other appeals. *Held*, further, that, having regard to the fact that the parties were the same in all the cases, and the plots of land were contiguous to one another and formed part of one estate, although in the occupation of different tenants, who were however not parties to the appeals, the appeals should be consolidated, and the court-fee paid upon the value of the consolidated appeals under s. 17 of the Court-fees Act (VII of 1870), subject to the limitation prescribed in the proviso to Art. 1, Sch. I, of that Act. *KASHI PRASAD SINGH v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* (1901) I. L. R. 29 Calc. 140

192. ———— *Testamentary matters—Testamentary and probate matters—Probate Act (V of 1881).* The practice in India in testamentary matters previously to Act V of 1881 was the same as that of the Ecclesiastical Court in England, except so far as that practice might be inconsistent with the Civil Procedure Code. *In the matter of PITAMBER GIRDHAR* I. L. R. 5 Bom. 638

*See In the Goods of BHUGGUBUTTY DASSEE.* *PROSUNNOMOYEE DOSSEE v. AGHORE CHANDRA DUTT* 4 C. W. N. 757

193. ———— *Translation of papers—Application for translations.* Translations of papers, if required, should be applied for before the case is posted. *KONDAYYA GAUNDAN v. RAMASVAMI GAUNDAN* 1 Mad. 130

194. ———— *Transfr of case—Applications under s. 4, Act XXIII of 1861—Suits on bonds, etc.* In all applications under s. 4, Act XXIII of 1861, in suits brought on a bond or other document, the place at which the document was executed must be definitely stated. *ANONYMOUS* 7 Mad. Ap. 34

195. ———— *Transmission of documents—Documents relating to security for costs of appeal.* Judges should not transmit to the High Court documents used before them to make out the title of parties offering immoveable property as security in Privy Council cases, but should, in reporting upon the securities, state particulars of the documents upon which the title of the surety appears to be made out. *In the matter of AMEEROONISSA KHATOON* 14 W. R. 94

196. ———— *Vakil and Counsel—Vakils' right to audience on the Original Side of the*



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*High Court—Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court over the Presidency Small Cause Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 622.* A *vakil* is not entitled to audience on the Original Side of the High Court. Applications for the exercise of the Court's revisional powers over the Presidency Small Cause Court are properly dealt with in the exercise of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the Court, and should be made in the usual way by an advocate of the Court, instructed by an attorney. *SARAT CHANDRA SINGH v. BROJO LAL MUKERJI* (1903)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 986

197. ———— *Withdrawal of suits or appeals—Withdrawal of suit—Landlord and tenant—Forfeiture for non-payment of rent—Right to relief from application in motion.* A motion was made on summons that a suit, seeking a declaration that defendants had forfeited their right to a lease by reason of non-payment of rent, be discontinued or dismissed. *Held*, that such an application should not be made by motion, but the defendant was entitled to be relieved from the forfeiture on payment of what was due. *GHOLAM MOHAMED v. CALCUTTA CLUB* . . . . . Cor. 67

198. ———— *Withdrawal of second appeal—Discovery of new evidence—Review by lower Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 623.* Having regard to the decisions in *Nanabhai v. Nathabhai*, 9 Bom. 89, and *Narayan v. Darudbhai*, 9 Bom. 238, and the uniform practice in accordance with them which had since obtained, and the practical similarity on this point of Act X of 1877, s. 623, and Act VIII of 1859, s. 376 (on which the cases abovementioned were decided), the High Court allowed the appellant to withdraw his second appeal, after it had been argued though not decided, in order that he might apply to the lower Court for a review of its judgment on the ground of the discovery of new evidence: the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of appeal. *PANDU v. DEVJI* I. L. R. 7 Bom. 287

199. ———— *Witness, expenses of—Application in Chambers—Expense for attendance in Court—High Court Rule 195.* A witness, who attends the Court on a subpoena, is entitled to demand at any time his reasonable expenses of such attendance from the party issuing the subpoena, even though he only gives evidence as a witness for a party to the suit other than the party summoning him. *In re BULLOCK* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 647

## 2. CRIMINAL CASES.

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.

1. ———— *Adjournment—Adjournment of trial by proclamation.* The adjournment of a trial by public proclamation is irregular and objectionable. *ANONYMOUS* . . . 8 Mad. Ap. 30

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## 2. CRIMINAL CASES—contd.

2. ———— *Affidavits—Contradicting allegation in verified petition.* Important statements made in a verified petition to the High Court, if untrue, should be contradicted on affidavit. *REG. v. KASHINATH DINKAR* . . . 8 Bom. Cr. 126

3. ———— *Showing want of jurisdiction and error in law on merits.* Though affidavits may be used to show a want of jurisdiction in a Magistrate, even though the affidavits contradict for this purpose the finding of the Magistrate, they cannot be used as affording materials for reviewing the Magistrate's decision on the merits. *REG. v. NATHALAL PITAMBAR*

10 Bom. 102

4. ———— *Inadmissibility of affidavit of accused when Magistrate has recorded plea of guilty.* Where a Magistrate has recorded that an accused person has pleaded guilty, an affidavit to the contrary sworn to by the accused is not admissible in evidence on revision by the High Court. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BHASHYAM CHETTI*

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 209

5. ———— *Hearing of rule to show cause—Supplementary affidavit of facts subsequent to issue of rule.* *Semle*: A supplementary affidavit stating facts which have transpired subsequent to the issue of the rule may be filed. *RATNESARI PERSHAD NARAYAN SINGH v. EMPRESS*

2 C. W. N. 498

6. ———— *Appeal—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 421—Judgment of Appellate Court, contents of.* It is very desirable that an Appellate Court, without going to the length of writing an elaborate judgment, should, in deciding a criminal appeal, notice briefly, but clearly, the objections urged on appeal and how they were disposed of. *EKCOWRI MUKERJEE v. EMPEROR* (1905) . . . . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 178

7. ———— *Privy Council leave to appeal to, in criminal case.* Before granting a certificate for leave to appeal to the Privy Council, the Court must be satisfied that there is reasonable ground for thinking that grave and substantial injustice may have been done by reason of some departure from the principles of natural justice. *Ex parte Carew*, [1897] A. C. 719 and *Dinizulu v. Attorney-General of Zululand*, 61 L. T. 740, followed. *In re BAL GANGADHAR TILAK* (1908)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 221

8. ———— *Approvers—Application for sanction to prosecute an approver.* An application to the High Court for sanction to prosecute an approver for giving false evidence should be by motion on behalf of the Crown in open Court. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MANIK CHANDRA SARKAR*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 492

9. ———— *Caution to accused—Warning accused before hearing his statement.* In an allegation of having warned an accused person before taking down his statements, a Magistrate should state how the accused was warned. *QUEEN v. DEDAR NUSHYO* . . . . . 14 W. R. Cr. 81

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**10. Evidence, mode of recording—Applications under Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 196.** All applications from Judges and Magistrates for bringing into operation the provisions of s. 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be made through the High Court. *ANONYMOUS* . . . . . **5 Mad. Ap. 9**

**11. Judgments, copies of—Copies of judgments for prisoners.** Copies of judgments should be made out at once without waiting for written applications from prisoners under sentence. *In the matter of RAM CHUNDER MUNDLE* **9 W. R. Cr. 19**

**12. Petition for bail—Petition for prisoner's admission to bail—Form of petition—Petition containing defamatory allegations against trying Magistrate and other public officers.** When a prisoner applied to the High Court to be admitted to bail pending the disposal of his appeal, and the petition contained defamatory allegations, consisting (*inter alia*) of irrelevant attacks on the trying Magistrate and other officers in the service of the Government of India, the Court refused to allow the petition to be filed, and ordered it to be returned. *In re DURANT* . **I. L. R. 15 Bom. 488**

**13. Record in Sessions cases—Proper contents of record.** There ought to be only one Sessions record, which should be continuous, and should contain accurately and consecutively the whole of the proceedings in the trial, including the examination of the accused. *QUEEN v. BILASH MOSULMANY* . . . . . **14 W. R. Cr. 46**

**14. Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, ss. 372-374.** A Sessions nuthee should contain the record of the defence set up by the prisoners in the Sessions Court. Points out how such record is to be made up with reference to ss. 372, 373, and 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *QUEEN v. GOPAL HAJJAM* **15 W. R. Cr. 16**

**15. Principal documents on record in Sessions cases.** The principal documents in a case should be put in a prominent place on the record, not buried among a mass of less important papers in the nuthee. *QUEEN v. BHEEKUN* . . . . . **8 W. R. Cr. 30**

*QUEEN v. RUTTON MEAH* . . . . . **8 W. R. Cr. 57**

*See QUEEN v. BROOND SHAHOO alias CHUNDRA CHATTERJEE* . . . . . **7 W. R. Cr. 112**

**16. Reference to High Court—District Magistrate, competency of, to refer—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 438.** When a case has been decided by the Sessions Judge on appeal from a Sub-divisional Magistrate, the District Magistrate should not refer the case to the High Court on the ground that the Sub-divisional Magistrate acted without jurisdiction. If he desires to move in the matter, he should proceed through the Legal Remembrancer. Observations of STRAIGHT, J., in *Queen-Empress v. Shere Singh*,

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*I. L. R. 9 All. 362*, referred to with approval. *HIRAMAN DE v. RAM KUMAR AIN* **I. L. R. 18 Calc. 186**

**17. Revision—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 439—Rule to show cause why conviction should not be quashed.** A rule to show cause why a conviction should not be quashed under the provisions of s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ought not to be granted unless, on the materials which are before the Court when the rule is granted, it would be prepared to make the rule absolute if no cause be shown against it. *BASIR-ADDI v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* . **I. L. R. 21 Calc. 827**

**18. Form of application for revision—Motion.** Application for revision by the High Court of an order passed in appeal by a Sessions Judge must be by motion. *HAZARI v. CHUNDI CHURN CHUCKERBUTTY* **16 W. R. Cr. 72**

**19. Criminal motion to High Court without previous application to lower Court with concurrent jurisdiction—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 435 to 439.** The High Court will not entertain an application for revision in cases where the Sessions Judge or Magistrate has concurrent jurisdiction, whether final or not, save on some special ground, unless a previous application has been made to the lower Courts: but where concurrent jurisdiction is not possessed by the lower Courts, no such general rule exists. *Queen-Empress v. Reolah*, **I. L. R. 14 Calc. 887**, followed. *EMPEROR v. ABDUS SOBHAN* (1909) **I. L. R. 36 Calc. 643**

**20. Rule to show cause—Mode in which Magistrate should appear to show cause—Appearance through Legal Remembrancer.** When a Magistrate wishes to show cause against a rule issued by the High Court, the proper course for him to adopt is to apply to the Legal Remembrancer to cause an appearance to be made for him in Court, and not to address the Registrar by letter. *In the matter of HURRO SOONDERY CHOWDHRAIN* **I. L. R. 4 Calc. 20 : 3 C. L. R. 93**

**21. Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 107-118—Rules issued upon the Magistrate—Right to appear of a party interested in the result.** When a rule is issued upon the Magistrate to show cause and the order sought to be set aside is one that is only intended to secure the peace of the district by binding down the petitioner, the Magistrate is the only party entitled to be heard. Any other party interested in the result of the order cannot appear. *DRIVER v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* . . . . . **I. L. R. 25 Calc. 798**

**22. Explanation of Magistrate to supplement judgment, if proper.** In the absence of any finding in the judgment of a Magistrate, a finding in the explanation submitted by the Magistrate in showing cause against a rule *nisi* should not be considered and given



PRACTICE—*cont'd.*2. CRIMINAL CASES—*cont'd.*

effect to at the hearing of the rule. *In the matter of NAZIR MALITA v. HARI CHARAN PARUI* (1901)

6 C. W. N. 118

23. ————— *Discharge of rule on the ground of error of parties—Liberty to apply for fresh rule upon the same facts.* Where a rule was discharged on the ground of some error as to the parties, and the petitioner, being allowed liberty to apply for another rule, obtained a fresh rule on similar terms, and it was objected that the same could not be heard: *Held*, that the rule could be heard, and the Court could not go behind the decision of the Bench which gave liberty to the petitioner for another rule. *RADHA GOBIND v. GOSSAIN MOHENDRA GIR* (1901) . . . 6 C. W. N. 340

24. ————— *Rules issued by the High Court—Right of Sessions Judge to show cause.* Rules issued by the High Court are addressed to District Magistrates as a matter of convenience and in accordance with the practice for appeals followed under s. 422, Code of Criminal Procedure, the Local Government having under that section appointed the District Magistrate as the officer to receive notices of appeals. If a rule is granted against the order of a Sessions Judge, he is the proper person to show cause. *BEPIN BEHARI DE v. NENDI HARIANI* (1902)

7 C. W. N. 80

25. ————— *Magistrate, if can add to or supplement his judgments in showing cause.* In showing cause, it is not open to the trying Magistrate to submit observations with a view to supplement or add to his judgment. *MADHU SUDAN DAS GUPTA v. SASTI PRASAD NANDY* (1903)

7 C. W. N. 859

26. ————— *Sentence—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 439—Reference to High Court—Enhancement of sentence—Practice of the High Court to accept the conviction as conclusive.* It has been the invariable practice of the Bombay High Court, in cases that come before it for enhancement of sentence, to accept the conviction as conclusive and to consider the question of enhancement of sentence on that basis. *EMPEROR v. CHINTO* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 162

27. ————— *Sessions Trials—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 269—Trial by Jury—Trial with the aid of assessors—Difference in the modes of trial—Accused if prejudiced can complain—Procedure.* The accused were tried with a jury on charges of murder (ss. 302, 109, Indian Penal Code), and with the aid of jurors as assessors on charges of rioting, grievous hurt and hurt (ss. 147, 148, 323 and 326 of the Code) respectively. The Judge charged the jury and asked for their verdict on both the charges in the manner prescribed for jury trials. He agreed with the verdict and sentenced the accused to various terms of imprisonment. The accused appealed on the grounds that the learned Judge erred in omitting to take the opinion of the jurors as assessors in the

PRACTICE—*cont'd.*2. CRIMINAL CASES—*cont'd.*

second charge and to write a judgment. *Held*, that the law makes no distinction as to the procedure at the trial between a trial by a jury and one with the aid of assessors except as to the summing up in the case of the former and the manner in which the verdict in the former and the opinions of the assessors in the latter are respectively taken. It is at this latter point that there is a departure of ways, and if the accused who is tried does not intervene at that crucial point, and get the procedure applicable to trials with the aid of assessors enforced, he cannot be heard to complain. *EMPEROR v. MAVSING* (1909) . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 423

28. ————— *Signature of Magistrate—Warrant of commitment—Summary trials.* The signature of a Magistrate to a warrant of commitment under s. 303 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872, should not be affixed by a stamp. In summary trials under the provisions of Ch. XVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872, the record in non-appealable cases and the judgment in appealable cases must be written by the Magistrate. A Magistrate in such cases is not authorized to depute that duty to a clerk, nor to affix his signature to the record or judgment by a stamp. *SUBRAMANYA v. QUEEN* . . . I. L. R. 6 Mad. 396

29. ————— *Stay of proceedings—Duty of Magistrate on obtaining reliable, though not official, information of stay of proceedings by High Court.* When a rule is issued by the High Court and proceedings stayed, Magistrates, on receiving reliable information thereof, should stay their hands then and there. So where it was brought to the notice of the Magistrate by the mooktear for the accused who had received telegrams from counsel and vakil, informing him of the issue of the rule directing stay of proceedings by the High Court, and the Magistrate refused to look at the telegrams and to stay proceedings, but, on the other hand, proceeded with the enquiry, it was held that the Magistrate had acted improperly, that he should not have proceeded with the enquiry, and in case he entertained any doubt as to authenticity of the telegrams, the proper course for him was to send a telegram to the Registrar of the High Court to ascertain the truth. *Semble*: A supplementary affidavit stating facts which have transpired subsequent to the issue of the rule may be filed. *RATNESSARI PERSHAD NARAYAN SINGH v. EMPRESS* . . . 2 C. W. N. 498

30. ————— *Procedure—Sanction to prosecute—Stay of criminal proceedings pending disposal of civil suit—High Court—Revision—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 195, 438, 476.* The High Court is competent, in the exercise of its revisional power under s. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), to interfere with an order made by a subordinate Court, under s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), directing the prosecution of any person for the offences referred to in that section. The High Court in this case refused to stay



**PRACTICE—concl'd.****2. CRIMINAL CASES—concl'd.**

criminal proceedings directed by a subordinate Court under s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), until an appeal in the civil suit in connection with which the criminal charges were made had been decided. *In re BAL GANGADHAR TILAK* (1902) . . . . . **I. L. R. 26 Bom. 785**

**31. ———— Transmission of record to High Court—***Record of proceedings prior to commitment.* The Magistrate's record of the proceedings prior to commitment should always be forwarded to the High Court. *QUEEN v. KASIM ALI* **15 W. R. Cr. 67**

**32. ———— Undefended accused—***Court to test statements of witnesses for prosecution.* Per PETHERAM, C.J.—Where an accused person is not defended, the Court should, in the interests of justice, test the statements of the witnesses for the prosecution, by questions in the nature of cross-examination. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KALLU* **I. L. R. 7 All. 160**

**PRECATORY TRUST.**

*See* DEBUTTER . **I. L. R. 33 Calc. 511**

**PRE-EMPTION.**

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*See* CUSTOM—PRE-EMPTION; WAJIB-UL-ARZ.

*See* DECREE—CONSTRUCTION OF DECREE—PRE-EMPTION.

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*See* GUARDIAN—DUTIES AND POWERS OF GUARDIANS . **I. L. R. 23 All. 129**

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*See* LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 10.

*See* LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ARTS. 10 AND 120. **I. L. R. 28 All. 424**

*See* MAHOMEDAN LAW—PRE-EMPTION.

*See* MAHOMEDAN LAW. **I. L. R. 32 Calc. 982 ; 988.**  
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*See* MORTGAGE—REDEMPTION—RIGHT TO REDEEM . **I. L. R. 24 Mad. 449**  
**I. L. R. 29 All. 163**

*See* ONUS OF PROOF—PRE-EMPTION. **9 C. W. N. 129**

*See* OUDH LAWS ACT, s. 9, CL. (2). **I. L. R. 26 All. 574**

*See* PRE-EMPTION—CUSTOM.

*See* PUNJAB LAWS ACT. **I. L. R. 30 Calc. 635**

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*See* VALUATION OF SUIT—SUITS. **3 B. L. R. Ap. 143.**  
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**I. L. R. 16 All. 493**  
**I. L. R. 24 All. 218**

*See* WAJIB-UL-ARZ.

**execution of decree for—**

*See* LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ARTS. 178 AND 179 . **I. L. R. 24 All. 300**

**right of—**

*See* MALABAR LAW. **I. L. R. 30 Mad. 388**

**1. SUBJECTS OF, AND TRANSFERS GIVING RISE TO, PRE-EMPTION.**

1. ———— Permanently-settled estates in Sylhet—*Act XXIII of 1861, s. 14—Extension of Act.* S. 14 of Act XXIII of 1861 was not applicable to permanently-settled estates in Sylhet, nor to estates in any district of Bengal, unless extended thereto. *ABDUL JABEL v. KHELAT CHUNDER GHOSE* . **1 B. L. R. A. C. 105 ; 10 W. R. 165**

2. ———— Right and interest of co-sharer in estate in Sylhet—*Substitution of claimant for actual purchaser—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 14.* The right and interest of a co-sharer



**PRE-EMPTION—contd.****1. SUBJECTS OF, AND TRANSFERS GIVING RISE TO, PRE-EMPTION—contd.**

in an estate in Sylhet being put up for sale in execution of a decree, the petitioner claimed the right of pre-emption under s. 14, Act XXIII of 1861, and he was thereupon substituted for the actual purchaser. *Held*, that in such circumstances the Court executing a decree had no authority to substitute the claimant for the actual purchaser without the consent of the latter, and that a party claiming a share under the section cited was simply in the position of a party who, having a right of pre-emption, has observed the requisite formalities to enable him to assert the right, and must resort to a civil suit to obtain the benefit thereof. The orders of the lower Courts were set aside accordingly. *ABDOOL JALEEL v. KALEE COOMAR DUTT* 6 W. R. Mis. 3

**3. ——— Puttadari estate—Act I of 1841, s. 2.** A claim for pre-emption under s. 2 of Act I of 1841 was sustainable in respect of an imperfect puttadari tenure. *KADIR BUX v. RAM TAHUL BHAGUT* . . . 3 N. W. 125

**4. ——— Confiscated property—Confiscation of property in suit for pre-emption.** A pre-emption suit is not barred by the fact that the property in suit had been the subject of confiscation. *SHEODUT RAM TEWARY v. RAMADHREE* 1 N. W. Pt. II, p. 35 : Ed. 1873, 93

**5. ——— Purchaser of confiscated property.** *Held*, that a claim for pre-emption would not lie against the purchaser of a confiscated property sold by the revenue authorities. *MOHAMED VILLAYET-OLL-LAH KHAN v. AHMED HUSSUN KHAN* . . . 3 Agra 70

**6. ——— Confiscation and sale of rebel's property—Right of co-sharers.** Where Government confiscates the share of a convict, and sells it for valuable consideration, the co-sharers have a right to claim such share by right of pre-emption on such sale, and the condition in the *wajib-ul-urz* is binding on Government as much as it was on the original owner, Government acquiring the share subject to the same condition as the former held it. *COLLECTOR OF FUTTEHPORE v. YAD ALI* 1 Agra 88

**7. ——— Buildings—Custom—Exercise of pre-emption in kotee and golah.** Exercise of right of pre-emption allowed in respect of a kotee and golah, as it was proved that, according to local usage and custom, such properties were subject to pre-emption. *KESHO RAI v. BINAYAK RAI. BINAYAK RAI v. LUCHMEE BAI* . . . 3 Agra 179

**8. ——— Separate estates—Co-parcenary, pre-emption on ground of.** Properties bearing separate numbers in the Collector's rent-roll are separate estates in the legal sense of the word "estate," implying such a separation as bars a claim to pre-emption on the ground of co-parcenary. *SOOBRAJ SINGH v. TOOKUN SINGH* . 14 W. R. 476

**PRE-EMPTION—contd.****1. SUBJECTS OF, AND TRANSFERS GIVING RISE TO, PRE-EMPTION—contd.**

**9. ——— Claim to mesne profits.** A claim to mesne profits due before the date on which a right to pre-emption arose cannot form the subject of pre-emption. *EMAMOODDEEN SOWDAGUR v. ABDOOL SOOBHAN* . . . 7 W. R. 117

**10. ——— Lease in perpetuity—Transfer other than sale.** *Pre-emption applies only to sales.* A lease in perpetuity, with a rent (however small) reserved, is not a sale, and cannot therefore be the subject of pre-emption. *MOOROOLY RAM v. HUREE RAM* . . . 8 W. R. 106

**11. ——— Transfer by lease—Alienation of transfer of proprietary right.** *Held*, that a provision in the *wajib-ul-urz* securing a right of pre-emption to the sharers in cases of sale or mortgage was not applicable to transfer by lease, which was not such an alienation as was contemplated by the terms of the *wajib-ul-urz*, *viz.*, alienation or transfer of proprietary rights. *MANICK CHAND v. BISHAI-SHUR BUKHSH SINGH* . . . 2 Agra 99

**12. ——— Transfer to manager on trust—Alienation giving right to pre-emption.** Where shares in a mouzah were by arrangement between the parties made over to a manager upon trust to pay part of the profits to the debtors of the transferors, and the residue of the profits to the transferors, who bound themselves not to alienate until the debts were paid :—*Held*, that it was not such alienation as would confer on the plaintiff a right of pre-emption under the *wajib-ul-urz*. *OUTAR SINGH v. ABLAKHEE KOONWER* 2 Agra 328

**13. ——— Alienation of "chuck" tenure—Right of sharer in zamindari.** Where a resumed *maafee* "chuck" was alienated by the holder thereof, and a preferential right to take it was claimed by a sharer in the zamindari under the terms of the *wajib-ul-urz* agreed to by the co-sharers at the time of settlement, and to which the holder of the "chuck" was no party :—*Held*, that such alienation was not an alienation of a share within the meaning of the *wajib-ul-urz*; that the holder of the "chuck" could neither confer on its possessor a right of pre-emption, nor subject his estate to such right in the event of alienation. *SHEO LALL SAHOO v. RUMZANEE* . . . 2 Agra 35

**14. ——— Exchange of property—Transfer giving right of pre-emption—Consideration.** A share in a mouzah, together with the dwelling-house of the proprietor, was exchanged for a share and dwelling-house in another mouzah. *Held*, that the transaction, being an exchange of property, was a sale, and that the right to purchase the land, but not the house, was claimable by a co-sharer by right of pre-emption. The consideration payable by the pre-emptor is the estimated value of the property given in exchange, and not that of the property claimed. *SEWA RAM v. RISAL CHOWDHRY* . . . 1 Agra 144



PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF, AND TRANSFERS GIVING RISE TO, PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*

15. ———— **Sale and re-sale before confirmation—Transfer raising right of pre-emption.** Where the decree-holder purchased the rights of his judgment-debtors sold at auction in satisfaction of his own decree, but having received the amount of the decree re-sold the property to the judgment-debtors before the confirmation of the sale:—*Held*, that the transaction did not amount to an alienation such as would give a right to the co-sharers of the debtors to exercise the right of pre-emption under the terms of the *wajib-ul-rz.* **MAHOMED RAZA KHAN v. JAWAHIR SINGH . 2 Agra 1**

16. ———— **Transfer under compromise and decree thereon to person claiming pre-emption—Wajib-ul-urz.** An appeal having been preferred from a decree in a suit for pre-emption based on the *wajib-ul-urz* of a village, the parties to the suit entered into a compromise whereby the plaintiff-pre-emptor relinquished his claim to a part of the property in dispute in favour of the defendants-vendees, and the latter admitted his claim with respect of the remainder of the property. Upon this compromise a decree was passed. Subsequently a co-sharer in the village where the property was situate brought a suit for pre-emption upon the contention that the compromise and the decree passed thereon amounted to a transfer to the plaintiff in the former suit within the meaning of the *wajib-ul-urz.* *Held*, that the suit was not maintainable. **HANUMAN RAI v. UDAY NARAIN RAI I. L. R. 7 All. 917**

17. ———— **Transfer by compromise—Wajib-ul-urz—"Transfer"—"Sale."** On the 1st September 1881 *L* and *R* entered into an agreement (which was duly registered) with *B* that in consideration of their bringing a suit for recovery of a 12-anna share in a village which *B* claimed by right of inheritance against *G*, they should receive a moiety of the share. *L* and *R* found funds for the prosecution of two suits in respect of the share, which on the 5th April 1882 were compromised, *B* getting 1 anna and 3 pies out of the 12 annas originally claimed by her. In that compromise *B* stated as follows: "I make over 1 anna to *L* and *R*, my partners, in lieu of the prosecution of the two cases. I, the plaintiff, shall remain in possession of the remaining 3 pies." Meanwhile, on the 3rd September 1881, *G* had sold 3 annas out of the 12 annas share to *M*. On the 3rd April 1883 *M* brought a suit against *L* and *R*, claiming the right of pre-emption in respect of the 1 anna which they had acquired from *B* on the allegation that the transfer of the share had taken place on the 5th April 1882. This claim was based on the *wajib-ul-urz* of the village which gave a right of pre-emption to the co-sharers of any sharer wishing to "transfer" his share. *Held*, that the compromise of the 5th April 1882 was only a re-adjustment of the amount of the interest in the share between *B* and *L* and *R*; that the real transfer to *L* and *R* was given effect to on the 1st September 1881, and that, this having

PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*1. SUBJECTS OF, AND TRANSFERS GIVING RISE TO, PRE-EMPTION—*concl'd.*

been prior to the acquisition by *M* of any right in the village, he was not a co-sharer at the time of the transfer; and that he had consequently no right as against *L* and *R* by way of claim for pre-emption. **LACHMI NARAIN v. MANOG DAT I. L. R. 7 All. 291**

18. ———— **Sale of property to a stranger—Re-sale to a co-sharer before a suit for pre-emption is brought.** Where property in respect of which a right of pre-emption exists in favour of a co-sharer is sold to a stranger, but before a suit for pre-emption is brought passes back into the hands of co-sharer, a suit for pre-emption cannot be maintained, and this rule is not affected by the fact that the co-sharer in whom the property sold to a stranger reverts was a party to its sale to a stranger. **Bhagwan Das v. Mahan Lal, I. L. R. 25 All. 421, referred to. LIAKAT HUSAIN v. RASHID-UD-DIN (1906) . I. L. R. 29 All. 125**

## 2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION.

1. ———— **Sale in execution of decree—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 14—Share sold in execution of decree.** A suit by a person claiming possession by right of pre-emption, under the provisions of s. 14 of Act XXIII of 1861, of a share sold in the execution of a decree was held to be premature and unmaintainable. The claimant should have sued to set aside the order of the Court confirming the sale in favour of the auction-purchaser and to have himself declared entitled to the pre-emption of the property and to be substituted for the auction-purchaser as its purchaser. **SHIB SAHAI v. THIKARAM 7 N. W. 97**

2. ———— **Property subject to conditional sale—Time for making claim.** A party alleging a right of pre-emption in respect of property which is the subject of a conditional sale is bound to make his claim immediately on the expiry of the year of grace mentioned in the notice of foreclosure. **AMEER ALI v. BHABO SOONDUREE DEBIA 6 W. R. 116**

3. ———— **Rights and interests of mortgagee—Share of undivided immoveable property—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 310.** The provisions of s. 310 of Act X of 1877 are not applicable in a case where the property sold is not a share of undivided immoveable property, but the rights and interests of a mortgagee in such a share. **JAIRAM DAS v. BENI PRASAD . I. L. R. 3 All. 15**

4. ———— **Co-sharer—Sale in execution of share in immoveable property—Stranger—Highest bidder—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 310.** A co-sharer in undivided immoveable property of which a share is sold in the execution of a decree does not, under s. 310 of Act X of 1877, acquire the right of pre-emption as against a stranger to whom such share has been knocked down by merely asserting such right at the time of sale and fulfilling the conditions of sale required by ss. 306 and 307 of that



PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*

Act. He must bid at the sale and as high as the stranger before he can acquire a right of pre-emption under that section. *TEJ SINGH v. GOBIND SINGH* . . . . . I. L. R. 2 All. 850

5. ————— *Sale in execution of share in immoveable property—Manner of claiming pre-emption—Highest bidder—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 310.* The requirements of s. 310 of Act X of 1877 are not satisfied by the co-sharer preferring his claim to the right of pre-emption before the property is knocked down, and offering to pay a sum equal to that bid by the highest bidder. That section contemplates a distinct bid by the co-sharer in the ordinary manner of offering bids. *Tej Singh v. Gobind Singh*, I. L. R. 2 All. 850, followed. *HIRA v. UNAS ALI KHAN* . . . . . I. L. R. 3 All. 827

6. ————— *Holder of pattidari estate—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 14.* A person holding a share in a pattidari estate as mortgagee was not in a position which gave him a right of pre-emption, under the provisions of s. 14 of Act XXIII of 1861, in respect of a share in the estate sold in execution of a decree; nor does he obtain such a position because a share in the estate has been put up for sale and knocked down to him. *DWAPKA PERSHAD SIKUL v. RAM AUTAR SIKUL* . . . . . 7 N. W. 281

7. ————— *Right against stranger—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 14.* A share in the mouzah having been put up for sale in the execution of a decree and knocked down to the defendant, a stranger, the plaintiff, a co-sharer of the share, was held to be entitled under the provisions of s. 14 of Act XXIII of 1861, to take the share. *RAM AUTAR v. SHEO DUTT* . . . . . 6 N. W. 243

8. ————— *Pattidari estate—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 14—Sale of land for arrears of revenue—Act XVIII of 1873, s. 177—Act XIX of 1873, s. 188.* The provisions of s. 14 of Act XXIII of 1861 were not applicable, where the land was sold in execution of a decree of a Revenue Court. Held, on the assumption that, where land is sold in execution of such a decree, a claim to the right of pre-emption can be preferred under the provisions of s. 177 of Act XVIII of 1873 and s. 188 of Act XIX of 1873, that such claim can only be preferred where the land is a patti of a mehal. *Semle*: That, where land which is a patti of mehal is sold in execution of such a decree, a claim to the right of pre-emption can be preferred under the provisions of s. 177 of Act XVIII of 1873 and s. 188 of Act XIX of 1873. *NARAIN SINGH v. MUHAMMAD FARUK* . . . . . I. L. R. 1 All. 277

9. ————— *Requisites of valid claim—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 14—Conditions required by Mahomedan law.* If a person claiming pre-emption under the provisions of s. 14 of Act XXIII of 1861 fulfilled the conditions of sale respecting the deposit of the purchase-money, the sale could not be held void merely by the failure of the person to

PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*

whose bid the property was knocked down also to complete the deposit. All that the claimant was bound to do was to establish that he was a pattidar within the meaning of the section in the estate of which the property sold formed part, and that he had fulfilled the conditions of sale. If he established this, the sale should be confirmed in his favour, unless some irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale was shown which would justify the setting aside of the sale. The conditions of pre-emption under the Mahomedan Law did not apply to a claim brought under the section. *DABEE PERSHAD v. BISHESHUR PERSHAD SINGH* . . . . . 6 N. W. 289

10. ————— *Wajib-ul-urz, claim under—Conditions required by Mahomedan law.* Held, that the person in whose favour a preferential right of purchase is stipulated for, by the terms of the wajib-ul-urz, is entitled to a decree if he comes forward and claims his right, without unreasonable delay, after he hears that a sale has been made without any tender to him, although he may not have proved specially that he has fulfilled all the conditions required in the case of a claim of pre-emption under the Mahomedan law of Shuffa. *KOULA PUT v. MAHARAJ DOOBEY* . . . . . 1 Agra 278

11. ————— *Act XXIII of 1861, s. 14—Sale of pattidari estate in execution of decree—Act I of 1841, s. 2—Right of co-sharer.* It was incumbent on an officer conducting a sale in execution of decree of land which was a share of a pattidari estate paying revenue to Government, as defined in s. 2 of Act I of 1841, to take notice of a claim made by a person under the provisions of s. 14 of Act XXIII of 1861, and to receive the purchase-money as a fulfilment of the conditions of the sale, subject to any question which might be raised by any party interested in the sale as to the claimant's title to advance the claim. When the whole of the purchase-money has been paid by the claimant within due time, the Court executing the decree, unless it is satisfied that he has no right to advance the claim, cannot treat the payment by him as a nullity, but must accept it as a fulfilment of the conditions of the sale respecting the purchase-money, and the sale is not defeasible by the failure of the bidder to complete the deposit of the purchase-money. The sale to the claimant cannot become absolute until it has been confirmed, and until it has become absolute, he cannot maintain a suit for possession. If the claimant has fulfilled the conditions of sale, and his right is clear, the Court executing the decree is bound to give effect to the right. *TASUDUK ALI v. MUKSUD ALI* 6 N. W. 272

12. ————— *Sale in execution of decree.* During the minority of two out of four brothers an ikrarnama was entered into between them to the effect that no separation was to take place without the consent of all, and that, if one of them separated without such consent, he was to forfeit his share of the family property, and that, if any one wished to dispose of his share, he was to give his brothers the



**PRE-EMPTION—contd.****2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—contd.**

preference. One *F* purchased at a private sale the share of *M*, one of the brothers. On this two of the brothers, *A* and *I*, brought a suit against *F* to set aside the sale as contrary to the terms of the *ikrar-nama*, and urged their claim to pre-emption. The suit was decreed with a stipulation that the purchase-money should be paid back. This not having been done, *F* sued *M*, got a decree, and in execution put up for sale *M*'s rights and interests in the family estate, bought them himself, and took possession. The present suit is by *A* and *I* to recover possession on the ground that *M* had no rights and interests left which could be sold in execution. *Held*, that, as *M* had never separated, his share had not been forfeited, and that the only other privilege left to the plaintiffs under the *ikrar-nama*, viz., pre-emption, could not be exercised, inasmuch as *M* had not sold his share, the sale having been the act of the Court. *FERASUT ALI v. ASHOOTOSH ROY SINGH* . . . **15 W. R. 455**

**13.** ——— *Right of auction-purchaser as against party whose claim to pre-emption is allowed.* The auction-purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree of a share in a pattidari estate seeking to establish his right as against a person whose claim to the right of pre-emption under the provisions of s. 14, Act XXIII of 1861, has been allowed, and in whose favour the sale has been confirmed, cannot maintain a suit for possession of the share, but should sue for a declaration that the person claiming the right of pre-emption has no such right and to set aside the sale. *FARZAND ALI v. ALIMULLAH*

**I. L. R. 1 All. 272**

*SANGAM RAM v. SHEOBART BHAGAT*

**I. L. R. 3 All. 112**

**14.** ——— *Condition for assertion of right—Wajib-ul-urz—Offer of property—Notification that property is for sale and offers will be received—Acquiescence.* In order to entitle a co-sharer to assert a right of pre-emption based on the *wajib-ul-urz*, there must, as a condition precedent to such assertion, be a sale of a share already negotiated with a stranger, and a price fixed with the stranger by the co-sharer desiring to sell. The only mode in which a pre-emptive claim can then be defeated is by proof of a distinct intimation to the co-sharer seeking to maintain such claim, of the contemplated sale, and of the price agreed to be paid by the stranger, of an offer to him (the co-sharer) at such price, and of his refusal to purchase. Where the sale in respect of which the pre-emptive claim was raised was one made by the Collector as Manager of the Court of Wards, and the Collector, before selling the property, issued a proclamation through the *tehsildar* notifying to all the shareholders that the property was for sale, and that sharers intending to purchase should make offers:—*Held*, that such a notification was not a sufficiently distinct and definite notice of a negotiated and intended sale to a stranger, so as to estop co-sharers failing to make

**PRE-EMPTION—contd.****2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—contd.**

an offer to purchase from subsequently asserting their pre-emptive rights. *SUBHAGI v. MUHAMMAD ISHAK* . . . **I. L. R. 6 All. 463**

**15.** ——— *Association of strangers in purchase—Specification of interest purchased by each person.* Where two co-sharers entitled to pre-emption in certain villages associated strangers with them in the purchase of such villages and other landed property:—*Held*, that they must be regarded in the light of total strangers in respect of the whole of the property included in the sale-deed, and that a note at the foot of the sale-deed mentioning the interest severally purchased by each of the vendees would not entitle them to retain the shares respectively purchased by them. *GUNESHEE LAL v. ZARAUT ALI* . . . **2 N. W. 343**

**16.** ——— *Joint purchase by co-sharer and strangers—Specification of interests taken by purchasers.* A co-sharer of an estate sold his share to *R*, who was also a co-sharer in such estate, and to two other persons, who were not co-sharers, but "strangers," selling it to all of them jointly and collectively for one integral sum as the consideration for the whole. The deed of sale specified that each of the purchasers took a one-third share of the property sold. The co-sharers of the estate were entitled, on the sale by a co-sharer of his share, to the right of pre-emption. *Held*, that such specification could not alter the joint nature of the sale transaction or permit of its being broken up and treated as involving three separate contracts, so as to entitle *R*, as a co-sharer having an equal right of pre-emption, to resist, so far as one-third of the property was concerned, a claim by another co-sharer to enforce a right of pre-emption in respect of such sale, but *R* must be regarded as a "stranger" in respect of the whole of the property sold by reason of having associated himself with "strangers." *Guneshee Lal v. Zaraut Ali*, 2 N. W. 343, observed on. *MANNA SINGH v. RAMADHIN SINGH* **I. L. R. 4 All. 252**

**17.** ——— *Wajib-ul-urz—Co-sharers—"Ekjaddi."* The *wajib-ul-urz* of a village gave a right of pre-emption, in cases of sale, to "brothers," and provided that, on refusal by a "brother," there should be a right of pre-emption in favour of co-sharers in the *thoke* who were related to the vendor by descent from a common ancestor ("hissadaran *ekjaddi thoke*"). It was also provided that, in the event of any dispute arising as to price, it should be settled by arbitration, and that, "if the co-sharers do not take at the amount fixed by the arbitrators," the co-sharer desiring to sell might make the transfer to a stranger. *Held*, that co-sharers who were not of common descent from the vendor were entitled to pre-emption after own brothers and co-sharers *ekjaddi* and to have preference over strangers. *Guneshee Lal v. Zaraut Ali*, 2 N. W. 343, followed. *SABIR ALI v. YAD RAM* . . . **I. L. R. 9 All. 660**

**18.** ——— *Benami purchaser—Purchaser not a co-parcener—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 14,*



**PRE-EMPTION—contd.****2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—contd.**

Where the rights of a judgment-debtor in a pattidari estate were sold at auction in execution of decree, and bid for by the son of the judgment-debtor who gave the name of his father-in-law to whom the property was knocked down (and who was not a co-parcener in the estate) as the actual purchaser, such father-in-law subsequently waiving his claim as auction-purchaser in favour of the judgment-debtor. *Held*, under s. 14 of Act XXIII of 1861, that the property had been knocked down to a stranger, and that the right of pre-emption attached in favour of the person entitled thereto on such sale, he having done all that was necessary to assert his claim. *GUNGA RAM v. MOOLA*

2 N. W. 200

19. *Co-sharers—Recorded co-sharers—Benami purchase of shares—Sale by co-sharer—Claim for pre-emption resisted by person claiming to be co-sharer by virtue of benami transaction—Equitable estoppel.* A secret purchase of benami shares in a village does not constitute the purchaser a co-sharer for the purposes of pre-emption either under the Mahomedan law or under the provisions of a wajib-ul-urz, so as to enable him upon the strength of the interest so acquired to defeat an otherwise unquestionable pre-emptive right preferred by a duly recorded shareholder who had no notice direct or constructive of his title, and asserted immediately upon his purchase of a share, for the first time, in his true character. *Ramcoomar Koondoo v. Macqueen, L. R. I. A. Sup. Vol. 49, referred to. BENI SHANKAR SHELHAT v. MAHPAL BAHADUR SINGH. I. L. R. 9 All. 480*

20. *Co-sharer—"Proprietor"—Transferee of lands in a village who has not obtained mutation of names in his favour—Wajib-ul-urz.* In a suit for pre-emption under a wajib-ul-urz which gave a right of pre-emption to "co-sharers" in a village:—*Held*, that the word "co-sharer" included a person who had acquired lands in the village, which were not merely sir of a co-sharer, and were not grove-lands held by a licensee from a zamindar, but lands belonging to a zamindar and in his occupation, notwithstanding the fact that he had not yet obtained mutation of names in respect thereof. *DAKHNI DIN v. RAHMUNNISA*

I. L. R. 16 All. 412

21. *Mortgagee of co-sharer.* A mortgagee of a co-sharer is not a "co-sharer." *NAND LAL v. BANSI*

I. L. R. 20 All. 19

22. *Wajib-ul-urz, construction of—Purchaser of isolated plot of land in mehal—Purchaser of sir land.* The wajib-ul-urz of a village gave a right of pre-emption to "co-sharers in the mehal." One of the co-sharers brought a suit for pre-emption which the vendee defendant resisted on ground that he also was a co-sharer in the mehal, and the plaintiff had therefore no preferential right. This contention was based on a former purchase by the defendant under a deed

**PRE-EMPTION—contd.****2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—contd.**

of sale executed by a co-sharer: and comprising (i) an isolated plot of land in the mehal; (ii) sir lands in the mehal. *Held* by the Full Bench, that, it being found that the vendee-defendant had already become a co-sharer in the mehal prior to the date of the purchase which was in question in the suit, the plaintiff had no preferential right of pre-emption. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*—The decisions of the Full Bench in *Naimat Ali v. Asmat Bibi, I. L. R. 7 All. 626*, have overruled *Hazari Lal v. Ugrah Rai, All. Weekly Notes (1884) 103*, and *Rup Ram v. Mungni, All. Weekly Notes (1886) 136*. *SAFDAL ALI v. DOST MUHAMMAD. I. L. R. 12 All. 426*

23. *Pre-emption among co-sharers under the Oudh Laws Act (XVIII of 1876), ss. 9 to 13—Pre-emptor's right, as such, dependent on the intending vendor's right to sell—Accounts between co-sharers—Contribution, right to, for expenses of suit.* Pre-emption, as declared in the Oudh Laws Act, 1876, is not applicable where the co-sharer claiming it denies the title of the co-sharer proposing to sell, alleges that the latter is not a sharer, and says that he himself is entitled to the property. One of two co-sharers, entitled to equal shares in an inheritance, having taken possession of the whole, was used by the other for her share, with mesne profits from the date of the suit. To provide costs, the latter had sold to her co-plaintiffs the right to claim half of her share. The defences were—(i) relinquishment of her claim in favour of the defendant; (ii) that the defendant had a right of pre-emption as to part, in consequence of the above transaction; (iii) that the share in dispute was subject to a proportion of the debts due from the estate of the deceased, chargeable on the whole inheritance; and that, if the plaintiffs should be held to be entitled to a decree, they should also be declared liable to pay, according to shares, their part of all the debts of the deceased liquidated by the defendant, as well as a proportion of money which he had expended, in good faith, in litigation for the protection of the inheritance. As to (i), the two Courts below concurred in the finding that no relinquishment had taken place. As to (ii), it was pointed out that there had been no attempt to sell a share of the inheritance, but only to sell a share in a suit; and it was held that the position taken up by the defendant was inconsistent with his claiming to pre-empt, so that pre-emption was inapplicable. As to (iii), it was held that, although the plaintiffs could not have a decree for mesne profits during the whole period of the defendant's possession, yet, if any account was to be taken of the defendant's payments, it must also be taken of his receipts; and it was held that the incidental benefit to the plaintiffs, who had not authorized the litigation, in which expense had been incurred, did not give rise to any implied contract on their part, or render them liable in equity for any portion of that expense. *ABDUL WAHID KHAN v. SHALUKA BIBI. I. L. R. 21 Calc. 496*

L. R. 21 I. A. 26



PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*

24. ——— Co-sharers in pattidari village—*Preferential claim.* In a pattidari village the sharers in each patti have a preferential claim to the right of pre-emption in that patti. *MAHARAJ SINGH v. BEECHOOK LALL*. 1 W. R. 233

25. ——— Co-sharers in pattidari estate—*Act XXIII of 1861, s. 1.—Stranger—Purchaser at sale in execution of decree.* A shareholder in one patti of a pattidari estate was not a "stranger" with reference to a shareholder in another patti of the estate within the meaning of that term in s. 14, Act XXIII of 1861. *FARZAND ALI v. ALIMULLAH*. I. L. R. 1 All. 272

*SANGAM RAM v. SHEOBART BHAGAT*  
I. L. R. 3 All. 112

26. ——— *Strangers.* Where a share in a certain patti was sold by the holder of the share to a stranger, and three persons, holding equal shares in the patti, were equally entitled under the village administration paper to the right of pre-emption of the share:—*Held*, that such persons were each entitled to have the sale made to him to the extent of one-third of the share. *MAHABIR PARSHAD v. DEBI DIAL*. I. L. R. 1 All. 291

27. ——— *Act XXIII of 1861, s. 14—Land held rent-free in zamindari.* Where a plot of land formerly held rent-free situate in a pure zamindari estate is sold at auction—*Held*, that the claim of preferential purchase under s. 14, Act XXIII of 1861, would not lie, as the estate was not a pattidari estate within the meaning of s. 2, Act I of 1841. *GHOOROO SINGH v. DABEE DYAL*

2 Agra 280

28. ——— *Act I of 1841, s. 2—Preferential right.* Where a resumed maafee estate comprising three pattis in an adaec-mahal was assessed with a lump sum of Government revenue payable through the lambardars of the adaec-mahal, who were empowered to proceed summarily against the sharers of the pattis in case of default, and to bring the share of the defaulter to public sale, and were held liable to Government for payment of the revenue assessed on the three pattis, and in case of default their rights in the mahal, not of the sharers of the defaulting patties, were liable to sale for satisfaction of Government demand on those pattis.—*Held*, that the estate was not a pattidari estate as contemplated by s. 2, Act I of 1841, and the right of pre-emption given to co-sharers of the patti by that enactment could not attach to it. To constitute a pattidari estate as contemplated by the 2nd section of the Act, it was necessary not only that it should come within the express terms of that section, but also that it should be liable to the same incidents which attached to the estates described in the section by the other provisions of the same Act. *SALIG RAM v. PURSIDH RAM*. 1 Agra 186

29. ——— *Act I of 1841, ss. 2 and 4—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 14—Imperfect pattidari estate—Right of co-sharer to pre-emption*

PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*

*against stranger.* It appeared from the settlement wajib-ul-urz that the lands in a certain mouzah were held in the following manner,—that is to say, the co-sharers had divided them into pattis, and each pattidar realized the rents or proceeds of his own separate holding and his share of the rent of the common lands, and paid his own quota of revenue separately. *Held*, that the tenure came within the definition of a pattidari estate contained in s. 2 of Act I of 1841. *RAM AUTAR v. SHEO DUTT*

6 N. W. 24

30. ——— *Wajib-ul-urz—Partition of mehal—Mode of division of property where there are several pre-emptors equally entitled.* The wajib-ul-urz, framed in 1856, of a village consisting of several pattis or thokes, gave a right of pre-emption to the owners of each thoke in respect of property situate in every other thoke, when such property was sold to anyone having no share in the village co-parcenary. The mehal subsequently became the subject of perfect partition under the N. W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), and one of the pattis was constituted a separate mehal and a new wajib-ul-urz was framed for it. Prior to the partition, a proprietor of land both in the pattis which remained in the original mehal and in the patti which formed the new mehal sold property in both to a stranger. Thereupon a co-sharer in the original mehal brought a suit for pre-emption in respect of the property situate therein which had been sold, excluding the property situate in the new mehal. *Held*, that the effect of the partition was to exclude property situate in the new mehal from the operation of the wajib-ul-urz framed in 1856, and to place it under new conditions as to the right of pre-emption; that the plaintiff could, after the separation, exercise no such right against and in respect of shareholders and property so separated, nor could the separate share-holders exercise any right of pre-emption against the plaintiff and his property remaining in the mehal from which they had separated; and that the suit to pre-empt that portion only of the property sold which was situate in the original mehal was maintainable. *Durgha Prasad v. Munsi*, I. L. R. 6 All. 423; *Hulasi v. Sheo Prasad*, I. L. R. 6 All. 455; *Kashi Nath v. Mukhta Prasad*, I. L. R. 6 All. 370; *Motee Shah v. Gokli*, N. W. P. S. D. A. (1861) p. 506; *Ram Prasad v. Buljeet Singh*, 2 Agra 252; *Oomar Khan v. Murad Khan*, N. W. P. S. D. A. (1865), p. 173; and *Salig Ram v. Dabi Prasad*, 7 N. W. 38, referred to. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*—The rule of the Mahomedan law that where more persons than one owning the property in virtue of which the pre-emptive right exists appear for the purpose of suing, their rights are to be taken as equal *per capita*, with reference to the number of pre-emptors and not with reference to the number of the shares of each pre-emptor in such property, is so consistent with justice, equity, and good conscience, that it must be followed in cases of rival suits for pre-emption under the wajib-ul-urz where there is nothing to show that the rival pre-emptors are



**PRE-EMPTION—contd.****2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—contd.**

not equally entitled. *JAI RAM v. MAHABIR RAI*.  
*MAHABIR RAI v. RAGHUNANDAN RAI*. *RAGHUNANDAN RAI v. MAHABIR RAI*

**I. L. R. 7 All. 720**

**31. ——— Partition of village, originally one, into three separate mehals—New record of village customs framed on partition—Wajib-ul-urz—Co-sharers—Rules of the Board of Revenue of the 13th November 1875—N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), s. 257.** Where at the settlement of a village constituting a single mehal a record-of-rights was framed giving certain pre-emptive rights to the co-sharers in the village, but subsequently the village was divided by perfect partition into three separate mehals and in accordance with the rules of the Board of Revenue of the 13th November 1875, issued under s. 257 of Act XIX of 1873, a new record of village customs was framed which did not give to the sharers in any one of the new mehals any right of pre-emption in respect of land situated in another mehal, it was held that the latter record of village customs was a valid and binding document, and no right of pre-emption existed in favour of the co-sharers in any one mehal in respect of land situated in another mehal. *Per ARMAN, J.*—Where a village, originally one, is divided by perfect partition into two or more mehals unless at the time of partition a right of pre-emption is specifically reserved by the co-sharers in respect of lands lying outside any given mehal, such right of pre-emption is not to be presumed from the mere fact that when the village formed but one mehal, the co-sharers had pre-emptive rights against such other. *Mote Sah v. Guklee, S. D. A. N.-W. P. (1861), Vol. 2, p. 506, and Jai Ram v. Mahabir Rai, I. L. R. 7 All. 720, referred to.* Under the above circumstances, the mere retention of a community of interest in certain property, such, e.g., as roads, etc., will not give the sharers in one mehal any right of pre-emption over land situated in another. *Nazir-ud-din v. Kadir Baksh. All. Weekly Notes (1894) 193, referred to. Gokal Singh v. Manu Lal, I. L. R. 7 All. 772, dissented from. GHUREE v. MAN SINGH . . . . . I. L. R. 17 All. 226*

**32. ——— Effect on pre-emptive rights of partition without new wajib-ul-urzes being framed—N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), s. 107.** When a mehal is divided by perfect partition into two or more separate mehals, a separate record-of-rights should be framed for each of the new mehals. Where under such circumstances no fresh records-of-rights are framed for the new mehals, the co-sharers in any one of the new mehals cannot, unless under very exceptional circumstances, claim, under the terms of the old records-of-rights applicable to the original undivided mehal, pre-emption in respect of land situated in any of the other new mehals. *Ghuree v. Man Singh, I. L. R. 17 All. 422, referred to. ABDUL HAI v. NAIN SINGH . . . . . I. L. R. 20 All. 92*

**33. ——— Effect of partition on pre-emptive rights, no new wajib-ul-urz being**

**PRE-EMPTION—contd.****2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—contd.**

**framed—Wajib-ul-urz—Partition—Cause of action—Extinction of cause of action before suit brought.** In order that a suit for pre-emption may be successfully maintained, it is necessary not only that a cause of action should arise in favour of the pre-emptor at the time of the sale on which the suit is based, but that such cause of action should subsist at the time when the suit is brought. *Dalgajam Singh v. Kalka Singh, All. Weekly Notes (1899) 111. JANKI PRASAD v. ISHAR DAS*

**I. L. R. 21 All. 374**

**34. ——— Meaning of the terms “patti” and “patti of mehal”—Co-sharers—N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), ss. 166, 168, 188—N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1881), s. 177—Interpretation of statutes.** The expression “patti of a mehal” as used in s. 188 of the N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873) means a division of a mehal distinct from the share of an individual co-sharer. The right of pre-emption, therefore, which is given by the above-named section is not exercisable on the sale merely of the share of an individual co-sharer not amounting to such a division of a mehal. Moreover, the provisions of s. 188 of Act XIX of 1873 do not apply to a sale under s. 168 of the same Act of land other than that in respect of which the arrears which it is sold to satisfy accrued. Hence, where the share of a co-sharer in an imperfect pattidari village, not being the land in respect of which the arrears of rent, for the satisfaction of which the said share is sold, are due, is sold under the provisions of s. 177 of the N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1881), no right of pre-emption can be claimed in respect of such sale. *So held by EDGE, C.J. and YOUNG, J., MAHMOOD J. (contra).* There being no statutory definition of the word patti, that word must be taken in its ordinary acceptation, and in that acceptation it means the share of a pattidar, whether such share amounts to a definite division of a mehal or not. The exigencies of the law of pre-emption require that in s. 188 of Act XIX of 1873, the word patti should be construed in its broader signification as equivalent to any share of a pattidar. The words of s. 168, which provide that land sold under that section is to be proceeded against “as if it were the land on account of which the revenue is due under the provisions of this Act,” render the incidents of sales under s. 166, including pre-emption applicable to sales under s. 168, with the exception that in such case only the defaulter’s interest in the land sold passes by the sale. Hence a right of pre-emption would accrue under s. 188 in respect of the compulsory sale of any share of a co-sharer, though such share did not amount to a patti in the sense of a definite division of a mehal. *BAIJ NATH v. SITAL SINGH . . . . . I. L. R. 13 All. 224*

**35. ——— Partition of village into separate mehals.** Cases where, after the division of a village area into separate mehals for which no new wajib-ul-urz is drawn up, the old wajib-ul-urz



**PRE-EMPTION—contd.****2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—contd.**

for the whole area has been held to apply generally to the new mehals, and such division has been held not to affect covenants existing between the co-sharers under such wajib-ul-urz, distinguished from cases where a new wajib-ul-urz has after the division been drawn up for each mehal. *Gokal Singh v. Mannu Lal*, I. L. R. 7 All. 772, and *Jai Ram v. Mahabir Rai*, I. L. R. 7 All. 720, referred to. *KUAR DAT PARSAD SINGH v. NAHAR SINGH*

I. L. R. 11 All. 257

**36. ——— Effect of perfect partition—Wajib-ul-urz—Co-sharers—Purchase of equity of redemption by mortgagee in possession—Acquiescence—Equitable estoppel.** The wajib-ul-urz of three villages which originally formed a single mehal gave a right of pre-emption to co-sharers in case of transfers of shares to strangers. Afterwards the shares in these villages were made the subject of a perfect partition and divided into separate mehals. Subsequently, by two deeds of sale executed on the 13th January 1884, and registered on the 17th January 1884, some of the original co-sharers sold to strangers their shares in all three villages. At the time of the sale, the shares in two of the villages were in possession of the vendees under a possessory mortgage, the amount due upon which was set off against the purchase money. The share in the third village was, at the time of the sale, in possession of another of the original co-sharers under a possessory mortgage. On the 17th January 1885 this last-mentioned co-sharers brought a suit against the vendors and the vendees to enforce his right of pre-emption under the wajib-ul-urz in respect of the shares sold in the three villages. *Held*, that, notwithstanding the partition of the village into separate mehals, the existing wajib-ul-urz at the time of partition must be presumed to subsist and govern the separate mehals until it was shown that a new one had been made. *Gokal Singh v. Mannu Lal*, I. L. R. 7 All. 772, referred to. *Held*, also, that the Court below was wrong in holding that the plaintiff, by reason of his having omitted in a suit previously brought against him for redemption of his mortgage, and dismissed for want of jurisdiction, to set up in defence any right of pre-emption or to express any desire to purchase, was equitably estopped by acquiescence in the sale from asserting his pre-emptive right. *SHIAM SUNDER v. AMANAT BEGAM*

I. L. R. 9 All. 234

**37. ——— Hindu widow in possession of property of her deceased husband, but not as his heir—Stranger—Effect of joining a stranger as plaintiff in a suit for pre-emption.** A Hindu widow in possession of the immovable property of her deceased husband, but not as his heir, there being a son living, has no right of pre-emption as a co-sharer by virtue of such possession, even though she may be recorded as a co-sharer in the village papers. *Phopi Ram v. Rukmin Kuar*, All. Weekly Notes (1895) 84, and *Imam-ud-din v. Surjaiti*, All. Weekly Notes (1895) 85, followed. *BRUPAL SINGH v. MOHAN SINGH*

I. L. R. 19 All. 324

**PRE-EMPTION—contd.****2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—contd.**

*PHOPI RAM v. RUKMIN KUAR*

I. L. R. 19 All. 327 note

*IMAM-UD-DIN v. SURJAITI*

I. L. R. 19 All. 329 note

**38. ——— Hindu widow with estate of inheritance—Shareholder in village.** A Hindu widow holding by inheritance her deceased husband's share in a village fully represents his estate as regards such share, and is entitled to prefer a claim to pre-emption as a shareholder in such village. *PHULMAN RAI v. DANI KUARI* I. L. R. 1 All. 452

**39. ——— Joinder of plaintiffs one of whom has no right to sue for pre-emption—Amendment of plaint.** The plaintiffs in a suit to enforce a right of pre-emption based on the wajib-ul-urz of a village, which gave the right to "co-sharers," alleged themselves to be jointly interested in the village, and in their plaint claimed relief jointly. One of the two plaintiffs was the widow of a co-sharer in the village, who, at the time of his death, was a member of a joint Hindu family. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the widow had only a right of maintenance out of the estate of her husband, she was not a co-sharer in the village, and therefore had no right to claim pre-emption. *KARAN SINGH v. MUHAMMAD ISMAIL KHAN* I. L. R. 7 All. 860

**40. ——— Possession of share of village in lieu of maintenance—Right of pre-emption.** Possession for life by a Hindu widow of a share of a village in lieu of maintenance under a decree of Court does not give her such an interest in the share as to entitle her to enforce the right of pre-emption on the sale of another share of the village. *DILA KUARI v. JAGAR NATH KUARI*

I. L. R. 6 All. 17

**41. ——— Purchaser of share subsequent to sale—Wajib-ul-urz—Purchaser's right of pre-emption.** Where there is a right of pre-emption under the wajib-ul-urz, which a shareholder could claim and enforce in respect of a sale of property, a person purchasing the said shareholder's interest in the village subsequently to the sale cannot claim and enforce pre-emption as his vendor might have done. *SHEO NARAIN v. HIRA*

I. L. R. 7 All. 535

**42. ——— Reservation of interest by father on partition—Right of son to pre-emption.** Where a Hindu father made a partition of his property among his sons, reserving to himself an interest in one village, which upon his death was to be divided among his sons:—*Held*, that during the father's lifetime no son could claim a right of pre-emption in respect of the village so reserved by the father. *RAM ADHEEN PANDEY v. GOORDIAL PANDEY* . . . . . 2 N. W. 434

**43. ——— Right of pre-emption reserved in family partition deed—Covenant by guardian of infant co-parcener—Notice of covenant—Constructive notice—Transfer of Property Act, s. 3—Tender of purchase-money.** The plaintiff and



**PRE-EMPTION—contd.****2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—contd.**

his step-mother, as guardian of her son, defendant No. 1, then an infant, made a division of the family property under a deed of partition by which (*inter alia*) a house was divided: the deed contained a covenant that if either co-parcener should desire to sell his share of the house, the other should have the right of pre-emption. Defendant No. 1, without the knowledge of the plaintiff, sold his share of the house to defendant No. 3 for R130 under a sale-deed which referred to the deed of partition. The plaintiff now sued to enforce his right of pre-emption, and in the course of the suit ordered to pay R130. *Held*, (i) that the purchaser had constructive notice of the covenant in the deed of partition; (i) that the covenant was not invalid, and that it was unnecessary for the plaintiff to prove tender by him of the purchase-money before suit. **RAJARAM v. KRISHNASAMI**. I. L. R. 16 Mad. 301

44. ———— **Transfer to plaintiff pre-emptor after sale—Hindu widow in possession for widow's estate.** *Held*, that the daughter of a Hindu widow to whom the widow had relinquished a share in a village, of which share she was in possession for a widow's life estate, was entitled to pre-emption in respect of a sale which had taken place in the village prior to the relinquishment made to her by her mother. **Sheo Narain v. Hira**, I. L. R. 7 All. 35, distinguished. **MUHAMMAD YUSUF ALI KHAN v. DAL KUR**. I. L. R. 20 All. 148

45. ———— **Mortgage—Covenant to give mortgagee preferential right to pre-emption.** An agreement by the mortgagor to give the mortgagee a preference of pre-emption in case of sale is not contrary to public policy, and may be enforced against a purchaser with notice of the covenant. **HARIS PAIK v. JAHURUDDI GAZI**. 2 C. W. N. 575

46. ———— **Sale to a co-sharer and stranger—Specification of interest sold to stranger and price—Right of pre-emption of vendee co-sharer.** The principle of denying the right of pre-emption, except as to the whole of the property sold, is that by breaking up the bargain the pre-emptor would be at liberty to take the best portion of the property and leave the worst part of it with the vendee. The rule applies only to those transactions which, while contained in one deed, cannot be broken up or separated. It should be limited to such transactions, and the reason of it does not exist where the shares sold are separately specified, and the sale to the stranger is distinct and divisible, though contained in the same deed as the sale to the co-sharers. The *ratio decidendi* of **Bhagwani Prasad v. Damru**, I. L. R. 5 All. 197, explained. **Sheodyal Ram v. Bhyro Ram**, N. W. P. S. D. A. (1860), p. 53, distinguished. **Guneshee Lal v. Ziaraut Ali**, 2 N. W. 243, and **Manna Singh v. Ramadhin Singh**, I. L. R. 4 All. 252, dissented from. A co-sharer in a village conveyed by deed of sale certain land to four persons, three of whom were co-sharers in the same patni as the vendor. The deed contained a specification of the interests purchased and the

**PRE-EMPTION—contd.****2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—contd.**

considerations paid by the co-sharers and the stranger vendees respectively. In a suit for pre-emption by certain co-sharers of the same patti as the vendor, the lower Appellate Court held that, although the co-sharers-vendees had a pre-emptive right of the same degree as the plaintiffs, nevertheless they, having joined a stranger with them in purchasing the property, had forfeited their right, and could not resist the claim even in respect of such portion as they had purchased under the sale-deed. *Held*, that this view was erroneous, and that, inasmuch as the deed of sale contained an exact specification of the shares purchased by the co-sharers-vendees, who had an equal right of purchase to that of the plaintiffs in respect of such shares, and as the shares purchased and the consideration paid by the stranger vendee were also exactly specified, the lower Court should not have decreed the claim for pre-emption as to that portion of the property which had been purchased by the co-sharers. **SHEOBHAROS RAI v. JIACH RAI**

I. L. R. 8 All. 462

47. ———— **Effect of co-sharer vendee joining with himself in his purchase a stranger.** When, in the purchase of immoveable property in respect of which a right of pre-emption exists, a vendee, being a person entitled to purchase, joins with himself in the purchase a stranger, then, in the event of a suit for pre-emption being brought, if the interest of the co-sharer vendee can be separated from the interest of the stranger vendee, the plaintiff pre-emptor can succeed only as against the stranger, the rights of the co-sharer vendee being equal or preferential to those of the pre-emptor. If, however, the interest of the co-sharer vendee cannot be separated from the interest of the stranger vendee, the plaintiff pre-emptor can succeed as against both. **Sheobharaos Rai v. Jiach Rai**, I. L. R. 8 All. 462, approved. **Sheo Dyal Ram v. Bhyroo Ram**, S. D. A. N. W. (1860), 53; **Guneshee Lal v. Ziaraut Ali**, 2 N. W. 243; and **Manna Singh v. Ramadhin Singh**, I. L. R. 4 All. 252, referred to. **RAM NATH v. BADRI NARAIN**. I. L. R. 19 All. 148

See **MUSHTAQ AHMAD v. AMJAD ALI**

I. L. R. 19 All. 311

**BHUPAL SINGH v. MOHAN SINGH**

I. L. R. 19 All. 324

48. ———— **Time from which right takes effect—Profits of property accruing between purchase and transfer to pre-emptor.** B purchased a share in a mehal on the 3rd January 1880 (Pous 1287 Fasli). A sued B and the vendor to enforce his right of pre-emption, and on the 24th March 1882 (Chait 1289 Fasli) obtained a final decree enforcing the right. Subsequently B, as a co-sharer in the mehal during 1288 Fasli, claimed from A, as lambardar of the mehal, the profits of the share for 1288 Fa-li. *Held*, that the pre-emptive right which was declared in the suit instituted by A, when it was once established, existed, and must be presumed to have taken effect on the date when the subsequently-



**PRE-EMPTION—contd.****2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—contd.**

awarded sale to *B* took place, and therefore there was no period of time during which *B* was properly in possession of the share and entitled to profits from *A* in his character of lambardar, but *A* must be presumed to have been in possession and entitled to the profits from the date of the sale to *B*. *AJUDHIA v. BALDEO SINGH* . . . **I. L. R. 7 All. 674**

**49. ——— Rights as to period before transfer—Interest.** Although a successful pre-emptor becomes substituted for the original transferee, and thus becomes entitled to the benefits of the transfer, those benefits cannot be claimed by him for any period antecedent to such substitution itself, and a pre-emptor, before his pre-emption is actually enforced, possesses no such right in the subject of pre-emption as would entitle him to any benefits arising out of the property which he is entitled to take, but has not yet taken. The original vendee cannot, whilst he is in possession, be regarded as a trespasser, who would have no right to enjoy the usufruct of the property which he has purchased. *Udian Singh v. Muneri Khan*, 2 *Sel. Rep.* 85, dissented from. *Manik Chand v. Rameshur Rae*, N.-W. P. S. D. A. (1865) Vol. II, p. 171; *Buldeo Persad v. Mohun. Agra Rev.* 30; and *Ajudhia v. Baldeo Singh*, **I. L. R. 7 All. 674**, followed. *DEO DAT v. RAM AUTAR* . . . **I. L. R. 8 All. 502**

**50. ——— Claim based upon custom—Evidence afforded by obsolete wajib-ul-arz—Rules of the Board of Revenue for the settlement of the Gorakhpur and Basti districts (B. E. C. 8—1, s. 38).** The plaintiffs brought their suit in 1890 to pre-empt certain property situated in the Gorakhpur district. Their claim was based upon two grounds: one, an alleged contract said to be recorded in and proved by a wajib-ul-arz of 1860 relating to the village in question; and the other, a custom of pre-emption alleged to be existing in the village. The period during which the wajib-ul-arz of 1860 was in force expired prior to the sale which gave rise to the right of pre-emption sought to be enforced. Subsequently to the expiration of that wajib-ul-arz certain rules had been framed, with reference to the settlement of the Gorakhpur and Basti districts, the material portions of which, for the purposes of the present case, were as follows: "A memorandum of the village customs will be appended to each khewat by the Assistant Settlement Officer, when he verifies the jamabandi, and it will take the place of the document hitherto known as the wajib-ul-arz" . . . "In regard to any custom or constitution peculiar to the mehal, the following matters should be noticed [class (d), s. 25]: (a) Pre-emption (as regards mehals which belong to other than Mahomedan proprietors) when the proprietors expressly demand that it may be noted and proved conclusively that the custom exists." At the new settlement made in accordance with these rules, no mention of the right of pre-emption, as obtaining in the mehal in question, was recorded. Upon these facts it was held by *EDGE, C.J.*, and *BURKITT, J.*, that having regard to the rules above-mentioned framed

**PRE-EMPTION—contd.****2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—contd.**

by the Board of Revenue for the settlement of the Gorakhpur and Basti districts, the mere absence of any mention of the right of pre-emption in the new memorandum of village customs was in itself no evidence that the custom of pre-emption had ceased to exist, and that the wajib-ul-arz of 1860 might be used as evidence of the existence of such a custom. *Per AIKMAN, J.*—The absence from the new memorandum of village customs of any mention of the existence of a right of pre-emption was a circumstance which the Court would be entitled to take into consideration in any conflict of evidence as to whether or not the custom of pre-emption did exist. *SADHU SAHU v. RAJA RAM*

**I. L. R. 16 All. 40**

**51. ——— Wajib-ul-arz—Custom—Mahomedan Law—Immediate and confirmatory demands.** The wajib-ul-arz of a village gave a right of pre-emption "according to the usage of the country." In a suit for pre-emption, there was no evidence to show what in fact was the usage prevailing in the districts in regard to pre-emption. There was no evidence that the plaintiff had satisfied the requirements of the Mahomedan law as to immediate and confirmatory demands, or that there was any custom which absolved him from compliance with those requirements, or that he was at any time willing to pay the actual contract price. *Held*, that, in the absence of evidence of any special custom different from or not co-extensive with the Mahomedan law of pre-emption, that law must be applied to the case, and that, under the circumstances above stated, the suit failed, and must be dismissed. *Fakir Rawot v. Imambakhsh*, *B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 35*; *Choudhry Brij Lal v. Goor Sahai*, *Agra F. B.* 128; and *Jai Kuar v. Hira Lal*, 7 N.-W. 1, referred to. *RAM PRASAD v. ABDUL KARIM*

**I. L. R. 9 All. 513**

**52. ——— Pre-emptor out of possession of his share—His own share lost by him pending appeal.** The plaintiff instituted this suit to enforce her right of pre-emption in respect of a share in a village of which she alleged she was a co-sharer with the vendors. The defendants to the suit were the vendors, the vendees, and others who were rival claimants for pre-emption in the share sold. The rival pre-emptors alone defended the action on the ground among others that plaintiff was not in possession of her own share in the village out of which she alleged that her right to claim pre-emption arose. The Court of first instance dismissed her suit. On appeal, the District Judge in effect dismissed her claim as against the defendants who were the rival pre-emptors, but gave the plaintiff a right to obtain the share if the other pre-emptors did not avail themselves of the decree which they had obtained in their action. On the 12th of January 1887 plaintiff's second appeal was admitted, and on the 20th January plaintiff's share in the village out of which her claim to pre-emption in respect of the share sold arose was sold in execution of a decree in another suit. Respondent contended that,



PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*

as since the appeal the share out of which plaintiff alleged that her right arose was sold, she could not get any decree now in her favour. *Held*, that this Court as a Court of appeal has only got to see what was the decree which the Court of first instance should have passed, and if the Court of first instance had wrongly dismissed the claim, the plaintiff cannot be prejudiced by her share having been subsequently sold in execution in another suit; such a sale could not have affected her right to maintain the decree, if he had obtained a decree in her favour in the Court of first instance, either on review or on appeal, nor could it have been made the ground of appeal. Further, plaintiff being out of possession of her share at the time she instituted the suit for pre-emption was immaterial, the Court should have ascertained whether the plaintiff was at the date of suit entitled in law to the share out of which her right of pre-emption was alleged to have arisen. *Held* by MAHMOOD, J., that the passage from Hamilton's Hedaya by Grady, p. 562, means that in the pre-emptive tenement the pre-emptor should have a vested ownership and not a mere expectancy of inheritance or a reversionary or any kind of contingent right, or any interest falling short of full ownership. *SAKINA BIBI v. AMIRAN*

I. L. R. 10 All. 472

53. ———— *Plaintiff's title to sue for pre-emption lost after suit, but before decree—Dismissal of suit.* Where a plaintiff who had filed a suit for pre-emption, based on the provisions of a *wajib-ul-arz* lost during the pendency of the suit the right to pre-empt by reason of the *mehal* in which both properties were originally comprised having become the subject of a perfect partition, it was *held* that the suit for pre-emption should be dismissed. *Sakina Bibi v. Amiran*, I. L. R. 10 All. 472, distinguished. *RAM GOPAL v. PIARI LAL*

I. L. R. 21 All. 441

54. ———— *Mortgagee by conditional sale—Foreclosure—Reg. XVII of 1806—Suit by mortgagee for possession—Compromise and decree thereon—Mortgagee accepting part of the property in suit—Suit for pre-emption—Pre-emptor not asserting or proving validity of foreclosure proceedings—Pre-emptor's title referred to date of compromise and decree—Purchase-money.* The mortgagee under a deed of conditional sale executed in 1878 took foreclosure proceedings under Regulation XVII of 1806, and the year of grace having expired, a foreclosure-proceeding was recorded on the 18th September 1882, declaring the mortgage to have been foreclosed. In August 1885 the mortgagee instituted a suit for possession of the mortgaged property. On the 19th September 1885, the suit was compromised, the mortgagee accepting a part of the mortgaged property, and relinquishing the remainder. A decree was passed in the terms of the compromise. Subsequently a suit for pre-emption was brought against the mortgagor and mortgagee to enforce pre-emption in respect of the alienation. The plaintiff claimed to pre-empt the whole of the

PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*

property to which the deed of 1878 related, including the portion relinquished by the conditional vendee under the compromise and decree of the 19th September 1885. *Held* that, although upon the expiration of the year of grace, the ownership of mortgaged property vested in a conditional vendee, even though he might not have obtained a decree establishing or declaring his right, and the right of pre-emption accrued on the date when the conditional sale thus became absolute, yet foreclosure proceedings under the Regulation, being of a purely ministerial character, were not conclusive or even *prima facie* evidence in a subsequent litigation against the conditional vendor that a valid foreclosure had been duly effected; that strict observance of the requirements of the Regulation were conditions precedent to the right of foreclosure; and that, in the present case, as the plaintiff had not asserted or attempted to prove that all those requirements had been fulfilled so as to result in an actual foreclosure and consequent accrual of pre-emption at the end of the year of grace, no foreclosure was shown to have taken place prior to the compromise of the 19th September 1885, and the plaintiff's right of pre-emption accrued on and must be referred to that date, and consequently extended only to the property to which the compromise related, and the price payable by the plaintiff was the amount specified in the compromise. *Bhadu Mahomed v. Radha Churn Bolia*, 4 B. L. R. A. C. 219; *Sheodeen v. Sookit*, S. D. A. N. W. (1864) 624; and *Tawakkul Rai v. Lachman Rai*, I. L. R. 6 All. 344, distinguished. *Norender Narain Singh v. Dwarka Lal Mundur*, L. R. 5 I. A. 18; *Madho Prashad v. Gajadhar*, L. R. 11 I. A. 156; *Sitla Bakhsh v. Lalla Prasad*, I. L. R. 8 All. 388; and *Jagat Singh v. Ram Bakhsh*, All. Weekly Notes (1887) 233, referred to. *AJAIB NATH v. MATHURA PRASAD*

I. L. R. 11 All. 164

55. ———— *Right among co-sharers of thoks—Village divided into several mahals—Rights of pre-emption given to co-sharers in the village—The wajib-ul-arz of a village gave a right of pre-emption to share-holders in a patti, then to those in a mahal and lastly to those in a village.* The village was divided into several *thoks*. One of the *thoks*, viz., *Jaraoli*, was subsequently sub-divided into several *mahals* and under the new arrangement the *thoks* were done away with. A share was sold in the *thok* so sub-divided and was purchased by a co-sharer in one of the old *thoks*. A co-sharer in one of the *mahals* of *thok Jaraoli* sued for pre-emption. *Held*, that the vendee being a co-sharer in the village, the plaintiff had no preferential right of pre-emption inasmuch as the old *pattis* and *thoks* had been done away with. *Daljanam Singh v. Kalka Singh*, I. L. R. 22 All. 1, distinguished. *DARIA v. HARKHIAL* (1903) . I. L. R. 31 All. 274

56. ———— *Grove land—Wajib-ul-arz—Co-sharer—Owner of plot of grove land.* *Held*, that a person who buys a plot of grove land in a village does not thereby become a co-sharer in the village



PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*

so as to entitle him to enforce a right of pre-emption under a *wajib-ul-arz*, which confers such right upon co-sharers. *Dakhni Din v. Rahimun-nissa*, I. L. R. 16 All. 412, and *Ali Husain Khan v. Tasaddug Husain Khan*, I. L. R. 28 All. 124, referred to. MUHAMMAD ALI V. HUKAM KUNWAR (1905)

I. L. R. 28 All. 246

57. ——— Assignment of mortgagee's rights—*Wajib-ul-arz*—Assignment of mortgagee's rights by mortgagee in possession—Sale to stranger who before suit brought, becomes a co-sharer. Held, that the assignment of mortgagee rights in a share in a village, by a co-sharer mortgagee in possession to a stranger, is not a transfer of any part of the mortgagee's "*haqqiyat*" in the village, and will not give rise to any right of the nature of pre-emption in the absence of express provisions relative to mortgagees in the village *wajib-ul-arz*. *Nand Lal v. Bansil*, I. L. R. 20 All. 19, referred to. Held, also, that, if a stranger purchases a share in a village in respect of which a right of pre-emption subsists in favour of co-sharers, but, subsequently to such purchase, and before any suit for pre-emption is brought in respect of such share, becomes himself, apart altogether from the purchase in dispute, a co-sharer in the village, he cannot be ousted by any co-sharer, not having superior pre-emptive rights to himself. *Serh Mal v. Hukam Singh*, I. L. R. 20 All. 100, followed. *Ram Gopal v. Piari Lal*, I. L. R. 21 All. 441, referred to. BHAGWAN DAS V. MOHAN LAL (1903) . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 421

58. ——— Customary law of Hindus in Behar—Pre-emption—Claim by a non-resident—Validity—Sham sale—Right of suit. Although there may be a custom of pre-emption amongst the Hindus of Behar, it cannot be availed of by persons, who are neither natives of, nor domiciled in, the district, in which the property is situate. A native of Balia in the North-Western Provinces cannot claim the right of pre-emption in respect of properties situate in the district of Chapra. Where the sale is not a *bona fide* one, but a sham transaction, no right of pre-emption arises. PARSASTH NATH TEWARI V. DHANAI OJHA AND DEWAKI-NUNDAN MISSEK (1905) . . . 9 C. W. N. 874

59. ——— Concurrent suits for pre-emption brought by co-sharers having equal rights—Form of decree. Where, pending a suit brought by one co-sharer for pre-emption, another co-sharer, having equal rights with the first, filed a similar suit for pre-emption of the same sale, it was held, that the second plaintiff was entitled to a decree for pre-emption in respect of one-half of the property sold. *Jai Ram v. Mahabir Rai*, I. L. R. 7 All. 720, followed. *Man Khan v. Mamur Khan*, All. Weekly Notes (1886) 56, distinguished. SALIG RAM V. KALI SHANKAR (1905) . . . I. L. R. 27 All. 465

60. ——— Ceremonies—Mahomedan law—*Talab-i-ishtishhad*—Reference to the previous *talab-i-mawasibat* necessary. When in asserting a claim for pre-emption under the Mahomedan law

PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*

the making of the *talab-i-ishtishhad* is required, it is absolutely necessary that at the time of making this demand reference should be made to the fact of the *talab-i-mawasibat* having been previously made and this necessity is not removed by the fact that the witnesses to both demands are the same. *Abid Husain v. Bashir Ahmad*, I. L. R. 20 All. 499, and *Rujjub Ali Chopedar v. Chundi Churn Bhadra*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 543, followed. *Chotu v. Husain Bakhsh*, All. Weekly Notes (1893) 101, referred to. *Sahibzadi v. Alahidiya*, All. Weekly Notes (1902) 147, and *Nundo Persad Thakur v. Gopal Thakur*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1008, dissented from. MUBARAK HUSAIN V. KANIZ BANOO (1905) . . . I. L. R. 27 All. 160

61. ——— Insolvency—Refusal to purchase—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 351 and 352—Private sale by Collector in pursuance of orders of Civil Court exercising jurisdiction in insolvency. In order to debar a party entitled to pre-empt a sale from exercising his right an opportunity to purchase must be given when a definite agreement to purchase at a fixed price has been entered into with a stranger. It is not enough to offer property to a person entitled to pre-empt before an agreement to purchase has been entered into. Where in pursuance of orders passed by the Civil Court in the exercise of insolvency jurisdiction certain revenue-paying property of the insolvent was sold by the Collector, but by private contract and not at public auction, it was held, that such a sale did not oust the pre-emptive rights of such persons as were otherwise entitled to claim pre-emption. *Baij Nath v. Sital Singh*, I. L. R. 13 All. 224, referred to. KANHAI LAL V. KALKA PRASAD (1905) . . . I. L. R. 27 All. 670

62. ——— Mahomedan law—Shafi-i-khalit—Easement—Owner of dominant tenement. Under the Mahomedan law of pre-emption the owner of the dominant tenement has in respect of a sale of the servient tenement a right of pre-emption as a *shafi-i-khalit*, which is preferable to the right of one, who is merely a neighbour as regards the property sold. *Shaikh Karim Buksh v. Kamr-ud-din*, All. H. C. (1874) 377, and *Chand Khan v. Niamat Khan*, 3 B. L. R. A. C. 296, referred to. KARIM V. PRIYO LAL BOSE (1905) . . . I. L. R. 28 All. 127

63. ——— Two successive purchases by same vendee—Claim to be a co-sharer at date of suit on first purchase in virtue of the second purchase. Where in a suit for pre-emption, it appeared that the vendee had, prior to the date of the suit, made a second purchase in regard to which no suit had been filed prior to the date of the institution of the suit in regard to the first purchase, but limitation had not expired in regard to the second purchase:—Held, that the vendee could not be considered by virtue of his second purchase to have been a co-sharer at the date of the institution of the suit on the first purchase. *Bhagwan Das v. Mohan Lal*, I. L. R. 25 All. 421, distinguished. KALESHAR RAI V. NABIBAN BIRI (1906) . . . I. L. R. 28 All. 642



**PRE-EMPTION—contd.****2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—contd.**

**64. ——— Under-proprietor—Act XVIII of 1876 (Oudh Laws Act), Part III, Chapter II—“Member of the village community”—Right of under-proprietor to pre-empt a mahal sold by a proprietor.** *Held*, that, under cl. 3 of s. 9 of the Oudh Laws Act, 1876, a person holding an under-proprietary interest in a mahal sold by the Court of Wards, on behalf of the proprietor of the mahal, was entitled to pre-emption in respect of such mahal as against the vendor. **DRIG BIJAI SINGH v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF GONDA (F.B. 1902)**

**I. L. R. 24 All. 420**

**65. ——— Cause of action—Wajib-ul-arz—Acquisition by defendants to a pre-emption suit of a title as co-sharers—Suit dismissed.** After an alleged cause of action for pre-emption had arisen, but before suit brought, the defendants vendees acquired by the dismissal of another suit for pre-emption brought against them by two of the plaintiffs on a different cause of action, a title as co-sharers in the village, in which the property sought to be pre-empted lay. *Held*, that the title so acquired was a good answer to the subsequent suit for pre-emption. The principle laid down in *Janki Prasad v. Ishar Das*, **I. L. R. 21 All. 374**, and *Ram Gopal v. Piari Lal*, **I. L. R. 21 All. 441**, applied. **RAM HIT SINGH v. NARAIN RAI (1904)**

**I. L. R. 26 All. 389**

**66. ——— Pre-emptive rights of manager of Hindu temple—Wajib-ul-arz.** *Held*, that the manager of a Hindu temple, who as such manager holds zamindari property on behalf of the temple, has the same rights of pre-emption (or pre-mortgage) under the village wajib-ul-arz as any other zamindar in the village may possess. **LEKHRAJ v. GURDAT (1904)**

**I. L. R. 26 All. 212**

**67. ——— Talab-i-mawasibat—Mahomedan Law—Power of general attorney to make the talab-i-mawasibat—Pleadings—Practice.** Where the plaintiff in a pre-emption suit alleged that the first demand or talab-i-mawasibat was made for him by his general attorney and the defendant did not deny that the person in question was the general attorney of the plaintiff, but in fact no mukhtarnama or copy of it was filed, the original being filed in another appeal then pending before the lower Appellate Court. *Held*, that, looking to the pleadings, the lower Appellate Court, if it had any doubt on the point, should either have examined the other record or at least have given the plaintiff an opportunity of filing the mukhtarnama or a copy. *Held*, further, that the first demand or talab-i-mawasibat can be made by a general attorney. **Abadi Begam v. Inam Begam**, **I. L. R. 1 All. 521**, and **Hari Har Dat v. Sheo Prasad**, **I. L. R. 7 All. 41**, followed. **Ojheoonissa Begam v. Sheikh Rustam Ali**, **W. R. 1864, 219**, referred to. **MUNNA KHAN v. CHHEDA SINGH (1906)**

**I. L. R. 28 All. 691**

**68. ——— Owner of isolated plots in a village—Wajib-ul-arz.** *Held*, that the owner of isolated plots of land in a village is a co-sharer

**PRE-EMPTION—contd.****2. RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION—concl.**

in the village and may as such possess rights of pre-emption, although he does not own a share in the zamindari of the village and his name is not recorded in the khewat. **Sajdat Ali v. Dost Muhammad**, **I. L. R. 12 All. 426**, and **Dakhni Din v. Rahim-un-nissa**, **I. L. R. 16 All. 412**, followed. **ALI HUSAIN KHAN v. TASADDUQ HUSAIN KHAN (1905)**

**I. L. R. 28 All. 124**

**69. ——— Contract for period of settlement—Wajib-ul-arz—Effect of expiry of period of settlement pending suit for pre-emption.** *Held*, that in the case of a suit for pre-emption based upon a contract embodied in the wajib-ul-arz the rights of the plaintiff remained unaffected by the fact that the period of the current settlement expired during the pendency of the suit. **Janki Prasad v. Ishar Das**, **I. L. R. 21 All. 374**, and **Ram Gopal v. Piari Lal**, **I. L. R. 21 All. 441**, distinguished. **GOPAL PRASAD v. BADAL SINGH (1908)**

**I. L. R. 31 All. 111**

**70. ——— Vendee stranger at date of sale—Subsequent acquisition of share by vendee—Cause of action—Lis pendens.** Where a suit for pre-emption was dismissed for deficiency of court-fees in both the Courts below, which decree was subsequently reversed by the High Court and the case remanded, and the vendee in the meantime acquired the status of a co-sharer:—*Held*, that the suit could not be dismissed, the pre-emptor having been entitled to a decree at the date of the institution of the suit. *Held*, further, that even if the date of decree can be looked to, that date must be the date on which the decree ought to have been made in the plaintiff's favour and not a later date. **ROHAN SINGH v. BHAN LAL (1909)**

**I. L. R. 31 All. 530**

**3. CONSTRUCTION OF WAJIB-UL-ARZ.**

**1. ——— Presumption of compliance with conditions of law—Intention of parties.** *Held*, that, where a pre-emptive claim is based on the wajib-ul-arz, it is not to be assumed that the claimant of pre-emption complied with the peculiar conditions which, under the Mahomedan law, are essential to give validity to such a claim, unless expressly provided by the wajib-ul-arz, and the Court construing such contracts ought to consider the intention of the parties as expressed in those contracts, and to give effect to them without alteration or addition. **CHOWDHRY BRIJ LALL v. GOOR SUDAI . Agra. F. B. 128 : Ed. 1874, 95**

**2. ——— Custom—Mahomedan law.** In a suit for pre-emption based on a wajib-ul-arz the material words of the wajib-ul-arz under the heading of “Custom for pre-emption” were as follows: “At the time a proprietary share is transferred a right of purchase will vest, first, in a co-sharer of the same family, and then in the other co-sharers of the village in preference to a stranger, provided that the same price is paid by the co-sharer as is offered by the stranger. *Held*, that these words



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were intended to define a special custom of pre-emption, and did not merely mean that the custom of pre-emption according to the Mahomedan law was to be followed. *Ram Prasad v. Abdul Karim, I. L. R. 9 All. 513*, distinguished. *JASODA NAND v. KANDHAIYA LALL . I. L. R. 13 All. 373*

**3. ———— Wajib-ul-arz not signed by lambardar or co-sharers.** Where a wajib-ul-arz was not signed by the lambardar or by any of the co-sharers of the village for which it was framed, but was found to have been in existence without having been questioned by any of the parties who might have been affected thereby for a period of some thirteen years:—*Held*, that the wajib-ul-arz might be taken as *prima facie* evidence of the custom of the village for which it was framed. The said wajib-ul-arz contained a clause relative to pre-emptive rights to the following effect: "When any muafidar in the patti desires to transfer his share, then first a shareholder in the patti takes it, and if he does not take it, then another man who desires to take it takes it." *Held*, that this clause was declaratory of the village custom, and that it was not intended thereby to adopt the Mahomedan law of pre-emption. *RUSTOM ALI KHAN v. ABBASI BEGAM . I. L. R. 13 All. 407*

**4. ———— "Brethren"—Sharers in patti—Preferential right.** Where the wajib-ul-arz provided that alienation should be first made to brethren of common ancestor, and then to the other sharers of the patti:—*Held*, that the brethren in whose favour the first right of pre-emption was secured must be construed to be brethren who were sharers in the patti. *HUR SAHAI v. JAWALA . 2 Agra 31*

**5. ———— Bhai-band—Suit to enforce the right of pre-emption—Non-joinder of vendor—Mortgage.** In a suit for pre-emption it was objected by the vendee in second appeal that the vendor had not been made a party. *Held*, that, whether the omission to make the vendor a party in a suit to enforce the right of pre-emption renders the suit unmaintainable or not, as the vendee had not been prejudiced by such omission in this case, the objection taken at such a late stage of the case could not be allowed. *Held*, also, that the word "bhai-band" in the wajib-ul-arz in this case meant the brotherhood of the village, and not merely those persons who were related by blood. *S. A. No. 1054 of 1881* decided the 1st April 1882 referred to. *HIRA LAL v. RAMJAS . I. L. R. 6 All. 57*

**6. ———— Shikmi showkayan—Preference to sharers in thoke—Sharers in village.** *Held* by a Full Bench, in concurrence with the lower Court, that the proper construction of the words "shikmi showkayan" used in a clause of the administration paper was that they gave a preference to sharers in the thoke over those who were merely sharers in the village. *JAY MULL v. KESREE*  
**Agra F. B. 171: Ed. 1874, 128**

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**7. ———— "Intiquial"—Absolute transfer—Conditional sales and usufructuary mortgages—Alienation.** *Held*, on the construction of a wajib-ul-arz that the word "intiquial" not only signifies an absolute transfer, but also applies to conditional sales and usufructuary mortgages. *CHUTTUR MULL v. CHUTTUR KISHORE LALL . 3 Agra 396*

**8. ———— Co-sharers—Members of joint Hindu family.** The members of a joint and undivided Hindu family, other than that member who is recorded in the Collector's book as a sharer in the mehal, are "co-sharers," for the purposes of pre-emption, in the sense of the wajib-ul-arz. *GANDHARP SINGH v. SAHIB SINGH . I. L. R. 7 All. 184*

**9. ———— "Ek jaddi."** The wajib-ul-arz of a village gave a right of pre-emption in cases of sale to "brothers," and provided that, on refusal by a "brother" there should be a right of pre-emption in favour of co-sharers in the thoke who were related to the vendor by descent from a common ancestor ("hissadaran ek jaddi thoke"). It was also provided that, in the event of any dispute arising as to price, it should be settled by arbitration, and that, "if the co-sharers do not take at the amount fixed by the arbitrators, the co-sharers desiring to sell might make the transfer to a stranger." *Held*, that co-sharers who were not of common descent from the vendor were entitled to pre-emption after own brothers and co-sharers *ek jaddi* and to have preference over strangers. *Guneshee Lal v. Zaraut Ali, 2 N. W. 343*, followed. *SABIR ALI v. YAD RAM . I. L. R. 9 All. 660*

**10. ———— "Pattidars"—"Chakdars."** *Held*, that the terms of a wajib-ul-arz conferring a right of pre-emption upon "pattidars" did not apply to a chakdar holding a share in the same chak as the vendor. *BALWANT SINGH v. SUBHAN ALI*  
**I. L. R. 10 All. 107**

**11. ———— "Karibi," meaning of.** The word "karibi" used by itself in the pre-emptive clause of a wajib-ul-arz to indicate shareholders "near" to the vendor, is ambiguous and inadequate to express the intentions of the shareholders. The pre-emptive clause in the wajib-ul-arz of a village gave a right of pre-emption, in cases of sale by shareholders, first to "bhai hakiki" (own brothers), next to "karibi" (near), and next to co-sharers in the same thoke as the vendor. *Held*, that, although the word "karibi" must be read in connection with the preceding word "bhai," the words "bhai karibi" could not reasonably be confined to cousins, but must be construed as meaning "bhai buand" or "bhai log," so as to include all near relatives, both male and female. *Held*, also, that a vendor's father's brother's widow, holding a share in the village absolutely and as heir of her deceased husband, was entitled to pre-emption in preference to the vendees, who were only sharers in the same thoke as the vendor. *KHUMAN SINGH v. HARDAI*  
**I. L. R. 11 All. 41**



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contd.**

**12. —** Express limitation of operation of wajib-ul-arz—*Time limited by agreement for pre-emption.* When by the express terms of a wajib-ul-arz its operation is limited to the period of the settlement, a right of pre-emption created by it cannot be enforced after the expiry of that period, unless a provision has been made for that purpose, or the operation of the wajib-ul-arz has been extended by the agreement of the parties. *RUTTUN SINGH v. OOMRAO SINGH* . 4 N. W. 13

**13. —** Right of alienation—*Express conditions.* Held, that the conditions of the wajib-ul-arz do in no way confer on any person under disability a right of alienation which he does not otherwise enjoy. *RADHEY PANDEY v. MUNSARAM* . . . . . 2 Agra 85

**14. —** Condition that sharer's consent shall be obtained. Held, on the construction of the wajib-ul-arz, that the condition stipulating that alienations should be made with the consent of all the sharers, did not stipulate for the existence of pre-emption, and that the claim based on that was untenable. *RAM PERSHAD SAHOO v. RUMZANEE* . . . . . 2 Agra 37

*GAYADEEN v. RAMSAHAI* . 2 Agra, Pt. II, 181

*BUBBOO DOOBEY v. ISHREE* . . . . . 3 Agra 74

**15. —** Right of pre-emption of co-sharer—*Holder of resumed muafi—N. W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), s. 62—Rules of the Board of Revenue, 1878, Department I, Rules 30 and 51.* The plaintiff, a co-sharer in the village of Deobarampur, sued for pre-emption of certain land, being "resumed revenue-free land" in the village, which had been sold to a stranger. The clause of the wajib-ul-arz under which pre-emption was claimed was as follows: "When any co-sharer (hissadar) is bent upon selling or mortgaging his right (haqqiyat), then first that co-sharer who is nearest to the sharer bent on transfer can take it; after that any other person who is interested (sharik) in the village rank by rank can take it. If no person interested in the village takes it, then a stranger may take it. Held, that, under the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff had no right of pre-emption in respect of the land claimed by him, the vendor not being, within the meaning of the wajib-ul-arz, a co-sharer in the village by virtue of his possession of a portion of the resumed muafi. *KALLIAN MAL v. MADAN MOHAN* . . . . . I. L. R. 17 All. 447

**16. —** Procedure of co-sharer who wishes to sell share. By the clause in a wajib-ul-arz which related to pre-emption it was provided as follows: When any co-sharer wishes to make a sale or mortgage of his share, it is incumbent on him to do so, first, in favour of a near co-sharer; next, in favour of a co-sharer of his thoke; and lastly, in favour of a co-sharer of another thoke, at the rate of R20 per bigha of cultivated land and R5 per bigha of waste land. If none of these take it, then

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contd.**

he may transfer it to an outsider. If any co-sharer (i.e., any co-sharer who wishes to sell or mortgage) fail to act as above directed, another co-sharer has the right of enforcing pre-emption in respect of the property. If the term of the mortgaged share of any co-sharer is about to expire and notice of foreclosure has been issued, and the co-sharer mortgagor has not the means to redeem, then another co-sharer, after paying up the money, may take back the share, and when the original mortgagor has the means, he after paying the money, may take possession of the share. Held, that, in the case of a conditional sale of property to which this wajib-ul-arz applied, there were only two stages contemplated by the wajib-ul-arz and not three. The first stage was at or about the time of the execution of the deed of conditional sale, and at that time pre-emption might be had by a co-sharer at the rate indicated in the wajib-ul-arz. The second stage was when the conditional vendee had brought his suit for foreclosure, and at that time the pre-emptor would have to pay the amount found to be due under the deed of conditional sale. When once, however, the order for foreclosure had been made absolute, the co-sharer's right of pre-emption was gone and extinguished. *GYA BHARTHI v. LAHNATH RAI* . I. L. R. 20 All. 103

**17. —** Co-sharers—*Co-sharers in the Khalisa mahal distinguished from owners of separate plots of muafi lands in the mahal.* The co-sharers in a mahal and the owners of a separate plot of muafi land included in the area of the mahal have, as a rule, no connection with one another, and it by no means follows that the custom adopted by or existing among the members of the khalisa co-partenary body would be applicable to the owners of the muafi plots. Strict evidence is always necessary to prove that the same custom is applicable to each. *Kalyan Mal v. Madan Mohan*, I. L. R. 17 All. 447, referred to. *NARAIN DAS v. RAM SARAN DAS* . I. L. R. 20 All. 419

**18. —** Agreement to offer property to co-sharers—*Mode of offer.* Where the terms of a wajib-ul-arz are that the property before sale to a stranger must be offered to the co-sharers, such offer must be made to each and every one of such co-sharers. *DOWLUT v. NETRAM* . 3 N. W. 42

**19. —** Preferential right of co-sharers—*Right of refusal.* Where the terms of wajib-ul-arz recognize the right of each sharer to sell without the consent of the others, but limit that right so far as to give preference or right of refusal to the co-sharers, the sale to a stranger can only be good and valid on proof of offer being made and refused by the co-sharers. *PERMESHREE DOSS v. RAIKOONDUN SINGH* . . . . . 3 Agra 3

**20. —** *Usufructuary lease, construction of.* Where the wajib-ul-arz provided that, in cases of transfer by "sale, etc.," the co-sharers would have a preferential right to the same:—Held, that the co-sharers were entitled to claim by right of pre-emption to take over an



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contd.**

usufructuary lease which was made for the term of eight years. *AHMED ALI KHAN v. AHMED*

1 *Agra* 101

**21.** ———— *Shareholders' right of—Relatives, right of—Strangers.* One of the provisions in the wajib-ul-arz of a village was that, when a shareholder was desirous of selling his share, the right of purchase should lie first, with the real brother of the shareholder; secondly, with the nearest relatives; thirdly, with the shareholders in the thoke; and, lastly, with the shareholders in other thokes. *Held*, that, if a person was a near relative, he fulfilled all the conditions required, and there was no necessity that he should belong to the same thoke as the vendor. *Held*, also, where the parties were Mahomedans, that the wife of the vendor must be regarded as a near relative within the meaning of the wajib-ul-arz, and that, though she was not a shareholder, she could not be considered a stranger, that is, a person who had no interest whatever in the family. *MAHOMED TUKEE v. HUIJEE alias KHUJJAI*. 5 *N. W.* 142

**22.** ———— *Partition, effect of—Co-sharers—"Village"—Effect of perfect partition on covenants contained in the wajib-ul-arz.* The wajib-ul-arz of a village contained a covenant among the co-sharers that, in the event of any one of them selling his share, a right of pre-emption should be enforceable, first, by a "near shareholder"; next by a partner in the thoke; and thirdly, by a partner in the village. The village was subsequently divided into three separate mehals by means of a perfect partition under the N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873). *Held*, that the agreement regarding pre-emption remained in force after the partition. The term "village," as used in the wajib-ul-arz, means a definite area of land with houses upon it, and does not necessarily imply a joint ownership of such land, inasmuch as after partition there may remain some community of interest, and things held and used in common by all the inhabitants. Every one who lives in that area has a share in it, and may therefore be regarded as a "shareholder" within the meaning of the wajib-ul-arz. *GOKAL SINGH v. MANNU LAL*. I. L. R. 7 *All.* 772

**23.** ———— *Perfect partition of mehal—N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), s. 191—No new wajib-ul-arz framed on partition—Pre-emption claimed under wajib-ul-arz of undivided mehal—Custom—Co-sharers—Hissadar deh.* Where, on the perfect partition of a mehal under the N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act, 1873, no new wajib-ul-arz has been framed for any of the new mehals, the question whether or how far a contract or a custom of pre-emption recorded in the wajib-ul-arz of the undivided mehal is still in force, or who is entitled to claim the benefit of it, is not capable of any absolute or invariable answer. It depends in each case upon the proper construction of the terms of the particular contract or the proper interpretation of the particular custom

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contd.**

recorded, assuming that there is no evidence of any intention on the part of the co-sharers at the time of partition to put an end to the contract or the custom. But there is a strong presumption against such claims for pre-emption when made after perfect partition by persons who are no longer co-sharers of the vendor; and where the language of the wajib-ul-arz is ambiguous, this presumption may be decisive. The wajib-ul-arz of a village forming one undivided mehal recorded a right of pre-emption by custom as existing in favour of "hissadaran deh" in cases of transfer by a "hissadar" of his share or "hissa" to a stranger. After a perfect partition, on which no new wajib-ul-arz was framed, and after a subsequent sale to a stranger of land in one of the new mehals, a person who, prior to the partition, was a co-sharer of the vendor in the undivided mehal, but who, since the partition, owned a share only in another of the new mehals, claimed pre-emption under the old wajib-ul-arz as a "hissadar deh." *Held*, by the Full Bench, upon the construction of the wajib-ul-arz, that he was not entitled to pre-emption. *DALGANJAN SINGH v. KALKA SINGH*. I. L. R. 22 *All.* I

**24.** ———— *Division of lands in village—Right of sharer in one division to right of pre-emption of share in another division.* The greater portion of the lands of a certain village were divided into thokes, each thoke comprising a certain amount of land, and the rest of the lands were held in common according to the interest of the co-sharers in the village. The wajib-ul-arz contained the following provision regarding the right of pre-emption: "Each sharer is by all means at liberty to transfer his right and share, but first of all the transfer should be effected by him in favour of his own brothers and nephews who may be sharers, and, in case of their refusal, in favour of the other owners of the thoke." *Held*, in a suit by a sharer in one thoke to enforce a right of pre-emption, under the wajib-ul-arz, in respect of a share in another thoke, that the fact that the plaintiff in common with all the sharers of the different thokes was a sharer in the common lands did not make her a sharer in the vendor's thoke, and she had therefore no right of pre-emption under the wajib-ul-arz. *MAYA RAM v. LACHHO*

I. L. R. 2 *All.* 631

Affirmed on appeal to the Privy Council. *LACHHO v. MAYA RAM*. I. L. R. 5 *All.* 158

L. R. 10 *I. A.* 1

**25.** ———— *Nearer co-sharer—Mortgage by conditional sale—Limitation—Acquiescence—Equitable estoppel.* The two joint owners of a 2 annas 8 pies share in a village jointly executed two deeds of mortgage by conditional sale, each for a share of 1 anna 4 pies, in favour, respectively, of R and A, co-sharers in the village, and related to the vendors. In 1875 the conditional sale in favour of R became absolute, and he was recorded as proprietor of half the share of the vendors, and obtained



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possession thereof. In 1882 A foreclosed his mortgage and obtained possession of the other half share. R thereupon claimed the right to purchase the half share so acquired by A on the allegation that he had a right of pre-emption in respect thereof, having become the vendee in 1875 of the other half share, and therefore being the "nearer co-sharer" of the vendors within the meaning of the wajib-ul-arz, and also being nearer in relationship to the vendors than A. The wajib-ul-arz provided that each co-sharer was competent to transfer his own share, but that, when making a transfer, it was incumbent on him to notify the same to his near co-sharer, and, on his refusal, to other sharers in the village. The lower Appellate Court held that the plaintiff was estopped from preferring a claim to pre-emption on the ground that he had acquiesced in the conditional sale in favour of the defendant, and also that he had no right to pre-emption under the wajib-ul-arz. *Held*, that, inasmuch as from 1875 to 1882 the only owners of the 2 annas 8 pies share were the plaintiff and the mortgagors, they were the only co-sharers in respect of this particular share, although there were other co-sharers in the village; that the plaintiff must therefore be regarded as a "nearer co-sharer" of the vendors than the defendant within the meaning of the wajib-ul-arz, and that as such he was entitled to claim pre-emption. *Held*, also, that the right of pre-emption which arose upon the sale was a new right, and not the same as that which arose at the time of the mortgage, inasmuch as the wajib-ul-arz distinctly contemplated the right of pre-emption as arising upon the two different events of mortgage and sale; that the alleged acquiescence of the plaintiff pre-emptor therefore occurred at a time when the right claimed by him was not yet in existence; and that consequently the claim was not barred. *RUP NARAIN v. AWADH PRASAD*

I. L. R. 7 All. 478

26. ——— "Stranger"—*Effect of joining stranger as co-vendee.* Under the terms of a wajib-ul-arz, successive pre-emptive rights were given, first, to "own brothers"; secondly, to "near cousins"; thirdly, to "shareholders." *Held* (BURKITT, J.), the parties being Mahomedans, that in regard to a sale of land to which this wajib-ul-arz applied, a nephew (brother's son) of the vendee was a "stranger," and his joinder as co-vendee would vitiate the sale and let it in other persons having a right of pre-emption. *Bhurey Mal v. Naval Singh*, I. L. R. 4 All. 259, distinguished. *AMJAD ALI v. MUSHTAQ AHMAD* . I. L. R. 17 All. 454

In the same case, on appeal under the Letters Patent, this decision was upheld by EDGE, C.J., and KNOX, J. *MUSHTAQ AHMED v. AMZAD ALI*

I. L. R. 19 All. 311

27. ——— Stipulated price—"Rights and interest"—"Qimat"—"Sale"—Exchange. The wajib-ul-arz of a village gave a right of pre-emption by a clause providing that in case of transfer by any co-sharer of his rights and interests

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(haqiqat), his partners should have a right to purchase at the same price (qimat) as the vendee had given. One of the co-sharers transferred to a stranger 1 biswa and 6 dhurs of a grove or garden in exchange for another piece of land. *Held*, by the Full Bench, that this transaction was a transfer of haqiqat within the terms of the wajib-ul-arz. *Held*, also, that the plot of land which was given in exchange for the 1 biswa and 6 dhurs must be considered as a price (qimat) within the terms of the wajib-ul-arz. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*, that the word "qimat" must be interpreted in the sense given to it by the Mahomedan law, including not only money, but other kinds of property capable of being valued at a definite sum of money, and covering the consideration of "sale" as well of exchange as defined in ss. 54 and 118 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), respectively. *NIAMAT ALI v. ASMAT BIBI* . I. L. R. 7 All. 626

28. ——— Simple mortgage—"Transfer"—Mortgage—Charge—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 58. The wajib-ul-arz of a village gave a right of pre-emption to co-sharers on a transfer (intikal) by sale or mortgage (rahn) by a co-sharer of "rights and interests" (hakkiyat). *Per PETHERAM, C.J.*—That as a simple mortgage, as defined in s. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, by giving a right to sell, transfers an interest in the property mortgaged, a simple mortgage of his share by a co-sharer created a right of pre-emption under the terms of the wajib-ul-arz. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*—The circumstance that possession had not been transferred to the mortgagee was one which had no bearing on the question whether a right of pre-emption arose under the terms of the wajib-ul-arz in the case of a simple mortgage. The word "intikal" as used in Hindustani, has the broadest meaning in connection with "alienation," "conveyance," "assignment" or "transfer" of rights in immoveable property. The word "hakkiyat" means rights and interests in the legal sense of the phrase. The word "rahn" is a generic word indicating all that is included in the English word "mortgage" and is not limited to usufructuary mortgages, but includes simple mortgages also. When general words are used in a document, they must be understood in a general sense, unless they are accompanied by any expression limiting or restricting their ordinary meaning, or unless such limitation or restriction arises from necessary implication. The words "intikal," "hakkiyat" and "rahn" in the wajib-ul-arz could be understood only in the most general sense. "Mortgage" as understood in Indian law, includes simple mortgage as well as usufructuary, and one is as much a "transfer of an interest in specific immoveable property" as the other. A simple mortgage is a "transfer," being the transfer of the right of sale. *Held*, therefore, by MAHMOOD, J., that a right of pre-emption accrued under the terms of the wajib-ul-arz in the case of a simple mortgage by a co-sharer of his share to a "stranger." *Per BRODHURST, J.*,



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that one of the entries in a statement showing the transfers which had taken place in the village at or about the time the wajib-ul-arz was framed, which statement was connected with the wajib-ul-arz, related to a simple mortgage, from which it appeared that it was the intention that the co-sharers should have the right of pre-emption in all cases of mortgage, whether usufructuary or otherwise, and therefore a right of pre-emption accrued under the terms of the wajib-ul-arz in the case of a simple mortgage. *Per DUTHOIT, J.*, that a pre-emptive right was raised by the terms of the wajib-ul-arz only upon the occurrence of a transfer of a share in the property of the mehal, and a simple mortgage was not a transfer of property. *OLDFIELD, J.*—The word “transfer” used in the wajib-ul-arz was not intended to refer to a simple mortgage, but to mortgages where possession of the property passes to the mortgagee. *SHEORATAN KUAR v. MAHIPAL KUAR*. . . **I. L. R. 7 All. 258**

**29. ——— Mortgage by conditional sale—**“Transfer”—*Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 58.* A clause in the wajib-ul-arz of a village gave a right of pre-emption in respect of “transfer” by the sharers of their rights and interests by sale and mortgage. *Held*, that a deed of conditional sale of a share in the village, which did not transfer possession, was a transfer of an interest in the village, and was sufficient to let in the right of pre-emption. *Sheoratan Kuar v. Mahipal Kuar*, **I. L. R. 7 All. 258**, followed. *AZIMAN BIBI v. AMIR ALI*. . . **I. L. R. 7 All. 343**

**30. ——— Conditional sale.** The pre-emptional rights of the parties to a deed of conditional sale cannot be affected by a wajib-ul-arz prepared subsequently to the execution of the deed of conditional sale, but prior to the sale becoming absolute, they not being parties to the wajib-ul-arz and the wajib-ul-arz not apparently indicating any pre-existing custom of pre-emption in the village. *Raghubir Singh v. Nandu Singh*, *All. Weekly Notes (1891) 134*, distinguished. *BECHAN RAI v. NAND KISHORE RAI*. . . **I. L. R. 14 All. 341**

**31. ——— Sale without registration of transfer—***Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 54—Fraudulent omission to transfer by registered instrument.* The wajib-ul-arz of a village gave the co-sharers a right of pre-emption in cases where any one of them should wish to “transfer his share wholly or partly by sale or mortgage.” One of the co-sharers entered into a transaction by which he transferred the possession of his share to a stranger for R300 and had mutation of names effected in the Revenue Department, but, in order to avoid the right of pre-emption, the parties omitted to execute or register a deed of sale in respect of the transfer. *Held*, by the Full Bench (*MAHMOOD, J.* dissenting), that the transaction gave rise to the right of pre-emption within the meaning of the wajib-ul-arz. *Per PETHERAM, C.J.*, that the terms of the wajib-ul-arz meant that, if any co-

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contd.**

sharer transferred his right wholly or partly, the right of pre-emption should arise; that although the legal interest in the share was never transferred, the effect of the transaction in question was to transfer absolutely the whole right of possession from the vendor to the vendee, and that it was therefore such a transfer as let in the right of pre-emption. *Per STRAIGHT, J.*, that, inasmuch as the defendants deliberately omitted to observe the necessary legal formality of a registered instrument with the object of defeating the pre-emptive right, it was very doubtful whether a Court of equity would be justified in allowing them to set up, and in giving effect to a defence based upon their own intentional evasion of the law. *Per OLDFIELD and BRODHURST, JJ.*, that the failure of the parties to the transfer to comply with the requirements of s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) as to the manner in which the transfer should be made did not alter the nature of the transaction or affect the fact that a sale had been made and could not affect a pre-emptor's right in respect of it. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*, that a valid and perfected sale was a condition precedent to the exercise of the pre-emptive right; that in the present case nothing had happened which could properly be termed a “sale” within the meaning of the wajib-ul-arz; that the application for mutation of names not having been registered, the provisions of s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act prevented it from taking effect as a sale, or passing the ownership from the vendor to the vendee; and that therefore, under the wajib-ul-arz, the right of pre-emption could not arise. *JANKI v. GIRJADAT*. **I. L. R. 7 All. 482**

**32. ——— Calculation of price, mode of—***Proportionate share of purchase-money.* The wajib-ul-arz of a village contained this clause regarding the transfer of shares by sale or mortgage, *viz.*, “Whenever a shareholder intends to transfer his rights, his nearest co-sharer shall be first entitled to purchase the same, and on his refusal the other sharers in the thoke, and on their refusal sharers in other thokes will be entitled.” *S*, the proprietor of a 4 pies share in one thoke and of a 9 pies share in another thoke, sold both shares, together with a bungalow, garden, and factory situated on the land comprised in the 4 pies share, for R10,000 to *T* and others, shareholders in the thoke containing the 9 pies share. *D* and others, shareholders in the thoke containing the 4 pies share, sued to obtain possession of that share and the bungalow, garden, and factory, claiming the right of pre-emption under the wajib-ul-arz, on payment of a proportionate part of the purchase-money, which they estimated at four-thirteenths of that sum, calculating the numbers of pies sold. It was *held* (in accordance with the opinion of the Full Bench), that the plaintiffs were entitled to claim the right of pre-emption in respect of the 4 pies share to the exclusion of the 9 pies. It was also held that the right of pre-emption did not extend to the bungalow, garden, and factory. Instead of adopting the plaintiffs' mode of



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calculating the price payable for the property claimed, the lower Courts should have ascertained separately the value of the several properties sold. *SALIG RAM v. DEBI PARSHAD*. 7 N. W. 38

**33. — Co-sharer—Wajib-ul-arz—Sale to a stranger—Re-sale to a co-sharer having a right of pre-emption, but subsequently to a suit brought by another such co-sharer.** Where property, which is subject to a right of pre-emption declared by the wajib-ul-arz, is sold to a stranger, such stranger may defeat the claim of a co-sharer having a right of pre-emption by sale to a co-sharer having a similar right; but, in order that the re-sale may have such effect, it must be completed before any suit for pre-emption is brought by a co-sharer entitled to pre-empt. *Serhmal v. Hukam Singh*, I. L. R. 20 All. 100, distinguished. *Janki Prasad v. Ishar Das*, All. Weekly Notes (1899) 125, referred to. *NARAIN SINGH v. PARBAT SINGH* (1901)

I. L. R. 23 All. 247

**34. — “Ekjaddi”—Wajib-ul-arz—Interpretation of document—Meaning of the term “ekjaddi.”** Held, that the term “ekjaddi,” used in the pre-emption clause of a wajib-ul-arz signifies persons descended from a common ancestor through the male line. *Guneshee Lal v. Zaraut Ali*, N. W. P. H. C. (1870) 343, referred to. *CHATAR SINGH v. KALYAN SINGH* (1900) . I. L. R. 23 All. 32

**35. — “Hissadar”—Wajib-ul-arz—Interpretation of document.** The clause in the wajib-ul-arz of a village relating to pre-emption gave a right of pre-emption against a stranger and at the price paid by the stranger, firstly, to a “hissadar ek jaddi,” secondly, to a “hissadar patti,” and, thirdly, to a “hissadar deh.” Held, that, in the absence of specific words to that effect, the clause above referred to could not be construed so as to give a right of pre-emption to a hissadar of a superior class upon a sale to a hissadar of an inferior class. *Ilahi Jan v. Pheku*, All. Weekly Notes (1895) 9, and *Ilahi Bakhsh v. Ghulam Abbas*, All. Weekly Notes (1898) 15, referred to. *SHEOBALAK SINGH v. LACHMIDHAR* (1901) . I. L. R. 23 All. 427

**36. — “Hissadaran shikmi”—Wajib-ul-arz—Construction of document—Meaning of the term “hissadaran shikmi.”** Held, that the expression “hissadaran shikmi,” as used in the clauses of a wajib-ul-arz dealing with various classes of persons who were entitled to pre-emption in preference to strangers, did not necessarily imply any idea of subordination, but was rightly considered applicable to persons who were co-sharers in the particular khattu of the patti in which the land was situated. *ABDUL SHAKUR v. MENDAI* (1901)

I. L. R. 23 All. 260

**37. — Mortgage—Mortgage by conditional sale—Accrual of right of pre-emption when sale becomes absolute—Wajib-ul-arz—Partition of mahal.** The wajib-ul-arz, framed in 1883, of an undivided mahal consisting of several villages contained the following provision as to pre-emption:—“Should

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“a sharer of any patti sell his share, he will sell it, first, to subordinate sharers; if they refuse to take it, then to sharers in the patti; and, if they also do not take it, then to proprietors of the mahal; and, in case of refusal by all the sharers before mentioned, he shall have power to transfer it to a stranger.” While this wajib-ul-arz was in force, namely, in 1890, certain property, to which its provisions applied, was mortgaged by a deed of conditional sale. In 1894, after partition of the mahal, a new wajib-ul-arz was framed for the mahal in which the mortgaged property was situated, which also contained a similar record of the custom of pre-emption, in the following terms:—“Should a sharer sell his share, he will sell it, first, to his subordinate sharers, afterwards to a sharer in the mahal, and, in case of refusal by the sharer in the mahal, to a sharer in the old mahal.” Held, that, the record as to the right of pre-emption being in both cases the record of a custom, and the provisions of the latter wajib-ul-arz being capable of application to the circumstances of the case, a right of pre-emption accrued to the shareholders in one of the other mahals into which the original mahal had been divided, upon the mortgage by conditional sale becoming an absolute sale in favour of a stranger. *Alu Prasad v. Sukhan*, I. L. R. 3 All. 610, followed. *Bechan Rai v. Nand Kishore Rai*, I. L. R. 14 All. 341, and *Gaya Bharthi v. Lakhnath Rai*, I. L. R. 20 All. 103, distinguished. *RAN BAHADUR RAI v. PARMESWAR BHARTI* (1902)

I. L. R. 24 All. 493

**38. — Construction of document—Wajib-ul-arz—Letters Patent, ss. 10 and 27—Difference of opinion between members of Bench hearing an appeal from a single Judge of the Court—Civil Procedure Code, s. 575.** Where the words of the pre-emptive clause of a wajib-ul-arz ran in the form: “If any co-sharer desires to sell or mortgage, etc., let him sell first to so-and-so, and then to so-and-so.” It was held by STANLEY, C.J., that the use of the imperative mood did not indicate a fresh contract between the co-sharers, but was consistent with the clause being a record of pre-existing custom. Where there is nothing to show clearly that such a clause embodies a new contract as to pre-emption, the rule of construction is that it is a record of a custom. *Majidan Bibi v. Hayatan*, All. Weekly Notes (1897) 3, and *Ali Nasir Khan v. Manik Chand*, I. L. R. 25 All. 90, followed. *PER BURKITT, J. (contra)*.—The language of the wajib-ul-arz indicates that what is recorded is a new contract between the co-sharers. Held, also, where an appeal under s. 10 of the Letters Patent is heard by a Bench consisting of two Judges, and such Judges are divided in opinion as to the decision to be given on such appeal, that the appeal will be decided according to the opinion of the senior Judge, that is, s. 575 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not, in respect of appeals under s. 10 of the Letters Patent, override s. 27 of the Letters Patent. *LACHMAN SINGH v. RAM LAGAN SINGH* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 10



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contd.**

**39.** *Wajib-ul-arz—*  
*Interpretation of document—N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), s. 91—Regulation VII of 1822, s. 9—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 35—Parties to suit.* Held, that, if the pre-emptive clause of a wajib-ul-arz does not show, and it is not otherwise proved, that such clause is merely the embodiment of a new contract as to pre-emption, the proper construction to be placed on such clause is that it is the recital of a pre-existing custom. *Ali Nasir Khan v. Manik Chand*, I. L. R. 25 All. 90, referred to. Held, also, that the entries in a wajib-ul-arz made prior to the coming into force of Act XIX of 1873 as to local usages connected with landed tenures are relevant evidence under s. 35 of the Evidence Act. *Kamta Prasad v. Chaturbhuj Sahai*, All. Weekly Notes (1904) 117, overruled. *Muhammad Hasan v. Munna Lal*, I. L. R. 8 All. 434, followed. In a suit for pre-emption the vendor is not a necessary party. *Hira Lal v. Ramjas*, I. L. R. 6 All. 57, and *Lok Singh v. Balvant Singh*, All. Weekly Notes (1903) 239, followed. *RAM SARUP v. SITAL PRASAD* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 549

**40.** *Wajib-ul-arz—*  
*Interpretation of document.* The pre-emptive clause of a wajib-ul-arz described the right of pre-emption as existing in (i) a near co-sharer in the same patti, (ii) any other co-sharer in the patti, (iii) a near co-sharer in another patti, and (iv) co-sharers in the mahal, the price being "whatever price is obtained from another." Held, that this did not mean that the right of pre-emption arose only in the case of a sale to a stranger, but that each class of pre-emptors was to have a preferential right of pre-emption as against persons belonging to the next following class, if the latter happen to be the purchasers. *SUKHDEO SINGH v. BAHADUR SINGH* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 544

**41.** *Wajib-ul-arz—*  
*Interpretation of document—Owner of an isolated plot of sir land.* Lal Singh and Thakur Das, joint owners of zamindari and sir land, made a grant of the sir land to their step-mother for maintenance during her life, with a reversion to themselves after her death. Subsequently the rights of Lal Singh in the zamindari, "except the rights in the sir" were sold by auction. After the death of the grantee the sir land came into the possession of the son of Lal Singh, who sold a portion of it. Held, that such a sale could not give rise to a right of pre-emption, not being within the terms of the wajib-ul-arz a transfer by a shareholder in the village. *HUSAIN BAKHSI v. DAMAR SINGH* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 547

**42.** *Wajib-ul-arz—*  
*Construction of document.* Where a wajib-ul-arz gave a right of pre-emption on transfer of a share, first, to a co-sharer, who was a collateral relative, then to a co-sharer in the patti, and then to a co-sharer in the mahal, "for the price offered by a stranger," it was held, that no right of pre-emption accrued

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contd.**

to a co-sharer of a superior class, when the sale was to a co-sharer of an inferior class; but the right only came into existence when the sale was to a stranger. *Sheo Balak Singh v. Lachmidhar*, I. L. R. 23 All. 427, referred to. *Sukhdeo Singh v. Bahadur Singh*, All. Weekly Notes (1904) 104, distinguished. *KHATUN BIBI v. SAYIDA BIBI* (1905) . I. L. R. 27 All. 457

**43.** *Wajib-ul-arz—*  
*Construction of document—Evidence—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 35—Effect, if any, of omission of an entry from a public document—Rules of the Board of Revenue for the settlement of Gorakhpur and Basti districts (Board's Circulars, 1890, 8—1, s. 38)—Meaning of the word "nadarad."* The plaintiff claimed a right of pre-emption in respect of a share in a certain mauza situated in the district of Gorakhpur. He relied principally on a wajib-ul-arz of the year 1866, as affording evidence of a custom of pre-emption prevailing in the village. The defendants contended that the wajib-ul-arz of 1866 was evidence only of a contract, and not of a custom, and further put forward the "memorandum of village customs" prepared at the Settlement of 1886-87, as showing that the right of pre-emption, whether by custom or contract, no longer existed. The wajib-ul-arz of 1866 contained the following provision as to the right of pre-emption: "Every co-sharer is entitled to transfer by sale or mortgage, but the condition of his doing so is, that he who wants to transfer do so, firstly, in favour of near co-sharers; secondly, in favour of other co-sharers of the *thok*; and, thirdly, in favour of strangers." The memorandum of village customs prepared at the Settlement of 1886-87 was prepared under rules framed by the Board of Revenue for the Settlement of the districts of Gorakhpur and Basti. The portion of those rules material to the present case is as follows:—"A memorandum of the village customs will be appended to each *khewat* by the Assistant Settlement Officer when he verifies the *jamabandi*, and it will take the place of the document hitherto known as the wajib-ul-arz."

... "In regard to any custom or constitution peculiar to the *mahal*, the following matters should be noted [class (d), s. 25]; (a) pre-emption (as regards *mahals* which belong to other than Mahomedan proprietors), when the proprietors expressly demand that it may be noted, and prove conclusively that the custom exists." In the memorandum of the village customs prepared at the Settlement of 1886-87 the only entry as to pre-emption was the word "*nadarad*." Held, that, as regards the wajib-ul-arz of 1866, in the absence of any evidence showing that the right of pre-emption arose by agreement or contract, it must be taken that the right recorded was customary right. *Majidan Bibi v. Sheik Hayatan*, All. Weekly Notes (1897) 3; *Isri Singh v. Ganga*, I. L. R. 2 All. 876, and *Muhammad Hasan v. Munna Lal*, I. L. R. 8 All. 434, referred to. As to the effect which the entry in the later memorandum of village customs of the word "*nadarad*" was alleged to have, as evidence



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of the disuse or abrogation of the custom or contract of pre-emption, it was held that the word "*nadarad*" itself did not, in the absence of any evidence showing that, as a matter of fact, the custom has ceased to exist, mean that the custom of pre-emption no longer subsisted, but was of no more value than if the memorandum of village customs had been completely silent on the subject; and it could not be inferred from such an entry alone that the custom had fallen into disuse or ceased to exist. *Sadhu Sahu v. Raja Ram*, I. L. R. 16 All. 40, referred to. *Ram Lagan v. Ram Ugrah*, All. Weekly Notes (1901) 29; *Gajadhar Pandey v. Hulas*, S. A. No. 198 of 1900, decided 14th Dec. 1900; and *Kodai Sahu v. Mahabir*, S. A. No. 342 of 1900, decided 7th Jan. 1901, overruled. Even if the word "*nadarad*" had the meaning contended for, and signified that the right of pre-emption no longer existed, it was an entry which it was in excess of the duties prescribed for Settlement Officers in the district in question to make, and therefore no evidential value whatever could be attached to it. In the matter of *Juggun Lall*, 7 C. L. R. 356, and *Queen-Empress v. Grees Chunder Banerjee*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1024, referred to. The cases of *Uman Parshad v. Gandharp Singh*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 20, and *Rani Lekhraj Kuar v. Baboo Mahpal Singh*, L. R. 7 I. A. 63, were referred to in the judgment of KNOX, J. *ALI NASIR KHAN v. MANIK CHAND* (F.B. 1902)

I. L. R. 25 All. 90

44. *Wajib-ul-arz—Construction of document—Mahomedan law—"Intiqal."* Where in a *wajib-ul-arz* it was recorded merely that "the custom of pre-emption prevails," it was held that in the absence of any special custom different from or not co-extensive with the Mahomedan law of pre-emption, the Mahomedan law must be applied. *Ram Prasad v. Abdul Karim*, I. L. R. 9 All. 513, followed. The term "*intiqal*" occurring in the pre-emptive clause of a *wajib-ul-arz* covers all kinds of transfers, mortgages as well as sales. *JAGDAM SAHAI v. MAHABIR PRASAD* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 All. 60

45. *Wajib-ul-arz—Construction of document—Partition of village into separate mahals.* In a village which consisted of two patti or mahals the *wajib-ul-arz* recorded a custom of pre-emption to the effect that in the case of a sale or mortgage by a shareholder a claim for pre-emption might be brought by (i) own brothers and nephews, (ii) cousins who are co-sharers, (iii) co-sharers in the patti, and (iv) share-holders in the village (*hissadaran deh*). The village was subsequently divided into more mahals: but no new *wajib-ul-arz* was framed:—Held, that a co-sharer in the village had a right of pre-emption as against a stranger, even though he did not own a share in the mahal, in which the property sold was situate. *Dalghanjan Singh v. Kalka Singh*, I. L. R. 22 All. 1, referred to. *JANKI v. RAM PARTAB SINGH* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 All. 286

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46. *Wajib-ul-arz—Construction of document—"Qimat."* Held, that the word "*qimat*" as used in the pre-emptive clause of a *wajib-ul-arz* is wide enough to include the consideration given for a usufructuary mortgage with possession as well as for a sale. *HULAS RAI v. RAM PRASAD* (1906) . I. L. R. 28 All. 454

47. *Wajib-ul-arz—Construction of document—Retention of same wajib-ul-arz after division of village into mahals—Hissadaran deh and hissadaran patti on the same footing.* Where a village was divided into three mahals and the new *wajib-ul-arz*, which was prepared for one of them A M was copied verbatim from the *wajib-ul-arz* of the village before division and clearly put *hissadaran deh* and *hissadaran patti* on the same footing:—Held, that a co-sharer in the mahal A M had no right of pre-emption in regard to property sold in A M as against a co-sharer who, though he had no share in the mahal A M, was a co-sharer in one of the other mahals. *Dalghanjan Singh v. Kalka Singh*, I. L. R. 22 All. 1, distinguished. *SARDAR SINGH v. IJAZ HUSAIN KHAN* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 614

48. *Wajib-ul-arz—Construction of document.* The pre-emptive clause of a *wajib-ul-arz* was drawn up in the following terms:—"In case of great necessity each co-sharer is entitled to transfer his property as recorded in the *khevat*, and the near co-sharers and the pattidars can claim a pre-emptive right; but out of them the one, who is nearer, will have a prior right to do so." Held, that the right of pre-emption only arose on a sale to a stranger. If the sale was to a co-sharer no right of suit accrued to a nearer co-sharer. *JAI DAT v. RAM BADAL* (1905) . I. L. R. 28 All. 168

49. *Custom—Wajib-ul-arz—Construction of document—Custom or contract.* In a suit for pre-emption two *wajib-ul-arz* were relied upon. The earlier *wajib-ul-arz* of the year 1864 provided that "if a sharer desires to transfer his share, the first right of pre-emption is possessed by his near brother, next by the sharers in the patti and next by sharers in other patti, and when all these have declined to take a transfer the sharer may sell to any one he likes." The later *wajib-ul-arz* of the year 1884 under the head, "custom as to pre-emption" provided that "no such case has as yet occurred: but we acknowledge the right of pre-emption." Held, that the *wajib-ul-arz* of 1864 was evidence of the existence of a right existing by custom and the provision in the latter was a recognition by the parties of the custom prevailing under the earlier *wajib-ul-arz*. *Ram Din v. Pokhar Singh*, I. L. R. 27 All. 553, followed. *DAULAT v. MATHURA* (1906) . I. L. R. 28 All. 456

50. *Wajib-ul-arz—Construction—Custom or contract—Silence as to right of pre-emption in wajib-ul-arz of last settlement—Duties of Settlement Officer when preparing record-of-rights.* Where in a suit for pre-emption, the *wajib-*



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concl'd.**

ul-arz of 1833 made no mention of the right and subsequent wajib-ul-arz of 1863 referred to the right of pre-emption in the following terms:—"In future every one would be entitled to transfer, etc.," but the wajib-ul-arz prepared at the settlement of 1890 was silent as to any right of pre-emption existing in the village: *Held*, that the record of 1863 was one of custom and that the silence of the record-of-rights of the latest settlement in respect to pre-emption was not a silence from which any inference opposed to the existence of the right of pre-emption could be drawn, inasmuch as the rules framed for the settlement of the district under s. 257 of Act No. XIX of 1873 did not require the Settlement Officer to put on record any custom of pre-emption. *Tota v. Sheo Narain, F. A. F. O. No. 135 of 1858, decided on June 15, 1899, dissented for. HARNAND v. KALLU (1909).* . . . **I. L. R. 31 All. 533**

**4. PURCHASE-MONEY.**

**1. ——— Apportionment of purchase-money, illegality of.** A person claiming to exercise his right of pre-emption must take the bargain as it was made. Any apportionment of the purchase-money is altogether illegal. *MADHUB CHUNDER NATH BISWAS v. TOMEE BEWAH* . . . **7 W. R. 210**

**2. ——— Dispute as to price—Arrangement between vendor and vendee.** In a suit to establish a right of pre-emption to property which had been sold, in which the plaintiff alleged that the actual value was different from that which was recited in the deed of sale between the defendants, the vendor and vendee:—*Held*, that plaintiff was entitled to have the property at the price agreed upon between the vendor and the vendee, but not to the benefit of an arrangement by which a portion of the price had been allowed to remain in the hands of the vendee that he might pay off a mortgage-debt. *GOLAM AYHYA v. JOY MUNGUL SINGH* . . . **13 W. R. 435**

**3. ——— Rights of pre-emptor—Sale contract—Deduction of amount recovered by vendee.** A pre-emptor is entitled to all the benefit which the vendee takes under the contract of sale. *Held*, therefore, where a certain sum was fixed as the price of the property, and such sum was paid by the vendee, but it was subsequently agreed between him and the vendor, as part of the sale-contract, that the vendee should recover for his own benefit certain moneys due to the vendor at the time of the sale, and the vendee recovered such moneys, that the pre-emptor was entitled to a deduction of the amount of such moneys from the sum originally fixed as the price of the property. *TAJAMMUL HUSAIN v. UDA* . . . **I. L. R. 3 All. 668**

**4. ——— Bad title of vendor as to part of property—Pre-emptor and preferential pre-emptor.** Certain persons sold an 8-anna share of a village. *G* sued the vendors and purchasers of the share to enforce his right of pre-emption in respect

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of the sale, and obtained a decree. *M*, claiming 1 anna 4 pies of the share as his property, sued the vendors and purchasers of the share and *G* for such 1 anna 4 pies, and obtained a decree. He then sued the same parties to enforce his right of pre-emption in respect of the remainder of the share, that is, 6 annas 8 pies, claiming to pay only a proportionate amount of the price paid for the whole share. *Held*, that *M* was not bound to pay the price paid for the whole share but only the proportionate amount of such price. *MUHAMMAD LATIF v. GOBIND SINGH* . . . **I. L. R. 5 All. 382**

**5. ——— Amount of purchase-money—Mortgage by conditional sale—Reg. XVII of 1806, s. 8—Foreclosure.** *Held*, that a proceeding under Regulation XVII of 1806 foreclosing a mortgage by conditional sale was not conclusive as to the amount of the mortgage-money against persons subsequently claiming to enforce a right of pre-emption and raising the question as to the amount of the purchase-money. *Forbes v. Ameeroonnissa Begum, 10 Moo. I. A. 340*, referred to. Also that on general principles, a decree in a suit to foreclose a mortgage by conditional sale cannot bind a person not a party to the suit claiming to enforce a right of pre-emption and raising a similar question. *Held*, also, that a person claiming a right of pre-emption in respect of a mortgage by conditional sale was bound to pay as the price of the property the entire amount due on such mortgage at the time it became absolute. *Ashik Ali v. Mathura Kandu, I. L. R. 5 All. 187*, followed. *TAWAKHUL RAI v. LACHMAN RAI. TAWAKHUL RAI v. SHEO GHULAM* . . . **I. L. R. 6 All. 341**

**6. ——— Arrangement between vendor and vendee as to payment of purchase money—Right of pre-emptor to stand in the position of the purchaser.** A co-sharer of a village sold part of his share to a stranger. This sale was subject to a right of pre-emption created by the wajib-ul-arz in favour of the partners of the vendor. Only a part of the purchase-money was paid in cash, it being agreed that the balance should remain on credit and be secured by two deeds in which the property was hypothecated by the purchaser to the vendor. *Held*, that it could not be said that the partners of the vendor had not only the right of pre-emption, but also the right to be put in the same position with reference to all the peculiar incidents of the payment of the purchase-money as that arranged between the vendor and purchaser. *NIHAL SINGH v. KOKALE SINGH* . . . **I. L. R. 8 All. 29**

**7. ——— Concealment by vendor and vendee of actual price—Evidence—Market value.** In suits for pre-emption, where the Court has come to the conclusion that the price alleged in the deed of sale is not the true contract price, and where it cannot ascertain the true price by reason either that the vendor and vendee refuse to disclose the same by their own evidence or their evidence cannot be believed, the Court should ascertain, if possible, what was the market price of the property in dispute



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at the time of the sale, and accept that market price as the probable price agreed upon between the parties. It is for the plaintiff either to show what was the actual contract price or to give substantial evidence on which the Court can act, showing what was the market value at the time of the sale. *AGAR SINGH v. RAGHURAJ SINGH*. I. L. R. 9 All. 471

8. ———— **Clause in wajib-ul-arz fixing price in case of sale to a co-sharer—Vendor and purchaser—Sale to a stranger for higher price—Agreement running with land—Pre-emptor entitled to take property on payment of price fixed in wajib-ul-arz—Purchaser entitled to recover purchase-money.** The wajib-ul-arz of a village contained a provision that any co-sharer desiring to sell his share should offer it to the other co-sharers before selling it to a stranger, and further that, in case of sale to co-sharer, the price to be paid should be calculated in proportion to the price for which a particular share had been sold in 1860. One of the co-sharers without first offering his share to the other co-sharers, sold it to a stranger, for a price higher than that which would be payable according to the above-mentioned provision. A suit for pre-emption was brought by a co-sharer against the vendor and the purchaser, and the plaintiff claimed the benefit of the sale upon payment of a sum calculated according to the condition of the wajib-ul-arz relating to sales between co-sharers. *Held*, by the Full Bench, that the condition of the wajib-ul-arz regarding the price to be paid for the share was still binding on the land, notwithstanding the sale; that a co-sharer was entitled to purchase the share at the price agreed before it could be sold to anyone else, and in case of sale to a stranger could call on the vendor and the purchaser to hand it over on payment of such price; and that, if the stranger vendee had paid more than was payable according to the wajib-ul-arz, he was entitled to recover it from the vendor. *Akbar Singh v. Juala Singh*, All. Weekly Notes (1885) 216, distinguished by *TYRRELL, J. KARIM BUKHSH KHAN v. PHULA BIBI*. I. L. R. 8 All. 102

9. ———— **Agreement running with the land—Pre-emptor entitled to take property on payment of price fixed in wajib-ul-arz.** The pre-emptive clause in the wajib-ul-arz of a village contained a provision that the right of pre-emption could be enforced on payment of such sum as would represent the "kimat-i-murav vajah," that is according to current rates. A suit for pre-emption was brought against the vendor and vendee of a certain fractional share in the village, and the plaintiff claiming the benefit of the above provision disputed the price entered in the sale-deed as the proper price for the share according to current rates. *Held*, following *Karim Baksh Khan v. Phula Bibi*, I. L. R. 8 All. 102, that a co-sharer was entitled to purchase the share sold at a price to be ascertained according to the rule in that behalf contained in the wajib-ul-arz, and the condition in the wajib-ul-arz regarding the price to be paid for the share sold was

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binding on the land and therefore binding on the stranger vendee. *UPMANI KUAR v. RAM DIN*

I. L. R. 10 All. 621

10. ———— **Application for refund of money paid into Court by a successful plaintiff in a suit for pre-emption, the decree having been set aside on appeal—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 583—Interest.** A plaintiff in a pre-emption suit obtained a decree and paid into Court the pre-emptive price as stated in that decree, and the money was drawn out of Court by the vendor. Subsequently the decree was reversed on appeal, and the plaintiff then applied under s. 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for a refund of the money paid into Court as above described with interest. *Held*, that the pre-emptor was entitled to a refund of the money together with interest up to date of repayment. *Rogers v. Comptoir D'Escompte de Paris*, L. R. 3 P. C. 475, followed. *Jaswant Singh v. Dip Singh*, I. L. R. 7 All. 432, referred to. *Hatti Prasad v. Chattarpal Dubey*, All. Weekly Notes (1888) 287, dissented from. *BHAGWAN SINGH v. UMMAT-UL-HASNAIN*

I. L. R. 18 All. 262

11. ———— **Decreed pre-emptive price paid into Court by pre-emptor—Subsequent partial withdrawal by a creditor of the decree-holder of the money so paid in.** The holder of a decree for pre-emption paid the decreed pre-emptive price into Court. A creditor of the decree-holder applied for attachment of the money so paid in, and ultimately was allowed by the Court to withdraw a portion of it. After the decree for pre-emption had been confirmed in appeal, the pre-emptor applied for possession of the pre-empted property. *Held*, that the decree-holder was entitled to obtain possession, and that it was not competent to the Court to pay out to any one but the person entitled to it under the decree for pre-emption any portion of the pre-emptive price, so long as the decree for pre-emption was not modified or reversed in appeal. *ABDUS SALAM v. WILAYAT ALI KHAN*. I. L. R. 19 All. 256

12. ———— **Calculation of price—Covenant for pre-emption, Breach of—Suit to enforce covenant.** Four brothers, on making a partition of their joint property, covenanted with each other that if any one of them, or their heirs, had to sell his share, he should offer to sell the same to one of the co-sharers. One of the brothers having died, his widow sold his share which she had inherited without such an offer to the surviving brothers, who thereupon sued her and her vendee for possession upon payment of what they alleged to be the value of the property (*viz.*, R27). The Munsif found the value to be greater (*viz.*, R95), and set aside the sale without giving possession. The lower Appellate Court made an order that, if plaintiffs deposited R95 in Court, their appeal would be decreed. The plaintiffs deposited the amount, and a decree for possession was given them. *Held*, that neither of the Courts had the power to make the decrees which they did; and the order of the lower Appellate



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Court to deposit the money was not binding on the plaintiffs, who had no right under their contract to an election, after the value had been ascertained whether they would purchase at that price or not. *Quære*: Can a perpetual covenant as to the disposition of land be enforced? **TRIPOORA SOONDUREE v. JUGGERNATH DUTT** . . . **24 W. R. 321**

**13. Conditional decree—*Appeal***  
—*Costs—Civil Procedure Code, 1852, ss. 214, 583.* A Court of first instance decreed a claim for pre-emption conditionally, on the pre-emptor paying into Court R125 within a specified period, and also awarded the pre-emptor R39-9-0 as his costs in the suit. Within the specified period the pre-emptor paid into Court the R125, and subsequently executed his decree for costs, by drawing out therefrom the R39-9-0. After this, the decree was modified on appeal, the Appellate Court raising the R125 payable as the condition of pre-emption to R200, and reversing the first Court's order as to costs. Within the period specified in the Appellate Court's decree, the pre-emptor paid into Court the further sum of R75. Subsequently the vendee, defendant, applied to the Court under s. 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure to have the property in suit restored to him, contending that the pre-emptor had failed to pay the full R200 within the prescribed period. *Held* by STRAIGHT, J., affirming the judgment of MAHMOOD, J., that this contention must fail; that the payment of R125 due under the first Court's decree could not be said to have been reduced by the pre-emptor subsequently executing against the amount so paid the order of that Court in his favour for costs, and that the subsequent payment of R75 within the period prescribed by the Appellate Court satisfied the requirements of that Court's decree, subject to the judgment-debtor's right to recover the costs realized in execution of the first Court's decree. *Held*, by TYRRELL, J. (*contra*), that, although the pre-emptor had once made a payment, which for a few days was a compliance with the first Court's decree, such compliance became immaterial when that decree was modified on appeal, and as he had never had in any Court a credit for R200 as required by the Appellate Court's decree which alone was the decree in the cause, he had failed to fulfil the condition essential to pre-emption, and therefore the defendant's application should be allowed. **BALMUKAND v. PANCHAM**  
**I. L. R. 10 All. 400**

**14. Mortgage—Mortgage-money fraudulently over-stated—Claim of pre-emptor decreed at a lower figure—Suit by mortgagees against mortgagor, to recover the difference.** Din Bandhu mortgaged to Sheodihal and others certain property, and the mortgagor and the mortgagees, for purposes of their own, fraudulently agreed to overstate the consideration for the mortgage. One Shuhrat Singh then brought a pre-emption suit against the parties to the mortgage, and obtained a decree, which allowed him to take over the rights of the mortgagees upon payment of a sum much less than

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the consideration stated in the bond, which was found by the Court to have been largely fictitious. The mortgagees, after the success of Shuhrat Singh's suit, sued the representatives of the mortgagor to recover from them the difference between the price paid by Shuhrat Singh and the consideration mentioned in the deed of mortgage. They based their suit mainly upon a stipulation in the deed, to the effect that, if the mortgage money due to the mortgagees was in any way jeopardized, the mortgagees would be entitled to realize it with interest at 9 per cent per annum, and partly upon general grounds of equity. *Held*, that from no point of view were the plaintiffs entitled to succeed. The stipulations in the bond above referred to enured to the benefit of the pre-emptor, and, since the plaintiffs had joined with the defendants in misrepresenting the amount of the consideration for the mortgage, they could not be allowed to take advantage of their own wrong. **BALBHADDAR NATH v. SHEODIHAL (1902)**  
**I. L. R. 24 All. 514**

**15. Set-off—Decree in pre-emption suit—Payment into Court—Costs.** A judgment, dated the 24th September 1904, in favour of the pre-emptors under a foreclosure decree directed payment within two months of R2,100, together with the costs, if any, incurred by the purchaser in obtaining the order absolute. The corresponding decree contained the words, "together with the costs of the purchaser in the foreclosure case, if any." The decree also awarded the plaintiffs a sum of R117-4-0 as costs. The R2,100 was paid within the time fixed. On the 24th February, 1905, the judgment-debtors claimed that they were entitled to be restored to possession and that the suit must be deemed to have been dismissed, inasmuch as the costs, amounting to R25-12-0, of the proceedings relative to the order absolute had not been deposited. *Held*, following *Ishri v. Gopal Saran, I. L. R. 6 All. 351*, that the R117-4-0 could be set off against the R25-12-0; that the R2,100 deposited was therefore in excess of the actual sum payable under the decree; and that the judgment-debtors' claim failed. *Jaggar Nath Pande v. Joku Tewari, I. L. R. 18 All. 223*, referred to. **PARMANAND RAOT v. GOBARDHAN SAHAI (1906)** . . . **I. L. R. 28 All. 676**

**16. Fictitious price—Price stated in sale-deed alleged to be fictitious—Burden of proof.** When a plaintiff pre-emptor comes into Court alleging that the price entered in the sale-deed is fictitious, it rests on him to give some *prima facie* evidence that this is the case. But comparatively slight evidence is sufficient for such purpose, and it will then be for the parties to the sale to show that the price alleged to have been paid was actually paid. *Bhagwan Singh v. Mahabir Singh, I. L. R. 5 All. 184*, *Sheo Pargash Dube v. Dhanraj Dube, I. L. R. 9 All. 225*, and *Agar Singh v. Raghuraj Singh, I. L. R. 29 All. 471*, referred to. *O'Connor v. Ghulam Haidar, I. L. R. 8 All. 217*, not followed. **ABDUL MAJID v. AMOLAK (1907)** . . . **I. L. R. 29 All. 618**



PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*

## 5. PROFITS OF LAND.

1. ———— **Lambardar collecting rents for co-sharer**—*Right of suit by pre-emptor to recover profits accruing between the date of his decree and the time when he obtained mutation of names—Principal and agent.* Held, that a pre-emptor who had obtained a decree for pre-emption in respect of a share in a pure zemindari village could not successfully maintain a suit against the judgment-debtor co-sharer for the profits of the pre-empted share accruing between the date of the original decree and the date of his obtaining mutation of names, such profits having been collected by the lambardar, but not paid over to the judgment-debtor; inasmuch as neither could the lambardar be considered as an agent of the co-sharer, whose possession of the profits was the possession of his principal, nor was there any obligation on the co-sharer to collect the profits and hold them to the use of the plaintiff. **SRI KISHEN LAL v. ATMA RAM**  
I. L. R. 19 All. 261

2. ———— **Annual profits—One total price for ten villages—Ten separate conveyances having a separate price for each village—Government revenue—Amount to be paid on pre-emption.** Where A agreed to buy from B ten villages for one total price, but by subsequent agreement between A and B ten separate conveyances were executed showing ten separate prices:—Held, in a suit for pre-emption that if it was proved that the consideration mentioned in the sale-deeds had been paid and received, the Court should not look further and ascertain the value of the property in suit by a consideration of the annual profits or of the amount of Government revenue. **O'CONNOR v. GHULAM HAIDAR** (1906) . I. L. R. 28 All. 617

## 6. LOSS OR WAIVER OF RIGHT.

1. ———— **Refusal to purchase—Conditional decree.** Held, that the plaintiff, having refused to purchase at the sum actually given, could not come into Court and ask for a conditional decree, which is given in cases where a higher price than was actually paid has been alleged to have been paid to the prejudice of the pre-emptor. **KUDHARA v. KHUMAN SINGH** . . . . . 1 **Agra 265**

2. ———— **Bona fide belief that price stated is in excess of real price.** A person having a right of pre-emption does not lose it by refusing to purchase the property at the price at which it is offered to him, because he believes that such price is in excess of the real price, where such belief is entertained and expressed in good faith. **LAJJA PRASAD v. DEBI PRASAD**  
I. L. R. 3 All. 236

3. ———— **Effect of imperfect partition on right of pre-emption.** Where there is imperfect partition,—*viz.*, where the land is divided, but the joint liability to the Government remains, and the property is not made into separate mehals,—the right of pre-emption is not lost. **RAM PERSHAD v. BULJEET SINGH** . . . . . 2 **Agra 252**

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4. ———— **Pre-emptor opposing mutation of names—Effect of such opposition on right of pre-emption.** Held, that a pre-emptor is not precluded from claiming the property by right of pre-emption because he opposed the mutation of names only on the ground that the vendor was not in possession. **PEERA v. SHIMBHOO** . 2 **Agra 348**

5. ———— **Insertion of names of purchaser's sons in deed of sale, effect of—Absence of intention to defraud.** Held, that a preferential right to purchase is not lost merely by the inclusion of the names of the sons of the purchaser in the sale-deed, if it be proved that the actual purchaser was the father, and the names of the sons were included in accordance with the prevailing usage, without any intention to defraud the other co-sharers. **DOWLAT SINGH v. KEDAR SINGH**  
3 **Agra 25**

6. ———— **Re-sale—Effect of re-sale on right of pre-emption.** A re-sale cannot destroy the right of pre-emption in a property, the sale of which is admitted by the vendor. **PUTTOOARAM v. SHAM LALL SAHOO** . . . . . 7 **W. R. 208**

7. ———— **Acquiescence in mortgage by conditional sale—Relinquishment.** Acquiescence in a mortgage by conditional sale does not involve relinquishment of the right of pre-emption upon the conditional sale eventually becoming absolute. **AJAIB NATH v. MATHURA PRASAD**  
I. L. R. 11 All. 184

8. ———— **Relinquishment of right—Partition of property sold on application of vendee—Silence of pre-emptor—Waiver—Estoppel.** Subsequently to the sale of a one-third share in a village, the vendee applied for partition of the share. A co-sharer, who had a right of pre-emption in respect of the sale, made no objection to this application, and the partition was effected. The co-sharer afterwards set up a claim to pre-emption. Held, that there was nothing in the conduct of the pre-emptor which could amount to estoppel, or to a waiver of his right of pre-emption. **Motee Sah v. Goklee, N.-W. P. S. D. A. (1861) 506**, distinguished and dissented from; and **Bhairon Singh v. Lalman, All. Weekly Notes (1884) 216**, referred to by **MAHMOOD, J. THAMMAN SINGH v. JAMAL-UD-DIN** . . . . . I. L. R. 7 All. 442

9. ———— **Transfer of property to "stranger"—Right of decree-holder to possession.** The holder of a decree enforcing a right of pre-emption, who subsequently to the date of the decree sells the property to a "stranger," and permits the latter to pay the purchase-money decreed into Court, does not by such conduct debar himself from obtaining possession of the property in execution of the decree. **Rajjo v. Lalman, I. L. R. 5 All. 180**, and **Sarju Prasad v. Jamnā Prasad**, unreported, distinguished. **RAM SAHAI v. GAYA**  
I. L. R. 7 All. 107

10. ———— **Co-sharer joining relatives with him in claiming right—Effect on**



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*co-sharer's right—Stranger.* A co-sharer of an estate, who has a right of pre-emption, does not merely by joining with himself members of his family who are not co-sharers in such state in a suit to enforce such right, defeat such right. *Manna Singh v. Ramadhin Singh*, I. L. R. 4 All. 252, distinguished. *BHUREY MAL v. NAWAL SINGH*  
I. L. R. 4 All. 259

**11. ——— Forfeiture of right—Suit by pre-emptor and "stranger" to enforce right—Effects on pre-emptor's right—"Justice, equity, and good conscience"—Mahomedan law.** Held, applying the doctrine of the Mahomedan law of pre-emption, such doctrine being in accordance with justice, equity, and good conscience, that a co-sharer in a village, who had under the *wajib-ul-arz* a right of pre-emption in respect of the sale of a share who joined a "stranger" (that is, a person who has not such right) with himself in suing to enforce such right, thereby forfeited such right. *Sheodiyal Ram v. Bhyro Ram*, N.-W. P. S. D. A. (1860) 53; *Guneshee Lal v. Zaraut Ali*, 2 N. W. 343; and *Fakir Rawot v. Emambaksh*, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 35, referred to. *BHAWANI PRASAD v. DAMRU*  
I. L. R. 5 All. 197

*RAJJO v. LALMAN* . I. L. R. 5 All. 180

**12. ——— Effect on right of pre-emption of breach on a former occasion of the provisions of the *wajib-ul-arz* relating to pre-emption.** *Semble*: That a claimant for pre-emption under a *wajib-ul-arz* would not forfeit his right to pre-emption if upon a former occasion he had violated the provisions of the *wajib-ul-arz* by mortgaging his share to a stranger. *Gokul Chand v. Ram Prasad*, All. Weekly Notes (1891) 127, followed. *Rajjo v. Lalman*, I. L. R. 5 All. 180, referred to. *UJAGAR LAL v. JIA LAL*  
I. L. R. 18 All. 382

**13. ——— Effect on right of pre-emption of joining a stranger in suit for pre-emption—Amendment of plaint—Striking out name of party.** Where a plaintiff having a right to pre-empt joins with himself in a suit for pre-emption a stranger, *i.e.*, a person who has no such right, he thereby forfeits his right to pre-empt, and this disability cannot be overcome by amending the plaint by striking out the name of the stranger. *Bhawani Prasad v. Damru*, I. L. R. 5 All. 147; *Ram Nath v. Badri Narain*, I. L. R. 19 All. 148; and *Fida Ali v. Muzaffar Ali*, I. L. R. 5 All. 65, referred to. *BHUPAL SINGH v. MOHAN SINGH*  
I. L. R. 19 All. 324

**14. ——— Sale to a stranger—*Wajib-ul-arz*—Re-sale before suit to a co-sharer—Effect of such re-sale.** In cases of pre-emption based upon a *wajib-ul-arz* the right of pre-emption does not survive, if the land which is subject to pre-emption having been sold to a stranger, is subsequently re-sold by the stranger vendee before suit to a co-sharer having equal rights with those seeking pre-emption. *SERH MAL v. HUKAM SINGH*  
I. L. R. 20 All. 100

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**15. ——— Non-payment of price fixed by decree within the time limited by decree—Effect of an appeal from a decree for pre-emption on the time limited for paying in the pre-emptive price—Limitation—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 214.** A decree was given in favour of the plaintiff in a suit for pre-emption. The plaintiff paid in a portion only of the pre-emptive price within the time limited by the decree. The defendant appealed. Long after the time prescribed for payment by the original decree had expired, the defendant's appeal was dismissed, but the time for payment was not extended by the Appellate Court's decree. The plaintiff then, after the lapse of a period from the date of the appellate decree in excess of that which had been given him for payment by the decree of the first Court, paid in the balance of the pre-emptive price, which was accepted by the Court. On appeal by the defendant from the Court's order directing the balance of the pre-emptive price to be received, it was held that the order of the Court allowing the payment was without jurisdiction, the decree having, on the expiration of the time limited without payment by the plaintiff, become a decree in favour of the defendant, and the plaintiff having therefore lost his right of pre-emption under it. *JAGGAR NATH PANDE v. JOKHU TEWARI* . I. L. R. 18 All. 223

**16. ——— Contract running with the land—Sale—Right of re-purchase, provided in a conveyance.** In a conveyance executed by plaintiffs in favour of defendant No. 1's father, it was provided that, in case he sold the property subsequently, he would be bound to give preference to the plaintiffs, *i.e.*, his vendors, to purchase the same for a certain sum, and on their refusal to accept the offer he would be at liberty to sell the same to others. After his father's death, defendant No. 1, without offering to sell the land to the plaintiffs, though they were willing to purchase it, sold the same to defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4, who had notice of the contract. Held, that the contract was not binding on defendant No. 1, and therefore the sale to defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4 was not liable to be set aside. *NOBIN CHANDRA SOOT v. NABAB ALI SARKAR* (1900) . 5 C. W. N. 343

**17. ——— Acquiescence—*Wajib-ul-arz*—Pre-emptor accepting a lease of property in suit from the vendee.** Where in a suit for pre-emption based upon a custom declared in the *wajib-ul-arz* it was found that the pre-emptor had, with knowledge of his right as pre-emptor, accepted a lease of the land claimed from the vendee, it was held that this amounted to such an acquiescence in the sale as would bar the plaintiff's right of suit. *KISHAN LAL v. ISHRI* (1905) . I. L. R. 28 All. 237

**7. CUSTOM.**

**1. ——— Evidence of custom—Custom need not be immemorial.** In order that a custom of pre-emption may be held to be established it is not necessary to show that the custom is immemorial,



PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*7. CUSTOM—*contd.*

in the sense of the English common law. Hence, where in a village, which came into existence after 1846 there was found in 1869 evidence of a custom of pre-emption amongst the co-sharers, and further evidence of such a custom in 1885, it was held, that the custom was sufficiently established for the Courts to give effect to it. *Kuar Sen v. Mamman*, I. L. R. 17 All. 87, *Gokul Dichhit v. Maheshri Dichhit*, All. Weekly Notes (1905) 266, and *Mohidin v. Shirlingappa*, I. L. R. 23 Bom. 666, followed. *LEKHRAJ BHARTI v. ANRUDH TIWARI* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 434

2. ——— Local custom—*Finding by lower Court regarding existence of alleged custom—Second appeal.* Where on a question as to the existence or non-existence of a particular custom the lower Appellate Court has acted upon illegal evidence or on evidence, which is legally insufficient to establish an alleged custom, the question is one of law; or if it appears that the lower Appellate Court has clearly from its judgment disregarded legal evidence, the Court can interfere; but the High Court in second appeal is not bound notwithstanding that the lower Appellate Court has heard and weighed the legal evidence offered on both sides, to examine and consider the evidence in all cases when the existence or non-existence of an alleged custom is the sole question at issue. *Kakarla Abbaya v. Raja Venkata Papayya Rao*, I. L. R. 29 Mad. 24, *Chakauri Devi v. Sundari Devi*, All. Weekly Notes (1906) 144, referred to. *HASHIM ALI v. ABDUL RAHMAN* (1906) . I. L. R. 28 All. 698

3. ——— *Wajib-ul-arz—Inference of custom from entry in previous wajib-ul-arz—Mahomedan law.* A village wajib-ul-arz, prepared in the year 1883, contained only the following entry with reference to pre-emption:—"Custom of pre-emption:—No pre-emption suit has been instituted, but the custom of pre-emption is accepted." But the wajib-ul-arz of the same village prepared in 1864, was more explicit. It ran as follows:—"Mention of the right of pre-emption:—When it is desired to transfer a share, the heirs and near brethren have the right first. On their refusal to take, the transferor is competent to sell, mortgage or assign to anyone he likes." Held, that in the wajib-ul-arz of 1883 the villagers intended to reproduce—and understood they were in fact reproducing—the custom of pre-emption that prevailed in 1864: that therefore the provisions of the Mahomedan law were not applicable. *POKHAR SINGH v. HUSAIN KHAN* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 679

4. ——— *Wajib-ul-arz—Custom—Effect of perfect partition, no new wajib-ul-arzes for the new mahals being framed.* Where a village, in which, according to the wajib-ul-arz, a custom of pre-emption existed amongst the co-sharers, was divided by perfect partition into three mahals, but no fresh wajib-ul-arzes were framed, for the new mahals it was held that the custom was either abrogated in its entirety, or remained applic-

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able in its entirety to the co-sharers in the various new mahals *inter se*. *Badri Prasad v. Hashmat Ali*, I. L. R. 29 All. 299, discussed. *Dalganjan Singh v. Kalka Singh*, I. L. R. 22 All. 1, referred to. *GOBIND RAM v. MASIHULLAH KHAN* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 295

5. ——— *Wajib-ul-arz—Custom of contract—Interpretation of document—Exchange—Variation in terms of wajib-ul-arz.* An exchange gives rise to a right of pre-emption when such right arises on a sale. Where there has been a variation in the terms of the wajib-ul-arzes prepared respectively at two settlements, and the previous wajib-ul-arz recorded a custom: Held, that the variation in the terms of the later wajib-ul-arz did not necessarily affect the custom. *Gulab Singh v. Jag Ram*, 3 All. L. J. R. 646, distinguished. *DARYAO SINGH v. JAHAN SINGH* (1909)

I. L. R. 31 All. 539

## 8. MISCELLANEOUS CASES.

1. ——— *Suit for pre-emption—Custom and contract—Practice.* It is the practice of the Courts to allow claims for pre-emption to be asserted on the grounds both of contract and custom in one and the same plaint. *NEHCHUL v. THAN SINGH* 2 N. W. 222

2. ——— *Pleading right of pre-emption—Right pleaded in defence to suit for possession by purchaser of co-sharer's rights and interests.* A co-sharer of a village, who is in possession, cannot plead the existence of a right of pre-emption in defence to a suit for possession by the purchaser of the rights and interests of another co-sharer. *AJUDHIA BAKHSH SINGH v. ARAB ALI KHAN* . . . . . I. L. R. 7 All. 892

3. ——— *Want of opportunity to exercise right—Conditions essential before alienation.* Held, that the plaintiff, who had a preferential right to purchase, and had no opportunity offered him, had a right to enforce those conditions, a compliance with which was essential before alienation to others. *ABDOOLAH KHAN v. AMEERUN* 1 Agra 274

4. ——— *Hindus—How far Mahomedan law of pre-emption applicable amongst Hindus—Statement of claim—Meaning and not form of statement to be considered.* Held, that "in the absence of allegation or proof as to any custom different from, or not co-extensive with the Mahomedan law of pre-emption that law must be applied" between Hindus. *Jagdam Sahai v. Mahabir Prasad*, I. L. R. 28 All. 60, *Chowdhree Birj Lal v. Raja Goor Sahai*, N.-W. P. H. C. Rep. F. B. 1866-67, Vol. 1, p. 128, and *Jai Kuar v. Heera Lal*, All. H. C. (1875) 1, referred to. Further, where the words used were "I have a claim for pre-emption on this house. If any one else purchases it, I shall be put to inconvenience. Go at this very moment and take the money from Shoshi Bhusan Sircar and tell Ram Charan and Chakauri Devi to return the



**PRE-EMPTION—*contd.*****8. MISCELLANEOUS CASES—*contd.***

house by taking the money." *Held*, that this was sufficient claim; the concluding portion evincing a desire on the part of the plaintiff to avail herself of her right. If she had merely stated that she had a claim that would not have been sufficient. *CHAKAURI DEVI v. SUNDARI DEVI* (1905)

**I. L. R. 28 All. 590**

**5. ——— Sale of land by Government—*Wajib-ul-urz.*** When Government has acquired land permanently it does not become a co-sharer in the village, to which the land originally appertained, and on a sale thereof the provisions contained in the village *wajib-ul-urz*, which deal with sales by co-sharers in the village, are not applicable. *GAYA SINGH v. RAM SINGH* (1905)

**I. L. R. 28 All. 235**

**6. ——— Attachment of price—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 266 (k)—Execution of decree—Attachment—Contingent right—Right of pre-emption under a conditional decree for pre-emption.*** *Held*, that the interest in the pre-empted property of a successful pre-emptor, who has not yet paid the pre-emptive price fixed by his decree is an interest the attachment of which is prohibited by s. 266 (k) of the Code of Civil Procedure. *GORAKH SINGH v. SIDH GOPAL* (1906)

**I. L. R. 28 All. 383**

**7. ——— Right of heir to maintain suit—*Wajib-ul-arz—Devolution of pre-emptor's interest before suit brought—Plaintiff pre-emptor joining as co-plaintiff the heir of a deceased co-sharer.*** Where a right of pre-emption exists by custom as recorded in the village *wajib-ul-arz*, the right having once accrued does not of necessity lapse by the death of the pre-emptor before making a claim, but descends along with the property in virtue of which it subsists to the heir of the pre-emptor. *Secus* if the pre-emptor sells such property to a stranger. The heir of a pre-emptor cannot be considered to be a "stranger" as that term is generally understood in connection with a customary right of pre-emption; nor will his joinder with a co-sharer in a suit for pre-emption have the effect of defeating the right of his co-plaintiff. *So held* by *RICHARDS* and *TUD-BALL, JJ.* (*dissentiente BANERJI, J.*). *Muhammad Yusuf Ali Khan v. Dal Kuar*, *I. L. R. 20 All. 148*, and *Kaunsilla Kunwar v. Gopal Prasad*, *I. L. R. 28 All. 424*, followed. *Sheo Narain v. Hira*, *I. L. R. 7 All. 535*, distinguished. *Kedar Nath v. Chunni Lal*, *S. A. No. 1123 of 1904*, decided 10th January 1907, unreported, *Fida Ali v. Muzaffar Ali*, *I. L. R. 5 All. 65*, *Bhawani Prasad v. Damru*, *I. L. R. 5 All. 197*, *Bhupal Singh v. Mohan Singh*, *I. L. R. 19 All. 324*, and *Chotu v. Husain Bakhsh*. *All. Weekly Notes* (1893) 25, referred to. *Per BANERJI, J.* :—The right of pre-emption being a right of substitution, the heir of pre-emptor not having himself a right of pre-emption at the date of the sale, cannot maintain a suit: but he is not a "stranger," whose joinder in a suit for pre-emption would defeat the right of a co-plaintiff himself entitled to pre-empt. *Sheo Narain v. Hira*, *I. L. R. 7 All. 535*, followed. *Muhammad Yusuf Ali Khan v. Dal Kuar*, *I. L. R.*

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*20 All. 148*, *Kedar Nath v. Chunni Lal*, decided 10th January 1907, unreported, *Bhawani Prasad v. Damru*, *I. L. R. 5 All. 65*, *Bhupal Singh v. Mohan Singh*, *I. L. R. 19 All. 324*, and *Chotu v. Husain Bakhsh*, *All. Weekly Notes* (1893) 25, referred to. *WAJID ALI v. SHABAN* (1909) **I. L. R. 31 All. 623**

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1. \_\_\_\_\_ Assertion of right, form of—  
*Election in alternative case.* The right asserted in a claim founded on prescription should be strictly and clearly defined, and cannot be based on rights which are inconsistent. When a party is called upon by the Court to elect which branch of a double case he will proceed with, the election must be distinct and clear, and such as will bind him and will show accurately on the face of the record the claim (if any) which is abandoned. *BIJOY KESHUB ROY v. OBHOY CHURN GHOSE* . . . 18 W. R. 198

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**2. EASEMENTS.****(a) GENERALLY.**

2. \_\_\_\_\_ Prescription Act—*Law of mofussil of India.* The English Prescription Act does not apply to the mofussil of India. *BIJOY PROKASH SINGH v. AMEER ALLY* . . 9 W. R. 91

3. \_\_\_\_\_ Easements, law of, applicability of, to British subjects in India—*Civil law.* The law of easements in England, being derived from the civil law, has no peculiarities to debar its being applied to British subjects in India. *CULLIANDOSS KIRFARAM v. CLEVELAND* . . . 2 Ind. Jur. O. S. 15

4. \_\_\_\_\_ Foundation of prescriptive rights—*Presumption of grant.* Prescriptive rights are founded on the presumption of a grant from long-continued uninterrupted user and enjoyment as of right. *CHUNDER JALEAH v. RAMCHURN MOOKERJEE* . . . . . 15 W. R. 212

5. \_\_\_\_\_ Easements how created—*User—Easement creating damage to servient tenement.* A grant, either express or implied, in prescription, is necessary to establish an easement. Conclusive evidence is required to prove an easement, the result of which is great damage to the servient tenement. Without an uninterrupted user, there can be no claim to an easement. *ZUMMEER ALI v. DOORGABUN* . . . 1 W. R. 230

6. \_\_\_\_\_ Long possession—*User—Presumption of title.* Long and undisturbed user or possession confers title by prescription, because it is presumed to be founded on title. *GOOROO PERSHAD ROY v. BYKUNTO CHUNDER ROY* . . . 6 W. R. 82

7. \_\_\_\_\_ Permissive possession. To constitute a right by prescription, the possession must have been as of right. Mere permissive possession cannot be the basis of right by prescription. *ASKAR v. RAM MANICK ROY* . . . 5 B. L. R. Ap. 12; 13 W. R. 344

8. \_\_\_\_\_ Right of user—*Ancient and uninterrupted right.* A party claiming the right of user by prescription over the property of another must show not only that the right has existed from ancient days, but also that it has been exercised as



**PRESCRIPTION—contd.****2. EASEMENTS—contd.****(a) GENERALLY—concl'd.**

of right, and has not been interrupted. **MALLIK JAWAD-UL-HUQ v. RAM PRASAD DAS**

**3 B. L. R. A. C. 281**

**9. ——— Period creating right—User as creating prescriptive title.** It was formerly held that no fixed period had been laid down to create a right by prescription. **KRISHNA MOHAN MOOKERJEE v. JAGANNATH ROY JUGI**

**2 B. L. R. A. C. 323**

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**DOORGA CHURN PAUL v. PEAREE MOHUN**

**9 W. R. 283**

**BIJOY KESHUB ROY v. OBHOY CHURN GHOSE**

**16 W. R. 168**

**10. ——— Uninterrupted enjoyment—Bom. Reg. V of 1827, s. 1, cl. 1.** Held, that uninterrupted enjoyment for a period of more than thirty years was necessary in order to acquire a title by prescription to an easement in the mofussil of the Bombay Presidency; the law applicable to such cases being Regulation V of 1827, s. 1, cl. 1, and that Act XIV of 1859 had made no alteration in this respect. **ANAJI DATTUSHET v. MORUSHET BAPUSHET**

**2 Bom. 354 : 2nd Ed. 334**

**RAMBHAU BAPUSHET v. BHAI BAPUSHET**

**2 Bom. 352 : 2nd Ed. 333**

**11. ——— User—Cases prior to Limitation Act, 1871.** Prior to the passing of the Limitation Act, 1871, in order to give rise to an easement by prescription over immoveable property in the island of Bombay, it was necessary for a plaintiff claiming such an easement to prove twenty years' uninterrupted user of it. **NAROTAM BAPU v. GANPATRAY PANDURANG**

**8 Bom. O. C. 69**

The period was fixed by the Limitation Act, 1871, s. 27, at twenty years, and that provision has been continued in the present Limitation Act, s. 26.

**12. ——— Alterations in property—Severance of tenements—Continuance of easement without grant.** If the alterations which a man makes in his property before alienation of any part of it are palpable and manifest, and in their nature permanent changes in the disposition of the property, so that one part thereof becomes dependent on another, the purchaser of either part must take the land either burdened or benefited, as the case may be, by the qualities thus attached thereto. On a severance of tenements, an easement in its nature continuous would pass by implication of law without any words of grant. **AMUTOOL RUSOOL v. JHOOMUCK SINGH**

**24 W. R. 345**

**(b) HOUSES AND OTHER BUILDINGS.**

**13. ——— Loss of easements—Discontinuance of user—Pulling down house.** Where the house, the right of easement to which was claimed,

**PRESCRIPTION—contd.****2. EASEMENTS—contd.****(b) HOUSES AND OTHER BUILDINGS—contd.**

was not and had not been in existence for several years, nor was the intention shown of rebuilding it within a reasonable time:—*Held*, that the right of easement which is acquired by prescription and enjoyment, and continues so long as the person enjoying it continues the enjoyment and shows an intention to continue it, had thus been lost by discontinuance; and that by the destruction of the tenement the servitude had been extinguished, and the plaintiff had no right to maintain the suit for the right of easement. **TEEKA RAM v. DOORGA PERSHAD**

**1 Agra 196**

**KALEE DASS BANERJEE v. BHOOBUN MOHUN DOSS**

**20 W. R. 185**

**14. ——— Long-continued user of house as house of prayer—Public right.** A thatched house, which has been used by the proprietor of the land whereon it stood as a house of prayer for himself, family, neighbours, and the public, having been blown down, a brick-built one was erected in its stead by public subscription and maintained for the same purpose. After the proprietor's demise, his heirs claimed the right and title to the house. *Held*, that the consent of the proprietor, added to the long use of the house by the public, entitled the public by way of implied grant to the occupation of the same as a house for prayer, and the plaintiffs could not succeed. **SUFROO SHAIKH DURJEE v. FUTTEH SHAIKH DURJEE**

**15 W. R. 505**

**15. ——— Wall—Adjoining building—Side wall.** A built a house in the rear of B's house. There was a passage between the houses. Over the passage A built a room connecting the two houses. This room corresponded with B's first floor, and had an open terrace on the top of it. The structure by which A connected the two houses was quite independent of B's house. It was supported throughout by wooden pillars adjoining B's wall, which the cross beams did not penetrate or touch. But the structure was built so close to B's wall that the latter served as a side wall to the room. This state of things had existed for upwards of twenty years. *Held*, that A did not acquire any easement over B's wall by merely building on his own ground close to B's house, even though A had built no side wall to his own house, but trusted to B's keeping up his wall to shelter his (A's) house on that side. **GORDHAN DALPATRAM v. CHOTALAL HARGOVAN**

**I. L. R. 13 Bom. 79**

**16. ——— Projection—Beneficial enjoyment of the dominant owner—Cornice projected over another's land, as ornamentation—Indian Easements Act (V of 1882).** There can be no prescriptive right to a projection which has been erected merely for the purpose of ornamentation. *John George Bagram v. Khettranath Karformah*, 3 B. L. R. (O. C.) 18, 47, referred to. **NRITTA KUNARI DASSI v. PUDDOMONI BEWAH** (1903)

**I. L. R. 30 Cal. 503  
E. s.c. 7 C. W. N. 649**



**PRESCRIPTION—contd.****2. EASEMENTS—contd.****(b) HOUSES AND OTHER BUILDINGS—concl'd.**

17. ———— *Right to cornice acquired by, after twelve years' enjoyment.* Where a man erects a building overhanging the land of another, he commits a trespass for which an action will lie against him and he will by prescription acquire a right to the space occupied by such projection and the right to maintain it in its position. A cornice overhanging a neighbour's land cannot be removed by such neighbour, if it has been in existence for more than twelve years. *Mohontal Jechand v. Amrahlal Bechardas*, I. L. R. 3 Bom. 174, referred to and followed. *RATHINAVELU MUDALIAR v. KOLANDAVELU PILLAI* (1906)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 511

**(c) LAND.**

18. ———— *Title by prescription—Adverse possession. Quære:* Whether a title to land can be gained by prescription without adverse possession. *RAJ NARAIN DUTT v. GOURMONEE DOSSEE* 6 W. R. 215

19. ———— *Immemorial use of land for burial ground—Right of zamindar.* Where a piece of land has been used from time immemorial by the inhabitants of a mohalla for the purpose of burying their dead, such use excludes any claim to exclusive possession by the zamindar which interferes with that use. *MOHUN LALL v. NOOR AHMUD* 1 N. W. Ed. 1873, 202

20. ———— *Right to land for stall in market.* In a suit to recover possession of a piece of land on which defendant had erected a stall for the sale of commodities on market days, it was held that defendant's right of resort to the market as a member of the public did not warrant his having a stall located in a particular spot, and that the latter right could only be acquired either by grant or by prescription. *RAM MANICK ROY v. ASGUR* 11 W. R. 112

21. ———— *Intervention of owner after title lost by lapse of time.* Where a proprietor of certain land lost all title to it through the operation of the statute of limitations, but subsequently intervened and held it for a year or two twenty-eight years before action brought, while Regulation V of 1827 was in force, it was held that he could not rely on this possession to defeat the statute, but must show affirmatively that this intervention was rightful and in virtue of proprietorship, and such as to supersede the previous prescriptive right acquired against him. *RAM CHANDRA BIN MADHAVRAV v. ABAJI* 1 Bom. 64

22. ———— *Right to watan—Bom. Reg. V of 1827, s. 1, cl. 1—Uninterrupted possession.* The plaintiff in 1861 sued to recover his share in a watan. The defendants had been in actual possession of it from 1811 to 1830, when the Government attached the watan and enjoyed its revenues till 1845. In 1846 it was restored to the defendants.

**PRESCRIPTION—contd.****2. EASEMENTS—contd.****(c) LAND—contd.**

*Held*, that the defendants had uninterrupted possession for more than thirty years, under cl. 1 of s. 1 of Regulation V of 1827. *LADO LAKSHUMAN v. KRISHNAJI SADASHIV* 6 Bom. A. C. 41

23. ———— *Right to place tazias on certain plot of land during Moharram—Easements Act (V of 1882), ss. 4 and 18—Customary right—Facts necessary to establish the existence of a customary right.* The plaintiff sued for possession of a piece of land which, he alleged, formed part of the court-yard of his kothi, and for demolition of a chabutra thereon. The defendants denied the plaintiff's title, and alleged that they always used the chabutra as a sitting place, and that during the Moharram the tazias and alums were exhibited upon the chabutra and a takht was placed upon it. The Court of first instance found that the defendants had a right to use the land in the manner claimed during the Moharram. The lower Appellate Court, on the question of the defendants' right to use the said land in the manner claimed by them, found as follows: "That various mirasis whose connexion with each other is not established have within a period of twenty years or so placed tazias upon the land and sung there." *Held, per AIKMAN, J.*—A right to place tazias on a certain plot of land during the Moharram is a right of the nature of the customary easements referred to in s. 18 of Act V of 1882, and may be acquired as such by prescription. *Ashraf Ali v. Jagan Nath*, I. L. R. 6 All. 497, referred to. *Held*, on appeal, by *EDGE, C.J.*, and *BANERJI, J.*, that this finding of fact did not necessarily in law lead to the conclusion that there was a local custom by virtue of which the easement now claimed by the defendants was acquired. Where a local custom excluding or limiting the general rules of law is set up, a Court should not decide that it exists unless such Court is satisfied of its reasonableness and its certainty as to extent and application, and is further satisfied by the evidence that the enjoyment of the right was not by leave granted, or by stealth, or by force, and that it had been openly enjoyed for such a length of time as suggests that originally by agreement or otherwise the usage had become a customary law of the place in respect of the persons and things which it concerned. *KUAR SEN v. MAMMAN*

I. L. R. 17 All. 87

reversing on appeal under the Letters Patent *MAMMAN v. KUAR SEN* I. L. R. 18 All. 178

24. ———— *Permanent tenancy, acquisition of, by farmer—Prescription—Landlord and tenant—Decree for khas possession against tenant, who set up permanent title—Continuance of tenant in possession—Presumption that tenant continued to hold as permanent tenant—Limitation—Commencement—Sub-soil, landlord's right to.* In a suit for khas possession against B, who set up a permanent tenancy, it was decided that B held some of the lands as *jotdar* and the rest as *ijaradar* under the plaintiff and a decree was made in plaintiff



PRESCRIPTION—*contd.*2. EASEMENTS—*contd.*(c) LAND—*concl'd.*

iff's favour for *khas* possession of such lands only as *B* held as *ijaradar*. But although symbolical possession of the lands decreed was delivered to the plaintiff, *B* continued to hold possession of all the lands in suit for more than twelve years. On several occasions during this period *B* made assertions of title as permanent tenant to the knowledge of the plaintiff's agents. *Held*, that *B* acquired by prescription a right to hold the lands as a permanent tenant, but that the sub-soil, in respect of which no prescriptive right had been made out by *B*, remained with the landlord. It was to be presumed that after symbolical possession was delivered to the plaintiff, *B* continued to hold the lands as on the title which he had already asserted in the suit, and limitation ran from that date and not from the date or dates on which *B* subsequently made assertions of permanent title to the knowledge of plaintiff's agents. A farmer may acquire by prescription the right of a permanent tenant by setting up such higher right adversely to the zamindar. *Juggobundhu v. Ram Chunder*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 584; *Gopal v. Krishna Rao*, I. L. R. 25 Bom. 275; *Seshamma Shettati v. Chickaya Hegade*, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 507; and *Rajundar Kishwar Singh v. Sheo Pursun Misser*, 10 Moo. I. A. 438, referred to. *BAGDU MAJHI v. DURGA PROSAD SINGH* (1905)  
9 C. W. N. 292

## (d) LIGHT AND AIR.

25. ———— *New windows—Injunction—Alteration of easement—New windows higher than the old ones—New easement—Indian Easements Act (V of 1882), s. 23.* Plaintiff had two windows in the rear wall of his house. In 1886 he rebuilt his house, and opened new windows, which were of nearly the same size, but were a little higher than the old ones. In 1899 defendant built his house and blocked up these two new windows. The plaintiff sued for an injunction. The first Court dismissed the suit. The lower Appellate Court reversed the decree and granted an injunction, holding that the plaintiff did not lose his easement by changing the position of the windows, because the new ones were nearly of the same dimension, and, as their position was higher than that of the old windows, the burden on the servient tenement was rather less than before. On second appeal:—*Held*, reversing the decree and dismissing the suit, that the easement claimed in respect of the new windows, which did not receive the same cones of light as were enjoyed through the old ones, was quite distinct from the easement in respect of the old windows; and that, therefore, the easement respecting them could be acquired only by enjoying it for the required length of time. *BAI HARI-GANGA v. TRICAMLAL KEDARESHWAR* (1902)  
I. L. R. 26 Bom. 374

26. ———— *Light and air, right to—Easements to dwelling-house—Use as a dwelling-*

PRESCRIPTION—*contd.*2. EASEMENTS—*contd.*(d) LIGHT AND AIR—*contd.*

*house.* To acquire by prescription a right to the uninterrupted access of light and air through the windows of a dwelling-house, it is sufficient that the building in respect of which the right is claimed has assumed the appearance and outward aspect of a dwelling-house for more than twenty years before the time of the commencement of the suit, though not completed or used as a dwelling-house for the full period of twenty years before that time. When a building is so far completed as to show an intention to use it as a dwelling-house, with certain windows or openings for light and air, from that time it becomes the duty of those who are concerned in preventing a prescriptive right to the access of light and air from arising in respect of such windows, to take steps to challenge and hinder the acquisition of such right. *PRANJIVAN DAS HARJIVAN DAS v. MAYARAM SAMAL DAS*  
1 Bom. 148

27. ———— *Ancient lights.* Ancient lights cannot be obstructed by the owner of the adjacent land building on it, so as to obscure the light and air always enjoyed. Whether the party has or has not other windows on another side of his premises is immaterial. *PURUN MUDDUCK v. OODAY CHAND MALLICK* . . . 3 W. R. 29

*MAHOMED HOSSEIN v. JAFUR ALI* 4 W. R. 23

28. ———— *Right to have building removed—Sufficient light, right to access of.* An easement of light to a window only gives a right to have buildings that obstruct it removed so as to allow the access of sufficient light to the window. *BALA v. MAHARU*  
I. L. R. 20 Bom. 788

29. ———— *Right to have windows closed—Invasion of privacy, comfort, and ventilation.* If the plaintiff's privacy was invaded, and the defendant could not establish his right by long usage, the former was entitled to have the windows closed, and the latter could not be allowed to open new windows, merely because the comfort and ventilation of his own building would be increased. *GOOR DASS v. MANOHUR DASS* . . . 2 Agra 269

30. ———— *Presumption of lost grant—Positive and negative servitudes—Obstructions—2 & 3 Will. IV, c. 71.* In a suit to remove an obstruction to the enjoyment of light and air and for damages:—*Held*, by MARKBY, J., that in cases where English law is applicable, the law of prescription is that existing in England prior to the passing of the Prescription Act. Although the enjoyment of light and air as of right for upwards of thirty years is evidence from which an enjoyment from time immemorial may be presumed, yet, inasmuch as the period of legal memory is about 700 years, the claim by prescription in this country is defeated by the fact that English law has only been introduced here for about 200 years. Where an easement has been enjoyed for upwards of twenty years, the presumption of a grant is a



**PRESCRIPTION—contd.****2. EASEMENTS—contd.****(d) LIGHT AND AIR—contd.**

question of fact and not of law. Distinction drawn between positive and negative servitudes. *Held*, by PEACOCK, C.J.—A right to air may be acquired by express grant, but it cannot be acquired merely by presumption arising from user, whether the presumption is a presumption of prescription or not. The only amount of light which can be claimed by prescription or by length of enjoyment, without an actual grant, is such an amount as is reasonably necessary for the convenient and comfortable habitation of the house. The uninterrupted enjoyment of light for twenty years acquiesced in by the owner of the servient tenement raises a presumption of right which, in the absence of any evidence to rebut it, ought to be acted upon by those who have to determine the facts. Such presumption is one of law, and not of fact. *Held*, by NORMAN, J.—Servitudes are known and recognized both in Hindu and Mahomedan law. A right to the unobstructed access of light is not a property or interest in the light itself, nor a right to be enjoyed in or over the soil of the adjacent owner. By analogy to the law of limitation, an adverse and uninterrupted use of an easement for twenty years confers a right to it; therefore, where the access of light and air through the windows of a house has been enjoyed for twenty years, and there is nothing to rebut the presumption of title, the law implies an obligation on the part of an adjoining owner not to interrupt the free access of necessary light and air through such windows. *BAGRAM v. KHETTRANATH KARFORMAH* . . . **3 B. L. R. O. C. 18**

**31.** ————— *Knowledge and acquiescence—2 & 3 Will. IV, c. 71.* In a suit for enforcing the removal of an obstruction to the alleged right of the plaintiffs to the light and air through certain windows in a room of a house contiguous to the house of the defendants, it was proved that the plaintiffs had purchased the premises in 1847, and that the building of the room in which the windows in question were had been subsequently commenced in 1849; and the Judge of the Court below found on the evidence that the room and windows had been completed and in use for a period of twenty years prior to the date of suit, May 18th, 1870; that the plaintiffs had enjoyed the light and air through the windows for a period of twenty years without any interruption by the defendants; and it being proved that the defendants had by buildings obstructed the light and air coming to the plaintiff's windows, he granted an injunction commanding the defendants to take down so much of the wall as rose to the height of more than five feet above the level of the plaintiff's floor, and restraining them, the defendants, from continuing their building above the height of five feet. *Held*, on appeal, *per COUCH, C.J.*—By the English law before the Prescription Act (which is the law governing the case), the presumption of a grant, in the case of a claim to the access and use of light for a building, was a presumption of fact,

**PRESCRIPTION—contd.****2. EASEMENTS—contd.****(d) LIGHT AND AIR—contd.**

the presumption being founded on the consent or acquiescence of the owner of the servient tenement. Acquiescence implies knowledge, and knowledge may be presumed where the owner is in possession. There must be knowledge for twenty years, at any rate; if the knowledge were for a lesser period, whether there was a grant would be a question of fact, and no presumption could arise. The question of whether or not there was knowledge is one preliminary to the consideration whether or not a grant is to be presumed. *Held*, on the evidence, that there had been no knowledge on the part of the defendants during the whole time, and therefore there had not been a twenty years' enjoyment of the light and air with their acquiescence. *Held*, *per MARKBY, J.*—The presumption of a lost grant is one of fact. An uninterrupted user for twenty years would be evidence from which, taken with other circumstances, it might be inferred that a grant had existed. No "patientia" or "submission" on the part of the defendants being shown so as to constitute an acknowledgment of the existence of the right of the plaintiffs to the light and air, the defendants were entitled to succeed. *BHUBAN MOHAN BANERJEE v. ELLIOTT*

**6 B. L. R. 85**

*Held*, on appeal to the Privy Council, that the law of prescription applicable to India was the English law previous to the passing of the Prescription Act, 2 & 3 Will. IV, c. 71. In order to establish a right to light and air, an uninterrupted user of at least twenty years, with the acquiescence of the owner of the servient tenement, must be shown. In a suit to restrain the defendants from obstructing the light and air through certain windows of a house belonging to the plaintiffs, it was shown that the enjoyment of the alleged right began on 14th April 1850, the windows then being in a sufficiently finished state to create the right. In March 1870 the plaintiffs received notice from the defendants of their intention to erect a building which would have the effect of obstructing the passage of light and air through the plaintiffs' windows. The building was actually commenced on 23rd March 1870, but it was not actually raised to such a height as to amount to an obstruction until some days after the twenty years had elapsed. *Held*, that there was not an enjoyment for twenty years with the acquiescence of the defendants such as entitled the plaintiffs to maintain the suit. *Quære*: Whether proof of constructive knowledge on the part of the defendants would not be sufficient to show their acquiescence. *ELLIOTT v. BHUBAN MOHAN BANERJEE* . . . **12 B. L. R. 406 : 19 W. R. 194**  
**L. R. I. A. Sup. Vol. 175**

**32.** ————— *Act IX of 1871, s. 27—Enjoyment "as of right"—Unity of possession—The English Prescription Act (2 & 3 Will. IV, c. 71), s. 3—Grant independent of user.* In a suit to restrain the defendant from obstructing the access of light and air through certain windows of



**PRESCRIPTION—contd.****2. EASEMENTS—contd.****(d) LIGHT AND AIR—contd.**

the plaintiff's house, it appeared that both the tenements had formerly constituted the joint property of a Hindu family, and that in 1835 a partition took place among the various members composing it, by which the tenement in the occupation of the plaintiff became separated from that occupied by the defendant; and that the latter property was, in 1860, purchased by the plaintiff jointly with one G, but under the purchase the plaintiff took sole possession thereof; that in 1867, however, he relinquished it in favour of G in pursuance of an award, wherein it was found the plaintiff had no right or title thereto; and that in 1870 it was purchased by the defendant, who, in 1871 and 1872, erected the obstructions complained of by the plaintiff. *Held*, that though, in the interval between 1860 and 1867, the plaintiff had not such an estate in the servient tenement as to constitute unity of title in him to the two tenements, and thereby extinguish all easements between them, yet the unity of possession in the plaintiff during that period excluded the operation of s. 27 of Act IX of 1871, as the enjoyment during that time was not "of right." *Semble*: In order that the enjoyment should be "of right," there must be an adverse exercise of it as against the servient holder. Act IX of 1871 does not exclude other modes than therein provided of acquiring an easement by enjoyment. In this case, applying the law of prescription in force in Calcutta prior to 1871, which was the English law previous to the passing of 2 & 3 Will. IV, c. 71, a grant might be implied independently of user; and, under the circumstances of the case, the plaintiff was entitled to such right to easements of light and air as can be inferred from enjoyment, *i.e.*, a right to restrain the defendant from committing any act whereby the access of light or air should be so diminished as with respect to air to prove a nuisance or injurious to health, and with respect to light to render the house unfit for comfortable habitation. **MODHOOSOODUN DEY v. BISSONATH DEY**

**15 B. L. R. 361****33. ——— Ancient lights—**

*Enlargement of window—Obstruction—Notice—Delay—Mandatory injunction.* Where a person, who has a right to light from a certain window, opens a new window, or enlarges the old one, the owner of an adjoining house has a right to obstruct the new or enlarged opening, if he can do so without obstructing the old; but if he cannot obstruct the new without obstructing the old, he must submit to the burden. A plaintiff entitled as of right to light and air through a certain window, subsequently enlarged it, and on the light thereto being interfered with by the defendant, gave him notice to remove the obstruction two days after it had been completed. *Held*, that he had been guilty of no delay in taking steps to prevent the obstruction, and that he was entitled to a mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to remove it. **PROVABUTTY DABEE v. MOHENDRO LALL BOSE**

**I. L. R. 7 Calc. 453****PRESCRIPTION—contd.****2. EASEMENTS—contd.****(d) LIGHT AND AIR—contd.**

**34. ——— Obstruction—Substantial injury—Injunction—Damages—Acquiescence.** Any act by which the control of light and air are taken off the hands of the person entitled to them, or by which the access of light and air to the window of a dwelling-house is interfered with, is *prima facie* an injury of a serious character. Where the defendant, without leave or license, took possession of the plaintiff's window as completely as if he had blocked it up altogether:—*Held*, that no precedent warranted the substitution of damages for an injunction in such a case against the plaintiff's will. The defendant's building, which obstructed the access of light and air to the plaintiff's window, began in May, and the plaintiff instituted his suit in July. *Held*, that, *prima facie*, the plaintiff was entitled to the removal of the obstruction, and that it was for the defendant to show that the right had been lost by acquiescence. **NANDKISHOR BALGOVAN v. BHAGUBHAI PRANVALUBHDAS**  
**I. L. R. 8 Bom. 95**

**35. ——— User—Adjoining houses with party wall.** The plaintiff and defendant being owners of two adjoining houses, with a common party wall between them, the former placed a window frame in an aperture in an upward extension of his part of the wall which he had erected eight years before suit, and the latter thereupon raised the wall on her side so as to cut off the supply of light and air which the plaintiff used to receive before, and after the placing of the window-frame. *Held*, that there had been no appropriation of the light and air by the plaintiff for the statutory period (twenty years) creating in him a right of easement, and entitling him to relief against the inconvenience sustained by him. **SARUBAI v. BAPU NARIHAR**  
**I. L. R. 2 Bom. 660**

**36. ——— Injunction—Damages—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 51, cl. (c)—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 26—Mandatory injunction.** The plaintiff complained that the defendants intended to build so as to obstruct the passage of light and air through an ancient window in his house, and render a room therein unfit for use, and prayed for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from so building. It was proved that the wall intended to be built would so shut out the light and air as to render the room completely dark and unfit for use. The Subordinate Judge granted the injunction as prayed. The defendants appealed to the Joint Judge, who amended the lower Court's decree by ordering the removal of the injunction and directing, in its stead, a new window to be opened in the plaintiff's house to the east of the window in question. On appeal by the plaintiff to the High Court:—*Held*, reversing the decree of the lower Appellate Court, that the plaintiff had an absolute and indefeasible right to the easement he had acquired; and the only possible question was whether injunction or damage was the appropriate remedy under the circumstances of



**PRESCRIPTION—contd.****2. EASEMENTS—contd.****(d) LIGHT AND AIR—contd.**

the particular case. *Held*, also, that, as the evidence established that, after defendants' wall was built, plaintiff's room would not remain substantially as useful to him as before, the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction. *Holland v. Worley*, *L. R. 26 Ch. D. 578*, distinguished. The High Court also directed a mandatory injunction to issue to the defendants to remove the wall they had raised after the lower Appellate Court had passed the decree in their favour and pending the plaintiff's appeal to the High Court. **KADARBHAI v. RAHIMBHAI**

**I. L. R. 13 Bom. 674**

**37.** ————— *New house erected on the site of old house.* The mere fact of a house having been taken down, or having fallen down, and a new house being erected on its site would not by itself be sufficient to extinguish any right to light and air which the owner of the house may possess. The question whether the right is or is not extinguished would depend on whether the new doors and windows are in the same position and are of the same dimensions as the old doors and windows; in other words, the question for consideration would be whether the easement claimed as appertaining to the newly constructed house imposes a different and a greater burden on the servient tenement. *Fowlers v. Walker*, *L. J. 49 Ch. 598*; *L. J. 51 Ch. 443*, and *Pendarves v. Monro*, *L. R. 1 Ch. 61*, followed. **A. CASPERSZ v. RAJ KUMAR SARKAR** . . . **3 C. W. N. 28**

**38.** ————— *Obstruction of right to light and air—Suit for injunction or damages—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 54.* The plaintiff was the owner of a house in Jambulwadi Street in Bombay. The defendant owned a house to the east of it, and between the two houses was a gully three feet seven inches wide, the part of which next the defendant's house was a gutter. On the ground floor of the plaintiff's house were four windows, and on the first floor two windows, all looking out into the gully, and all of them ancient windows. The defendant's house originally was a little higher than the plaintiff's house, and consisted of a ground floor, a first floor, and a loft. Shortly before suit, the defendant pulled down this house, and on the same site began to build a new four-storied house with a loft. The plaintiff sued for an injunction, alleging that this new house, which would be of much greater height than the old one, would completely block up his ancient windows and cause him material damage, there being no other window in his house on the side next the defendant. The defendant in his written statement denied that his new house would cause material damage to the plaintiff. He alleged that his old house, which was higher than the plaintiff's, had a projecting cornice, so that hardly any direct light came to the plaintiff's windows, which were almost, if not entirely, lighted by the light that came from each end of the gully. He further stated that his new house would have no cornice, and that

**PRESCRIPTION—contd.****2. EASEMENTS—contd.****(d) LIGHT AND AIR—contd.**

he had widened the gully, so that light to the plaintiff's windows would not be appreciably diminished, but that, even if the passage had not been widened, there would have been little diminution of light. He also alleged that the plaintiff had other windows and sources of light than the said six windows. While denying all damage, the defendant, however, to avoid litigation and without prejudice, paid into Court R200, which, he said, was more than sufficient to compensate the plaintiff. After filing the suit, the plaintiff obtained a rule for an injunction at the date of which the walls of the defendant's house had been built up as far as the second floor. The rule was subsequently discharged, the defendant consenting that the cause should be argued at the hearing as if the new house was then in the same condition. The defendant, however, subsequently continued to build, and at the date of hearing it was practically complete. The lower Court (*STARLING, J.*) found that prior to the building of the new house direct light came to the plaintiff's windows to the extent at all events of 5 inches, and in addition to this a considerable amount of lateral light came to the windows over the defendant's roof. The Court held that, as the plaintiff had a right to this light by prescription, he was absolutely entitled to the whole of it; that the defendant had by his new building cut off all the direct light, and that practically all the light left to the plaintiff was reflected light, the amount of which depended on the condition in which the defendant might choose to keep the walls of his house. Under these circumstances, the lower Court, looking at the house as if it was still in the condition in which it was at the time the injunction was discharged, held that the plaintiff was entitled to a mandatory injunction, and directed the defendant to remove the upper portion of the house, which had been built since that time. On appeal:—*Held*, that, although the plaintiff's light had been sensibly diminished by the defendant's new building, there had not been such a large, material, and substantial damage as to require interference by injunction, or that the plaintiff's room had been rendered unfit for the purpose for which it might reasonably be expected to be used. The Appeal Court therefore varied the decree of *STARLING, J.*, and refused an injunction, but ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff R500 as damages. **GHANASHAM NILKANT NADKARNI v. MOROBA RANCHANDRA PAI**

**I. L. R. 18 Bom. 474**

**39.** ————— *Access of light and air to windows—Agreement preventing the acquirement of an easement—Easements Act (V of 1882), s. 15, expl.—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 54.* A promise was made regarding the access of light and air, by the plaintiff's predecessor in title, to windows placed by him in the upper part of his house which was separated by a narrow space from a building opposite belonging then to the defend-



PRESCRIPTION—*contd.*2. EASEMENTS—*contd.*(d) LIGHT AND AIR—*contd.*

ant's predecessor. This promise was that the owner of the house would make no objection to the blocking up of the windows in question when the owner of the building opposite should rebuild it and raise it to a higher elevation. The owner of the windows accepted this promise. After the lapse of twenty years, the defendant, having given notice that he would act on the agreement, proceeded to rebuild; and he raised his building higher than the old one, causing the obstruction of which the plaintiff now complained. The High Court (FARRAN, J.) in its Original Jurisdiction decided that the case was not one for an injunction, but for damages, and gave the plaintiff a decree for a sum as compensation. On appeal, the Appellate Bench of the High Court (PARSONS and STRACHEY, JJ.) held, that the plaintiff had made out no prescriptive right to light and air, and the cases of *Dhanjibhoj v. Lisboa*, I. L. R. 13 Bom. 252, and *Ghanasham Nilkant Nadkarni v. Moroba Ramchandra Pai*, I. L. R. 18 Bom. 474, followed and approved as to the circumstances in which the Court will grant an injunction where a right to light and air is infringed. SULTAN NAWAZ JUNG v. RUSTOMJI NANABHOY

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 704

Held, on appeal to the Privy Council, that there having been a continuing agreement between the parties within the meaning of expl. 1 of the Easements Act, 1882, the acquirement by the plaintiff of an easement by prescription had been prevented. From the agreement it was apparent that the enjoyment of light and air had not been granted as an easement. SULTAN NAWAZ JUNG v. RUSTOMJI NANABHOY BYRAMJI JIJIBHOY

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 156

L. R. 26 I. A. 184

40. ——— Air, right to—*Right to uninterrupted passage of air.* The owner of a house cannot by prescription claim to be entitled to the free and uninterrupted passage of a current of wind. He can claim no more air than what is sufficient for sanitary purposes. BARROW v. ARCHER

2 Hyde 125

41. ——— South breeze—*Limitation Acts (IX of 1871), s. 27; (XV of 1877), s. 26—English Prescription Act (2 & 3 Will. IV), c. 71—Limitation Act, effect of, on the pre-existing law as to nature and extent of the right to light or air.* The Indian Limitation Act, unlike the English Prescription Act, places light and air on the same footing; and the object of the Prescription Act and of the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act is not to enlarge the extent and operation of the easement, but to provide another and more convenient way of acquiring such easements—a mode independent of legal fiction and capable of easy proof in a Court of law; these Acts do not therefore alter in any way the pre-existing law as to the nature and extent of the right. The only amount of light for a dwelling-house which can be claimed by prescription or by length of time (whether prior or

PRESCRIPTION—*contd.*2. EASEMENTS—*contd.*(d) LIGHT AND AIR—*contd.*

subsequently to the Limitation Act of 1871) without an actual grant is such an amount as is reasonably necessary for the convenient and comfortable habitation of the house. Rule laid down in *Bagram v. Khettranath Karformah*, 3 B. L. R. O. C. 41, followed. The right of air is co-extensive with the right to light. To give a right of action, either prior or subsequently to the Limitation Act of 1871, in a case (where there is no express contract on the subject) for an interference with the access of air to dwelling-houses by building on adjoining land, the obstruction must be such as to cause what is technically called a nuisance to the house; in other words, to render the house unfit for the ordinary purposes of habitation or business. There is no such right as a right to the uninterrupted flow of south breeze as such. The "45 degree rule" is not a positive rule of law, but is a circumstance which the Court may take into consideration, and is especially valuable when the proof of the obstruction is not definite or satisfactory. DELHI AND LONDON BANK v. HEM LAL DUTT

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 839

42. ——— Partition of a joint family house—*Effect of partition by a consent decree where the decree does not reserve any right to the use of light and air—Implied grant of easement upon severance of tenement.* On partition of a family dwelling-house by a consent decree the plaintiff claimed a right to the passage of light and air necessary for the enjoyment of his share of the building in the way in which it was enjoyed at the time of the partition, though no such right was expressly reserved in the decree. The defence was that the principle of an implied grant of easement upon severance of the tenement should not be applied to the case, but that the rights of the parties should be determined solely with reference to the decree made in the partition suit. Held, that the principles of justice, equity, and good conscience should be applied to the case, and that the plaintiff was entitled to the right claimed, even in the absence of any express provision in the decree reserving such right. *Quære*: Whether the principle of an implied grant of easement in severance of tenements would apply in a case where the partition was effected by a decree of the Court in a contested suit, and not by a consent of parties. KADAMBINI DEBI v. KALI KUMAR HALDAR

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 516

3 C. W. N. 409

43. ——— Partition, decree for, of family dwelling-house—*Implied grant of easement—Easements Act (V of 1882).* In a partition suit between brothers with respect to a family dwelling-house the plaintiff was given certain rooms with windows. No easements were claimed in respect of the windows in that suit and the decree made no mention of it. The windows being ancient lights, it was held that the partition decree must be taken to have made an implied grant of



**PRESCRIPTION—contd.****2. EASEMENTS—contd.****(d) LIGHT AND AIR—concl'd.**

such easements. **DWARKA NATH PAUL v. SUNDER LALL SEAL** . . . . . **3 C. W. N. 407**

**(e) MONEY ALLOWANCE.**

**44. ——— Allowance attached to hereditary office—Bom. Reg. V of 1827—Immoveable property.** An annual allowance for palkihaq to the holder of the hereditary office of desai paid by Government out of the land revenue of a particular pergunnah to successive desais for upwards of thirty years was held not to create a prescriptive title, as such money payment was not "immoveable property" within the meaning of Bombay Regulation V of 1827, s. 1, cl. 1. **GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY v. DESAI KULLIANRAI HAKOOMUTRAI**

**14 Moo. I. A. 551**

**45. ——— Annual allowance—Presumed grant.** For upwards of a century the holders of an inam had paid an annual allowance to the parties represented by the appellants, plaintiffs below. Held (TUCKER, J., dissentiente), that the recipients had acquired a good title to allowance by prescription, and that an original grant for a sufficient consideration must be presumed. **BHAVANI v. HASAN MIYA** . . . . . **1 Bom. 45**

**46. ——— Continued voluntary payment—Bom. Reg. V of 1827, s. 1—Chirda haqs—Acquisitive prescription.** A prescriptive right to have a yearly payment made by Government to a private individual cannot be acquired by reason of a continued series of voluntary payments made to him by Government extending over a period of more than thirty years. Thus where Government paid a yearly sum of Rs 2-4-6 to a chirda haqdar, by whom no services in return were rendered, from the year 1818 to 1860, and then discontinued such payment to the heir of the last holder, it was held that such yearly payments gave the haqdar no prescriptive rights against Government. **COLLECTOR OF SURAT v. DAJI JOGI** . . . . . **8 Bom. A. C. 166**

**47. ——— Allowance not incidental to hereditary office—Bom. Reg. V of 1827, s. 1, cl. 1.** In considering, with reference to prescription, whether an allowance (not being incidental to an hereditary office) is or is not immoveable property the High Court has generally followed the test—"Is or is not the allowance a charge upon land or other immoveable property?" Where an allowance by Government was neither incidental to an hereditary office nor a charge upon immoveable property, and was not supported by a grant from Government, the enjoyment of it for thirty years did not create a prescriptive title to its continuance under Regulation V of 1827, s. 1, cl. 1. **GOVERNMENT OF BOMBAY v. GASVAMI SHRI GIRDHARLALJI**

**9 Bom. 222**

**48. ——— Fixed permanent allowance—Grant—Immoveable property—Nibandha—Hindu law.** The right to receive annually a fixed

**PRESCRIPTION—contd.****2. EASEMENTS—contd.****(e) MONEY ALLOWANCE—concl'd.**

permanent allowance payable out of the revenues of a temple is "nibandha," and must be regarded as immoveable property under the Hindu law; but this rule could not enable the right to be acquired by prescription. **LAKSHMANDAS BHAGAT-RAMJI v. MANOHAR GANESH TAMBEKAR**

**I. L. R. 10 Bom. 149**

**(f) OFFICE.**

**49. ——— Religious office held by successive appointees—Bom. Reg. V of 1827, s. 1, cl. 1.** When a religious office with lands attached thereto was held by several gurus in succession, each holding such office by virtue of an appointment made on his succession, it was held that no proprietary right could be acquired by such gurus in the office or lands against the patron or owner by prescription, as such a case did not come within the meaning of cl. 1 of s. 1 of Regulation V of 1827. **TVATAT SVAMI v. ANDANYA CHARANTI**

**6 Bom. A. C. 132**

**(g) COLLECTION OF REVENUE.**

**50. ——— Joint kabuliats—Exclusive collection by one kabuliatar for more than thirty years.** Where a kabuliatar collected Government revenue for more than thirty years, the kabuliatar being signed each year by his co-kabuliatar as well as by himself, it was held that by so doing he had not, under the circumstances, acquired a prescriptive right to collect the revenue to the exclusion of his co-kabuliatar. **BAPU RAM PARBHU v. VISAJI CHANDO SAKTANEKAR** . . . . . **8 Bom. A. C. 182**

**(h) PRIVACY.**

**51. ——— Customary easement—Right to have windows closed—Custom.** Case in which it was found that the plaintiff was by local custom entitled to an easement of privacy and in which the Court granted a mandatory order compelling the defendant to permanently close the door or window complained of. **LACHMAN PRASAD v. JAMNA PRASAD** . . . . . **I. L. R. 10 All. 162**

**52. ——— Custom—Right of suit.** A customary right of privacy under certain conditions exists in India and in the North-Western Provinces, and is not unreasonable, but merely an application of the maxims *sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas* and *aedificare in tuo proprio solo non licet quod alteri noceat*. A substantial interference with such a right, where it exists, if without the consent or acquiescence of the owner of the dominant tenement, affords such owner a good cause of action. Each case in which such a right is in dispute must be decided upon its own facts, the primary question in all cases being whether the privacy in fact and substantially exists, and has been and in fact en-



**PRESCRIPTION—contd.****2. EASEMENTS—contd.****(h) PRIVACY—concl'd.**

joyed. If this is answered in the negative, no further question arises. If in the affirmative, the next question is whether the privacy has been substantially interfered with by acts done by the defendant, without the consent or acquiescence of the person seeking relief against such acts. The Indian law relating to the right of privacy reviewed. *GOKAL PRASAD v. RADHO*. **I. L. R. 10 All. 353**

**53. — Custom—Right of privacy.** The customary right of privacy which prevails in various parts of the North-Western Provinces is a right which attaches to property, and is not dependent on the religion of the owner of such property. *ABDUL RAHMAN v. EMILE*. *EMILE v. ABDUL RAHMAN*. **I. L. R. 16 All. 69**

**54. — Usage, proof of—Right of privacy—Suit to prevent opening of windows.** In a suit for closing the window on the wall of the defendant, and for the issue of a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from opening any windows in future in that wall, on the ground that the privacy of the plaintiff had been interfered with, it was proved that it had not been usual for windows to be opened out in any one house in the village so as to overlook the female apartments of another, but not that the villagers had been in the habit of preventing their co-villagers from opening windows in such a manner. *Held*, that the usage as to the right of privacy was not proved. *Held*, also, that the fact that the defendant's wall had been standing there over fifty years, and during this period no window had been opened, was not sufficient to give the plaintiff a prescriptive right to prevent the defendant opening a window in that wall. *SRI NARAIN CHOWDHRY v. JODOO NATH CHOWDHRY* (1900). **5 C. W. N. 147**

**(i) RIGHT OF WAY.**

**55. — Path across land—Implied grant—Modes of acquiring easements—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 26.** In a suit for an injunction to restrain the defendant from using a path on the plaintiff's land, it appeared that the land held by the plaintiff and defendant had originally belonged to one owner, and that the plaintiff and the defendant had obtained their respective tenements more than twenty years previously. The path had been admittedly made by the original owner, but the plaintiff contended that, when he purchased the land, he had closed the path. This the Munsif disbelieved, and refused the injunction. The District Judge, treating the case as if it fell under s. 26 of the Limitation Act, and being of opinion that the defendant had not proved twenty years' peaceable, open, and uninterrupted exercise of the right of way, gave the plaintiff a decree. *Held*, that the mode of acquiring an easement provided by s. 26 of the Limitation Act is not the only way in which an easement may be acquired, but an easement may also be acquired by implied grant. In the

**PRESCRIPTION—contd.****2. EASEMENTS—contd.****(i) RIGHT OF WAY—contd.**

present case the use of the path might be absolutely necessary to the enjoyment of the defendant's tenement, in which case there would be an easement of necessity; or the use of the path, though not absolutely necessary to the enjoyment of the defendant's tenement, might be necessary for its enjoyment in the state in which it was at the time of severance; and in this case, if the easement were apparent and continuous, there would be a presumption that it passed with the defendant's tenement. *CHARU SURNOKAR v. DOKOURI CHUNDER THAKOOR*

**I. L. R. 8 Calc. 956: 10 C. L. R. 577**

**56. — Right of way—Implied grant—Easement upon the severance of a heritage by its owner into two or more parts—Continuous and apparent easement—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 26.** Implication of a grant of easement upon the severance of a tenement may extend to a "way," but that is so only where there has been some permanence in the adaptation of the tenement from which continuity could be inferred. *Charu Surnokar v. Dokouri Chunder Thakoor*, **I. L. R. 8 Calc. 956**, distinguished. *RAM NARAIN SHAHA v. KAMALA KANTA SHAHA*. **I. L. R. 26 Calc. 311**

**57. — Lane from public road to house—User—Limitation Act (XV of 1871), s. 27.** In a suit for declaration of the plaintiff's right of way over a lane leading from a public road to a door in the plaintiff's house, which lane the defendant, who resided at the end of the lane, had obstructed so as to prevent access to the plaintiff's house, it appeared that the house in respect of which the easement was claimed belonged in 1855 to one H C, during the time of whose occupation there was user of the right of way over the lane to the door, until he had the door bricked up. In April 1865 the house was sold by H C, and in June 1867 was conveyed by the purchaser to the plaintiff. From the blocking up of the door until the plaintiff's purchase no user was proved. The suit was brought in June 1875, about a month after the erection by the defendant of the obstruction complained of. *Held*, both in the Court below and on appeal, that the owner of the dominant tenement having, with the intention of preventing the use of the way, created an obstruction of a permanent nature which rendered such use impossible, the way could not be said, during the continuance of such obstruction, to have "been openly enjoyed" within the meaning of s. 27 of Act IX of 1871; and that accordingly, though there had been no interruption within the meaning of that section, a right to the way had not been established under the Act. *SHAM CHURN AUDDY v. TARINEY CHURN BANERJEE*. **I. L. R. 1 Calc. 422: 25 W. R. 228**

**58. — Right of passage—Unity of possession—Severance—Nuisance arising from acts of several persons.** The words "appurtenant" or "belonging" will ordinarily carry only actual



**PRESCRIPTION—contd.****2. EASEMENTS—contd.****(i) RIGHT OF WAY—contd.**

existing easement, and therefore will carry no right of way over the land of the grantor, though, under certain circumstances, even these words will have a wider construction. Where further words are used, such as "therewith held or used," such words will carry a way formerly enjoyed as an easement, but as to which the right has been suspended by unity of possession. But such words will not carry a way made by the owner of both properties during the unity of possession for his own greater convenience in the use of the two properties jointly. But where, during the unity of possession, a way, which has never existed as an easement, is in fact used for the convenience of one of the tenements afterwards severed, the authorities show that the words in question are large enough to carry it. One who has a right of passage over any place must not, any more than the owner of the soil might, use it in an excessive or improper manner so as to obstruct the exercise by others of their rights. The acts of several persons may together constitute a nuisance though the damage occasioned by the acts of any one, if taken alone, would not be appreciable. **CHUNDER KOOMAR MOOKERJI v. KOYLASH CHUNDER SETT** . . . . . **I. L. R. 7 Calc. 665**

Substantially confirmed on appeal: see **SHAMA CHURN DEY v. CHUNDER COOMAR MOOKERJEE**. **CHUNDER COOMAR MOOKERJEE v. KOYLASH CHUNDER SETT** . . . . . **I. L. R. 8 Calc. 677**

**59.** ———— *Change of use—Easements Act (V of 1882), s. 23—Increase of servitude.* Under s. 23 of the Indian Easements Act (V of 1882), a right of way enjoyed for agricultural purposes may be used for the purposes of a factory, provided no additional burden is thereby imposed on the servient heritage. **JESANG v. WHITTLE** . . . . . **I. L. R. 23 Bom. 595**

**60.** ———— *Right of passage for boats in the rainy season—Water.* A right of passage for boats in the rainy season over a channel wholly in another man's land is, in respect of extent, analogous to an ordinary right of way; and the dominant owner cannot complain of the servient owner's narrowing the channel, so long as the latter, by so doing, does not prevent the former from passing and re-passing as conveniently as he has always been accustomed to do. A right of passage for boats in the rainy season over another person's tank must be claimed in a particular direction in order to be valid. **DOORGA CHURN DHUR v. KALLY COOMAR SEN** . . . . . **I. L. R. 7 Calc. 145: 8 C. L. R. 375**

**61.** ———— *Right of private ferry—User for twenty years.* Per **GARTH, C.J.**, and **WHITE, J.**—Twenty years is the shortest period within which such a right of ferry can be established by user. Per **MITTER, J.**—Where the existence of a private right of ferry plying between the lands of *A* and *B* is admitted by *B*, no question of user arises; the issue that is raised between the

**PRESCRIPTION—contd.****2. EASEMENTS—contd.****(i) RIGHT OF WAY—contd.**

parties is not whether a private ferry exists, but whether the recognized private ferry which is in existence is the property of *A* or *B*; but *semble*: Supposing such question of user to arise, a right of private ferry cannot be established as an indefeasible right by long user. **PARMESHARI PROSAD NARAIN SINGH v. MAHOMED SYUD**

**I. L. R. 6 Calc. 608: 7 C. L. R. 504**

**62.** ———— *Landlord and tenant—Easements Act (V of 1882)—Act VIII of 1891—Application of Act—Suit before Act VIII of 1891 came into force.* There is nothing in Act VIII of 1891, which extended the Easements Act to the North-Western Provinces, to compel the Court to apply the Easements Act (V of 1882) to a suit commenced before Act VIII of 1891 came into force. A tenant cannot as against his landlord acquire by prescription an easement of way in favour of the land occupied by him as tenant over other land belonging to his landlord. So held by the Full Bench, **Gayford v. Moffatt**, **L. R. 4 Ch. App. 133**, referred to. **UDIT SINGH v. KASHI RAM**

**I. L. R. 14 All. 185**

**63.** ———— *Easement of necessity—Landlord and tenant.* A tenant cannot, as against his landlord, acquire by prescription an easement of way, in favour of the land occupied by him as tenant over other land belonging to his landlord. But a tenant is entitled to a way of necessity over the adjoining land of his landlord. **Udit Singh v. Kashi Ram**, **I. L. R. 14 All. 185**, approved. **Gayford v. Moffatt**, **31 L. J. Ch. 610**, followed. *Quære*: Whether one tenant can acquire a prescriptive right of easement against other tenant under the same landlord. **JEENAB ALI v. ALLABUDDIN**

**1 C. W. N. 151**

**64.** ———— *Prescriptive right of the defendant to have branches of his trees overhanging the plaintiff's land—Right of the defendant to go on to the plaintiff's land to collect the fruit of the trees distinct from, and not accessory to, the right to have the branches overhanging.* The defendant having acquired a prescriptive right to have the branches of his trees overhanging the plaintiff's land, the lower Courts held that he had a right to go on to the plaintiff's land for the purpose of gathering the fruit of trees, on the ground that the prescriptive right to have the branches of his trees overhanging the plaintiff's land carried with it an "accessory" right to enjoy the profits of the branches in the best way possible. *Held* (reversing the lower Court's decree), that the right to go on to the plaintiff's land to pick the fruit off the branches was perfectly distinct from the prescriptive right to have the branches overhanging the land, and could not be said to be accessory to the latter right in the sense of being within the limits of that right. **PARSOTAM GHELA v. GANDRAP FATELAL GOKULDAS**

**I. L. R. 17 Bom. 745**



PRESCRIPTION—*contd.*2. EASEMENTS—*contd.*

## (j) RIGHT CONCERNING WATER.

**65.** ———— **Right to flow of water—Obstruction to flow of water—Continual user.** The plaintiff brought a suit to establish his right to an uninterrupted flow of water through a channel which ran into a tank in a village which was the plaintiff's property, and to compel the removal of sluices erected across the said channel by the first defendant's predecessor in office, and used for the purpose of diverting the flow of the water. *Held*, that acquiescence in the sense of mere submission to the interruption of the enjoyment does not destroy or impair an easement. To be effectual for that purpose, it must be attributable to an intention on the part of the owner to abandon the benefit before enjoyed. *Held*, also, that the diversion of the water was a continuing injury down to the time of the institution of the suit, and that the plaintiff's suit was not barred. *Held*, also, that it must appear from the circumstances in evidence in such case that the interference or obstruction complained of is not a trivial but a substantial injury in order to warrant relief by way of injunction. *Held*, also, that the right to an easement in the flow of water through an artificial water-course is as valid against the Government as it is against a private owner of land. *Held*, *per* SCOTLAND, C.J., that the grant of an easement may be presumed from mere continued user of the privilege openly enjoyed by the occupiers of the dominant tenement as of right throughout any long period of time without interruption on the part of the proprietor of the servient tenement, but with this qualification, that the user should be for at least the period of adverse possession which is prescribed by s. 1, cl. 12, of the Act of Limitations, as a bar to the enforcing of title to corporeal property. *Per* INNES, J.—That no precise period of uninterrupted enjoyment can be fixed as sufficient of itself to establish a right to an easement. *PONNUSAWMI TEVAR v. COLLECTOR OF MADURA* . . . . . **5 Mad. 6**

**66.** ———— **Presumption from long user—Limitation Act, 1877, s. 27.** A right to the uninterrupted flow of water along a defined channel over the lands of others may exist independently of the provisions of s. 27 of the Limitation Act, 1871. When such a right is claimed as a hereditary and customary right and evidence is given in support of long user, such evidence may be sufficient to justify the Court in presuming a grant of the easement, and a Court is not justified in dismissing the suit on the ground that there had been no user by the plaintiff within two years prior to suit. *SRINIVASA RAU SAHEB (JAGIRDAR OF ARNI) v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* . . . **I. L. R. 5 Mad. 226**

**67.** ———— **Permission to erect dam—Grant—Relief against injury done by permissive act.** When a tenant by his lessor's permission erected a dam upon his holding, and thereby obstructed the natural flow of the water to other

PRESCRIPTION—*contd.*2. EASEMENTS—*contd.*(j) RIGHT CONCERNING WATER—*contd.*

lands of the lessor :—*Held*, that the mere permission did not amount to a grant. *Held*, also, that there was no implied grant of the right to use water so as to derogate from the rights of those through whose lands the stream would otherwise flow. *Held*, also, that the right under the permission might be terminated by revocation of the latter, but that such revocation would only be permitted on the terms of the landlord paying to the tenant the expenses which that permission had led him to incur. Even when the dominant and servient tenements are the property of different persons, a man may license an act in its inception, and yet be entitled to relief when the act is found to have injurious consequences which he could not have contemplated at the time of the license. *KESAVA PILLAI v. PEDDU REDDI* . . . . . **1 Mad. 258**

**68.** ———— **Exclusive right to use of water.** The plaintiffs, as shareholders in, and heads of, the villages of Ariyur and Kurvirkudi, sued for an injunction directing the defendants to close an irrigation channel which was opened in 1869 and to remove the sluice. It appeared that a channel called Kaduvai had, by means of a branch, for very many years, supplied the plaintiff's village with water. The village of Partical, of which the first defendant was mirasidar, up to the date of the opening of the new channel, had received its supply from the Mallattar channel. The supply from this was insufficient, and then the second defendant, the Superintending Engineer (representing Government), designed a new channel from the Kaduvai to supplement the deficiency of the Mallattar. The water of the Kaduvai was diverted into the new channel at a point above the point of divergence of the branch channel from the Kaduvai to the plaintiff's village. The relief was prayed for in the Court of first instance, on the ground that the supply by the Kaduvai had never been sufficient for the wants of the village, and that the new channel must necessarily cause a still further deficiency. The Civil Judge found that the plaintiffs had sustained no loss by the opening of the new channel, and dismissed the suit. On appeal it was contended, first, that plaintiffs had an absolute right to the uninterrupted flow of all the water in the Kaduvai channel without subtraction or diminution by the defendants or by the Government, represented by the second defendant, and that any diminution, though not causing loss, was an invasion of their rights; second, that if they had not such absolute right, they had a right to a supply of water for the necessary purposes of irrigation and otherwise for their village, and that possibility of loss at some future time, arising from a possible wrongful diminution of the water to their detriment through the new sluice and channel, entitled them to the relief claimed. Upon the first point :—*Held*, that the plaintiffs had not the extensive and exclusive right to the water contended for by them, but that their right was limited to the beneficial



**PRESCRIPTION—contd.****2. EASEMENTS—contd.****(j) RIGHT CONCERNING WATER—contd.**

enjoyment of the water for the irrigation and other necessary purpose of their tenancies as heretofore enjoyed. Also that the Government, as proprietor of the Kaduvai channel and water in it, had, subject to the above limited use by the plaintiffs and other villages in the same position as the plaintiffs, a right to distribute the water of the Kaduvai channel for the benefit of the public. *Ponnusawmi Tevar v. Collector of Madura*, 5 Mad. 6, distinguished. *KRISTNA AYYAN v. VENKATACHELLA MUDALI* . . . . . 7 Mad. 60

69. ————— *Suit to restrain interference with water rights—Damages—Right of Government to distribute water.* The plaintiffs, who were raiyats under the Government, brought a suit to restrain the defendants, the agents of the Government, and others, from so altering a calingula as to diminish the quantity of water which the plaintiffs were entitled to receive for the irrigation of their lands, and the plaintiffs alleged that the supply of water had been materially diminished by reason of the acts of the defendants. The only ground upon which the plaintiff's claim was put was that they had received the water for a long time. The District Court held that the Government were authorized to regulate the distribution of water in such cases. *Held*, on regular appeal, *per HOLLOWAY, J.*, that no legal right was shown by the plaintiffs which could have been violated by the defendants, and that, if such right were established, there was nothing to show that a decree for damages would not have been the proper remedy. *Per INNES, J.*—That the evidence did not show any diminution of the supply of water below the quantity to which the plaintiffs were entitled. *VENKATA REDDY v. LISTER*

7 Mad. 342

**70. ————— Interruption—**

*Abandonment.* The plaintiff claimed a prescriptive right to the flow of the surface drainage water from the land of the defendant on to his land. *Held*, that such an easement can be acquired only where the water flows in a definite channel. In a suit for interrupting the flow of water from the land of the defendant to the land of the plaintiff it appeared that eight years before suit, the defendant had diverted the water, and that it had been diverted ever since. *Held*, that the right, if acquired, would not necessarily be lost by the interruption, but that, if the plaintiff acquiesced during that time in the interruption, it might be some evidence of an abandonment of the right. *KENA MAHOMED v. BOHATOO SIRCAR* . . . . . Marsh. 506

*LUCHMEE PERSHAD v. FUZEELUTOONISSA BIBEE*  
7 W. R. 367

**71. ————— Right to passage of water**

—*Limitation Act (XV of 1877), ss. 23 and 26—Continuing nuisance—Easement.* From time immemorial and certainly for more than twenty years prior to the date of the obstruction by the defendants,

**PRESCRIPTION—contd.****2. EASEMENTS—contd.****(j) RIGHT CONCERNING WATER—contd.**

the plaintiff enjoyed the right of having an egress for his rain-water through a drain in the defendants' land. The plaintiff, more than two years after the date of the obstruction, sued the defendants for the removal of the obstruction. *Held*, that though, under the circumstances, the plaintiff had failed to prove a title acquired under s. 26 of Act XV of 1877, yet the plaintiff, having a title evidenced by immemorial user, did not require the aid of that Act; and inasmuch as the obstruction complained of constituted a continuing nuisance, as to which the cause of action was renewed *de die in diem*, the plaintiff's claim was not barred by any provision of the Act, but, on the contrary, was saved by the express provision of s. 23. *PUNJA KUVARJI v. BAI KUVAR* . . . . . I. L. R. 8 Bom. 20

*SOOJAN BIBI v. SHAMED ALI* . . . 1 C. W. N. 96

72. ————— *Easement apparent and continuous—Easements of necessity—Implied grant.* A and B were originally in joint possession of certain land. They divided this land in 1865, and, ten years later, built at their joint expense a partition wall between their respective portions, leading a drain in the wall for the passage of water from A's to B's land. In 1885 B stopped the flow of water by this drain. A thereupon sued for an injunction to restrain B from causing the obstruction. The Court of first instance decreed the claim. The Appellate Court rejected the claim, on the ground that there was no express agreement between the parties that the water should be carried off by the drain in the wall. *Held*, on second appeal to the High Court, that A would be entitled to the easement claimed by him if he could show either that it was necessary for the enjoyment of his share of the property or that it was apparent and continuous and necessary for enjoying the share as it was enjoyed when the partition took effect. *PURSHOTAM SAKHARAM v. DURGOJI TUKARAM*

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 452

73. ————— *Water in defined channel.* From time immemorial a certain "al" formed the boundary of two pieces of land belonging to the plaintiffs and the defendants respectively. The plaintiffs' land was in a higher level than that of the defendants, and from time immemorial the surplus water used to flow from the plaintiffs' land through certain passages in the "al" and across the defendants' land. The defendants closed up the passages and increased the height of the "al." *Held*, that, it having been established that for a long series of years the waters from the plaintiffs' lands had been accustomed to escape in a particular direction and by certain separate passages across the defendants' land, the defendants could not do anything which would interfere with the plaintiffs' rights in this respect. *IMAM ALI v. PORESH MUNDUL* . . . . . I. L. R. 8 Calc. 468 : 10 C. L. R. 396

74. ————— *Right to use of water—Irrigation—License creating right of easement—Revoca-*



**PRESCRIPTION—contd.**

**2. EASEMENTS—contd.**

**(j) RIGHT CONCERNING WATER—contd.**

*tion of agreement to use water.* In a suit to establish a right of water and for damages for interruption of the same, the facts were as follows: Plaintiff and defendant by agreement between them constructed a dam across a main channel and from thence a smaller channel was made through the land of the defendant to the plaintiff's land, by means of which it was agreed that the plaintiff should be at liberty to irrigate the fields. The agreement was acted upon for a long course of years. *Held*, that the agreement was not a mere parol license revocable at the pleasure of the defendant, but an agreement which created a right of easement, unlimited in point of time to the use of the water by the plaintiff, and imposed upon the defendant the corresponding duty of allowing the accustomed supply to flow. A mere license differs in its effects from a license coupled with the creation of an interest. The former is revocable, but the latter is subject to the same incidents, and is as binding and irrevocable as any other contract, gift, or grant. **KRISHNA v. RAYAPPA SHANBHAGA**  
**4 Mad. 98**

**75. ——— Artificial water-course.**

The right to water flowing to a man's land through an artificial water-course, constructed on a neighbour's land, must rest on some grant or arrangement proved or presumed, from or with the owner of the land from which the water is artificially brought, or on some other legal origin. Such a right may be presumed from the time, manner, and circumstances under which the easement has been enjoyed. **RAMESSUR PERSAD NARAIN SING v. KOONJ BEHARI PATTUK**  
**I. L. R. 4 Calc. 633 : L. R. 6 I. A. 33**

**76. ——— User—Artificial**

*water-course.* In 1860 *R*, whom the plaintiff in this suit represented, agreed with Government for the lease of a plot of ground called the D estate and got possession. In 1865 *R* took a lease of the estate from Government for 999 years, to enure as a lease from 1860, the time at which he entered upon possession. The defendant's estate adjoined plaintiff's. Defendant's title, also derived from Government, dated from 1869. A formal lease was granted to his predecessor in 1874 in similar terms to that to plaintiff. In 1864 *R* opened an artificial channel for the conveyance of water for the use of his estate. This channel was taken off from a ravine in Government waste land, and before reaching the plaintiff's estate passed through land which in 1864 belonged to Government, but which subsequently formed portion of the defendant's estate. When the lease, under which the defendant claimed, was made in 1874, the flow of water through the channel was enjoyed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued to restrain the defendant from interfering with and diverting the flow of water in this channel and for damages. *Held*, that the flow of water in the channel having existed as an apparent and continuous easement in fact at the time

**PRESCRIPTION—contd.**

**2. EASEMENTS—contd.**

**(j) RIGHT CONCERNING WATER—contd.**

of the execution of the lease in 1865, a right to it passed by implication under that lease, and that the plaintiff was accordingly entitled to it; that the defendant, whose lease was subject to that right, was not entitled to interrupt the flow; but that he might use the water in a reasonable manner, as it flowed through his land. **MORGAN v. KIRBEY**  
**I. L. R. 2 Mad. 46**

**77. — Obstructing water-course**

*—Presumption of title founded on user—Limitation Act, 1871, s. 27, and Art. 31—Continuing act of wrong.* More than twenty years, and possibly fifty or sixty, before suit, the plaintiff's ancestors and predecessors in estate had constructed and used a *páin*, or artificial water-course, on the defendants' land, making compensation to them. The *páin*, by a channel at one part of its course, contributed to the water in a *tál*, or reservoir, belonging to the defendants; and by a channel at another part took the water which overflowed from the *tál*, after the defendants had used as much of the water therein as they required. Less than twenty years before the suit, the defendants, without authority, obstructed the flow of water along the *páin* in several places. The Courts below differed as to whether some of these obstructions had not been made more than two years before the suit, the rest having been made within that period. *Held*, that the provisions of Act IX of 1871—a remedial Act, and neither prohibitory nor exhaustive—did not exclude, or interfere with, the acquirement of rights otherwise than under them. A title might be acquired under that Act by a person having no other right at all; but it did not exclude, or interfere with, other titles and modes of acquiring easements. And s. 27, by allowing a user of twenty years, if exercised until within two years of suit, under the conditions prescribed, to give, without more, a title, did not prevent proof of an easement founded on another title, independently of the Act. Such a long enjoyment as the plaintiff had proved should be referred to a legal origin, and the long user of the *páin* and of the superfluous water of the *tál* afforded evidence giving rise to a presumption that a grant, or an agreement, had been made creating an easement. Although, on the assumption that some of the obstructions in question had existed for more than two years before the suit, the plaintiff might not have shown a right under Act IX of 1871, s. 27, yet he did not require its aid. *Held*, also, that such obstructions being continuous acts, as to which the cause of action accrued *de die in diem*, Act IX of 1871, Sch. II, Part V, cl. 31, fixing two years from the date of the obstruction as the period of limitation "for obstructing a water-course," did not preclude a suit complaining of obstructions, though made more than two years preceding the date of the commencement of the suit. **RAJRUP KOER v. ABUL HOSSEIN**

**I. L. R. 6 Calc. 394 : L. R. 7 I. A. 240**  
**7 C. L. R. 529**



**PRESCRIPTION—contd.****2. EASEMENTS—contd.****(j) RIGHT CONCERNING WATER—contd.**

**78. ——— Right to discharge surplus water on another's land—*Servitudes—Servient and dominant owners.*** Where A has a right to discharge the surplus rainfall from his land on to the land of B, no length of time will give B a right to compel A to send the water on; provided that A does not interfere with any portion of the water which flows from his land to that of B in a natural and defined channel. The servient owner cannot prevent the dominant owner from putting an end to the servitude at any time he may think proper.

KHOORSHED HOSSEIN v. TEKNARAIN SING

2 C. L. R. 141

**79. ——— Right to have water carried off over neighbour's land—*How far it interferes with right of erecting buildings.*** A right to have water carried away over the adjoining land does not give its owner any power to prevent the erection of buildings on the adjoining ground so long as the arrangements necessary to the preservation of his right are made.

BALA v. MAHARU

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 788

**80. ——— Right to use of water drain—*Proof of enjoyment of easement for term sufficient to give right to it.*** In a suit for the recovery of a right of easement in a drain that had been closed up, in which suit the Munsif found that a drain had existed which had recently been closed, and that there was no other way whereby water could escape from plaintiff's land, and accordingly gave the plaintiff a decree which was upheld by the Judge:—*Held*, that the real issue to be tried was whether the plaintiff had enjoyed the easement for the time (twenty years) and in the manner laid down in the law.

RAMESUR MISSER v. BROJO BHOOKUN MISSER

25 W. R. 271

**81. ——— Right to divert flow of water—*Presumption of grant—User.*** A right to divert the flow of water into a particular channel by erecting a dam across a stream was held to be established in a suit brought in 1878 by proof of exercise of the right for eighteen years prior to 1871.

ZAMINDAR OF KURUPAM v. ZAMINDAR OF MERANGI. VERICHERLA SURYA NARAYANA RAJU v. SATRACHERLA JAGANADA RAJU

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 253

**82. ——— Right to water of river—*Relative rights of riparian proprietors and occupiers to the water of river—Diversion—User—Rights of the Government—Khalsa or raiyatvadi land.*** A dam had been in existence across a river for upwards of 280 years, and during all that time the villages of D and P had received an equal supply of water from separate sluices in the dam. The Government authorities, being of opinion that D required less water than P, reduced the size of the D sluice, and consequently the amount of water flowing to the D village. The village of D was khalsa or raiyatvadi, i.e., was held immediately of Government. The inhabitants of D appealed against the action

**PRESCRIPTION—contd.****2. EASEMENTS—contd.****(j) RIGHT CONCERNING WATER—contd.**

of Government. *Held*, that the Government had no such right of interference, neither (i) as riparian proprietors (supposing them to be such), since the right to the enjoyment of the water of a river belongs to the occupant of the river-bank, whatever the nature of his tenancy; nor (ii) by any other imaginable rights existing in the Government as such, since, if any such rights ever existed, the long user for upwards of 280 years of the water from the dam by the village of D would be amply sufficient to justify a presumption of an original *animus dedicandi* in the Government. COLLECTOR OF NASIK v. SHAMJI DASRATH PATIL

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 209

**83. ——— Natural streams—*Easements Act (V of 1882), ss. 6, 7, 17—Surface water—Rights of riparian owners.*** The owners of a tank fed by natural streams which depended for their supply on natural rainfall and surface water sued for an injunction to restrain superior riparian owners from damming the streams or interfering with the supply of water, over which the plaintiffs claimed a right of easement. The issue as to the ownership of the land on which the streams rose was undecided. *Held*, (i) The Easement Act only declared the existing law as to easements over water; (ii) An easement can therefore be acquired in regard to the water of the rainfall. But surface water not flowing in a stream, and not permanently collected in a pool, tank, or otherwise, is not a subject of easement by prescription, though it may be the subject of an express grant or contract; (iii) It is the natural right of every owner of land to collect or dispose of all water on the surface which does not pass in a defined channel; (iv) Riparian owners are entitled to use and consume the water of the stream for drinking and household purposes, for watering their cattle, for irrigating their land, and for purposes of manufacture, subject to the conditions (i) that the use is reasonable, (ii) that it is required for their purposes as owners of the land, and (iii) that it does not destroy or render useless or materially diminish or affect the application of the water by inferior riparian owners in the exercise either of their natural right or their right of easement, if any; (v) It was therefore necessary to ascertain where the streams rose, and the course, source, and length of their tributaries. PERUMAL v. RAMASAMI

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 16

**84. ——— Easement over a well—*Easements Act (V of 1882), s. 2 (b)—Customary right to use the well.*** No fixed period of enjoyment is laid down by law as necessary to establish a customary right, and a customary right to use a well may exist apart from a dominant heritage. PALANIANDI TEVAN v. PUTHIRANGONDA NADAN

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 389

**85. ——— Water-course—*Riparian owners, right of—Mamlatdar, jurisdiction of—Easements Act (V of 1882), s. 7.*** The law as to



**PRESCRIPTION—contd.****2. EASEMENTS—contd.****(j) RIGHT CONCERNING WATER—contd.**

riparian owners is the same in India as in England, and is stated in illustration (h) of s. 7 of the Easements Act (V of 1882). Each proprietor has a right to a reasonable use of the water as it passes his land, but, in the absence of some special custom, he has no right to dam it back, or exhaust it, so as to deprive other riparian owners of like use. What would constitute an unreasonable diversion of water such as to disturb the use of the lower riparian owners, is a question of fact which the Legislature has given a Mamlatdar jurisdiction to decide. **NARAYAN HARI DEVAL v. KESHAV SHIVRAM DEVAL** I. L. R. 23 Bom. 506

**86. ——— Right to throw back water on another's land—***Right of other person to relieve himself from inconvenience.* The tank used for the irrigation of the plaintiff's village was supplied in part by rain-water falling on the lands of the village occupied by defendants 9 to 17, and the bund of the tank used formerly to throw back the waters so flowing into the tank on to the lands of defendants, where it remained till gradually drawn off into the area of the tank. Defendants 9 to 17, through the agency of the Government, relieved themselves of this inconvenience by making a work for draining off the water so periodically thrown back their land. A channel was also constructed for conducting a supply of water to the plaintiff's tank. Plaintiffs, however, claimed to have the former state of things restored, on the ground that they had a prescriptive right to throw back the water on the defendant's lands and to keep it there till required for use. *Held*, that there was here no object over which a right could be acquired. **ROBINSON (COLLECTOR OF NORTH ARCOT) v. AYYA KRISHNAMA CHARİYAR. MANİYAM NARASINMA GAUNDAN v. AYYA KRISHNAMA CHARİYAR**

7 Mad. 37

**87. ——— Right to discharge water from roof on another's land—***Purchaser, right of.* If a party has ancient right to the discharge of water from his roof on a certain piece of land, it is not competent for a purchaser of the land to exercise his right thereto in such a manner as to interfere with the easement, and impose the trouble and expense on the owner of the easement of procuring some new mode of discharge. **SHEO NAUTH SINGH v. BISHONATH SINGH** 2 Agra, Pt. II, 191

**88. ——— Suit for removal of wall.** In a suit for the removal of a wall on which plaintiff had been allowed by defendants for a number of years to rest the thatch of a hut, and which wall and thatch, after having been thrown down by a cyclone, had been rebuilt by plaintiff though the thatched roof had been again blown down, and there was no thatch at the time of the suit:—*Held*, that, under these circumstances, the plaintiff could not have acquired a prescriptive right that the water from the thatch should pass over defendant's lands, and was not entitled to

**PRESCRIPTION—contd.****2. EASEMENTS—contd.****(j) RIGHT CONCERNING WATER—concl'd.**

restrain him building up the wall. **LALL MONEE DOSSEE v. JOYNARAIN SHAHA** 11 W. R. 508

**89. ——— Right to discharge water from roof on house of another—***Limitation—User.* The plaintiff and the defendant were owners, respectively, of two adjoining houses, having a space between them belonging to the plaintiff. The roof of the defendant's house, built more than thirty years previously, projected over a part of this space. The plaintiff built a new storey to his house, with a roof overhanging the roof of the defendant's house, and under an alleged custom of the country (Ahmedabad) claimed a right to remove the part of the defendant's roof which projected over his (plaintiff's) land. He also sued to establish his right to an easement as against the defendant of compelling the defendant to receive upon the roof of his house the rain-water which flowed from the newly erected roof of the plaintiff. *Held*, with regard to the former claim, that if the enjoyment by the defendant were considered as possession, by him, of the space occupied by his projecting roof, the Limitation Act extinguished the plaintiff's right to sue; and if such enjoyment were to be regarded as a mere easement, then to the uninterrupted user of more than thirty years vested in the defendant a proprietary right to the same. *Held*, further, with regard to the plaintiff's claim to an easement, that the plaintiff could only have acquired such easement either by contract or prescription, on neither of which did he rely. No custom can be admitted to override the provisions of the Limitation Act. **MOHANLAL JECHAND v. AMRATLAL BECHERDAS** I. L. R. 3 Bom. 174

**90. ——— Rights accessory to an easement—***Easements Act (V of 1882), s. 24.* The plaintiff, having in a previous suit obtained a decree declaring his right of having the roof of his house projecting over the defendant's land and discharging water thereon, now sued for a declaration of his right to go upon the defendants' land for the purpose of repairing the roof. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to the right claimed as being accessory to the easement already established, but that it should be exercised only once a year, and after notice to the defendants. **HAYAGREEVA v. SAMI** I. L. R. 15 Mad. 286

**(k) TREES.**

**91. ——— Trees overhanging neighbour's land—***Right to have branches of trees cut—Nuisance—Easements Act (V of 1882).* Plaintiff sued for an injunction restraining the defendant allowing the branches of a tree belonging to him to overhang plaintiff's land, and for an order directing him to cut off the branches. Defendant pleaded that the branches of his tree had projected over plaintiff's land for forty years, and contended he had therefore acquired a prescriptive right of the nature of an easement over plaintiff's land. *Held*



**PRESCRIPTION—concl'd.****2. EASEMENTS—concl'd.****(k) TREES—concl'd.**

that the plaintiff was entitled to cut away the branches which overhang his land, though they had done so for more than forty years. **HARI KRISHNA JOSHI v. SHANKAR VITHAL**

**I. L. R. 19 Bom. 420**

**PRESIDENCY BANKS ACT (XI OF 1876).**

**s. 4—Certificate of administration—Act XXVII of 1860—Registration of guardian as proprietor of shares—Power to negotiate.** A, the mother and guardian of a minor, obtained a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860. Part of the property of the minor consisted of shares in the Bank of Bengal. A obtained power under her certificate to draw the dividends due upon the shares. After the passing of the Presidency Banks Act, 1876, A applied under s. 4 of that Act to be registered as proprietor of the shares. The Bank refused to register her name as proprietor, and A then applied to have her certificate amended by empowering her to negotiate the shares. *Held*, that she was not entitled to have such a power inserted in the certificate. *In the matter of the petition of RADHABULLUBH SIL*

**I. L. R. 8 Calc. 300 : 11 C. L. R. 274**

**ss. 20, 22, 23—Bank of Bombay—Registration and transfer of shares—Rights of surviving co-parceners—Necessity of probate or letters of administration.** Thirteen shares of the Bank of Bombay stood in the name of one Sarabhai, who died in March 1895. The plaintiff, who was the minor son of Sarabhai and joint and undivided with him, applied to the Bank to have the shares transferred to his name as the sole surviving co-parcener of Sarabhai. The Bank contended they were not bound to do so without production of the probate of the will of Sarabhai or letters of administration to his estate. *Held* (reversing **RUSSELL, J.**), that, having regard to the terms of the Presidency Banks Act (XI of 1876), the Bank were right in their contention. For a share in the Bank, for the purposes of devolution or survivorship, must be deemed, as far as the Bank was concerned, the exclusive property of its registered holder, and that therefore the sole surviving co-parcener of a deceased Hindu cannot demand that the Bank of Bombay should, by reason of his survivorship, register him as a shareholder in respect of shares in the Bank which stand in the name of his deceased co-parcener. **BANK OF BOMBAY v. AMBALAL SARABHAI**

**I. L. R. 24 Bom. 350**

**ss. 36, 37—Bank of Bombay—Power of Directors to lend money on equitable mortgage.** The Directors of the Bank of Bombay discounted at different times promissory notes for sums amounting in all to about Rs 60,000, drawn by the firm of Fezulbhoy Meheralli Chinoy in favour of one Meheralli Mahomed Chinoy, who, it subsequently appeared, was a partner in the firm, but was not

**PRESIDENCY BANKS ACT (XI OF 1876)—concl'd.****ss. 36, 37—concl'd.**

known to be so at the time of the said transactions. Before discounting the later notes, the Directors of the Bank obtained from Meheralli an equitable mortgage, by deposit of title-deeds on certain immoveable properties situate in Bombay and Mahabaleshwar, as security for the then existing and future indebtedness of the said firm or Meheralli to the Bank. The notes became due, and were dishonoured, the firm having in the meanwhile become insolvent. The Bank thereupon sued the Official Assignee, as assignee of the firm's estate, to recover the sums due on the notes, and for a declaration that it was entitled to a charge on the immoveable properties held by it as security. The Official Assignee contended that, under s. 37 of the Presidency Banks Act (XI of 1876), it was illegal for the Bank to lend money on equitable mortgage and that no valid charge had been created. *Held*, that, notwithstanding the provisions of the said Act, the Bank was entitled to realize the securities. *Held*, also, that the provisions of s. 37 of the Act did not invalidate a charge on immoveable property created as a security for a *bond fide* liability already in existence. The words of s. 37 impose a restriction on making a loan on mortgage of immoveable property, not upon the Bank but upon the Directors. As between the Directors and the Bank, the Directors would be liable for any loss resulting from the breach of the provisions of the sections, but the mortgagors could not repudiate the obligation into which they purported to enter, and the Official Assignee was not in a more favourable position. **TURNER v. BANK OF BOMBAY (1900)**

**I. L. R. 25 Bom. 52**

**1. s. 50—Bank of Bombay—Right of a shareholder to inspect the register of shareholders of the Bank—Object of such inspection—Common law right of a member of a corporation to inspect books of the corporation.** Every member of a corporation has a right under common law to inspect its books and records and such right does not cease merely because a corporation is created by a statute which does not confer the right, unless the statute expressly excludes it. The member of a corporation as such is entitled to the inspection of any of its documents if he satisfies the Court that he is seeking inspection not from mere idle curiosity or for some speculative purpose, but that he had some reasonable and definite object, in which he is interested, and for which the inspection is required, whether that definite object concerns or not any subject then in controversy or discussion. *Rex v. The Fraternity of Hostmen*, 2 Stra. 1221, and *Rex v. The Merchant Tailors' Company*, 2 B. & Ad. 115, followed. It is but reasonable that a shareholder of a Bank should desire from time to time to consult other shareholders and discuss with them the affairs of the Bank for the purpose of taking concerted action, where and when necessary, apart from any question of any irregularity existing in the management of the Bank. And for that purpose inspection of the register of shareholders



**PRESIDENCY BANKS ACT (XI OF 1876)—concl'd.****s. 50—concl'd.**

is necessary, to enable him to find out who the shareholders are whom it would be worth his while to consult and whose co-operation he should seek. Other books and records of the Bank may stand on a different footing : when inspection of any of them is claimed other and stricter consideration might apply. *Held*, further, that the plaintiff's proper remedy was by way of suit and not *mandamus* under the Specific Relief Act. *SULLEMAN SOMJI v. THE BANK OF BOMBAY* (1907)

**I. L. R. 31 Bom. 319**

**2. ————— Bank of Bombay**

*—Right of a shareholder to inspect register of shareholders of the Bank—Object of such inspection—Common law right of member of corporation to inspect books of the corporation—Companies Acts (X of 1866), s. 231 ; (VI of 1882), s. 256.* The respondent as a shareholder in the appellant Bank claimed a right to inspect, copy and make extracts from the register of shareholders which the Bank refused to allow, but offered to furnish him with the list he asked for, if he could satisfy them that he required it for use in his own interests as a shareholder. Without accepting this offer the respondent brought a suit against the Bank in which he based his claim on irregularities which he alleged existed in the management of the Bank, in the election of Directors and in other matters, and stated that he claimed inspection of the register to enable him to communicate with the other shareholders and obtain their assent to resolutions for improvement in the Bank's management to be proposed at a future meeting. The first Court dismissed the suit, but the High Court on its Appellate Side reversed the decision and passed a decree giving the respondent without any restriction the right to inspect a copy extract from the register, which he had originally demanded from the Bank. *Held*, by the Judicial Committee, that the suit should be treated according to the principles regulating an application for a writ of *mandamus*, and in that view the respondent was not entitled to succeed, unless he showed clearly that he had the specific right to enforce for which he asked for the interference of the Court, that he had claimed the exercise of that right and none other, and that his claim had been refused. In this case there was no statute giving him an unrestricted right, the appellant Bank (which was incorporated under Act XI of 1876) being by s. 231 of the Companies Act, 1866, and s. 256 of the Companies Act, 1882, expressly exempted from the operation of those statutes. The result of the authorities as to the nature and extent of the common law right, which every member of a corporation has, to inspect the documents of the corporation was that "the privilege of inspection was confined to cases where the member of the corporation has in view some definite right or object of his own, and to those documents which would tend to illustrate such right or object." Taylor on Evidence, 10th Edition (1906), Volume II, paragraph 1495, referred to. On the evidence the res-

**PRESIDENCY BANKS ACT (XI OF 1876)—concl'd.****s. 50—concl'd.**

pondent had not brought himself within the principles so laid down and his claim should therefore not be allowed. *Rex v. Merchant Tailor Company*, 2 B. & Ad. 115, followed. He was entitled to the extended right given him by the decree of the Appellate Court, and the limited and qualified right contended for in the suit was never put forward or insisted on before action brought nor was any claim based on it ever refused. *BANK OF BOMBAY v. SULEMAN SOMJI* (1908)

**I. L. R. 32 Bom. 466**

**s.c. L. R. 35 I. A. 139**

**PRESIDENCY MAGISTRATE.**

*See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT V OF 1898), ss. 203, 437, 439.*

**I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1282**

*See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—CALCUTTA—CRIMINAL.*

**I. L. R. 26 Calc. 746**

*See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION.*

**I. L. R. 32 Calc. 469**

**concurrent jurisdiction of—**

*See CORONER . . . 7 C. W. N. 889*

**duty of—**

*See COMMISSION—CRIMINAL CASES.*

**I. L. R. 24 Calc. 551**

*See DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.*

**I. R. L. 27 Bom. 84**

*See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—COMMITMENTS . . . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 580*

**jurisdiction of—**

*See DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.*

**I. L. R. 28 Calc. 652**

*See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—GENERAL JURISDICTION—OFFENCE COMMITTED ON THE HIGH SEAS.*

**I. L. R. 25 Bom. 636**

**order of discharge by—**

*See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF.*

**I. L. R. 36 Calc. 994**

**proceedings of—**

*See COMPLAINT—REVIVAL OF COMPLAINT.*

**I. L. R. 24 Calc. 528**

**1 C. W. N. 49**

**4 C. W. N. 26 ; 46**

*See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS CASES.*

**I. L. R. 26 Calc. 6 ; 746**

**record of evidence—**

*See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ss. 110, 123 . . . 13 C. W. N. 318*



**PRESIDENCY MAGISTRATE—contd.**

reference to High Court by—

See **RIGHT TO BEGIN.****I. L. R. 19 Calc. 380**

rules framed by—

See **CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 21.****8 C. W. N. 862**

statement made to—

See **CONFESSION—CONFESSIONS TO MAGISTRATE . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 595****I. L. R. 21 Bom. 495**

1. ——— **Jurisdiction—Coroners Act (IV of 1871), s. 25—Committal to the High Court by a Coroner—Presidency Magistrate's power to inquire into a case committed by the Coroner.** A Presidency Magistrate is competent to hold a preliminary inquiry into the case of an accused person who has been committed to the High Court by the Coroner under s. 25 of Act IV of 1871. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MAHOMED RAJUDIN**

**I. L. R. 6 Bom. 159**

2. ——— **Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 195—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 116, 193—Abetment—Instigating person to give false evidence.** B, without having obtained sanction under s. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code, charged C before the Chief Presidency Magistrate with instigating her to give false evidence in a certain divorce suit in which C was respondent. Held, that the Chief Presidency Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the case without the sanction of the Court before which the divorce proceedings were pending, as the offence charged was alleged to have been committed in relation to those proceedings. **CHANDRA MOHAN BANERJEE v. BALFOUR . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 359**

3. ——— **"Magistrate of Police"—Act XIII of 1859, ss. 1, 4—Criminal breach of contract—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 3.** A Presidency Magistrate of Calcutta may lawfully take cognizance, under s. 1 of Act XIII of 1859, of a complaint in respect of a contract made in Calcutta, the breach of which has been committed beyond the local jurisdiction of his Court. The expression "Magistrate of Police" in s. 1, Act XIII of 1859, means "Presidency Magistrate." **LAL MOHAN CHOWBEY v. HARI CHARAN DAS BAIRAGI . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 637**

4. ——— **Summary trial—Conviction in non-appealable case—Code of Criminal Procedure, s. 370.** In every case which is not appealable to the High Court, a Presidency Magistrate should state his reasons for convicting the prisoner, so that the High Court may judge as to whether there were sufficient materials before the Magistrate to support the conviction. In the matter of the petition of YACOOB. **YACOOB v. ADAMSON**

**I. L. R. 13 Calc. 272**

5. ——— **Reasons for conviction—Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, s. 370.** In the trial of a case under Act XIII of 1859 the record need not be framed in accordance with s. 370 of the Code

**PRESIDENCY MAGISTRATE—contd.**

of Criminal Procedure. **AVERAM DAS MOCHI v. ABDUL RAHIM . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 131**  
**4 C. W. N. 201**

6. ——— **Sentence of imprisonment—Reasons for conviction to be recorded—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 370, cl. (i)—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 408.** S. 370 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that in a case in which the accused is sentenced to imprisonment a Presidency Magistrate shall record a brief statement of the reasons for the conviction. It is not sufficient for him to record that the offence is proved, for that may necessarily be implied to be his opinion from the fact that he has convicted the accused. The law contemplates something further as the reason for the conviction. **NATABAR GHOSE v. PROVASH CHANDRA CHATTERJEE . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 461**  
**4 C. W. N. 467**

7. ——— **Judgment—Record of reasons for conviction—Evidence—Sentence of imprisonment—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 370, cl. (i).** S. 362 of the Criminal Procedure Code prescribes that the evidence in appealable cases, that is, in which a Presidency Magistrate imposes a fine exceeding Rs 200 or imprisonment for a term exceeding six months, shall be duly recorded. There is no obligation in law to record evidence in other cases; the discretion rests with the Magistrate. Under the provisions of s. 370, cl. (i), of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Magistrate should state the reasons for conviction in such a manner that the High Court on revision may judge whether there were sufficient materials before him to support the conviction. The law does not demand a full and complete statement of reasons, but only a brief one. **ENAMAN v. EMPEROR (1904) . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 983**

8. ——— **Presidency Magistrate—Judgment, recording of—Evidence, taking down of—Reason for conviction, recording of.** Although s. 370 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers a Presidency Magistrate to record a brief statement of his reasons for his conviction instead of a judgment, this must be done in such a manner that the High Court in revision may be in a position to judge whether there were sufficient materials before him to support the conviction. Where a Presidency Magistrate convicted and sentenced the accused to a term of imprisonment under ss. 61 and 74 of Bengal Act VII of 1878 but did not in his judgment give either the substance or a summary of the evidence and there was nothing on the record to show that the accused had been previously convicted, the High Court set aside the conviction on the ground that the judgment was defective. **TOOLSEY KAHARIN v. EMPEROR (1904)**  
**8 C. W. N. 587**

9. ——— **Law as to recording of evidence—Presidency Magistrate, recording of reasons for conviction by—Appealable and non-appealable cases, difference in procedure in—Revision, adequate materials for.** In a case in which the Chief Presidency Magistrate convicted certain persons and



**PRESIDENCY MAGISTRATE—concl'd.**

sentenced them each to 21 days' rigorous imprisonment, he recorded evidence very meagrely. *Held*, that under s. 262 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it was not obligatory on the Magistrate to record evidence in this case; that the "brief statement of reasons for conviction" recorded by the Magistrate under s. 370 (i) of the Criminal Procedure Code was sufficient in this case to satisfy a Court of Revision that there were materials before the Magistrate to support the conviction. *EMAMDU v. KING-EMPEROR* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 839

10. ——— Appointment of a pleader to act as Presidency Magistrate—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 557*. The appointment of a pleader to act as a Magistrate is not forbidden by s. 557 or any other provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898). After the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 had come into force, a practising pleader was appointed to act as a Presidency Magistrate. On his appointment he gave up practising, and was not practising at the time the accused was tried and convicted by him of theft. The accused applied to the High Court in revision to quash the conviction, on the ground that the appointment of the Magistrate contravened the provisions of s. 557 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Held*, that s. 557 of the Code does not deal with appointments, and had no application to the present case, as the Magistrate was not practising at the time the accused was tried and convicted. *In re JIVANJI ADAMJI*

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 490

**PRESIDENCY MAGISTRATES ACT (IV OF 1877).**

——— s. 39 (Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 197)—

See SANCTION TO PROSECUTION—WHERE SANCTION IS NECESSARY OR OTHERWISE. I. L. R. 3 Calc. 758 : 2 C. L. R. 520

——— s. 41 (Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 195)—

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—ACTS—PRESIDENCY MAGISTRATES ACT. I. L. R. 2 Calc. 466

——— s. 87 (Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 209)—

See MALICIOUS PROSECUTION. I. L. R. 6 Bom. 376

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES—GENERALLY. I. L. R. 5 Calc. 121 : 4 C. L. R. 305

——— s. 124 (Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 92, 344)—

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—EFFECT OF DISMISSAL. I. L. R. 6 Calc. 523

**PRESIDENCY MAGISTRATES ACT (IV OF 1877)—concl'd.**

——— s. 129 (Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 495)—

See COUNSEL.

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 59 : 6 C. L. R. 374

——— s. 167 (Criminal Procedure Code, 1882 ss. 411, 412)—

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—ACTS—PRESIDENCY MAGISTRATES ACT.

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 85

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT IN DEFAULT OF FINE.

I. L. R. 2 Mad. 30

——— s. 168 (Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 417, 427)—

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CHARTER ACT, s. 15—CRIMINAL CASES.

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 447

s. 170—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 548.

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 166

10 C. L. R. 190

——— s. 181 (Criminal Procedure Code, s. 526)—

See TRANSFER OF CRIMINAL CASE—GENERAL CASES I. L. R. 2 Calc. 290

This Act was repealed, and its provisions were incorporated into the Criminal Procedure Codes (Act X of 1882 and Act V of 1898).

**PRESIDENCY SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT (XV OF 1882).**

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT XIV OF 1882), s. 622 . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 490

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, PRESIDENCY TOWNS.

——— s. 9—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 622—Regulation XXVII of 1827, s. 5—Decree of Presidency Small Cause Court—High Court's power of superintendence and revision—Grave and irreparable injustice—Receiver—Rent—Use and occupation*. The plaintiff owned a certain house at Bombay. He let it out to a tenant on a monthly tenure. The tenant used the premises for his press, machinery and stock which he had mortgaged to his creditor, before he entered into a contract by way of lease with the plaintiff. Subsequently the mortgagee brought a suit in the High Court upon his mortgage and under the Court's order the Official Receiver took possession of the machinery and stock on the plaintiff's premises. Before the suit in the High Court the plaintiff had given to the tenant a notice to quit. Later on he gave another notice to the Receiver that he was going to charge him rent from a particular date. On failure of the Receiver to pay rent, the plaintiff, with the permission of the High Court, brought a suit against him in the Court of Small Causes, Bombay, for the recovery of the rent, or, in the



**PRESIDENCY SMALL CAUSE COURT ACT (XV OF 1882)—*contd.*****s. 9—*concl'd.***

alternative, for compensation for use and occupation. The suit was dismissed by the Court on the ground that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendant, who, as Receiver, was merely a custodian appointed by the Court and that his appointment did not affect the rights of the contracting parties. Against the said decision the plaintiff applied to the High Court under the extraordinary jurisdiction and obtained a *rule nisi* requiring the defendant to show cause why the decision should not be reversed. *Held*, discharging the rule, that the plaintiff could not succeed in the suit. *Per* BEAMAN, J.—Courts in the exercise of superintending powers will not ordinarily interfere except in cases of grave and otherwise irreparable injustice. *ISMALJI v. N. C. MACLEOD* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 31 Bom. 138

**ss. 9, 19, 28—**

*See* TITLE . . . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 823

**s. 17—**

*See* NEW TRIAL, APPLICATION FOR. . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 339

**s. 19(k)—Annuity payable under a will—Assent of executors—Suits to recover arrears—Presidency Small Cause Court—Jurisdiction.** A suit to recover arrears of an annuity payable under a will and assented to by executors is cognizable by the Presidency Small Cause Court. Such a suit is a suit for money had and received by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff and it does not fall under s. 19 (k) of the Presidency Small Cause Court Act (XV of 1882). *DOSSIBAI v. COOVERBAI* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 575

**s. 22—**

*See* COSTS—SPECIAL CASES—SMALL CAUSE COURT SUITS . . . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 399  
I. L. R. 21 Bom. 779

**s. 23—**

*See* CLAIM TO ATTACHED PROPERTY. . . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 296

**s. 37—**

*See* CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 108. . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 269  
I. L. R. 20 Bom. 380

*See* CLAIM TO ATTACHED PROPERTY. . . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 296  
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 778

*See* LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 164 . . . I. L. R. 17 Bom. 507

**s. 38—**

*See* WITHDRAWAL OF SUIT. . . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 233

**s. 38, Chap. VII—Proceedings in ejectment—Order—Decree.** The plaintiff instituted proceedings in ejectment against the defendant

**PRESIDENCY SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT (XV OF 1882)—*contd.*****s. 38—*concl'd.***

under Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1882); the Judge passed an order directing the defendant to vacate. The defendant applied under s. 38 of the above Act to the Full Court which declined to entertain the application. The defendant thereupon applied to the High Court under its extraordinary jurisdiction (s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code, Act XIV of 1882) and obtained a *rule nisi* requiring the plaintiff to show cause why the order should not be set aside. *Held*, discharging the rule, that an application under Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1882) does not come within the operation of s. 38 of the Act. A proceeding under Chapter VII results not in a decree but in an order. Therefore, the condition under which the Presidency Small Cause Court can interfere under s. 38 does not arise in a proceeding under Chapter VII of the Act. *RAMKRISHNA v. HAJI DAWOOD* (1907)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 259

**ss. 41—49 (Chap. VII)—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 108—Presidency Small Cause Court—Proceedings in ejectment—Ex parte order—Power to set aside.** The Small Cause Court has an inherent power to deal with an application to set aside an order made *ex parte* and to set it aside upon a proper cause being substantiated. *Per* JENKINS, C.J.—It is erroneous to suppose that s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no application to proceedings under Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts' Act. It is quite true that it has not a direct application, because proceedings under Chapter VII are not a suit, nor is an adjudication in the proceedings a decree. *TYEB BEG MAHOMED v. ALLIBHAI* (1906)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 45

**1. s. 69—Negotiable Instruments Act, s. 84 (2)—Question whether cheque was presented within a reasonable time is a question of fact and cannot be referred to the High Court by the Presidency Court of Small Causes.** The Presidency Court of Small Causes referred to the High Court, under s. 69 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, the question whether a cheque was presented within a reasonable time. *Held*, that, under s. 84 (2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the question must be determined with regard to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade and of bankers and the facts of the particular case. The question is one of fact and not of law and is not one which can be referred to the High Court under s. 69 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act. *EAST INDIAN AND ANGLO-INDIAN DEPOSIT AND LOAN SOCIETY v. T. MCNAIR* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 31 Mad 364

**2. Revisional power of High Courts over Presidency Courts of Small Causes—Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, s. 69—Where the Judges differ matter must be referred to High Court.** There is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure or in the Presidency Small Cause Courts' Act to exempt Presidency Courts of Small Causes from the revisional powers of the High Court under



**PRESIDENCY SMALL CAUSE COURTS  
ACT (XV OF 1882)—concl'd.**

s. 69—concl'd.

s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code. Where the Judges of such Court sitting together in Full Bench to dispose of a suit take different views on a point affecting the merits of the case, they are bound under s. 69 of the Act to refer the matter for the opinion of the High Court and ought to deal with the matter finally. Where the order of the Full Bench, on the application of the party for a retrial, fully deals with all the points arising for decision in the suit itself without granting a formal order for retrial, the absence of such formal order is immaterial, and the Judges must be considered to have sat together in the suit within the meaning of s. 6. The substantial effect of the order and not its mere form must be considered. *Seshammal v. Munusamy Mudali*, I. L. R. 20 Mad. 358, referred to. *RANGIAH NAIDU v. RANGIAH* (1908) . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 490

ss. 69, 70—

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, PRESIDENCY  
TOWNS—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.  
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 260

**PRESIDENCY SMALL CAUSE COURTS  
ACT (I OF 1895).**

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, PRESIDENCY  
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s. 11—

See COSTS—SPECIAL CASES—SMALL CAUSE  
COURT SUITS . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 399  
I. L. R. 21 Bom. 779

**PRESS AND REGISTRATION OF  
BOOKS ACT (XXV OF 1867).**

s. 18—

See COPYRIGHT ACT (XX OF 1847).  
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 571

**PRESSING FACTORY.**

See STAMP ACT (II OF 1899).  
I. L. R. 32 Bom. 505

**PRESUMPTION.**

See AGRA TENANCY ACT (II OF 1901).  
I. L. R. 30 All. 58  
I. L. R. 31 All. 253; 257

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 50.  
13 C. W. N. 1149

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 51.  
6 C. W. N. 589

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, ss. 103, 103B.  
10 C. W. N. 908  
13 C. W. N. 111

See CHAUKIDARI CHAKRAN LAND, SETTLE-  
MENT OF . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1107

See CHOTA NAGPUR TENANCY ACT, s. 169.  
13 C. W. N. 111

See COMPROMISE—MINOR.  
13 C. W. N. 163

**PRESUMPTION—concl'd.**

See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—EXEMPTION  
FROM ENHANCEMENT BY UNIFORM PAY-  
MENT OF RENT AND PRESUMPTION.

See EVIDENCE . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 751

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MAPS.  
7 C. W. N. 849

See EVIDENCE ACT (I OF 1872), s. 114.  
I. L. R. 29 All. 138

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See HINDU LAW—

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I. L. R. 29 Calc. 433

JOINT FAMILY—PRESUMPTION AND  
ONUS OF PROOF AS TO JOINT  
FAMILY;

PRESUMPTION OF DEATH.

WIDOW—POWER OF WIDOW—POWER  
OF DISPOSITION OR ALIENATION.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 351  
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1086

See HUNDI—ACCEPTANCE.  
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 526

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—NATURE OF  
TENANCY.

See LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.  
10 C. W. N. 432

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—LEGITIMACY.  
I. L. R. 26 All. 295

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—PRESUMPTION OF  
DEATH.

See OWNERSHIP . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 712

See OWNERSHIP, PRESUMPTION OF.

See PARDANASHIN WOMEN.  
5 C. W. N. 505

See POSSESSION . 12 C. W. N. 273

See RECORD-OF-RIGHTS.  
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 336

See RES JUDICATA—ESTOPPEL BY JUDG-  
MENT . . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 109

See REVENUE SALE LAW, s. 37.  
10 C. W. N. 503

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I. L. R. 30 Calc. 281

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—  
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as to ancient document—

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**PRESUMPTION—contd.**

- \_\_\_\_\_ as to nature of tenancy—  
See LANDLORD AND TENANT—NATURE OF TENANCY.
- \_\_\_\_\_ as to tenancy being a "tenure"—  
See BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF 1885), s. 5 (5) . . . 6 C. W. N. 825
- \_\_\_\_\_ from non-denial in written statement of allegation made against defendant—  
See INJUNCTION—SPECIAL CASES—OBSTRUCTION OR INJURY TO RIGHTS OF PROPERTY . I. L. R. 26 Bom. 735
- \_\_\_\_\_ as to legality of distraint—  
See PENAL CODE, s. 424.  
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- \_\_\_\_\_ of correctness—  
See APPELLATE COURT.  
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 833
- \_\_\_\_\_ of death—  
See EVIDENCE . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 25  
See PRESUMPTION.  
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 173
- \_\_\_\_\_ of existence of certain facts—  
See WARRANT OF ARREST—CIVIL CASES.  
6 C. W. N. 845
- \_\_\_\_\_ of holding at fixed rent from time of Permanent Settlement—  
See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 50.  
5 C. W. N. 60
- \_\_\_\_\_ of legitimacy—  
See ONUS OF PROOF—LEGITIMACY.  
I. L. R. 25 All. 403
- \_\_\_\_\_ of lost grant—  
See PRESCRIPTION—EASEMENTS—GENERALLY . . . 15 W. R. 212  
See PRESCRIPTION—EASEMENTS—LIGHT AND AIR . . . 3 B. L. R. O. C. 18  
6 B. L. R. 85  
s.c. on appeal . . . 12 B. L. R. 406  
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- \_\_\_\_\_ of marriage—  
See MARRIAGE . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 232
- \_\_\_\_\_ of ownership—  
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I. L. R. 23 All. 126
- \_\_\_\_\_ of payment—  
See PROMISSORY NOTES—ASSIGNMENT OF, AND SUITS ON, PROMISSORY NOTES.  
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- \_\_\_\_\_ rebuttal of—  
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- \_\_\_\_\_ under Evidence Act, 1872, s. 114, Ill. (g)—  
See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS—ROAD-CESS PAPERS . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1033
- \_\_\_\_\_ when one co-parcener separates from others—  
See HINDU LAW—PARTITION—EFFECT OF PARTITION . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 725
- 1. \_\_\_\_\_ Presumption of intention to bring about a certain result. There is no presumption that a person intends what is merely a possible result of his action or a result which, though reasonably certain, is not known to him to be so; but it must be presumed that, when a man voluntarily does an act, knowing at the time that in the natural course of events a certain result will follow, he intends to bring about that result. *Queen v. Hicklin*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 375; *Queen v. Martin*, 8 Q. B. D. 58; *Reg. v. Lobett*, 9 C. & P. 466; *Freeman v. Pope*, L. R. 5 Ch. 538; *Ex parte Mercer*, in *re Wise*, 17 Q. B. D. 290, referred to. *EMPEROR v. LAKSHMAN RAGHUNATH* (1902)  
I. L. R. 26 Bom. 558
- 2. \_\_\_\_\_ Presumption of death—*Evidence Act* (I of 1872), ss. 107, 108—*Disappearance of heir in distribution of estate of Mahomedan—Claim by son of missing man to share in estate of grandfather—Onus of proof—Matter of distribution of shares in estate referred by heirs to arbitration—Effect of arbitrator's award—Mahomedan law.* The appellant through his father, one of the children of a Mahomedan, claimed a share in the property of his grandfather, who died in 1884. It appeared that the father disappeared in 1870 and had not since been heard of. *Held*, that the onus was on the appellant to prove that his father survived the grandfather, failing which proof the share he claimed would go to the brother and sisters of the missing man as preferable heirs to the appellant. The grandfather's will being disputed, the distribution of his estate was referred to an arbitrator, who by his award made in 1888 reserved a share for the father of the appellant and his children. *Held*, that there was nothing in that fact or in the award which could be construed as evidence that the appellant's father was alive when the award was made; nor could it be regarded as an admission on the part of the other heirs, nor as a finding by the arbitrator that he was then alive, the reservation of a share for a missing man being only in accordance with Mahomedan law. *MOOLLA CASSIM v. MOOLLA ABDUL RAHIM* (1905)  
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 173
- PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS ACT (XI OF 1890).**  
\_\_\_\_\_ ss. 2 and 3—*Crabs—Animals—Cruelty to animals.* The provisions of Act XI of 1890 apply to cruelty exercised towards any animal which



**PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS ACT (XI OF 1890)—concl'd.**

ss 2 and 3—concl'd.

is either "domestic" or which being *feræ naturæ* has been "captured" and is in captivity. Crabs are "animals" within the definition of s. 2 of Act XI of 1890. If a person exposes them for sale at a public place with their legs broken and with their shells crushed in so as necessarily to cause them pain, he incurs the penalty prescribed by s. 3 of the Act. **TULSI BEWAH v. SWEENEY**

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 881

In the matter of TULSI BEWA . 1 C. W. N. 642

s. 3—*Animals—Cruelty to animals—Police, Bombay Town—Act XLVIII of 1860, s. 21—Railway Company—Master and servant—Criminal liability of master for his servant's acts—Goods yards of a railway—Public place.* The Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company carried twenty-seven head of cattle from Talegaon to Bombay. These cattle were put in one truck by their owner under the supervision of the Company's goods clerk at Talegaon, and were so allowed to be put by the Company's servants at Talegaon in spite of a circular issued to them by the Traffic Manager to prevent the overcrowding of cattle. When the cattle were detrained at the goods yard of the Company at Wadi Bundar, they were found suffering from the effects of overcrowding. The Bombay Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals prosecuted the Railway Company under s. 21 of Act XLVIII of 1860 and s. 3 (b) of the Act for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Act XI of 1890). The Presidency Magistrate, who tried the case, referred to the High Court the following two questions:—(i) Is the Company liable, under the above circumstances, for the acts of the owner of the cattle and the goods clerk at Talegaon under s. 3 (b) of Act XI of 1890, though they may have no knowledge as to how the animals were carried? (ii) Is the Wadi Bundar goods station a place accessible to the public, when the Company's orders are that men on business alone should be admitted there? The High Court answered the first question in the negative and the second in the affirmative. Act XI of 1890 is aimed at the individual who actually practises the cruelty, and it was not intended by the Legislature to make a master penally liable for the act of his servant done in the course of the servant's employment, and certainly not when the act is done contrary to the orders of the master. **CAWASJI MERWANJI SHROFF v. GREAT INDIAN PENINSULA RAILWAY COMPANY (1902)**

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 609

s. 6 (1)—*Meaning of the word "permitted."* Held, that the word "permits," as used in s. 6, cl. (1), of Act XI of 1890, implies knowledge of that which is permitted. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. LALTA PRASAD.**

I. L. R. 20 All. 186

**PREVIOUS ACQUITTAL.**

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 403.

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 641

**PREVIOUS ACQUITTAL—concl'd.**

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 689

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

5 C. W. N. 28

See WHIPPING . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 712

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See CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—GENERAL CASES .

19 W. R. Cr. 41

21 W. R. Cr. 40

22 W. R. Cr. 39

4 Mad. Ap. 11

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ss. 307, 310 .

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 134

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 310.

12 C. L. R. 555

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 403.

I. L. R. 28 All. 313

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS.

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See SENTENCE—SENTENCE AFTER PREVIOUS CONVICTION.

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13 C. W. N. 318

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**PRIEST, APPOINTMENT OF.**

See CHURCH . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 447

**PRIMOGENITURE.**

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS—WAJIB-UL-ARZ.

I. L. R. 15 All. 147

See HINDU LAW—CUSTOM—IMPARTIBILITY.

I. L. R. 19 All. 1

L. R. 23 I. A. 147

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 590

See HINDU LAW—CUSTOM—PRIMOGENITURE.

See HINDU LAW—ENDOWMENT—SUCCESSION IN MANAGEMENT.

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 3

L. R. 16 I. A. 137

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—IMPARTIBLE PROPERTY .

5 Bom. A. C. 161

6 Mad. 93

I. L. R. 5 All. 542

I. L. R. 2 Mad. 286

I. L. R. 4 Mad. 250

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 406

L. R. 17 I. A. 134

I. L. R. 19 All. 1

L. R. 23 I. A. 147



**PRIMOGENITURE—*concl'd.***

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—ENDOWMENT.  
I. L. R. 13 Bom. 555

See OUDE ESTATES ACT, s. 8.  
I. L. R. 10 Calc. 515 ; 792  
L. R. 11 I. A. 51 ; 135  
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 649  
L. R. 20 I. A. 77

See OUDE ESTATES ACT, s. 23.  
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 997  
L. R. 21 I. A. 163

See SALSETTE, LAW APPLICABLE IN.  
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 680

See SUCCESSION . L. R. 30 I. A. 190

—— family custom—Chiefship of Tank—

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**PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.**

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I. L. R. 12 Bom. 502

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8 C. W. N. 113

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I. L. R. 28 Bom. 314

See TEZI-MANDI CHITTIS.  
8 B. L. R. 412 ; 415 note

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT (IV OF 1882), ss. 83, 84.  
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—— application of rule that notice to agents binds principal—

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**PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—contd.****liability of principal—**

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**undisclosed principal—**See CONTRACT ACT (IX OF 1872), s. 231.  
I. L. R. 32 Bom. 356**1. AUTHORITY OF AGENTS.**

1. **Proof of authority—Agent acting out of scope of authority.** To hold a person bound by the acts of his agent, it must be shown that the agent acted within the scope of his authority. *MUNOHUR DASS v. DEEN DYAL*

3 N. W. 179

*BEER KISHORE SAHOY v. GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL* . . . . .

17 W. R. 497

2. **Effect of act done without authority—Signing document by unauthorized agent.** The signature by an agent of a *wajib-ul-arz* from which the record of an important interest in property was omitted cannot be considered as a waiver of the right or claim unless he was properly authorized to sign it. *IMAMBUNDEE v. BHUGWAN-DASS* . . . . .

1 N. W. 41: Ed. 1873, 38

3. **Suit against agent for account—Payments or advances to third parties—Proof of authority of agent.** As a general rule, an agent or collector cannot discharge himself of moneys for which he is liable to account, by proving payments or advances to third parties, unless he can show that such payments or advances were made by the express authority of the principal, or with his knowledge and consent. *FAGAN v. CHUNDER KANT BANERJEE* . . . . .

7 W. R. 452

4. **Implied authority of agent—Liability of Principal.** When a person takes advantage of the management of his affairs by another, he must fulfil the engagements which that other has contracted in his name, provided such engagement be within the proper limits of the manager's authority, and be for the benefit of the estate. *KOORA v. ROBINSON* . . . . .

2 Agra Mis. 2

5. **Holding out, by the principal, of the agent's authority.** The right of a third party against the principal on the contract of his agent, though made in excess of the agent's actual authority, was nevertheless enforced where the evidence showed that the contracting party had been led into an honest belief in the existence of the authority to the extent apparent to him. *RAM PERTAB v. MARSHALL* . . . . .

I. L. R. 26 Cal. 701  
3 C. W. N. 313

6. **Evidence of authority—Policy of insurance.** To prove the authority of an agent who underwrites a policy of insurance, it is not necessary, in order to charge his principal, that the instrument appointing such agent should be produced, if it is shown that he has been in the habit of underwriting policies for his principal, and that the latter has been in the habit of paying losses upon

**PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—contd.****1. AUTHORITY OF AGENTS—contd.**

policies so subscribed. *MULCHAND CHUTUMAL v. SUNDARJI NARANJI* . . . . .

7 Bom. O. C. 39

7. **General or special power of agent—Evidence of agency.** Where the evidence goes to show that a particular person said to be the agent of the defendant was really his general agent, and did transact business of various kinds for his principal, it is unnecessary to prove any special power enabling him to enter into a particular contract of bargain and sale. *Per MACPHERSON, J.*—The extent and nature of the powers vested in an agent are not so much matter of law as matter of fact. If it be proved that a person acted ordinarily as an agent for the defendant in buying and selling articles of merchandise, the fact of his not being proved to have previously purchased a particular kind of article, would not necessarily operate against the plaintiff's case. The Court, in deciding the question of agency, must look to the general evidence on the record. *RAM BAKS LAL v. KISHORI MOHUN SHAHA*

3 B. L. R. A. C. 273: 12 W. R. 130

8. **Factors, shipments by—Consignees—Custom of Calcutta.** Factors having an interest by reason of their advances in their principal's goods, are justified in shipping those goods for sale, either "on account of those concerned," or "on account of themselves," unless their general authority was controlled by instructions from their principal or by contract. The evidence failing to show that any particular usage or custom qualifying the law of England as between principal and factor prevails in Calcutta. *Held*, that the powers and duties of the factors in making consignments of their principal's goods must be determined by the general mercantile law. Factors entrusted with possession of their principal's goods, and having advanced upon them, shipped the goods to London, drawing bills against them in their own names, and selling the bills with the shipping documents in the market. The acceptance of the factors' bills by the consignees, and the delivery of the shipping documents to them, made them the pledgees, but did not alter the character of the transaction, which was one whereby the factors had pledged the goods for the payment of bills on which they (and not the principal) were liable as drawers for an amount exceeding the value of the goods. In such a case no privity exists between the consignees and the undisclosed principal. *Held*, therefore, that, a loss having occurred on the shipments, the principal was liable to the factors' estate for the full amount of re-drafts representing that loss, although the factors had become insolvents, and had in fact paid only a small dividend on the redrafts. *MIRTUNJOY CHUCKERBUTTY v. COCHRANE*

4 W. R. P. C. 1: 10 Moo. I. A. 229

9. **Pledge by agent without authority—Stat. 5 and 6 Vict., c. 39, ss. 1 and 3—Factors Act (XX of 1844)—Notice of agents' *malá fides*.** Where an agent entrusted with a document of title to goods pledged it *malá fide*, or with-



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out authority, it was necessary, in order to deprive the transaction of the protection given by the 1st section of 5 & 6 Vict., c. 39, and to bring it within the proviso of the 3rd section, that the jury should find categorically that the lender had notice of the agent's *malá fides* or want of authority. To prove such notice, it was sufficient to show that the circumstances attending the transaction were such as that a reasonable man, and a man of business, applying his understanding to them, would certainly infer that the agent had not authority to make the pledge or that he was acting *malá fide* in respect thereof against his principals. **GOBIND CHUNDER SEN v. ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL**

1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 17

1 W. R. P. C. 43: 9 Moo. I. A. 140

**10. ————— Banian—Del credere agent—**  
*Dealings between Native and European firm.* **G S & Co.** employed **R** to make purchases for them in the bazar, upon orders which were in force for two days, and they imposed restrictions on **R**'s authority to pledge their credit, which were not made known to those with whom he dealt. His remuneration was to be certain dustooree on the purchases, and he paid and gave receipts for the jute, as agents for **G S & Co.** He furnished accounts specifying the price of the goods and the expenses incurred by him upon them, and upon being paid he affixed his receipts to them. The purchases were unusually large and in **R**'s books **G S & Co.** were debited with the amount paid for the goods, **R** retaining no interest in, or profit out of, it. **J S**, one of the vendors to **R**, sued **G S & Co.** for the price of some of the goods so purchased by **R**. *Held*, that a general authority implies all powers necessary, or usual or proper, as means to effectuate the purposes for which it was created. A banian is a *del credere* agent with regard to his employer in making purchases, and is a principal with reference to third persons. *Held*, also, that a person who has been allowed to represent himself as agent of a merchant under a general authority is not as such a banian; that when a native dealer makes purchases for a European house, the presumption is that the vendor gave credit to the native dealer; and that goods having been purchased for an employer and entered to his debit, and receipts given for them in his name, raises no presumption that the buyer was a banian. **GRANT, SMITH & Co. v. JUGGOBUNDUO SHAW**. **Bourke A. O. C. 17: 2 Hyde 301**

*Held*, in the same case in the Court below:—In the absence of a specific contract, a European firm in Calcutta is not bound by a contract made by third parties with their banian. **JUGGOBUNDUO SHAW v. GRANT, SMITH & Co**

2 Hyde 129: Cor. 47

**11. ————— Agent exceeding authority—**  
*Variation in time for delivery.* Where a principal instructed his agent to enter into a contract for the delivery of cotton at the end of Kartik, but the agent entered into a contract for the delivery thereof by the middle of that month, it was *held* that

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the agent exceeded his authority in such a manner as to exempt the principal from liability upon the contract. Though the objection assigned by a principal for repudiating a contract at the time of such repudiation be unfounded, he is not precluded from subsequently availing himself of other valid objections. **ARLAPA NAYAK v. NARSI KESHAVJI & Co.**  
**8 Bom. A. C. 19**

**12. ————— Taking advances.**

A native lady, possessing an estate in a district in which she did not reside, opened an account with a banker, through her son, as agent, to provide for the punctual payment of Government revenue and to meet current expenses. *Held*, that such a course of dealing did not of itself warrant the banker in advancing to the son, as the accredited agent of his mother, large sums of money on bonds. **MISRAIN v. GOPAL LALL DOSS**

10 W. R. 376

**13. ————— General agent, power of—**  
*Universal agents.* A general agent has not ordinarily powers co-extensive with those possessed by a universal agent. A general agent therefore employed to carry on a trading business has no authority to deal with immoveable property by sale. **DOORGA CHURN v. KOONJBEHAREE PANDEY**

3 Agra 23

**14. ————— Power of agent to borrow—**  
*Evidence of authority.* Although a general agent may not have power to borrow money for his principal, yet the authority to borrow in a particular case may be shown by a previous authority either express or implied, or by subsequent ratification. **BUNWAREELAL SAHOO v. MOHESHUR SINGH**  
**Marsh. 544: 2 Hay 644**

**15. ————— General agent—Power to purchase—**  
*Authority to sell.* An authority granted to an agent to purchase does not imply authority to sell; and the mere fact of the principal not questioning his agent's right to sell is no proof that he consents to the latter's exercising such right. **GOLUCK CHUNDER CHOWDHRY v. KANTO PERSHAD HAZAREE**

15 W. R. 317

**16. ————— Government officers—**  
*Officers acting as agents of Government.* Question of authority of Government officers acting as agents of Government discussed. **RUNDLE v. SECRETARY OF STATE**

2 Hyde 25: 36

JOHNSON v. SECRETARY OF STATE 2 Hyde 153

**17. ————— Master and servant—**  
*Buying goods on credit. Semble:* If a master usually instructed his servant to buy goods upon credit, he will be bound by his acts, even when he has prohibited him specially from buying upon credit. **NARAINEE KOONWAREE v. JOOGUL KISHORE ROY**  
**6 W. R. 309**

**18. ————— Agent employed to make wagering contract—**  
*Money paid on account of wagering contract, liability for—* Act XXI of 1843. An agent employed to effect a wagering contract



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is entitled to recover from his principal money paid on his account in respect thereof, his authority not having been revoked. The claim is not affected by Act XXI of 1848. *TRIBHUVANDAS JAGJIVANDAS v. MOTILALL RAMDAS*. 1 Bom. 34

19. ——— Agent sent to bid at auction—*Contract Act, s. 237*. The sending a man to bid at an auction cannot be considered as conduct calculated in the language of the Contract Act (s. 237), to induce third persons to believe he had general authority to buy. *MACKENZIE, LYALL & Co. v. MOSES*. 22 W. R. 156

20. ——— Agreement by agent with third party. When a principal merely authorizes an agent to bid at an auction, he is not liable for an agreement entered into by the agent with a third party pledging him to pay to such party a certain sum in consideration that he should abstain from bidding. *ESHAN CHUNDER SINGH v. SHAMA CHURN BHUTTO*. 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 87: 6 W. R. P. C. 57

11 Moo. I. A. 7

21. ——— Husband and wife—*Mortgage by wife*. When a man allowed his wife to have control over certain property and to mortgage it:—*Held*, that she acted as his agent, and that he was bound by her act. *MOORADEE BERE v. SYEFOOLLAH*. W. R. 1864, 318

22. ——— Suit for goods sold and delivered to wife after separation. It is not necessary that knowledge of a separation between husband and wife should be brought home to the plaintiff in an action for goods sold and delivered to the wife after separation where plaintiff has long dealt with the wife as the husband's agent. *SHAM CHUND DASS v. COX*. Cor. 82

23. ——— Right of agent to sue—*Suit by wife's constituted attorney—Lunatic—Act XXXV of 1858*. D sued in the Mamlatdar's Court, as A's constituted attorney, for an injunction restraining the defendants from causing any obstruction to his possession of certain lands. The land belonged to A's husband, who was alleged to be a lunatic, but there was no adjudication of his lunacy, nor was A appointed a manager of his estate under Act XXXV of 1858. *Held*, that D had no right to sue. A, not having been appointed a manager of her husband's estate, had herself no right to sue in respect of a disturbance of her husband's possession. She could not therefore authorize her agent to sue on her behalf. *NEMAVA v. DEVANDRAPPA*. I. L. R. 15 Bom. 177

24. ——— Gomashta, power of—*Contract through broker*. N sued J S & Co. for damages occasioned by the inferiority of certain goods, which he alleged that he bought of them on a verbal contract made by his gomashta M through his broker F. The defendants' case was that the contract was a written one, and contained a stipulation exempting them from liability on certain conditions

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which had not been complied with, and was made by K, one of the plaintiffs' gomashtas, by the pen of J, one of their brokers, whom R had authorized to sign the contract. The Court below found that K was N's gomashta, but could not as such depute a third party to sign a contract for N, and judgment was given for the plaintiffs. On appeal:—*Held*, that a gomashta has a general authority to manage his employer's business, not as a mere agent, but with power to do all acts necessary for carrying it on, and to authorize brokers to make contracts. A broker authorized to sign a particular contract is not authorized to sign it if it contain a stipulation unknown to his employer, and *vice versa*. *JARDINE SKINNER & Co. v. NATHORAM*. Bourke A. O. C. 43

25. ——— Gomashta employed to collect rents—*Power to distrain—Ratification*. A gomashta employed to collect rents is not authorized to distrain unless he has been expressly authorized by power-of-attorney. Therefore if a gomashta, without such express authority, distrain for rent due, or pretended to be due, to his principal, his principal is not bound by his acts, unless he ratify them, as, for example, by receiving the proceeds of the distress, knowing they had been obtained by distress. *RAMJOY MUNDUL v. KALLYMOHUN ROY CHOWDHRY*. Marsh. 282

S.C. KALLYMOHUN ROY CHOWDHRY v. RAMJOY MUNDUL. 2 Hay 289

26. ——— Authority to sue for principal without special powers. A suit for rent under Act X of 1859 may be instituted by a gomashta employed in the collection of rents or management of land, on behalf of his principal, without his being specially empowered by warrant of attorney. *MEAJAN KHAN v. AKALLY*. Marsh. 384: 2 Hay 426

27. ——— Authority to sue on behalf of principal. In a suit, under Act X of 1859, where plaintiff sues as a gomashta of the zamindar, it is not necessary that a power-of-attorney or any other formal document conferring a special power on the plaintiff should be produced, if it is proved from the evidence that he filled that character. *MADHO SINGH v. GUNESHEE LALL*. 2 Agra 275

28. ——— Tahsildar, power of—*Act X of 1859, s. 69*. A newly-appointed tahsildar stands in the same position in respect to arrears of rent which accrued during the time of his predecessor as in respect to rents accruing during his own time, and may take advantage of s. 69, Act X of 1859, in respect of one as well as the other. *Held* (by MARKBY, J.), that no one can be plaintiff in a suit for rent except the person who has the right to recover; the only effect of s. 69 being to enable the person who is employed in the collection of rents, to sue as agent. *Held*, also (by MARKBY, J.) that, though it has been decided that a general authority to collect rents and to sue for them must



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be stamped if, in writing, it has not yet been decided whether such authority must be in writing. **MODHOOSOODUN SINGH v. MORAN & Co.**

11 W. R. 43

29. ——— **Naib, power of—Power of mofussil naib to grant pottahs at fixed rents.** As it does not fall within the ordinary scope of the duties of a mofussil naib to grant pottahs for fixed rents it is requisite in such cases that express authority should be proved to make the grants valid. **GOLUCKMONEE DABEA v. ASSIMOODEEN**

1 W. R. 56

**OOMA TARA DEBIA v. PEENA BIBEE.**

2 W. R. 155

**PUNCHANUN BOSE v. PEARY MOHUN DEB**

2 W. R. 225

**KALEE COOMAR DOSS v. ANEES**

3 W. R., Act X, 1

30. ——— **Power to grant mokurari lease.** The grant of a mokurari lease is beyond the scope of a naib's general authority. To enable him to give such a lease, his principal's special consent or approval is necessary. **UNNODA PERSHAD BANERJEE v. CHUNDER SEKHUR DEB**

7 W. R. 394

31. ——— **Agent of lessor—Power to grant lease—Stipulation for recovery of costs of litigation from lessor.** The agent of a lessor was held to have acted in excess of his power in granting a lease containing a stipulation that the lessee was to receive from the lessor the expenses which he might incur in any litigation which might take place with third parties respecting the land leased. Where such litigation did ensue, and the lessee was cast in costs, he was held entitled to recover the same, not from the lessor, but from the agent. **KENNY v. MOOKTA SOONDEREE DABEE**

7 W. R. 419

32. ——— **Agent of inamdar—Power to lease on permanent tenure.** An inamdar's agent cannot grant lands on suti or other permanent tenure without express authority from his principal. **NASARVANJI HORMASJI v. NARAYAN TRIMBAK PATIL**

4 Bom. A. C. 125

33. ——— **Manager—Agent granting lease on pretended title afterwards set aside—Right of lessees to possession.** Where a manager has conveyed certain property to himself by a pretended deed of gift, and under such pretended title granted a darmokurari lease, and his title is set aside by a decree of Court, the lessees cannot be allowed to maintain possession, at any rate, where the lease granted is beyond the powers of the manager as agent. **SHEO SHUNKUR LALL v. DHURM JOY POOREE**

8 W. R. 360

34. ——— **Agent of zamindar—Power to authorize transfer of lease.** Without special powers, the ordinary agent of a zamindar who cannot grant a lease cannot authorize the quasi transfer of a lease by a tenant to some other party. **RAI MOORAREE DOSS v. BUCHA SINGH**

4 N. W. 122

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35. ——— **Agent of owner of estate—Lease by agent—Fraud and collusion—Ratification.** In a suit to set aside a lease as granted without authority by an agent to the defendant, who was the naib of the estate, and as procured by fraud by the defendant in collusion with the agent, the latter charge of collusion having been withdrawn at the hearing before the Subordinate Judge, the High Court remarked on the impropriety of presenting a plaint charging collusion between the agent and defendant without good grounds for such imputation, and on the withdrawal of such charge at the hearing if there were grounds for it; and agreed with the Subordinate Judge in thinking that the owner of the estate in issue must be presumed to know what was being done on her behalf by her agent. The presumption is that a man acts rightly and not fraudulently. The mere circumstance that the rents were low does not give rise to the presumption that there had been fraudulent conduct on the part of the naib, or that he did not state the circumstance to the agent before obtaining the lease from him. There is also this difference between this case and other cases in which contracts between principals and agents are sought to be set aside on the ground of good faith, that here another agent is interposed, and it is not the case of the defendant (the naib) making a report to the owner in England. Even supposing the original transaction liable to be set aside, the ratification by a person having authority from the owner to make inquiries and ratify what had been done would render it invalid. **ANNUND CHUNDER BOSE v. BROUGHTON**

17 W. R. 301

Affirmed by Privy Council. **ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL v. ANUNDO CHUNDER BOSE**

21 W. R. 425

36. ——— **Agent for receipt of rent—Notice of renewal to.** A lessor's agent for the receipt of rent is not necessarily his agent to receive the lessee's notice of option to renew the lease; but if he has received such notice, and given it to the lessor within time, the notice is sufficient. **BARNET v. SKINNER**

2 W. R. 208

37. ——— **Agent to give lease—Notice of prior claim.** *Semble: per NORMAN, J.,* that a person who has authority to conduct the negotiation respecting a lease is such an agent that a notice to him may be notice to his principal. **NUDDEAR CHAND SEIN v. KISHOREE LAL CHUCKERBUTTY**

7 W. R. 463

38. ——— **Headman of village—Acts of, to bind co-sharers.** Held, that to make the acts of the headmen of a village in boundary disputes and other matters binding on the co-sharers it is not necessary that there should be specific authority by power-of-attorney or otherwise, or subsequent express or implicit assent or sanction in absence thereof. Requisite authority may be inferred from the facts of each case by showing that the headman of the village have usually in similar disputes been permitted to act and represent for the other sharers.



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*Held*, also, that agency in every case can only be created by the will of the principal, and his will may be manifested in writing or orally or simply by placing another in a position so as to be understood according to ordinary rules and usages to represent and act for one who has placed him. *GUNGAPERSHAD v. AJOODHIA PERSHAD. GUNGAPERSHAD v. RAMPERSHAD . Agra F. B. 31: Ed. 1874, 23*

**39. — Agent in survey of land—Thakbust map—Act of agent—Endorsement—Evidence.** In a suit for possession of certain lands, for rectification of a thakbust map, and reversal of an Act X decision, the plaintiffs obtained a decree in the Court of first instance, the lower Appellate Court, and subsequently in the High Court on appeal. It appeared that the lower Courts had before them an incorrect copy of the thakbust map, the original forming part of the record of another suit. The High Court on appeal refused to send for this map, but subsequently, on review, it was sent for. There was an endorsement on the back, which did not appear on the copies originally before the Court, to the effect that the lands in dispute were pointed out by one *T C* acting as agent for the plaintiffs, to be measured as belonging to the defendant's talukh. *Held*, that the case must be remanded to the lower Appellate Court to determine (i) whether *T C* was the agent of the plaintiff; (ii) whether, acting within the scope of his authority as such agent, he did sign the map as a correct map and pointed out the lands as belonging to the defendant; (iii) and if so, how far these acts of the agent were binding on the plaintiffs. *SUDAKHINA CHOWDHRAIN v. RAJ MOHAN BOSE . 3 B. L. R. A. C. 377*

**40. — Power to appear in suit—Manager.** The manager of an estate under a safu-namah on behalf of *B* cannot, without special authority from *B*, represent him in any suit or charge him with the costs of the defence of an action brought against him. *BHOLANATH SANDYAL v. GOUREE PERSHAD MOITRO . 16 W. R. 310*

**41. — Power-of-attorney—Option of agent to accept service of summons.** A person holding a power-of-attorney, even if authorized by the power to appear and defend suits on behalf of his principal, is at liberty to refuse to accept service of summons and appear in a suit brought against his principal, but may either act upon the power or not, as he may think proper. *In the matter of the petition of LUCHMEE CHUND I. L. R. 8 Calc. 317*

**42. — Power to carry on suits—Assent to be bound by witness.** An agent's assent to be bound by the statement of a particular witness is not an assent to arbitration, but is an act entirely within the scope of his general authority as agent to carry on his principal's suits, and to do all acts necessary to that end. *RAJENDER CHUNDER NEWGEE v. MAHOMED AYNODEEN . 1 W. R. 1864, 143*

**43. — Mooktear, power of—Admission of title by mooktear—Authority of mook-**

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*tear to bind mortgagee.* Where a mortgagee signed a mooktearnama, in which he stated that he would abide by any arguments which might be urged, and any documents which might be filed by the mooktear thereby appointed, and the mooktear subsequently filed a written statement signed by himself alone in which he admitted the mortgagor's title:—*Held*, that the written statement could not be incorporated with the mooktearnama so as to make it part of the document signed by the mortgagee. *LUCHMEE BUKSH ROY v. RUNJEET RAM PANDAY 13 B. L. R. P. C. 177: 20 W. R. 375*

s.c. in Court below . **12 W. R. 443**

*See SUNDER DAS v. FATIMULUN-NISSA*

**1 C. W. N. 513**

**44. — Mooktear appointed by several co-sharers—Authority of agent—Evidence of general authority.** Where a general mooktear empowered to act on behalf of co-sharers does formal acts to enforce the rights of his principals (the zamindars), it is not necessary to trace back his authority in each case to the explicit sanction of every single member of the family. Mooktears must be considered to have a certain discretion, and, unless the contrary is shown, to do such acts as come within the ordinary scope of their duty with authority. *HURRY KISTO ROY v. MOTEE LALL NUNDEE . 14 W. R. 36*

**45. — Authority to sign deed of sale—Proof of authority of agent.** Where a man resists liability for a deed of sale executed by his am-mooktear, it is necessary for the purchaser claiming under that deed to show that the mooktear had authority either by virtue of a general or special power-of-attorney to execute that deed and to bind his principal by executing that deed. *MOHAN KOORER v. AJOODHYA DOSS 20 W. R. 119*

**46. — Pardanashin woman—Account stated.** A mooktearnama executed by a pardanashin woman appointed her husband to be her general mooktear, and declared that "all acts done by the said mooktear, such as giving and taking loans to and from others, executing on my behalf, getting executed in my favour, deeds of absolute sale," and so on, "shall be accepted by me." It was sought to render the principal liable, on an account stated by her husband as her mooktear so empowered, for a debt, without proof that the money constituting it had been borrowed on her account. *Held*, on the construction of the mooktearnama, that the mooktear had no authority to bind her by such a statement of account, whatever authority he might have had to bind her by an actual borrowing of money on her behalf. No implication of authority in the mooktear to bind the woman by his stated account had arisen from the carrying on of a course of business. Accordingly, when the evidence of express authority failed, the statement of account by the mooktear was insufficient to render the principal liable. No



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evidence was given of the items lent, so as to establish an indebtedness independently of the account stated. *SUDISHT LALL v. SHEOBARAT KOER* . . . . . **I. L. R. 7 Calc. 245**  
**L. R. 8 I. A. 39**

**47. ———— Manager of firm—Power of manager to bind partners in concern.** The partners of a concern are bound by the acknowledgments of their manager as their avowed agent. *MASSEYK v. GRISH CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY* **24 W. R. 34**

**48. ———— Partner of firm—Knowledge of person dealing with partner—Contract incapable of division.** A firm of carriers authorized one of their partners to draw bills on the firm to the extent of R200 each. The partner, acting in excess of his authority, and without the knowledge of the firm, made two promissory notes, in the name of the firm, for R1,000 each. The plaintiff knew the partner was limited to a particular sum, but also knew that two of his bills for R300 each had been previously accepted by the firm. In an action on the notes:—*Held, first*, that the firm was not liable for the whole amount drawn; and, *secondly*, that the contract, whereon the action was founded, was not capable of division, and therefore the firm was not liable to the extent of R200. *PREMABHAI HEMABHAI v. BROWN* **10 Bom. 319**

**49. ———— Partnership in tea garden—Liability of partner for acts of managing partner—Authority of agent.** By an agreement made on 22nd July 1862 between *C* and *T* (since deceased) and the defendants *P* and *S*, *C* agreed to sell, and *T*, *P*, and *S* to purchase, a half share in the lands, plantation and estate belonging to *C*, known as the Laojan Tea Estates and Grants. The agreement provided that *C* was to conduct and manage all matters and affairs of the estates, but nothing was said as to its being done in his own name or in that of the partners of any firm. Money to carry on the business was provided by means of bills drawn by the local manager upon *C* in the same manner as if he (*C*) had been the sole owner, the defendants being fully aware of this and finding the funds. This mode of dealing continued down to the time of the transaction, which is the subject of this suit. The only act in the way of notice to the public on the part of the defendants was a notification in a directory published by them in Calcutta (*T*, *S* & *Co.* being book-sellers and publishers), in which in the list of tea estates the Laojan concern was mentioned, and *C*, *T*, *P*, and *S* named as proprietors. In the directory for 1870 and 1872 *C* was also described as Calcutta agent. This suit was brought to recover a balance due in respect of moneys alleged to have been advanced by the plaintiffs on the tea to be manufactured in the season 1872, the plaintiffs being tea brokers who made the advances on the security of tea invoices and bills of lading. The terms on which the required advances were to be made were arranged by an agreement, dated 9th February 1872, between *C* and the plaintiffs, who

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were under the belief that *C* was the proprietor of the Laojan concern and not merely manager. By reason of *C*'s death and the non-delivery of a portion of the season's tea, the plaintiffs were unable to reimburse themselves for their later advances, and brought the present suit against the defendants, who, they contended, were bound by all *C*'s acts and dealings. *Held*, by *COUCH, C.J.*, that, assuming that the plaintiffs knew what was in the directory, it could not be considered as a notice to them that the authority which *C* had been exercising, and which he continued to exercise with, so far as it related to bills and drafts drawn by the local manager, the knowledge of his partners, the defendants, had been determined, and that he had only the authority of an ordinary Calcutta agent. *Held*, also, that the question in the case was whether the transaction between *C* and the plaintiffs was within the scope of the authority which *C* had, or was allowed by his partners to appear to have, in managing and conducting the affairs and business of the partnership. It was a question of actual or apparent authority, and whether the transaction was one which the owner of a tea garden carrying on the cultivation of it would in the ordinary course of business enter into. *Held*, further, that the transaction would have been according to usage if *C* had been the sole owner of the gardens, and the defendants, by allowing him to manage ostensibly as sole owner clothed him with every authority incidental to a sole owner in that business. The defendants were therefore bound by the agreement of the 9th February 1872. *SPINK v. MORAN* **21 W. R. 161**

**50. ———— Mercantile agent—Power of agent to indorse bills—Special authority—Implied authority.** A special authority is required to empower a mercantile agent to draw or endorse bills and notes, but the authority may be implied from circumstances. *PESTONJEE NESSERWANJEE v. GOOL MAHOMED SAHIB* . . . . . **7 Mad. 369**

**51. ———— Managing agent—Liability of principal—Banker and customer—Bills of exchange—Indorser and acceptor.** *N & Co.*, the managing agents of the Baree Tea Company, had a general banking account with the Oriental Bank Corporation, which account they were allowed to overdraw on having the overdraft properly secured. Under the articles of association of the Baree Tea Company, *N & Co.* had power to "draw, accept, indorse, and negotiate on behalf of the company all such cheques, promissory notes, drafts, etc., as should be necessary for enabling them to carry on the business of the company." Purporting to act under this power, *N & Co.* drew a bill of exchange on the managing agents of the company, which was accepted by the latter, and indorsed by *N & Co.* to the Oriental Bank Corporation, who credited the amount to *N & Co.*'s general account. The amount was drawn out by cheques drawn by *N & Co.* personally without reference to the Baree Tea Company, and there was no proof that the money



PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—*contd.*1. AUTHORITY OF AGENTS—*contd.*

had been applied for the purposes of the Baree Tea Company. *Held*, in an action by the Oriental Bank against the Baree Tea Company, that the latter were not liable on the bills as acceptors. **ORIENTAL BANK CORPORATION v. BAREE TEA COMPANY I. L. R. 9 Calc. 880: 13 C. L. R. 412**

**52. — Agent acting contrary to authority—Liability of agent.** An agent who acts contrary to the authority given him by his principal is himself liable on the transaction in which he has so acted. **GOMANEE LALL v. JEEWUN RAM . . . . . 2 Agra 33**

**53. — Agent acting out of scope of authority—Liability of principal.** *Held*, that an agent who is appointed for the general management and conduct of business cannot bind his principal by an unusual contract, not strictly relating to the conduct of the business, unless he has express or implied authority for the same. The fact that a consignor dealt in good faith with the agent, who exceeded his authority, is not sufficient to bind the principal. The consignor dealing with the agent ought to satisfy himself of the agent's authority. The defendant, not having ratified his agent's act by receiving the benefit of the contract, cannot be bound by the acts of his agent and liable to make good the losses. **MUDAREE LALL v. GILMORE 3 Agra 196**

**54. — Payment to agent in belief he was principal—Liability of purchaser.** Where a party purchased cotton from a person both banker and broker, upon the just belief authorized by the facts that he (the seller to him) was the principal and not merely a broker, and paid him in good faith the price of the article purchased, he cannot be held liable to the real principal's claim, such payment protecting him from further liability. **PETUMBER BHUGUTT v. MUTHOORA DASS . . . . . 1 Agra 121**

**55. — Suit brought by agent for principal—Dismissal of suit brought by agent in his principal's name—Amendment of plaint—Court, power of.** A Court in which a suit is brought on behalf of one person through the agency of another, is entitled to inquire as to the agent's authority. A suit for arrears of rent was brought by an agent, professing to act under authority from his principal. The plaintiff, after instituting the suit in his own name as agent, obtained an order from the Court granting him leave to amend the plaint by substituting the name of his principal as plaintiff, suing through him, an amendment which the defendant resisted disputing the authority of the agent. *Held*, that the Court in allowing it did not decide that the agent had authority: that remained to be proved; and as it was not proved, the suit failed. **NAM NARAIN SINGH v. RAGHU NATH SAHAI I. L. R. 19 Calc. 678**

**I. L. R. 19 I. A. 135**

**56. — Suit by agent in his own name—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 230—Agency coupled with an interest—Suit by agent,**

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—*contd.*1. AUTHORITY OF AGENTS—*concl'd.*

*in his own name, on contract not entered into by him as agent—Maintainability of suit.* A document was executed in favour of plaintiff by the Members of a Malawar *devasom*, whereby, in consideration of advances made by plaintiff, all the properties of the *devasom* were given over to him on lease for eighteen years. Plaintiff was given authority to sign, conduct suits and do other acts on behalf of the executants; and the document was held to be an authority coupled with an interest and irrevocable. Plaintiff now sued in his own name to recover certain property belonging to the *devasom* and which had been demised on *kanom* prior to the date of plaintiff's authority. *Held*, that plaintiff was not entitled to recover. Where an agent enters into a contract as such, if he has an interest in the contract he may sue in his own name. Unless the contract for the breach of which the action is brought is one made by the agent, he has no cause of action, because there is not privity. **SUBRAHMANTIA PATTAR v. NARAYANAN NAYAR (1900)**

**I. L. R. 24 Mad. 130**

**57. — Tenant, suit by—Suit for damages.** Because a person is the sole recorded tenant in the landlord's *sherista*, he is not therefore alone entitled to sue third parties for damages done to the tenure, if other persons are also interested in and have a right to the same. **ISWAR CHUNDER SANTRA v. SATISH CHUNDER GIRI (1902)**

**I. L. R. 30 Calc. 207  
s.c. 7 C. W. N. 126**

**58. — Authority of agent to borrow—Implied authority—Liability of principal—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 187, 188.** The general provisions of ss. 187 and 188 of the Contract Act would no doubt authorize an agent to borrow money, if necessary, but such provisions are subject to modifications in particular cases, specially where the transactions do not prove anything in favour of an implied authority to borrow. **FERGUSON v. UM CHAND BOID (1905) . . . . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 343**

## 2. RATIFICATION.

**1. — Effect of ratification—Act of principal.** Where the act of the agent has been communicated to and ratified by the principal, it becomes the act of the principal in point of law. **PESTONJEE NESSERWANJEE v. GOOL MAHOMED SAHIB . . . . . 7 Mad. 369**

**2. — Promise to redeem mortgage—Consideration—Contract made by agent on his own behalf.** The plaintiff sued the defendant on mortgages executed to the plaintiff by the adoptive mothers of the defendant (who were also defendants) subsequently to his adoption. The plaintiff contended that the mortgages had become effectual as against the defendant by reason of his subsequent conduct. Evidence was given that he had promised his adoptive mothers to redeem the mortgages, and that he had stood by and allowed the plaintiff to carry out the provisions of the mortgage-deeds to his own detriment by paying maintenance to the



**PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—contd.****2. RATIFICATION—contd.**

defendant's adoptive mothers, and by paying off certain mortgages which had been created by them previously to the adoption of the defendant. *Held*, that the defendant was not liable upon the mortgages. His promise to redeem the mortgages was not made to the plaintiff, but to his adoptive mothers and there was no consideration for such promise as he made. Nor could the promise have the effect of ratification, for the ratification of the authorized contract of an agent can only be effectual when the contract has been made by the agent avowedly for or on account of the principal, and not when it has been made on account of the agent himself. *SHIDDESHVAR v. RAMCHANDRARAV*

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 463

**3. ——— Acquiescence by co-sharers**  
—*Mortgage by lambardar—Acquiescence in acts of agent.* Where a mortgage was made by a lambardar of his own share and shares of his co-sharers as agent on their part in order to raise a sum required to pay the Government revenue:—*Held*, that the co-sharers being aware of the fact of mortgage, and not having at the time repudiated it, and, moreover, having acquiesced in the decree of the Court of first instance which awarded their shares on payment of their quota of the mortgage-debt and interest, must be taken to have thereby consented to the act of the lambardar which was done on their behalf. *PUNCHUM SINGH v. MUNGLE SINGH*

2 Agra, Pt. II, 207

**4. ——— Acquiescence by mortgagor**  
—*Condition in wajib-ul-arz—Execution of wajib-ul-arz as mortgage.* *Held*, that the original proprietors were not bound by a condition in the wajib-ul-arz which had been signed and attested by a third party then in possession, not as authorized agent on behalf of the proprietors, but as a mortgagee. Subsequent acquiescence by the mortgagor or his representative might be only an acquiescence in the mortgagee's act to the extent and in the qualified way in which his consent was given. *BHAGEERUTH v. MOHUN*

2 Agra 129

But see *MISAJOOLNISSA v. BUNSEEDHUR*

1 N. W. 193: Ed. 1873, 277

**5. ——— Government officers—Government—Scope of authority.** The plaintiff sued the Secretary of State (defendant 1) and one Makan Haribhai (defendant 2), who was an overseer in the Government Local Fund Department in the Surat district, for the price of bamboos sold to the second defendant for the purpose of erecting sheds during an epidemic of plague in 1897. The plaintiffs alleged that they supplied the bamboos to the second defendant on his representing that he was acting under the orders of the Assistant Collector and the *Mamlatdar*. The first defendant denied that Government had ever authorised the purchase of the bamboos, and the second defendant denied that he had made the alleged representation. The lower Court passed a decree against the first defendant. On appeal to the High Court: *Held*, (reversing the decree), that there was no evidence

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to show that the second defendant was authorised by the Government to purchase the bamboos and to pledge the credit of the Government for payment, or that the acts of the second defendant had ever been ratified by the Government or by any officer of the Government duly authorised in that behalf. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. SULEMANJI MOOSAJI* (1902) . I. L. R. 26 Bom. 801

**6. ——— Ratification—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 198, 211, 216—Suit for adjustment of accounts.** The defendants as agents for the plaintiff entered into certain contracts for the sale of grain for future delivery. The defendants discharged these contracts by means of goods of their own and when subsequently the plaintiff sent on grain to the defendants to meet these contracts the defendants sold the plaintiff's grain at a profit. The defendants did not inform the plaintiff either that they had fulfilled the contracts with their own grain or that they had resold the plaintiff's grain at a profit. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to whatever profit was realized by the defendants on this latter transaction. *Held*, also, that where on a direction by the principal to his agents to purchase grain for him, the agent sold to him their own grain at a price higher than the prevailing market rate, the principal was entitled to repudiate the transaction and could not be alleged to have ratified it in the absence of knowledge that the agents were selling their own property and were charging him in excess of the market rate. *DAMODAR DAS v. SHEORAM DAS* (1907) . I. L. R. 29 All. 730

**3. REVOCATION.**

**1. ——— Agency of manager—Revocation by one of several shareholders.** A principal can determine the authority given to an agent. The authority given to a manager may be revoked by a shareholder, and another shareholder cannot resist such revocation, unless there has been a stipulation in the deed providing for the appointment of a manager that the authority should continue for some definite time. *BULAKEE LALL v. INDURPUTTEE KOWAR* . 3 W. R. 41

**2. ——— Agent to sell property—Agreement—Remuneration for work and labour done.** The defendant requested the plaintiff to sell for him a plot of ground on the Esplanade in Bombay at any rate exceeding the price at which the defendant himself had purchased it, and agreed to give him as remuneration half of the net profit realized on the sale. The defendant subsequently revoked this authority, and the plaintiff shortly afterwards found a purchaser, whose offer the defendant did not accept. *Held*, that the plaintiff could not recover on the agreement, which had not been performed on his part; that there was no ground for holding that the plaintiff and the defendant were partners in the transaction as between themselves; and that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover for work done as broker, or for commission, the nature of the agreement being that the plaintiff



PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—*contd.*3. REVOCATION—*contd.*

took the risk of the authority being revoked. *HURST v. WATSON*. 2 Bom. 423 : 2nd Ed. 400

3. ———— **Hereditary agency—Contract—Consideration—Specific performance—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 202, 203.** The defendant, by an agreement in the nature of a letter of attorney, constituted the plaintiff and his descendants the hereditary agents of the defendant, gave him authority to collect the rents of his share in an inam village, and promised to pay him an annual salary out of the rents. *Held*, that, as between the parties and during their lifetime, the appointment was valid and binding whether or not any valuable consideration passed, the mere acceptance of the office by the plaintiff being a sufficient consideration or the appointment. But, independently of the terms of the agreement, and whether or not the agency had been created for valuable consideration, the defendant had, under the general provisions of s. 203 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872), a right to revoke the authority, as the mere arrangement that the plaintiff's salary should be paid out of the rents could not be regarded as giving to the plaintiff an interest in the property, the subject-matter of the agency, within the meaning of s. 202. If the defendant had revoked the agency improperly, the remedy lay, under ordinary circumstances, in a suit by the plaintiff for damages for breach of contract. Where, however, the plaintiff chose to sue for specific performance, and demanded arrears of salary : —*Held*, that, without a valuable consideration for the defendant's promise, the agreement passed by him to the plaintiff would be *nudum pactum*, and the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover, except for work and services actually rendered. *VISHNUCHARYA v. RAMCHANDRA*

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 253

4. ———— **Revocation of authority—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 201, 202, 203—Agent—Interest of agent in property—Exercise of authority, so as to bind principal.** The plaintiff received instructions by letter from the defendants to purchase cotton on their behalf. This letter was received by the plaintiff before a telegram sent by the defendants the next day revoking the order reached him. The plaintiff replied by letter stating that the telegram had arrived too late, and that the purchase had already been made. In fact, the plaintiff had merely appropriated to the defendants a contract entered into by himself with a third party the day before the defendants' order reached him. *Held*, that the telegram was a revocation of the order contained in the letter of the previous day. *Held*, further, that the plaintiff had no such interest in the subject-matter of the agency as to prevent its termination; nor had he exercised his authority so as to bind his principal, no contractual relation with any third person having been created before the receipt of the telegram. *LAKHMI-CHAND RAMCHAND v. CHOTOORAM MOTIRAM*

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 403

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—*contd.*3. REVOCATION—*concl.*

5. ———— **Registration—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 208.** If the authority of the agent to admit execution of a document is revoked before registration, but such revocation is not known either to the grantee of the document or the registering officer, the document is not invalidated, although it is registered by the agent after the revocation of his authority. *Mujibunnissa v. Abdur Rahim*, I. L. R. 23 All. 233, distinguished. *MOHENDRA NATH MOOKERJEE v. KALI PRASAD JOHURI* (1902) . . . . . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 265  
s.c. 7 C. W. N. 229

## 4. DUTY OF AGENTS TO ACCOUNT.

1. ———— **Form of account—Right to inspect books.** *Per FIELD, J.*—It is the duty of an agent to render proper accounts to his employer irrespective of any contract to that effect. And he does not discharge that duty by merely delivering to his employer a set of written accounts without attending to explain them, and produce the vouchers by which the items of disbursements are supported. In order to enable an agent to prepare accounts to be furnished to his principal, he should be allowed to have reasonable access, at proper times and in the presence of responsible persons, to such books and papers in the principal's possession as may be necessary for the preparation of the accounts. *ANNODA PERSAD ROY v. DWARKANATH GANGOPADHYA*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 754 : 8 C. L. R. 321

2. ———— **Right to account on death of manager—Manager of company and employer—Liability to account—Accrual of right on death of manager against representatives.** A manager is bound to account to his employer whenever he is called upon to do so under reasonable circumstances. On the death of such manager, a fresh right to an account accrues to the employer as against the manager's representatives. *LAWLESS v. CALCUTTA LANDING AND SHIPPING COMPANY. CALCUTTA LANDING AND SHIPPING COMPANY v. LAWLESS* . . . . . I. L. R. 7 Calc. 627

## 5. LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 34

1. ———— **Proof of purchase having been made for principal—Constructive purchase by agent with funds of principal.** To establish a *prima facie* case of constructive purchase by an agent out of the funds of the principal, it must be proved that at the time of the purchase the agent had in his hands funds of the principal sufficient to make the purchase. *ROOKONISSA v. WOOLFUT ALI. SUFUDUR ALI v. WOOLFUT ALI* . . . . . 3 W. R. 232

2. ———— **Right to sue principal—Election to sue agent—Suit. Dismissal of.** Where a creditor sued an agent of his debtor, alleging that the agent had made himself personally liable for



**PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—contd.****5. LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL—contd.**

debt, and the suit was dismissed on the ground that the creditor gave credit to the principal:—*Held*, that the creditor was not debarred by such proceedings from suing the principal. *RAMAN v. VAIRAVAN*. I. L. R. 7 Mad. 392

**3. Purchase by agent out of scope of authority—Assistant in indigo factory, purchase of seed by—Disclosed principal.** *Held*, by the majority (*GLOVER, J., dissentiente*), that it is not within the reasonable scope of the authority of an assistant in an indigo factory to purchase any amount of indigo seed for his master and to make his master liable, particularly when the seed was not purchased or used for the factory; and that, though the assistant, in writing to the vendor for the seed, styled himself in the body of the letter as the manager of the concern, yet his signing himself for another person, and not for the owner of the factory, disclosed to the vendor that the other person, and not the owner of the factory, was his principal. *ROGHOORBUDYAL MUNDER v. CHRISTIAN*. 3 W. R. 123

**4. Liability of principal to be sued on negotiable instrument executed by agent in his own name—Contract Act, 1872, ss. 233, 234.** *Quære*: Whether, having regard to ss. 233 and 234 of the Contract Act, a principal cannot be proceeded against upon a negotiable instrument executed by an agent in his own name—*Per SUBBRAHMANYA AYYAR, J.* *KRISHNA AYYAR v. KRISHNASAMI AYYAR*. I. L. R. 23 Mad. 597

**5. Right of person dealing with agent personally liable—Suit and judgment recovered against agent—Subsequent suit against agent barred—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 233.** The obligee under a hypothecation-bond brought a suit thereon against one who, upon the face of the instrument, contracted as obligor, but whom, when the suit was instituted, the plaintiff knew to have acted as agent in the transaction for a third person. Having obtained a decree, he satisfied it in part by attachment of a sum of money, and next caused the hypothecated property to be sold, and purchased it himself. Upon attempting to obtain possession, he was successfully resisted by the principal debtor under the hypothecation-bond, on the ground that the latter was the real owner of the property, and that the decree-holder had derived no title thereto from his judgment-debtor. He then sued the principal debtor to recover the balance remaining due upon the bond, after giving credit for the amount recovered by attachment in the suit against the agent. *Held*, that the plaintiff, having elected to hold the agent responsible upon the contract, and having obtained judgment and decree against him and written up full satisfaction of the decree, could not afterwards maintain a suit against the principal in respect of the same subject-matter. *Priestly v. Fernie*, 3 H. & C. 977: 34 L. J. Ex. 172, referred to. *BIR BHADDHAR SEWAK PANDE v. SARJU PRASAD*. I. L. R. 9 All. 681

**PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—contd.****5. LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL—contd.**

**6. Carriage of goods by railway—Goods passing over the lines of several companies—Agreement for interchange of traffic—Loss of goods—Liability.** The plaintiff delivered to the Madras Railway Company a bale of cloth for carriage from B, a station belonging to that company, to S, a station belonging to the defendants, the G. I. P. Railway Company, and obtained from the Madras Company a receipt which recited that it was granted, "subject to the rules and regulations and charges in force on that or any other railway over which the goods might pass." The goods were lost while on the line and in the charge of the defendants, the G. I. P. Railway Company, and the plaintiff sued them for damages for breach of the contract of carriage. Between the two railway companies there existed an agreement arranging for the interchange of traffic, which provided, *inter alia*, that goods should be booked through to and from all stations on both lines at certain stated rates; that in such cases one company should receive payment and should account to the other; that any claim for loss or damage should be paid by the company in whose custody the goods were when lost or damaged, or if that could not be ascertained, then by both companies rateably; and that no alteration affecting the through traffic should be made by either company without previous notice to the other. The defendants pleaded that the suit was wrongly brought against them, as there was no contract between themselves and the plaintiff. *Held*, that the suit, whether or not it might also have been brought against the Madras Railway Company, was rightly brought against the defendants inasmuch as the agreement between the two companies, if it did not actually constitute a partnership between them, showed at least that the Madras Railway Company became the agents of the defendants to make the contract for carriage with the plaintiffs. *G. I. P. RAILWAY COMPANY v. RADHAKISAN KHUSALDAS*. I. L. R. 5 Bom. 371

**7. Undisclosed principal—Settlement of accounts between principal and agent—Right of unpaid vendor—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 231, 232.** The defendant, who resided in Dholera, employed the firm of S K as his agents in Bombay. A running account was kept, in which the defendant was debited with the price of goods purchased on his account by S K, and was credited with the price of goods sold by S K on his account and with the amount of the remittances which he made from time to time. In fulfilment of orders received from the defendant on 16th March 1879, S K, on the 23rd March 1879, bought from the plaintiff 20,000 cocoanuts (out of a cargo of 42,000 then lately arrived at Bombay); on the 24th March, 1879, 10,160 cocoanuts (out of cargo of 23,000); and on the 27th March, 26,626 cocoanuts (out of a cargo of 71,250). By each of these three contracts it was agreed that the purchase-money should be paid on delivery. At the time of making these contracts the plaintiff did not know, nor had he any reason to suspect, that S K was an agent and not



PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—*contd.*5. LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL—*contd.*

principal, in the transactions. On the 27th and 28th March 1879 the 30,160 cocoanuts (the subject-matter of the first two contracts) were transhipped into the vessel *Lakhmiprasad*, and on the 29th March 1879, the 26,626 cocoanuts (the subject-matter of the third contract) were transhipped into the vessel *Lalsari* for conveyance to Dholera. The *Lalsari* sailed from Bombay on the 31st March, and on her arrival at Dholera the defendant obtained possession of the third lot of 26,626 cocoanuts which had been shipped on board. On the 1st April, *S K* received from the defendant remittances sufficient to pay for all the cocoanuts, and to leave a balance of *Rs. 1,727* to the credit of the defendant in his account with *S K*. These remittances were made by the defendant in good faith, and were received by *S K* at a time when the plaintiff gave credit to *S K*, and did not know of any one else to be charged with the price of the cocoanuts. On the 2nd April the firm of *S K* stopped payment, and on the 3rd April 1879 the plaintiff, in consequence of the failure of *S K* and the non-payment of the price of the cocoanuts, transhipped the 30,160 cocoanuts (the subject of the first two contracts) from the *Lakhmiprasad* into the *Ramprasad*. These cocoanuts were subsequently sold, and the proceeds of the sale deposited in the Bank of Bombay to abide the result of this suit. On the 4th April the plaintiff discovered that the defendant was the principal in the cocoanut transaction, and brought this suit against him to recover the price of the three lots of cocoanuts. The defendant denied that *S K* had authority to pledge his (defendant's) credit in making purchases, and contended that, having in good faith paid his agent *S K* for the cocoanuts prior to the institution of the suit, he (the defendant) was not liable to the plaintiff. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The rule of English law, which makes the liability of an undisclosed principal subject to the qualification that he has not *bona fide* paid the agent, or that the state of accounts has not been altered, is not adopted in the Contract Act. S. 232 is to be read as a qualification of the first portion of paragraph 1 of s. 231, which gives a principal a general right to enforce a contract entered into by his agent. S. 232 qualifies that general right by making it subject to the rights and obligations subsisting between the agent and the other contracting party. The second clause of paragraph 1 of s. 231 gives a party contracting with an agent the same rights against the principal only as he would have had against the agent; and s. 234 adds a further qualification to his rights as against the principal. S. 232 of the Contract Act adopts the qualification imposed by English law upon the right of the principal to enforce a contract, *viz.*, that he must take the contract subject to all the equities, in the same way as if the agent were the real principal; but it does not impose upon the right of the other contracting party the qualification laid down by the cases of *Thompson v. Davenport*, 2 *Smith's L. C. 7th Ed. 364*, and *Armstrong v.*

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—*contd.*5. LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL—*contd.*

*Stokes, L. R. 7 Q. B. 598*, namely, that the principal has not paid the agent, or that the state of the account between the principal and agent has not been altered to the prejudice of the principal. The only qualification to the right of the other contracting party against the principal is that imposed by s. 234, namely, that he has not induced the principal to act upon the belief that the agent only will be held liable. *PREMI TRIKAMDAS v. MADHOUJI MUNJI*. . . . . **I. L. R. 4 Bom. 447**

8. ——— Secret arrangement by agent—*Purchase by agent afterwards adopted by principal.* If a principal adopts the acts of an agent in respect of the purchase of a property, he must take the property subject to the conditions with which the agent encumbered it, notwithstanding any secret arrangement between them not known to third parties. *ISHEN CHUNDER SINGH v. SHAMA CHURN*. . . . . **W. R. 1864, 3**

9. ——— Fraud—*Fraudulent statements made by agent.* Statements fraudulently made by an agent for his own benefit are not binding on the principal. *JOWAHIR LALL v. POOKURUM SINGH* **6 W. R. 252**

10. ——— Fraud of agent in sale of property. If an agent, authorized to sell property, commits a fraud against his principal, the principal is the person who ought to suffer, and not a stranger. *DOORGA NARAIN SEN v. BANAY MADHUB MOZOOMDAR*. . . . . **I. L. R. 7 Calc. 199**

11. ——— Fraud of agent—*Adoption of, by principal.* Principals are not allowed to benefit by adopting the fraud of their agents. *KOYLASH CHUNDER BANERJEE v. KALEE PROSONNO CHOWDHRY*. . . . . **16 W. R. 80**

12. ——— Liability in civil action of principal for consequences of agent's fraud. In a suit to recover the value of bullocks hired by the defendant's gomashtha to convey quantities of salt from the Government golahs, which, proving to be in excess of the quantity entered in the Government pass owing to the fraud of the gomashtha in making an addition to the lawful quantity, was seized by the Salt officials as contraband, and the bullocks sold under the provisions of Regulation X of 1819:—*Held*, that neither the want of authority on the part of the gomashtha, nor the ignorance of the salt merchant, the defendant, could be pleaded to exonerate him from the consequences of his servant's fraudulent act. *SADHOOJUNNA v. RAMHURRY MUNDUL*. . . . . **1 Hay 461**

13. ——— Bankruptcy of agent, effect of—*Breach of contract—Damages—Amendment of bill of complaint.* This was a suit for foreclosure of a mortgage for *Rs. 50,000* during a certain contract which, the plaintiffs contended, had determined by the bankruptcy of their Calcutta agents. The defence was that the contract was not so determined; and that, even if it were, the defendant had a right of lien or set-off, which would cover the amount of the advances. This set-off



PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—*contd.*5. LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL—*contd.*

consisted of the amount of loss in the sale of silk which the defendants, after the said bankruptcy, had shipped direct to London, and sold there on non-acceptance by the plaintiffs; and of a claim of R18,024, the amount of a bill of the said agents which the defendant had accepted from them as payment for silk, but which bill was dishonoured after the said bankruptcy. Cl. 6 of the agreement was as follows: "The silk to be paid for on delivery. Delivery to be taken within ten days of the arrival of any parcel in Calcutta; failing the payment within that time, Carr, Tagore & Co. may sell it at the market price; and should this be under the contract rate, you agree to pay the difference." Cl. 10 of the agreement was as follows: "As you have no authority to make advances previous to the receipt of the silk, and as Carr, Tagore & Co. stipulate for the advance in part of the sum which they are out of pocket, to carry on the filatures, the advances proposed being R50,000, at such times and in such portions as they may require after the delivery of the first parcel of silk under this contract, so that such advances shall not at any time be in excess of R50,000, beyond the silk delivered, for which interest at the rate of 6 per cent. will be allowed, and it is agreed that the question of advances shall be an open question; and that, in the event of advances being authorized, the contract shall at once be in force." The lower Court held that under these two clauses the defendants could not resort to the advances for their set-off; that the plaintiffs were not liable for the R18,024; and that the contract was not determined. Plaintiff also alleged a series of frauds on the part of their agents, with whom defendants were in collusion, but these charges were abandoned at the hearing. *Held*, that acceptance by the agent binds the principal where there is no fraud; that voluntary acceptance of an agent's bill as payment discharges the principal; that a contract is not determined by death or bankruptcy of an agent, unless there has been an express stipulation to that effect; that an impossibility of fulfilling the terms of a contract must be clearly established in order to avoid a liability for breach thereof; that when a place of delivery is specified in a contract, delivery must be made there; that the plaintiff, having failed to prove alleged fraud in a deed, although entitled to relief under a distinct head of equity, will not be allowed to make a new case, and cannot, in the same suit, obtain a decree on the footing of the said deed; that amendment of a bill will not be allowed, if it appear that an account, being the relief attainable, would have been given if demanded, and that the plaintiff has not offered to perform his part of a contract and allow compensation for breaches thereof to the defendant and to pay any balance that should be found against him; that the mode of ascertaining damages for breach of contract prescribed in the contract must be adopted, and the remedy by action at once accrues. *POLE v. GORDON*

2 Hyde 289: Cor. 83: Bourke O. C. 1

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—*contd.*5. LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL—*contd.*

14. ——— Misfeasance and tort of agent—*Liability of principal for wrongful acts of agent.* A principal is liable for the misfeasance or tort of his agent, when such misfeasance or tort has been done or committed with the subsequent assent, adoption, or ratification of the principal. When it is found that a principal was cognizant of and countenanced the act of his agent, it may be inferred that he assented to it. *RAI KISHEN CHAND v. SHEO BARAM RAI* . . . 7 N. W. 121

15. ——— Fraud of agent—*Liability of principal—Scope of agent's authority—Fraud in the interest of the agent and not of the principal—Theft and forgery by servants, no duty to guard against—Neglect—Proximate and direct cause of loss—Presumption—Guarantee by broker in one transaction; effect of, on subsequent transactions, where signature of broker forged.* A principal is liable for the wrongs of his agent committed within the scope of his authority and purporting to be for the benefit of the principal, although no express order of the principal can be shown; but, where the fraud is committed by the agent when he was acting, not in the interest of his employers but entirely in his own interests, the principal cannot be held responsible for the consequences of his fraudulent conduct. *Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank*, L. R. 2 Exch. 259; *Houldsworth v. City of Glasgow Bank*, 5 App. Cas. 317; *British Mutual Banking Co., Ltd., v. The Charnwood Forest Ry. Co.*, L. R. 18 Q. B. D. 714, referred to. There is no duty incumbent upon mercantile men, any more than upon other people, to anticipate and to take precautions against the possibility of a theft of letters or of forgery being committed. *Societe General v. Metropolitan Bank*, 27 L. T. 849, referred to. The rule "that whenever one of two innocent parties must suffer by the act of a third person, he who has enabled such person to occasion the loss must sustain it" must be restricted to this, that the neglect must be in the transaction itself and be the proximate and direct cause that led to the loss complained of. *Leikbarrow v. Mason*, 2 T. R. 63, commented on. *Freeman v. Cooke*, 2 Exch. 654; *Arnold v. Cheque Bank and Arnold v. City Bank*, 1 C. P. D. 578; *Bank of England v. Vagliano Bros.*, [1891] App. Cas. 107; *Swan v. North British Australasian Co.*, 2 H. & C. 175, referred to. Even if there is negligence on the part of one of the parties in the conduct of their business, it would not be sufficient to fix him with liability, unless the loss was the ordinary or likely result of that negligence. *Bank of Ireland v. Trustees of Evan's Charities*, 5 H. L. C. 389; *Arnold v. Cheque Bank*, 1 C. P. D. 578, referred to and discussed. *Young v. Grote*, 4 Bing. 253, discussed and distinguished. *Scolfield v. Earl of Lonsborough*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 543, referred to. The signing by a broker of a bought note, in which he guarantees the fulfilment of a contract on the part of the seller, raises no presumption of law, in transactions between the same parties, which cannot be contradicted, that subse-



PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—*contd.*5. LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL—*contd.*

quent bought notes, to which the signature of the broker is forged, containing similar guarantees, were signed with the authority of the broker. *Spooner v. Browning*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 528, referred to. *MORRISON v. VERSCHOYLE* (1901)

6 C. W. N. 429

## 16. ——— Tenant—Suit for Damages.

A master or principal is liable for wrong done to third parties by his servant or agent, provided that the act is done on his behalf and with the intention of serving his purposes. *ISWAR CHUNDER SANTRA v. SATISH CHUNDER GIRI* (1902)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 207  
s.c. 7 C. W. N. 126

17. ——— Agent's right to sue principal for price of goods purchased—*Liability of principal—Right of suit.* Where the plaintiffs as agent of the defendants, purchased goods for the defendants from wholesale dealers, and it was not their case as set out in the plaint that they had done so by pledging their own personal credit or that the pledging of their own credit was within the scope of the agency:—*Held*, that they would have no cause of action against the defendants for the amount due to the wholesale dealers, until they were compelled to pay their demands. *KHURKUN SAHA v. DHATIA DAS* (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1145

18. ——— Contract with broker acting as principal—*Contract—Specific performance—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 23<sup>c</sup>.* Where the plaintiffs purported to act under contract with the defendant as brokers for the sale and purchase of jute, but really acted on their own account as principals without the knowledge and consent of the defendant:—*Held*, that they were not entitled to recover for the latter's breach of contract by reason of s. 236 of the Indian Contract Act. S. 236 is not restricted to cases where an agent purports to act for a named principal, but follows the rule underlying the cases of *Rothschild v. Brookman*, 2 Dow & Cl. 188, and *Robinson v. Mollett*, L. R. 7 E. & I. App. 862, that an agent cannot recover on a contract if he really acts as a principal. *SEW-DUTT ROY MASKARA v. NAHAPIET* (1907)

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 628

19. ——— Undisclosed principal—*Agent—"Discloses himself"—Strict construction.* S. 231 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872) deals with the rights (a) of the principal and (b) of the third party in cases where the contract is entered into by the agent without disclosing the principal. The first clause refers to the general case and the rule is that the third party shall have as against the undisclosed principal the same rights which he would have against the agent, if the agent had been the principal. The second clause deals with the particular case where the principal discloses himself before the contract is completed. The second clause should be read as governed by the first clause. The words "discloses himself"

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—*contd.*5. LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL—*concl'd.*

in s. 231 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872) should be construed strictly. *Per* BATCHELOR, J. It has been warmly urged that the third party's right to repudiate, which is allowed, if the principal himself makes the disclosure, should not be refused merely because the disclosure is made by some other person or the information reaches him from some other source. But the argument to my mind is not convincing. For whatever may be the subjective belief or conviction of the third party, it is conceivable that he should have no right to avoid the contract, unless the principal, hitherto undisclosed, comes out into the open and claims the benefit of the contract for himself, and there would be no hardship in requiring the third party to challenge the alleged principal as to whether he makes this claim or not. *LAKSHMANDAS v. ANNA LANE* (1904)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 356

## 6. LIABILITY OF AGENTS.

1. ——— Banian, liability of—*Custom.*

There is a presumption in Calcutta that where a vendor of goods deals with a banian of a European firm, *quâ* banian, he is only to look to the banian for the price. *FAIZULLAH v. RAMKAMAL MITTER*

2 B. L. R. O. C. 7

*JUGGOBUNDUO SHAW v. GRANT, SMITH & Co.*

2 Hyde 129 : Cor. 47

s.c. on appeal. *GRANT, SMITH & Co. v. JUGGOBUNDUO SHAW*

Bourke A. O. C. 117 : 2 Hyde 301

2. ——— Agent of foreign principal—*Presumption of law as to whom credit is given.*

Where it is sought to make the agent of a foreign principal liable on a contract, there is no presumption of law, but the case must be determined by the particular facts. But in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it will be presumed, as a matter of fact, that credit was given to the agent. *McGAVIN v. WILSON*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 405

3. ——— Agent mixing transactions of principal with his own—*Borrowing.* An agent is personally liable who mixes up his private transactions with those of his principal by borrowing for both. *JUGGURNATH ROY CHOWDHRY v. MUNOREKHA DOSSEE*

2 W. R. 156

4. ——— Agent dealing with third party's goods as those of the principal—*Liability to owner of goods.* An agent who deals with another man's goods as if they belonged to his principal may be answerable to the true owner, notwithstanding that he acts by the command or direction of his principal. *WISE v. BURN*

4 W. R. Rec. Ref. 1

5. ——— Unconditional acceptance of bill by agent—*Liability on bill.* *Held*, that the defendant's agent, having unconditionally accepted the bill, must be held liable for the amount. *SALIG RAM v. JUGGUN NATH*

1 Agra 137



**PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—contd.****6. LIABILITY OF AGENTS—contd.**

**6. ——— Purchase by agent—Knowledge of agency by vendor—Government servant.** The defendant, a servant of Government, having given orders for bricks, and the plaintiff being aware that the defendant was a servant of Government, and that the bricks were required for building bridges on account of Government :—*Held*, that the Government was liable, and not the defendant personally. *SREENATH ROY v. ROSS*

4 W. R. S. C. C. Ref. 13

**7. ——— Goods ordered by principal and accepted by agent—Personal liability of agent.** In a suit for the recovery of the value of certain articles sold and delivered to defendant No. 1, who had given an order for payment, which defendant No. 2, as his agent, had accepted by an endorsement, plaintiff gave up the claim against defendant No. 1, and demanded the amount from defendant No. 2 alone. *Held*, that, under the circumstances, there could be no claim against defendant No. 2. *KALEE MOHUN SIRCAR v. HUMATN KADER MAHOMED ALI*

25 W. R. 91

**8. ——— Liability in case of two innocent persons—Liability of agents to third parties—Forgery.** Two letters were presented to M, one addressed to himself and the other to the manager of the Mussooree Savings Bank, both purporting to be written by K. In the letter to M, M was requested to deliver to the manager of the Bank the letter addressed to him. In the letter to the manager he was asked to send Rs. 2,500 in currency notes through M, payment being promised by a remittance through another bank or through M. M delivered the letter to the manager, who upon the strength of it made over the notes to M, who gave a receipt for them for and on behalf of K, and afterwards handed them over to the person who had brought him the letter. The letters were forgeries. In a suit against M by the Bank to recover the money paid to M :—*Held*, that, in presenting the letter, in receiving the notes, and in granting a receipt for them, the defendant was in some sense an agent of K; but, inasmuch as the notes were given on the authority of the letter addressed to the plaintiff himself, and not in consequence of any representation made by the defendant, the latter could not be held liable for the loss sustained by the former. *MOONEY v. MUSSOOREE SAVINGS BANK*

6 N. W. 319

**9. ——— Undisclosed principal—Promissory note signed by agent.** If an agent signs a promissory note without disclosing the names of his principals, the latter are not liable. *SHEO CHURN SAHOO v. CURTIS*

3 W. R. 139

**10. ——— Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 230.** A broker gave to one G the following sold note : "Sold this day by order and for account of E.E. Gubboy, to my principal, G. P. Notes, for Rs. 2,00,000 (two lakhs) at Rs. 11. (Sd.) A. T. A., Broker." This note was endorsed—"A. T. A., for principal." In a suit by G against the

**PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—contd.****6. LIABILITY OF AGENTS—contd.**

broker for failure to take delivery :—*Held*, that there was nothing in this contract to rebut the personal liability of the broker. *GUBBOY v. AVETOOM*

I. L. R. 17 Cal. 449

**11. ——— Liability of agent for rent—Honorary Secretary to a School maintained by a foreign society—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 230.** The plaintiff sued the defendant to recover possession of a certain house in Bombay and for arrears of rent. The defendant pleaded that the house in question was occupied by the Beni Israel school of Bombay which was maintained by the Anglo-Jewish Association of London, that he was Honorary Secretary of the school, and as such, and not in his personal capacity, had hired the house, and that he had never paid the rent or expenses of the school out of his own pocket. He contended that he was not liable to be sued personally. *Held*, that the defendant was liable for the rent. There was nothing to show that the contract for the house was made on the personal credit of any one except the defendant. *BHOJABHAI ALLARAKHIA v. HAYEM SAMUEL*

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 754

**12. ——— Right to sue—Liability of agent—Charter party—Actual knowledge—Disclosure of name of principal at time of making the contract—Presumption of liability of agent where name of principal not disclosed—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 230.** The plaintiffs by charter-party contracted to let the steam-ship *Oakdale* to the defendants upon certain terms. The first clause of the charter-party stated that the plaintiffs "agreed as agents for owners of the said steam-ship," and subsequent clauses provided that the owners should bind themselves to receive the cargo on board, and that the master on behalf of the owners should have a lien on the cargo for freight, etc. The charter-party was signed by the plaintiffs and defendants in their own names. The plaintiffs sued the defendants for breach of the charter-party in refusing to load the said steam-ship. *Held*, that the plaintiffs had contracted as agents, and were therefore not entitled to sue. If a contract made by a person who is an agent is worded so as, when taken as a whole, to convey to the other contracting party the notion that the agent is contracting in that character, he cannot sue or be sued on the contract. Where one contracting party knows that the other is contracting as an agent for a third person whose name he also knows, the presumption laid down in cl. 2 of s. 230 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872) does not arise, although at the time of making the contract the agent does not disclose the name of his principal. The essential point is the knowledge, and actual knowledge is equivalent to disclosure, the whole object of which would be to convey such knowledge. *MACKINNON, MACKENZIE & Co. v. LANG, MOIR & Co.* I. L. R. 5 Bom. 584

**13. ——— Liability of agent—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 230—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 92—Charter-party—Employment of steredores to load and discharge cargo.** The defend-



PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—*contd.*6. LIABILITY OF AGENTS—*contd.*

ants let a steam-ship, to the plaintiff for a certain term, and signed a charter-party "by and on behalf of the owners of the steam-ship A." The charter-party was a time-charter to commence on arrival at Calcutta, and to terminate at one of certain ports; the steamer in the interim to ply to and from any port the charterers pleased. It was agreed that the steamer should be provided "with a proper and sufficient crew of seamen, engineers, stokers, firemen, and other necessary persons for working cargo with all despatch;" and that in taking and discharging cargo "the master and his crew with his boats shall be aiding and assisting to the utmost of their power;" and that "the owners or agents of the said steam-ship shall be held responsible to the said charterers for any incapacity, want of skill, insobriety, or negligence on the part of master, officers, engineers, stokers, firemen, or crew of the said steam-ship." The names of the principals were not disclosed in the charter-party, but were verbally disclosed before the charter-party was signed. In an action against the agents for damages for refusing to supply stevedores and other persons, in addition to the crew, when loading and discharging cargo:—*Held*, that the presumption created by the second clause of s. 230 of the Contract Act is merely a *prima facie* one and may be rebutted, and that the contract was not personally binding on the agents, because the *prima facie* presumption of an intention to contract personally was rebutted by the language of the contract itself. *Held*, also, that the terms of the charter-party showed that the crew only were to assist in loading and discharging cargo; and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to call on those responsible for the steamer to load and discharge cargo by stevedores instead of by the crew. Reading the second part of s. 230 of the Contract Act with s. 92 of the Evidence Act, *semble*: that if, on the face of a written contract, an agent appears to be personally liable, he cannot escape liability by evidence of any disclosure of his principal's name apart from the contract. SOOPROMONIAN SETTY v. HEILGERS

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 71 : 4 C. L. R. 377

14. — On 6th April 1865, A, who resided and carried on business at Bombay, through his gomastah at Calcutta, shipped on board the *Sir Jamsetjee Family* 268 bags of sugar, and received from the captain a bill of lading by which he certified that they were shipped in good order and well conditioned on board the said ship bound for Bombay, to be there delivered in like good order and well conditioned to B, or his assigns, on payment of freight at R16 per ton. The bill of lading was subject to the usual exceptions. The vessel was at the time chartered to H A, and C & C were agents for the owners. H A being unable to carry out the terms of the charter, there was a delay in the departure of the vessel. On 26th May 1865 A wrote to C & C, addressing them as agents of the ship: "I beg to inform you that I have shipped per *Sir Jamsetjee Family* 268 bags of sugar for Bombay; I hold the bills of lading for the

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same, and the ship is still detained here. I hope you will be kind enough to let me know what you will do about the cargo, if the said ship will sail for Bombay or tranship to any other vessel, or deliver the cargo here." To which C & C on the same day replied: "We shall be able to tell you in the course of a week or so what we propose doing with the ship *Sir Jamsetjee Family*; as soon as any thing has been decided, due notice shall be given to the shippers of cargo already on board." On 1st June C & C again wrote: "H A having failed to carry out his charter of the *Sir Jamsetjee Family* in terms of the shipping order and sundry goods having been sent on board by him, of which the following are believed to be to your order, and for which bills of lading have been signed and delivered to H A, we shall be glad to know whether you are willing that the said goods—268 bags of sugar—be transhipped to a steamer going to Bombay, at the current rate of freight, the bills of lading for the same being sent to the owners of the *Sir Jamsetjee Family*, to be delivered to the consignees of the goods upon production of the bills of lading already signed. You will, of course, understand that the goods are liable for the chartered rate, *viz.*, R20-10 per ton; and the charterer having failed to complete the loading, the difference of freight between what H A granted you a shipping order at and the freight charged by the steamer will have to be paid by the shipper previous to the goods being delivered in Bombay." On the 5th June A replied: "I am agreed that my goods be transhipped to a steamer going to Bombay at the current rate of freight, but I must not pay the difference of freight, whatever it may be. In regard to H A, I have nothing to do with them, as the bills of lading per *Sir Jamsetjee Family* for 268 bags of sugar being signed by the captain of the same at the rate of freight, R16 per ton. I am liable for the same only. If you are willing to tranship my said goods to a steamer at the same rate of freight, I am willing and must pay it; otherwise you will kindly order to deliver my goods from *Sir Jamsetjee Family* here." C & C accepted and acted on the proposal in the last letter. The sugar was transhipped from the *Sir Jamsetjee Family* to the *Gunga*, from the mate of which C & C obtained a receipt, stating that the goods had been shipped in good order, etc. The goods were afterwards removed without the knowledge of C & C from the *Gunga* to another steamer, the *Mula*, which belonged to the same owners. Subsequently C & C gave up the receipt from the mate of the *Gunga*, and obtained in exchange a bill of lading signed by the agents for the captain of the *Mula*. The bill of lading stated the receipt of goods (in which were included those of A) from C & C, and made them deliverable to order of C & C, at Bombay, and receipt of freight for the whole at R15 per ton was admitted. A knew that his goods had been put on board the *Mula* and got his policy of insurance, which was against a total loss only, transferred. There were inserted in red ink in the bill of lading when given to A the words, "Bags all more or less in bad order and torn; contents



**PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—contd.****6. LIABILITY OF AGENTS—contd.**

damaged and rotten; marks indistinct; not responsible for marks or condition of packages or contents." The *Mula* proceeded on her voyage, but returned to Calcutta with her cargo damaged by the perils of the sea: 260 of A's bags of sugar were condemned and sold in Calcutta, under the authority of the agents of the *Mula*, without notice to C & C or to A, and neither were aware that the sale was about to take place. The remaining eight bags were sent to Bombay in another ship by the agents of the *Gunga* and *Mula*, and were received by A. *Held* (overruling PHEAR, J.), that C & C were agents only of the owners of the *Sir Jamseljee Family*; but had C & C been liable as agents for A, they would not have been liable for the full value of the goods damaged by the perils of the sea. *Quære*: If C & C had expressly, as agents of the owners of the *Sir Jamseljee Family*, contracted to tranship and deliver at Bombay, according to the terms of the bill of lading would they have been personally liable? *Semble*: A contract made with express reference to a principal, though not by name, would not render the agent personally liable as the agent of an undisclosed principal. *COWIE v. DHURMSEE POONJABHOY*. 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 75

**15. — Agents of ship—Liability of agents.** Upon the following fact referred "Defendants contracted with plaintiffs as agents of the captain and owners of a certain ship then in the Madras Roads. The plaintiffs were aware of this at the time when the contract was made. The captain was at the time in charge of his ship. At the time of the contract nothing was said by either party as to the person or persons on whose credit the contract was made,—all that occurred being that defendants known by plaintiffs to be acting as agents for the captain and owners of the ship, agreed with plaintiffs to carry certain of their goods on board the ship to Calcutta. The defendants did not at the time of the contract in terms say that they contracted only as agents. The plaintiffs did not know the names of the owners, nor the captain; nor had they any further or other knowledge of the latter than that which his designation by his office of master of the ship conveyed." *Held*, that, in the absence of anything more than knowledge that the defendants were acting as agents of the master and owners of a ship in the Roads, a decision declaring the agents liable was strictly in accordance with English law. *PATER v. GORDON*. 7 Mad. 82

**16. — Captain and officers of man-of-war—Damage occasioned by treatment of stranded ship without consent of owner.** A, the captain of a man-of-war, gave written instructions to B, his lieutenant, concerning a certain ship which was stranded. The official instructions contained the following passage: "You will in all emergencies act as your discretion and judgment direct." At the same time, A sent a demi-official letter to B, in which, after several directions having reference to the disposal of the cargo, he added, "After getting all you can, I should think that the wreck ought

**PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—contd.****6. LIABILITY OF AGENTS—contd.**

to be burnt; but all is left to your discretion and judgment." In pursuance of these orders, the wreck was burnt without the consent of the owner. A subsequently ratified the act of his subordinate. *Held*, (i) that A, by the expressions used in the demi-official letter, rendered himself liable as principal; and (ii) that B, as the agent directly concerned in causing the burning of the ship, was liable jointly with A to the owner for the damage occasioned thereby. *ABDOOLA BIN SHAIK ALLY v. STEPHENS*. 2 Ind. Jur. O. S. 17

**17. — Fraud—Fraudulent agreement between agent and contractors for work.** The ex-King of Oudh ordered M, one of his officers, to procure the erection of certain buildings. M made over to Y (also one of the King's officers) the contract for a portion of the work which the appellant undertook to execute. The contract for the work was signed by the appellant alone, and it provided (among other things) that Y was to be allowed R20,000 out of every R1,00,000 paid to the appellant. By another agreement it was stipulated that the work should be examined and checked by Y or his agents. The appellant was discharged before the completion of the work, and he sued Y, M, and the ex-King jointly. *Held*, that Y did not render himself personally liable, and that the contract was of such a description that the appellant was not entitled to a decree against the other respondents in respect of it, as both Y and the appellant were parties to a fraud on the ex-King. *BHOGOBAN CHUNDER SEN v. BADSA ALLY SHA*

1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 103

**18. — Payment of deposit as purchase-money with auctioneer—Suit to recover deposit.** The plaintiff purchased immovable property at an auction sale and deposited certain amount on account of the purchase-money with the auctioneer. The vendor refused to convey the property to the plaintiff. *Held*, that the money having been deposited with the auctioneer as a stakeholder and not as an agent merely, and being in his hands, the action to recover it lay against the auctioneer, and not against the vendor. *ESSAJI ADAMJI v. BHIMJI PURSHOTAM* 4 Bom. O. C. 125

**19. — Contract for municipality—Repudiation of contract by municipality—Want of authority.** Plaintiff sued one M.M., overseer for the municipal office, for the recovery of money due on a contract under which plaintiff had done certain work, defendant contracting for the municipality, and for the performance of work known by plaintiff to be municipal work. The municipality having ignored the contract, it was held that the contract being a quasi-contract, defendant could not be held personally liable in the action. *MODHOOSOODUN DEY v. MOHENDRONATH MOOKERJI*

9 W. R. 206

**20. — Gratuitous agent—Negligence—Gross negligence.** A gratuitous agent is liable for any loss sustained by his principal through



PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—*contd.*6. LIABILITY OF AGENTS—*contd.*

the gross negligence of the agent. What is gross negligence is a question on the facts of each particular case. *AGNEW v. INDIAN CARRYING COMPANY* . . . . . **2 Mad. 449**

**21. ——— Negligence of agent—Agent to buy indigo seed—Exercise of judgment.** Agents buying indigo seed in a rising market, under an order to purchase on the most favourable terms, cannot experiment by sowing a sample and waiting before they purchase to see whether it will germinate. They are only bound to act to the best of their judgment, and to use proper care and skill as agents in purchasing what they are ordered to purchase, and their action cannot be repudiated unless they are shown to have been guilty of negligence. *BETTS v. ARBUTHNOT*

**19 W. R. P. C. 65**

Affirming decision of High Court in *ARBUTHNOT v. BETTS* . . . . . **6 B. L. R. 273**

**22. ——— Liability of firm for acts of member of firm—Contract Act, s. 192.** The plaintiffs and defendants carried on business in the same place, and when a member of either firm was sent to Calcutta to make purchases, the other firm took advantage of the opportunity to get the same person to purchase goods on their behalf. A member of the defendant's firm, who was sent to Calcutta, through his own negligence lost a sum of money given by the plaintiffs to the defendants' firm for the purchase of goods. The lower Courts found that the defendants acted as agents. *Held*, that the defendants' firm, and not only the particular member of the firm by whose negligence the money was lost, was responsible. *SEKUNDER MONDUL v. NOCOWRI BISWAS* . **11 C. L. R. 547**

**23. ——— Liability for loss sustained by company.** *Held*, under the circumstances, that the company had suffered loss by the neglect of their agent, and that he was liable to make good the loss sustained in consequence of his negligence. *CRAWLEY v. MALING* . **1 Agra 63**

**24. ——— Suit by principal against agent to recover money received and not accounted for—Termination of agency—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 201, 218.** Where an agent for the sale of goods receives the price thereof, the agency does not terminate, with reference to ss. 201 and 218 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872), until he has paid the price to the principal; and a suit by the principal to recover the price is within time if brought within three years from the date of a demand for an account of such price. The agency does not terminate immediately on the sale of the goods. It does not terminate at the time when the plaintiff obtained knowledge of the defendant's breach of duty. *BABU RAM v. RAM DAYAL* . . . . . **I. L. R. 12 All. 541**

*FINK v. BULDEO DASS* . **I. L. R. 26 Calc. 715**

**25. ——— Illegal cess—Khurcha—Liability of agent to account for sums realized, not legally**

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*recoverable by principal—Bengal Tenancy Act, s. 74.* An agent is liable to account to his principal for the sums realized by him from tenants, although the said sums are not legally recoverable by the landlord, as being illegal cesses. *Nobin Chunder Roy Chowdry v. Gooroo Gobind Mojoomdar*, 25 W. R. 8, doubted. *Gobind Soonder Singh v. Chandi Charan Bhattacharjee*, unreported, followed. *NAGENDRABALA DASSI v. GURU DOYAL MUKERJI* (1903)

**I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1011 :  
s.c. 7 C. W. N. 535**

**26. ——— Administrator's Agent—Agent appointed by administrator not liable on the contract of agency to the person entitled to the estate.** An agent appointed by the administrator of an estate as such, cannot be proceeded against on such contract of agency by the person entitled to the estate, and it makes no difference that the administrator obtained the grant as the attorney of the mother and guardian of the person entitled. *CHIDAMBARAM CHETTI v. PICHAPPA CHETTI* (1907)

**I. L. R. 30 Mad. 243**

## 7. COMMISSION AGENTS.

**1. ——— Unauthorized profits of agent—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 215, 216—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 92—Contemporaneous oral agreement—Account-sales.** The plaintiffs, a firm of merchants, entered into an agreement (which was reduced to writing) with the defendants, who were dealers in coffee and other produce, to the following effect, *viz.*, that all consignments of produce, which the defendants might make to Europe, should be made through the plaintiffs' firm; that the plaintiffs should receive a commission of 1 per cent. for themselves and 2½ per cent. for their agents at the port of consignment; that the plaintiffs should make certain advances to the defendants against the produce; and that the sums advanced should be repaid with interest "at such rates as may be fixed at the various dates of such loans, it being agreed that such interest is to be regulated by the then prevailing rate at the office of the Bank of Madras at Tellicherry." The written agreement was silent as to the mode of sale, rate of exchange, and other matters connected with the business; but it was at the same time further agreed orally that the sales of the defendants' produce were to be made under the directions and at the discretion of the plaintiffs. Business was carried on on the footing of the above agreements for eighteen months, during which period the plaintiffs furnished to the defendants copies of the account-sales for the consignments made through them, and they were accepted without objection by the defendants. The business resulted in the defendants becoming indebted to the plaintiffs; and about nine months after the date of the above-mentioned agreement the defendants executed in favour of the plaintiffs a mortgage in which the then amount of their indebtedness was recited. The defendants became further indebted to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs,



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having furnished them with an account of the transactions between them, now sued to recover the balance due. The defendants admitted the correctness of the debit side of the account, but denied in general terms that of the credit side. Evidence was given by the plaintiffs of the receipt of the account-sales in the ordinary course of business and of the delivery of copies to the defendants from time to time, and they were filed as exhibits without further proof. It appeared that in the account the defendants were charged on account of local exchange at a rate higher than that actually paid to the Bank, with which the plaintiffs had made a special arrangement without reference to the contract with the defendants. It also appeared that the plaintiffs, under an arrangement made with their agents at the ports of consignment, had received from them about 1 per cent. on the various consignments by way of return commission, and that this arrangement had not been communicated to the defendants. *Held*, (i) that the account-sales were *prima facie* proof of the transactions to which they related; (ii) that evidence of the contemporaneous oral agreement was admissible; (iii) that the defendants were not entitled to the benefit of the special arrangement between the plaintiffs and the Bank; (iv) that the plaintiffs were liable to the defendants for the amount received by them as return commission. *MAYEN v. ALSTON*. I. L. R. 16 Mad. 238

2. — Principal and Factor—*Consignment for sale—Advance by factor on consignment—Right of factor to sell goods consigned to him for sale below the limit of price prescribed by consignor.* In January 1889 an agreement was made between the plaintiffs and the defendant which provided that the defendant in Bombay was to act for the plaintiffs "in influencing consignments of produce" to the care of the plaintiffs in London. Such produce was to be sold by the plaintiffs in London for a certain commission and brokerage. One of the terms of the agreement was that the business in England was to be worked entirely in the defendant's name, and the defendant was to "undertake to guarantee the plaintiffs free of all loss in connection with the said consignments and to guarantee the payment of redrafts, etc." On the 25th January 1889 the defendant consigned 435 packages of cloves to the plaintiffs, in London and drew against the consignment a draft for £2,100 on the plaintiffs. In his consignment letter the defendant stated that the consignment was from his constituent C K, but that, as Rs30,000 had been advanced to him, the consignment was shipped in the defendant's name. The letter continued: "The cost is 9½d. per pound, but he expects more, and not to be sold under the above rate." The sum drawn against the cloves (£2,100) was £400 in excess of their value, and on receipt of the consignment letter on the 11th February 1889, the plaintiffs at once telegraphed to the defendant to remit by cable £400 against over-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—*contd.*7. COMMISSION AGENTS—*contd.*

draft against cloves. On the next day the defendant replied by telegraph: "I will remit you by outgoing mail." The plaintiffs accepted and paid the draft for £2,100 drawn against the cloves. The price of cloves in the London market fell rapidly. The defendant from time to time lowered the limit of price, but not to such an extent as to allow of a sale being effected. The lowest limit named by him was 6d. per pound on the 31st October 1889. In December 1889 the market price was only 5d. per pound, and the deficit owing to the plaintiffs was £1,300. The plaintiffs presented bills to the defendant for this balance, but they were refused. On the 5th February 1890, after due notice to the defendant, the 435 bales of cloves were sold, 20 of them at 4½d. per pound and 415 at 4½d. The balance due to the plaintiffs in respect of this consignment after allowing for the proceeds of sale was £1,432-15-0. This sum was part of the amount for which the present suit was brought. The defendant contended that the plaintiffs were not justified in selling the cloves below the price limited, *viz.*, 6d. per pound, and claimed to be credited with £329-1-8, which was the difference between the amount actually realized by the sale and the amount which would have been obtained if the cloves had been sold at the prescribed price. *Held*, by FARRAN, J., and by the Court of appeal on the evidence, (i) that the plaintiffs had accepted the consignment and had advanced money against it on condition of being kept in funds in case a deficit should arise owing to a falling market, and that the defendant acquiesced in that condition; (ii) that the plaintiffs had throughout claimed the right to sell if the condition was not observed, and that the defendant inferentially admitted the right claimed by the plaintiffs. The conclusion to be drawn was that the business was conducted on that basis, and that, when the condition was broken, the plaintiffs' right to sell arose according to the course of business, notwithstanding the limit of price imposed by the defendant. *Per* SARGENT, C.J.—The result of the authorities is to show that where a factor for sale, who has made advances, claims the right to sell, *invito domino*, the question is whether there was an agreement between the parties, either express or to be inferred, from the general course of business or from the circumstances attending to particular consignment, that the factor should under any and what circumstances have the power to sell against the wish of the owner of the goods. The onus of proving such agreement lies on the factor who has made the advances. *Per* FARRAN, J.—On the whole, the authorities warrant the inference that where goods are consigned to a foreign merchant as security for an advance, albeit he may be a factor entrusted with the sale of goods on commission, and where by reason of the fall in the market or other causes his security is declining in value, and becoming insufficient, such foreign merchant is invested with a power of sale over the goods after due notice to his principal, although the latter may place a



**PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—contd.****7. COMMISSION AGENTS—contd.**

limit on their sale, and desire to hold them on, if the principal do not put his factor in funds to make up the deficit so caused. *JAFFERBOY LUDHABHOY CHATTOO v. CHARLESWORTH*

**I. L. R. 17 Mad. 520**

**3. ——— Agency to sell, coupled with interest—Contract Act, s. 202—Discretion as to price left with agent—Power of principal to impose limits as to price.** The defendant consigned goods to a firm in London for sale, and in respect of each consignment he received an advance from the plaintiff, who was the agent of the London firm, and signed a consignment note, which contained the following passage: "I hereby authorize you to sell the above goods at the best price obtainable without reference to me, and I give you full discretion and power to act on my behalf to the best of your judgment in regard to such sale and in all matters connected with the management of this consignment. Should there be any short fall after realization of the above consignment, I hereby authorize you to draw on me for the amount, and I engage to honour such draft and to pay it on presentation." The plaintiff guaranteed the payment of the redrafts to the London firm, on whose account he made the advances to the defendant. Short falls having occurred on certain consignments and the London redrafts having been dishonoured, the plaintiff paid them, and now sued to recover the amount from the defendant. It appeared that consignments had been sold at prices less than certain limits which had been fixed by the defendant subsequent to the receipt of the advances and the signature of the consignment notes. *Held*, that the defendant had no right (regard being had to the terms of the consignment note and the course of dealing between the parties) so to impose limits of price, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. *KONDAYYA CHETTI v. NARASIMHULU CHETTI*

**I. L. R. 20 Mad. 97**

**4. ——— Sale or lease of house through agent—What entitles agent to commission—Express stipulation—Direct intervention—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 205—Period of time for revocation or renunciation of authority—Quantum meruit.** In the absence of any special stipulation, an agent, in order to found a claim for his bonus or commission in selling or letting a house, must show that such sale or lease was the direct result of his intervention and was obtained by means of his agency or some sub-agent of his; it is not sufficient for him to show that such lease or sale was obtained indirectly as a remote and casual consequence of his efforts. *Autrobus v. Wickens*, 4 F. & F. 291; *Curtis v. Nixon*, 24 Law Times 706; *Toulmin v. Millar*, 58 Law Times 96, followed. Under s. 205 of the Indian Contract Act, in the absence of any express contract, the period of time, which is to be implied, depends on the particular circumstances of each case. *Simpson v. Lamb*, 17 C. B. 603;

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*Hamlyn & Co. v. Wood & Co.*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 488, followed. *JORDON v. RAM CHANDRA GUPTA* (1904)

**8 C. W. N. 831**

**5. ——— Commission agents—Pakki adat system—Sale and purchase by the agent on his own account—Wagering contracts—Usage of trade—Tender of evidence as to delivery at other *vaidas*—Relevancy of such evidence.** The defendant, a resident of the North-West Provinces, from time to time sent orders to the plaintiffs in Bombay to sell and purchase cotton on his account. The plaintiffs carried out the defendant's orders as they were received. Up to the due date they had purchased on behalf of the defendant 400 bales more than they had sold. It appeared that by reason of other contracts entered into with the merchants from whom they had purchased on behalf of the defendant the plaintiffs had 'cancelled' all these purchases before the due date. The defendant neither sent money to pay for the cotton nor did he direct the plaintiffs to sell on his behalf. The plaintiffs sued the defendant describing themselves as commission agents for their commission and for the loss on 400 bales sold on defendant's account. The plaintiffs were unable to show that they had paid any damages on account of the defendant, for failure to take delivery, to any of the merchants from whom they had purchased on defendant's account. The suit was dismissed in the lower Court on the ground that the contracts were wagering contracts. In appeal the plaintiffs contended that they were entitled as between themselves and the defendant to treat themselves as the principals, on the ground that the business was conducted on the *pakki adat* system, under which no privity was established between the defendant and the merchants to whom or from whom cotton was sold or bought on his account. *Held*, that, if the plaintiffs were, as their plaint stated, commission agents, and they were employed by the defendant as his commission agents, and as such, under instructions and on account of the defendant, entered into these purchases, they had no cause of action. *Held*, further, that the usage termed the *pakki adat* system involved a material departure from the ordinary relations between a principal and his agent of which there was no suggestion in the pleadings or issues, nor was there any evidence to prove it. The plaintiffs must therefore be held to the case they had made. During the course of the hearing in the lower Court it appeared that at the *vaida*, for which contracts in question had been made, the plaintiffs had neither given nor taken delivery of any cotton. They tendered evidence to show that at other *vaidas* they had given or taken delivery of cotton and other goods. The learned Judge rejected the evidence as irrelevant to the issue whether the contracts were wagering contracts. *Held*, on appeal, that the evidence tendered was relevant and should have been admitted. *CHANDULAL SUKLAL v. SIDHRUTHRAI* (1905) . **I. L. R. 29 Bom. 291**



PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—*contd.*

## S. SUIT FOR ACCOUNT.

1. ———— **Limitation—Suit for account—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Arts. 89 and 120.** A suit by a principal against his agent for an account and also for recovery of money from him that may be found due, is a suit for moveable property received by the agent on behalf of the principal and not accounted for, and is governed by Art. 89, Sch. II of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877). *Jogendra Nath Roy v. Deb Nath Chatterjee*, 8 C. W. N. 113, followed. *SHIB CHUNDRA ROY v. CHANDRA NARAIN MUKERJEE* (1905). I. L. R. 32 Calc. 719

2. ———— **Account, suit for—Limitation—Charge upon immovable property—Contract under registered document—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Arts. 89, 116, 132.** Where the suit is not merely one for account, but one to enforce in the plaintiff's favour the charge created to secure the moneys, which might be found due from the agent to his principal on his accounts, the case falls within Article 132 of the Second Schedule of the Limitation Act. To ascertain which Article of the Second Schedule of the Limitation Act applies, it is important to see what is the relief which the plaintiff claims. *Asghar Ali Khan v. Khurshed Ali Khan*, I. L. R. 24 All. 27, L. R. 28 I. A. 221; *Jogendra Nath Roy v. Deb Nath Chatterjee*, 8 C. W. N. 113; *Madhub Chunder Chuckerburti v. Debenra Nath Dey*, 1 C. L. J. 147, *Shib Chandra Roy v. Chandra Narain Mukerjee*, I. L. R. 32 Calc. 719, *Mati Lal Bose v. Amin Chand Chattopadhyay*, 1 C. L. J. 211, distinguished. *HAFEZUDDIN MANDAL v. JADU NATH SAHA* (1908). I. L. R. 35 Calc. 298 s.c. 12 C. W. N. 820

3. ———— **Pleader and Client—Agency—Relation between co-mortgagors one of whom a pleader, if fiduciary—Accountability—Settled accounts—Suit to falsify—Specific averment of errors necessary—Changing suit for accounts into suit to falsify settled accounts—Procedure in account suits—Account.** A person does not become the agent of another merely because he gives him advice in matters of business. The essence of the matter is that the principal authorises the agent to represent or act for the principal in bringing him or aid in bringing him in contractual relation with a third person, that is to say, there must be a recognition of the derivative authority of the agent. A solicitor who has been employed as such in a transaction for investment of money may be liable for negligence in lending money on insufficient security. But the liability varies with the extent of the part he is employed to take in the transaction. *Dooby v. Watson*, 39 Ch. D. 179, referred to. Plaintiff jointly with one R, a pleader, advanced money on what turned out to be insufficient security. It was, however, found that the plaintiff knew and approved of the security at the date of investment. Held, that the plaintiff could not call upon R to recoup him any loss he sustained by reason of the insufficiency of the security, even though he might have obtained the advice of R as pleader on enter-

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—*concl.*S. SUIT FOR ACCOUNT—*concl.*

ing into the transaction. *MOHESH CHANDRA BOSU v. RADHA KISHORE BHATTACHARJEE* (1908) 12 C. W. N. 28

## PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.

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——— liability of—

See SURETY BOND I. L. R. 36 Calc. 562

## 1. LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL.

1. ———— **Joint and several liability—Decrees against both parties.** Where two parties are jointly and severally liable under the terms of a bond, the principal may be sued for the amount due with interest, notwithstanding that a decree has been obtained for the same sum against the other party. *MAHOMED ROHEEMOODDEEN v. INDOOR CHUNDER JOWHUREE* . . . . . 12 W. R. 192

2. ———— **Remedy between principal and surety—Deficit in Collectorate treasury—Attachment of property by Collector.** When on the discovery of a deficit in the deposit accounts of certain zamindars a Collector attaches the property of the sureties for the Collectorate treasurer, the remedy open to the sureties is against the treasurer only. *SADUT ALI KHAN v. MANIKARNIKA CHOWDHRAIN. NUND MOHUN CHOWDHRY v. MANIKARNIKA CHOWDHRAIN* . . . . . W. R. 1864, 119

3. ———— **Right of surety who has paid the debt to recover from principal.** Applying the law of England and Scotland and the general law of Europe to this country, it was held that, when a surety has paid off the debt of his principal, not only are all the collateral securities transferred to the surety, but by what is called subrogation, the right is also transferred to him to stand in the place of the original creditor, and to use against the principal debtor every remedy which the principal creditor himself could have used. Accordingly, the surety is not debarred from proceeding against the original debtor upon the instrument itself which created the debt, by reason of the debt having been paid by himself. *HEERA LALL SAMANT v. OOOZEER ALI* . . . . . 21 W. R. 347



**PRINCIPAL AND SURETY—contd.****2. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF SURETY.**

1. ———— **Extent of liability—Voluntary payments by principal.** The liability of a surety will not extend beyond the precise limits of his undertaking; he is not liable for any sum voluntarily paid by his principal to a third party for any purpose of his own. *KHETTAR NATH SEAL v. SHIB NATH CHATTERJEE* . . . **W. R. 1884, 284**

2. ———— **Specific contract—Liability of surety—Costs of suing principal.** *Held*, that a surety's liability must be measured by the contract; and where the contract is specific, and not in general and in definite terms, the surety cannot be held liable for costs and interest incurred in suing the principal debtor. *DABEE CHURN v. JANKEE PERSHAD* . . . **3 Agra 141**

3. ———— **Liability on bond—Running account—Appropriation of payments—Joint bond—Notice to surety of default.** A principal and two sureties executed in favour of a bank a joint bond to secure the payment of sum placed to the cash credit loan account of the principal, together with interest, and the premia on a policy of life assurance within one year from the date of the bond. At the end of the year a considerable sum remained unpaid, but the principal continued dealing with the bank, and the account was continued for three years after the date of the bond as a running account, during which time divers sums were paid in by the principal, more than sufficient to discharge the amount due at the end of the first year from the date of the bond, and divers sums were in like manner drawn out. In a suit brought by the bank against the sureties to recover the amount due at the end of the first year, it was *held* that, inasmuch as the whole account from the date of the bond to the end of the principal's dealing with the bank had been treated as a running account, all payment made by the principal to the bank were to be appropriated to the earliest items in the account; and inasmuch as all the moneys due on the bond at the end of the first year were thereby satisfied, no amount remained due on the bond. *Semble*: That for the purpose of giving persons who appear on the face of an instrument to have executed it as principals the equitable rights of sureties, they may show by evidence dehors the instrument that they executed only as sureties. *Semble*: That a surety is not entitled to notice of default made by the principal. *Semble*: That there being no express stipulation to the contrary, the fact that the principal was allowed a greater credit than that secured would not have discharged the sureties. *KOONDAN LALL v. JAHANS* . . . **1 Agra 17**

4. ———— **Sale of mortgaged property in execution of money-decree obtained by first mortgagee—Effect on second mortgagee's rights—Purchase by one of several joint mortgagees of mortgaged property—Limitation—Suit for sale of mortgaged property.** In January 1866 *B* obtained a simple money-decree only in a suit for enforcement of lien created by a bond executed by the wife

**PRINCIPAL AND SURETY—contd.****2. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF SURETY—contd.**

of *Z*, and, at a sale in execution of such decree, a 10-biswas share hypothecated in the bond was sold and purchased by *Z* in November 1872. On the 3rd May 1872, two bonds were executed in favour of *B* and *H* jointly, the first by *Z* and *I* jointly hypothecating  $6\frac{1}{2}$  out of the above-mentioned 10 biswas and the second by *S*, in which the obligor promised to pay the obligees the amount of the bond given by *Z* and *I* in the event of such amount not being paid by them, and mortgaged certain property as security for such payment by him. In December 1872 *Z* gave another bond to *B* hypothecating the same 10 biswas, and in execution of a decree obtained by *B* upon this bond the 10 biswas were sold and purchased by *B* himself in 1877, and in 1883 were sold by him to *D*. Subsequently, *B* and *H* brought a suit against *Z* and *I*, the joint obligors, under the bond of the 3rd May 1872, the heirs of their surety *S*, a purchaser from those heirs of the property mortgaged in the security-bond, and *D*, in which they claimed to recover the money due on the bond by sale of the property mortgaged therein, and also by the sale of the property mortgaged in *S*'s security bond. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the bond executed by *S* was only a guarantee for the personal obligation created by the joint bond of *Z* and *I*, and a cause of action could only accrue as against him in respect of the personal default of the joint obligors to pay the bond-money, and such default occurred beyond the period of limitation within which a suit to enforce the personal obligation to pay the money could have been maintained, it followed that, had there been a claim in the plaint to obtain a decree personally against the joint obligors, the plea of limitation by which such a claim could have been defeated would have been equally efficacious as regards the heirs of *S*; but no such claim had been made, and the obligation of surety under his bond of the 3rd May 1872 being confined to the personal default of *S*, his heirs had been wrongly imported into the present litigation, which alone sought to enforce the hypothecation of the joint bond against the hypothecated property. *BHUP SINGH v. ZAIN-UL-ABDIN* . . . **I. L. R. 9 All. 205**

5. ———— **Contract Act, s. 187, illus. (c)—Surety-bond—Want of consideration.** Where *N* advanced money to *K* on a bond hypothecating *K*'s property and mentioning *M* as surety for any balance that might remain due after realization of *K*'s property, *M* being no party to *K*'s bond, but having signed a separate surety-bond two days subsequent to the advance of the money:—*Held*, that the subsequent surety-bond was void for want of consideration under s. 127 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872). *Per STUART, C.J.*—The legal position of the surety considered and determined. *NANAK RAM v. MEHIN LAL* . . . **I. L. R. 1 All. 487**

6. ———— **Bond for faithful discharge of duty of overseer—Carelessness of principal.** By a bond given for the faithful discharge of the



**PRINCIPAL AND SURETY—contd.****2. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF SURETY—  
—contd.**

office of overseer to a ferry fund committee, the surety became bound "to make good any funds entrusted to the overseer which may be misused." *Held*, that, under these words, the surety was liable for a loss of funds arising from the mere carelessness or indiscretion of the principal, independently of any dishonesty, as by his lending the money to contractors. **SECRETARY OF THE FERRY FUND COMMITTEE v. WARD . Marsh. 89 : 1 Hay 155**

**7. ——— Bond for performance of duties of office—Clerk of Small Cause Court—Subordinate Judge, powers of.** The defendant and J W C, clerk of the Small Cause Court at Allahabad, entered into a bond to the Judge of the Small Cause Court, as well as to his successors in office, in a certain sum as security for the true and faithful performance by J W C, of his duties as clerk of the said Court, and for his well and truly accounting for all moneys entrusted to his keeping as such clerk of the Court. *Held*, in a suit against the defendant as surety, that he was liable for misappropriation by J W C of moneys arising from sales of moveable property held in execution of decrees passed by the Judge of the Small Cause Court in the exercise of his powers as Subordinate Judge, and that, had the Small Cause Court Judge not been invested at the time of the execution of the bond with the powers of a Subordinate Judge, the defendant's liability in respect of such moneys would not have been thereby affected. **CROSTHWAITE v. HAMILTON**

**I. L. R. 1 All. 87**

**8. ——— Creditor and surety—Right of surety to benefit of securities held by creditor—Surety for a part of debt due by principal debtor to creditor—Payment by surety of that part—Right of surety to benefit of securities does not arise until whole of debt paid off—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 141.** In August 1889, one K was indebted to the Bank of Bengal (the defendants) in the sum of R3,15,000. The Bank pressed for security or payment, and on the 5th September 1889 K executed in favour of the Bank, two mortgages of certain immoveable properties, the value of which was estimated to be R1,35,000. The mortgages, though stamped to secure this amount only, were drawn to cover the whole liability of K to the Bank, and recited that he had become largely indebted to the Bank on certain bills, etc., and had agreed to give security in respect of such indebtedness as was thereafter expressed, and they contained covenants by K to pay to the Bank all sums of money then due, or thereafter to become due, by him in respect of such bills, etc. Besides the said two mortgages, the Bank obtained other securities for a further sum of R55,000, making the total sum secured R1,90,000, and leaving a balance of R1,25,000 unsecured. Under these circumstances, the Bank refused to renew certain bills of K's which fell due on the 9th September 1889, unless further security were given, and accordingly the plaintiff became surety for K for the sum of R1,25,000. This sum

**PRINCIPAL AND SURETY—contd.****2. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF SURETY  
—contd.**

he was subsequently obliged to pay, and he then brought this suit claiming to share in the proceeds of the mortgages held as security by the Bank. He contended that these mortgages were given as security for the whole debt (*viz.*, R3,15,000); that of this debt he as surety had paid a part, *viz.*, R1,25,000 to the Bank; and that he was therefore to that extent entitled to stand in the place of the Bank and to receive a share of the proceeds of the said securities proportioned to the sum which he had paid. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of the securities held by the Bank until the whole of the debt due to the Bank by K was paid. A surety, who has paid the debt which he has guaranteed, has a right to the securities held by the creditor, because as between the principal debtor and surety the principal is under an obligation to indemnify the surety. The equity between the creditor and the surety is that the creditor shall not do anything to deprive the surety of that right. But the creditor's right to hold his securities until his whole debt is paid is paramount to the surety's claim upon such securities, which only arises when the creditor's claim against such securities has been satisfied. **GOVERDHANDAS GOKULDAS TEJPAL v. BANK OF BENGAL . . . I. L. R. 15 Bom. 48**

**9. ——— Stipulation with bank to be considered as sureties only as respected the principal debtor, not principal debtors as between themselves and bank.** The appellants, in becoming sureties to the respondent Bank, covenanted that, though as respects the principal debtor they should be considered as sureties only, yet as regards the Bank they should "be considered as principal debtors," so as not to be exonerated from liability by any dealings between the Bank and the principal debtor, which would otherwise have that effect. *Held*, that the appellants became liable as principals to the Bank immediately on the default of the principal debtor, and were not discharged by reason of time having been given to him. The effect of the deed being plain, neither appellant could escape liability except by proof of misrepresentation or undue influence. **HODGES v. DELHI AND LONDON BANK . L. R. 27 I. A. 168**

**10. ——— Laches of creditor—What amounts to laches—Discharge of surety.** Plaintiff advanced money to K to enable him to complete a Government contract and repayment was secured by an assignment of the expected profits. The official to whom the arrangement was notified declined to recognize it, and this was known to all parties. K made default in payment and the plaintiff, who had taken no further steps in applying to the Government for payment of profits according to the arrangement between himself and K, found that K had been drawing the profits. In a suit against the surety, who claimed to be exempt from liability at least to the extent of the profits which the plaintiff might by due diligence have received:—*Held*, that the plaintiff had not neglected any imperative



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duty incumbent on him as a creditor, and that his conduct did not amount to laches so as to discharge the surety from any portion of his liability.

DWARKANATH MITTER *v.* DENONATH BONNERJEE  
Bourke O. C. 1

11. ———— **Mutual debts—Set-off—Discharge of surety.** *R* borrowed money of the *D. B.* Corporation payable by monthly instalments, and *G* became security for him. *R* failed to pay the *D. B.* Corporation, having then a considerable balance to his credit in their hands. A year after they sued *G* as surety for the sum borrowed. *Held*, in giving a decree for the plaintiffs, that a banker need not set off against a debt a cash balance of the debtors in his hands, but may proceed against the surety.

DELHI BANK CORPORATION *v.* GREENWAY  
Bourke O. C. 227

12. ———— **Agreement to mortgage, assignment of—Bond of indemnity—Guarantee—Interest.** Liability of parties discussed and form of decree given in a case where by an agreement in writing, one of the defendants, in consideration of money lent to him by *B*, the other defendant, agreed to execute a mortgage to *B* containing the usual covenants (in default the agreement to stand as a mortgage), and *B* assigned the agreement to the plaintiff, guaranteeing by bond of even date the payment of the principal and interest specified in the agreement. MANICKYA MOYEE *v.* BARODA PROSAD MOOKERJEE

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 355 : 11 C. L. R. 430

13. ———— **Suit against surety—Acquittal of principal by Criminal Court.** The acquittal of the principal in a Criminal Court is no bar to a civil action against the sureties. In a suit by the mutwalli of the Hooghly Imambara against the treasurer of that endowment and sureties, under a security bond executed on an optional stamp of RS for a sum of R17,280-5-6 alleged to have been misappropriated by the treasurer, who had been committed to, but acquitted by, the Sessions Court:—*Held*, that, although there was gross neglect on the part of the mutwalli in the supervision and examination of his cash balance, yet as there was no evidence of fraud or mutual connivance at the delinquency of the treasurer, the former was entitled to recover from the sureties the sum which the stamp used on the security bond would cover, *viz.*, R1,000 with costs in proportion and interest. KERAMUT ALI *v.* ABDOL WAHAB . . . 17 W. R. 131

14. ———— **Suit for breach of contract—Performance by surety.** Where the surety had begun to perform the duty which the principal had contended to perform:—*Held*, that this circumstance would not preclude the plaintiffs from suing the defendant as surety for breach of the contract. PIERCE *v.* OPENDRA SHETTI GANAPATHY  
7 Mad. 364

15. ———— **Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 133, 139—Surety still liable though**

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contd.**

*remedy against principal barred.* Where a plaintiff sued a principal and surety for arrears of rent, and it appeared that the principal was dead at the time the suit was instituted, and where the representative of the principal was not made a party till after the right to recover the arrears as against him was barred by limitation:—*Held*, that the surety was still liable, the suit as against him having been instituted within the period allowed. HAJARIMAL *v.* KRISHNARAV, I. L. R. 5 Bom. 647, cited and approved. KRISHTO KISHORI CHOWDHRAIN *v.* RADHA ROMUN MUNSHI . . . I. L. R. 12 Calc. 330

16. ———— **Obligation to sue principal.** *Held*, that a creditor is not bound to exhaust his remedies against the principal debtor before suing the surety, and that, when a decree is obtained against a surety, it may be enforced in the same manner as a decree for any other debt. LACHMAN JOHARIMAL *v.* BAPU KHANDU. NANDRAM SARDARNAL *v.* BHABANI HAIRATI  
6 Bom. A. C. 241

17. ———— **Contract Act, ss. 134, 137.** A surety's liability to pay the debt is not removed by reason of the creditor's omission to sue the principal. SANKANA KALANA *v.* VIRUPAKSHAPA GANESHAPA . . . I. L. R. 7 Bom. 146

18. ———— **Suit on hundi—Accommodation acceptance—Contract Act, s. 128—Co-extensive liability of surety.** In a suit against the acceptor of a hundi, the dependant contended that as he had accepted the hundi for the accommodation only of a third person, he was liable only as surety, and the plaintiff therefore could not proceed against him until he had exhausted all his remedies against the principal. *Held*, that the liability of a surety being under the Contract Act co-extensive, unless there is some contrary agreement, with that of his principal, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to have first exhausted his remedies against the principal. Totakot Shangunni Menon *v.* Kurusingal Kaku Varid, 4 Mad. 190, and Lachman Joharimal, *v.* Bapu Khandu, 6 Bom. A. C. 241, cited. PANIOTY *v.* DWARKA MOHUN DASS  
4 C. L. R. 145

19. ———— **Execution of decree against surety—Right to execute decree against property forming security for payment of debt where principals have been released.** Where a judgment-creditor or decree-holder releases his deceased judgment-debtor's representatives, into whose hands that debtor's assets have come, and exempts the property in question from execution, he cannot go against property which only became liable by way of security for the due payment of the debt by the principal debtor. VILLAYET ALI KHAN *v.* AMEEN-ODDEEN AHMED . . . 23 W. R. 19

20. ———— **Contract of guarantee—Surety bond—Consideration—Forbearance of claim—Continuing guarantee—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 129.** The forbearance of a claim against



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a third person is a sufficient consideration for a surety bond, although there may be no express contract by the obligee to forbear. *Callisher v. Bischoffsheim*, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449, and *Crears v. Hunter*, L. R. 19 Q. B. 341, followed. *Lloyds v. Harper*, L. R. 16 Ch. D. 290; *Balfour v. Grace*, [1902] 1 Ch. 733; *Burgess v. Eve*, L. R. 13 Eq. 450; and *Raj Narain Mookerjee v. Ful Kumari Debi*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 68, referred to. *JAGADINDRA NATH ROY v. CHANDRA NATH PODDAR* (1903)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 242

**21. ———— Limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 20—Payment of interest by principal—Liability of surety.** The payment of interest by the debtor within limitation does not give a fresh starting point for limitation against the surety under s. 20 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877), even in the absence of a prohibition by the surety against the payment of interest by the debtor on his account. *GOPAL DAJI v. GOPAL BIN SONU* (1904) . . . . . I. L. R. 28 Bom. 248

**22. ———— Joint decree—Liability of surety—Liable for full amount decreed in the absence of any equity.** Where principal and surety are jointly sued and a decree is passed against both for a certain amount and against the principal for the full amount, including the amount jointly decreed, the contract of suretyship is merged in the decree and the surety, when the whole amount has not been recovered from the principal, remains liable for the balance to the extent of the amount decreed against him unless he can show some equity in his favour which entitles him to say that he is not liable for the full amount decreed against him. No such equity arises, because the amount recoverable by attachment and sale from the principal was reduced by rateable distribution among other creditors of the principal by an order under s. 295 of the Code of Civil Procedure; nor can the surety claim that a proportionate share of the amount realised from the principal must go to reduce his own liability. *APASAMI AYYANGAR v. RAMANATHAM CHETTIAR* (1906) . . . . . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 167

**23. ———— Variance in terms of contract—Breach of Contract—Surety, liability of—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 133.** A entered into a surety bond on behalf of B for the performance of the duties of B as a *tehsildar* under the terms of a contract, the security being limited to a fixed amount. One of the terms was that B should render account of his *tehsil* every year. B did not render account for the year 1308, and was allowed to realize rents for 1309 in breach of the terms of the contract. In a suit for account against B and his surety:—*Held*, that there was no variation in the contract between the parties, as contemplated by s. 133 of the Contract Act, and that the surety was liable. *KANAI PROSAD BOSE v. JOTINDRA KUMAR ROY, CHOWDHRY* (1909)

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 626

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**1. ———— Death of principal—Execution of decree.** A decree was obtained against a surety only, the principal debtor being dead, and his property having been attached as of an intestate, and proclamation made. *Held*, that the property could not be taken in execution of the decree against the surety. *KALI CHARAN v. SRIRAM*

2 B. L. R. A. C. 192: 11 W. R. 60

**2. ———— Beng. Reg. II of 1806, s. 4.** The liability of a surety of his heir under s. 4, Regulation II of 1806, ceased after the death of the principal. *DHURM CHAND SREEMUL v. HURRISH CHUNDER DOOBEY* . . . . . 2 Hay 115

**3. ———— Indulgence granted to principal—Absence of injury to surety. Semble:** An indulgence granted to a principal debtor does not absolve a surety who is not injured thereby. *DELHI BANK CORPORATION v. GREENWAY*

Bourke O.C. 227

**4. ———— Relinquishment of portion of claim by creditor—Act prejudicial to surety.** Where a creditor sued his principal debtor and two sureties upon a mortgage-bond, and in his plaint formally relinquished his claim against part of the mortgaged property, it was *held* that after such relinquishment the sureties were no longer bound, their position being altered for the worse by reason of such relinquishment. *NARAYAN GOVIND OK v. GANESH ATMARAM FADKE* . . . . . 7 Bom. A. C. 118

**5. ———— Right of surety to disclosure of material facts—Absence of fraud.** There is no rule of law entitling a surety, without question asked, to a disclosure of all material facts known to the creditor which it may be material for him to know. Without proof of fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment on the part of the creditor or his agent, a surety is not entitled to be discharged from his suretyship. *DELHI AND LONDON BANK v. HUNTER* . . . . . 3 N. W. 264

**6. ———— Concealment of material fact from surety—Guarantee—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 133, 143—Further duties imposed on person for whom defendants were sureties.** In August 1881 the defendants became sureties to the Bank of Bengal for the due discharge by one B of the duties and liabilities of the office of *khajanchi* of the Bank in Bombay. B was the second clerk in the Bank, and it was arranged between him and the agent that he should still continue to fill that office. He did so after his appointment as *khajanchi*, and he received the same salary as before in respect of it. In 1889 defalcations, for which as *khajanchi* he was responsible, were discovered to the extent of Rs. 42,142. The Bank obtained a decree against him for the total amount and they sued the defendants as sureties. The defendants pleaded that they were not liable, inasmuch as the Bank had appointed B to perform the duties of second clerk, in addition to those of *khajanchi* without their knowledge and consent and they contended that such appointment amounted to a subsequent variation of the contract, which discharged them under s. 133



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of the Contract Act as to transactions subsequent to the variance. The Court was of opinion that, inasmuch as the evidence showed that *B* was second clerk at the time of his appointment as khajanchi and continued afterwards to fill that office by arrangement between him and the agent of the Bank the question was not whether there had been a subsequent variation of the contract, but whether, as the surety-bond was silent as to this part of the arrangement between the Bank and *B*, and it was made (as the defendants alleged) without their knowledge and consent they were discharged from liability on the ground that a material circumstance had been concealed from them. *Held*, that the defendants were not discharged from liability. The expression "keeping silence" in s. 143 of the Contract Act clearly implies intentional concealment as distinguished from mere non-disclosure. The withholding must be fraudulent, as necessarily is the case where a material circumstance is intentionally concealed. In this case there was not the slightest reason to suppose that there had been any intentional concealment by the Bank of the fact that *B* was to continue to fill the office of second clerk, or that, if the defendants had been informed of it, it would have in the least degree affected their readiness to make themselves liable for his faithful discharge of the duties of khajanchi. The evidence showed that the duties of the two offices were perfectly distinct, and therefore, even if *B* had been re-appointed to the office of second clerk after his appointment to the office of khajanchi (as it was contended for the defendants was the proper way of regarding what occurred), there would have been no material alteration in the duties of khajanchi which would have relieved the defendants from their obligation as sureties, but merely the addition of a new office which would not affect the sureties' liability, unless, indeed, the surety-bond contained an agreement that the principal should not undertake any other business. It was also contended for the defendants that they were discharged liability, inasmuch as in the year 1883 the names on certain bills discounted with the Bank were found to be forged. The Bank then made a claim upon *B* in respect thereof, and he repudiated his liability. The defendants contended, on the authority of *Phillips v. Foxall*, L. R. 7 Q. B. 666, that it was the duty of the Bank to have informed them of this occurrence at that time. *Held* (distinguishing *Phillips v. Foxall*), that it could not have been assumed that *B* was infallible in detecting forgeries, and the guarantee given by the defendants was not therefore founded on that assumption and therefore fair dealing could not require that the Bank should at once have informed the sureties as soon as *B* had proved to be fallible. *BALKRISHNA KIRTIKAR v. BANK OF BENGAL*. I. L. R. 15 Bom. 585

7. ——— Subsequent arrangement—Obtaining fresh acknowledgement from debtor. Money was lent on the security of a third party who died before the loan was repaid. The lender then

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took a fresh acknowledgment from the borrower for the sum due. *Held*, that the subsequent arrangement, which did not contemplate the continuance of the third party's security, cancelled his liability. *SEETARAM SAHOO v. DAcOSTA*. 12 W. R. 294

8. ——— Variance in terms of contract—Contract Act, s. 133. A kabuliati whereby a lessee agrees, without the consent of the person guaranteeing the payment of the rent agreed to be paid under a former kabuliati, that he will pay rent at a higher rate than that agreed to be paid in such former kabuliati, amounts to a variance of the terms of the contract of guarantee, and discharges the lessee's surety in respect of arrears of rent accruing subsequent to such variance. *KHATUN BIBI v. ABDULLAH*. I. L. R. 3 All. 9

9. ——— Neglect to register bond—Suit for money lent against principal. In a suit against a principal and two sureties to recover the amount advanced on a bond by which certain immoveable property was mortgaged, one of the sureties appeared and contended that he was discharged from his liability in consequence of the plaintiff's neglect to have the bond registered. *Held*, that the surety was discharged, as he could only be liable by virtue of the mortgage-bond, which, being invalid for want of registration, could not be used against him. The principal, however, might be sued as for money lent, if the loan could be proved by the other evidence. *SHANKAR BAPU v. VISHNU NARAYAN*. 4 Bom. A.C. 79

10. ——— Bills of exchange—Deposit of goods as collateral security for repayment—Sale by creditor of goods deposited as security. *A* drew five bills in favour of *B* on *F & Co.*, who accepted them and got them discounted by the Bank of Bengal, and on their becoming due procured their renewal. *F & Co.* subsequently drew three bills on the Bank and for securing as well the repayment of the principal sum due on these bills and interest, as of all sums which the Bank had already advanced or should advance on account of the drawers, deposited as collateral security various quantities of Chili copper of a larger amount in value than the advances then made. By a condition in these bills, the Bank was authorized, in default of payment within the time stipulated, to dispose of the copper by public or private sale, and to reimburse themselves the principal and interest due thereon. Shortly afterwards *F & Co.* failed, and assignees of their estate and effects were appointed under the Insolvent Act. On presentation to *A* of the first of the renewed bills, he served notice on the Bank not to part with the securities deposited with them alleging that the bills drawn and renewed by him were accommodation bills, for which he had not received any consideration, and were renewed on the faith of the securities being applicable to their discharge. The assignees of *F & Co.* redeemed the copper by paying to the Bank the amount of the principal and interest due on the bills drawn by *F & Co.*, all the bills drawn by



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A were dishonoured, and the Bank of Bengal brought an action against A for their amount. On a bill filed by A, the Bank was restrained by injunction from proceeding with the action at law. *Held*, on appeal by the Judicial Committee, discharging the injunction and reversing the decree of the Supreme Court, that, under the circumstances the redemption of the securities was a sale within the meaning of the condition contained in the deposit bills, and that such sale was not a release to A as surety for the previous bills, the condition not being that the copper or the proceeds thereof should be applied preferentially or *pari passu* with the other debts, but simply in reimbursement to the Bank of the principal and interest due on the bills. *BANK OF BENGAL v. RADHAKISSEN MITTER*

3 Moo. I. A. 19

11. — Agreement for payment of decree, or in default to execute it—*Failure to execute it on default*—Act IX of 1872, ss. 134, 137, 139 and 141. A decree-holder, in execution proceedings, agreed to accept payment of the decretal amount by the judgment-debtors in annual instalments. He also accepted from certain other persons a surety-bond in the following terms: "In case of default of paying the instalments, the whole decretal money, with costs and interest at 8 annas per cent., shall be executed after one month; and for the satisfaction of the decree-holder we, the executants, stand as sureties of the judgment-debtors. The judgment debtors paid five instalments and then made default. The decree-holder omitted to apply for execution, and the decree became time barred. He then sued the sureties to recover the amount of the decree. *Held*, that the terms of the bond requiring the creditor to execute his decree within one month were peremptory, and imported much more than the usual agreement under such circumstances; that the decree-holder might execute his decree, if he pleased, on a default; that the legal consequence of his omission to execute the decree being the discharge of the principal debtors, the sureties would, under s. 134 of the Contract Act, stand discharged likewise; that his action was much more serious than "mere forbearance" in favour of this debtors, in the sense of s. 137; that he had done an act inconsistent with the equities of the sureties, and omitted to do an act which his duty to them (under the agreement) required, whereby their eventual remedy against the principal debtors was impaired (s. 139); that he had deprived the sureties of the benefit of the security constituted by the decree; that they were therefore discharged to the extent of the value of that security (s. 141); and that the suit must consequently be dismissed. *HAZARI v. CHUNNI LAL* . I. L. R. 8 All. 259

12. — Giving time to principal—*Execution of subsequent agreement unknown to surety*. A and his surety B executed a bond to C for the faithful discharge of A's duties as a gomashtha. In September 1866, upon accounts being rendered, A was found indebted to C in a certain sum of money.

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A thereupon executed an *ikrar* to C, which was accepted by C agreeing thereby to pay the amount due in February following. On default being made, C sued A and B for the amount due. *Held*, that the acceptance of the *ikrar*, without the knowledge or consent of B giving time for payment, was a discharge to the surety. *PURI SUNDARI DEBI v. DROBOMAYI DEBI* . 7 B. L. R. Ap. 10

S.C. PUREE SOONDUREE DABEE v. CHUNDER SHEKHUR GHOSAL . 15 W. R. 252

13. — *Liability of surety—Acceptance of promissory notes*. A entered into a bond to C as surety for B's good conduct, etc., as C's servant. C subsequently, on A's request, retained B in his service. B became a defaulter and with A's concurrence gave C promissory notes to satisfy the defalcations. *Held*, that C could sue A on the bond, although he had sued and recovered against B on one of the promissory notes and had received payment on another. *WISEMAN v. GOPAUL DOSS SEN*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 277

14. — *Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), ss. 37, 39, 66—Contract Act, s. 135—Accommodation maker, discharge of—Presentment of promissory note*. Suit by the endorsee against the maker of a promissory note, dated 9th August, 1886. The plaintiff was aware that the note was made by the defendant for the accommodation of the acceptor, Watson & Co., with whom the plaintiff had large dealings. On the 4th August, 1887, Watson & Co. executed in favour of the plaintiff and another creditor a mortgage of certain property to secure the amount then due by Watson & Co., including the amount due to the plaintiff on the promissory note: the mortgage contained a personal covenant by Watson & Co. to pay the sums due, together with interest on the 4th August, 1888; and the mortgagees practically took over the whole business of the mortgagor, and it was intended that they should work it for his benefit up to that date. The promissory note fell due in June 1887, but was not presented to the defendant for payment. *Held*, that the plaintiff, by accepting the mortgage, promised to give time to Watson & Co., and thus rendered it impossible for him to sue Watson & Co. had the defendant as surety called on him to do so, and that the defendant was accordingly discharged. *Pogose v. Bank of Bengal, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 174*, distinguished. *Semle*: The maker of a promissory note is not discharged by the holder's failure to present it at due date. *RAMAKISTNAYYA v. KASSIM*

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 172

15. — *Surdies of naib—Acceptance of bonds from naib*. The sureties of naib are absolved from liability if the principal takes bonds from the naib in acknowledgment of the debts, giving him different periods of time for payment, without the knowledge and consent of the sureties. *POGOSE v. ANUND CHUNDER GOHOO*

1 W. R. 81

14 M 2



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16. ————— *Proof of fact of person being surety.* In a suit against *D* and *K* on a promissory note, where *K* raised the defence that he was only a surety for *D*, and that the plaintiff having given time, *D* was released from liability:—*Held*, that it was necessary to show that the fact that *K* signed the note only as surety for *D* was known to the plaintiff at the time when the note was made. *Held*, also, that a binding contract to give time to the principal cannot be inferred from the mere receipt by the creditor of interest in advance on the note. *PUNCHANUN GHOSE v. DALY*

15 B. L. R. 331

17. ————— *Acceptance of interest in excess or advance—Discharge of surety.* In an action against a surety for principal and interest payable on a promissory note:—*Held*, overruling the decision of the Court below (*MACPHERSON, J.*), that the creditor, by the mere acceptance, without the knowledge or consent of the surety, of interest in excess of what was due on the note, bound himself to give time to the principal debtor, and thereby discharged the surety. *KALI PRASANNA ROY v. AMBICA CHARAN BOSE*

9 B. L. R. 261 : 18 W. R. 416

18. ————— *Acceptance of interest in advance.* The mere taking by the holder of a promissory note of interest in advance from the principal debtor does not operate as an agreement not to sue during the time covered by the interest, and therefore does not constitute such a giving of time to the principal as would release the surety. *DWARKANATH MITTER v. DALY*. *DWARKANATH MITTER v. BIRCH* . . . 15 B. L. R. 338 note

19. ————— *Interest paid in advance—Discharge of surety—Accommodation acceptor—Contract Act (IV of 1872), s. 136.* The drawer of hundis paid advance interest to the holder to obtain time, which he did obtain, for payment after due date. *Held*, by the Privy Council that the liability of an accommodation acceptor of the hundis depended on whether he knew of and consented to this arrangement. *Held*, also, on the merits, that he knew of, and consented to, advance interest being taken. *GOURCHANDRA RAI v. PROTAPCHANDRA DASS* I. L. R. 6 Calc. 241 : 6 C. L. R. 591

Affirming on appeal. *PROTAP CHUNDER DAS v. GOUR CHUNDER ROY*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 132 : 2 C. L. R. 455

20. ————— *Suit on hundi—Accommodation—Acceptance.* The defendant, in the course of dealing with *S A* of Patna, used to draw hundis at Patna on himself at Calcutta, and sell them to *S A* at Patna; *S A* sometimes only paying part of the consideration for the hundi. On 13th September 1867 the defendant drew a hundi for R2,500, payable forty-one days after date in the usual way, and it was stipulated between him and *S A* that the value should be paid by *S A* in three days. On 15th September, the plaintiff in Calcutta discounted the hundi in the ordinary course of busi-

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ness, paying for it R2,468, or thereabouts. It then purported to be accepted by the defendant in favour of *S A*. Before the hundi fell due, *S A* failed, and the plaintiff took the hundi to the defendant in Calcutta, and, informing him of *S A*'s failure, asked him to pay the hundi. The defendant admitted he had drawn the hundi, denied he had accepted it, and refused to pay, saying (he alleged) that he had received no consideration for it. Before the failure to *S A*, who had not paid the consideration as stipulated, the defendant pressed him for payment of the consideration for the hundi, and *S A* wrote and delivered to the defendant the following letter, dated September, 16th, 1867, from himself to his firm in Calcutta: "Further, I sent you a chitti (hundi) for R2,500, drawn by Bhugwan Das (the defendant) upon Bhugwan Das upon (us) Calcutta; value deposited by me on September 13th, 1867, payable forty-one days after date in Company's rupees. I have taken a hundi of this description, which you will pay on its due date. The money has not been paid, for which I give this puja in writing, which you will know." After *S A*'s failure, and after the defendant's refusal to pay on the due date, the plaintiff made the arrangement with *S A*, which is embodied in the following letter from *S A*, to the plaintiff, dated November 3rd, 1867: "Further, I discounted with you at Calcutta hundis for R5,000, which, one Pitam Das coming to Calcutta, were paid off in the following manner: a hundi for R2,500 drawn by Bhugwan Das, on Bhugwan Das, value deposited by me on the 15th day of the light side of the moon in Bhadra, payable forty-one days after date in Company's rupees; and a hundi for R2,500 by Gopi Shaw, Debi Shaw, Radha Shaw, Ram Sahayi Ray, value deposited by me on 14th day of the light side of the moon in Bhadra payable forty-one days after date in Company's rupees. I discounted hundis of this description, and out of them I paid R2,200 in cash through Syad Mahomed Hossain Khan Sahib. The balance, R2,800, is due the condition for payment of which is as follows (here follows the manner in which payment was to be made): I made an agreement of this sort, and I will pay the whole of the amount, inclusive of interest at 8 annas, and will take the two hundis from Bhai Ram Kissen Futteh Chund, with whom they are kept: Should I not pay the money according to the condition, then you have the authority." For the defendant it was contended that the effect of the letter of 16th September was to make the defendant a surety only for *S A*; that the plaintiff had notice of this at the time of entering into the agreement giving time to *S A*, which therefore operated as a release to the defendant. In a suit by the plaintiff to recover the amount of the hundi from the defendant, the Court found that it was not proved that the hundi had been accepted by the defendant, but held that, whether the effect of the agreement contained in the letter of September 16th was to make the defendant a surety only or not, the defendant was liable. *Per NORMAN, J.*—Notice of the defendant's position in regard to the hundi was not com-



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municated to the plaintiff. *Per* MACHPERSON, J.—The agreement contained in the letter of 16th September did not alter the position of the parties so as to make S A the principal debtor and the defendant his surety. *HARJIBAN DAS v. BHUGWAN DAS* 7 B. L. R. 535 : 16 W. R. O. C. 16

**21. —** Omission by creditor to sue principal debtor within period of limitation—*Contract Act*, ss. 131, 137—*Discharge of surety*. The omission of a creditor to sue his principal debtor within the period of limitation discharges the surety under s. 134 of the *Contract Act* (IX of 1872); even though the non-suing within such period arose from the creditor's forbearance, s. 137 of the *Contract Act* does not limit the effect of s. 134. Its object is to explain and prevent misconception as to the meaning of s. 135. It applies only to a forbearance during the time that the creditor can be said to be forbearing to exercise a right which is still in existence. *Hajarimal v. Krishnarav*. I. L. R. 5 Bom. 647, and *Kristo Kishori Chowdhraïn v. Radha Romun Munshi*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 330, dissented from. *Hazari v. Chunnî Lal*, I. L. R. 8 All. 259, referred to. *RADHA v. KINLOCK*. I. L. R. 11 All. 310

**22. —** Omission of creditor to serve summons on the principal debtor—*Contract Act*, s. 134—*Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), s. 99A.—*Practice*. In a suit against the principal debtor and the surety, the omission of the creditor to effect service of summons on the principal debtor does not discharge the surety from his liability under s. 134 of the *Contract Act* (IX of 1872). *ALLI v. MAHOMED* I. L. R. 14 Bom. 267

**23. —** Suit for rent—*Release of parties who were sureties for payment of rent*. Where in a suit for rent some persons were made parties as purchasers of certain property which had been hypothecated by some of the lessees as security for the rent, and subsequently they were released by the plaintiff:—*Held*, that the release of these defendants had not the effect of the release of the liability of the other defendants. *Heeralall Samunt v. Oozeer Ali*, 21 W. R. 347, distinguished. *JOGEMAYA DASSI v. GIRINDRA NATH MUKERJEE* 4 C. W. N. 590

**24. —** Agreement to give time to principal debtor—*Contract Act* (IX of 1872), ss. 135, 137—*Gratuitous agreement*. A mere gratuitous agreement by a creditor to give time to the principal debtor will not discharge the surety. In order to have such effect, an agreement to give time to the principal debtor must amount to a contract, that is, there must be consideration therefor. *Philpot v. Briant*, 4 Bing. 717; *Tucker v. Laing*, 2 K. & J. 748; and *Clarke v. Birley*, L. R. 41 Ch. D. 422, referred to. *DAMODAR DAS v. MUHAMMAD HUSAIN* I. L. R. 22 All. 351

**PRINTER, LIABILITY OF.**

*See* SEDITION I. L. R. 35 Calc. 141

**PRINTING PRESS.**

\_\_\_\_\_ confiscation of—

*Sedition—Instrument for commission of offence*. A printing press cannot be said to have been used for the commission of sedition inasmuch as the offence consists in the publication and not the printing, the press being only a remote instrument. *ABINASH CHANDRA BHATTACHARJEE v. EMPEROR* (1907) I. L. R. 34 Calc. 986

**PRINTING PRESSES AND NEWS-PAPERS ACT (XXV OF 1867).**

\_\_\_\_\_ ss. 3 and 12—"Publisher," meaning of. The word "publisher" has been used in the *Printing Presses and Newspapers Act* (XXV of 1867) in the restricted sense, and does not include a person who merely sells a book or a paper. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BANKA PATNI* I. L. R. 23 Calc. 414

**PRIOR MORTGAGE.**

*See* MORTGAGE I. L. R. 31 Bom. 112

**PRIOR AND PUISNE MORTGAGEES, RIGHTS OF.**

*See* MORTGAGE 11 C. W. N. 403

**PRIORITY.**

*See* BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 167. 13 C. W. N. 412

*See* MORTGAGE.

*See* MORTGAGE I. L. R. 33 Calc. 41  
10 C. W. N. 276; 1010  
L. R. 35 I. A. 139  
12 C. W. N. 993

*See* SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—  
DISTRIBUTION OF SALE-PROCEEDS.

*See* TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 88. 13 C. W. N. 1138

*See* VENDOR AND PURCHASER—INVALID SALES I. L. R. 26 Bom. 159

\_\_\_\_\_ between landlord and mortgagee—

*See* SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT. I. L. R. 34 Calc. 724

\_\_\_\_\_ of deeds—

*See* MORTGAGE—MARSHALLING.

*See* MORTGAGE—SALE OF MORTGAGED PROPERTY—PURCHASERS.

*See* MORTGAGE—SALE OF MORTGAGED PROPERTY—RIGHTS OF MORTGAGEES.

*See* VENDOR AND PURCHASER—LIEN.

*See* VENDOR AND PURCHASER—NOTICE.

*See* VENDOR AND PURCHASER—PURCHASE OF MORTGAGED PROPERTY.



**PRIORITY—concl'd.****of Official Assignee—**

See **INSOLVENCY—CLAIMS OF ATTACHING CREDITORS AND OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE.**

See **INSOLVENCY ACT (11 & 12 VICT., c. 21).**  
**I. L. R. 28 Calc. 419**

**of registered over unregistered deed—**

See **REGISTRATION ACT (III OF 1877)—**

s. 49;

ss. 49 AND 50;

s. 50.

**PRISONER.**

See **ACCUSED PERSON.**

See **EXAMINATION OF ACCUSED PERSON.**

See **INSOLVENCY ACT (11 & 12 VICT., c. 21),**  
s. 8 . . . **I. L. R. 26 Bom. 649**

See **PARDON.**

See **WRONGFUL CONFINEMENT.**  
**I. L. R. 30 Calc. 95**

**examination of—**

See **EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—EXAMINATION AND STATEMENTS OF ACCUSED.**

See **EXAMINATION OF ACCUSED PERSON.**

**rights and privileges of—**

1. **Preparation of petition of appeal.** Every facility should be allowed to prisoners to enable them to prepare their petition of appeal. **QUEEN v. NITTO GOPAL PAULI**  
**13 W. R. Cr. 69**

2. **Presentation of petition of appeal—Right to present petition to Court without intervention of vakil.** A prisoner in jail under a civil warrant is entitled to present a petition of appeal to the Court having power to hear appeals without the intervention of a vakil. *In the matter of the petition of KRISTNAPPAH* **6 Mad. 38**

3. **Employment of pleaders—Vakalatnama, opportunity for giving.** Prisoners should have the fullest opportunity of giving vakalatnamas to any persons they please. *In the matter of the petition of DADABHAI* . **1 Bom. 16**

4. **Conversing with and instructing pleaders—Private instructions.** Prisoners should be allowed to have free converse with their vakils out of the hearing of the police officers in charge of such prisoners. **REG. v. KASHINATH DINKAR** . **8 Bom. Cr. 126**

5. **Right of freedom from fetters on trial.** A Judge should not refuse to try a prisoner brought up in chains to stand his trial, but the Judge may direct the removal of the fetters, unless satisfied by a representation from the proper officer that they are necessary. **ANONYMOUS**  
**4 Mad. Ap. 69**

**PRISONER—concl'd.****rights and privileges of—concl'd.**

6. **Nature of charge—Accused, right of, to know exact nature of charge made against him—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 221.** An accused is entitled to know with certainty and accuracy the exact nature of the charge brought against him, and unless he has this knowledge, he must be seriously prejudiced in his defence. This is true in all cases, but it is more especially true in cases where it is sought to implicate him for acts not committed by himself, but by others with whom he was in company. **BEHARI MAHTON v. QUEEN-EMPRESS**

**I. L. R. 11 Calc. 106**

7. **Right of accused to have charge read and to appear by mukhtar.** The Magistrate, when he has prepared the charge, is bound to read it to the accused, and to ask him if he wishes to have any witnesses summoned to give evidence on his behalf at the Sessions. The Magistrate cannot refuse to permit an accused person to attend at the Sessions by mukhtar. **QUEEN v. HURNATH ROY** . **2 W. R. Cr. 50**

8. **Right to copies of documents—Right of, on trial—Evidence.** A prisoner applied for copies of certain documents filed in Court for the purpose of his defence. *Held*, that the Magistrate had erred in refusing his application. *Per* **LOCH, J.**—A prisoner is entitled to have copies of all documents for which he asks, and which he thinks necessary for his defence, and it is for the officer trying the case, whether Magistrate or Judge, to determine at the hearing whether the documents filed by the prisoner are or are not admissible as evidence. *In the matter of the petition of SHIB PRASAD PANDA*  
**6 B. L. R. Ap. 59 : 14 W. R. Cr. 77**

9. **Right to inspect books in case of theft—Right to make statement.** So far as it may be necessary for the purposes of the trial, when books are the subject of a charge of theft, the accused is entitled to inspection of the books. It is not competent to the Court in a criminal trial to refuse to allow the accused to make a statement. *In the matter of* **ABDUL GUFFOOR** **10 C. L. R. 54**

10. **Right of accused to hear sentence—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, 1869, s. 277.** When the proceedings in a case tried by a Subordinate Magistrate are submitted, under s. 277 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to a District Magistrate to pass sentence upon the accused, the accused is entitled to be present at the passing of such sentence before the District Magistrate. **REG. v. RAGHA NARANJJI** . **7 Bom. Cr. 31**

**QUEEN v. GUNESH SIRCAR** . **7 W. R. Cr. 38**

**PRISONERS ACT (III OF 1900).**

ss. 2, 11—

See **CORONER** . . . **7 C. W. N. 889**



**PRISONERS ACT (III OF 1900)—contd.**

ss. 7, 8, 9—

See HABEAS CORPUS, WRIT OF.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 286

s. 11—

See CORONER, INQUISITION BY.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 1

**PRISONERS' TESTIMONY ACT (XV OF 1862).**

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 87 (1859, s. 78) . 4 B. L. R. O. C. 51

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—JURISDICTION—PRISONERS' TESTIMONY ACT 5 B. L. R. 215 : 13 W. R. 278

**PRISONS ACT (XXVI OF 1870.)**

**Power of Superintendent of jail**  
*—Abetting escape of prisoner—Beng. Reg. XIV of 1816.* A superintendent of a jail has no power under Act XXVI of 1870 to imprison for one year a night watchman convicted before him on a charge of aiding and abetting the escape of a prisoner. Neither had he power under Regulation XIV of 1816. *QUEEN v. SHEOUMBER LAL*

4 N. W. 4

**s. 45—Entering a havalat with intent to convey food to prisoner—Rules made by Local Government for the management and discipline of prisons—House-trespass—Offence in relation to prison—Penal Code, s. 442—Previous acquittal.** *Per SPANKIE, J., and OLDFIELD, J. (STUART, C.J., doubting), that a havalat (lock-up) is a prison within the meaning of the Prisons Act. Per STUART, C.J., that food is not an "article" within the meaning of s. 45 of that Act. Per STUART, C.J., and OLDFIELD, J., that the conveyance of food into a havalat, not being expressly prohibited by the rules made by the Local Government under s. 54 of that Act for the management and discipline of prisons, is not "contrary to the regulations of the prisons" within the meaning of s. 45 of that Act, and is therefore not an offence punishable under that section. Held, therefore, per STUART, C.J., and OLDFIELD, J., that, where a person entered into a havalat with intent to convey or attempt to convey food to an under-trial prisoner, such act on his part did not amount to house-trespass within the meaning of s. 442 of the Penal Code, and it was not an act punishable under s. 45 of the Prisons Act. Per SPANKIE, J., (contra). Per STUART, C.J., that the fact that such person had been tried for house-trespass and acquitted was no bar to his being tried subsequently for an offence under s. 45 of the Prisons Act. *EMPRESS v. LALAI**

I. L. R. 2 All. 301

**PRISONS ACT (IX OF 1894).**

**s. 52—Presidency Magistrate not a District Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class within s. 52 of the Act.** A Presidency Magistrate is not a District Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class within the meaning of s. 52 of the

**PRISONS ACT (IX OF 1894)—concl'd.**

s. 52—concl'd.

Prisons Act and he has no jurisdiction to try prisoners for offences under that section. *EMPEROR v. CHOTA SINGH (1908)* . I. L. R. 32 Mad. 303

**PRIVACY.**

See CUSTOM . I. L. R. 10 All. 358

See EASEMENT . I. L. R. 29 All. 285

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—PRIVACY, INVASION OF.

See PRESCRIPTION—EASEMENTS—PRIVACY.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—PRIVACY, INVASION OF.

intrusion on—

See CRIMINAL TRESPASS.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 391 ; 994

See PENAL CODE, s. 332.

I. L. R. 18 All. 246

right of—

See PRIVACY I. L. R. 29 All. 64 ; 582

*Easement—Easements Act (V of 1882), s. 4—Suit by occupier of house.* Not only the owner, but the lessee or other person in lawful possession of premises may maintain an action if his right of privacy is interfered with. *Gokal Prasad v. Radho, I. L. R. 10 All. 358*, referred to. *KUNDAN v. BIDHI CHAND (1906)*

I. L. R. 29 All. 64

**PRIVATE AWARD.**

See APPEAL . 11 C. W. N. 220

**PRIVATE DEFENCE, RIGHT OF.**

See ABSCONDING OFFENDER.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 417

See CULPAELE HOMICIDE.

12 W. R. Cr. 15

I. L. R. 3 All. 253

See PENAL CODE, ss. 96 to 100.

13 C. W. N. 1180

See PENAL CODE, s. 424.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 729

See RIOTING . 1 C. L. R. 521

10 C. L. R. 578

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 148

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 686

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 574

I. L. R. 24 All. 298

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 296 ; 827 ; 865

See THUMB IMPRESSIONS.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 97

using force in protecting property—

See PENAL CODE, s. 143.

13 C. W. N. 827



**PRIVATE DEFENCE, RIGHT OF—contd.**

1. ———— **Commencement of, and restrictions on, right—***Penal Code, ss. 97, 99.* The right of private defence, as described in s. 97 of the Penal Code, is subject to the restrictions mentioned in s. 99, that is, it should be exercised only in the defence of one's own body or that of another person against an offence affecting the human body. Under s. 102, the right commences only on a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body caused by an attempt or threat to commit an offence, and by s. 99, cl. 4, the right is restricted to not inflicting more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence. *QUEEN v. GOBARDHAN BHUYAN 4 B L. R. Ap. 101 : 13 W. R. Cr. 55*

2. ———— **Extent of right—***Penal Code, s. 103 and s. 99.* The right of private defence under s. 103 of the Penal Code is restricted by s. 99 of that Code, and does not extend to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the purpose of defence. *QUEEN v. DHUNUNJAI POLY 14 W. R. Cr. 68*

3. ———— **Commencement and extent of the right—***Penal Code, ss. 99, 105—Information of offence to be committed.* The third clause of s. 99 of the Penal Code must be read with the first clause of s. 105. The right of private defence of property commences when a reasonable apprehension of danger to the property commences. Before such apprehension commences, the owner of the property is not called upon to apply for protection to the public authorities. The apprehension which justifies a recourse to the authorities ought to be based on some information of a definite kind as to the time and place of the danger actually threatened. The accused No. 1 received information, one evening, that the complainants intended to go on his land on the following day and uproot the juvari seed sown in it. At about 3 o'clock next morning he was informed that the complainants had entered on his land and were ploughing up the seed. Thereupon he at once proceeded to the spot, followed by the other accused, and remonstrated with the complainants. The complainants, without paying any attention to his remonstrances, commenced an attack on the accused. In the fight which ensued, both sides received serious injuries, and the leader of the complainant's party was killed. The accused were thereupon charged and convicted, under ss. 304, 114, 325, and 323 of the Penal Code, of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, and of causing hurt. *Held*, reversing the convictions, that the complainants being the aggressors, the accused had, under the circumstances, the right of private defence, both of person and of property, and that, in the exercise of this right, they did not inflict more harm than was necessary. *Held*, also, that the accused were not bound to act on the information received on the previous evening and seek the protection of the public authorities, as they had no reason to apprehend a night-attack on their property. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NARSANG PATHABHAI . . . I. L. R. 14 Bom. 441*

**PRIVATE DEFENCE, RIGHT OF—contd.**

4. ———— **Pleading right—***Persons inviting attack.* The right of private defence cannot be pleaded by persons who, believing they will be attacked, court the attack. *QUEEN v. NOWABDEE W. R. 1864 Cr. 11*

5. ———— **Onus probandi—***Alternative plea.* It is for those who raise the plea of private defence to prove it. The act charged cannot be denied, and the plea of private defence raised as an alternative. If raised, a full account of the occurrence must be given in evidence. *In the matter of the petition of JAMES SIRDAR 1 C. L. R. 62*

6. ———— **Right of private defence—***Plea of accused.* If the accused pleads not guilty and does not admit the act, but the pleader for the defence advances in his argument the plea of the right of private defence, the duty of the Court is to accept the plea if it appears upon the evidence, either for the prosecution or from the defence, that what was done by the accused was in self-defence. *PASPUT GOPE v. RAM BHAJAN OJHA 1 C. W. N. 545*

7. ———— **Onus probandi—***Evidence Act, s. 105.* Where the accused had been convicted of riot under s. 148 and of grievous hurt under s. 325 of the Penal Code, the Sessions Judge on appeal held that the complainants had themselves been the aggressors, and that the accused had merely exercised the right of private defence; but, inasmuch as they had not set up the plea of private defence, he considered it was not competent to him to set aside the conviction. *Held*, that, though the onus was on the accused, the finding of the Judge amounted to one that they had discharged that onus, and on that finding the accused were entitled to an acquittal. *In the matter of KALI CHURN MOOKERJEE 11 C. L. R. 232*

8. ———— **Exercise of right—***Possession.* A party in possession of land is legally entitled to defend his possession against another party seeking to eject him by force. *QUEEN v. TULSI SINGH 2 B. L. R. A. Cr. 16 : 10 W. R. Cr. 64*

*QUEEN v. MOKEE . . . 12 W. R. Cr. 15*

9. ———— **Dispute as to possession of land.** Where A is in actual peaceable possession of land, B's attempt to recover possession of it by force is an illegal act which A has a right to resist. If B uses force in carrying out his attempt, A has a right to oppose force to force, and to inflict upon B such injury as is necessary to compel him to desist. *QUEEN v. SACHEE alias SACHEE BOLER . . . 7 W. R. Cr. 112*

10. ———— **Criminal trespass—***Penal Code, ss. 99 and 104.* Where the offence which occasions the right of private defence of property is criminal trespass, the right of defence under s. 104 of the Penal Code only extends (subject to the restrictions of s. 99) to the voluntarily causing to the wrong-doers some harm other than death. *QUEEN v. GOBURDHUN PARI 14 W. R. Cr. 74*



**PRIVATE DEFENCE, RIGHT OF—contd.**

11. ——— **Culpable homicide.** The legal right of private defence of the body and property is not exceeded by a person who is attacked by another with a spear, and who strikes a blow with a latee, which results in the death of the party attacking, and such right of private defence of the body extends, under s. 100 of the Penal Code, to the taking of life where grievous hurt is reasonably apprehended. *QUEEN v. MOIZUDIN*

11 W. R. Cr. 41

12. ——— **Penal Code, ss. 148, 304—Culpable homicide.** The prisoners, who in resisting a sudden attack made upon them by certain persons for the purpose of cutting their crop, and when they had no time to complain to the police, inflicted a wound on one of them with a bamboo, from the effects of which the man died, were convicted by the Sessions Judge under ss. 148 and 304 of the Penal Code. The High Court acquitted the prisoners, holding that the force used, or the injuries inflicted, were not such as to exceed their rights of private defence of property. *QUEEN v. GOOROO CHURN CHANG*

6 B. L. R. Ap. 9 : 14 W. R. Cr. 69

13. ——— **Penal Code, s. 100, cl. 2, and s. 103, cl. 4.** Under the facts of this case, a person was held to have rightly exercised the right of private defence as contemplated in cl. 2, s. 100, and cl. 4, s. 103, Penal Code, though in the exercise of such right he killed one of his aggressors. *QUEEN v. RAM LALL SINGH*

22 W. R. Cr. 51

14. ——— **'House-breaking—Limits of right of defence.** The right of private defence of property against house-breaking does not extend to causing the death of the house-breaker when he has made his escape from the premises empty-handed, and is at some distance from the place. No more harm should be done than is necessary to effect his capture. *QUEEN v. BOLAKI JOLAHAD*

1 B. L. R. S. N. 8 : 10 W. R. Cr. 9

15. ——— **Attacking man found in house at night.** The accused was attacked by a man whom he found by a hole cut in his house for the purpose of committing a burglary, and struck the man a blow which caused his death. Held, that the accused simply exercised his right of private defence, and had committed no crime. *QUEEN v. PELKOO NUSHYO*

2 W. R. Cr. 42

16. ——— **House-trespass with intent to commit adultery. Penal Code, ss. 96, 104.** Where a person assisted by a friend retaliated severely on another who trespassed into his house with the object of having intercourse with his wife, he was held to have committed no offence; ss. 96 and 104 of the Penal Code justifying him in causing any harm short of death to the trespasser; and his friend was also acquitted as having aided him to commit no offence. *QUEEN v. DHAMAN TELI*

20 W. R. Cr. 36

17. ——— **Obstruction of public servant—Resisting police officer making search without warrant—Penal Code, s. 99—Criminal Procedure**

**PRIVATE DEFENCE, RIGHT OF—contd.**

*Code, 1861, s. 135.* An officer, subordinate to an officer in charge of a police station, who was deputed by the latter to make an inquiry under s. 135 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, attempted without a search warrant to enter a house in search of property alleged to have been stolen, and was obstructed and resisted. Held (applying s. 99 of the Penal Code), that, even though the police officer was not strictly justified in searching the house without a warrant, the person obstructing and resisting could not set up the illegality of the officer's proceeding as a justification of his obstruction, and it was not shown that that officer was acting otherwise than in good faith and without malice. *REG. v. VYANKATRAV SHRI-NIVAS*

7 Bom. Cr. 50

18. ——— **Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 99—Obstruction of, and resistance to, Inspector searching house without warrant—Officer acting illegally, but in good faith—Madras Abkari Act, ss. 31 and 36.** A Sub-Inspector of Salt and Abkari attempted, without a search warrant, to enter a house in search of property, the illicit possession of which is an offence under the Madras Abkari Act, and was obstructed and resisted. Held, that, having regard to s. 99 of the Penal Code, even though the Sub-Inspector was not strictly justified in searching a house without a warrant, the persons obstructing and resisting could not set up the illegality of the officer's proceeding as a justification of their obstruction, as it was not shown that that officer was acting otherwise than in good faith and without malice. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PUKOT KOTT*

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 349

19. ——— **Penal Code, ss. 99 and 186—Voluntarily obstructing a public servant in discharge of his duties—Mamlatdar's decree—Execution by a surveyor under Collector's orders—Public function.** In a suit filed in a Mamlatdar's Court under Bombay Act III of 1876, the plaintiff obtained a decree against the accused for possession of a certain piece of land. When the Mamlatdar proceeded to execute the decree, he found that there was no land corresponding to the boundaries set forth in the plaint, and that the parties were joint owners and in joint occupation of the land in dispute. Finding himself unable to execute the decree, the Mamlatdar referred the matter to the Collector for advice. The Collector, on looking into the papers of the case, ordered a surveyor to execute the decree by dividing the land in dispute and putting the decree-holder in possession of his share. The surveyor, in attempting to execute the decree, was obstructed by the accused, who was thereupon tried and convicted of voluntarily obstructing a public servant in the discharge of his public functions, under s. 186 of the Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860). Held, that the Collector's order was entirely *ultra vires* as to leave no room for the operation of either the first or the second clause of s. 99 of the Penal Code, as to right of private defence. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. TULSIRAM*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 168



PRIVATE DEFENCE, RIGHT OF—*contd.*

20. ————— *Penal Code, s. 99*  
—*Resistance to warrant of arrest in execution of a decree—Assault on officer.* A warrant issued for the arrest of a debtor under the provisions of s. 251 of the Civil Procedure Code was initialled by the Munsarim of the Court, sealed with the seal of the Court, and delivered to the proper officer for execution. The debtor forcibly resisted the officer, and was tried and convicted, under s. 353 of the Penal Code, of assaulting a public servant in the execution of his duty as such. *Held*, with reference to s. 99 of the Penal Code, that the act of the accused did not cease to be an offence on the ground that it was done in the exercise of the right of private defence. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. JANKI PRASAD*

I. L. R. 8 All. 293

21. ————— *Premeditated riot.* There can be no right of private defence, either on one side or the other, in a case of premeditated riot. *QUEEN v. JEOLALL*

7 W. R. Cr. 34

22. ————— *Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 96 et seq.* When a body of men are determined to vindicate their rights or supposed rights by unlawful force and when they engage in a fight with men who, on the other hand, are equally determined to vindicate by unlawful force their rights or supposed rights, no question of self-defence arises. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PRAG DAT*

I. L. R. 20 All. 459

23. ————— *Penal Code, s. 104*  
—*Persons acquitted of culpable homicide, but convicted of rioting.* In an affray respecting land one of the aggressive party was killed. The prisoners, who were exercising the right of private defence of property, were acquitted by the jury of culpable homicide, but convicted of rioting. *Held*, that, not being legally guilty of any offence coupled with rioting, and not being rioters or members of an unlawful assembly, they could claim the benefit of s. 104, Penal Code: they were therefore released. *QUEEN v. MITTO SINGH*

3 W. R. Cr. 41

24. ————— *Rioting—Unlawful assembly—Right of private defence of property—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 97, 103, 104, 105, and 107.* A party of persons consisting of some five peadas and a number of coolies sufficient for the work to be done went to a spot on a river flowing through the lands of M for the purpose of either repairing or erecting a bund across it to cause the water to flow down a channel on the lands of their master T. The river at the time was almost dry, and the party did not go armed ready to fight or use force, and they did not during the subsequent occurrence use force. Having arrived at the spot about 10 A.M., they proceeded to work at the bund until the afternoon. At about 4 P.M. a body of men, consisting about 1,200 in all, many of them armed with lathis and headed by the prisoners, who were servants of M, which had been seen collecting together during the day, proceeded to the spot, and about 25 or 30 of them attacked T's men, some five of whom were more or less severely wounded with the lathis. The occurrence resulted in the con-

PRIVATE DEFENCE, RIGHT OF—*contd.*

viction of some of M's servants for rioting under s. 147 of the Penal Code. M's people wholly denied any right on the part of T to construct or repair the bund, and had previously denied the existence of such right and refused permission to T to exercise it. It was contended that the assembly of M's people was not an "unlawful assembly"; that the interference by T's people with the channel of the river justified them in coming to stop the work, and the show and use of force in compelling them to do so. *Held*, that the prisoners had been rightly convicted. *Held*, further, that, as no right of private defence of property is conferred by the Penal Code, except as against the perpetrators of offences under the Penal Code, and that, as upon the facts of the case as found no offence had been committed by T's people, their acts amounting merely to a civil trespass, and as there was no pressing or immediate necessity of a kind, showing that there was no time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities, no question as to the right of private defence arose in the case. *GANOURI LAL DAS v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 206

25. ————— *Trespass—Penal Code, ss. 97, 104, 105.* Where A trespassed on the lands of B, whose servants seized and confined A till the following day, when B gave information to the police, it was *held* that the conduct of B and his servants in confining A could not be supported on the ground that they were exercising the right of private defence of property under ss. 97, 104, and 105 of the Penal Code. *SHURFOODDIN v. KASSINATH*

13 W. R. Cr. 64

26. ————— *Trespass—Demand for payment of rent.* Mere persistence in demand for rent does not amount to trespass justifying the exercise of the right of private defence. *MAHOMED JAN v. KHADI SHEIKH. HURNATH DE v. JOYGOPAL DE. HURIS CHUNDRA DAS v. BOLA AUDHICAREE. AHMUDDY v. ANUND MOHAN MOZUMDAR*

16 W. R. Cr. 75

27. ————— *Wrongful distraint of crops—Penal Code, ss. 97, 99.* Where a zamindar's servants enter on land with the intention of distraining the crops without proper notice, the raiyat-owners are justified in considering such actions as trespass. *Quære*: Would the raiyats in such a case be protected by the provisions of the Penal Code, ss. 97 and 99, in preventing the distraint and confining the men employed to make it? *QUEEN v. KANHAI SHAHU*

23 W. R. Cr. 40

28. ————— *Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 147—Riot—Private defence of property—Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 96 et seq.—Deliberate aggression by party entitled to possession.* Party A sowed a crop in a field to the possession of which apparently they were entitled. Party B, claiming the field and the crop as theirs, entered upon the land and began to cut the crop. Party A, having watched party B enter upon the land, took counsel together and then proceeded to attack party B, and a fight ensued in which grievous hurt was caused. *Held*, that it was



**PRIVATE DEFENCE, RIGHT OF—contd.**

not open to party A to plead that they were acting in the exercise of their right of private defence of property. *Queen-Empress v. Prag Dat*, I. L. R. 20 All. 459, followed. *Queen-Empress v. Narsang Pathabhai*, I. L. R. 14 Bom. 441, distinguished. *Pachkauri v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 686, not followed. *KING-EMPEROR v. KALIJI* (1901) I. L. R. 24 All. 143

29. ——— Obstructing religious procession—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860)*, ss. 97, 101, 104—*Private defence*—"Protect a right"—*Unlawful assembly*. The villagers belonging to C walked in a religious procession, through a part of the village of K, carrying with them a vessel containing water which purported to be consecrated. The villagers of K, objecting, obstructed the procession, whereupon the members of it resisted the obstruction, and used some violence, causing grievous hurt to one of the obstructors and hurt to others of them. The members of the procession were charged with, and convicted of, being members of an unlawful assembly, possessing deadly weapons, and causing grievous hurt; and their convictions were upheld on appeal. On revision:—*Held*, that the convictions were wrong. The accused were justified, in the circumstances, in exercising their right of private defence; and the harm inflicted was not more than appeared to have been necessary for the purpose of self-defence. *REGULA BHEEMAPPA v. EMPEROR* (1902) I. L. R. 26 Mad. 249

30. ——— Illegal warrant—*Penal Code*, s. 99—*Obstruction to execution*—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898)*, ss. 96 and 100—*Warrants wrongly issued under s. 96 instead of under s. 100*. Where on the complaint of one G that his wife was wrongfully confined by his father-in-law, a warrant was issued under s. 96, Criminal Procedure Code, and the Police attempting to execute this warrant at the house of the father-in-law was obstructed by him and seven others who also used criminal force. *Held*, that the accused were justified in doing what they did in the exercise of the right of private defence. That as the warrant issued was wholly illegal and must be treated as nullity, the accused were not deprived of the right of private defence under s. 99, Indian Penal Code. "Not strictly justifiable by law" in s. 99, Indian Penal Code, explained. *BISU HALDAR v. EMPEROR* (1907)

11 C. W. N. 836

31. ——— Attack by a large body of armed men prepared to fight—*Rioting*—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860)*, ss. 96 to 106, 147, 325. The complainant's party, consisting of twelve or thirteen persons, went with *kodalis* to a *bund* erected on the land of the master of the accused in order to cut it, as it obstructed the flow of water from their lands and destroyed their crops. The accused hearing of this at once assembled to the number of 50 or 60, armed themselves with *lathis* and proceeded to the *bund*. At this time the complainant's party had either finished the cutting or

**PRIVATE DEFENCE, RIGHT OF—concl'd.**

ceased to do so, when they saw the accused approaching. The latter attacked the complainant's party and drove them to their village. One or more of the assailants also beat a man, who was present there, but was not connected with the cutting of the *bund*, both in the first attack and when they returned from the chase, and fractured his skull, in consequence of which he died shortly after. *Held*, that the accused were members of an unlawful assembly from the beginning, as they went armed with *lathis* and in large numbers to enforce their right at all hazards, that, if not so at the beginning, they became an unlawful assembly and had no right of private defence, when the opposite party had ceased cutting the *bund*, and that, even if they had, they exceeded their right by attacking their opponents and chasing them and by beating the deceased. *Shunker Singh v. Burmah Matho*, 23 W. R. Cr. 25; *Pachkauri v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 686, distinguished. *Kabiruddin v. Emperor*, I. L. R. 35 Calc. 368; 12 C. W. N. 384, followed. *EMPEROR v. AMBIKA LAL* (1908) I. L. R. 35 Calc. 443

32. ——— *Rioting*—*Assembly of armed men prepared for fight*—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860)*, ss. 96 to 106—*Misdirection to jury*. There is no right of private defence where two parties arm themselves for a fight to enforce their right or supposed right, and deliberately engage in large numbers in a fight. In such a case, if it is not shown that the accused were acting within the legal limits of the right of private defence, it does not matter which party was the first to attack. *In re Kalee Beparee*, 1 C. L. R. 521, and *Jairam Mahton v. Emperor*, I. L. R. 35 Calc. 103, followed. *KABIRUDDIN v. EMPEROR* (1908)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 368

33. ——— *Common object as found by Original and Appellate Courts*—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860)*, ss. 96—106. No right of private defence arises where a large body of men go armed and prepared for a fight, and attack the opposite party with intent to enforce their right or supposed right to certain land. The petitioners numbering from forty to sixty, armed with *lathis*, spears and heavy billets of wood, proceeded to the disputed land, attacked the complainant and his father, and destroyed the crops growing thereon. Both parties claimed the land as having fallen to their shares on partition. The Magistrate found that the complainant was in possession and had grown the crops. *Held*, that the right of private defence did not arise, as there was no invasion of the petitioner's rights on the day of occurrence, and, in any case, that they had ample time to have recourse to the authorities for the protection of their rights. Where the accused were charged with rioting with intent to dispossess the complainant, but the Appellate Court thought the question of possession not clear and found them guilty of rioting with the intention of enforcing their right or supposed right: *Held*, that both common objects raised the same questions, and that the accused were in no way prejudiced. *MANIRUDDIN v. EMPEROR* (1908) I. L. R. 35 Calc. 384



**PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW.**

French citizens in British India—*Onus—Domicile, proof of—Post-nuptial marriage settlement—Immoveable property, law governing—Lex rei sitæ—Matrimonial domicile—Code Napoleon, Arts. 1401—1496.* One Alexandre Charriol married a French woman in British India *sans contract*. Subsequently he executed a marriage settlement dealing with certain immoveable property in Calcutta settling the same on certain trusts. The property was sold later on and the sale-proceeds were invested in certain funds. In this suit by the present trustees for directions for the disposition of the trust funds, the question was whether the deed was invalid and inoperative and therefore whether French, and not English law, should govern the disposal. *Held*, that the onus was first on the person attacking the settlement to show conclusively that the settlor was a French citizen with a French domicile. *Held*, also, on the facts of this case, that the settlor was not a French citizen with a French domicile. *Held*, further, that even if the settlor were of French domicile, his having married a French woman *sans contract* did not imply such a *special contract* as would take away the operation of the ordinary rule that *lex rei sitæ* would govern immoveable property. *D'Nicols v. Curlier*, [1900] 2 Ch. 410, dissented from. *D'Nicols v. Curlier*, [1900] A. C. 21, explained. Story's Conflict of Laws, s 159, referred to. *BONNAUD v. CHARRIOL*  
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 631  
9 C. W. N. 394

**PRIVATE LAND.**

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 120 (2).  
7 C. W. N. 400

**PRIVATE PARTITION.**

See PARTITION. I. L. R. 36 Calc. 726

**PRIVATE PROSECUTOR.**

Right to papers—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), s. 434.* Private prosecutor not allowed to appear on a reference to the High Court under s. 434 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *QUEEN v. RAMJAI MOZUMDAR*  
6 B. L. R. Ap. 46

S.C. SUDDURUDDEEN SIRCAR v. RAM JOY MOJOONDAR . . . . . 14 W. R. Cr. 51

**PRIVATE SALE.**

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, 310A.  
I. L. R. 30 Bom. 575  
See PRACTICE. I. L. R. 30 Bom. 109

**PRIVATE STREET.**

See BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT  
(BOM. ACT VI of 1873), ss. 33 AND 42  
I. L. R. 27 Bom. 221

**PRIVILEGE.**

See DEFAMATION . . . . . 8 Bom. Cr. 168  
I. L. R. 6 Mad. 381  
I. L. R. 11 Mad. 477  
I. L. R. 15 Mad. 214; 414  
I. L. R. 16 Mad. 235  
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 127; 573  
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 46  
I. L. R. 17 Mad. 87  
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 51; 340  
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 375

See FALSE CHARGE I. L. R. 19 Bom. 51

See LIBEL . . . . . I. L. R. 14 Bom. 97  
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 867  
8 C. W. N. 731  
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 495  
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 883; 907

**from arrest—**

See ARREST—CIVIL ARREST.

See CONTEMPT OF COURT—EFFECT OF CONTEMPT . . . . . 4 B. L. R. O. C. 90

See PARDANASHIN WOMEN 8 W. R. 282  
1 B. L. R. F. B. 31  
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 583  
I. L. R. 7 Calc. 19

**from attendance in Court—**

See PARDANASHIN WOMEN.

See PARTIES—PRIVILEGES OF PARTIES.  
Marsh. 627  
15 W. R. 129

**from suit—**

See DEFAMATION.

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—FOREIGN AND NATIVE RULERS.

See LIBEL.

See SECRETARY OF STATE.  
I. L. R. 27 Bom. 189

**of counsel—**

See PENAL CODE, s. 499, EXCEP. 9.  
13 C. W. N. 340

**PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.**

See ARBITRATION—AWARDS—VALIDITY OF AWARDS AND GROUND FOR SETTING THEM ASIDE . . . . . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 231

See DEFAMATION.

See INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS.  
I. L. R. 2 Bom. 453  
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 655  
I. L. R. 12 Calc. 265  
I. L. R. 15 Bom. 7  
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 105

See LIBEL.

1. ——— Professional communication—*Attorney and client—Privilege—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 126.* To be privileged under s. 126 of the



**PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION—**  
*contd.*

Evidence Act (I of 1872), a communication by a party to his attorney must be of a confidential or private nature. Where defendants at an interview, at which the plaintiff was present, admitted their partnership to their attorney, who was then also acting as attorney for the plaintiff:—*Held*, that the attorney was not precluded by s. 126 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872) from giving evidence of this admission to him: 1st, because the defendants' statements, having been made in presence and hearing of the plaintiff, could not be regarded as confidential or private: 2nd, because those statements did not appear to have been made to the attorney exclusively in his character of attorney for the defendants, but to have been addressed to him also as attorney for the plaintiff. **MEMON HAJEE HAROON MAHOMED v. ABDUL KARIM**

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 91

2. ———— *Privilege, extent of—How far solicitor bound to disclose communication made in course of employment—Attorney and client—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 126.* The law relating to professional communications between a solicitor and a client is the same in India, as in England. It is not every communication made by a client to an attorney that is privileged from disclosure. The privilege extends only to communications made to him confidentially, and with a view to obtaining professional advice. Where a solicitor claims privilege under s. 126 of the Indian Evidence Act (I of 1872), he is bound to disclose the name of his client, on whose behalf he claims the privilege. The mere fact that the client's name had been communicated to him in the course and for the purpose of his employment as solicitor by another client, affords no excuse, unless it was communicated to him confidentially, on the express understanding that it was not to be disclosed. But a solicitor is not at liberty, without his client's express consent, to disclose the nature of his professional employment. S. 126 of the Indian Evidence Act protects from publicity not merely the details of the business, but also its general purport, unless it be known *aliunde* that such business falls within proviso I or II to the section. At an interview between a solicitor and a client, the solicitor took down a certain statement made by a person named *A B*, who was in his client's company, and whose name was communicated to him in the course and for the purpose of his professional employment. *A B* was afterwards tried for defamation, and the solicitor was examined by the prosecution with reference to the statement made to him by the accused at the above interview. The solicitor was asked whether the person who had made the statement had given his name as *A B*. The solicitor declined to answer the question on the ground of privilege. *Held*, that the solicitor was bound to answer the question, unless *A B*'s name was communicated to him by his client in confidence with a view to its not being disclosed. **FRAMJI BHICAJI v. MOHANSING DHANSING** I. L. R. 18 Bom. 263

**PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION—**  
*—contd.*

3. ———— *Communication to Mukhtears acting as pleaders for their clients—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 126.* The restrictions imposed by s. 126 of the Evidence Act in respect of what are known as privileged communications extend also to communications made to mukhtears when acting as pleaders for their clients. **ABBAS PEADA v. QUEEN-EMPRESS**

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 736  
2 C. W. N. 484

4. ———— *Communication to clerk of pleader—Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 120, 127.* *Per BANERJEE, J.*—S. 127 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872) extends to a communication made to the pleader's clerk the same confidential character that attaches to a communication to the pleader direct, under s. 126. **KAMESHWAR PERSHAD v. AMANUTULLA**

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 53  
2 C. W. N. 649

5. ———— *Act II of 1855, s. 24.—Vakil and client.* S. 24. Act II of 1855, does not warrant a vakil's exclusion from the witness-box, though it may excuse his answering certain questions relating to communications between him and his client. **DOOLAR JHA v. RUNJEET ROY**

15 W. R. 340

6. ———— *Act II of 1855, s. 24.—Mukhtear and client.* The question whether a communication between the accused and witness is privileged, is a question of law for the Judge to decide. Communications between mukhtears and their clients are not privileged within s. 24 of Act II of 1855. **QUEEN v. CHANDRAKANT CHUCKERBUTTY**

1 B. L. R. A. Cr. 8 : 10 W. R. Cr. 14

7. ———— *Prosecutor in criminal case and his attorney and clerk. Semble:* Communications between a prosecutor in a criminal case and his attorney, and between the attorney and his clerk with respect to the case, are not privileged. *In the matter of the petition of BELILIOS*

12 B. L. R. 249  
S. C. QUEEN v. BELILIOS 20 W. R. Cr. 61

8. ———— *Statements laid before counsel—Legal advice.* Statements laid by clients before counsel for the purpose of obtaining legal advice are privileged. **MUNCHERSHAW BEZONJI v. NEW DHURUMSEY SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY**

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 576

9. ———— *Letters between Government servants—Discovery—Production of documents—Solicitor and client—Act XIV of 1882, s. 133.* Letters written by one of the defendant's servants to another for the purpose of obtaining information with a view to possible future litigation are not privileged, even though they might, under the circumstances, be required for the use of the defendant's solicitor. In order that privilege may be claimed, it must be shown on the face of the affidavit that the documents were prepared or written merely for the use of the solicitor. **BIPRO DOSS DEY v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA.**

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 655



**PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION—**  
*contd.*

10. ——— Letters between solicitors for various plaintiffs—*Attorney and client—Inspection—Production—Waiver of privilege.* The plaintiffs resided in England, and sued the defendant in Bombay for specific performance of an agreement to purchase certain premises. This agreement had been made on behalf of the plaintiffs by S, their agent in Bombay. The defendant pleaded that by the terms of the agreement it was provided that the deed of assignment should contain a covenant by the three plaintiffs to indemnify the defendant against any claims upon the premises that might be made at any time by or on behalf of the representatives of one N. The defendant's solicitor prepared a draft assignment which contained this covenant, and sent it to the plaintiff's solicitors (Messrs. P and W) for approval. On the 19th March 1880, W called upon B, the defendant's solicitor, and informed him that M, the third plaintiff, refused to sign any deed which contained the above covenant. At this interview W read to B portions of a letter written with reference to the proposed deed by McG & Co. (solicitors for the first two plaintiffs) to V, the solicitor of the third plaintiff, and of another letter written by V to his client, the third plaintiff. The defendant called upon the plaintiff to produce these letters for inspection. *Held*, that the letters were privileged, and that the fact that portions of them had been read to the defendant's solicitor was no waiver of the privilege as regarded the parts which were not read. *KAY v. POORUNCHAND POONALAL*.

**I. L. R. 4 Bom. 631**

11. ——— Letters by client to solicitor—*Discovery—Affidavit of documents—Sufficiency of affidavit—Further affidavit—Inspection of documents—Practice.* Where in an affidavit of documents privilege is claimed for a correspondence on the ground that it contains instructions and confidential communications from the client (the plaintiff) to his solicitor, it must appear not merely that the correspondence generally contains instructions, etc., but that each letter contains instructions or confidential communications to the attorneys with reference to the conduct of the suit. *Bewicke v. Graham*, 7 Q. B. D. 490, followed. *ORIENTAL BANK CORPORATION v. BROWN & Co.*

**I. L. R. 12 Calc. 265**

12. ——— Statement in petition to Magistrate—*Defamation.* *Held*, that, under the circumstances of the case, the allegations contained in a petition presented by respondent to the Magistrate acting in his administrative capacity cannot be regarded as a privileged communication made in the course of judicial proceedings; and it being proved that the allegations so made were made with sinister motive and malicious intention, and that they were irrelevant to the occasion, the appellant was entitled to some substantial damages. *CHOWDHRY GOORDUTT SINGH v. GOPAL DASS*

**1 Agra 33**

13. ——— Statement to punchayet—*Illegal conviction for defamation.* Where a person

**PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION—**  
*contd.*

called upon by a punchayet, convened by the complainant's relatives, to explain why he had made a defamatory remark concerning the complainant, made a statement by way of explanation:—*Held*, that, such statement being privileged, a conviction for defamation for making such statement was illegal. *In re GOVINDAPPA NAYAK*

**I. L. R. 7 Mad. 36**

14. ——— Petition to Revenue Officer—*Defamation—Presumptions as to malice.* Certain raiyats in a zamindari village addressed a petition to the tehsildar praying that the Village Munsif might be retained in office notwithstanding the zamindar's application for his removal. The petition imputed criminal acts to the zamindar, who now sued the petitioners for damages on the ground that the petition contained a false and malicious libel. It was found that in fact the communication was made *bonâ fide*, and that there was some ground for some of the imputations. *Held* that the petition was a privileged communication, and the alleged libel was not actionable. The question when malice may be presumed, discussed. *VENKATA NARASIMHA v. KOTAYYA*

**I. L. R. 12 Mad. 374**

15. ——— Communication by a servant of a company to one of his subordinates as to another subordinate—*Defamation.* In an action for damages for defamation brought by a brewer recently employed by a brewery company against the local manager of the company, the defamatory statements complained of were contained in a letter written by the defendant to the directors of the company, and also in a letter written to another brewer in the employ of the company, in which he said that the plaintiff "had failed most utterly, and I have been compelled to inform him that you will take the position of senior brewer at the brewery." *Held*, that all these statements were in the nature of privileged communications. *LEISHMAN v. HOLLAND*

**I. L. R. 14 Mad. 51**

16. ——— Letter from husband to wife—*Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 122—Letter taken on search of wife's house.* On a trial for the offence of breach of trust by a public servant, a letter was tendered in evidence for the prosecution which had been sent by the accused to his wife at Pondicherry and had been found on a search of her house made there by the police. *Held*, that the letter was not inadmissible in evidence against the accused as being a privileged communication. S. 122 of the Evidence Act was not applicable. *QUEEN-EM-PRESS v. DONAGHUE*

**I. L. R. 22 Mad. 1**

17. ——— Official communication—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 499, Eighth Exception—Defamatory communication made in official confidence—Malice in fact—Privilege of public officer to refuse to disclose official communication, nature of—Public interests—Indian Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 124.* Where a defamatory statement is made on a privileged occasion, the complainant must show that there was malice in fact. S. 124.



**PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION—**  
*concl'd.*

Indian Evidence Act, makes the public officer, to whom a communication is made in official confidence, the judge of whether such communication should or should not be divulged in the public interest, and he is entitled to decide whether the public interests would suffer by its production, and, if he considers they would so suffer, to refuse to produce it. *Beatson v. Skene*, 5 H. & N. 838; *Hennesy v. Wright*, 21 Q. B. D. 509, referred to. Where a public officer, to whom a defamatory communication had been made in official confidence, claimed privilege on the ground that the publication of the communication might cause a scandal in the office: *Held*, that the case did not come in within s. 124 of the Evidence Act, inasmuch as the officer in this case did not consider that public interest would suffer, but claimed privilege on a different ground, *viz.*, to prevent a scandal in the office. *BIDHU BHUSAN BOSE v. HARI NATH CHAKRAVARTI* (1902) . . . . . 7 C. W. N. 246

**PRIVILEGED OCCASION.**

See LIBEL . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 907

**PRIVY COUNCIL.**

See APPEAL . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 648

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 596 . . . . . 9 C. W. N. 370

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 610  
I. L. R. 28 All. 337  
10 C. W. N. 545; 564

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See LETTERS PATENT . 9 C. W. N. 566  
I. L. R. 32 Bom. 186

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5 B. L. R. 605; 13 Moo. I. A. 490  
16 W. R. 30  
123 W. R. 449

**PRIVY COUNCIL—cont'd.**

1. ———— Decree of affirmance or refusal—*Leave to appeal to Privy Council—Valuation.* In a Land Acquisition case the applicant claimed a sum of R77,000 odd as the value of the land taken; the Collector assessed the value at R28,287; the Judge on reference to him upheld the Collector's award. The applicant then preferred an appeal to the High Court valuing the appeal at R49,000 odd, being the difference between the Collector's award and the amount claimed. The High Court partially decreed the appeal by giving the petitioner an additional sum of about R7,000. The appellant then applied for leave to appeal to the Privy Council. *Held*, that the decree of the High Court was properly a decree of affirmance of the first Court's decree as regards the subject-matter of the proposed appeal and as there was no question of law the application ought to be refused. *SREE NATH ROY BAHADUR v. THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* (1904) . . . . . 8 C. W. N. 294

2. ———— Pauper suit—*Leave to appeal to Privy Council—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 595, 622—Letters Patent of 1865, s. 39—Order of the High Court under s. 622 allowing a party to sue in formá pauperis—Power of High Court to grant certificate as to fitness of appeal.* An order passed by the High Court under s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code deciding that a certain party should be allowed to sue in formá pauperis is not a final decree passed in an appeal within the meaning of s. 595 of the Civil Procedure Code, nor is it a final judgment made on appeal within the meaning of s. 39 of the Letters Patent of 1865. *Held*, in an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council against such an order, that the High Court had no power to grant a certificate as to the fitness of the appeal. *SAKAN SING v. GOPAL CHANDRA NEOGI* (1904) . . . . . 8 C. W. N. 296

3. ———— Interlocutory orders—*Letters Patent, cls. 13, 40—Leave to appeal—Jurisdiction, question of.* The High Court in the exercise of its Extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction removed to itself for trial a suit instituted in the Court of the Resident at Aden. On an application having been made for leave to appeal to the Privy Council:—*Held*, that the certificate prayed for should be given, for (i) even if the order to be appealed from was interlocutory, the High Court had discretion to grant the certificate under cl. 40 of the Amended Letters Patent; (ii) that the value of the subject-matter was R10,000; and (iii) the question raised was one of jurisdiction. *MUNICIPAL OFFICER, ADEN, v. ABDUL KARIM* (1904)  
I. L. R. 28 Bom. 292

4. ———— Agency Courts in Kathiawar—*Appeal—Governor of Bombay in Council—Relation of Kathiawar to the British Crown and nature of extent of control exercised over it—Suits, Civil and Political—Political Jurisdiction—Order of a King's Court injuriously affecting person not a British subject—King in Council, right of redress by.* The Province of Kathiawar is not wholly British Indian territory. The relation of the



**PRIVY COUNCIL—contd.**

Kathiawar States to the British Crown was that the Chiefs paid a forced tribute, but were otherwise independent. Political control was largely exercised over them, but the intervention was only with the object of maintaining peace, good order, and security: there was no assertion of territorial sovereignty; and no legislative power over the province was claimed. The nature and extent of the control exercised by the British Indian authorities over the administration of justice in Kathiawar were that all arrangements were carried out, not by legislative action, but by orders or resolutions of the Executive Government. In cases within the jurisdiction of the Chiefs, there was no judicial appeal to the British authorities. The Agency Courts dealt with the classes of cases withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the Chiefs, the functions of the Political Agent being not so much judicial as "diplomatic and controlling." Appeals from the Agency Courts lay, not to the High Court, but to the Governor of Bombay in Council, and thence to the Secretary of State for India, the whole system showing that the intention of Government was, and always had been, that the jurisdiction exercised in connexion with Kathiawar should be political and not judicial in its character. Two suits were instituted in, and determined by the Agency Courts in Kathiawar and by the Governor of Bombay in Council; one, to enforce a mortgage, was classed as a "Civil" case, and the other, to redeem a mortgage, was merely on account of the rank of the parties classed as "political." *Held*, that there was, for the purposes of these appeals, no substantial distinction between them, and that the relation of the Kathiawar States to the British Crown and the nature and extent of the control over them being as above, no appeal lay from the orders made in such suits to the King in Council. *Seem*: If a Court administering justice on the King's behalf makes an order, judicial in its nature, by which some one is unjustly and injuriously affected, the person aggrieved is not precluded from applying to the King in Council to redress his wrong, merely by the fact that he is not the King's subject. *HEMCHAND DEVCHAND v. AZAM SAKARLAL CHHOTAMLAL* (1905). **I. L. R. 33 Calc. 219** s.c. 10 C. W. N. 361 **L. R. 33 I. A. 1**

5. ——— Lower Court in framing rules acts in execution and its order is appealable under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An Order in Council discharged the decrees of the High Court and District Court and referred it to the latter to frame rules for carrying out a scheme of management directed by the said Order in Council. *Held*, that the Order in Council disposed of the same finally, and it was not intended to make a reference to the District Court under s. 17 of the Privy Council Act, 3 and 4 Will. IV, Cap. 41. If such a reference was contemplated, the referee would have to report and the case would have been adjourned pending the receipts of such report. The judgment and order clearly did not contemplate such a report, but disposed of the case finally

**PRIVY COUNCIL—concl'd.**

The District Judge, in framing the rules, did not act as referee, but in execution of the final decree in the case and his order framing the rules was appealable under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *PRAYAGA DOSS JEE VARU v. TIRUMALA PURISA SRIRANGA CHARYULU* (1908)

**I. L. R. 31 Mad. 406**

6. ——— "Decree"—Application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council—Limitation—High Court's refusal to admit appeal after period of limitation—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 595—"Final decree passed on appeal," meaning of. An order of the High Court refusing to admit an appeal after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the Limitation Act is not a "decree passed on appeal" by a High Court under s. 595 of the Civil Procedure Code and there is therefore no jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal therefrom to the Privy Council under clause (a) or (b) of that section. *Sunder Koer v. Chandishwar Prosad Singh*, **I. L. R. 30 Calc. 679**, followed. *KARSONDAS DHARAMSEY v. GANGABAI* (1907)

**I. L. R. 32 Bom. 108**

7. ——— Security for costs of respondents—Government Promissory Notes at their nominal value, whether acceptable—High Court Rules (Appellate Side), Part II, Chap. IV, Rule XX—Practice. A deposit of Government Securities amounting to R4,000, at their nominal value, comes within the express words of Rule XX, Part II, Chap. IV of the High Court Rules, requiring the appellant to deposit Government Securities "to the extent of R4,000" for costs of the respondent in an appeal to His Majesty in Council. *GOLAP KUMARI v. GANESH CHANDRA MITRA* (1909)

**I. L. R. 36 Calc. 653**

**PRIVY COUNCIL APPEALS ACT (VI OF 1874).**

*See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL.*

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13 C. W. N. 782

## 1. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE.

Rules of 31st of March 1871—  
*Vakil of High Court.* The words of ss. 2 and 3 of the Rules of 31st March 1871 are such that the classes of persons to be admitted to practise in the Privy Council must be either solicitors or others practising in London, or solicitors admitted by the High Court in India or in the Colonies, respectively, and have not left an undefined class admissible at the discretion of the Judicial Committee. *In the matter of the petition of TWIDALE*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 636  
L. R. 16 I. A. 163

## 2. RECORD, PREPARATION OF.

Decision limited to one of several issues of law—*Omission of immaterial matter in preparation of printed book.* In a suit in which the original Court had framed and decided several issues, the High Court on appeal confined their decision to the questions which in their opinion governed the case, leaving other issues undecided as not affecting the result after the decision to which they had come. Afterwards the suit was admitted to appeal in conformity with s. 603, Code of Civil Procedure. In the preparation of the printed copy of the record the question arose whether the copy should be made of the whole record, or of only so much of it as was material to the correctness of the High Court's decision.

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Their Lordships directed that only so much of the original record as bore upon, and was material to, the questions decided by the High Court, and the subject of the appeal, should be printed in the copy. *VENKATA SURIYA MAHIPATI RAM KRISHNA RAO v. COURT OF WARDS* I. L. R. 20 Mad. 395  
L. R. 24 I. A. 194

## 3. APPEALS FROM INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS.

There is no law which requires a suitor to appeal from interlocutory orders under penalty of forfeiting for ever the benefit of the consideration of the Appellate Court. The Privy Council have in many cases corrected erroneous interlocutory orders on the appeal of the whole cause coming before them. *MOHESHUR SINGH v. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA*

3 W. R. P. C. 45 : 7 Moo. I. A. 283

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1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 161 : 5 W. R. P. C. 21  
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*FORBES v. AMEEROONISSA BEGUM.*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 117  
5 W. R. P. C. 47  
10 Moo. I. A. 340

## 4. ENLARGING TIME FOR APPEAL.

Jurisdiction of Judicial Committee as to application to enlarge time for appeal. The Judicial Committee have no jurisdiction to entertain an application for extension of time to appeal until the petition of appeal is lodged. Where it appeared that an inquiry was pending before the Master in the Court below, arising out of the decree which was the subject of the appeal, the result of which might render the prosecution of the appeal unnecessary, the Judicial Committee enlarged the time prescribed by Rule 5 of the Order in Council of 13th June 1853 for prosecution thereof, until further order. *GUNGADHUR SEAL v. RADDAMONEY DOSSEE* 6 Moo. I. A. 209

## 5. SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL.

1. Form of petition—*Amendment of a petition too general and vague.* It is incumbent upon a party applying for special leave to appeal to set out in the petition a full statement of the facts and legal grounds, to show that there is a substantial case on the merits, and a point of law involved, proper to be determined by the Appellate Court. A petition for special leave to appeal contained a general statement of the proceedings in India, and an averment that they were irregular and contrary to law. Such petition ordered to be dismissed or to stand over for amendment as being too general and vague. On the amended petition, stating in detail the facts, and specially showing

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PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*5. SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL—*contd.*

legal grounds of objection to the decrees and order of the Court below refusing leave to appeal, special leave to appeal was granted. *GOREE MONEE DOSSEE v. JUGGUT INDRO NARAIN CHOWDHRY*

11 Moo. I. A. 1

2. ——— Application for special leave—*Omission of material facts—Costs.* A petition for special leave to appeal being *ex parte*, it is a universal and most important rule of the Court that every fact which is material to the determination of the question raised upon the petition should be truly and fairly stated, and where there is an omission of material facts, whether it arises from improper intention on the part of the petitioner, or whether it arises from accident or negligence, still the effect is the same, if the Court has been induced to make an order which, if the facts had been fully before it, it would not, or might not, have been induced to make. Where the Court was of opinion that there had been no intentional misrepresentation, and that there had been delay on the other side, it discharged an order giving special leave to appeal where an important fact had been kept from the Court, without costs, remarking that it would have thought it right, whether the mistake was intentional or not, to have given costs, had it not been for the delay. *MOHUN LALL SOOKUL v. BEBEE DOSS*

8 Moo. I. A. 193

3. ——— *Incorrect statement of facts—Incorrect statement as to valuation.* In this case the Privy Council originally gave leave to appeal, provided satisfactory evidence were supplied by the appellants to the Registrar of the Sudder Court that the real or market value of the land in dispute exceeded R10,000. This order was subsequently discharged as obtained upon an incorrect statement of the facts, it appearing afterwards that the appellants had satisfied the Registrar that the real or market value of the land exceeded R10,000. The appeal was restored, with a general suggestion that the terms of the Bengal Stamp Regulation (X of 1829) upon the subject of value should be carefully attended to. *MOHUN LALL SOOKUL v. DEBEE DASS DUTT*

2 W. R. P. C. 9

8 Moo. I. A. 492

4. ——— Reasons omitted in order admitting to review—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 626.* With reference to the requirement in s. 626 of the Civil Procedure Code that reasons should be recorded by the Judge granting an order of admission to review, the mere omission to record them was not held a ground for granting special leave to appeal from the order or from the decree, which was subsequently made. *SHANKAR BAKSH v. BULWANT SINGH. Ex parte SHANKAR BAKSH*

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 333

L. R. 27 I. A. 79

4 C. W. N. 203

5. ——— Counter-petition to dismiss appeal—*Leave to appeal granted ex parte.* If leave to appeal be granted *ex parte*, the respondent may, as a matter of course, present a counter-petition to

PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*5. SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL—*contd.*

dismiss the appeal. *SIBNARAIN GHOSE v. HULLODHUR DOSS*

6 Moo. I. A. 207

6. ——— Appeal in matter not strictly appealable—*Stat. 3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 41.* Where a matter has been referred by Her Majesty to the Judicial Committee which is not strictly an appealable grievance, their Lordships may, under the reservations contained in 3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 41, advise Her Majesty to grant the petitioner leave to appeal. *MORGAN v. LEECH*

2 Moo. I. A. 428

7. ——— Special leave where no application made in India—*Case under appealable value.* The Judicial Committee will not entertain an application for special leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council from a decree of the High Court where the subject-matter in suit is under the appealable value prescribed by ss. 39 and 40 of the Bombay Charter of 1682, unless the petitioner has applied to the High Court for such leave and has been refused. *GUNGOWA KOME MALUPA v. ERAWA KOME JOGAPA*

13 Moo. I. A. 433

8. ——— Special leave where application in India not made within time—*Order giving interest on amount of decree.* Leave to appeal was granted on payment of costs from an order of the Sudder Court at Bombay decreeing interest upon the amount awarded by the judgment of the Court, the appellant having failed to apply to the Court in India within six months as required by the Order in Council of 10th April 1838. *KIRKLAND v. MODEE PESTONJEE KHOORSHEDJEE*

3 Moo. I. A. 220

9. ——— Alteration of practice by High Court—*Appeal from original decree and order refusing review.* Pending proceedings before the High Court on an application for a review of judgment, that Court altered the then prevailing practice of permitting an appeal within six months from the date of the judgment allowing or refusing a review. In such circumstances, the six months prescribed by the Order in Council of the 16th April 1838 from the date of the decree having expired, special leave to appeal from the original decree and the order refusing a review was allowed. *NOGENDRO CHUNDER GHOSE v. MAHOMED EUSUFF*

12 Moo. I. A. 107

10. ——— Case under appealable value—*Subject-matter at issue exceeding appealable value.* Special leave to appeal granted, notwithstanding that no application had been made for such leave to the Court below, upon the allegation that, though the amount decreed was much under the appealable value, the original demand being necessarily limited by the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit was originally instituted, yet the subject-matter at issue exceeded in value the appealable amount. *MUTUSAWMY JAGAVERA YETTAPA NAIKER v. VENKATASWARA YETTEA*

10 Moo. I. A. 313

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 205



PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*5. SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL—*contd.*

11. ———— *Leave granted on terms—Provision for payment of compensation agreed on.* Where the Court grants leave to appeal under the general jurisdiction of the Queen in Council, it will impose such terms upon the party applying as the special circumstances of the case require. Appeal admitted from an order confirming the report of the commissioners in a partition suit, although the appealable value was under R10,000, the amount prescribed by the Order in Council of the 10th April 1838. The petitioner (the plaintiff) had offered to compensate the defendant if the report of the commissioners was varied. The Judicial Committee, in granting leave to appeal, put the petitioner upon terms of lodging in the Council office, within four months, a certificate of recognizance to the Queen in the sum of £1,500 for such compensation and costs as might be awarded. *In re SIBNARAIN GHOSE*

5 Moo. I. A. 322

12. ———— *Value of the subject-matter disputed.* The value of the subject-matter in dispute, though laid in the plaint at a sum exceeding the minimum amount, R10,000, was reduced on calculation by the Zillah Judge to an amount under that sum, and the finding on the merits was for the plaintiff for such reduced sum. In a cross-appeal the Sudder Court dismissed the entire claim, and on the ground that the matter in dispute was under the appealable value, refused leave to appeal to England. On special petition, leave to appeal was granted, the appellant claiming to open the question of the value of the subject-matter in question calculated by the Zillah Judge. *PRANNATH ROY CHOWDHRY v. SURNOMOYEE*

7 Moo. I. A. 553

13. ———— *Important principle of law involved.* Where an important principle of law was involved in the decision, special leave to appeal was granted, though the amount of damages recovered was under the appealable value. *ROGERS v. RAJENDRO DUTT*

2 W. R. P. C. 51 : 8 Moo. I. A. 103

*KERAKOOSE v. BROOKS.*

8 Moo. I. A. 339 : 4 W. R. P. C. 61

14. ———— *Question of public importance.* Where a question of great public importance arose, special leave was granted, though the subject-matter in dispute was under R10,000. *SUMBHOOLALL GIRDHURLALL v. COLLECTOR OF SURAT*

4 Moo. I. A. 1  
8 W. R. P. C. 55

15. ———— *Question on which the decision of many suits depended.* Special leave to appeal given in a case involving a question of tenure service, called chakeran, although the subject-matter in dispute was below the appealable value; there being many other suits depending on the decision of the case. *JOYKISSEN MOOKERJEE v. COLLECTOR OF EAST BURDWAN*

8 Moo. I. A. 265

PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*5. SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL—*contd.*

16. ———— *Leave granted on terms as to payment of costs—Question of jurisdiction.* The Supreme Court, in overruling the objections to the jurisdiction of the Court, refused leave to appeal, the subject-matter of the action being trifling and under the amount required by the rules of the Privy Council. On petition, the Judicial Committee granted leave to appeal, but upon terms of the East India Company paying the respondent's costs of the appeal, to enable him to appear, to prevent the question being argued *ex parte*. *SPOONER v. JUDDOW*

4 Moo. I. A. 353

17. ———— *Leave in suits consolidated by consent—Valuation.* Special leave to appeal granted in a suit which had been consolidated by consent of both parties. A defendant to a suit, having adopted a certain valuation, cannot in the same suit object to that valuation. *KRISTO INDRO SAHA v. HUROMONEE DOSSEE*

L. R. 11 A. 84

18. ———— *Decrees of the High Court made on cross-appeals—Procedure.* The High Court passed a separate decree on a cross-appeal identical in terms with those of a decree passed on the appeal in the same suit. From the latter decree an appeal to Her Majesty in Council was then declared by the High Court to be admitted under s. 603, Civil Procedure Code. But the defendant's application to have his appeal from the decree on the cross-appeal similarly admitted was refused. The Judicial Committee was of opinion that special leave should be granted to appeal from this decree, without further security being required than had already been taken in respect of the appeal in the other. *MUHAMMAD IKRAM-UD-DIN v. NAJIBAN*

I. L. R. 19 All. 95

L. R. 23 I. A. 167

19. ———— *Leave on appeal from a decree not final—Practice on erroneous construction of Charter.* On a special application to the King in Council, founded on the fact that the previous uniform practice of the Supreme Court at Madras, though upon an erroneous construction of the Charter, was to admit only appeals upon a final decree, leave to appeal was granted by the Privy Council. *EAST INDIA COMPANY v. ALLY*

7 Moo. I. A. 555

20. ———— *Order as to custody of child—Child with Christian father and Mahomedan mother.* Special leave to appeal allowed from an order of the High Court of Judicature for the North-West Provinces of India, by which order an infant daughter was taken from the custody of her mother, a Mahomedan, on the ground that the minor's deceased father had been a professed Christian, and her mother, who was, as the Court held, living in adultery, was inducing her daughter to adopt the faith and habits of a Mahomedan. Liberty given, pending the hearing of the appeal to the petitioner to apply to the High Court to have access at suitable times to her daughter. *In the matter of SKINNER, alias NAWSHABA BEGUM*

13 Moo. I. A. 532

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PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*5. SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL—*contd.*

21. ———— Order as to important question of law—Special leave to appeal was granted to try the question whether, under the Registration Act, 1871, a Zillah Judge can review an order of his own Court refusing to register a document. *REASUT HOSSEIN v. ABDOOLLAH*  
L. R. 1 I. A. 72

22. ———— Appeal from Non-Regulation Provinces—*Stat. 3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 41*. No provision by Statute or Charter being made for appeal to Her Majesty in Council from judgments of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, created on the annexation of that kingdom in the year 1858, the Judicial Committee, to prevent the denial of justice, admitted an appeal under *Stat. 3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 41*. *SALIK RAM v. AZIM ALI BEG*  
1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 117 : 8 Moo. I. A. 270

23. ———— Order suspending pleader for misconduct—*Act XX of 1865*. The High Court, acting regularly within its jurisdiction, suspended a pleader from practice for misconduct. The Judicial Committee, not being prepared to say, from the materials before it, that the High Court's conclusion on a pure question of fact was wrong, refused to grant special leave to appeal. It would not have followed, even if more doubt had been entertained on such a question, that an appeal would have been granted against Judges so acting. *In the matter of QUARRY*  
I. L. R. 2 All. 511 : L. R. 7 I. A. 6

24. ———— Leave to appeal on terms—*Counter-petition to revoke leave*. Leave to appeal on an *ex parte* application was, under the special circumstances, granted on terms of the appellant prosecuting the appeal and giving security for £500. No step was, however, taken by the appellant to perfect the security or prosecute the appeal. The respondents, on being served with the order admitting the appeal, filed a counter-petition to revoke the leave granted to appeal. The Judicial Committee under the circumstances, there having been great delay, made an order putting the appellant upon terms of lodging his petition of appeal within six weeks, or the appeal to stand dismissed, and enlarged the amount of the recognizance to £1,000 to cover the expenses occasioned by proceedings which, owing to appellant's delay in appealing, had taken place in the Master's office, reserving the costs of the application to revoke the leave to appeal until the hearing. *McKELLAR v. WALLACE*  
5 Moo. I. A. 372

25. ———— Time for making application—*Application nunc pro tunc—Special appeal, appeal from order on—Judgments of lower Court on facts*. Where a case has been heard by the High Court on special appeal, and on appeal to the Privy Council it is desired to include in the appeal the decisions of the lower Courts on the facts, an application for special leave to do so should be made previous to the hearing. The Judicial Committee will not, as a rule, allow a petition of appeal from

PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*5. SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL—*contd.*

those decisions to be put in at the hearing *nunc pro tunc*. *GOLAM ALI v. KALLY KISHEN THAKOOR*  
12 B. L. R. P. C. 107 : 18 W. R. 299

26. ———— Application *nunc pro tunc—Leave to appeal granted without authority—Preliminary objection*. An objection that an appeal has come before the Judicial Committee without proper authority ought to be taken at the earliest moment, but may be entertained at any stage of the appeal, and is not unfrequently heard when the appeal is called on and before the arguments on the merits have commenced. An appeal being called on, and before the case was gone into on the merits, the objection was taken by the respondent and appeared to be well founded. The appellant thereupon applied to the Judicial Committee to grant him special leave to appeal *nunc pro tunc*. Held, that it was competent to the Judicial Committee to grant such special leave, but leave was refused under the particular circumstances of the case. *GAJADHAR PERSAD v. WIDOWS OF EMAM ALI BEG* . . . . . 15 B. L. R. P. C. 221  
L. R. 2 I. A. 205

27. ———— Case under appealable value—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 600, 596—Privy Council, special leave to appeal to—Practice*. In preferring an appeal to the Privy Council, in a case which is under the appealable value, a person who asks for special leave to appeal should first apply to the High Court for a certificate, under the second part of s. 600, that the case "is otherwise a fit one for appeal." Special leave to appeal will be given only in cases which involve a substantial question of law. The word 'and,' in the first part of s. 596, means 'and,' and not 'or.' *MOTI CHAND v. GANGA PERSHAD SINGH (1901)* . . . . . I. L. R. 24 All. 174  
s.c. 6 C. W. N. 362  
L. R. 29 I. A. 40

28. ———— Value of subject-matter in dispute—*Special leave to appeal—Suit for damages for more than Rs10,000 dismissed on appeal—No assessment of amount of damages by first Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 596—Refusal of leave to appeal by High Court*. The Judicial Committee granted special leave to appeal in a case in which the petitioner had sued for Rs30,000, but his suit had been dismissed without any assessment of the amount of damages recoverable and the High Court had, under s. 596 of the Civil Procedure Code, refused leave to appeal to the Privy Council on the ground that the petitioner had not shown that the case was necessarily of the proper appealable value. *IKRAMUL HUQ v. WILKIE (1906)* . . . . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 893  
s. c. L. R. 33 I. A. 106  
11 C. W. N. 946

29. ———— Native Appellate Court of New Zealand—*Special leave—Petition, if lies—Prerogative of Crown—Exclusion must be express—Forfeiture of rights by Sovereign and subject—Decision declared final and conclusion by Statute—*



PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*5. SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL—*concl'd.*

*Effect.* The Native Appellate Court and the Native Land Court of New Zealand have been given exclusive jurisdiction over the civil rights of natives in land and in matters of succession, probate and administration, the object being to provide for determination of disputes among the natives according to their own customs. The Statute, which constituted the Native Appellate Court, declares that the decisions of the Court shall be "final and conclusive." *Held*, that this does not exclude a petition to His Majesty for leave to appeal. The Native Appellate Court was given jurisdiction over matters which but for its creation would have been subject to the jurisdiction of the ordinary law Courts, and the exclusion of the right to appeal would therefore be a forfeiture of existing rights on the part of Sovereign and subject. *Theberge v. Landry*, L. R. 2 A. C. 102, and *Cushing v. Dupuy*, L. R. 5 A. C. 419. *In the matter of the Will of Wi Matua* (1908) . . . 12 C. W. N. 1081

## 6. LEAVE TO DEFEND APPEAL.

1. ———— Appeal by one of two defendants severed in defence—*Alternative liability.* Two sets of defendants severed in their defence (their interest involving an alternative as to which was responsible to the plaintiff), and the Court below fixed one set of the defendants with liability. On an appeal in which the plaintiff was made sole respondent, the other defendants were held entitled to appear, and to lodge a separate case. *EAST INDIA COMPANY v. ROBERTSON* . . . 7 Moo. I. A. 361

2. ———— Allowing respondent to defend after great delay in appearing—*Leave on terms.* Where the respondent did not appear, the appeal was after two years set down for hearing *ex parte*. Before the hearing, the respondent appeared, and moved under special circumstances to postpone the hearing for six months to enable him to lodge his case. The Judicial Committee put him upon terms of having the appeal heard at the next sittings, restraining him from doing anything in the interval to the prejudice of the fund in the Court below, and with payment of the costs of the application. *WATSON v. SREEMUNT LALL KHAN* . . . 5 Moo. I. A. 447

3. ———— Delay of respondents in entering appearance—*Service of peremptory notice on respondent.* No appearance having been entered by the respondents to an appeal from India, and the appellants being ready with their case for hearing, their Lordships, on the application of the appellant, made an order that the respondents should be served with notice that, unless they brought in their case without delay, the appeal would be heard *ex parte*, giving the appellant liberty to proceed in the Court below, to render such service effectual, and the Court was ordered to certify to the Judicial Committee what had been done with respect to the same. *WISE v. KISHEN COOMAR BOSE* . . . 4 Moo. I. A. 201

PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*

## 7. CROSS-APPEAL.

1. ———— Admission of cross-appeal after time—*Admission on conditions.* A cross-appeal from a decree of the Sudder Court in India, although not interposed within the proper time, admitted upon conditions (i) of the principal appeal being prosecuted, and (ii) that the principal and cross-appeals be consolidated and heard on one printed case. *OMANATH CHOWDHRY v. NUJEEB CHOWDHRY* . . . 8 Moo. I. A. 498

2. ———— Mistake of respondents as to practice. Cross-appeal allowed from part of a decree of the Sudder Court appealed from to England, although the respondents had not applied in India for leave to appeal within the proper time; the respondents being mistaken in the practice of the Judicial Committee upon a cross-appeal. Such cross-appeal directed to be prosecuted and heard upon one printed case if the principal appeal was proceeded with; but in the event of the principal appeal being dismissed for want of prosecution, liberty was reserved to the respondents to prosecute the cross-appeal as a separate appeal. *NANA NARAIN RAO v. HURREE PUNT BHAO* . . . 6 Moo. I. A. 464

3. ———— Leave given at hearing to bring cross-appeal in order to open out whole decree—*Appeal from part of decree.* In an appeal from part of a decree the whole decree is not open to the respondents. Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, however, leave was given to present a cross-appeal, and the appellants not objecting, the appeal was heard from the whole decree. *MYNA BOYEE v. OOTTORAM* . . . 2 W. R. P. C. 4 : 8 Moo. I. A. 400

## 8. VALUATION OF APPEAL.

1. ———— Mode of valuation—*Appeal to Privy Council—Appealable value—Stamp on plaint—Beng. Reg. X of 1829, s. 17.* In estimating the appealable value for an appeal to the Privy Council by order of 10th April 1838, *viz.*, R10,000, regard should be had to the whole matter involved in the suit, and not to the value of a fractional part of the property sought to be recovered. A suit was brought to recover a zamindari in the possession of different persons under deeds of sale in execution of a decree. The value of the property was, by Bengal Regulation X of 1829, stated in the plaint to be R14,325. The Sudder Court upheld the sales so far as related to the claim of some of the defendants. The other defendants applied for leave to appeal to England, which the Sudder Court refused, on the ground that, as the value of their portion was only RS,215, it was not within the appealable value; but this construction was overruled by the Judicial Committee, and leave was granted to appeal. *Quære*: Whether the stamp on the plaint required by Regulation X of 1829, s. 17, being for fiscal purposes only, is conclusive of the value of the property sued for. *AMEENA KHATOON v. RADHABENOD MISSEER* . . . 7 Moo. I. A. 261



PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*8. VALUATION OF APPEAL—*contd.*

2. ———— **Test of value of property—Market value—Appeal to Privy Council.** By Bengal Regulation X of 1829, the test of the value of the property in suit is the selling or market value. *MOHUN LALL SOOKUL v. BEBEE DOSS*

8 Moo. I. A. 193

3. ———— **Case under appealable value unless by addition of interest after decree—Discretion of Judicial Committee.** Leave to appeal to the Privy Council is to be given in cases where the petition is presented within the prescribed period, and the value of the matter in dispute in the appeal amounts to R10,000, including interest up to the decree. The grant of leave to appeal in cases where the specified amount of R10,000 can only be reached by the addition of interest subsequent to the decree is in the discretion of the Privy Council. *SUTEESCHUNDER ROY v. GUNES CHUNDER. SURNOMOYEE v. SUTEESCHUNDER ROY. GOOROPERSAD KHOOND v. JUGGUT CHUNDER*

3 W. R. P. C. 14  
8 Moo. I. A. 164 to 166

4. ———— **Abandonment on appeal of part of amount of claim—Reduction of claim to below prescribed limit of appealable amount.** The defendants, having a *bona fide* intention to appeal in respect of the whole amount decreed, obtained the certificate and admission of their appeal as competent within the Code of Civil Procedure. Afterwards, in their printed case and at the hearing they withdrew part of their appeal, reducing, by so doing, the amount in dispute to one below the limit prescribed for appeals, where there is no special leave obtained. *Held*, that this did not render the appeal incompetent. *KALKA SINGH v. PARAS RAM*

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 434  
L. R. 22 I. A. 68

5. ———— **Addition of costs of suit to principal sum—Appealable value—Appeal to Privy Council.** Costs of suit cannot be added to the principal sum and interest in calculating the appealable value of R10,000, the amount restricted by the Order in Council of the 10th April 1838. *DOORGA DOSS CHOWDRY v. RAMANAUTH CHOWDRY*

8 Moo. I. A. 262

6. ———— **Actual value of property in suit—Valuation in plaint—Evidence.** Appeal admitted from the Sudder Court at Calcutta in a case where the land sued for was laid in the plaint as under R10,000 upon evidence stating the value of the property much to exceed that sum. *GOURMONEY DEBIA v. ABDOL GUNNY*

8 Moo. I. A. 268

7. ———— **Valuation in plaint—Evidence.** The amount of the stamp upon the plaint is not conclusive of the value of the subject-matter of the suit. By the procedure of the Native Courts the value of the suit for the purpose of the stamp duty is assessed at three times the annual rent payable to Government in respect of the property sued for. *Held*, on an *ex parte*

PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*8. VALUATION OF APPEAL—*concl.*

petition for leave to appeal in a case in which the value was laid in the plaint as being under R10,000, that as the calculation was estimated with reference to the stamp duty only, leave to appeal would be granted conditionally upon the production of satisfactory evidence in India by the petitioner, and transmitted with the transcript, that the real or market value of the property exceeded R10,000 otherwise the leave granted to be null and of no effect. *MOHUN LALL SOOKUL v. BEBEE DOSS*

7 Moo. I. A. 428

8. ———— **Consolidation of suits under appealable value—Stat. 21 Geo. III, c. 70, s. 21.** Upon the construction of the Stat. 21 Geo. III, c. 70, s. 21, it was held that two suits (each for less than R50,000, but both for more than that amount), in which separate judgments were given, could not be consolidated for the purpose of permitting an appeal to the Privy Council; each judgment, when pronounced, having been final and conclusive. *MAHOMED UBDOLLAH v. MOTEECHUND*

5 W. R. P. C. 34 : 1 Moo. I. A. 363

9. ———— **Several suits each under appealable value—Suits as to same question of law—Leave to appeal granted on condition.** Five separate suits were brought by the same plaintiff against the same defendants in which the same question of law was raised. The amount involved in each suit was under R10,000, the appealable value, although in the aggregate the amounts claimed exceeded that sum. Leave to appeal in the suits was granted upon the undertaking that the parties consented within two months, by a proceeding before the Sudder Court, to abide by the decision of the Privy Council in the first appeal, as governing the four other appeals, when the Registrar of the Sudder Court was to transmit only the transcript of the first suit; otherwise the five transcripts to be remitted in the ordinary course. *GOPAL LALL THAKOOR v. TELUK CHUNDER RAI*

7 Moo. I. A. 548

9. STAY OF PROCEEDINGS IN INDIA  
PENDING APPEAL.

1. ———— **Refusal to stay proceedings—Appeal specially admitted by Privy Council.** By a decree of the Sudder Court at Calcutta a suit was remanded to the Zillah Court to be tried *de novo*. An appeal to England from this decree was refused, but, upon special application, was admitted by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; whereupon the appellant applied to the High Court at Calcutta to stay proceedings pending the appeal to England, on the ground that the decision of the Appellate Court would govern the question at issue, which application that Court refused. The appellant then presented a petition to Her Majesty in Council, and applied *ex parte* for the same relief, but the Judicial Committee, in the respondent's absence, refused to make any order, though without prejudice to the petitioner's further application.



PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*9. STAY OF PROCEEDINGS IN INDIA PENDING APPEAL—*contd.*

when he had served the respondent. *PERLADH SEIN v. BHODDOO SINGH* . 10 Moo. I. A. 78

2. ——— Application to stay proceedings without appealing from order refusing to stay them—*Appeal from order of remand—Delay in applying.* Application to stay proceedings in a cause in which an appeal from an order in the nature of an interlocutory order is pending before Her Majesty in Council ought satisfactorily to show that a serious injury will be the result to the party applying unless the delay asked for be granted, and that the party applying has come promptly to make the application. Where therefore an appellant from an order of the High Court of Judicature, which remitted back a cause appealed to that Court from the Zillah Court for the trial of issues framed in accordance with the provisions of Act XIII of 1859, s. 139, having failed in obtaining an order from the High Court to stay proceedings in the Zillah Court pending the appeal, but not having appealed from that decision, presented a petition to Her Majesty in Council praying that all proceedings in the remanded suit might be stayed till the pending appeal had been heard, the Judicial Committee, without determining the question of their right to interfere in such circumstances, held that the petitioner had not shown any such injury, or used such expedition as entitled him to ask for a stay of proceedings. *Quare.*—Whether, where an order has been made by the superior Court below refusing to stay proceedings, and such order is not especially appealed from, the Judicial Committee have any authority to interfere, though an appeal is pending before them from a previous order of the superior Court made in the same suit, remitting the cause back to the inferior Court before which it is pending. *SIDHEE NUZUR ALLY KHAN v. OOOJODHYARAM KHAN*

10 Moo. I. A. 322 : 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 185

3. ——— Stay of proceedings on recognizances—*Abandonment of appeal—Vacation of recognizance pending appeal.* Recognizance entered into to abide the determination of an appeal vacated upon petition of the appellant upon the abandonment of the appeal. *REED v. GOURMOXEY DABEE* . . . . . 6 Moo. I. A. 490

4. ——— Stay of proceedings in India pending appeal—*Protection of property pending an appeal by special leave—Order for stay of proceedings—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Ch. XLV.* Special leave of Her Majesty in Council was obtained for the filing an appeal from a decree of the High Court affirming the dismissal of the petitioner's suit. The High Court rejected his application as plaintiff (appellant) for an order staying execution and continuing the possession of a manager of the estate in litigation pending the result of the appeal. The rejection was grounded

PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*9. STAY OF PROCEEDINGS IN INDIA PENDING APPEAL—*contd.*

on the absence of authority for this purpose, the High Court being authorized in their judgment only to make such an order in regard to appeals admitted by themselves. On the petition that the High Court's decision might be reversed or such order made as would protect the property to abide the ultimate disposal of the suit, their Lordships were of opinion that direct interference to continue the management or to appoint a Receiver was impracticable. But that, on the other hand, interference had, on occasions, been effected where, the appellant being in possession, an order for stay of proceedings had maintained the existing state of things. Therefore, an order staying proceedings should now be recommended by them, the petitioner being answerable in damages, and any aggrieved respondent having leave to move for the discharge of the order. *MOHESCHANDRA DHAL v. SATRUGHAN DHAL* . . . . . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 1

*Ex parte MOHESCHANDRA DHAL.*

L. R. 26 I. A. 284  
4 C. W. N. 31

5. ——— *Appeal to Privy Council—Stay of proceedings pending appeal—Application to be made to the Court in India in the first instance—Conditional order for stay—Costs.* Application for stay of proceedings pending an appeal to the Judicial Committee ought always to be made, in the first instance, at any rate, to the Court in India, which has ample power to deal with the matter according to the circumstances of the particular case, and has knowledge of details, which the Judicial Committee cannot possess on an interlocutory application. Application was granted in the special circumstances of this case, on the appellant giving an undertaking for expediting the hearing of the appeal, and leave was given to the respondent to apply to the Court in India for the appointment of a Receiver or for payment by the appellant of a reasonable amount in Court or any other relief as he may be advised. Appellant to pay the costs of the application in any event. *VASUDEVA MODELIER v. SADAGOPA MODELIER* (1906) . . . . . 10 C. W. N. 945

6. ——— Stay of execution—*Application to set aside order of Court in India for execution pending appeal.* An application to rescind an order of the Sudder Court at Madras for the execution of a decree pending an appeal, and for an order to stay execution, refused on the ground of the length of time that had elapsed from the making of the order, and the probability of its having been acted on in India. *In re BOMMARANJEE BAHADUR* 5 Moo. I. A. 298

7. ——— Refusal of order staying execution where decree was not yet appealed to the Privy Council, but leave to appeal from interlocutory orders in execution granted—*Security for performance of order to be*



PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*9. STAY OF PROCEEDINGS IN INDIA PENDING APPEAL—*concl'd.*

*made by Her Majesty in Council—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 608—Intimation to Court below.* A party to a suit in an Appellate Court, who had obtained leave to appeal from its decree to Her Majesty in Council, petitioned for the order of the latter staying execution of interlocutory orders made in execution of such decree, and directing payment by the petitioner to the opposite party of large sums without security taken for their repayment in the event of the decree being reversed. This accompanied a petition for special leave to appeal against those orders. The latter was granted, but it not being competent to the Judicial Committee to make any order as to the stay of execution, an intimation was made by it to the Court below that it appeared to be the reasonable course that the opposite party should not, pending the appeal, be put into possession of the large sums in dispute. That intimation being made, the petitioner might apply to the Court below for the due security of all money paid into the Treasury in obedience to the decree. *Shidhee Nazir Ali Khan v. Oojoodhyaram Khan*, 10 Moo. I. A. 322, and *Jariutool Batool v. Hosseinee Begum*, 10 Moo. I. A. 196, referred to. *INDER KUMARI v. JAIPAL KUMARI* . . . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 290  
L. R. 14 I. A. 1

8. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 608, sub-s. (c).* The High Court having, under s. 603, sub-s. (a), of the Civil Procedure Code, declared the admission of an appeal from their decree, refused an order, applied for under s. 608, sub-s. (c), for staying execution pending the appeal, the two Judges constituting the Court differing as to whether or not the case was such that the application should be granted. Their Lordships decided that the execution of the decree should be stayed pending the appeal. An order of Her Majesty in Council followed to that effect. *CHATRAPAT SINGH DURGA v. DWARKANATH GHOSE*  
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 1  
L. R. 21 I. A. 70

See (the latest Case) *NIRYAMONI DAS v. MADHU SUDAN SEN*  
I. L. R. 38 Calc. 335

## 10. WITHDRAWAL OF APPEAL.

Application for dismissal of appeal by agreement—*Arrangement between parties.* A petition to dismiss an appeal from the Sudder Court in India, and for an order directing that Court to carry into execution the terms of a deed of compromise, upon which the withdrawal of the appeal was founded, refused. All that the Privy Council will do in such circumstances is to make an order of dismissal, reserving to the parties leave to apply to the Court in India to take further proceedings in pursuance of such agreement. *SUTTI CHURN GHOSAL v. MUDDEN KISHORE INDOO*  
5 Moo. I. A. 107

PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*

## 11. INSOLVENCY OF APPELLANT.

Effect of insolvency of appellant on appeal—*Procedure—Adjournment to allow Official Assignee to appear.* After an appeal from Calcutta had been set down for hearing, intelligence was received shortly before the day appointed for hearing that the appellant had been adjudged an insolvent under the Indian Insolvent Act, 11 & 12 Vict., c. 21. On the appeal being opened, the Court postponed the hearing for six months, to enable the Official Assignee in insolvency in Calcutta to revive the appeal and prosecute the same, and in default the appeal to be dismissed; and directed the respondents to serve the Official Assignee in India with such notice. No steps having been taken by the Official Assignee within the time limited for prosecution, their Lordships refused a further extension of time and dismissed the appeal. *GOOROO CHURN SEIN v. RADHANATH SEIN*

7 Moo I. A. 1

## 12. DEATH OF PARTY ON RECORD.

1. ———— *Practice relating to substitution of parties on revivor—Representative character to be ascertained by lower Court.* On the death of a party on the record of an appeal pending before Her Majesty in Council, proof must be given in the Court from which the appeal has been preferred of the representative character of the person or persons by or against whom revivor is sought. There ought to be some finding of the Court below; which also should give its own opinion as to who are the parties proper to be substituted upon the record. A certificate or statement on which their Lordships can act should be made by the Court below. *HAIDAR ALI v. TASSADUK RASUL. Ex parte HAIDAR ALI*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 184  
L. R. 16 I. A. 209

2. ———— *Death of respondent after hearing and before judgment—Addition of parties.* Where the respondent, a widow and heir, died after the case had been argued, and in consequence the inheritance ceased to be represented in the suit, and there was no one in whose presence certain necessary accounts could properly be taken against the widow, the Judicial Committee, after adding the heir, thought it unnecessary to delay the decree, but let it rest with the plaintiff, the appellant, to apply to the Court below to add the necessary parties. *SURENDRO KESHUB ROY v. DOORGASOONDERY DOSSEE* I. L. R. 19 Calc. 513  
L. R. 19 I. A. 108

See *CHETAN CHARAN DAS v. BALBHADRA DAS* . . . I. L. R. 21 All. 314

## 13. SUBSTITUTION OF APPELLANT.

Procedure—*Security for costs—Terms as to costs.* An appellant, after the transmission of his appeal to England, obtained leave in the High Court to withdraw it. The appeal involved the rights of a minor, party to the suit, whose mother and guardian obtained an order for



**PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—contd.****13. SUBSTITUTION OF APPELLANT—concl'd.**

her to be substituted for the withdrawing appellant, on the terms that she should give security to the satisfaction of the High Court for costs already ordered, and should undertake to abide by any order as to general costs. *GOUR MOHUN CHAKRABATI v. TARASUNDERI DEBI*

**I. L. R. 17 Calc. 693**

**14. DISMISSAL OF APPEAL FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION.**

1. ———— **Delay in taking proceedings after admission of appeal.** An appeal was allowed in October 1854 by the Supreme Court at Calcutta to England. After the allowance of the appeal, no further steps were taken by the appellant. In March 1856 the Judicial Committee, upon a certificate of the Registrar of the Supreme Court that no further proceedings had been taken after the order allowing the appeal, dismissed the appeal at the instance of the respondents for want of prosecution. *RABUTTY DOSSEE v. RADHANATH SEIN*

**6 Moo. I. A. 346**

2. ———— **On special application, permission to appeal was granted in December 1860, on the condition of the appellant depositing with the Registrar of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council the sum of £300 for costs.** The record was transmitted from India and the respondent brought in his printed case, but the appellant, though served with a peremptory notice, did not lodge his case or take any other step in the matter. In such circumstances, on application by the respondent, the appeal was dismissed, and the respondent's costs directed to be paid out of the sum deposited in the Council office, the balance to be returned to the appellant. *GOURMONEE DEBIA v. ABDOL GUNNEE*

**10 Moo. I. A. 59**

3. ———— **Failure to deposit security.** Six months having elapsed without the appellant having lodged the required security, the respondent applied to dismiss the appeal for non-performance of that condition. As it appeared that the appellant's agent was in daily expectation of funds from India, the case was, on the appellant paying the costs of the day, ordered to stand over for three months, for the appellant to perform the condition; in failure thereof the appeal to stand dismissed. *HURROSOONDREE DIBIAH v. PRAN KISHEN SINGH*

**7 Moo. I. A. 16**

4. ———— **Application to the Court in India by infant on coming of age to withdraw from the suit—Guardian and ward.** An infant appellant, in an appeal pending in the Privy Council, having come of age, and having petitioned the High Court, in India to be allowed to withdraw from the suit:—*Held*, that it was competent to the respondent in England to have the appeal dismissed for want of prosecution, although the guardian had given security for the costs and paid the expenses of the appeal, and although the (former) infant was not served with notice of the motion, the Council being satisfied that he had in

**PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—contd.****14. DISMISSAL OF APPEAL FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION—concl'd.**

the High Court petitioned for leave to withdraw. *BISTUPRYA PATMADAYI v. BASUDEB DHALL BEWARTI PATNAIK*

**6 B. L. R. 190 : 15 W. R. P. C. 19**

*S.C. BISTOOPRIA PUTMADAYE v. NUND DHUL.*

**13 Moo. I. A. 602**

**15. RESTORATION OF APPEAL.**

1. ———— **Appeal dismissed through "unavoidable accident"—Acts XV<sub>1</sub> of 1845, XXIX of 1841, and XV of 1853, s. 6—Costs.** Act XVI of 1845, amending Act XXIX of 1841, enacts that it is competent to the Sudder Court in the case of the dismissal of an appeal for want of prosecution, upon the application of the appellant within three months after the appeal has been dismissed, to re-admit the appeal, if the appellant satisfies the Court that the dismissal was "occasioned by the default of his vakil or by unavoidable accident." An appeal was made to the Sudder Court at Calcutta, but in consequence of the absence from illness of the appellant's mukhtar the written reasons of appeal were not lodged within six weeks, the time prescribed by Act XV of 1853, s. 6, and the appeal was dismissed. Upon application for re-admission of the appeal, the evidence showed that there had been no wilful delay, and that the appellant was in ignorance of the fact of the reasons of appeal not having been filed. *Held*, reversing the decree of the Sudder Court, that such circumstances constituted a case of "unavoidable accident" within the meaning of Act XVI of 1845, and the appeal was ordered to be re-admitted on the file of pending causes. In reversing the decree of the Sudder Court, the order of that Court that the costs of the application to re-admit the appeal should be paid by the appellants, was confirmed; but as the appellants were successful in obtaining a reversal of the decree of the Court below, the costs of the appeal in England against such decree were ordered to be paid by the respondents. *ANUNDMOYEE DOSSEE v. POORNO CHUNDER ROY*

**9 Moo. I. A. 26**

2. ———— **Appeal dismissed by reason of guardian absconding and abandoning case—Power to rectify mistakes in orders.** By the Common Law the Judicial Committee possesses the same power as the Courts of Record and Statute have, of rectifying mistakes which have crept in by misprision or otherwise in embodying its judgments. Where therefore an order had been made *ex parte* upon the appearance of the respondents alone for the dismissal of an appeal, and affirmance of the judgment of the Court below which purported to be upon the hearing of the cause, the Judicial Committee *held* that such order must be taken simply as a dismissal; and it appearing that the appellants were infants under the protection of the Court of Wards in India, and that the agent appointed by the Court to act as their guardian *ad litem* in the matter of the appeal had absconded



PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*15. RESTORATION OF APPEAL—*contd.*

and abandoned the cause, their Lordships rescinded the order of dismissal, and restored the appeal on the terms of the appellant's paying the costs and giving access to the transcript of the proceedings in the Court below, in their hands, and undertaking to lodge the case within five months. *RAJINDER NARAIN RAE v. BIJAI GOVIND SINGH*

2 Moo. I. A. 181

3. ———— *Appeal dismissed for want of prosecution—Ignorance of necessary proceedings.* Where an appeal had been dismissed for want of prosecution, no step having been taken in it for ten years, the appeal was, on petition to the King in Council, restored, the appellant paying the costs of dismissal and restoration; it appearing that the appellant was ignorant of the proceedings necessary to be taken in England, and that he had, though after the lapse of some years, instructed a commercial house in Calcutta to prosecute the appeal, but whose agent in England becoming insolvent, no proceedings were taken to bring the case to a hearing. *DEEDAR HOSSEIN v. ZUHOORONNISSA*

2 Moo. I. A. 441

4. ———— *Delay in receipt by agent of appellant of the transcript.* Leave given to restore an appeal dismissed for want of prosecution, the appellant's agent, though instructed to prevent the dismissal of the appeal, not having received the transcript until after the expiration of a year and a day from the time of the allowance of the appeal, and the respondent having in consequence thereof obtained an order of dismissal. *BISSNOSOONDERY DABEE v. BURRODACAUNT ROY*

2 Moo. I. A. 127

5. ———— *Ignorance of existence of new rules.* Appeal restored after being dismissed for want of effectual prosecution within the time limited by the 5th rule of the Order in Council of 13th June 1853, the new rules having been only recently adopted by the Sudder Court at Calcutta, and the appellant, in ignorance of their existence, being engaged in taking steps to prosecute the appeal within the time and according to the practice previously existing. *GUDADHUR PURSHAD TEWAREE v. SOONDERKOOMAREE*

6 Moo. I. A. 201

*SETO LUCHMEECHUND v. SETO ZORAWAR MULL*

6 Moo. I. A. 204

6. ———— *Abandonment of appeal—Stat. 8 & 9 Vict., c. 30, s. 2.* In circumstances showing conflicting and opposite decisions by the Sudder Court upon the same question at issue between the same parties, an appeal treated under Stat. 8 & 9 Vict., c. 30, s. 2, as abandoned for non-prosecution, was restored upon terms of paying costs and undertaking to lodge cases forthwith and to lodge security or a bond in England to the amount of £500. Where an appeal has been treated as abandoned under 8 & 9 Vict., c. 30, s. 2, their Lordships have no power to grant leave to institute a new appeal; only a discretion to allow

PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*15. RESTORATION OF APPEAL—*concl.*

the original appeal to be restored. *HURROSOONDREE DEBIAH v. PRAN KISHEN SINGH*

6 Moo. I. A. 491

7. ———— *Consolidation of dismissed appeal with another pending.* Leave given to restore an appeal dismissed for want of prosecution, the Court below having consolidated it with another appeal in the same cause which was still pending. *SUROOP CHUNDER SIRCAR CHOWDRY v. RAMRUTTON MULLICK*

1 Moo. I. A. 358

8. ———— *Application for restoration of case—Security for costs of appeal.* Application for restoration of appeal acceded to in consideration of the interests of infants being involved in the case, and of the state of that part of India when the matter arose in and after 1857, on the condition of deposit of further security, and of the prosecution of the appeal within a certain time. The security in India was held to have gone by the dismissal of the appeal for default of prosecution. *BIRJOBUTTEE v. PERTAB SINGH*

3 W. R. P. C. 36 : 8 Moo. I. A. 168

9. ———— *Security on restoration of appeal—Deposit of costs.* Where Government securities for the due prosecution of the appeal and costs were deposited in the registry of the Sudder Court, the Judicial Committee in restoring the appeal dispensed with the usual recognizance in England. *SETO LUCHMEECHUND v. SETO ZORAWAR MULL*

6 Moo. I. A. 204

10. ———— *Petition to restore an appeal—Terms under which it was restored.* Under rule 5 of the Orders in Council of the 13th June 1893, an appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution on the 8th October 1896. The record had been received on the 15th January 1896, and since then no steps had been taken. The delay having been explained, and the cause of it considered sufficient, the appeal was restored to the file, on conditions as to costs, and on security to be given in England. *RABIABAI v. MAHOMED ISMAIL KHAN*

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 723

L. R. 24 I. A. 128

## 16. REMISSION OF CASE TO INDIA.

1. ———— *Refusal to consider documentary evidence not sent with record.* The Privy Council will not act as a Court of Original Jurisdiction; therefore, where the Judge of the Court below improperly suppressed documents which were not discovered until after the transmission of appeal to Her Majesty in Council, their Lordships refused to give an opinion on the merits and remitted the case to India for reconsideration. *JUVEERBHAE v. VURUJBHAE*

3 Moo. I. A. 324

2. ———— *Remand to take fresh evidence—Refusal of Court below to consider evidence.* Where the lower Courts, on the ground that the defendant's title under a sanad was absolute, declined to consider evidence which the plaintiff



PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*

16. REMISSION OF CASE TO INDIA—*concl'd.*  
relied on as showing that the defendant really held for him as a trustee, the case was remanded by the Judicial Committee in order that such evidence might be received and considered. *SHERE BAHADUR SING v. THAKURAIN DABIAO KUAR*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 645

3. ——— Reversal in former analogous case—*Case decided by High Court as involving question already decided.* The High Court dismissed an appeal from the Zillah Court on the ground that it involved the same question as had been decided by them in another suit brought by the plaintiff in respect of the validity of a *zur-i-peshgi* deed. The decision in the prior suit was on appeal reversed by the Judicial Committee. In such circumstances, on the appeal from the later decision coming on for hearing *ex parte*, their Lordships, with the consent of the appellant, remitted the case to the High Court, with a declaration that the deed was valid; and with directions that, if the respondent did not appear within a reasonable time, to be fixed by the High Court, to dismiss the appeal from the Zillah Court and in the event of the respondent appearing, then to hear the case on the merits. *KALEEPERSHAD TEWAREE v. LALLA BINDA LALL* . . . 12 Moo. I. A. 343

4. ——— Form of decree of High Court—*General decree affirming Court below without details where lower Court merely reverses first Court.* A suit for possession and redemption in which a third party intervened on the claim that the plaintiff had conveyed to him half of the property in dispute, was dismissed. On appeal by the plaintiff in which the intervenor did not appear, the lower Appellate Court merely reversed the decree of the first Court, and the High Court affirmed the decree of the lower Appellate Court. The Privy Council, while affirming the decree of the High Court, observed that the question as to the form of the decree ought to have been raised before the High Court, if it was thought that the decree was not sufficient to found execution upon, so that the details of the decree might have been stated; and they remanded the case to the High Court to amend their decree in conformity with their judgment by declaring affirmatively what the plaintiff was entitled to recover. *LALA SHAM SOONDUR LAL v. SOORAJ LAL* 26 W. R. P. C. 48

## 17. PRACTICE AS TO OBJECTIONS.

1. ——— Formal objections. The practice of the Privy Council has been never to favour objections merely of form. *MOKUDDIMS OF MOUZA KUNKUNWADY v. ENAMDAR BRAHMINS OF MOUZA SOORPAL*

7 W. R. P. C. 8 : 3 Moo. I. A. 383

2. ——— Pleadings—*Matters of form—Refusal to insist upon.* In reviewing proceedings of the Courts in India where the Hindu and Mahomedan laws are the rule, and where the forms of pleadings are wholly different from

PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*17. PRACTICE AS TO OBJECTIONS—*contd.*

those in use in Courts where the law of England prevails, the Privy Council will look to the essential justice of the case, not considering whether matters of form have been strictly attended to. *GIRDHAREE SINGH v. KOOLAHUL SINGH*

6 W. R. P. C. 1 : 2 Moo. I. A. 344

3. ——— Technical objections—*Fresh grounds—Question of disputed consent to arbitration.* In the examination of such questions as whether, as alleged, the consent of one of the parties to an arbitration was obtained by threats, the Privy Council will look to the broad principles of justice and equity, and discourage mere technical objections, and the invention of new grounds of dispute which were not even mentioned at the commencement of the suit. *PURVATHA VURDHAY NAUCHIAR v. JAYAVERA RAMAKOMARA ETTYAPA NAICKER*

4 W. R. P. C. 31

S.C. ZAMINDAR OF RAURNAD v. ZAMINDAR OF YELTIAPPOORAM . . . 7 Moo. I. A. 441

4. ——— Objections on matters of practice—*Immaterial irregularities.* The Privy Council will not interfere in a case in which objections are taken to matters of practice, unless they see very clearly that justice has not been done. *ABDOOL ALI v. MOZUFFER HOSSEIN CHOWDRY*

16 W. R. P. C. 22

5. ——— Pleadings, rule of—*Presumption as to averments not traversed.* The strict rule that averments not traversed must be taken to be admitted, will not be applied by the Privy Council to the Indian Courts. *ANUNDOMOYEE CHOWDHRAIN v. SHEEB CHUNDER ROY*

2 W. R. P. C. 19 : 9 Moo. I. A. 287  
Marsh. 455

6. ——— Ground for varying decree—*Duty of Appellate Court—Suits heard together, evidence in.* It is objectionable to disturb or vary a decree properly made by the lower Court for the mere purpose of guarding against the possible error of some other tribunal in some future suit. Two suits were heard together. On objection made in appeal that the evidence taken in one suit (to which the objector was not a party) had been irregularly read in the other:—*Held*, that, having regard to all the circumstances, the suits having been tried together, and the evidence objected to having been commented on by the objector, or on his behalf, it sufficiently appeared that the evidence had been substantially taken in both suits. A Court of Appeal has to determine whether the decision of the lower Court, when pronounced, was a correct decision of the issues then pending before it between the then parties to the suit. *ANUNDOMOYEE CHOWDHRAIN v. SHEEB CHUNDER ROY*

Marsh. 455 : 2 W. R. P. C. 19  
9 Moo. I. A. 287

7. ——— Objection as to suit being merely declaratory—*Special leave to appeal—Technical nature of grounds of appeal.* A defendant obtained special leave to appeal to Her Majesty



PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*17. PRACTICE AS TO OBJECTIONS—*contd.*

in Council, on the ground that the case involved questions of law of great importance to the Jain sect, of which he was a member. On the appeal coming on for hearing, he contended that the suit should have been dismissed by the Courts below as a claim for a declaration of right in respect of which no consequential relief was sought or could be given. *Held*, that, considering the special grounds on which the defendants had obtained leave to appeal, the somewhat technical character of the defence he now put forward, and the general circumstances of the case, he ought not to be allowed to insist on this objection. *SHEO SINGH RAI v. DAKHO*

I. L. R. 1 All. 688 : 2 C. L. R. 193  
L. R. 5 I. A. 87

8. ———— *Objection not taken before High Court—Grounds of appeal.* The Judicial Committee refused to entertain an objection taken in the grounds of appeal, which had not been taken on appeal to the High Court. *FORBES v. MEER MAHOMED HOSSEIN*

12 B. L. R. P. C. 210 : 20 W. R. 44

9. ———— *Point not taken in lower Courts.* A point not raised in the plaint before the District Judge nor in the High Court cannot be raised before the Judicial Committee. *SOMBHU NATH SANTRA MOHAPATRA v. SURJA MONI DEI*

1 C. W. N. 649  
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 187  
L. R. 24 I. A. 191

10. ———— *Circumstances not raised in the lower Court—Pleadings.* In this case there were concurrent findings of facts both by the lower Court and the High Court, but it was sought to distinguish the case against two of the defendants on the ground of special circumstances connected with their holding. These circumstances were never relied upon in the pleadings, no issue was directed as to them, and there was no proper examination of the case with respect to them. *Held*, that the High Court was justified in refusing to allow the appellant to raise the point. *NAM NARAIN SINGH v. BHIM GANJHU*

3 C. W. N. 249

11. ———— *Objection as to validity of deeds.* A plaintiff sued to set aside certain documents which he alleged to have been forged by the defendant. At the trial of the case in the Court of first instance the only issue directed to these documents was:—"Are the three written agreements said to have been given by the plaintiff to the defendant genuine and valid deeds?" It was not contended by the plaintiff in that Court that the agreements had been obtained from him while he was a minor by undue influence, nor was that objection taken in the grounds of appeal against the judgment of the Court. *Held*, that it was too late to take the objection for the first time

PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*17. PRACTICE AS TO OBJECTIONS—*contd.*

in the Court of Appeal. *AMEEROONISSA KHATOON v. ADADOONISSA KHATOON*

15 B. L. R. 67 : 23 W. R. 208  
L. R. 2 I. A. 87

12. ———— *Objection to right of action.* The Privy Council will not entertain a purely technical objection to a party's right of action which has not been made in the Court below. *BANK OF BENGAL v. MACLEOD*

5 Moo. I. A. 1

13. ———— *Right to sue.* *Semble*: The right of a party to institute a suit as heir of an original grantee, not having been disputed in the Courts below, cannot be questioned before the Judicial Committee. *MILLS v. MODEE PESTONJEE KHOORSHEDJEE*

2 Moo. I. A. 37

14. ———— *Objection of limitation—Beng. Regs. II of 1805, II of 1819, III of 1828.* An objection raised for the first time at the hearing of the appeal before the Privy Council, that the Government's right to sue was barred by Regulation II of 1805 from lapse of time, sustained, the proceedings in India before the Revenue Collector and Special Commissioner under Regulations II of 1819 and III of 1828 not being in the nature of a regular suit. *DHEERAJ RAJA MAHATAB CHUND BAHADOOR v. GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL*

4 Moo. I. A. 466

15. ———— *Objection to order of Court in India substituting respondent for appellant on death of sole appellant.* Pending the appeal to England, the sole appellant died, and the Sudder Court made an order substituting one of the respondents in his stead as appellant. *Semble*: It is not competent to the other respondents to object to such order at the hearing of the appeal, the proper course being to move the Sudder Court to discharge such order. *KASI PERSAD NARAIN v. KAWALBASI KOOER*

5 Moo. I. A. 146

16. ———— *Objections to report of Commissioner under Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 181.* Where a report, or supplemental report, had been made by Commissioners to whom accounts had been referred for investigation under Act VIII of 1859, s. 181, the Privy Council refused to entertain any objections thereto which had neither been brought to the notice of the first Court nor made in any of the grounds of appeal in the Courts in India. *SETH GUJMULL v. CHAHEE KOWAR*

L. R. 2 I. A. 34

17. ———— *Objection taken without cross-appeal—Alteration of decree asked for by respondent without cross-appeal—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 561.* In reference to whether the decree made against one of the respondents could be varied in his favour, he not having filed a cross-appeal, the rule prevailed that he could only be heard to support the decree, s. 561 of the Civil Procedure Code not applying in an appeal to the



PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*17. PRACTICE AS TO OBJECTIONS—*concl'd.*

Privy Council. *CASPERSZ v. KISHORI LAL ROY CHOWDHRI* . . . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 922  
1 C. W. N. 12

18. ——— Question of law referred to Full Bench—*Objection by respondent without cross-appeal to answer of Full Bench.* Where a Division Bench of a High Court refers a question of law for the consideration of the Full Bench, and the answer of the Full Bench is not framed as a decree or as an interlocutory order, and an appeal is brought to Her Majesty in Council, it is open to the respondent without a cross-appeal to object to the correctness of the answer given by the Full Bench on the question of law referred. *PHOOLBAS KOONWAR v. LALLA JOGESHUR SAHOY*

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 226  
L. R. 3 I. A. 7 : 25 W. R. 285

## 18. REVIVOR OF APPEAL.

Revivor of appeal which had abated—*Alteration of form of claim on appeal—Succession or inheritance.* Leave to revive an appeal, in a case governed by the Oudh Estates Act (I of 1869), which abated on the appellant's death before the hearing, was obtained by the younger daughter of the deceased talukdar, one of the defendants, she being next among those who would have a claim to inherit the talukh in succession should the appeal be decreed. *Held*, that the appellant by revivor must be restricted to the suit for the talukh, and could not advance on this appeal any claim of her own which she might have preferred in a suit to inherit property which had belonged to the deceased other than the talukdari estate. *UMRAO BEGUM v. IRSHAD HUSAIN*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 997  
L. R. 21 I. A. 163

## 19. QUESTIONS OF FACT.

1. ——— Unanimous judgment on facts—*Onus of proof.* The rule of the Appellate Court is that it will not, on a question of fact, reverse an unanimous judgment of the Courts in India unless the very clearest proof is shown that such decision is erroneous. *TAREENY CHURN BONNERJEE v. MAITLAND* . . . 11 Moo. I. A. 317

2. ——— Credibility of witnesses—*Effect of evidence.* It is not the habit of the Privy Council, unless in very extraordinary cases, to advise the reversal of a decision of the Courts of India merely on the effect of evidence, or the credit due to witnesses. *NARAGUNTY LUCHMEDAVAMAH v. VENGAMA NAIDOO*

1 W. R. P. C. 30 : 9 Moo. I. A. 66

*JARUITOOL BUTOOL v. HOSSEINEE BEGUM.*

10 W. R. P. C. 10 : 10 Moo. I. A. 196

3. ——— *Issues of fact—Miscarriage in reception or appreciation of evidence.* It is not the practice of the Privy Council to dis-

PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*19. QUESTIONS OF FACT—*contd.*

turb the finding of the Court below upon mere issues of fact, unless it is clearly satisfied that there has been some miscarriage either in the reception or in the appreciation of evidence. In cases that turn upon the credibility of the testimony given, it is disposed to defer to the judgment of those who, with the advantage of local experience have had the means of seeing the witnesses under examination and of inspecting the original documents. *RICHARDSON v. GOVERNMENT*

1 W. R. P. C. 47

*CHEYT RAM v. CHOWDHRY NOWBUT RAM*

5 W. R. P. C. 3 : 7 Moo. I. A. 207

*KRIPAMOYEE DEBIA v. ROMANATH CHOWDHRY*

2 W. R. P. C.

*S.C. KRIPOMOYEE DEBIA v. GRISH CHUNDER LAHOREE* . . . 8 Moo. I. A. 467

*GHOOLAM MOORTOOZAH KHAN v. GOVERNMENT.*

9 Moo. I. A. 456

*DWARKA DOSS v. SITA RAM* . . . 5 C. L. R. 430

4. ——— *Consideration of vivâ voce evidence.* Considering the advantages which the Judges in India generally possess of forming a correct opinion of the probability of a transaction and in some cases of the credit due to the witnesses, the fact that the Courts below have decided against the validity of an instrument affords a strong presumption of the correctness of their decisions, but does not and ought not to relieve the Privy Council, as the Court of last resort, from the duty of examining the whole evidence, and forming for itself an opinion upon the whole case. With reference to the lamentable disregard of truth prevailing amongst the natives of India, the Privy Council held that it would be very dangerous for the Court altogether to discredit witnesses deposing *vivâ voce* by reason of the necessity imposed on the Court to sift the evidence of such witnesses with great minuteness and care. *MO-DHOOSOODUN SANDIAL v. SOROOP CHUNDER SIRCAR CHOWDHRY*

7 W. R. P. C. 73 : 4 Moo. I. A. 431

5. ——— *Documentary evidence—Decision on facts.* Their Lordships refused to reverse a decision of the High Court upon a question of fact in which that Court had before it the documents and the evidence of the witnesses, and had an opportunity of judging of the demeanour of the witnesses. *JUGOJEEBUN LALL DHUBAL DEB v. KARTICK CHUNDER BONDOPADHAY* . . . 25 W. R. P. C. 1

6. ——— *Erroneous conclusions from evidence.* *Semble:* The Privy Council will not disturb a judgment of a Court in India upon a question of the credibility of witnesses, unless it is manifestly clear from the probabilities attached to certain circumstances in the case that the Court below was wrong in the conclusion drawn from such evidence. *MUSADEE MAHOMED CAZUM SHERAZEE v. ALLY MAHOMED KHAN*

6 Moo. I. A. 27



PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*19. QUESTIONS OF FACT—*contd.*

7. ——— Disputed facts—*Presumption of correctness in cases of disputed fact.* It is the practice of the Judicial Committee in a case of disputed fact, when the Courts in India appear to have diligently investigated the evidence, and no palpable mistake is apparent in the appreciation by the Court below of such evidence, to affirm the decree appealed from with costs. CHUNDER MONEE DEBIA CHOWDHOORAYAN v. MUN MOHINEE DEBIA  
8 Moo. I. A. 477

8. ——— Judgment on facts—*Appeals from Non-Regulation Provinces.* In cases from Non-Regulation Provinces, wherein the procedure is somewhat loose, and where the merits depend much on local custom and local inquiry, it is even more necessary than it is on appeals from the Civil Courts in the Regulation Provinces to act on the principle of not disturbing the judgment under appeal, unless it is substantially wrong. HYDER HOSSEIN v. MAHOMED HOSSEIN  
14 Moo. I. A. 401: 17 W. R. 185

9. ——— Improper admission of evidence—*Sufficiency of evidence.* Where evidence, such as hearsay, is improperly admitted, the question for the Judicial Committee is whether, rejecting that evidence, enough remains to support the finding. Disapproval was expressed by their Lordships of the reception by the lower Court of evidence which ought not to have been admitted. MOHUN SING v. GHURIBA  
6 B. L. R. 495: 15 W. R. P. C. 8

10. ——— Erroneous conclusion from evidence—*Hearsay evidence.* Where the High Court founded their judgment upon evidence which did not justify the conclusion, the Judicial Committee reviewed the whole evidence, in order to ascertain whether the decree could be supported. AJODHYA PRASAD SING v. UMRAO SING  
6 B. L. R. 509: 15 W. R. P. C. 1  
13 Moo. I. A. 519

11. ——— Evidence wrongly admitted—*Sufficiency of evidence.* Where the Courts below had admitted evidence not properly admissible, the Judicial Committee examined the whole evidence, and being satisfied that there was, independent of that inadmissible evidence, sufficient to justify the decision of those Courts, dismissed the appeal. LALA BANSIDHAR v. GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL . 9 B. L. R. 264: 16 W. R. P. C. 11  
14 Moo. I. A. 86

12. ——— Direct evidence as opposed to suspicion—*Adoption.* The Sudder Ameen having held an adoption proved, the Principal Sudder Ameen on appeal reversed that decision on the facts. The case came before the High Court on special appeal, and the decision then given was appealed to England, and special leave was given by Her Majesty to appeal against the decision of the Principal Sudder Ameen. The decision of the High Court on the law was admitted to be good, but the Judicial Committee reversed the finding of

PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*19. QUESTIONS OF FACT—*contd.*

the Principal Sudder Ameen on the facts. KALI CHANDRA CHOWDHRY v. SHIB CHANDRA BHADURI  
6 B. L. R. 501: 15 W. R. P. C. 12

13. ——— Second appeal—*Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 584, 585—Jurisdiction to hear a second appeal, on what matters—Secondary evidence, question of.* Under ss. 584 and 585 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, a second appeal is confined to matters of law, usage having the force of law, or substantial defect in procedure. On an appeal to the Judicial Commissioner from a decree given on first appeal by an Appellate Court, and maintaining a finding of fact by the original Court, the only questions were (i) whether secondary evidence had been properly admitted on a case that had arisen for its admission; and (ii) whether the evidence offered constituted secondary evidence of the matter in dispute, which was the making of a document. *Held*, that (no special leave to appeal from the judgment of the Commissioner, the first Appellate Court, having been applied for) the facts were not open to decision on this appeal; this Committee could only do what the Judicial Commissioner on second appeal, under the above sections, could have done; and that, as the case stood, they were bound by the findings of facts of the first Appellate Court. LUCHMAN SINGH v. PUNA I. L. R. 16 Calc. 753  
L. R. 16 I. A. 125

14. ——— Question in issue—*Parties—Admission—Execution of deed.* The plaintiff claimed to have inherited estate in the possession of the defendant, who was also related to the last owner, but who set up, independently of other title, a deed of gift from the latter in his favour. It was decided in the Appellate Court that, even if this deed had been executed, it was inoperative, and on this point the decision of the first Court was maintained. An issue having been fixed as to the execution, and the plaintiff also showing that the execution was disputed, their Lordships declined to treat the execution as not having been in contest. ANAND KUR v. TANSUKH  
I. L. R. 11 All. 396

15. ——— Failure to produce evidence at hearing—*Omission of Judge to call for record.* At the hearing of a suit a party, though he had sufficient warning of what was necessary, did not take the proper steps to cause the production of the documentary and only admissible evidence of a material fact which had to be proved by him, and the decision was against him. The record of another proceeding would, it was said, have supplied this evidence; and an application had been previously made on which the order of the Judge was that "the matter would be decided when the case was tried, and the record would be sent for, if necessary." No further application to the Court was made, and no attempt to supply this evidence. *Held*, that, if there had been, as there might have been, an oversight by the party in not calling the attention of the Judge to the above order, and in not tendering the evid-



PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*19. QUESTIONS OF FACT—*contd.*

ence, there had been no omission on the Judge's part affording ground for appeal, and the Judicial Committee refused to interfere. *CHANDICHURN SHASHMAL v. DURGA CHURN MIRDUA*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 260 : 12 C. L. R. 81

## 16. ——— Questions of boundary—

*Miscarriage in conduct of decision.* The Privy Council will never interfere with the finding of an Indian Court on a question of boundary, unless they are clearly satisfied that there has been some plain miscarriage in the conduct or decision of the case upon which they can put their hands and make the grounds for an order reversing or varying the decree. *RANGOPAL ROY v. GORDON, STUART & Co.*

14 Moo. I. A. 453 : 17 W. R. 285

## 17. ——— Reversal on evidence.

In a question relating to boundaries of land, the Judicial Committee on a review of the evidence reversed the concurrent decrees of the Court of first instance and the Sudder Court, but without costs. *RAM CHUNDER DUTT v. CHUNDER COOMAR MUNDL*

13 Moo. I. A. 181

## 18. ——— Waiver—New point—Question

*not allowed to be raised on appeal—Question of fact decided by first Court against appellant, and not raised in High Court.* Held, that a question of whether there had been or not a waiver of an irregularity in the conduct of a sale, which question had been decided by the first Court adversely to the appellants, and had not been submitted to the High Court for review could not be entertained on appeal to the Privy Council, being a question of fact which had not been subject to the consideration of the Court from whose decision the appeal was brought. *DHANTUKDHARI SINGH v. MAHABIR PERSHAD SINGH* (1907)

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 709 : L. R. 34 I. A. 164

## 19. ——— Circumstances to be taken

into consideration in dealing with conflicting evidence—*Courts in India differing as to question of fact—Question as to a mortgage being a real or fictitious transaction.*—On the question whether a mortgage was a fictitious or a real transaction there was evidence on each side bearing directly on the character of the transaction, but on neither side was the evidence wholly convincing. Persons, whom one might have expected to be prominent witnesses, were not called, and the evidence given by those who were called was open to much adverse criticism. The Courts in India differed, the Subordinate Judge deciding that the mortgage was fictitious, and the High Court holding it to be a genuine transaction. Held, by the Judicial Committee that, in determining which story was to be accepted, it was necessary for their Lordships to rely largely upon surrounding circumstances, the position of the parties and their relation to one another, the motives which could govern their actions; and their subsequent conduct: and so dealing with the case their Lordships upheld the decision of the High Court. The fact that, if a genuine transaction, it was advantageous to the

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mortgagor, and, if fictitious, it afforded him no immediate protection from creditor (which was the motive alleged by the defendants for entering into the transaction) was a very material circumstance in the case. *DALIP SINGH v. NAWAL KUNWAR* (1908)

I. L. R. 30 All. 258

## 20. CONCURRENT JUDGMENTS ON FACTS.

1. ——— Presumption as to correctness of facts. Where the lower Courts have proceeded upon the evidence and have come to the same conclusion, it is an established rule of practice, that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council will not on appeal enter into the question whether the decisions of the Courts below are or are not correct on matters of fact. *JAIMUNGAL KOERI v. MOKHUN KORI*

10 C. L. R. 611

2. ——— The Privy Council, in cases pending upon facts which have received the concurring judgments of two Courts in India, will not set aside the last judgment, unless it can see very clearly that that judgment was wrong. *PETAMBER MANIKJEE v. MOTEECHUND MANIKJEE*

5 W. R. P. C. 53 : 1 Moo. I. A. 420

*KHORSHEDJEE MANIKJEE v. MEHRWANJEE KHOORSHEDJEE*

5 W. R. P. C. 57 : 1 Moo. I. A. 431

*VENCATA NILADRY ROW v. ENOOGOONTY SOORIAH*

5 W. R. P. C. 79

*CHELLAYAMAL v. MUTTIALMAL*

15 W. R. P. C. 1

*RAMRUDEEGOWDA v. DESSAI SAHEB*

17 W. R. P. C. 8

*JOY NARAIN GIRI v. SHEEB PROSHAD GIRI*

19 W. R. P. C. 275

*PORESH NARAIN ROY v. WATSON & Co.*

23 W. R. P. C. 451

3. ——— This case did not come strictly within the above rule, but the Privy Council observed that, whereas in this case the question of fact had been tried upon evidence fairly warranting the conclusion to which the High Court had come and there had been no adverse findings of facts, their Lordships would require a strong case to be made out before they would recommend Her Majesty to reverse such a decision. *HUMEEDA alias KHAJOO v. AMATOOOL MEHDEE BEGUN*

17 W. R. P. C. 106

4. ——— The Lords of the Privy Council do not, as a rule, disturb the concurrent decision of both the Courts below upon a question of fact unless it very clearly appears there has been some miscarriage of justice, some mistrial, or that the conclusion is very plainly erroneous. *GOSAIN TOTA RAM v. RUKINIBALLAB*

3 B. L. R. P. C. 34

12 W. R. P. C. 32 : 13 Moo. I. A. 77



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—*contd.*

LALA SHAM SOONDUR LAL *v.* SOORAJ LAL.  
26 W. R. P. C. 48

DEVAJI GAYAJI *v.* GODABHAI GODBHAI.  
2 B. L. R. 85 : 11 W. R. P. C. 35

5. ————— Where the Court of appeal in India concurs in the finding of the Court of first instance on a question of fact, the Privy Council will not disturb that finding, unless satisfied, beyond all reasonable question, that there was some miscarriage in respect of the principle on which the decision rested, of a presumption to which too much weight was given, or of something as to which the Judicial Committee could see there was a principle involved which ought to be set right for the guidance of the Court in other cases. GABINDSUNDARI DEBI *v.* JAGADAMBA DEBI  
6 B. L. R. 168 : 15 W. R. P. C. 5

6. ————— Provided that there has been no contravention of law or procedure, or of any principle of justice, the rule is observed by the Judicial Committee, and commonly recognized by Courts of second appeal, that there will be no interference with concurrent judgment of Appellate and Original Courts upon matters of fact unless very definite and explicit reasons are assigned for it. Such concurrent judgments are, however, open to argument before the Committee, as in this case. MOUNG THA HNYEEN *v.* MOUNG PAN NYO . . . . . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 1  
L. R. 27 I. A. 166  
4 C. W. N. 808

7. ————— *Weight of evidence, question as to.* Where both the lower Courts had agreed as to the facts, the Privy Council refused to examine the evidence, the controversy being merely as to the weight to be attributed to it. LALJI SAHU *v.* COLLECTOR OF TIRHOOT  
6 B. L. R. 648 : 15 W. R. P. C. 23

8. ————— *Omission of reasons for affirmance of judgment on facts.* Where the High Court affirmed the judgment of the Court below on the facts, without giving reasons for such affirmance, the Judicial Committee reviewed the facts and reversed the decree. GUTHRIE *v.* ABUL MAZAFFAR 7 B. L. R. 630 : 15 W. R. P. C. 50  
14 Moo. I. A. 53

9. ————— *Question of boundary.* Where there are concurrent decisions on a question of fact, the Judicial Committee will not (specially on a question of fact as to boundaries) reverse the decision, unless there was no evidence, or there has been in the conduct of the trial, or in the mode in which evidence was adduced, or in the course of deciding the case, a clear departure from the ordinary principles which regulate judicial proceedings. GANESWAR SING *v.* DURGA DUTT  
7 B. L. R. 651

S.C. GUNESHUR SINGH *v.* DOORGA DUTT.  
15 W. R. P. C. 37

PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*20. CONCURRENT JUDGMENTS ON FACTS—  
*contd.*

10. ————— *Balance of testimony.* Where the decision of the first Court upon a question of fact has been affirmed on appeal, their Lordships will not reverse such finding on a mere balance of testimony : there must be so strong a preponderance of testimony that they can confidently pronounce it to be wrong. SARAT SUNDARI DEBI *v.* PARESNARAIN ROY  
8 B. L. R. 113 : 16 W. R. P. C. 9

11. ————— *Question as to compromise—Failure to show fraud or collusion.* The Judicial Committee, reversing the finding of the Courts below, refused to set aside a compromise (confirmed by a decree of Court) by the former guardian of the plaintiff of a claim against his estate for debt after sixteen years, the plaintiff having failed to prove that the suit was fictitious, and the compromise fraudulent and collusive. LEKRAJ ROY *v.* MAHTABCHUND  
10 B. L. R. 35 : 17 W. R. P. C. 117  
14 Moo. I. A. 393

12. ————— *Question as to amount of dower—Refusal to ascertain amount.* The Courts below, without ascertaining the amount of the widow's dower, decreed possession of the estates to the heirs. Such decree was reversed on appeal, and the amount of dower was ascertained. BACHUN *v.* HAMID HOSSEIN  
10 B. L. R. 45 : 17 W. R. P. C. 113  
14 Moo. I. A. 377

13. ————— *Question of dissolution of marriage.* A decree of a High Court, confirming the decree of a District Judge for dissolution of marriage, reversed so far as it affected the correspondent and condemned him in costs. The circumstances of the case took it out of the general rule not to reverse the concurrent findings of two Courts on a question of fact. HAY *v.* GORDON  
10 B. L. R. 301 : 18 W. R. P. C. 480  
L. R. I. A. Sup. Vol. 106

14. ————— *Mixed question of law and fact.* The rule of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council not to permit the concurrent judgments of two Courts on a question of fact to be disputed may be relaxed in a case where the question of fact is closely mixed up with questions of law. VALOO CHETTY *v.* SOORAYAH CHETTY  
I. L. R. 1 Mad. 252 : L. R. 4 I. A. 109

15. ————— *Question as to property belonging to endowment—Admissibility of evidence—Sthanam lands.* A raja having made a perpetual lease of sthanam lands appertaining to the raj, one of his successors sought to set it aside on the ground that the property was devaswam, or the endowment of temples. That it was devaswam was denied; and after questions of the admissibility of evidence, the construction of documents, and the effect to be given to judgments had arisen, the fact was found in the affirmative by two Courts concurrently. Upon an examination of the evid-



PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*20. CONCURRENT JUDGMENTS ON FACTS  
—*contd.*

ence by the Judicial Committee it was, however, found that the plaintiff had not proved his case.  
VENKATESWARA IYAN *v.* SHEKHARI VARMA

I. L. R. 3 Mad. 384 : L. R. 8 I. A. 143

16. ——— Question as to disputed adoption—*Reversal of concurrent Courts on fact.* In a suit which involved a disputed question of fact as to an alleged adoption and the due execution of a will, the Courts in India, disregarding other evidence, relied solely upon the evidence of a witness examined at the instance of the first Court itself. The effect of the evidence of this witness was to show that, at the time of the adoption and execution of the will, the alleged testator was in a dying state, and although at times roused to consciousness, was, from his enfeebled mind, incapable of understanding the acts he was represented to have performed; the Courts below, however, on the evidence of this witness as to his testamentary capacity, corroborated, as they thought, by a letter of the widow of the alleged testator recognizing the adoption, and by her acquiescing in the performance of certain funeral rights of her deceased husband by the supposed adopted son, pronounced both the adoption and the will to be valid. Upon appeal, held that, although, as a general rule in a question of fact, the Judicial Committee were unwilling to disturb the judgment of the Court below, yet that, as it was the duty of the Appellate Court to weigh the evidence and probabilities, and form an independent judgment and taking into consideration the evidence regarding the state and capacity of the alleged adopter and testator, they were of opinion that the evidence relied upon was so unsatisfactory that neither of the decrees of the Courts below could be supported, and reversed the same with costs. TAYAMMAUL *v.* SASHACHALLA NAIKER. 10 Moo. I. A. 429

17. ——— Question as to authority of agent—*Document signed by agent—Objection not raised below.* Where the sole question raised in both Courts in India was whether or not certain documents purporting to be an allowance of plaintiff's accounts by the defendant's agent were signed by the agent, as to which fact both Courts below were concurrent, the Privy Council declined to relax their rule as to concurrent judgments on facts, and to allow the defendant to raise before them the question as to the authority of the agent to bind his principal. BABOO LALL *v.* LUTTOO RAM. 18 W. R. P. C. 233

18. ——— Concurrent judgments as to failure to prove title. Where in a suit for confirmation of possession the Indian Courts agree in holding that the plaintiff has not made out his title, the Judicial Committee will not, even though the High Court may not have attended to the deposition of material witnesses, disturb the decision of the Court below. TORAB ALLY *v.* MAHOMED TUKKEE. 19 W. R. P. C. 1

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PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*  
20. CONCURRENT JUDGMENTS ON FACTS  
—*contd.*

19. ——— Question as to evidence of custom—*Question of fact.* It having been alleged that an estate, by custom, descended to a single heir in the male line, the High Court, concurring with the Court of first instance, found that this custom had not been proved to prevail in the family. On an appeal contesting this finding, it was argued, among other objections, that the High Court had not given sufficient effect to an entry in the *wajib-ul-urz* of a zamindari village, the principal one comprised in the family estate now in dispute; the last owner of that estate, who held all the shares in the village, having caused an entry to be made to the effect that his eldest son should be his sole heir, the others of the family being maintained. The appeal was not taken out of the rule as to the concurrent findings of two Courts, primary and appellate, on a question of fact. MUHAMMAD ISMAIL KHAN *v.* FIDAYAT-UN-NISSA

I. L. R. 8 All. 516

20. ——— *Wajib-ul-urz*—*Concurrent findings of Courts below.* A custom of inheritance was alleged to prevail in an Oudh clan that, if the branch of a family became extinct, the other branches of it should take the estate amongst them in equal shares without regard to their degrees in kinship to the deceased. This custom was found not proved by the Original and Appellate Courts upon evidence of instances of succession in kindred families and of rights recorded in certain *wajib-ul-urz*. If there had been any principle of evidence not properly applied, or documentary evidence had been referred to, on which it could be shown that the Courts below had been led into error, the case might have been re-examined on this appeal, but in the absence of such ground this could not be done. THAKUR HARIHAR BAKSH *v.* THAKUR UMAN PARSHAD. I. L. R. 14 Calc. 296  
L. R. 14 I. A. 7

21. ——— Agreement for division of family property in equal shares. Two Courts in concurrence found that there had been an agreement between two parties, interested in a family fund, that it should be divided into equal four parts among the four branches of the family, but that an unequal division, made under a decree, had resulted from unfair dealing. To contest upon this appeal those findings of fact, nothing was stated to make it appear to the Committee that, if they went through the whole of the evidence they would differ from the Courts below on anything but questions of pure fact. Accordingly, their Lordships were of opinion that the case fell within the rule which makes appellate tribunals reluctant to interfere, and in most cases makes them refuse to interfere, with concurrent findings of the Courts below. KRISHNAN *v.* SRIDEVI. PUTHIA KOVILAKATH KRISHNAN RAJA AVERGAL *v.* PUTHIA KOVILAKATH SRIDEVI. I. L. R. 12 Mad. 512

22. ——— Findings of fact—*Concurrent findings by two Courts.* The usual course of

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**PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—contd.****20. CONCURRENT JUDGMENTS ON FACTS—contd.**

not disturbing concurrent findings of fact may be followed, notwithstanding that a part of the evidence in the suit has not been considered by the lower Court, when both Courts have arrived at the same result. In this case, however, the whole of the evidence having been brought to their notice, the Judicial Committee expressed their opinion that the Appellate Court below could not have decided otherwise than as it had decided. **RAM LAL v. MEHDI HUSAIN** . . . **I. L. R. 17 Calc. 882**  
**L. R. 17 I. A. 70**

**23. ————** Necessity of there being gift and acceptance of the adopted child.—*Hindu Law—Adoption.* The Court of first instance and the Appellate Court, after observing fully upon the evidence, found that, although a ceremony of adoption had taken place, there had not in fact been a giving and taking of the child. There being no reason for departing from the ordinary course where two Courts have concurred, the above finding was accepted; and it was thereupon held that there had been no adoption. **BIRESWAR MUKERJI v. ARDHA CHANDRA ROY. SHIB CHANDER ROY v. GOBIND MOHINI** . . . **I. L. R. 19 Calc. 452**  
**L. R. 19 I. A. 101**

**24. ————** Practice of abiding by concurrent decisions on fact followed. **ASGHAR REZA v. MEHDI HOSSEIN** . . . **I. L. R. 20 Calc. 560**  
**L. R. 20 I. A. 38**

**25. ————** Inferences of fact—*Concurrent findings by two Courts below, not influenced by precisely the same considerations, upon the same evidence.* It cannot detract from the weight of concurrent findings of fact that different Courts, in arriving at the same result upon the same evidence, have not been influenced by precisely the same considerations; a difference of opinion to that extent is only calculated to suggest that the evidence, whatever view be taken of it, necessarily leads to one and the same inference. **NILMONI SINGH DEO v. KIRTI CHUNDER CHOWDHRY** . . . **I. L. R. 20 Calc. 847**  
**L. R. 20 I. A. 95**

**26. ————** Findings of fact on documentary evidence apart from construction. Against a claim for the proprietary right by inheritance brought by the nearest bandhu or cognate heir of the deceased, the defendant in possession set up his adoption by the widow under her husband's authority. The Courts below had found that no such authority had been given, and that the widow, not adopting to her husband, had adopted the defendant as her son. The Courts below had also concurred in finding against the fact of a dattaka adoption having taken place, which would have had the effect of removing one of the plaintiff's ancestors into another family, whereby a necessary link in the succession would have been lost to the plaintiff's title had this adoption been proved. As a ground for interference

**PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—contd.****20. CONCURRENT JUDGMENTS ON FACTS—contd.**

with these findings of fact, it was suggested that the evidence consisted, in a great measure, of documents of which the construction had been matter for decision, thus rendering the questions to be other than of fact, but it was held that they turned on the effect of the evidence afforded by the documents, and not on the construction, so that there was no reason for departing from the ordinary rule as to the concurrence of two Courts upon fact. **LACHMAN LAL CHOWDHRI v. KANHAYA LAL MOWAR** . . . **I. L. R. 22 Calc. 609**  
**L. R. 22 I. A. 51**

**27. ————** Effect of reception in evidence on appeal of documents rejected by first Court. The merits of a claim depended upon the authenticity of an anumati-patro (deed of permission to adopt) alleged to have been given to a widow by her husband. The first Court found that the instrument was not genuine. The High Court, on appeal, upheld this finding, but had considered relevant and admitted in evidence documents rejected by the first Court when tendered by the appellants. This reception of evidence afforded no reason for making the case an exception to the application of the rule, in the discretion of the Committee, against the disturbance of concurrent decisions upon a fact in issue below. **HURRI BHUSAN MUKERJI v. UPENDRA LAL MUKERJI** . . . **I. L. R. 24 Calc. 1**  
**L. R. 23 I. A. 97**

**28. ————** Want of legal necessity.—*Hindu Law—Alienation by one of two co-widows.* Two widows of the same husband, each having inherited her undivided share in the inheritance, disputed as to their rights therein. They then settled their dispute by a compromise, in which it was agreed that each had obtained absolute proprietary right in her share as a co-widow, and that division had been made between them. Having no power by this to affect the rights of the successor to the estate on their deaths, each was entitled to her share for her widow's estate only. Upon a mortgage made by the elder widow before her death, the mortgagee now claimed not only the interests of both the widows and thus to deprive the younger who had survived the other of her interests during her life, but also claimed a charge on the estate of inheritance in the land mortgaged. Against the competency of the elder widow to charge the estate of both and to bind the reversioner, both Courts below had decided. They had found that there had been no justifying necessity established by the evidence for the mortgage. These concurrent findings having been accepted by the Judicial Committee as correct in regard to the absence of necessity for the mortgage, they saw no occasion to say anything about any other questions as to the competency of the elder widow to mortgage the whole estate in the way in which she did. **DHARAM CHAND LAL v. BHAWANI MISRAIN** . . . **I. L. R. 25 Calc. 189**  
**L. R. 24 I. A. 183**  
**1 C. W. N. 697**



PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*20. CONCURRENT JUDGMENTS ON FACTS—*concl'd.*

29. — Courts basing decision on different grounds—One Court relying on oral, and the other on documentary, evidence. The rule of the Judicial Committee not to disturb a concurrent finding of fact by two Courts, unless it is clearly shown to be erroneous, is none the less applicable, although the Courts have not taken precisely the same view of the weight to be attached to each particular item of evidence. A case where one Court has relied on the oral, and the other on the documentary, evidence is within the rule. *RAM ANUGRA NARAIN SINGH v. CHOWDHRY HANUMAN SAHAI* (1902) . . . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 303 s.c. 7 C. W. N. 225 : L. R. 30 I. A. 41

30. — Privy Council—Concurrent decisions on fact—Disagreement of lower Courts as to circumstances leading up to conclusions—Appellate Court not affirming decision of first Court on all issues in the case. Where both Courts below had come to the same conclusion on the two main questions of fact in the case, which were sufficient to dispose of it, but had not agreed on all the circumstances which led up to such conclusion, and the Appellate Court had either differed from the first Court on other questions or had not decided them, the Judicial Committee, referring to the case of *Umrao Begum v. Irsad Husain*, L. R. 21 I. A. 163, 166 : I. L. R. 21 Calc. 997, declined to depart from the general rule as to concurrent findings of fact by the lower Courts. *SANWAL SINGH v. SATRUPA KUNWAR* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 All. 215  
s.c. 10 C. W. N. 230  
L. R. 33 I. A. 53

31. — Privy Council—Concurrent decisions on fact—Disagreement of lower Courts as to circumstances leading up to conclusions—Appellate Court not affirming decision of first Court on all issues in the case. Where there are concurrent conclusions by both the lower Courts on questions of fact sufficient for the disposal of the case, the mere fact that the two Courts do not agree on all the steps which lead to one and the same conclusion is no reason for disregarding the rule as to concurrent findings of fact. But the fact that the Courts have differed on some important, though subordinate, questions is a matter to be taken into consideration in determining whether the evidence before the lower Courts should be reviewed in detail. *CHITPAL SINGH v. BHAIROO BAKHSH SINGH* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 28 All. 219 s.c. 10 C. W. N. 225

## 21. RE-HEARING.

1. — Grounds for re-hearing. An order passed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council after hearing an appeal is final; and an application for a re-hearing will not be granted except upon the ground that the applicant has, by some accident, without blame or default on his own

PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*21. RE-HEARING—*contd.*

part, not been heard, and the order has inadvertently been made as if he had been heard. *In the matter of the appeal of PERTAB NARAIN SINGH v. SUBHAO KOOER*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 184 : L. R. 5 I. A. 171

2. — Irregularity in trial. An irregularity in a trial is no ground of complaint to the party at whose instance it was caused. The suspicion that a party who has failed to prove his case may prove more successful on a second and fuller investigation is no sufficient ground for directing a new trial. *NITRASUR SINGH v. NUND LALL SINGH*

1 W. R. P. C. 51 : 8 Moo. I. A. 109

3. — Laches of petitioner. There were four respondents in an appeal to the Privy Council. At the hearing, the appeal was allowed *ex parte* against all the respondents. One respondent afterwards petitioned for a re-hearing, on the ground that neither he nor his agents had notice that the appeal had been entered or fixed for hearing until after it had been decided. On inquiry, it appeared that the petitioner had inaccurately described the suit to his agents, as an appeal against himself only, without mentioning the names of the other respondents; and the agents, on being told at the Privy Council office that no appeal so entitled was pending, had taken no further steps. *Held*, that there had been omission and neglect on the petitioner's part and on the part of his agents such as to prevent the Judicial Committee from recommending a re-hearing of the case. *SWARNAMAYI v. SHASHI MUKHI BARMANI*

2 B. L. R. P. C. 10 : 11 W. R. P. C. 5  
12 Moo. I. A. 44

4. — Party accidentally prevented from being heard. In a petition for re-hearing of two appeals which had been fully heard upon their merits, and in which judgment had been given and reported to Her Majesty, and confirmed by regular orders in Council :—*Held*, that, assuming a relevant case of new matter had been made out, the decision was final, and the petition must be refused. There may be exceptional circumstances which will warrant this Board, even after an order of Her Majesty in Council has been made, in allowing a re-hearing at the instance of one of the parties; but this is an indulgence with a view mainly to doing justice when by some accident, without blame, the party has not been heard, and an order has been made inadvertently as if the party has been heard. *Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Sing*, 2 Moo. I. A. 181, referred to. *VENKATA NARASIMHA APPA ROW v. COURT OF WARDS. VENKATA RAMALAKSHMI GARU v. GOPALA APPA ROW. Ex parte GOPALA APPA ROW*. L. R. 13 I. A. 155 : I. L. R. 10 Mad. 73

5. — Alleged want of notice to respondent—Appeal heard *ex parte*. There is no rule, among those made by the High Court under the authority of law, that the respondent



PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*21. RE-HEARING—*concl'd.*

in an appeal to the Queen in Council shall receive formal notice of the transmission of the record of the appeal, of the pendency whereof he has had notice. The mere allegation that the respondents in this appeal had, in consequence of their having had no express notice that the appeal had been set down for hearing, allowed the hearing of the appeal to take place *ex parte* was not considered sufficient to entitle them to a re-hearing thereof. *LALTA PRASAD v. AZIZ-UD-DIN*. I. L. R. 19 All. 209 L. R. 24 I. A. 49

6. ——— *Infancy of party at the time of the hearing of appeal—“Res noviter.”* There may be exceptional circumstances which will warrant the Judicial Committee in allowing, even after an order of Her Majesty in Council has issued upon their report, a re-hearing at the instance of one of the parties. But this is an indulgence with a view mainly to doing justice when by some accident, without any blame, the party has not been heard, and an order has been made, inadvertently as if he had been heard. In one of two appeals in suits relating to the same estate, judgment was given by the Judicial Committee after a hearing on the merits. In the other judgment was given to the same effect as in the first, it being conceded between the parties that the questions in both suits were the same. After both judgments had been reported to Her Majesty and confirmed by her orders in Council, a petition for a re-hearing was presented. *Held*, that, even assuming that a case of *res noviter* had been made out (which was not, however, the fact), the orders were final, and the petition must be rejected. *In re APPA RAO. VENKATA NARASIMHA APPA ROW v. COURT OF WARDS. VENKATA RAMALAKSHMI GARU v. GOLAPPA APPA ROW*. I. L. R. 10 Mad. 73 L. R. 13 I. A. 155

7. ——— *“Res noviter.”* The judgment of the Judicial Committee reported to, and confirmed by, Her Majesty in Council cannot be re-opened only for the reason that new evidence is forthcoming. *In re Appa Rao, I. L. R. 10 Mad. 73*, referred to. *YARLAGADDU DURGA v. MALLIKARJUNA*. I. L. R. 14 Mad. 439

## 22. LEAVE TO BRING FRESH SUIT.

——— *Suit brought under misapprehension of law.* The parties having acted under a misapprehension of the law, leave was given to bring a new suit within three years. *GOOROO SWAMY PERRIA WOODIA TAVER v. ANGA MOOTOO NATCHIAR* 6 W. R. P. C. 50 : 3 Moo. I. A. 278

## 23. EXECUTION OF DECREE OR ORDER.

1. ——— *Application to enforce execution of order—Order for possession—Issue of peremptory order of enforcement.* Where the Court in India, having decided a suit for land in favour

PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*23. EXECUTION OF DECREE OR ORDER—*concl'd.*

of *A*, put him into possession of the estate without taking security as required by Madras Regulation VIII of 1818, s. 4, and on appeal by *B* the decision was reversed and *B* ordered to be put in possession, and in the meantime the Madras Board of Revenue had got into possession as purchasers of a portion of the estate at a sale for arrear of its revenue, and the Court in India refused to carry into execution the order of the Privy Council, the Judicial Committee, on the application of *B*, issued a peremptory order to the Madras Court to carry it into execution and put *B* into possession. *In re VASSAREDDY LUTCHMEPUTTY NAIDOO* 5 Moo. I. A. 300

2. ——— *Restoration of property alienated pending appeal to the Privy Council—Execution of decree—Privy Council—Procedure.* Pending an appeal to His Majesty in Council, certain property forming part of the subject-matter of the suit in which such appeal had been preferred was sold by auction in execution of a money decree against the plaintiff, who held the decree of the High Court under appeal. The defendant's appeal to the Privy Council was decreed. *Held*, that the successful appellant was entitled to recover the property sold as abovementioned by means of an application under s. 244, read with s. 610 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and this right was not affected by the fact that the auction-purchasers were not parties to the decree of the Privy Council. *Gulzari Lal v. Madho Ram, I. L. R. 26 All. 447*, followed. *Bhagwati Prasad v. Jamna Prasad, I. L. R. 19 All. 136*, and *Sadiq Husain v. Lala Prasad, I. L. R. 20 All. 139*, distinguished. *GARURDHUJ PRASAD SINGH v. BAIJU MAL (1906)*. I. L. R. 28 All. 337

## 24. COSTS.

1. ——— *Discretion as to costs—Appeal—Bom. Reg. II of 1800, s. 7.* When a discretion is vested in a Court as to costs, the Privy Council will not allow any appeal against the exercise of that discretion, because no appeal lies against a mere decree as to costs. But when a Court has no discretion to exercise in the matter (as when a suit was instituted by parties who had no right to institute it, as the person in whose name and on whose behalf they instituted it was dead at the time), costs must follow the decree according to s. 7, Regulation II of 1800 of the Bombay Code. *KEEMEE BAE v. LUCHMAN DAS NARAIN DAS* 5 W. R. P. C. 59 : 1 Moo. I. A. 470

2. ——— *Improper admission of evidence—Penalty on parties to appeal.* The Privy Council, whilst lamenting the great latitude with which documentary evidence was received in India, *held* that it would be contrary to justice in any particular case to visit upon an individual penal consequences by way of costs, because the administration of justice was not more strictly conducted.



PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*24. COSTS—*contd.*

with reference to the admission of evidence. *BUNWARREE LALL v. HETNARAIN SINGH*

4 W. R. P. C. 128 : 7 Moo. I. A. 148

3. ——— Respondent's right to uphold judgment—*Reversal of decision.* Appeal by defendant against whom the suit was decreed in the Court of first instance, which decree was confirmed on appeal by the Sudder Adawlut. The Privy Council held that the plaintiff had not made out his case below, and reversed the judgment, but awarded to the defendant costs in the first Court only, and not in either of the Appellate Courts, on the ground that the plaintiff, as respondent, was defending the judgment. *MADHO ROW CHINTO PUNT GOLAY v. BHOOKUN DAS BOOLAKI DAS*

5 W. R. P. C. 33 : 1 Moo. I. A. 351

4. ——— Respondents in same interest. Where respondents were in the same interest, but served in their defences only one set of costs was allowed, and that to the respondent who first entered appearance. *WOOMATARA DEBIA v. UNNOPOORNA DEBIA*

11 B. L. R. P. C. 158  
18 W. R. 163

5. ——— Delay in suing—*Disallowance of costs.* Case in which the Privy Council affirmed the decision of the Sudder Court; but as there had been delay in suing, and as the case was attended with a considerable degree of suspicion, refused to the respondent before it all costs, and decreed further that the cost of the appeal to the Sudder Court should be disallowed. *ULRUK SINGH v. BENY PERSAD*

5 W. R. P. C. 77

6. ——— Delay in appealing by which costs were incurred—*Set-off of costs.* Where, in a suit to have accounts re-opened, the Court at Calcutta found that the accounts ought to be opened, and referred the suit to the master, and the defendant did not appeal at once from this interlocutory order, but proceeded in the master's office in respect of the matters included in the accounts, but before the general report was made by the master he appealed to England from such interlocutory decree,—the Judicial Committee, in reversing the decree, ordered him to pay the costs of the proceedings in the master's office and remitted the cause to the Court below, with directions that the costs, payable to the defendant on the dismissal of the bill, and the costs payable by him consequent on his proceedings in the master's office should be set off one against the other, and the balance paid to the party entitled to the same. *McKELLAR v. WALLACE*

5 Moo. I. A. 372

7. ——— Slight modification of decree—*Alteration in rate of interest.* Where, in lieu of interest at 5 per cent. on a loan made to a guardian of a minor in a transaction which was set aside, the Privy Council made an order for 6 per cent. interest:—*Held*, not to be such a modification of the decree of the Court below as was sufficient to deprive the respondent of the costs of appeal. *LALLA BUNSEEDHUR v. BINDESEREE DUTT SINGH*

10 Moo. I. A. 454

PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*24. COSTS—*contd.*

8. ——— Leave to appeal granted on condition that appellant paid respondents' costs if directed to do so—*Cost given at hearing against respondents.* Special leave to appeal had been granted on terms that the appellant should be liable to pay the respondents' costs in any event, if directed so to do. Costs were, however, directed to be paid by the respondents. *BENI RAM v. KUNDAN LAL*

I. L. R. 21 All. 496

L. R. 26 I. A. 58

3 C. W. N. 502

9. ——— Evidence—*Costs—Co-sharers.* One of two co-sharers by ancestral title in the under-proprietary right in certain villages obtained in 1870 decrees against the talukhdar for sub-settlement, and getting possession had his name entered in the khewat. The other co-sharer remained entitled to claim that this possession was held partly for him. The present suit was brought upon two agreements, purporting to have been made in 1870, between the two co-sharers, while proceedings to obtain the above decrees were pending, to the effect that, whereas both had claims against the talukhdar, one only was to sue him, the other paying half of the costs and being entitled to receive half of what might be decreed. The Judicial Committee upon the evidence concluded that the Appellate Court, attributing too much to certain omissions and acts on the plaintiff's part which were more or less explained, had erred in reversing the decree of the first Court, which maintained the agreements, depriving the plaintiff of his costs in that Court only. *MUHAMMAD YUSUF v. MUHAMMAD HUSAIN*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 62

10. ——— Appeal dismissed on grounds different from the reasons given by lower Court—*Dismissal without costs.* Where an appeal was dismissed on wholly different grounds than those which the lower Court had given for its decision, it was dismissed without costs. *FISCHER v. KAMALA NAICKER*

3 W. R. P. C. 33 : 8 Moo. I. A. 170

11. ——— Misstatement in petition. Where special leave to appeal to the Privy Council is granted upon a petition in which material misstatements are made, objection should be taken by the respondent by preliminary motion to rescind the leave to appeal, or at any rate before the hearing of the appeal, when called on, has been entered on. Where it was not clear that the material misstatements in the petition had been made with an intention to deceive and the objection to the appeal was only taken at a late stage of the hearing, the Judicial Committee declined to dismiss the appeal, but refused the appellant the costs of the appeal. *RAM SABUK BOSE v. KAMINEE KOOMAREE DOSSEE*

14 B. L. R. 394

S.C. RAM SABUK BOSE v. MOHMOHINI DOSSEE

L. R. 2 I. A. 71 : 23 W. R. 113

12. ——— *Petition for special leave to appeal.* An Order in Council granting leave to appeal is liable at any time to be res-



PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*24. COSTS—*contd.*

cinded with costs, on its appearing that the petition upon which the order has been granted contains any misstatement or any concealment of facts which ought to have been disclosed. Even if there has been no intention to mislead, a material misstatement having been made, the order is still liable to be rescinded; and to maintain it to clear the case of bad faith is not sufficient. *Mohan Lall Sukul v. Bebee Dass*, 8 Moo. I. A. 193, referred to and followed. Of three grounds on which special leave to appeal had been obtained, two had been correctly stated, but with the third was connected an error in the petition to which objection was taken at the hearing. On its appearing that there had been no intention to mislead, the appeal was heard and allowed; but, in regard to the above, without costs. *Ram Sabuk Bose v. Monmohini Dossee*, L. R. 2 I. A. 71, referred to. *MUSCOORIE BANK v. RAYNOR* I. L. R. 4 All. 500 : L. R. 9 I. A. 70

13. ———— Appeal brought contrary to agreement not to appeal. A fixed sum *nomine expensarum* was given to each respondent in lieu of costs, where an appeal was preferred contrary to an agreement not to appeal, and the proceedings had been stayed. *AMIR ALI v. INDURJIT KOER*

9 B. L. R. 460  
14 Moo. I. A. 203

14. ———— Suit for damages valued unnecessarily high—*Decree for smaller amount*. There being no grounds for a claim for damages amounting to the appealable sum of Rs. 10,000, and the amount actually recovered falling far short of that sum, the Court directed the costs below to be apportioned according to the ordinary course in these Courts, and gave neither party costs of the appeal. *MUDUN MOHUN DOSS v. GOKUL DOSS*

10 Moo. I. A. 563 : 5 W. R. P. C. 91

15. ———— Charges by respondent of fraud, forgery and perjury—*Reversal of decree*. Charges of fraud, forgery, and perjury having been made by the respondents against the appellant, the party who propounded the will, costs of the Courts in India and upon appeal to England were, upon the reversal of the decree of the Sudder Court, ordered to be paid by the respondents. *NANA NARAIN RAO v. HUREE PUNTH BHAO*

9 Moo. I. A. 98

16. ———— Costs of respondents—*Printed cases—Ex parte hearing*. The respondents in four appeals which were consolidated and heard as one filed their printed case, and did not appear at the hearing, which was *ex parte*. Held, that the respondents, notwithstanding their non-appearance, were on the dismissal of the appeal entitled to the costs thereof up to and including the filing of their printed case, and also to the costs of applying for those costs. *SUMBHU NATH SANTRA MAHAPATRA v. SURJAMONI DEBI*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 187  
L. R. 24 I. A. 191  
1 C. W. N. 649

PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—*contd.*24. COSTS—*concl'd.*

17. ———— Taxation of costs—*Costs of appeal from India—Unnecessary expenses*. In taxing the costs of an appeal from India, the Privy Council will disallow all such costs and expenses as may have been unnecessarily occasioned by the inclusion, in the transcript sent from India, of matters which have been improperly introduced therein. *TARAKANT BANNERJEE v. PUDDMONEY DOSSEE*

5 W. R. P. C. 63 : 10 Moo. I. A. 476

18. ———— Irrelevant matter—*Directions as to taxation of costs*. Where irrelevant matter had been introduced into the record, the Registrar was directed to tax the costs as if the record had not contained what he might consider to have been inserted unnecessarily. *PITTAPUR RAJA v. BUCHI SITAYYA*

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 219

S.C. RAJA OF PITTAPUR v. ROW BUCHI SITAYYA GARU . . . . . L. R. 12 I. A. 16

BISHENMUN SINGH v. LAND MORTGAGE BANK OF INDIA . I. L. R. 11 Calc. 244 : L. R. 12 I. A. 7

19. ———— Costs of printing record. In consequence of reckless extravagance in the printing of the record, their Lordships directed that only the costs of two volumes should be allowed, limited in respect of them to what is fair and reasonable. *VENKAYYAMMA GARU v. VENKATARAMANAYYAMMA* (1902)

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 678 ;  
s.c. L. R. 29 I. A. 156  
7 C. W. N. 1

## 25. CRIMINAL CASES.

1. ———— Felony. *Semble* : No appeal lies in cases of felony to the Queen in Council, from any of the dominions of the Crown of Great Britain which are governed by the law of England. *QUEEN v. EDULJEE BYRAMJEE*

3 Moo. I. A. 468

2. ———— Irregularity in trial causing injustice—*Prerogative of Crown*. There is no right of appeal to the Privy Council in criminal cases. In a petition for leave to appeal against a conviction and sentence of the Sudder Nizamut Adawlut of Bengal on the ground of alleged irregularities in the proceedings causing great hardship and injustice :—*Held*, that, assuming that the prerogative of the Crown extended to the granting of leave of appeal in such a case, and was not curtailed by the operation of the Indian Act XXV of 1861, and that this was *prima facie* a cause of great grievance, yet the consequences of allowing appeals in criminal cases would be such as to justify their Lordships in advising Her Majesty, in the exercise of her discretion, to refuse to grant the prayer of the petition. *JOYKISSEN MOOKERJEE v. QUEEN*.

1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 61  
1 W. R. P. C. 13 : 9 Moo. I. A. 168



# PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF— concl'd.

## 25. CRIMINAL CASES—concl'd.

3. ———— **Refusal of leave to appeal—**  
*General rule as to refusal of leave to appeal in criminal cases—Misdirection of a jury not of itself a ground.* Although in very special and exceptional circumstances leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council may be granted in a criminal case, no countenance was given to the view that an appeal would be allowed merely on the ground that the Judge trying the case had misdirected the jury. There was no reason to believe that there had been any misdirection by the Judge, or that he had, as he was alleged by the petitioner to have done, misconstrued, in charging the jury, a section of the Penal Code. Not only on the latter ground, but on the broader ground above stated, the petition was rejected. *In the matter of MACCREA*

I. L. R. 15 All. 310  
L. R. 20 I. A. 90

4. ———— *Refusal of leave to appeal from a conviction and sentence—Alleged misdirection to a jury—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 244.* The petitioner applied to the Privy Council for leave to appeal from a verdict finding him guilty on a charge under s. 124A of the Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860). *Held*, that, consistently with the rules hitherto guiding the Judicial Committee in recommending the grant of leave to appeal from convictions in criminal cases, the petitioner's case was not one in which leave should be granted. *BAL GANGADHAR TILAK v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* . . . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 528

L. R. 25 I. A. 1

5. ———— *Leave to appeal to the Privy Council in criminal case—Practice—Joinder of charges—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 233, 234, 235, 236, 237 and 239.* Before granting a certificate for leave to appeal to the Privy Council, the Court must be satisfied that there is reasonable ground for thinking that grave and substantial injustice may have been done by reason of some departure from the principles of natural justice. *Ex parte Carew*, [1897] A. C. 719 and *Dinizulu v. Attorney-General of Zululand*, 61 L. T. 740, followed. *In re BAL GANGADHAR TILAK* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 221

## 26. ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF ORDER IN COUNCIL.

——— *Practice—Decision of High Court in execution of order in Council—Appeal from such decision—Erroneous interpretation of order in Council—Expression of opinion by Judicial Committee on petition pending appeal.* Where the High Court, in execution of an order in Council, had interpreted the order in a manner not intended, the Judicial Committee, pending an appeal from the High Court decision, expressed an opinion as to the intention of the order. *In the matter of the petition of YARLAGADDA DURGA PRASHAD NAYADU* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 27 Mad. 153  
s.c. L. R. 31 I. A. 64

# PROBABLE CAUSE.

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I. L. R. 26 Bom. 267

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I. L. R. 4 Calc. 645

*See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1877, s. 50.*

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 73

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8 C. W. N. 197 ; 821

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*See COURT FEES ACT, s. 19D.*

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 161

*See COURT FEES ACT, SCH. I, CL. 11.*

*See EVIDENCE* . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 710

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*See LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.*

1 Hyde 67

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*See WILL* . . . 9 C. W. N. 49 ; 769

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 530

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I. L. R. 35 Calc. 156

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INTESTATE JURISDICTION . 1 Mad 59

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I. L. R. 20 Bom. 238

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*See* LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART.  
178 . . . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 48

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 379

*See* PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—PROBATE  
AND LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.*See* WILL—FORM OF WILL.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 721

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 784

duty.

*See* COURT-FEES ACT, SCH. I, ART. 11.

inquiry as to value of property—

*See* COURT-FEES ACT, s. 19H.

6 C. W. N. 898

of will of Sikh, grant of—

*See* PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION ACT  
(V OF 1881) . . . 7 C. W. N. 895

second grant of—

*See* COURT FEES ACT, SCH. I, CL. 11.

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 733

**1. POWER OF HIGH COURT TO GRANT,  
AND FORM OF.****1. Power of High Court—***Testator having no assets within jurisdiction—  
British European-born subject.* The High Court  
granted probate of a will of a British European-  
born subject who had no assets within the local  
limit of the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the Court.  
*In the goods of REED* . 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 20**2. Testator dying out  
of jurisdiction with effects within it—Act XXVII  
of 1860.** Where a Hindu testator died out of the  
jurisdiction of the Court, but left effects within it,**PROBATE—contd.****1. POWER OF HIGH COURT TO GRANT,  
AND FORM OF—contd.**

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 10 : Bourke Test. 3

**3. Act XIII of 1875**—Rule 4 of Rules of High Court, 22nd June 1875.  
Act XIII of 1875 does not empower the High Court  
to grant probate limited to property in any province  
or presidency, in cases where an unlimited grant had  
been made extending only to property in another  
province or presidency before the passing of the Act.  
*Per MACPHERSON, J.*—Rule 4 of the Rules of 22nd  
June 1875, as to grants of probate, only applies to  
grants of the class mentioned in rule 1, i.e., only  
to cases in which the application for probate is  
made after 1st April 1875, and not to cases in which  
the application was made before that date.  
*In the goods of SHAMACHURN MULLICK. In  
the matter of the petition of RAJRANEE DOSSEE*  
I. L. R. 1 Calc. 52 : 24 W. R. 206**4. Form of probate**—Limited probate—Succession Act (X of 1865),  
ss. 179, 226. Probate limited to part of the estate  
cannot be granted in cases where, under s. 179 of  
the Succession Act (X of 1865), the whole estate is  
vested in the executor. *In re THAKER MADHAVJI*  
I. L. R. 6 Bom. 460**5. Form of probate**—Probate in cases not governed by the Succession  
Act—Probate to take effect throughout India—Limit-  
ed probate—Probate duty—Cutchi Memon Maho-  
medan—Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 331—Hindu  
Wills Act, s. 2—Act XXVII of 1860, s. 18. In  
cases not governed by the Indian Succession Act  
(X of 1865), probates and letters of administration  
granted by the High Court of Bombay in respect of  
Hindus, Mahomedans, and other persons not usually  
designated as British subjects, take effect only and  
can only be granted for the purpose of recovering  
debts and securing debtors paying the same, except  
so far as is otherwise provided in Act XXVII of  
1860; and probate duty is only payable on the  
amount of such debts. Cutchi Memons are not  
Hindus within the meaning of s. 2 of the Hindu  
Wills Act (XXI of 1870), and therefore probate to  
take effect throughout India cannot be granted in  
the case of a will of a Cutchi Memon testator. Cut-  
chi Memons are Mahomedans to whom Mahome-  
dan law is to be applied except when an ancient and  
invariable special custom to the contrary is estab-  
lished. *In re ISMAIL* . . I. L. R. 6 Bom. 452*See* AHMEDBOHY HUBIBHOY v. VULLEEBOHY  
CASSUMBHOY . . . I. L. R. 6 Bom. 703**6. Probate or Letters  
of Administration—Jurisdiction of High Court to  
grant—Estate of a deceased who had not dwelt or left  
goods within limits of Presidency—Succession Act  
(X of 1865), s. 40—Letters Patent, 1862, cl. 34.** The  
High Court of Madras has no jurisdiction to grant



**PROBATE—contd.****1. POWER OF HIGH COURT TO GRANT, AND FORM OF—concl'd.**

probate of the will of a testator, or letters of administration of the estate of an intestate, who did not dwell, and who did not leave assets, within the limits of the Presidency. *In the matter of ROSE LEARMOUTH* (1900) . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 120

**2. JURISDICTION IN PROBATE CASES.**

**1. — Facts giving jurisdiction—***Succession Act, s. 244—Property in possession of testator at his death—District Judge, power of.* In an application for probate of a will, it is sufficient, for the purpose of giving jurisdiction under s. 244 of Act X of 1865, that the property alleged by the petition to have been situate within the jurisdiction of the Judge should have been in the possession of the testator at the time of his death. *RTN BAHADUR SINGH v. RAJ RUP KOORER*  
4 C. L. R. 498

**2. — Will made before Hindu Wills Act—Hindu Wills Act (XXI of 1870), s. 2—District Judge, power of.** The only powers conferred on mofussil Courts being in respect of wills made on or after the 1st day of September 1870, probate of a will made by a Hindu prior to that date cannot be granted by a mofussil District Court. *LUCHMAN BHARTI v. DUKHARAN BHARTI*  
6 C. L. R. 138

**3. — Will of Hindu made before Hindu Wills Act (XXI of 1870)—Probate Act (V of 1881)—Succession Act, s. 187—Application for letters of administration.** Since the passing of Act V of 1881 the District Courts have jurisdiction to entertain applications for the grant of probate or letters of administration in respect of wills of Hindus made before the 1st September, 1870, that is to say, wills of Hindus to which the Hindu Wills Act (XXI of 1870) did not apply. *KRISHNA KINKER ROY v. RAI MOHUN ROY*  
I. L. R. 14 Calc. 37

**4. — Will of Mahomedan—District Judge, power of.** A District Court has no jurisdiction to admit the will of a Mahomedan to probate. *FATIMUNISSA BEGUM v. HAMZA ALI*  
6 C. L. R. 391

**5. — Will of Hindu woman of immoveable property in mofussil—District Judge, power of—Execution in Bombay—Property in mofussil—Hindu Wills Act (XXI of 1870), s. 2—Probate Act (V of 1881), ss. 2 and 83—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), s. 177.** Held, that the District Judge of Thana had jurisdiction to grant probate of a will executed on 28th October 1881 by a Hindu woman in the town of Bombay devising immoveable property situated in Thana. Where the caveator refuses to answer a question, s. 177 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act IV of 1882), the provisions of which are extended to proceedings before the District Judge by s. 83 of Act V of 1881, will not justify the Judge in dispensing

**PROBATE—contd.****2. JURISDICTION IN PROBATE CASES—concl'd.**

with the proof of the will set up, and passing a decree in favour of the petitioner. The Court of appeal will reverse such a decree if passed. *RAVJI RANCHOD NAIK v. VISHNU RANCHOD NAIK*  
I. L. R. 9 Bom. 241

**6. — Application for probate where on appeal from District Court the High Court finds that the will was proved.** Where on appeal from the District Court it was found by the High Court that a will was proved:—*Held*, that a subsequent application for probate should be made to the District Court. *BAYABAI v. SARASVATIBAI* . I. L. R. 17 Bom. 686

**7. — Will executed at Baroda—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), ss. 56 and 57—Testator subject of the Baroda State—Disposition of immoveable property in British India—Jurisdiction of Courts in British India.** Under s. 56 of the Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), a District Judge has jurisdiction to grant probate of a will executed out of British India by a person who is not a British subject, if the testator had at the time of his death moveable or immoveable property within the jurisdiction of the Judge. The discretion vested in a Judge by s. 57 of that Act does not extend to a case where there is no Court of concurrent jurisdiction in India to which application for probate can be made. The validity of a will which purports to dispose of immoveable property in British India must be tested by the rules applicable to the execution of wills in British India. *BHATRAO DADAJIRAO v. LAKSHMIBAI*  
I. L. R. 20 Bom. 607

**8. — Transfer of a probate case by the District Judge in whose Court it was instituted to that of a Subordinate Judge—The Bengal, North-Western Provinces, and Assam Civil Courts Act (XII of 1887), s. 23, sub-s. 2, cl. (d)—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), s. 52.** An application was made for probate of the will of a deceased testator in the Court of the District Judge who transferred the case to that of the Subordinate Judge. The opposite party *inter alia* objected that the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to try the case. *Held*, that the case came within the scope of s. 23, sub-s. 2, cl. (d), of the Bengal, North-Western Provinces, and Assam Civil Courts Act (XII of 1887), and therefore the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to try it. *KUNJO BEHARI GOSSAMI v. HEM CHUNDER LAHIRI*  
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 340

**3. APPLICATION FOR PROBATE, AND PROCEDURE.**

**1. — Minor—Special citation—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), ss. 50, 83—Service of summons—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 443, 647.** Where executors applied for probate and there was living a minor widow entitled to maintenance and residence under the will:—*Held*, that a special citation should



**PROBATE—contd.****3. APPLICATION FOR PROBATE, AND PROCEDURE—concl'd.**

issue upon the widow and be served personally on her and on her father with whom she resided. *In the goods of* AMRITA LAL MULLICK

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 350

2. ———— *Service of notice on minor—Appointment of guardian ad litem.* If an application is made for the probate of a will which affects the interest of a minor, the proper course is to serve the minor with a notice and have a proper guardian *ad litem* appointed for him. *REBELLS v. REBELLS* . 2 C. W. N. 100

3. ———— *Withdrawal of application before proceeding became contentious—Right of applicant to propound will in opposition to application for grant of letters of administration—Succession Act, s. 261—Effect of withdrawal of previous application for probate of same will without leave to apply again—Civil Procedure Code, s. 373.* Where a person applied for probate of a will, but withdrew the application before the proceedings became contentious :—*Held*, that he was entitled as caveator to propound the same will in opposition to an application for grant of letters of administration to the estate of the deceased. *Held*, further, that, though the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable to suits under Act X of 1865, s. 261, still, in the present case, the application for probate had been withdrawn before the proceedings became contentious, and that therefore s. 373, Civil Procedure Code, was not applicable. *PAKIAM PILLAI v. INNASI FERNAND* . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 458

4. ———— *Official Trustee—Executor—Renunciation—Retraction—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), s. 17.* Where the Official Trustee expressed his intention of renouncing probate, but subsequently retracted : *Held*, that no formal renunciation having been made, he was not precluded from applying for probate. *In the goods of Robert Morant, L. R. 3 P. & D. 151; Golup Sundari Dassi, 15 C. W. N. (Notes) clv*, followed. *Held*, also, that there was nothing under the Official Trustees Act which precluded the Official Trustee from being appointed an executor and acting as such. *In the goods of* MANICK LAL SEAL (1907)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 156

**4. OF WHAT DOCUMENTS GRANTED.**

1. ———— *Document partly testamentary—Gift, deed of.* If one part of a document is testamentary in its character, it may be presumed that the remainder, if the language is capable of that construction, is also intended to be testamentary. Under such circumstances, where there is nothing inconsistent with the supposition that the arrangements made therein are to take effect from the death of the person executing it, the document ought to be admitted to probate as a will. *In the matter of* KOMOLA KANT BISWAS . 4 C. L. R. 401

2. ———— *Probate of part of a will—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), s. 25.*

**PROBATE—contd. 1****4. OF WHAT DOCUMENTS GRANTED—contd.**

Probate can be granted of a portion only of a will to the extent to which the contents are proved where the other portion is lost; and there is nothing in s. 25 of the Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881) to prohibit such a grant of probate. *Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards, L. R. 1 P. D. 154*, referred to. *KEDAR NATH MITTER v. SAROJINI DASI*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 634

3 C. W. N. 617

3. ———— *Document in form of will passing no property and only appointing guardians—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), ss. 2, 4.* A document in the form of a will, which was presented for probate, dealt with no property, the petition stating that the family of which the testator had been managing member was undivided and that the testator's property had devolved by survivorship on his sons and nephews. The document, however, appointed persons to manage the family business during the minority of the said minors. *Held*, that it was not a document of which probate could be granted. *In re* BUKTHAWAR MULL SOWCAR . I. L. R. 23 Mad. 133

4. ———— *Nuncupative will of a Mahomedan—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), ss. 3, 24, 25, 26, 62—Succession Act (XV of 1865), s. 244, and Ch. IX.* Probate may be granted of a nuncupative will. *In the matter of the will of* MAHOMED ABBA. *In re* MARIAMBAL . I. L. R. 24 Bom. 8

5. ———— *Nuncupative will of a Hindu—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), s. 3—Will—Probate granted of a nuncupative will made by a Hindu.* *Held*, that probate may be granted of a nuncupative will made by a Hindu. *In re the will of* Haji Mahomed Abba, I. L. R. 24 Bom. 8, followed. *GOKUL CHAND v. MANGAL SEN* (1903) I. L. R. 25 All. 313

6. ———— *Will with alterations in pencil—Practice—Application for probate of copy-will with alterations in pencil—Codicil—Will, pencil alterations in, made before execution—Photographic facsimile of will attached to probate—Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 58—Illegible portions of will.* Where the executors applied for probate of a will, consisting of two documents, the first being a copy-will with various alterations and interlineations made in pencil by the testator himself some time before the execution of the second, which was in the nature of a codicil confirming the first as altered, the Court granted probate with a copy of the will showing the alterations and interlineations in red ink, and directed a photographic facsimile of the copy-will, taken in the presence of the Registrar and the executors, to be attached, as the pencil alterations were likely to fade in course of time. *Gann v. Gregory, 3 De G. M. & G. 777*, and *Shea v. Boschetti, 18 Beav. 321*, relied upon. *In the goods of* Hall, L. R. 2 P. and D. 256, distinguished. *Held*, that the provisions of the Succession Act,



**ROBATE—contd.**

4. OF WHAT DOCUMENTS GRANTED—*concl'd.*  
s. 58, are inapplicable to this case. *In the goods of*  
L. P. D. BROUGHTON (1902)

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 311  
s.c. 6 C. W. N. 477

**5. TO WHOM GRANTED.**

1. ——— **Nephew—Brother—Hindu will.**  
In this case the High Court directed probate of will executed by a Hindu in favour of a nephew (the son of an elder brother) to be granted to the nephew, instead of to a brother; the property being of small value and consisting of several small holdings, and the widow of the deceased being a girl of very immature age, whereas the nephew had been brought up by him and was the object of his special affection. CHUNDER SHIKUR MULLICK v. SHAM CHAND MULLICK . . . . . 18 W. R. 395

2. ——— **Executor by implication—**  
*Direction in will to get in and distribute estate.* Where A, under the terms of a will, although not expressly appointed an executor, was directed to receive and pay the testator's debts and to get in and distribute his personal estate:—*Held*, that A must be taken to have been appointed under the will an executor by implication, and therefore was entitled to probate. *In the matter of* MONOHUR MOOKERJEE . . . . . I. L. R. 5 Calc. 756 : 6 C. L. R. 228

3. ——— **Administration**  
*with will annexed—Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 182.* A Hindu died leaving a will whereby he bequeathed all his property whatever (including debts) to two of his sons who now applied for probate of the will on the ground that they were appointed executors by implication. *Held*, that the sons were not entitled to probate of the will. *Ex parte* VITTAL DOSS . . . . . I. L. R. 15 Mad. 360

4. ——— **Universal legatee—Succession Act, s. 182—Hindu Wills Act (XXI of 1870).** Probate granted of the will of a Hindu to his widow and heiress, who was universal legatee under the will, as executor by necessary implication, there being no executor mentioned in the will. *In the goods of* RADHICA MOHAN SETT . . . . . 7 B. L. R. 563

5. ——— **Universal legatee**  
*not entitled to probate—Letters of administration with the will annexed—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), s. 19.* A universal legatee is not entitled to probate, but only to letters of administration with the will annexed. *In the goods of* Radhica Mohan Sett, 7 B. L. R. 563, not followed. *In the goods of* SHOSHEE BHUSAN BANNERJEE . . . . . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 582

6. ——— **Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), ss. 6, 19—Universal legatee—Probate granted by mistake, effect of.** Under s. 6 of the Probate and Administration Act, probate can be granted only to an executor appointed by the will, and an universal legatee is only entitled under s. 19 to a grant of letters of administration

**PROBATE—contd.****5. TO WHOM GRANTED—contd.**

with the will annexed. Where probate was granted to an universal legatee by mistake: *Held*, that such grant was invalid from the first, and the person to whom such grant was made could not be constituted an executor so as to be empowered to exercise any of the powers conferred on executors under the Act. *Held*, also, that a mortgage executed by such a person without the Judge's permission is bad. PUNDIT PRAYRAG RAJ v. GOWKARAN PERSHAD TEWARI (1902) . . . . . 6 C. W. N. 787

7. ——— **Wife—Appointment of wife as manager of all property and guardian of children.** The testator by his will appointed H, his wife, guardian of his infant children, "in order that of all his property she should carry on the management (until his youngest son should attain twenty-two years of age), and in the testator's name the management of his firm. He appointed his brothers, R and M, his vakils to settle any quarrel that might arise, and directed them not to give unjust advice; but should the vakils give unjust advice, H was not to act upon it. Upon certain contingencies H and the vakils were to separate and make over to the sons their shares. *Held*, that H was by implication appointed sole executrix, and that she alone, to the exclusion of the testator's brothers, was entitled to probate. HAMABAI v. BAMANJI NASARVANJI . . . . . 7 Bom. A. C. 64

8. ——— **Executrix—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), ss. 35, 42, 62—Letters of administration with will annexed.** A petitioner prayed for a grant of probate of her deceased son's will. No executrix had been appointed therein, but the petitioner was directed that out of certain property she should pay certain debts. *Held*, that such a direction was insufficient to show an intention on the testator's part that for the general purposes of administration the petitioner should be executrix; and that the petition should have been for letters of administration with the will annexed; that the petition should state all assets likely to come to the petitioner's hands; and that proof of execution and of the consciousness of a testator is insufficient, and that it should be further shown that he knew of and understood the contents of the document which he signed. KUPPAYAMMAL v. AMMANI AMMAL . . . . . I. L. R. 22 Mad. 345

9. ——— **Discretion of Court as to refusal to grant probate—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881)—Executor.** Where, on application for probate by a person appointed executor by the will, the genuineness of the will is not disputed, and the applicant is a person not legally incapable, the Court acting under the Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881) has no discretion to refuse probate on the ground that in its opinion the applicant is not a fit and proper person to be appointed executor. HARA COOMAR SIRCAR v. DOORGAMONI DAS . . . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 195



PROBATE—*contd.*5. TO WHOM GRANTED—*concl'd.*

10. ————— *Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), s. 9—Application for probate by an executor—Discretion of Court as to granting such application.* Although under s. 85 of the Probate and Administration Act, 1881, it is within the discretion of the Court to refuse to grant an application for letters of administration, no such discretion is given in regard to an application for probate by a person selected by a testator for the administration of his estate. *Hara Coomar Sircar v. Doorgamani Dassi*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 195, referred to. *PRAN NATH GHOSE v. JADO NATH BHATTACHARJI* . . . I. L. R. 20 All. 189

11. ————— *Probate in formâ pauperis—Executor without means to pay fees—Application by executor for probate in formâ pauperis—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 647.* Where an executor is not in possession of the property of his testator and cannot get possession of it, and where he has not himself the means of paying the necessary fees, he may be allowed to petition for, and, if entitled thereto, to obtain, probate in formâ pauperis. *In the matter of the will of DAWUBAI* . . . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 237

12. ————— *Trustees—Executor according to the tenor—Probate to executor according to the tenor granted only where discharge of such duties as executors have to perform are included.* Where property is left by a will to trustees, they will not be entitled to probate as executors according to the tenor, unless it appears from the will that they have to discharge such duties as executors have to perform. *APPACOOTY MUDALI v. MUTHU KUMARAPPA MUDALI* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 191

## 6. PROOF OF WILL.

1. ————— *Evidence of execution of will—Hindu Wills Act, 1870—Procedure.* It is incumbent on persons propounding a will for the purpose of obtaining probate or letters of administration under the Hindu Wills Act to produce all the evidence which the circumstances of the case indicate as proper and necessary to prove the execution of the will. *TARA CHARAN CHUCKERBUTTY v. DEB NATH ROY* . . . 10 C. L. R. 550

2. ————— *Evidence of testator's knowledge of contents of will.* Proof of execution and of the consciousness of a testator is insufficient; it should be further shown that he knew of and understood the contents of the document which he signed. *KUPPAYAMMAL v. AMMANI AMMAL* . . . I. L. R. 22 Mad. 345

3. ————— *Evidence.* Probate is rightly granted where the Judge believes the witness who speaks to the execution of the will and the disposing mind of the testator. The rule in *Tyrrell v. Panton*, [1894] P. 171, requiring proof that the testator actually knew and approved the contents of the will does not apply, unless surrounding cir-

PROBATE—*contd.*6. PROOF OF WILL—*contd.*

cumstances excite suspicion. *SHAMA CHARAN KUNDU v. KHETROMONI DAS*

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 521  
4 C. W. N. 501

4. ————— *Genuineness of will—Appearance and signatures—Probate, application for—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881).* The High Court, considering it to have been proved by the evidence that the alleged testator was incapable, by reason of illness, of signing the will as firmly as it purported to be signed, found that the signatures were not genuine, and reversed the decree of the first Court which had granted probate. On appeal there was no view of the signatures, neither party having applied to have the originals transmitted, or to have photographs taken of them. But their Lordships found that the evidence did not warrant the conclusion that on the day on which the will purported to have been executed the testator physically and mentally was unable to execute it; but that there was sufficient evidence to establish the genuineness of the will and the capacity of the testator to make it, and that the evidence for the defence was not sufficient to destroy the petitioner's case on either of these points. *BAMASUNDARI DEBI v. TARASUNDARI DEBI* . . . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 65  
L. R. 18 I. A. 132

5. ————— *Sufficiency of proof of will—Proof of execution of will.* Having regard to the fact that a grant of probate is not irrevocable, and to the importance of a deceased testator's estate being represented as speedily as possible, *prima facie* proof of the execution of his will is sufficient to warrant the grant of a probate when the application for such probate is unopposed. *In the matter of the petition of NOBODOORGA* . . . 7 C. L. R. 367

6. ————— *Proof of inofficious will—Knowledge of testator as to nature of his acts in making will.* Where a will is inofficious in character, it is incumbent on the parties propounding it to prove it not only affirmatively, but completely, and by circumstances showing not only that the testator signed the will, but that he knew what he was doing, that he was making a will, and that he did all that he did with his eyes open. *SARODA SOONDUREE DOSSIA v. MUDDUN MOHUN SHAHA* . . . 24 W. R. 162

7. ————— *Internal evidence in will—Grant of probate unopposed—Ground for refusal of probate.* Where an application for probate was unopposed, although a notice in the nature of a citation had been issued to the testator's widow, the Judge was held not to have been justified in rejecting the application merely upon internal evidence contained in the will. *SHUSTEE CHURN PATUK v. AUKHIL CHUNDER SEN* . . . 23 W. R. 103

8. ————— *Evidence of acknowledgment by testator—Ground for granting probate* That fact that a contested will bears an endorse-



**PROBATE—contd.****6. PROOF OF WILL—concl'd.**

ment stating that it was acknowledged by the testator before the Registrar, does not warrant a Judge in granting probate without any other evidence in support of the will, even though the caveator does not produce any evidence to impeach the will. *OBHOY CHURUN MUSTAFI v. UMA CHURUN MUSTAFI* . . . **1 C. L. R. 362**

and see CASES UNDER PROBATE—OPPOSITION TO, AND REVOCATION OF, GRANT.

**9. ———— Consent of parties—Will, proof of—Compromise—Agent—Caveat—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 41—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 177, 375.** Unless a will is proved in some form no grant of probate can be made merely on the consent of parties. Hence an agreement or compromise as regards the genuineness and due execution of a will, if its effect is to exclude evidence in proof of the will, is not lawful within the meaning of s. 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Evans v. Saunders*, 30 L. P. J. D. A. 184, distinguished. *Norman v. Strains*, L. R. 6 P. D. 219; *Ravji Ranchod Naik v. Vishnu Ranchod Naik*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 241; and *Ghellaibhai v. Nandubhai*, I. L. R. 21 Bom. 335, followed. *Roadnight v. Carter*, 3 Sw. & Tr. 421, referred to. Any party to a suit has the right to repudiate the action of an agent compromising it without his knowledge and consent, before an order is passed accepting the compromise as the final determination of the suit. *Brojodurlabh Sinha v. Ramanath Ghose*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 908, referred to. *MONMOHINI GUHA v. BANGA CHANDRA DAS* (1904) . . . **I. L. R. 31 Calc. 357**

**7. ADMINISTRATION BONDS.**

**1. ———— Practice as to taking bond—Bond, form of—Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 256—Practice.** The Indian Succession Act, s. 256, requires that an administration bond should be taken in every case. It may, however, be varied, by special order of the Court, in the case of a limited or special administration and follow the English form. *In the goods of GUBBOY* . . . **I. L. R. 26 Calc. 407**

**2. ———— Succession Act, s. 256—Bond when probate is granted.** A bond is not to be taken from a person to whom probate is granted under the Succession Act. *ANONYMOUS* . . . **3 Mad. Ap. 10**

**3. ———— Succession Act, ss. 3 and 256.** It having been the uniform practice of the Court to grant probate without taking a bond from executors named in the will:—*Held*, that it was unnecessary to depart from the practice, notwithstanding the words of ss. 3 and 256 of Act X of 1865. *RUN BAHADUR SINGH v. RAJ RUP KOER* . . . **4 C. L. R. 498**

(*Contra*) *In the matter of the petition of JUGGODISHARI DEBI* . . . **I. L. R. 7 Calc. 84: 6 C. L. R. 397**

**PROBATE—contd.****8. AMENDMENT OF ERROR IN PROBATE.**

——— **Amendment allowed—Will—Succession (Act X of 1865), s. 232.** Amendment of error in probate allowed. *In the goods of WHITE* . . . **I. L. R. 4 Calc. 582**

**9. OPPOSITION TO, AND REVOCATION OF, GRANT.**

**1. ———— Opposition to grant—Succession Act, s. 261—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 172—Proof of will.** Where a will is contested, the proceedings should take, as nearly as may be, the form of a regular suit, as if brought by the party propounding the will; and where a Judge granted a probate, it was *held* to be a serious defect with reference to Act XXIII of 1861, s. 38, and Act VIII of 1859, s. 172, that he took down only memorandum of the evidence, and not their testimony in the language in ordinary use in proceedings before the Court. *SARODA SOONDUREE DOSSIA v. MUDDUN MOHUN SHAHA* . . . **24 W. R. 162**

**2. ———— Probate Act, 1881, s. 50—Hindu widow—Interest—Revocation of probate—Locus standi.** Where a will has been proved summarily, proof in solemn form *per testes* will not, as a rule, be required on the application of a person who had had notice, or had been aware of the previous proceedings before the grant of probate issued, and had then abstained from coming forward. The widow of a Hindu testator who has died leaving sons has sufficient interest to call upon the executor to prove the will in solemn form *per testes*. *BRINDA CHOWDHRAIN v. RADHICA CHOWDHRAIN* . . . **I. L. R. 11 Calc. 592**

**3. ———— Succession Act, s. 261—Procedure—Contested cases of application for probate of will.** In cases where a will is contested, the Court is bound to consider, not only whether the alleged will was executed by the testator, but whether the will is valid or invalid, and whether probate of the will ought to be granted. Every consideration which ought to induce the Court to refuse probate of the will must be taken into account. *Saroda Sundoree Dassia v. Muddaun Mohan Shaha*, 24 W. R. 162, cited. *ANNODA SUNDARI DABI v. JUGUT MONI DABI* . . . **6 C. L. R. 176**

**4. ———— Procedure—Question as to power of disposition—Succession Act, s. 254.** Upon a *bona fide* application for probate of a will, it is not the province of the Court to which the application is made to go into questions with reference to the power of the testator to make a disposition of the property of which the will purports to dispose. *Behary Lall Sandyal v. Juggo Mohun Gossain*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 1: 2 C. L. R. 422, followed. *Komul Lochun Dutt v. Nilrutton Mundle*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 350: 4 C. L. R. 175, commented on. *NANHU KOER v. SOMIRUN THAKUR* . . . **8 C. L. R. 287**

**5. ———— Question of title—Rights of persons claiming under will.** Upon a



**PROBATE—contd.****9. OPPOSITION TO, AND REVOCATION OF, GRANT—contd.**

*bona fide* application for probate of a will, it is not the province of the Court to which the application is made to go into questions of title with reference to the property of which the will purports to dispose. The grant of probate does not prejudice the rights of any person who claims any such property.

BEHARY LALL SANDYAL *v.* JUGO MOHUN GOSSAIN  
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 1: 2 C. L. R. 422

See TEEN COWREE DOSSEE *v.* HUREEHUR MOOKERJEE . . . . . 8 W. R. 308

6. ————— *Person having interest in estate—Person disputing right of testator to deal with property as his own—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), s. 69.* A person not claiming any of the property of the testator, but disputing the right of the testator to deal with certain property as his own, has not such an interest in the estate of the testator as entitles him to come in and oppose the grant of probate. *Kamona Soondary Dassee v. Hurro Lall Shaha*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 570, dissented from. *Behary Lall Sandyal v. Juggo Mohun Gossain*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 1: 2 C. L. R. 422, and *Nanku Koer v. Somirun Thakur*, 8 C. L. R. 287, followed in principle. *ABHIRAM DASS v. GOPAL DASS* . . . . . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 48

7. ————— *Interest entitling person to apply for revocation—Hindu law—Inheritance—Succession to property of degraded and outcast woman—Right of her husband's family in her property acquired while degraded.* In an application for revocation of probate of the will of K, which had been granted to D, it appeared that K was a Hindu widow, who many years ago left her husband's family dwelling house and became a woman of the town; that she had lived under the protection of D for 35 years; that when she came to D, she had no property, but that all the property she left had been acquired by her while in a degraded and outcast state. *Held*, that the applicant, as her husband's sister's son, had no interest in her estate entitling him to maintain the application. The general rule, that the tie of kindred between a woman's natural family and herself ceases when she becomes degraded and an outcast, applies with even greater force as between her and the members of her husband's family. Those members therefore have no right of inheritance in property acquired by a woman who leaves her husband's family and becomes degraded. *In the goods of KAMNEY-MONEY BEWAH* . . . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 697

8. ————— *Application to revoke probate—Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Right of suit to revoke probate.* A grant of probate of a will is not in the nature of a summary proceeding to be contested by a regular suit in the Civil Court. The grant must be contested by a suit in the Court out of which such grant issued, and it must be contested before the Court sitting as a Court of Probate, and not in the exercise of its ordinary civil jurisdiction. Persons who seek to contest a will must prove

**PROBATE—contd.****9. OPPOSITION TO, AND REVOCATION OF, GRANT—contd.**

an interest to entitle them to a *locus standi* in Court, but the want of interest is an objection which should be taken at the earliest stage of the proceedings. There is nothing in the Indian Succession Act to deprive a District Court, as a Court of Probate, of jurisdiction to hear and determine an application to revoke grant of probate of a will on the ground of the execution of such will having been obtained by force and coercion. *Semble*: That a legatee under a will has "an interest" sufficient to maintain a suit for the revocation of probate. *MAYHO v. WILLIAMS* . . . . . 2 N. W. 268

9. ————— *Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), ss. 50, 69—Revocation of probate—Party interested in applying for such revocation—"Interest," whether claim for maintenance is such an, as entitles the claimant to apply for revocation.* Where one of the two widows of the adoptive father of the testator, who was entitled to maintenance out of her husband's estate, applied for revocation of the probate of the will:—*Held*, that the right to maintenance cannot be affected by the will in question, whatever the provisions of that will may be. The Court may look at the will to see if it affects the claim to maintenance. The applicant for revocation of probate has no such interest in the estate as would entitle her to make the application under s. 50 of the Probate and Administration Act. *Brinda Chowdhrair v. Radhica Chowdhrair*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 492, distinguished. *Abhiram Das v. Gopal Das*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 48, and *Rahamtullah Sahib v. Rama Ram*, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 373, followed. *GARABINI DASSI v. PRATAP CHANDRA SHAHA* . . . . . 4 C. W. N. 602

10. ————— *Succession Act, s. 261—Procedure.* As to procedure in opposing grants of probate, see s. 261 of the Succession Act, and *KALEE TARA DOSSIA v. NOBIN CHUNDER KUR* . . . . . 21 W. R. 84

11. ————— *Right to oppose grant of probate.* A person who is not the next of kin, and who has no interest in the estate of a testator, has no right to oppose the grant of the probate or dispute the validity of the will. *In the matter of MEE TSEE* . . . . . 15 W. R. 351

12. ————— *Application for revocation of probate—Jurisdiction—Interest of applicant in the estate—Reversioner—Special citation—Succession Act (X of 1865), ss. 235, 244, 250.* The test of jurisdiction made use of in applications for grant of probate may be also applied to cases in which a revocation of probate is demanded, viz., whether or no the deceased, at the time of his death, had his fixed place of abode, or had some property, moveable or immovable, situate within the jurisdiction of the particular District Judge to whom the application is made. A presumptive reversioner to property with which a will deals has a sufficient interest in the property to entitle him to maintain a suit in respect of such property; and on the author-



**PROBATE—contd.****9. OPPOSITION TO, AND REVOCATION OF, GRANT—contd.**

ity of *Nobeen Chundra Sil v. Bhobo Soonduri Dabee*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 460, he is entitled to maintain a case for the revocation of probate. In every case in which probate of a Hindu's will is applied for, a special citation should be served upon those persons whose interests are directly affected by the will. *In the matter of the petitions of HURRO LALL SHAHA. KAMONA SOONDURY DASSEE v. HURRO LALL SHAHA*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 570 : 10 C. L. R. 409

13. ———— *Creditors of alleged heir—Hindu testator—Succession Act, s. 250—Caveat.* A Hindu testator died, leaving B, alleged to be his adopted son, and C, who would be his heir in default of adoption. On application made by B for probate of the will after the usual notices, the creditors of C came in and opposed the grant of probate. *Held*, under the Succession Act, as made applicable by the Hindu Wills Act, that the creditors were not parties having any interest in the estate of the deceased, and therefore were not entitled to oppose the grant of probate. *In the matter of the petition of DESPUTTY SINGH. BAIJNATH SAHAI v. DESPUTTY SINGH*

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 208 : 25 W. R. 489

14. ———— *Proceedings to revoke probate—Purchaser or assignee of next-of-kin—Succession Act, ss. 188, 242.* The grant of probate is the decree of a Court which no other Court can set aside, except for fraud or want of jurisdiction. Where it has been alleged that probate has been wrongly granted, the proper course to be pursued is to apply to the Court which granted the probate to revoke the same. Procedure upon such application discussed. *Semble* : A person interested by assignment in the estate of the deceased may, where a will has been set up and proved at variance to his interests, apply for the revocation of probate of the will so set up. *KOMOLLOCHUN DUTT v. NILRUTTUN MUNDLE*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 360 : 4 C. L. R. 175

15. ———— *Person having interest in estate—Mortgagees—Application to revoke or withdraw probate.* Mortgagees of the estate of a deceased person have an interest in such estate entitling them to intervene and be heard in opposition to an application made to withdraw probate. *KASHI CHUNDRA DEB v. GOPI KRISHNA DEB*

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 48

16. ———— *Caveat—Interest of attaching creditor—Next-of-kin—Mortgagee—Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 234, illus. (b), s. 242—20 & 21 Vict., c. 77, s. 61.* A, a judgment-creditor attached certain property as belonging to B, his debtor. B was the next-of-kin of C, deceased. The widow of C applied for probate of an alleged will of her husband. On caveat entered by A :—*Held*, that he had such an interest as entitled him to oppose the grant. D held a mortgage from B, executed subsequently to C's death, of other property

**PROBATE—contd.****9. OPPOSITION TO, AND REVOCATION OF, GRANT—contd.**

which the widow also alleged formed part of her husband's estate. On caveat entered by D :—*Held*, also, that he had such an interest as entitled him to oppose the grant. *Per FIELD, J.*—Under s. 242 of the Succession Act any person who can show that he is entitled to maintain a suit in respect of property over which probate would have effect possesses a sufficient interest to entitle him to enter a caveat and oppose the grant. *In the matter of the petition of BHOBOSOONDURI DABEE. NOBEEN CHUNDER SIL v. BHOBOSOONDURI DABEE*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 460

17. ———— *Person claiming interest in the estate of the deceased—Interest sufficient to support application to revoke probate—Revocation of probate—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), s. 69.* Where the heir *ab intestato* of a deceased person has entered into a contract to sell the property of the deceased, and has received the greater part of the consideration-money, the purchaser from such heir is a person claiming to have an interest in the estate of the deceased within the meaning of s. 69 of the Probate and Administration Act, and is entitled, upon a will being set up and proved at variance with his interest, to apply for revocation of the probate of the will so set up. *KOMOLLOCHUN DUTT v. NILRUTTUN MUNDLE*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 360, followed. *MUDDUN MOHUN SIRCAR v. KALI CHURN DEY* . . . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 37

18. ———— *Application for order revoking probate—Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 243—Locus standi of attaching creditor of next-of-kin to apply for revocation.* A will on the evidence was held duly proved. An application for revocation of probate was made by a judgment-creditor who had attached his debtor's right, title, and interest in family estate, whereof a one-fourth share would, but for this will, which made other dispositions, have been inherited by such debtor. Whether such an attaching creditor can oppose the grant of probate or apply to have it revoked, is a matter of grave doubt ; at least, in a case which is not founded on the ground that the probate has been obtained in fraud of creditors. *Baijnath Sahai v. Desputty Singh*, I. L. R. 2 Calc. 208, referred to ; and *Komollochun Dutt v. Nilruttun Mundle*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 360, distinguished. *NILMONI SINGH DEO v. UMANATH MOOKERJEE. NILMONI SINGH v. BHAY-HARINI DERI*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 19 : 13 C. L. R. 314  
L. R. 10 I. A. 80

Affirming the decision of the High Court, which held that a judgment-creditor, who has attached property of his debtor, which purports to have been inherited by such debtor from his deceased father, may, where the will of such deceased is set up and proved at variance to his interests, apply for a revocation of the order granting probate of the will so set up. *In the matter of the petition of NILMONEY SING. UMANATH MOOKHOPADHYA v. NILMONEY SING* . . . I. L. R. 6 Calc. 429



**PROBATE—contd.****9. OPPOSITION TO, AND REVOCATION OF GRANT—contd.**

**19.** *Caveat—Mortgagee—Attaching creditor—Fraud.* A mortgaged certain property to B, who obtained a decree on his mortgage on the 20th of August, 1881. In execution of this decree, B, on the 5th of September 1881, attached the mortgaged property and obtained an order for sale. On the 14th of September 1881, the wife of the mortgagor applied for probate of the will of one T D, the mother of the mortgagor, who had died on the 16th of May, 1881. The testatrix, by her will, left all her property to the mortgagor's wife. The mortgaged property was included in the property dealt with by the will. B, the mortgagee, entered a caveat against the grant of probate, alleging that the will was a forgery, got up by the mortgagor for the purpose of saving the mortgaged property from being sold in execution of a decree against himself. *Held*, that B was entitled to enter a caveat. *SURBOMONGALA DASSI v. SHASHI-BHOOSHUN BISWAS.* I. L. R. 10 Calc. 413

**20.** *Interest in testator's estate—Defendant in suit for probate of will—Legatee—Creditor of testator—Proof of former will.* In a suit brought to obtain probate of a will, the defendant, before he can contest the will, must show that he has some interest in the testator's estate. The fact of being a legatee under the will, or a creditor of the testator, does not amount to such an interest. But proof of a former will of the testator in which the defendant is interested is a sufficient interest to contest the will set up. *RAHAMTULLAH SAHIB v. RAMA RAU*

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 373

**21.** *Will by a Hindu widow in respect of property inherited from her deceased husband—Invalid will—Ground for refusing probate.* A Court is not justified in refusing to grant probate of a will because the testator had no power to dispose of some or even all of the property he purported to deal with. *BAROT PARSHOTAM KALU v. BAI MULI.* I. L. R. 18 Bom. 749

**22.** *Issue raised as to testator's title to property purporting to be dealt with by the will—Practice.* It is not the duty of a Court entertaining an application for grant of probate to consider any issue as to the title of the testator to the property with which the will propounded purports to deal, or as to what disposing power the testator may have possessed over such property. *Behary Lall Sandyal v. Juggo Mohun Gossain, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 1; Hormusji Navroji v. Rai Dhanbaiji, I. L. R. 12 Bom. 164; Arunamoyi Dasi v. Mohendra Nath Wadadar, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 888; and Barot Parshotam Kalu v. Bai Muli, I. L. R. 18 Bom. 749, referred to. Thorp v. Macdonald, L. R. 3 P. D. 76, and Annoda Sundari Dasi v. Jugutmani Dabi, 6 C. L. R. 176, distinguished. BIRJ NATH DE v. CHANDAR MOHUN BANERJI*

I. L. R. 19 All. 458

**PROBATE—contd.****9. OPPOSITION TO, AND REVOCATION OF GRANT—contd.**

**23.** *Probate, nature and effect of—Act V of 1881, ss. 16 and 50.* S, a Parsi, died, leaving a will, whereby he directed that after his death his estate should be managed by his widow J and after her death by his sister-in-law H, and after H's death by the appellant, his adopted son H N. On J's death, the testator's brother D applied for letters of administration, and issued a citation to the appellant H N. H entered a caveat. No further proceedings were taken, and the matter remained pending. On H's death, D applied for a fresh citation to the appellant H N, but the District Judge held it to be unnecessary and declined to issue it. Letters of administration were then granted to D. The appellant H N subsequently applied for probate of the testator's will. The respondents filed caveats alleging that the will was void on the ground of certain bequests contained in it, and on this ground the District Judge refused probate of the will. *Held*, that the District Judge was wrong in refusing probate of the will on the ground that the bequests contained in it were illegal and void. Probate is only conclusive as to the appointment of executors and the validity and contents of the will; and in an application for probate it is not the province of the Court to go into the question of title with reference to the property of which the will purports to dispose, or the validity of such disposition. *HORMUSJI NAVROJI v. BAI DHANBAIJI*

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 164

**24.** *Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), ss. 55, 83—Application for revocation of probate, whether a civil suit or a miscellaneous proceeding.* S. 3 of the Probate and Administration Act does not apply to an application for revocation of probate; the section applicable is s. 55; a proceeding instituted for revocation of probate cannot be regarded (for the purposes of costs and pleader's fees) as a regular civil suit, but is a miscellaneous proceeding, and pleader's fees should be fixed on that footing. *PRATAP CHANDRA SHAHA v. KALI BHANJAN SHAHA*

4 C. W. N. 600

*GARABINI DASSI v. PRATAP CHANDRA SHAHA*

4 C. W. N. 602.

**25.** *Opposition to grant—Caveat—Judgment-creditor—Fraudulent creditor—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1861), s. 69.* The words "interest in the estate of the deceased," in s. 69 of the Probate and Administration Act, mean "interest in the estate left by the deceased." A judgment-creditor who, but for the will, would in execution of his decree have a right to seize the property or that share of it which should descend to his debtor, and who alleges that the will has been set up for the purpose of defrauding the creditors, is a person claiming an interest in the estate of the deceased, and such has a *locus standi* in opposing the grant of probate of the will. *Umanath Mookhopadhyaya v. Nilmoney Sing, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 429, and Nilmoni Singh Deo.*



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*v. Umanath Mookerjee. I. L. R. 10 Calc. 19, referred to. KISHEN DAI v. SATYENDRA NATH DUTT (1901) I. L. R. 28 Calc. 441*

**26.** ——— **Revocation of grant—Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 234—Practice—Review in testamentary matters.** S. 234 of the Succession Act (X of 1865) applies to Hindus, and an application to revoke probate of the will of a Hindu may be made under that section. When once probate in solemn form has been granted, no one who has been cited or has taken part in the proceedings, or who was cognizant of them, can afterwards seek to have it cancelled. *Quære*: Whether a review may not be granted. The practice in India in testamentary matter previously to Act V of 1881 was the same as that of the Ecclesiastical Court in England, except so far as that practice might be inconsistent with the Civil Procedure Code. *In the matter of PITAMBER GIRDHAR . . . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 638*

**27.** ——— **Removal of mohunt claiming under a will—Succession Act, s. 234.** By his will the mohunt of an akra, or religious endowment, appointed A to be the malik of the properties comprised in the endowment, and to receive the dues and pay the debts, and to do everything necessary connected therewith, and provided that, if any act was done prejudicial to any of those purposes, or to any property set apart therefor, or contrary to the Hindu practice and religion or usages, the property should vest in such disciple of his who should be competent and virtuous. A obtained probate of the will, and entered upon the properties mentioned therein. *Held*, that the Court had no power, under s. 234 of the Succession Act, to revoke the probate upon the ground that A had since he took charge of the office, taken to an immoral course of conduct, and in consequence had been excluded from the community of mohunts. The proper course to take for depriving such a person of his office would be to bring a suit under the Religious Endowment Act, or any other suit, for a declaration that he had disqualified himself, and if in that suit a decree was obtained and duly certified to the Court which granted probate, that Court would, no doubt, direct the revocation of the probate. *In the matter of the petition of MOHUN DASS. MOHUN DASS v. LUTCHMUN DASS.*

**I. L. R. 6 Calc. 11: 6 C. L. R. 265**

**28.** ——— **Procedure—Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 234—Onus probandi.** Upon a petition under s. 234 of the Succession Act, praying that the probate of a will alleged to have been made by the petitioner's husband should be revoked upon the grounds that no citation was duly published; that the petitioner was a minor, living under the care of the person to whom probate had been granted, and had no opportunity of understanding his *malá fides* and improper acts, and that the will was a forgery, the District Judge held that the burden of proof in respect of the whole case was

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on the petitioner, and dismissed her petition. *Held*, that the District Judge ought to have given the petitioner an opportunity of proving that she had no knowledge of the previous proceedings. If satisfied that she had no such knowledge, then he should have ordered a new trial as to the factum of the will, when the person propounding it would have to prove it in the ordinary way. *In the matter of the petition of DINTARINI DEBI. DINTARINI DEBI v. DOIBO CHUNDER ROY*

**I. L. R. 8 Calc. 880: 11 C. L. R. 190**

**29.** ——— **Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 234—Just cause—Revocation of probate—Citation upon the heirs of the deceased without citing minor.** If a will, which affects the interest of an infant, be admitted to probate without the infant being cited, when he attains his majority he is entitled to require the executor to prove the will in his presence; and the absence of citation upon the infant would be just cause within the meaning of s. 234 of the Succession Act for revoking the probate, as the grant was made without citing parties who ought to have been cited. *REBELLS v. REBELLS . . . 2 C. W. N. 100*

*See In the goods of GUNGA BISSEN MUNDRA 2 C. W. N. 607*

**30.** ——— **"Just cause"** for revocation—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), s. 50. The mere absence of a special citation in proceedings in which probate of a will is granted is not, where the person to whom a citation has not been issued is otherwise aware of the proceedings, a "just cause" for revocation of probate as making the proceedings substantially defective within the meaning of s. 50 of the Probate Act, even where such person is a minor. *NISTARINY DABYA v. BRAHMONOYI DABYA . . . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 45*

**31.** ——— **Ground for revocation of probate—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), s. 50, expl. (4)—Just cause—"Mismanagement by executor."** Mismanagement by the executor of an estate is not, under s. 50, expl. 4, of the Probate and Administration Act, a just cause for revoking the probate. *Held*, therefore, that the order of revocation made by the District Judge for that cause was made without jurisdiction, and must be set aside. The words "just cause," as explained in s. 50 of the Probate and Administration Act, are not illustrative merely, but exhaustive. *AN-NODA PROSAD CHATTERJEE v. KALLIKRISHNA CHATTERJEE . . . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 95*

**32.** ——— **Right to have proceedings re-opened and grant revoked—Person cognizant of proceedings and not objecting—Caveator.** A party cognizant of proceedings in an action for probate or letters of administration and not objecting to the grant is not, as a rule, entitled to have the matter re-opened and the grant revoked. In this case he was allowed to re-open the case under



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certain circumstances and upon certain conditions.  
*In the goods of BHUGGOBUTTY DASI*

**I. L. R. 27 Calc. 927**  
**4 C. W. N. 757**

**33.** ————— *Succession Act, s. 187—Power of executors or administrators. Semble:* S. 187 of the Succession Act not being made applicable to wills of Hindus made before 1st September, 1870, that is, to wills of Hindus to which the Hindu Wills Act did not apply it is not obligatory on executors or legatees under them to take out probate or letters of administration in order to establish their rights in a Court of justice.  
**KRISHNA KINKUR ROY v. RAI MOHUN ROY**

**I. L. R. 14 Calc. 37**

**34.** ————— *Executor, power of, before Hindu Wills Act—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 41—Probate Act (V of 1881), ss. 2, 149. S. 41 of the Evidence Act is applicable to probates granted prior to the passing of the Hindu Wills Act. GRISH CHUNDER ROY v. BROUGHTON*

**I. L. R. 14 Calc. 861**

**35.** ————— *Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 187—Hindu Wills Act (XXI of 1870), s. 2—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), Chs. II to XII—Probate or administration to wills of Hindus executed before 1st September 1870. S. 187 of the Succession Act, which, by s. 2 of the Hindu Wills Act, was made applicable to wills executed subsequent to the 1st September 1870, has not been incorporated in Act V of 1881; and although it is competent to a Court to grant probate or letters of administration in respect of wills antecedent to the 1st September 1870, still it is not obligatory upon executors or persons claiming probate or administration to obtain such probate or letters of administration before they can establish their right in respect to any property subject to such wills. KRISHNA KINKUR ROY v. PANCHURAM MUNDUL*

**I. L. R. 17 Calc. 272**

**36.** ————— *Revocation of grant—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), ss. 50 and 87—Revocation of probate—Procedure—Practice—Motion on notice—Rule nisi—Jurisdiction—“High Court,” meaning of, in s. 87. To revoke a grant of probate on the ground of forgery, the proper course is to make an application under s. 50 of the Probate and Administration Act, and not to bring a suit. Komol Lochun Dutt v. Nilruttun Mundle, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 360, followed. The expression “High Court,” in s. 87 of the Probate and Administration Act, is not merely confined to the Appellate Jurisdiction of that Court, but includes its Original Jurisdiction; and, under that section, the High Court exercising its Original Jurisdiction has concurrent jurisdiction with the District Judge for the purpose of exercising all powers provided by the Act. Proceedings of this description should be initiated by motion on notice, and not by rule. The procedure by rule nisi should*

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be confined to applications which are urgent, and where relief in the shape of an injunction is required. *In the goods of MOHENDRA NARAIN ROY (1900)* . . . . . **5 C. W. N. 377**

**37.** ————— *Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), ss. 50 and 83—Revocation of probate—Procedure—Practice—Motion on notice—Suit to set aside probate—Rule nisi—Will, invalidity of—Grant of probate, irregularity in—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sch. IV, Form 115. When it is sought to revoke a grant of probate on the ground of the invalidity of the will, the proceedings should be initiated by a regular suit, using the form of plaint given in the Civil Procedure Code, Sch. IV, No. 115, and not by motion on notice. Komol Lochun Dutt v. Nilruttun Mundle, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 360, distinguished. When it is sought to revoke the grant of probate of a valid will, on the ground of some irregularity in making the grant, the proceedings should be by motion on notice. Proceedings of this description should not be initiated by a rule nisi. In the goods of Mohendra Narain Roy, 5 C. W. N. 377, referred to. In the goods of HARENDRA KRISHNA MUKERJEE (1900)* . . . . . **5 C. W. N. 383**

**38.** ————— *Effect of probate—Revocation of probate—Grounds of refusal or revocation of probate—Filing of inventory and account—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), ss. 50 and 98. On the 7th August, 1897, one Baba Maharaj died at Poona, leaving his widow pregnant. By his will he appointed Bal Gangadhar Tilak (the appellant) and three others to be his executors. The will, after reciting the fact of his wife's pregnancy, provided that if no son was born or if one was born and should die prematurely, his wife should, with the advice of the executors, continue to manage the property on behalf of that son until he attained his majority. A posthumous son was born on 18th January, 1898. The executors obtained probate of the will on 16th February, 1898, and assumed the management of the estate. The son died on 9th March, 1898. Three years subsequently, viz., on 29th July, 1901, the widow applied to the District Court for revocation of the probate granted to the executors, on the grounds (i) that the will had become inoperative by the birth of her son, who had succeeded to the property, which on his death had devolved on her as his heir, and (ii) that the executors had wilfully and without reasonable cause omitted to file an inventory and account as required by s. 98 of the Probate Act (V of 1881). The District Judge granted the application, and revoked the probate. On appeal to the High Court: Held, that an order of revocation could not be made. The circumstances which had supervened with regard to the devolution of the property would not have justified the refusal of probate if they had existed at the time at which it was granted, and they were therefore no grounds for its revocation. Held, also,*



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that the mere omission by the executors to file the inventory and account required by s. 98 of the Probate Act (V of 1881) was not a ground for revocation. There was no circumstance in the case from which wilful omission on the part of the executors could be inferred. The grant of probate is decisive only of the genuineness of the will propounded, and of the right of the executors thereby appointed to represent the estate of the testator. It in no respect decides any question as to the disposing power of the testator or as to the existence of any disposable property. The words "become useless and inoperative," in s. 50, cl. 41, of the Probate Act (V of 1881), imply the discovery of something which, if known at the date of the grant, would have been a ground for refusing it, e.g., the discovery of a later will or codicil, or subsequent discovery that the will was forged, or that the alleged testator is still living. *BAL GANGADHAR TILAK v. SAKWARBAI* (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 792

**39.** ———— *Letters of administration—Revocation of grant of probate or letters of administration—Just cause—Grant obtained fraudulently—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), s. 50—Res judicata—Parties—Same parties or their representatives—Decree against Hindu widow—Reversioners—Fraud.* After the grant of probate or letters of administration with the will attached has been made the only procedure provided by the law for the revocation of such a grant is that laid down in s. 50 of the Probate and Administration Act. Where the petitioner applied for the revocation of a grant of letters of administration with the will annexed on the ground of fraud, the fraud originally alleged being collusion between the parties to the proceedings, in which the grant was made. *Held*, that, having failed to make out the case of fraud, she was not entitled to go into the question whether the will was a forgery, and that her application for revocation was rightly dismissed. A decision dismissing an application made by the widow and heiress of the deceased testator for revocation of letters of administration with the will annexed, which had been granted to his mother, is binding on the daughter, who would if the will were set aside, be the next heir, unless, the latter can make out that there was collusion between the mother and the widow of the testator. *DURGAGATI DEBI v. SATRABINI DEBI* (1906) I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1001  
s.c. 10 C. W. N. 955

**10. EFFECT OF PROBATE.**

**1.** ———— *Appointment of executors—Validity and contents of will.* Probate is only conclusive as to the appointment of executors and the validity and contents of the will. *HORMUSJI NAVROJI v. BAI DHANBAI* I. L. R. 12 Bom. 164  
**2.** ———— *Executor, position of—Will of Hindu—Evidence of title.* Grant of probate of

**PROBATE—contd.****10. EFFECT OF PROBATE—contd.**

the will of a Hindu confers no title upon the executor, but he derives his title from the will itself. Probate is evidence of his title only so far as a decree of the Court granting it would be,—namely, between the parties and those privy to the suit in which the decree is made. *SHARO BIBI v. BALDEO DAS*

1 B. L. R. O. C. 24

**3.** ———— *Liability of person acting as executor of forged will.* Government promissory notes belonging to the estate of a deceased Hindu were endorsed over, without consideration, by A (who had taken out probate of a forged will, and was acting under the same as executor) to B, who received the same *bona fide*, but without due inquiry; and on obtaining a renewal of the same, endorsed the renewed paper back to A for the purpose of enabling him to raise money thereon, believing that A had a right to do so. *Held*, that A was liable to account to the representatives of the deceased for the value of the said promissory notes as assets of the deceased come into his hands. The property in the moveable estate of a Hindu does not pass to his executor as such. *JAYKALI DEBI v. SHIBNATH CHATTERJEE*

2 B. L. R. O. C. 1

**4.** ———— *Evidence of will—Will—Evidence—Hindu Wills Act (XXI of 1870)—Succession Act (X of 1865), ss. 180, 242.* The effect of the Hindu Wills Act, which makes (among others) ss. 180 and 242 of the Succession Act applicable to Hindus, is to make the probate of the will evidence of the will against all persons interested under the will. *BRAJANATH DEY SIKKAR v. ANANDANAYI DASI*

8 B. L. R. 208

**5.** ———— *Probate as giving person right to sue under will—Succession Act, s. 187—Suit for land claimed under will.* Where the first Court decreed a suit for possession of land claimed under a will, the lower Appellate Court was *held* to have done right in reversing the decision on the ground that the plaintiff had not taken out probate under Act X of 1865, s. 187. The "probate" intended by s. 187 is a copy of the will, certified and sealed by a Court of competent jurisdiction, and it may be taken out by a legatee. *MUN MOHUN GHOSAL v. PRESHNATH ROY* . 22 W. R. 174

**6.** ———— *Probate as giving right to sue under will—Probate Act (V of 1881), ss. 92, 154—Probate when necessary in cases of Hindu and Mahomedan will—Executor—Act XXVII of 1860—Right of one out of three executors to carry on a suit—Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 187—Hindu Wills Act (XXI of 1870).* Previously to the passing of the Probate Act (V of 1881), executors appointed by such wills as fell within the Hindu Wills Act (XXI of 1870) acquired the same estate and interest in the property of their deceased testator, with the same restrictions in representing the estate in a Court of justice, as obtained under English law. All the sections of the Succession Act (X of 1865) relating to grants of probate and letters of administration which were formerly incorporated in the



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Hindu Wills Act (XXI of 1870) are now (with the exception of s. 187) removed from that Act by s. 154 of Act V of 1881, but are, with the exception of s. 187, re-enacted verbatim in Act V of 1881. S. 187, however, still remains incorporated by reference with the Hindu Wills Act (see s. 154 of Act V of 1881). The result is that probate is necessary in case of such Hindu wills as fall within the Hindu Wills Act. But the omission from Act V of 1881 (which applies to all Mahomedans and Hindus) of any section corresponding to s. 187 of the Indian Succession Act, and the retention of that section in the Hindu Wills Act, shows that it was the intention of the Legislature that, except in cases falling under the Hindu Wills Act, an executor of any Hindu or Mahomedan will may establish his right in a Court of justice without taking out probate. In cases, however, falling within the provisions of Act XXVII of 1860, debtors, have still the right (under s. 2 of that Act) of insisting upon a plaintiff executor taking out probate. Where A, one of three executors of a Mahomedan will, none of whom had taken out probate, desired to carry on a suit originally instituted by their testator to recover a share of an estate, all the other parties to the suit being desirous that the suit should be dismissed:—*Held*, that A, under s. 92 of the Probate Act (V of 1881), being only one of three executors, could not carry on the suit without first taking out probate of the testator's will. *Held*, further, that A, being an executor, had a right to carry on the suit and get in the assets of his testator in order to meet possible claims on the estate. The other parties to the suit who were beneficially interested in the estate, and, who desired that the suit should terminate, had the remedy in their hands by putting the executor in funds to discharge the debts. *MOOSA v. ESSA*

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 241

7. ———— *Necessity of probate—Probate and Administration Act, 1881—Mahomedan will.* An executor of the will of a deceased Mahomedan, since the 1st April 1881, the date of the coming into force of the Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), cannot claim to represent the estate of his testator until he has taken out probate. *FATMA v. ESSA*

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 266

8. ———— *Guardian appointed under a will—Whether probate is a condition precedent to certificate of guardianship under Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890).* It is not incumbent on a person who has been appointed guardian of a minor under a will to take out probate as a condition precedent to his obtaining a certificate of guardianship under Act VIII of 1890. *PATHAN ALIKHAN BADLUKHAN v. BAI PANIRAI*

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 832

9. ———— *Will made by Hindu—Suit by legatee for legacy—Hindu Wills Act, 1870.* Save where the Hindu Wills Act, 1870, is in force, it is not obligatory on a person claiming under the will of a Hindu to obtain probate of the will before instituting his claim. *Krishna Kinkar*

PROBATE—*contd.*10. EFFECT OF PROBATE—*contd.*

*Roy v. Panchuram Mundul*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 272, and *Thakurain v. Ram Charan*, All. Weekly Notes (1895) 87, followed. *KANHAIYA LAL v. MUNNI*  
I. L. R. 18 All. 260

10. ———— *Effect of probate of Parsi will before Succession Act—Probate in 1866—Act XXVII of 1860—Construction of will—Executrix also trustee—Suit against executrix—Representation of the estate—Civil Procedure Code, s. 437.* The will of a Parsi testator in Bombay affecting lands in the mofussil, made before the 1st January 1866, when the Indian Succession Act (X of 1865) came into force, and proved subsequently,—*viz.*, on the 25th day of January 1866,—but before Act XXIV of 1867 came into operation, is governed by Act XXVII of 1860. *Held*, that such probate has the same effect as probate in respect of the property of British subjects, but for the purpose only of collecting debts. It did not confer a title on the executrix to represent the testator's estate except for the above-mentioned limited purpose, or to exercise the usual powers of an executrix where the testator's intention, to be gathered from the whole of the will, to vest his property with the entire management of, and control over, it in a series of persons in succession as trustees, the first of whom was the executrix. *Held*, also, that, having regard to s. 437 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the persons acting as such trustees in succession under the said will adequately represented all person beneficially interested in the estate in all suits relating to it. *ARDESIR JEHANGIR FRAMJI v. HIRABAI*

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 474

11. ———— *Hindu will made outside Bombay relating to property situate partly within and partly outside Bombay—Will—Hindu Wills Act (XXI of 1870)—Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 179—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), s. 4—Probate of such will, effect of—Representation of the estate—Parties to suit.* One L died at Surat in 1878 possessed of ancestral property situate partly in Bombay and partly in Surat district. He left a widow B, and a minor son M. At his death he made a will bequeathing his property to his son, and appointing certain executors to manage the property during the son's minority. The son died in 1877, leaving a minor widow, M G. In 1879 one of the executors obtained probate of L's will from the High Court. In 1884 a suit was filed on behalf of the minor M G, against her mother-in-law B to recover possession of the property covered by the will of L. One of the defences to this suit was that the property in dispute had vested in the executor, who had obtained probate of the will, and that, as the defendant held the estate under the executor, the suit was not maintainable without impleading the executor. *Held*, that the executor was not a necessary party to the suit. S. 179 of the Indian Succession Act (X of 1865) as incorporated into the Hindu Wills Act (XXI of 1870) did not apply so far as it related to property outside Bombay. The property in



**PROBATE—concl'd.****10. EFFECT OF PROBATE—concl'd.**

dispute was situate in the Surat district. It was joint ancestral property. On the father's death, it vested in the son by survivorship, and on the son's death it vested in the son's widow, the plaintiff, in the present suit. Under the provisions, therefore, of the Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), s. 4 (if that Act can be held to operate at all in the mofussil before a notification is issued under s. 2), the estate could not vest in the executor, as it had passed by survivorship to another person long before the Act came into operation. *BAI HARKOR v. MANEKLAL RASIK DAS*

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 621

**12. ——— Mahomedan will—Effect of probate—Will—Will of Mahomedan lady—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881)—Executor of Mahomedan will—Will of Mahomedan lady confirming release obtained from her by undue influence—Suit by heirs to set aside release—Release—Res judicata—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Estoppel—Act V of 1881, ss. 4, 59 and 88.** The Supreme Courts in India never applied the English rules as to the necessity for probate to Hindu or Mahomedan wills, nor did they attribute to such probates, when granted, the English doctrines as to the operation of probate. Under that system a Hindu or Mahomedan executor took no title to property merely as such by virtue of the probate. In the case of Mahomedan executors such a title was created for the first time by the Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881). Since by Mahomedan law a testator has power only to dispose of one-third of his property, an executor of a Mahomedan will, who had obtained probate under Act V of 1881, is a bare trustee for the heirs as to two-thirds of the estate, when realized, and an active trustee as to one-third for the purposes of the will; and of these trusts one is created by the Act and the Probate irrespective of the will and the other by the will established by the probate. The effect of probate of a Mahomedan will granted under that Act is limited to the effect given to it by the terms of the Act itself. These terms (contained in s. 59. and s. 4 supplemented by s. 88) cannot be applied so as to give the probate the effect of an estoppel as to the will and its contents. The will of a Mahomedan lady, widow of the late King of Oudh, confirmed a release, which she had executed in favour of the principal defendant, who had been for some years in her household as her confidential agent and manager of her affairs, by which she declared that certain property he had obtained from her was a free and absolute gift and that neither she nor her heirs had any claim or demand on him in respect of it. Probate of the will was granted to the Administrator-General, the executor appointed by it, the grant being opposed by her heirs the plaintiffs, who pending the probate proceedings instituted a suit, in which they claimed to set aside the release and prayed for an account and for two-thirds of the property of the testatrix. Held, reversing the decision of the High Court, that the

**PROBATE—concl'd.****10. EFFECT OF PROBATE—concl'd.**

grant of probate did not, under the provisions of the Probate and Administration Act, create any such estoppel as to prevent the plaintiffs from denying the validity of the confirmation of the release to the defendant contained in the will. It was also contended that an estoppel arose from the decision in the proceedings for probate, which constituted a *res judicata* under s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), but the probate proceedings were not in evidence, and their Lordships held that in their absence there was no sufficient evidence to support the estoppel. *KURRUTULAIN BAHADUR v. NUZBAT-UD-DOWLA ABBAS HOSSEIN KHAN* (1905) . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 116

**PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION ACT (V OF 1881).**

See ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL'S ACT, 1874,  
s. 31 . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 732

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 788  
L. R. 22 I. A. 107

See EXECUTOR . 13 C. W. N. 557

See LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.

See PROBATE.

See WILL.

Application to Sikhs—Sikhs, if Hindus—Hindu law—Will—Proof of execution—Brahmos, if Hindus—Interpretation of Statutes—Meaning of the word "Hindu," as used in old and new Acts—Lapses from orthodox practice, effect of. A Sikh is a Hindu, within the meaning of the Probate and Administration Act, s. 2, and the Indian Succession Act, 1865, s. 331; and probate of the will of a deceased Sikh can be granted under the former Act. The meaning of the word "Hindu," as used in old Acts, Regulations and Charters, and in modern Acts, discussed. *Sheo Singh Rai v. Mussumut Dakho*, L. R. 5 I. A. 87; *Chotay Lall v. Chunno Lall*, 6 I. A. 15; *Doe dem. Kissenchunder Shaw v. Baidam Beebee*, 2 Morley's Digest 22; *Abraham v. Abraham*, 9 Moo. I. A. 195, referred to. A Sikh or Hindu, by becoming a Brahmo, does not necessarily cease to belong to the community in which he was born. Certain lapses from orthodox practice in matters of diet and ceremonial observance held not to have the effect of excluding from the term "Hindu," in the Probate and Administration Act, one who was born within it and who never became otherwise separated from the religious communion in which he was born. *BHAGWAN KUAR v. BOSE* (1903)

7 C. W. N. 895; I. L. R. 31 Calc. 11;  
s.c. L. R. 30 I. A. 249

s. 2—

See PROBATE . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 11

"Hindu"—"Sikh"—  
Application for probate of will of Sikh—  
Succession Act (X of 1865), ss. 331, 332—Effect  
of Hindu or Sikh becoming a Brahmo—



**PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION  
ACT (V OF 1881)—*contd.***

**s. 2—*concl.***

*Unorthodox practices, effect of—Evidence of execution of will.* A Sikh is a "Hindu" within the meaning of that term as used in s. 2 of the Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881). An application therefore for probate of the will of a Sikh testator was held to have been rightly granted under that Act. Since the case of *Doe dem. Kishenchunder Shaw v. Baidam Beebee*, 2 *Morley's Digest* 22, the view that Sikhs are Hindus has always been acted upon by the Courts in India, which have applied the Hindu law to them (as in the case of Jains) in the absence of custom varying that law. That application of the law was based upon the view that Sikhs were Hindus within the meaning of the early legislation on the subject, and not upon the alternative rule of "justice, equity and good conscience" also sanctioned by that legislation. In s. 331 of the Indian Succession Act (X of 1865), the term "Hindu" is used in the same wide sense as in the earlier enactments and includes Sikhs. A Sikh or Hindu by becoming a member of the Brahmo Samaj does not necessarily cease to belong to the community in which he was born. In this case, however, it was found on the evidence that the testator, a Sikh by birth, never became a professed Brahmo. Departures by the testator, from the standard of orthodoxy binding upon him in matters of diet and ceremonial observances, assuming them to be established, were held not to have the effect of excluding him from the category of "Hindu" in the Probate and Administration Act, he having been born within such category, and never having become otherwise separated from the religious communion in which he was born. Objections having been taken that the will had not been duly executed, and that alterations had been made in it since its execution, the Judicial Committee (affirming the decision of the Chief) decided on the evidence in favour of its due execution in the form in which it was produced to the Court on the application for probate. *BHAGWAN KOER v. J. C. BOSE* (1903)

**I. L. R. 31 Calc. 11**

**s. 3—**

*See* APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT—VALUATION OF APPEAL

**I. L. R. 24 Calc. 30**

*See* PROBATE . **I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1082**

*See* PROBATE—OF WHAT DOCUMENTS GRANTED . **I. L. R. 25 All. 313**

*Of what documents granted*

*—Document appointing successor to sebaiship—Will.* Where the mohant of an *akhra* executed a document described as a will, but purporting merely to appoint the petitioner as the next *seba* or manager for the purpose of carrying out the *seba pujas*, and other rites and ceremonies appertaining to the *akhra*, with full power to manage and supervise the properties belonging to the *akhra*. *Held*, that the document was not a will and could not be admitted

**PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION  
ACT (V OF 1881)—*contd.***

**s. 3—*concl.***

to probate. *CHAITANYA GOBINDA PUJARI ADHIKARI v. DAYAL GOBINDA ADHIKARI* (1905)

**I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1082  
s.c. 9 C. W. N. 1021**

**ss. 3, 7—Executor by implication—Bequest to an idol—Right of shebait to take out probate.** Where a testator had bequeathed the bulk of his estate for the sheba of a thakur and made certain other dispositions in regard to the rest of the property. *Held*, on the construction of the will, that his wife, whom he had appointed *shebait*, having been confided with the execution of the will, was executor by implication, and as such entitled to take out probate of the will. *Brojo Chunder Goswami v. Raj Kumar Roy*, 6 C. W. N. 310. referred to. *KRIPAMOYEE DASSI v. MOHIM CHANDRA DUTT* (1906) . **10 C. W. N. 232**

**ss. 4, 12, 14, 15, 19, 38, 82, 187—**

*See* REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEASED PERSON . **I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1044**

**ss. 4, 12, 59, 88, 90—**

*See* MAHOMEDAN LAW . **9 C. W. N. 938**

**s. 7—**

*See* WILL, CONSTRUCTION. **6 C. W. N. 310**

**s. 11—**

*See* WILL . **13 C. W. N. 557**

**s. 12—**

*See* RES JUDICATA—ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENTS . **I. L. R. 21 Bom. 563**

**ss. 12, 14, 15—**

*See ante*, ss. 4, 12, ETC.

**s. 17—**

*See* PROBATE . **I. L. R. 35 Calc. 156**

**ss. 18 to 23, 37, 44, 45, 46, 83 and 86—Debutter property, administration in respect of—Idol—"Beneficiary"—Trustee with power of appointment—Administration, grant of letters of, to idol's property where probate has been previously granted of will dedicating the property.** A testatrix by her will dedicated certain immoveable property to the sheba of an idol, and appointed an executrix, whom she also constituted shebait, and to whom she gave power to appoint the next shebait. The executrix died without having made any such appointment, and thereupon an application was made by the sister's son of the testatrix for letters of administration, with a copy of the will annexed, to be granted to him with respect to the debutter property. *Held*, that s. 45 of the Probate and Administration Act authorized such a grant to be made, inasmuch as no shebait having been appointed, there still remained some portion of the



# PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION ACT (V OF 1881)—*contd.*

s. 18—*concl'd.*

estate of the testatrix to be administered. *Held*, also, that the idol, being the *cestui que trust*, was a "beneficiary" within the meaning of that term as used in s. 37 of the Act, and that, as it could not undertake the management of the estate, under that section administration might be granted to some person on its behalf. *Held*, further, that the applicant, the sister's son of the testatrix, being the heir in the absence of other nearer heirs, as such was entitled to letters of administration, as the original grant in respect of the debutter property might have been made to him. **RANJIT SING v. JAGANNATH PRASAD GUPTA. GUNGADHUR DASS RAI v. JAGANNATH PRASAD GUPTA**

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 375

s. 19—

See *ante*, ss. 4, 12, ETC.

See PROBATE—TO WHOM GRANTED.

6 C. W. N. 787

See RES JUDICATA—ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 888

ss. 20, 24—

See WILL I. L. R. 31 Calc. 885

s. 24—

See WILL 8 C. W. N. 821

s. 33—Grant for the use and benefit of minor—Minor wife—Husband, grant to—Guardian—Practice. Where a husband applied under s. 33 for the Probate and Administration Act for letters of administration for the use and benefit for his minor wife:—*Held*, that such application was not maintainable until the applicant had been appointed guardian of his minor wife. **NIROJINI DEBI, In the goods of (1907)**

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 706

s. 34—

See ADMINISTRATION, SUIT FOR.

1 C. W. N. 336

s. 38—

See *ante*, ss. 4, 12, ETC.

s. 41—Application for letters of Administration—*Bonâ fide*—Discretion of Court to refuse. Where a person made a will devoting the whole of his estate to an idol and appointing his wives and adopted son as *shebait*s, executrices and executor, but none of them applied for probate, and the son, who was an executor, mortgaged the property as if there was no will: *Held*, on an application for probate or letters of administration by the minor sons of the adopted son (in whom the *shebait*ship was to be continued under the will) through their mother as next friend, that they were not entitled to probate as they were not executors. That the application was not a *bonâ fide* one and the Court in its discretion under s. 41 of the Probate and Administration Act would refuse to grant the letters of administration prayed for. **NORENDRA**

# PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION ACT (V OF 1881)—*contd.*

s. 41—*concl'd.*

**KUMAR PRAMANIK v. CHARU CHANDRA PRAMANIK (1909)**

12 C. W. N. 747

s. 45—

See LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.

10 C. W. N. 432

s. 47—Unadministered estate—Letters of Administration *de bonis non*. Where letters of administration to the deceased's estate were granted to the widow, limited during the minority of her infant son, and the son died before attaining majority and before the estate was fully administered: *Held*, that letters of administration *de bonis non* to the estate of the deceased husband may be granted to the widow, under s. 47 of the Probate and Administration Act, and that her being the heir to the son's estate is no bar to such grant. *In the goods of GIRIS CHANDRA MITTER (1902)*

6 C. W. N. 581

s. 50—

See s. 98 8 C. W. N. 578

See LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.

6 C. W. N. 912

See PROBATE—OPPOSITION TO, AND REVOCATION OF, GRANT.

5 C. W. N. 377, 383

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 792

See WILL I. L. R. 31 Calc. 914

See WILL—EXECUTION.

See WILL, PROOF OF 9 C. W. N. 49

1. Just cause—Revocation of probate—Omission to file inventory—Special citation—Onus—Procedure. To successfully maintain an application for revocation of probate under s. 50 of the Probate and Administration Act on the ground of the omission of an executor or administrator to file an inventory or account, it must be proved to the satisfaction of the Judge that the omission was wilful or without reasonable cause. Mere omission to serve a special citation would not by itself be a sufficient ground for revoking the grant, if it is shown that the person, on whom the citation ought to have been served, had knowledge of the application for probate. The onus of proving that he had such knowledge rests on the party, who alleges it, and it is not necessary for the party, who applies for the revocation of the grant, to prove not only that no special citation was served on him, but also that he had no knowledge of the proceedings. When a Judge is satisfied that a summary grant made without service of special citation ought not to have been made, he ought not to order revocation directly, but should call upon the applicant for the grant to prove in solemn form. **PREM CHAND DAS v. SURENDRA NATH SAHA (1905)** 9 C. W. N. 190

2. Revocation of probate or letters of administration—Issues in such



**PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION  
ACT (V OF 1881)—contd.**

ss. 50—concll.

*proceeding—Practice—Just cause—Hindu widow, order against, binds reversioner.* Where an application was made for revocation of letters of administration with the will of the deceased annexed and it was prayed that the will should be proved before the applicant: *Held*, that, until the applicant made out a case for revocation, the question of the genuineness of the will could not be gone into. English practice and practice of mofussil Courts in India distinguished. *Held*, further, that a previous application for revocation by the widow of the deceased having failed, that decision bound reversioner, and the latter's application for revocation could not succeed except upon proof that the previous proceeding had been collusive and fraudulent. *Katama Natchier v. Raja of Shivagunga*, 9 Moo. I. A. 539, 604, *Pertab Narain Singh v. Triloki Nath Singh*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 186, relied on. *DURGAGATI DEBI v. SOURABINI DEBI* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1001  
s.c. 10 C. W. N. 955

3. Citation on minor—Minor represented by applicant as guardian—Proceeding defective—Revocation, application for—Applicant acting in concert with another. Where an applicant for probate of a will took out citation upon a minor, who was represented by the applicant herself as guardian: *Held*, that the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in substance and the grant should be revoked. The fact that the petitioner for revocation of probate was acting in concert with somebody else could not take away the right which she otherwise possessed of applying for revocation. *SHOROSHIBALA DEBI v. ANONDAMOYEE DEBI* (1906) 12 C. W. N. 8

ss. 50, 55, 69, 83—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 588—Order or decree—Purchaser from widow of deceased—Locus standi of such person to apply for revocation of probate—Appeal, right of. A person interested in the estate of the deceased by assignment from his widow (who is his next heir) may, where a will has been set up and proved at variance with his interests, apply for the revocation of probate under s. 50 of the Probate and Administration Act. The expression "order" in s. 86 of the Probate and Administration Act does not mean such an order only as is referred to in s. 588 of the Civil Procedure Code. An application under s. 50 of the Probate and Administration Act must be treated under the provisions of ss. 55 and 83 as a suit, and when such a suit is dismissed on the ground that the applicant had no *locus standi* to bring the suit, such decision amounts to a decree and an appeal lies to the High Court against such decree. *AZIM v. CHANDRA NATH NAMDAS* (1904) 8 C. W. N. 748

ss. 50, 76, 83—

See PROBATE I. L. R. 31 Calc. 357

**PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION  
ACT (V OF 1881)—contd.**

ss. 50, 98—

See PROBATE, REVOCATION OF.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 628

ss. 51, 52 and 86—Bombay Civil Courts Act (XIV of 1869), s. 1<sup>st</sup>—Amending Act (Bombay Act I of 1900), s. 2—Indian Councils Act, 1892, ss. 5; 55 & 56 Vic., c. 14—Application for probate—Value of the subject-matter not exceeding Rs. 5,000—Order of the Assistant Judge—Appeal—District Judge—Jurisdiction. The Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881) being made by an authority in India is subject to the powers of repeal and amendment granted to the Local Legislature by s. 5 of the Indian Councils Act, 1892, 55 and 56 Vic., c. 14. Therefore the provision of the Bombay Civil Courts Act (XIV of 1869), by which a probate matter can be tried in the first instance by the Assistant Judge and by which the appeal in cases where the amount of the subject-matter does not exceed Rs. 5,000 will lie to the District Court is one which the Local Legislature was competent to make. In so far as the provisions of the Probate and Administration Act are inconsistent with those of the amendments introduced into the Bombay Civil Courts Act by Bombay Act I of 1900, the provisions of the first-mentioned Act must be taken to have been impliedly repealed for this Presidency. *LAXMI v. ABA* (1908) I. L. R. 32 Bom. 634

ss. 51, 78—

See SURETY—DISCHARGE OF SURETY.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 68

ss. 51, 86, 90—

See APPEAL I. L. R. 28 Calc. 149

s. 53—

See APPEAL—PROBATE.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 539

ss. 55, 69, 83—

See ante, s. 50 8 C. W. N. 748

ss. 59, 83—

See RES JUDICATA—ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 888

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 563

s. 62—

See RES JUDICATA—ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 380

s. 69—

See PROBATE—OPPOSITION TO, AND REVOCATION OF, GRANT

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 441

s. 78—

See ante, ss. 51, 78.



**PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION ACT (V OF 1881)—*contd.***

**s. 78—*concl'd.***

1. ————— *Security bond.*  
Under s. 78 of the Probate and Administration Act a District Judge is not competent to call upon the executor (to whom probate has already been granted) to furnish security at any time after the grant of the probate. *GIRIBALA DASSI v. BIJOY KRISHNA HALDAR* (1904). **I. L. R. 31 Calc. 688**

2. ————— *Administration bond entered into by surety—Allegations by surety against administratrix of waste and mismanagement—Suit by surety against administratrix seeking to be discharged from liability regarding future acts of administratrix—Maintainability—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 130—Revocation of continuing guarantee—Application to a contract of suretyship under administration bond.* First defendant was administratrix of her husband's estate. Plaintiff became one of her sureties under s. 78 of the Probate and Administration Act. Plaintiff brought this suit alleging that first defendant as administratrix was wasting and mismanaging the estate. He asked that he might be discharged from his recognisance as a surety as regards future transactions on the part of the administratrix; that in the alternative the administratrix might be directed to complete her administration of the estate, and that his surety bond might then be vacated. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief asked for. *Held*, also, that s. 130 of the Indian Contract Act does not apply to the special contract of suretyship, which is entered into by a surety to an administration bond. *Raj Narain Mookerjee v. Ful Kumari Debi*, **I. L. R. 29 Calc. 68**, not followed. *Bai Somi v. Chokshi Ishvardas Mangaldas*, **I. L. R. 19 Bom. 245**, followed and approved. *SUBROYA CHETTY v. RAGAMMAL* (1905)

**I. L. R. 28 Mad. 161**

3. ————— *Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 129—Administration—Surety—Continuing guarantee.* When a person becomes surety that an administrator will duly get in and administer the estate of a deceased person, this is not a continuing guarantee within the meaning of s. 129 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Such a surety cannot of his own free will withdraw from his suretyship. *Subroya Chetty v. Ragammal*, **I. L. R. 28 Mad. 161**, followed. *Raj Narain Mookerjee v. Ful Kumari Debi*, **I. L. R. 29 Calc. 68**, dissented from. *KANHYA LAL v. MANKI* (1908)

**I. L. R. 31 All. 56**

**s. 81—**

*See MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.*

**I. L. R. 31 Calc. 397; 993**

————— *Suit for damages—Death of plaintiff before trial—Survival of causes of action—Legal representatives—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), s. 89—Act XII of 1855.* A brought a suit for malicious prosecution claiming damages on the ground that he had suffered pecuniary loss in consequence of the costs incurred in defending the prosecution. Subsequently A died

**PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION ACT (V OF 1881)—*contd.***

**s. 81—*concl'd.***

while the suit was pending. The legal representatives of A then applied for, and obtained, leave from the Court to place their names upon the record in the place of A. At the hearing of the suit the question arose as to whether the cause of action survived. *Held*, that the cause of action does not survive to the legal representative of A, inasmuch as the pecuniary loss which A suffered by reason of expenses incurred in defending the prosecution is not an injury to his estate, and cannot be treated as separate and distinct from the original cause of action. *London v. London Road Car Co.*, **4 T. L. R. 448**, referred to. *KRISHNA BEHARI SEN v. THE CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA* (1904)

**I. L. R. 31 Calc. 406**

**s.c. 8 C. W. N. 329; 745**

**s. 82—**

*See ante*, ss. 4, 12, ETC.

*See EXECUTOR*. **I. L. R. 27 Calc. 683**

**s. 83—**

*See PROBATE—OPPOSITION TO, AND REVOCATION OF, GRANT* **5 C. W. N. 383**

**s. 84—**

*See WILL—VALIDITY OF WILL.*

**6 C. W. N. 787**

**s. 86—**

*See ante*, ss. 51, 86, 90.

*See APPEAL—PROBATE.*

**I. L. R. 17 Calc. 48**

**I. L. R. 21 Calc. 539**

**I. L. R. 27 Calc. 5**

*See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT, N.-W. P., CL. 10*. **I. L. R. 17 All. 475**

**s. 87—**

*See PROBATE—OPPOSITION TO, AND REVOCATION OF, GRANT*. **5 C. W. N. 377**

**s. 90—**

*See ante*, ss. 51, 86, 90.

*See EXECUTOR.*

**I. L. R. 23 Calc. 580; 908**

**I. L. R. 23 Bom. 342**

**3 C. W. N. 403**

*See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT, CL. 15.*

**I. L. R. 23 Calc. 580**

**I. L. R. 24 Calc. 350**

*See RIGHT OF SUIT—INTEREST TO SUPPORT RIGHT*. **I. L. R. 23 Calc. 446**

1. ————— **s. 90 and s. 40—Letters of administration—Effect of transfer of immoveable property by a Hindu widow with the Judge's sanction on obtaining letters of administration—Legal necessity—Fraudulent representation.** An alienation made with the permission of the District Judge



**PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION ACT (V OF 1881)—contd.****s. 90—concl'd.**

by a Hindu widow who had obtained letters of administration in respect of the estate is valid as an absolute alienation under s. 90 of the Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), irrespective of the existence of legal necessity. **KAMIKHYA NATH MUKERJEE v. HARI CHARN SEN**

**I. L. R. 26 Calc. 607**

2. *Letters of administration—Administratrix, application by, for leave to mortgage—Estate fully administered.* Application by the widow and administratrix for leave to mortgage certain premises left by the deceased. The estate had been fully administered, and there were no debts or legacies of the deceased to be paid. *Held*, that applications of this nature should not be granted unless it is necessary for the purposes of administration and not when the estate has been fully administered. That the estate having been administered, the widow was in possession as heiress, and she can sell or mortgage for purposes for which a widow is entitled to sell or mortgage under the law, and no leave of Court is necessary. *In the goods of NURSING CHUNDER BYSACK*

**3 C. W. N. 635**

3. *A lease for a term exceeding five years granted by an administrator is as between the lessor and lessee a good lease.* **SUBHADRA DASSYA v. CHANDRA KUMAR NAG (1904)**

**8 C. W. N. 54**

4. *Power given by will to executor to sell testator's property—Power to mortgage if withheld thereby—Purdanashin—Independent advice.* Where a will gave the executor power to sell the testator's property "to pay off the debts incurred by him or if the property was a losing concern:" *Held*, that, there being no prohibition in the will against the executor mortgaging the property, he had power under s. 90 of the Probate and Administration Act to mortgage such property. **Kanti Chandra Chattopadhyay v. Kristo Churn Acharjee, 3 C. W. N. 515**, distinguished. *In the goods of Nundo Lall Mullik, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 908*, and **Rajani Nath Mukhopadhyaya v. Ramanath Mukherjee, 3 C. W. N. 483**, referred to. **PURNA CHANDRA BAKSHI and RAM BRAHMO BAKSHI v. NOBIN CHANDRA GANGOPADHYA (1904)**

**8 C. W. N. 362**

**s. 91—**

*See WILL* . . . **13 C. W. N. 557**

**s. 92—**

*See EXECUTOR* . **I. L. R. 27 Calc. 683**

**s. 98—**

*See PROBATE—OPPOSITION TO, AND REVOCATION OF, GRANT.*

**I. L. R. 26 Bom. 792**

1. *Act VI of 1889, s. 15, amending Act V of 1881—Construction of Act—Meaning of the words "an account."* The provi-

**PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION ACT (V OF 1881)—contd.****s. 98—contd.**

sions of s. 98 of the Probate and Administration Act that an executor shall, within one year from the grant of probate or letters of administration "or within such further time as the Court may from time to time appoint, exhibit an account of the estate" mean that one account is to be exhibited and not a series of accounts from time to time; the words "from time to time appoint" relating to an extension of the period within which an account is to be exhibited. **MOHESH CHANDRA BHUTTACHARJEE v. BISWA NATH BHUTTACHARJEE**

**I. L. R. 25 Calc. 250**

**1 C. W. N. 646**

2. *Sanction to prosecute, without finding if omission to file accounts is intentional or accounts intentionally false—Jurisdiction of District Judge to call for accounts after revocation of probate.* N was executor to an estate. The probate was revoked. He had not filed an account during his executorship. After the revocation of the probate, he was ordered to submit accounts. He failed to do so within the time appointed. Sanction was given to prosecute him under s. 98, cl. (c), of Act V of 1881. The accounts were subsequently filed, whereupon the Court kept the order in abeyance, but after examination of the accounts and suspecting its genuineness, the Court restored the sanction for prosecution. *Held*, that the Judge was not right in making the order depend on the examination of the accounts themselves, and that the Judge ought not to have made an order sanctioning the prosecution under s. 176 without an enquiry whether the omission to produce the accounts was intentional, or the accounts filed were intentionally false. **NABA CHANDRA CHOWDHURY v. TRIPURA CHARAN CHOWDHURY**

**2 C. W. N. 597**

3. *Executor—Inventory—Account—Commission—District Judge, powers of.* A District Judge has no power to institute an audit of the inventory and account submitted by an executor under s. 98 of the Probate and Administration Act, undertaking elaborate and expensive proceedings for that purpose; nor does the section empower him to hold, of his own motion, a judicial inquiry into that matter and make the executor pay the costs of each; nor can such an authority be implied from the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code as to the appointment of a Commissioner to examine such accounts. All that the District Judge has to do under the section is to see that the inventory and account *prima facie* satisfy its requirements. In 1899 an executor exhibited in the Court of the District Judge, under s. 98 of the Probate and Administration Act, an account of the estate of the testator for one year, from the grant of probate; and the then District Judge recorded the order—"Accounts checked and reported to be correct"—on it. No further action was taken with regard to it until 1902, when a new District Judge ordered the executor to file a revised



**PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION ACT (V OF 1881)—*concl'd.***s. 98—*concl'd.*

account for that year and also further accounts for the subsequent years. *Held*, that the proceedings of the new District Judge to reopen the matter in 1902 in connection with the accounts were *ultra vires* and illegal. A District Judge has no power to commence proceedings to revoke a probate under s. 50 of the Probate and Administration Act on his own motion. *SARAT SUNDARI BARMANI v. UMA PRASAD ROY CHOWDHRY* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 628

s. 104—

See ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL'S ACT, 1874.

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 54

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—EXECUTION BY AND AGAINST REPRESENTATIVES.

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 194

ss. 105, 108—*Specific legacy, mortgage of—Charge—Debts.* When a person takes a legacy under a will she takes subject to the debts due from the estate, but a mortgage of the property created by the legatee is not necessarily invalid, even if there are debts due from the deceased. *P* by a will appointed *A*, his widow, as his executrix and gave her a specific legacy in respect of a certain piece of land, which she mortgaged to defendant No. 3, who sold the mortgage right to the plaintiff; subsequently the property was sold in execution of a decree obtained against *P*'s representatives (*A* having died in the meantime) on account of a debt due from *P*'s estate, and the property was purchased by defendant No. 2. Plaintiff asked relief against this defendant. The lower Appellate Court held that the mortgage by *A* was invalid, having regard to the provisions of s. 105 of the Probate Act: *Held*, that the mortgage was not necessarily invalid. That the decree in execution of which the property was sold and purchased by defendant No. 2 was simply a money decree and no charge upon the property bequeathed was created thereby, and the purchaser in execution could not claim a valid charge upon the property in question as against the mortgagee. *AMBIKA CHARAN DUTT v. MUKTO KISORI* (1905) . . . 10 C. W. N. 38

ss. 128, 130, 131—*Interest allowable on demonstrative legacies—Demonstrative legatee, right of, to resort to general assets—Will, construction of—'Labham,' meaning of—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 35 (b)—Exception not applicable where debt not the whole consideration.* The word 'Labham' is generic and covers different kinds of profit and in its ordinary and comprehensive sense means profit, gain or income as opposed to the corpus yielding the same and includes interest, and dividends and income from immoveable property, especially where other portions of the will show such to have been the intention of the testator. The exception in paragraph (b) of s. 135 of the Transfer of Property Act will apply only where the whole of the consideration for the transfer is a debt due by the transferor. The rule that

**PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION ACT (V OF 1881)—*concl'd.***s. 128—*concl'd.*

in the case of demonstrative legacies, the legatee is entitled to resort to the general assets on failure of the source intended will not apply where there are directions to the contrary by the testator. Under the English law, interest is payable on demonstrative legacies from the expiry of one year from the testator's death. *Mullins v. Smith. 1 Dr. & Sm. 204; Lord Lonsborough v. Somerville, 19 Beav. 295.* approved and followed. The same is the law in India and the absence of a distinct provision in ss. 128, 130 and 131 of the Probate and Administration Act with respect to interest on such legacies does not imply an intention to disallow interest in such cases. *CHINNAM RAJAMANAR v. TADIKONDA RAMACHANDRA RAO* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 155

s. 131—

See SUCCESSION ACT, s. 96.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 549

s. 187—

See *ante*, ss. 4, 12, ETC.**PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION AMENDMENT ACT (VI OF 1889).**

s. 14—

See EXECUTOR . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 342

See RIGHT OF SUIT—INTEREST TO SUPPORT

RIGHT . . . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 446

**PROBATE DUTY.**

See COURT FEES ACT, s. 19 D.

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 161

See COURT-FEES ACT, SCH. I, ART. 11.

**PROCEDURE.**

See ACCOUNTS . . . 12 C. W. N. 28

See AGRA TENANCY ACT, s. 202.

I. L. R. 27 All. 167

See APPEAL . I. L. R. 30 All. 136; 319

See BENGAL REGULATION XVII OF 1806,

s. S . . . I. L. R. 29 All. 145

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT (VIII OF

1885), s. 103 . . . 12 C. W. N. 122

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 202.

I. L. R. 31 All. 153

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, ss.

244, 318, 319 . . . I. L. R. 21 All. 82

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 440.

I. L. R. 31 All. 7

See DECREE.

See DISPUTE RELATING TO LAND.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 774

See EXECUTION OF DECREE.

I. L. R. 30 All. 476

See POSSESSION . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 68



**PROCEDURE—concl'd.**

See PRACTICE . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 109

See SUCCESSION CERTIFICATE ACT, s. 1,  
CL. (4) . I. L. R. 31 All. 236

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, ss. 88,  
89 . I. L. R. 31 All. 114

**civil—**

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

See ALSO THE PARTICULAR HEAD WHICH  
IS APPLICABLE.

**criminal—**

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

See ALSO THE PARTICULAR HEAD WHICH IS  
APPLICABLE.

1. ————— Refusal of Court  
of first instance to examine all the plaintiff's wit-  
nesses—Appeal by defendant decreed—Remand.  
Owing to the direction of the Court of first instance  
only a portion of the evidence available in support  
of the plaintiff's case was recorded by that Court,  
which decreed the plaintiff's suit. On appeal, how-  
ever, the lower Appellate Court took a different  
view of the plaintiff's evidence and dismissed the  
suit. Held, that the plaintiff should be given an  
opportunity of producing the evidence, which  
had not been recorded owing to the attitude taken  
up by the Court of first instance. *Kijayat-ullah  
Mondol v. Sakina Bibi*, 11 C. W. N. p. xcii, and  
*Kalyani Prasad v. Bishnath*, All. Weekly Notes  
(1945) 266, referred to. *PABITRA KUNWAR v.  
MAHARAJA OF BENARES* (1908)

I. L. R. 30 All. 367

2. ————— Relief granted  
which was not asked for by the plaintiffs—Appeal—  
Court-fee. The plaintiffs in a suit for sale on a  
mortgage were granted by the first Court a relief  
for which they had not asked and which could not  
properly have been granted to them without an  
amendment of the plaint. On appeal by one of  
the defendants the appellant was made to pay an  
additional Court-fee corresponding to the relief  
granted to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs respon-  
dents were also required to make good the defi-  
ciency in the Court-fee paid in the first Court.  
This the plaintiffs declined to do, unless the decree  
was confirmed in its entirety. Held, that the  
plaintiffs were not entitled to retain the full benefit  
of the first Court's decree nor liable to pay the  
additional Court-fee; and the appellant might on  
application to the proper authority obtain a refund  
of the excess Court-fee, which he had been errone-  
ously compelled to pay. *INDRA SEN SINGH v.  
RIKHAI SINGH* (1907) . I. L. R. 30 All. 103

**"PROCEEDINGS," MEANING OF.**

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 3  
(1877, s. 3) . I. L. R. 3 Calc. 662  
I. L. R. 8 Bom. 287

**"PROCEEDINGS," MEANING OF—  
concl'd.**

See GENERAL CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION  
ACT, s. 6 . I. L. R. 3 Calc. 662; 727  
3 C. L. R. 208; 391  
I. L. R. 8 Bom. 340  
9 C. L. R. 281  
I. L. R. 13 Calc. 86  
I. L. R. 16 Calc. 267

**PROCEEDS OF SALE.**

See SALE-PROCEEDS.

**PROCESS.**

See COURT FEES ACT, 1870, s. 20.  
I. L. R. 17 Calc. 281  
See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 145.  
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1093  
See WITNESSES . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1093

**non-payment of fees for—**

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 179—  
STEP IN AID OF EXECUTION—SUITS  
AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS BY DECREE-  
HOLDER . I. L. R. 16 Mad. 452  
See MAINTENANCE, ORDER OF CRIMINAL  
COURT AS TO . I. L. R. 16 Mad. 234

**payment of fees for—**

See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—CRIMI-  
NAL PROCEDURE CODE.  
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 421  
See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 179—  
STEP IN AID OF EXECUTION—SUITS  
AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS BY DECREE-  
HOLDER . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 827  
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 196; 374  
I. L. R. 20 Bom. 179  
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 722  
I. L. R. 22 All. 358

**refusal to issue—**

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—SUM-  
MONING WITNESSES.  
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 508, 508n

**resistance to—**

See CONTEMPT OF COURT—CONTEMPTS  
GENERALLY . 2 B. L. R. F. B. 21

**service of—**

See COMPANY—WINDING UP—GENERAL  
CASES . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 241  
See SUMMONS, SERVICE OF.

**to compel attendance of wit-  
ness—**

See WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—SUM-  
MONING WITNESSES.  
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 121

1. ————— Cost of service of process—  
Act XXIII of 1861, s. 2—Civil Procedure Code,  
1877, 1882, s. 93—Talabana. A plaintiff in the



**PROCESS—contd.**

Munsif's Court filed a list of witnesses, but failed to deposit talabana, or cost of the service of summons, for their attendance. The Court failed to fix a time for the service of talabana. The processes were not served, and the Court dismissed the suit because the plaintiff had produced no evidence in support of his claim. *Held*, that, under Act XXIII of 1861, s. 2, the lower Court should first have fixed a time for the deposit of talabana. Case remanded. *LALA PRASADI LAL v. LALA AMBIKA PRASAD*. . . . . **3 B. L. R. Ap. 25**

*S.C. PURSHADEE LALL v. UMBIKA PERSHED LALL*  
**11 W. R. 290**

2. ——— **Substituted service—Native woman of rank.** Where by the custom of India the respondent, being a Hindu woman of rank, could not be personally served with an order of revivor, the Judicial Committee allowed service to be substituted on her dewan or chief servant. *CLARK v. ROUPLAL MULLICK. CLARK v. DOORGAMONEY DOSSEE*. . . . . **2 Moo. I. A. 263**

3. ——— **Sufficiency of service—Act VIII of 1859, s. 239—Service of prohibitory order, Sufficiency of.** Where service of the prohibitory order was effected by affixing it to the wall of the dwelling-house of the person on whom it was intended to serve it:—*Held*, it was not a sufficient service under s. 239 of Act VIII of 1859. It ought to have been served by delivery or by registered letter. *GOBIND CHUNDER DUTT v. KHERODE CHUNDER MITTER*. . . . . **10 B. L. R. Ap. 12**

4. ——— **Attachment—Private alienation.** Where an attachment of land was made by written order under s. 235 of Act VIII of 1859, the conditions in s. 239 had to be fulfilled in order to render any private alienation of the property attached null and void under s. 240. *INDRA CHUNDRABABU v. AGRA AND MASTERMAN'S BANK*. . . . . **1 B. L. R. S. N. 20**

*S.C. INDRO CHUNDER BAROO v. DUNLOP*  
**10 W. R. 264**

*NUR AHMAD v. ALTAF ALI*. . . . . **I. L. R. 2 All. 58**

5. ——— **Service on attorney's clerk.** Service upon an attorney's clerk of an order direct to be served upon an attorney is not good service. *EMRITLALL SALIGRAM v. KIDD*  
**2 Hyde 116**

6. ——— **Service on pleader—Order under s. 165, Civil Procedure Code, 1859.** An order under s. 165 of the Civil Procedure Code, requiring a party to a suit to attend and give evidence, might be served on such party's pleader and not necessarily personally. *SHIVUDRAPPA v. KASHINATH VISHNU*. . . . . **6 Bom. A. C. 141**

7. ——— **Service of notice on pleader.** Service upon a respondent's pleader is good service upon himself, so far as notice of the appeal is concerned. *ISHUR DUTT MUNDUL v. SHIB PERSHAD THAKOOR*. . . . . **15 W. R. 290**

8. ——— **Service in foreign territory—Service of notice of appeal—Civil Procedure Code,**

**PROCESS—concl'd.**

1859, s. 60. Where a respondent resides in Chandernagore, i.e., out of British territory, the summons or notice of appeal should be forwarded to him by post, under a registered cover; and if he does not appear, a verified statement should be put in to show that he is at present or has recently been residing there. *SONATUN BUKSHEE v. GOPAL CHUNDER SHAMUNTO*. . . . . **15 W. R. 31**

9. ——— **Fresh notice, application for—Failure for long time to serve notice of appeal—Sufficiency of service.** Where an appellant failed for twelve months to serve notice of appeal upon his respondent, the Court refused to allow him the opportunity to have a fresh summons issued and served. Where the party serving a notice of appeal finds the respondent absent from home, and is told where he is, and yet affixes the notice to the door of his house, such service is void and of no effect. *DOOLEE CHUND v. NIRBAN SINGH*. . . . . **20 W. R. 62**

10. ——— **Inability to trace party for purpose of service—Service of notice of appeal—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 57.** Where an appellant to the High Court was unable to serve notice on the plaintiff (respondent), because of inability to trace the plaintiff in the place given as his place of residence, when the (plaintiff) commenced the suit and sent in his petition of appeal to the Zillah Court:—*Held*, that the case might be dealt with in analogy to the procedure in respect to summons under s. 57 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *BEDHOO KOOLANEE v. BONOMALEE GURAIN* **11 W. R. 496**

11. ——— **Proof of service—Return of service of notice.** The return of service of notice with the name of the officer who effected the service on the back of it is *prima facie* evidence of the service of the notice. *LOOTF ALI v. ABOO BIBEE*  
**15 W. R. 203**

*MOOKOONDONATH BHADOORY v. SHIB CHUNDER BHADOORY*. . . . . **19 W. R. 102**

12. ——— **Service of notice of appeal—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 79, 80, 82—Respondent's refusal to sign acknowledgment of service—Ex parte decree against respondent.** Where a respondent refused to sign the acknowledgment of service endorsed on the original notice of the appeal, and the serving officer, instead of affixing a copy of the notice on the outer door of the house in which the respondent was residing, returned the notice to the Court with an affidavit stating the respondent's refusal to sign the acknowledgment, and the Court passed an *ex parte* decree against the respondent:—*Held*, that, under the circumstances, there was no due service of the notice, and that the appeal was wrongly decided *ex parte*. *MARUTI v. VITHU*. . . . . **I. L. R. 16 Bom. 117**

**PROCESSION.**

——— **in highway—**

See PUBLIC ROAD, HIGHWAY, STREET, OR THOROUGHFARE **I. L. R. 26 Mad. 376**  
See RELIGION, OFFENCES RELATING TO.  
**I. L. R. 26 Mad. 554**



**PROCESSION—contd.****in public road—**

See JURISDICTIONS OF CIVIL COURT—  
PROCESSIONS . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 524  
I. L. R. 18 Bom. 693

See PUBLIC STREET.

I. L. R. 32 Mad. 478 ; 527

See RIGHT OF SUIT—OBSTRUCTION TO  
PUBLIC HIGHWAY . 1 Mad. 50

I. L. R. 2 Bom. 457

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 304

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 203

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 693

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 524

**with— powers of police in dealing**

See MADRAS POLICE ACT, s. 21.

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 37

*Public worship of idol—Claim to exclusive right to have procession in public streets—Dispute between rival sects of Vaishnava Brahmins—Streets vested in Local Boards under Madras Local Boards Act (Madras Act V of 1884)—Res judicata—Ownership of land in village—Presumptive dedication to idol.* The plaintiffs, members of the community of the Vadagalai sect of Vaishnava Brahmins, claimed the exclusive right to public worship of their idol and processions in its honour in the public streets of the village where they resided, and to prohibit the defendants, members of the Tungalai sect in the same village, from publicly worshipping the Tungalai idol or carrying it in processions in the public streets. The claim was based on the grounds (i) that the Vadagalais were the original owners of all the land of the village and only allowed houses to be built and streets formed subject to the reservation that no worship or procession of a Tungalai idol should be allowed in them, thus dedicating them to their own idol; (ii) that, in the alternative, they had by immemorial usage and custom the right to prevent such worship or processions in the streets; and (iii) that so far as the Tungalai idol was concerned the rights of the parties were *res judicata* by the decision in a former suit:—*Held*, that the ownership of the village by the Vadagalais was not proved nor any dedication of the streets exclusively to their idol; and that no such custom as alleged had been established; the village was an ordinary ryotwari village; the streets were public streets now vested, under the Madras Local Boards Act (Madras Act V of 1884), in the Local Board. All members of the public had an equal right in them. If the Vadagalais had any objection to the streets being so vested, they had had the opportunity when the Act was passed of raising the objection by appeal to the Governor-General in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Not having done so it was now too late to set up any claim. *Held*, also, that the former suit was not a representative suit binding property, nor a suit framed for the purpose of binding the Tungalai sect for all time. It was a suit against certain persons alleged to be wrong-

**PROCESSION—concl.**

doers in their individual capacity; the decision in it was, therefore, not *res judicata* in the present suit. *SADAGOPA CHARIAH v. KRISHNAMOORTHY RAO* (1907) . . . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 185  
L. R. 34 I. A. 93

**PROCLAMATION.**

See ABSCONDING OFFENDER.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 417

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 287.

See FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY.

2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 124

See SALE . . .

8 C. W. N. 686

**of sale—**

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—  
SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY—  
GENERAL CASES.

**right of Government to withdraw—**

See FOREST ACT, ss. 75 AND 76.

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 670

*Change of jurisdiction—Sambalpoore—Jurisdiction of High Court to entertain appeal—Authority of the Governor-General in Council to transfer a territory to the jurisdiction of the High Court from that which was not under the jurisdiction of a High Court—Proclamation under Statute 28 & 29 Vict., Chap. 15. Held*, that the Proclamation No. 2833, issued by the Governor-General in Council on the 1st September 1905, which declared and appointed that the district of Sambalpoore should cease to form part of the Central Provinces and should be subject to and be included within the limits of the Bengal Division of the Presidency of Fort William, was not *ultra vires*. *Held*, also, that the Governor-General in Council had authority under Statute 28 & 29 Vict., Ch. 15, to issue this proclamation, so as to transfer a portion of the territory originally comprised within the jurisdiction of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of the Central Provinces and place it within the jurisdiction of the High Court. *BALESHWAR BAGARTI v. BHAGIRATHI DASS* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 701  
s.c. 12 C. W. N. 657

**PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.**

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, ss. 138, 139.

See CONTEMPT OF COURT—PENAL CODE, s. 175 . . . I. L. R. 13 Mad. 24

See INTERROGATORIES.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 117

See PLAINT—REJECTION OF PLAINT.

2 Bom. 391 : 2nd Ed. 369

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—INSPECTION AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.

1. ——— Summons to produce document—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 152, 153—1882, ss. 163, 164—Verbal order to pleader to pro-



## PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS— *contd.*

*duce.* A written summons distinctly describing the nature of the document required must be issued on a party to a suit required to produce a document. A verbal order to his pleader is not sufficient, and is not such a summons as is contemplated by law. **DOORGAMONEE DOSSEE v. BENODE MONEE DOSSEE** **W. R. 1864, 164**

2. ———— **Production of documents with plaint—Ground for non-production.** Plaintiffs must, on the presentation of their plaint, produce in Court the originals of the document relied on by them in support of their claim. When a plaintiff can satisfy the Court at the hearing that some document on which he desires to rely was not presented with the plaint, because he was ignorant of its existence at the time, the Court will probably allow it to be received as evidence. **CAMPBELL v. KEITH** . . . . . **1 Hyde 287**

**S.C. RITCHIE, STEWART & Co. v. GLADSTONE, WYLLIE & Co.** . . . . . **1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 125**

*See* **MAHABEER DOSS v. LALLA DOSS**  
**1 W. R. 12**

3. ———— **Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 39.** Under s. 39 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1859, the plaintiff was bound to produce, at the time the plaint is filed, all the documents on which he relied. **PREMSOOKH CHUNDER v. RAJ KISTO MITTER** . . . . . **1 Hyde 145**

**S.C. ANONYMOUS** . . . . . **1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 14**

4. ———— Where a plaintiff sues upon title-deeds as evidence of his claim, he is bound to file them with his plaint, or else have them ready to produce at the time of the first hearing; otherwise he is bound to show good cause for not having done so. **LEKHRAJ ROY v. MUTTY MADHUB SEN** . . . . . **14 W. R. 95**

5. ———— **Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 58, 62, 63, 64—Rejection of plaint after being registered with copy extract from account books annexed—Omission to produce books of account for verification—Penalty for non-production of books.** On the 14th April 1897 a plaint was presented, and was numbered and registered as a suit. Annexed to it was a copy of an extract from the plaintiff's account books. The matter was adjourned to the 2nd June 1897 for the production of the account books, in order that the copy might be compared and verified. On that day neither the plaintiff nor his pleader appeared with the books, whereupon the Subordinate Judge rejected the plaint, holding that no summons could be issued unless the copy extract annexed to the plaint was found to be correct. *Held* (reversing the order), that, the plaint having been registered on the 14th April, summonses ought to have been issued on the 2nd June. There was no provision in the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) justifying the rejection of the plaint. The penalty which the plaintiff incurred for not producing his original accounts was that prescribed in s. 63, *viz.*, not being able to put in that account without the

## PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS— *contd.*

special leave of the Judge. **GOPAL GUNDAPA NAIK v. VISHNU KRISHNA NAIK** **I. L. R. 22 Bom. 971**

6. ———— **Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 39—Document given to witness to refresh his memory.** A document given to a witness as a script to refresh his memory is not "received in evidence" within the meaning of s. 39 of Act VIII of 1859, and need not therefore have been produced when the plaint was filed. **RAMJI MADATJI v. RANGAYYA CHETTI** . . . . . **1 Mad. 168**

7. ———— **Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 39.** The plaintiff sued to recover certain jewels, and one of her witnesses being examined by her counsel with reference to a list of the jewels which was in his possession, the defendant's counsel objected to the document being referred to at all, as it had not been filed with the plaint in compliance with s. 39 of Act VIII of 1859. *Held*, that s. 39 of Act VIII of 1859 referred only to promissory notes, bills of exchange, and such documents as are in their nature the very essence of the case. **KAMENEE DOSSEE v. HURROMONEY DOSSEE** . . . . . **Bourke O. C. 91: Cor. 151**

**MANOORAM SHAW v. HURRYPERSAUD ROY**  
**Bourke O. C. 162**

8. ———— **Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 59, 140—Madras High Court Rules, Nos. 39, 43, 44, and 47.** A defendant is entitled, under the High Court Rules, to be furnished with a copy of documents sued on, which are deposited with the plaint. **MAHOMED ABDUL AZIZ v. SUBBA NAIDU** . . . . . **I. L. R. 21 Mad. 490**

9. ———— **Discretion to receive documents after filing of plaint.** Act VIII of 1859 gave a discretionary power to receive documents after the filing of the plaint. **LOPEZ v. DRIBERG** . . . . . **W. R. 1864, Act X, 67**

10. ———— **Reception of documents after filing of plaint—Ground of appeal.** Reception of documents under s. 39, Act VIII of 1859, by the Court of first instance cannot be a ground of appeal. The sanction of the Court receiving the documents clears the defect of their not having been tendered with the plaint. **GOSAIN TOTA RAM v. RUKINIBALLAB**

**3 B. L. R. P. C. 34: 12 W. R. P. C. 32**  
**13 Moo. I. A. 77**

**ATTA OOLLAH MUNDLE v. SUKEEGODDEEN TURUPDAR** . . . . . **W. R. 1864, 271**

11. ———— **Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 59, 63—Appeal—Rejection of documents admitted by lower Court.** Certain documents having been allowed by the District Munsif to be filed by the plaintiff during the trial of a suit, the District Judge, on appeal, held that he was bound to strike them off the file on the ground that they were not filed with the plaint nor entered in any list annexed to the plaint, and because the Munsif had not recorded any reason for admitting them.



# PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS— contd.

*Held*, that, as the documents had been admitted in evidence by the lower Court the Appellate Court was bound to consider them. **MINAKSHI v. VELU**  
**I. L. R. 8 Mad. 373**

12. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 59, 63. Held*, that the refusal to admit in evidence a registered certificate of sale under s. 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, on the ground that it had not been produced with the plaint as required by s. 59 of the Code, was improper, there having been no doubt of its existence at the date of suit. **DEVIDAS JAGJIVAN v. PIRJADA BEGAM**  
**I. L. R. 8 Bom. 377**

13. *Second certificate of sale obtained after first rejected as unregistered. Quære*: Whether, where the original certificate of sale had been rejected by the Court as being unregistered and the plaintiff had obtained a second one, the Court of first instance ought to have received the second one in evidence if issued and tendered in evidence subsequently to the filing of the suit, but previously to the original hearing. **LALBHAI LAKHMIDAS v. KAMULUDIN HUSEN KHAN**  
**12 Bom. 247**

14. *Omission to put copy on record*. In a suit brought on a promissory note, where the note was produced when the plaint was presented and was marked by the officer of the Court, but the Judge at the hearing refused to receive it when tendered in evidence, because he found that there was no copy of the note among the papers, and the plaintiff's counsel was unable to explain the omission, and there being no application made to withdraw, the suit was dismissed:—*Held*, that the Judge ought to have received a note in evidence which was "produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint was presented" (s. 39 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1859); that the plaintiff's counsel was not bound, under the circumstances, to apply to withdraw the suit, and the Judge was not justified in dismissing the suit, which was accordingly remanded under s. 351 of the Code, with a direction that it should be restored to its original place on the register, and be tried by one of the Judges of the Court. **THOMPSON v. JEHANGIR HORMASJI**  
**3 Bom. O. C. 66**

15. *Dismissal of claim for non-compliance with Civil Procedure Code*. The Judges' decision disallowing a claim because the provisions of s. 39 of Act VIII of 1859 had not been complied with, was held to be incorrect under the circumstances. *Ex parte* **RAYACHAND AMICHAND**  
**2 Bom. 369**

16. *Civil Procedure Code, s. 174—Court's jurisdiction to punish a witness for refusing to produce a document—Procedure—Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 175—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 480*. A witness was summoned to produce a document in Court in connection with a certain suit. He

# PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS— concl'd.

attended the Court, but did not produce the document, stating on oath that it was not in his possession. But his statement was disbelieved, and the Court fined him R75 under s. 174 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882). *Held*, that the fine was illegally levied. The jurisdiction of the Court to punish under s. 374 of the Civil Procedure Code exists only in the case of a witness, who, not having attended on summons, has been arrested and brought before the Court. The case of a witness who having a document will not produce it is provided for by s. 175 of the Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) and s. 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882). *In re* **PREMCHAND DOWLATRAM**  
**I. L. R. 12 Bom. 63**

# PRODUCTION OF PROPERTY:

*See* PROPERTY.

*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 94, 96, 517, 523—Security required for production of ornaments—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 404. Executive order*. When a Magistrate thinks that there are in a person's possession articles in respect of which some criminal offence has been committed, he should, in order to secure their production, proceed under s. 94 or 96 or any other appropriate section of the Criminal Procedure Code. No section of the Code enables him to demand security, from the person in possession of the articles, for their production when required. Where, on a complaint made by one B.M., the Magistrate ordered a preliminary inquiry into it by a Subordinate Magistrate, and, after receiving that report, passed an order to the following effect: "PB is to execute a surety-bond to the extent of R400 and to hold the ornaments in deposit with him as trust, and to produce them when required. In the meantime the complainant should have his claim proved by a competent Court": *Held*, that the order, having been made in a matter which had come before the Magistrate in his judicial capacity, could not be regarded as an executive order merely, and that, as a judicial order, it was made without jurisdiction. *Held*, also, that, if the Magistrate did not think fit to take proper steps under the law to secure the production of the property before the Court, the only course which was open to him, when he referred the complainant to the Civil Court, was to leave it to the Civil Court to take such steps as it might think fit for the production and custody of the property in question. **PURNA CHANDRA BANDOPADHYA v. SASI BHUSAN MULLICK (1903)**  
**7 C. W. N. 522**

# PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT.

*See* ADVOCATE . **I. L. R. 33 Calc. 151**

*See* MOOKTEAR.

*See* PLEADER.



**PROFITS, SUIT FOR.**

*See* CO-SHARERS—SUITS BY CO-SHARERS  
WITH RESPECT TO THE JOINT PROPERTY  
—MISCELLANEOUS SUITS.

23 W. R. 286  
I. L. R. 3 All. 186  
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*See* JURISDICTION OF REVENUE COURT—  
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*See* MESNE PROFITS.

*See* N.-W. P. RENT ACT, s. 7.  
I. L. R. 1 All. 659

*See* N.-W. P. RENT ACT, s. 94.  
I. L. R. 1 All. 512

*See* N.-W. P. RENT ACT, s. 208.  
I. L. R. 2 All. 239  
I. L. R. 8 All. 61

*See* PRE-EMPTION—PROFITS OF LAND.  
I. L. R. 19 All. 261

*See* SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—SMALL  
CAUSE COURT SUITS—PROFITS OF LAND.  
I. L. R. 21 Bom. 248

**PROHIBITORY ORDER WITHOUT  
EXPRESS LIMITATION OF TIME.**

*See* CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT V  
OF 1898), s. 144. I. L. R. 34 Calc. 897

**PROJECTION.**

*See* ENCROACHMENT.  
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*See* LIMITATION ACT (XV OF 1877), SCH.  
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*See* NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, SUMMARY  
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*See* STAMP ACT (XXXVI OF 1860).  
1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 124  
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*See* STAMP ACT, 1862, s. 22.  
2 B. L. R. O. C. 165  
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*See* STAMP ACT, 1862, SCH. A, CL. 1.  
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21 W. R. 446  
13 B. L. R. Ap. 33  
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*See* STAMP ACT, 1869, s. 39.  
I. L. R. 3 All. 115

*See* STAMP ACT, 1879, s. 3, CL. 4.  
I. L. R. 8 Bom. 297  
I. L. R. 8 Mad. 87  
I. L. R. 17 All. 211

*See* STAMP ACT, 1879, s. 3, CL. 10.  
I. L. R. 13 All. 66

*See* STAMP ACT, 1879, s. 34.  
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I. L. R. 3 Mad. 251  
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assignment of—

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1 B. L. R. O. C. 14

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I. L. R. 17 Mad. 108

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TRACTS—GENERALLY

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I. L. R. 26 Mad. 322

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8 B. L. R. 372

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I. L. R. 30 Calc. 446

See JURISDICTION—CAUSES OF JURISDIC-  
TION—CAUSE OF ACTION—NEGOTIABLE  
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suit on—concl'd.

See MAJORITY ACT, s. 3.

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I. L. R. 21 Bom. 281

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SUE OR DEFEND. I. L. R. 3 Calc. 539

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AGREEMENTS . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 262

**1. FORM OF.**

1. Document without express  
promise to pay. A document is not a promis-  
sory note if it does not contain an express promise  
to pay. GOVIND GOPAL v. BALWANTRAO

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 986

2. Document proposing to bor-  
row on certain conditions—Stamp Act, 1879  
—Proposal —Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 4. A  
letter containing a request to borrow a certain sum  
of money promising that the same should be repaid  
with interest on a certain day is not liable to stamp  
duty. It is not a promissory note, but a mere propo-  
sal under s. 4 of the Indian Contract Act (IX of  
1872). DHONDBHAT NARHARBHAT v. ATMARAM  
MORESHVAR . I. L. R. 13 Bom. 669

NARAYANASAMI MUDALIAR v. LOKAMBALAMMAL  
I. L. R. 23 Mad. 156 note

3. Acknowledgment. The plaint-  
iff sued on two documents, signed by the defend-  
ant, in one of which a sum of R203 was stated to be  
“due to you, and payable on the 16th July;” and  
in the other a sum of R515 was mentioned “for  
which I give you this writing, the whole amount of  
which will be paid up in full on the 3rd of August.”  
Held, to be not mere acknowledgments, but promis-  
sory notes. MANICK CHUND v. JOMOONA DOSS

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 645

4. Uncertain agreement. Held,  
that the following instrument was so vague and in-  
definite in its terms that it could not be regarded as  
a promissory note: “I, J M C, do hereby prom-  
ise to pay at Allahabad to the manager of the  
Agra Savings Bank, Limited, the sum of R10 on or  
before the 15th day of October 1876, and a similar  
sum monthly every succeeding month, for full  
value and consideration received; dated the 9th  
September 1876.” CARTER v. AGRA SAVINGS BANK

I. L. R. 5 All. 562

5. Promissory note payable to  
“bearer on demand”—Note payable whenever  
“dhani” (i.e. the owner) may demand—Dhani note  
equivalent to “bearer”—Not a negotiable instru-  
ment—Paper Currency Act (XX of 1882), s. 25—  
Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), ss. 4  
and 13. The plaintiffs brought a suit on an alleged



**PROMISSORY NOTE—contd.****1. FORM OF—contd.**

promissory note of the defendants for R2,125. The note was in Gujarati, in the form of an account, on a loose sheet of paper. After reciting that the defendant had borrowed the said sum of R2,125 on personal security, and that interest was to run there on at a specified rate, the document continued as follows: "The same (i.e., the sum borrowed with interest) are payable whenever *dhani* (the owner or lender) may demand payment thereof." The defendant contended that the note in question was in form one payable to "bearer on demand," and as such illegal and void, as being in contravention of the provisions of s. 25 of the Paper Currency Act (XX of 1882). *Held*, that *dhani* was not in the ordinary or the commercial language of the Bombay Presidency equivalent to "bearer" in the sense that word was employed in the Paper Currency and Negotiable Instruments Acts, and that the document in question was not therefore a negotiable instrument, nor obnoxious to the provisions of the former Act, and there was no objection to a suit founded upon it. *JETHA PARKHA v. RAMCHANDRA VITHOBA* . . . . . **I. L. R. 16 Bom. 689**

**6. ——— Proposal for a loan—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 2—Stamp Act, s. 3.** A letter reciting a request for a loan, calling on the addressee to pay the amount to the bearer of the letter, and continuing, "this sum I shall repay with interest . . . . and get back this letter: I request you will not neglect to pay the amount on the strength of this letter," is a promissory note and not a mere proposal for a loan. *CHANNAMMA v. AYYANNA* . . . . . **I. L. R. 16 Mad. 283**

**7. ——— Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), s. 4—Stamp Act (1879), Sch. I, Art. 1.** A debtor signed and delivered to his creditor an unstamped document as follows: "The account executed on . . . by . . . to . . . The amount which I have this day received from you in cash is R700. This sum I am bound to pay you. Therefore, adding to this sum interest at 8 annas per cent. per mensem, I am liable to pay. This is the account in this manner executed with my consent." *Held*, that the document was not a promissory note, and was admissible in evidence. *TIRUPATHI GOUNDAN v. RAMA REDDI* . . . . . **I. L. R. 21 Mad. 49**

**8. ——— Contract or obligation.** A promissory note was held to be a "contract or obligation" under s. 16 of the Registration Act of 1864 for the purposes of limitation. *PYARI CHAND MITTER v. FRAZER* . . . . . **6 B. L. R. Ap. 40**

*S.C. OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE v. FRAZER*

**14 W. R. O. C. 51**

*See LESLIE v. PUNCHANUN MITTER*

**6 B. L. R. 668**

**15 W. R. O. C. 1**

**9. ——— Necessity of delivery of note—Making of note.** The making of a promissory note is altogether the act of the maker, and delivery

**PROMISSORY NOTE—contd.****1. FORM OF—concl'd.**

to the promisee is requisite to render it complete. *WINTER v. ROUND* . . . . . **1 Mad. 202**

**2. EXECUTION.**

**Evidence as to execution—Probabilities.** Case in which it was held on the evidence and a discussion of surrounding probabilities that the first Court was in error in finding that a promissory note sued on had been executed by the defendant. *HURRICHER BOSE v. MONINDRA NATH GHOSE* . . . . . **L. R. 19 I. A. 4**

**3. CONSIDERATION.**

**1. ——— Note given in payment of loss on wagering contract—Act XXI of 1848—Bom. Act III of 1865.** A promissory note which has for its consideration a debt due on a wagering contract is not binding in the hands of the original payee. *TRIKAM DAMODHAR v. LALA AMIRCHAND* . . . . . **8 Bom. A. C. 131**

**2. ——— Note given partly for "balance of bets and lotteries"—Lottery Act (V of 1844).** The defendant agreed with the plaintiff to take the plaintiff's mare "Bridesmaid" on "racing terms"—all winnings to be divided equally between them, and the plaintiff to have the option of claiming a one-fourth share of any lottery in which she might be bought by or on account of the defendant; the plaintiff to keep and train "Bridesmaid" for R60 a month. Subsequently, the plaintiff agreed to keep and train, for a like sum for each horse, five horses belonging to the defendant. The defendant having been posted as a defaulter, the plaintiff, at the defendant's request, advanced certain sums to the Secretary of the Calcutta Races to enable the defendant's horses to run. As security for the repayment of such advances, and of a sum of R4,456-6 which had become due to the plaintiff, and which included an item of R1,149 for "balance of bets and lotteries," and a smaller sum in respect of certain tickets in the "Secundra Raffle," the defendant gave to the plaintiff a letter of hypothecation of his five horses, whereby it was agreed that in case of the defendant's default the plaintiff should be at liberty to sell the horses. The defendant made default, and the plaintiff advertised the horses for sale. On the same day the defendant wrote and gave to the plaintiff a letter stating that, in consideration of the plaintiff's withdrawing the advertisement, and withholding the sale for a certain period, he would give the plaintiff a promissory note for the balance of his claim. A note for R7,000 was accordingly given by the defendant to the plaintiff. In the account delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant, he had by mistake overcredited the defendant with R744 in an item headed "cash received from the Secretary of the Calcutta Races, balance of racing account" and under which was included the following item: "I. O. U., deducted from lottery account, R480." On receiving information of the error, the defend-



**PROMISSORY NOTE—contd.****3. CONSIDERATION—concl'd.**

ant gave the plaintiff another promissory note for R744. In an action on the notes brought under Act V of 1866, the plaintiff obtained a decree, which was set aside on the defendant's application, and leave was given to him to appear and defend. Written statements were then filed on the plaintiff's application. *Held*, by MACPHERSON, J., that the two promissory notes were given as security for the whole of the plaintiff's claim; that the items for "balance of bets and lotteries" and for the "Secundra Raffle" being rendered illegal by the Lottery Act (V of 1844), part of the consideration for the notes was illegal, and no action was maintainable upon them. His Lordship therefore dismissed the plaintiff's suit. On appeal, held by COUTH, C.J., that the promissory note for R7,000 was not vitiated by the R1,149 being part of the consideration for it: although that portion of the latter sum which was won by lotteries was obtained by an illegal transaction, it was not illegal for the defendant to receive the money, and, having done so, to pay the plaintiff his share or to promise to do so. But the money paid in respect of the "Secundra Raffle," being money paid in execution of an illegal purpose, was an illegal consideration which disentitled the plaintiff to recover on the note. *Held*, further, that the note for R744 was given upon good consideration. All the facts of the case being stated in the plaintiff's written statement, the Court might allow the plaint to be amended, and frame an issue as to what amount was due to the plaintiff in respect of the consideration for the note for R7,000. *Held*, by MARKBY, J., that both notes were good, inasmuch as the promise contained in them did not spring from, nor was it the creature of, the original illegal agreement, but was a separate agreement. JOSEPH v. SOLANO

9 B. L. R. 441 18 W. R. 424

**3. ——— Promissory note on account of pre-existing loan—Action maintainable on original consideration, even if note unstamped and inadmissible.** Where a bill or note is not itself the original contract, but is executed on account of a pre-existing independent obligation complete in itself, an action on the original obligation is maintainable without regard to such bill or note, if it is not paid at maturity, provided the party taking the bill or note has done nothing with it, which would render the debtor liable on it to third parties and the inadmissibility in evidence from any cause of such bill or note will not affect the maintainability of the suit. It will be otherwise, if the original cause of action is the bill or note itself. *Sheikh Akbar v Sheikh Khan*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 256, followed. *Pothi Reddi v. Velayudasivan*, I. L. R. 10 Mad. 94, distinguished. YARLAGADDA VEERA RAGAVAYYA v. GORANTLA RAMAYYA (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 111

**4. ASSIGNMENT OF, AND SUITS ON, PROMISSORY NOTES.**

**1. ——— Endorsement to a third person for purpose of allowing him to sue**

**PROMISSORY NOTE—contd.****4. ASSIGNMENT OF, AND SUITS ON, PROMISSORY NOTES—contd.**

—*Assignment of negotiable instrument.* There is nothing illegal in the true holder of a promissory note endorsing it to another person, with the express object of allowing him to sue upon it. RAM-LAL MOOKERJEE v. HARAN CHANDRA DHAR

3 B. L. R. O. C. 130: 12 W. R. O. C. 9

**2. ——— Benami transaction—Right of benamidar to sue on note.** The payee and holder of a promissory note is not debarred from suing on it by reason of the fact that a third person is really interested in it. BOJJAMMA v. VENKATARAMAYYA

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 30

**3. ——— Minor's suit by another next friend—Right to sue on note not endorsed.** An infant sued by his next friend to recover the balance due on a promissory note alleged to have been made and delivered on account of his estate to his mother and guardian who had not endorsed the note. *Held*, that the suit was maintainable in the absence of an endorsement. GURUMURTI v. SIVAYYA

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 391

**4. ——— Assignment of promissory note by endorsement—Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1882), s. 8—Right of suit—Benamidar.** An endorsement legally made of a promissory note followed by delivery of it to the endorsee makes him the "holder" of it within the meaning of s. 8 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and he can sue upon the note, although he may be a benamidar of the real owner of the note. SARAT CHUNDER DUTT v. KEDAR NATH DASS

2 C. W. N. 286

**5. ——— Suit by endorsee against maker—Endorsement of overdue note.** In a suit by endorsee against the maker of a promissory note payable on demand, the defence was that there were dealings in skins between the defendant and the payee, and an agreement was made by which the payee was to pay the defendant R4,500 as an advance upon goods to be supplied by the defendant to the payee; that the money was paid and the promissory note sued on was made, and delivered as an acknowledgment of the receipt of the money and as a security for what should be due to the maker in respect of the dealings. The defendant stated that the state of the accounts between him and the maker showed a balance in favour of the defendant, and notice to the plaintiff of these facts was alleged. The note was endorsed to the plaintiff two years and eleven months after date. *Held*, that, although the evidence failed to make out notice to the plaintiff, the note when endorsed was an overdue note, and that the plaintiff took it subject to the then state of the accounts between the payee and the defendant. COMMUNDUN MOHIDEEN SAIB v. OREE MEERAH SAIB

7 Mad. 271

**6. ——— Endorsement of note overdue—Note on demand—Re-endorsement.** Before a promissory note on demand can be treated as overdue in the hands of an endorsee, there must be some evidence of demand. The re-endorsement of a dis-



**PROMISSORY NOTE—contd.****4. ASSIGNMENT OF, AND SUITS ON PROMISSORY NOTES—contd.**

charged promissory note cannot revive the liability of the maker. *Commundun Mohideen Saib v. Oree Meerah Saib*, 7 Mad. 271, followed. The fact that the endorsee of a promissory note becomes one of the members of a firm which has undertaken to discharge the liability created by the maker of the note does not discharge the obligation on the note so as to invalidate re-endorsement for value. *VAN INGEN v. DHUNNA LALL LALLAH*

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 108

7. ———— **Receipt endorsed on note—Presumption of payment.** Though a receipt on the back of a bill of exchange or promissory note *prima facie* imports that the bill or note has been paid, yet the receipt is capable of being explained; and if it appears that the bill or note has not been paid and that another bill or note was substituted for it, the Court will not be justified in concluding that the party who gave up the note in that way meant that the debt secured by the note was to be considered to have been paid. *STEWART v. DELHI AND LONDON BANK*

17 W. R. 201

8. ———— **Suit to recover money due on a promissory note by assignee of rights of payee not being endorsee—Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, ss. 8, 9.** *K* executed a promissory note on demand for Rs. 6,000 in favour of *S* in 1882. In 1884 *S* by an agreement in writing assigned all her property, including the promissory note to *M*, but did not endorse over the promissory note to *M*. *M* assigned his rights in the promissory note to a bank in payment of a debt. In a suit by *M* and the bank against *K* and *S* to recover the principal and interest due on the note:—*Held*, that the plaintiffs could not maintain the suit. *PATTAT AMBADI MARAR v. KRISHNAN*

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 290

9. ———— **Suit by assignee by invalid endorsement—Claim also on the original debt in respect of which note was given—Maintainability of suit.** The purchaser of the assets of a bank in liquidation, which assets included a debt due by defendants to the late bank and a promissory note given in respect of that debt, sued defendants on the promissory note as well as on the original debt in respect of which the note had been given. The note had not been endorsed until after the bank had been wound up and had ceased to exist, and the endorsement had been held to be invalid. *Held*, that plaintiffs were entitled to sue for the original debt even though they were not entitled to sue on the promissory note. *Pothi Reddi v. Velayudasivan*, I. L. R. 10 Mad. 94, referred to. *RAMCHANDRA RAO v. VENKATARAMANA AYYAR*

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 527

10. ———— **Bill of exchange—Endorser of note or bill, rights of—Right to securities deposited of endorser paying the holder of note or bill—Surety.** The same rule is applicable to the endorser of a promissory note that applies to the endorser of a bill-of-exchange, that, if he pays the holder of it, he

**PROMISSORY NOTE—contd.****4. ASSIGNMENT OF, AND SUITS ON, PROMISSORY NOTES—contd.**

is entitled to the benefit of the securities given by the maker in the one case, the acceptor in the other, which the holder has in his hands at the time of the payment, and upon which he has no claim except for the note or bill. *Duncan Fox & Co. v. North and South Wales Bank*, L. R. 6 Ap. Cas. 1, referred to. Promissory notes made by an agent, acting for himself and for his principal, were secured by the deposit of title-deeds of property, belonging to the principal, in the hands of a bank which discounted the notes, and the latter were paid at maturity by an endorser. *Held*, that the endorser was entitled to a transfer of the deeds to him as security, without further assent from the owner. *Held*, also, that he was entitled to have them transferred to him on the ground that, as a fact, the agent, acting within the principal's authority, had agreed that in consideration of his paying the amount of the notes to the holder, he should have this security, the bank assenting. *AGA AHMED ISPAHANI v. CRISP*

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 242  
L. R. 19 I. A. 24

11. ———— **Liability of maker, discharge of—Failure to present note at due date.** *Semble*: The maker of a promissory note is not discharged by the holder's failure to present it at due date. *RAMAKISTNAYYA v. KASSIM*

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 172

12. ———— **Promissory note not presented for payment at maturity—Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), ss. 64, 66—Effect of non-presentment.** *Held*, that the non-presentment for payment at maturity of a promissory note, the presentment of which is required by s. 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, has not the effect of relieving from liability the maker of the note. *Farzand Ali v. Agra Savings Bank*, All. Weekly Notes (1896) 201, and *Ramakistnayya v. Kassim*, I. L. R. 13 Mad. 172, followed. *PHUL CHAND v. GANGA GHULAM*, I. L. R. 21 All. 450

13. ———— **Effect of an invalid endorsement of a promissory note by payee—Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), s. 46—Note recovered by, but not re-indorsed to, the payee.** The defendant gave plaintiffs a promissory note payable on demand. The plaintiff endorsed the note to a third party, a creditor of his, who sued the defendant on the note on his refusal to pay the defendant pleaded that it had been agreed between the payee and himself that the note should not take effect until the payee had performed certain conditions which remained unperformed. The suit was accordingly dismissed. The plaintiff thereupon paid the endorsee and took back the note, which, however, was not re-indorsed, and instituted the present suit against the defendant, who pleaded that the property in the note was not vested in the original plaintiff so as to enable him to maintain the suit. On the decease of the plaintiff before the trial, his sons were substituted as plaintiffs. *Held*, that, although the property in a promissory note payable



**PROMISSORY NOTE—contd.****4. ASSIGNMENT OF, AND SUITS ON, PROMISSORY NOTES—contd.**

to order on demand passes by endorsement and delivery (Act XXVI of 1881, s. 46), the endorsement in this case had been declared invalid in the suit referred to, and must therefore be treated as cancelled, and consequently the property in the note was vested in the plaintiff at the date of the suit so as to enable him to maintain it. *MARIMUTHU PILLAI v. KRISHNASAMI CHETTI*

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 197

14. ——— Assignment by payee of all his property including the promissory note—*Negotiation—Absence of endorsement—Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), ss. 8 and 9.* A promissory note payable to payee or order cannot be negotiated by the mere assignment by the payee of all his property including the note. *Pattat Ambodi Marar v. Krishnan, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 29*, followed. *ABROY CHETTI v. RAMCHANDRA RAU*

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 461

15. ——— Contemporaneous collateral agreement consistent with the terms of the promissory note—*Right of suit under Ch. XXXIX, Civil Procedure Code.* The plaintiffs advanced money to defendant for the supply of certain goods. On defendant's failure to supply the goods, plaintiffs pressed for repayment, and a promissory note payable on demand for the amount due, was executed; at the same time an agreement entered into by defendant to liquidate the amount due on the promissory note by fortnightly consignments, the consignment to be made within fourteen days of the date of the promissory note. On defendant's failure to send the consignments as promised, a suit was brought under Ch. XXXIX, Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that the suit was rightly filed under Ch. XXXIX; that the agreement to liquidate the amount due by fortnightly consignments was a collateral undertaking consistent with the existence of the note containing an absolute promise to pay; that such collateral agreement was no answer to the suit on the promissory note; and that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree. *SIMON v. MAHOMED SHERIFF*

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 368

16. ——— Promissory note by member of an undivided Hindu family—*Liability of other member—Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), ss. 4, 26, 27.* The maker of a promissory note (executed in plaintiff's favour), being a member of an undivided Hindu family, had borrowed from plaintiff the money represented by the note and purchased therewith land for the benefit of the family, which consisted of himself (the maker of note), an uncle, and the sons of the uncle. The uncle had always recognized the debt as a family debt, and the land purchased with the money borrowed had, in a subsequent division of property, been allotted to the uncle and his sons, who had also agreed with the maker of the note that they would discharge the debt. On a suit being brought against the maker of the note, as well as the uncle and his sons:—*Held, per SHEPHARD and SUBRAHMANIA*

**PROMISSORY NOTE—contd.****4. ASSIGNMENT OF, AND SUITS ON, PROMISSORY NOTES—contd.**

AYYAR, J.J. (DAVIES, J., dissenting), that all the members of the undivided family were liable. *Per SUBRAHMANIA AYYAR, J.*—Even assuming that the maker of the note was not the manager of the family he was the agent of his co-parceners when buying the land and raising the loan, and his acts as such agent bound the uncle who expressly assented to them; also that, inasmuch as the uncle was liable, his sons must be also held liable for the debt to the extent to which they were interested in the family property, and that even if they were minors when the money was borrowed. Whether, having regard to ss. 233 and 234 of the Indian Contract Act, a principal cannot be proceeded against upon a negotiable instrument executed by an agent in his own name. *Quære: Per DAVIES, J.*—(i) Had the suit been brought on a bond, or on the debt of which the promissory note afforded evidence, other members of the family might have been held liable as well as the maker of the note, on the ground that the latter represented them. But in the case of a suit on a promissory note (as this suit was) no such representation could be alleged unless the persons said to be represented appeared by name on the face of the document; (ii) where the name of only one person appears on a promissory note and he does not purport to make it on behalf of any one but himself, none but the maker can be held liable to discharge it. *KRISHNA AYYAR v. KRISHNASAMI AYYAR*

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 597

17. ——— Endorsement—*Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881), s. 51—Promissory note in favour of two payees—Endorsement by one in favour of the other—Suit by endorsee as such—Maintainability—Suit by endorsee as assignee of chose in action—Endorsement, evidence of assignment.* Where a promissory note has been made in favour of two payees, one of whom endorses it to the other, the endorsee cannot sue on the note as endorsee or as one of two joint payees. He may, however, maintain a suit, in respect of the amount due under the note, as assignee of the chose in action. Though such an endorsement cannot operate as an endorsement under the law merchant, it may be relied on as evidence of an assignment by way of release in favour of the endorsee. Rule 428 of the Rules of Procedure of the Presidency Small Cause Court is not *ultra vires*. *MUHAMMAD KUMARHALLY v. RANGA RAO (1901)*

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 654

18. ——— False or forged note—*Debt—Suit for recovery of Promissory note false or forged—Whether plaintiff can succeed on proof of loan.* Where the plaintiffs brought a suit for recovery of money, on the allegation that the defendant had taken from the plaintiffs a loan by executing a note in favour of one of the plaintiffs:—*Held*, that, even if the promissory note be a forgery, the plaintiffs would succeed if they could prove the loan by independent evidence. *MOITI LAL SAHA v. MONMOHAN GOSSAMI (1900)*

5 C. W. N. 56



**PROMISSORY NOTE—concl'd.****4. ASSIGNMENT OF, AND SUITS ON, PROMISSORY NOTES—concl'd.****19. ——— Presumption of payment—**

*Presumption of payment arising from possession of note by debtor—Evidence rebutting presumption—Books of account kept in course of business—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 31.* In a suit on a promissory note, where the note and the security for its payment were in the possession of the defendant:—*Held*, that, under the circumstances of this case, as shown by the evidence, the *prima facie* presumption that the note had been paid was rebutted. Books regularly kept in the course of business can, under the Evidence Act, be used, not only for the purpose of refreshing the memory of a witness, but also as corroborative evidence of the story he tells. *BHOG HONG KONG v. RAMANATHEN CHETTY* (1902) . . . . . **I. L. R. 29 Calc. 334**  
**s.c. 6 C. W. N. 401**  
**L. R. 29 I. A. 43**

**20. ——— Collateral covenant not**

**to sue for limited time no bar to suit on—**  
*Indorsee with notice of covenant may sue.* A collateral covenant not to sue for a limited time on a promissory note does not suspend the right of action on the note and cannot be pleaded in bar to an action on the note. *Thimbleby v. Barron*, 3 M. & W. 210, referred to and followed. *Ray v. Jones* 9 C. B. R. N. S. 416, referred to and followed. The payee of the promissory note executed an agreement in the following terms:—"You will ever from the 1st of May be paying interest to me on account of the (promissory) note for Rs. 5,000 executed this day by you in my favour, the interest for every month being sent on the first of the next month. I shall take the above rupees five thousand from you after giving jivanamsam (maintenance money) to my mother-in-law, and obtaining a release bond; or I will take the said rupees five thousand after the lifetime of my mother-in-law." *Held*, that this agreement was only a collateral covenant not to sue for a limited time and was no bar to an action by an indorsee with notice of the agreement. *SOMASUNDARAM CHETTIAR v. NARASIMHA CHARIAR* (1905)  
**I. L. R. 29 Mad. 212**

**PROOF.**

*See BURDEN OF PROOF.*

*See ONUS OF PROOF.*

——— of custom—

*See HINDU LAW* **I. L. R. 36 Calc. 590**

——— of deposition—

*See DEPOSITION* . . . **13 C. W. N. 409**

**PROPERTY.**

*See ATTACHMENT—SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT.*

**PROPERTY—cont'd.**

*See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ss. 517, 520 . . . . . I. L. R. 27 All. 630*

*See IMMOVEABLE PROPERTY.*

*See JOINT PROPERTY.*

*See MOVEABLE PROPERTY.*

——— at disposal of Government —

*See RIGHT OF SUIT—PROPERTY AT DISPOSAL OF GOVERNMENT.*

**I. L. R. 19 Bom. 668**

*See TREASURE TROVE.*

**I. L. R. 19 Bom. 668**

——— decreed to plaintiff. order for production of—

*See EXECUTION OF DECREE—MODE OF EXECUTION—GENERALLY, ETC.*

**3 N. W. 319**

——— description of—

*See REGISTRATION ACT, s. 21.*

——— disposal of—

*See CONFISCATION* **I. L. R. 34 Calc. 986**

——— divesting of—

*See HINDU LAW—*

*ADOPTION—EFFECT OF ADOPTION.*

*INHERITANCE—DIVESTING OF, EXCLUSION FROM, AND FORFEITURE OF, INHERITANCE.*

*WIDOW—DISQUALIFICATION—UNCHASTITY.*

*See WILL—CONSTRUCTION.*

**I. L. R. 4 Calc. 420**

**1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 375**

**I. L. R. 6 All. 583**

**I. L. R. 15 Mad. 448**

——— found on accused—

*See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.*

**I. L. R. 30 Calc. 690**

*See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 517.*

**I. L. R. 24 Calc. 499**

**1 C. W. N. 438 ; 561**

——— in different districts—

*See JURISDICTION—SUITS FOR LAND—PROPERTY IN DIFFERENT DISTRICTS.*

——— injury or obstruction to enjoyment of—

*See INJUNCTION—SPECIAL CASES—OBSTRUCTION OR INJURY TO RIGHTS OF PROPERTY*

*See RIGHT OF SUIT—INJURY TO ENJOYMENT OF PROPERTY.*



**PROPERTY—concl'd.**

\_\_\_\_\_ in the soil—

See FISHERY, RIGHT OF . 24 W. R. 200  
W. R. 1864, 63  
I. L. R. 9 Calc. 183  
I. L. R. 10 Calc. 50  
1 W. R. 79  
Marsh. 334 : 2 Hay 568

See OWNERSHIP, PRESUMPTION OF  
I. L. R. 9 Mad. 175 ; 285

See SANAD . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 523

\_\_\_\_\_ not in esse, pledge of—

See STAMP ACT, 1869, s. 3.  
I. L. R. 2 Calc. 58

\_\_\_\_\_ on which duty has been paid  
in England—

See COURT FEES ACT, SCH. 1, CL. 11.  
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 725

\_\_\_\_\_ on which there is a mortgage or  
incumbrance—

See COURT FEES ACT, SCH. 1, CL. 11.  
8 B. L. R. Ap. 43  
6 N. W. 214  
I. L. R. 1 Bom. 118

\_\_\_\_\_ preservation of, pending litigation—

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—STAY OF  
EXECUTION . 5 C. W. N. 781

\_\_\_\_\_ production of—

See PRODUCTION OF PROPERTY.

\_\_\_\_\_ restitution of—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 522.  
5 C. W. N. 250

\_\_\_\_\_ seized by police—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 523.  
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 748  
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 761

\_\_\_\_\_ subject to a trust—

See COURT FEES ACT, SCH. I, ART. 11.  
6 B. L. R. Ap. 138  
7 B. L. R. 57  
11 B. L. R. Ap. 39  
14 B. L. R. 184  
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 575

\_\_\_\_\_ Restitution of order for—*Execution of decree—Possession under decree—Reversal of decree—Restitution of property after reversal of decree—Mesne profits—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 241.* A Court reversing a decree under which possession of property has been taken has power to order restitution of the property taken possession of, and with it any mesne profits which may have accrued during such possession. *MOOKOOND LAL PAL CHOWDHRY v. MAHOMED SAMI MEAH*  
I. L. R. 14 Calc. 484

**PROPINQUITY.**

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE.  
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 721

**PROPRIETARY RIGHT.**

See BOUNDARY . . . 8 W. R. 343  
9 W. R. 426

\_\_\_\_\_ exercise of—

See CONTRACT—BREACH OF CONTRACT.  
7 C. W. N. 562

\_\_\_\_\_ Proprietary right—*Mofussil Courts—Legal and equitable rights to property.* In mofussil Courts in this country there is no distinction between legal right and equitable right to property. There is but one kind of proprietary right not divisible into parts or aspects. *SEEDER NAZEER ALI KHAN v. OJOODHYA RAM KHAN. MUNSOOR ALI KHAN v. OJOODHYA RAM KHAN* . 8 W. R. 399

**PROPRIETOR.**

See BABUANA GRANT . 13 C. W. N. 118  
See TRESPASS . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 28

**PROSECUTION.**

See ABATEMENT OF PROSECUTION.  
4 Mad. Ap. 55

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 476.

See EVIDENCE, CONCOCTION OF.  
13 C. W. N. 622

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT.  
11 C. W. N. 832

See MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION.

\_\_\_\_\_ commencement of—

See COMPLAINT—INSTITUTION OF COMPLAINT, AND NECESSARY PRELIMINARIES.

\_\_\_\_\_ of witness—

See DEFAMATION . I. L. R. 29 All. 685

\_\_\_\_\_ order for—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT V OF 1898), s. 476.  
I. L. R. 34 Calc. 551

\_\_\_\_\_ revival of—

See COMPLAINT—REVIVAL OF COMPLAINT.

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 437.  
See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES, DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.

See REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—REVIVAL OF COMPLAINT AND RETRIAL.

\_\_\_\_\_ stale—

See RIOTING . 7 C. W. N. 245 ; 301



**PROSECUTION—concl'd.**

— withdrawal from—

See PUBLIC PROSECUTOR.

I. L. R. 8 All. 291

1. — Limitation—Prosecution—*Limitation—Calcutta Municipal Act (Bengal III of 1899), ss. 408, 419, 574 and 631—Bustee improvement—Notice—Date of offence—Subsequent notice under s. 419—Extension of time by Corporation.* Where a notice under s. 408 of the Calcutta Municipal Act was served on the owner of a bustee on the 3rd March 1906, directing certain improvements within three months from its date, but the owner failed to comply with it and served a notice under s. 419 of the Act on the 2nd July, whereupon the Corporation gave her further time till the 2nd January 1907, and instituted a complaint on the 23rd January for non-compliance with the terms of the notice of the 3rd March 1906:—*Held*, that the three months having expired on the 2nd June 1906, the offence was committed on the next day, and the prosecution was therefore barred under s. 631; and that the notice under s. 419 and the extension of time by the Corporation, both being after the date of the offence, were ineffectual in extending the period of limitation. *KUMUD KUMARI DAS v. CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA (1907)* . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 909

2. — Jurisdiction—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 476—Prosecution for offence committed before predecessor in office—Practice. The petitioner swore an affidavit making certain allegations against a peon, in a suit pending in the Court of the Additional Munsif of R., who ordered an enquiry. On the transfer of that officer, the suit was made over to the 2nd Munsif, and the enquiry was continued by the 1st Munsif of the place, who under s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code ordered the prosecution of the petitioner for making a false affidavit: *Held*, that the affidavit having been filed before the additional Munsif, the first Munsif had no jurisdiction to make the order. *Begu Singh v. Emperor, I. L. R. 34 Calc. 551*, followed. *Ranga Ayyar v. Emperor, I. L. R. 29 Mad. 338*, not followed. *KARTIK RAM BHAKAT v. EMPEROR (1907)* . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 114

3. — Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 476—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 114, 119, 193 and 210—Cognizance in the course of a judicial proceeding—Jurisdiction—Judicial proceedings—Execution proceedings. The powers conferred by s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code can only be exercised if the offences, in respect of which a prosecution is ordered, have come to the cognizance of the Court in a judicial proceeding. Execution proceedings subsequent to the trial of a suit are not judicial proceedings. *Hara Charn Mookerjee v. Emperor, I. L. R. 32 Calc. 367*, followed. *Begu Singh v. Emperor, I. L. R. 34 Calc. 551*, *Dharmadas Kamar v. Sagore Santra, 11 C. W. N. 189*, and *Emperor v. Molla Fuzla Karim, I. L. R. 33 Calc. 193*, referred to. *KANTO RAM DAS v. GOBARDHAN DAS (1907)* . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 133

**PROSECUTOR.**

See MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

I. L. R. 30 All. 525

12 C. W. N. 817

**PROSPECTUS.**

See COMPANY—ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION AND LIABILITY OF SHAREHOLDERS.

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 320

**PROSTITUTE.**

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—GUARDIAN.

I. L. R. 1 All. 598

— suit for rent of lodgings let to—

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—TENANCY FOR IMMORAL PURPOSES.

9 B. L. R. Ap. 37

— adoption by—

See HINDU LAW—ADOPTION—WHO MAY OR MAY NOT ADOPT.

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 491

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 824

— removal of—

See NUISANCE—UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE—REMOVAL OF PROSTITUTES.

1. — Registration of prostitutes—Act XIV of 1868, ss. 11 and 21—Jurisdiction of Magistrates to entertain pleas of irregularity in the registry—Possession of registry ticket. Under Act XIV of 1868, the police are not empowered to put a woman on the register of "common prostitutes" against her will. The penalty prescribed by s. 11, Act XIV of 1868, for disobedience of any of its rules is for a "woman who voluntarily registers herself as a common prostitute." A Magistrate has authority to hear any objection urged by a woman charged with disobedience of the rules under Act XIV of 1868 against the legality of her registry, or that she is not a common prostitute. The possession of a registry ticket is not sufficient evidence of being a common prostitute. *In the case of LAKHIMANI RAUR* . 3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 70

S.C. QUEEN v. LUKHIMONEE RAUR

12 W. R. Cr. 55

2. — Act XIV of 1868, ss. 11, 21—Rules 13 and 27 passed under the Act—Magistrate, Competency of—Jurisdiction. Any woman desirous of ceasing to carry on the business of a common prostitute is, under the provisions of the Contagious Diseases Act, 1868, absolutely entitled to have her name removed from the register; and any rule, or portion of a rule purporting to have been framed under the provisions of that Act which places any obstacle in the way of her doing so is *ultra vires*, and therefore void. Where a woman is prosecuted before a Magistrate under s. 11 of Act XIV of 1868, she is not precluded from pleading that she has ceased to be a common prostitute and that she has taken steps, under s. 21 and the rules framed thereunder, for the removal of her name from the register; and the Magistrate is



**PROSTITUTE—concl'd.**

competent to entertain such a defence. **EMPRESS  
v. NISTAR RAUR**  
I. L. R. 6 Calc. 163 : 7 C. L. R. 197

**PROSTITUTION.**

See **HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE.**

obtaining possession or disposal  
of minor for purposes of—

See **PENAL CODE**, ss. 332, 373.

**PROTECTED INTEREST.**

See **BENGAL TENANCY ACT**, s. 160.  
13 C. W. N. 1025

**PROTECTION OF JUDICIAL OFFI-  
CERS ACT (XVIII OF 1850).**

s. 1—

See **TRESPASS** . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 433

**PROTECTOR OF LABOURERS.**

See **BENGAL ACT VI OF 1865.**  
3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 39

**PROVIDENT FUND OF CORPORA-  
TION OF CALCUTTA.**

See **ATTACHMENT** . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 641

**PROVIDENT FUNDS ACT (IX OF  
1897, AS AMENDED BY ACT IV OF  
1903).**

ss. 2 (4), 4—*Compulsory deposit—Provident Fund—Contributions by a servant—Liability of the contributions to be attached on the servants leaving the Railway Company's service—Attachment—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 278.* The contribution, which the employé of a Railway Company makes towards the Railway Provident Fund, governed by the provisions of the Provident Fund Act (IX of 1897), is a "compulsory deposit" within the meaning of s. 4 of the Provident Funds Act (IX of 1897, as amended by Act IV of 1903). The deposit does not cease to be compulsory, when the employé leaves the service of the Company, since it was not, when made, repayable on demand, and was, therefore, at that time a "compulsory deposit;" and having once acquired that character with the attendant consequences it continued to retain it. A "compulsory deposit" of the above description does not become liable to be attached under s. 268 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), on the subscriber's leaving the Company's service. The expression "compulsory deposit," as used in the Provident Funds Act (IX of 1897, as amended by Act IV of 1903), is not merely descriptive of the sum deposited, but is a term of art, which by virtue of legislative provision includes that which is not within its natural meaning; for, under s. 2, cl. 4 of the Act, it includes "any contribution which may have been credited in respect of, and any interest or increment which may have accrued on, such subscription or deposit under

**PROVIDENT FUNDS ACT (IX OF  
1897, AS AMENDED BY ACT IV OF  
1903)—concl'd.**

s. 2—*cont'd.*

the rules of the fund." **VEERCHAND v. B. B. & C.I.  
RAILWAY COMPANY (1905)**

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 259

ss. 2 (4), 4, 6—

See **ATTACHMENT.**

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 641

s. 4—*Insolvent Debtors' Act (11 & 12 Vict., c. 21), ss. 7, 30—Vesting order—Sum due to an insolvent from a Provident Institution—Right of Official Assignee to claim—Construction of Statutes—Distinction between enactments affecting vested rights and those regulating procedure.* A member of a Railway Provident Institution, who had made compulsory deposits therein, became insolvent, and the usual vesting order was made under s. 7 of the Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors. By the rules of that Institution, a member is to be paid, on his retirement from service, the sum of money standing to his credit. At the date of the vesting order, the insolvent had not yet retired from service. Subsequently to the date of the vesting order but before the retirement of the insolvent, the Provident Funds Act, 1897, came into force, s. 4 of which provides that, after the commencement of that Act, the Official Assignee shall not be entitled to or claim any such compulsory deposits in any Railway Provident Fund. On a claim being made by the Official Assignee to the amount, on the ground that when the Act came into force the interest of the insolvent in the Fund had become vested in the Official Assignee: *Held*, that, by s. 4 of the Provident Funds Act, all the right and title of the Official Assignee was determined as from the coming into operation of the Act, and that its operation was not limited to cases where the vesting order had been made after its commencement. The distinction between the construction of enactments affecting vested rights and those which merely affect procedure recognized. *Javanmal Jitmal v. Muktabai*, I. L. R. 14 Bom. 516, referred to. Under s. 7 of the Insolvent Debtor's Act, the right of the insolvent to be paid the sum standing to his credit in the fund, on his retirement from service, vested in the Official Assignee. **OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE OF MADRAS v. DALGAIRNS (1902)** . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 440

**PROVINCIAL SMALL CAUSE COURTS  
ACT (IX OF 1887).**

See **CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE**, 1882, s. 108.  
8 C. W. N. 355

See **CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE**, 1882, s.  
586 . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 560

See **MUNSHIF, JURISDICTION OF.**

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 155

See **SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL.**

See **SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—  
JURISDICTION—SUIT FOR CONTRI-  
BUTION** . I. L. R. 28 All. 292



# **PROVINCIAL SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT (IX OF 1887)—contd.**

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—  
JURISDICTION—DAMAGES.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 176

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—SMALL  
CAUSE COURT SUITS.

s. 15—

See SMALL CAUSE COURTS, MOFUSSIL—  
JURISDICTION—RENT.

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 356

See VALUATION OF SUIT—SUITS.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 661

s. 15 and Sch. II, Art. 35 (j)—

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—  
JURISDICTION—WRONGFUL DISTRAINT.

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 540

s. 16—

See MUNSIF, JURISDICTION OF.

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 477

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 212

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CIVIL  
CASES . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 249

s. 17—

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 108.  
2 C. W. N. 693

ss. 17, 32—*Civil Procedure Code*  
(Act XIV of 1882), s. 203, paras. (1) and (2)—  
*Court invested with Small Cause Court powers—*  
*Decision—Reasons.* The judgment of a Court in-  
vested with Small Cause Court powers need not  
contain more than the points for determination and  
the decision thereupon; the practice and proce-  
dure of such Courts being determined in the matter  
of judgments by paragraph (1) of s. 203 of the Civil  
Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *Ramchandra*  
*v. Ganesh*, I. L. R. 23 Bom. 353, dissented from.  
*NARAYAN v. BHAGU* (1907)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 314

s. 18—

See JURISDICTION—CAUSES OF JURIS-  
DICTION—CAUSE OF ACTION—GENERAL  
CASES . . . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 528

s. 23—

See MUNSIF, JURISDICTION OF.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 425

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—  
JURISDICTION—TITLE, QUESTION OF.

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 625

6 C. W. N. 687

1. Exercise of power

under s. 23 gives Court jurisdiction to try suit as an  
original suit. Where a question of title which a  
Court of Small Causes cannot finally determine is  
involved in a small cause suit, the Court has discre-  
tionary power under s. 23 of Act IX of 1887 to  
return the plaint to be presented to a Court having

# **PROVINCIAL SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT (IX OF 1887)—contd.**

s. 23—concl'd.

such jurisdiction. The latter Court thereupon ac-  
quires jurisdiction to try the suit as an original suit  
and is bound to receive the plaint and try it as such.  
*Mahamaya Dosya v. Nitya Hari Das Bairagi*, I. L.  
R. 23 Calc. 425, followed. *SUBBAROYADU v.*  
*GANGAYYA* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 529

2. Provincial Small  
*Causes Court Act (IX of 1887), ss. 23 and 25—Order*  
*returning a plaint under s. 23, whether falls within s.*  
*25.* The order of a Court of Small Causes under s. 23  
of Act IX of 1887 returning a plaint, is not an order  
made in a case decided by the Court of Small Causes  
within the meaning of s. 25 of the Act and there-  
fore cannot be interfered with by the High Court  
under the powers conferred upon it by that  
section. *SUBAL RAM DUTT v. JAGADANUNDA*  
*MAZUMDAR* (1909) . . . 13 C. W. N. 403

s. 24—

See APPEAL ORDERS I. L. R. 15 Mad. 89

s. 25—

See DISTRICT JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF.  
I. L. R. 24 Bom. 311

See JUDGMENT—CIVIL CASES—FORM AND  
CONTENTS OF JUDGMENT.

I. L. R. 13 All. 533

See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT, N.-W.  
P., CL. 10 . . . I. L. R. 15 All. 373

See REVISION—CIVIL CASES—SMALL  
CAUSE COURT CASES.

ss. 25 and 27—

See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT, CL.  
15 . . . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 100  
I. L. R. 23 Mad. 169

s. 32—

See MUNSIF . . . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 212

s. 32 (2)—*Civil Procedure Code (Act*  
*XIV of 1882), s. 245 B—Institution of a suit before*  
*a Munsif exercising Small Cause Court power up*  
*to a certain value—Trial by his successor invested*  
*with higher powers.* Where a suit for recovery of a  
sum of R70 was instituted in the Court of a Munsif  
exercising Small Cause Court powers up to R50  
and subsequently during the pendency of the suit  
the Munsif was transferred and the substantive  
Munsif, who succeeded him, had powers of a Small  
Cause Court up to R100 :—*Held*, that the suit should  
be tried as if the powers of the Court remained the  
same as they were when the suit was instituted.  
*MAHIMA CHANDRA SIRDAR v. KALI MANDOL* (1907)  
12 C. W. N. 167

s. 33—

See SUBORDINATE JUDGE, JURISDICTION  
OF . . . I. L. R. 14 Bom. 371

s. 35—

See MUNSIF, JURISDICTION OF.  
I. L. R. 19 Mad. 445



**PROVINCIAL SMALL CAUSE COURTS  
ACT (IX OF 1887)—*contd.***

s. 35—*concl.*

See TRANSFER OF CIVIL CASES—GENERAL  
CASES . I. L. R. 13 All. 324

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 382

*Application under, to be made in Court having jurisdiction at time of application.* Where a Court of Small Causes is abolished after having passed a decree, the Court in which, under s. 35 of Act IX of 1887, proceedings are to be taken in respect of such decree, is the Court in which the suit is instituted at the time of such application would have to be instituted. Where the jurisdiction in such a case is to be determined by considering the place of residence of the defendant, his residence at the time of the application is to be considered as his place of residence. KURELLA CHENCHAYYA v. POLISETTI SITARAMASWAMY (1906)  
I. L. R. 30 Mad. 217

Sch. II, cl. (6)—

See ATTACHMENT—SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—PROPERTY AND INTEREST IN PROPERTY OF VARIOUS KINDS.  
I. L. R. 14 All. 30

Sch. II, cl. (8)—

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—  
JURISDICTION—RENT.  
I. L. R. 24 Mad. 356

Sch. II, cl. 8, and ss. 15 (1), 32—*Suit for recovery of rent of homestead land—Jurisdiction of Judges of Courts invested with Small Cause Court powers.* Clause (1) of s. 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act should be read with clause 8 of the Second Schedule of the Act. So read, the expression "the Judge of the Court of Small Causes" in clause 8 of the Second Schedule must be taken to apply either to a Court of Small Causes constituted under the Act or to a Court invested with the jurisdiction of a Court of Small Causes. AKSHAY KUMAR SHAHA v. HIRA RAM DOSAD (1908)  
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 677

cl. (13)—

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—  
JURISDICTION—IMMOVABLE PROPERTY  
I. L. R. 23 All. 437

1. — *Dues to which a person is entitled by reason of his interest in a religious institution—Suit for a share of presents made to a religious institution—Maintainability.* A suit by a member of religious association to recover his share of the "voluntary payments" made to the association is a suit within the meaning of Art. 13, Sch. 2 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act for "dues" to which a person is entitled "by reason of his interest in a religious institution," and as such it is excepted from the cognisance of a Court of Small Causes. Mahadeo v. Budhai Ram, I. L. R. 26 All. 360, commented on. BHAVADASAN v. NARAYANA SOMAYAJIPAD (1905)  
I. L. R. 28 Mad. 202

**PROVINCIAL SMALL CAUSE COURTS  
ACT (IX OF 1887)—*concl.***

cl. (13)—*concl.*

2. — *Suit for account, what is.* A suit for an account within Art. 31 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act does not mean every case in which accounts have to be looked into to ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff. A suit for an account is a special form of suit, in which a special process is required to take an account. KONDURU RUNGA REDDI v. SUBBIAH SETTY AND KUMBAHALA SUBBAMMA (1905)  
I. L. R. 28 Mad. 394

cl. (18)—

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—  
JURISDICTION—TRUSTS.  
I. L. R. 24 All. 208  
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 200 ; 368

cl. (21)—

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—  
ERRORS IN DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY  
SOLD . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 235

cl. (31)—

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—  
JURISDICTION—  
IMMOVEABLE PROPERTY ;  
MESNE PROFITS.

cl. (35) (j)—

See ante, s. 15 AND SCH. II, ART. 85(j).

cl. (35) (k)—

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—  
JURISDICTION—ATTACHMENT.  
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 504

cl. (38)—

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—  
JURISDICTION—MAINTENANCE.  
I. L. R. 23 All. 495

cl. (41) —

See CONTRIBUTION, SUIT FOR.  
I. L. R. 30 Mad. 212

**PROVOCATION.**

See CULPABLE HOMICIDE.

See DAMAGES—SUITS FOR DAMAGES—  
TORT . . . 6 C. W. N. 915

See MURDER . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 571

**PROXY.**

See COMPANY—MEETINGS AND VOTING.  
I. L. R. 27 Bom. 113

*Company—Articles of Association—Meeting of shareholders to alter Memorandum of Association—Validity of votes given by proxy—Act XII of 1895.* By a power-of-attorney dated 14th October 1881, some of the shareholders in the appellant Company appointed and authorized certain specified persons, "and all persons who at any time during the continuance of



**PROXY—concl'd.**

these powers-of-attorney may be partners in the firm of Messrs. Wallace & Co., of Bombay, however that firm may be constituted . . . and in the absence from Bombay" of all the said persons "then the person or persons for the time being holding the procuration of the said firm and managing the said business" to vote as proxy for them at meetings of the Company. Art. 65 of the Articles of Association of the Company provided that "no person shall be appointed or have authority to act as a proxy, who is not a shareholder in the Company." At meetings in May and June, 1902, the right of proxy was exercised by a person, who had become a shareholder in the Company in March, 1889, and was manager of the firm of Wallace & Co., and holding its procuration from 1st April, 1889, but who was neither a member of the firm nor a shareholder in the Company, when the power-of-attorney was executed. *Held*, by the Judicial Committee (reversing the decision of the High Court), that on the true construction of Art. 65 the proxy was not necessarily required to be a shareholder, when the power of attorney was signed: the article was complied with by his being so qualified at the time when he was called upon to act as a proxy. *Held*, also, that, although the proxy was not expressly named in the power-of-attorney, he was sufficiently described in it for all business purposes, and the articles of association required nothing more. **BOMBAY-BURMA TRADING CORPORATION v. DORABJI (1905)**

**I. L. R. 29 Bom. 126**  
**L. R. 32 I. A. 39**

**PUBLIC BENEFIT.**

*See* **LIBEL** . **I. L. R. 35 Calc. 495**

**PUBLIC BODY.**

— delegation of powers to—

*See* **PORTS ACT**, s. 6.  
**I. L. R. 17 Mad. 118**

— protection of—

*See* **MADRAS CITY MUNICIPAL ACT**, 1884,  
ss. 392, 433 AND 458.  
**I. L. R. 25 Mad. 118**

**PUBLIC CHARITY.**

*See* **CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE**, 1882, s. 539.  
**I. L. R. 30 Bom. 603**

**PUBLIC CONVEYANCES.**

*See* **HACKNEY-CARRIAGE ACT**.

**PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT (BENG. VII OF 1868).**

s. 2—*Bengal Act VII of 1868*, s. 2—*Suit to set aside a sale in execution of a certificate—Act XI of 1859—Civil Procedure Code*, ss. 244, 312. *Held*, by the Full Bench (RAMPINI J., dissenting), that an appeal to the Commissioner under s. 2 of Bengal Act VII of 1868 is not the only remedy open to the party whose property has been sold in enforcement of a certificate issued

**PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT (BENG. VII OF 1868)—concl'd.**

under the Public Demands Recovery Act, and that that section is no bar to his bringing a suit in a Civil Court to set aside the sale, on the ground that the sale was vitiated by a material irregularity leading to substantial injury. The cases of *Sadhusaran Singh v. Panchdeo Lal*, **I. L. R. 14 Calc. 1**, and *Troyluckho Nath Mozumdar v. Pahar Khan*, **I. L. R. 23 Calc. 641**, in so far as they decide otherwise, overruled. **RAM TARUCK HAZRA v. DILWAR ALI (1901)** . **I. L. R. 29 Calc. 73**  
**s.c. 5 C. W. N. 521**

s. 11—

*See* **SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE**.  
**I. L. R. 31 Calc. 1036**

**PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT (BENG. VII OF 1880).**

*See* **APPEAL—ORDERS**.

**I. L. R. 22 Calc. 419**

*See* **CERTIFICATE** . **I. L. R. 33 Calc. 84**

*See* **LIMITATION ACT**, 1877, s. 14.

**I. L. R. 20 Calc. 264**

*See* **LIMITATION ACT**, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 12 . . . **I. L. R. 23 Calc. 775**

**L. R. 23 I. A. 45**

*See* **REVIEW—POWER TO REVIEW**.

**I. L. R. 22 Calc. 419**

*See* **SALE** . . . **13 C. W. N. 750**

*Sale in execution of a certificate against the recorded tenant alone, whether it passes the entire holding.* A certificate under the Public Demands Recovery Act can only be enforced against the person whose name is entered in such certificate, as if it were a personal debt of his. So where, in execution of a certificate taken against the recorded tenant, the landlord put the holding to sale:—*Held*, that the right, title and interest of the recorded tenant alone, and not the entire holding, passed by the sale. The interest of the other joint tenants was not affected by the sale. *Shekaat Hossein v. Sasi Kar*. **I. L. R. 19 Calc. 783**, referred to. *Jeolal Singh v. Ganga Pershad*, **I. L. R. 10 Calc. 996**, and *Nitayi Behari v. Hargovind*. **I. L. R. 26 Calc. 677**, distinguished. **RUPRAM NAMASUDRA v. ISWAR NAMASUDRA (1902)** . . . **6 C. W. N. 302**

1. — s. 2—*Bengal Act VII of 1868*, s. 8—*Certificate of sale—Evidence of sufficiency of service of notice of sale—Act XI of 1859*. S. 2 of the Public Demands Recovery Act (Bengal Act VII of 1880), which enacts that "that Act, so far as is consistent with the tenor thereof, shall be construed as one with Act XI of 1859 and Bengal Act VII of 1868," does not extend the effect of s. 8 of Bengal Act VII of 1868 to a sale-certificate granted under s. 19 of Bengal Act VII of 1880, so as to make such a certificate conclusive evidence of the sufficiency of the service of the notices of sale under the last-named Act. **PULIN CHANDRA ROY v. AKBAR HOSSEIN** . **I. L. R. 21 Calc. 350**



**PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT  
(BENG. VII OF 1880)—contd.**

s. 2—contd.

**BHOLA NATH MAITI v. MAHINUDDIN MOHOMED**  
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 350 note

2. ——— and s. 7—*Bengal Act VII of 1868, s. 8—Certificate of sale—Evidence of sufficiency of service of notice—Act XI of 1859, s. 28—Sale for arrears of rent.* S. 8 of Bengal Act VII of 1868 does not apply to a certificate of title granted to a purchaser at a sale in execution of a certificate issued under s. 7 of Bengal Act VII of 1880 for arrears of rent alleged to be due to an estate under the Court of Wards, but it is limited in its application to the two descriptions of certificates of title therein referred to, namely, certificates granted under s. 28 of Act XI of 1859 and those granted under s. 11 of Bengal Act VII of 1868. *Pulin Chandra Roy v. Akbar Hossein, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 350*, and *Bhola Nath Maiti v. Mohinuddin Mahomed, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 350 note*, approved. **BISHAMBER HALDER v. BONOMALI HALDER**

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 414  
3 C. W. N. 233

3. ——— and ss. 8, 10, 19—*Beng. Act VII of 1868, s. 2—Sale for arrears of road cess—Suit to set aside sale—Ground for setting aside sale under certificate—Act XI of 1859, s. 33—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 290, 311, 312.* Neither the provisions of s. 33 of Act XI of 1859 nor those of s. 2, Bengal Act VII of 1868, affect the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a suit to set aside a sale under a certificate on any of the following grounds, namely, that no arrears were due at all, that no notice was served in accordance with the provisions of Bengal Act VII of 1880, or that the provisions of s. 290 of the Civil Procedure Code were infringed. The words "in respect of sales in execution of decrees" in s. 19 of Bengal Act VII of 1880 do not include any proceedings instituted after the sale for setting it aside. Ss. 311 and 312 therefore of the Civil Procedure Code do not apply to sales under a certificate. The infringement of the provisions of s. 290 of the Civil Procedure Code is not a mere irregularity, but vitiates the sale. *Bakshi Nand Kishore v. Malak Chand, I. L. R. 7 All. 289*. The provision in s. 8 of Bengal Act VII of 1880, as to the certificate becoming absolute and acquiring the force and effect of a final decree, does not come into operation unless the notice required by s. 10 is actually served. The only remedy of a judgment-debtor where property has been sold in execution of a certificate issued under Bengal Act VII of 1880, and who has sustained substantial injury by reason of a material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale, is by way of an appeal under s. 2 of Bengal Act VII of 1868. The effect of s. 2 of Bengal Act VII of 1880 is that Act XI of 1859 and Bengal Act VII of 1868 and Bengal Act VII of 1880 are to be considered as if the provisions contained in them were contained in one Act so far as such construction is consistent with the tenor of the last-mentioned

**PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT  
(BENG. VII OF 1880)—contd.**

s. 2—contd.

Act. By the force therefore of s. 2 of the Act of 1880, the provisions of s. 2 of the Act of 1868 became applicable to a sale under an execution issued upon a certificate made under the Act of 1880. Bengal Act VII of 1880 is an Act for the recovery of all kinds of public demands, and therefore applies to cases of road or other public cesses. **SADHUSARAN SINGH v. PANCHDEO LAL**

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 1

4. ——— and s. 8—*Beng. Act VII of 1868, s. 2—Suit to set aside certificate and sale for arrears of cesses—Right of suit—Appeal.* No suit will lie to set aside the sale of a property sold in execution of a certificate issued by the Collector for arrears of cesses, where it is found by the Court that there was an unsatisfied arrear at the time of the sale. The only remedy of the judgment-debtor, whose property has been sold, is by way of an appeal to the Commissioner under s. 2 of Bengal Act VII of 1868. *Sadhusaran Singh v. Panchdeo Lal, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 1*, followed. **TROYLUCKHO NATH MOZUMDAR v. PAHAR KHAN**

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 641

5. ——— *Beng. Act VII of 1868, s. 2—Sale in execution of certificate under Public Demands Recovery Act—Appeal to Commissioner to set aside sale.* In an appeal to the Commissioner under s. 2 of Bengal Act VII of 1868 to set aside a sale in execution of a certificate under the Public Demands Recovery Act (VII of 1880) :—*Held*, that s. 2 of Bengal Act VII of 1868 applied to a sale under Act VII of 1880, and the appeal to the Commissioner was rightly made under that section. *Sadhusaran Singh v. Panchdeo Lal, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 1*, followed. **GUNESSAR SINGH v. GONESH DASS**

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 789

6. ——— and s. 20—*Act XI of 1859, s. 34—Limitation.* S. 2 of the Public Demands Recovery Act (Bengal Act VII of 1880) does not make the provision of limitation in s. 34 of Act XI of 1859 applicable to the execution of a decree annulling a sale under s. 20 of Bengal Act VII of 1880. **MAHOMED ABDUL HYE v. GAJRAJ SAHAI**

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 283  
2 C. W. N. 89

ss. 2, 7 (1), 8 (b), 10, 19—*Agriculturists' Loans Act (XII of 1884), s. 5—Taccavi—What passes at a sale under the Public Demands Recovery Act—Right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor—Hypothecation of land—Mortgage—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 67, 99—Act XI of 1859 s. 5—Bengal Act VII of 1868, s. 1—Revenue sale law.* When property is sold in enforcement of a certificate under Bengal Act VII of 1880, filed by the Collector to recover an amount due to the Government for an advance made under the Agriculturists' Loans Act, nothing but the judgment-debtor's right, title and interest in the property at the date of service of the notice under s. 10 of Bengal Act VII of 1880 can pass to the purchaser. Such a sale has not the effect of a sale for arrears of



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(BENG. VII OF 1880)—contd.****s. 2—concl'd.**

land-revenue, or of an assignment to the purchaser of the mortgage-interest created in favour of the Government by the bond executed by the judgment-debtor under the Agriculturists' Loans Act. **LACHMI NARAIN SINGH v. NAND KISHORE LAL DAS** (1902) . . . **I. L. R. 29 Calc. 537**  
s.c. 6 C. W. N. 484

**ss. 2, 17, 24—Sale in execution of certificate—Jurisdiction of Revenue Courts—Appeal to Commissioner—Limitation—Suit in Civil Courts to set aside sale—Remedy of purchaser, when sale is set aside by Revenue authorities without hearing him.** A certificate granted by the Revenue Court in respect of a fine imposed on the respondent for failure to comply with a notice issued under s. 16 of the Bengal Cess Act (Bengal Act IX of 1880) was executed and his village sold on 9th September 1893 under the Public Demands Recovery Act (Bengal Act VII of 1880) and purchased, by the appellant, who was put into possession on 5th December 1893. The respondent, on 2nd January 1894, after the expiry of the sixty days allowed for that purpose, appealed to the Commissioner to cancel the sale as irregular, fraudulent and collusive. The Commissioner ordered an enquiry whether the respondent had been prevented by fraud from taking any steps in the matter, and against that order the appellant appealed to the Board of Revenue, who on 9th May 1895, acting under the powers of revision given them by Act VII of 1880, set aside the certificate under which the sale was held: and on 4th February 1896 the Commissioner passed a formal order annulling the sale on the ground of fraud, but without hearing the purchaser. In a suit in the Civil Court to set aside the sale brought by the respondent pending the above proceedings, which suit was decided on the footing of the orders made by the Revenue authorities, which were put in as evidence in the suit: *Held* (upholding the decisions of the Courts below), (a) that under ss. 17 and 24 of Bengal Act VII of 1880, the revenue authorities had ample jurisdiction to make the orders on which decrees of the Civil Court were based, the former section applying to orders made after as well as to those made before sale in execution of certificates issued under the Act; (b) that as the Commissioner was acting in the exercise of his revisional jurisdiction under s. 17 of the Act the appeal to him was not barred by the provisions as to limitation in ss. 12 and 16; (c) that the proper remedy of the appellant, if aggrieved by the order setting aside the sale, was to apply to the Revenue authorities for a re-hearing and that it was now too late to ask for a remand on that ground. **GANESWAR SINGH v. GANESH DAS** (1906) . . . **I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1178**  
s.c. L. R. 33 I. A. 135

**ss. 3, 7—Executor by implication—Bequest to an idol—Right of shebait to take out probate.** Where a testator had bequeathed the bulk of his estate for the *sheba* of a *thakur* and made

**PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT  
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certain other dispositions in regard to the rest of the property. *Held*, on the construction of the will, that his wife, whom he had appointed *shebait*, having been confided with the execution of the will was executor by implication, and as such entitled to take out probate of the will. **Brojo Chunder Goswami v. Raj Kumar Roy**, 6 C. W. N. 310, referred to. **KRIPAMOYEE DASSI v. MOHIM CHANDRA DUTT** (1905) . . . **10 C. W. N. 232**

**s. 6 (b) and s. 10—Suit to set aside certificate—Mode of service of notice.** Although no special provision is made in Bengal Act VII of 1880 as to the manner of service of the notice prescribed in s. 10, it is not to be presumed that the Legislature intended that service of a less effectual character should be sufficient than it has expressly provided for similar processes under the Civil Procedure Code. Before therefore a service under Bengal Act VII of 1880 can be effected by posting it on the residence of the party on whom it is wished to serve it, it must be shown that some attempt has been made to effect personal service, and that such personal service, for reasons stated, could not be made. In such a case, when the fact of service of notice is denied, the onus is on the party alleging service to prove it. **RAKHAI CHANDRA RAI CHOWDHURI v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA** . . . **I. L. R. 12 Calc. 603**

**ss. 7, 8—**

**Set SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.**  
**I. L. R. 18 Calc. 125**

**ss. 7, 10—Sale for arrears of cesses—Collector's certificate, effect of, after notice of it.** According to the true construction of s. 7 of Bengal Act VII of 1880, there is no foundation for a sale thereunder, until a certificate has been made by the Collector strictly in the manner prescribed thereby, specifying the sum due and the person from whom it is due. *Held*, that such certificate, when duly made, has, after service of notice thereof under s. 10, the effect of a decree so far as regards the remedies for enforcing it. **BAIJNATH SAHAI v. RAMGUT SINGH** . . . **I. L. R. 23 Calc. 775**  
**L. R. 23 I. A. 45**

**ss. 7, 15, 31—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244—Certificate-sale—Irregularity—Right of suit.** The mere fact that a greater sum is claimed as due in a certificate than is in fact due does not make the certificate and notice bad. S. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code is applicable, when the only grounds alleged for setting aside a sale are irregularities not in the proceedings anterior to the certificate or in the certificate, which is sought to be executed, but in the execution proceedings subsequent to it. **UMED ALI BHUYA v. RAJ LAKSHMI DEBYA** (1905)  
**10 C. W. N. 130**



**PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT  
(BENG. VII OF 1880)—*contd.***

1. — s. 8 (b), cl. 3. and s. 10—*Certificate, Suit to set aside—Amount not “due.”* Where rent was payable jointly to certain wards of Court, and another proprietor whose guardianship under the Court of Wards had ceased, and the Collector issued a certificate, under Bengal Act VII of 1880, for a proportionate share of the rent due to the wards:—*Held*, that, there being no right at law to claim any separate share of the rent, there was no sum “due,” and therefore, under s. 8 of the Act, the certificate was invalid and must be cancelled. *GIRJANATH ROY CHOWDHURY v. RAM NARAIN DAS* I. L. R. 20 Calc. 264

2. — and s. 12—*Suit to set aside certificate and sale—Limitation.* A certificate was issued under the Public Demands Recovery Act (Bengal Act VII of 1880), and notice under s. 10 of the Act was served on the 12th December 1895. The debtor objected under s. 12 on the ground that no arrears were due, but the objection was overruled, on his failure to produce evidence, on the 7th August 1895, and the sale took place on the 10th August 1895. In a suit brought on the 8th August 1896 to set aside the certificate and the sale:—*Held*, that the terms of s. 8, cl. (b), providing the limitation of one year from the date of service of notice are peremptory, and in no way controlled by the provisions of s. 12, and the suit in respect of the certificate was therefore barred by limitation. *Held*, also, that, if the certificate cannot be cancelled, the sale held in execution of it also cannot be cancelled. *RAJBUNS SAHAI v. KAMESHAR PROSAD* I. L. R. 26 Calc. 172

ss. 8, 10, 12—*Ben. Act I of 1895, s. 15—Sale, setting aside—Notice under s. 10, non-service, effect of—Limitation.* When the notice under s. 10 of Bengal Act VII of 1880 is not served, the certificate does not acquire the force of a decree, and is not binding upon the judgment-debtor, and the sale held in execution of such a certificate is necessarily bad in law, and may be set aside by a suit if brought within the statutory period allowed by the Limitation Act. S. 15 of Ben. Act I of 1895 refers to a suit to have a certificate cancelled or modified, and it has no application to a suit to have a sale held in execution of such a certificate set aside. If a person is entitled, under Ben. Act VII of 1880, to bring his suit within one year, or if otherwise the suit is within time, the mere facts of his presenting an appeal to the Commissioner, and the Commissioner having rejected his appeal under Ben. Act I of 1895, would not deprive him of the full period of limitation which, having regard to the provisions of Bengal Act VII of 1880, under which the sale was held, is entitled to. *GOPAL DAS v. HARDEO DAS* (1900) 5 C. W. N. 86

s. 9—

*See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—  
SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.*  
1 C. W. N. 516

**PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT  
(BENG. VII OF 1880)—*contd.***

s. 10—

*See ante—*

ss. 2, 7 (1), 8 (b), 10, 19;  
ss. 8, 10, 12.

*See CESS . . . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 783*

*See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—  
SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.*

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 125  
1 C. W. N. 516

1. — Act XI of 1859, ss. 5, 17—*Sale for arrears of revenue, notification of—Attachment under certificate procedure.* Where a notice under s. 10 of Bengal Act VII of 1880 was served, and a certificate issued by the Collector for default of payment of road-cess of a revenue-paying estate, and the Government revenue being in arrears, no notification under s. 5 of Act XI of 1859 was issued, and the estate was subsequently sold for arrears of Government revenue:—*Held*, that the sale was valid, and ss. 5 and 17 of Act XI of 1859 did not apply, the certificate issued by the Collector being not an attachment as contemplated by s. 5. *Ram Narain Koer v. Mahabir Pershad Singh*, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 208, referred to. *RIPPOO MURDAN SINGH v. RAM REKHA LAL* I. L. R. 20 Calc. 325.

2. — Bengal Act VII of 1868, ss. 2 and 8—*Notice—Sale for arrears of—Certificate of sale.* A sale for arrears of public demands recoverable under Bengal Act VII of 1880 cannot be supported unless the certificate, upon which execution is taken out, is in strict compliance with the Act. The notice under s. 10 of the said Act must be issued by the Collector in whose office the certificate is required to be filed. Even supposing that s. 8 of Act VII of 1868, read with s. 2 of the said Act, makes a certificate of sale conclusive evidence that all notices have been duly served and posted in the case of a sale under Bengal Act VII of 1880 as well, the question when the notice was served would still remain open. The certificate of sale, moreover, cannot be conclusive evidence that the certificate in execution of which the property was sold was a certificate duly issued in accordance with the law. *UZIRALI MOLLAH v. KARTICK CHANDER GHOSH* 2 C. W. N. 363

3. — s. 10 and s. 23—*Attachment under certificate procedure.* The certificate and notice referred to in s. 10, Bengal Act VII 1880, are executive acts, and an attachment, which is the result of those acts, is not a judicial, but an executive proceeding. The meaning of s. 23 of that Act, which lays down that a Collector “in the discharge of his functions shall be deemed to be a person acting judicially within the meaning of Act XVIII of 1850,” is that, for the purpose of protecting him from personal liability, his action is to be regarded as judicial. *RAM NARAIN KOER v. MAHABIR PERSHAD SINGH* I. L. R. 13 Calc. 208.

s. 12—

*See ante*, ss. 8, 10, 12.



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(BENG. VII OF 1880)—*contd.***

s. 17—

See SALE . . . 10 C. W. N. 969

s. 19—

See *ante*, ss. 2, 7 (1), 8 (b), 10, 19.See SALE FOR ARREARS OF REVENUE—  
SETTING ASIDE SALE—IRREGULARITY.  
I. L. R. 18 Calc. 125

1. *Suit to set aside a sale in execution of a certificate*—Ben. Act I of 1895, ss. 19, 20—Act XI of 1859—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 11, 244, 287, 311, 312, 316. 588 (16), 595. A suit to set aside a sale, held in enforcement of a certificate under the Public Demands Recovery Act, is a suit of a civil nature, which is barred neither by s. 244 nor by s. 312 of the Code of Civil Procedure. RAM TARUCK HAZRA v. DILWAR ALI (1901) . . . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 94  
s.c. 6 C. W. N. 246

2. *Certificate procedure*—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 311, 312. A suit will lie in a Civil Court to set aside a sale held under Bengal Act VII of 1880, where the sale proclamation is issued against the whole sixteen annas of the estate, but a sale held only of a portion thereof. The effect of s. 19 of that Act is, that it relates to the practice and procedure in respect of sales, that is, to the practice and procedure of executing Courts in the carrying out of sales. RAM LOGAN OJHA v. BHAWANI OJHA . . . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 9

ss. 21 and 22—*Sale in execution of a certificate under the Act*—Procedure—*Satisfied certificate*—Act XI of 1859. The Collector, having received a report from the Tehsildar that arrears of road cess (Bengal Act IX of 1880) were due in respect of villages, took proceedings purporting to be in pursuance of Bengal Act VII of 1880. In the certificate of unpaid demand, the names of the persons described as debtors were those not of the present proprietors, but of former proprietors, and the copy and notice were addressed to them. Held, by the High Court, that the procedure laid down by Bengal Act VII of 1880 must be strictly followed; and it is therefore absolutely incumbent on the Courts, when considering the validity of sales under that Act, to rigidly require an exact compliance with the formalities prescribed therein by the Legislature. Where a certificate is issued in respect of a demand under the Act, upon payment of such demand, it becomes the duty of the Collector, under s. 22, to enter satisfaction upon the certificate, and also in the register kept under s. 21. A sale in execution of a satisfied certificate, or of a certificate not duly made under the Act, is absolutely void. Abdul Hye v. Nawab Raj, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 911; and Lala Mobaruk Lal v. Secretary of State for India, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 200, followed. Mohan Ram Jha v. Baboo Shib Dutt Singh, 8 B. L. R. 235, referred to. *Semble*: Demands in respect of cess under Bengal Act VII

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of 1880 are not on the same footing as revenue demands to which Act XI of 1859 applies, and therefore the procedure prescribed by Act XI of 1859 for the recovery of the latter is not applicable to the recovery of the former. GUJRAJ SAHAI v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 414

Held, on appeal, by the Privy Council, affirming the decision of the High Court, that even if the certificate and the proceedings following it had been duly authenticated, and intimated to the present proprietor, which had not been the case, they could not affect his right of property in the villages, inasmuch as the Act only authorized the attachment and sale of the property of the persons who are described as debtors. This of itself was a ground for cancelling the sale. Their Lordships also concurred in the view taken by the High Court that there was no evidence showing that the certificate had been duly signed, and were of opinion that the High Court had rightly found payment of the arrears before the sale. MAHOMED ABDUL HAI v. GUJRAJ SAHAI . . . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 826

L. R. 20 I. A. 70

**PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT  
(BENG. I OF 1885).***Certificate-sale—*

*Suit to partially set aside sale—Maintainability.* The owner of a portion of property sold in execution of a certificate under the Public Demands Recovery Act cannot sue to have the sale set aside as to his portion only. His remedy is either to pay for setting aside the sale of the whole property or to allow the sale to stand and pray that his co-sharers, who were the purchasers at the sale, should reconvey his share to him. Bhooban Chandra Sen v. Ram Soondar Surnah, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 309, referred to. BIDESHAJ JHA v. SRIRISHEN JHA (1905) . . . 9 C. W. N. 805

ss. 3, 19, cl. (2) and 20—*Suit to set aside a sale on the ground of fraud, whether maintainable*—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 312 and 424—Secretary of State, notice upon. A suit to set aside a sale under the Public Demands Recovery Act, on the ground of fraud on the part of the auction-purchaser, is maintainable; and neither s. 244 nor s. 312 of the Civil Procedure Code is a bar to such a suit. Umed Ali v. Rajlaksmi Debya, 1 C. L. J. 538, and Barhamdeo Narayan Singh v. Bibi Rasul Bandi, I. L. R. 32 Calc. 691; 1 C. L. J. 360, distinguished. In such a suit, where no relief is claimed by the plaintiff on the ground of fraud against the Secretary of State for India, it is not necessary to serve a notice under s. 424 of the Civil Procedure Code upon him, as it would be impossible to serve a notice fulfilling the requirements of that section. Sahebzadee Shahunshah Begum v. Fergusson, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 499; Muhammad Saddiq Ahmad v. Panna Lal, I. L. R. 26 All. 220, referred to. RAGHUEANS SAHAI v.

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PHOOL KUMARI AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (1905) . . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1130

s. 7—

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 107.  
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 678

See LAND REGISTRATION ACT (BEN. ACT VII OF 1876), s. 82 . 7 C. W. N. 568

ss. 7, 8—

See PARTIES . . . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 159

ss. 7, 8, 19, 22—

See PENAL CODE, s. 206.  
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 217

ss. 7, 10, 16, 19, 31—

See CERTIFICATE. I. L. R. 32 Calc. 691

ss. 8, 10—*Notice—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Arts. 12, 142—Sale in execution of certificates—Suit to set aside sale—Possession—Certificate, effect of.* When notice has not been served under s. 10 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, 1895, and a suit is brought to set aside the sale and to recover possession of the property sold, Art. 142, and not Art. 12 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act is applicable. Under s. 8 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, a certificate duly made and filed has, in so far as regards the remedies for enforcing it, the force and effect of a decree of a Civil Court notwithstanding that notice may not have been served under s. 10; but a sale held without service of notice under s. 10 is wholly without authority, and is a nullity. PURNA CHANDRA CHATTERJEE v. DINABUNDHU MUKERJEE (1907) . . . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 811

s. 10—*Sale, setting aside of—Service of notice—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244.* Where the certificate was not duly served under the provisions of s. 10 of the Public Demands Recovery Act:—*Held*, that there could be no execution, and that the proceedings held under such certificate were bad. S. 244, Civil Procedure Code, does not apply to the case of execution proceedings held under the Public Demands Recovery Act. *Ram Tarak Hazra v. Mosaheba Khan*, 6 C. W. N. 245, and *Janki Das v. Ram Golam Sahu*, 6 C. W. N. 331, relied upon. *RAMRUP SAHAY v. KHUSHAL MISSER* (1902) . . . 6 C. W. N. 630

ss. 10, 12, 15, 17, 24, 26—

See SALE . . . 13 C. W. N. 710

ss. 10, 12, 31—

See NOTICE, SERVICE OF.  
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 286

ss. 10, 17 and 21—*Sale for arrears of cesses—Suit to set aside sale on the ground that no*

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s. 10—*contd.*

*notice was issued under s. 10 of the Act, whether maintainable—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244, applicability of.* A suit to set aside a sale held for arrears of cesses, on the ground that no notice of the certificate, under s. 10 of the Public Demands Recovery Act (Ben. Act I of 1895), was served upon the plaintiff, is maintainable in the Civil Court, even if the certificate has become absolute. Under the provisions of s. 21 of the Public Demands Recovery Act (Ben. Act I of 1895), before its amendment by Bengal Act I of 1897, s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) is not applicable in its entirety and does not apply so as to bar a separate suit for setting aside a sale for arrears of cesses; it applies only so far as the procedure to be followed in execution proceedings to enforce the certificate and realize the amount thereunder is concerned. *Chunder Kumar Mukerjee v. Secretary of State*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 698, and *Ram Taruck Hazra v. Dilwar Ali*, 5 C. W. N. 521, followed. *JANKI DASS v. RAM GOLAM SAHU* (1901) . . . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 813  
s.c. 6 C. W. N. 331

ss. 10, 31—*Notice—Non-service of notice, effect of—"Adult"—Sale—Suit to set aside sale—Procedure—Limitation—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 312—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 12 (b).* Where it is alleged that notice has not been served under s. 10 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, the onus is on the party alleging want of notice. *Rakhal Chandra Rai Chowdhuri v. Secretary of State*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 603, referred to. It is not sufficient that such notice should be actually served; it must be served in accordance with the provisions of s. 31 of the Act. "Adult" in that section does not mean a person who has attained majority within the meaning of the Majority Act, but a person of such an age as to be capable and responsible for the due communication of the notice to the member of the family for whom it is intended. A duly made certificate has on its filing the force and effect of a decree. Until, however, service of notice under s. 10, which has the effect of an attachment, no particular property is bound by the decree. A sale without prior attachment is irregular, but not a nullity. *Kishory Mohun Roy v. Mahomed Mujaffar Hossein*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 188, referred to. The due making and filing of the certificate gives it the effect of a decree, and therefore non-service of notice under s. 10 does not affect the validity of the certificate itself. A suit to set aside a sale on the sole ground that the decree under which it was held was an invalid decree simply because of absence of notice under s. 10, fails because such absence of notice does not affect the validity of the decree. *Bajinath Sahai v. Ramgout Singh*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 775, followed. *Saroda Charan Bando-padhya v. Kista Mohun Bhattacharjee*, 1 C. W. N. 516; *Chunder Kumar Mukerjee v. The Secretary of State*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 698; *Gopal Das v. Hardeo Das*, 5 C. W. N. 86; *Ambica Prosad v. Gopal*



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*Buksh Das*, 1 C. L. J. 550; *Ramrup Sahay v. Khushal Misser*, 6 C. W. N. 639; *Srinath Hore v. Bishan Chandra Das*, 2 C. L. J. 504; *Umed Ali Bhuyan v. Raj Lakshmi Debya*, 1 L. R. 33 Calc. 84; *Ramrup Sahai v. Khushal Misser*, 3 C. L. J. 280; *Sham Lal Mandal v. Nilmani Das*, 5 C. L. J. 385, 387, not followed. The Certificate Officer has jurisdiction to transfer the execution of the decree. The Collector of the 24-Parganas is *ex officio* Collector of Calcutta. The Collector of the 24-Parganas may, in his capacity of Certificate Officer, sell immovable property in Calcutta. Ss. 244 and 312 of the Civil Procedure Code apply to execution proceedings under the Public Demands Recovery Act, Art. 12 (b), Sch. II of the Limitation Act bars the suit. *HARI CHARAN SINGH v. CHANDRA KUMAR DEY* (1907). I. L. R. 34 Calc. 787

**s. 15—**

See PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT  
(BEN. ACT VII OF 1880), ss. 8, 10, 12.

5 C. W. N. 86

ss. 15, 19, 32 and 33—*Sale in execution of certificate*—"Final," meaning of—*Appeal*—*Review*—*Revision*—*Power of revision by Commissioner*. A suit to set aside a sale in execution of a certificate under the Public Demands Recovery Act is maintainable in the Civil Court. *Ram Taruck Hazra v. Dilwar Ali*, 1 L. R. 29 Calc. 73, referred to. An order made by a Certificate Officer under s. 19 of Bengal Act I of 1895 is final only in the sense that it shall not be open to appeal as provided by s. 32 of that Act, but not in the sense that it shall not be open to review or revision by the Commissioner under s. 33 of the same Act. *Nasiruddin Khan v. Indronarayan Chowdhry*, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 367; *Badaricharya v. Ramchandra Gopal Savant*, 1 L. R. 19 Bom. 113, and *Ramsing v. Babu Kisansing*, 1 L. R. 19 Bom. 116, relied upon. *MATANGINI DEBI v. GIRISH CHUNDER CHONGDAR* (1903)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 619  
s.c. 7 C. W. N. 433

**s. 17—**

See ante, ss. 10, 17 AND 21.

**s. 19—**

See ante—

ss. 7, 8, 19, 22;

ss. 15, 19, 32 AND 35.

**ss. 19, 20—**

See PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT  
(BEN. ACT VII OF 1880), s. 19.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 94

**s. 21—**

See ante, ss. 10, 17 AND 21.

s. 21—*Suit to set aside a sale in execution of a certificate*—*Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 223, 311, 312—*Material irregularity*—

**PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT  
(BENG. I OF 1895)—*concl.*****s. 21—*concl.***

*Order sending certificate to another Court for execution*—*Void sale*. Where an order sending a certificate made under the Public Demands Recovery Act to another Court for execution was not authorized by s. 223 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the latter Court proceeded to execute the certificate by selling certain property: *Held*, that the Court purporting to sell the property had no power to do so, the proceedings being vitiated *ab initio* on the ground that there was no power to send the certificate for execution to that Court and that s. 312 of the Code of Civil Procedure was no bar to the suit for setting aside the sale. *Held*, further, that s. 312 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to proceedings in execution of certificates under Bengal Act I of 1895. *Ramrup Sahay v. Khushal Misser*, 6 C. W. N. 610, *Janki Das v. Ramgolam Sahu*, 6 C. W. N. 381, *Raghubans Suhai v. Phool Kumari*, 1 L. R. 32 Calc. 1130, referred to. Observations in *Ram Taruck Hazra v. Dilwar Ali*, 1 L. R. 29 Calc. 94, footnote, approved. *GIRISH CHANDRA v. GOLAM KARIM* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 451  
s. c. 10 C. W. N. 347

**s. 22—**

See ante, ss. 7, 8, 19, 22.

**ss. 32 and 33—**

See ante, ss. 15, 19, 32 AND 33.

**PUBLIC DOCUMENT.**

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 74.

See EVIDENCE. I. L. R. 34 Calc. 293

*Inspection of document, right to certified copies*—*Loan Register of the Public Debt Office*—*Evidence Act* (I of 1872), ss. 74, 76—*Banker's Books Evidence Act* (XVIII of 1891). The Loan Register of the Public Debt Office in the Bank of Bengal is a "public document" within the meaning of s. 74 of the Evidence Act; and under s. 76 of the Act, any person having an interest in the document is entitled to inspect the same and obtain certified copies thereof. *Queen-Empress v. Arumugam*, 1 L. R. 20 Mad. 189, followed. *Mutter v. Midlands Railway Co.*, L. R. 38 Ch. D. 92; *Rex v. Justices of Staffordshire*, 6 Ad. & E. 34, referred to. *CHANDI CHARAN DHAR v. BOISTAB CHARAN DHAR* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 284  
s.c. 8 C. W. N. 125

**PUBLIC DUTY.**

See LIBEL. I. L. R. 27 Bom. 585

See MALICIOUS SEARCH.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 590

enforcement of—

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—CALCUTTA—CIVIL. I. L. R. 17 Calc. 329  
I. L. R. 21 Calc. 348



**PUBLIC FUNCTIONS.**

See PENAL CODE, s. 186.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 286; 596

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 896

1 C. W. N. 74

**PUBLIC HEALTH, OFFENCE AFFECTING.**

1. ———— Penal Code, s. 269—*Travelling in a train while suffering from cholera.* K, knowing that he was suffering from cholera, entered a train as a passenger without informing the railway company's servants of his condition. M, knowing of K's condition, bought K's ticket and travelled with him. *Held*, that K was properly convicted under s. 269 of the Penal Code of negligently doing an act which was, and which he had reason to believe was, likely to spread infection of a disease dangerous to life, and M of abetment of K's offence. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KRISHNAPPA*

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 276

2. ———— *Communicating syphilis by the act of sexual intercourse—Cheating.* A prostitute who, while suffering from syphilis, communicates the disease to a person who has sexual intercourse with her, is not liable to punishment under s. 269 of the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), "for a negligent act and one likely to spread infection of any disease dangerous to life." *QUEEN EMPRESS v. RAKHMA*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 59

3. ———— *Negligent act—Refusal to allow person suffering from infectious disease to be removed to a hospital.* Where a mother refused to allow her daughter suffering from small-pox to be removed to a hospital in accordance with an order made by the District Magistrate, unless she accompanied her, and was convicted of an offence under s. 269 of the Penal Code by the District Magistrate:—*Held*, that no unlawful or negligent act had been committed within the meaning of s. 269 of the Penal Code. *CAHOON v. MATHEWS*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 494  
1 C. W. N. 274

**PUBLIC HIGHWAY.**

See PUBLIC ROAD, HIGHWAY, STREET OF THOROUGHFARE.

**PUBLIC INTEREST.**

See PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.

7 C. W. N. 246

**PUBLIC NAVIGABLE RIVER.**

See FISHERY . . . 12 C. W. N. 559

**PUBLIC NUISANCE.**

See NUISANCE . . . I. L. R. 31 All. 444

See NUISANCE—UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

See NUISANCE—PUBLIC NUISANCE UNDER PENAL CODE.

See PENAL CODE, ss. 268, 290, 291.

**PUBLIC NUISANCE—contd.**

See PUBLIC ROAD, HIGHWAY, ETC., OBSTRUCTION TO OR NUISANCE ON; PROCESSION IN.

1. ———— *Obstruction of ford by erection of bund—Prescriptive right of public to user of ford—Desuetude of right to erect bund—Use of one's right so as not to cause obstruction or nuisance—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 133.* Where the petitioner erected a bund in a river, the effect of which was to render it unfordable at a place where the stream had been fordable throughout the year, except for a few days during the freshets, and claimed the right to do so, but it was proved that for a period exceeding 20 years the public had used the ford, and had never been so obstructed in crossing the river on foot or on vehicles:—*Held*, that the public had acquired a prescriptive right-of-way through the river and that the petitioner had lost his right of erecting a bund by long desuetude; that even if the petitioner had a subsisting right to dam the river by a bund, such right was subject to the maxim *sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas*; that his action had caused an obstruction, which was not justifiable to the public, who were in the lawful enjoyment of a right-of-way, and that the order of the Magistrate to remove the obstruction was not illegal. *ZAFFER NAWAB v. EMPEROR* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 930

2. ———— *Offensive smells—Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 268 and 290.* In order to constitute an offence under s. 268 of the Penal Code it is not necessary that the alleged nuisance should produce smells injurious to health, it is sufficient if they be offensive to the senses. *Rer v. Nel*, 2 C. & P. 485, approved of. To allow a large stack of bones to remain uncovered in the open for a long time so as to become rotten and to emit a smell noxious to people living in or passing by the vicinity is not an act which a bone-mill manager is entitled to do in carrying on his trade in a reasonable way and by allowing such act to be done he would be guilty of committing a public nuisance. *BERCKEFELD v. EMPEROR* (1906)

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 73

3. ———— *Killing of cows by Mahomedans—Custom.* Under certain limitations the slaughtering of kine by Mahomedans is not illegal. It is the legal right of every person to make such use of his own property as he may think fit, provided that in so doing he does not cause real injury to others or offend against the law, even though he may thereby hurt the susceptibilities of others. The right of Mahomedans to slaughter kine is one to which they are legally entitled irrespective of custom, and it is only when they abuse the right that its exercise can be interfered with. *Muttunnira v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 590, *Queen-Empress v. Byramji Edalji*, I. L. R. 12 Bom. 437, *Queen-Empress v. Zaki-uddin*, I. L. R. 10 All. 41, *Queen-Empress v. Imam Ali*, I. L. R. 10 All. 150, *Romesh Chandra Sanyal v. Hiru Mandal*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 882, and *Hadjee Muzhur Ali v. Gundowree*



**PUBLIC NUISANCE—concl'd.**

*Sahu, 25 W. R. (Cr.) 72*, referred to. *SHAHBAZ KHAN v. UMRAO PURI* (1908)

**I. L. R. 30 All. 181**

4. ——— Obstruction or nuisance on land—*Claim of title to land—Bonâ fides of claim—Limitation, question of—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 133.* Where a party, against whom a conditional order under s. 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code is passed for an alleged obstruction or nuisance on land, raises a claim of title to such land, the Magistrate must come to a proper finding as to the question of *bonâ fides* of the claim; and he is not competent to decide whether it is barred by limitation. *KAMINI KUMAR BISWAS v. EMPEROR* (1907)

**I. L. R. 35 Calc. 283**

**PUBLIC OFFICER.**

See ATTACHMENT—SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—SALARY **I. L. R. 24 Calc. 102**

See COLLECTOR **I. L. R. 3 All. 2**

See OFFICIAL TRUSTEE.

**I. L. R. 7 Calc. 489**

**I. L. R. 12 Mad. 250**

See PUBLIC SERVANT.

See STAMP ACT, SCH. I, ART. 22.

**I. L. R. 19 All. 293**

——— money lent to—

See SUBORDINATE JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF **I. L. R. 22 Bom. 170**

——— offer of bribe to—

See ACCOMPLICE **I. L. R. 14 Bom. 331**  
**I. L. R. 27 Calc. 144; 925**

——— power of Government over—

See SECRETARY OF STATE.

**I. L. R. 27 Bom. 189**

——— suit against—

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 424.

**13 C. L. R. 195**

**I. L. R. 24 Calc. 584**

**I. L. R. 20 Bom. 697**

**I. L. R. 25 Calc. 239**

See PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.

**7 C. W. N. 246**

See PUBLIC OFFICER.

**I. L. R. 29 All. 567**

See SECRETARY OF STATE.

**I. L. R. 26 Mad. 263**

See SUBORDINATE JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF **I. L. R. 15 Bom. 441**

**I. L. R. 21 Bom. 754; 773**

**I. L. R. 22 Bom. 170**

——— suit to set aside order of—

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 14.

**PUBLIC OFFICER—concl'd.**

1. ——— Notice of suit—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 2 and 424—Notice of suit—Official Assignee—Practice—Procedure.* The Official Assignee is a public officer, within the meaning of s. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), and is therefore entitled to the notice prescribed by s. 424 of the Code before a suit is filed against him in respect of acts done by him in his official capacity. *JOOSTUB HAJI ALLI v. KEMP* (1902) **I. L. R. 26 Bom. 809**

2. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 424—Talukhdari settlement officer managing estate under Act XXI of 1881—Broach and Kaira Encumbered Estates Act.* The plaintiff sued for a declaration that he was entitled to succeed, on his father's death, to a talukhdari estate to the exclusion of defendant 1, who, he alleged, was a supposititious child set up by his stepmother to defeat the plaintiff's right of inheritance. It appeared that defendant 1 had obtained a decree against the plaintiff's father establishing his legitimacy and declaring him entitled to receive maintenance out of the estate in question. In accordance with that decree, the talukhdari settlement officer (defendant 2), who was manager of the estates under the Broach and Kaira Encumbered Estates Act (XXI of 1881), paid defendant 1 an allowance of R200 a month on account of his maintenance, which allowance, the plaintiff alleged, was illegal and wrongful. The defendants contended that the suit was bad, because notice had not been given to the talukhdari settlement officer as required by s. 424 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *Held*, following *Shahebzadee v. Ferguson, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 499*, and *Bhanu Balapa v. Nana, I. L. R. 3 Bom. 343*, that although the talukhdari settlement officer, acting as manager under XXI of 1881 was a "public officer," yet the suit was maintainable without giving the talukhdari settlement officer the notice required by s. 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it was not a suit arising out of acts done by him in his official capacity. *SARDARSINGJI v. GANPATISINGJI*

**I. L. R. 14 Bom. 395**

3. ——— Suit to recover articles seized by police during a search—*Suit against public officer.* The plaintiff sued to recover from the defendant three account books which he alleged that the defendant, a Sub-Inspector of Police, had seized during a search apparently in pursuance of the provisions of s. 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, of the plaintiff's house. *Held*, that the defendant, if he seized the books, which was denied, did so in his capacity as a police officer, and that the suit was not maintainable in the absence of the notice prescribed by s. 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Muhamm d Saddiq Ahmad v. Panna Lal, I. L. R. 26 All. 220*, distinguished. *Jogendra Nath Roy Bahadur v. Price, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 581*, referred to. *BAKHTAWAR MAL v. ABDUL LATIF* (1907) **I. L. R. 29 All. 567**

**PUBLIC PATHWAY.**

See PUBLIC ROAD, HIGHWAY, ETC.



**PUBLIC PATHWAY —concl'd.***See* PUBLIC STREET.*See* PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE.**obstruction of—***See* CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 133.  
13 C. W. N. 367**PUBLIC PLACE.***See* GAMBLING . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 386*See* GAMBLING ACT (III OF 1867), ss. 11, 13.*See* PENAL CODE, s. 159.  
I. L. R. 17 All. 166**PUBLIC POLICY.***See* VENDOR AND PURCHASER.  
I. L. R. 27 All. 271**agreements contrary to—***See* BENGAL EXCISE ACT (VII OF 1878).  
I. L. R. 16 Calc. 436*See* CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE.*See* CONTRACT ACT, s. 23—ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.*See* COSTS—TAXATION OF COSTS.  
I. L. R. 17 Mad. 162*See* ENDOWMENT I. L. R. 26 Mad. 31*See* EXECUTOR . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 14*See* HINDU LAW—HUSBAND AND WIFE.  
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 751*See* MADRAS ABKARI ACT.  
I. L. R. 24 Mad. 401**contract with public servant—***See* CONTRACT . 13 C. W. N. 59*See* CONTRACT ACT, s. 27.  
13 C. W. N. 388**custom contrary to—***See* HINDU LAW—CUSTOM—ENDOWMENTS . I. L. R. 14 Bom. 90*See* HINDU LAW—CUSTOM—IMMORAL CUSTOMS . I. L. R. 1 Mad. 168 ; 356*See* HINDU LAW—MARRIAGE—VALIDITY OR OTHERWISE OF MARRIAGES.  
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 400**PUBLIC PROSECUTOR.***See* CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.  
8 Bom. Cr. 126**discretion of—***See* WITNESS—CRIMINAL CASES—EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES—GENERAL CASES . I. L. R. 7 All. 904  
I. L. R. 16 All. 84*Government pleader—Withdrawal from prosecution—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 494. Held, by the Full Bench, that a person ap-***PUBLIC PROSECUTOR—concl'd:***pointed by the Magistrate of the district, under s. 492 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to be Public Prosecutor for the purpose of a particular case tried in the Court of Session, has not the power of a Public Prosecutor with regard to withdrawal from prosecution under s. 494. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MADHO . . . I. L. R. 8 All. 291***PUBLIC RECORD.***See* EVIDENCE ACT, s. 35.**PUBLIC RELIGIOUS TRUST.***See* CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT XIV OF 1882), ss. 10, 539.  
I. L. R. 33 Calc. 789**PUBLIC ROAD, HIGHWAY, STREET OR THOROUGHFARE.***See* BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT, 1864, ss. 2, 10 to 16, 57, 58 . I. L. R. 2 Calc. 425*See* BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT, 1864, s. 10.  
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 732*See* BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT, 1873, s. 17 . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 490  
I. L. R. 20 Bom. 146*See* LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1870, ss. 13 AND 24 . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 194  
I. L. R. 24 I. A. 177*See* OWNERSHIP, PRESUMPTION OF.  
I. L. R. 7 All. 362*See* PUBLIC STREET.*See* RES JUDICATA—ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 732**allowing water to remain on—***See* BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT, 1873, s. 54 . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 83**encroachment on—***See* LIMITATION ACT, ART. 149.  
I. L. R. 19 Mad. 154**obstruction to, or nuisance on—***See* BENCH OF MAGISTRATES.  
I. L. R. 13 Mad. 142*See* BENGAL MUNICIPAL ACT, 1884, s. 217.  
I. L. R. 17 Calc. 684*See* BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT, 1873, s. 42 . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 212*See* DECLARATORY DECREE, SUIT FOR—ORDERS OF CRIMINAL COURTS.  
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 293*See* JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—MAGISTRATE'S ORDERS, INTERFERENCE WITH.*See* JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—PROCESSIONS . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 524  
I. L. R. 18 Bom. 693*See* JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—PUBLIC WAYS, OBSTRUCTION OF.



**PUBLIC ROAD, HIGHWAY, STREET  
OR THOROUGHFARE—*contd.***

obstruction to, or nuisance on—  
*concl'd.*

See JURY—JURY UNDER NUISANCE SECTIONS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

I. L. R. 18 All. 158

I. L. R. 22 All. 267

See MADRAS POLICE ACT, 1888, s. 71.

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 223

See NUISANCE—PUBLIC NUISANCE UNDER PENAL CODE. I. L. R. 20 Mad. 433

See NUISANCE—UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE.

See OBSTRUCTION—TO PUBLIC WAY.

See RIGHT OF SUIT—OBSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC HIGHWAY.

procession in—

See RELIGION, OFFENCES RELATING TO.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 554

I. L. R. 32 Mad. 478 ; 527

rash riding on—

See PENAL CODE, s. 279.

14 W. R. Cr. 32

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 715

regular line of street—

See BOMBAY CITY MUNICIPAL ACT (BOMBAY ACT III OF 1888), s. 297.

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 107

what constitutes a "public street"—

See BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT (BOM. VI OF 1873), ss. 17, 48, 64.

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 315

1. ——— User of road by public—*Evidence that a road is public.* In order to establish that a road is a public road, it is sufficient if acts of user by the public are shown to have been acquiesced in by the owner of the land over which the road passes, and that those acts are of such a character as to warrant the inference that the owner intended to make over to the public the right to use the land as a public highway. *ANDERSON v. JEGGODUMBA DABI* . . . . . 6 C. L. R. 282

2. ——— Suit to remove trees planted on public road—*Space on sides of road.* A public road includes a fair margin on either side of the road, which may be used for various purposes in connection with the road itself. Where trees have been planted on the margin of a public road, a suit will not lie by the proprietor of the land through which the road passes to have them removed. *HARRENDRO COOMAR CHOWDHRY v. TARAMONI CHOWDHRAIN* . . . . . 7 C. L. R. 272

3. ——— Diversion of road—*Right of owners of land adjoining old road—Grant by muni-*

**PUBLIC ROAD, HIGHWAY, STREET  
OR THOROUGHFARE—*concl'd.***

*cipality of land forming old road—N.-W. P. and Oudh Municipalities Act (XV of 1873), s. 38—Power of municipality over public highway.* There is a presumption that a highway, or waste land adjoining thereto, belongs to the owners of the soil of the adjoining land. S. 38 of Act XV of 1873 (N.-W. P. and Oudh Municipalities Act) was not intended to deprive persons of any private right of property they have in the land used as a public highway, or to confer such rights on the municipality, or has the section any such effect. In a case where such land ceased to be used as a public highway, and was granted by the municipality to third persons, who proceeded to build thereon—*Held*, that the owners had a good cause of action against such persons for the demolition of the buildings and restoration of the property to its original condition. *NIHAL CHAND v. AZMAT ALI KHAN*

I. L. R. 7 All. 362

4. ——— Obstruction by owner of abutting property—*Madras District Municipalities Act (Mad. Act IV of 1884, as amended by Mad. Act III of 1897; s. 5), s. 3, cl. 27—"Street"—Effect of vesting in municipality—Obstruction by owner of property abutting on street—Suit for injunction to prevent interference by municipality—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 143 A.* When a street is vested in a Municipal Council, such vesting does not transfer to the Municipal authority the rights of the owner in the site or soil over which the street exists. It does not own the soil from the centre of the earth *usque ad calum*, but it has the exclusive right to manage and control the surface of the soil, and so much of the soil below and of the space above the surface as is necessary to enable it adequately to maintain the street as a street. It has also a certain property in the soil of the street, which would enable it, as owner, to bring a possessory action against trespassers. The effect of Art. 146A of Sch. II to the Limitation Act considered. *Municipal Commissioners for the City of Madras v. Sarangapani Moodaliar*, I. L. R. 19 Mad. 154, commented on. *SUNDARAM AYYAR v. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF MADURA* (1901)

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 635

5. ——— Processions—*Right to conduct through public streets.* The right to conduct religious processions through the public streets is a right inherent in every person, provided he does not thereby invade the rights of property enjoyed by others, or cause a public nuisance or interfere with the ordinary use of the streets by the public, and subject to directions or prohibitions for the prevention of obstructions to thoroughfares or breaches or the peace. Every member of the public, and every sect, has a right to use the streets in a lawful manner, and it lies on those who would restrain him in its exercise to show some law, or custom having the force of law, depriving him of the privilege. *SADAGOPACHARIAR v. RAMA RAO* (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 376



**PUBLIC SAFETY, OFFENCE AFFECTING.**

*See* CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—SPECIAL CASES—PUBLIC SAFETY . 1 Bom. 137

**PUBLIC SERVANT.**

*See* ABSCONDING OFFENDER.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 417

*See* ASSAULT ON PUBLIC SERVANT.

13 W. R. Cr. 49

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 558

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 630

3 C. W. N. 605 ; 627

*See* ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY.

I. L. R. 6 All. 129

*See* EVIDENCE ACT, s. 74.

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 534

*See* FALSE EVIDENCE—FABRICATING FALSE EVIDENCE.

*See* ILLEGAL GRATIFICATION.

3 W. R. Cr. 10

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 517

*See* LAND-MARKS.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1084

*See* PENAL CODE, ss. 21, 186.

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 213

*See* PENAL CODE, ss. 170, 186, 434.

*See* PENAL CODE, s. 221.

I. L. R. 3 All. 60

*See* PUBLIC OFFICER.

*See* SANCTION TO PROSECUTION—WHERE SANCTION IS NECESSARY OR OTHERWISE.

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 758 : 2 C. L. R. 520

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 540

*See* SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—JURISDICTION—GOVERNMENT. SUITS AGAINST . I. L. R. 18 Mad. 395

acts done by—

*See* MUNSIF, JURISDICTION OF.

1 Bom. 144

*See* PENAL CODE, s. 217.

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 412

assaulting—

*See* ASSAULT ON PUBLIC SERVANT.

*See* POLICE ACT (V of 1861), ss. 17, 19.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 411

*See* THUMB IMPRESSIONS.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 97

assaulting, in execution of his duty—

*See* PENAL CODE, s. 332.

I. L. R. 18 All. 246

*See* SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES.

4 C. W. N. 245

contempt of authority of—

*See* CONTEMPT OF COURT.

**PUBLIC SERVANT—contd.**

contract with—

*See* CONTRACT . 13 C. W. N. 59

disobedience of direction of law by—

*See* CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODES, s. 45 (1872, s. 90) . I. L. R. 1 Mad. 266

*See* PENAL CODE, s. 217.

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 266

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 412

disobedience of order of—

*See* NUISANCE—UNDER CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE . 5 C. W. N. 329

*See* NUISANCE—PUBLIC NUISANCE UNDER PENAL CODE . I. L. R. 8 All. 99

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 464

*See* PENAL CODE, s. 188.

giving false information to—

*See* PENAL CODE, s. 182.

obstruction of—

*See* PENAL CODE, s. 186.

6 C. W. N. 120

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 285

obstruction of, in execution of his duty.

*See* ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY.

2 Bom. 134 : 2nd Ed. 128

*See* PENAL CODE, s. 152.

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 105

*See* PENAL CODE, s. 183.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 564

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 274

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 78

*See* PENAL CODE, s. 186.

*See* WRONGFUL RESTRAINT.

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 377

offering bribe to—

*See* ACCOMPLICE . I. L. R. 26 Bom. 193

personating—

*See* SENTENCE—CUMULATIVE SENTENCES. I. L. R. 10 All. 58

prosecution of—

*See* ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 927

*See* SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—NATURE, FORM, AND SUFFICIENCY OF SANCTION.

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 468

sanction of—

*See* SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION.

1. Municipal Commissioner—

Act XXVI of 1850—Bom. Reg. 11 of 1827, s. 43. A municipal commissioner appointed under Act



**PUBLIC SERVANT—contd.**

XXVI of 1850 was a public servant within the meaning of Regulation II of 1827, s. 43; and consequently a Munsif had no jurisdiction to try a suit brought against him for acts done in his public capacity. *GREAVES v. BHAGVAN TULSI*

4 Bom. A. C. 93

REG. v. PURSHOTAM VALJI . 5 Bom. Cr. 33

2. ——— Person performing public duties—*Penal Code*, s. 21. Any person whether receiving pay or not, who chooses to take upon himself duties and responsibilities belonging to the position of a public servant, and performs those duties and accepts those responsibilities, and is recognized as filling the position of a public servant, must be regarded as one, and it does not lie in his mouth to say subsequently that, notwithstanding his performance of public duties and the recognition by others of such performance, he is not a "public servant" within the definition contained in s. 21 of the *Penal Code*. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PARMESAR DAT*

I. L. R. 8 All. 201

3. ——— Engineer receiving municipal pay—*Penal Code*, s. 21. An engineer who receives and pays to others municipal moneys is a public servant within the meaning of s. 21, cl. 10, of the *Penal Code*, although he may not have the power of sanctioning the expenditure of such moneys. *REG. v. NANTAMRAM UTTAMRAM*

6 Bom. Cr. 64

4. ——— Izaphatdar—*Penal Code*, s. 21—*Lessee of village undertaking to keep forest account—Officer*. The word "officer" in s. 21, cl. 9, of the *Penal Code* means a person employed to exercise to some extent a delegated function of Government; he must be either himself armed with some authority or representative character or his duties must be immediately auxiliary to those of some one who is so armed. Hence an izaphatdar—i.e., a lessee of a village who has undertaken to keep an account of its forest revenues and pay a certain proportion to the Government keeping the remainder for himself—is not an officer, and therefore not a public servant, within the meaning of s. 21. *REG. v. RAMAJIRAV JIVEAJIRAV*

12 Bom. 1

5. ——— Surveyor employed by the Collector—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860)*, s. 21 and s. 186. The Collector acting in the management of a khas mehal, the property of the Government, is as much "the Government" within the meaning of s. 17 of the *Penal Code* as when he is exercising any other of the duties of his official position. A surveyor employed by the Collector in the khas mehal department to make a survey of a certain portion of a watercourse is a "public servant" within the meaning of s. 21 of the *Penal Code*. *Reg. v. Ramajirav*, 12 Bom. 1, and *Chatter Lal v. Thacoor Pershad*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 518, referred to. *BAJOO SINGH v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 158

3 C. W. N. 115

6. ——— Labourer employed by Government—*Penal Code*, s. 21. A carter employed

**PUBLIC SERVANT—contd.**

by Government is not a public servant within the meaning of s. 21 of the *Penal Code*. *QUEEN v. NACHIMUTTU*

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 18

7. ——— Mohurrir appointed under Beng. Act IX of 1862—*Money received for registering deeds*. Money received by a mohurrir appointed under the Registration Act, Bengal Act IX of 1862, by way of fees for registering deeds is money entrusted to him as a public servant. *QUEEN v. DWARKANATH GHOSH*

20 W. R. Cr. 49

8. ——— Court of Wards peon—*Penal Code*, s. 21. A peon employed by the manager of an estate under the charge of the Court of Wards is not a public servant within the meaning of s. 21 of the *Penal Code*. *QUEEN v. ARAYI*

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 17

9. ——— Manager employed under the Court of Wards—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860)*, ss. 21, 161—"Public servant." Held, that the manager of an estate employed under the Court of Wards is a "public servant" within the meaning of s. 21 of the *Penal Code*. *Queen-Empress v. Arayi*, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 17, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MATHURA PRASAD*

I. L. R. 21 All. 127

10. ——— Person appointed by Government Solicitor to act as Prosecutor in the Police Court—*Penal Code*, s. 21. A person appointed by the Government Solicitor with the approval of Government and under an arrangement by the Governor General in Council to act as Prosecutor in the Calcutta Police Court is a public servant within the meaning of s. 21 of the *Penal Code*. *EMPRESS v. BUTIO KRISHTO DOSS*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 497

11. ——— Public servant, Peon attached to the office of the Superintendent of the Salt Department whether a—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860)*, s. 21, cl. (9), s. 161—"Officer" meaning of. "An officer in the service or pay of Government" within the terms of s. 21 of the *Penal Code* is one who is appointed to some office for the performance of some public duty. A peon in the service and pay of the Government and attached to a Government office, is an officer of Government and a public servant within the meaning of s. 21, cl. (9), of the *Penal Code*. *Reg. v. Ramajirav Jiveajirav*, 12 Bom. 1, explained and distinguished. *Queen v. Arayi*, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 17, and *Queen-Empress v. Mathura Prasad*, I. L. R. 21 All. 127, disapproved of. *In the matter of NAJAMADDIN*

4 C. W. N. 748

12. ——— Civil Surgeon—*Penal Code*, ss. 116 and 161—*Abetment of illegal gratification*. Where the accused was charged under s. 116, *Penal Code*, with having abetted the commission of an offence punishable under s. 161 of that Code, the person abetted having been a Civil Surgeon of a sudder station, it was held that the enhanced imprisonment prescribed by the latter part of s. 116 could not be awarded, as the Civil Surgeon was not a public servant within the words of the section



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“whose duty it is to prevent the commission of such offence.” *QUEEN v. RAMNATH SARMA BISWAS*  
21 W. R. Cr. 9

13. ———— **Peon of Collector's Court—**  
*Penal Code, s. 21, cl. 9, and s. 161—Illegal gratification—Peon remunerated by fees.* A peon of the Collector's Court, who received no fixed pay from the Government, but was remunerated by fees whenever employed to serve any process, and was placed on the register of supernumerary peons, had been ordered by the Magistrate to do duty on a particular day at the office of the Special Sub-Registrar, where he was detected receiving an eight-anna pieco from a person, and was prosecuted for receiving an illegal gratification as a public servant. *Held*, that the peon was a public servant under the definition in the 9th clause of s. 21 of the Penal Code, and the trial of the charge against him must be proceeded with. *QUEEN v. RAM KRISHNA DAS*  
7 B. L. R. 446

S.C. *QUEEN v. REMKISTO DASS*

16 W. R. Cr. 27

14. ———— **Officer employed in Criminal Court—Obtaining valuable thing without consideration—Illegal gratification—Penal Code, s. 165.** K, a police officer, employed in a Criminal Court to read the diaries of cases investigated by the police and to bring up in order each case for trial with the accused and witnesses, after a case of theft had been decided by the Court in which the persons accused were convicted, and a sum of money, the proceeds of the theft, had been made over by the order of the Court to the prosecutor in the case, asked for and received from the prosecutor a portion of such money, not as a motive or reward for any of the objects described in s. 161 of the Penal Code, but as “dasturi.” *Held*, that K was not, under these circumstances, punishable under s. 161 of the Penal Code, but under s. 165 of that Code. *EM-PRESS OF INDIA v. KAMPTA PRASAD*  
I. L. R. 1 All. 530

15. ———— **Poddar of Bank of Bengal—Illegal gratification—Penal Code, ss. 21 and 161.** The manager of a Court of Wards estate paid into a bank, carrying on the treasury business of the Government, a sum of money on behalf of Government. B, a poddar in the bank, demanded and took a reward for his trouble in receiving the money. On B being prosecuted and charged under s. 161 of the Penal Code:—*Held*, that, although the money might have been paid on account of Government, it was on behalf of the bank, and not on behalf of the Government; that the money was received by the accused; and that the poddar was a servant of the bank only, and not a public servant within the meaning of cl. 9, s. 21, of the Penal Code. *In the matter of the petition of MODUN MOHUN*  
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 376

16. ———— **Convict warders—Penal Code, s. 223—Suffering an escape from custody.** Convict warders are “public servants” within the meaning of s. 223 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN v. KALLACHAND MOITREE*  
7 W. R. Cr. 99

**PUBLIC SERVANT—contd.**

17. ———— **Municipal Inspector—District Municipalities Act (Mad. Act IV of 1884), s. 41.** A Municipal inspector is a public servant within the meaning of s. 41 of the Madras District Municipalities Act. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAMASANI*  
I. L. R. 13 Mad. 131

18. ———— **Duties of zamindari karnam—Accounts—Penal Code, s. 166—Mad. Reg. XXIX of 1802, s. 12.** A zamindari karnam is a public servant, and is bound by law to produce accounts to the proprietor or farmer of a zamindari. *SUBRAMANAYA v. SOMASUNDARA*  
I. L. R. 15 Mad. 127

19. ———— **Sanitary Inspector—Madras Local Boards Act (Mad. Act V of 1884).** A Sanitary Inspector appointed by the local board is a public servant within the meaning of Local Boards Act, Madras, 1884, s. 43. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. TIRUVENGADA MUDALI*  
I. L. R. 21 Mad. 428

20. ———— **Party called upon to attend and witness a search—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 287—Rendering assistance to a public servant—Refusal to sign search list, by person who attended search under Abkari law—Liability—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 103 (1).** A person was called upon by an Abkari Inspector to attend a search held under s. 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and did so. He, however, refused to sign the search list when it was prepared. On a charge being preferred against him, under s. 187 of the Indian Penal Code, of intentionally omitting to assist a public servant in the execution of his duty:—*Held*, that the accused was not guilty of an offence under s. 187. Assuming that a person called upon to attend and witness a search under s. 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is under a legal obligation to attend the search and sign the search list, the “assistance” which a person is bound, by the earlier part of s. 187 of the Penal Code, to render is *ejusdem generis* with the various forms of assistance referred to in the latter part of the section. It must have some direct personal relation to the execution of the duty by the public officer. The signing of the search list required by s. 103 is an independent duty which is imposed on the witnesses, whereas, the word “assistance,” as used in the section, implies that the party who assists in doing something which, in ordinary circumstances, the party assisted could do for himself. *In the matter of RAMAYA NAIKA* (1903)  
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 419

21. ———— **Illegal gratification—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 161, 165—Receiving illegal gratification as a public servant—Gratification received partly on one day and partly on another—Continuous offence—Conviction for separate offences if proper.** Where a certain sum of money is paid to a public servant as illegal gratification on one day, and a certain sum on another day for the same purpose, the offence of receiving illegal gratification becomes a continuous offence, and there ought not to be separate convictions for offences under ss. 161 and 165 of the Penal Code for the same



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offence. *JAGAT CHANDRA SARMA v. LAL CHAND DAS* (1901) . . . . . **5 C. W. N. 332**

**22. ——— Peon—Peon attached to office of Superintendent of the Salt Department—Manager of estate under Court of Wards—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 21, cl. 9.** An officer in the service or pay of the Government, within the terms of s. 21, cl. (9), of the Penal Code, is one who is appointed to some office for the performance of some public duty. *Held*, that a peon in the service and pay of the Government, and attached to the office of a Superintendent of the Salt Department, is a public servant. *Held*, further, that a Manager of an estate under the Court of Wards is not a public servant. *Reg. v. Ramajirav Jirbajirav*, 12 Bom. H. C. R. 1, and *The Queen v. Arayi*, 1. L. R. 7 Mad. 17, referred to. *Queen-Empress v. Mathura Prasad*, 1. L. R. 21 All. 127, dissented from. *NAZAMUDDIN v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* (1900) . . . . . **I. L. R. 28 Calc. 344**

**23. ——— Receiver appointed under Land Registration Act (Ben. Act VII of 1876)—Non-attendance in obedience to order from public servant—Omission to produce document to public servant—Obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions—Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant—Persuasion to tenants not to pay rent to Receiver—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 174, 175, 186 and 188—Land Registration Act (Ben. Act VII of 1876), s. 56.** *Held*, that a Receiver appointed under s. 56 of the Land Registration Act is not a public servant within the terms of ss. 174, 175, 186 and 188 of the Penal Code. *Held*, further, that such a Receiver was not a public servant legally competent to issue an order directing persons to attend before the Collector with their collection papers and rent receipts, and that disobedience to such an order did not constitute an offence under either s. 174 or s. 175 of the Penal Code. *Held*, also, that an order by such a Receiver, forbidding persons to pay rent to any person other than the Receiver, was not an order promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, and that disobedience to such order was not an offence within the terms of s. 188 of the Penal Code. *Held*, further, that persuasion addressed to tenants, in the absence of such Receiver, not to pay rent to him, was not an obstruction of the Receiver within the provisions of s. 186 of the Penal Code. *EBRAHIM SIRCAR v. EMPEROR* (1901)

**I. L. R. 29 Calc. 236**  
**s.c. 6 C. W. N. 141**

**24. ——— Time-expired warrant—Penal Code, ss. 149, 353—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 251—Criminal force by members of an unlawful assembly to deter public servant from discharge of duty.** S. 251 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires the Court to specify in a warrant execution for decree the day on or before which the warrant must be executed. A Commissioner attempting to give possession under a time-expired warrant has no authority to go upon land in the possession of the party, who resists the execution.

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*ABINASH CHANDRA ADITYA v. ANANDA CHANDRA PAL* (1904) . . . . . **I. L. R. 31 Calc. 424**

**25. ——— Constable—Penal Code, s. 353—Using criminal force to deter a public servant—Entry by police on premises of suspected person at night—Assault on police.** A police constable, at midnight, entered upon the premises of a person, who was regarded by the police as a suspicious character, and knocked at his door to ascertain, if he was there, whereupon he came out and abused and pushed the constable and lifted a stick as if he were about to hit the constable with it. On a complaint being preferred under s. 353 of using criminal force to deter a public servant in the execution of his duty:—*Held*, that the offence had not been committed. The constable was not engaged in the execution of his duty as a public servant and was technically guilty of house trespass, and his action was calculated to cause annoyance to the inmates of the house, and was insulting to the accused, who was justified in causing the slight harm, which he had inflicted on the constable. The latter could not be regarded, under s. 99, as acting in good faith under colour of his office, as his action was not authorized by any police circular or order. *DORASAMY PILLAI v. EMPEROR* (1904)

**I. L. R. 27 Mad. 52**

**26. ——— Clerk to a Sub-Registrar—Illegal gratification—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 21, 161—Registration Act (III of 1877), ss. 6 to 14, 67, 84.** A clerk appointed by a Sub-Registrar, and paid out of an allowance given to the Sub-Registrar is not a "public servant" within the meaning of s. 21 of the Penal Code. *BHAGWATI SAHAI v. EMPEROR* (1905)

**I. L. R. 32 Calc. 664**

**PUBLIC SPRING.**

See PENAL CODE, s. 277.

**I. L. R. 2 Calc. 383**

**I. L. R. 4 Mad. 229**

**PUBLIC STREET.**

See PROCESSION.

See PUBLIC ROAD, HIGHWAY, STREET OR THOROUGHFARE.

**1. ——— Right to carry religious processions in—Custom—Right to obstruct such processions not claimable on the ground of usage or custom—When proof of damage necessary in suit brought for obstruction of procession.** Persons of all sects and creeds are equally entitled to carry religious processions along public streets and thoroughfares and no particular sect can claim, on the ground of custom or immemorial use, an exclusive right to carry processions through such streets. The exercise of such right must not interfere with the ordinary use of such streets by the public and must be subject to such directions as the Magistrate may lawfully give to prevent obstructions of thoroughfare or breaches of public peace. *Sadagopachariar v. Krishna Moorthy Rao*, 1. L. R. 30 Mad. 185 at 190, referred to. An action for obstructing a procession may not be maintainable without proof



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of special damage. Where, however, an illegal order of the Magistrate has been procured restraining such procession, a suit to declare the right to carry such procession is sustainable without such proof, the cause of action being the improper order so obtained by the defendants. *KANDASAMI MUDALI v. SUBROYA MUDALI* (1909)

**I. L. R. 32 Mad. 478**

2. ————— *Right to carry religious processions in.* Continued use by the public of a way raises a presumption that that way belongs to the public and that it has been dedicated by the owner for the public use. *Farquhar v. Newbury Rural Council*, [1908] 2 Ch. 586 at page 596, referred to. All members of the public have a right to carry religious processions through such public way in a lawful manner, irrespective of the religion to which they may belong. *MANNADA MUDALI v. NALLAYA GOUNDEX* (1909)

**I. L. R. 32 Mad. 527**

**PUBLIC THOROUGHFARE.**

*See* NUISANCE . **I. L. R. 31 All. 444**

*See* PUBLIC ROAD, HIGHWAY, STREET OR THOROUGHFARE.

**PUBLIC TRUSTS.**

*See* CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 539.

*See* RIGHT OF SUIT.

**I. L. R. 32 Calc. 273**

1. ————— *Public trust—Sanction of the Advocate-General, when necessary, under the Civil Procedure Code.* S. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code contemplates the existence of a dispute of such a public nature that the intervention of the Advocate-General is necessary to decide if and by whom a suit should be brought to establish a public right. *Sajedur Raja v. Gour Mohun Das*, **I. L. R. 2 Calc. 418, 425**, referred to. *MONI JAN BIBEE v. KHADEM HOSSEIN* (1905)

**9 C. W. N. 151**

2. ————— *Suit by an individual to establish a common right to a public religious trust—Other persons associated as co-plaintiff—If such suit falls within s. 39 or s. 539—Ss. 539 and 30, if mutually exclusive—S. 539, construction of.* The words of s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code contemplate the existence of persons, other than those permitted to sue, who may be affected. The existence of such other persons, or the joinder of some of them as co-plaintiffs does not take away the right of an individual to sue under that section, provided his rights, as contemplated in that section, have been infringed. The Chinese community of Calcutta are divided into two classes, the Puntis and the Hakalus. The Puntis being excluded from the Chinese temple and cemetery, five of them, after obtaining the sanction of the Advocate-General under s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code, instituted this suit for a declaration that the temple and cemetery were public religious and charitable trusts for the benefit of the said community and as such, the

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Puntis including the plaintiffs were entitled to the benefits thereof. Objection was taken that the suit, as framed, was not maintainable as it fell within s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code and not under s. 539:—*Held*, that the suit was maintainable. *MACMOCHI v. LEE CHIN* (1905) . **9 C. W. N. 594**

**PUBLIC WORKS IRRIGATION DEPARTMENT.**

*See* TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT (IV OF 1882), s. 54 . **I. L. R. 34 Calc. 207**

**PUBLIC WORSHIP.**

*See* HINDU LAW—WORSHIP.

*See* MADRAS MUNICIPAL ACT, 1878, s. 119. **I. L. R. 6 Mad. 287**

*See* MAHOMEDAN LAW—CUSTOM.

**I. L. R. 18 Calc. 448**  
**L. R. 18 I. A. 59**

*See* MAHOMEDAN LAW—WORSHIP.

*See* RIGHT OF SUIT—PUBLIC WORSHIP, SUITS REGARDING RIGHT OF.

**PUBLICATION.**

*See* DEFAMATION ; LIBEL.

*See* PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.

**7 C. W. N. 246**

————— of banns of marriage—

*See* BIGAMY . . . **I. L. R. 1 All. 316**

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*See* LOTTERY . . . **I. L. R. 10 Bom. 97**

*See* PRINTING PRESSES AND NEWSPAPERS ACT (XXV OF 1867), ss. 3, 12.

**I. L. R. 23 Calc. 414**

**PUISNE MORTGAGEE.**

*See* MORTGAGE.

————— *Prior mortgage—Suit by prior mortgagee for sale—Puisne mortgagee not made a party—Sale in execution—Rights of the puisne mortgagee.* Where a prior mortgagee sues his mortgagor for the sale of the mortgaged property without making the puisne mortgagee a party to the suit, the latter is in no way affected by the suit or its results. Thus if the property is brought to sale in execution of the decree and is bought by a third person, the puisne mortgagee has, as against him, precisely the same rights as he had collectively against his mortgagor and the prior mortgagee. That is to say, he may sue to redeem the purchaser as mortgagee or thereafter as mortgagor to foreclose or suffer himself to be redeemed by him. *PANDURANG v. SAKHARCHAND* (1906)

**I. L. R. 31 Bom. 112**

**PUJA KHARACH.**

*See* ABWAB .

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**PUNCHAYET.**

*See* CONFESSION .

**1 C. W. N. 904**



**PUNDITS, OPINIONS OF.**

1. ———— **Weight to be attached to.** Observations of the Privy Council as to the weight to be attached to the opinions of pundits. **COLLECTOR OF MADURA v. MUTU RAMALINGA SATHUPATHY**  
1 B. L. R. P. C. 1: 12 Moo. I. A. 397  
10 W. R. P. C. 17

2. ———— *Pundits disagreeing with current authorities.* The opinions of pundits must not be taken on their authority to be a correct exposition of the law when such opinions are discordant from works of current and established authority. **COLLECTOR OF MASULIPATAM v. CAVALY VENCATA NARAINAPAH**  
2 W. R. P. C. 61: 1 Moo. I. A. 529

3. ———— **Reference to pundits—State-ment of cases.** Every reference in a suit to law officers likely to bind a right should embrace all important facts proved or admitted in the cause which may affect the conclusion, and it is the duty of the Court itself so to frame the questions as to elicit an opinion upon the very facts on which the legal title depends. **MYNA BOYEE v. OOTTORAM**  
2 W. R. P. C. 4: 8 Moo. I. A. 400

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**POWERS OF MAGISTRATES.**

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——— **form of—**

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See **SENTENCE.**

**PUNJAB LAWS ACT.**

——— **IV of 1872 (as amended by Act XII of 1878), ss. 10, 12, 14—**

——— *Pre-emption—"Vil-lage community"—Occupancy tenants in zamin-dari village.* The expression "village community," in the Punjab Laws Act (XII of 1878), is not used to denote a village community of the typical sort, consisting of members of one family or one clan holding the village lands in common, and dividing between them the agricultural lands according to

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——— **IV of 1872 (as amended by Act XII OF 1878), ss. 10, 12, 14—concl'd.**

the custom of the village; but is used to denote a body of persons bound together by the tie of resi-dence in one and the same village, amenable to the village customs, and subject to the administra-tive control of the village officers. A "village com-munity" is not confined to the landowners in the village. Occupancy tenants are members, within the meaning of the Punjab Laws Act, and so are all persons in any inferior position who belong to the village, though they may be unconnected with the land and not entitled to any right of pre-emption under the Act. **RAHIMUDDIN v. REWAL (1903)**

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 635

s.c. 7 C. W. N. 498

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See **BENGAL TENANCY ACT**, s. 167.

13 C. W. N. 412

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Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 69—*Money paid by purchaser towards an incumbrance subject to which he buys, not recoverable under.* Where a purchaser of property at a Court sale purchases it, subject to a charge for maintenance, such purchaser cannot, under s. 69 of the Contract Act, recover from the owner in whose hands it was so liable, payments made by him (the purchaser) towards maintenance to prevent the sale of the property. *MANGALATHAMMAL v. NARAYANSWAMI AIYAR* (1907).  
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1. \_\_\_\_\_ *Putni Regulation (VIII of 1819)—Notice—Irregularity—Sale setting aside.* In a suit to set aside a sale held under the Putni Regulation it was found that the notices were stuck up in the Collector's Office Board outside the Court from 10 A.M. to 5 P.M. and were not put up at all on Sundays. *Held*, that this was a sufficient compliance with the terms of the Regulation. *Bejoy Chand Mahatap v. Atulya Charan Bose, I. L. R. 32 Calc. 953*, explained and distinguished. *SACHI NANDAN DUTTA v. BEJOY CHAND MAHATAP (1906)* . . . . .

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2. \_\_\_\_\_ *Suit to set aside sale—Jurisdiction—Return of plaint—Appeal.* A suit to set aside a sale held under the Putni Regulation may be brought in any one of several Courts in whose jurisdiction the property or a part thereof is situated although the sale was held in the Collectorate of a district other than that in which the suit is to be brought. A *putni* was sold in the Burdwan Collectorate and a suit was instituted to set aside the sale in the Court of the Sub-Judge of Hughly in whose jurisdiction a portion of the property was situate. The Court returned the plaint for presentation to the proper Court; the plaintiff took back his plaint and presented it to the Burdwan Court. *Held*, that having regard to the action of the plaintiff in presenting the plaint to the Burdwan Court, *i.e.*, in accepting and acting under the order of the Hughly Court, it is not open to him to appeal from the order returning the plaint. *BENI MADHUB DAS v. JOTINDRA MOHUN TAGORE (1907)*

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**QUIA TIMET ACTION.**

*Easement—Ancient lights—Injunction to restrain defendant from interfering with ancient lights.* There are at least two necessary ingredients for a *quia timet* action. There must, if no actual damage is proved, be proof of imminent danger and there must also be proof that the apprehended damage will, if it comes, be very substantial. *Fletcher v. Bealey*, L. R. 28 Ch. D. 688, followed. *GANGABAI v. PURSHOTAM* (1907)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 146

**QUO WARRANTO, WRIT OF.**

See CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL CONSOLIDATION ACT, s. 31 . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 717

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See BOMBAY POLICE ACT, 1890, s. 47.

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 746

**RAILWAY.**

——— cattle straying on—

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I. L. R. 18 Mad 228

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See BOMBAY MUNICIPAL ACT, 1865, s. 2.

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See CONTRACT—PRIVITY OF CONTRACT.

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1. ——— Liability for nuisance caused by works—Statutory powers—Beng. Reg. I of 1824—Act XLII of 1850—Land taken for public purposes—Suit for injunction to restrain nuisance.

The plaintiffs, the owners and occupiers of a house and premises in Howrah, sued for an injunction to restrain a nuisance caused by certain workshops, forges, and furnaces erected by the defendants, and for damages for the injury done thereby. The defendants were a railway company incorporated under an Act of Parliament for the purpose of making and maintaining railways in India, and by an agreement (entered into under their Act of Incorporation) between them and the East India Company, they were authorized and directed to make and maintain such railway stations, offices, machinery, and other works (connected with making, maintaining, and working the railways) as the East India Company might deem necessary or expedient. The workshops complained of were erected in 1867 under the sanction of the Bengal Government on land purchased by the Government in 1854 for the purposes of the railway under Regulation I of 1824 and Act XLII of 1850, and which had been made over to the defendants. *Held*, that a nuisance having been proved to exist—that is to say, such annoyance as materially interfered with the ordinary comfort of human existence in the house and caused sensible injury to the property of the plaintiffs,—the defendants could not plead laches or acquiescence on the plaintiffs' part, as, upon the plaintiffs complaining in May 1870, the defendants had admitted that there was a nuisance, and had up to June 1871 made various efforts to abate it. Nor could the defendants escape liability on the ground that the nuisance had been caused by them in the reasonable exercise of powers conferred upon them by the Legislature. An injunction was granted restraining the defendants, and liberty to apply was reserved in the decree. On a motion by the defendants, supported by an affidavit showing the alterations which they proposed to make with the view of abating the nuisance, and alleging that a period of three months was required to carry out these alterations, and that a refusal to grant this time would necessitate the closing of the company's workshops, and would occasion great inconvenience, the Court granted the time asked for, on the conditions that the defendants paid the costs of the application, and did all they possibly could in the meanwhile to prevent annoyance to the plaintiffs. *RAJ MOHUN BOSE v. EAST INDIAN RAILWAY COMPANY* . . . . . 10 B. L. R. 241

2. ——— Fire caused by spark from engine—Action for damages—Negligence—Statutory powers. The East Indian Railway Company was incorporated under 12 & 13 Vict., c. XCIII, "for the purpose of making and constructing, working, and maintaining" the East Indian Railway, including all necessary, accessory, or convenient extensions, branches, etc., as might be agreed upon between the Railway Company and the East India Company; and by agreement between the Railway Company and the East India Company, dated 17th August 1849, the Railway Company



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was "authorized and directed to make and maintain such stations, offices, machinery, and other works and conveniences connected with the making, maintaining, and working the Railway," and "to provide a good and sufficient working stock of engines, carriages, and other plant and machinery for working the said railway." The plaintiff was the owner of a piece of land adjoining the railway line at Kharmatta, a station on the Chord Line of the Company's railway, on which land was erected a bungalow, with stables and out-houses adjoining. In the action brought by the plaintiff against the Railway Company to recover compensation for damages occasioned by a fire caused by a spark from one of the engines of the Company, the plaintiff alleged want of due care on the part of the defendants in the management of the line by allowing dry grass of too great a length to remain on the railway banks, and in driving their engines along the line without due precautions being taken to prevent the expulsion of sparks. *Held*, that the defendant Company was authorized to run locomotive engines on the lines of railway constructed by the Company under the statutory powers given to it, and therefore the Company was not liable for damage caused in working the line under such a statutory powers, without proof of negligence. *Held*, also, on the evidence, that neither in the construction of their engines nor in the condition of the railway banks was any negligence shown on the part of the Company. **HALFORD v. EAST INDIAN RAILWAY COMPANY**

14 B. L. R. 1

See also **MADRAS RAILWAY COMPANY v. ZAMINDAR OF CARVETINAGARAM**

14 B. L. R. 209 : 22 W. R. 279  
L. R. 1 I. A. 364

3. ———— **Liability of company—Loss of articles not declared or insured—Liability between arrival and delivery.** A railway company is not liable for non-delivery of articles specified in s. 10, Act XVIII of 1854, the value of which has neither been declared nor insured. The protection conferred by that section extends till such time as the consignee takes delivery, and does not terminate on the arrival of the articles at their destination. **ILLOOR KRISTNIAH v. GREAT INDIAN PENINSULA RAILWAY COMPANY. ILLOOR KRISTNIAH v. MADRAS RAILWAY COMPANY** . I. L. R. 2 Mad. 310

4. ———— **Railway Act, 1854, s. 10—Declaration of nature of goods—Silver—Loss by criminal act of company's servants.** S. 10 of the Railway Act, which provides that no railway company shall in any case be answerable for loss or injury in respect of gold, silver, and other excepted articles delivered for carriage, unless the conditions of that section are fulfilled, applies where the loss has been caused by the criminal acts of the company's servants. *Semble*: If, after declaration made by the sender of an excepted article entitling the railway company to receive an increased charge, the goods are carried at the ordinary rates the sender would be entitled to recover in case of loss. The conditions of s. 10 are not fulfilled by the sender

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merely giving an account of the quantity and description of the goods delivered for carriage when required to do so by the booking clerk. To establish the liability of the railway company in the case of excepted articles, the declaration required by s. 10 must be made in such a manner as to intimate that the sender invites the company to undertake the special risk and is willing to pay the special rates. **VENKATACHALA v. SOUTH INDIAN RAILWAY COMPANY** . I. L. R. 5 Mad. 208

5. ———— **Negligence—Liability for injury—Act XVIII of 1854, s. 11.** A railway company is liable for injury sustained by goods committed to their care, if they have been guilty of gross negligence. **ASSAM TEA COMPANY v. EAST INDIAN RAILWAY COMPANY**

Bourke O. C. 39

6. ———— **Damage done not covered by risk note—Onus probandi.** A company, though protected from certain risks by a risk note, is not absolved from all liability or able to impose on the consignor the burden of proving that the loss or non-delivery of the goods was caused by some default not covered by the risk note for which the company is liable. **SUNTOKH RAI v. EAST INDIAN RAILWAY COMPANY** . . . 2 Agra 200

7. ———— **Liability of company—Carriers of goods—Act XVIII of 1854, s. 11—Negligence.** The East Indian Railway Company cannot, under s. 11 of Act XVIII of 1854, limit their responsibility as carriers in respect of ordinary goods so as not to be liable for loss or injury caused by gross negligence or misconduct, though possibly they may, with the consent of Government, limit their liability by contract or notice for loss arising otherwise than by gross neglect. **EAST INDIAN RAILWAY COMPANY v. JORDAN**

4 B. L. R. O. C. 97 : 14 W. R. O. C. 11

8. ———— **Carriers—Insufficiency of evidence.** The consignees of two bundles of cow-hides which had been carried by a railway company having refused to take delivery on the ground of shortness in the number of pieces, the railway company pleaded that they were not indebted, as he had contracted to carry such and such a number of bundles and had done so. The bills of lading showed so many bundles said to contain such a number of pieces. The company also contested the plaintiff's enumeration of pieces. *Held*, that the railway company was not liable, there being no evidence that the bundles had been broken or the hides counted by pieces. **SCHLAEPFER, PUTZ & Co. v. EASTERN BENGAL RAILWAY COMPANY**

21 W. R. 830

9. ———— **Carriers—Evidence—Burden of proof of negligence—Misdescription of goods—Carriers Act (III of 1865), s. 9—Act XVIII of 1854, s. 11.** The plaintiff caused to be delivered to the defendants, for carriage from Bombay to Oojein, certain goods, among which were twelve bags of sugar-candy. His agent, when signing the consignment note at the railway station, erroneously, but without fraudulent intent, stated



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the contents of the twelve bags to be alum, for which a lower freight was charged by the defendants. The railway clerk received the goods and gave a receipt note, on which the following condition was printed: "The company give notice that they are not responsible for loss or damage arising from fire, the act of God, or civil commotion." In the course of the journey a fire broke out in the train, and a large portion of the plaintiff's goods including ten bags of the sugar-candy was destroyed. In an action for damages for non-delivery:—*Held*, (i) that under the provisions of s. 9 of the Carriers Act (III of 1865), the burden of proving negligence on the part of the defendants did not rest upon the plaintiff, notwithstanding the condition in the receipt note; (ii) that the misdescription by the plaintiff's agent, of the twelve bags of sugar-candy as alum did not exonerate the defendants from all liability to the plaintiff in respect of these bags. The plaintiff, however, was only entitled to recover, in respect of the ten lost bags, the value of alum only, and not sugar-candy; while the defendants, on the other hand, could not, in respect of the said ten bags, charge freight as for sugar-candy. *ISHVARDAS GULASCHAND v. G. I. P. RAILWAY COMPANY*

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 120

10. — *Act XVIII of 1854, ss. 11 and 43—Carriers.* The defendants, having made arrangements with the Madras Railway Company for the through carriage of goods, received from the plaintiff's agent at Poona thirty bags of jowari to be conveyed thence to Bellary and delivered to the plaintiff's agent there. The "goods consignment note," which was signed by the plaintiff's agent at Poona, contained the following condition, of which he had due notice: "The Company receive goods for conveyance to stations on other railways with which they have made arrangements to book through, *subject to the rules and regulations and rates and fares of the respective companies over whose lines the goods may pass.*" On reaching Raichore, the bags of jowari were transferred from the defendants' wagon in which they had left Poona into wagon of the Madras Railway Company. One bag was subsequently lost; but the remaining twenty-nine arrived and were unloaded in good condition at Bellary on the 19th September, 1877. No steps were taken, either by the defendants or by the Madras Railway Company, to give information of the arrival of the bags to the consignee, and he never received them. The plaintiff sued to recover their value. The defendants pleaded (i) that, under a rule of the Madras Railway in force at the time of the making of the contract between the plaintiff and the defendants, delivery was complete the instant the bags were unloaded at Bellary; and (ii) that the plaintiff's agent at Bellary did not apply for the goods, but allowed them to remain in the station-yard until they became rotten by rain and were destroyed by order of the Collector some time in November. The Madras Railway Company had issued a public notice of the above rule in the following terms: "The Madras Railway Company here-

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by give public notice that they will not be responsible for loss of, or damage to, grain after it has been unloaded from the Company's wagons." The defendants sought to incorporate this notice into their contract with the plaintiff by virtue of the condition printed in their "goods consignment note." *Held*, that the said public notice afforded no protection to the defendants, on the ground that it was invalid as a regulation for non-compliance with the provisions of s. 43 of Act XVIII of 1854, inasmuch as it had not been sanctioned by the Local Government, and had not been posted up at all the stations of the Madras line of railway; and that it could not otherwise be binding against the plaintiff, as neither the plaintiff nor his agent were shown to have had any knowledge of it at the time of entering into the contract with the defendants. *Quære*: Whether, if the plaintiff or his agent had such knowledge at the time of making the consignment, the notice would have constituted such a stipulation as to contravene s. 11 of Act XVIII of 1854 or whether it might be read together with that section, and treated as effectual, except so far as its operation would be limited in its scope by that section. *Held*, also, that the arrival of the grain at the station of destination (Bellary) having been proved, the burden of showing that the goods were ready for delivery to the plaintiff for a reasonable time after such arrival lay on the defendants, although no proof had been given of any application for delivery by the plaintiff within a reasonable time. It is the duty of a railway company to keep goods which have reached the station of their destination ready there for delivery until the consignee, in the exercise of due diligence, can call for and remove them, and it is the duty of the consignee to call for and remove them within a reasonable time. *Semble*: The object of s. 11 of Act XVIII of 1854 is to preclude railway companies from being able by any stipulation to escape from liability for loss or injury to goods caused by the gross negligence or misconduct of their agents or servants. *SURUTRAM BHAYA v. G. I. P. RAILWAY COMPANY*

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 96

11. — *Carriers, liability of—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 151, 152—Act XVIII of 1854—Act III of 1865.* The English common law rule, under which common carriers are held liable as insurance of goods against all risks except the act of God or the King's enemies is not now in force in India. In cases not met by the special provisions of the Act relating to railways and carriers, the liability of carriers for loss or damage to goods entrusted to them is prescribed by ss. 151 and 152 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872). The plaintiff's goods were being carried in a train of the defendants from Nandgaon to Egatpuri. During the journey the train was plundered by robbers, and the plaintiff's goods were stolen. *Held*, that the defendants were entitled to the benefit of s. 152 of the Contract Act, and should be permitted to give evidence that the robbers of the plaintiff's goods were not the servants or agents of the defendants, and that the defendants (by their servants and agents) took as much care of their goods as a man



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of ordinary prudence would, under similar circumstances, take of his own goods of the same bulk, quality, and value as the goods in question. **KUVERJI TULSIDAS v. G. I. P. RAILWAY COMPANY**  
I. L. R. 3 Bom. 109

12. ————— *Exemption from liability—Special contract—Risk note—Railway Act (IX of 1890), s. 54, cl. (1), s. 72, cls. (a), (b), sub-cl. (2) and (3)—Carriers Act, 1865.* The plaintiff sued the defendants (a railway company) for damage for short delivery of goods consigned to him. The defendants pleaded a special contract signed by the consignor, which, in consideration of their carrying the goods at a special reduced rate instead of the ordinary tariff rate, exempted them from liability for loss or damage to the goods from any cause whatever before, during, and after transit over their railway or other railways working in connection therewith. *Held*, that under the contract the defendants were not liable to the plaintiff. **TIPPANNA v. SOUTHERN MAHARATHA RAILWAY COMPANY** . . . I. L. R. 17 Bom. 417

13. ————— *Railway Act (IV of 1879), s. 11—Loss of goods—Carrier—Bailment—Declaration of nature and value of goods and payment of increased charge, Effect of—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 151.* In respect of goods for which, under s. 11 of the Indian Railway Act (IV of 1879), a railway company is under no liability unless "an increased charge" is paid, the payment of an increased charge puts them under the same liability as they are under with respect to goods not specially provided for by that section, *viz.*, the liability of ordinary bailees. The payment of "an increased charge" is not equivalent to insurance. In January 1890 a box containing rupees was delivered by the plaintiffs to the defendant Company in Bombay to be carried to Saugor. From the evidence it appeared that the plaintiffs did not intend to insure the box. The box was taken to the booking office at the station, and the parcel clerk asked what it contained, and was told that it contained coin, and he learned casually that the amount was Rs. 6,000. The clerk charged Rs. 18-1-0 for the box, which was the "treasure rate" for carriage. This sum was paid, and the box was duly despatched, but was lost or stolen in the course of transit. The plaintiffs sued to recover the Rs. 6,000. The defendants contended that, having regard to the provisions of s. 11 of Act IV of 1879, they were not liable, inasmuch as (1) the contents of box had been duly disclosed, nor (2) had an increased charge been paid. The plaintiffs obtained a decree in the lower Court. On appeal: *Held* (reversing the decree), that the defendant company was not liable (i) because there was no sufficient declaration of the value and contents of the box; (ii) because the sum paid by the plaintiffs for the carriage of the box was the ordinary charge for treasure, and was not the increased charge which under s. 11 of Act VI of 1879 should have been paid in order to make the company liable. **GREAT INDIAN PENINSULA RAILWAY CO. v. RAISETT CHANDMULL**  
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 165

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Reversing the decision in **RAISETT CHANDMULL HAMIRMULL v. G. I. P. RAILWAY COMPANY**  
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 723

14. ————— *Railways Act (IX of 1890), ss. 72 and 76—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 151, 152, and 161—Carriers Act (III of 1865)—Liability of Railway Companies as bailees.* Subject to the provisions of Act IX of 1890, the responsibility of Railway Companies for loss of goods delivered to them for carriage is that of a bailee under ss. 151, 152, and 161 of the Indian Contract Act. In a suit for damages occasioned by such a loss, the plaintiff need not prove how the loss occurred, but, on proof of the loss, the company will, in absence of proof of any ground upon which it can be exonerated, be liable as a bailee. **SESHAM PATER v. MOSS** I. L. R. 17 Mad. 445

15. ————— *Railways Act (IX of 1890), ss. 72, 76—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 151, 152, and 161—Contract—Bailment—Liability of bailee—Burden of proof—Railway Company.* Where goods are delivered to a railway company for carriage not "at owner's risk," and such goods are lost or destroyed while in the custody of the company, it is not for the owner suing for compensation for such loss or destruction to prove negligence on the part of the company, but when the owner has proved delivery to the company, it is for the company to prove that they have exercised the care required by the Contract Act, 1872, of bailees for hire. **NANKU RAM v. INDIAN MIDLAND RAILWAY CO.** . . . I. L. R. 22 All. 361

16. ————— *"Terminal charges"—Right of G. I. P. Railway Company to levy terminal charges—Stat. 12 & 13 Vict., c. 83 (Local and Pers.)—Railway Act (IX of 1890), ss. 41, 45, 46—Carriers.* By the Act of Incorporation of the defendant Company it was enacted that it should be lawful for the Railway Company and the East India Company to enter into such contracts, etc., as they thought fit (*inter alia*) for performing all matters and things necessary or convenient for carrying into effect the making, maintaining, and working the railway . . . including any provision as to the tolls, receipts, and profits thereof." Subsequently the defendant Company and the East India Company entered into an agreement with each other, under which the defendant Company were empowered to make certain charges called "terminal charges"—charges which are levied on account of the carrying of goods to and from the wagon, loading and unloading them on and from the wagon, and for the use of the Company's premises till the goods are removed. The plaintiffs sued to recover from the defendants the sum of Rs. 1,34,152-11, which during the three years prior to suit the plaintiffs had been obliged by the defendants to pay as "terminal charges" on consignments of cotton made by the plaintiffs from up-country stations to Bombay. The plaintiffs objected to these charges as not within the scope of the powers conferred by the Act of Incorporation of the defendant Company, and contended (i) that such charges were illegal; (ii) that if not illegal, they were



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excessive. *Held*, by FARRAN, J., dismissing the suit, that the defendants were entitled to charge "terminal charges" on the goods carried by them for the plaintiffs, subject only, as to the rates and amounts thereof, to the sanction of Government; and that the rates charged to the plaintiffs were not higher than the sanctioned charges. "Terminal charge" means a charge for the use of goods station and for the various duties which a Railway Company, as common carriers, perform in connection with the goods consigned to them for carriage. *Semle*: Under ss. 41, 45, and 46 of Act IX of 1890, the High Court has no jurisdiction to consider or entertain a claim relating to terminals charged by the defendants subsequently to the time at which that Act came into operation. *Held*, on appeal (SARGENT, C.J., and BAYLEY, J.), that the charges were within the authority given by that Act. Such charges, if not strictly "tolls," were certainly charges for performing services, if not, "necessary," at any rate "convenient for the working of the railway," and payment for such services might also properly be regarded as a source of "profit" to the Railway Company, within the meaning of that Act. The only "terminal charge" sanctioned by Government was a charge sanctioned in 1865, and then expressly defined as "including collection and delivery." The defendant Company had since that date given up "collecting and delivering," but there had been no new scale of terminal charges submitted for sanction, or sanctioned. It was consequently contended by the plaintiffs that the "terminal charge" now levied had never been sanctioned. *Held*, also, that a review of the proceedings leading to the sanction of 1865 showed that Government had contemplated the possible abandonment by the Company of "collection and delivery" when it sanctioned the rate then fixed; and that consequently it must be presumed that Government had left it to the defendant Company to make such deductions, in case of abandonment of this portion of their services, as they should think proper, which they had done. LALJIBHAI SHANJI v. G. I. P. RAILWAY COMPANY. I. L. R. 16 Bom. 434

Affirming decision of lower Court in same case.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 537

17. ——— Remoteness of damage—*Railways Act (IX of 1890), s. 72—Condition under which goods despatched by Railway—Absence of proof of deterioration—Contract Act, s. 73.* The plaintiff, who was a tailor, delivered a sewing machine and some cloths to the Madras Railway Company (the defendant) to be sent to a place where he expected to carry on his business with special profit by reason of a forthcoming festival. Through the fault of the Company's servants, the goods were delayed in transmission, and were not delivered until some days after the conclusion of the festival. The plaintiff had given no notice to the Company that the goods were required to be delivered within a fixed time for any special purpose, and he had signed a forwarding note under a statement that he agreed to be bound by the conditions at the back,

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and one of those conditions was to the effect that the Company is not liable "for any loss of or damage to any goods whatever by reason of accidental or unavoidable delays in transit or otherwise." The plaintiff now sued to recover from the Company a sum on account of his estimated profits and the travelling expenses of himself and his assistant at the place of delivery and their expenses for food and lodging while there. *Held*, (i) that, as the plaintiff had not shown that the goods had undergone deterioration in value or otherwise, the condition above cited was not void under Railways Act, 1890, s. 72, although it had not been approved by the Governor General in Council; (ii) that the plaintiff was bound by the condition even if he was in fact ignorant of its effect; (iii) that the damages claimed were too remote. MADRAS RAILWAY CO. v. GOVINDA RAU. I. L. R. 21 Mad. 172

18. ——— Explosion in carriage—*Duty to carry passengers safely—Negligence—Onus of proof—Ignorance or knowledge of law as a defence, Its limitation—Damages, measure of—Costs.* *Held*, by the Appellate Court (affirming the decision of the Court below), that in providing for the safety of their passengers it is the duty of a Railway Company to exercise such a degree of care, at the very least, as may reasonably be required from them under all the circumstances of the case, and where an accident happens, they must show that it was not preventable by any care or skill. If a railway carriage be rendered dangerous to the passengers travelling therein by reason of the fact that there are fireworks in it, and if the carrying of the fireworks could have been prevented by the exercise of due care on the part of the Railway Company, they are liable for damages for negligence should an explosion of the fireworks occur. Where loss of life and a damage have resulted from the explosion of fireworks in a passenger carriage, the onus is on the Railway Company to show that they took due care to prevent the conveyance of fireworks in that manner, and not on the plaintiff to show that they did not. *Scott v. London Dock Co.*, 3 H. & C. 596; *Kearney v. London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Co.*, L. R. 5 Q. B. 411; on appeal L. R. 6 Q. B. 759; *Byrne v. Beadle*, 2 H. & C. 722; *Cotton v. Wood*, 8 C. B. N. S. 568; *Foulkes v. Metropolitan Railway Co.*, L. R. 5 C. P. D. 157; *Welfare v. London and Brighton Railway Co.*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 693; and *Daniel v. Metropolitan Railway Co.*, L. R. 3 C. P. 593; on appeal, L. R. 5 E. & I. Ap. 45, referred to. Costs in a case like the present should be allowed as between attorney and client, so as not to exhaust the damages or the larger portion thereof. *Narayan Jetha v. Municipal Commissioners of Bombay*, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 254; *Sorabji Ratanji v. Great Indian Peninsula Railway Co.*, 7 Bom. O. C. 119 note; and *Ratanbai v. Great Indian Peninsula Railway Co.*, 7 Bom. O. C. 120 note; 8 Bom. O. C. 130, followed. *Per O'KINEALY, J.* (in the Court below). In the absence of evidence that the defendants had taken steps to prevent passengers from taking fireworks into the carriage, the Court cannot presume that the fireworks were taken clandestinely into the



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compartment, notwithstanding the fact that such carriage of fireworks is an offence, and that every one is presumed to know the law. The maxim that every man is presumed to know the law is limited to the determination of the civil or criminal liability of the person whose knowledge is in question. It cannot legitimately be made use of where (as in the present case) the parties are different and distinct from him. *EAST INDIAN RAILWAY CO. v. KALLY DASS MOOKERJEE* I. L. R. 26 Cal. 465 2 C. W. N. 809 : 3 C. W. N. 781

19. — Negligence of Railway Company in leaving door of railway carriage open or unfastened—*Hurt caused to passenger while trying to secure door.* Leaving the door of a railway carriage open or unfastened amounts to negligence on the part of a Railway Company, and the Company is liable for any injury caused thereby to a passenger. If any inconvenience or danger is caused by the negligence of the Company, a passenger may lawfully attempt to get rid of such inconvenience or danger, provided that in doing so he runs no obvious risk disproportionate to the inconvenience or danger; and is not himself guilty of any negligence; and, if in such attempt he is injured, the Company is liable in damages. The door of a railway carriage attached to a train running from Poona to Bombay was left open or unfastened when the train left the Khandala station. The plaintiff was then asleep in the carriage. He subsequently awoke when the train was passing through a tunnel and found that the whole of the door, which opened outwards, had been torn away from its hinges, except the upper part or sunshade, which was flapping backwards and forwards against the side of the tunnel and the door post of the carriage. In attempting to secure it, the top of the plaintiff's finger was torn away and the bone of one of his fingers fractured. *Held*, that the injuries were caused by the negligence of the Railway Company, and that the plaintiff was entitled to damages. *BROMLEY v. GREAT INDIAN PENINSULA RAILWAY CO.* I. L. R. 24 Bom. 1

20. — Interchange of traffic between two Railway Companies—*Agency.* When two Railway Companies interchange traffic goods, and passengers with through tickets, rates, and invoices, payment being made at either end and profits shared by mileage, the receiving Company, by granting a receipt-note for goods to be carried over and delivered at a station of the delivering company's line, does not thereby contract with the consignor of the goods as agent of the delivering Company. *KALEE KAHU RUM MAIGRAJ v. MADRAS RAILWAY COMPANY*

I. L. R. 3 Mad. 240

21. — Responsibility of a Railway Company, in the care of passengers—*Passengers—Injury to the latter by the illegal act of a fellow passenger—Indian Railways Act (IX of 1890), s. 59—Negligence.* The legal obligation upon a Railway Company to exercise due care and skill in

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carrying passengers does not extend so far that the Company can be held responsible, under all circumstances, for not carrying them safely. Negligence alleged against them must be proved affirmatively, where denied. It was not the duty of the railway servants to search every parcel that passed the ticket barrier, carried by a passenger. Words in the judgment of the Chief Justice, Q. B., in *Collett v. The London and North-Western Railway Company*, 16 Q. B. 984, as to the duty to "carry safely," explained. As no act, or omission, of neglect had been proved against the Company or their servants, the decrees below were recommended for reversal, and the suit for dismissal. *EAST INDIAN RAILWAY COMPANY v. KALIDAS MUKERJI* (1901) I. L. R. 28 Cal. 401 s.c. 5 C. W. N. 449 : L. R. 28 I. A. 144

22. — Responsibility of Railway Company for goods left on its premises without a receipt being obtained for them—*Railways Act (IX of 1890), s. 47 (b)—Rules framed by the Company under the Act.* *Held*, that a rule by which a Railway Company disclaimed all responsibility for goods left on the Company's premises unless certain conditions were fulfilled, the principle of which was that the goods should have been accepted and a receipt given for them by a duly authorized employé of the Company, was a rule properly made under the provisions of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, and that no suit in respect of the loss of goods merely deposited upon the Company's premises without such a receipt being taken for them, could be maintained. *Shea v. The Great Northern Railway Company*, 14 C. B. 647, referred to. *BANNA MAL v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* (1901) I. L. R. 23 All. 367

23. — Re-booking of goods after arrival at original destination—*Carriage of goods—Contract—Formation of contract—Rules of Company for consignment of goods—Instructions to Station-master to re-book.* The rules of a Railway Company prescribed certain procedure for the booking of goods. In accordance with those rules, certain goods were booked from Trichinopoly to Bagalkot. The plaintiff requested A, the goods clerk and Station-master at Hotgi (on defendants' railway), to have the goods re-booked from Bagalkot to Hotgi, and for this purpose handed him the railway receipt, with a written application, which, however, was not in the form of consignment used by the Company. A accordingly sent a service telegram to the Station-master at Bagalkot, asking him to re-book the goods. The Station-master there did not re-book the goods, and they were delivered at Bagalkot. The plaintiff sued the Railway Company for damages for non-delivery at Hotgi. *Held*, that the defendant Company had not contracted with the plaintiff to carry the goods from Bagalkot to Hotgi. The mere fact that the plaintiff got A, the Station-master at Hotgi, to send a service telegram to Bagalkot did not constitute a contract to bind the Company. *MALKARJUN SHIDAPA v. SOUTHERN MARATHA RAILWAY COMPANY* (1902) I. L. R. 27 Bom. 126



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24. ————— Negligence in construction of railway—*Suit for damage to land by causing water to flood it—Indian Railways Act (IX of 1890), ss. 7, 312—Acting in excess of statutory powers in construction of railway—Suit for damages.* The defendants, by the negligent construction of a railway made in exercise of their powers under the Indian Railways Act (IX of 1890), caused the plaintiff's land to be flooded in the rainy season, and consequently damaged. That Act provides that a suit shall not lie to recover compensation for damage caused by the exercise of the powers thereby conferred, but that the amount of such compensation shall be determined in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act, 1870. *Held*, it being shown that the defendants had exceeded or abused their statutory powers, that the plaintiff's remedy was by suit for damages, and not for compensation under the Act. Statutory powers under such an Act are to be exercised with ordinary care and skill, and with some regard to the property and rights of others: they are granted on the condition sometimes expressed and sometimes understood—expressed in the Railways Act of 1890, but if not expressed always understood—that the undertakers "shall do as little damage as possible in the exercise of their statutory powers." The injunction should be in general terms, restraining the defendants from flooding, and should not direct the execution of specified works. *Lawrence v. Great Northern Railway Company*, 16 Q. B. 643; *Broadbent v. Imperial Gas Company*, 7 DeG. M. & G. 436; *Bagnall v. London and North-Western Railway Company*, 7 H. & N. 423; *I. H. & C. 544*; *Ricket v. Metropolitan Railway Company*, L. R. 2 E. & I. App. 175, 202; and *Geddis v. Proprietors of the Bann Reservoir*, L. R. 3 A. C. 430, 455, referred to. **GAEKWAR SARKAR OF BARODA v. GANDHI KACHRABHAI** (1903) **I. L. R. 27 Bom. 344**  
**L. R. 30 I. A. 60**  
**7 C. W. N. 393**

25. ————— Diversion of consignment while en route—*Consignment of goods—Delivery to the original consignee—Liability of the Railway Company—Railways Act (IX of 1890), s. 77—Notice—Second appeal—Plea of want of notice, whether allowable—Practice.* G booked a consignment of goods from the Sakrigali Ghat Station on the East Indian Railway to R at Kamptee, a station on the Bengal-Nagpur Railway. Whilst the consignment was en route to Kamptee, G directed the railway servants at Sakrigali Ghat station to notify to the Station-master at Kamptee to deliver the consignment to plaintiff at Nargaon. This direction was given; but, disregarding the order, the Station-master at Kamptee delivered the consignment to R at Kamptee. The plaintiff sued the East Indian Railway to recover compensation for loss of goods. *Held*, that the Railway Company was liable in damages; the case was a simple case of breach of contract; the defendant contracted to carry the goods and deliver them at Nargaon to the plaintiff, and failed to do so. *Held*, further, that the liability of the Railway Company was not

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affected by the fact that the Station-master at Kamptee acted wrongly in disregarding the instructions which he had received from Sakrigali Ghat station. *Held*, further, that a plea of failure to give notice under s. 77 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, urged for the first time in second appeal, and not supported by any evidence that such notice was not given, was taken too late. This could not be regarded as a stale demand, as the suit was filed within two months after the cause of action arose. **CHHAGANLAL SHALIGRAM SHET v. EAST INDIAN RAILWAY COMPANY** (1903)

**I. L. R. 27 Bom. 597**

26. ————— Criminal offence—*Railways Act (IX of 1890), s. 47—Rules under the Act.* Neither s. 47 of the Railways Act, nor the rules made by a Railway Company under that section, create any criminal offence. The section merely gives the Company power to frame rules and to enforce them by imposing fines on its own officers. **BASANTA KUMAR BANERJEE, In re** (1907)

**11 C. W. N. 583**

27. ————— Reserved accommodation—*Railways Act (IX of 1890), s. 67—Benefit of section not waived by Railway Company when they grant reserved accommodation under the rules.* The provision in s. 67 of the Indian Railways Act that 'fares shall be deemed to be accepted and tickets deemed to be issued subject to the condition of there being room available in the train for which the tickets are issued' is introduced for the benefit of Railway Companies and can be waived by them. One of the rules under which reserved accommodation is granted is 'Reserved carriages in mail trains can be provided when the load of the train permits.' In granting reserve accommodation on the terms embodied in the rules, the Company does not contract itself out of the benefit conferred by s. 67, and is not liable in damages for refusing to attach a reserved carriage to a mail train already fully loaded. **KOMIREDDY SURAYANARAYANAMURTY v. THE MADRAS RAILWAY COMPANY** (1907)

**I. L. R. 30 Mad. 417**

28. ————— Receipt of goods by one company for carriage over its own and another company's line—*Contract—Liability in respect of overcharge made by delivering company—Bye-laws—Power of Railway Company to alter the principle of calculation of rates.* Two wagon loads of chillies were received by the Station Master at Bez-wada on the Nizam's Guaranteed State Railway for carriage to Agra station on the Great Indian Peninsula Railway at a rate of Rs 270 per wagon for the whole distance. On arrival at Agra the Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company's Station Master demanded payment of higher rates, calculated per maund, and refused delivery until such rates were paid. The consignees paid under protest and sued both Railway Companies for a refund of the excess charges. *Held*, that the contract for carriage of the goods for the whole distance was one entire contract with the receiving company, who were liable for the overcharge, if any, wrongfully demanded from the consignees. **Muschamp v. Lancaster and Preston**



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*Junction Railway Company*, 8 M. & W. 421 ; 58 R. R. 758 ; *Webber v. The Great Western Railway Company*, 3 H. & C. 771, and *Kalu Ram Maigraj v. The Madras Railway Company*, I. L. R. 3 Mad. 240, followed. *Held*, also, that a bye-law of the Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company which reserved to the Railway the right of remeasurement, reweighment, recalculation and re-classification of rates, terminals and other charges at the place of destination and of collecting before the goods are delivered any amount that may have been omitted or undercharged did not authorize the Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company to alter the contract between the parties and charge at the place of destination maund-rates instead of wagon-rates. *CHUNI LAL v. THE NIZAM'S GUARANTEED STATE RAILWAY COMPANY, LD.* (1906) . I. L. R. 29 All. 228

29. ———— **Luggage, loss of—Passenger's luggage—Merchandise booked as "Luggage," loss of—Railways Act (IX of 1890), ss. 47, 72—General Rules of Railway Companies—Damages, suit for.** A passenger took a journey on a railway and booked as his "luggage" a package containing merchandise. The package was lost and consequently not delivered at the end of his journey. He, thereupon, sued the Railway Company for damages caused by its loss :—*Held*, that the case was governed by s. 72 of the Indian Railways Act (IX of 1890) and the section of the Contract Act referred to therein ; and that the Railway Company was liable for the loss of the package. *VELAYAT HOSSEIN v. BENGAL AND NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY CO.* (1909) . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 819

**RAILWAY, INJURIES ON.**

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, ss. 568, 623 . I. L. R. 31 Bom. 381

**RAILWAY RECEIPT.**

See CONTRACT—BREACH OF CONTRACT. 8 B. L. R. 581

See VENDOR AND PURCHASER—VENDOR, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF. I. L. R. 14 Bom. 57

**possession of—**

See OPIUM, ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF. I. L. R. 36 Calc. 1016

**RAILWAY SERVANTS.**

See ATTACHMENT SUBJECTS OF ATTACHMENT—SALARY. I. L. R. 30 Calc. 713

**RAILWAYS ACT (XVIII OF 1854).**

See RAILWAY COMPANY.

**s. 10—**

See RAILWAYS ACT, 1879, s. 11. 4 Bom. O. C. 129

**s. 15—**

See NEGLIGENCE . I. L. R. 1 All. 60

**RAILWAYS ACT (XVIII OF 1854)—concl'd.****s. 17—**

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—RAILWAYS ACT, 1854. 3 Bom. Cr. 54

**s. 26—**

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—RAILWAYS ACT, 1854. 3 Bom. Cr. 10  
4 Mad. Ap. 9  
6 Mad. Ap. 41  
7 Mad. Ap. 8

See SESSIONS JUDGE, JURISDICTION OF. 6 Mad. Ap. 41

ss. 26, 29—**Duty of guard—Injury to coolies getting on train when in motion.** Where some coolies were employed in assisting a ballast train into motion at a railway station, and one of them, after pushing the train, in getting up on the train, or in attempting to do so, fell and was so injured that he afterwards lost his life :—*Held*, that that evidence did not show that it was the duty of the guard to see that no one got up on the train when in motion. *QUEEN v. FLOOD* 8 W. R. Cr. 4

**s. 27—**

See JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURT—OFFENCES COMMITTED DURING JOURNEY. 1 Mad. 193

**s. 34—**

See SENTENCES AND FINE. 6 Mad. Ap. 37

**s. 35—**

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—RAILWAYS ACT. 3 Bom. Cr. 54

**RAILWAYS ACT (XXV OF 1871).**

s. 2—*Act XVIII of 1854, s. 17—Refusal to produce ticket—Fraudulent intention—Trespass—Passenger by rail.* The plaintiff entered a carriage on the defendants' railway at Surat with the purpose of proceeding to Bombay. By an oversight, and without any fraudulent intent, he omitted to procure a ticket at Surat. On arriving at Nowsari, he applied to the station master for a ticket to Bombay, but was refused ; he was, however, allowed by the defendants' servants to proceed in the same train to Bulsar, where he again applied for a ticket, and was again refused, but was directed by the defendants' servants to get into the train and not leave it again. At Dhandu he again got out and applied for a ticket to the station master. During a discussion between the plaintiff's master and the station master, the plaintiff, at the direction of his master, re-entered the train. Ultimately the station master refused to give the plaintiff a ticket, and ordered him to get out of the train ; and, on his not complying with this order, sent a sepoy, who forcibly removed the plaintiff from the carriage. In an action by the plaintiff to recover damages for



**RAILWAYS ACT (XXV OF 1871)—concl'd.****s. 2—concl'd.**

the forcible and illegal removal of the plaintiff from the carriage, and for the illegal detention of the plaintiff at the station at Dhandu, and for the illegal refusal of the defendants to allow the plaintiff to proceed in the train to Bombay:—*Held*, (i) that the latter portion of s. 2 of Act XXV of 1871, amending s. 1 of Act XVIII of 1854, which provides for payments to be made by persons failing to produce their tickets when demanded by the servants of the company, applies only to the case of a person who has received a ticket and will not or cannot produce it, and not to a person travelling without having obtained a ticket with no intention to defraud; (ii), that the absence of a fraudulent intention did not make the entry into the carriage less unlawful, and consequently that the plaintiff started from Surat as a trespasser; (iii) that the conduct of the railway officials at the stations intermediate between Surat and Dhandu, if it amounted at all to leave and license to the plaintiff to proceed without a ticket, could only operate as such until the train stopped at the next station; (iv), that there was no legal obligation on the station master to issue a ticket to the plaintiff to enable him to proceed from Dhandu. *PRATAB DAJI v. BOMBAY, BARODA AND CENTRAL INDIA RAILWAY COMPANY*

**I. L. R. 1 Bom. 25**

**s. 21—Allowing cattle to stray on the line—Fences to line.** On the 10th April 1874, prisoner's cow strayed on a railway line provided with a fence. On the 13th June following, the Government published rules under s. 21 of the Railway Act Amendment Act, 1871, determining what kind of fences should be deemed to be suitable for the exclusion of cattle. On the date of the offence there were no such rules. No evidence was offered of the state of the fence, and the prisoner was convicted solely on his admission that he was the owner of the cow. *Held*, that the state of the fences required specific proof, in the absence of which the conviction could not be sustained. *ANONYMOUS*

**8 Mad. Ap. 1**

**s. 29—Endangering life by negligence—Precaution taken by others to avoid danger.** The prisoner, a servant of a railway company, was convicted, under s. 29 of Act XXV of 1871, of endangering the lives of the persons in a certain train by negligence. There was no evidence that the safety of any persons in any train had been endangered by his neglect of duty. On the contrary, by reason of precautions taken by other persons any possible danger which might have resulted from his neglect was avoided. *Held*, that he could not be convicted and punished under s. 29 of Act XXV of 1871. *QUEEN v. MANPHOOL*

**5 N. W. 240****RAILWAYS ACT (IV OF 1879).**

See CARRIERS.

See RAILWAY COMPANY.

**RAILWAYS ACT (IV OF 1879)—concl'd.****s. 11—**

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 30.

**I. L. R. 19 Bom. 165**

**1. ——— and Sch. II (1)—Silks—Insurance—Loss of goods by railway company.** The term "silks in a manufactured state and whether wrought up or not wrought up with other materials" used in the second Schedule of the Railways Act, 1879, does not apply to all classes of goods in which silk may be introduced. A cloth composed of silk and cotton thread, one-eighth being silk and seven-eighths cotton, the proportionate value of silk and cotton being one to four and a half, does not come within the meaning of the said term. *SAMINADHA MUDALI v. SOUTH INDIAN RAILWAY COMPANY*

**I. L. R. 6 Mad. 420**

**2. ——— Railways Act, 1854, s. 10—Silk—Question of fact.** Whether or not cotton fabrics bordered with silk, or having a portion of silk otherwise used in their manufacture, are "silks in a manufactured or unmanufactured state, wrought up or not wrought up with other materials," within the meaning of Act XVIII of 1854, s. 10, is a question of fact to be decided on the evidence, not a question of law to be reserved for the opinion of the High Court, under Act IX of 1850, s. 55, and Act XXVI of 1864, s. 7. *Semble*: The proper test for a Judge to apply in such cases is to determine whether or not the value of the silk wrought up with other materials is more than half the value of the fabric. If it be not, the fabric cannot be considered to be silk within the meaning of the Act. *LAKHMIDAS HIRACHAND v. G. I. P. RAILWAY COMPANY*

**4 Bom. O. C. 129**

**ss. 17, 31—Passenger not producing season ticket when called upon—Travelling without a ticket—Order for recovery of fare.** A passenger who has obtained a monthly ticket is liable to be called upon to produce it at any time on the journey which it covers, and if he does not so produce it, he is liable under ss. 17 and 31 of the Railways Act to pay the fare for the journey between the stations for which his ticket was issued. The order, under s. 31, in case of his refusal to pay it, should be one merely for recovery of the amount due as the fare and not an order to pay such or any other sum as if it were a fine. A passenger who has such a ticket which is still in force and in his possession cannot be said to be travelling without a ticket within the meaning of s. 31, merely because he does not happen to have the ticket with him, and therefore cannot produce it when called upon to do so. *In the matter of the petition of BUSKIN. In the matter of the petition of THOMAS. HART v. BUSKIN. HART v. THOMAS*

**I. L. R. 12 Calc. 192**

**s. 26—Disobedience of rule—Accident—Liability.** Liability to conviction under s. 26 of the Railways Act, 1879, arises not from the consequences directly referable to the breach of the rule, but because of the danger which the breach of the rule entails. *SNELL v. QUEEN*

**I. L. R. 6 Mad. 201**



**RAILWAYS ACT (IX OF 1890).**

See CARRIERS.

See PENAL CODE, s. 304A.

8 C. W. N. 645

See RAILWAY COMPANY.

ss. 3, 6, 77 and 140—*Notification of claim for refund as condition precedent to suit—To whom such notification must be given.* Where the plaintiff sued a Railway Company for recovery of money alleged to have been taken by the defendant as freight upon certain goods in excess of what was legally due, and before filing the suit gave notice of her claim for a refund to the General Traffic Manager, it was held that this was not a compliance with the provisions of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, and the suit could not be maintained. *Periannan Chetti v. South Indian Railway Company*, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 137, *The Secretary of State for India in Council v. Dipchand Poddar*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 306, *East Indian Railway Company v. Jeth Mull Ramanand*, I. L. R. 26 Bom. 669, and *Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway Company v. Sauti Lal*, I. L. R. 26 All. 207, followed. *GREAT INDIAN PENINSULA RAILWAY COMPANY v. CHANDRA BAI* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 28 All. 552

ss. 7 to 12—

See RAILWAY COMPANY.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 344

ss. 7, 10 and 11—*Compensation for damage caused by railway works—Suit to enforce construction of a channel to irrigate land—Maintainability.* Plaintiff alleged that the execution of certain works by a Railway Company, under s. 7 of the Indian Railways Act, had interfered with his right to the flow of water to his land. He did not suggest that the Company had exceeded the powers conferred on them by that section, but claimed that they had failed to discharge the obligation, imposed by s. 11 (b) of the Act, to make the necessary accommodation works, and sought a decision of the Court that such works should be executed: *Held*, that he had no right of action. The effect of s. 11 of the Indian Railways Act is that the opinion of the executive, with reference to the sufficiency of accommodation works, is final. *SEETANRAJU KONDAL ROW v. COLLECTOR OF GODAVARI* (1901)

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 632

s. 10—

See COMPENSATION.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 470

s. 12—*Municipality of Bombay—Right to enter on land of Railway Company to lay pipes, etc., in connection with water works—Bombay Municipal Act (Bom. Act III of 1888), ss. 222, 265.* Under the Bombay Municipal Act (Bombay Act III of 1888) the Corporation of Bombay has the right for the purpose of supplying the city with water, to enter upon land belonging to other owners to make connections between the mains and to lay the pipes forming the connections through or under such lands without the owners' permission, though not without giving them reasonable notice in

**RAILWAYS ACT (IX OF 1890)—contd.**

s. 12—contd.

writing. *Held*, also, that s. 12 of the Railways Act (IX of 1890) does not exclude the above right of the Corporation of Bombay to enter on land belonging to the Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company for the said purposes. *GREAT INDIAN PENINSULA RAILWAY CO. v. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF BOMBAY* I. L. R. 23 Bom. 358

s. 47—

See RAILWAY COMPANY.

I. L. R. 23 All. 367

11 C. W. N. 583

ss. 47, 72—

See RAILWAY COMPANY.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 819

s. 59—

See RAILWAY COMPANY—LIABILITY OF COMPANY . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 401

s. 67—

See RAILWAY COMPANY.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 417

1. s. 72—*Risk Note, Form B—Indian Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 151, 152, 161—Railway Company—Goods, loss of—Bailee—Suit for compensation.* A special agreement, known as "Risk Note, Form B," sanctioned by the Governor General in Council under s. 72, cl. (2), of the Indian Railways Act, absolves a Railway Company from all liability for loss of goods from any cause whatsoever. The Company, in such a case, is not a bailee under the Indian Contract Act. *TOONYA RAM v. EAST INDIAN RAILWAY COMPANY* (1902)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 257

s.c. 7 C. W. N. 370

2. Contract saving liability of Company for loss of goods carried by it—"Risk note." The contract embodied in what is commonly known as a "risk note," i.e., a contract whereby, in consideration of goods being carried by a Railway Company at a reduced rate, the consignor agrees that the Company shall be free of all responsibility for any loss or damage to the goods, is a valid and legal contract within the terms of s. 72 of Act IX of 1890. *Suntokh Rai v. East Indian Railway Co.*, 2 Agra 200, distinguished. *EAST INDIAN RAILWAY CO. v. BUNYAD ALI*

I. L. R. 18 All. 42

3. Railway Company, liability of, as carriers—*Delivery, meaning of—Resul, bye-laws and conditions under ss. 47, 54, of Act IX of 1890, reasonableness of—"Delivered."* "Delivered" in s. 72 of the Indian Railways Act refers merely to a physical event and is a word devoid of any legal significance. A Railway Company has cast upon it by s. 72 the duties of an ordinary bailee, but it may determine the conditions under which those duties may vest and in particular may specify the point of time at which they shall vest by rules under ss. 47 and 54. These rules, however, must be consistent with the Act and reasonable. Where a consignor had delivered



**RAILWAYS ACT (IX OF 1890)—contd.****s. 72—concll.**

goods to a Railway Company for transmission and had had the forwarding note in respect thereof duly registered and marked by the Railway Company, but had obtained no receipt from the Railway Company, and the goods were lost: *Held*, that rules framed by the Railway Company under ss. 47 and 54, whereby goods were to stand at owner's risk, and the Railway Company were not to be liable therefor, until a receipt had been granted by them, were inconsistent with the Act and unreasonable, and that the Railway Company were liable to pay compensation for the loss incurred. **JALIM SINGH KOTARY v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (1904)**

**I. L. R. 31 Calc. 951**  
**s.c. 8 C. W. N. 725**

**s. 75—**

*See CARRIERS, LIABILITY OF.*

**I. L. R. 34 Calc. 419**  
**11 C. W. N. 1076**

**1. Liability of Railway Company for loss of goods.** (i) The words "loss, destruction, or deterioration" in s. 75 of the Indian Railways Act (IX of 1890) include loss caused by the criminal misappropriation of the parcel by a servant of the Railway Administration in charge thereof. (ii) Under s. 75 of that Act, it is necessary that both the value and contents of a parcel (if over Rs. 100 in value) should be declared before the Railway Administration can be held liable in respect thereof. (iii) The payment by a consignor of silver coin of the specie rate required by the general regulations of a Railway Company to be paid for the carriage of such goods is not such a payment as satisfies the requirements of s. 75 of the Indian Railways Act (IX of 1890). **BALARAM HARICHAND v. SOUTH MAHRATTA RAILWAY Co.**

**I. L. R. 19 Bom. 159**

**2. Sch. II, cl. (l)—Parcel containing articles liable to be insured and also not liable to be insured—Loss of the parcel in transit on Railway line—Suit against Railway Company to recover damages with respect to goods not liable to be insured—Railway Company not liable—Articles—Package.** Plaintiff's agent at Poona consigned a parcel to plaintiff at Dharwar. The parcel contained goods which, according to s. 75 and Sch. II of the Indian Railways Act (IX of 1890) were liable to be insured as well as those not so liable. The parcel was lost in transit on the Southern Maratha Railway Line. The plaintiff thereupon sued the Railway Company to recover damages for the loss of the goods which were not liable to be insured. The defendant Company denied liability. *Held*, that the Railway Company was not liable. The words of s. 75 of the Railways Act (IX of 1890) draw a distinction between articles mentioned in Sch. II of the Act and the parcel or package in which they are contained and provides that the Railway Administration shall not be responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the parcel or package. **PUNDALIK v. S. M. RAILWAY COMPANY (1909)**

**I. L. R. 33 Bom. 703**

**RAILWAYS ACT (IX OF 1890)—contd.****s. 77—**

*See RAILWAY COMPANY.*

**I. L. R. 27 Bom. 597**

**1. Notice of claim—Goods lost in transit—Sufficient notice.** Notice of claim for goods lost in transit given to Railway Company A, with whom they were originally booked, is not sufficient notice within ss. 77 and 140 of the Railways Act to Railway Company B, on whose line the goods were subsequently lost. *The East Indian Railway Company v. Jethmull Ramanand*, **I. L. R. 26 Bom. 669**, followed. **TILAK CHAND LAHUTHY v. EAST INDIA RAILWAY COMPANY (1907)**

**12 C. W. N. 165**

**2. Notice of suit—Agent of Manager—Traffic Superintendent—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 147, and 149—Practice—Pleading.** The Traffic Superintendent is not the Manager's agent, and notice to him is not notice to the Railway Administration within s. 77 of the Indian Railways Act (IX of 1890). Under s. 77 of the Indian Railways Act, it is not necessary for the defendant to plead want of notice of action in order to avail himself of it, but he may raise the objection at the hearing. **SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. DIP CHAND PODDAR**

**I. L. R. 24 Calc. 306**

**3. ss. 77 and 80—Suit against Railway Company—Notice of claim—Notice to be given to the Company, which it is intended to sue.** Under s. 80 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, when goods are booked through or over the lines of two or more railway administrations and are lost or damaged in transit, it is at the option of the person damaged to sue either the railway administration to which the goods were delivered by the consignor or the railway administration, on whose line the loss occurred. But under s. 77 of the Act it is a condition precedent to the bringing of such a suit that notice of the plaintiff's claim must be given within six months from the date of the delivery of the goods for carriage to the railway administration, which the plaintiff seeks to render liable. In default of such notice the plaintiff will not be entitled to a decree against the defendant company. **BOMBAY, BARODA AND CENTRAL INDIA RAILWAY COMPANY v. SAUTI LAL (1904)**

**I. L. R. 26 All. 207**

**4. ss. 77 and 140—Notice of suit to Railway Administration—Service on Traffic Manager.** In a suit against the South Indian Railway Company to recover the value of a parcel delivered to the defendant company for carriage, it appeared that the plaintiff had within two months of the delivery given notice of the suit to the Traffic Manager of the defendant company at Trichinopoly. *Held*, that the notice was a good notice of it, in fact, reached the agent of the defendant company within the period of six months. **PERIANNAN CHETTI v. SOUTH INDIAN RAILWAY Co.**

**I. L. R. 22 Mad. 137**

**5. Claim against Railway Company—Notice of claim.** The plaintiff sued the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Rail-



RAILWAYS ACT (IX OF 1890)—*contd.*s. 77—*contd.*

way Company and the East Indian Railway Company for damages for non-delivery of goods alleged to have been delivered at Ghaziabad for conveyance to Bombay on the 16th May, 1898. From Ghaziabad to Delhi the railway line belongs to the East Indian Railway Company, and from Delhi to Bombay the line is that of the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway Company. Both Companies were, therefore, made defendants in the suit. On the merits, the suit was dismissed as against the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway Company, but a decree was passed against the East Indian Railway Company for Rs. 4,617. It appeared that no notice of plaintiff's claim under s. 140 of the Indian Railways Act (IX of 1890) had ever been directly addressed to the East Indian Railway Company. The plaintiff relied on a notice dated the 28th July, 1898, which he had addressed to the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway Company, making a claim against that Company. The latter Company had at once informed the East Indian Railway Company of the plaintiff's claim, and had given notice that, in case the plaintiff sued them, they would expect the East Indian Railway Company to bear all the expenses. Further correspondence took place between the two Companies with reference to the plaintiff's claim, and, on the 31st October, 1898, the Solicitors of the East Indian Railway Company wrote to the plaintiff's Solicitors as follows: "DEAR SIR,—Your letter of the 21st instant, to the address of the General Traffic Manager, Bombay, Baroda, and Central India Railway, Bombay, has been handed to us by our clients, the East Indian Railway, Calcutta, claiming on behalf of your clients a sum of Rs. 7,437, being the amount of loss alleged to have been sustained in respect of short delivery of 500 and 125 bags of wheat. The file of papers has just been handed to us, and we will write to you further as soon as we have had an opportunity of going through same. Yours faithfully, (Signed) MORGAN & Co." The lower Court held that in this letter the Solicitors of the East Indian Railway Company treated the communication sent to them by the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway Company as a communication affecting themselves, and that they could not afterwards say that the notice of claim given by the plaintiffs to the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway Company and forwarded to them (East Indian Railway Company) was no notice to them: that the plaintiffs must be held to have given the notice through the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway Company; and that such notice was good. On appeal: *Held* (reversing the decree, and dismissing the suit), that no sufficient notice had been given to the East Indian Railway Company under ss. 77 and 140 of Act IX of 1890. *EAST INDIAN RAILWAY COMPANY v. JETHMULL RAMANAND* (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 669

6. ———— ss. 77, 140—*Claim for compensation for short delivery—Notice of claim on whom*

RAILWAYS ACT (IX OF 1890)—*contd.*s. 77—*contd.*

to be served—*Service on Traffic Manager.* The notice of claim under s. 77, Railways Act, must be served under s. 140 of the Act on the Agent of the Company. But the law does not require that the notice should be physically thrust in the Agent's hand. It is sufficient if it appears from the findings that the Agent has had full knowledge and notice of the claim. Where from the Rules of Railway Company it appeared that the Traffic Manager in the Claims department settles all such claims and the Agent also refers to him claims for disposal:—*Held*, that the notice to the Traffic Manager was sufficient. *WOODS v. MEHER ALI BEPARI* (1908) . . . 13 C. W. N. 24

7. ———— ss. 77, 140—*Refund of an overcharge—Notice—Letter—Manner of service—Statement of fact not a proof of fact.* Plaintiffs, who were merchants residing at Poona, entered into an agreement with the Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company that the latter should deliver consignments of goods despatched from Wadi at Poona at a certain rate. Several consignments were accordingly delivered by the Railway Company at Poona and they were paid for according to the agreed rate. At the time of the delivery of the last consignment, the Railway Company refused to deliver it unless all the consignments, including those already delivered and paid for, were paid for at a higher rate. The plaintiffs thereupon paid the higher rate under protest and sued the Railway Company in the Court of Small Causes at Poona for the recovery of the overcharges claimed and received by the defendant. The defendant contended that the suit was not maintainable inasmuch as no notice of the claim was served by the plaintiffs according to s. 77 of the Indian Railways Act (IX of 1890). The Judge overruled the defendant's contention and allowed the claim holding that a notice under s. 77 of the Act was not necessary because the section contemplated overcharges recovered before the delivery of the goods to the consignee, and not to overcharges recovered after the delivery as was the present case. He further held that if notice was necessary, it was given by the plaintiff inasmuch as there was an allegation that a notice had been sent in a letter addressed to the Agent of the Company, care of the Station Master, Poona, by the plaintiffs. The defendant having applied under revisional jurisdiction: *Held*, that notice was necessary. The overcharge referred to in the section is not confined in its meaning to an overcharge recovered before the delivery of the goods to the consignee at their destination. *Held*, further, that the delivery of a letter under s. 140 of the Act must be in exact compliance with the terms of the section and it must be delivered to the Agent at his office. The statement of a fact in a letter is no proof of the fact itself. *GREAT INDIAN PENINSULA RAILWAY COMPANY v. DEWASI* (1907)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 534

8. ———— ss. 77, 140—*Notice of claim—"May be directed"—Claim against Railway ad-*



RAILWAYS ACT (IX OF 1890)—*contd.*s. 77—*concl'd.*

*administered by a Railway Company.* A notice of claim for short delivery was served upon the Traffic Manager of a Railway administered by a Railway Company, and not on the Agent. *Held*, that such a notice was not a sufficient compliance with the provisions of ss. 77 and 140 of the Indian Railways Act. *Secretary of State for India v. Dip Chand Poddar*, I. L. R. 24 Cal. 306, referred to. The word "may" in s. 40 of the Indian Railways Act means that if a plaintiff is desirous of serving an effective notice of claim, the notice must be directed to the Manager or Agent as the case may be. *Great Indian Peninsula Railway Company v. Chandra Bai*, I. L. R. 28 All. 552, followed. *Perianran Chetti v. South Indian Railway Company*, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 137, dissented from. *NADIAR CHAND SHAHA v. WOOD* (1907). I. L. R. 35 Cal. 194 s.c. 12 C. W. N. 450

## s. 101—

See COLLISION

. 11 C. W. N. 173

*Endangering safety of persons—Death by rash or negligent act—Contributory negligence—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 304A.* The Bengal-Nagpur Railway is worked on the "line clear and caution message" system, no train being allowed to leave a station without a "line clear" certificate in a prescribed form to the effect that the line is clear up to the next station. The petitioner, the assistant station master of Gomharria Station, who was on duty and busy issuing tickets to passengers, wrote out in the prescribed form book the following conditional line clear message, although he had received no message from Sini Station: "On arrival of 15 down passenger at Gomharria, line will be cleared for No. 80 up goods train from Gomharria to Sini." All the particulars required by the rule were not filled in, no number was entered on it, nor was the time of arrival of the train filled in. The form-book was left in the station-master's room. The guard of No. 80 up goods train, which was waiting at Gohmarria, entered the station-master's room in his absence, took the imperfect certificate out of the book, and without reading it appended his signature, passed it on to the driver and gave the signal for the train to start,—all without the knowledge of the petitioner. The result was a collision between the 15 down passenger train and the 80 up goods train, causing the death of several persons. The petitioner was convicted under s. 304A of the Penal Code and s. 101 of the Indian Railways Act of 1890 and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment:—*Held*, that the act of the petitioner did not in itself endanger the safety of other persons, and that the effect was too remote to be attributable to such a cause. *Sant Dass v. The Empress, Ind. Ry. Cas. 722*, followed. *SHANKAR BALKRISHNA v. EMPEROR* (1905). . . . I. L. R. 32 Cal. 73 8 C. W. N. 645

s. 110—"Compartment"—*Meaning of the word—Offence of smoking in compartments of railway carriage without consent of fellow-passen-*

RAILWAYS ACT (IX OF 1890)—*contd.*s. 110—*concl'd.*

*gers.* *Per JENKINS, C.J., and CANDY, J.*—Good sense requires that to the word "compartment" in certain sections of the Indian Railways Act (IX of 1890) the quality of complete separation should be attributed, and it is with that force that it is used in s. 110. *Per RANADE, J.*—The word "compartment" is used in s. 110 of Act IX of 1890 in the same sense in which it is used throughout the Act, and does not necessarily mean a completely partitioned division. *In re DADABHAI JAMSEDJI*

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 293

s. 112—*Offence—Separate sentence—General Clauses Act (X of 1897), s. 26—Indian Railways Act (IX of 1890), ss. 68, 112—Travelling without ticket—Attempt to cheat—Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 417, 511—Dishonest or fraudulent intention.* The essence of an offence under s. 112 of the Indian Railways Act is dishonest or fraudulent intention, the intention to defraud the Railway Administration of its just dues. Merely travelling without a ticket is not an offence under the section. *Bentham v. Hoyle*, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 289; *Queen-Empress v. Rampal*, I. L. R. 20 All. 95, referred to. Travelling with a false and entirely irrelevant ticket with fraudulent or dishonest intention is an offence under s. 112 (a) of the Railways Act. Facts which form the basis of a conviction and sentence under one charge cannot form the basis of a conviction and also a separate sentence under another charge. There cannot be cumulative sentences though a conviction might take place on an alternative charge or even both charges. It is ordinarily desirable that when an act or omission is made penal by two Acts, one general and the other special, the sentence should be passed under the Special Act. *Quære*: Whether in this country a special penal law repeals by implication, in every case, a previously existing general law relating to an offence of the same nature. *KULODA PROSAD MAJUMDAR v. EMPEROR* (1906)

11 C. W. N. 100

1. — s. 113—*Excess charge and fare, non-payment of—Power of Magistrate to impose imprisonment in default—Fine—Imprisonment.* S. 113, sub-s. 4, of the Indian Railways Act (IX of 1890), which directs that on failure to pay on demand excess charge and fare when due the amount shall on application be recovered by a Magistrate as if it were a fine, does not authorize the Magistrate to impose imprisonment in default. The excess charge and fare referred to in the section is not a fine, though it may be recovered as such. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KUTRAPA*

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 440

QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SUBRAMANIA AYYAR

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 385

2. — and s. 132—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 40, 64—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 33—"Offence"—Travelling on a railway without a proper ticket—Imprisonment.* A passenger who travels in a train without having a proper pass or ticket with him has not committed



**RAILWAYS ACT (IX OF 1890)—concl'd.**

———— s. 113—concl'd.  
 an " offence." He cannot therefore be legally sentenced to imprisonment in default of payment of the excess charge and fare which may be recovered under the provisions of s. 113, cl. (4), of Act IX of 1890. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAM PAL*  
**I. L. R. 20 All. 95**

———— s. 122—  
*See EASEMENT . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 525*

———— s. 125—  
*See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—  
 SPECIAL ACTS—RAILWAYS ACT, 1890.*  
**I. L. R. 18 Mad. 228**

———— s. 128—  
*See JOINDER OF CHARGES.*  
**I. L. R. 29 Calc. 385**

———— s. 140—  
*See ante, ss. 77 AND 140.*

**RAIYAT.**

*See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, ss. 5, 49.*  
**8 C. W. N. 454**

*See BENGAL TENANCY ACT.*

*See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT.*

*See LANDLORD AND TENANT.*

*See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY.*

———— definition of—  
*See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 5, cl. 2.*  
**I. L. R. 20 Calc. 708**  
**I. L. R. 21 Calc. 129**

*See RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—ACQUISITION  
 OF RIGHT . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 272*  
**L. R. 23 I. A. 158**

———— and tenure-holder ; distinction  
 between—

*See BENGAL CESS ACT, s. 4.*  
**5 C. W. N. 535**

———— at fixed rates, if incumbrance—  
*See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 160.*  
**13 C. W. N. 1025**

———— interest of—  
*See MORTGAGE—REDEMPTION—RIGHT OF  
 REDEMPTION . 5 C. W. N. 83*

———— non-occupancy—  
*See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 20.*  
**I. L. R. 24 Calc. 207**

———— non-occupancy ; suit by, for re-  
 covery of possession—  
*See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 3.*  
**7 C. W. N. 218**

———— status of, question as to—  
*See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—ORDERS  
 SUBJECT OR NOT TO APPEAL.*  
**I. L. R. 21 Calc. 776**

**RAIYATWARI TENURE.**

*See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART.  
 149.*

———— *Grant of bed of  
 tidal and navigable river on raiyatwari tenure—  
 Power of Government to determine such tenure—  
 Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 149—  
 Decree in the alternative, legality of.* Land forming  
 the bed of a tidal and navigable river is the absolute  
 property of Government. Where Government has  
 for a long time been collecting revenue and special  
 cesses from the occupant thereof, it will be pre-  
 sumed that such land was granted on raiyatwari  
 tenure and the occupier will be entitled to hold the  
 land so long as he pays the revenue ; and he can be  
 ousted only under the provisions of Madras Act II  
 of 1864. Where the assignees from the Secretary  
 of State join him as a co-plaintiff with themselves  
 in a suit, the period of limitation will not be 60  
 years under Art. 149, Sch. II of the Limitation  
 Act ; such article applying only to suits brought  
 on behalf of the Secretary of State. The only  
 parties entitled to a decree in such a suit will be the  
 assignees and a decree in the alternative cannot be  
 passed in favour of the Secretary of State or the  
 assignees, when the right of the assignees is ad-  
 mitted. *PULLANAPPALLY SANKARAN NAMBUDERI v.  
 VITTIL THALAKAT MUHAMED (1905)*  
**I. L. R. 28 Mad. 505**

**RAJ.**

———— confiscation of—

*See CONFISCATION . 11 C. W. N. 655*

———— succession to—

*See HINDU LAW—ALIENATION—RES-  
 TRAINT ON ALIENATION.*  
**I. L. R. 8 Calc. 199**  
**I. L. R. 10 All. 272**  
**L. R. 15 I. A. 51**

*See HINDU LAW—*

*CUSTOM—*

*IMPARTIBILITY ;*

*See HINDU LAW—CUSTOM—INHERITANCE  
 AND SUCCESSION . 3 B. L. R. P. C. 13*  
**12 Moo. I. A. 523**

**9 B. L. R. 310 note**

**6 W. R. P. C. 1 : 2 Moo. I. A. 344**

**2 W. R. 232**

**W. R. F. B. 97**

**I. L. R. 1 Calc. 186**

**PRIMOGENITURE : I. L. R. 29 Calc. 343**

**INHERITANCE—IMPARTIBLE PROPERTY.**

**RAPE.**

*See ADULTERY . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 415*

*See CHARGE TO JURY—SPECIAL CASES—*

*RAPE . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 230*

*See PENAL CODE, ss. 375, 376.*

*See SENTENCE—GENERAL CASES.*

**6 W. R. Cr. 59**

*See SENTENCE—TRANSPORTATION.*

**1 B. L. R. A. Cr. 5**



**RAPE—concl'd.**

1. ———— **Consent—Consent through fear of injury.** Sexual intercourse by a man with a woman without her free consent—i.e., a consent obtained without putting her in fear of injury—amounts to rape; and the Judge should leave the question to the jury, and not direct them to find that the woman's consent after a considerable struggle renders the charge of rape nugatory. *QUEEN v. AKBAR KAZEE* . 1 W. R. Cr. 21

2. ———— **Attempt to commit rape—Indecent assault—Penal Code, ss. 354, 375, and 511.** An indecent assault upon a woman does not amount to an attempt to commit rape, unless the Court is satisfied that there was a determination in the accused to gratify his passions at all events, and in spite of all resistance. *Reg. v. Lloyd*, 7 C. & P. 318, followed. *EMPRESS v. SHANKER* . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 403

**RASH AND NEGLIGENT ACT.**

See CULPABLE HOMICIDE.

See DEATH BY RASH OR NEGLIGENT ACT.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 302

See HURT—GRIEVOUS HURT.

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 49

See PENAL CODE, s. 304 A.

I. L. R. 31 All. 290

Swinging by hooks inserted in the flesh—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 336*—Rash and negligent act likely to endanger human life or personal safety of others—License to conduct swinging on a Hindu festive occasion—Swinging by means of cloth attached to the swinging apparatus. A person, having a license to conduct the swinging during *charak puja*, a Hindu festival, does not, by allowing persons in his absence to swing by hooks inserted in the flesh, instead of by being attached to the pole by a cloth, render himself liable for an offence under s. 366, Indian Penal Code, unless it is shown that he knew of it. *GOPI NATH MAHTO v. MANSARAM KOOMAR* (1900) . 5 C. W. N. 376

**RATEABLE DISTRIBUTION.**

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, ss. 244, 295, 322.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 130

*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 295—Assets—First decree against three judgment-debtors—Subsequent decree against only one of them.* S. 295 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) governs where the first decree is against three judgment-debtors and the decree, on which the petitioner relies, is against one of those three. *Nimbaji v. Vadia Venkati*, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 683, not followed. *CHHOTALAL v. NABIBHAI* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 528

**RATIFICATION.**

See ARBITRATION—AWARDS—VALIDITY OF AWARDS AND GROUND FOR SETTING THEM ASIDE . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 469

**RATIFICATION—cont'd.**

See COMPANY—POWERS, DUTIES, AND LIABILITIES OF DIRECTORS.

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 280

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 14

See ESTOPPEL—ESTOPPEL BY DEEDS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS.

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 272

See GUARANTEE . I. L. R. 5 Calc. 421

L. R. 6 I. A. 238

See GUARDIAN—RATIFICATION.

See HINDU LAW—ALIENATION—ALIENATION BY FATHER . 2 Bom. 301

See HINDU LAW—ALIENATION—ALIENATION BY WIDOW—ALIENATION FOR LEGAL NECESSITY OR WITH CONSENT OF HEIRS OR REVERSIONERS.

6 C. W. N. 905

See HINDU LAW—WIDOW.

I. L. R. 30 All. 1

See MASTER AND SERVANT.

2 B. L. R. O. C. 140

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

I. L. R. 29 All. 730

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—RATIFICATION.

See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE—SPECIAL CASES . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 223

L. R. 16 I. A. 221

————— by reversioner—

See HINDU LAW . 13 C. W. N. 201

————— of lease—

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—NATURE OF TENANCY . I. L. R. 27 Bom. 515

————— of transactions—

See CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 420

1. ———— **Doctrine of ratification—Criminal case.** The doctrine of subsequent ratification does not apply in a criminal case. *REG. v. RAMA BIN GOPAL* . 1 Bom. 107

2. ———— **Delay in repudiating contract—Consent.** Where a party to a contract seeks release from its obligations, on the ground that, for some reason or another, he is entitled to repudiate it, he must assert this right as soon after becoming aware of it as he reasonably can. Long inaction unaccounted for must be held in equity to be a ratification of the contract. *ISHAN CHUNDER MOJOOMDAR v. SREEKANT NATH* . 9 W. R. 110

3. ———— **Delay in repudiating act of agent—Agent acting contrary to authority of principal.** Where the proprietors of an estate, on being informed by their agent of a proposition to obtain a lease of the property, refused their consent, and the agent notwithstanding gave the applicant



**RATIFICATION—concl'd.**

an amuldustuck to enter upon the property as lessee, and gave no notice at the time to the proprietors, but subsequently informed them of it:—*Held*, that the proprietors were not under obligation to take early steps to disavow the act of their agent, and their not doing so did not amount to ratification of his act. *MUHBOOL BUKSH v. SUHDEEDUN* . . . . . 14 W. R. 378

**READINESS AND WILLINGNESS.**

*See* CONTRACT—CONDITIONS PRECEDENT.  
3 Mad. 125 ; 209

*See* CONTRACT—CONTRACTS FOR GOVERNMENT SECURITIES OR SHARES.

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 791  
3 Bom. O. C. 79  
1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 17  
2 Bom. 260 ; 267 ; 272  
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*See* CONTRACT ACT, s. 51.  
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 252

**READMISSION.**

*See* DISMISSAL FOR DEFAULT.  
I. L. R. 34 Calc. 403

**REASONABLE AND PROBABLE CAUSE.**

*See* ARREST—CIVIL ARREST.  
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 583

*See* CHAMPERTY . I. L. R. 2 Calc. 233  
13 B. L. R. 530

*See* DEFAMATION.

*See* MALICE . . . . . 2 N. W. 353  
4 N. W. 42

*See* MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

**REASONABLE CAUSE FOR SUSPENSION.**

*See* ADVOCATE.  
I. L. R. 29 All. 95 ; L. R. 34 I. A. 41

**REASONABLE DOUBT.**

*See* CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 617.  
I. L. R. 30 Bom. 226

**RECAPTURE.**

*See* WILD ANIMALS.  
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 413

**RECEIPT.**

*See* PROMISSORY NOTES—ASSIGNMENT OF, AND SUITS ON, PROMISSORY NOTES.  
17 W. R. 201

*See* REGISTRATION ACT, 1877, s. 17, cl. (c) AND CL. (n).

*See* STAMP ACT, 1869, SCH. II, CL. 7.  
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 829

*See* STAMP ACT, 1869, SCH. II, CL. 11.  
23 W. R. 403

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*See* STAMP ACT, 1879, s. 61.  
I. L. R. 8 Mad. 11  
I. L. R. 11 Mad. 329  
I. L. R. 23 Bom. 54  
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 324

*See* STAMP ACT, 1879, SCH. I, ART. 52.  
I. L. R. 6 All. 253  
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 271  
I. L. R. 12 Bom. 103

*See* STAMP ACT, 1879, SCH. II, ART. 15.  
I. L. R. 10 Mad. 64

*See* STAMP ACT (II OF 1899), SS. 35 AND 42 . . . . . I. L. R. 24 All. 374

*See* STAMP ACT (II OF 1899), SCH. I, ART. 53 (c) . . . . . I. L. R. 31 All. 36

\_\_\_\_\_ for counsel's fees—

*See* STAMP ACT, SCH. II, ART. 15.  
I. L. R. 9 Mad. 140  
I. L. R. 16 All. 132

\_\_\_\_\_ for money deposited with banks.

*See* CONTRACT—CONDITIONS PRECEDENT.  
I. L. R. 14 Bom. 498

\_\_\_\_\_ for rent—

*See* BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 88.  
I. L. R. 16 Calc. 155  
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 531 ; 533 note

*See* EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—RENT RECEIPTS.

\_\_\_\_\_ given by secretary of club to member for club bill—

*See* STAMP ACT, 1879, SCH. II, ART. 15.  
I. L. R. 10 Mad. 85

\_\_\_\_\_ of rent from various tenants, for one holding—

*See* BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 88.  
6 C. W. N. 823

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I. L. R. 3 Calc. 621  
5 Bom. Cr. 34  
I. L. R. 5 Mad. 199 ; 200 note  
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*See* STAMP ACT, 1879, s. 64.  
I. L. R. 9 Bom. 27

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*See* ACCOUNT . . . . . 12 C. W. N. 1035

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*See* APPEAL—RECEIVERS.

*See* APPELLATE COURT—OBJECTIONS TAKEN FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL—SPECIAL CASES—PARTIES  
12 W. R. 117



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See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, ss. 351, 355, 357, 503

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 152 ; 157

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 503  
8 C. W. N. 605

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 393 ; 568

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See COSTS—SPECIAL CASES—ATTORNEY AND CLIENT . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 85

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I. L. R. 7 Bom. 455

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5 C. W. N. 91

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10 C. W. N. 959

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—RECEIVER.

See PLAINT—AMENDMENT OF PLAINT.  
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See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT (IV OF 1882), ss. 83, 84.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 840

**1. Appointment—Civil Procedure**

*Code, 1882, s. 503—Discretion.* The appointment of receiver is a matter resting in the discretion of the Court. The powers of appointing a receiver conferred by s. 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be exercised with a sound discretion, upon a view of the whole circumstances of the case, not merely the circumstances which might make the appointment expedient for the protection of the property, but all the circumstances connected with the right which is asserted and has to be established. The Court will not interfere by appointing a receiver where a right is asserted to property in the possession of a defendant claiming to hold it under a legal title, unless a strong case is made out. *Owen v. Homan*, 4 H. L. C. 997, 1032, and *Clayton v. Attorney-General*, 1 Cooper's Cases 97, referred to. *SIDHESWARI DABI v. ABHOYESWARI DABI*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 818

**2. Temporary injunction—Civil Procedure**

*Code, 1882, ss. 492 and 503.* The distinction between a case in which a temporary injunction may be granted and a case in which a receiver may be appointed is that, while in either case it must be shown that the property should be preserved from waste or alienation in the former case it would be sufficient if it be shown that the plaintiff in the suit has a fair question to raise as to the existence of the right alleged ; while



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in the latter case a good *prima facie* title has to be made out. *Sidheswari Dabi v. Abhoyeswari Dabi*, *I. L. R. 15 Calc. 818*, approved. An order of the lower Court for appointment of a receiver under s. 503 of the Civil Procedure Code, Act XIV of 1882, was set aside, and an order for a temporary injunction under s. 492 of the Code granted. *CHANDIDAT JHA v. PADMANAND SINGH*

**I. L. R. 22 Calc. 459**

3. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (1882), s. 503—Waste or misappropriation of property as a ground for appointing a receiver.* The fact that the acts complained of amount to misappropriation rather than waste makes no difference for the purposes of s. 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *HANUMAYYA v. VENKATASUBBAYYA*

**I. L. R. 18 Mad. 23**

4. ————— *Administration, Suit for—Receiver appointed where executor is in possession—Suit against executor where will not proved—Will of Mahomedan testator.* The rule of the Court of Chancery, that a receiver will not be appointed against an executor unless gross misconduct was shown, is not applicable to the case of an executor of the will of a Mahomedan. *HAFIZABAI v. ABDUL KARIM*

**I. L. R. 19 Bom. 83**

5. ————— *Appointment out of jurisdiction of High Court—Power of High Court. Quære: Whether the High Court at Calcutta can appoint a receiver of property situate at Bombay.* *ISMAIL HADJEE HUBEEB v. MAHOMED HADJEE JOOSUB. ROHIMA BYE v. MAHOMED HADJEE JOOSUB*

**13 B. L. R. 91: 21 W. R. 303**

6. ————— *Receiver in testamentary suit—High Court, Power of—Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 239.* The High Court has power to appoint a receiver in a testamentary suit. *YESHWANT BHAGWANT v. SHANKAR RAMCHANDRA*

**I. L. R. 17 Bom. 388**

7. ————— *Pending suit.* It is not a matter of course, but when the circumstances are such that a special case is made out, the Court will appoint a receiver, pending litigation to set aside probate. *JOYKALLY DABEE v. SHIB NATH CHATTERJEE*

**Bourke Test. 5**

8. ————— *Power of Principal Sudder Ameen. Semble: A Principal Sudder Ameen cannot, like the Court of Chancery, appoint a receiver in a case where the defendant has kept the plaintiff for a considerable time out of assets to which he is jointly entitled with the defendant.* *JOYNARAIN GEEREE v. SHIBPERSHAD GEEREE*

**6 W. R. Mis. 1**

9. ————— *Grounds for appointment—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 503—Waste by Hindu widow.* The powers conferred by s. 503 of the Civil Procedure Code are not to be exercised as a matter of course, and it is not a reason for allowing an application for the appointment of a receiver that it can do no harm to appoint one. The discretion given by that section is one that should be used with the greatest care and

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caution. Because a plaintiff in his plaint makes violent and wholesale charges of waste and malversation against a defendant in possession of property as executor under a will or as the tenant for life, and upon this basis applies for a receiver to be appointed, it is not a necessary consequence that such appointment should be made. *Held*, in this case where the sons of a Hindu widow in possession of her husband's estate under a will sued their mother, as reversioners under the will, for possession of the estate, on the ground of mismanagement and waste, and on the same grounds applied for the appointment of a receiver under s. 503 of the Civil Procedure Code, that a receiver had been appointed on insufficient grounds. *PROSONOMOYEE DEBI v. BENI MADHAB RAI*

**I. L. R. 5 All. 556**

10. ————— *Power of Subordinate Judge—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 503, 505.* A Subordinate Judge, if he has good grounds, may decline to appoint a receiver even after he has received the necessary authority from the District Judge under s. 505 to do so. *GOSSAIN DULMIR PURI v. TEKAIT HETNARAIN*

**6 C. L. R. 467**

11. ————— *Receiver in suit for arrears of rent and ejectment—Beng. Act VIII of 1869, ss. 23, 52—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 503, 505.* Although, having regard to the provisions of ss. 23 and 52 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 503 of the Civil Procedure Code would not apply to a suit brought under Bengal Act VIII of 1869 merely for arrears of rent, there is no provision in that Act which excludes the operation of s. 503 when suit is brought for recovery of the tenure itself. When therefore a suit was brought under Bengal Act VIII of 1869 for arrears of rent and for ejectment of the defendant:—*Held*, that a receiver of the rents and profits of the tenure might properly be appointed under the provisions of s. 503 of the Civil Procedure Code. *KARTIC NATH PANDY v. PADMANUND SINGH*

**I. L. R. 11 Calc. 496**

12. ————— *Ground for appointment of receiver—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 503.—Discretion of Court—Waste.* The removal of a large amount of property by the defendant, and under circumstances which might fairly give rise to suspicion during the pendency of the suit in which the question of title to that property would be determined, is a sufficiently strong ground for the appointment of a receiver. *Sidheswari Dabi v. Abhoyeswari Dabi*, *I. L. R. 15 Calc. 818*; *Chandidat Jha v. Padmanand Singh*, *I. L. R. 22 Calc. 459*; and *Sham Chand Giri v. Bhairam Pundey*, *Suit No. 179 of 1893*, referred to. *SIA RAM DAS v. MAHABIR DAS*

**I. L. R. 27 Calc. 279**

13. ————— *Joint estate—Mortgage—Jurisdiction—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 503.* In a suit for partition of a joint estate the words "property the subject of a suit" in s. 503 of the Civil Procedure Code mean the whole joint estate. In such a case "the owner"



**RECEIVER—contd.**

in s. 503 (d) means the whole body of owners to whom the joint estate belongs. The Court has jurisdiction to place the whole of a joint estate out of which a plaintiff seeks to have his share partitioned in the hands of a receiver, and to order that a receiver so appointed shall be at liberty to raise money on the security of the whole of such joint estate. **PORESH NATH MOOKERJEE v. OMERTO NATH MITTER** . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 614

14. ————— *Receiver of mortgaged property appointed at instance of mortgagee—Receiver appointed by Appeal Court—Practice.* In a suit by a mortgagee for foreclosure or sale in default of payment of his mortgage-debt the Court of first instance, when passing a decree for the plaintiff, refused, on the plaintiff's application, to appoint a receiver of the rents and profits of the mortgaged property. The plaintiff appealed against the latter part of the decree, and after filing a memorandum of appeal obtained a rule for the appointment of a receiver until the hearing of the appeal. The Court of appeal, after argument, made the rule absolute, and appointed a receiver until the hearing of the appeal, and subsequently, when the appeal came on for hearing, varied the decree of the Court below by appointing a receiver of the mortgaged property. The High Court possesses the same powers with regard to the appointment of a receiver as are possessed and exercised by the Courts in England under the Judicature Act. **JAIKISSONDAS GANGADAS v. ZENABAI** I. L. R. 14 Bom. 431

15. ————— *Receiver in insolvency proceedings under Civil Procedure Code—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 356—Commission of receiver how computed.* A receiver appointed in insolvency proceedings under the Civil Procedure Code is entitled to a lien for the amount of his commission on the net assets remaining after payment of the charges specified in Civil Procedure Code, s. 356 (b), (c), and (d). **MAHADEVA v. KUPPUSAMI** I. L. R. 15 Mad. 233

16. ————— *Jurisdiction of District Judge to appoint receiver—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 503 and 505.* A District Judge has no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver of properties which are the subject of a suit or attachment in other Courts, even though such Courts may have been subordinate to his Court. (Ss. 503 and 505 of the Civil Procedure Code reviewed). In a suit upon a mortgage, the mortgaged property was directed to be sold, and the time of grace had expired. An application was then made by the Judgment-debtor to the Court of execution for the appointment of a receiver under s. 503, both as regards the mortgaged property as well as other properties belonging to the judgment-debtor. *Held*, that the Court had no power to appoint a receiver of properties other than the subject-matter of the suit, and as regards the mortgaged property a receiver could be appointed on the mere ground that the property would not fetch so much by

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forced sale as it would by sale under a private contract. **LATAFUT HOSSEIN v. ANUNT CHOWDHRY** I. L. R. 23 Calc. 517

17. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 505—Power of District Court under s. 505 as to appointment of receiver.* The concluding words of s. 505 of the Code of Civil Procedure—"or pass such order as it thinks fit"—must be read as controlled by the words preceding them, and do not confer upon the District Court the power itself to appoint a receiver not nominated by the Subordinate Court. **AMIR NATH v. RAJ NATH** I. L. R. 18 All. 453

18. ————— *Nomination by—Subordinate Courts with grounds of nomination—Sanction of the District Judge—Order passed by the District Judge—Power to review—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 505.* The District Judge made an *ex parte* order for the appointment of a receiver under s. 505 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). Subsequently, it having been shown to the Judge that the nomination made by the Subordinate Judge on which the order was passed was incorrect, the District Judge made an order admitting a review. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court. Without deciding whether an appeal would lie against the order of the District Judge, the High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the order of the District Judge having in the first instance been *ex parte*, he had clearly the power to review it. The words of s. 505 give the District Judge full discretion to pass such order as the circumstances of the case in all their bearing require: the "nomination" in that section is equivalent to the conditional appointment of a receiver which the District Judge can accept or reject, or modify. **CHUNILAL HAJARIMAL v. SONIBAI** I. L. R. 21 Bom. 328

19. ————— *Subordinate Judge, power of, to appoint—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 503 and 505.* A Subordinate Judge, when considering the expediency of the appointment of a receiver, is acting under s. 503 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) as explained by s. 505. When he does appoint, his order is passed under s. 503, and when he refuses to take the necessary step preliminary to appointment, his order is also made under that section. An appeal lies from such an order made by a Subordinate Judge. Circumstances under which a receiver is appointed considered. **John v. John**, [1898] 2 Ch. 573, referred to. **SANGAPPA v. SHIVBASAWA** . I. L. R. 24 Bom. 38

20. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 505—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 145—Order of Magistrate for maintenance of possession.—Effect of or power of appointment of a receiver by a Civil Court.* The fact that there exists in respect of any immoveable property an order of a Magistrate passed under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is no bar to the exercise by a Civil Court of the power conferred on it by s. 505 of the Code of Civil Procedure of appointing



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a receiver in respect of the same property. *BARKAT-UN-NISSA v. ABDULLA AZIZ*. I. L. R. 22 All. 214

21. ————— *Duration of receivership—Discretion of Court—Practice—Variance between judgment and decree—Civil Procedure Code, s. 206.* It is within the discretion of a Court appointing a receiver in a suit to order that the office should continue permanently after the decree when such continuance is necessary, or for so long as it may be so. A decree of the High Court declared it to be necessary that a permanent appointment should be made of a receiver and manager of the estate allotted by the Government to the family of the deceased Maharajah of Tanjore, and directed that fresh appointments to the receivership should be made from time to time as occasion might require during the life of the senior widow, under whose management the estate had been originally placed, and the lives of the co-widows surviving her, or for so long as the Court might consider necessary. *Held*, that the decree directing the permanent receivership was not in variation of the judgment which it purported to follow; that the Court had a discretion to make such an order when necessary for the preservation of the estate; and that so doing was in accordance with the practice, there being nothing to prevent the Court from giving the management to the senior widow living at the time, if she should be fit to manage the estate on behalf of all interested in it. *MATHUSRI UMAMBA BOYI SAIBA v. MATHUSRI DIPAMBA BOYI SAIBA*. I. L. R. 19 Mad. 120  
L. R. 23 I. A. 28

22. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 503—Appointment of receiver after decree.* In a suit brought in 1880 by the widow of a deceased partner to wind up a partnership, the surviving partner was prohibited by the Court, at the instance of the plaintiff, from collecting debts due to the firm; but leave was given to apply for the recovery of debts which might become barred by limitation. After decree, on the application of the plaintiff, a receiver was appointed under s. 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure to collect outstanding debts for the purpose of executing the decree. The receiver having sued in 1883 to recover a debt which was due to the firm in 1879, the suit was dismissed, on the ground, among others, that the appointment of a receiver after decree was *ultra vires*. *Held*, that the appointment of the receiver was valid. *SHUNMUGAM v. MOIDIN*  
I. L. R. 8 Mad. 229

23. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 267, 268, and 503—Execution—Practice—Garnishee—Attachment by a judgment-creditor of a debt due to judgment-debtor by a third party—Order upon third party to pay, where debt admitted—Procedure where existence of debt not admitted.* When a debt alleged to be due by a third party to a judgment-debtor has been attached by the judgment-creditor, the Court may, under s. 268 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), make an order upon the garnishee for the

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payment of such debt to the judgment-creditor in case the former admits it to be due to the judgment-debtor. Where, however, the garnishee denies the debt, there is no other course open to the judgment-creditor than to have it sold, or to have a receiver appointed under s. 503 of the Civil Procedure Code. *TOOLSIA GOOLAL v. ANTONE*  
I. L. R. 11 Bom. 448

24. ————— *Receiver of High Court—Position of—Right to sue and defend suits.* The Receiver of the High Court does not represent the estate for which he is receiver, but is merely an officer of the Court, and as such cannot sue and be sued, except with the permission of the Court. *MILLER v. RAM RANJAN CHAKRAVARTI*  
I. L. R. 10 Cal. 1014

25. ————— *Position and functions of—Parties—Suit for specific performance.* The receiver in a suit is nothing more than the hand of the Court for the purpose of holding the property of the litigants whenever it is necessary that it should be kept in the grasp of the Court in order to preserve the subject-matter of the suit *pendente lite*; and the possession of the receiver is simply the possession of the Court. He has no personal rights in the property, nor can he take any steps with regard to it without the sanction of the Court. If it is necessary for him to take action of any sort, he should be put in motion by the Court on the application of the parties to the suit; and whatever he rightly does with regard to the property, he does simply as the agent of the owners of the property. Where the receiver in a suit had, by order of Court, sold certain property in the suit, and had executed the contract of sale in his own name, a plaintiff praying for specific performance against the purchaser for refusing to complete the contract was admitted with the receiver as co-plaintiff, he having obtained leave to sue. *WILKINSON v. GANGADHAR SIEKAR*. . . . . 6 B. L. R. 486

26. ————— *Right of suit as receiver and right to possession of property—Rule of Supreme Court.* In a suit by *K* against *B* and others, the Supreme Court ordered that the estate of *R* (deceased) should be applied to the payment of his debts, legacies, etc., and appointed a receiver of the rents and profits of his real property. It also ordered the defendants and persons claiming through them to give up to the receiver such of the real property as might be in their possession. Subsequently, in the same suit, the High Court declared that *K* was entitled to a moiety of the estate of *R* after payment of costs and legacies, and directed the estate to be sold and the proceeds brought into Court. Afterwards the receiver brought a suit in his own name against *R* and one *S*, alleging that, though the property had been decreed to *K* and himself jointly, yet *K* had, by collusion, obtained sole possession of it, and that, in execution of a money-decree against her, it had been sold to *S*. *Held*, that, as Receiver of the High Court, plaintiff had no title as of right against *S* to the immediate possession of the property, and no right to sue in another Court in his own person to



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receive possession thereof. The rule on the Original Side of the Court, taken from the practice of the English Court of Chancery, is not to compel a party to a suit to give up to the receiver possession of property unless an order of Court to that effect has previously been made upon him; the proper course being by proceedings in Court to fix an occupation rent, and to order the party in possession to pay the same. *RAM LOCHUN SIRCAR v. HOGG* . . . . . **10 W. R. 430**

**27.** ——— *Power of receiver—Power to question title of third party.* A receiver appointed by order of the Supreme Court can only sue for possession, and has no right to question the title of a third party in a suit with respect to the property put under his management. *DINONATH SREEMONEE v. HOGG* . . . . . **2 Hay 395**

**28.** ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 503—Right to sue.* A zamindari was attached in execution of certain decrees against the zamindar, and the plaintiff was appointed receiver with full powers, under s. 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to manage the zamindari. Before the appointment of the receiver, the zamindar had expended certain sums at the defendant's request to repair a tank for the irrigation of lands held by them in common with him. This suit was brought to recover the sum so expended. It was objected that the receiver could not maintain the suit on the ground that the sum sued for was neither the subject of a suit against the zamindar nor property attached in execution of a decree against him. *Held*, that the receiver could maintain the suit. *SUNDARAM v. SANKARA* . . . . . **I. L. R. 9 Mad. 334**

**29.** ——— *Power of Court to allow receiver to sue in his own name—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), s. 503.* The Court has authority, under s. 503 of the Civil Procedure Code, to confer on a receiver the power to sue in his own name; and if the order appointing the receiver gives him liberty, he may do so. *FINK v. MOHARAJ BAHADUR SINGH* . . . . . **I. L. R. 25 Calc. 642**  
**2 C. W. N. 469**

**30.** ——— *Suit to eject tenant claiming permanent tenure without leave of Court—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 503.* D was appointed receiver in a partition-suit pending in the High Court by an order which, amongst other things, gave him power to let and set the immoveable property, or any part thereof as he should think fit, and to take and use all such lawful and equitable means and remedies for recovering, realizing and obtaining payment of the rents, issues, and profits of the said immoveable property, and of the outstanding debts and claims by action, suit, or otherwise as should be expedient. D, without special leave of the Court, served a notice to quit on certain tenants of the estate who claimed to hold a permanent lease, and afterwards instituted a suit to eject them, also without special leave of the Court. *Held*, that the order appointing him did not give him power to serve such notice or to institute such suit without

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the special leave of the Court, and that, as he was appointed under the provisions of s. 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure and not vested with the general powers referred to in that section, but only with the power referred to in the order appointing him, and as a receiver is not otherwise authorized to institute such suits without special leave of the Court, the suit must be dismissed. *DROBOMOYI GUPTA v. DAVIS* . . . . . **I. L. R. 14 Calc. 323**

**31.** ——— *Right to sue without permission of Court—Suit for ejectment—Monthly tenant holding over after expiry of notice to quit.* The order appointing a receiver gave him power "to let and set the immoveable property or any part thereof as he shall think fit, and to take and use all such lawful and equitable means and remedies for recovering, realizing, and obtaining payment of the rents, issues, and profits of the said immoveable property, and of the outstandings, debts, and claims, by action, suit or otherwise, as shall be expedient." *Held*, under the terms of such order, the receiver had power to sue to eject without obtaining permission of the Court, a monthly tenant whose tenancy was determinable by a notice to quit which had been duly served. *Drobomoyi Gupta v. Davis, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 323*, distinguished. *HURI DASS KUNDU v. MACGREGOR* . . . . . **I. L. R. 18 Calc. 477**

**32.** ——— *Appearance of receiver in applications for payment of money by him.* In all applications for payment of money by a receiver, the receiver ought to appear and give information to the Court, if required, about funds in his hands and whether there are any attachments or claims on them. *CHAITAN CHARAN MULLICK v. GOCPOOL CHANDRA MULLICK* . . . . . **1 C. W. N. 303**

**33.** ——— *Position and power of receiver—Agreements entered into with one party to a suit—Contempt of Court—Attorney, improper conduct of.* A receiver appointed by the Court entered into two private agreements, one prior to, the other subsequent to, the date of his appointment, with one of the defendants in the suit, restricting and controlling his powers. Neither agreement was at any time brought to the notice of the Court. *Held*, that this was a gross contempt of Court for which the parties were liable to committal. A receiver is a servant of the Court, and has only such power and authority as the Court may choose to give him. *MANICK LALL SEAL v. SURRUT COOMAREE DASSEE* . . . . . **I. L. R. 22 Calc. 648**

**34.** ——— *Powers of receiver pending final decree.* A receiver appointed by the Court in a civil suit with the object of preserving property and keeping it within the reach of the Court until a final decree can be made can but exercise at the utmost such powers and rights over the property as the parties to the suit turn out to be possessed of when their rights are finally determined. *In the matter of the petition of TEIL & Co. TEIL & Co. v. ABDUL HYE* . . . . . **19 W. R. 37**

**35.** ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 503.* In 1879 a zamindar granted a lease of part of the zamindari for twenty years,



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reserving a rent of R18,000 per annum. In 1881 the zamindari having been attached by a creditor, the zamindar granted a new lease in perpetuity in lieu of the former lease, reserving a rent of R12,000 a year. A receiver of the zamindari, having subsequently been appointed with full powers under the provisions of s. 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure, sued the lessee to recover rent at the rate reserved in the first lease from 1881. *Held*, that the receiver was entitled to recover the rent claimed. The provisions of s. 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure were intended to declare that the receiver, in respect of all property which was or could be attached, had the powers of the owner as they existed at the time the property was brought under the orders of the Court by attachment, provided that they have not ceased by operation of law. *GOPALASAMI v. SANKARA*

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 418

36. ——— **Parties to conveyance—Sale by receiver under order of Court.** Where certain property, the subject-matter of a suit, in which the Court receiver had been appointed receiver, was sold in pursuance of an order of Court made by consent of parties. *Held*, that an application by the Court receiver for an order that the purchaser do complete the purchase according to the conditions of sale must be refused as not being made in proper form. A sale of property under an order of Court by a person appointed receiver in a suit is not a sale by the Court. The fact that such person is the Court receiver does not place him in a different position. When the receiver sells under such an order, it is necessary that he, being in possession of the property, should be a party to the conveyance. *CHANDRA NATH BISWAS v. BISWANATH BISWAS* . . . 6 B. L. R. 492 note

37. ——— **Mode of questioning acts of receiver—Seizure of property by Collector as receiver.** Where property is seized and retained by a Collector in his capacity of receiver, his acts cannot be disputed by way of motion to discharge or get rid of the attachment. *BISSESSUREE DE BIA v. SOOKRAM DOSS* . . . 15 W. R. 347

38. ——— **Firm in hands of receiver, claims on—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 503—Management of business by receiver—Claim by servant for prior arrears of wages on assets of firm.** A servant of a firm, the business of which is being managed by a receiver appointed under s. 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877, has no preferential claim over the attaching creditor on the assets of the firm for wages due before the appointment of the receiver. *SHORT v. PICKERING*

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 138

39. ——— **Refusal to remove a receiver and manager of the estate of Hindu widows—Discretion of Court.** Case in which rights and proceedings rendering a Court's order refusing to remove an appointed receiver and manager of the estate, of which the widowed rani of the late Maharaja of Tanjore had become possessed by grant from the Government were con-

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sidered, and such order held to be entirely a matter for the discretion of the Court which had exercised its discretion soundly. *Ex parte JIJAI AMBA*

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 390

40. ——— **Partnership funds in hands of receiver—Attachment by some of many creditors—Leave of Court for attachment necessary—Terms on which leave is granted.** Where a fund, such as the assets of a partnership, is in the hands of the Court through its officer, the receiver, one out of the whole body of creditors against the fund will not be allowed to gain priority over the remainder by the expedient of attaching the moneys in the hands of the receiver. Such an attachment is an interference with the Court's possession through its officer, the receiver, and may not therefore be made without the Court's leave first obtained, which leave will not be granted except on such terms as will ensure equality between the creditors. *KAHN v. ALI MAHOMED HAJI UMER*

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 577

See *MAHOMMED ZOHURUDDEEN v. MAHOMMED NOOROODDEEN* . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 85

41. ——— **Money in hands of Receiver—Estate administered by Court—Pressing claims against estate, or part owners thereof—Power to order Receiver to pay—High Court, power of.** Plaintiff was admittedly entitled to a half share of an estate, which this suit was brought to divide. A decree had been made referring it to the Commissioner to ascertain and divide the said estate and a Receiver had been appointed. No power had been especially reserved by the decree to the Receiver to pay pressing or other debts due by the estate, or the part owners thereof. Some time would elapse before the accounts could be taken in the Commissioner's office, and meanwhile two creditors were threatening attachment of the property of the estate, and their debts were running at considerable interest. The estate was not otherwise indebted. There was money in the Receiver's hands to the credit of the estate, half of which would be more than sufficient to pay off the claims of these creditors. The plaintiff applied to the Court for an order to the Receiver to pay these two debts out of the plaintiff's half share of the moneys in his hands, leaving the plaintiff to prove his right to debit the estate with such payments. *Held*, that the Court had power to make the order asked for, though such an order would only be made in special cases and on special conditions. *Held*, further, that the present was a case in which the order asked for might properly be made. *MOTIVAHU v. PREMVAHU* I. L. R. 16 Bom. 511

42. ——— **Execution of mortgage-decree by sale of properties in the possession of the Receiver—Mortgage decree—Attachment.** A judgment-creditor can sell properties in the hands of a Receiver of the Court in execution of a mortgage-decree, although he cannot execute a decree against such properties by way of attachment and sale. *Semle*: A proceeding by way of attachment is an interference with the



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possession of the Receiver. *Hem Chunder Chunder v. Prankristo Chunder*, I. L. R. 1 Calc. 403, distinguished. *JOGENDRA NATH GOSSAIN v. DEBENDRA NATH GOSSAIN*. I. L. R. 26 Calc. 127  
3 C. W. N. 90

**43. ——— Duties and liability of receiver—***Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 503—Costs.* A receiver appointed under s. 503 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) to collect the rents of an estate is bound to make good a loss caused to it by a breach of his duties. A receiver is not justified in delegating or entrusting to another a duty entrusted to him by the Court. He should in all important matters apply for and obtain the direction of the Judge who appoints him. A receiver is entitled to his costs, charges, and expenses properly incurred in the discharge of his duties. *BALAJI NARAYAN PATVARDHAN v. RAMCHANDRA GOVIND KANADE*  
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 660

**44. ——— Receiver appointed by Court under s. 503 of Civil Procedure Code, 1882—Misappropriation by receiver of money collected by him—Liability for loss so caused—***Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 258—Effect of, as to satisfaction of decree and discharge of judgment-debtor.* In execution of a decree, a receiver was appointed to collect certain rents due to the judgment-debtor. Some of the judgment-debtor's tenants paid the rents due by them into the hands of the receiver, but the receiver did not pay the money into Court. *Held* by *MUTTUSAMI AYYAR, J.*—In cases in which a receiver, appointed at the instance of the judgment creditor under s. 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure, misappropriates moneys collected by him, the decree is not satisfied *pro tanto*, but the loss falls on the estate or its owner, subject to the receiver's liability. *ORR v. MUTHIA CHETTI*  
I. L. R. 17 Mad. 501

*Held*, on appeal under the Letters Patent, *per SHEPHARD, J.*, that the payment by the tenants to the receiver did not *pro tanto* discharge the judgment-debtor from liability under the decree. *Held per DAVIES, J.*, that payment by the tenants to the receiver *pro tanto* discharged the judgment-debtor from liability under the decree. *MUTHIA CHETTI v. ORR*. I. L. R. 20 Mad. 224

[The Judges differing in opinion, the case was referred under s. 575 of the Code to *COLLINS, C. J.*, who agreed with the decision of *SHEPHARD, J.*]

**45. ——— Accounts—Exceptions to accounts—Mofussil accounts—Receiver, liability of—Procedure—Practice—Costs—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 503.** A Receiver is responsible for all properties which come into his custody or management and he is responsible, not only for actual sums received by him, but for those which might have been received by him but for his wilful neglect and default. *Balaji Narayan Patvardhan v. Ram Chandra Govind*, I. L. R. 19 Bom. 660, referred to. The only question which properly arises on an application by a Receiver to pass his

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accounts is as to the items of the particular account, and it involves the inquiry whether all his collections, made on behalf of the property of which he is the Receiver, are duly entered in the accounts and, next, whether all his disbursements are payments properly made in respect of that property. A Receiver's liability is not restricted to matters shown upon his accounts. If there is any liability attaching to the Receiver, other than that which appears on the face of the accounts, the proper course is to sue the Receiver for the purpose of establishing that liability. Questions with regard to the soundness or prudence of the system of management adopted by a Receiver, or charges of wilful default or neglect, are not matters that can be disposed of in the shape of exceptions to accounts. Even where a *prima facie* case of the responsibility of the Receiver for malpractices of his servants is made out, an inquiry into such practices is foreign to an application to pass Receiver's accounts. The objection that a Receiver has not included in his accounts collections made in the mofussil, cannot be dealt with upon an application to pass his accounts. If a *prima facie* ground is made out of the accountability of the Receiver for the mofussil collections, the proper course is either to postpone the passing of the accounts until the question of the Receiver's liability is established by suit, or to pass the accounts, reserving the right of the parties to establish any claim they may make against the Receiver in a suit properly framed for the purpose. *SATTYA SANKAR GHOSAL v. GOLAFMONEE DEBEE* (1900) 5 C. W. N. 223

**46. ——— Appointment—Title to property—Removal of property.** In an application for the appointment of a Receiver, it is sufficient if a *prima facie* title to the property, over which the Receiver is sought to be appointed, is made out. The fact that a large amount of property is removed by the defendant under circumstances which may fairly give rise to suspicion, during the pendency of a suit in which the question of title to that property is to be determined, is in itself a sufficient ground for the appointment of a Receiver. *SHAM CHAND GIRI v. BHAYA RAM PANDAY* (1894)  
5 C. W. N. 365

**47. ——— Waste by mohunt—**The suit relates to a certain *mohuntship* which became vacant by the death of one *J.* the former *mohunt*, who died on the 8th September, 1899. *M.*, who was the plaintiff, and the nephew of the deceased, alleged that he was installed as *mohunt* on the 2nd September; *S.* the defendant, who was in possession, alleged that he was installed as *mohunt* on the 12th September by a *punchayet*. Plaintiff applied for appointment of a Receiver; and, in support of his allegation as to his installation, he relied upon a considerable number of affidavits of most respectable witnesses. It was admitted that *S.* was installed as *mohunt* as alleged. There was great reason to believe that since he took possession of the property he had committed gross waste. *Held*, in the circumstances, that it was a fit case in which a Receiver should be appointed. In an application



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for the appointment of a Receiver in a suit where the title to certain properties, in the possession of the defendant, is in dispute, it is not necessary that a strong case should be made out; it is sufficient if a fair *prima facie* case is made out. *Sidheswari Debi v. Abhoyeswari Debi*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 818; *Chandidat Jha v. Padmanand Singh*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 459; *Sham Chand Giri v. Bhaya Ram Pandey*, 5 C. W. N. 365, referred to. *MOHUNT SIARAM DAS v. MOHUNT MOHABIR DAS* (1899)

5 C. W. N. 362

48. ———— **Practice—Application for appointment of Receiver, whether to be made in Chambers or in Court.** An application for the appointment of a Receiver on the retirement of another Receiver should be made in Court, and not in Chambers. *STALKARTT v. STALKARTT* (1900)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 250

49. ———— **Mortgage suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 503—Appointment of Receiver in a mortgage suit.** A Receiver can be appointed under s. 503 of the Civil Procedure Code in a suit to enforce a mortgage. *Womda Khanum v. Rajroop Koer*, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 335, explained. *GHANASHYAM MISSEER v. GOBINDA MONI DAS* (1902)

7 C. W. N. 452

50. ———— **Contempt—Contempt proceedings—Appeal—Receiver appointed pending appeal—Appeal no longer pending—Discharge of Receiver—Jurisdiction of Court.** There is nothing to prevent the Receiver of a property appointed by the Court from himself applying for taking proceedings against a party for contempt. When a Receiver of a property has been appointed by an Appellate Court pending an appeal to that Court, even when the appeal is no longer pending, he must be regarded as the Receiver of the property, of which he has been put in possession, until he is finally discharged; and the Appellate Court has jurisdiction to deal with matters relating to the Receiver, including proceedings for contempt, until he has had his accounts passed by it. *GREY v. WOOGRAMOHUN THAKUR* (1901)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 790

51. ———— **Debt incurred by Receiver—Creditor, right of suit by—Estate, liability of—Receiver, personal liability of—Executor or Trustee, Creditor, nature of liability of.** A creditor is entitled to proceed against the representative of an estate for recovery of debt incurred by the Receiver during the management of the estate by him; the right to maintain such suit against the representative is founded on the just and equitable principle that, as the acts of a Receiver, acting within his authority, are the acts of the Court, the estate cannot be permitted to enjoy the benefit of those acts without being held responsible for the obligations arising out of them. *Burt, Boulton & Hayward v. Bull*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 276, referred to and explained. A Receiver occupies a position towards an estate in his hands different from that of an executor or trustee: the latter, not acting through or under directions of the Court, do not and cannot, under ordinary circumstances, create obligations

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binding on the estate in favour of creditors. *MOHARI BIBI v. SHYAMA BIBI* (1903)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 937  
s.c. 7 C. W. N. 799

52. ———— **Discharge—Administration suit—Discharge of Receiver before completion of administration decree.** No order can be made for the discharge of a Receiver appointed in an administration suit, and directing him to make over possession of the estate to the plaintiff, before the completion of the administration decree. *BHUGWAN DAS SUREKA v. HEERA LAL* (1901)

5 C. W. N. 417

53. ———— **Leave to sue—Making Receiver party to a suit.** When a Receiver has been appointed for property, the leave of the Court should be taken to bring a suit in respect of it. But, in a suit for declaration of title, when the beneficial owner has been made a party, it is not necessary to join the Receiver. *Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China v. Hurish Chunder Neogy*, 5 C. W. N. xv., explained and distinguished. *RODGER v. ASHUTOSH MUKERJI* (1902)

6 C. W. N. 829

54. ———— **Party—Jurisdiction—Proceedings under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898)—Possession of Receiver.** A Receiver appointed by the High Court cannot be made a party to a proceeding under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure merely in his capacity of Receiver, and a Magistrate has no jurisdiction to interfere with him in respect of his possession of the estate, without the sanction of the Court,—his possession being the possession of the Court. *Ex parte Cochrane*, L. R. 20 Eq. 282; *William Russell v. The East Anglian Railway Company*, 3 Mac. & G. 104; and *Ames v. The Trustees of the Birkenhead Docks*, 20 Beav. 332, referred to. *Semble*: The Receiver can neither sue nor be sued without the leave of the Court. *Miller v. Ram Ranjan Chakravarti*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1014, referred to. *DUNNE v. CHANDRA KISORE* (1902)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 593  
s.c. 7 C. W. N. 390

55. ———— **Suit against Receiver to recover amount not recovered by Receiver owing to alleged negligence—Necessity for leave of the Court.** When a party feels aggrieved at the conduct of a Receiver, he should seek redress against the Receiver in the proceedings in which he was appointed. If separate proceedings be taken against him, either in that Court or elsewhere, they should be with the leave of the Court under whose authority the Receiver was acting. *KAMATCHI AMMAL v. SUNDARAM AYYAR* (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 492

56. ———— **Party to criminal proceedings—Leave of Court—"Owner"—Calcutta Municipal Act (Bengal Act III of 1899), ss. 3, 320, 574.** A Receiver appointed by the High Court is not the "owner" of the property of which he has been appointed Receiver, within the meaning of s. 3, cl. (32), of Bengal Act III of 1899; nor can he be made a party to any suit or proceeding without



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the leave of the Court appointing him. *Dunne v. Chandra Kisore*, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 593, referred to. *FINE v. CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA* (1903)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 721  
s.c. 7 C. W. N. 706

57. ———— **Remuneration—Agreement to pay salary of Receiver—Position of Receiver—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1822), s. 503.** A promise to pay the salary of a Receiver without leave from the Court, even if unconditional, being in contravention of the law, is not binding on the promisor. A Receiver being an officer of the Court, the Court only is to determine his fees or remuneration; and the parties cannot by any act of theirs add to, or derogate from, the functions of the Court, without its authority. *Manick Lall Seal v. Surrut Coomaree Dasse*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 648, referred to. *PROKASH CHANDRA SARKAR v. ADLAM* (1903)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 696

58. ———— **Receiver, appointment of—Pending suit for recovery of property.** Where in a suit pending before a first Subordinate Judge for recovery of property, an application has been made for the appointment of a Receiver and granted. *Held*, on appeal, that it is inadvisable to go into the merits of a case, which is pending before a Court, where the appointment of a Receiver is under consideration. Such a course is undesirable and tends to prejudice the case. *RAM SUNDER DASS v. KAMAL JHA alias KAMAL DAS* (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 741

59. ———— **New Receiver—Appointment of new Receiver in place of original Receiver—Civil proceedings instituted by original Receiver and pending at date of appointment of new Receiver—Necessity for making new Receiver a party.** When a Receiver appointed under s. 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure institutes civil proceedings and is then replaced by another Receiver, it is necessary that the new Receiver should be made a party to those proceedings. Observations on the mode and circumstances in which a new Receiver will be made a party. *AKULA PARADESI v. DHELI JAGANNADHA ROW* (1905) I. L. R. 28 Mad. 157

60. ———— **Suit against Receiver without leave of Court—Application for such leave after filing of suit—Practice.** The consent of the Court to an action against a Receiver appointed by the Court is a condition precedent to the right of the party to sue, and cannot be rectified by a subsequent application for permission to continue the action brought without such permission. *PRAMATHA NATH GANGOOLY v. KHETRA NATH BANERJEE* (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 270  
s.c. 9 C. W. N. 247

61. ———— **Suit in ejectment by Receiver—Practice—Discharge of Receiver before termination of suit—Devolution of interest—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 372—Mortgage—Accession to mortgaged property—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 8, 70—Lease by mortgagor—Sub-**

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*lease pendente lite—Rights of mortgagee.* Somjee, a Khoja merchant, died in 1885, leaving as his survivors four sons by his first wife (who predeceased him), his second wife Labai, and four sons by Labai. By his will, Somjee gave the whole of his moveable and immoveable property to his sons by his first wife, directing them out of such property to give to Labai and his sons Rs. 30,000 within six years of his death. On the 12th January, 1899, Somjee's sons by his first wife mortgaged certain of the properties to the Bank of Bombay. In 1903, the Bank having advertised such properties for sale under a power reserved to them by the mortgage deed, Somjee's sons by Labai (who had since died) brought a suit No. 554 of 1903 against Somjee's sons by his first wife and the Bank of Bombay, claiming that the properties could only be sold subject to the charge in their favour. On the 14th January, 1904, the Bank assigned the mortgage to Dwarkadas. On the 26th January 1904, Mr. Macleod was appointed a Receiver by the Court. On the 24th February, 1904, the Receiver was authorised to file an ejectment suit, where necessary. On the 18th March, 1904, the Receiver as plaintiff No. 1 and Dwarkadas as plaintiff No. 2 filed the present suit to eject Kissan, the first defendant, from a portion of the property mortgaged to the Bank. Kissan claimed to be in possession under a lease from Goolam, the second defendant, one of the four sons of Somjee by his first wife. After the commencement of the suit, suit No. 554 of 1903 was disposed of in favour of the Bank of Bombay and the Receiver was discharged. The first defendant contended that Dwarkadas had no right to join the Receiver in bringing the suit, that the moment the Receiver was discharged his power to sue and with it the suit itself came to an end. *Held*, that the Bank or its assignee Dwarkadas had a right to come in under s. 372 of the Code of Civil Procedure and apply that the suit be continued by one or the other of them. No such application was in fact made, because Dwarkadas was already on the record as plaintiff No. 2. The joinder of Dwarkadas as a co-plaintiff with the Receiver, though it was not perhaps, strictly speaking, legal at the time, did not constitute a misjoinder. *Held*, also, that a theatre, erected by the mortgagors on the land, after the execution of the mortgage, was, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, included in the mortgage. The Transfer of Property Act makes no distinction between freehold and leasehold for the purposes of the rule of law embodied in ss. 8 and 70 of the Act. In this respect the Act reproduces the English law, which is, that all things which are annexed to the property mortgaged are part of the mortgage security and therefore the deed need contain no mention of structures or fixtures, unless a contrary intention can be collected from the deed. *Held*, also, that if a mortgagor left in possession grants a lease without the concurrence of the mortgagee, the lessee has a precarious title, inasmuch as, although the lease is good as between himself and the mortgagor, who granted it, the paramount title of the



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mortgagee may be asserted against both of them.  
**MACLEOD v. KISSAN (1904)**

**I. L. R. 30 Bom. 250**

**62. ————— Mortgage by Receiver—**  
*Money decree against joint owners—Attachment—*  
*Decree—Attaching creditor's right to property over*  
*mortgagee.* Where a receiver of joint property  
 mortgaged that property to another after a money  
 decree had been obtained against the owners,  
 but had executed the mortgage previous to the  
 attachment. *Held*, that the attaching creditors  
 were not entitled to priority over the mortgagee.  
**HERUMBO NATH BANERJEE v. SATISH CHANDRA**  
**MUKERJEE (1905)**

**I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1175**

**63. ————— Receiver, whether he can**  
**sue in his own name.—Civil Procedure Code (Act**  
**XIV of 1882), ss. 503 and 505—Appointment of**  
**Receiver by a subordinate Court without sanction**  
**of the District Court, validity of.** Where a suit  
 was instituted by a Receiver at a time when he had  
 been appointed by a Subordinate Judge to act  
 temporarily, but without the previous sanction of  
 the District Judge, which, however, was subse-  
 quently obtained:—*Held*, that such a suit was  
 validly instituted by the Receiver. **Benode Behary**  
**Mookerjee v. Raj Narain Mitter I. L. R. 30 Calc.**  
**699, distinguished. Harakumar Pal Chowdhary**  
**v. Safatulla, 2 C. L. J. 70, and Padmanand Singh**  
**v. Anant Lal Misser, 4 C. L. J. 421, referred to.**  
 A Court may authorise a Receiver to sue in his  
 own name, and a Receiver, who is authorised to  
 sue, though not expressly in his own name, may  
 do so by virtue of his appointment with full  
 powers under s. 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  
**William Robert Fink v. Moharaj Bahadur Singh,**  
**I. L. R. 25 Calc. 642, and The Oriental Bank**  
**Corporation v. Gobin Lall Seal, I. L. R. 10 Calc.**  
**713, relied upon. Shunmugam v. Moidin, I. L. R.**  
**8 Mad. 229; Gopalasami v. Sankara, I. L. R. 8**  
**Mad. 418; Sundaram v. Sankara, I. L. R. 9 Mad.**  
**334; Drobomoyi Gupta v. C. T. Davis, I. L. R. 14**  
**Calc. 323; Haridass Kundu v. J. C. Macgregor,**  
**I. L. R. 18 Calc. 477; and W. R. Fink v. Buldeo**  
**Dass, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 715, referred to. JAGAT**  
**TARINI DAS v. NABA GOPAL CHAKI (1907)**

**I. L. R. 34 Calc. 305**

**64. ————— Application by Receiver for**  
**liberty to sell after dismissal of suit—Practice—**  
**Dismissal of suit—Application by Receiver**  
**for liberty to sell—Power of Court—Costs.** When  
 a suit in which a Receiver has been appointed,  
 has been dismissed, the Court has no jurisdiction to  
 give the Receiver any fresh power, as for instance,  
 liberty to sell. **RABEHOLME v. SMITH (1907)**

**I. L. R. 34 Calc. 336**

**65. ————— Sale by Receiver—Right of a**  
**party to suit to challenge validity of sale in a separate**  
**suit—Shebait of Thakur, a party—Right of succeed-**  
**ing shebait to recover property sold—Representation**  
**of Thakur by shebait—Continuing representation**  
**—Application in suit to set aside sale—Maintain-**  
**ability.** A sale of properties, the subject-matter  
 of a suit, by the Receiver under the order of

**RECEIVER—contd.**

the Court, cannot, in the absence of fraud, be  
 attacked collaterally by persons who were parties  
 thereto or their representatives. **Willkinson v.**  
**Gangadhar Sirkar, 6 B. L. R. 486, referred to.**  
 Where one member of a joint Hindu family sued  
 for partition of certain properties on the allega-  
 tion that they were secular properties of the  
 family and another resisted it on the ground that  
 the properties were the absolute *debutter* properties  
 of the family idol of which he was the *shebait*, and a  
 Receiver was appointed in that suit, and he, under  
 the direction of the Court, sold certain portions  
 of the properties to meet the costs of the suit:—  
*Held*, in a suit brought to recover the properties  
 sold by persons claiming to be successors in office  
 of the *shebait*, that the substantial question raised  
 in the former suit was as to the real character of  
 the properties sold and the *Thakur* was represented  
 in it in the only manner possible, *viz.*, by the *shebait*.  
 The succeeding *shebait*s, forming a continuing repre-  
 sentation of the *Thakur's* property, were bound  
 by the order for sale which it was not open to them  
 to challenge in an independent action. **Prasanno**  
**Kumari v. Golab Chand, L. R. 2 I. A. 145, 152;**  
**Moharanee Shibeswaree Debia v. Mathura Nath**  
**Acharjo, 13 Moo. I. A. 270, 275; Jagadindra Nath**  
**v. Hemantha Kumari, 8 C. W. N. 809, L. R.**  
**31 I. A. 203, 210; Benode Behari v. Nistarini,**  
**9 C. W. N. 961; L. R. 32 I. A. 193; 2 C. L. J. 189,**  
*relied on. Quære:* Whether having regard to the  
 purpose for which the properties were sold an appli-  
 cation in the former suit to set aside the order  
 would have succeeded. **GORA CHAND LURKI v.**  
**MAKHAN LAL CHAKRAVARTY (1907)**

**11 C. W. N. 489**

**66. ————— Receiver's account—Direc-**  
**tions as to, if appealable—Civil Procedure Code**  
**(Act XIV of 1882), ss. 503, cl. (f), and 588, cl. 24.**  
 Directions given by a Court in passing Receiver's  
 accounts are not appealable. **KESHOBATI KUMARI**  
**v. MACGREGOR (1908)**

**I. L. R. 35 Calc. 568**  
**s. c. 12 C. W. N. 648**

**67. ————— Lease by Receiver—Appli-**  
**cation to set aside—Summary jurisdiction—Pro in-**  
**teresse suo—Receiver's account—Action—Practice.**  
 No summary order can be passed to set aside a lease  
 already executed and granted by a Receiver. The  
 proper remedy of the aggrieved parties is to institute  
 a regular suit to set aside the lease against the  
 Receiver and also the lessee, if it is alleged that  
 the lease was obtained by collusion. **Surendra**  
**Keshab Roy v. Durga Sundari Dassee, I. L. R. 15**  
**Calc. 253, distinguished.** No order can be made  
 against a lessee from a Receiver for arrears of rent  
 or interest in an application in a suit. A regular  
 suit ought to be instituted to recover them. The  
 claims against a Receiver for giving up arrears of  
 rent or interest due under a lease granted by  
 him are matters which cannot be dealt with on  
 an interlocutory application in the suit. *Quære:*  
 —Whether the Court can go into such matters on  
 the passing of the Receiver's accounts or the parties  
 must file a suit in respect of them against the



**RECEIVER—contd.**

Receiver. *KRISTA CHUNDR A GHOSE v. KRISTA SAKHA GHOSE* (1908) . 12 C. W. N. 1023

68. ———— *Lease—Summary jurisdiction—Remedy—Interest—Receiver's accounts—Practice.* Where a lease had been already granted by a Receiver acting under an order of Court, and possession of the property had been given to the lessee, and subsequently certain parties applied to the Court for a declaration that the lease was invalid, and for certain other reliefs against the Receiver and the lessee:—*Held*, that no summary order could be passed to set aside the lease. The proper remedy would be by suit against the Receiver, and also against the lessee, if it was alleged that the lease was obtained by collusion. *Surendro Keshub Roy v. Doorga Soondery Dossee*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 253, distinguished. *Held*, further, that on this application no order could be made against the lessee for interest on arrears of rent, nor could any order be passed against the Receiver in respect of the same, as this was a matter touching the Receiver's accounts. *KRISTA CHANDRA GHOSE v. KRISTA SAKHA GHOSE* (1908)

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 52

69. ———— *Suit for account against officer employed by Receiver—Discharge of Receiver—Right of proprietor to sue for account—Agent and sub-agent.* Where a receiver was appointed in respect of certain properties about which there was a litigation, in which plaintiff was found to be the proprietor:—*Held*, that a suit for account at the instance of the plaintiff does not lie against the *teshildars* employed under the Receiver as they were his sub-agents and were not liable to render an account to the plaintiff. *JATINDRA NARAIN ACHARYA CHOWDHURY v. MOHARAM AKAND* (1908)

12 C. W. N. 1035

70. ———— *Rights of stranger against Receiver—Appeal—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 503, cl. (b); 588, cl. (24)—Stranger in possession of property in suit—Lien on property—Jurisdiction of Court when ousted—Possessory lien—Possession by Receiver.* Where in a mortgage suit a Receiver appointed by Court was directed to take possession of the property in custody of a person not a party to the suit:—*Held*, that such an order was made under s. 503, cl. (b) of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) and was appealable under s. 588, cl. (24). Where a stranger to a suit claims under a title paramount to that of the parties, the jurisdiction of the Court is not ousted by the mere assertion of the existence of the circumstances but upon proof of the actual existence of such circumstance and upon judicial investigation. *Budh Singh Dhudhuria v. Niradbaran Roy*, 2 C. L. J. 431, and *Mahomed Mehdi Galistana v. Joharra Begam*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 285, followed. *Hurree Pershad Malee v. Koonjo Behary Shaha*, Marsh. 99; *Chunder Koomar Mundul v. Bakur Ali Khan*, 9 W. R. 598; *Shashti Charan Chatterjee v. Tarak Chunder Chatterjee*, 8 B. L. R. 315; 15 W. R. 9 (F. B.); *Mahomed Wahiduddin v. Hakimani*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 757; and *Mayor of London v. Cox*, L. R. 2 H. L. 239, referred to. The possessory

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lien of an agent attaches only upon goods or chattels in respect of which the principal has, as against a third person, the right or power to create a lien; such lien is confined to the rights of the principal in the goods or chattels at the time when it attaches, and is subject to all the rights and equities of third persons available against the principal at that time. *Attorney-General v. Freeman*, 11 M. & W. 694; *Attorney-General v. Walmsley*, 12 M. & W. 179; *Manningford v. Taleman*, 1 Coll. 670; 66 R. R. 239. *In re Llewellyn*, [1891] 3 Ch. 145; and *Peat v. Clayton*, [1906] 1 Ch. 659, referred to. *HUDSON v. MORGAN* (1909) . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 713

13 C. W. N. 654

**RECEIVING OFFICER.**

See BOMBAY DISTRICT MUNICIPAL ACT.

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 409

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See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 120.

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19 W. R. 149

4 B. L. R. F. B. 54

10 W. R. 407

1 B. L. R. A. C. 92

See REGISTRATION ACT (III OF 1877), ss. 50 AND 17. I. L. R. 27 Bom. 452

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY.

L. R. 28 I. A. 46

**RECOGNIZANCE TO APPEAR.**

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1898, s. 476.

8 C. W. N. 779

1. ———— *Case made over to police for investigation—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 151—Particulars of recognizance.* In a case which is made over for investigation to the police, the prosecutor and his witnesses should be required to enter into recognizances to attend and give evidence. A recognizance binding over an accused person to appear to answer a charge should specify the particular day on which he should be in attendance in Court. *QUEEN v. POORAN JOLAH*

11 W. R. Cr. 47

2. ———— *Power to take recognizances—Witness—Power of Magistrate.* A Subordinate Magistrate has no power under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code to take recognizances from a complainant and witnesses to appear on a



**PARTITION ACT (IV OF 1893)—concl'd.**

———— s. 2—concl'd.

inexpedient and one of the parties asks the Court to modify the decree by passing an order under this section. *Kadir Bacha Saheb v. Abdul Rahiman Saheb*, I. L. R. 24 Mad. 639, and *Hirmoni Dasi v. Radha Churn Kar*, 5 C. W. N. 128, followed. *BAI HIRAKORE v. TRIKAMDAS* (1907)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 103

1. ————— s. 4—*Transfer of Property Act* (IV of 1882), s. 44—"Undivided family"—S. 4 of the *Partition Act* applicable to Mahomedans. Held, that Mahomedans are not excluded from the benefit of s. 4 of the *Partition Act* (IV of 1893). *Kalka Parshad v. Bankey Lall*, 9 Oudh Cases 158, approved. *Amme Raham v. Zia Ahmad*, I. L. R. 13 All. 282, referred to. *Hashmat Ali v. Muhammad Umar*, I. L. R. 29 All. 308, overruled. *SULTAN BEGAM v. DEBI PRASAD* (1908)

I. L. R. 30 All. 324

2. ————— *Dwelling house belonging to an undivided family—Mahomedans.* Held, that the expression "a dwelling house belonging to an undivided family" as used in s. 4 of the *Partition Act*, 1893, is not applicable to a house belonging to a Mahomedan family. *Amme Raham v. Zia Ahmad*, I. L. R. 13 All. 282, referred to. *HASHMAT ALI v. MUHAMMAD UMAR* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 308

———— s. 10—

See *PARTITION—MISCELLANEOUS CASES.*

I. L. R. 21 All. 409

**PARTITION ACT (BENG. V OF 1897).**

———— ss. 46, 48—*Board of Revenue, rules framed by—Batwara proceedings—Rent, entries as to, payable by tenants, if evidence against tenants—Publication presumed in the absence of certificate.* Entries in batwara papers as to the amount of the rents payable by tenants are evidence in the same way as entries in the record-of-rights prepared under Chap. X of the *Bengal Tenancy Act* are evidences under s. 103B of the *Bengal Tenancy Act* though they may not be very valuable evidence. Absence of the certificate of local publication not sufficient to show that there was no publication. A presumption should be made of the regularity of the proceedings of an officer conducting a partition. *JANKI DOBEY v. KIRTARATH ROY* (1908)

13 C. W. N. 93

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See *LANDLORD AND TENANT.*

10 C. W. N. 818

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See *CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE*, 1882, s. 28.

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 80

See *CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST.*

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1108

See *MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.*

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 226

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12 B. L. R. 35

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7 B. L. R. Ap. 58  
11 B. L. R. Ap. 26

**PARTNERSHIP.**

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I. L. R. 12 Calc. 383

**1. WHAT CONSTITUTES PARTNERSHIP.**

1. ——— Participation in profits—*Application of English law.* *M M & Co., merchants in London, carrying on business with W N & Co., merchants in Calcutta, sought to make the defendant liable as a partner in the latter firm, under a particular memorandum of agreement between the members of the firm of W N W & Co., and the defendant. Held, that such agreement did not constitute the Rajah a partner in or with the said firm. Participation in profits does not constitute a partnership. The question is, not whether the person sought to be made liable participated in the profits, but whether the trade has been carried on by persons acting on his behalf. There is no rule of law which imposes partnership liability upon a man who advances to others money for the purpose of carrying on their business, and in return secures to himself a share of the profits which may arise from the employment in the business of the money so advanced by him.* PRATAB CHUNDRA SINGH v. MOLLOW, MARCH & Co.

3 B. L. R. A. C. 238

S.C. COURT OF WARDS v. MOLLOW, MARCH &amp; Co. . . . . 12 W. R. 56

On appeal to the Privy Council:—Held, that

**PARTNERSHIP—contd.****1. WHAT CONSTITUTES PARTNERSHIP—contd.**

although a right to participate in the profits of trade is a strong test of partnership, and there may be cases where, from such participation alone, it may, as a presumption, not of law, but of fact, be inferred, yet whether that relation does or does not exist must depend on the real intention and contract of the parties. To constitute a partnership, the parties must have agreed to carry on business and to share profits in some way in common; but where a contract is entered into between partners and a third person for the protection of that person as a creditor, whereby it is agreed that he shall receive in consideration of advances commission on the net profits of the partnership business, and large powers of control over the business are given to him, but no power to direct transactions, the Court, if satisfied that the contract was one of loan and security, will not interpret it as constituting a partnership. In applying the English law of partnership to cases in India, the usages of trade and habits of business of the people of India, so far as they may be peculiar and differ from those in England ought to be borne in mind. MOLLOW, MARCH & Co. v. COURT OF WARDS

10 B. L. R. 312; 18 W. R. 384  
L. R. I. A. Sup. Vol. 86**2. ——— Agreement to share profits—**

*Money paid as rent to one party.* The parties had entered into a contract of partnership to work certain supposed mines; plaintiff to receive a bonus and also six monthly payments as "rent" for the land, both parties to share the profits and bear the losses; it being stipulated that in case coal should not be discovered, the bonus and any sum paid as rent would be refunded. Held, that this was a partnership arrangement, and the payment of the money which went by the name of rent was not as by a tenant to a landlord, but as consideration-money for land forming a portion of the capital. SREEMUNJUREE DOSSEE v. POORSUTTUN DOSS

9 W. R. 499

**3. ——— Contract Act,**

ss. 239, 240—*Loan of money.* Held, on the construction of the agreement in this case, that such agreement did not create a "partnership" between the parties thereto, as defined in s. 239 of Act IX of 1872, but was an agreement of the kind mentioned in s. 240 of that Act. BHAGGU LALL v. DEGRUY-THUR . . . . . I. L. R. 4 All. 74

**4. ——— Joint Hindu family—**

*Separation among members of.* Circumstances under which the Court will infer a partnership between members of a Hindu family alleged to have separated. MISSREELOLL v. RAMNARAIN . Cor. 63

**5. ——— Account.**

There is no analogy in respect of the manager being liable to account between a joint Hindu family and a partnership. Where it was arranged amongst the members of a joint Hindu family that the accounts of a banking business carried on by them should be kept, on the understanding that the profits, when



**PARTNERSHIP—contd.****1. WHAT CONSTITUTES PARTNERSHIP—  
contd.**

realized, should be divided amongst the individual members in certain proportions, and that the expenses of each member should be credited and charged in the name of each member:—*Held*, that this was in the nature of a partnership, and an account was decreed. **RANGANMANI DAS v. KASINATH DUTT** . . . **3 B. L. R. O. C. 1**

**6. ——— Ancestral business—Account.** An ancestral trade may descend like other inheritable property upon the members of a Hindu undivided family. The partnership so created or surviving has many, but not all, of the elements existing in an ordinary partnership. For example, the death of one of the partners does not dissolve the partnership; nor, as a rule, can one of the partners, when severing his connection with the business, ask for an account of past profits and losses. **SAMALBHAI NATHUBHAI v. SOMESHWER**

**I. L. R. 5 Bom. 38**

But see **ABHIJAY CHANDRA ROY CHOWDHRY v. PYARIMOHAN GUHO** . . . **5 B. L. R. 347**

**7. ——— Document creating partnership—Determination of partnership.** Where a document creating a partnership for a particular business is silent as to the date at which the partnership is to commence and end:—*Held*, that the partnership is conterminous with the business for the purpose for which it was created. **BUDDREENATH v. ISREE PERSHAUD** . . . **Cor. 114**

**8. ——— Continuing firm—Partnership for a fixed term—Death of partner—Power of partner to nominate a successor—General device not an exercise of power—Effect of default in exercising power of nomination—Good will—Valuable asset.** *V, J, and S*, being large shareholders in the Great Eastern Spinning and Weaving Mills, Limited, entered into an agreement in October 1873 to cause the said company to be wound up and to form a new company to take over its assets and liabilities, and to cause themselves to be appointed agents of the new company under the firm of *V J S & Co.*, and under that name to act as agents of the new company, subject to the terms of the agreement. The agreement provided that the firm of *V J S & Co.*, should take the agency of the new company for a period of thirty years; that of the profits to be derived by the said firm out of the agency *V* should receive 39 cents, *J* 31 cents, and *S* 30 cents; that in case of a vacancy in the firm of *V J S & Co.*, caused by the death or retirement of any of the partners, the nominee of the dying or retiring partner should be admitted into partnership, and should receive the share of such partner, and should exercise all his authority. In pursuance of this agreement, the Great Eastern Spinning and Weaving Mills, Limited, was wound up, and a new company called "The New Great Eastern Spinning and Weaving Company, Limited," was formed and registered. Both the memorandum and articles of association of the said new company contained clauses providing that the firm of *V J S & Co.*, or

**PARTNERSHIP—contd.****1. WHAT CONSTITUTES PARTNERSHIP—  
contd.**

whatever member or members that firm for the time consist of, should be agents of the company so long as the said firm should carry on business in Bombay, or until they should resign. The firm of *V J S & Co.*, having been constituted under the said agreement, became the agents of the said company, and continued to act as such down to the date of the present suit. No other business was done by the firm, and the three partners divided the profits realized by the firm out of the agency business in the shares specified in the agreement as above mentioned. *V* died in 1874, leaving a will whereby, in exercise of the right vested in him by the agreement, he nominated and appointed his wife *K* as his successor in the firm, and she accordingly became and was recognized as a partner therein. In August 1875 she assigned her interest in the firm to *H*, and he thereupon became a partner and received 39 cents of the profits. In November 1876 *J* assigned his interest in the firm (31 cents), to *H* and *S*, of which 21 cents became the property of *H* and 10 cents the property of *S*,—the firm henceforth consisting only of these two partners, of whom the former received in all 60 cents of the profits and the latter 40 cents. In November 1882, *H* died, leaving a will whereby he appointed his wife *B* his executrix, and left all his property to her for life, and after her death to his son. The will did not refer to the firm, or nominate any successor in the partnership. In the present suit *B* as executrix claimed to be entitled to 60 cents or shares in the firm of *V J S & Co.* up to the date of the testator's death, and to a like share in the profits earned subsequently to his death, or to be earned by the firm so long as it continued to carry on the said agency business of the company. The defendant admitted the right of the plaintiff to the share claimed in the profits earned prior to the testator's death, but resisted her claim to any portion of the subsequent profit. *Held* (i), on the authority of *Beamish v. Beamish, Ir. Rep. 4 Eq. 120*, that the testator's will did not operate as an exercise of the power of nominating a successor in the firm so as to make the plaintiff a partner. (ii) That having regard to the nature of the duties of the firm as agents and to the language of the agreement constituting the firm, coupled with the fact that there was no capital employed in the business, it must have been intended that, in default of nomination of a successor by a retiring or deceased partner, the agency should be carried on by the continuing or surviving partners in the name of the firm, and that the interest of the testator in the firm upon his death therefore survived to the defendant. *Held* also, that, although the plaintiff was entitled to an account up to the date of the testator's death, she was not entitled to a share of the good-will as an asset of the firm. The good-will of a firm is attached to the name, and in the present case, by the partnership agreement itself, the name was to be used by the surviving partners or partner for the own benefit. That arrangement took away a value from the good-will, if indeed it was consist-



**PARTNERSHIP—contd.****1. WHAT CONSTITUTES PARTNERSHIP—  
contd.**

with its being an asset at all. *BACHUBAI v. SHAMJI JADOWJI*. I. L. R. 9 Bom. 536

9. ——— Intention of parties—Profits, participation in—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 242, 238—Broker. A right to participate in profits is sometimes a strong test of partnership; but whether or not the relation of partners does or does not exist depends on the real intention and agreement of the parties, and not upon the mere fact of participation in profits. *Davis v. Davis*, [1894] 1 Ch. 393, referred to. The facts that B, an assistant in a firm of brokers, received, over and above his salary, a share in the profits; and that, with the knowledge of the partners, he occasionally signed, on delivery orders which came from buyers in favour of the firm, the signature "for Carritt & Co." (the name of the firm), with his own initials or name underneath; that he occasionally signed with his own signature letters dealing with mere matters of detail; and that he purported to make firm offers to buyers and sellers, and initialled alterations in some contracts, do not constitute him a partner in that firm. The duties and responsibilities of a broker discussed. *MORRISON v. VERSCHOYLE* (1901). 6 C. W. N. 429

10. ——— Partnership, tests of—Participation in profits by lender—Taking active interest in business—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 240, 241—Holding out as partner to strangers—Estoppel—Intention—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 115. The right to participate in the profits of trade is in itself a strong test of partnership, but participation in profits, although strong evidence, is not conclusive evidence of a partnership and the question of partnership must be decided by the intention of parties to be ascertained from the contents of the written instruments, if any, and the conduct of the parties. It being established in this case with regard to a person's relation towards a business carried on with his money, that he was a mere lender:—*Held*, that neither the fact of his participating in the profits nor that he took an active interest in the business were inconsistent with his position as a lender. *Mollow, March & Co. v. Court of Wards*, 10 B. L. R. 312, and *Badeley v. Consolidated Bank*, L. R. 38 Ch. D. 208, followed. Where the question was as to whether a person, though not in fact a partner, did by his acts and conduct hold himself out to strangers as such, so as to become liable by estoppel:—*Held*, that to establish such liability it was not essential to show that he acted fraudulently or negligently. Even want of knowledge on his part of the effect of his acts and conduct would not absolve him from liability, if his acts and conduct were such as would induce a reasonable man to believe that he was a partner and to act upon such belief. *Sarat Chandra Dey, v. Gopal Chandra Laha*, L. R. 19 I. A. 203, *Cornish v. Abington*, 4 H. & N. 549, *Carr v. London and North-Western Railway Company*, L. R. 10 C. P.

**PARTNERSHIP—contd.****1. WHAT CONSTITUTES PARTNERSHIP—  
contd.**

216, *Dickenson v. Valpy*, 10 B. & C. 128, referred to. *PORTER v. INCELL* (1905). 10 C. W. N. 313

**2. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PART-  
NERS.**

1. ——— Construction of deed of partnership—Agreement to give managing partner commission—Dissolution of partnership—Loss of commission on dissolution. By an agreement, made on the 10th of January 1857, between K N and several other persons, it was agreed that they should form a co-partnership for the purpose of erecting a mill for the manufacture of yarn. The capital of the partnership was fixed at Rs. 3,00,000, divided into 100 shares of Rs. 3,000 each. By the 4th clause of the agreement it was provided that, in return for the trouble K N had been at in establishing the factory, "whatever cotton had to be purchased for the factory K N was to purchase, and whatever yarn should be made in the factory K N was to sell, and for whatever he should sell on account of the factory he was duly to receive from the co-partnership his commission at the rate of 5 per cent. during his lifetime," and it was also provided that, though the purchases and sales by the co-partnership should not be made through K N, "yet upon the whole amount of the sales the co-partnership was duly to pay 5 per cent. to K N during his lifetime." The factory was built, and its machinery procured and set up by K N, and both financially and otherwise the factory was wholly managed by him. Shortly after it commenced to work, it was found that the co-partnership had expended all its capital and was heavily involved in debt—incurred by K N without the sanction of his co-partners,—and that the factory was working at a loss; and at the suit of some of them, but against the consent of K N and a minority of the co-partners, the co-partnership was ordered to be dissolved. K N then claimed to be entitled to compensation for the loss of the commission he should have earned upon the sale of the yarn of the factory during his lifetime. *Held*, that he was not so entitled; that as between his co-partners and K N there was no obligation on the former to subscribe more capital after the original capital of the co-partnership had been exhausted; and that there was no implied covenant on the part of co-partnership to continue to work the factory in order that K N should be in a position to earn his commission during his lifetime. Distinction between right to compensation for loss of fixed wages and right to compensation for loss of commission pointed out. When a partnership is wound up by the Court, all questions arising between the partners out of the partnership transactions should be disposed of in the winding-up suit. *LALBHAI VALLABHBHAI v. KAVASJI NANABHAI*. 8 Bom. O. C. 209



# RECOGNIZANCE TO KEEP PEACE— contd.

## 3. WHEN RECOGNIZANCE MAY BE TAKEN —contd.

7. ——— Order for recognizance on conviction of criminal trespass—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 489—Sentence.* On a conviction of criminal trespass under s. 447, Penal Code, the Joint Magistrate added to the sentence of imprisonment an order that the prisoners should give recognizances to keep the peace. The Sessions Judge recommended that the order as to recognizances should be quashed, as criminal trespass was not one of the offences detailed in s. 489 for which such recognizances could be taken. The High Court declined to act on this recommendation, holding that there was nothing illegal in the Joint Magistrate's order, the conduct of the accused clearly pointing to an intention to commit a breach of the peace. *QUEEN v. JHAPOO*

20 W. R. Cr. 37

8. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 106—Security to keep the peace on conviction of house trespass—Breach of the peace—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 448.* An order under s. 106 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), binding down the accused to keep the peace, upon conviction for "house trespass" under s. 448 of the Indian Penal Code, cannot stand where the intention of the accused for committing the trespass was to have illicit intercourse with the complainant's wife. *Queen v. Gendoo Khan, 7 W. R. Cr. 14, and Queen v. Jhapoo, 20 W. R. Cr. 37, distinguished.* It is necessary before an order under s. 106 of the Criminal Procedure Code can be made that the accused should have an opportunity of answering to an accusation for an offence of the kind, upon a conviction for which such an order can be made. *SUBAL CHUNDER DEY v. RAM KANAI SANYASI*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 628  
3 C. W. N. 18

9. ——— Order for recognizances on renewal of conviction of house trespass—*Order in absence of accused—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 280.* A conviction of house trespass by a Subordinate Magistrate was reversed on appeal by the Magistrate of the district, who, moreover, directed the subordinate Magistrate to take a recognizance bond in the sum of Rs50 from the accused that he would not for one year enter the house and would not commit a breach of the peace. *Held*, by the High Court, that the order directing the recognizance bond to be taken should be set aside as having been improperly made by the Magistrate in the absence of the accused and upon the assertion of his adversary. *Semle*: The order was also illegal as not authorized by s. 280 or any other section of the Criminal Procedure Code. *REG. v. BHASKAR K. KHARKAR* . 3 Bom. Cr. 1

10. ——— Order for recognizance in case of rioting—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 489—Personal recognizance.* No order requiring personal recognizance to keep the peace can be

# RECOGNIZANCE TO KEEP PEACE— contd.

## 3. WHEN RECOGNIZANCE MAY BE TAKEN —contd.

passed under Act X of 1872, s. 489, unless the accused has been convicted of rioting or any other offence. *SAHEBDI v. KURAN* . 21 W. R. Cr. 37

11. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 106—Security for keeping the peace on conviction—Conviction under s. 143 of the Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860).* Conviction of a person under s. 143 of the Penal Code (being member of unlawful assembly) is not necessarily a ground for making an order against him under s. 106 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In order to bring his acts within the terms of the latter section, there must either be an express finding to the effect that his acts involved a breach of the peace or an evident intention of committing the same, or the evidence must be so clear as to satisfy the Court (without an express finding) that such was the case. *JIB LAL GIR v. JOGMOHAN GIR*  
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 576

12. ——— *Conviction under s. 143 of the Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860)—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 106.* An offence under s. 143 of the Penal Code is not one of the offences specified in s. 106 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which would justify an order directing a person or persons to furnish security to keep the peace. There may be findings in the case which justify such an order if such findings can be brought within the terms of s. 106. *Jib Lal Gir v. Jogmohan Gir, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 576, referred to.* Where the accused were convicted under s. 143 of the Penal Code and ordered under s. 106 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to furnish security to keep the peace, and it was alleged that the facts as proved showed that the accused came in a body, some of whom were armed with lathis and some of whom used threats and did other acts showing an evident intention to commit breaches of the peace:—*Held*, that there should have been an express finding to that effect; that if the accused or any of them acted in such a manner, they should have been convicted of criminal intimidation or other offence which would enable the Magistrate to bind them over to keep the peace; and that the order under s. 106 should be set aside. *SHEO BHAJAN SINGH v. MOSAWI* . . . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 983  
4 C. W. N. 795

13. ——— Order for recognizance to witness in case of rioting—*Admission of being present at or near scene of riot.* A witness for the defence in a case of rioting having admitted being present at or near the scene of the riot and denied that the accused took any part in it, the Magistrate, after finding the accused guilty and without further proceedings, called upon both the accused and his witness to enter into bonds to keep the peace for one year. *Held*, that this procedure was illegal so far as the witness was concerned. *QUEEN v. KADER KHAN* . . . I. L. R. 5 Mad. 380



**RECOGNIZANCE TO KEEP PEACE—**  
*contd.***3. WHEN RECOGNIZANCE MAY BE TAKEN**  
*—contd.*

14. ———— **Order for recognizance in case of criminal intimidation—***Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 489—Penal Code, ss. 503, 506.* The words in s. 489 of the Criminal Procedure Code, "taking other unlawful measures with the evident intention of committing a breach of the peace," do not include the offence of intimidation by threatening to bring false charges. Where therefore a person was convicted under ss. 503 and 506 of the Penal Code of such offence:—*Held*, that the Magistrate by whom such person was convicted could not, under s. 489 the Criminal Procedure Code, require him to give a personal recognizance for keeping the peace. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. RAGHUBAR* . . . **I. L. R. 2 All. 351**

15. ———— **Order for recognizance on conviction of offence of voluntarily causing hurt—***Power of Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 489.* It is in the power of a Magistrate, on conviction of a person of voluntarily causing hurt, to take security from him under s. 489 of Act X of 1872. An order under that section requiring security should not direct that the person convicted should execute the engagement to keep the peace at the end of the term of imprisonment to which he may have been sentenced. The person convicted is at liberty to execute the engagement at once or at any time during the term. *QUEEN v. BACHU* **7 N. W. 328**

16. ———— **Order made under Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 106, with respect to a person convicted of theft—***Illegality thereof—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 379.* Where an accused person was convicted of an offence under s. 379, Penal Code, and the Magistrate, having found on the evidence that there was an intention of committing breach of the peace, directed him to execute a bond under s. 106, Criminal Procedure Code, it was *held* that the order under s. 106 was illegal, as the accused was convicted of theft only. *Queen v. Gendoo Khan*, 7 W. R. 14, and *Queen v. Jhapoo*, 20 W. R. 37, distinguished. *RAM CHARAN MAITIE v. UMESH CHUNDER MONDAL* . **1 C. W. N. 186**

17. ———— **Order for recognizance to refrain from collecting cesses—***Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 282.* A Magistrate cannot pass an order under s. 282 calling on a person to enter into recognizances not to collect certain cesses, though under s. 282 the Magistrate may bind him down to keep the peace, if there is sufficient evidence to show that a breach of the peace is imminent through his act. *In the matter of LUCHMEEPUT SINGH* . . . **14 W. R. Cr. 3**

18. ———— **Order for second recognizance before expiration of first—***Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), s. 290—Execution of second recognizance.* Under s. 290 of the Criminal Procedure Code, an order to execute a

**RECOGNIZANCE TO KEEP PEACE—**  
*contd.***3. WHEN RECOGNIZANCE MAY BE TAKEN**  
*—contd.*

second recognizance during the time the first recognizance is in force is illegal. *QUEEN v. KUMODINI-KANT BANERJEE CHOWDHRY*

**9 B. L. R. Ap. 30 : 18 W. R. Cr. 44**

19. ———— **Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), s. 295—***Illegal order.* A was bound over to keep the peace for a year. Before the expiry of the period, he was involved in fresh disputes with other persons. The Deputy Magistrate, instead of referring the case to the Court of Session under s. 298 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, directed A to enter into another recognizance for a further period of one year. *Held*, that the order was illegal. *QUEEN v. KALINATH BISWAS* . **6 B. L. R. Ap. 116 : 15 W. R. Cr. 18**

20. ———— **Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1895), ss. 120 (2), 123—***Order to give fresh security upon expiry of a previous and existing security bond, legality of.* A security to keep the peace once given is sufficient for that purpose so long as it is in force in respect of every act of the person bound over breaking any of its conditions. A second order to give further security during the continuance of the first one is not contemplated by law; but if upon expiry of the first order the dispute still exists, a further security may be demanded on fresh proceedings properly taken. *MAHOMED ABDUL BARI v. EMPRESS*

**4 C. W. N. 121**

21. ———— **Disputes concerning land—***Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 107, 145—Procedure.* Where a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning possession of land, proceedings under s. 145, and not under s. 107, of the Criminal Procedure Code should be instituted. *DOLEGOBIND CHOWDHRY v. DHANU KHAN* . . . **I. L. R. 25 Calc. 559**

22. ———— **In a case of a dispute regarding land where the Magistrate had taken proceedings under s. 107 and one of the parties moved the High Court, and contended that the Magistrate should have acted under s. 145, and not s. 107, the High Court held that they were not competent to direct the Magistrate to act under s. 145, but they expressed an opinion that it would be more desirable that proceedings should be taken under that section, and left it to the Magistrate to consider whether it would not be desirable to institute proceedings.** *In the matter of the petition of EKRAM SINGH* . . . **3 C. W. N. 267**

*BEJOY SINGHA NEOGI v. EMPRESS* **3 C. W. N. 463**

23. ———— **Assembly of armed men—***Criminal Procedure Code, s. 106—Binding down to keep the peace, order for.* S. 106 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may apply to a case in which armed men are assembled with the intention of committing a breach of peace, but no breach of



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*contd.***3. WHEN RECOGNIZANCE MAY BE TAKEN**  
*—contd.*

the peace occurs because the assembly does not go so far. *SRIHARI SHOME v. LAL KHAN* (1900)

5 C. W. N. 250

**24. ——— Security for keeping the peace on conviction, order for—***Offences not within the terms of s. 106 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898)—Duty of Magistrate to record findings of fact which make that section applicable.* Where the offences of which a person is convicted do not in themselves, and apart from any other incidents, come within the terms of s. 106 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is incumbent upon the Magistrate to record a clear finding with respect to the facts which in his opinion make the provisions of that section applicable. *Jib Lal Gir v. Jogmohan Gir*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 576, followed. *BAIDYA NATH MAJUMDAR v. NIBARAN CHUNDER GOPE* (1902)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 93  
s.c. 6 C. W. N. 471

**25. ——— House-trespass—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 106, order under, when proper—Breach of peace—Penal Code, s. 448.** An order under s. 106, Code of Criminal Procedure, can be passed against a person who has been convicted of house-trespass, if he committed it with the object of causing hurt. *Subal Chunder Dey v. Ram Kanai Sanyasi*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 628, distinguished. *Queen v. Gendoo Khan*, 7 W. R. Cr. 14, and *Queen v. Jhapoo*, 20 W. R. Cr. 37, referred to. *TARINI CHARAN MUNDLE v. GOURIKANT BISWAS* (1902)

7 C. W. N. 25

**26. ——— Order of recognizance when proper—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 107, 118—Record of order.** An order under s. 118, Code of Criminal Procedure, requiring security for keeping the peace, should show that the person so called upon is likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity or to do some wrongful act that may probably occasion breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquillity. Where an order passed under s. 118, Criminal Procedure Code, stated that the persons bound over had used their influence for the purpose of stopping the services of the village barber, washerman, and others from being rendered to complainant, and also, generally, that they had committed "diverse other acts of oppression:" *Held*, that the former statement was not enough to justify an order under s. 118, Code of Criminal Procedure, and the latter was by itself too vague to sustain the order. *JINNAT CHOWDRY v. RHUSEN* (1902)

7 C. W. N. 32

**27. ——— Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 106—Order for security to keep the peace on convictions for offences not necessarily involving a breach of the peace—Validity.** Certain accused were convicted of theft, of mischief, and of being members of an unlawful assembly.

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*contd.***3. WHEN RECOGNIZANCE MAY BE TAKEN**  
*—concl.*

They were sentenced to imprisonment, and were further required to give security to keep the peace. There was no finding that a breach of the peace had been committed by them. *Held*, on revision, that the order requiring them to give security for keeping the peace must be set aside, as none of the offences for which they had been convicted necessarily involved a breach of the peace. *Quære*: Whether such an order might be made in a case in which a person is not accused of an offence involving a breach of the peace, but there is nevertheless an express finding that a breach has been committed. *KANNOOKARAN KUNHAMAD v. EMPEROR* (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 469

**4. CREDIBLE INFORMATION.**

**1. ——— Nature of information required—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 107.** *Held* by the Divisional Bench, that "information" of the kind mentioned in s. 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, must be clear and definite, directly affecting the person against whom process is issued, and should disclose tangible facts and details so that it may afford notice to such person of what he is come prepared to meet. *In the matter of the petition of JAI PRAKASH LAL*

I. L. R. 6 All. 26

**2. ——— Report of police officer.** The report of a police officer is "credible information" within s. 282 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861. *In the matter of BRINDABUN SHAHA*

10 W. R. Cr. 41

*BEHARI PATAK v. MAHOMED HYAT KHAN*

4 B. L. R. F. B. 46  
12 W. R. Cr. 60

**3. ——— Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 491, 530.** A police report is, under Act X of 1872, s. 530 (explanation), sufficient information on which a Magistrate may take action in a case of apprehended breach of the peace under s. 491 of that Act. *QUEEN v. RAM CHUNDER ROY*

21 W. R. Cr. 28

**4. ——— Statement of complainant on oath—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 282.** There is nothing in the Criminal Procedure Code which makes it imperative on a Magistrate to confront the accuser and the accused in a case under s. 282 of the Criminal Procedure Code; and if a Magistrate considers a statement on oath of a complainant to be "credible information" under that section, there is no reason why he should not call on the accused to give security, the sufficiency of such "credible information" being ordinarily left to the Magistrate to determine. *In the matter of petition of TARINEE KANT LAHOORY CHOWDHRY*

8 W. R. Cr. 79

**5. ——— Statement of complainant—Expectation of attack by defendant—Criminal Pro-**



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*contd.***4. CREDIBLE INFORMATION—concl'd.**

*cedure Code, 1861, s. 282.* A statement by a complainant (believed by the Magistrate) that he expected the defendant at any time to make an attempt on his person or property, is credible information, within the meaning of s. 282 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, of an intended breach of the peace. *QUEEN v. KRISTENDRO ROY*

7 W. R. Cr. 30

**6. ———— Petition not on oath—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 282.** A petition unsupported by any complaint or deposition on solemn affirmation cannot be considered "credible information" within the meaning of s. 282 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on which to warrant a Magistrate to demand security to keep the peace. *CHAMARO MALO v. KASHI CHUNDER LALLA*

8 W. R. Cr. 85

**7. ———— Statement by private person, not on oath—Report by Subordinate Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, ss. 282, 288.** A statement by a private person, not upon oath or solemn affirmation, is not credible information upon which alone a Magistrate should issue a summons under s. 282 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Semble*: A report by a Subordinate Magistrate of facts within his knowledge would be credible information upon which such summons might issue, but would not be sufficient ground for a final adjudication under s. 288. *REG. v. JIVANJI LIMJI*

6 Bom. Cr. 1

**8. ———— Report of Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 282.** The report of a Subordinate Magistrate is such "credible information" within the meaning of s. 282 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to authorize a Magistrate to summon an individual named in the report, and require him to enter into a recognizance to keep the peace, although the report does not suggest that a recognizance should be required, but suggests other means for the prevention of dispute and the preservation of order. *Ex parte NELLIKEL EDAT-THIL ITTI PUNGY ACHEN*

2 Mad. 240

REG. v. IRAPA BIN BASAPA . 8 Bom. Cr. 162

**9. ———— Conversations out of Court—Evidence—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 197.** Conversations out of Court with persons, however respectable, are not proper or legal material on which Magistrates should adopt proceedings under s. 107, Act X of 1882. *EMPRESS v. BABUA*

I. L. R. 6 All. 132

**10. ———— Information unsupported by witnesses—Necessity for witnesses.** It is not necessary to call witnesses in support of an information laid before a Magistrate previous to requiring security for keeping the peace. *In the matter of MULLICK FUKERUN*

11 W. R. Cr. 6

**5. SUMMONS.**

**1. ———— Contents of summons—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 491, 492.** In a

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*contd.***5. SUMMONS—contd.**

case in which parties are summoned to show cause why they should not be bound down to keep the peace, the proceedings should be conducted with due regard to the provisions of ss. 491 and 492 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and the summons should distinctly specify the amount and nature of the security required and the time for which the security is to run. *QUEEN v. GUNGA SINGH*

20 W. R. Cr. 38

**2. ———— Dispute likely to occasion breach of the peace.** It should appear on the face of a Magistrate's order that he had received credible information that the persons ordered to enter into their recognizances were likely to commit a breach of the peace, or to do any act that might probably occasion a breach of the peace. *In re BIRESHUREE PERSHAD*

6 W. R. Cr. 93

**3. ———— Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 283—Separate summons to several persons.** It is essential to the validity of a summons issued under s. 283 that it should contain the substance of the information by which the Magistrate is moved to act. A separate summons should be issued to each person required to furnish security, and a separate bond taken from each, which should be in the form required by the Code, and in the order the Magistrate should state the period for which the person against whom the order is made is to be imprisoned if he fail to comply with it. *QUEEN v. POWELL*

3 N. W. 96

**4. ———— Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 282.** A summons under s. 282 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, should set forth the substance of the information. It should also call upon the parties summoned to show cause. *QUEEN v. NIJABUT HOSSEIN*

1 N. W. Ed. 1873, 304

**5. ———— Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 283.** The summons to a person to show cause why he should not be required to furnish recognizances to keep the peace should, under s. 283, Code of Criminal Procedure, set out the substance of the information against him. When the party summoned shows cause, the Magistrate in taking evidence should look not merely to the question of possession, but also whether he is satisfied that there was a probability of a breach of the peace. *KOONJBEHARY CHOWDHRY v. EKNATH GURAIN*

15 W. R. Cr. 43

**6. ———— Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872), s. 492.** The words of s. 492 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are directory, and not imperative; and an omission to insert in a summons under that section the amount of the recognizance and security required will not invalidate any subsequent proceedings binding over the parties to keep the peace. *ABASU BEGUM v. UMDA KHANUM*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 724

**7. ———— Form of summons—Summons to appear—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 491.**

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*contd.***5. SUMMONS—concl'd.**

A summons setting out that the person to whom it is directed is charged with an offence under s. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and requiring his personal appearance in Court, is not such a summons as is required by that section. *In the matter of* CHAROO CHUNDER MULLICK

10 C. L. R. 430

**6. OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW CAUSE.**

**1. ——— Omission to issue summons to show cause—***Order directing recognizance to be taken.* An order directing certain persons to enter into recognizances of Rs500 each, conditioned to keep the peace for the period of one year, without first summoning them to show cause why they should not be required so to do, is irregular, and will be quashed. *QUEEN v. MOONEE DOOBEY*

2 N. W. 189

*KALI PERSHAD SIRDAR v. FUTTEH CHUND DASS*  
9 W. R. Cr. 16

**2. ——— Order giving insufficient time to show cause—***Irregular order—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 491.* Where parties required on the 1st July to show cause on the 9th under s. 491, Criminal Procedure Code, why they should not furnish security for breach of the peace were served on the 5th and 7th idem, it was held that they had not had sufficient time allowed them for the purpose, and the order requiring security was accordingly set aside. *QUEEN v. CHEYT SINGH*

22 W. R. Cr. 70

**3. ——— Omission to give opportunity to show cause—***Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 492.* On a complaint being lodged of criminal trespass and assault, the Magistrate recorded that, after interrogating the witnesses, he found that a breach of the peace was likely to ensue, and proceeded to examine the complainant and two of his witnesses and the accused, and thereupon ordered that the parties should furnish recognizances to keep the peace:—*Held*, that the parties had not had opportunity afforded them under s. 492, Criminal Procedure Code, to show cause why they should not be bound. *QUEEN v. SHUKUR MAHOMED*

22 W. R. Cr. 68

**4. ——— Notice to accused giving insufficient time.** The notice to the accused should give him sufficient time to come in and produce his evidence. *QUEEN v. ISREEPERSHAD SINGH*

20 W. R. Cr. 18

*RUN BAHADUR SINGH v. TILSUREE KOOR*  
22 W. R. Cr. 79

**7. SUMMONING WITNESSES.**

**1. ——— Obligation of Magistrate as to summoning witnesses—***Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 491.* A Magistrate is bound to assist

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*contd.***7. SUMMONING WITNESSES—concl'd.**

both parties in a case under s. 491, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, in bringing in their witnesses by issuing summonses to attend. *QUEEN v. CHEYT SINGH*

22 W. R. Cr. 70

**2. ——— Right to adjournment to produce witnesses—***Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 491, 496, 497.* Under the sections (491 and 497) of the Criminal Procedure Code relating to security for breach of the peace, the party charged is not entitled, when sufficient time has already been given him to show cause and to produce his witnesses to an adjournment in order to produce his witnesses. In such a case, he must either bring his witnesses with him or apply for summons in such time as to enable him to bring them into Court on the day fixed. *CHULAN TEWARI v. SUKEDAD KHAN*

23 W. R. Cr. 9

**8. LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH OF PEACE AND EVIDENCE.**

**1. ——— Evidence of specific act or conduct likely to cause breach of the peace—***Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 491.* A party cannot be called upon under Act X of 1872, s. 491, to enter into recognizances to keep the peace, unless the evidence points to some specific conduct or act on his part from which a reasonable or immediate inference can be drawn that he is likely to commit a breach of the peace. *HUREE MOHUN MULLICK v. KALINATH ROY*

25 W. R. Cr. 15

**2. ——— Mere possibility of breach of peace—***Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 491.* To justify an order under s. 491, Act X of 1872, calling on a person to give security to keep the peace, there must be a reasonable probability of a breach of the peace being committed, and not merely a bare possibility of a breach of the peace. *QUEEN v. ABDUL HUQ*

20 W. R. Cr. 57

*QUEEN v. HUR KUMARI DASSIA*

24 W. R. Cr. 10

**3. ——— Omission to prevent rioting—***Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 282.* Parties who are not stated by a Magistrate to be likely to commit a breach of the peace, or to do any act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace, cannot be called upon to enter into recognizances to keep the peace with a view that they should interfere to prevent riot, simply because they did not interfere when they might have done so between the persons actually quarrelling so as to prevent a riot, their laches in this respect not bringing them within the purview of s. 282 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *QUEEN v. OMERTO LALL*

19 W. R. Cr. 32

**4. ——— Acts of agents of zamindar—***Non-resident zamindar, liability of.* A non-resident zamindar cannot be bound over to keep the peace because his local agents are committing



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*contd.***8. LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH OF PEACE AND EVIDENCE—***contd.*

acts likely to cause a breach of the peace. *In the matter of* CHAROO CHUNDER MULLICK

10 C. L. R. 430

5. ————— Probable resistance by raiyats—*Distrain for arrears of rent—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 491.* The petitioner, a tahsildar, applied to the police for assistance to protect him while distraining the crops of certain raiyats for arrears of rent. On this being reported to the Magistrate, he required the petitioner to furnish security to keep the peace, on the ground that any riot which might result from the resistance of the raiyats to the attachment of their crops would be attributable to his act. This order was set aside by the High Court as illegal, because the Magistrate had not found that the petitioner himself was likely to commit a breach of the peace. *In the matter of* SHEO SURN LALL

3 C. L. R. 280

6. ————— Want of evidence of likelihood of breach of peace. A Magistrate cannot bind over a person to keep the peace where there is no evidence to show that such person was likely to commit a breach of the peace, or to do any act that might probably occasion a breach of the peace. *QUEEN v. KIDAR NATH*

7 N. W. 233

*In the matter of the petition of* BROJENDRO KUMAR ROY CHOWDHRY *alias* DIGHOO BABOO

17 W. R. Cr. 35

7. ————— Want of adjudication as to security for preservation of peace—*Recognition made on admission of accused.* A Magistrate has no power to make an order that an accused person should enter into a bond to keep the peace until after an adjudication that it is necessary for the preservation of peace to take a bond from him, and until he is satisfied on that point, unless there is an admission by the party against whom the order is to be made. *QUEEN v. LALL BEHAREE SINGH*

11 W. R. Cr. 50

8. ————— Evidence of necessity for taking security—*Necessity of adjudication by Magistrate—Onus probandi.* In proceedings against persons to show cause why they should not enter into bonds to keep the peace, it is incumbent on the Magistrate to adjudicate judicially on evidence given before him as to the necessity for taking such security; and in such cases the onus of proof lies upon the party on whose complaint the summons was issued. *QUEEN v. NIRENJUN SINGH*

2 N. W. 431

9. ————— Inquiry by Magistrate—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 282.* After calling upon a person, under s. 282 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to show cause why he should not enter into recognizances to keep the peace, a Magistrate should not order the defendant to enter into such recognizances without taking evidence, or making inquiry whether defendant had

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committed any act which might probably occasion a breach of the peace. *QUEEN v. DEO NUNDUN SINGH*

12 W. R. Cr. 16

*QUEEN v. HARVEY*

20 W. R. Cr. 68

10. ————— Evidence of likelihood of breach of peace—*Necessity of adjudication by Magistrate.* After summoning a person to show cause why he should not enter into a bond to keep the peace, the Magistrate cannot bind over that person until he adjudicates on evidence before him that such person is likely to commit a breach of the peace. *GOSHAIN LUCHMUN PERSHAD POOREE v. POHOOP NARAIN POOREE*

24 W. R. Cr. 30

*QUEEN v. NIAZ ALI*

5 N. W. 80

*QUEEN v. ISREEPERSHAD SINGH*

20 W. R. Cr. 18

*RUN BAHADOOR SINGH v. TILLESUREE KOOR*

22 W. R. Cr. 79

11. ————— Evidence not taken in presence of accused—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 491, 494—Necessity for adjudication by Magistrate.* A Magistrate cannot bind over a person to keep the peace unless he has adjudicated on evidence taken in the presence of that person that a breach of the peace is probable. If such person fails to attend on a summons duly served, a warrant should issue (s. 494); the order for security cannot be passed *ex parte*. *In the matter of* OKHIL CHUNDER BISWAS

1 C. L. R. 48

12. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 491—Necessity for adjudication by Magistrate—Notice.* To constitute a proper foundation for an order under s. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, it is necessary that the Magistrate should adjudicate upon legal evidence before him that the person against whom the order is made is likely to commit a breach of the peace, and the Magistrate should give notice to the party who is to be affected by the order, of the particular conduct on his part which is complained of. Where such notice was given and the ground of complaint to which such notice had reference was found by the Magistrate to be unfounded, it was held that the Magistrate could not proceed to adjudicate that an entirely different ground existed upon which it was likely that the party charged would commit a breach of the peace. *RAM KISSORE ACHARJEE CHOWDHRY v. ARIK KHAN*

21 W. R. Cr. 6

13. ————— Necessity of judicial investigation and adjudication. In order to warrant an adjudication under s. 288, Civil Procedure Code, 1861, there should be a judicial investigation, and the order should be passed upon legal evidence duly taken and recorded. *REG. v. JIVANJI LIMJI*

6 Bom. Cr. 1

14. ————— Order for recognizance made without evidence duly taken. Order of District Magistrate, requiring certain persons to



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enter into recognizances and find security to keep the peace, reversed, as such order appeared to have been made without any legal evidence having been taken and recorded, as required by s. 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, *REG. v. DALPATRAM PEMABHAI* . . . . . **5 Bom. Cr. 105**

15. ————— *Presence of accused—Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), s. 282—Procedure.* Before making an order absolute directing a person to enter into a bond to keep the peace, the Magistrate must take the evidence on which he bases the order in the presence of the accused or his agent. (*GLOVER, J., dissenting.*) *MAGHAN MISRA v. CHAMMAN TELI*  
**2 B. L. R. A. Cr. 7 : 10 W. R. Cr. 46**

*QUEEN v. NARSINGH NARAYAN*

**2 B. L. R. A. Cr. 7 note : 10 W. R. Cr. 1**

16. ————— *Presence of accused—Necessity of adjudicating on evidence.* A Magistrate is not competent to require persons to give security to keep the peace until he has adjudicated, on evidence taken in their presence, that they have by their conduct rendered this necessary. *Run Bahadoor Singh v. Tilessuree Kooer*, **22 W. R. Cr. 79**, cited and followed. *In the matter of UMDA KHANUM* . . . **3 C. L. R. 72**

17. ————— *Dispute likely to cause breach of peace—Report of police officer.* The existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace must be first proved by legal evidence before the Magistrate can proceed to call upon the parties to enter into recognizances to keep the peace. The report of a police officer is not such legal evidence. *ABHAYA CHOWDHARY v. BRAE*  
**6 B. L. R. Ap. 148 : 15 W. R. Cr. 42**

18. ————— *Report of police officer—Procedure.* Held (*GLOVER, J., dissentiente*), that the report of a police officer, though it justifies the issuing of a summons, is not sufficient ground on which to bind a man over in a recognizance to keep the peace. The Magistrate must adjudicate on the question whether there is reasonable ground for believing that the defendant is likely to commit a breach of the peace, after taking evidence in the presence of the person charged, and giving him an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. *BEHARI PATAK v. MAHOMED HYAT KHAN. DUNNE v. HEM CHANDRA CHOWDHRY. GOVERNMENT v. BEHARI LALL BRAJABASI*  
**4 B. L. R. F. B. 46 : 12 W. R. Cr. 60**

*In the matter of PORESH NARAIN ROY*

**16 W. R. Cr. 45**

19. ————— *Report of police inspector.* A report of an inspector of police and the evidence given by the same inspector are not sufficient to justify an order binding a person to keep the peace. *In the matter of RAJENDRO KISHORE ROY CHOWDHRY* . . . **10 W. R. Cr. 55**

# RECOGNIZANCE TO KEEP PEACE— *contd.*

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20. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 282—Inquiry before taking recognizances—Cross-examination of witnesses.* The kind of inquiry required to be held by a Magistrate in cases under s. 282, Code of Criminal Procedure, is a full judicial inquiry, evidence being taken in the presence of the parties charged, and opportunity given for the cross-examination of witnesses. *NOOR MAHOMED v. NIL RUTUN BAGCHEE*  
**18 W. R. Cr. 2**

21. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 282—Inquiry before taking recognizances—Cross-examination of witnesses.* A Magistrate is not competent, under s. 282 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to order persons to enter into bonds to keep the peace merely upon the statement of the complainant on which the summons was granted, and without taking further evidence or giving the parties an opportunity of cross-examining the complainant. *QUEEN v. NUSSEER-OD-DEEN*  
**2 N. W. 461**

*QUEEN v. MAHOMED AFZUL* . . . **7 W. R. Cr. 59**

22. ————— *Report of Subordinate Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, ss. 280, 287, 288.* The report of a Subordinate Magistrate, although it is credible information on which a Magistrate of the district would be justified, under s. 280 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in issuing a summons, is not evidence on which he can properly arrive at a conclusion that the accused is likely to cause a breach of the peace; ss. 287 and 288 of the Code require that evidence in such a case shall be recorded, and, if none is forthcoming, security to keep the peace should not be demanded. *REG. v. IRAPA BIN BASAPA* . . . **8 Bom. Cr. 162**

23. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 490—Want of evidence.* In the absence of any evidence rendering a breach of the peace probable, a Magistrate is not justified in calling upon parties to show cause why they should not enter into recognizances, and, on their failure, to make an order under Act X of 1872, s. 490. *QUEEN v. GOSSAIN MUNRAJ POOREE. QUEEN v. GOSSAIN LUCHMEE NARAIN POOREE* . . . **24 W. R. Cr. 23**

24. ————— *Evidence taken as to some only of accused—Illegal order.* Where a Magistrate bound down twenty-six persons to keep the peace under s. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, after recording evidence as to eleven of them only, the order was set aside as to the persons not affected by the evidence. *In the matter of KASSIM BISWAS* . . . **10 C. L. R. 335**

25. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 107, 112, 115—Security to keep the peace—Substance of information—Joint inquiry.* A Magistrate ordered sixty-nine persons to show cause why they should not give security to keep the peace, it having been reported to him by the police and the tehsildar of the pergunnah in which such



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persons resided that they were likely to commit a breach of the peace at a religious procession which was about to take place, and the holding of which was opposed to their religious tenets. After an inquiry, as against all the accused jointly, the Magistrate on the evidence of the tehsildar and a sub-inspector of police ordered that ten of the accused, who were said to be the "ringleaders," should enter into bonds with sureties and the rest should enter into their own recognizances to keep the peace for one year. *Held*, that the Magistrate's order purporting to be prepared under s. 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code, did not adequately or properly disclose the substance of the report or information upon which he issued his summons: the parties were entitled to something more than a mere assertion by the Magistrate that he had been informed that a breach of the peace was likely to occur, in order to enable them, if they were in a position to do so, to bring evidence to rebut the truth of such information; that the very loose statements of the tehsildar and the sub-inspector, as to the large majority of the persons summoned, were quite insufficient to justify the wholesale order for security passed by the Magistrate; that as the religious procession would have been over in a fortnight, it was a most excessive exercise of power to require all the parties to give security for one year; and that the Magistrate should have dealt with the cases of the ten alleged "ringleaders" first, and should have required the tehsildar and sub-inspector to give much fuller statements *seriatim*, and particularly as to each individual man; and as to the remaining fifty-nine, there should have been some clear and distinct proof affecting each of them and warranting the inference that such person was likely to commit a breach of the peace or to do a wrongful act likely to occasion a breach of the peace. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NATHU . I. L. R. 6 All. 214**

**26. ——— Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 107, 112, 117, 118—Nature of order to show cause—Onus Probandi—Nature and quantum of evidence necessary before passing order for security.** An order passed by a Magistrate under ss. 107 and 112 of the Criminal Procedure Code, requiring any person to "show cause" why he should not be ordered to furnish security for keeping the peace, is not in the nature of a rule *nisi* implying that the burden of proving innocence is upon such person. The onus of proof lies upon the prosecution to establish circumstances justifying the action of the Magistrate in calling upon persons to furnish security. *Dunne v. Hem Chundra Chowdhry*, 4 B. L. R. F. B. 46, and *Queen v. Nirunjun Singh*, 3 N. W. 431, referred to. In proceedings instituted under s. 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code against more persons than one, it is essential for the prosecution to establish what each individual implicated has done to furnish a basis for the apprehension that he will commit a breach of the peace.

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In holding such an inquiry it is improper to treat what is evidence against one of such persons as evidence against all, without discriminating between the cases of the various persons implicated. *Queen-Empress v. Nathu*, I. L. R. 6 All. 214, referred to. Although in an inquiry under s. 117 the nature or quantum of evidence need not be so conclusive as is necessary in trials for offences, the Magistrate should not proceed purely upon an apprehension of a breach of the peace, but is bound to see that substantial grounds for such an apprehension are established by proof of facts against each person implicated which would lead to the conclusion that an order for furnishing security is necessary. What the nature of the facts should be depends upon the circumstances of each case, but where the nature of the Magistrate's information requires it, overt acts must be proved before an order under s. 118 can be made, and such an order cannot be passed against any person simply on the ground that another is likely to commit a breach of the peace. *Queen v. Abdool Huq*, 20 W. R. Cr. 57; *Goshain Luchmun Pershad Pooree v. Pohoop Narain Pooree*, 24 W. R. Cr. 30; *Rajah Run Bahadoor v. Ranee Tillessuree Koer*, 27 W. R. Cr. 79; and in the matter of *Kashi Chunder Doss*, 10 B. L. R. 441; 19 W. R. Cr. 47, referred to. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ABDUL KADIR I. L. R. 9 All. 452**

**27. ——— Interference by High Court—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861. ss. 282, 288.** Where there is evidence which would justify the finding of a Magistrate that an act likely to cause a breach of the peace had been committed, the High Court will not interfere with the proceedings of the Magistrate. **ANONYMOUS**

**4 Mad. Ap. 33**

**28. ——— Evidence taken irregularly.** The High Court declined to interfere with an order passed by a Magistrate in a case in which he ordered security to be taken for the preservation of the peace, where it appeared that the evidence was sufficient to warrant the order, although such evidence was taken in the vernacular and in disregard of the provisions of s. 267 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861. **QUEEN v. PURIAG SINGH . 13 W. R. Cr. 20**

**29. ——— Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 107, 145—Dispute relating to possession—Propriety of instituting proceedings for taking security—Findings justifying order for security—Issue raised, as in a case under s. 145—Order under s. 107—Jurisdiction.** In a proceeding instituted under s. 107, Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate found that one M "was the aggressor, and was trying his best to disturb the peaceful possession" of S and B in certain lands in dispute, and upon that finding made an order for taking security from M. *Held*, that the finding was not such as would justify the order, and it should



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be set aside. *Per BANERJEE, J.*—The mere fact of a dispute likely to lead to a breach of the peace being a dispute relating to the possession of land may not be sufficient to preclude the Magistrate from taking proceedings under s. 107, Criminal Procedure Code. *Per BRETT, J.*—It cannot be held as a general rule that by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code a Magistrate is deprived of jurisdiction under s. 107, Criminal Procedure Code, in a case in which the dispute likely to cause breach of the peace relates to possession of land. **KING-EMPEROR v. BASIRUDDIN MOLLAH (1903)**

**7 C. W. N. 746****9. SECOND APPLICATION FOR SECURITY.**

1. ———— **Order for recognizances not passed at decision of case—Necessity of subsequent proceedings for valid order—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, ss. 280, 281.** An order calling for recognizances under s. 280, or for security under s. 281, Code of Criminal Procedure, must be passed at the time of deciding the original case. If no such order is then made, subsequent proceedings must be taken under s. 282 and the parties summoned to show cause. *In the matter of the petition of GOBIND SOOBOODHEE*

**15 W. R. Cr. 56**

2. ———— **Subsequent order—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 281—Evidence of likelihood of breach of the peace—Separate summons.** Although it is competent to a Magistrate upon conviction and sentence for assault, to order the accused to enter into an engagement to keep the peace, yet having omitted to do so he can afterwards only institute proceedings under s. 281 of the Criminal Procedure Code, upon receiving some further credible information (other than that which he derived from the previous trial) that the parties are likely to commit a breach of the peace. **QUEEN v. POWELL**

**3 N. W. 96**

3. ———— **Use of evidence formerly taken in other proceedings—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 491—Evidence Act, s. 33.** S. 33 of the Evidence Act, 1872, does not justify a Magistrate in proceedings under s. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code, in using evidence taken in a previous criminal trial in supersession of evidence given in the presence of the accused. **QUEEN v. PROSONNO CHUNDER GOSSAMI**

**22 W. R. Cr. 36***See DILLOO SINGH v. OOTIM SINGH***22 W. R. Cr. 9***RUN BAHADOOR SINGH v. TILLESUREE KOORER***22 W. R. Cr. 79**

4. ———— **Order for further security—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 290—Procedure** Where a matter in respect of which further security to keep the peace is required is the same as that

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before the Magistrate on the first occasion, the case can only be dealt with under s. 290 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. **DE SILVA v. JEHANGEER**

**7 W. R. Cr. 23****KALLY CHURN SINGH v. BUNKER SINGH****7 W. R. Cr. 26****10. EFFECT OF ORDER POSTPONING PROCEEDINGS FOR CIVIL SUIT.**

——— **Discharge of accused—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 491.** An order postponing proceedings instituted under s. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1872) until the person called upon to show cause shall have established in a Civil Court the title claimed by him to the property disputed, with reference to which there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace, amounts to a discharge. **EMPRESS v. DHUNIRAM**

**5 C. L. R. 366****11. ORDER LIMITED BY REQUISITION.**

——— **Order going beyond terms of requisition—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 491, 492—Order for other and further security than originally required.** Where information of a probable breach of the peace is first laid in general terms and is subsequently supported by evidence, which is given in the presence of the persons who are particularly implicated by it, the case for a demand for recognizances may properly rest on the whole evidence taken in the case; but when a Magistrate calls upon persons to show cause why they should not be bound down in their own recognizances to keep the peace, he cannot go beyond the requisition and on the adjudication of the matter order them to furnish other securities besides. *In the matter of the petition of ABDOL BARI*

**25 W. R. Cr. 50****12. AMOUNT OF SECURITY.**

1. ———— **Considerations in fixing amount of security—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 284.** A Magistrate should have due regard to the circumstances of the case and the means of the parties when fixing the amount in which the sureties should be bound in a case under s. 284 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861. *In the matter of the petition of NILMADHUB GHOSAL* *In the matter of the petition of JUDONATH ROY*

**19 W. R. Cr. 1**

2. ———— **Mode of calculating amount—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 493—Means of parties called on.** The High Court reduced the amount of recognizances required in this case, as it was very much in excess of, and out of proportion to, the means of the party accused, s. 483 of the Criminal Procedure Code requiring that the Magistrate should look to the means of the party ordered



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to find sureties. **FUTTEH BAHADOOR v. GIBBON.**  
**LALL MAHAMAD v. GIBBON . 22 W. R. Cr. 74**

**3. — Statement of amount in summons—Power of Magistrate to alter amount and form from what is stated in summons.** A party was called upon summons to show cause why he should not be required to enter into his own recognizance to keep the peace for six months, the amount specified being R200. On his appearing before the Magistrate, he was required to enter into his own recognizance to the amount of R4,000 and to find two sureties for R1,000 each for a period of one year. *Held*, that the order was an illegal one. **QUEEN v. ISREE PERSHAD SINGH**

**9 B. L. R. Ap. 44 : 18 W. R. Cr. 61**

*See In the matter of the petition of* **ABDOOL BARI . . . . . 25 W. R. Cr. 50**

**4. — Power to increase amount—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 290.** Notwithstanding that a person has been bound down by bond to keep the peace for a stated period, a Magistrate has power, under s. 290 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to increase the amount of the security required before the expiry of that period. *In the matter of the petition of* **GOORODAS ROY**  
**18 W. R. Cr. 57**

**13. EFFECT OF SIGNING WRONG BOND.**

**— Bond signed by mistake for security for good behaviour—Invalid bond.** Where a person who had been required to give a bond to keep the peace in the form E to Sch. II of the Code of Criminal Procedure instead of giving such bond, signed a security bond in the form G under s. 509 of that Code for good behaviour, it was *held* that the latter did not constitute a binding obligation. **BINDESSUREE PERSHAD v. GUJADHUR PERSHAD . 23 W. R. Cr. 1**

**14. CANCELLING ORDER.**

**1. — Power of Magistrate to cancel order—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, ss. 282, 291.** A Magistrate may, under s. 291 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, cancel an order passed by him under s. 282 of that Code, summoning a person to show cause why he should not enter into a bond to keep the peace. **ANUNDEE KOORER v. SOONSET KOORER. GOVERNMENT v. ANUNDEE KOORER . . . . . 10 W. R. Cr. 40**

**2. — Power of Sessions Judge to cancel Magistrate's order for recognizances—Power of Appellate Court.** In a case in which an accused was charged with voluntarily causing grievous hurt, the Magistrate convicted him of that offence, and also ordered him to furnish recognizances to keep the peace. *Held*, that, as the Magistrate had jurisdiction under Ch. XVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure to pass the latter order

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regarding recognizances, the Sessions Judge could not on appeal, while upholding the conviction for grievous hurt, cancel the order as to take recognizances, the evidence on the record being sufficient for that purpose. **QUEEN v. IMAMOODDEEN BHINA . . . . . 13 W. R. Cr. 73**

**3. — Order for keeping the peace on conviction—Appeal—Appellate Court, power of, to set aside such order—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1895), ss. 106 and 423, cl. (d).** An order in appeal, setting aside an order of the first Court made under s. 106 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is an incidental order, within the meaning of s. 423, cl. (d), of the Code and can be made by an Appellate Court. **ABDUL WAHED v. AMIRAN BIBI (1902) . . . . . I. L. R. 30 Cal. 101 s.c. 6 C. W. N. 422**

**15. DISCHARGE OF RECOGNIZANCES.**

**— Order as to disposition of property in dispute—Illegal order.** Where a Magistrate who apprehended a breach of the peace eventually discharged the recognizances which he had compelled the parties to give, it was *held* that he exceeded his jurisdiction when he also gave directions as to the disposition of the property in dispute between the parties. **CHOWDHRY SHEO NUNDUN PROSHAD v. CHOWDHRY NIL KANTH PROSHAD**  
**13 W. R. Cr. 44**

**16. FORFEITURE OF RECOGNIZANCES.**

**1. — Proof of forfeiture—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 502—Evidence on oath.** A Magistrate has no jurisdiction to call on a person who has entered into a recognizance bond, under s. 493 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to pay the penalty or show cause why he should not do so, without previous *prima facie* proof, by which is meant evidence on oath, that it has been forfeited. *In re* **HARIRAM BIRBHAN . . . . . 11 Bom. 170**

**2. — Sufficiency of evidence to prove forfeiture.** Before a recognizance can be forfeited, it must be proved that the person accused has either personally broken the peace or abetted some other person or persons in breaking it. The mere fact that the accused is a servant of one of two rival parties for whose benefit the breach took place is not sufficient. **QUEEN v. KALI BHYRUB SANDYAL . . . . . 11 W. R. Cr. 52**

**3. — Necessity to record evidence of forfeiture.** Before a Magistrate can declare that recognizances to keep the peace have been forfeited, he must record legal evidence in the presence of the accused, proving that he was about to do something which would cause a breach of the peace. *In re* **KALIKANT ROY CHOWDRY**  
**3 B. L. R. Ap. 155 : 12 W. R. Cr. 54**



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4. ————— *Necessity for evidence of forfeiture—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 502.* An order estreating a recognizance or a bail bond must be made upon evidence duly recorded in the case, and not upon evidence taken in other cases. Where a Magistrate makes an order forfeiting a recognizance under s. 502 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the terms of the section must be strictly followed. It is not competent to direct that in default of payment the person whose recognizance is forfeited should be imprisoned, without first issuing a warrant for the attachment and sale of his immoveable property. *In the matter of MOHESH CHUNDER ROY* . . . . . 10 C. L. R. 571

5. ————— *Evidence of person bound over—Power of Magistrate to reduce penalty.* *Per AINSLIE, J.*—In a case in which proceedings are taken for forfeiture of recognizances, the person against whom they are held is competent to give evidence on oath on his own behalf. *Quære*: When recognizances are forfeited, is a Magistrate bound to forfeit the whole amount of the bond, and is the power of reducing the sum to a penalty corresponding to the breach of the peace confined only to the Government? *In the matter of the petition of JEHAN BUKSH* . . . . . 15 W. R. Cr. 87

6. ————— *Opportunity to accede for cross-examination of witness—Proceedings on forfeiture of recognizance—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872), s. 502.* A Magistrate is not justified in forfeiting a recognizance under s. 502 of Act X of 1872, unless the party charged with a breach of the peace has had an opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses upon whose evidence the rule to show cause why the recognizance should not be forfeited has been issued. *EMPERESS v. NOBIN CHUNDER DUTT* . . . . . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 865 ; 4 C. L. R. 243

7. ————— *Liability to forfeiture—Evidence necessary—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 514.* The mere fact of the person for whom another stands surety being convicted of a breach of the peace ought not to be sufficient to make the surety bond executed by the latter liable to forfeiture without any evidence taken in the presence of the surety to show that the forfeiture has been incurred. The language of s. 514 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882) does not indicate that the final order making a person bound by a bond can be made without taking any evidence in his presence or giving him any opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses on whose evidence the forfeiture is held to be established. The mere production of the original record or of a certified copy of the original record of the trial in which the principal had been convicted of breaking the peace within the period covered by a bond would not be conclusive, if indeed it would be any evidence, against the surety in a proceeding under s. 514 of

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the Criminal Procedure Code. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. HAR CHANDRA CHOWDHRY* I. L. R. 25 Calc. 440

8. ————— *Delay in taking steps to forfeit recognizance—Invalid proceedings.* When a Magistrate has before him the fact that a person convicted by him of an offence attended with violence was under recognizance to keep the peace, and does not nevertheless proceed to forfeit such recognizance, it must be held that he thought it unnecessary to do so. Proceedings taken after the lapse of a considerable period are bad and contrary to the intention of the law. *In re RAM CHUNDER LALLA* . . . . . 1 C. L. R. 134

9. ————— *Liability to forfeiture—Commission of offence—Theft.* Where a person had been bound down by recognizance not to commit a breach of the peace, the amount of the recognizance cannot be recovered from him if he is guilty of an offence, such as theft, which does not amount to a breach of the peace, or which is not likely to occasion a breach of the peace. *In the matter of the petition of HARAN CHUNDER ROY* . . . . . 18 W. R. Cr. 63

10. ————— *Subsequent offence.* A person was bound down under recognizances to keep the peace towards all Her Majesty's subjects for a period of one year. Some time afterwards he wrongfully confined and extorted a sum of money from two raiyats who were supposed to have committed theft on his lands, he being for such offence fined and his recognizances forfeited. *Held*, that the matter ought to have ended with the fine; for the raiyats not having offered any resistance, no breach of the peace took place, and the amount of the recognizance could not be taken. *In the matter of the petition of ZEABUDDIN HOWLADAR* . . . . . 19 W. R. Cr. 48

11. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), s. 293—Jurisdiction.* A executed in district T a recognizance to keep the peace towards B. A was afterwards convicted in district S of having assaulted B in that district. *Held*, that A had forfeited his recognizance, and the Magistrate in district T could proceed against him under s. 293 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *QUEEN v. SHAM SUNDER CHOWDHRY* . . . . . 2 B. L. R. Cr. 11

12. ————— *Assault.* On the application of A, a recognizance was taken from B that he would keep the peace for six months under a penalty of R500. Before the expiry of the period, B assaulted C. *Held*, that there was a forfeiture of the recognizance. *JAHU BAX v. GOVERNMENT* . . . . . 6 B. L. R. Ap. 66 ; 15 W. R. Cr. 14

13. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 502.* Where certain persons were bound over to keep the peace and were subsequently convicted of voluntarily causing grievous



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*—concl'd.*

hurt, and at the time of conviction the Magistrate made an order estreating their recognizances, as part of his judgment in the case, without in any way fulfilling the provisions of s. 502 of Act X of 1872, and the convictions were quashed by the Court of Session, the High Court cancelled the order of forfeiture. *QUEEN v. GHISA* . 7 N. W. 375

**14.** *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 502—Forfeiture of recognizances—Fresh recognizances.* On the 20th of April 1877 A was bound down to keep the peace for one year. On the 14th of January 1878 he was convicted of an offence, and sentenced therefore to fine and imprisonment, but no order was made for the recovery of the penalty, though the Magistrate knew that the recognizance had been forfeited. On the 2nd of April 1878 the Magistrate, at the instance of a third party, called upon A to show cause why the penalty of the recognizance should not be paid, and a warrant for its recovery was issued on the 6th of June 1878. *Held*, that the warrant must be quashed on the ground that the Magistrate having inflicted a sentence of fine and imprisonment with the knowledge that the recognizance was forfeited he was not competent to inflict a further penalty, on a reconsideration of the circumstances. *In the matter of PARBUTTI CHURN BOSE*

3 C. L. R. 406

**15.** *Forfeiture of portion of recognizances—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 293.* Under the provisions of s. 293, a Magistrate cannot direct the forfeiture of a portion of the penalty. Where the amount of the recognizances were wholly out of proportion to the nature of the dispute and to the means of the parties, the High Court *held* they could not interfere, but the Government might be moved in the matter. *In the matter of the petition of NILMADHUB GHOSAL. In the matter of the petition of JUDDOONATH ROY*

19 W. R. Cr. 1

**16.** *Reduction of penalty—Power of Magistrate to enforce only portion of penalty.* A Magistrate has no power to mitigate the penalty entered in a recognizance bond, which must be enforced to its full amount, unless Government forego a portion of the penalty. *ANONYMOUS*

1 Bom. 138

**17.** *Power of Court to reduce amount of penalty.* The High Court has no power to reduce the amount of recognizances which have been forfeited, but in a case of hardship the matter should be referred to Government. *EMPRESS v. NURAL HUQQ*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 757 : 2 C. L. R. 408

*In the matter of the petition of NILMADHUB*

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*In the matter of NAKI HAZI* . 8 C. L. R. 72

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**18.** *Mode of enforcing penalty—Surety—Imprisonment on forfeiture of recognizance to keep the peace.* S. 294 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861, did not authorize the imprisonment of sureties. *ANONYMOUS*

4 Mad. Ap. 69

**RECOLLECTION.**

*—cross-examination from, by Advocate—*

*See* DEFAMATION—PENAL CODE, s. 499,  
EXCEP. 9 . 13 C. W. N. 340

**RECORD.**

*See* EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—POLICE  
EVIDENCE, DIARIES, PAPERS AND  
REPORTS . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 348

*See* POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL  
COURT AS TO—STRIKING OFF PROCEED-  
INGS . 6 C. W. N. 923

*See* PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—RECORD.  
5 W. R. 271  
I. L. R. 5 Calc. 317

*See* PRACTICE—CRIMINAL CASES—RECORD  
IN SESSIONS CASES 14 W. R. Cr. 46  
15 W. R. Cr. 16  
7 W. R. Cr. 112  
8 W. R. Cr. 30 ; 57

*—disallowance of cost of printing—*

*See* PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—COSTS.  
L. R. 29 I. A. 156

*—entry in—*

*See* KHOTI SETTLEMENT ACT.

*—loss of—*

*See* EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—SECONDARY  
EVIDENCE—LOST OR DESTROYED DOCUMENTS.

*—Appeal case to High Court—Procedure.* Where the records of a case in appeal were not forthcoming, the High Court ordered the return of whatever papers had been sent up, together with such papers as the parties had respectively filed, with a direction to the lower Court to summon both parties, and to take such further evidence as either of them might think fit to adduce in support of his case and to return such evidence with its own opinion for final disposal by the High Court. *BUNWARRY LALL v. FURLONG*

8 W. R. 38

*—loss of, in Mutiny—*

*See* POSSESSION—EVIDENCE OF TITLE.  
4 B. L. R. Ap. 21



**RECORD—concl'd.**

\_\_\_\_\_ of proceeding in Small Cause Court—

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS—SMALL CAUSE COURT, PROCEEDINGS IN.

6 B. L. R. 729, 730 note  
7 B. L. R. Ap. 61

\_\_\_\_\_ of statement made by dying person—

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—DYING DECLARATION . . . 6 C. W. N. 72

See INFORMATION OF COMMISSION OF OFFENCE . . . 6 C. W. N. 921

\_\_\_\_\_ preparation of, for appeal—

See PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—RECORD, PREPARATION OF.

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 395  
L. R. 24 I. A. 194

\_\_\_\_\_ signature to—

See PRACTICE—CRIMINAL CASES—SIGNATURE BY MAGISTRATE

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 396

\_\_\_\_\_ transmission to High Court—

See PRACTICE—CRIMINAL CASES—TRANSMISSION OF RECORD TO HIGH COURT . . . 15 W. R. Cr. 67

\_\_\_\_\_ under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code—

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—LIKELIHOOD OF BREACH OF THE PEACE . . . 6 C. W. N. 923

**RECORD-OF-RIGHTS.**

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 101.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 378

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT—

ss. 101 to 108 I. L. R. 30 Calc. 339

ss. 101 to 111A I. L. R. 28 Calc. 28

s. 102 . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 38

s. 103 . . . I. L. R. 16 Calc. 641, 643

9 C. W. N. 504

11 C. W. N. 153

12 C. W. N. 122

s. 108 . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 521

ss. 108, 109 . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 176

s. 188 . . . 7 C. W. N. 400

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 57

See PRE-EMPTION. I. L. R. 24 All. 493

See RENT, SUIT FOR . . . 6 C. W. N. 914

See RES JUDICATA—COMPETENT COURT—REVENUE COURTS . . . 5 C. W. N. 798

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\_\_\_\_\_ amendment of—

See SONTHAL PERGUNNAHS SETTLEMENT REGULATION (III OF 1872), ss. 11 AND 25 . . . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 146

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 473

\_\_\_\_\_ dispute as to—

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—ORDERS SUBJECT OR NOT TO APPEAL.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 596

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 776

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 477

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 462

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 146

\_\_\_\_\_ duties of Settlement Officer when preparing—

See PRE-EMPTION . I. L. R. 31 All. 533

\_\_\_\_\_ entries in—

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 103A.

10 C. W. N. 908

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—RENT AND REVENUE SUITS, N.-W. P.

I. L. R. 1 All. 614

\_\_\_\_\_ presumption of accuracy of—

See RECORD OF RIGHTS.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 336

11 C. W. N. 48

\_\_\_\_\_ publication of—

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 105.

13 C. W. N. 1149

See SONTHAL PERGUNNAHS SETTLEMENT REGULATION (III OF 1872), ss. 24, 25.

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 245

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 765

1. \_\_\_\_\_ *Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 107, 109—Undisputed entry—Presumption of accuracy, how rebutted.* The presumption under s. 109 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885) in favour of the accuracy of an undisputed entry as to the rate of rent is sufficiently rebutted by the decree in a contested suit *inter partes* showing a different rate. S. 109 of the Bengal Tenancy Act lays down a rule of evidence; it does not override the rules of *res judicata*, which are of general application. *GHANESHYAM MISSER v. PADMANAND SINGH* (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 336

s.c. 9 C. W. N. 610

2. \_\_\_\_\_ *Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 101 to 106—Settlement Officer, jurisdiction of.* The particulars specified in s. 102 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, when recorded and compiled under s. 103, amount to a "Record-of-rights" as contemplated in Chapter X of the Act; and proceedings taken by a Revenue Officer, after making a record of the particulars under s. 103 including those under s. 165 of the Act, are not therefore void for want of jurisdiction. *Dharani*



**RECORD-OF-RIGHTS—contd.**

*Kanta Lahiri v. Gaber Ali Khan*, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 339, relied upon. *Per* PARGITER, J.—The difference between s. 103 of the old Act and the present section is, that under the former, the Revenue Officer was to record the particulars specified in s. 102; but under the present Act s. 103 gives an applicant the right to select what particulars he may wish to have recorded. If the applicant asks that all or almost all particulars mentioned in s. 102 be recorded that would constitute a "Record-of-rights;" but if only the particulars mentioned in cls. (a) and (c) of s. 102 be recorded, they not involving any rights, the record could hardly be called a "Record-of-rights." *SUDHENDU NARAIN ACHARJYA CHOWDHRY v. GOBINDA NATH SIRCAR* (1905) . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 518 s.c. 9 C. W. N. 504

3. ————— *Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 103A, 111A—Draft record-of-rights, objection to—Entry made on objection—Final publication of record-of-rights—Presumption as to correctness of entry—Suit to declare entry erroneous—Limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 14—Decree not produced—Recital in later decree produced, if evidence.* A suit by a party whose objection under s. 103A, Bengal Tenancy Act, to an entry in the draft record-of-rights has been rejected by the Revenue Officer, for a declaration of his rights is not governed by Art. 14, Sch. II of the Limitation Act. The order rejecting the objection under s. 103A, Bengal Tenancy Act, having no finality is not an order of a Government officer within the meaning of Art. 14, Sch. II of the Limitation Act. Further, the final publication of the record-of-rights merely raises a presumption of the correctness of the entry, and it is not necessary to bring a suit to avoid a presumption. Nature of remedy under s. 111A of the Bengal Tenancy Act discussed. *Agin Bindh v. Mohan Bickramshah*, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 20, followed. *Ashutose Nath v. Abdool*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 676, referred to. *Semble*: The recital of the purport of a previous decree, not produced in a later one which has been produced, is evidence. *RANGULAM SINGH v. BISHNU PARGASH NARAIN SINGH* (1906)

11 C. W. N. 48

4. ————— *Record-of-rights—Suit to correct or alter entries—Maintainability—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 103B, 105, 106, 108.* No suit lies for the alteration or correction of entries made in the record-of-rights published under Ch. X of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Persons aggrieved by the entries should have recourse to the special remedy provided in that chapter. *JOGENDRA NATH ROY v. KRISHNA PROMODA DASSI* . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 1013 s.c. 12 C. W. N. 1032

5. ————— *Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 108, 109, sub-s. (3)—Settlement Officer, power of—Revision of entries—Objection by tenants—Second appeal—Settlement of rent.* S. 108 of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not warrant the Settlement Officer in revising his entries as to *mal* lands in the record-of-rights. The Act

**RECORD-OF-RIGHTS—concl'd.**

gives to tenants ample opportunity for correction of mistakes in the record-of-rights; but the tenants to avail themselves of the opportunity must make an objection to the draft-record, or institute a suit under s. 106 of the Act after the final publication of the record. No second appeal lies from the decision of a Settlement Officer settling rent under s. 109 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *SHAMBHU CHANDRA HAZRA v. PURNA CHANDRA PAL* (1907) I. L. R. 35 Calc. 176

**RECORD OFFICE.**

report from—

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS.

6 B. L. R. Ap. 15

**RECORDER OF MOULMEIN.**

See PARTIES—ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—GENERALLY . 10 W. R. 86

See RECORDER'S ACT, 1863.

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CHARTER ACT, s. 15—CIVIL CASES.

6 B. L. R. 180

1. ————— *Jurisdiction of Recorders—Execution of decree made by Town Assistant Commissioner.* The Court of the Recorder of Moulemin has no jurisdiction to execute a decree made by the late Court of the Town Assistant Commissioner. *KYANPETTEE v. NGA SHA LAW* . 14 W. R. 386

2. ————— *Trespass to personalty in foreign State—Judicial cognizance—Question of title.* Trespass to personalty in a foreign State (the title to such personalty depending upon the right to land in such foreign State) is cognizable by the Recorder's Court, so as to rebut a *prima facie* title to such personalty acquired within the Court's jurisdiction. The Recorder's Court cannot take judicial cognizance of the fact that the country in which the rights of the party attempting to rebut such *prima facie* title accrued is lawless and unsettled, and possesses no tribunal capable of pronouncing a decision on the rights of the parties which the Recorder's Court could consider as the decision of a Court of competent jurisdiction. Although the foreign State might be civilised, and have Courts competent to try the title, the Recorder's Court would have a right in a suit against a party subject to his jurisdiction to try incidentally the question of title to the land for the purpose of determining the right to the personalty. *SAYA LOO v. NGA PAW LOO* . 6 W. R. Civ. Ref. 4

**RECORDER OF RANGOON.**

See ADVOCATE . 21 W. R. 297

See RECORDER'S ACT, 1863.

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CHARTER ACT, s. 15—CIVIL CASES.

15 W. R. 351

Court of—

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—POWER TO GRANT SANCTION.

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 487



**RECORDER OF RANGOON—concl'd.**

decree of, appeal from—

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT—VALUATION OF APPEAL. I. L. R. 24 Calc. 30

1. — Cause of action—*Defendant out of the jurisdiction.* The Court of the Recorder of Rangoon had no jurisdiction in a suit brought against a defendant dwelling in Surat, though the cause of action arose in Rangoon. ANONYMOUS CASE . . . 18 W. R. 397

2. — Jurisdiction—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 16 (c), proviso—Suit for damages for trespass on land and for injunction.* The plaintiff sued in the Court of the Recorder of Rangoon to recover damages for trespass on land in his own possession situate outside the limits of the original jurisdiction of the Recorder's Court, asking at the same time for an injunction restraining the defendant from further acts of trespass. Both plaintiff and defendant resided within the limits of the original jurisdiction of the Recorder's Court. *Held*, (i) that the plaintiff, having alleged that the land was in his possession, was not entitled to the benefit of the proviso to s. 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and (ii) that a suit for damage to land cannot be said to be a suit for which relief can be entirely obtained through the personal obedience of the defendant, even though it may be joined with a claim for an injunction; and that for the above reasons the Recorder had no jurisdiction to try the suit. CRISP v. WATSON . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 689

3. — Reference to High Court, Calcutta—*Lower Burma Courts Act (XI of 1889), s. 42—Conflicting decisions—Decision of Superior Court—Power of Recorder to refer.* The Recorder of Rangoon, in a suit tried by him, referred to certain decision of the High Courts at Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras, which were in conflict, and, not agreeing with the decision of the Calcutta High Court, referred the case to the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction. *Held*, that, as the decisions of the High Court at Calcutta are binding on the Recorder, he had no jurisdiction to make the reference, and that it must be returned. MAHOMED HADY v. SWEE CHEANG & Co.

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 488  
1 C. W. N. 172

**RECORDERS ACT (XXI OF 1863).**

1. — Jurisdiction of Recorder—*Recorder of Moulmein—District of Amherst.* Under Act XXI of 1863, the Recorder of Moulmein had no power to order execution to issue on a judgment of the late Court of the First Class Assistant Commissioner of the district of Amherst. *In the matter of RYAW PETEE* . . . 6 B. L. R. Ap. 15

2. — Minors Act (IX of 1861). Recorders appointed under Act XXI of 1863 possess all the jurisdiction relative to minors referred to in s. 1, Act IX of 1861, or intended to be given by that Act. *In re HUTTON*

3 W. R. Rec. Ref. 5

**RECORDERS ACT (XXI OF 1863)—concl'd.**

3. — Jurisdiction of Judge in cases of bank in which he is a share-holder. A Recorder, under Act XXI of 1863, being the holder of Bank of Bengal shares, has power to dispose of a suit to which the Bank is a party, in a case of necessity, as when the Commissioner also has shares in the Bank. BANK OF BENGAL v. GOLAM AZIM . . . 12 W. R. 185

4. — Suit on judgment of Court of Queen's Bench. In a suit to make a judgment passed in the Court of Queen's Bench in London the judgment of the Recorder's Court in Rangoon, and to enforce the said judgment in due form of law within the jurisdiction of the Court last mentioned, it was *held*, with reference to s. 11, Act XXI of 1863, that the Recorder has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, it not being a suit for land, and the defendant not dwelling, carrying on business or personally working for gain within the local limits of the Court's jurisdiction, and the cause of action not having arisen within those limits. SIEVEKING, DROOP & Co. v. FOCKE . 9 W. R. 215

s. 17—Withdrawal of license to practise as a pleader. The Recorder of Moulmein, under s. 17 of Act XXI of 1863, had no power to withdraw a license granted by him to plead in the Court of Moulmein, "except for any sufficient reason." *In the matter of THOMSON* 6 B. L. R. 180 : 14 W. R. 257

s. 18—

See ADVOCATE . . . 7 W. R. 390

ss. 22, 25—Reference to High Court—*Execution of decree.* The Recorders could not, under Act XXI of 1863, refer for the opinion of the High Court questions arising in execution of a decree. The question must be one in the trial of a suit. DACOSTA v. CURRIE . 4 B. L. R. A. C. 50

S.C. ASHBURNER v. CURRIE . 13 W. R. 27

*In the matter of SUTHERLAND* . 9 W. R. 478

s. 27—

See APPEAL—ACTS—ACT XXI OF 1863.

7 W. R. 508

1. — Appeal to High Court—*Valuation of suit.* Where the plaintiff sued to establish his right to a quantity of timber, the value of which he stated in his plaint to be R1,590, but on appeal to the High Court valued his appeal at R3,100, and made no claim for damages :—*Held*, that no appeal lay to the High Court under s. 27, Act XXI of 1863. MUTU v. VEERAPAH CHETTY 8 B. L. R. Ap. 91 : 17 W. R. 243

2. — and s. 39—*Appeal—Valuation of suit.* The Recorder of Moulmein, in trying an administration suit, valued at R13,000, found as to R6,000 in value of the property claimed that it did not exist. The value of the amount decreed by him amounted to R7,000. *Held*, that, under Act XXI of 1863, ss. 27 and 39, the appeal lay in the first



**RECORDERS ACT (XXI OF 1863)—concl'd.**

s. 27—concl'd.

instance to the High Court, and not to the Privy Council. *HAWABI v. IBRAHIM SALI BHAY DAPTI*  
5 B. L. R. 305

S.C. HOWAH BEE v. IBRAHIM SALEE BHAY  
DUPLEE . . . . . 13 W. R. 393

**RECOVERY OF RENTS ACT (X OF 1859).**

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 21.

9 C. W. N. 141

s. 153—

See PRACTICE . . . 11 C. W. N. 112

**RECTIFICATION.**

*Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 31—Sale—Suit for specific performance—Mutual mistake—Clear proof.* To establish a right to rectification of a document it is necessary to show that there has been either fraud or mutual mistake. Under the terms of s. 31 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), it is necessary that the Court should find it clearly proved that there was such mistake. "A person who seeks to rectify a deed upon the ground of mistake must be required to establish, in the clearest and most satisfactory manner, that the alleged intention to which he desires it to be made conformable continued concurrently in the minds of all parties down to the time of its execution, and also must be able to show exactly and precisely the form to which the deed ought to be brought." *Fowler v. Fowler*, 4 D. & J. 250, 264, followed and applied. *MADHAVJI v. RAMNATH* (1906) . . . . . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 457

**RECURRING RIGHT.**

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 131.

**REDEMPTION.**

See BENAMIDAR . . . I. L. R. 30 All. 30

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, SS. 13, 244 . . . . . 10 C. W. N. 115

See EQUITY OF REDEMPTION.

See EXECUTION OF DECREE.

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 211

See HINDU LAW . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 372

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II—

ART. 144—ADVERSE POSSESSION.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 43

ART. 148 . . . I. L. R. 26 Bom. 500

See MALABAR LAW—MORTGAGE.

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 649

See MORTGAGE . 10 C. W. N. 592 ; 778

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 590

I. L. R. 31 All. 482

See MORTGAGE

CONSTRUCTION I. L. R. 26 Bom. 252

POSSESSION UNDER MORTGAGE.

I. L. R. 25 All. 287

**REDEMPTION—concl'd.**

See MORTGAGE—  
REDEMPTION.

ACCOUNTS . . . I. L. R. 26 Bom. 363

See MORTGAGE SALE.

9 C. W. N. 201 ; 225 ; 789

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—MORTGAGES, SUITS CONCERNING.

5 C. W. N. 423

See REDEMPTION DECREE.

See REGISTRATION ACT (III OF 1877), s. 17, CLS. (b) AND (h).

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1016

See RES JUDICATA—MATTERS IN ISSUE.  
I. L. R. 25 Bom. 115

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882,  
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See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882,  
s. 91 . . . . . I. L. R. 30 All. 497

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882,  
SS. 92, 93 . . . . . I. L. R. 29 All. 481

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882,  
SS. 92, 94 . . . . . I. L. R. 30 All. 36

See USUFRUCTUARY MORTGAGE.

I. L. R. 31 All. 325

by minor—

See MORTGAGE . . . 11 C. W. N. 1078

suit for—

See DEKKHAN AGRICULTURISTS' RELIEF  
ACT . . . . . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 722

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 92.

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 426

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 148 (1871, ART. 148).

See SALSETTE, LAW APPLICABLE IN.

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 680

See VALUATION OF SUIT—APPEALS.

I. L. R. 2 All. 778

I. L. R. 13 All. 94

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See VALUATION OF SUIT—SUITS.

*Transfer of Property Act, s. 91.* Before confirmation of sale an auction-purchaser has such a title in the property as entitles him to ask for redemption under s. 91 of the Transfer of Property Act. *RADHA KISHUN MARWARI v. HEM CHANDRA BOSE* (1907)  
11 C. W. N. 495

**REDEMPTION DECREE.**

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, SS. 13,  
43 . . . . . I. L. R. 31 Bom. 527

See MORTGAGE, EQUITY OF REDEMPTION.

See PARTNERSHIP I. L. R. 28 Bom. 176

**RE-ENTRY, RIGHT OF.**

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## REFERENCE.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, CH. XLVI . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 226

See LAND ACQUISITION ACT (I OF 1894).  
12 C. W. N. 985 ; 987

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s. 18 . 12 C. W. N. 98 ; 241

See LAND ACQUISITION ACT, s. 50.  
13 C. W. N. 117

See LAND REGISTRATION ACT (BENGAL  
ACT VII OF 1876), ss. 52, 55, 62.  
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 120

See REFERENCE TO FULL BENCH.

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT.

## REFERENCE BY COLLECTOR.

*Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), ss. 12 and 18—Notice by the Collector—Construction of statute—Meaning of word “immediately.” Held, that the conditions prescribed by s. 18 of the Act are the conditions to which the power of the Collector to make the reference is subject, and these conditions must be fulfilled before the Court can have jurisdiction to entertain the reference. In re LAND ACQUISITION ACT (1905) . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 275*

## REFERENCE FROM SUDDER COURT AT AGRA.

*Establishment of High Court—Letters Patent, N.-W. P., 1866, s. 27. The Sudder Court, being equally divided, referred a case for the opinion of the High Court of Calcutta. The High Court at Agra having been established in the meanwhile :—Held, that the Chief Justice of that Court had power to hear and determine the case. UDEY KUNWAR v. LADU*

6 B. L. R. 283 : 15 W. R. P. C. 16  
13 Moo. I. A. 585

## REFERENCE TO CIVIL COURT.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 103.  
11 C. W. N. 430

## REFERENCE TO FULL BENCH.

1. ——— Power of one Judge to refer. When the senior Judge of a Division Bench of the High Court composed of two Judges passes an order which he intends as a final judgment in a case, the junior Judge cannot of his own authority refer the case to a Full Bench. *In the matter of the petition of CHUNDER KANT BHUTTACHARJEE*

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. Ap. 43

S.C. CHUNDER KANT BHUTTACHARJEE v. BINDABUN CHUNDER MOOKERJEE . 7 W. R. 277

2. ——— Refusal to answer question when found not to arise in the case. The majority of the Judges of a Full Bench refused to answer the question referred, on the ground that it did not arise in the case. *INDRA CHANDRA DUGAR v. BRINDABUN BIHARA*

7 B. L. R. F. B. 251 : 15 W. R. F. B. 21

## REFERENCE TO FULL BENCH—contd.

3. ——— Power of a single Judge sitting alone, to refer a case in which the value of the subject-matter in dispute does not exceed R50 —*Division Court—Rules of the High Court, Ch. V, Rule 1, Ch. VI, Rules 1 and 6—Stat. 24 & 25 Vict., c. 109, s. 13.* A reference to the Full Bench cannot be made by a Judge of the High Court sitting alone to hear cases in which the value of the subject-matter in dispute does not exceed R50. *NABU MONDUL v. CHOLIM MULLIK*  
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 896

*NATU MANDAL v. BADAL MULLICK*

2 C. W. N. 405

4. ——— Question referred not answered on the ground that it did not arise in the case. *GRISH CHANDRA LAHURY v. FAKIR CHAND* . . . B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 503

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See also *RAM KANTH CHOWDHRY v. BHUBAN MOHAN BISWAS, per PEACOCK, C.J.*

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 25 : W. R. F. B. 183

See *KIRTEE NARAIN CHOWDHRY v. PROTAP CHUNDER BUROOAH* . . . W. R. F. B. 129

5. ——— *KEMP and MACPHERSON, JJ.*, were of opinion that the first question referred did not arise in the case, and therefore should not have been answered. *PROSONNO COOMAR PAL CHOWDHRY v. KOYLASH CHUNDER PAL CHOWDHRY* . . . B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 759

2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 327 : 8 W. R. 428

6. ——— Difference of opinion between individual Judges—*Practice.* A question arising from a conflict of opinion between individual Judges is not, properly speaking, the subject of reference to a Full Bench. *RAJ KOOMAR SINGH v. SAHEBZADA ROY* . I. L. R. 3 Calc. 20

7. ——— *Practice—Regular appeal—Special appeal.* On a reference to a Full Bench from a special appeal, the Full Bench will decide the special appeal ; but on a reference from a regular appeal the Full Bench will only decide the point referred, and send the case back to be dealt with by the Bench which made the reference. *SURDAR REZA v. AMJAD ALI*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 703 : 10 C. L. R. 121

8. ——— *Power of Full Bench to send case back to referring Bench for final disposal—High Court, Appellate Side, Ch. V, rule 5.* The language of rule 5 of Ch. V of the Rules of the High Court, Appellate Side, relating to references to the Full Bench in criminal matters is sufficiently wide to enable the Full Bench to send a case back, with an expression of opinion upon the point of law raised, to the Bench which referred it for final disposal. *In the matter of ABDUR RAHMAN* . . . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 839

*ABDUR RAHMAN v. EMPRESS* . 4 C. W. N. 656  
and *per MACLEAN, C.J.*, in *NEMAI CHATTARAJ v. EMPRESS* . . . 4 C. W. N. 645.



REFERENCE TO FULL BENCH—*concl'd.*

9. ——— Matter not decided in order of reference—*Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 64—Statement of account unsigned—Cause of action.* The plaintiffs claimed on a statement of account in writing dated the 18th October 1877; this statement of account was not signed by the defendant. The date of the institution of the suit was the 30th September 1880. A Division Bench of the High Court held on the appeal on the case coming up before them on the 18th October 1877 that the suit was not based upon any express contract made between the parties; that the transaction which took place on that date did not constitute an implied contract; and that therefore these contentions were not open to the plaintiffs, but the Court referred the question whether the plaintiffs' claim, so far as it was based on the statement of account on the 18th October 1877, fell within Art. 64 of Sch. II of Act XV of 1877. *Held*, by MITTER, PRINSEP, and McDONELL, JJ.—That the question referred was a matter of limitation arising in the case which had not been decided in the order of reference, and without such a decision the case could not be disposed of; and as to that point, that the statement of account, not being signed by the defendant, did not fall within the terms of Art. 64 of Sch. II of Act XV of 1877. *Held* by GARTH, C.J., and TOTTENHAM, J.—That the Division Bench, having held that the transaction afforded no basis for a suit, had disposed of the case, and the question referred was therefore immaterial. *DUKHI SAHU v. MAHOMED BIKHU*  
I. L. R. 10 Calc. 284 : 13 C. L. R. 445

10. ——— Matter not decided in or made the subject of reference—*Matter for decision by Full Bench.* Per TYRRELL, J., that in a reference to the Full Bench the only matters which can legally be attended to are the cases referred, and it is not competent for the Full Bench to review or pronounce judicial opinions upon the Court's judgment in cases which have been finally decided and not made the subject of reference. *Jagram Das v. Narain Lal*, I. L. R. 7 All. 857, and *Afzal-un-nissa Begam v. Al Ali*, I. L. R. 8 All. 55, followed and explained. *JADU RAI v. KANIZAK HUSAIN*  
I. L. R. 8 All. 575

11. ——— Reference in Sessions case—*Power of Judge of High Court presiding at the Criminal Sessions to refer to Full Bench point raised by accused before he is called upon to plead—Letters Patent, High Courts, 1865, cl. 25.* Where a point is raised on behalf of the accused before he is called upon to plead, the Judge presiding at the Sessions has no power, under the Charter, to refer the matter to a Full Bench. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. DOLEGOBIND DASS* (1900)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 211  
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1. ——— Question for reference—*Act XXIII of 1861, s. 28—Question arising on application for review.* S. 28, Act XXIII of 1861, merely authorised the reference of such questions as might arise in the trial of the suit, and not of questions arising on an application for a review of judgment, which cannot in any sense be considered as the trial of a suit. *BONOMALLY DEO v. RAM SODOY CHUCKERBUTTY* . . . 17 W. R. 95

2. ——— Question arising on application for review. A reference cannot be made upon an application for a review of judgment. *TALIM MUNDAL v. WATSON & CO.* . 17 W. R. 94

3. ——— Order made on application for probate—*Court of concurrent jurisdiction—Succession Act (X of 1865), ss. 182, 264—Code of Civil Procedure (Act X of 1877), s. 617.* The order made by a District Judge on an application for probate, not being a final order, cannot be referred for the opinion of the High Court under s. 617 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But the Court will, under certain circumstances, entertain such an application, as a Court of concurrent jurisdiction, under s. 264 of the Succession Act. *In the matter of MONOHUR MOOKERJEE*  
I. L. R. 5 Calc. 756 : 7 C. L. R. 228

4. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 617—*Case in which there is no appeal.* It is only when a matter cannot come before the High Court as a Court of appeal that a reference



**REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CIVIL CASES—contd.**

can be made under s. 617 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877). **KRISHNA NATH SIRCAR v. RAM KUMAR DE . . . 7 C. L. R. 144**

5. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 617—Final decree or order.* A Munsif, being of opinion that he had no jurisdiction to entertain a particular suit, made an order returning the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. An appeal was preferred, under s. 588 of the Civil Procedure Code, to the District Judge, who, entertaining doubts upon the question of jurisdiction, referred the matter to the High Court under s. 617. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the order of the Munsif was not a final decree in the suit, and any order of the Judge in appeal disposing of the plea of jurisdiction would not amount to a "final" decree within the meaning of s. 617 of the Civil Procedure Code, the High Court had not jurisdiction to entertain the reference. **RAMPHUL v. DURGA . . . I. L. R. 7 All. 815**

6. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 617—Reference of question arising in execution of a decree—Final decree.* A question arising in execution of a decree cannot be referred for the decision of the High Court under s. 617 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) except where the decree is final. **ORIENTAL LOAN ASSOCIATION v. HATCH . . . I. L. R. 17 Bom. 735**

7. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 617—Stay of execution—Amount of security required on granting stay of execution, question as to.* The defendant in a redemption suit, against whom a decree had been passed, appealed to the High Court, which on his application granted the usual stay of execution pending the appeal, upon security being given by him. The subordinate Judge, feeling doubt as to whether the actual value of the property or the value stated in the plaint should be regarded in fixing the security, referred the case to the High Court under s. 617 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *Held*, even assuming that section to apply to a proceeding of this kind under s. 647, that no reference would lie under s. 617 of the Civil Procedure Code. The question as to the amount of the security was a question relating to execution as contemplated by s. 244 of the Code, and therefore an order determining that question would be appealable under s. 2 of the Code. **ISHWARGAR v. CHUDASAMA MANABHAI . . . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 30**

8. *Difference of opinion between Judges of Division Bench on reference—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 575, 647.* On a reference to the High Court under the Legal Practitioners Act, s. 575 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing for a difference of opinion between the Judges of a Division Bench, was applied and read with s. 647 of the Code, and the case was referred to a third Judge. *In the matter of* **PURNA CHUNDER PAL . . . 4 C. W. N. 389**

9. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 617—Pleader—Professional conduct.*

**REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CIVIL CASES—contd.**

S. 617 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882) does not authorize a reference, except on a point arising in a litigation between parties in a suit, or appeal, or in a matter wherein the Court is called on to adjudicate, that is, to pronounce on the opposite pretensions of contending parties. A pleader was fined Rs 25 by a second class Subordinate Judge for refusing to act on behalf of his client after receipt of retaining fee. On appeal, the District Judge referred the matter to the High Court under s. 617 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XI of 1882). *Held*, that the inquiry into the pleader's professional conduct was of a disciplinary, and not litigious, character. The fact that an appeal lay from the Subordinate Judge to the District Judge did not make it litigious. In such an enquiry no reference could properly be made under s. 617 of Act XIV of 1882. **YESHWANT NARAYAN ADARKAR v. DESOUZA . . . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 78**

10. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 646A—Reference of case before judgment.* A reference to the High Court which applies to a case before judgment is not authorized by s. 646A of the Civil Procedure Code. **DIWALEBAI v. SADASHIVDAS . . . I. L. R. 24 Bom. 310**

11. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 646B—Reference by District Judge of proceedings in Small Cause Court attacked for want of jurisdiction.* Before a District Court can make a reference under s. 646B of the Civil Procedure Code, it must be of opinion that the subordinate Court has erroneously held upon the point of jurisdiction in regard to the particular suit before it, and that therefore the matter is one in which the interference of the High Court should be sought. The word "shall" in s. 646B, cl. (1), is not mandatory, but directory. **MADAN GOPAL v. BHAGWAN DAS . . . I. L. R. 11 All. 304**

12. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 646B—Reference where appeal lies to lower Court—Case in which jurisdiction of Small Cause Court is doubted.* A suit to recover a sum of money as payable to the plaintiff under an award which was contested was filed in a subordinate Court on the Small Cause side. The Subordinate Judge returned the plaint, being of opinion that the suit was not cognizable by a Court of Small Causes. The plaint was then presented in the Court of the District Munsif as an ordinary suit, but the District Munsif returned it on the ground that the suit was cognizable by a Court of Small Causes. The plaintiff then applied to the District Judge to submit the record for the orders of the High Court. *Held*, that the District Judge was bound to submit the record to the High Court under s. 646B of the Code of Civil Procedure on the requisition of the plaintiff, although the plaintiff might have appealed to the District Court against the order of the District Munsif. **SIMSON v. McMASTER . . . I. L. R. 13 Mad. 344**

13. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 646B—Civil Procedure Code Amend-*



**REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CIVIL CASES—contd.**

*ment Act (VII of 1888), s. 60—Provincial Small Cause Court Act (IX of 1887), s. 16—Power of High Court on reference under s. 646B.* Notwithstanding s. 16 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, the High Court has, on a case being submitted to it under s. 646B of the Civil Procedure Code, full power to consider the matter of jurisdiction or to deal with it on the merits, so as to do substantial justice without putting the parties to the expense of a fresh trial. *SURESH CHUNDER MAITRA v. KRISTO RANGINI DAS* . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 249

14. ————— *Ajmere Court Regulation (I of 1877), s. 18 et seq.—Reference by Commissioner of Ajmere—Powers of High Court—Jurisdiction.* Held, that, where a point of law or a question as to the construction of a document is referred to the High Court by an order purporting to be made under s. 18 of the Ajmere Courts Regulation, the High Court cannot consider whether the point referred arises in the case in which the reference before it has been made or not; but its functions are limited to pronouncing an opinion on any point which may be so referred to it. *KALIAN MAL v. RAM KISHEN* I. L. R. 21 All. 163

15. ————— *Refusal to interfere—Practice—Procedure—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 539, 617, 647.* M, claiming to be a trustee or manager of a mosque, applied to the District Judge for permission to grant a lease of lands belonging to the mosque. In response to a proclamation issued, A, the opponent, appeared before the District Judge, claiming to be the owner of the village in which the lands were situate, and contended that the lands did not belong to the mosque and that the applicant was not the manager. The District Judge felt a doubt as to whether he had jurisdiction to entertain the application unless a suit was properly framed and filed under s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), and referred the point to the High Court under s. 617 of the Code. The High Court referred to answer the reference, being of opinion that no reference under s. 617 could be made on such an application. Ss. 617 and 647 of the Civil Procedure Code apply when doubts arise in the proceeding of a suit or appeal or execution or other proceeding. S. 617 was not intended to provide for suppositious cases which do not naturally arise in a proper proceeding before the Court. *MAHAMAD HAJI ZAKERIA v. AHMADBAI HABIB-BHAI* (1900) . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 327

16. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 646B—Small Cause Court—Jurisdiction—Question of jurisdiction not raised in the Court of Small Causes—Reference by District Judge under s. 646B declined.* S. 646B of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to every case in which a Court of Small Causes has failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law, or has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, but applies only to a restricted number of such cases, namely, those cases in which a Court of Small Causes

**REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CIVIL CASES—concl.**

has erroneously held a suit to be, or not to be, cognizable by it. Where no question as to the Court's jurisdiction was raised by either party, and the Court of Small Causes proceeded to judgment as if the case was properly cognizable by it, the High Court refused to interfere upon a reference by the District Judge purporting to be made under s. 646B of the Code of Civil Procedure. *RAM LAL v. KABUL SINGH* (1902)

I. L. R. 25 All. 135

**REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CRIMINAL CASES.**

See CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT, 1899, s. 449 . 7 C. W. N. 554

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I. L. R. 29 Calc. 286

See PLEADER—APPOINTMENT AND APPEARANCE . 6 B. L. R. Ap. 46  
17 W. R. C. R. 37

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—DECISION OF MAGISTRATE AS TO POSSESSION . 5 C. W. N. 71

See PRACTICE—CRIMINAL CASES—REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT.  
I. L. R. 18 Calc. 186

See RIGHT TO BEGIN . 9 B. L. R. 417  
20 W. R. Cr. 33  
I. L. R. 8 Bom. 200

See VERDICT OF JURY—POWER TO INTERFERE WITH VERDICTS.  
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 128  
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 380

————— by Presidency Magistrate (record of evidence necessary)—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 123.  
13 C. W. N. 318

————— for confirmation of sentence of death—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 374.  
5 N. W. 130

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODES, s. 376.  
I. L. R. 1 Bom. 639  
19 W. R. Cr. 57  
2 C. W. N. 49

————— right of—

See OFFENCE BEFORE PENAL CODE.  
I. L. R. 1 All. 599

1. ————— Discretion of Magistrate—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1852, s. 296* A Magistrate should, under s. 296, Criminal Procedure Code, exercise a discretion as to whether he will refer a case to the High Court, and is not bound to refer every case in which he may detect an error. 3 W.

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# REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*

*R. Cr. Let. 5*, explained. NIBARUN CHUNDER DASS  
v. BHUGGOBUTTY CHURN CHATTERJEE

20 W. R. Cr. 40

2. ——— Power to refer—Power of Joint Magistrate—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 434. A Joint Magistrate of a district had no power to make a reference to the High Court under s. 434 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such references can be made only by the Sessions Judge or by the Magistrate of a District. *QUEEN v. CHOORAMONI SANT* . . . 14 W. R. Cr. 25

3. ——— Power of Magistrate—Case heard by Sessions Judge. One of two prisoners, who were tried jointly before a Bench of Magistrates on the complaint of the District Magistrate, appealed to the Sessions Judge and was acquitted. The District Magistrate thereupon, under ss. 296 and 297 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, transmitted the proceedings in the case to the High Court, and asked that they might be quashed on the ground that there had been a failure of justice. *Held*, that the Magistrate was not competent to refer the proceedings of a superior Court to the High Court. *In the matter of DAVID*

6 C. L. R. 245

4. ——— Power of Magistrate—Order of Appellate Court—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872), ss. 295, 296, and 297. A District Magistrate, being of opinion that the Sessions Judge had on appeal improperly set aside a conviction made by a Cantonment Magistrate, referred the matter to the High Court under s. 297 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Held*, that the Magistrate had no power to make such a reference. *In the matter of the petition of RAM LAL EMPRESS v. RAM LALL* . . . I. L. R. 8 Calc. 875

5. ——— Practice—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 438—Reference by District Magistrate of proceeding of Sessions Judge. A District Magistrate who considers that there has been a miscarriage of justice in the Court of Session should not report the case to the High Court for orders under s. 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but should communicate with the Public Prosecutor as to the case in which he thinks such miscarriage has occurred, and invite his assistance to move the Court with regard to it. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SHERE SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 9 All. 362

6. ——— Criminal Procedure Code, s. 438—Reference by Magistrate of orders passed by Sessions Judge. A Magistrate is not justified in referring under s. 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code orders passed by the Sessions Judge on appeal, except in very special cases. *Queen-Empress v. Shere Singh*, I. L. R. 9 All. 362, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ZOR SINGH*

I. L. R. 10 All. 146

7. ——— Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 438—Power of the District Magistrate to question the propriety of finding and sentence by the Sessions Judge—Criminal Proce-

# REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*

*Code*, ss. 435 and 439. The power conferred by s. 438 read with s. 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code upon a District Magistrate to make a reference to the High Court refers clearly to a "proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court." By the words "or otherwise" in s. 438 the Legislature never intended to give to a Magistrate the power to question the propriety of a judgment or sentence by a superior criminal authority; nor by the use of the words "or which has been reported for orders" in s. 439 could it have been intended that such report might be made by an inferior criminal authority with respect to a proceeding by a superior authority. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KARANDI*  
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 250

8. ——— Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 438—Power of the District Magistrate to refer to the High Court a case in which the Sessions Court has, under s. 123, refused to confirm his order under s. 118 of the Code. S. 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not authorize the District Magistrate to refer to the High Court a case in which the Sessions Court has, under s. 123 of the Code, refused to confirm his order under s. 118. If the District Magistrate, as the officer responsible for the peace of his district, is dissatisfied with any such order, his proper course is to ask the Public Prosecutor to move the High Court for the revision of the same. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. JAHANDI*  
I. L. R. 23 Calc. 249

9. ——— Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 307—Duty of Sessions Judge as to referring cases tried with a jury. The discretionary power to refer cases conferred on Sessions Judges by Criminal Procedure Code, s. 307, should always be exercised when the Judge thinks that the verdict is not supported by the evidence. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GURUVADU* . I. L. R. 13 Mad. 343

10. ——— Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 307—Reference necessary for ends of justice. A reference under s. 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code should be made when the Judge is "clearly of opinion" that he should do so for the ends of justice. *SURJA KURMI v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*  
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 555

11. ——— Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, s. 269, cl. 3, and s. 307—Trial by jury of an offence triable with the aid of assessors. The accused was tried by a jury on four charges, (i) forgery, (ii) using a forged document, (iii) criminal misappropriation, and (iv) attempting to use a forged document as genuine. The jury returned a unanimous verdict of "not guilty" on all the charges. The Sessions Judge agreed with the jury in their verdict on the 1st, 2nd, and 4th charges, but he differed from them on the 3rd charge, which was criminal misappropriation. This offence was not triable by a jury, and ought therefore, under cl. 3 of s. 269 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), to have been tried by the Sessions Judge with the aid of the jurors as assessors. Nevertheless, the Judge took the verdict



# REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*

of the jury upon this charge, and, differing from it, referred the case to the High Court under s. 307 of the Code. *Held*, that although the procedure of the Sessions Judge was irregular, the trial by jury must be accepted as legal, and the case as one that could be referred to the High Court under s. 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. JAYRAM HARIBHAI*

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 696

12. ———— *Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), ss. 369, 307—Verdict of a jury, Acceptance of, by Sessions Judge—Reference to High Court for decision on a reconsideration of verdict—Sessions Judge, power of.* It is not open to a Sessions Judge, when he has once accepted the verdict of the jury and has postponed the case for passing sentence, to reconsider his order and to refer the case to the High Court under s. 307, Criminal Procedure Code, but he must pass sentence on the persons awaiting sentence on the verdict. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MOJAHUR RAHMAN* 4 C. W. N. 683

13. ———— *Mode of reference—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 434—Reasons for reference by Judge.* A Sessions Judge, in referring a case under s. 434 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, should state reasons of his own for the reference, and not merely send up the reasons which may have been left by his predecessor. *BATOOL NASHYO v. BHUGLOO CHOWKEEDAR* 10 W. R. Cr. 50

14. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 307—Power of Judge in dealing with evidence.* In making a reference under s. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Sessions Judge is limited to the evidence at the trial which was before the jury. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. JADUB DAS* I L. R. 27 Calc. 295  
4 C. W. N. 129

15. ———— *Question as to validity of commitment—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 296—Power of Sessions Court to set aside commitment.* The Court of Session has no power to set aside a commitment made under its direction. If it doubts the legality of the commitment, it should make a reference to the High Court. *In the matter of the petition of HASSAN RAZA KHAN*  
7 N. W. 211

16. ———— *Order contrary to law—Sessions Judge—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 296.* Where a Sessions Judge considers that a judgment or order is contrary to law, or that the punishment is too severe, he should report the proceedings to the High Court in the manner prescribed by the circular order of 15th July 1863, which is applicable to references under s. 296 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872. *RAJKISTO PAUL v. NITYANUND PAUL* 20 W. R. Cr. 50

17. ———— *Question of jurisdiction pending trial—Reference under s. 269 of Act X of 1872 by Court of Session.* A Court of Session, after it had asked the assessors their opinion in a case which was being tried by it, suspended the trial of the case and made a reference to the High Court

# REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*

under s. 296 of Act X of 1872, on a question of jurisdiction which had arisen in the trial of the case. *Held*, that it was not intended that that section should be so used, and the Court of Session must dispose of such question itself. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. BHUP SINGH* I. L. R. 2 All. 771

18. ———— *Question of sufficiency of evidence—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 434.* S. 434 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861, contemplated reference to the High Court in cases where the sentence or order is contrary to law. A case where a Magistrate had convicted of an offence on the evidence of one witness whom he considered credible was held not a proper subject of reference to the High Court. *QUEEN v. BINDU*  
8 W. R. Cr. 60

19. ———— *Power of High Court on reference—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 434.* The power exercised by a Court sitting as a Court to decide questions of law reserved in criminal cases under s. 434 of the Criminal Procedure Code (X of 1882) is the power of review, and the Court is a Court of Reference and Revision. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. APPA SUBHANA MENDRE* I. L. R. 8 Bom. 200

20. ———— *Reference made without jurisdiction.* Upon a reference made without jurisdiction, the High Court has no power to act in considering the merits of the case on the evidence. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MOJAHUR RAHMAN*  
4 C. W. N. 683

21. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872), s. 466; (Act X of 1872), s. 197—Grounds for non-interference—Government orders as to tribunal for trial of officials—Magistrate, Jurisdiction of.* In 1890 the Collector of Ganjam reported to the Board of Revenue a charge of bribery, etc., against a Sub-Magistrate and received directions to send the case for trial to some Magistrate other than himself, or the Principal Assistant Magistrate. He accordingly sent it to the Senior Assistant Magistrate of Berhampore; the accused was convicted, but he appealed to the Sessions Judge, who held that the Magistrate had jurisdiction to try it, but reversed the conviction on the merits. The Government did not appeal against the acquittal of the accused, but the District Magistrate referred to the High Court the question whether the Magistrate had jurisdiction. *Held*, on the reference, that it was not a case for the interference of the High Court, because (i) it was not shown that the Magistrate had acted without jurisdiction; (ii) Government had not appealed against the acquittal by the Sessions Judge who had tried and determined the question of jurisdiction. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RANGA RAU*

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 36

22. ———— *Illegality in proceedings—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 434.* The Court can only interfere under s. 434, Code of Criminal Procedure, when there is some illegality in the proceedings of a lower Court. *QUEEN v. JOY KISHEN LALL* 12 W. R. Cr. 46



REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*

23. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, s. 307—Trial by jury—Verdict of acquittal—High Court's power of interference with the verdict of a jury.* In a case referred under s. 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), the High Court will not, as a rule, interfere with the verdict of a jury, except when it is shown to be clearly and manifestly wrong. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MANIA DAYAL* . . . I. L. R. 10 Bom. 497

24. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, s. 307—Powers of High Court under s. 307—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 418, 423 (d).* No trial can be, legally speaking, concluded until judgment and sentence are passed and the trial of a case referred by a Sessions Judge to the High Court under s. 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code remains open for the High Court to conclude and complete, either by maintaining the verdict of the jury and causing judgment of acquittal to be recorded, or by setting aside the verdict of acquittal, and causing conviction and sentence to be entered against the accused. The provisions of s. 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code are not in any way cut down by ss. 418 and 423; and the High Court has power, under s. 307, to interfere with the verdict of the jury where the verdict is perverse or obtuse, and the ends of justice require that such perverse finding should be set right. The power of the High Court is not limited to interference on questions of law, *i.e.*, misdirection by the Judge, or misapprehension by the jury of the Judge's directions on points of law. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MCCARTHY*

I. L. R. 9 All. 420

25. ————— *Question as to credibility of witnesses—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 434.* S. 434 gave the High Court no power to interfere in a case where the difference of opinion between the Magistrate and the Judge was as to the credibility of witnesses. The Magistrate's order may be an improper one, but, if passed on legally sufficient evidence, it cannot be called illegal. *OODLA v. BARKAT* . . . 18 W. R. Cr. 7

*In the matter of RAMDHUN MUNDLE*

18 W. R. Cr. 39

26. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 296—Acquittal by Magistrate.* When a Magistrate, having called on the prisoners for their defence, takes the evidence of a witness and finally acquits them of the charge, the High Court had no power to interfere upon a reference made to it under s. 296, Act X of 1872. *OKHOY TELI v. MODHOO SHEIKH* . . . 19 W. R. Cr. 55

27. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 296—Order of Magistrate rejecting application for restitution of forfeited property.* The High Court declined, on a reference under s. 296, Code of Criminal Procedure, to interfere with the order of a Magistrate rejecting an application for the restitution of property which had been sold some years ago under the provisions of ss. 183 and 184 of the Code. The proper mode of raising the question as to the propriety of the order would be by a regu-

REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*

lar suit against the Government. *In the matter of the petition of GHUMUNDEE SINGH*

23 W. R. Cr. 30

28. ————— *Taking up on reference case where sentence of imprisonment had expired.* Where the imprisonment awarded on a summary conviction before a Magistrate had already expired, the High Court declined to go into the case on a reference from the Sessions Judge, because it would be no advantage to the prisoner to do so, and because, if the Magistrate's proceedings were quashed, the prisoner would be put to risk of being tried again for the offence with which he had been charged. *KOPIL DOLAI v. KANHAI JENNA*

24 W. R. Cr. 71

29. ————— *Right of counsel to be heard—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 296.* Counsel cannot claim as of right to be heard on a reference to the High Court under s. 296 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *REG. v. DEVAMA*

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 64

*See ANGELO v. CARGIL* . . . 9 B. L. R. 417

30. ————— *Acquittal—Practice—Reference to High Court from verdict of acquittal, when not proper—Making up of records, defect in—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1850), ss. 116, 161, 466.* Where, on the Sessions Judge's own showing in his charge to the jury, the evidence for the prosecution was so open to hostile criticism as to justify the jury in regarding it with suspicion: *Held*, that the Sessions Judge was not justified in making a reference, under s. 307, Code of Criminal Procedure, against a verdict of acquittal delivered upon such evidence. *KING-EMPEROR v. CHIDGHAN GOSSAIN (1902)* . . . 7 C. W. N. 135

31. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 435, 438, 439—Practice—Revision, Reference by District Magistrate recommending the reconsideration of an order of acquittal passed by a Subordinate Magistrate.* In the case of an acquittal by a subordinate Magistrate, where the Local Government does not appeal, or where the District Magistrate does not move the Local Government to appeal, the High Court will not, as a general rule, entertain a reference direct from the District Magistrate under s. 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *In the matter of AMIN-UD-DIN (1902)* . . . I. L. R. 24 All. 346

32. ————— *Criminal Procedure Code, s. 438—Revision—Practice—Reference by District Magistrate questioning an order of acquittal.* The High Court will not ordinarily entertain a reference under s. 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the object of which is to have an order of acquittal passed by an inferior Court set aside. *EMPEROR v. MADAR BAKSH (1902)*

I. L. R. 25 All. 128

33. ————— *Duty of Sessions Judge—Reference under s. 307, Criminal Procedure Code—Duty of the Sessions Judge in making a reference.* Where a Sessions Judge, in his reference to the High



# REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*

Court under s. 307. Criminal Procedure Code, merely said that the verdict of the jury was against the weight of the evidence, and expressed no other opinion, it was observed that in a case of this description it is the duty of the Sessions Judge to set out on what portions of the evidence or on what facts disclosed by the evidence the accused should have been convicted. *KING-EMPEROR v. BHUT NATH GHOSE* (1902) . 7 C. W. N. 345

34. ——— Security of good behaviour—*Criminal Procedure Code, s. 118—Security for good behaviour—Discretion of Court—Security demanded not to be excessive.* Where a Magistrate, acting under s. 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, required securities to an amount which the person to be bound over was totally unable to furnish, in consequence of which he remained in jail for some two months and-a-half, the Court held that the Magistrate had not exercised a proper discretion in the matter, and reduced the amount of the security. *Queen-Empress v. Rama, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 372*, followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAZA ALI* (1900) . I. L. R. 23 All. 80

35. ——— Acquittal by Jury—*Powers of the High Court—“Opinion” of Jury in cases of divided verdict—Consideration of entire evidence—Verdict not unreasonable on the face of the charge—Pardon—Omission to state reasons when facts leading to grant of pardon appear on the record—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1893), ss. 307, 337 (1).* Where the facts which led up to the tender of pardon appear on the record, the omission by the Magistrate granting it to state his reasons for so doing is not an illegality nor even an irregularity which vitiates the subsequent proceedings. *Deputy Legal Remembrancer v. Banu Singh, 5 C. L. J. 224*, followed. The High Court cannot throw out a reference under s. 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code merely because it might be argued, upon the face of the charge to the Jury, that the verdict was not altogether an unreasonable one, but it must consider the entire evidence and arrive at its own judgment after giving due weight to the opinions of the Judge and Jury. *Emperor v. Lyall, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 128*, and *Emperor v. Abdul Rahman, 9 C. L. J. 432*, followed. *King-Emperor v. Chidghan Gossain, 7 C. W. N. 135*, *Emperor v. Anaruddin Biswas*, unreported, and *King-Emperor v. Anes*, unreported, and *King-Emperor v. Prasanna Kumar Ganguli*, unreported, referred to. *Emperor v. Chirkua, 2 All. L. J. 475*, dissented from. The opinion of the Jury is their conclusion and not the reasons therefor, and in the case of divided verdicts the opinion of the minority must also be considered by the Court. The Legislature in directing the High Court to duly weigh the opinion of the jury gives an implied authority for the taking of their reasons for the verdict, and the Judge will do well before making the reference to invite such reasons, not for the purpose of deciding whether it should be made, but for consideration by the High Court after having made up his mind to refer the case and after telling the Jury of his intention to do so.

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But the omission to take or record the reasons does not warrant the High Court in declining to go into the evidence. *Emperor v. Chellan, I. L. R. 29 Mad. 91*, referred to. *EMPEROR v. ANNANDA CHARAN THAKUR* (1909) . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 629

# REFORMATORY SCHOOLS ACT (V OF 1876).

——— ss. 2, 7—

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—  
POWERS OF MAGISTRATES.

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 94

Reformatory Schools Act (VIII of 1897), s. 1, cls. 2, 3, and s. 8—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 3 and s. 399—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872), s. 318.* The accused was convicted of the offence under s. 457 of the Penal Code by the Deputy Magistrate of Barisal, who found that the accused was a boy of fourteen or fifteen years, decidedly under sixteen, and passed the following order: “I find Ahmad Ali, boy, guilty of house-breaking by night for the purpose of committing theft, and instead of being imprisoned in the jail under s. 457 of the Penal Code, I direct, under s. 399 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and s. 7 of Act V of 1876, that Ahmad Ali be confined in the Calcutta Reformatory for two years for training in some branch of useful industry.” Held, that the order could not be sustained under s. 7 of Act V of 1876, as that Act had been repealed before the date of the order and the commission of the offence, nor under s. 8 of Act VIII of 1897, as the order does not comply with the provisions of the latter Act. Held, further, that, s. 318 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872) having been repealed by s. 2 of Act V of 1876, the corresponding s. 399 of present Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882) must also be held by virtue of s. 3 of the Code to have been repealed in the provinces, including Bengal, to which Act V of 1876 was extended. The repeal of a statute repealing another statute does not revive the repealed statute. The law in India, as embodied in s. 7 of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897), is the same as the law in England. *Queen-Empress v. Madasami, I. L. R. 12 Mad. 94*, and *Queen-Empress v. Manaji, I. L. R. 14 Bom. 381*, referred to and approved of. *DEPUTY LEGAL REMEMBRANCER v. AHMAD ALI* . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 333  
2 C. W. N. 11

s. 8—*Magistrate’s duty under that section to ascertain the prisoner’s age—Nature of proceeding under that section—High Court’s power of revising such proceeding—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 4 and 435—Judicial proceeding.* A Magistrate acting under s. 8 of the Reformatory Schools Act (V of 1876) is bound to ascertain the age of prisoner, and, in accordance with that finding, to direct the confinement in a reformatory according to the rules made under s. 22 of the Act. It is not sufficient for the Magistrate merely to find that the prisoner is under a particular age. Under s. 8 of the Act, evidence may be taken



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s. 8—concl'd.

by the Magistrate as to the age of the prisoner; and as the proceeding of the Magistrate involves the alteration of a sentence after the exercise of judicial discretion, such proceeding is clearly a judicial proceeding within the meaning of ss. 4 and 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882). The High Court is therefore competent to exercise its revisional jurisdiction in such cases. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MANAJI** . **I. L. R. 14 Bom. 381**

1. — s. 22—*Government Notification (India) No. 173 of the 14th March 1889—Sentence.* Where a boy over fourteen, but otherwise of uncertain age, was ordered upon conviction by a Magistrate to be detained in a Reformatory School for two years:—*Held*, that such sentence, having regard to the rule made by the Governor-General in Council on the 14th March 1889 under s. 22 of Act V of 1876, was illegal. The proper course for the Magistrate to have adopted with reference to the above-mentioned rules was to have ascertained, as near as might be, the exact age of the offender and sentenced him to a specified period of detention, which should be that elapsing between his conviction and the attainment by him of the age of eighteen years. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NARAIN**

**I. L. R. 15 All. 208**

2. — *Reformatory Schools Act (VIII of 1897), s. 2—Period of detention in reformatory—Rules under Act of 1876.* *Held*, by SHEPHARD, *Offg. C.J.*, affirming the judgment of MOORE, *J.* (DAVIES, *J.*, dissenting), that the rules made by Government under Act V of 1876 must be deemed to have been made under Act VIII of 1897; and that Magistrates acting under Act VIII of 1897 must order the detention of a juvenile offender until he attains the age of eighteen. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAMALINGAM** . **I. L. R. 21 Mad. 430**

**REFORMATORY SCHOOLS ACT (VIII OF 1897).**

ss. 8, 9, 11—*Recording of and finding on evidence as to age of offender—Jurisdiction of Sessions Judge as a Court of Appeal to pass order for detention in reformatory school in lieu of imprisonment.* A Sessions Judge can on appeal from a Magistrate pass an order for detention in a reformatory school in supersession of an order for imprisonment. But he can only do so when he has before him evidence as to the age of the accused, otherwise he must take evidence under s. 11 of the Act, and record a finding stating the age, and then with reference to such finding pass a sentence within the terms of the Reformatory Schools Act and the rules made by the Local Government thereunder. **DEPUTY LEGAL REMEMBRANCER v. KOPIL KAHAR** **4 C. W. N. 225**

ss. 8, 9, 11, 13 and 16—*Youthful offenders—Periods of detention allowable under the Act—Finding by Magistrate as to age—Form of order—Exact period of detention.* A District Magistrate before whom the case of a youthful offender came

**REFORMATORY SCHOOLS ACT (VIII OF 1897)—cont'd.**

s. 8—cont'd.

under the provisions of s. 9 of the Reformatory Schools Act, 1897, found the accused to be thirteen years of age, sentenced him to six months' rigorous imprisonment, and directed that, in lieu of undergoing that sentence, he should be detained in a reformatory school for a period of five years, unless he should attain the age of eighteen years at an earlier date. *Held*, that the order was wrong, inasmuch as it failed to fix the exact period of detention. *Semble*: That in some cases it may not be necessary to ascertain the exact age of the offender. If he be not over fifteen, a period of three years may rightly be fixed; if not over eleven, a period of seven years may be fixed without further inquiry. But, in cases in which inquiry is necessary in order to fix the period, as when the offender is over eleven, and the Magistrate wishes to make the period as long as possible, he must find, as well as he can, the exact age of the offender, and is not at liberty to leave the decision of the question to the reformatory officials. The effect of the notification published by Government, regulating the periods for which youthful offenders may be sent to reformatory schools in the Madras Presidency, is to fix a minimum period of five years for all cases in which such a period is legally possible; namely, in all cases where the offender is not over thirteen at the date of conviction. It was not intended to prevent the Magistrate from fixing a period short of five years, but not short of three years, in the case of a boy over thirteen. **QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAMA (1900)**

**I. L. R. 24 Mad. 13**

ss. 8, 9 and 16—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) s. 379—Theft—Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), s. 439—High Court, power of revision of—Order for detention of youthful offender in reformatory school without passing sentence, legality of—Jurisdiction of High Court to consider legality or propriety of conviction, sentence or order if affected by s. 16, Reformatory Schools Act—Limitation of power.* S. 16 of the Reformatory Schools Act (VIII of 1897) does not affect the jurisdiction of the High Court as a Court of revision, to consider the legality or propriety of the conviction or sentence or of any order passed by a Subordinate Court other than that mentioned in that section. *Reasut v. Courtney, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 423*, referred to. The law requires that a Magistrate trying a case, or one to whom the proceedings of the case are submitted under s. 9 of the Reformatory Schools Act, should, in the first instance, sentence the accused to a term of imprisonment or transportation, which may then commute into one of detention in a reformatory school for such period as the law prescribes. An order for the detention of a youthful offender in a reformatory school, when no sentence of imprisonment or of transportation has been passed, is bad in law. **RADHA KRISTO BARAT v. GOKULA NUT (1901)** . **5 C. W. N. 210**

ss. 8 and 16—*Jurisdiction—Reformatory school—Detention in, in lieu of sentence of impri-*



**REFORMATORY SCHOOLS ACT (VIII OF 1897)—contd.****s. 8—concl'd.**

*sonment—Power of High Court to alter or set aside such sentence.* S. 16 of the Reformatory Schools Act does not in any way take away the jurisdiction of the High Court to alter or set aside the sentence, in substitution of which an order for detention is made. The power of the High Court remains intact, to consider the propriety or legality of any sentence passed upon a youthful offender. *REASUT v. COURTNEY* (1900). I. L. R. 28 Calc. 423 s.c. 5 C. W. N. 211

**s. 9—**

*See ante—*

ss. 8, 9, 11, 13 AND 16.

ss. 8, 9 AND 16.

**ss. 11 and 13—**

*See ante*, ss. 8, 9, 11, 13 AND 16.

**s. 16—**

*See ante—*

ss. 8, 9, 11, ETC.

ss. 8, 9 AND 16.

ss. 8 AND 16.

1. **s. 16 and ss. 8, 11, and 31—Rule framed by the Local Government—Youthful offender—Evidence of age—Order not properly passed—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 83.** If an order for detention in a reformatory school in substitution for transportation or imprisonment be not properly passed, a Court is not debarred by s. 6 of the Reformatory Schools Act (VIII of 1897) from altering or reversing such order. A boy of about 9 years of age was found in the grounds of the residence of the Commissioner of Patna at 3 A.M. in the morning with a brass lota in his hand. He was tried summarily and, without any preliminary inquiry as to the age of the boy being made, was sentenced to three months' rigorous imprisonment, or in lieu thereof to be detained in a reformatory school for seven years. *Held*, that the accused did not come within the definition of "youthful offenders" as given in the rule framed by the Local Government under s. 8 of the Reformatory Schools Act, and the offence of the accused being his first offence, the case should have been dealt with under s. 31 of the Act. It is not that a Magistrate is under no circumstances competent to find from the appearance of a person convicted by him that he is a youthful offender, but it is generally desirable that there should be some reliable evidence on the point, and especially when it is necessary to determine the period of detention. The age of the accused being under twelve years, the Magistrate should, considering the provisions of s. 83 of the Penal Code, have found that the accused had attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his act. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. MAKIMUDDIN*

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 133

**REFORMATORY SCHOOLS ACT (VIII OF 1897)—contd.****s. 16—contd.**

2. **Order for detention in a reformatory school under s. 8—Powers of High Court in revision.** *Held*, that the High Court has no power to interfere in appeal or revision with an order for detention in a reformatory school passed in substitution for an order of transportation or imprisonment. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. HIMAI*

I. L. R. 20 All. 158

*QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GOBINDA*

I. L. R. 20 All. 159

*QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BILLAR*

I. L. R. 20 All. 160

3. **Power of High Court in revision.** The prohibition contained in s. 16 of Act VIII of 1897 does not apply to an order for detention in a reformatory school when the person to whom it relates has not been convicted of any offence and has not been sentenced to any term of imprisonment or transportation for which detention in a reformatory school could be substituted. In such a case the High Court has power to interfere in revision. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BILLAR*

I. L. R. 20 All. 160

4. **Substitution of an order of detention in a reformatory school for a sentence of imprisonment passed on a youthful offender—Power of Appellate Court to order the alteration of such order—Evidence—Age of such offenders, finding as to—Revisional powers.** S. 16 of the Reformatory Schools Act (VIII of 1897) does not entitle any Appellate Court to order the alteration of the substitution of an order for detention in a reformatory school to imprisonment. Before an order for detention in a reformatory school can be passed in lieu of a sentence for imprisonment, there should be a definite finding as to the age of the boy and as to his being a fit subject for a reformatory school. *EXPRESS v. HARIDAS MUKHERJEE*. 3 C. W. N. 576

5. **Rules of the Local Government framed under s. 8 (3) of the Act—Order sending a boy of the Dalera caste to a reformatory school—Jurisdiction of High Courts to interfere with orders under s. 16—Interpretation of statutes.** *Held*, that the High Court has power to interfere in appeal or revision with an order for detention in a reformatory school passed in substitution for transportation or imprisonment when such order is made without jurisdiction and is not an order warranted by Act VIII of 1897. S. 16 of Act VIII of 1897 only precludes the interference of a superior Court with the original Court's order so far as it (1) determines the age of a youthful offender or (2) directs the substitution of detention in a reformatory school for transportation or imprisonment, where such substitution is not made without jurisdiction or is not otherwise illegal, having regard to the provisions of the Act. *Queen-Empress v. Himai*, I. L. R. 20 All. 158, and *Queen-Empress v. Gobinda*, I. L. R. 20 All. 159, overruled. *Queen-Empress v. Billar*, I. L. R. 20 All. 160; *Queen-Empress v. Kaidya Husain*,



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———— s. 16—concl'd.  
*1 Bom. L. R. 162; Deputy Legal Remembrancer v. Ahmad Ali, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 333; Queen-Empress v. Ramalingam, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 430; Roop Lal Das v. Manook, 2 C. W. N. 572; Queen-Empress v. Partap Chunder Ghose, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 852; Ex parte Bradlaugh, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 509; and Colonial Bank of Australasia v. Willan, L. R. 5 P. C. 417, referred to. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. HORI . . . I. L. R. 21 All. 391*

**REFORMED LAND.**

See DILUVION . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 856

**REFUND OF OVERCHARGE.**

See RAILWAYS ACT, ss. 77, 140.  
 I. L. R. 31 Bom. 534

**REFUND OF STAMP DUTY.**

See STAMP DUTY I. L. R. 36 Calc. 645

**REFUSAL.**

———— to answer questions—

See MISJOINDER OF CHARGES.  
 I. L. R. 35 Calc. 161

———— to perform services—

See SERVICE TENURE.  
 I. L. R. 4 Calc. 67  
 I. L. R. 23 Bom. 602

———— to register—

See FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERAL CASES.  
 5 C. W. N. 44

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1877, s. 35.

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1877, s. 73.  
 I. L. R. 1 All. 318

See REGISTRATION ACT (III OF 1877)—  
 ss. 73 TO 77.

I. L. R. 24 All. 402  
 s. 77 . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 532

———— to take oath—

See MISJOINDER OF CHARGES.  
 I. L. R. 35 Calc. 161

See OATHS ACT, ss. 11, 12.  
 I. L. R. 31 Mad. 1

See REGISTRATION . 12 C. W. N. 47

**REGIMENTAL DEBTS ACT.**

26 and 27 Vict., c. 57, ss. 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 22, and 35—Committee of adjustment—Royal Warrant, cl. 17—"Surplus"—"Person"—*Bona fides*. The president of a committee of adjustment, appointed under the provisions of 26 & 27 Vict., c. 57 (Regimental Debts Act, 1863), wrote to the Agra Bank at Bombay a letter enclosing the order by which the committee had been appointed, stating that he had given over to the widow of a deceased officer the whole of the estate of her hus-

**REGIMENTAL DEBTS ACT—cont'd.**

band by direction of the Military Secretary to Government, and requesting the Bank to conform to her instructions concerning the amount of deposit receipts then in charge of the Bank in the name of the deceased officer. The widow had taken out no letters of administration to the estate of her husband, nor had she a preferential claim or any preferential charge against it; but she paid all the preferential charges. On receipt of the letter from the president of the committee of adjustment, the Bank paid over all the moneys of the deceased officer in their hands to his widow. In a suit brought against the Bank by the first plaintiff (the grand-daughter of the deceased officer), who had taken out letters of administration to his estate on 6th June 1873, and her husband, the second plaintiff, to recover two-thirds of the moneys so paid by the Bank to the widow, with interest:—*Held*, that, on the payment by the widow of the preferential charges, the whole of the property remaining in the hands of the committee was "surplus" within the meaning of s. 5 of the Regimental Debts Act of 1863, and that, assuming the Agra Bank at Bombay to be "within the command" within the meaning of s. 7, the moneys of the deceased officer in the hands of the Bank, as being part of such "surplus," should have been dealt with by the committee in accordance with the provisions of s. 10 of the Regimental Debts Act, 1863, and cl. 17 of the Royal Warrant, and should have been remitted to the Military Secretary to Government. *Held*, also, that the Military Secretary to Government had no authority to pay or order the payment of such "surplus" to any person except in accordance with the provisions of s. 12 of the Regimental Debts Act of 1863. *Held*, also, that s. 8 of the Regimental Debts Act of 1863 did not render it incumbent on the widow, for the purpose of ousting the jurisdiction of the committee of adjustment, to pay the preferential charges before the committee had taken any steps under s. 7. The true construction of s. 8 is that, on payment of the preferential charges, the committee of adjustment must be regarded as *functi officio*, except for the purpose of reporting, and should make over whatever property they have, which comes under the denomination of "surplus," in accordance with the terms of s. 10. *Held*, also, that the letter of the president of the committee of adjustment was a sufficient notice to the Bank that the committee were *functi officio*, and that the period had arrived when the civil law stepped in to regulate the case. *Quære*: Whether the Bank could be held to be a "person" within the meaning of s. 22 of the Regimental Debts Act of 1863; but even if it could:—*Held*, that the Bank were not protected by that section, the payment by them not having been made to a "representative" as defined in the Act. *Held*, also, that the Bank were not protected by s. 35 of the Regimental Debts Act, the payment not having been made "in pursuance" of the Act and the carelessness of the Bank in paying the money having been such as to amount to positive negligence, and debar them from pleading that they acted under



**REGIMENTAL DEBTS ACT—concl'd.**

the *bonâ fide* belief that the payment was made in pursuance of the Act. *Pemberton v. Chapman*, 7 E. & B. 210, distinguished. *SARSTEDT v. AGRA BANK* . . . . . 12 Bom. 268

**REGISTER.**

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS—REGISTERS.

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 74.

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 534

entry in—

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 32.

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 689

L. R. 19 I. A. 157

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 35.

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 940

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 492

See LAND REGISTRATION ACT (BENGAL), s. 7 . . . . . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 304

**REGISTRAR OF DOCUMENTS.**

See REGISTRATION ACT (III OF 1877), ss. 32, 34 AND 87 . . . . . 5 C. W. N. 177

**REGISTRAR OF HIGH COURT.**

See ADMINISTRATION BOND.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 713

authority of—

See LEAVE TO SEE.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 619

reference to—

See DIVORCE ACT, s. 36 6 C. W. N. 414

See GUARDIAN—DUTIES AND POWERS OF GUARDIANS . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 334

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—REFERENCE TO REGISTRAR . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 585

report of—

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT—SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF LAW—REGISTRAR'S REPORT.

See HINDU LAW—USURY.

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 899; 903 note; 906 note

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—REPORT OF REGISTRAR . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 437

sale by—

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—SALE BY REGISTRAR . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 566

1. ——— Examination of stamps. The

examination of stamps is a fiscal duty belonging to a Revenue officer, and the Registrar of the High Court is not responsible for it. *BHIKOO MOLLAH v. RASH MONEE DOSSEE* . . . . . 9 W. R. 357

**REGISTRAR OF HIGH COURT—cont'd.**

2. ——— Authority of Registrar—Power to execute conveyance and enter into covenants on behalf of infants and persons refusing to execute—Effects of title known to purchaser at time of sale—Covenants for title and quiet enjoyment—*Pardanashin*, when not bound by conveyance executed by her containing covenants for title and quiet enjoyment—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 261, 262—Rules of Court (*Belchambers' Rules and Orders*), Nos. 341 and 436. The Registrar of the High Court has authority, when so directed by an order of Court, to execute a conveyance on behalf of a party refusing to do so, so as to pass his estate, if any, but has no authority to bind him by entering into any covenants on his behalf. The power of the Registrar to execute such a conveyance rests upon statutory authority. General covenants for title and quiet enjoyment extend to the case of a defect known to the purchaser at the time of the sale, unless the intention of the parties that they should not do so is clearly expressed in the covenants themselves. "Conveyance," as used in rule 436 (*Belchambers' Rules and Orders*) means such an instrument as may be necessary to transfer the estate, if he has any, belonging to the person on behalf of whom the Registrar executes the transfer to the purchaser. Circumstances under which a *pardanashin* lady will be relieved from liability under covenants contained in a conveyance executed by her. *D*, an heir of one *X*, a deceased Hindu lady, sold and conveyed to *M*, in March 1878, a moiety in certain premises belonging to the estate of *X*. Subsequently a decree was made for partition of the estate left by *X* in a suit to which *D*, *A*, *R*, *G*, and *S* were parties, and an order was made in that suit directing the premises, of which *D* had so sold a moiety, to be sold by the Registrar and the parties were directed to join in the conveyance, the Registrar being directed to approve and execute the same on behalf of *G*, who was an infant. At the sale, the plaintiff purchased the premises, and thereafter *D* refused to execute the conveyance which included the usual covenants for title and quiet enjoyment. A summons was thereupon taken out against him and an order was made directing the Registrar to execute the conveyance on his behalf. The conveyance was then executed in September 1885 by *A*, *S*, and *R*, and by the Registrar on behalf of *D* and the minor *G*. In a suit instituted by *M* under the conveyance of 1878, the Court held that he was entitled to possession, as against the plaintiffs of the moiety of the premises covered by his conveyance. The plaintiff therefore brought a suit against *D*, *A*, *R*, *G*, and *S* to recover damages for breach of the covenants for title and quiet enjoyment. It was not found that *R* had any good independent advice in the matter, or that she clearly understood the nature of the contract she was entering into, and the liabilities she was taking upon herself. *Held*, that, although the Registrar had authority to execute the conveyance on behalf of *D* and *G*, he had no authority to enter into the covenants on their behalf, and that the suit should be dismissed as against them. *Held*, also, that,



**REGISTRAR OF HIGH COURT—*contd.***

having regard to the position of *R*, the suit should also be dismissed as against her. **RAM CHUNDER DUTT v. DWARKA NATH BYSACK**

**I. L. R. 16 Calc. 330**

**3. ————— Sale by Registrar—Title to property purchased at Registrar's sale—Doubtful title, enforcement of—Endowment—Rent charge.** The Court will not enforce a doubtful title on a purchaser where (a) there is a reasonable probability of litigation resulting; or (b) where the title depends on the construction and legal operation of some ill-expressed and inartificial instrument, and the Court holds the conclusion it arrives at to be open to reasonable doubt in some other Court. Case in which the title sought to be enforced did not fall within these rules. **KALLY DOSS SEAL v. NOBIN CHUNDER DOSS**

**I. L. R. 14 Calc. 518**

**4. ————— Compensation to purchaser for deficiency in area of land—Conditions of sale.** At a Registrar's sale held on 13th June 1895 a property described as "Lot No. 11, formerly Lot No. 21, Emambaree Lane, containing by estimation 8 cottahs, be the same a little more or less," was sold to the applicant. One of the conditions of sale was that the purchaser would not be entitled to any compensation. On the 10th July the purchaser applied for and obtained an order to pay the balance of the purchase-money into Court, and for confirmation of the sale. Subsequently the purchaser caused the property to be measured, and discovered that it consisted only of 5 cottahs 13 chittaks and 38 sq. ft., and he accordingly applied for compensation in respect of the deficiency. The purchase-money was still in the hands of the Court at the time of the application. *Held*, that the proviso in the conditions of sale applied only to small or unimportant errors and misstatements, and not to a deficiency in measurement of a substantial character; and that in respect of the latter the purchaser was entitled to compensation out of the purchase-money in Court, although he had obtained an order for confirmation of the sale. **Whitmore v. Whitmore, L. R. 8 Eq. 603**, followed. **KISSORY MOHAN ROY v. KALI CHARAN GHOSE**

**1 C. W. N. 106**

**5. ————— Sale notification—Boundaries, Rectification of—Compensation—Annulment of sale.** In an application by a purchaser for rectification of boundaries or annulment of sale, where such rectification would involve the inclusion within his boundaries of a cookroom, which according to the sale notification was included within the boundaries of another lot purchased by another person, but which, according to the evidence, was always included in the lot purchased by the applicant and which the applicant was led to believe was included in his lot:—*Held*, that in determining what the property is which is purchased at Registrar's sale one has to look at the sale notification the description of the property and the boundaries therein given. It is therefore impossible to determine in the present application what were the boundaries of the property purchased by the applicant. That in a

**REGISTRAR OF HIGH COURT—*concl.***

proceeding of this kind an application for rectification of boundaries cannot be entertained, and the best course is to annul the sale. **ADMINISTRATOR GENERAL OF BENGAL v. ANNODA PROSAD DASS**

**4 C. W. N. 504**

**6. ————— Dwelling-house—Conditions of sale—Title, abstract of, misstatement in—Acceptance of title by purchaser—Payment into Court of balance—Subsequent discovery of misstatement—Sale, rescission of—Compensation.** A purchaser of a dwelling-house at a Registrar's sale accepted the conditions of sale, whereby he was required to furnish requisitions and objections, if any, within a fortnight after delivery of the abstract (and in this respect time was of the essence of the contract), and he was not entitled to call for any other documents except those abstracted, or for the originals of documents of which the vendor had only copies, and was to accept the title as shown in the abstract of title. By the abstract it was represented to the purchaser that he was purchasing the entire sixteen annas of the house and premises. The purchaser accepted the title as shown in the abstract, and paid the balance of the purchase-money into Court, without reserving any right to object to the title. He now applied to be discharged from such purchase, and for leave to withdraw the purchase-money from Court, on the ground that he had subsequently discovered that only an eight-twelfth share of the house had been sold to him, and that he had been misled in the purchase by misrepresentation contained in the conditions of sale and the abstract of title. *Held*, that, although there was no fraud on the part of the vendor, he knew, or had the means of knowing, that the sixteen-annas share of the property could not be sold, and, if the purchaser's allegations were true, the Court would not enforce the contract. **Lachlan v. Reynolds, Kay's Rep. 52; M'Culloch v. Gregory, 1 Kay & Johnson, 286; Thomas v. Powell, 2 Cox 394; Else v. Else, L. R. 13 Eq. 196; and In re Banister, Broad v. Munton, 12 Ch. Div. 131**, referred to. *Held*, also, that, in the case of a purchase of a dwelling-house, it is impossible to compensate a person in respect of such a material misstatement, and the Court must either enforce the contract or rescind the sale. It is different in the case of land, occupied for agricultural or such like purposes, where there is a deficiency in area. *Ordered*: that it be referred to the Registrar to inquire and report whether a title can be made to the property by the vendor. Further hearing adjourned until the return of the report. **UPENDRA NATH MITER v. OBHOY KALI DASSI (1901)**

**5 C. W. N. 593**

**REGISTRAR OF MAHOMEDAN MARRIAGE.**

**Registration—Divorce—Mahomedan marriage—Evidence.** Where one *X*, by personating *P* before the Mahomedan Registrar of Marriages, obtained the registration of *P*'s divorce from his wife, and the appellant identified *X* as *P* before the Registrar:—*Held*, that the appellant was not guilty of an offence under s. 199 of the Penal Code, inasmuch as the Registrar was not



**REGISTRAR OF MAHOMEDAN MARRIAGE—concl'd.**

bound or authorized by law to receive his statement in evidence: but whether he was guilty of an offence under s. 414 of the Penal Code would depend chiefly on whether he knew that X was not P or had no knowledge whether he was P or not. *Held*, that the Judge had fairly put the evidence on this point to the jury. *YASIN SHEIKH v. EMPEROR* (1905) . . . . . 9 C. W. N. 69

**REGISTRAR OF SMALL CAUSE COURT.**

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—

POWER TO GRANT SANCTION.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 130

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 193

REVOCATION OF SANCTION.

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 130

**REGISTRAR OR SUB-REGISTRAR.**

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1877, ss. 57-84.

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—WHERE SANCTION IS NECESSARY OR OTHERWISE.

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 154

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 3; 500

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 36

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 201

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 138

I. L. R. 15 All. 141

offence committed before—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODES, ss. 480, 481, 482 . . . . . 13 B. L. R. Ap. 40

**REGISTRATION.**

See DEED—EXECUTION. 6 C. W. N. 329

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—SECONDARY EVIDENCE—UNSTAMPED OR UNREGISTERED DOCUMENTS. I. L. R. 11 All. 13

See GIFT . . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 584

See LEASE . . . I. L. R. 30 All. 82

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 610

See MORTGAGE. I. L. R. 29 Bom. 199

See OUDH ESTATES ACT (I OF 1869), s. 13.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 468; 556

See REGISTRATION ACT.

I. L. R. 27 All. 307; 305; 392; 564

See REGISTRATION ACT (III OF 1877), s. 35.

I. L. R. 26 All. 57

See SALE CERTIFICATE.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 614

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882,

s. 54 . . . I. L. R. 31 All. 612

See VALUATION OF SUITS.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1133

See WILL . . . 10 C. W. N. 521

effect of—

See DEED—PROOF OF GENUINENESS.

15 W. R. 15; 305

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 903

**REGISTRATION—concl'd.**

effect of—concl'd.

See HINDU LAW—GIFT—REQUISITES FOR GIFT . . . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 464

See MORTGAGE—SALE OF MORTGAGED PROPERTY—PURCHASERS.

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—MORTGAGES, SUITS CONCERNING.

I. L. R. 13 All. 432

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT—REVOCATION.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 265

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1877—

ss. 49 AND 50.

s. 50.

s. 50 AND s. 17.

See VENDOR AND PURCHASER—NOTICE.

non-validity of unregistered lease—

See COMPROMISE—COMPROMISE OF SUITS UNDER CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE.

7 C. W. N. 90

of divorce—

See REGISTRAR OF MAHOMEDAN MARRIAGE. 9 C. W. N. 69

of kobala—

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 54. 13 C. W. N. 692

of land—

See LAND REGISTRATION ACT, 1876 (BEN. ACT VII OF 1876).

suit to enforce—

See REGISTRATION.

I. L. R. 29 All. 284

See REGISTRATION ACT (III OF 1877), s. 77 . . . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 532

I. L. R. 29 All. 284

whether it amounts to notice—

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 3—“NOTICE” . . . 7 C. W. N. 1

1. ——— Beng. Reg. XXXVI of 1793, s. 17—*Document registered by Kazi*. This Regulation did not apply to registration by Kazis. *SREEMUNT KOWAR v. AKBUR MUNDUL*

8 W. R. 438

2. ——— Mad. Reg. XVII of 1802, s. 3—*Instrument of hypothecation*. An instrument of hypothecation is a mortgage instrument, and may as such be registered under Regulation XVII of 1802, s. 3. *KADARSA RAUTAN v. RAVIAH BIBI*

2 Mad. 108

3. ——— Notice of prior incumbrance—*Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 81—Marshalling of security*. Registration of a sale or mortgage is in itself notice to subsequent purchasers or mortgagees. This doctrine is as applicable since the introduction of the Transfer of



**REGISTRATION—concl'd.**

Property Act (IV of 1882) as it was before. *DINA v. NATHU* (1902) . I. L. R. 26 Bom. 538

4. — **Deed of compromise—How far compromises in suits exempted from.** A razinamah does not require registration only in regard to such of its stipulation and provisions as are incorporated with and given effect to by the order of the Judge. The provisions of the Registration Act will apply to terms in the razinamah, which are not so incorporated. *Pranal Anni v. Lakshmi Anni*, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 508, followed. *PATHA MUTHAMMAL v. ESUP ROWTHER* (1906) . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 365

5. — **Suit to compel registration—Indian Registration Act (III of 1877), ss. 76 and 77—Registration—Grounds of such suit.** Where a Registrar refused to register document presented to him upon the grounds that there was not sufficient proof that the document was executed by the authority of the alleged executant and that there was undue and unexplained delay in presenting the document for registration, it was held that a suit would lie under s. 77 of the Indian Registration Act, 1877, to compel registration. Held, also, that in a suit under s. 77 of the Registration Act, the Court is only concerned with the genuineness of the document sought to be registered and not with its validity. *Kudrathi Begum v. Najib-un-nissa*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 93, and *Raj Lakhi Ghose v. Debendra Chandra Majumdar*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 668, referred to. *KANHAYA LAL v. SARDAR SINGH* (1907)

I. L. R. 29 All. 284

6. — **Deed of gift—Gift of immoveable property—Acceptance of the gift—Registration of the deed subsequent to acceptance—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 121 and 122.** A gift of immoveable property duly made and accepted is not invalid merely because the registration of the deed of gift took place after the death of the donor. *Nand Kishore Lal v. Suraj Prasad*, I. L. R. 20 All. 392, followed. On registration the deed of gift would operate as from the date of execution. *KHASHABA v. CHANDRABHAGABAI* (1908)

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 441

7. — **Mortgage decree, assignment of.** A mortgage decree for R100 or more is assignable without registration. *RAM RATAN CHUCKERBUTTY v. JOGESH CHUNDRA BHATTACHARJEE* (1907)

12 C. W. N. 625

**REGISTRATION ACT (XIX OF 1843).**

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1877, s. 50.

1. — s. 2—"Satisfied," meaning of. Held, that the term "satisfied," as used in s. 2, Act XIX of 1843, did not merely signify that the mortgage-money might be realized by sale, but that all the stipulations of the mortgage-deed were to be performed, and its terms and conditions fulfilled. *PURSIDH NARAIN RAI v. MAHOMED SHOOKOOL HURQ* . 1 N. W. 38 : Ed. 1873, 35

2. — **Construction—Mortgages—Deed of sale—Deed tainted by fraud.**

**REGISTRATION ACT (XIX OF 1843)—concl'd.**

s. 2—concl'd.

The words, "any knowledge or notice of any such unregistered deed or certificate alleged to be had by any party to such registered deed or certificate notwithstanding," in s. 2, Act XIX of 1843, referred not only to the mortgages and certificates mentioned in that part of the section which immediately precedes these words, but extended also to the deeds of sale or gift which were mentioned in the earlier part of the section. The words "provided its authenticity be established to the satisfaction of the Court" in the same section pointed not merely at the exclusion of a forged deed from the benefit of the Act, but also of a deed tainted by fraud, although in other respects genuine. *SREENATH BHATTACHARJEE v. RAM COMUL GANGOOLY*

3 W. R. P. C. 43 : 10 Moo. I. A. 220

3. — **Construction—Effect of registration.** The words in Act XIX of 1843, "provided its authenticity be established to the satisfaction of the Code," were introduced in order to prevent any supposition that registration would give to a merely fictitious transaction any effect which it would not otherwise possess. *NARASANNA v. GAVAPPA* . 3 Mad. 270

**REGISTRATION ACT (XVI OF 1864).**

s. 13—

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1877, s. 17.

— and ss. 17 and 68—**Admissibility in evidence—Priority of registered over unregistered deed.** A deed creating an interest in immoveable property exceeding in value R100 executed prior to 1st January 1865 was not affected by Act XVI of 1864, s. 13, although it might have been registered under s. 17. All former Acts and Regulations having been repealed except in respect of registered instruments, an unregistered deed creating an interest in immoveable property exceeding in value R100 executed prior to 1st January 1865 was not, by any provision of Act XVI of 1864, postponed to a registered instrument executed subsequently to that date. *CHUTTERDHAREE MISSER v. NURSINGH DUTT SOOKOOL*

3 Agra 371

Agra F. B. Ed. 1874, 163

S. 13 did not apply to deeds executed before 1st January 1865, and s. 17 contained no penalty for non-registration. *BAM SOONDUREE DOSSIA v. MADHUB CHUNDER GOOHOO* . 8 W. R. 269

s. 15—

See PLEADER—REMUNERATION.

9 W. R. 101

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1877, s. 77.

s. 16—

See PROMISSORY NOTES—FORM OF.

6 B. L. R. Ap. 40



**REGISTRATION ACT (XVI OF 1864)**  
—concl'd.

s. 17—*Construction—Inducement to register old deeds.* S. 17, Act XVI of 1864, did not say that deeds executed prior to the passing of the Act should not be received as evidence in Courts. It was intended merely to encourage parties to register old deeds at once. *KAROO LALL THAKOOR v. DHOONAL MUNDUL* . . . . . 8 W. R. 86

## s. 29—

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1877, ss. 34, 35.

s. 51—*Record of agreement by Registrar—Signature of Registrar.* S. 51, Act XVI of 1864, did not require a Registrar to record the agreement there spoken of entirely with his own hand. The signature of the Registrar was sufficient. *HOBEEBO SOB AIR v. HOSSAIN ALI* . . . . . 5 W. R. S. C. C. Ref. 14

## ss. 51, 52—

See BOND . . . . . 3 Mad. 88  
5 B. L. R. 167

## s. 52—

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSIL—  
JURISDICTION—REGISTRATION ACT.  
4 W. R. S. C. C. Ref. 11

## s. 68—

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1877, s. 50.

**REGISTRATION ACT (XX OF 1866).**

See REGISTRATION ACT, III OF 1877.

## s. 32—

See APPEAL—ACTS—REGISTRATION ACT.  
6 B. L. R. 578 note

## ss. 52 and 53—

See APPEAL—ACTS—REGISTRATION ACT.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 178 (1859,  
s. 22) . . . . . 18 W. R. 512  
I. L. R. 10 Calc. 196  
I. L. R. 5 Bom. 673  
I. L. R. 1 All. 586

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 179 (1871,  
ART. 167)—LAW APPLICABLE TO APPLI-  
CATION FOR EXECUTION.

I. L. R. 1 All. 586

See MORTGAGE—SALE OF MORTGAGED  
PROPERTY—MONEY-DECREES ON MORT-  
GAGES.

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1871, s. 2.  
6 Mad. 351

See RES JUDICATA—CAUSES OF ACTION.  
14 B. L. R. 408  
8 B. L. R. Ap. 92  
I. L. R. 3 Calc. 363

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—  
JURISDICTION—REGISTRATION ACT.  
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 169  
18 W. R. 199

**REGISTRATION ACT (XX OF 1866)**  
—concl'd.

## ss. 52 and 53—concl'd.

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, PRESIDENCY  
TOWNS—JURISDICTION—REGISTRATION  
ACT . . . . . 6 B. L. R. 177

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—ORDERS  
SUBJECT OR NOT TO APPEAL.

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 401  
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 169

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—  
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 622.

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 401

1. ss. 52, 53, and 54—*Bond for delivery of paddy—Money-bonds.* Ss. 52 to 54. Act XX of 1866. contemplated money-bonds only. A bond for the delivery of paddy without specification of its money value, or of the amount to be paid in case of non-delivery, could not be summarily enforced under s. 53 of that law. *JADEB MUNDUL v. BISHOO SIRDAR* . . . . . 15 W. R. 369

2. Bonds hypothecating immoveable property. Bonds containing hypothecation of immoveable property were not excluded from the provisions of ss. 52 and 53 of Act XX of 1866. *GOBIND SHUNKERJEE v. GIRDHAREE SINGH* . . . . . 1 N. W. 90 : Ed. 1873, 142

*WOOMA CHURN MOOKERJEE v. HURRY CHURN BOSE* . . . . . 11 W. R. 60

3. Bond—*Instalment.* A bond, payable by instalment stipulated that, in case of default in payment of two successive instalments, the whole amount secured should become due. Held, that a petition in a summary way could not be presented under s. 53 of Act XX of 1866. *In the matter of the INDIAN REGISTRATION ACT, 1866. In the matter of LACHMIPAT SING DUGAR ROY* . . . . . 2 B. L. R. O. C. 151 : 11 W. R. O. C. 24

*VENITHITHAN CHETTY v. MOOTHIROOLANDI CHETTY* . . . . . 6 Mad. 4

*GRISH CHUNDER CHOWDHRY v. KRISTO SOON-  
DUR SANDYAL* . . . . . 14 W. R. 277

4. Bond payable by instalments—*Agreement that on non-payment of interest amount of bond should become due.* A bond payable two years after date contained a stipulation that in case of default being made in payment of interest on the principal sum secured, the principal sum, with interest up to the due date of the bond, should at once become payable. The bond was specially registered under s. 52 of the Registration Act, 1866. Held, that such an agreement did not come strictly within the words of ss. 52 and 53 of the Act, and could not therefore be summarily enforced by petition under s. 53. *In the matter of the petition of GANPUT MANIKJI PATIL* . . . . . 6 Bom. O. C. 64

5. Summary application—*Representative of obligee.* The summary remedy under s. 53 of the Registration Act, 1866, was made applicable only as between the immediate



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ss. 52, 53, and 54—contd.

parties to the registered obligation. Such remedy therefore could not be enforced by the representative of an obligee. *In the matter of the petition of SUBBUVIYAN* . . . **4 Mad. 233**

RAMNARAIN DOSS BISWAS *v.* SREEMUNTH PODDAR . . . **9 W. R. 498**

Nor by an assignee of the bond. GAUR MOHUN DASS *v.* RAMRUP MAZOOMDAR **1 B. L. R. A. C. 42**  
**10 W. R. 84**

6. ————— *Proceeding against heirs of obligor.* An agreement recorded on a bond or obligation under s. 52, Act XX of 1866, binds the obligor only, and not his heirs, who cannot be summarily called upon to shew cause, why a decree should not be passed against them. RAM NARAIN DOSS BISWAS *v.* SREEMUNTH PODDAR. **9 W. R. 498**

7. ————— *Procedure—Summoning defendant.* In cases of application to the Court under s. 53 of the Registration Act (XX of 1866), the Court ought not to summon the defendant, but the applicant was entitled to a decree merely on production of the obligation and the record duly signed. KRISTO KISHORE GHOSE *v.* BROJONATH MOOZOOMDAR. **6 W. R. Civ. Ref. 11**

So with his personal representative. PUDIYA-PORAYIL MAMY *v.* MADAKARATH AMMAN KUTTI **3 Mad. 199**

BOISTUB CHURN DIGPUTTY *v.* GOBIND PERSHAD TEWAREE . . . **13 W. R. 203**

And so with a partner. The petitioner was held to be only entitled to a decree against the partner who actually signed the note and special agreement. *In the matter of the petition of* BAKATRAM BADRINATH . . . **6 Bom. O. C. 131**

8. ————— *Application to enforce bond—Copy of obligation and record.* In an application to a Small Cause Court, under s. 53, Act XX of 1866, to enforce the agreement recorded by the registering officer under s. 52 on the bond:—*Held*, that the applicant would be entitled to a decree only on production of the original obligation and of the record signed, but not on a copy of the same. SREERAM ROY CHOWDHRY *v.* KOLEMOOD-DEE MOLLAH . . . **9 W. R. 477**

9. ————— *Application to enforce mortgage-bond—Money-decree.* The obligee of a simple mortgage-bond was only entitled, under s. 53, Act XX of 1866, to a money-decree. AKHE RAM *v.* NAND KISHORE . . . **1 I. L. R. 1 All. 236**

10. ————— *Decree on mortgage-bond—Enforcement of lien.* A decree obtained under the summary procedure prescribed by the Registration Act, 1866, could be for money only, and not the enforcement of a lien. JUGGUN NATH *v.* KOMAL SINGH . . . **3 N. W. 123**

ASMA BIBEE *v.* RAM KANT ROY CHOWDHRY **19 W. R. 251**

# REGISTRATION ACT (XX OF 1866) —contd.

ss. 52, 53, and 54—contd.

GRISH CHUNDER CHOWDHRY *v.* KRISTO SOONDUR SANDYAL . . . **14 W. R. 277**

BOISTUB CHURN DIGPUTTY *v.* GOBIND PERSHAD TEWAREE . . . **13 W. R. 203**

11. ————— *Form of decree on obligation enforceable under Act.* The only jurisdiction given to the Court under s. 53 Act XX of 1866, so far as the terms of the decree are concerned was to give a decree for the sum mentioned in the obligation, with interest and costs. A prayer for a declaration of right to sell property pledged by the obligation cannot be given. RAJMOHUN MOOKERJEE *v.* NIL MONEE MITTER . . . **11 W. R. 222**

Nor any declaration against the property pledged nor to make the sureties of the bond liable. POORNOO CHUNDER GHOSE *v.* GOBIND CHUNDER MOOKERJEE . . . **22 W. R. 28**

12. ————— *Suit for instalments due more than a year before suit.* In a suit on a bond registered under s. 53, Act XX of 1866, one instalment of which had fallen due more than a year before the institution of the suit, the plaintiff sued for that instalment, and also included another instalment which he might have recovered in a summary way. The Judge came to the conclusion on the evidence that the bond had not been executed by the defendant, nor duly registered. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not entitled to waive the first instalment and get a decree for the second, as if he had enforced the summary remedy on the bond. DHUNUNJOY GHOSE *v.* BEMAL DHARA BAGDEE **17 W. R. 514**

13. ————— *Decree on bond—Interest.* No sum as interest from the date of decree to the date of realization could be awarded by a decree under s. 53, Act XX of 1866: a decree under that section could only award a sum not exceeding that mentioned in the bond, together with interest at the rate specified (if any) to the date of decree, and a sum for costs to be fixed by the Court. MAHCUM CHUND *v.* MAHTAB . . . **3 Agra 318**

BHAIRO SINGH *v.* BECHOO . . . **3 Agra 393**

14. ————— *Bond specially registered—Interest.* Where a bond was specially registered under the provisions of Act XX of 1866, the creditor was entitled, on observing the procedure there prescribed, unmarily to have a decree for the amount specified including interest up to the date of such decree. If the creditor intended to secure interest at the rate stipulated after suit and decree it was not enough to insert the customary phrase "date of realization" in the instrument, as such phrase must be held controlled by other parts of the agreement as expressed in the bond. ADUR MONEE DEBIA *v.* KOULO CHUNDER CHATTERJEE **21 W. R. 140**

15. ————— *Effect of decree on registered bond.* A decree under s. 53 of Act XX of 1866 had all the effect of a decree in a regular suit



**REGISTRATION ACT (XX OF 1866)**  
—*concl'd.*ss. 52, 53, and 54—*concl'd.*under the Code of Civil Procedure. **GUNGA NARAIN CHATTERJEE v. RADHA KRISHNA DUTT.**

25 W. R. 322

16. ——— and s. 55—*Specially registered bond—Setting aside of summary decree.* A decree obtained by the plaintiff upon a specially registered bond under s. 53 of Act XX of 1866, and set aside under s. 55 of that Act, *held* not to bar a regular suit upon the bond. **UTSHAB NARAYAN CHOWDHRY v. CHITTRA RAKA GUPTA**

8 B. L. R. Ap. 92

S.C. OOTSHUB NARAIN CHOWDHRY v. CHITTRA RECKA GOOPTA . . . . .

17 W. R. 154

17. ——— *Bond—Appeal.* A petition for payment of a bond which had been specially registered under Act XVI of 1864, was presented on the 3rd April 1866. *Held*, that it must be considered as having been presented under s. 53 of Act XX of 1866 by virtue of the 3rd section of that Act, which repealed Act XVI of 1864; consequently the decision of the Principal Sudder Ameen, to whom the petition was presented, was, under s. 55 of Act XX of 1866, final. There could be no appeal from that decision; therefore the Judge had no jurisdiction to reverse the Principal Sudder Ameen's decision. **GRISH CHUNDER DUTT v. BUZLU-L-HUQ**

3 B. L. R. A. C. 68 : 11 W. R. 41<sub>2</sub>

s. 55—

See APPEAL—ACTS—REGISTRATION ACT.

18 W. R. 512

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 511

23 W. R. 328

24 W. R. 225

I. L. R. 1 All. 377

See MANAGER OF ATTACHED PROPERTY.

15 W. R. 477

1. ——— *Setting aside or staying execution of decree.* Under s. 55, Act XX of 1866, the Court might after decree, on a representation by the judgment-debtor, set aside the decree, and stay or set aside execution. **KRISTO KISHORE GHOSE v. BROJONATH MOZOOMDAR**

6 W. R. Civ. Ref. 1

2. ——— *Suit to set aside decree on registered bond—Grounds for setting aside decree under s. 55, Act XX of 1866.* Decrees on two specially registered bonds were obtained against plaintiff under s. 53 of the Registration Act (XX of 1866). He petitioned the Civil Court, under s. 55, to set aside these decrees, on the ground that the bonds were executed on consideration of something to be done by the obligee, who had wholly failed to perform his part. The Judge dismissed the petitions, because he thought the matter was a more proper one for investigation in a regular suit. His successor dismissed the suit when brought, because, in his opinion, it did not lie. *Held* on appeal (by the majority of the Court), that no suit lay. The effect of ss. 52 to 55 was to make a decree

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**REGISTRATION ACT (XX OF 1866)**  
—*concl'd.*s. 55—*concl'd.*

under them of precisely the same validity as any other decree to make it enforceable by the same process, but to render it impeachable on the special grounds referred to in s. 55. *Held*, also, that the matters alleged were not such as, if proved, would have justified the setting aside of the decree. The special circumstances must be such as to show a vice in the mode in which the contract to submit to decree and the special registration were obtained, and an infirmity in the original obligation will not do. **SINIA TEVAR v. RANGASAMI AIYANGER**

7 Mad. 112

3. ——— *Right to sue to cancel deed and enforce it.* The powers conferred on the Court under the Registration Act, 1866, for enforcement by process of execution of the payment of a bond are not inconsistent with the right to sue to cancel and annul the deed as fraudulent. **SREE- RAM v. HOKOOM SINGH . . . . .**

2 N. W. 467

The summary procedure provided for in ss. 52 to 55 of this Act has been omitted in the latter Acts.

s. 66—

See ADMISSION—MISCELLANEOUS CASES.

15 W. R. 280

ss. 83 and 84—

See APPEAL—ACTS—REGISTRATION ACT.

6 B. L. R. 578 note

7 W. R. 130

s. 84—

See APPEAL—ACTS—REGISTRATION ACT.

3 Bom. A. C. 104

8 W. R. 266

9 W. R. 122

See PLEADER—REMUNERATION.

7 Bom. A. C. 132

s. 91—

See JURY—JURY IN SESSIONS CASES.

14 W. R. Cr. 32

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—REGISTRATION ACT, 1866.

5 Bom. Cr. 7

s. 93—

See FALSE PERSONATION.

7 W. R. Cr. 99

2 B. L. R. A. Cr. 25

s. 94—

See SENTENCE—GENERAL CASES.

8 W. R. Cr. 16

s. 95—

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—REGISTRATION ACT, 1866.

5 Bom. Cr. 7

**REGISTRATION ACT (VIII OF 1871).**

See GENERAL CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT, s. 6 . . . . .

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 536

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 727

14 y



**REGISTRATION ACT (VIII OF 1871)**  
—concl'd.

See LIMITATION—STATUTES OF LIMITATION  
—LIMITATION ACT, 1871, ART. 168.

24 W. R. 372

See REGISTRATION ACT, 1877.

s. 2—*Stamps on petitions under s. 53, Registration Act, 1866—Court Fees Act, 1870, Sch. I, Art. 3.* The effect of the first and fourth clauses of s. 2 of the Registration Act of 1871, read with the provision in the first schedule as to the extent of the repeal of Act VII of 1870, was to keep in force all the provisions of Act XX of 1866 relating to the procedure for the recovery in a summary way of the amount of an obligation upon agreements recorded under s. 52 of that Act before the 1st day of July 1871. *PACHAIPERUMAL CHETTI v. SAVAYYAR AUDONI KURUSU RAVVEL*  
6 Mad. 351

[The sections of this Act correspond substantially with those of the present Act III of 1877, under which therefore the cases will be found.]

s. 76—

See APPEAL—RIGHT OF APPEAL, EFFECT OF REPEAL ON . I. L. R. 3 Calc. 727

s. 80—

See SENTENCE—IMPRISONMENT—IMPRISONMENT GENERALLY 18 W. R. Cr. 3

**REGISTRATION ACT (III OF 1877).**

See APPEAL—RIGHT OF APPEAL, EFFECT OF REPEAL ON . I. L. R. 3 Calc. 727

See CHARGE . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 854

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT XIV OF 1882), s. 375 . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 867

See COMPROMISE . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 867

See COURT-FEES ACT, s. 7 (4), ART. 17 (6).  
I. L. R. 31 Mad. 89

See LEASE . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 502

See POWER OF ATTORNEY.  
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 854

See SALE CERTIFICATE.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 614

Operation of Act. The provisions of Act III of 1877 apply to all documents tendered in evidence on or after 1st April 1877. *RAJU BALU v. KRISHNARAV RAMCHANDRA*

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 273

But see *OGHRA SINGH v. ABLAKH KOOR*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 536

s. 3—

See post, s. 28 . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 50

1. s. 3 (1871, s. 3)—Lease. The expression "an undertaking to cultivate or occupy," used in s. 3 of Act VIII of 1871 in defining the word "lease," means an accepted undertaking giving to the lessee a right or interest in the thing left. *APU BUDGAVDA v. NARIHARI ANNAJEE*

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 21

**REGISTRATION ACT (III OF 1877)**  
—cont'd.

s. 3—cont'd.

2. (1866, s. 2)—Moveable property—Trees. Trees are to be held moveable property for the special purposes of the Registration Act, but they are not ordinarily so regarded in Indian Acts. *CHOWDHRY ROOSTUM ALI v. DHANDOO* . . . 3 Agra 157

3. Lease to take juice from date trees. The right to take juice from date trees is not, according to s. 2, Act XX of 1866, a right to immoveable property, but falls under the definition of moveable property. *JALU NAMDAR v. BEICHA NAMDAR* . . . 3 B. L. R. A. C. 394

S.C. JANOO MUNDUR v. HUCHA MUNDUR  
12 W. R. 366

4. (1866, s. 3)—Timber—Standing timber—Mango tree—Custom of a locality. By the term "timber" is meant properly such trees only as are fit to be used in building and repairing houses. A mango tree, which is primarily a fruit tree, might not always come within the term "standing timber" used in the definition of immoveable property in s. 3 of the Registration Act (XX of 1866), but it may be classed as a timber tree where, according to the custom of a locality, its wood is used in building houses. *KRISHNARAO v. BABAJI* . . . I. L. R. 24 Bom. 31

5. and s. 84—District Court—Jurisdiction of High Court, North-West Provinces. For the purposes of Act XX of 1866, "District Court" meant "the principal Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and included the High Court in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction." The High Court of the North-West Provinces, which has no ordinary original civil jurisdiction was not a "District Court" to which a petition might be presented under s. 84 of the Act, and an order passed by that Court on such a petition directing the registration of a deed, was made without jurisdiction. *MUKHUN LALL PANDAY v. KOONDUN LALL* 15 B. L. R. P. C. 228 : 24 W. R. 75  
L. R. 2 I. A. 210

6. District Court—Jurisdiction of High Court. Where the property, the subject of a deed presented for registration, was without the jurisdiction of the High Court, but the order of refusal was made by the Registrar General, who was within such jurisdiction :—*Held*, the High Court was the District Court under s. 84 of Act XX of 1866 to which the petition should be made. *In the matter of the INDIAN REGISTRATION ACT (XX OF 1866). In the matter of WYNDHAM*  
6 B. L. R. 576

7. District Court—Regulation provinces. The Registration Act of 1871 gives power to the Government to appoint districts and sub-districts for the purposes of registration; but the "District Courts" mentioned in the Act (except where the High Court, when exercising its local jurisdiction, is said to be a District Court within the meaning of the Act) must, in the



**REGISTRATION ACT (III OF 1877)**  
—*contd.*s. 3—*concl'd.*

case of a regulation province, be taken to import the ordinary Zillah Courts. *In the matter of the petition of ABDULLAH REASUT HOSSEIN v. ABDULLA* . I. L. R. 2 Calc. 131  
26 W. R. 50; L. R. 3 I. A. 221

## ss. 3, 17—

See REGISTRATION.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 502

1. ———— *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 107—Immoveable property—Definition—Lease of right to receive market dues.* Held, that the right to collect market dues upon a given piece of land is a benefit to arise out of land within the purview of s. 3 of the Registration Act, 1877. A lease, therefore, of such right for a period of more than one year must be made by registered instrument. *SIKANDAR v. BAHADUR* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 462

2. ———— *Lease—Agreement to lease—Amalnama—Evidence, admissibility of—Ejectment—Right to possess.* By certain unregistered *amalnamas* tenable for nine years the landlord agreed that upon the defendant fulfilling certain conditions mentioned in the *amalnama* during that period, he would grant a lease to the defendant. No lease was, however, granted in the terms of the *amalnamas* and the defendant was allowed to hold on the lands for eleven years, after the expiration of the nine years, upon payment of rent. In a suit for ejectment:—Held, that there being no absolute agreement on the part of the landlord to lease the lands, the *amalnamas*, though unregistered, were admissible in evidence, and that the defendant had such an interest in the property as would disentitle the plaintiff to eject him as a trespasser. *Syed Sufdar Reza v. Amjad Ali*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 703, distinguished. *DWARKA NATH SAHA v. LEDU SIKDAR* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 502

## ss. 6 to 14, 69, 84—

See PUBLIC SERVANT.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 664

s. 7—*Registration of mortgage—Interest in land—Right to redeem immoveable property mortgaged—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 59.* Two documents were produced in evidence, one of which was in terms an absolute sale. This document had been registered. The other document (which was not dated) had apparently been written contemporaneously with the first, but it had not been registered. This document purported to show that the transaction between the parties was a mortgage. Held, that the second document could not be received as evidence of a mortgage transaction not below R100, and that the registration of the first document, which was on the face of it an absolute and unconditional sale, could not be regarded or operate as the registration of a mortgage. Though there is nothing to prevent the whole of a mortgage transaction being reduced in any form to

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—*contd.*s. 7—*concl'd.*

writing on different papers, whether attached together or detached, yet the requirements as to registration cannot be said to have been complied with, if some of such papers are registered, while others are left unregistered. A document, which gives a person a right to redeem a mortgage on immoveable property on payment of money creates an interest in immoveable property and its registration is compulsory under s. 7 of the Registration Act. *MUTHA VENKATACHELAPATI v. PYANDA VENKATACHELAPATI* (1904) I. L. R. 27 Mad. 348

s. 17 (1864, s. 13; 1866, s. 17; 1871, s. 17)—

See post, s. 18.

See post, s. 28 . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 654

See post, ss. 49, 50 AND 17.

See EVIDENCE—PAROL EVIDENCE—VARYING OR CONTRADICTING WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS . . . I. L. R. 29 I. A. 138

See INSOLVENCY ACT (11 AND 12 VICT., C. 21), s. 23 . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 659

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—TRANSFER BY TENANT . . . 6 C. W. N. 916

See LIMITATION ACT (XV OF 1877), ss. 19, 22 . . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 613

1. ———— *Operation of section—Document not registrable under Registration Act (XX of 1866), but requiring registration under Act III of 1877—Immoveable property—Hereditary allowance attached to office of Desai—Deed of gift of such property.* S. 17 of the Registration Act, III of 1877, should not be construed as requiring a document to be registered which would not have required registration when it was executed. *Raju Balu v. Krishnara*, I. L. R. 2 Bom. 273, distinguished. An instrument which did not require registration under Act XX of 1866 is not inadmissible in evidence by reason of Act III of 1877. Dues incidental to an office such as that of a Desai, which is capable of being held by a person other than a Hindu, were not immoveable property when Registration Act XX of 1866 was enacted. *DESAI MOTILAL MANGALJI v. DESAI PARSHOTAM NANDLAL* . . . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 92

2. ———— *Kabuliyat—Act XVI of 1864, s. 13.* Neither s. 17 of Act III of 1877 nor the similar sections of the preceding Acts had the effect of rendering a document, which was not compulsorily registrable under Act XVI of 1864, inadmissible in evidence under the succeeding Acts without registration. *RAM KOOMAR SINGH v. KISHARI* . I. L. R. 9 Calc. 68; 11 C. L. R. 318

3. ———— *Document executed before Act XVI of 1864 came into operation—Hibbanama.* A hibbanama executed before Act XVI of 1864 came into operation was admissible as evidence, though not registered. S. 13 did not apply to deeds executed before 1st January 1865, and s. 17 contained no penalty for non-registration.



# REGISTRATION ACT (III OF 1877) —contd.

## s. 17—contd.

BAMA SOONDUREE DOSIA v. MADHUB CHUNDER GOOHOO . . . . . 8 W. R. 269

4. ————— *Kabuliat executed when registration was unnecessary.* An unregistered kabuliat is not inadmissible as evidence if it was executed at a time when the law did not require registration. SHEO RAM SINGH v. SEWAK RAM . . . . . 20 W. R. 83

5. ————— and s. 49—*Registration Act, 1871, s. 17—Decree—Instrument—Admissibility in evidence.* A decree by which immoveable property was charged did not need Registration under s. 17 of the Registration Act, 1871, in order to make it admissible in evidence under s. 49. Such decrees are now expressly excluded by s. 17, Registration Act, 1877. PURMANANDAS JIWANDAS v. VALLABDAS WALLJI . . . . . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 506

6. ————— cl. (a)—*Deed of gift—Immoveable property.* All instruments of gift of immoveable property must be registered, whatever be the value of the property. PUTONA KOLITA v. MUTIA KOLITA . . . . . 2 B. L. R. Ap. 46

S.C. PROTONA KOLITA v. MOTTEA KOLITA . . . . . 11 W. R. 334

7. ————— *Judicial Proceedings—Petitions—Pleadings—Order by Court, etc.*—S. 17 of the Registration Act III of 1877 does not apply to proper judicial proceedings, whether consisting of pleadings filed by the parties or orders made by the Court. BINDESI NAIK v. GANGA SARAN SAHU . . . . . I. L. R. 20 All. 171

L. R. 25 I. A. 9  
2 C. W. N. 129

8. ————— *Unregistered agreement incorporated into a judicial proceeding.* A prior suit between the same parties, now contesting the right to part of an ancestral estate, claimed another part of the same estate, without comprising the lands now in suit, which, at the time when the first suit was brought, were outstanding under a mortgage. A decree had been made by consent excluding the lands now sued for. The defendant's case was that the lands now claimed together with those decreed by consent, had been made the subject of a compromise of which the terms had been stated in two written agreements not registered. Also that, according to the compromise, each of the parties was to take a moiety of the whole estate. Each had obtained possession; but the decree was limited to the part of the estate for which the prior suit then disposed of, was brought; and only one of the agreements—that one which related to the lands then in suit—was presented to, and accepted by, the Court which made the consent decree. *Held*, that this agreement had a different effect from the other one, as it constituted a step in a judicial proceeding and did not require registration. The order was pronounced in terms of it. But as regarded the lands now in suit, excluded as they had been from the decree in the former suit, the

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## s. 17—contd.

defendant's title to them had been left to stand or fall by the other unregistered document. The latter by the Registration Act, 1877, conferred no title and this defence failed. PRANAI ANNI v. LAKSHMI ANNI . . . . . I. L. R. 22 Mad. 508  
L. R. 26 I. A. 101  
3 C. W. N. 485

9. ————— *Hibba-bil-awaz—Deed of gift—Nominal consideration.* A hibba-bil-awaz, although made on the nominal consideration of "a than of cloth and natural love and affection" is merely a deed of gift, and as such must be registered. GOLAM MOSTOFA v. GOBURDHUN MULLA . . . . . 8 C. L. R. 441

10. ————— cl. (b)—*Determination of necessity for registration.* The necessity for registration must be determined by the value of the consideration stated in the deed. ROHINEE DEBIA v. SHIB CHUNDER CHATTERJEE . . . . . 15 W. R. 558

11. ————— *Computation of value for purposes of registration—Deed of sale—Consideration.* The consideration mentioned in a deed of sale by the parties thereto must be regarded as showing the value of the interest conveyed for the purpose of registration under Act XX of 1866. Rohinee Debia v. Shib Chunder Chatterjee, 15 W. R. 558, followed. VASUDEV MORESHVAR GUNPULE v. RAMA BAAJI DANGE . . . . . 11 Bom. 149

12. ————— *Statement in will—Words not purporting or operating to extinguish an interest in the present or in future—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 32, cl. (6).* S. 17, cl. (b), of the Registration Act (III of 1877) does not render a passage in a will inadmissible in evidence if the words of it do not purport or operate to extinguish an interest in the present or in future, but state only past facts. Such a statement would, if proved, be admissible also under s. 32, cl. (6), of the Indian Evidence Act (I of 1872). CHAMANBU JAVJE MAHOMED ALI BHORI v. MULTANCHAND SHIVRAM . . . . . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 562

13. ————— *Assignment of mortgage—Consideration—Stamp.* A executed to B an assignment of a mortgage. It was stamped with a stamp of R168, and recited that B had instituted a suit against C to recover R3,000, interest and costs, and that an agreement had been come to between B and C; that on C getting A to execute the assignment of the mortgage, and on his paying R500, the suit should be dismissed and settled. It further recited that R5,000 was due to A on the mortgage, and that A had, at C's request agreed to assign it to B. By the operative part, A, in consideration of R5 paid to A by B and "in consideration of the premises," assigned the mortgage to B. *Held*, that the consideration for the deed of assignment was not merely R5 paid to A, but the assignee's agreement to withdraw the suit if A assigned the mortgage to him upon the instrument; that the money value of the latter part of the consideration was the amount covered by the stamp



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put by the parties themselves ; and as it exceeded R100, the deed of assignment was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration (s. 17 of Act VIII of 1871). **NAGO KANATTURIA v. BABAJI KATARI**  
**I. L. R. 8 Bom. 610**

**14. — Agreement relating to family arrangement—Valuation for purpose of registration.** Where a document was in the nature of a family arrangement, and drawn up mainly for the purpose of settling a widow's maintenance, though some right in immoveable property was created or declared by such instrument, and it was proved that the actual value of the whole of the immoveable property mentioned in the document exceeded R100, but there was no evidence to show that the value of the widow's right exceeded that sum :—*Held*, that, for the purpose of registration under Act XX of 1866, the actual value of the whole immoveable property named in the document must not be taken to be the value of the right so created or declared. **NILAVA KOM RACHAPPA v. RUDRAYA BIN RACHAPPA** . . . **12 Bom. 141**

**15. — Agreement to prevent acquisition of easement—Document not creating, etc., right in immoveable property—Chance of acquiring easement—Immoveable property.** The chance of acquiring a right to light and air is not immoveable property within the meaning of the Registration Act, nor can a pecuniary value be put upon it. A document, therefore, which limits or extinguishes the chance of acquiring such an easement does not require registration. **SULTAN NAWAZ JUNG v. RUSTOMJI NANABHOY**  
**I. L. R. 20 Bom. 704**

**16. — Change of name in Government records—Mortgage or conditional sale—Subsequent agreement to re-transfer land in Government records on payment of debt—Document creating a right in land.** In 1877, the plaintiff, being indebted to the defendant, transferred certain land to the defendant's name in the Government records. In July 1879 the defendant executed the following document to the plaintiff reciting the previous transfer and agreeing to re-transfer the land to the plaintiff's name on the 12th July 1880, if the debt which would then be due should be paid off: "In the village of Berhampur is your (plaintiff's) field, Survey No. 146, measuring 5 acres 3 gunthas, bearing assessment R16. You (plaintiff) have got it transferred to our name. That field therefore stands in our (defendant's) name in the Government records. You owe a debt to us. On account of that debt, you have transferred it to our name. . . . The field shall be re-transferred to your name when you repay the said debt to me. You have cultivated the field for the produce of Samvat 1936, and a lease in respect thereof you have this day passed to me. And a stamp paper was purchased at the time of the transfer for the execution of this agreement, but no agreement was then passed. This

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agreement is therefore this day passed to you when the lease is executed. And you owe me (a) debt bearing interest. I will pay out of my pocket the expenses to be incurred at present in cultivating the field. The debt due to me would in all amount to R100. If you repay all these rupees due to me till the Vaishakh Shudh 6th. Samvat 1936, I will take them and transfer the field to your name. And if you fail to pay (them) till Vaishakh Shudh 4th, you will have no claim whatever to the said field. I shall not take the rupees after the 4th (chauth), nor shall I give (or transfer the field to you. . . . I shall lease the field to any one I like without keeping any claim of you as regards cultivation, manure, and hedge. You have no claim or right whatever. . . . This document was not registered. The plaintiff brought this suit to redeem the land, alleging that it had been mortgaged to the defendant, and that the debt had been paid off. The defendant contended that the transaction in 1877 was not a mortgage, but a sale of the land to him, and that the document of July 1879 was an agreement to resell it to the plaintiff, which was not admissible in evidence, as it was not registered. *Held*, that the document of the 11th July 1879 did not require registration. It created no rights in land, but only amounted to a personal covenant to effect a mutation of names in the Government books when the debt due by the plaintiff was satisfied. **PATEL RANCHOD MORAR v. BHIKABHAI DEVIDAS**  
**I. L. R. 21 Bom. 704**

**17. — Document providing for payment of hereditary allowance—Interest in immoveable property—Registration Act (III of 1877). s. 3—Bombay General Clauses Act (Bom. Act III of 1886).** Plaintiffs sued in the Court of Small Causes at Poona to recover R400 for arrear alleged to be payable to them under an agreement by the defendant's father to pay R150 per annum, of which R50 were for maintenance of plaintiff's mother, and the residue was to be applied towards defraying the expenses of a temple. The terms of the agreement showed that it was intended that the payment for the expenses of the temple should be continued in perpetuity. The Judge dismissed the suit, holding that, being for a hereditary allowance, it was a claim for immoveable property, and came within the meaning of ss. 3 and 17 of the Registration Act, and that the document creating it required registration, and, not being registered, was inadmissible in evidence. On application by the plaintiffs to the High Court under s. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (IX of 1887) :—*Held*, reversing the decree, that the document did not require registration, as it was not an instrument purporting or operating to create or declare an interest in immoveable property within the meaning of s. 17, or create an hereditary allowance in the sense in which that expression is used in s. 3 of the Registration Act. **VISHNU GANESH JOSHI v. YESHVANTRAO** . . . **I. L. R. 21 Bom. 387**



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18. ———— *Bond creating charge on immoveable property—Larger sum payable on contingency.* The words in s. 17 of the Registration Act (VIII of 1871), "present or future," "vested or contingent," point, not to the value or its ascertainment, but to the right or interest in the land which is to be created as a security. If the charge or interest created is of a value less than R100, registration is needless. *NARASAYYA CHETTI GURUVAPPA CHETTI* . . . I. L. R. 1 Mad. 378

19. ———— *Valuation of right, title, and interest created by mortgage.* The value of the right, title, or interest created by a mortgage is estimated by the amount of the principal money thereby secured. The words "or in future" in s. 17 of Act XX of 1866 and s. 17 of Act VIII of 1871 have reference to estates in remainder or in reversion in immoveable property, or to estates otherwise deferred in enjoyment, and not to interest payable in future on principal moneys lent on the security of immoveable property. *NANA BIN LAKSHMAN v. ANANT BABAJI* . . . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 353

20. ———— *Bond creating interest in land—Mode of testing value.* For the purpose of registration, the value of the interest created in immoveable property by a mortgage-bond is that sum by the payment of which the interest could be determined. *TIYAGARAJA PADYACHI v. RAMANUJAM PILLAI* . . . I. L. R. 6 Mad. 422

21. ———— and s. 49—*Mortgage.* The value of the interest created by a mortgage of immoveable property is estimated, for the purposes of the Registration Act of 1871, not by the amount of the principal money thereby secured, but by the amount of such money and the interest payable thereon. Consequently, a bond, dated the 9th August 1873, which charged certain immoveable property with the payment on the 31st May 1874 of R98, and interest thereon at the rate of one per cent. per mensem, should have been registered. *Darshan Singh v. Hanwanta*, I. L. R. 1 All. 274, followed. *Nana bin Lakshman v. Anant Babaji*, I. L. R. 2 Bom. 353, differed from. *RAJPATI SINGH v. RAM SUKHI KUAR* . . . I. L. R. 2 All. 40

22. ———— *Bond hypothecating immoveable property.* The registration of a bond hypothecating immoveable property to secure the repayment of R95-14-0, with interest at eighteen per cent. per annum, the principal to be paid in four annual instalments, three of R23-5-4, and the fourth of R25-14-0, and the whole of the interest to be paid on the date of the last instalment, without any provision that the debtor should be at liberty to anticipate the payment of any instalment, is compulsory, inasmuch as the lowest sum which the debtor could compel the creditor to accept is in excess of R100. The proper test for determining the value of the interest created by a mortgage for the purpose of registration is the amount of the least sum recoverable, and not the consideration for the bond. Although an unregistered mortgage

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bond which creates an interest in land in excess of R100 is of no effect as a mortgage, it may be received as evidence of the personal obligation. *Seshathri Ayyengar v. Sankara Ayyen*, 7 Mad. 296, followed. *KATTAMURI JAGAPPA v. PADALU LATCHAPPA* . . . I. L. R. 5 Mad. 119

23. ———— *Bond creating interest in immoveable property.* The registration of a deed which does not necessarily create an interest in immoveable property of the value of R100 is not compulsory. *Darshan Singh v. Hanwanta*, I. L. R. 1 All. 274, and *Rajpati Singh v. Ram Sukhi Kuar*, I. L. R. 2 All. 40, dissented from. *Nana bin Lakshman v. Anant Babaji*, I. L. R. 2 Bom. 353, and *Narasayya Chetti v. Guruvappa Chetti*, I. L. R. 1 Mad. 380, approved. A bond for R99-8-0 with interest at 12 per cent. per annum, payable twelve months after date, by which immoveable property is hypothecated to secure repayment of the debt need not be registered. *SADAGOPA AYYANGAR v. DORASAMI SASTRI*. . . I. L. R. 5 Mad. 214

24. ———— *Bond creating charge on immoveable property—Mortgage.* A bond which charged immoveable property with the payment on a day specified therein of R99, the principal amount, and R6, interest thereon, should have been registered under the provisions of cl. (b), s. 17, Act VIII of 1871. *DARSHAN SINGH v. HANWANTA*. . . I. L. R. 1 All. 274

*DEOJIT v. PITAMBAR* . . . I. L. R. 1 All. 275

25. ———— *Bond hypothecating immoveable property—Amount together with interest over R100.* A bond which secures by the hypothecation of immoveable property the repayment after four months from the date thereof, of a loan of R96-15-0, with interest at the rate of 12 per cent. per annum, is an instrument requiring to be registered under s. 17 of Act XX of 1866. *DHURMDEO NARAIN SINGH v. NUND LALL SINGH*. . . 6 N. W. 257

26. ———— *Bond under R100—Compulsory registration—Priority—Mortgage-bond.* A mortgage-bond for R99 repayable in nine months and eleven days, with interest at the rate of 2 per cent. per mensem does not require registration, but a registered mortgage-bond for R195, subsequently executed, will have priority over it. *KORBAN ALI MIRDHA v. SHARODA PROSHAD AICH*. . . I. L. R. 10 Calc. 82

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27. ———— *Bond—Principal and interest.* A bond for the payment of R83-8-0 on demand, together with interest thereon at the rate of 2 per cent. per mensem, which charges immoveable property with such payment, does not, though the amount due on it may in time exceed R100, purport to create an interest of the value of R100 within the meaning of the Registration Act



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and its registration is therefore optional. **KARAN SINGH v. RAM LAL** . I. L. R. 2 All. 96

28. ——— and cl. (h)—*Instrument creating a charge in the nature of a mortgage—Admissibility in evidence of documents compulsorily registrable, but unregistered.* A kararnama (agreement), dated 11th day of June 1885, was passed by A to B to the following effect: "As my father S is dead, it has been arranged that I should succeed to his estate . . . . Part of this estate, at Vagoda, consisting of a house, fields, cattle, and a cart, has been given into your possession for use and enjoyment. The reason thereof is that you have undertaken to pay R450 found due on an adjustment of khata from my father to G. I am unable to pay off this debt; and so you have been put into possession of this property. I shall pass to you a sale-deed in respect of this property, and shall transfer the fields to your name from the year 1888-89." *Held*, that the kararnama required registration. It did not fall within the exception provided for by cl. (h) of s. 17 of the Registration Act (III of 1877). It was not a document which merely created a right to demand another document. It created as between the parties to it a charge in the nature of a mortgage. The document of itself declared a right, and the mention of an intention to execute a deed of sale made no difference. An unregistered mortgage-bond for one hundred rupees and upwards may be admissible in evidence to prove the simple debt or a personal obligation, but it is inadmissible in evidence to prove any right to the property affected by it. **VANI v. BANI** . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 553

29. ——— *Document compulsorily registrable—Valuation—Least sum payable—Sum repayable before expiry of stated term—Principal sum without interest.* A charge on certain property to secure R50 was given by the jenmis in favour of defendant No. 1, who held a kanom on the property granted three years previously, containing the following terms: "This amount of R50, together with the customary interest thereon, will be added to the kanom amount when after the expiry of the period of demise of the paramba a renewal is effected or the paramba is caused to be surrendered. The jenmam right over the said paramba has been mortgaged to you for this R50 and the interest thereon. The document was not registered. It was contended that the document was one compulsorily registrable under s. 17 of the Registration Act, 1877, inasmuch as payment under it was postponed for at least nine years (i.e., the balance of the term granted by the kanom) by the end of which period the accumulations of interest would have amounted to R54 in addition to the principal sum of R50, making R104 in all. *Held*, that the document did not contain a clear expression of intention that the sum of R50 was not repayable except at the end of the previous kanom term. Full effect would and could be given to the

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words by construing them to mean no more than that, in the event of the amount remaining unpaid when the kanom became redeemable, the R50 with interest thereon should be treated as if it were part of the kanom amount so as to entitle the appellant to insist on redemption upon payment of such amount in addition to what might be found due under the kanom. That there was nothing in the document to prevent the interest accruing under it from being paid from time to time, even if the unpaid capital were not repaid until the kanom was redeemable. And that the least sum payable being the test as to whether a document is compulsorily registrable, the document need not be registered under s. 17 of the Registration Act, 1877. *Per* O'FARRELL and MICHELL, JJ., that under cl. (b) of s. 17 of the Registration Act, 1877, only the principal amount secured should be taken into consideration. **KUNHI AMMA v. AHMED HAJI** . I. L. R. 23 Mad. 105

30. ——— *Mortgage—Suit on unregistered bond charging immoveable property.* The obligor of a bond hearing date the 20th January 1873 agreed to pay the obligor R80, together with interest on that amount at the rate of 2 per cent. per month, between the 2nd April 1874 and the 1st May 1874, and hypothecated immoveable property as collateral security for such payment. On the 15th February 1879 the obligee sued the obligor on the bond to recover R196-8-0, being the principal amount and interest, from the hypothecated property. *Held*, by the majority of the Full Bench (STUART, C.J. dissenting), that, for the purpose of registration, the value of the right assigned by the bond to the obligee in the property should be estimated by the amount secured for certain by the hypothecation, and, that amount exceeding R100, the bond should have been registered. *Per* STUART, C.J.—That, for that propose, the value of that right should be estimated by the principal amount of the bond, and, that amount being under R100, the bond did not require to be registered. *Nana bin Lakshman v. Anant Babaji*, I. L. R. 2 Bom. 353, and *Narasayya Chetti v. Guruvappa Chetti*, I. L. R. 1 Mad. 378, followed. *Per* PEARSON, J., OLDFIELD, J., and STRAIGHT, J. That a suit on a bond for money charged thereby on immoveable property must, where the bond is not admissible in evidence because it is unregistered, fail. **HIMMAT SINGH v. SEWA RAM**

I. L. R. 3 All. 157

Overruled by **HABIBULLAH v. NAKCHED RAI**

I. L. R. 5 All. 447

31. ——— and s. 49—*Occupancy tenancy—"Immoveable property"—Mortgage—General Clauses Act (I of 1868), s. 2 (5).* The obligee of a bond, dated the 29th October 1869, sued to recover the amount due thereunder from the property hypothecated therein. By the terms of the bond the obligor agreed to pay the sum of R75, with interest at 2 per cent. per mensem on



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the 12th May 1873. The amount thus secured exceeded R200. The property mortgaged was the tenant holding of the obligor. *Held*, that the interest of a tenant in his holding was right or interest to or in immoveable property; that consequently such bond, which affirmed as a security a right of which the value, estimated by the amount secured, exceeded R100, ought to have been registered; that being unregistered it could not affect the "immoveable property comprised therein" or "be received in evidence of any transaction affecting" the same: and that the suit brought on the basis of such bond for the enforcement of the lien must, in the absence of the bond, fail. *Himmat Singh v. Sewa Ram*, I. L. R. 3 All. 157, followed. *NABIRA RAI v. ACHAMPAT RAI*

I. L. R. 3 All. 422

32. ———— *Bond charging immoveable property—Interest.* The obligors of a bond for the payment of money charging land agreed to pay the principal amount, R99, within six months after the execution of the bond, and to pay interest every month on the principal amount at the rate of 2 per cent., and that, in the event of default of payment of the interest in any month, whole amount mentioned in the bond should become due at once. There was no stipulation preventing the obligors from repaying the loan at any time within the six months after which it was reclaimable. *Held*, that the only amount certainly secured by the bond was the principal, and the bond did not therefore need to be registered. *AHMED BAKHSH v. GOBINDI*. I. L. R. 2 All. 216

33. ———— *Bond—Mortgage.* The immoveable property charged by a bond payable by instalments, dated the 17th December 1866, was charged for both principal and interest, and the first instalment was payable within three years from the date of the bond with the accumulated interest, and the amount then becoming due exceeded R100. *Held*, in a suit on the bond, that it was an instrument creating an interest in immoveable property of the value of R100 and upwards, and under s. 17 of Act XX of 1866 required registration. *Rajpati Kuar v. Ramsukhi Kuar*, I. L. R. 2 All. 40, followed. *BANNO v. PIR MUHAMMAD*

I. L. R. 2 All. 688

34. ———— *Mortgage of immoveable property—Registered and unregistered documents.* *Held*, by the majority of the Full Bench (STRAIGHT and OLDFIELD, JJ. dissenting), that the principal sum secured by a mortgage of immoveable property is alone to be considered for the purpose of deciding whether the registration of the instrument of mortgage is optional or compulsory under the Registration Act, 1877. The ruling of the Full Bench in *Himmat Singh v. Sewa Ram*, I. L. R. 3 All. 157, overruled. *Held*, therefore, where an instrument of mortgage by way of conditional sale, dated the 2nd July 1871, secured the payment of a principal sum of R72, with interest at R2 per cent. per

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mensum, on the 12th May 1873, the whole amount thus secured exceeding R190, that the registration of such instrument was optional and not compulsory. *HABIBULLAH v. NAKCHED RAI*

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35. ———— *Mortgage for sum just under R100 with interest.* Where the plaintiff sued upon a mortgage to secure R98 with interest at R2-8 per month, it was objected that the mortgage was inoperative as being unregistered. *Held*, that the mortgage was one to secure a sum under R100, and did not require registration. *PANCHI DASSI v. AHMEDULLA*

12 C. L. R. 444

*KORBAN ALI MIRDHA v. PITAMBARI DASI*

13 C. L. R. 256

S.C. *KORBAN ALI MIRDHA v. SHARODA PROSHAD AICH*

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36. ———— and s. 18. *N* agreed by an instrument in writing called a "sattah," in consideration of a loan of R99-8-0, that *B* should have the right of cultivating indigo on certain land from a certain date for a certain period; that if she failed to make over to him any portion of such land, or interfered with his cultivation of any portion of it, she should be responsible in damages for the loss occasioned to *B* in respect of such default or interference at the rate of R40 per bigha, and for the repayment of such loan; "that if she failed to pay, *B* was at liberty to recover from her person and property; and that, until the conditions of the agreement were fulfilled, she hypothecated her 4-anna share in mouzah B." *B* sued *N* upon the "sattah" to recover R1,059-6-0, being the amount of such loan and damages, by the sale of such 4-anna share, such suit being founded on a breach of the agreement. *Held*, per STUART, C.J., that, inasmuch as the value relating to the immoveable property hypothecated in the "sattah" was simply R99-8-0, without any stipulation as to interest or any other payment by which the sum might be augmented, the damages stipulated for depending upon a contingency which might or might not happen and respecting which nothing could be anticipated at the time of registration, the instrument did not, under Act VIII of 1871, s. 17, require registration. *Darshan Singh v. Hanwanta*, I. L. R. 1 All. 274, observed on. Per OLDFIELD, J.—That the only certain sum secured by the "sattah" being R99-8-0, the instrument did not require registration under that Act, but it could not be used to enforce a lien to any greater extent than R99-8-0, against the property in suit. *BASANT LALL v. TAPESHRI RAI*

I. L. R. 3 All. 1

37. ———— *Bond for money to be advanced.* Where a bond pledges land for sums to be hereafter advanced not exceeding R100 and the sums actually advanced exceed that amount, the bond becomes an instrument of which registration is necessary under s. 17, Act XX of 1866. *PERRIN v. LEDLIE*

15 W. R. 364



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38. ———— *Bond by which land is pledged as collateral security.* A bond for money in which land is pledged as a mere collateral security is not one of the instruments defined in cl. 2, s. 17, Act XX of 1866, the registration of which is compulsory, but is one of which registration is optional. *WOODOY CHAND JANA v. NITYE MUNDUL* 9 W. R. 111

39. ———— *Mortgage-deed—Evidence.* A executed an instrument in favour of B, thereby covenanting to repay B the amount of a loan, together with interest, and mortgaging certain immoveable property as security for repayment of the same. B sued A for the debt. *Held*, that the instrument did not directly create, declare, transfer, or extinguish any right or title in immoveable property; the land was mentioned as a collateral security, and therefore the instrument was not inadmissible in evidence under s. 13 of Act XVI of 1864. *GOPAL PRASAD v. NANDARANI*

1 B. L. R. A. C. 92 : 10 W. R. 252

40. ———— *Deposit of title-deeds—Memorandum of deposit on promissory note—Admissibility in evidence.* The defendant deposited certain title-deeds with the plaintiff as security for the repayment of R1,200 lent him by the plaintiff at the time when the deposit was made. On the evening of the same day, the defendant, by way of further security, gave to the plaintiff a promissory note for the amount of the loan, and endorsed thereon the following memorandum: "For the repayment of the loan of R1,200 and the interest due thereon of the within note of hand, I hereby deposit with" the plaintiff "as a collateral security by way of equitable mortgage, title-deeds of my property," etc. *Held*, that the memorandum did not require registration. *KEDARNATH DUTT v. SHAMLOLL KHETTRY*

11 B. L. R. 405 : 20 W. R. 150

41. ———— *Document giving future right in immoveable property.* An agreement for the purchase and sale of certain immoveable property provided that the completion of the contract should be "subject to the approval of the purchaser's solicitors" (naming them), and that, if they should not approve of the title, the vendor should refund the earnest-money and pay all costs incurred by the purchaser in investigating the title. *Held*, that the agreement did not require registration. *SREEGOPAL MULLICK v. RAM CHURN NUSKUR.* I. L. R. 8 Calc. 856 : 12 C. L. R. 152

42. ———— *Instrument intending to create charge on immoveable property.* Where the parties had agreed upon a sale of certain property and the terms were settled, but the seller took an advance of R100, the instrument which was drawn up showing that the intention was that the purchaser should have a security upon the property for the money advanced:—*Held*, that the instrument operated as a charge upon the property to the extent of R100, and came within the terms of

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Act VIII of 1871, s. 17. *JOY RAM GOSAIN BUTTA CHARJEE v. KALEE NARAIN ROY.* 20 W. R. 291

43. ———— *Deed covenanting to pay sum for immoveable property—Admissibility in evidence.* A deed by which a defendant covenanted to pay monthly a certain sum "for the use and hire of a steam-engine, boiler and machinery, sheds, and a bungalow," is one relating to immoveable property, and therefore not admissible in evidence without registration. *WINTERSCALE v. GOPAL CHANDRA SEAL.* 3 B. L. R. O. C. 90

44. ———— *Agreement as to land—Suit for specific performance.* The plaintiff lent defendant R20,000 and received a document in the following terms: "On demand we promise to pay S. V. Mutu Ramen Chetty and C. T. A. Chinia Chetty the sum of rupees twenty thousand, value received." Memo.—"For the above promissory note the grant of the dockyard and offices to be deposited in three days, and a proper agreement drawn out. The time of credit to be one year or eighteen months, the interest at R1-10 per cent. per mensem." In a suit to compel specific performance and for damages for breach of the agreement contained in the above memo.:—*Held*, that the document did not contain an agreement creating an interest in land, and registration was not therefore necessary to render it receivable in evidence under the Registration Act of 1866. *CURRIE v. MUTU RAMAN CHETTY*

3 B. L. R. A. C. 126 : 11 W. R. 520

45. ———— *Document concerning right of use of growing trees.* A document creating and transferring a right of use of growing trees for a term of years is a document which purports to create or transfer an interest in immoveable property within the meaning of s. 13 of Registration Act of 1864; and therefore such document, if not registered, is inadmissible in evidence. *SVEERY KURDEPPA v. GOONDAKULL NAGIRUDDI* 6 Mad. 71

46. ———— and s. 49—*Hypothecation of crops—"Moveable property"—Act I of 1868, s. 2(6)—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 54.* *Held*, that an assignment by endorsement of a registered bond hypothecating certain crops was a transaction relating to moveable property, and registration of such endorsement was not required by s. 17 of the Registration Act (III of 1877) or s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882). *KALKA PRASAD v. CHANDAN SINGH*

I. L. R. 10 All. 20

47. ———— *Assignment of decree obtained by mortgagee.* Where a mortgagee obtained a decree against his mortgagors for the payment of the mortgage money, and in default for the sale of the mortgaged property, and his heir afterwards executed an assignment of the decree for valuable consideration to the plaintiff, who proceeded to execute the decree by sale of the mortgaged property:—*Held*, that the assignment was a document of which the registration was



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compulsory. **GOPAL NARAIN v. TRIMBAK SADA-SHIV** . . . **I. L. R. 1 Bom. 267**

**48. — Assignment of mortgage**—*Extrinsic evidence—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 91—Title to sue—Amendment of plaint.* An equitable mortgage by deposit of title-deeds was created on 15th August 1862. In March 1873 the mortgagee, *P D*, executed an assignment of all his property and of all debts due to him, and all the securities therefor, to the plaintiff. The assignment also contained a power-of-attorney from the mortgagee to the plaintiff, "in the name of the said *P D*, his executors, etc., but for the sole use and benefit of the said *AD* (the plaintiff), to ask, demand, sue for, recover and receive of and from all and every the person or persons liable in that behalf all and every (*inter alia*) the sum and sums of money and debts hereby assigned or intended so to be or any of them or any part of them, to hold the same unto and to the use and behoof of the said *AD*, his executors, etc." Some days after the execution of the assignment, the title-deeds, which had been deposited in 1862 with the mortgagee, were handed to the plaintiff, in accordance with the terms of an agreement to that effect contained in the assignment. The deed of assignment was not registered. On 13th August 1874 the plaintiff, as the assignee of the equitable mortgage, sued for foreclosure. The Court of first instance held that, as an assignment, the deed required registration, and that, not being registered, it could not be received in evidence; that under s. 91 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872) no evidence, other than that contained in the document itself, could be given to prove the fact of the assignment; and that therefore the plaintiff had failed to show a title to sue as assignee of the equitable mortgage. The Court, however, permitted an amendment of the plaint, by which the plaintiff was described as suing "in his own name and as the constituted attorney of *P D*," and then allowed the deed of assignment to be put in as evidence of the power thereby conferred on the plaintiff to sue for and recover all debts due to *P D*, and therefore to maintain the present suit in respect of the equitable mortgage. On appeal:—*Held*, that, if the suit were regarded as the suit of *P D*, the power-of-attorney contained in the deed did not enable the plaintiff to maintain the suit for *P D*, inasmuch as it purported to enable the plaintiff to recover the debts mentioned in the deed on his own account only and not on account of *P D*; and, on the other hand, if the suit were regarded as that of the plaintiff, the Court, by treating the power in the deed as enabling him to recover on his own account, virtually gave to that power the full effect of an assignment, and for that purpose such an assignment, whether legal or equitable, should be registered under ss. 17 and 49 of Act VIII of 1871. The Court, however, being of opinion that there had not been any deliberate intention on the part of the parties to the deed, to evade the law of registration, granted the plaintiff

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an adjournment of the case, in order to complete his title as an equitable mortgagee, by obtaining, registering, and putting in evidence a fresh assignment to himself from *P D*. **GANPAT PANDURANG v. ADARJI DADABHAI** . . . **I. L. R. 3 Bom. 312**

**49. — Deed of assignment showing payment of rent as interest—Admissibility of deed in evidence—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 20—Payment of interest as such—Mortgage—Payment of rents to mortgagee in lieu of interest on debt.** By a bond, dated the 15th July 1872, *A* assigned to *B* the "vahivat of assessment" of certain lands belonging to him as security for a loan of R10,000. The bond provided that *B* should receive the assessment, and after making certain payment should retain the balance in lieu of interest until the principal debt should be repaid. The bond was not registered. The assessment was duly received by *B* until April 1887. In February 1890, *B* filed this suit to recover the principal sum from *A* personally, relinquishing his claim against the land, as the bond was not registered. *A* pleaded limitation. *B* contended that the receipt of the assessment in lieu of interest was a payment of "interest as such" within the meaning of s. 20 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877), and that, the last of such payment having been made within three years before suit, his claim was not barred. *Held*, that the assignment of the "vahivat of assessment" contained in the bond was an assignment of a benefit arising out of immoveable property within the meaning of ss. 17 and 3 of the Registration Act (III of 1877), or else a mortgage; and in either case the bond could not be admitted in evidence, as it was not registered. But it was only by reading the terms of the bond that the Court could gather that the assessment was to be received in lieu of interest. This would be to admit indirectly the provisions of the bond in evidence. Apart from the bond, there was no evidence that the plaintiff (*B*) had been paid "interest as such" within three years of the filing of the suit by the duly authorized agents of the defendants, and the claim was therefore barred. **VENKAJI BABAJI NAIK v. SHIDRAMAPA BALAPA DESAI** . . . **I. L. R. 19 Bom. 663**

**50. — Deed of assignment of a decree—Admissibility in evidence—Registration Act, s. 49.** S. 17 (b) of the Registration Act (III of 1877) does not apply to a kobala or deed of assignment of a decree, and an unregistered kobala of a decree dealing with immoveable property of more than R100 in value is not inadmissible in evidence under s. 49 of that Act. **Gopal Narain v. Trimbak Sadasiv**, **I. L. R. 1 Bom. 267**, dissented from. **Jivan Ali Beg v. Basa Mal**, **I. L. R. 9 All. 108**, referred to. **GHOUS MAHOMED v. KHAWAS ALI KHAN** . . . **I. L. R. 23 Calc. 450**

**51. — Assignment of a right to recover assessment.** *A* passed to *B* document by which he assigned his inam rights over certain lands held by mirasi tenants, including the right to



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—*contd.*s. 17—*contd.*

recover the assessment fixed on them at R40 a year and also the right of succession to the full ownership of the lands, should the mirasi tenure on which they were held come to an end. *Held*, that the document purported to assign a right, title, and interest in immoveable property of the value of more than R100, and, as such, required registration under cl. (b) of s. 17 of the Registration Act. **ANANDRAO v. JOTI** . I. L. R. 24 Bom. 615

## 52. ——— Deed of compromise.

**R S R**, a Hindu, died in 1811, leaving a will, by which he gave his property to his four sons subject to certain charges, and, among other things, directed that the profits of a portion of it should be dedicated to a certain idol. After his death, his sons partitioned the property. In 1857, **B**, one of the sons, brought a suit in the late Supreme Court to establish the will and to have the trusts carried into execution. The decree in that suit ordered that the portion so dedicated by the testator should be conveyed to **N C**, **B D N**, and **K R M**, as trustees for the idol. In pursuance of this decree, a conveyance was settled by the Master, but it was never executed, the parties having come to an agreement to compromise, and executed a deed to that effect on 15th March 1866. The deed recited that the parties now agreed to compromise certain suit and to execute mutual releases, etc., as thereafter declared, and then witnessed that the real property belonging to the idol, which the trustees were entitled to hold under the will, was set forth in a schedule, and that it had been agreed that a conveyance should be executed to the plaintiff and others in trust for the idol, and that the same should be duly registered; provision was then made for the settlement of the dedicated portion, when for more than one year, and extending beyond the term of the turn of worship of any one of the parties; and there was a declaration that all leases, etc., made without consent of the parties should only be valid for the turn of worship of such party; that the rents and profits were to pass to and remain with the party or parties who should for the time being be entitled to the turn of worship; and that a house of worship should be built for the idol on the land mentioned in the schedule: provision was also made for the forfeiture of interest of any party who should renounce the Hindu religion; and it was declared that a certain portion was not to be considered divided as theretofore, but that it belonged to the plaintiff, and was not liable to be sold. *Held* (reversing the decision of **MARKBY, J.**), that the document was one which required registration under s. 13 of Act XVI of 1864. **RAJKUMAR ROY v. KALIKRISHNA ROY** . 7 B. L. R. 197

## 53. ——— Deed of compromise.

It was *held* not necessary that a deed of compromise should be registered in order to make it admissible in evidence. **GUPTA NARAIN DAS v. BIJOYA SOONDARI DEBYA** . 2 C. W. N. 663

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—*contd.*s. 17—*contd.*

See **PRANAL ANNI v. LAKSHMI ANNI**.

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 508

3 C. W. N. 485

L. R. 26 I. A. 101

54. ——— Covenant for title running with the land. A covenant for title, running with the land, would seem to be in itself a transaction affecting the land, and the instrument containing it, if coming within cls. (a) to (d) of s. 17 of Act III of 1877, must be registered, unless it comes within the exceptive cls. (e) to (l) of the same section. **RAJU BALU v. KRISHNARAY RAM-CHANDRA** . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 273

## 55. ——— Contract of mortgage—

*Letter stating terms of equitable mortgage, effect of—Equitable mortgagee, his proper remedy.* **A** and **B** executed a joint and several promissory note in favour of the plaintiff. On the same day **A** deposited with the plaintiff the title-deeds of his property as collateral security, and received conjointly with **B** a part of the consideration-money for the promissory note. Shortly afterwards **A** addressed a letter to the plaintiff to this effect: "As collateral security for the due payment of R2,000 secured by a promissory note of even date . . . I herewith hand you the title-deeds of my property . . . money borrowed and received in pledge of house," and obtained the balance. In a suit on the basis of the documents for foreclosure or for sale of the property or in the alternative for a conveyance of the legal estate:—*Held*, that the letter itself was not a contract of mortgage, and was without registration admissible in evidence of the equitable mortgage which had been completed upon deposit of the title-deeds. *Held*, also, that the fact of the existence of the letter would not prevent the plaintiff from giving any other evidence in proof of his claim. **Kedar Nath Dutt v. Sham Lal Khetry**, 11 B. L. R. 405, followed. **Oo Nong v. MONG HROON Oo** . I. L. R. 13 Cal. 322

56. ——— Endorsement on deed of sale of immoveable property. **D** sold a house to **P**, and executed a deed of conveyance, which was duly registered. **P** did not pay the purchase-money, and therefore did not get possession. Shortly after the conveyance had been registered, **P** returned it to **D** with an endorsement thereon to the effect that it was returned because **P** was unable to pay the purchase-money. The right, title and interest in the house were subsequently attached and sold under a decree obtained against him by the plaintiff. The plaintiff became the purchaser. *Held*, in a suit by him against **D** for possession, that the endorsement on the conveyance, not having been registered, could not affect the property. **UMED MAL MOTIRAM v. DAVU BIN DHONDIBA** . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 547

57. ——— Sanad—Endorsement on a sanad returning the sanad to the grantor—Evidence—Admissibility. The plaintiff sought to attach a certain *hak* as belonging to his judgment-debtor **K**.



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The defendant, who was the original grantor of the *hak*, pleaded a re-grant of the *hak* to himself. In support of this plea, the defendant produced from his possession the original sanad bearing the following endorsement by *K*: "You have passed me a receipt for the sanad. I have accordingly given you the ownership of the sanad. Therefore over the said sanad I have no right or title." The defendant offered to put in this endorsement, and also tendered the evidence of *K*'s brother. This evidence was rejected by the Court, on the ground that the endorsement, which had the effect of extinguishing the grant, was not registered. *Held*, that the endorsement did not require registration. It did not itself rescind the grant to *K*, nor constitute a re-grant to the defendant. It was simply an endorsement returning the sanad to the defendant, and therefore passed no interest in any property. **HERAMBDEV DHARNIDHARDEV v. KASHINATH BHASKAR.**

**I. L. R. 14 Bom. 472**

**58.** ——— Letter depositing title-deeds—*Admissibility in evidence of unregistered document.* The defendant deposited certain title-deeds with the plaintiff as security for money due on a bond executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff. The deeds were sent with the following letter from the defendant to the plaintiff's attorney: "I have the pleasure of handing to you the title-deeds of a house, 56, Lower Circular Road, as a collateral security for R20,000, which falls due this day. Please accept them from my manager." In a suit for an account of what was due to the plaintiff on the security of the deed:—*Held*, that the letter needed registration, as being a document which created an interest in land, and therefore, being unregistered, was inadmissible in evidence. **DWARKANATH MITTER v. SARAT KUMARI DASI** . . . . . **7 B. L. R. 55**

**59.** ——— Letter containing contract—*Acknowledgment of receipt of consideration—Evidence Act, s. 91—Oral evidence, Admissibility of—"Instruments."* An advertisement appeared in the *Bombay Gazette* newspaper of the 9th March 1874, advertising for sale certain moveable and immoveable property situate in the village of Angur, near Junnar, in the district of Poona. On reading that advertisement, plaintiff entered into a negotiation with the solicitors of the widow and administratrix of the owner of the said property for the purchase of a certain portion of it. On the 26th May 1874 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the solicitors, offering to purchase the said property for R14,000 on certain conditions, and proposing to pay a deposit of R1,000 as earnest-money if the offer was accepted. On the following day the solicitors informed plaintiff, in writing, that the widow accepted his offer, and requested him to deposit the earnest-money offered by him in his letter. Plaintiff accordingly deposited the earnest-money (R1,000) with the solicitors on the same day, and obtained from them a receipt, bearing a one-anna receipt

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stamp. The receipt mentioned the money as being in part payment of the sum of R14,000, the amount for which the plaintiff had agreed to purchase the property. Instead of completing the contract of sale with the plaintiff, and putting him in possession of the property, the widow sold it to other persons. In a suit of the nature of a suit for specific performance brought by the plaintiff, as first purchaser, against the widow and the other purchasers to set aside the subsequent sale of the property, and to compel the widow to execute a conveyance thereof to the plaintiff, the following documents were produced and tendered in evidence, *viz.*, the advertisement of the 9th March, the plaintiff's letter of the 26th May (exhibit No. 3), the solicitors' reply (exhibit No. 4), and their receipt of the 27th May 1874 (exhibit No. 5), and it was contended that three of the four documents—*viz.*, exhibits Nos. 3, 4, and 5—required registration under the Registration Act (VIII of 1871), s. 17. *Held*, that the plaintiff's letter (exhibit 3) offering to purchase the property in question, and the letter of acceptance (exhibit 4) written on behalf of the vendor (defendant No. 1) by her attorneys, did not fall within cl. (b) of the 17th section of the Registration Act (VIII of 1871), and were admissible in evidence to prove the contract of sale, although not registered. The acceptance of the plaintiff's offer was conditional on his payment of the R1,000 as earnest-money, and therefore, until that sum was paid, no estate, legal or equitable, in the property passed to the plaintiff. *Quære*: Whether the letters between the parties (exhibits Nos. 3 and 4), even if they did constitute a complete contract for sale unincumbered by the necessity for the payment of the deposit by way of earnest could be regarded as "instruments" within the meaning of s. 17 of the Registration Act (VIII of 1871). **WAMAN RANCHANDRA v. DHONDIBA KRISHNAJI** . . . **I. L. R. 4 Bom. 126**

**60.** ——— and s. 49—*Letters of one partner to another transferring to the latter the share of the former in the assets of the firm, including the mortgages, but not mentioning them—Necessity of registering such letters—The words "document" and "instrument" in the Registration Act.* By two mortgage-bonds, dated respectively 25th July 1866 and 19th September 1870, certain lands were mortgaged to a firm of money-lenders at Khadkala, carrying on business under the style of *G* and *M*. There were four partners in the firm, *viz.*, *G*, *M*, *P*, and *S*. In 1874 *G* retired from the firm, and wrote three letters the effect of which was to transfer his share in the partnership to *P* and *S*. In 1878 the shop was closed, and the partners divided the assets of the firm. The two mortgages fell to the share of *S*. Subsequently *S* died, and the plaintiff, his son, inherited his property and took possession of the mortgaged lands. These lands were afterwards attached in execution of a money decree against one of the mortgagors (defendant 1). The plaintiff objected to the attachment, but his objection was disallowed, and the property was



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sold in execution and purchased by defendants 2 and 3. The plaintiff then filed this suit to establish his rights under the two mortgage-bonds. The defendants contended that the plaintiff had no interest in the mortgages, and was not entitled to sue. The plaintiff relied (*inter alia*) in support of his title upon the letters (A, B, and C) whereby G had transferred his share in the assets of the firm to his (the plaintiff's) father S. These letters were objected to as inadmissible in evidence, not having been registered. *Held*, that, independently of the letters, there was evidence to show that the plaintiff's father S was a partner in the firm, and that as such partner the mortgages in question fell to his share at the final division of assets. The position of S as a partner being once established, his right to the property followed by operation of law, and no other proof of title was required. *Per JARDINE, J.*—"To lay down that the three letters in question, which deal generally with the assets, moveable and immovable, without specifying any particular mortgage or other interest in real property, require registration, would, I incline to think, in the present state of the authorities, go too far. It may be argued that such letters are not 'instruments of gift of immovable property,' but rather disposals of a share in a partnership of which the business is money-lending and the mortgage securities merely incidental thereto." *Per TELANG, J.*—"Although a partner's share does not include any specific part of any specific item of the partnership property, still where the partnership is entitled to immovable property, such share does include an interest in immovable property, and therefore every instrument operating to create or transfer a right to such share requires to be registered under the Registration Act (III of 1877). It is true that the authorities referred to apply, in terms, only to immovable property owned by a partnership. But I am, on the whole, disposed to hold that the principle of those authorities applies to cases where immovable property is held by a firm not in full proprietorship, but only by right of mortgage. . . . Upon the whole I should, if necessary, have been disposed to hold that the letters in question, not being registered, were rightly treated by the Court below as being inadmissible in evidence to prove directly a transfer of the share of G in the partnership to S." *Per TELANG, J.*—A perusal of various sections of the Registration Act seems to show that the Legislature has used the words "document" and "instrument" interchangeably. *JOHARMAL v. TEJRAM JAGRUP* . . . I. L. R. 17 Bom. 235

61. ———— *Deed of partition.* S. 17 of Act XX of 1866 extended to a deed of partition, and this was not prevented by such an instrument being enumerated in s. 18 amongst those which were optionally registrable. *SHANKAR RAM-CHANDRA v. VISNU ANANT* I. L. R. 1 Bom. 67

62. ———— *Deed of division of immovable property.* The registration of a deed

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of division of immovable property of the value of more than Rs 100, executed by members of an undivided Hindu family, was optional under cl. 2, s. 17 of Act XX of 1866, and a suit will not lie to compel registration. *ANONYMOUS* . . . 6 Mad. Ap. 9

63. ———— *Deed of partition.* A deed of partition need not be registered. *NEM ROY v. LALMUN ROY* . . . 25 W. R. 376

Instruments of partition made by revenue officers require registration under s. 17, cl. (k) of the Registration Act of 1877.

64. ———— and cl. (c) and s. 49—*Unregistered document—Document to contradict witness—Meaning of word "declare" in s. 17 of Act III of 1877—Acknowledgment, necessity for registration of.* S and R sued their brothers M and V in 1880 for partition of the family property. The defendants pleaded that the property had been partitioned in 1870, and that the various members of the family had been ever since in possession and enjoyment of their respective shares. At the hearing a document was produced by the defendant M, dated the 13th January 1877, which was proved to have been signed by his three brothers, S, R, and V, on the occasion of M's effecting a mortgage of part of the property. This document contained the following words: "Our eldest brother M has built houses and is building new houses on property appertaining to his share . . . . To the same we three persons and our heirs and representatives have no interest of any kind whatever. If we or they should prefer any claim, then the same is to be null. This release paper we have duly passed in writing jointly and severally and in sound mind. This document had not been registered, and was therefore inadmissible as evidence of the alleged partition. In cross-examination of the plaintiff R, he was interrogated as to the circumstances under which the mortgage was made by M on the 13th January 1877. He said: "I was present when the mortgage was made, but I was ill in bed.

. . . . This was on the 13th January 1877. . . . I did not say on that day that I had no claim to the property." He was then shown the above document, and admitted his signature. The document was then tendered in evidence, not as a release, but to contradict the witness. *Held*, that the document was admissible for that purpose, as it was not a document which itself declared a right in immovable property in the sense intended by s. 17 of the Registration Act (III of 1877). It was an acknowledgment that there had, in time past, been a partition between the brothers who signed it and the defendant M, but it was not itself the instrument of partition. That an acknowledgment of a partition is distinct from the instrument of partition, is to be gathered from cl. (c) of s. 17 of the Registration Act (III of 1877). Had the terms of cl. (b) of that section been satisfied by a mere acknowledgment, cl. (c) would have been superfluous. Its operation is to require an acknowledgment in



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the form of a receipt to be registered, but not an acknowledgment in any other shape as distinguished from the instrument of the transaction. The word "declare" in s. 17 of the Registration Act (III of 1877) is to be taken in the same sense as the words "create, assign, etc.," used in the same section, *viz.*, as implying a definite change of legal relation to the property by an expression of will embodied in the document referred to. It implies a declaration of will, not a mere statement of a fact, and thus a deed of partition which causes a change of legal relation to the property divided amongst all the parties to it is a declaration in the intended sense; but a letter containing an admission, direct or inferential, that a partition once took place, does not "declare" a right within the meaning of the section. It is not the expression or declaration of will by which the right is constituted. *Quære*: Whether, if the above document were itself a release operating or intended to operate as a declared volition constituting or severing ownership, it could be received even for the purpose of contradicting a witness who had denied that he had previously made a statement inconsistent with his evidence. **SAKHARAM KRISHNAJI v. MADAN KRISHNAJI** . . . **I. L. R. 5 Bom. 232**

**65. — Release from mortgage—**In June 1875 *L* executed a bond in favour of *S*, in which he mortgaged, amongst other property, a village called Chand Khera, as security for the payment of certain moneys. He subsequently sold such village to *A*, concealing the fact that it had been mortgaged to *S*. On this fact coming to the knowledge of *A*, he threatened *L* with a criminal prosecution, whereupon *L* proposed to *S* in writing that the security of a share in a village called Kelsa, which he alleged was his property, should be substituted for the security of Chand Khera. *S* accepted this proposal by a letter in which he referred to *L*'s proposal in terms. It subsequently appeared that the share in Kelsa did not belong to *L*, but to another person. *S* having sued upon his bond, claiming to enforce thereunder a lien upon Chand Khera, *A* set up as a defence to the suit that *S* had agreed to substitute Kelsa for Chand Khera in the bond producing *S*'s letter as evidence of the agreement. *Held*, that such letter operated as a release, and should therefore have been stamped and registered. **SAFAR ALI KHAN v. LUCHMAN DASS** . . . **I. L. R. 2 All. 554**

**66. — Release from mortgage—***Agreement for fresh consideration, between mortgagee and third person, for release of property from mortgage—Release not required to be in writing and registered.* The mortgagee of immoveable property under a hypothecation-bond entered into an agreement with one who was not a party to his mortgage to release part of the property from liability under his mortgage. This agreement was not in writing and registered. The mortgagee subsequently sought to enforce the hypothecation against the whole of the mortgaged property. *Held*,

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that the agreement, being a new contract for a fresh consideration between persons who were not parties to the mortgage, was not, as between the parties to the mortgage, a release which the law required to be in writing and registered. **GURDIAL MAL v. JAUHRI MAL** . . . **I. L. R. 7 All. 820**

**67. — Widow's right to maintenance, release of—***Release affecting property.* A widow's right to maintenance constitutes no interest, vested or contingent, in the immoveable property of an undivided Hindu family within the meaning of the Registration Act, XX of 1866, and a release thereof did not require to be registered under cl. 2, s. 17 of that Act. *Semble*: Under Act XX of 1866, s. 17, cls. 2 and 3, releases affecting immoveable property above R100 in value had to be registered, and the releases mentioned in cl. 7 of s. 18 are releases relating to moveables. The ruling in *Anonymous Case*, 6 *Mad. Ap. 9*, dissented from. **KALPAGATHACHI v. GANAPATHI PILLAI** . . . **I. L. R. 3 Mad. 184**

**68. — Deed of release by adopted son—***Document registered under the Dekkan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879), ss. 56 and 60.* The plaintiff was adopted in 1880 by *K*, the widow of one *G*. In June 1885 he executed a document which recited that he and *K* had not been on amicable terms, and that his adoption had consequently been cancelled, and that she had adopted another son (defendant No. 1) to whom she had given all rights of heirship and declared that in consideration of R200 paid by *K* he delivered back to her the right which he had obtained by virtue of his adoption and heirship. This document was not registered under the General Registration Act (III of 1877), but was registered under s. 56 of the Dekkan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879), which section applied to the district in which the transaction took place. *K* died in October 1885, and the plaintiff brought this suit, as adopted son, to recover the property of *G*. The first defendant, who had been adopted by *K* subsequently to the plaintiff's adoption, contended that he had been validly adopted, and that he was entitled to the property. He relied (*inter alia*) upon the release executed by plaintiff in June 1885. It was contended that the release in question was not admissible in evidence, not having been registered under the General Registration Act (III of 1877). *Held*, that the document was admissible. It was a conveyance within s. 56 of the Dekkan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879), and the law in force as to its registration was contained in ss. 56 and 60 of that Act. **MAHADU GANU v. BAYAJI SIDU** . . . **I. L. R. 19 Bom. 339**

**69. — and s. 49—Deed of conditional sale—***Admissibility of evidence.* A deed of bye-bil-wafa, or conditional sale, is a deed which, under s. 17 of Act XX of 1866, requires registration before it can become admissible as evidence. But so far as it is a covenant or agreement for



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the repayment of the money lent on a particular day, it is not an instrument requiring registration; and therefore, for such purposes, notwithstanding s. 49, it is admissible in evidence. *NILMADHUB SING DAS v. FATTEH CHAND SHAHA*.

3 B. L. R. A. C. 310 : 12 W. R. 222

70. ——— *Shebaitnamah*—A *shebaitnamah* which conveyed no right or interest but merely declared that a particular portion of the thakoor's income should be expended through the instrumentality of the *shebait* in the worship of the thakoor was not a deed registered under Act XVI of 1864. *GIREEDHUR DASS v. NITTO GOPAL DASS*.

19 W. R. 291

71. ——— *Sulehnamah*—*Agreement creating a charge on immoveable property—Suit for money charge on immoveable property*. Certain immoveable property having been attached in the execution of a decree held by S, B and L objected to the attachment. An arrangement was subsequently effected between the objectors and the parties to the decree, which resulted in all parties jointly filing a "*sulehnamah*" in Court, in which B and L, who had purchased the rights of the judgment-debtor in the attached property, agreed to pay the amount of the decree, which exceeded one hundred rupees, within one year, and hypothecated such property as security for the payment of such amount. S having sued upon the document claiming to recover the amount of the decree by the sale of such property:—*Held*, that the document required to be registered, and, not being registered, the suit thereon was not maintainable. Cases decided by the High Court in which the "*sulehnamah*" having been relied on, not as containing the hypothecation itself, but as evidence only of a separate parol agreement, or in which a decree, having been made in accordance with the terms of the document, was held not to require registration, remarked upon and distinguished by SPANKIE, J. *SURJU PRASHAD v. BHAWNT SAHAI*.

I. L. R. 2 All. 481

72. ——— *Deed of surrender*—"*Acknowledgments*." An *istifanamah*, or deed of surrender, surrendering pledged property of which the party executing it was in possession, on receiving back the amount of a bond-debt, comes under cls. 2 and 3, s. 17 of Act XX of 1866, and must be registered to be admissible in evidence. "*Acknowledgments*," in cl. 7 of s. 18 refer to transactions of quite a different description. *BHYRUB CHUNDER DASS v. KALEECHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY*.

16 W. R. 56

73. ——— *Surrender of interest by tenant to landlord*—*Act XVI of 1864, ss. 13, 14*. A document, which was substantially a surrender by a tenant of his interest in land to his landlord, and as such was exempted from stamp duty by Act X of 1862 under the general exemption clause, did not require registration under Act XVI

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of 1864, ss. 13 and 14. *JADAV RUGHNATH v. RAIJI HIMMAT*.

9 Bom. 248

74. ——— *Deed of relinquishment by tenant to landholder in consideration of waiver of right to arrears of rent*. An instrument by which a tenant in a zamindari, in consideration of the zamindar waiving his right to arrears of rent accrued due, relinquishes the land to him, is not admissible in evidence, unless it is registered in accordance with law, although it may have been drawn up and delivered to the servants of the zamindar before he had signified his consent to waive his right to the arrears. *RANGAYYA APPA RAU v. KAMESWARA RAU*.

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 367

75. ——— cl. (c)—*Acknowledgment of consideration-money—Document acknowledging receipt of consideration-money for conveyance*. A document which acknowledges the receipt of consideration-money for the conveyance of immoveable property cannot be received as evidence unless it is registered. *SREENATH CHURN SOOR v. NILKANTO DEY*.

22 W. R. 309

76. ——— *Acknowledgment of receipt of consideration*. J T passed a writing to V under date 28th April 1874, stipulating that the deed of sale of J T's bungalow to V for R4,300 which was to have been made that day owing to certain circumstances therein mentioned, should be made and delivered by J T to V twenty days thereafter. The writing further acknowledged the receipt by J T from V of R100 as earnest-money for the purchase of the bungalow, and concluded with certain penalties in the event of a default by either party. In a suit in the nature of a suit for specific performance brought by V to compel J T to execute the deed of sale to V and to register the same as promised in the writing of 28th April 1874:—*Held*, that the writing required registration under Act VIII of 1871, s. 17, cls. 2 and 3, as it distinctly acknowledged the receipt of R100 as part of the consideration for the sale of the house to the plaintiff for the sum of R4,300, and operated to create an interest in the house of the value of R100 and upwards. *Mahad v. Dari*, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 176, approved and followed. *Jusab Haji Jafar v. Haji Gul Mahammad*, 12 Bom. 175; *Hargovandas v. Balkrishna*, 7 Bom. O. C. 67; and *Kedarnath Dutt v. Shamlal Khettry*, 11 B. L. R. 405, distinguished. *VALAJI ISAJI v. THOMAS*.

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 180

77. ——— *Receipt for earnest-money—Consideration*. Where the plaintiff proposed to purchase property, moveable and immoveable, for R14,000 and to pay a sum of R1,000 as earnest-money, and his offer was accepted and the earnest-money deposited, a receipt was given for it stamped with a one-anna receipt stamp. The receipt mentioned the money as being in part payment of the sum of R14,000, the amount for which



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the plaintiff had agreed to purchase the property. Instead of completing the contract of sale with the plaintiff and putting him in possession the defendant sold it to other persons. In a suit to set aside the sale to them and to compel the defendant to execute a conveyance to the plaintiff:—*Held*, that the receipt for R1,000 earnest-money (exhibit No. 5) fell within cl. (3) of s. 17 of the Registration Act (VIII of 1871) as being an acknowledgment of the receipt or payment of consideration on account of the creation of a right, title, or interest in immoveable property of the value of upwards of R100, and was therefore inadmissible in evidence, not having been registered; but that under s. 91 of the Evidence Act (I of 1872) oral evidence was admissible to prove the payment, notwithstanding the existence of the written receipt. The third clause of s. 17 of the Registration Act (VIII of 1871) includes within its scope a payment of a part of the consideration as well as a payment of the whole of it. *WAMAN RAM CHANDRA v. DHANDIKA KRISHNAJI*

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 126

78. — and s. 20—Declaration of title—*Receipt*. The defendant passed to the plaintiff a document worded, in substance, as follows: "Your fields. . . are entered in my name. Ever since they came into your possession, I have received from you the assessment due upon them. I have now no claim upon you for any balance of assessment. . . I will cause the aforesaid two fields to be entered in your name. Nothing remains due by or to either of us in respect of the produce of these fields." The document was stamped as a receipt with a stamp of one anna. *Held*, that, for the purpose of establishing satisfaction of all claims which the plaintiff and the defendant had upon one another, the document was admissible in evidence; but that, if used as evidence of title, it came within the provisions of s. 17 of the Registration Act (XX of 1866) and the corresponding provisions of the Registration Act (III of 1877), and was inadmissible unless duly registered. *FAKI v. KHOTU*

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 590

79. — Receipt by mortgagee—*Release of claim secured by mortgage*. *Held*, that a document, called a receipt, but intended to be used to prove the release of a claim secured by mortgage, required registration under s. 49 of Act VIII of 1871, inasmuch as it affected immoveable property. *BASAWA v. KALKAPA*

I. L. R. 2 Bom. 489

*Contra GUGUNFUR ALI v. MAHOMED YASEEN.*

20 W. R. 334

80. — Receipt by mortgagee—*Admissibility of evidence*. The defendant tendered in evidence a receipt for R250, to show that the interest of his co-mortgagee (the plaintiff) in the mortgage had been extinguished. The receipt was objected to on the ground that it had not been registered. *Held*, that the receipt, being tendered to show that the interest of the plaintiff in the mortgage had been extinguished, required

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registration, and was inadmissible without registration. *Shidlingapa v. Chenbasapa, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 235*, distinguished. *RAMAPA v. UMANNA.*

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 123

81. — Document acknowledging receipt of consideration—*Parol evidence*. In a suit for possession where plaintiff's case was that a kut-mirash (usufructuary mortgage-deed) had been granted to defendant, who had promised upon repayment of the money consideration to surrender the pottah and give back the land, and where plaintiff produced a receipt in proof that such repayment had been effected:—*Held*, that the receipt, being an instrument acknowledging receipt of the consideration on account of extinction of interest in land, came within the terms of Act VIII of 1871, s. 17, cl. 3, and was not admissible as evidence without registration. But oral evidence was receivable in proof of the receipt of the money. *SOORJO COOMAR BHUTTACHARJEE v. BHUGWAN CHUNDER ROY*

24 W. R. 328

82. — Memorandum—*Receipt—Extinction of mortgagee's lien, Evidence of*. A document purporting to have been passed by a mortgagee to his mortgagor, and reciting the demand of the former for repayment of his mortgage-money before the due date of the mortgage, and the compliance with that demand by the latter by means of a fresh loan upon a second mortgage of the same property; and reciting also the fact of the delivery of possession of the property by the original to the second mortgagee; and purporting, in conclusion, to contain a declaration by the original mortgagee that nothing remained due to him in respect of his mortgage, is a document which, under cls. 2 and 3 of s. 17 of Act XX of 1866, as well as under cls. 2 and 3 of s. 17 of Act VIII of 1871, requires registration, and, if unregistered, is, by s. 49 of the same two Acts, inadmissible as evidence of any transaction affecting any property comprised therein. The fact of the extinction of the original mortgagee's lien may, however, be proved by other documentary or proper oral evidence. *MAHADAJI v. VYANKAJI GOVIND*

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 197

83. — Receipt for sums paid on bond hypothecating immoveable property. A receipt for sums paid in part liquidation of a bond hypothecating immoveable property must be registered under the provisions of s. 17 of Act VIII of 1871 to render it admissible as evidence under s. 49 of the said Act. *DALIP SINGH v. DURGA PRASAD*

I. L. R. 1 All. 442

84. — Receipt for money paid under an hypothecation bond. A receipt acknowledging as a fact part payment of a sum due under an hypothecation bond does not require registration under s. 17 cl. (c), of the Registration Act, unless the fact is referred to as a consideration for a contractual engagement, whereby the interest created by the prior registered instrument is limited or extinguished. A mere receipt does not acknow-



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ledge the receipt or payment of a consideration. *Dalip Singh v. Durga Prasad*, I. L. R. 1 All. 442, dissented from *Venkatarama Naik v. Chinnathambu Reddi*, 7 Mad. 1, approved. *VENKAYYAR v. VENKATASUBBAYYAR*, I. L. R. 3 Mad. 53

85. — and cl. (b)—*Receipts by mortgagee*. Receipts passed by a mortgagee for sums paid on account of the mortgage-debt, and exceeding R100 each, are not inadmissible in evidence for want of registration under Act III of 1877, s. 17. The technical term "consideration" implies that the person to whom the money is paid himself limits or extinguishes his interest in the land in consideration of such payment. Such limitation or extinction (if there can be said to be any) as results from the payment on account of the mortgage-debt is the legal consequence of such payment, and not the act of the mortgagee. The payment reduces the sum due at the time on the mortgage, and thus modifies the account between the mortgagor and mortgagee. But it does not operate to limit or confine within narrower limits the right or interest of the mortgagee in the land, which is simply to have the payment of the principal and interest secured on the mortgaged premises by some one or other of the remedies available for that purpose. Money paid on account of a mortgage-debt is not the consideration for the limitation or extinction of so much of the interest in the land created by the mortgage, and a receipt for such a payment need not therefore be registered under s. 17, cl. (b), of the Registration Act, III of 1877. *Dalip Singh v. Durga Prasad*, I. L. R. 1 All. 442, dissented from. *SHIDLINGAPA v. CHENBASAPA*.

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 235

86. — *Receipts given by mortgagee for payments on account of the mortgage-debt*. Unregistered receipts given by a mortgagee to a mortgagor for sums paid on account of the mortgage-debt are not inadmissible in evidence, under cl. (c), s. 17 of the Registration Act (III of 1877) *Shidlingapa v. Chenbasapa*, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 235, followed. *ANNAPA v. GANPATHI*.

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 181

87. — *receipt for payment of mortgage-money*. The payment of money by a mortgagor to a mortgagee in satisfaction of the mortgage-debt is a payment of consideration on account of the extinction of the mortgagee's right within the meaning of cl. (c), s. 17 of Act VIII 1871 (Registration Act). A receipt for such payment is therefore a document of which the registration is compulsory, and which, if unregistered, is inadmissible in evidence under s. 49. *Dalip Singh v. Durga Prasad*, I. L. R. 1 All. 442; *Basawa v. Kalkapa*, I. L. R. 2 Bom. 489; *Mahadaji v. Vyankaji Govind*, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 197; and *Ramapa v. Umanna*, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 123, followed. *Shidlingapa v. Chenbasapa*, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 235, dissented from. *Mattongeny Dassee v. Ramnarain*

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*Shadkhan*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 83, referred to. *IMDAD HUSAIN v. TASADDUK HUSAIN* I. L. R. 6 All. 335

88. — *Receipt by mortgagee setting forth a settlement of mortgage accounts—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 92, cl. 4*. In 1875 certain lands were mortgaged for R675. The mortgage-bond provided that the mortgagee was to enjoy the rents and profits in lieu of interest on R475, and that the remaining R200 were to carry interest at 6 per cent. per annum. In 1880 a receipt was passed by the mortgagee to the mortgagor reciting that on taking accounts R525 was due on account of the mortgage, that R100 was paid on the day of the receipt, that a further sum of R100 was to be paid in a month and-a-half, and that the rents and profits of the property were in future to be taken for the interest on the balance of R325 only. In 1896 the mortgagor sued for redemption, and relied on the receipt in support of his case. *Held*, that the receipt did not require registration. It purported to be a mere settlement of accounts, and was not intended to modify or supersede the original mortgage contract. Cl. 4, s. 92, of the Evidence Act (I of 1872) had therefore no application to the case. *LAKSHMAN v. DAMODAR*. I. L. R. 24 Bom. 609

89. — and s. 49—*Mortgage-bond—Indorsement of part-payment—Receipt*. The strictest construction should be placed on the prohibitory and penal sections of the Registration Act, which impose serious disqualifications for non-observance of registration. An instrument to come within s. 17 (b) of the Registration Act (III of 1877) must in itself purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit, or extinguish some right, title, or interest of the value of R100 or upwards in immoveable property. To come within s. 17 (c) it must be on the face of it an acknowledgment of the receipt of payment of some consideration on account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation, or extinguishment of such a right, title or interest. In a suit by a mortgagee for the sale of immoveable property mortgaged in certain simple mortgage-bonds for amounts severally exceeding R100, the defendant pleaded that he had made certain payments in respect of the bonds, and in support of his plea relied on indorsements of payment upon them, one of which was as follows: "Paid on the 21st December R300." The other indorsements were in similar terms. *Held*, by the Full Bench (STRAIGHT, J., doubting), that the indorsements even if assumed to be receipts, did not fall within s. 17 (b) of the Registration Act, inasmuch as a receipt, unless so framed and worded as to purport expressly to limit or extinguish an interest in immoveable property (which the indorsements did not), could not come within the section, and what ordinarily operated to limit or extinguish a mortgagee's interest in the mortgaged property was not the paper receipt, but the actual part-payment of the mortgage-debt. *Held*, also,

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that the indorsements did not fall within s. 17 (c) of the Act, inasmuch as, taken by themselves, they were merely memoranda made by the mortgagee, and could not be treated as acknowledgments, nor even if assumed to be such, did they show, upon their face, that they were acknowledgments, of the receipt or payment of any consideration for the limitation or extinguishment of any interest of the mortgagee in the mortgaged property. *Held*, therefore, that the indorsements did not require to be registered in order to make them admissible in evidence of the payments to which they related. *Mahadaji v. Vyankaji Govind*, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 179; *Basawa v. Kalkapa*, I. L. R. 2 Bom. 489; *Faki v. Khotu*, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 590; *Waman Ram Chandra v. Dhondiba Kisnaji*, I. L. R. 4 Bom. 126; *Futteh Chand Bahoo v. Leclumber Singh Doss*, 14 Moo. I. A. 1:9; and *Imdad Husain v. Tasaddak Husain*, I. L. R. 6 All. 335, distinguished. *Dalip Singh v. Durga Prasad*, I. L. R. 1 All. 442, referred to *JIWAN ALI BEG v. BASA MAL*

I. L. R. 9 All. 108

**90. — Agreement to renew kanom—***Agreement to renew a kanom and to credit as renewal fees a sum of money then due by plaintiff to defendant—Portion of agreement severable from rest—Admissibility in evidence of portion though unregistered.* A written agreement to renew a kanom and to credit as renewal fees two sums of money then due is not an acknowledgment of money paid for the creation of interest in land within the meaning of s. 17 (c) of the Registration Act, and therefore inadmissible in evidence, though unregistered. *Held*, that in such an agreement the agreement to renew is severable from the rest of the agreement, and the document, though unregistered, is admissible in evidence of the agreement to renew, even if it were inadmissible for other purposes. *KRISHNAN NAM-BUDRI v. RAMAN MEMON* . I. L. R. 20 Mad. 484

**91. — Receipt showing payment of money—***Document proving extinction of mortgage right.* Plaintiff purchased a portion of certain land from two persons who owed him money on mortgage-bond and took as mortgage over another portion, taking possession of the whole estate as security for the balance of his debt. He then permitted defendants to purchase a portion and to take a mortgage over the remainder of the lands, and gave them possession, on condition that they should pay to him the said balance that was due. Plaintiff, alleging that defendants had failed to pay him the balance, now filed this suit to recover possession of the land. Defendants contended that the balance had been duly paid, and in support of that contention produced a receipt which, however, was held to be inadmissible in evidence for want of registration. Oral evidence of the alleged payment was also excluded. *Held*, that the receipt had been wrongly excluded. It did not purport to extinguish the mortgage right, and, even if it did so, it was receivable as evidence of the payment, oral

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evidence as to which was also admissible. *APPAM-MA NAYURALU v. RAMANNA* I. L. R. 23 Mad. 92

**92. — and cl. (h)—Receipt for purchase-money—***Document creating or extinguishing a right to immovable property.* The plaintiffs sued to recover the property sold to them by the defendants. The defendants set up a re-purchase and produce a receipt passed to them by the plaintiffs which stated that the plaintiffs had no longer any interest in the property, and that they would execute a new sale-deed. The plaintiffs contended that the receipt required registration. *Held*, that, as the receipt created or declared or extinguished a right to the property with a superadded covenant to execute a stamped document to the same effect on a future occasion, it required registration. *PARASHRAM v. GANPAT*. I. L. R. 21 Bom. 533

**93. — cl. (d)—Unregistered lease.** By Act XVI of 1864, no unregistered lease for a term exceeding a year could be received in evidence in any civil proceeding, however small the value of the property leased. *OMAR v. ABDOL GUFFOOR*. . . . . 9 W. R. 425

**94. — Kabuliat—Lease.** A kabuliat was not a "lease" within the meaning of s. 13, Act XVI of 1864. *AMJED ALI v. ALA BUKSH* 9 W. R. 537

*HUR CHUNDER GHOSE v. WOOMA SOONDUREE DOSSEE* . . . . . 23 W. R. 170

**95. — Lease for more than a year—***Liability under unregistered lease.* Where a house is let for a term exceeding a year, the registration of the kabuliat is compulsory; and no action will lie for the recovery of the rent stipulated to be paid under the kabuliat if that document is unregistered. A party who retains and holds a building under such unregistered kabuliat is nevertheless bound to pay a reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy thereof. *PUROMA SOONDUREE DOSSEE v. PROLLAD CHUNDER DASS* 12 W. R. 289

**96. — Pottah—Agreement between landlord and tenant—Pottah—***Mad. Act VIII of 1865.* An agreement between a landlord and tenant in the Presidency of Madras for more than one year is a pottah within the meaning of Act VIII of 1865, and consequently exempted from registration under Act XX of 1866. *VAKATY RAMAREDDY v. DUVVURU AYAPPAREDDY* . . . . . 7 Mad. 234

**97. — and s. 49—Agreement for lease—***Evidence.* Under cl. (d) s. 17, of the Registration Act, III of 1877, an agreement for a lease needs registration if the parties to such agreement intend to create a present demise. Although the agreement may contemplate a formal document being subsequently executed, the paramount intention, as gathered from the whole of



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the instrument, must prevail. PURMANANDDAS  
JIWANDAS v. DHARSEY VIRJI.

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 101

98. Lease—Agreement for lease—Doul durkhast—Proposal—Acceptance—Contract. Every lease, or agreement for a lease in writing, must be registered before being given in evidence. But a proposal in writing to take a lease of certain lands on certain terms, made by one person to another, need not be registered, unless the proposal in writing has been so accepted that the proposal and acceptance constitute a contract in writing. SUFDAR REZA v. AMZAD ALI.

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 703; 10 C. L. R. 121

LUCHMISSUR SINGH v. DAKHO. LUCHMISSUR  
SINGH v. RUNGAL.

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 708; 10 C. L. R. 127

99. Proposal to pay rent—Doul darkhast—Lease—Agreement to lease. Whether a doul darkhast amounts to nothing more than a proposal by a tenant to pay a certain rent for certain land, it does not amount to a lease or to an agreement for a lease, and does not therefore require registration. But if the proposal has been so accepted that the proposal and acceptance constitute a contract in writing, then such contract must be registered. Choonee Mundur v. Chundee Lall Dass, 14 W. R. 178, and Meheroonissa v. Abdool Gunee, 17 W. R. 569, distinguished. LAL JHA v. NEGRO.

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 717

100. Agreement to execute lease. Where defendants had contracted to execute a murasli pottah of certain land at a given rent for a consideration of which a portion was paid as earnest-money, and the balance was to be paid within fifteen days, and had agreed that, if they failed to execute the pottah, the baena-pottro was to be considered a pottah, and plaintiff on allegation of failure sued the defendants for possession on the footing that the baena-namah was a mirasi pottah:—Held, that the deed under which the plaintiff sued was a pottah, and under cl. 2, s. 17 of Act XX of 1866, an instrument the registration of which was compulsory. As an unregistered document, it could not hold its ground against a registered pottah put in by intervenors. NUND RAM GHOSE v. MAUNOO BIBEE.

10 W. R. 177

101. Lease or agreement to lease. In a suit for possession of certain property and for the execution of a pottah, it appeared that two of the defendants had executed an agreement which was duly registered, by which they acknowledged the receipt of a portion of the salami and covenanted to execute a pottah on a certain day. This agreement was afterwards confirmed by two of the defendants who were minors when it was entered into: the confirmation was by deed, which was duly registered. Subsequently all the defendants executed a document, which provided for the

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payment of a portion of the salami on the day when possession should be given as provided in the first agreement, and for the payment of the remainder by instalments which were to carry interest. This document was not registered. Held, that it was not a "lease or agreement to lease" within the meaning of s. 17 of the Registration Act and was admissible in evidence. KEDARNATH MITTER v. SURENDRO DEB ROY.

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 865; 13 C. L. R. 58

102. Lease—Usufructuary mortgage—Act XVI of 1864, ss. 13, 14. B sued for possession of certain lands on a contract embodied in a document which purported to grant B possession of these lands for a period of six years on payment of R99. Held, that the document in question was not a lease; but a usufructuary mortgage, and that the consideration-money being less than R100, its registration under Act XVI of 1864 was merely optional. ISHAN CHANDRA v. SUJAN BIBI.

7 B. L. R. 14; 15 W. R. 331

103. Lease—Agreement to lease—Contract of special nature. Held, that certain letters forming a correspondence which had passed between the parties did not require registration, for they did not amount to a lease or an agreement for a lease, but were evidence of a contract of a special character not coming within any of the definitions in the Registration Act. PORT CANNING LAND COMPANY v. SMITH.

21 W. R. 315; L. R. 1 I. A. 124

104. Lease at an annual rent. A lease for no definite time, but fixing an annual rent (sone-bosone) falls within cl. 4 of s. 17 of Act XX of 1866, and must be registered in order to be admissible in evidence. RAMKUMAR MANDAL v. BRAJAHARI MRIDHA.

2 B. L. R. A. C. 75; 10 W. R. 410

105. Lease for more than a year—Condition which may shorten term. A lease for more than a year is not the less a lease because a condition is attached to the consideration, and because its term may be lessened on the payment of a sum of money by the lessor. Such a lease cannot be used in evidence unless it is registered. BUKSH ALI BOOHEAN v. NUBOTARA.

13 W. R. 468

106. Lease with provision extending term. Where a kabuliati for one year contains a provision extending its term to more than that period, it cannot be admitted in evidence without registration. KISTO KALEE MOONSHEE v. AGEMONA BEWA.

15 W. R. 170

107. Lease with agreement for renewal on expiration. A kabuliati in which a raiyat agreed to hold under a pottah for a specified year, the agreement between the parties being that at the close of that period a fresh settlement would be made, was held to be a lease for one year, and not to need registration under Act XX of 1866 as being a lease for more than a year, although

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a clause intervened between the above clauses to the effect that year by year the raiyat would pay rent at the above rate. **JUGDESH CHUNDER BISWAS v. ABEDOLLAH MUNDUL . 14 W. R. 68**

**108.** ————— *Lease for more than a year—Lease with option of renewal.* Where a lease is only for one year with option to the lessor to allow the lessee to continue his tenure on the old conditions after expiration of the year:—*Held*, that the absolute right of the lessee is restricted to one year, and that the lease is therefore one year's lease, the registration of which is not necessary. **SOUTH PERSAD DASS v. PARASU PADHAN. SOUTH PERSAD DASS v. RUGHOO PADHAN . 26 W. R. 98**

**109.** ————— *Lease for so long as tenant continues to pay.* A lease for so long as the lessee or tenant continues to pay the stipulated rent is a lease not limited to a year, and must be registered under s. 17 of the Registration Act of 1866, and, not being registered, cannot be received in evidence under s. 49 of that Act. **SHEOGHOLAM v. BUDDREE NATH . 4 N. W. 36**

**110.** ————— *Zur-i-peshgi lease—"Leases not exceeding one year," Meaning of.* Leases which were exempted from the operation of s. 17, cl. 2, Act XX of 1866, were leases the term of which was one year certain. Where a zur-i-peshgi lease was granted for one year, but with a stipulation that unless the loan were repaid within that time it should continue in force:—*Held*, that such a lease came within the words of s. 17, cl. 4, Act XX of 1866, "leases of immoveable property for any term exceeding one year" of which registration was compulsory. **BHOBANI MAHTO v. SHIBNATH PARA . I. L. R. 13 Calc. 113**

**111.** ————— *Lease for one year—Lease exceeding one year—Option of renewal.* A lease for one year, containing an option of renewal for a further period of one year, is not a lease for a term exceeding one year within the meaning of cl. (d), s. 17 of the Registration Act, so as to render registration thereof compulsory. Certain correspondence passed between the plaintiff and the defendant relating to a lease of a flat in premises in occupation of the plaintiff which admittedly contained an agreement for a lease for one year with an option of renewal for another year. The terms in which the option was given were as follows: The defendant in one letter wrote, "So I expect you will give me the option of renewal for another year, respectively five months, on same terms." To which the plaintiff replied, "You may have the option of retaining it (the flat) for another year on the same terms, but not for a shorter period." In pursuance of an arrangement, the defendant had a draft lease prepared embodying the terms agreed on, which he sent to the plaintiff for approval, and which was in due course returned by him "approved." The defendant then had the lease engrossed and properly stamped, but the plaintiff eventually refused to execute it, and it was never signed by the

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defendant. The option of renewal was given in the unexecuted lease in the following terms: "Also with option to renew for another twelve months certain." The defendant having entered into possession and disputes having arisen, the plaintiff gave him notice to quit and sued to eject him, alleging that at the most he was a mere monthly tenant. The defendant pleaded that under the lease he was entitled to hold for a year. The year expired before the suit came on to be heard, and the defendant, not having exercised the option to renew, vacated the premises. At the hearing the defendant in support of his case, tendered the correspondence and the stamped unexecuted lease. It was objected that the correspondence was inadmissible in evidence, because the option to renew made the period for which the lease was to run exceed one year, and therefore rendered registration compulsory. On behalf of the defendant it was urged that registration was unnecessary, as the option did not make the lease one for a longer period than one year, and that the stamped unexecuted lease must be treated as part of the correspondence. *Held*, following *Hand v. Hall, L. R. 2 Ex. D. 355*, that the existence of the option did not create a lease for a term exceeding one year within the meaning of cl. (d), s. 17 of the Registration Act, and that consequently the correspondence did not require registration. **Bhobani Mahto v. Shibnath Para, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 113**, dissented from. **BOYD v. KREIG I. L. R. 17 Calc. 548**

**112.** ————— *Lease reserving annual rent—Tenancy-at-will.* The defendant executed to the plaintiff a rent note under which he rented two houses from the plaintiff at a rent of Rs 18 per annum. The document provided that the defendant was to live in the said houses so long as the plaintiff permitted him to do so, and so long as he should pay the rent. He was to vacate when asked to do so by the plaintiff. *Held*, that the lease created a tenancy-at-will, and did not require registration, although an annual rent was reserved thereby. **JIVRAJ GOPAL v. ATMARAM DAYARAM I. L. R. 14 Bom. 319**

**113.** ————— *Settlement papers given by raiyats.* Settlement papers prepared at the beginning of each year and signed by the raiyats setting forth the quantity of nugdee lands to be held and the amount of rent to be paid by each tenant during the year are admissible in evidence, and do not require registration, provided the amount of rent therein agreed to be paid is under Rs 100, and the term is for only one year. **NUSRUN v. RAM DEBUL SINGH . 17 W. R. 273**

**114.** ————— *Lease—Lease for one year at a rental of more than Rs 100—Evidence—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 4 and 107.* The owner of certain land exchanged it for certain other land, but took a lease for one year of the former land and paid the rent thereof, and received and retained the rents of the land he had acquired by the exchange. *Held*, in a suit for recovery of



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possession on the expiry of the lease, that the fact that such a lease recites the fact of the exchange of the lands does not evidence the exchange, and as such create a title in land. Nor does the fact that the rent reserved under the lease is more than R200 create an interest in land of R100 and more in value, so as to necessitate registration of the lease under s. 17 of the Registration Act. Such a lease falls under s. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. The provisions of which sections are, by s. 4 of the Act, supplemental to the Registration Act.

SEETHARAMA RAJU v. BAYANNA PANTULU

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 275

115. — *Lease for life of the lessee.* A lease of immoveable property for the life of the lessee is a lease for a term exceeding one year. It therefore requires registration.

PARSHOTAM VISHNU v. NANA PRAYAG

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 109

116. — *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 4 and 107—Lease of a shop for three years.* Leases falling under s. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act are compulsorily registrable notwithstanding the Government notification issued under the proviso to s. 17 (d) of the Registration Act.

VAIRANANDA NADAR v. MIYAK ROWTER

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 109

117. — *Kabuliat or lease—Lease for so long as landlord might leave land with tenant.* A kabuliat of lease, under which the tenant might claim possession of the land for one year, but was to pay rent to the landlord so long as the landlord might leave the land with the tenant, did not require registration.

JAGJIVANDAS JAWHERDAS v. NARAYAN LAKSHMAN PATIL

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 493

118. — *Lease—Compulsory registration.* Where a lease deed contained a clause whereby the tenancy thereunder was absolutely determinable at any moment at the option of the lessor, it was held that such deed was not compulsorily registrable under s. 17 of the Registration Act, notwithstanding that it also contained provisions for an "annual rental" and for payment of "rent in advance each year," provisions which had they stood alone, would have raised a presumption that a tenancy exceeding a year was contemplated.

Jagjivandas Jawherdas v. Narayan, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 493; Morton v. Woods, L. R. 3 Q. B. 658; and Hand v. Hall, L. R. 2 Ex. D. 355, referred to and approved.

RATNASABHAPATHI v. VENKATACHALAM

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 271

119. — *Bhadekhat—Lease.* Held, that a *bhadekhat* is an agreement between a lessee and a lessor in the nature of a counterpart of a lease, and that an instrument of this character must, for the purposes of the Registration Act, be treated as a lease. Held, also, that a provision in the *bhadekhat*, that the lessee might after six months remain in occupation at a monthly rent, till the lessor called upon him to vacate, did

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not extend the term for which the lease was granted, as to the conclusion of that term the lessee would be only monthly tenant of the lessor, and therefore it did not require registration under s. 17 of Act XX of 1866.

MORO VITHAL v. TUKARAM VALAD MALHARJI

5 Bom. A. C. 92

120. — and s. 49—*Lease—Lease from year to year.* In a suit for possession of a piece of land, and for rent of the same, the plaintiff produced in support of his claim two sarkhats or kabuliats purporting to be executed in his favour by the defendants, and dated respectively in January 1875 and June 1876. These documents were not registered. The first, after reciting that the executant had taken the land from the plaintiff on a specified yearly rent and promised to pay the same yearly, proceeded as follows: "If the owner of the land wishes to have it vacated, he shall give me fifteen days' notice and I will vacate without making objection; if I delay in vacating the land, the owner can realize by recourse to law, rent from me at the rate of RS per annum." The second sarkhat, after reciting that the executants had taken the land from the plaintiff on a yearly rent specified for six years and promised to pay the same year by year, proceeded thus: "And if the said Shaikh wishes to have the land vacated within the said term, he shall first give us fifteen days' notice, and we will vacate it without objection." The lower Courts held that the sarkhats were not admissible in evidence, as they required registration under s. 17 (4) of the Registration Act VIII of 1871, being leases of immoveable property from year to year or reserving a yearly rent. Held, that the two sarkhats created no rights except those of tenants-at-will, inasmuch as the clause common to both to the effect that at any time, at the will of the lessor, the lessees were to give up the land at fifteen days' notice, governed all the previous clauses, and the defendants could be asked to quit at any time before the lapse of the term at fifteen days' notice. Held, therefore, that the leases did not fall under s. 17 (4) of Act VIII of 1871; that their registration was not compulsory; and that they could not be excluded from evidence under s. 49 of Act III of 1877, which governed the question of admissibility, while Act VIII of 1871 governed the question whether registration was or was not compulsory.

KHODA BAKHSH v. SHEO DIN

I. L. R. 8 All. 405

121. — *Lease—Exemption from registration by Government.* Leases for a term not exceeding five years, with a rent reserved not exceeding R50 being exempted by the local Government from registration:—Held, that a potta for one Fasli to remain in force until another pottah is granted, with a rent reserved of R110 did not fall within the exemption. Held, also, that such a pottah was a lease for a term exceeding one year and not a lease for a year, and therefore subject to the general provision of cl. (d), s. 17 of



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the Registration Act, 1877. VENKATACHELLAM CHETTI v. AUDIAN . . . I. L. R. 3 Mad. 358

122. ————— Exemption from registration—Lease for one year and till another lease is executed. A muchalka executed for one Fasli to remain in force until the execution of a fresh muchalka, for a rent less than R50, is exempted from registration by virtue of the notification of the Local Government under s. 17 of the Registration Act, which exempts from registration leases the terms granted by which do not exceed five years, and the annual rents reserved by which do not exceed R50. VIRAMMAL v. KASTURI RUNGAYANGAR I. L. R. 4 Mad. 381

123. ————— Interest in immoveable property—Registration Act, s. 3—Document giving right to "cut and enjoy trees"—Lease—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 36—Injunction. The plaintiff (who held on lease a share in a village and in the trees standing in the village tank), in consideration of R200 and a promissory note for R3,200, executed in favour of the defendant a document by which he assigned to the latter the right "to cut and enjoy the trees, etc.," for a period of four years from its date. The instrument was not registered. The defendants felled the trees which were mature at the date of the instrument, and subsequently felled others since matured. The plaintiff now sued for a declaration of his title to the remaining trees and for an injunction to restrain the defendant from intermeddling therewith, alleging that he had sold to the defendant orally the right to fell only such trees as were then matured. Held, that the unregistered instrument purported to convey an interest in immoveable property, and was not a lease and was inadmissible in evidence; and that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief by way of injunction or otherwise. SEENI CHETTIAR v. SANTHANATHAN CHETTIAR I. L. R. 20 Mad. 58

124. cl. (h)—Agreement for lease. An agreement for a lease does not require registration. BHAIKARNATH KHETTRI v. KISHORI MOHUN SHAW . . . 3 B. L. R. Ap. 1

ABDUL VIDONA JONAS v. HARONE ESMILE 7 B. L. R. Ap. 21

125. ————— Dowl-durkast—Document preliminary to lease. A dowl-durkast being only a preliminary to a lease, does not require registration. MEHEROONISSA v. ABDOL GUNEE . . . 17 W. R. 509

126. ————— Dowl or amulnama. The registration of a dowl or an amuldaree, which are mere preliminaries to a lease, was not compulsory under s. 13, Act XVI of 1864. GOLUCK KISHORE ACHARJEE (CHOWDHRY) v. NUND MOHUN DEV SIRCAR . . . 12 W. R. 394

127. ————— Dowl-durkast—Proposal by tenant to pay rent. Where a dowl-

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durkast amounts to nothing more than a proposal by a tenant to pay a certain rent for certain land, it does not amount to a lease or an agreement for a lease and does not therefore require registration. But if the proposal has been so accepted that the proposal and acceptance constitute a contract in writing, then such contract must be registered. CHOONEE MUNDUR v. CHUNDEE LALL DOSS, 14 W. R. 178, and MEHEROONISSA v. ABDOL GUNEE, 17 W. R. 509, distinguished. LALL JHA v. NEGROO I. L. R. 7 Calc. 717

SUFDAR REZA v. AMZAD ALI I. L. R. 7 Calc. 703: 10 C. L. R. 121

LUCHMISSUR SINGH v. DAKHO. LUCHMISSUR SINGH v. RUNGAL I. L. R. 7 Calc. 708: 10 C. L. R. 127

128. ————— Intention to create present demise—Intention to execute more formal document. An agreement for a lease needs registration if the parties to such agreement intend to create a present demise. Although the agreement may contemplate a formal document being subsequently executed, the paramount intention as gathered from the whole of the instrument must prevail. PURMANAND DAS JIWANDAS v. DHARSEY VIRJI . . . I. L. R. 10 Bom. 101

129. ————— Petition asking for lease. S. 17, Act XX of 1866, does not provide for the registration of a petition asking for a lease. CHOONEE MUNDUR v. CHUNDEE LALL DOSS 14 W. R. 178

s.c. on review . . . 14 W. R. 334

130. ————— Agreement to mortgage—Equitable mortgage. Documents amounting to an equitable mortgage when creating an interest in land of the value of R100 or upwards require registration under s. 17 of the Registration Act; but documents, when amounting merely to an agreement to mortgage, do not require registration under that section. Such documents are therefore available in evidence as agreements to mortgagee without registration, but for the purpose of proving an equitable mortgage they must be registered before they are available in evidence. BENGAL BANKING CORPORATION v. MACKERTICH I. L. R. 10 Calc. 315

131. ————— Amuldustuks—Agreements preliminary to main contract. It was not intended that compulsory registration under s. 13, Act XVI of 1864, should apply to deeds, like amuldustuks, which are merely preliminary to the main contract or engagement, or that deeds which are steps in, or mere parts of a transaction, should be registered before they can be used as evidence. BUNWAREE LAL v. SUNGUM LAL . . . 7 W. R. 280

See RAMTONOO SURMAH SIRCAR v. GOUR CHUNDER SURMAH SIRCAR . . . 3 W. R. 64  
and SHIBKISHEN DOSS v. ABDOL SOBHAN CHOWDHRY . . . 3 W. R. 103



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132. ——— Deed of agreement to sell at future time—*Act XIX of 1843*. A deed of agreement to sell at some future period may be registered under *Act XIX of 1843*. *SHIBKISHEN DOSS v. ABDOL SOBHAN CHOWDHRY* 3 W. R. 103

See *RAMIONOO SURMAH SIRCAR v. GOUR CHUNDER SURMAH SIRCAR* . . . 3 W. R. 64

*NUDDER CHAND SEIN v. KISHOREE LALL CHUCKERBUTTY* . . . 7 W. R. 463

133. ——— “Bargain-paper”—*Agreement for sale of land contemplating future deed*. A “bargain-paper” for the purchase of immoveable property above the value of R100, which contemplates the execution of a future conveyance, does not require registration. *JUSAB HAJI JAFAR v. GUL MUHAMMAD* . . . 12 Bom. 175

134. ——— Document not itself creating an interest in immoveable property—“Bargain-paper.” An agreement, or “bargain-paper,” in writing, for the sale of a house by the defendants to the plaintiff, stated that the defendants had agreed to sell, and the plaintiff to buy, the house in question for R15,225, on the following conditions,—that the plaintiff should, on the execution of the bargain-paper pay R1,000 as earnest-money, and that the defendants were duly to make out a good title to the house, and get approved by the plaintiff’s solicitors, “as being of good title,” a deed of sale thereof, prepared according to law, within two months, the cost incidental to the preparation of the deed to be borne jointly by vendor and vendee; that on the execution of such deed and delivery of possession of the house to the plaintiff, the balance of the purchase-money was to be paid; that in case a good title to the house could not be made out, the bargain-paper was to be null, and the earnest-money was then to be returned to the plaintiff with interest, and any solicitors’ charges incurred were to be paid by the defendants. *Held*, that the document was admissible in evidence, though unregistered, as coming within the provisions of cl. (h) of s. 17 of the Registration Act III of 1877. *CHUNILAL PANALAL v. BOMANJI MANCHERJI*

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 310

135. ——— Document giving right to call for other instrument—*Contract for sale of immoveable property—Vendor and purchaser*. A contract for the sale of immoveable property recited that, on the date thereof, R100 had been received as earnest-money, and provided that within two months the vendor would execute a proper conveyance, and thereupon receive the balance of the purchase-money and give up possession. *Held*, that the document did not pass any right, title or interest in the property to the purchaser, but merely gave him a right against the vendor personally to call for a conveyance and possession on paying the balance of the purchase-money.

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*HORMASJI MANIKJI DADACHANJI v. KESHA FURSHOTAM* . . . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 13

See *KARALIA NANUBHAI MAHOMEDBHAI v. MAN-SUKHEAM VAKHATCHAND* . I. L. R. 24 Bom. 400

136. ——— Agreement to sell equity of redemption—*Document creating a right to obtain another document*—By an unregistered writing, dated the 17th April 1889, A agreed to sell to B certain landed property on his (B’s) paying off the mortgage-debt due upon it and a further sum of R1,500. The agreement also stated that B had on that day paid A the R1,500, and might pay off the mortgage-debt at anytime he liked, and that A would execute a valid deed of sale. In a suit brought by A upon the agreement the lower Court held that the agreement was an assignment of the equity of redemption and required registration, and that, being unregistered, the plaintiff’s claim based on it could not be maintained. On second appeal: *Held*, following *Chunilal Panalal v. Bomanji*, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 310, that the agreement did not require registration. *SHEIDHAR BALLAL KELKAR v. CHINTAMAN SADASHIV MEHENDALE*

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 396

137. ——— Suit for specific performance of contract to sell land—*Person claiming by subsequent title—Notice of prior contract—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 54—Contract for sale—Bainanamah—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 27—Legal and equitable rights—Registration Act (III of 1877), ss. 48, 50—Document creating a right to obtain another document—Unregistered document—Admissibility of evidence*. On the 27th December 1895 S executed an unregistered document bearing a one-anna receipt stamp in favour of J agreeing to execute a deed of conveyance of certain immoveable property in favour of J within a certain time, and acknowledging receipt of earnest-money. Subsequently on the 3rd January 1896 S executed a registered *bainanamah* in respect of the same property in favour of R and H, which was followed by a registered deed of conveyance in their favour, dated the 9th January 1896, and delivery of possession, although R and H had notice of the previous contract with J before the registration of the *bainanamah* and execution of the deed of conveyance in their favour. *Held*, that, having regard to s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and s. 27 (b) of the Specific Relief Act, in a suit for the specific performance of contract brought by J neither the *bainanamah* nor the deed of conveyance in favour of R and H could prevail against the prior unregistered contract of J. *Held*, further, that the unregistered document of the 27th December 1895 came under s. 17, cl. (h), of Act III of 1877, and was not inadmissible in evidence for want of registration; and that the registered *bainanamah* of the 3rd January 1896 did not take effect against it under s. 50 of that Act. *HURNANDUN SINGH v. JAWAD ALI* I. L. R. 27 Calc. 468

138. ——— and cl. (b)—*Document creating a right to obtain another document—Pleading*



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*admission—Effect of admission in pleading of execution of contract—Evidence to prove an admitted document not necessary—Evidence.* By an agreement, dated 2nd August 1880, the defendant agreed to sell to the plaintiff a certain piece of land with a dwelling house for R1,900. At the time of the execution of this agreement the plaintiff paid the defendant R100 earnest-money, and the agreement provided that the remaining R1,800 should be paid within a month from the date of the agreement when the deed of conveyance of the property should be executed. The material part of the agreement was as follows: "I have received from you R100, namely, rupees one hundred, as earnest (*i.e.*) at time of the execution of this bargain-paper. And as to the remaining R1,800, namely, one thousand and eight hundred, the same are duly to be paid to me within one month from this day, when you will get the deed (or) document made in your favour. And all the expenditure in respect of the deed (or) documents and transferring (the property) to your name you are duly to make on your account . . . on these terms this informal bargain-paper, having been written, is agreed to and delivered." The plaintiff sued for specific performance, and tendered the agreement in evidence, although unregistered. *Held*, that the document, although unregistered, was admissible in evidence under cl. (h) of s. 17 of the Registration Act III of 1877. Being unregistered, it could not create or assign the interest intended by the parties to be transferred, and being thus incapable of carrying out the primary intention of the parties, the agreement became one "merely creating a right to obtain another document which would, when executed," effect the desired purpose if the execution were accompanied with registration. The right given by the agreement was merely a right *in personam*, and the agreement was admissible in evidence to show the contract entered into for another conveyance, though not as a conveyance itself. **BURJORJI CURSETJI PRATHAKA v. MUNCHERJI KUYERJI**

**I. L. R. 5 Bom. 143**

**139.** ——— *Ikrar agreeing to execute deed—Optional registration—Admissibility of evidence.* Where a party borrowing money gave the lender an *ikrar* agreeing to execute a conveyance of certain landed property:—*Held*, that the instrument was in substance an agreement the registration of which was optional and which might be given in evidence in a suit for specific performance of the agreement to execute the conveyance for which it stipulated. **ASGUR ALI SHIKDAR v. MOTHORA NATH GHOSE** . . . **15 W. R. 354**

**140.** ——— and cl. (b)—*Document giving right to obtain another document.* Where by an *ikrarnama* tenants conjointly promised that they would sign, and have registered, *kabuliats* for rents at rates mentioned:—*Held*, that the document did not come under cl. (b) of s. 17 of the Registration Act III of 1877, as operating to create or declare an

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interest, but came under cl. (h) as a document merely creating a right to obtain another document, which would, when executed, create or declare an interest. **PERTAP CHUNDER GHOSE v. MOHENDRA-NATH PURKAIT** . . . **I. L. R. 17 Calc. 291**  
**L. R. 16 I. A. 233**

**141.** ——— and cl. (b)—*Document showing that a further deed was in contemplation as to same rights—Admissibility in evidence—Partition. deed of.* Where a deed of partition between a mother and her son declared certain existing rights in her over moveable and immoveable property above the value of R100:—*Held*, that, although the deed showed that the execution of another deed with reference to those rights was in contemplation, yet the deed was one the registration of which was compulsory under s. 17 of the Registration Act and, being unregistered, was not admissible in evidence of the mother's title to either the moveable or immoveable property. **LAKSHMAMMA v. KAMESWARA** . . . **I. L. R. 13 Mad. 281**

**142.** ——— *Letter acknowledging payment of consideration on account of creation of interest in land.* A wrote a letter to B stating that an agreement had been made between them that A should sell certain land to B for R4,500, that A had received R500 of this sum, and was only entitled to receive the balance after executing the sale-deed within a certain date, and had no connection whatever with the land. *Held*, that the letter not being registered, was not admissible in proof of the agreement to convey. **RAMASAMI v. RAMASAMI**  
**I. L. R. 5 Mad. 115**

**143.** ——— *Document containing covenants for title—Suit for breach of covenant.* A document containing covenants for title, though, no doubt, embodying "a transaction affecting immoveable property," is admissible in a suit for damages for breach of such covenants, provided the document conform to the requirements of the exceptive clause of s. 17 of Act III of 1877; but where, as in the present case, the evidence of the covenant is contained in a document itself purporting to assign an interest in immoveable property,—the covenant being ambiguous and uncertain without reference to such assignment,—the document is not excepted from the necessity of registration. **RAJU BALU v. KRISHNARAV RAMCHANDRA** . . . **I. L. R. 2 Bom. 273**

**144.** ——— cl. (n) and s. 18—*Receipt not affecting mortgage-debt.* Although under the Registration Act (III of 1873), s. 17, cl. (n), a receipt given by a mortgagee purporting to extinguish the mortgage-debt does require registration:—*Held*, that the language of the receipt in the present case did not indicate any intention to extinguish or limit the mortgagor's interest, and that therefore registration was unnecessary. **UPPALAKANDI KUNHI KUTTI ALI HAJI v. KUNNAM MITHAL KOTTAPRATH ABDUL RAHMAN**

**I. L. R. 19 Mad. 288**



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**145.** ———— *Receipt purporting to extinguish mortgage—Receipt only covering interest of one co-mortgagee.* The provisions of s. 17, cl. (n), of Act III of 1877 do not apply to a receipt which purports to extinguish not the entire mortgage, but only the rights under the mortgage of one of the co-mortgages. **SRI RAM v. KESRI MAL**  
**I. L. R. 18 All. 338**

and see CASES UNDER CL. (c) OF THIS SECTION.

**146.** ———— cl. (o)—*Certificate of sale—Sale of immoveable property.* A certificate of sale of immoveable property of the value of more than one hundred rupees must be registered, and the fact of sale cannot be proved except by the production of such certificate. **MULJI BECHAR v. ANUPRAM BECHAR** . . . . . **7 Bom. A. C. 138**

**PADU MALHARI v. RAKHMAI** . . . . . **10 Bom. 435****ANONYMOUS CASE** . . . . . **6 Mad. Ap. 40**

**147.** ———— *Certificate of sale—Priority of registered over unregistered deeds—Bom. Reg. IX of 1827, s. 3, cl. 2.* Held, that a certificate of sale was not a document of such a character as to be entitled by law to priority, by virtue of its being registered, over an unregistered lease, but that it came within the class of documents described in Regulation IX of 1827, s. 3, cl. 2, as judicial process, which may, at the option of the holder, be registered, but the force and effect of which is in no wise to depend on their being registered. **FAKIRCHAND GOVINDRAM v. KAHANDAS BHAGVANDAS**  
**3 Bom. A. C. 167**

**148.** ———— *Certificate of sale.* A certificate of sale requires registration under s. 17 of the Registration Act in order to make it admissible in evidence under s. 49 **HARKISANDAS NARANDAS v. BAI ICHHA**  
**I. L. R. 4 Bom. 155**

**149.** ———— *Certificate of sale—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 316.* Held, that a sale certificate granted under s. 316 of the Civil Procedure Code is not a document the registration of which is compulsory under the Registration Act, 1877, s. 17 (b). **MASARAT-UN-NISSA v. ADIT RAM**  
**I. L. R. 5 All. 568**

**HUSAINI BEGUM v. MULO** . . . . . **I. L. R. 5 All. 84**

**150.** ———— *Certificate of sale—Construction of Act—Maxim “Optimus legis interpret consuetudo.”* Sale certificates granted under the provisions of s. 259 of Act VIII of 1859 are not documents the registration of which is compulsory under the provisions of s. 17 of the Registration Act of 1871. **PROKASH CHUNDER DASS v. TARACHAND DASS** . . . . . **I. L. R. 9 Calc. 82 : 12 C. L. R. 1**

**151.** ———— *Certificate of sale—Admissibility in evidence—Evidence to prove sale.* A certificate of sale, issued under s. 259 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, is an “instrument” requiring registration within the meaning of Act XX

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of 1866, s. 17. Where such a certificate is not registered, other evidence is not admissible to prove the sale. *Per NANABHAI HARIDAS, J.*—An unregistered certificate of sale is not only inadmissible in evidence, but invalid. **PADU MALHARI v. RAKHMAI**  
**10 Bom. 435**

**LALBHAI LAKHMIDAS v. KANALUDIN HUSEN KHAN** . . . . . **12 Bom. 247***See HARRISHANDAS NARANDAS v. BAI ICHHA*  
**I. L. R. 4 Bom. 155**

**152.** ———— *Certificate of sale—Certificate of payment—Receipt—Beng. Reg. VIII of 1819, s. 15, cl. 1—Civil Procedure Code, VIII of 1859, s. 259 (X of 1877, s. 316).* A certificate of payment granted under the provisions of cl. 1, s. 15 of Regulation VIII of 1819, is admissible in evidence without being registered. *Quære :* Whether a sale certificate granted under Act X of 1877, s. 316 (corresponding to s. 259 of Act VIII of 1859), is admissible in evidence without being registered. **ABDOOL AZIZ BISWAS v. RADHA KANTO KOBIRAJ** . . . . . **I. L. R. 5 Calc. 226**

**153.** ———— *Certificate of sale. Quære :* Does a certificate of sale need registration ? **BENODI LAL GHOSE v. TAMIZUDDIN**  
**7 C. L. R. 115**

*See RAJKISHEN MOOKERJEE v. RADHA MADHUB HALDAR* . . . . . **21 W. R. 349**

**154.** ———— *Certificate of sale—Memorandum declaring person to be purchaser at sale.* What operates to create the property recognized as a right of occupancy is the revenue sale and consequent entry of the occupant's name in the Collector's books. A memorandum therefore declaring a person to be the successful bidder at the sale is not an instrument creating or declaring an interest in immoveable property and requiring registration under s. 17 of Act XX of 1866. **GHELABHAI BHIKARIDAS v. PRANJIVAN ICHHARAM**  
**11 Bom. 218**

**155.** ———— *Certificate of sale—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 259.* Under Act VIII of 1859, s. 259, and Act XX of 1866, s. 17 and s. 2, it was necessary to register the certificate of sale itself, and not merely the memorandum of the certificate of sale. **SRINIVASA SASTRI v. SESHAYANGAR** . . . . . **I. L. R. 3 Mad. 37**

**156.** ———— *Certificate of sale—Mortgage.* Where the Subordinate Judge of Dehra Dun made and signed the following endorsement on a deed of mortgage of immoveable property : “ This deed was purchased on the 1st December 1875, at a public sale in the Court of Dehra Dun by N and K, plaintiffs, for R2,400, under special orders passed by the Court on the 23rd November 1875, in the case of N and K, plaintiffs, against R, for self, and as guardian of the heir in possession of the estate left by M ”—*Held, Per SPANKIE, J.*, that this instrument operated as a



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sale certificate and consequently, as it related to immoveable property of the value of R100 and upwards, it required to be registered. *Held, per* OLDFIELD, J.—That as the instrument operated to assign the deed of mortgage to the auction-purchasers, it for the same reason required to be registered. *KANAHIA LAL v. KALI DIN*

I. L. R. 2 All. 392

157. ———— *Certificate of sale—Property sold in lots—Single sale-certificate for lots each under R100.* In compliance with an application for the sale of land to satisfy a decree, the Civil Court put up certain land to auction in four lots. One lot was purchased by the plaintiff for R88, and each of the other three were bought by him for less than R100, the price for the whole amounting to R111-8-0, for which amount the Court granted a single certificate of sale dated 10th February 1874. This certificate was never registered. The plaintiff applied to be put in possession, but, the defendant resisting him, his application was rejected. On the 16th of November 1879, the plaintiff brought this suit to have his right declared to the piece bought for R88 and to recover its possession. Along with the plaint the plaintiff produced the unregistered certificate of sale of the 10th February 1874. On the application of the plaintiff, another certificate for the same property was issued by the Court to the plaintiff on the 31st of October 1877, that is, three years after the confirmation of sale. This was registered on the 20th of December 1877, and was produced by the plaintiff in the proceedings which gave rise to the present suit. It was obtained by the plaintiff on the 23rd of February 1880, and tendered in evidence, but was rejected under s. 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure (XIV of 1882). *Held*, that, although the four lots purchased by the plaintiff at the auction-sale were included in one certificate of sale, such certificate, although one instrument in form, should, for the purpose of registration, be regarded as four separate certificates of the four several lots, each of which did not require registration. *DEVIDAS JAGJIVAN v. PIRJADA BEGAM*

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 377

158. ———— *Withdrawal petition setting out terms of compromise filed in Court—Subsequent suit for land referred to in the compromise—Necessity for registration.* In 1893, plaintiff sued defendants for possession of certain immoveable property. The parties then entered into a compromise, by the terms of which defendants were to give plaintiff a portion of the property sued for. They then filed a petition in Court, setting out the agreement at which they had arrived, and asking that the suit might be withdrawn. The Court thereupon ordered the suit to be struck off the file, and made an order as to costs. The agreement was never registered. Plaintiff, relying on the agreement, now sued to have it established and to recover possession of the pro-

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perty to which he was entitled under it. *Held*, that the agreement should have been registered, and that the suit brought on it must fail. *MUTHAYYA v. VENKATARATNAM* (1901)

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 553

159. ———— *Deed of gift of immoveable property—Registration by legal representative after death of donor—Validity of gift.* The voluntary registration of a deed of gift by the legal representative of the donor has the same effect as its voluntary registration by the donor himself in his lifetime. *MEIYYALU NADAN v. ANJALAY* (1902)

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 672

160. ———— *Petition settling disputes regarding immoveable property—Unregistered instrument—Non-testamentary document—Admissibility of evidence.* In proceedings for obtaining Letters of Administration, the parties having settled their disputes presented a petition to the Court to the following effect:—"That I, Gyanoda Sundari Dassi will get 10-anna share of all the moveable and immoveable properties left by Kristomoni deceased, and I, Ishwar Chandra Sarkar, will get the remaining 6-anna share." . . . "Be it explicitly expressed that after taking out the Letters of Administration I, Gyanoda Sundari Dassi, shall amicably take 10-anna share, and I, Iswhar Chandra Sarkar, shall take 6-anna share of the movable and immovable properties, after dividing the shares by demarcation." No order was made on this petition. The properties were of the value of over one hundred rupees. *Held*, that the petition, unless registered, would be inadmissible in evidence. *Pranal Anni v. Lakshmi Anni*, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 508, referred to. *KALI CHARAN GHOSAL v. RAM-CHANDRA MANDAL* (1903). I. L. R. 30 Calc. 783

161. ———— *cls. (b) and (h)—Deed of partnership—Partnership—Clause giving one partner only a right of redemption of mortgaged property—Document giving right to obtain another document—Evidence.* A deed of partnership, which contained a clause stating that the partnership property was mortgaged, and giving one only of the partners a right of redemption for and during a future period of limited duration, was *held* to declare a right in immoveable property, and therefore to need registration under clause (b) of s. 17 of the Registration Act (III of 1877), to make it admissible in evidence. *MAUNG PO HTI v. MAHOMED CASSIM* (1903)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1016

s.c. 7 C. W. N. 861

L. R. 30 I. A. 230

162. ———— *cl. (d)—Lease for agricultural purposes—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 107, 117—Lease reserving annual rent—Term exceeding five years.* Defendants executed an instrument by which they leased a betel garden from plaintiff for an indefinite period at an annual rent of R35. The instrument was not registered. Rent having fallen into arrears, plaintiff sued to recover the same, when it was pleaded in defence that the



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instrument of lease was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration. The Munsif dismissed the suit on the grounds (1) that the lease was not for agricultural purposes, and that therefore its registration was compulsory under s. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, and (2) that, assuming it to be an agricultural lease, its registration was compulsory under s. 17, cl. (d), of the Indian Registration Act, inasmuch as it was not a lease for a term not exceeding five years. On a petition being filed to revise the Munsif's decree: *Held*, (i) that a lease of land for the cultivation of betel is an agricultural lease, *Kunhayen Haji v. Mayan*, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 98, not followed; (ii) that, although the lease might continue beyond five years in the event of neither party determining it in the meanwhile, it was not a lease for a term exceeding five years as either party might determine it before the expiration of that period. *Virammal v. Rungayyengar*, I. L. R. 4 Mad. 381, followed. Inasmuch as the annual rent was under Rs 50, registration was optional, and plaintiff was not precluded from proving the letting by oral evidence or by proof of the unregistered instrument. *MURUGESA CHETTI v. CHINNATHAMBI GOUNDAN* (1901). I. L. R. 24 Mad. 421

163. — Agreement to lease—Darkhast application—Endorsement sanctioning application—Communication to applicant—Document not expressed to be for over five years nor for rent exceeding Rs 50 per annum—Necessity for registration. Application was made to a devasthanam for some waste land on darkhast. The manager of the devasthanam sanctioned the grant by endorsement on the darkhast application, and this was communicated to the applicant. The document did not in terms purport to be for a period exceeding five years, nor did the rent reserved by it exceed Rs 50 per annum. *Held*, that it must be taken to be an agreement to lease and in consequence subject to the provisions of the Registration Act as if it were a lease. But, treating it as a lease, it did not require registration under s. 17 of the Registration Act. It did not in terms purport to be for a period exceeding five years nor did the rent reserved by it exceed Rs 50 per annum. It was therefore exempted from registration by the notification of Government published under that section. The criterion for purposes of registration is what is expressed on the face of the document, not what incidents may be annexed by custom to a grant of the kind. Even though one such incident may be that the grantee is entitled to hold permanently, another would be that the tenant may relinquish the holding at the end of any fasli, and therefore before the expiration of five years. *RAMASWAMY AYYAR v. THIRUPATHI NAIK* (1904)

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 43

164. — cl. (e)—Composition deed—Conveyance—Trustees under the deed. The expression "Composition deed" as used in s. 17 (e) of the Registration Act, III of 1877, denotes a transaction entered into by a debtor, insolvent or

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in embarrassed circumstances, with his creditors with the object of paying the latter a composition upon their claims. The deed must in substance be of the nature of a composition, not a conveyance. Hence, where a debtor transfers his property to a creditor or creditors in consideration of his debts, i.e., when he parts with his rights absolutely, the transaction may partake of the nature of a composition, but it is in reality a conveyance. It is otherwise where with the consent of his creditors he parts with his property in favour of a trustee for the purpose of paying the composition upon the claims, and the trustee is authorized to deal with the property for that purpose. A composition deed for the benefit of all the creditors, not comprising the whole of the property of the judgment-debtor, is not void, if the transaction is fair and *bona fide* and in the ordinary course of business or upon the pressure of the creditors. It does not become void by the circumstance that it is signed by some only of the creditors, and that among them are some whose debts are barred by limitation. *MALUKCHAND AMARCHAND v. MANILAL NANSHA* (1904)

I. L. R. 28 Bom. 364

## 165.

## Release from mortgage—

Release of part of mortgaged property on part payment of mortgage debt effected by endorsement on Bond—Registration. A portion of certain property, the subject of a mortgage, was purchased by a stranger to the bond, who paid off a portion of the mortgage-debt, and on the bond the fact of payment together with the release of a specified portion of the mortgaged property was endorsed. *Held*, that such an endorsement did not require registration. *Gurdial Mal v. Jauhri Mal*, I. L. R. 7 All. 820, followed. *GANGA BAKSH v. JAGANNATH* (1905)

I. L. R. 27 All. 305

## 166.

## Assignment of arrears of profits—

Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 54—Registration—Lambardar and co-sharer. A deed of assignment of profits already due by a lambardar to a co-sharer does not require to be registered, either by virtue of s. 17 of the Registration Act, 1877, or by virtue of s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. *DAMODAR DAS v. GIRDHARI LAL* (1905). I. L. R. 27 All. 564

## 167.

## Sale of standing timber—

Registration—Immoveable property. *Held*, that a document, which purported to be a "theka" of a certain portion of a forest "for all kinds of trees" for two years was not a document conveying an interest in immoveable property and did not require to be registered. *Seeni Chettiar v. Santhanathan Chettiar*, I. L. R. 20 Mad. 58, distinguished. *MATHURA DAS v. JADUBIR THAPA* (1905). I. L. R. 28 All. 277

## 168.

## Conveyance by registered

deed to transferee, who has notice of previous agreement—Agreement to convey and possession given to transferee—Estoppel. It was agreed amongst certain successful plaintiffs, who by a



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decree of Court had become entitled to a large estate, that a certain relative, who had helped them in their suit should have a share in the property, and this agreement was carried out to the extent that this person's name was entered in the village papers as a co-sharer and he was put into possession by consent of the other co-sharers, but no conveyance of the share was executed and registered. Subsequently one of the original donors purported to sell the share so assigned to a person, who had notice of the terms upon which it was held by the original donee. *Held*, that this sale, even though carried out by means of a registered instrument, was ineffectual as against the rights of the original donee, inasmuch as both the vendor knew that in equity he could not have a title to convey, and the vendee also was aware that the vendor could not convey without committing a fraud on the original donee. *Benham v. Keane*, 1 *Johnson & Hemming*, 685, 702. *Greaves v. Tofield*, 1. R. 14 Ch. D. 563, and *Le Nere v. Le Nere*, 3 *Atk.* 646, referred to. *ANNU MAL v. COLLECTOR OF BAREILLY* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 315

169. ———— **Compromise of suit embodied in a decree—Registration.** In a suit for possession of certain plots of land reference was made as part of the evidence in the case, to a compromise in a previous suit relating to other lands, but which dealt also with the lands in suit and had been incorporated into the decree of the Court in the previous suit. *Held*, that such compromise did not require registration and was admissible in evidence. *Bindsri Naik v. Ganga Saran Sahu*, 1. L. R. 20 All. 171, and *Pranal Anni v. Lakshmi Anni*, 1. L. R. 22 Mad. 508, referred to. *Birbhadra Rath v. Kalpatara Panda*, 1 C. L. J. 388, considered. *RAGHUBANS MANI SINGH v. MAHABIR SINGH* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 78

170. ———— **Division of a mortgage into two to escape registration—Registration.** *Held*, that there is nothing in the Registration Act to render illegal the division of what was apparently one mortgage transaction relative to a loan of R198 into two mortgages of even date each for R99. *RAMJI MAL v. CHHOTE LAL* (1906)

I. L. R. 29 All. 50

171. ———— **Petition of compromise containing a recital of a previous oral agreement for lease—Stamp—Registration—Evidence.** Where a petition of compromise merely contained a recital of a previous oral agreement for lease :—*Held*, that it did not require registration or stamp. It was evidence of an oral agreement, but not an agreement in itself. *PITAMBAR GAIN v. UDDHAB MONDAL* (1908) . 12 C. W. N. 59

172. ———— **Suit for registration—Suits Valuation Act, s. 8—Suit for registration of document under s. 77 of Registration Act does not fall for purposes of Court-fees within s. 7, cl. (4) (c) of the Court Fees Act, but under Art. 17 (6) of Sch. II of the Act—Such suit to be valued for purposes of jurisdic-**

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tion on the value of the property. A suit for registration of a document under s. 77 of the Registration Act is not, for the purposes of payment of Court-fees, a suit for a declaratory decree with consequential relief within s. 7, cl. (4) (c) of the Court Fees Act, but is a suit in which it is not possible to estimate at a money value the subject-matter in dispute, within Art. 17 (6) of Sch. II of the Act. The Court-fee payable in such cases is a fixed fee of 10 rupees. *Jantoo v. Radha Canto Dass*, 1. L. R. 8 Calc. 515, followed. *Savarimuthu Pillai v. Alagiam Pillai*, 12 Mad. L. J. 88, followed. The question of valuation for purposes of jurisdiction is not in such cases to be decided under s. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. The value in such cases will be the value of the interest created by such document. *Ramakrishnamma v. Bhagamma*, 1. L. R. 13 Mad. 56, followed. *RAMU AIYAR v. SANKARA AIYAR* (1908) . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 89

173. ———— **Dastak.** A *dastak* which merely allows a tenant to take possession of the land and to cultivate it does not require registration as it is not a lease for any term exceeding one year or a lease from year to year or a lease reserving an annual rent. *AHMUD BEPARI v. TOHI MAHOMED* (1894) . 13 C. W. N. 267

174. ———— **s. 17 (1)—Hypothecation clause in consent-decree—Matters outside the scope of suit, if may be embodied—Terms introduced as a consideration for relief given—Registration—Registration Act (III of 1877), s. 17 (i)—Whether mortgage or charge—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 58, 100.** In a suit for recovery of money due on *bahi-khatta* accounts a decree was made upon a petition of compromise for the payment by the defendants of a certain sum by instalments. The decree further declared that certain immoveable properties specified in the petition of compromise "shall be hypothecated for the realisation of the money and that the defendants shall not be able to create any incumbrance on the same." *Held*, that having regard to cl. (1) of s. 17 of the Registration Act the latter clause, even if it amounted to a mortgage, would not require registration. *Bindsri Naik v. Ganga Saran Sahu*, 2 C. W. N. 129 : s.c. 1. L. R. 25 I. A. 9 : 1. L. R. 20 All. 171 ; *Pranal Annee v. Lakshmi Annee*, 3 C. W. N. 485 : s.c. 1. L. R. 26 I. A. 101 : 1. L. R. 22 Mad. 508, followed. *Raghubans Mani Singh v. Mahabir Singh*, 1. L. R. 28 All. 78 ; *Patha Muthammal v. Esup Rowther*, 1. L. R. 29 Mad. 365 ; *Gupta Narain Das v. Bijoya Sundari Debya*, 2 C. W. N. 663, referred to. That the hypothecation of immoveable property was the consideration for the time allowed for payment of the sum decreed by instalments, and thus formed an integral and necessary part of the adjustment of the claim in the suit ; and the Court did not act contrary to the provisions of s. 375 of the Civil Procedure Code, in inserting this clause in the consent decree. *Birbhadra v. Rath Kalpataru Panda*, 1 C. L. J. 388 ; *Gurdeo Singh v. Chandrikah Singh*, 5 C. L. J. 611, distinguished. *Raghubans*



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*Mani Singh v. Mahabir Singh*, I. L. R. 28 All. 78 ; *Gupta Narain Dass v. Bejoya Sundari Debya*, 2 C. W. N. 663 ; *Purna Chandra Surkar v. Nil-madhub Nandi*, 5 C. W. N. 485, relied on. *Held*, further, on the construction of the hypothecation clause, that it merely created a charge within the meaning of s. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act and not a mortgage within s. 58. *Tancred v. Delagoa Bay and East Africa Railway Co.*, 23 Q. B. D. 239 ; *Burlinsan v. Hall*, 12 Q. B. D. 347, relied on. The question whether any particular term of petition of compromise incorporated in a compromise decree relates to the suit or is covered by its subject-matter must be decided from the frame of the suit, the relief claimed and the relief allowed by the decree on adjustment by lawful agreement. The mutual connection of the different parts of the relief granted by a consent-decree is an important element for consideration in each case in deciding whether any portion of the relief is within the scope of the suit. No hard and fast rule can be laid down and each case must be governed by its own facts. *GOBINDA CHANDRA PAUL v. DWARKA NATH PAUL* (1908) . I. L. R. 35 Cal. 867 12 C. W. N. 849

175. — ss. 17, 18 cls. (d) and (f), 21, 24 and 77—Document relinquishing right of inheritance—*Transfer of Property Act* (IV of 1882), ss. 6, 19 and 21—*Succession Act* (X of 1865), s. 107—Document whereby a Mahomedan daughter relinquished her right of inheritance to her father's property—*Refusal to register on the ground that the document did not contain sufficient description of property—Discretion of Registrar—Vested or contingent interest—"Spes Successionis"—Alteration not affecting the legal effect of the contract.* A Mahomedan daughter executed in favour of her father a document under which, in consideration of her receiving R9,000, she relinquished her right of inheritance to the father's property and also to certain ornaments directed to be given to her by her mother. The document was presented for registration to the Sub-Registrar, who accepted the registration fee, which was endorsed on the document and subsequently refused to register the document on the ground that its execution was denied and that it did not contain sufficient description of the immoveable property to which it related—ss. 35 and 21 of the Registration Act (III of 1877). On appeal to the Registrar, he held that the execution of the document was proved, but refused registration on the ground that the provisions of s. 21 had not been complied with. Thereupon a suit having been filed under s. 77 of the Registration Act (III of 1877) for a decree directing registration of the document:—*Held*, allowing the claim, that s. 21 of the Registration Act (III of 1877) did not apply. The document could not be treated as relating to property because it related to mere heirship; much less could it relate to immoveable property capable of being described and identified. Supposing that s. 21 was applicable and that the document related to

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immoveable property, then the conditions of the section were satisfied, because under the document the executant gave up her right of inheritance to such of her father's immoveable property as he might leave on his death and that this is not only a sufficient, but the only description that could be given of the property. *Held*, further, that document did not fall within the category of any of the documents mentioned in s. 17 of the Registration Act (III of 1877). It fell within cls. (d) and (f) of s. 18 of the Act. It fell within cl. (d) of s. 18, because there was a release by the executant of her right to certain ornaments to which she had a present right. It fell within cl. (f) because it was a document under which the executant agreed to release her right as heir to her father and that belonged to a class of documents not mentioned in s. 17 and not falling within the preceding clauses of s. 18. Where a Sub-Registrar or Registrar receives a document and the registration fee, and endorses the payment on the document and issues a commission for taking evidence, he must be regarded as having exercised his discretion under s. 21 of the Registration Act (III of 1877) and accepted the document for registration. But even if there was at first no acceptance under that section, that being a matter in his discretion, the Court cannot, under s. 77 of the Act, question the subsequent exercise of such discretion. The discretion under s. 21 arises where a non-testamentary document "relates to immoveable property." Where it does not so relate, the section cannot apply and the discretion cannot arise. It is open for a Civil Court to enquire into such question in a suit under s. 77 of the Act. The right of a son or daughter or other heir of a person to inherit his property is not an estate in remainder or in reversion in immoveable property or an estate otherwise deferred in enjoyment. It is neither a vested nor a contingent right. It does not come within the definitions of "a vested interest" in s. 19 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), or of "a contingent interest" in s. 21 of the Act and s. 107 of the Indian Succession Act (X of 1865). So far from being a vested or a contingent right, or a right in present or in future, it is, in the language of cl. (a) of s. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), "the chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate" or "a mere possibility of succession" which cannot be transferred. A mere *spes successionis* is unknown to, and not recognised by, Mahomedan law. An alteration to be material for the purpose of registration must affect the legal effect of the contract so as to make it cease to be the same instrument. *ABDOOL HOOSEIN v. GOOLAM HOOSEIN* (1905) . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 304

176. — ss. 17 (b) and 47—Mortgage deed—*Date of execution of deed—Date of registration—Priority—Construction—Execution of the deed on plain paper—Subsequent registration—Complete transaction—Unpaid consideration-money.* On the 24th May 1900, the defendant No. 1 mortgaged



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certain lands to plaintiff for R1,300, of which R775 were in respect of past debts and R525 were to be advanced in cash. This latter sum the defendant No. 1 did not attempt to receive. The deed was written on a plain paper bearing one anna receipt stamp, and it was attested by two witnesses. The deed itself contained a recital that the mortgagor (defendant No. 1) was, within 15 days from its date, to execute a mortgage on a stamped paper and get it registered. This he failed to do. The plaintiff thereupon presented the original deed for registration on the 30th July 1900, and it was duly registered at a subsequent date on the payment of stamp duty and penalty. In the meantime, on the 4th June 1900, the defendant No. 1 sold five survey numbers from out of the above lands to the defendant No. 2; this sale-deed was registered on the 4th July 1900. On this latter date the defendant No. 1 mortgaged 4 more survey numbers out of the same property to defendant No. 3; and the deed was registered on the same day. The plaintiff then brought this suit to recover his money by sale of the property mortgaged to him. *Held*, that it was clear from the terms of the plaintiff's deed that legally the mortgage therein contained began to operate from the date of the document, that is, in other words, it was not a document, which merely created a right to demand another document, but created as between the parties a charge in the nature of a mortgage. *Purmanandas Jiwandas v. Dharsey Virji*, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 101, followed. *Held*, further, that the non-payment of R525 by the plaintiff could not affect the nature of the document itself or vary its terms: the defendant No. 1 could sue to recover the unpaid remainder or for damages. *Held*, also, that the plaintiff's document, though registered later than the deeds of defendants Nos. 2 and 3, was by virtue of its prior execution, entitled to priority over them under s. 47 of the Registration Act (III of 1877). *MOTICHAND v. SAGUN* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 46

## ss. 17, 48—

See EQUITABLE MORTGAGE.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 410

## ss. 17 (d), 49—

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, ss. 4, 107 . I. L. R. 32 Mad. 532

ss. 17, 49—Authority to adopt in writing and not contained in a will—Document not a testamentary disposition of property and not registered—Invalidity—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 91—"Grant"—Admissibility of evidence of authority to adopt. In a suit for a declaration that first defendant was not the adopted son of plaintiff's deceased brother, the first defendant and his mother relied on an authority to adopt, which was contained in a document, which they contended was a will of the deceased. This document, which had never been registered, and which was the only evidence of the

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alleged adoption, authorised the wife to adopt, and further authorised her to put into the possession of the adopted son all the properties which the deceased got under a certain decree, and all his immoveable properties, etc. *Held*, that the document was not a testamentary disposition of property within the meaning of s. 3 of Act V of 1881. It was an authority to adopt and nothing else, and the direction therein to put the adopted son into possession of the property could not be construed as a device of the property. It was simply a statement of the consequences that should legally follow on the adoption. *Bhoobun Moyee Debia v. Ram Kishore Acharj Chowdhry*, 10 Moo. I. A. 279, 312, referred to. The authority to adopt being in writing, and not being contained in a will, its registration was compulsory. *Quere*: Whether other evidence of such authority having been given could have been adduced under s. 91 of the Evidence Act. *SOMASUNDARA MUDALI v. DURAISAMI MUDALIAR* (1904)

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 30

## s. 18 (1871, s. 18; 1866, s. 18)—

See ante, s. 17, CLS. (b) AND (d).

See post, s. 28 . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 654

See VENDOR AND PURCHASER—COMPLETION OF TRANSFER.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 622

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 179

1. ——— Deed of assignment of mortgage—Consideration less than R100—Mortgage for R100 or more. A deed of assignment, for a consideration of less than R100, of a mortgage for a consideration of R100 or upwards, does not need registration. *SATRA KUMAJI v. VISRAM HASGAVDA* . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 97

2. ——— Lease—Lease expressing tenant's willingness to continue tenant after a year—Lease. A lease for one year certain containing an expression, on the tenants' part, of readiness to hold the land longer at the same rent if the landlord should desire it, is a lease for a term not exceeding one year, the registration of which is optional under s. 18 of the Registration Act (VIII of 1871). *APU BUDGAVDA v. NARHARI ANNAJEE*

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 21

3. ——— Lease for one year—Lease exceeding one year. A kabuliati dated the 6th May 1880, and executed by the lessee of a house in favour of the lessors, set forth that the house was let to the former at an annual rent of R3 for a term of one year. It also contained this stipulation: "I (the lessee) do declare that I shall continue to pay the annual rent every year, and that, if I should fail to pay the rent in any year, the owners of the house shall be at liberty to recover the rent through the Court." The lease was not registered. In a suit by the lessors against the lessee for possession of the house and for R7-8 arrears of rent, the defendant pleaded that, according to the right construction of the lease, he was



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entitled to occupy the house and the lessors were not entitled to eject him therefrom, so long as he paid the annual rent of R3; that he had duly paid rent at the agreed rate from the 6th May 1880 to the 6th May 1884; and that, under these circumstances, the plaintiffs were not entitled to either of the reliefs claimed. *Held*, that the lease was for one year only, and thus falling under s. 18 of the Registration Act (III of 1877), it was admissible in evidence without registration; that the defendant had been a mere tenant-at-will since the expiry of the year 1880-81; and that the plaintiffs were therefore entitled to possession of the house. *Hand v. Hall*, L. R. 2 Ex. D. 355, referred to. *KHAYALI v. HUSAIN BAKHSI* . . . I. L. R. 8 All. 198

4. ——— *Admissibility in evidence of unstamped and unregistered document—Entry in book showing extent of holding and rate of rent—Admission.* A lessor having let certain lands to a lessee under a verbal agreement, the lessee entered upon possession. Afterwards, and during the lessee's occupation, an entry showing the extent of the holding and the amount of rent payable in respect of it was made in a book of the lessor and signed by the lessee. In a suit subsequently brought by the lessor against the lessee for arrears of rent, the lessee did not deny that he was a tenant of the lessor, but disputed the extent of his holding and the rate of rent. *Held*, that the entry in the book of the lessor did not, although signed by the lessee, amount to a lease or to an agreement for a lease, but to an admission only, and could therefore be used as evidence against the lessee, although neither stamped nor registered. *NARAIN COOMARY v. RAMKRISHNA DASS*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 364 : 6 C. L. R. 286

5. ——— *Dowl fehrisht—Memorandum of rate of rent.* A *dowl fehrisht* being merely a memorandum by a zamindar's agent of the rates of rent agreed upon, and to which the tenants affix their signatures in token of such agreement, is not a contract, and does not require to be stamped or registered. *GUNGAPERSAD v. GOGUN SINGH*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 322

S. C. KARTICK NATH PANDAY v. KHAKUN SINGH

1 C. L. R. 328

6. ——— *Principal sum under R100—Interest—Interest in immoveable property.* A deed purporting to secure the sum of R95 advanced on certain properties giving the lender possession for a fixed period at a yearly rent of R8-12, R6-12 out of such rent being retainable by the lessee as interest on the sum advanced, does not require registration. *RAM DOOLARY KOOR v. THACOOR ROY*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 61 : 2 C. L. R. 547

7. ——— *Assignment of debt—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 8 and 54—Assignment of debts secured on land—Unregistered instrument of assignment.* In 1879 the defendants executed a hypothecation-deed, which was registered to secure

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the repayment with interest of a loan of RS7. In 1884, the obligee transferred his rights to the plaintiff, in consideration of R70, under an instrument which was not registered. At the date of the transfer of debt amounted with interest to R137. The plaintiff now sued to recover R129, being the principal and interest due on the hypothecation bond at the date of suit. *Held*, that registration of the deed of transfer was not compulsory, and the plaintiff was not precluded from proving the instrument of transfer and establishing his rights thereunder to a personal decree and to a charge on the land by reason of its not having been registered. *Satra Kumaji v. Visram Hasgavda*, I. L. R. 2 Bom. 97, referred to. *SUBRAMANIAM v. PERUMAL REDDI* I. L. R. 18 Mad. 454

8. ——— *Variation of lease—Subsequent written agreement to abate rent—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 107—Form of decree.* In the year 1879 the plaintiff granted a lease of certain land to the father of the defendants. In May 1889 he agreed in writing to allow the defendants an abatement of rent to the extent of R100 per annum. This agreement was not registered, but was stated in the plaint in a previous suit brought by the plaintiff. He subsequently brought a suit against the defendants for the recovery of the entire amount of the original rent. *Held*, that the agreement did not operate as a lease, but was merely a variation of the lease, and that therefore registration was not necessary. *Held*, therefore, varying the order of the District Judge, that the decree for the entire amount of the original rent must be set aside, and a decree made for the amount of rent due at the reduced rate. *SATYESH CHUNDER SIRCAR v. DHUNPUL SINGH*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 20

9. ——— *Document varying amount of rent.* A document given by the owner of land to his tenant varying the term of tenancy with reference to the amount of rent to be paid, is not an instrument relating to an interest in immoveable property, and does not require registration. *OBAI GOUNDAN v. RAMALINGA AYYAR*

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 217

s. 20—*Refusal of executing party to initial alteration—Registrable document.* Refusal by the executing party to initial an apparent alteration not materially affecting the instrument, unaccompanied by any suggestion that the alteration was improperly made after execution, does not render the document non-registrable. *In the matter of the petition of VENKATASAMI NAIK* . . . 4 Mad. 101

1. ——— *s. 21 (1871, s. 21; 1866, s. 21)—Requisites for registration—Description of property.* The only two things which are absolutely required by s. 21 of Act XX of 1866, as conditions without compliance with which registration is prohibited are, first, that the instrument shall contain a description of the property sufficient to identify it; and, secondly, that if the instrument contains a



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map, a copy or copies of the map shall accompany the instrument when presented for registration. The other provisions of s. 21 are directory only. The circumstance therefore that the description of the parcels in the instrument does not specify the registration district, or sub-district, or division, or village, in which the property is situate, or the former occupancy, is not alone sufficient to disentitle a party getting an instrument registered, if the description in the instrument is sufficient to identify the property. *In the matter of the petition of NARAINASAMI PILLAI* . . . . . **4 Mad. 91**

**2.** ————— *Presentation of two instruments—Description of property only in one.* Where two instruments are contained in the same paper and relate to the same property, and are both presented for, and in all other respects are entitled to registration, it is not a sufficient ground for refusing registration that in one of the documents the property is described only by reference to the other. Though in the later of two instruments there are no words directly referring to the first, yet the frame to the document showing that the second document should be taken to refer to the first, the second document must be taken to contain a sufficient reference to the first. *In the matter of the petition of VENKATASAMI NAIK* . . . . . **4 Mad. 101**

**3.** ————— and ss. 7 and 28—*Description of property in deed—Deed referring to land not in the sub-district of registering officer, a Sub-Registrar.* Certain property was described in a mortgage-bond as bearing towji No. 10, as paying a sudder jama of R719, and as lying within the jurisdiction of thana Kotwali, sub-district Bhagulpur, collectorate of Bhagulpur. This description was so far erroneous in that the property was in reality situated in thana Amarapur, sub-district Banka, and bore a sudder jama of R919-15. Banka was, however, within the area of the district of Bhagulpur. The mortgage-bond was registered by the Sub-Registrar of Bhagulpur who was, under s. 7 of the Registration Act, authorized, in addition to his own duties, to exercise and perform the duties and powers of the Registrar of Bhagulpur. *Held*, by PIGOT, O'KINEALY, MACPHERSON, and GHOSE, JJ. (PETHERAM, C.J., dissenting), that the provisions of s. 21 of the Act had not been complied with, that the description of the property was misleading and insufficient for the purposes of identification, and that therefore no registration of the document had been effected within the provisions of the Registration Act. *Held*, by PETHERAM, C.J., that the description was sufficient to identify the property, and that, the Sub-Registrar having been authorized to exercise the powers and duties of the Registrar of Bhagulpur and the property being situate in sub-district Banka, the Sub-Registrar of which sub-district was subordinate to the Registrar of the district of Bhagulpur, the provisions of s. 28 of the Act being directory only, registration of the document was valid. *BAIJ NATH TEWARI v. SHEO SAHOY BHAGUT*

**I. L. R. 18 Calc. 556**

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— s. 21—*concl'd.*

**4.** ————— and s. 60—*Description of property not contained in the body of the deed of conveyance, but inserted as a foot-note.* A conveyance of immoveable property did not contain in the body of the deed a description of it sufficient to identify it. In a foot-note, however, such a description was given, and it was signed by the assignee only. The deed was accepted by the Registrar, and was registered, and a certificate to that effect was given under s. 60 of the Registration Act (III of 1877). The deed, being tendered in evidence, was objected to on the ground that it ought to be treated as unregistered, since it had been improperly accepted for registration. *Held*, that the error in accepting it, if error there was, did not invalidate the registration: see *Sah Mukhun Lal Panday v. Sah Koon-dun Lal*, 15 B. L. R. 228: L. R. 2 I. A. 210. *ADAM ISUFBHAI v. JAMNADAS RANCHORDAS*

**I. L. R. 17 Bom. 94**

**5.** ————— *Defective description of property—Deed affecting land registered in wrong book—Suit by purchaser for value.* In a suit for land, forming part of the self-acquired property of a deceased Hindu, it appeared that in 1885 his widow and his cousin had (on the death without issue of his son) entered into an agreement whereby the latter relinquished in the widow's favour for consideration all his rights in the self-acquired property left by her husband. The agreement was registered in book No. 4 under the Registration Act, 1877, and it contained no such description of the property as to satisfy the requirements of s. 21. The plaintiff afterwards purchased the land now in question from the cousin; the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 having purchased it and obtained possession from the widow. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. *NARASAMMA v. SUBBARAYUDU.*

**I. L. R. 18 Mad. 364**

**ss. 21, 22, 76—Refusal to register—Suit to enforce registration—“Sufficient to identify the same”—Jaidad—Scope of s. 21—Letters relating to immovable property.** Where a letter purported to transfer immovable property and was presented as a non-testamentary document for registration which has refused on the ground that it contained no description of the property “sufficient to identify the same,” *held* that the refusal was, under the circumstances, proper. The provisions of s. 21, Registration Act, are positive and imperative, and not merely directory. *SAIYID MAHMUD v. MOHAMMAD ZUBAIR* (1909)

**I. L. R. 31 All. 523**

**s. 22—Sufficiency of description—Question as to nature or effect of document—Intention of parties.** When any question arises under the Registration Act as to the nature or effect of any instrument, or the sufficiency of any description contained in it, the Court must endeavour to gather from the words used the intention of the parties, and give effect to it, and not require as a condition of registration that the instrument be drawn up in



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technical language. *In the matter of the petition of VENKATASAMI NAIR* . . . 4 Mad. 101

1. — s. 23 (1871, s. 23; 1866, ss. 22, 24; 1864, s. 18)—*Time for presentation for registration—Power of Registrar to register deed after time specified in Act.* There was no provision in Act XVI of 1864 obliging or empowering a registrar to register a deed after the expiry of the time specified in s. 18, whether under a decree of Court of otherwise, except in cases which came under the provisions of s. 18. *MONMOHINEE DOSSEE v. BISHEN MOYEE DOSSEE. BISHEN MOYEE DOSSEE v. DELSHAD BIBEE* . . . 7 W. R. 112

2. — *Time for presentation for registration—Procedure.* Ss. 22 and 24 of Act XX of 1866 made it imperative that the instruments therein referred to should be presented for registration within four, or at most eight months from the date of their execution; but the Act fixed no time within which the registration must be completed. Where the registration of an instrument has been declared by a competent Court to be invalid, the instrument if originally presented in due time, may again be submitted for registration, although the four months provided by s. 22, Act XX of 1866, and the further period of four months allowed by s. 24, have both expired. *MUKHUN LALL PANDAY v. KOONDUN LALL* . . . 15 B. L. R. 228; 24 W. R. 75

L. R. 2 I. A. 210

s.c. in lower Court, *KOONDUN LALL v. MAKHUN LALL* . . . 1 N. W. 168; Ed. 1873, 247

3. — and ss. 34, 35, and 73—*Time for presentation for registration—Refusal to register—Effect of non-appearance within prescribed time.* When a document has been presented for registration in due time by one of the executants, but the others have failed to appear within the time prescribed, the registering officer must "refuse to register," as in cases falling under the latter clauses of s. 35, Act VIII of 1871, and must record the reasons for his refusal. The party desiring registration ought to apply to the Registrar before the period for registration has gone by, either to register or to refuse to register, so as to enable him, in case of refusal, to take further proceedings under s. 73. So soon as it appears that the prescribed time has gone by and the executing parties have not appeared, the order of refusal should be made at once. *In the matter of the REGISTRATION ACT, 1871. In the matter of BUTTOBHARY BANERJEE* . . . 11 B. L. R. 20

4. — *Period within which document may be registered—Agreement of parties.* By an agreement entered into between the parties, the vendor bound himself to execute within thirty days a deed of conveyance, and in default that the agreement should be considered as itself the deed of conveyance of certain lands mentioned in the agreement. The vendor having failed to execute such deed, the vendee, more than four

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months after the date of the agreement, presented it for registration. *Held*, that the conduct of the parties concerned could in no way affect the period of limitation within which such agreement could have been registered under the Act, and that the agreement could not be registered. *NOBAN NUSYA v. DHON MAHOMED* . . . I. L. R. 5 Calc. 820; 6 C. L. R. 136

5. — *Certificate of sale—Period within which it should be registered.* Although s. 316 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1877, says that a certificate granted thereunder shall bear "the date of the confirmation of the sale," that provision cannot alter the fact of execution or the time execution does take place, which is the starting point from which the four months mentioned in s. 23 of the Registration Act, 1877, begin to run. *Held*, therefore, that a certificate granted under that section in respect of a sale which was confirmed on the 7th April 1880, which was registered within four months from the 10th May 1882, when it was executed, was registered within the time allowed by law. The certificate showing that a document has been registered is conclusive proof that it has been registered according to law. *HUSAINI BEGAM v. MULO* . . . I. L. R. 5 All. 84

6. — *Presentation for registration—Limitation for completion of registration.* There is no provision, either in the Registration Act or in the Stamp Act, which lays down that where a document is presented for registration insufficiently stamped such a presentation shall have no effect. The only effect of such a presentation is that the actual registration is delayed. There is in law no limitation for the actual fact of registration provided that the requirements of the Act have been complied with in the matters for which a limitation of time is provided. *Mukhun Lall Panday v. Koondun Lall*, 15 B. L. R. 228, followed. *SHAMA CHARAN DAS v. JOYENOOLOH* . . . I. L. R. 11 Calc. 750

1. — s. 28 (1871, s. 28) and s. 85—"Whole or some portion of the property." The terms of s. 28 of Act VIII of 1871 must not be construed in their literal sense, inasmuch as to do so would defeat the intention of the Legislature that registration should be made with reference to the locality of the property to which the document relates and hence the words of the section "some portion of the property" must be read as meaning some substantial portion. A bond which purported to mortgage 500 square yards of land situate at P. two entire villages and shares in fourteen villages in the G district, and a village in the C district, and which required registration under Act VIII of 1871, was registered at P. *Held*, that the bond was not properly registered in accordance with the provisions of s. 28 of Act VIII of 1871. *Per MAHMOOD J.*—The imperative direction of s. 28 of Act VIII of 1871 is addressed not to the registering officer, but to the person presenting a document to that officer for registration; and therefore s. 85, which refers

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only to defects in the appointment or procedure of the registering officer, could not cure the irregularity which was committed under s. 28. *SHEO DAYAL MAL v. HARI RAM*. I. L. R. 7 All. 590

2. ————— *Transfer of decree—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 232, 244—Appeal—Act III of 1877, s. 28.* The words of s. 28 of the Registration Act (III of 1877), “some portion of the property,” should not be read as meaning some substantial portion. *Sheo Dayal Mal v. Hari Ram*, I. L. R. 7 All. 590, dissented from. The holders of a decree for the sale of mortgaged property transferred the same to *M* by instruments which were registered at a place where a small portion only of the property was situate. Subsequently *M* transferred the decree to other persons, and the co-transferees applied, under s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code, to have their names substituted for those of the original decree-holders. The judgment-debtor opposed the application on the grounds that *M*’s name had not been substituted for the names of the original decree-holders, who had transferred to him, and that the transfer by *M* were inoperative as the instruments of transfer had not been registered at the place where the substantial portion of the mortgaged property was situate in accordance with s. 28 of the Registration Act (III of 1877). The application was allowed by the Courts below. *Held*, that the objection in reference to s. 28 of the Registration Act could only properly be raised between the transferor and the transferee, and not by the judgment-debtor, and moreover had no force. *GULZARI LAL v. DAYA RAM*  
I. L. R. 9 All. 46

3. ————— and ss. 64, 65, and 66—*Place of registration of documents.* The requirements of s. 28 of Act VIII of 1871 are fulfilled by the registration of a document relating to immoveable property in the office of the sub-registrar within whose sub-district any portion of the property is situate. The words “some portion of the property” are not to be read as meaning some substantial portion of the property. All matters of publicity which it is the object of a register to afford are provided for in this respect, by the carrying out of the provisions of ss. 64, 65, and 66. *HARI RAM v. SHEO DAYAL MAL*  
I. L. R. 11 All. 136  
L. R. 16 I. A. 12

Reversing the decision of the High Court in *SHEO DAYAL MAL v. HARI RAM*. I. L. R. 7 All. 590

4. ————— *Registration Act (III of 1877), ss. 3, 28, 64 and 65—Registration—Registration of a document relating to property situate partly outside British India.* A document relating to immoveable property which is partly situate within British India and partly outside British India can be registered, under Act III of 1877, in the district in which a portion of the property is situate. *GOPAL AMRIT v. ANNABHAT* (1900)  
I. L. R. 25 Bom. 50

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**s. 28—*concl.***

5. ————— *Registration—Mortgage—Registration Act (III of 1877), ss. 17, 18, 28, 49—Registration of documents—Jurisdiction to register documents—Effect of registration by an officer not having jurisdiction—Mortgage security, ineffectuality of, by reason of defective registration—Money-decree—Limitation—Transfer of Property Act, s. 59.* Where registration of a deed has been effected by a Registrar having no jurisdiction in that behalf under s. 28 of the Registration Act (III of 1877), the document is not effective for the purpose for which it is created. The Sub-Registrar of Sealdah registered a mortgage-deed, dated October 10, 1896, purporting to hypothecate immoveable property within the area of the Sealdah Registration Office. In the suit brought on August 31, 1901, for the enforcement of the mortgage-bond, the defendant contended, *inter alia*, that no such property as described in the deed ever existed; and no satisfactory evidence having been given as to its existence:—*Held*, that the document could not take effect as a mortgage-bond; but, it being registered, the plaintiff’s claim was not barred though the suit was brought more than three years after the date of execution of the deed; and the plaintiff was entitled to a money-decree for the whole amount secured by the deed, with interest at the contract rate. *Baij Nath Tewari v. Sheo Sahoy Bhagut*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 556, and *Beni Madhab Mitter v. Khatir Mondul*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 449, relied upon. *Ram Coomarr Sen v. Khoda Newaz*, 7 C. L. R. 223, commented upon. *JOGINÉE MOHUN CHATTERJEE v. BHOOT NATH GHOSAL* (1902)  
I. L. R. 29 Calc. 654  
s.c. 6 C. W. N. 856

————— s. 31 (1871, s. 31) and s. 85—*Presentation—Residence of executant—Intending to register—Special cause—Registration Act, VIII of 1871, ss. 31 and 85.* The words “any person intending to register any document” in s. 31 of the Registration Act, VIII of 1871, include not only the person or persons in whose favour a document is executed, but also any person or persons executing the same. Under the provisions of that section, therefore, the presentation of a document for registration on special cause shown, at the residence of a party executing it, is valid. The registering officer is the judge of the sufficiency of the special cause; and, if he is satisfied, the Civil Court has no power to question his decision on that point. Assuming the presentation at the residence of one of the executants of a document for registration to be an irregularity, it is one which, if committed in good faith, is covered by the provision of s. 85 of Act VIII of 1871. *ISAK MAHAMAD v. BAI KHATTA*  
I. L. R. 6 Bom. 96

————— ss. 32, 33 and 87—*Validity of registration—Power-of-attorney—Authority of registering officer.* One Daulat Ram, after selling certain immoveable property to Musammatt Ram Bai, the mother of the plaintiff, on the 6th August 1900 sold the same property again on the 12th August



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1900, to the defendant. The latter sale-deed was duly registered on the 13th August 1900, and on the same day the sale-deed of the 6th August 1900 was presented for registration by a pleader acting under a power-of-attorney from Musammam Ram Bai. The power-of-attorney admittedly was not executed or authenticated in accordance with the provisions of s. 33 of the Registration Act. The registering officer, however, took no notice of the defect and after summoning Daulat Ram, who admitted execution, registered the sale-deed of the 6th August on the 17th November 1900. *Held*, that the document of the 6th August had not been legally registered. The terms of ss. 32 and 33 of the Registration Act are imperative and proper presentation by an authorized agent is an indispensable foundation of the registering officer's jurisdiction; nor was the error of the Sub-Registrar a mere defect in procedure that could be cured by s. 57 of the Registration Act or by the fact that the executant, when summoned by the registering officer, consented to the registration of the sale-deed of the 6th August. *Mujib-un-nissa v. Abdur Rahim*, I. L. R. 23 All. 233, followed. *ISHRI PRASAD v. BAIJNATH* (1906) . . . . . I. L. R. 28 All. 707

ss. 32, 34 and 87—*Registration after death of executant—Registrar, jurisdiction of—Procedure, defect in.* A Registrar has no power or jurisdiction to register a deed unless he is moved by some person entitled to present it for registration under s. 32 of Act III of 1877, i.e., by some person having a direct relationship to the deed. The absence of any party legally entitled to a present deed for registration is not merely a defect in procedure, falling under s. 57 of Act III of 1877, but goes to the jurisdiction of the Registrar and renders the deed invalid. *MUJIB-UN-NISSA v. ABDUL RAHIM* (1900) . . . . . I. L. R. 23 All. 233  
s.c. 5 C. W. N. 177  
L. R. 28 I. A. 15

## s. 33 (1871, s. 33)—

See STAMP ACT, 1869, SCH. II, ART. 13.  
9 Bom. 43

## s. 34—

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—WHERE  
SANCTION IS NECESSARY OR OTHERWISE.  
I. L. R. 11 Mad. 3  
I. L. R. 12 Mad. 201

1. — (1871, s. 34; 1866, s. 36; 1864, s. 29)—*Appearance of parties executing—Execution by party as agent.* Where a document is executed by one of two parties on behalf of himself and the other, it is sufficient, for the purposes of the Registration Act, VIII of 1871, s. 34, that the person executing it appear before the registering officer. The other party is not required to appear. An agreement to let premises may be made by an agent; there is no law that it shall be signed by the principal. *BISSENDOYAL v. SCHLAEPFER*  
22 W. R. 68

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—*contd.*s. 34—*contd.*

2. — and s. 77—*Attendance before Registrar to admit execution, time for.* Although s. 34 of the Registration Act, 1877, lays down that no document shall be registered unless the person executing the same, their representatives, assigns, or authorized agents appear before the Sub-Registrar within the periods allowed for presentation, yet this section is directly subject to s. 77, and that section nowhere provides any time within which the parties, their representatives, assigns, or authorized agents shall appear to admit execution. *SHAMA CHARAN DASS v. JOYENGOOLAH*

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 750

3. — “*Representative, assign, or agent.*” The representative, assign, or agent mentioned in s. 36, Act XX of 1866, meant the representative, assign, or agent of one of the executors of the deed. *In the matter of RAMCHUNDER BISWAS* . . . . . 16 W. R. 180

4. — *Fact of execution—Title.* It was not necessary, under Act XVI of 1864, s. 29, that the Registrar of Assurances should be satisfied of the validity of the title of the person applying to have an instrument registered; he should merely enquire whether the person who purports to have executed the instrument did, in fact, do so; if he was satisfied of that, he should not refuse to register. *RAJ CHUNDER BUXDOO v. RAJESSORY DOSSEB* . . . . . 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 240

*MUTUKDHAREE LALL v. FUZUL HOSSEIN*  
6 W. R. Mis. 130

5. — *Suit to compel registration—Ground for refusal to register.* *Held*, in a suit to compel registration under Act XVI of 1864, s. 15, that where it was found that the requirements of s. 29 of the Act had not been complied with before the Registrar, he was justified in refusing to register the deed. *BHAGVAN JAYARAM v. VITHOBA GOVIND* . . . . . 4 Bom. A. C. 140

*SAJANJI VALAD GODAJI v. ANAJI VALAD LAKSMAN*  
4 Bom. A. C. 142 note

6. — *Registration without parties appearing before Registrar—Invalid registration.* A registering officer who registers a deed of sale without the vendor who executed the deed having appeared before him, acts in contravention of s. 36, Act XX of 1866; but there are no words in that section which declare that the registration of a deed under such circumstances shall be null and void. *Quære*: Whether the words of that section are not merely directory to the registering officer for the benefit of the parties to the deed and whether his acting without the appearance of the parties as provided by the Act is more than a defect of procedure within the meaning of s. 88. *MUKHUN LALL PANDAY v. KOONDUN LALL*  
15 B. L. R. 228: 24 W. R. 75  
L. R. 2 I. A. 210

s.c. in lower Court, *KOONDUN LALL v. MAKHUN LALL* . . . . . 1 N. W. 168: Ed. 1873, 247

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## s. 34—concl'd.

7. ——— and ss. 23, 24, 76, 77—*Limitation for registration or order of refusal of a document admitted for registration by Registrar—Denial of execution—Refusal to attend—Limitation for suit under s. 77 of the Registration Act.* No period is prescribed by Act III of 1877 within which a document which has been admitted for registration may be registered or within which the order of refusal by the Registrar to register the document must be made. There is nothing in ss. 76 and 77 to compel the Registrar in cases where there has been no express denial of execution, but where the executant refuses to attend at his office, to make his order of refusal within the time limited for admission of execution by ss. 23 and 24. Limitation in respect of a suit under s. 77 begins to run from the date of such order. *Mukhun Lall Panday v. Koondun Lall*, 15 B. L. R. 288 : L. R. 2 I. A. 210 : 24 W. R. 75, and *Shama Charan Das v. Joyenoolah*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 750, relied on. In the matter of *Buttobehary Banerjee*, 11 B. L. R. 20, dissented from. *LUCKHI NARAIN KHETTRY v. SATCOWRIE PYNE* . . . I. L. R. 16 Calc. 189

Affirming on appeal the decision in *SATCOURIE PYNE v. LUKHI NARAIN KHETTRY*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 538

## s. 35—

See GIFT

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 584

1. ——— s. 35 (1871, s. 35; 1866, s. 36)—*Admission of execution—Duty of Registrar when executant does not consent.* The plaintiff, having purchased at an execution-sale the right, title, and interest of a tenant in an istemrari jote, obtained from the zamindar a pottah which he sought to register according to law. The zamindar appeared at the registration office and admitted the execution of the pottah, but did not assent to its being registered, whereupon the registering officer withheld registration. Held, that it was the duty of the registering officer to register the pottah, notwithstanding the executant's refusal of assent. *MAGON MAILLO v. DOOLA GAZEE KOOLAN* 19 W. R. 198

2. ——— *Deed of sale—Refusal of vendor to endorse deed—Refusal to register, ground for.* A deed of sale of land situated in the registration district of Calcutta was executed and presented by the purchaser for registration. The vendor appeared personally, and admitted execution, but refused to endorse the deed, on the ground that she did not intend to sell, but only to renew a certain deed of mortgage. The Registrar refused to register the deed. Held, that the Registrar was justified in refusing to register the deed on the ground that the vendor, one of the parties to it, refused to endorse it. *BRAJANATH PYNE*, In the matter of the *Indian Registration Act*

3 B. L. R. O. C. 60 : 12 W. R. 386 note

3. ——— *Non-payment of consideration—Refusal to register—Duty of Registrar.* Under Act XX of 1866, a Registrar had no

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power to refuse to register a deed, on the ground that the full consideration there mentioned had not been paid. His duty is, when the parties appear in person before him, simply to ascertain whether the deed has been executed by the persons by whom it purports to have been executed. In the matter of *Act XX of 1866 and of the petition of BRINDABUN CHANDRA SHAW AND NOBODEEP CHANDRA SHAW* . . . 1 B. L. R. O. C. 47

4. ——— *Admission of execution of document—Setting up collateral agreement.* Where the defendant admitted the execution of the documents, but set up a collateral agreement which would render the documents of no legal force, the lower Courts found that the agreement relied on by the defendant was come to with the plaintiff:—Held (reversing the decrees of the lower Courts), that, execution having been admitted, the documents ought to be registered. *RAMANANDAN CHETTY v. VIJIASAMY* . . . 4 Mad. 425

5. ——— *Improper admission to registration—Suit on deed improperly admitted to registration.* H and S admitted in the registering office the execution of a deed of sale purporting to be executed by H, S, and M. The third person did not appear before the registering officer and did not admit or deny the execution of the deed on her part, but the other two persons stated that it had been executed without her knowledge or authority. It was held, that, under the provisions of ss. 34 and 35 of Act VIII of 1871, the registering officer was not warranted in registering the deed. The deed of sale, which the suit was brought to enforce, not having been registered according to law, could not be received in evidence of the sale, and the suit to enforce the sale was unmaintainable. *BAIJANATH v. MAHOMED IRADAT*

7 N. W. 185

6. ——— *Refusal to register—Disability of executants from minority, idiocy, or lunacy.* The words of s. 35 of the Registration Act, VIII of 1871, which provide that "If all or any of the persons by whom the document [i.e., the document presented for registration] purports to be executed deny its execution, or if any such person appears to be a minor, an idiot, or a lunatic, or if any person by whom the document purports to be executed is dead, and his representative or assign denies its execution, the registering officer shall refuse to register the document," taken literally, seem to require the registering officer to refuse registration of a deed which purports to be executed by several persons if any one of them deny execution, or appear to be a minor, an idiot, or a lunatic. Since such a construction would cause great difficulty and injustice, and would be inconsistent with the language and tenor of the rest of the Act, the words in question must be read distributively, and construed to mean that the registering officer shall refuse to register the document *quoad* the persons who deny the execution of the deed and *quoad* such



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persons as appear to be under any of the disabilities mentioned. The registration of a deed is not necessarily invalid by reason of a failure on the part of the registering officer to comply with the provisions of the Registration Act. *Mukhun Lall Panday v. Koondun Lall*, 15 B. L. R. 228, referred to and approved. *MUHAMMAD EWAZ v. BIRJ LAL*

I. L. R. 1 All. 465

L. R. 4 I. A. 166

**7. Registration of**

*will after death of testator—Inquiry by registering officer into disability of testator—Registration Act (III of 1877), ss. 40 and 41.* The procedure prescribed by s. 35 of the Indian Registration Act is not applicable to the registration of wills which, under s. 40 of that Act, are presented for registration after the death of the testator by persons claiming under them. *ARUMUGAM PILLAI v. ARUNACHALLAM PILLAI*

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 254

**8. Registration of**

*bond executed by minor—Concealment from Registrar of fact of executant being a minor—Fraud—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 17.* A sum of money was advanced by the plaintiff to a minor, who executed a bond in respect of the loan, and registered it. Registration was effected in the ordinary way; the parties appearing before the Registrar and the minor admitting execution of the bond, which was then registered. *Held*, in a suit on the bond, that there being nothing to show that the minor appeared to be such to the Registrar at the time of registration so as to enable the Registrar to refuse registration under s. 35 of the Registration Act, and the concealment of the fact of the executant's minority both by himself and by the plaintiff from the Registrar not amounting to fraud (see s. 17 of the Contract Act), so as to invalidate the registration-proceedings as against the minor, the Registrar had in no way violated the law relating to the registration of documents, and the bond must be taken to have been duly registered. *SHAM CHARAN MAL v. CHOWDHRY DEBYA SINGH PAHRAJ*

I. L. R. 21 Cal. 872

**9. Representative of**

*deceased settlor—Admission of execution of document by one out of three representatives—Defect of procedure in course of registration—Validity of registration.* The mother of three sons executed a deed of gift in favour of one of them and then died. The donee alone registered the document, the other sons not appearing before the registering officer. The document having been subsequently put in evidence it was contended that it was inadmissible on the ground that under s. 35 of the Registration Act, the donor being dead, the execution of the document must be admitted by the representative of the deceased, and that an admission by one out of three representatives is not an admission within the meaning of the Act. *Held*, that, assuming that the three sons of the deceased donor ought to have joined in admitting the execution of the document

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and that the registering officer was in error in considering one of them the due representative of the deceased, such error was a defect in procedure in the course of registration and the registration was not rendered invalid by reason thereof. *PAKRAN v. KUNHAMMED*

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 580

**10. and ss. 74 and 77—Denial of execution, what is—Non-appearance—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 45.** A, by an indenture of mortgage, dated 15th March 1887, mortgaged certain property to S to secure the repayment of Rs. 18,500 within two months. The deed was duly lodged for registration; but A (the mortgagor) neglected to appear at the registration office to admit execution. A summons was accordingly issued against him under s. 36 of the Registration Act III of 1877 to enforce his attendance, and was duly served upon him as required by s. 39. He, however, did not obey the summons, and neglected to attend the Sub-Registrar's office on the day appointed. He subsequently went away to Arabia without admitting execution, and was not expected to return to Bombay. S (the mortgagee) then applied to the Sub-Registrar to treat A's neglect to attend and admit execution as equivalent to a denial of execution and to "refuse to register" the deed under the provisions of s. 35 (last clause), in order that an application might be made to the Registrar, under s. 73, for the purpose of establishing the right of S (the mortgagee) to have the deed registered. The Sub-Registrar, however, considered that he could not treat A's non-appearance as a denial of execution. On application to the High Court under s. 45 of the Specific Relief Act, I of 1877:—*Held*, following *Radhakrishnan Rowrea Dakna v. Choonilal*, I. L. R. 5 Cal. 445, that the non-appearance of A in pursuance of the summons was equivalent to a denial of execution within the meaning of s. 35 of the Registration Act; and that, under the provisions of that section, the Sub-Registrar was bound to "refuse to register" the deed. The Court accordingly made an order directing the Registrar to proceed under s. 74 to make the inquiry therein directed. *In re ABDUL AZIZ*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 691

**11. Refusal to register—Disability of minority.** The object of s. 35 of the Registration Act, 1877, which directs the registering officer to refuse to register a document if the person by whom it purports to be executed appears to be a minor, is that, if the registration authorities refuse to register on that ground, the question of minority may at once be brought into a Civil Court, and there determined. *CHUNEE MUL JOHTRY v. BROJO NATH ROY CHOWDRY*

I. L. R. 8 Cal. 967; 11 C. L. R. 315

**12. Execution of bond by father on minor son's behalf—Registration of bond without the minor being represented, effect of.** At the registration of a bond executed by H and B and by H on behalf of J, a minor, the minor was not represented for the purpose of registration by any one.



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*Held*, that the bond should not affect any immovable property comprised therein so far as *J* was interested in the same. *Muhammad Ewaz v. Birj Lal*, I. L. R. 1 All. 465, and s. 35 of the Registration Act, 1877, referred to. *SHANKAR DAS v. JOGRAJ SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 5 All. 599

13. ————— *Mortgage executed and registered by major son and by the father for himself and for a minor son.* A joint Hindu family consisted of the father and two sons, the one of full age, the other a minor. The father and the major son executed a mortgage of the joint family property, the father describing himself in the bond as acting for himself and as guardian and next friend of the minor son. The bond was registered on the admission of the father and the major son. *Held*, in a suit by the mortgagees for sale, that, there being no dispute as to the fact of the debt for which the mortgage was executed, and it not being alleged that such debt was incurred for any purpose which would exempt the son from the pious obligation of paying it, there was no defect in the registration of the bond in suit which would prevent its affecting the share of the minor son. *Shankar Das v. Jograj Singh*, I. L. R. 5 All. 599, overruled. *Muhammad Ewaz v. Birj Lal*, I. L. R. 1 All. 465; *In the matter of Ram Chunder Biswas*, 16 W. R. 180; and *Badri Parsad v. Madan Lal*, I. L. R. 5 All. 75, referred to. *KESHO DEO v. HARI DAS* . . . I. L. R. 21 All. 281

14. ————— *Registration—Execution, denial of—Deed—Admissibility of deed in evidence.* Where a Sub-Registrar in disregard of the provisions of s. 35 of the Registration Act, 1877, registered a document as against a person denying execution thereof, it was *held*, that his action was *ultra vires* and without jurisdiction and that the document could not be admitted in evidence as against the party denying execution. *Muhammad Ewaz v. Birj Lal*, I. L. R. 1 All. 465; *Malkarjun v. Narhari*, I. L. R. 25 Bom. 337; *Mujib-un-nissa v. Abdur Rahim*, L. R. 20 I. A. 15; S.C. I. L. R. 23 All. 233. *RAZI-UN-NISSA v. SABIR HUSAIN* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 26 All. 57

15. ————— *Registration—Deed of gift of immoveable property after death of the donor—Representative of deceased donor—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 4, 123.* Where the widow of a deceased person, who had executed a deed of gift, was his representative, she would be his representative within the meaning of s. 35 of the Registration Act, although she was also the donee under the deed, and would be qualified to admit the execution and so to render the registration of the deed proper and effectual. *Pakran v. Kunhammad*, I. L. R. 23 Mad. 580, referred to. S. 123 of the Transfer of Property Act is, by virtue of s. 4 of the Act, to be read as supplemental to the Indian Registration Act, and the expression "registered instrument" in s. 123 means an instrument registered in accordance with the

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provisions of the Indian Registration Act, and not necessarily one registered by the donor himself. *Nand Kishore Lal v. Suraj Prasad*, I. L. R. 20 All. 392, approved. Where a Hindu executed a deed of gift in favour of his wife and it was registered after his death on her admission, she being his representative:—*Held*, that the deed was a registered instrument within the meaning of s. 123 of the Transfer of Property Act. *BHABATOSE BANERJEE v. SOLEMAN* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 584

s. 39 (1871, s. 39; 1866, s. 40)—*Revenue officer—Collector—Sub-Collector. Semble:* The words, "the revenue officer in whose jurisdiction the person whose attendance is desired may be," in s. 40 of the Registration Act, 1866, point to the chief revenue officer of the district, *viz.*, the Collector, or, if in any defined sub-district, the Sub-Collector. Such Sub-Collector has all the powers of a Collector. *In the matter of the petition of NARAINASAMI PILLAI* . . . 4 Mad. 91

## s. 41—

*See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—WHERE SANCTION IS NECESSARY OR OTHERWISE.*

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 154

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 201

ss. 42—46 (1871, ss. 42—46; 1866-ss. 54, 46)

*See OUDH ESTATES ACT, 1869 s. 13.*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 976

L. R. 11 I. A. 121

1. ————— s. 47—*Priority—Possession—Notice.* The plaintiff purchased certain land by a deed dated the 8th April 1879. The deed was registered on the 26th August of the same year. The defendant purchased the same land by a deed dated the 14th June 1879. It was registered on the same day. That deed recited that the land was in the possession of the plaintiff as tenant. Both the deeds were optionally registrable. The Subordinate Judge rejected the plaintiff's claim, and awarded the land to the defendant. His decree was affirmed, on appeal, by the District Judge on the ground that the defendant's deed was registered before the plaintiff's deed. On appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to the land. Both the deeds having been registered according to law, they operated from their respective dates of execution as provided by s. 47 of the Registration Act (III of 1877). *Held*, also, that the defendant had notice of the plaintiff's equitable title to the land. *SAN-TAYA MANGARSAYA v. NARAYAN*

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 182

2. ————— *Date of operation—Date of execution of the deed.* On the 11th August 1898, the defendant No. 1 passed to the plaintiff a *mulgeni* lease, which was registered on the 10th December 1898. In the meanwhile the defendant No. 1 passed another *mulgeni* lease to the



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defendant No. 2 in respect of the same property on the 17th November 1898, and got it registered on the 18th November 1898. On the 5th December 1898, the defendant No. 1 mortgaged the same property to the defendant No. 2; this deed of mortgage was registered on the 9th December, 1898. Defendant No. 2 obtained possession of the property. The plaintiff then sued to establish his *mutgeni* lease and to recover possession of the lands. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover possession of the lands; for though his deed was registered after the defendant No. 2's deeds, yet the moment it was registered it had operation from the date of its execution by virtue of s. 47 of the Registration Act (III of 1877). *Held*, further, that it was immaterial whether the defendant No. 2's deeds were or were not accompanied by possession. *Kali Das Mullick v. Kanhya Lal Pandit*, L. R. 11 I. A. 218, and *Bai Suraj v. Dattatram Dayashankar*, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 380, followed and applied. *NARAYAN v. LAXMAN* (1905) . . . . . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 42

1. — s. 48 (1871, s. 48; 1866, s. 48) —*Verbal contract between Hindus—Subsequent registered deed.* Where a lien by verbal contract and deposit of title-deeds of immovable property in the Island of Bombay by a Hindu in favour of a Hindu was created before the 1st of January, 1865, when the first general Registration Act (XVI of 1864) came into force, and a Gujrati document (unregistered) was subsequently (on the 13th of June 1865) executed by the giver of the lien which set out its particulars, and acknowledged the receipt of the loan on account of which the lien was given, it was *held*, that the original oral contract of lien, being in itself a perfected transaction, was not merged in or invalidated by the subsequent document, and that therefore the fact of the latter not being registered did not affect the validity of the prior transaction. S. 48 of Act XX of 1866, which enacted that all instruments duly registered under that Act and relating to moveable or immovable property should take effect against any oral agreement relating to the same property, did not apply to oral agreements completed before Act XVI of 1864 came into force. *JIVANDAS KESHAVJI v. FRAMJI NANABHAI* . . . . . 7 Bom. O. C. 45

2. — *Registration of illegal or fraudulent document—Priority—Oral agreement accompanied by possession—English principles of equity.* Persons claiming under a registered document which has been given, accepted, and registered in fraud of a third party, and in collusion with the grantor, are not entitled to the benefit of s. 48 of the Registration Act (VIII of 1871), and therefore the registration of a document of title which has been procured in fraud of a party possessing a prior equitable title, or with actual notice of his prior equitable title, does not deprive such party of his priority. Registration cannot confer validity upon an instrument

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which is *ultra vires*, or illegal, or fraudulent. The reason for the exception made by s. 48 of the Regulation Act, VII of 1871, in favour of an oral agreement accompanied by possession is that by such possession the parties who rely on a subsequent registered deed had, or might, if they had been reasonably vigilant, have had, previously to their entering into their contract with the vendor and to their taking a conveyance, notice, by the fact of such possession, that there was some prior claim to the property. Therefore, where there is actual notice of a prior oral agreement, although unaccompanied by possession, the object of the Legislature is fully attained. *Hicks v. Powell*, 4 Ch. 741, *Futtechand Sahoo v. Leelumber Singh Dass*, 14 Moo. I. A. 129; 9 B. L. R. 433; and *Valaji Isaji v. Thomas*, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 194, distinguished. Instances in which the rules of English Courts of Equity have been applied in the *mofussil*, referred to. *WAMAN RAMCHANDRA v. DHONDIBA KRISHNAJI* . I. L. R. 4 Bom. 126

3. — *Case where there is no transfer or giving possession.* The Registration Act, 1871, s. 48, which says that documents relating to any property duly registered shall take effect against any oral agreement or declaration relating to such property, unless where the agreement or declaration has been accompanied or followed by delivery of possession, does not apply to a case where there is no transfer or making over of possession. *KIRTY CHUNDER HALDAR v. RAJ CHUNDER HALDAR* . . . . . 22 W. R. 273

4. — *Priority—Verbal contract—Registered deed of sale.* A subsequent registered deed is entitled to preference to a prior verbal contract: the former would invalidate the latter. *KYLASH CHUNDER CHATTERJEE v. GOPAL CHUNDER CHATTERJEE* . . . . . 1 W. R. 78

5. — *Priority—Verbal sale with possession—Registered deed.* *Held*, that a deed of sale of immovable property, duly registered under Act XX of 1866, was to be preferred to a prior verbal sale of the same property accompanied by possession, where it appeared that it was the intention of the parties to the verbal sale to complete the transaction by a deed. *Semle*: That the effect would have been the same if there had been no such intention. *BHANDU VALAD RAJRAM v. DAMAJI VALAD JIVAJI* . . . . . 6 Bom. A. C. 59

6. — *Priority—Possession under unregistered lease.* Where possession of immovable property has been given under an unregistered lease, a subsequent grantee of a registered lease cannot maintain a suit to evict the lessee in possession, on the ground of the priority of his deed under s. 48, Act XX of 1866. *NARSING PORKEAT v. BEWAH* . . . . . 5 B. L. R. Ap. 86; 14 W. R. 250

7. — *Mortgage without possession—Subsequent purchase with possession—Law in Kanara.* *Quære*: Where in Kanara a



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mortgage without possession can be sustained against a subsequent purchase from the mortgagor with possession. **PURMAYA v. SONDE SHINIVASAPA**  
**I. L. R. 4 Bom. 459**

**8.** ————— *Deposit of title-deeds—Priority—Oral agreement.* A deposit of title-deeds of certain property, under a verbal arrangement to secure payment of a debt, is not an "oral agreement or declaration relating to such property" within the meaning of s. 48 of the Registration Act, 1877. **COGGAN v. POGOSE**  
**I. L. R. 11 Calc. 158**

**9.** ————— *Oral alienation—Evidence of possession.* *Per PONTIFEX, J.*—The words relating to possession found in s. 48 are merely intended as a declaration of the law limiting the operation of oral alienations, and of declaring the law with respect to them, by laying down that the only oral alienations of which the law can take notice in competition with registered instruments are those which are properly established by evidence of possession. **FUZLUDEEN KHAN v. FAKIR MAHOMED KHAN**  
**I. L. R. 5 Calc. 336 : 4 C. L. R. 257**

**10.** ————— *Oral agreement—Registration Act (XX of 1866), s. 48.* *Held*, that an oral agreement of hypothecation of immoveable property, entered into in August 1869, and which was not accompanied nor followed by possession of the property charged, could not avail against a registered sale certificate obtained in respect of the same property and dated in August 1876, whether s. 48 of Act XX of 1866 or s. 58 of Act VIII of 1871 were looked to. **NATHU RAM v. PHULCHAND**  
**I. L. R. 6 All. 581**

**11.** ————— *Oral agreement of sale—Subsequent sale to third party—Notice of prior agreement—Rights of purchaser.* Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 48 of the Registration Act, a party who purchases, even under a registered deed of sale, with notice of a prior agreement for sale of the same property, will not be allowed to retain the property as against the person claiming under the prior agreement. **Solano v. Lala Ram Lal**, 7 C. L. R. 481, followed. **Fuzluddeen Khan v. Fakir Mahomed Khan**, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 336, distinguished. **CHUNDER NATH ROY v. BHOYRUB CHUNDER SURMA ROY**  
**I. L. R. 10 Calc. 250**

**12.** ————— *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1881), s. 54—Oral agreement for sale of land—Subsequent conveyance with notice—Delivery of possession—Priority—Specific performance.* Plaintiff, being in possession of certain land as an incumbrancer under a registered instrument, agreed orally with the mortgagor in 1885 to purchase it. The mortgagor subsequently sold the land to others who took the conveyance which was registered with notice of the plaintiff's mortgage and of the oral agreement with him. Plaintiff now sued for a declaration that the conveyance was not binding on him, and for specific performance of the oral agree-

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ment. *Held*, that the plaintiff's possession under his incumbrance together with the agreement to sell was equivalent to delivery of possession within the meaning of Registration Act, s. 48; and that the plaintiff was entitled to have the oral contract specifically enforced notwithstanding the subsequent registered sale. **KANNAN v. KRISHNAN**  
**I. L. R. 13 Mad. 324**

**13.** ————— *Suit for specific performance of contract to sell land—Person claiming by subsequent title—Notice of prior contract—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 54—Contract for sale—Bainanamah—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 27—Legal and equitable rights—Registration Act (III of 1877), ss. 17 (h), 48, 50—Document creating a right to obtain another document—Unregistered document—Admissibility of evidence.* On the 27th December 1895 *S* executed an unregistered document bearing a one-anna receipt stamp in favour of *J*, agreeing to execute a deed of conveyance of certain immoveable property in favour of *J* within a certain time, and acknowledging receipt of earnest-money. Subsequently on the 3rd January 1896 *S* executed a registered bainanamah in respect of the same property in favour of *R* and *H*, which was followed by a registered deed of conveyance in their favour, dated the 9th January 1896, and delivery of possession, although *R* and *H* had notice of the previous contract with *J* before the registration of the bainanamah and execution of the deed of conveyance in their favour. *Held*, that, having regard to s. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and s. 27 (b) of the Specific Relief Act, in a suit for the specific performance of contract brought by *J* neither the bainanamah nor the deed of conveyance in favour of *R* and *H* could prevail against the prior unregistered contract of *J*. *Held*, further, that the unregistered document of the 27th December 1895 came under s. 17, cl. (h), of Act III of 1887, and was not inadmissible in evidence for want of registration; and that the registered bainanamah of the 3rd January 1896 did not take effect against it, under s. 50 of that Act. **HURNANDUN SINGH v. JAWAD ALI**  
**I. L. R. 27 Calc. 468**

**14.** ————— *Effect of oral agreement as against subsequent registered conveyance.* *A*, by an oral agreement, agreed to grant two mokurrari leases of certain properties upon certain terms to *B*, and thereupon executed two mokurrari leases in favour of *B*, which were not, however, registered. Afterwards *A* granted two mokurrari leases of the same mouzahs, upon terms more favourable to himself, to *C* and *D*, who, at the time of such grant, had notice of *A*'s previous agreement with *B*. *Held*, in a suit for specific performance brought by *B* against *A*, and to which *C* and *D* were added as defendants, that, notwithstanding the fact that *B* had never got possession under the oral agreement as provided in s. 48 of Act III of 1877, *B* could obtain a decree for specific relief, and



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a declaration that the leases to *C* and *D* were void as against him. *NEMAI CHARAN DHABAL v. KOKIL BAG*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 534 : 7 C. L. R. 487

See *CHUNDER KANT ROY v. KRISHNA SUNDER ROY* . . . I. L. R. 10 Calc. 710  
a case to which the Specific Relief Act applied.

15. ————— *Constructive possession in pursuance of oral agreement to sell land.* Where a vendor in pursuance of an oral agreement to sell certain land directed the tenants of the land to pay, and the tenants agreed to pay, rent to the purchaser :—*Held*, that such possession was given to the purchaser as would satisfy the condition of s. 48 of the Registration Act, and enable him to resist the claim of a subsequent registered purchaser. *PALANI v. SELAMBARA* . I. L. R. 9 Mad. 267

## s. 49 (1871, s. 49 ; 1866, s. 49)–

See *ante*, s. 17.

See *ante*, s. 28 . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 654

See *EXCHANGE* . 11 C. W. N. 342

See *LANDLORD AND TENANT—NATURE OF TENANCY* . I. L. R. 27 Bom. 515

See *LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 19 (1871, s. 20)—ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEBTS.*  
I. L. R. 5 Calc. 215 : 4 C. L. R. 361

1. ————— *Construction of section.* In considering the effect to be given to s. 49, Act XX of 1866, that section must be read in conjunction with s. 88 and with the words of the heading of Part X, "Of the effects of registration and non-registration." It is not clear that the words of s. 49, "unless it shall have been registered in accordance with the provisions of this Act," are not confined to the procedure on admitting to registration, without reference to any matters prior to registration, or to the provisions of ss. 19, 21, or 36, or other provisions of a similar nature. *MUKHUN LALL PANDAY v. KOONDUN LALL*

15 B. L. R. 228 : 24 W. R. 75  
L. R. 2 I. A. 210

s.c. in lower Court, *KOONDUN LALL v. MAKHUN LALL* . . . 1 N. W. 168 : Ed. 1873, 247

2. ————— *Properly-registered document, requisites of—Act XX of 1866, ss. 66, 67, 68, and 69.* The registration of a document under Act XX of 1866 is complete when all the requirements stated in ss. 66, 67, 68, and 69 have been fulfilled, and the certificate mentioned in s. 68 is *prima facie* evidence of such completeness. Where a *kobala* bore the above certificate, a memorandum from the Sub-Registrar, stating that he was not satisfied that the heirship of the party conveying had been established, was *held* in no way to affect the registration. Where the requirements of the law had been fulfilled, a report made by the Sub-Registrar, in which he expressed his intention

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to reject the document, was *held* not to affect its claim to being a well-registered document within the meaning of s. 49. *ROHIMOONISSA v. ABDOOL-LAH KHAN* . . . 22 W. R. 319

3. ————— *Document not duly registered—Admissibility of evidence.* Although a document has been actually registered by the proper officer appointed for the purpose of registering documents, it cannot be received in evidence under s. 49 if it has been registered contrary to the provisions of the Registration Act. *MAHOMED ALTAH ALI KHAN v. PERTAB SINGH* . 5 N. W. 91

4. ————— *Decree, sale of—Decree on mortgage-bond—Right to execute decree.* A decree-holder purported to sell to *A*, by private sale, all his right, title, and interest in a mortgage-decree obtained by him in a suit on a mortgage-bond against the mortgagor. The deed of sale was not registered. Afterwards, by a registered deed of sale, *A* conveyed all his right, title, and interest in the same decree to *B*. *Held*, that the right to execute the decree as a mortgage-decree did not pass to *B*, the deed of sale not affecting immoveable property without registration. *KOOB LALL CHOWDHRY v. NITYA NUND SINGH*  
I. L. R. 9 Calc. 839 : 12 C. L. R. 393

5. ————— *Deed made before Registration Act—Admissibility of unregistered deed.* *Held*, that there is no provision in the law excluding a deed made before the Registration Act came into force, and not registered within the time appointed for the registration of such deeds, from being adduced in evidence. *RAM SURUN DASS v. RAM CHUND* . . . 1 Agra 283

6. ————— *Admissibility in evidence of unregistered deed for purpose for which registration is unnecessary—Bond.* An unregistered document requiring registration as affecting an interest in land is admissible in evidence for any purpose for which registration is unnecessary. *LACHMIPAT SINGH DUGAR v. KHAIRAT ALI*  
5 B. L. R. F. B. 18 : 12 W. R. F. B. 11

*SHAM NARAYAN LALL v. KHEMAJIT MATOE*  
4 B. L. R. F. B.

*MONOMOTHONATH DAY v. SREENATH GHOSE*  
20 W. R. 107

7. ————— *Collateral purpose—Mortgage, unregistered—Limitation Act (XV of 1877).* An unregistered document, the registration of which is compulsory, may be admissible in evidence for a collateral purpose, i.e., to prove admission of liability on part of the executant sufficient to prevent a claim from being barred by the Limitation Act. *MUGNIRAM v. GURMUKH ROY* . . . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 334

8. ————— *Admissibility of unregistered deed—Collateral security of land.* A bond for money in which land is pledged as a mere collateral security is not one of the instruments



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defined in cl. 2, s. 17, Act XX of 1866, the registration of which is compulsory, but is one of which the registration is optional under cl. 7, s. 18 of that law : therefore, in a suit for money due on the bond, the reception of the bond as evidence, though not registered, is not barred by s. 49. *WOODOY CHAND JANA v. NITYE MUNDUL* . 9 W. R. 111

9. ————— *Admissibility in evidence of unregistered deed to prove debt—Suit for money due on mortgage.* In a suit to recover a sum of money due on a mortgage, the mortgage-deed, though not registered, was admitted in evidence to prove the debt. *BUTOKRISTO DOSS v. KHETTRA CHANDRA BHUTTACHARJEE* . 6 B. L. R. Ap. 69

10. ————— *Admissibility in evidence of unregistered deed as receipt or acknowledgment of debt—Deed of sale—Acknowledgment of debt.* An unregistered deed of sale, so far as it is a receipt or acknowledgment of money paid or an acknowledgment for old debts, is admissible in evidence notwithstanding s. 49, Act XX of 1866. A portion of an unregistered document requiring registration is admissible in evidence, when such portion does not relate to immoveable property. *SHIB PRASAD DOSS v. ANNA PURNA DAYI*

3 B. L. R. A. C. 451 : 12 W. R. 435

11. ————— and s. 17—*Admissibility of unregistered sale-deed—Suit for specific performance of contract to sell land.* The defendant executed a sale-deed of certain land to the plaintiff. The instrument bore R1 stamp only. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had improperly refused to register the sale-deed and prayed for a decree compelling its registration and for the possession of the land in question. *Held*, that the unregistered instrument was admissible in evidence, and that, in any case, secondary evidence of its contents was admissible, the document having remained unregistered through no fault of the plaintiff. *NAGAPPA v. DEVU* . I. L. R. 14 Mad. 55

12. ————— *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 58—Unregistered mortgage—Suit on personal covenant to pay.* An unregistered mortgage-deed executed in 1885 contained a personal covenant by the mortgagors to pay the debt secured thereby. *Held*, that the mortgagee was entitled to sue on the covenant and obtain a personal decree against the mortgagors. *GOMAJI v. SUBBARAYAPPA* . I. L. R. 15 Mad. 253

13. ————— *Evidence, admissibility of—Mortgage-bond.* An unregistered bond, containing a personal undertaking to repay money borrowed, and also a hypothecation of land above R100 in value as security, may be used in evidence to enforce the personal obligation. *ULFATUNNISSA alias ELAHIJAN BIBI v. HOSAIN KHAN* I. L. R. 9 Calc. 520 : 12 C. L. R. 20

14. ————— *Document creating interest in land.* A document which gives or purports to give a right to have immoveable pro-

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perty brought to sale with a view to the recovery, out of its proceeds, of money lent (principal and interest), is an instrument which creates an interest in moveable property, and as such cannot, under s. 49 of the Registration Act, be received in evidence without being registered. *KALA CHAND MUNDUL v. GOPAL CHUNDER BHUTTACHARJEE*

12 W. R. 163

15. ————— *Suit for money-decree on mortgage-deed of immoveable property—Admissibility of document in evidence.* A sued in the Small Cause Court on the covenant of a mortgage-deed for a money-decree. The deed, being unregistered, was held inadmissible in evidence. *Held*, on reference to the High Court, that the unregistered mortgage-deed, being in its terms indivisible and disclosing one transaction only which it would be imperative on the plaintiff to prove for the purpose of making out his case, was, under s. 49 of Act VIII of 1871, inadmissible in evidence to prove a fact for which registration was unnecessary. *MATTOXGENEY DOSSEE v. RAMNARAIN SADKHA*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 83 : 2 C. L. R. 428

16. ————— *Admissibility of document requiring registration—Divisible transaction.* When a transaction is indivisible, and the registration of the document evidencing it is by law compulsory, the document will not be admissible in evidence if not duly registered ; but when the transaction is divisible,—as when upon a loan of money it is agreed (i) that the loan shall be secured by a bond containing a covenant for repayment of the sum advanced with interest within a certain time, and also (ii) that certain designated property shall be hypothecated as collateral security for the repayment of the loan,—the same rule does not apply, and an unregistered bond for the amount advanced, with interest, containing a further provision that as collateral security for the amount advanced certain property should remain hypothecated, may be used as evidence of the loan, although inadmissible to prove the hypothecation. *KRISHTO LALL GHOSE v. BONOMALEE ROY*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 611 : 5 C. L. R. 43

17. ————— *Admissibility of unregistered bond in evidence to prove money-debt—Collateral security.* In order to secure a loan of R120, the defendant executed a bond to repay the loan with interest, which provided that by way of collateral security certain immoveable property should be hypothecated. The bond was not registered. In a suit upon the bond praying for a money-decree against the defendant and for a declaration of a lien upon the property hypothecated, it was objected that the bond was inadmissible in evidence by reason of its not being registered. *Held*, that the bond might be taken as divisible in its nature, as being a money-bond with a provision that certain property should be hypothecated as collateral security, and that it was therefore admis-



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sible in evidence. *GOUR CHURN SURMA v. JINTU ALI* . . . . . **11 C. L. R. 166**

18. ————— *Unregistered mortgage-bond pledging land—Consent of parties—Power of Court.* Where land of the value of R100 or upwards was mortgaged on a bond which was not registered, as it ought to have been, under the Registration Act in force at the time:—*Held*, that the bond could only be sued upon as a money-bond, and though the suit might be brought in a Court within whose jurisdiction the land was not situated, the Judge would have no right, even with the consent of the parties, to deal with it as a mortgage, or to make any decree affecting the land in dispute. *SHIBO SOONDUREE DEBIA v. SOWDAMINEE DEBIA*

**25 W. R. 78**

19. ————— *Admissibility in evidence of unregistered deed in suit to recover debt.* Where an instrument purports to create an interest in immoveable property only as a collateral security for the payment of money, and is also a simple contract or bond for the payment of a debt, and where effect is sought to be given to the instrument only as a simple contract, it is admissible in evidence in a suit to recover the debt, though it has not been registered. So far as it is a contract for the payment of money, it is an instrument the registration of which is made optional by s. 18 of Act XX of 1866. *VELLAYA PADYACHY v. MOORTHY PADYACHY* . . . . . **4 Mad. 174**

20. ————— *Instrument creating interest in immoveable property—Suit for money-debt.* The plaintiff sued, as the assignee of a mortgagee of immoveable property, to recover the amount of the debt from the mortgagor in pursuance of an express contract to pay the debt contained in the mortgage. The mortgage was executed before the Registration Act (XVI of 1864) came into operation. The assignment to the plaintiff was executed after the Registration Act (XX of 1866) became law. *Held, per BITTLESTON, INNES, and COLLETT, JJ.*, that the assignment, being an instrument operating to create an interest in immoveable property, and as such requiring to be registered under s. 17 of Act XX of 1866, was not admissible in evidence in a suit to enforce the personal obligation only. *Per SCOTLAND, C.J.*—That an instrument which has the two-fold operation of a simple contract or bond to pay a debt and a collateral mortgage security for the debt is admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving the simple contract debt. *ACHOO BAYAHAM v. DHANY RAM* . . . . . **4 Mad. 378**

21. ————— *Admissibility of unregistered document in which land is pledged as a collateral security in a suit to enforce the personal security.* Under the provisions of s. 49 of Act VIII of 1871, an unregistered bond, though immoveable property be made by the terms of it collateral security, is admissible in evidence in a suit to enforce the personal liability of the person executing the bond. It is only excluded where it is offered as

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evidence of a transaction affecting immoveable property. *SESHATHRI AYYENGAR v. SANKARA AYYEN* . . . . . **7 Mad. 296**

22. ————— *Admissibility in evidence of document inadmissible under Act XX of 1866 as not being registered—Suit for money-debt on document.* A suit was brought to recover money secured by a mortgage in writing of immoveable property made in 1870 whilst the Registration Act (XX of 1866) was in force. By Act XX of 1866 the document was not admissible in evidence even to enforce the demand for money, the document not having been registered. By Act VIII of 1871 (the Registration Act) the document was rendered admissible when the suit was brought. *Held*, that the document was admissible in evidence. *GUDURI JAGANNADHAM v. RAPAKA RAMANNA*

**7 Mad. 348**

23. ————— and s. 17—*Registration Act, 1871, s. 17—Decree—Instrument—Admissibility in evidence.* Where a decree contained a charge on immoveable property:—*Held*, that it was admissible in evidence under s. 49 of Act VIII of 1871 without registration under s. 17. S. 17 of the Registration Act, 1871, expressly excludes such decrees. *PURMANANDAS JIWANDAS v. VALLABDAS WALIJI*

**I. L. R. 11 Bom. 506**

24. ————— and s. 17—*Unregistered conveyance—Covenant to pay money contingent on ejectment—Suit for money dismissed.* By an unregistered document A stipulated that B should enjoy certain land for a term of years in order that a debt and interest might be liquidated by receipt of profits, estimated at a fixed sum, and it was provided that, if B's possession was disturbed in the meantime, A should pay the balance of the principal then due and interest from the date of the loan. B, having been ejected, sued A upon the covenant to pay. *Held*, that, as the covenant to pay depended on the principal contract, which could not be proved for want of registration, B could not recover. *VENKATRAYUDU v. PAPI* . . . . . **I. L. R. 8 Mad. 182**

25. ————— *Admissibility in evidence of unregistered bond—Suit for money due on bond.* *Held*, by *COUCH, C.J.*, following the decisions of the Calcutta and Madras High Courts, but doubting, that an unregistered bond, whereby immoveable property was pledged by way of collateral security, is admissible in evidence where effect is sought to be given to it for the purpose of obtaining a decree for the money due under it. *TUKARAM VITHOJI v. KHANDOJI MALHARJI*

**6 Bom. O. C. 134**

26. ————— *Admissibility in evidence of unregistered bond—Suit for money due on bond.* Where a bond or other instrument creating an interest in land also contains a distinct promise to pay the money due under it, such bond or instrument is evidence in a suit brought to recover the money only. *SANGAPPA BIN NINGAPPA v. BASAPPA BIN PARAPPA* . . . . . **7 Bom. A. C. 1**



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27. ————— *Admissibility in evidence of unregistered bond—Suit for money due on bond.* An unregistered bond containing the condition that the lender will get possession of certain land in default of payment by the borrower within a specified time is admissible in evidence in case the lender sues, not to enforce any charge or lien against the land, but seeks for personal relief in the shape of a decree against the defendant for the payment of the bond-debt. *ESHREE RAI v. BINDOOT RAI*

3 *Agra 60 : Agra F. B. Ed. 1874, 142*

28. ————— *Admissibility in evidence of unregistered bond—Suit for money due on bond.* Although a bond which creates an interest in land as security for the debt is inadmissible in evidence if unregistered, it may be adduced as evidence of the debt, and a money-decree may be given on the basis of it for the sum secured by it. *SEETA KULWAR v. JUGURNATH PERSHAD*

3 *Agra 170*

29. ————— *Suit for money on unregistered mortgage-bond—Promise to pay.* Where the debtor by an unregistered bond acknowledged the debt and promised to pay and subsequently on his failure to pay on a certain date stipulated for its recovery by sale of the hypothecated property :—*Held*, that a suit could be maintained on the personal promise to pay. *NEMDHARI ROY v. BISSESSARI KUMARI* . 2 *C. W. N. 591*

30. ————— *Conveyance containing acknowledgment of debt.* *G* owed *B* Rs. 500, and executed a conveyance of certain land to *B*, for which such debt was partly the consideration. In such conveyance *G* acknowledged his liability for the debt, but he died before it was registered and it did not operate. In a suit against *G*'s widow for the debt :—*Held*, that, notwithstanding the conveyance was not registered, it was admissible as evidence of the acknowledgment by *G* of his liability for the debt. *KHUSHALO v. BEHARI LAL*

1 *L. R. 3 All. 523*

31. ————— *Unregistered bond hypothecating immoveable property as collateral security—Admissibility of bond as evidence of the money-obligation—Effect of non-registration.* A bond whereby a person obliges himself to pay money to another, and at the same time hypothecates immoveable property as collateral security for such payment, although the money-obligation is of the value of one hundred rupees, and the bond is not registered, can be received in evidence in support of a claim to enforce the money-obligation. *In the matter of the petition of SHEO DIAL v. PRAG DAT MISR* . . . . . 1 *L. R. 3 All. 229*

32. ————— *Unregistered bond for the payment of money hypothecating immoveable property—Admissibility in evidence of the bond in support of a claim for money—Mortgage.* On the 3rd February 1871 the defendants, having borrowed Rs. 1,000 from the plaintiffs, executed in favour of the latter an instrument in which they

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mortgaged, by way of conditional sale, certain immoveable property as security for the loan, and in which it was provided that they should pay certain interest on such sum annually, and should pay such sum on the expiration of five years from the date of such instrument, and in the event of failure in these respects that the plaintiffs might apply for foreclosure. On the 18th January 1879 the plaintiffs sued the defendants for the balance of such sum and interest, waiving their claim on such property and suing for such balance as a simple debt, as such instrument was not registered. *Held*, following *Sheo Dial v. Prag Dat Misr*, 1 *L. R. 3 All. 229*, that inasmuch as such instrument involved a personal obligation of the defendants distinct and severable from the obligation in respect of such property, such instrument, notwithstanding it was not registered, was admissible as evidence in support of the claim to enforce that money-obligation; and it was also admissible in proof of the fact that the debt was not exigible from the defendants until on and after the expiration of five years from the date of the loan. *LACHMAN SINGH v. KESRI*

1 *L. R. 4 All. 3*

33. ————— *Admissibility of unregistered deed—Specific performance, suit for.* *A* brought a suit in the Munsif's Court against *B* and *C*, alleging that they had sold outright to him by *saf-kobala* certain landed property for Rs. 300, which was duly paid, and the *kobala* was executed; that possession was given to him; that *B* and *C* set up before the Deputy Registrar fraudulent objections to the effect that a stipulation to return the property to the vendors on the repayment by them of the consideration-money had not been embodied in the deed, and that part of the consideration-money was still unpaid; that therefore the Registrar refused to execute the deed; that in fact there was no such stipulation as set up by *B* and *C*, and that the whole of the purchase-money was paid; and it was stated in the conclusion of the plaint that the suit had been instituted to set aside the fraudulent objections, and to establish the full title of *A* as purchaser. *Held* (MITTER, J., dissenting), that the suit would not lie. The unregistered deed could not be admitted in evidence, nor parol evidence of the contract be given under which *A* alleged that he acquired his title. *A* ought to have proceeded under s. 83 of Act XX of 1866. *RAHMA-TULLA v. SARIUTULLA KAGCHI*

1 *B. L. R. F. B. 58 : 10 W. R. F. B. 51*

*MAHOMED OHID v. KALEE PERSHAD SINGH*  
24 *W. R. 320*

*FATI CHAND SAHU v. LILAMBER SING DAS*  
9 *B. L. R. 433 : 14 Moo. I. A. 129*  
16 *W. R. P. C. 26*

34. ————— *Suit for breach of covenant—Admissibility in evidence of unregistered document.* In a suit for breach of a covenant to register contained in an unregistered mortgage-deed, the defendant cannot plead the non-registra-



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tion of the instrument for the purpose of protecting himself. Such a deed is admissible in evidence for a collateral purpose without being registered. *SHAM NARAYAN LAL v. KHEMAJEET MATOE*

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S.C. SHAM NARAIN LALL v. KHEMAJEET MATOE  
12 W. R. F. B. 11

35. ———— *Suit for possession based on unregistered deed—Suit to enforce registration.* Held, that a suit for possession based merely on an unregistered sale-deed must fail, such unregistered sale-deed being inadmissible as evidence in any civil proceeding under s. 13, Act XVI of 1864. *KRISHEN KISHORE CHUND v. MAHOMED ZUKAHOOLLAH.* Agra F. B. 148 : Ed. 1874, 111

36. ———— *Unregistered indigo "sattah"—Admissibility in evidence of claim for damages.* S gave M a lease of certain land, which was required by law to be registered, but which was not registered, in which it was stipulated that, if he failed to deliver any portion of such land, he should pay damages at a certain rate per bigha in respect of the portion not delivered, and in which such land was hypothecated as security for the payment of such damages. S having failed to deliver a portion of such land, M sued him for damages in respect of such portion according to the terms of the lease, not seeking to enforce the hypothecation, as the lease was not registered, but seeking only a money-decree. Held, that the lease, being unregistered, could not be received as evidence even of S's personal liability thereunder. *Sheo Dial v. Prag Dat Misr, I. L. R. 3 All. 229*, distinguished. *MARTIN v. SHEO RAM LAL* . . . I. L. R. 4 All. 232

37. ———— *Admissibility in evidence—Suit for damages for breach of covenants in unregistered deed—Document containing covenants for title—Act III of 1877, s. 17—Estoppel.* S L, by a deed of gift of 16th February 1847, granted and assured to S, his daughter, certain immoveable property. By a subsequent unregistered deed of gift of 15th July 1865, S L purported, in consideration of natural love and affection, to grant and convey the same property, the value of which exceeded R100, to B R, the husband of S, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns. The last-mentioned deed contained covenants on the part of S L, his heirs, executors, and administrators with B R, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns for title to "the hereditaments and premises hereinbefore expressed to be hereby granted and assured unto and to the use of the said B R, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns." S died in the lifetime of B R, who in 1867 mortgaged the premises comprised in the deed of 15th July 1865, and died in 1868. In 1870 the mortgagee sold the premises by auction, under the power of sale contained in the mortgage-deed; the plaintiff became the purchaser; and the mortgagee, on 24th March 1871, executed to him a conveyance of the premises, which were then in the possession of the surviving members of the

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family of B R and S. The plaintiff, having failed in a suit for ejectment against the parties in possession, who relied on the prior gift to S, sued the representatives of S L for damages for breach of the covenants for title contained in the unregistered deed of the 15th July 1865. Held, that though, as in *Tukaram v. Khandoji*, 6 Bom. O. C. 134, and *Sangappa v. Basappa*, 7 Bom. A. C. 1, an unregistered document requiring registration may be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, yet it cannot be looked at so far as it affects the immoveable property comprised therein, nor so far as it is evidence of any transaction affecting such property, and that, excluding the part of the document of 15th July 1865 which purported to be the conveyance to B R, the covenant for title sued on in the present suit was itself ambiguous and uncertain; and there being nothing to connect the premises, to which the covenant related, with the premises conveyed to the plaintiff, no breach of the covenant sued upon had been proved. The Court being precluded by the operation of the Registration Act (III of 1877) from looking at the deed of 15th July 1865 so far as it was a conveyance, the defendants were not estopped from contending that, nothing having passed under it to B R, nothing had passed to the plaintiff under the subsequent deeds, and that consequently the plaintiff was not entitled to maintain this suit. *RAJU BALU v. KRISHNARAY RAMCHANDRA* . . . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 273

38. ———— and s. 17—*Covenant in unregistered lease—Suit for specific performance.* The plaintiff leased a house to the defendant for three years by an unregistered instrument which contained a covenant by the lessee that he would purchase the house at a certain price on an event which took place. The plaintiff now sued for specific performance of the covenant. Held, that the unregistered instrument was not admissible in evidence. The covenant sought to be enforced depended on the lease, and the latter being invalid for want of registration, the former must also fail: the suit therefore should be dismissed. *SAMBAYYA v. GANGAYYA* . . . I. L. R. 13 Mad. 308

39. ———— *Admissibility in evidence independently of document sued on when unregistered.* In a case where it is made to appear that the cause of suit arises upon a document which by law requires registration, but has not in fact been registered, the plaintiff cannot be permitted to establish a claim independently of the document, the existence of which is shown. *RAMPERSHAD v. MEWA KOOR* . . . 2 N. W. 12

MOONA v. JEY MUNGUL SINGH . 4 N. W. 164

KABOOLUN v. SHUMSHEIR ALI . 11 W. R. 16

Unless it is apparent that such document is not the foundation of his suit. *SAWANTEE v. SEWA RAM* . . . 2 N. W. 35

40. ———— *Unregistered kabuliati—Suit for rent.* Where the contract between



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the parties to a rent suit is in no way disputed or denied, and the fact of certain lands having been taken at a certain rent is admitted the only issue being whether the rent has been paid or not, the case may be tried notwithstanding that the kabuliati is inadmissible by reason of non-registration. **DINONATH MOOKERJEE v. DEBNATH MOOKERJEE**  
**14 W. R. 429**

**41. ——— Inadmissibility for want of registration—Evidence in suit on document.** In a suit upon a razinama, the execution of which was admitted by the defendants, which purported to create an interest in immoveable property, the Civil Judge dismissed the suit because the document had not been registered in accordance with Act XVI of 1864, s. 13. *Held* (reversing the decree of the Civil Judge), that the existence of the agreement not having been disputed, its production was not necessary, and that the plaintiff was entitled to whatever relief the effect of the plaint and answer taken together would entitle him on the admission of the defendant. **CHEDAMBARAM CHETTY v. KARUNALYAVALANGAPULY TAVER**  
**3 Mad. 342**

*See REZA ALI v. BHIKUN KHAN* . **7 W. R. 334** where the only disputed point being the fact of payment for which the production of the kabuliati was unnecessary, the dismissal of the suit for its non-registration was *held* unjustifiable.

**42. ——— Inadmissibility of evidence where registrable document is not registered.** The plaintiff sued the defendant to recover rent due upon a muchilka executed by the defendant. The defendant admitted that he occupied the land under the express contract contained in the muchilka. The muchilka was a document the registration of which was compulsory under the Registration Acts, but was not registered. *Held*, that the plaintiff could not establish his case without putting the muchilka in evidence, and it was inadmissible, not having been registered. **MORRIS v. SAPAMTHEETHA PILLAY** . **6 Mad. 45**

**43. ——— Evidence where contract is unregistered and therefore inadmissible.** Where defendant, after executing a bill of sale in respect of certain lands and receiving the full amount of purchase-money agreed upon, had repudiated the contract and refused to make over possession, it was *held*, that, though the fact of the deed of sale not being registered precluded it, under s. 13, Act XVI of 1864, from being admitted as evidence, yet plaintiff was not excluded from showing by other evidence that he performed his part of the contract. There is nothing in that section which says that no contract purporting to create or transfer any right, title, or interest in land shall be recognised by the Civil Court unless reduced to writing. *Held*, also, that there was no reason why plaintiff should not be permitted to show that non-registration was owing, not to any fault of his own, but to the fraudulent conduct of his

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adversaries. **HELALOODDEEN v. CHOWDHRY ABDOL SUTTAR** . **9 W. R. 351**

**44. ——— Unregistered document with possession—Evidence of possession.** An unregistered document, when followed by delivery of possession, may be used as evidence of that possession. **LALLA GOPEE CHAND v. LIAKUT HOSSEIN** . **25 W. R. 211**

**45. ——— Admissibility in evidence—Intention of parties.** A sued B for recovery of possession of land which he alleged had been sold to him by B under a bill of sale. The bill of sale had been duly registered and was not disputed by B, but B produced an unregistered ikrarnamah, executed by A, to prove that the sale was not absolute, but only by way of mortgage. B alleged that the terms of the bill of sale were qualified and explained by the ikrarnamah. *Held*, that the ikrarnamah was inadmissible in evidence, as it had not been registered under s. 13 of Act XVI of 1864, but that the Court might look at other and independent evidence, viz., the acts and conduct of the parties, to throw a light upon their intention. **PARABDI SAHANI v. MAHOMED HOSSEIN**  
**1 B. L. R. A. C. 37**

**46. ——— Agreement to have deed of partition drawn up.** An agreement to have a deed of partition drawn up in a particular form, even if not admissible in evidence without registration, can be put in, unregistered, as evidence of the intention of the parties. **NEM ROY v. LALMUN ROY** . **25 W. R. 376**

**47. ——— Receipt for sums paid on bond hypothecating immoveable property—Admissibility in evidence—Parol evidence—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 91, illus. (e).** A receipt for sums paid in part liquidation of a bond hypothecating immoveable property must be registered under the provisions of s. 17 of Act VIII of 1871 to render it admissible as evidence under s. 49 of the said Act. Under illus. (e), s. 91 of Act I of 1872, such payments may nevertheless be proved by parol evidence, which is not excluded owing to the inadmissibility of the documentary evidence. **DALIP SINGH v. DURGA PRASAD**  
**I. L. R. 1 All. 442**

**48. ——— Proof of unregistered mortgage by subsequent admission rejected—Evidence Act, s. 65 (b).** The defendant in an ejectment suit claimed to be in possession under a mortgage deed for R1,000, executed in 1865, but not registered, and a second mortgage-deed for R50 of the same date, in which the first mortgage was recited. *Held*, that by virtue of s. 13 of the Registration Act, 1864, the first mortgage-deed could not be put in evidence, and that the defendant could not give secondary evidence thereof under s. 65 (b) of the Evidence Act. **DIVETHI VARADA AYYANGAR v. KRISHNASAMI AYYANGAR** . **I. L. R. 6 Mad. 117**

**49. ——— Landlord and tenant—Entry under unregistered lease—Holding**



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*over—Proof of terms of lease.* The plaintiff sued in 1881 to recover certain land and arrears of rent from the defendant, alleging that the defendant's ancestor entered on the land as a tenant in 1865 under a lease for five years, which was not registered. The defendant denied the lease of 1865, admitted that she was the tenant of the land, but denied that she could be ejected, and claimed to deduct from the rent certain emoluments. *Held*, that the plaintiff could not prove the tenancy alleged in the plaint, inasmuch as the lease of 1865 was not registered, and therefore could not eject the defendant. **NANGALI v. RAMAN . . . I. L. R. 7 Mad. 226**

## 50. ————— *Unregistered lease*

*—Proof of tenancy ejectment—Occupancy rights.* If a contract of lease is, for want of registration, ineffectual, the landlord is not debarred from giving other evidence of a tenancy and requiring the Court to adjudicate on his right to eject. Dictum in *Nangali v. Raman, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 226*, observed upon. **VENKATAGIRI v. RAGHAVA. ZAMINDAR OF VENKATAGIRI v. RAGHAVA . I. L. R. 9 Mad. 142**

**51. ————— *Effect of a registered instrument confirming a prior one of the same purport not registered.*** An instrument purporting to assign a right in immoveables of more than the value of R100 [s. 17, sub-s. (b), of Act III of 1877], being unregistered, was ineffectual to affect the title of the purchaser. Some years after, the parties executed a deed of conveyance, making the same assignment confirming the former instrument, and setting it forth in a schedule. The latter instrument was registered. In a suit in which the ownership of the property was contested:—*Held*, that the fact of the prior deed not having affected the property, being unregistered, was no reason why the deed afterwards registered should not be admitted as evidence of title. In this there had been nothing contravening the object of the Registration Act. **MITCHELL v. MATHURA DAS I. L. R. 8 All. 6 L. R. 12 I. A. 150**

**52. ————— *Inadmissibility in evidence of unregistered deed—Secondary evidence***  
*—Evidence Act, s. 91.* Plaintiff alleged that A and B had sold and conveyed, by an unregistered deed, certain land to the person under whom he claimed. The deed being inadmissible in evidence, B was called to prove the sale. *Held*, that B's evidence should have been rejected, as secondary evidence of the unregistered deed could not be received. **RAM CHUNDER HALDAR v. GOBIND CHUNDER SEN 1 C. L. R. 542**

**53. ————— *Unregistered document—Admissibility of other evidence where document is not admissible—Admission.*** The plaintiff sued to recover certain immoveable property sold to him by the first defendant by a registered deed of sale executed on the 23rd of July 1868. The second, third and fourth defendants pleaded a sale to them by the same party, the first defendant, on

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the 23rd March 1867; and that the first defendant after receiving consideration in full, had improperly refused to have their deed of sale registered. The provisions of s. 49 of the Registration Act of 1866 precluded the reception in evidence of the prior unregistered instrument of conveyance, but the lower Courts held that certain admissions made by first defendant in an inquiry held before the registration officer were admissible in evidence to prove the sale to third and fourth defendants. The suit was therefore dismissed with costs. Upon special appeal:—*Held*, by INNES and KINDERSLEY, JJ., that the admissions made by first defendant were evidence against plaintiff, as made by one from whom plaintiff derived his title, but that the provisions of the Registration Act precluded any effect being given to the sale evidenced by such admissions; there being a writing, the sale could not be proved by mere oral evidence. By INNES, J.—The term "instrument," in s. 49 of Act XX of 1866, is used on the understanding that the writing is not merely evidence of the transaction, but is the transaction itself. **SOMU GURUKHAL v. RANGAMMAL 7 Mad. 13**

**54. ————— *Suit to compel registration—Evidence of contract—Document being unregistered held inadmissible to prove the contract sought to be registered.*** The defendants agreed to let certain premises to the plaintiff for a term of three years from the 1st of November 1883 at a monthly rent of R200. Subsequently to the making of the agreement, viz., on the 17th January 1884, the plaintiff caused a writing to be prepared, which, as he alleged, contained the terms of the lease agreed on, and, having signed it, handed it over to the defendants. The defendants did not sign it, and the document remained with them. The plaintiff alleged that he did not ask the defendants to sign it, as the defendants told him they would get a copy of it prepared, which they would sign and send to him. The defendants alleged that, at the time the document was given to them by the plaintiff, they objected to it on the ground that it was incomplete, inasmuch as it did not contain two of the terms agreed on which prohibited the plaintiff from sub-letting or altering the premises, and required him to maintain them in their then existing condition. The plaintiff denied these allegations of the defendants. In May 1884 the plaintiff, through his attorneys, called upon the defendants to lodge the document for registration. The defendants refused, and the plaintiff filed the present suit, praying—(i) that the defendants might be ordered to lodge the said document for registration and do all such acts as might be necessary to obtain registration thereof; (ii) that, if necessary, another similar document might be prepared and registered; (iii) that, in the alternative, the defendants should pay R4,000 damages. At the trial the plaintiff raised (*inter alia*) an issue as to the truth of the defendants' allegation that the agreement of lease comprised terms forbidding the



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plaintiff to sub-let or alter, etc. The defendants objected to the proposed issue. In the course of the hearing the plaintiff tendered the document of the 17th January 1884 in evidence. The defendants objected, on the ground that it was unregistered. The Court held that it was admissible as a mere writing, with reference to which, irrespective of its contents, the other evidence in the case was given. At the close of the plaintiff's case the defendants declined to call evidence, and judgment was given on all the issues in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants appealed, and contended that they were not bound to produce the document for registration, and that the Court was wrong in permitting the above issue to be raised and determined in this suit, and that, the document being inadmissible as evidence of the contract, no oral evidence of the contract was receivable. The plaintiff contended that there was an implied obligation upon the defendants to register the document arising from the fact that the document contained the true contract between the parties, and that the object of the suit being to compel registration, the document, although not registered, could be given in evidence to prove the contract between the parties. *Held* (reversing the decree of the Court below), that there was no obligation upon the defendants to produce the document for registration, and that they could not be compelled to do so. *Held*, also, that the object of giving the document in evidence being to establish the contract of lease for the purpose of drawing an inference from it, the document was for that purpose inadmissible, being unregistered, and that the Court below, although admitting it originally as merely a piece of paper, was wrong in using it as evidence of the contract between the parties.

HURJIVAN VIRJI v. JAMSETJI NOWROJI

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 63

55. ———— *Suit for damages for breach of contract to execute a lease—Admissibility in evidence of an unregistered kabuliati to prove contract.* Defendant entered into an agreement with the plaintiff to lease a certain property to him. The plaintiff delivered the kabuliati to the defendant, and was put into possession of the property. The defendant did not execute the cowlie and did not register the kabuliati, and subsequently improperly deprived the plaintiff of his possession. Plaintiff brought a suit for damages for breach of contract. *Held*, on a question as to whether the kabuliati was admissible in evidence, having regard to s. 49 of Act III of 1877, since it had not been registered, that, since the plaintiff's action was not founded on an alleged title under a lease granted by the defendant, but was an action for damages for breach of the contract to execute the lease, the kabuliati was admissible in evidence to prove the contract. *Hurjivan Virji v. Jamsetji Nowroji*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 63, distinguished. RAJAH OF VENKATAGIRI v. NARAYANA REDDI

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 456

56. ———— *Instrument of hypothecation—Endorsement of payment unsigned—*

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*Admissibility of evidence of endorsement to show payment.* The plaintiff hypothecated certain land to the defendant by a duly registered instrument, and subsequently paid off the debt and received back the instrument. At the time of payment the defendant made an endorsement on the bond to the following effect: "25th Kartik of Sukla. Rupees two hundred and sixty-three, principal including interest, was received on account of this bond, and there is therefore no lien whatever." Some time afterwards plaintiff discovered that what he had paid in redemption of the mortgage-claim was in excess of what was due, and he brought a small cause suit to recover the amount overpaid, tendering in evidence the endorsement on the bond. The objection was taken that the endorsement, not being registered, was not receivable in evidence under s. 49 of the Registration Act of 1866. The District Munsif dismissed the suit upon the ground that the endorsement was not signed by the defendant, and was therefore not admissible in evidence, but referred to the High Court the question whether the evidence was rightly excluded. *Held*, by SCOTLAND, C.J., and INNES, J., that the fact of there being no signature to the endorsement was no objection to its reception as confirmatory evidence of the sum received by the defendant. By SCOTLAND, C.J.—That the endorsement was admissible evidence for the purpose for which it was offered, although not registered, the endorsement not being used as evidence of the creation or discharge of an obligation, but merely as confirmatory proof of a fact provable by oral evidence, although stated in writing. By INNES, J.—That the endorsement was admissible evidence, its reception not being precluded by the provisions of the Registration Act. VENKATARAMA NAIK v. CHINNATHAMBU REDDI . . . . . 7 Mad. 1

57. ———— *Sale certificate—Inadmissibility of, as unregistered—Other evidence of sale.* Independently of the sale certificates, where they are inadmissible, being unregistered, any proceedings confirming an auction sale are sufficient evidence of the sale. BENODI LALL GHOSE v. TAMIZUDDIN . . . . . 7 C. L. R. 115

See RAJKISHEN MOOKERJEE v. RADHAMADHUB HALDAR . . . . . 21 W. R. 349

58. ———— *Certificate of sale—Right of action.* The plaintiff sued to recover possession of a house purchased by him at a Court sale for R350. The plaint was filed on the 31st March 1873. No certificate of sale was filed with it; but plaintiff subsequently produced one, dated the 8th July 1873, and the Court admitted it in evidence. Defendant submitted that the suit should be dismissed, as no certificate was produced by the plaintiff with the plaint. The first Court made a decree in the plaintiff's favour. The Court of Appeal reversed that decree, and dismissed the suit, holding that the certificate ought not to have been received in evidence by the lower Court. The



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High Court, on second appeal, confirmed the decision of the lower Appellate Court, on the ground that the plaintiff had no right of action, as he had no registered certificate of sale at the date of the institution of the suit. **HARKISANDAS NARANDAS v. BAI JAMNA . . . I. L. R. 4 Bom. 155**

**59. ————** *Admissibility in evidence of instrument registrable, but unregistered destroyed by fire.* Where an instrument, the registration of which was rendered compulsory by s. 17 of the Registration Act (XX of 1866), was destroyed accidentally by fire soon after its execution, and before registration:—*Held*, in a suit to compel the defendant to execute another instrument to the same effect as that which had been destroyed, that secondary evidence of the contents of the unregistered instrument was admissible. **NYAKKA ROUTHEN v. VAVANA MAHOMED NAINA ROUTHEN 5 Mad. 123**

**60. ————** *and s. 17—Instrument affecting moveable and immoveable property.* The widow, daughter, and divided brother of a deceased Hindu executed an instrument which provided for the distribution of his property, both moveable and immoveable, as to which they had disputed. The document was not registered. The widow set up a will made by the deceased in her favour; the brother sued the widow for a declaration that the will was a forgery, but the Court held that it was genuine. He now sued the widow and daughter on the above instrument to recover his agreed share of the moveable property of the deceased. The widow set up the will, which the plaintiff averred was invalid according to the custom governing the family. *Held*, that the unregistered instrument was admissible as evidence in support of the plaintiff's claim for the moveable property. **THANDAVAN v. VALLIAMMA . I. L. R. 15 Mad. 336**

**61. ————** *Unregistered contract for sale of land subsequently attached in execution—Evidence of transfer of ownership in property.* In execution of a decree against S and P, property was attached on the 11th February 1891 and sold by auction to the plaintiff in July 1892. The defendants, however, alleged that at the date of attachment the property did not belong to S and P, as they had sold it to them (the defendants) on the 22nd January 1891, under a contract of sale of that date. Their contract had not been registered. *Held*, that by cl. (b) of s. 17 of the Indian Registration Act (III of 1877) the contract needed registration if it was intended that it should affect the land (s. 49). Not being registered, it did not operate to transfer the ownership, and could not be received in evidence of any transaction affecting the land, *ie.*, it could not be used to show that the ownership had passed from the vendor to the purchaser. The property in question was therefore, at the date of attachment, the property of S and P, and under the attachment and sale in execution it passed to

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the plaintiff. **HORMASJI MANEKJI DADACHANJI v. KESHAV PURSHOTAM . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 13**

*See KARALIA NANUBHAI MAHOMEDBHAI v. MANSUKRAM VAKHATCHAND I. L. R. 24 Bom. 400*

**62. ————** *Lease—Agreement to indemnify contained in lease—Suit for indemnity.* A lease of land for nine years contained a clause by which the lessor agreed to indemnify the lessee in case he should incur any loss in consequence of disputes which might arise as to the land between the lessor and his kinsmen. The lease was not registered. After the lessee had held the land under the lease for two years, a suit for possession was brought against him, and the lessor and he were dispossessed and obliged to pay mense profits. He then brought this suit against the lessor under the above clause in the lease. *Held*, that the lease, being unregistered, was not admissible in evidence, and could not be looked at. The clause on which the plaintiff sued could not be separated from the lease itself, and the plaintiff's claim must therefore be rejected. **GURUNATH SHRINIVAS DESAI v. CHENBASAPPA . . . I. L. R. 18 Bom. 745**

**63. ————** *Notice of attornment on redemption of mortgage—Evidence of attornment, but not of satisfaction of mortgage-debt.* Where on the redemption of a mortgage the mortgagee executed a document which purported to be a notice of attornment to the tenants in occupation of the mortgaged property, containing a recital that the property had been redeemed:—*Held*, that the document, though unregistered, was admissible in evidence for its own proper purpose of proving the attornment, though not for the purpose of proving that the mortgage charge was satisfied. **ANTAJI v. DATTAJI . . . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 36**

**64. ————** *Mortgage taken from Hindu widow—Unpaid interest claimed on her deceased husband's mortgages.* A pardanashin widow executed a mortgage of part of the family estate to secure payment of the balance of interest alleged to be due on three previous mortgages, which had been executed by her husband in his life-time. In a suit to enforce the mortgage the one made by the widow was held to be invalid. Notes promising to pay interest, additional to that contracted for in the mortgages, had been signed by the husband, which, it was held, could not affect the right to redeem, being unregistered. **TIKA RAM v. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF BARA BANKI 405**

**I. L. R. 26 Calc. 707**  
**L. R. 28 I. A. 97**  
**3 C. W. N. 573**

**65. ————** *and ss. \*3 and 47—Assignment of decree for sale of hypothecated property—Non-registration of deed of assignment—Civil Procedure Code, s. 232—Effect of subsequent registration.* The assignee of a decree for sale of hypothecated property applied, under s. 232 of the Civil Procedure Code, for execution of the decree, but objection



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being raised that the deed of assignment had not been registered, he subsequently applied for the return of the deed that it might be registered, and it was returned accordingly. The deed was afterwards duly registered. *Held*, (i) that the deed of assignment was not a document which comprised immoveable property within the meaning of s. 49 of the Registration Act (III of 1877), a decree for sale not being immoveable property as defined in s. 3; (ii) that consequently, although the assignee might not, under the latter portion of s. 49, use the deed for the purpose of proving his title, there was no provision in the Act saying that he should not take title under the deed; (iii) that the position of the assignee when he made his application on the 13th November 1886 was that he was unable to prove that there was a title by assignment in himself; (iv) that the subsequent registration cured the absence of registration on the 13th November 1886, and, under s. 47 of the Registration Act, the document thereupon had full effect, and related back to its execution. **ABDUL MAJID v. MUHAMMAD FAIZULLAH**. . . . **I. L. R. 13 All. 89**

**66.** ——— and s. 17 (c)—*Unregistered agreement by mortgagor to sell to mortgagee—Subsequent assignment of equity of redemption to third person for value, but with notice of agreement.* In a suit for redemption filed by an assignee for value of the equity of redemption against a mortgagee in possession, it was found that the mortgagor had agreed with the defendant to sell the mortgaged premises to him, that part of the purchase-money had been acknowledged as paid, and that the balance had been tendered in pursuance of the agreement. It was further found that the plaintiff had taken his assignment with notice of the above agreement and tender. The agreement was in writing, but not registered. *Held*, that, though the agreement was not admissible in evidence as creating an interest in land, still it might be used for the purpose of obtaining specific performance, and the plaintiff, having purchased the equity of redemption with notice as above, was not entitled to redeem. **ADAKKALAM v. THEETHAN**

**I. L. R. 12 Mad. 505**

**67.** ——— and s. 60—*Certificate of registration—Distinction between act of registering officer and conduct of parties—Certificate not invalidated and document not made inadmissible by erroneous procedure in presenting or admitting execution.* The word “registered,” as used in s. 49 of the Registration Act (III of 1877), refers to the act of registration by the registering officer, and not to matters of procedure or conduct of the parties seeking registration, which are governed by special provisions of the Act. S. 49, read with s. 60, only means that a document to be admissible in evidence for the purposes of the former section, must be registered, i.e., the officer must, under s. 60, have put upon it the certificate required by that provision. If he has done so, the document bearing such certificate

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becomes admissible in evidence: if he has not, or there has been no registration of the document, then such document is inadmissible. Where the document bears such a certificate, it is registered within the meaning of s. 60, and becomes under the second paragraph thereof admissible in evidence, and the operation of the second paragraph is not interfered with by s. 49. Where, therefore, the lower Appellate Court rejected as inadmissible in evidence under s. 49 a deed-of-gift of immoveable property upon which was endorsed a certificate under s. 60, on the ground that the person presenting it for registration and admitting execution was not qualified to do so under ss. 32 and 35, and the registration was consequently void and the document not registered under s. 17 (a):—*Held*, that the Court was wrong in so doing, and ought to have looked at and dealt with the document. **Har Sahai v. Chunni Kuar**, **I. L. R. 4 All. 14**; **Ikbāl Begam v. Sham Sundar**, **I. L. R. 4 All. 384**; **Bishunath Naik v. Kelliani Bai**, **All. Weekly Notes (1882) 175**; **Husaini Begam v. Mulo**, **All. Weekly Notes (1882) 183**; **Sheo Shunkar Sahoy v. Hirdey Narain Sahu**, **I. L. R. 6 Calc. 25**; **Muhammed Ewaz v. Birj Lal**, **L. R. 4 I. A. 166**; **Jah Mukhan Lall Panday v. Jah Koondan Lall**, **L. R. 2 I. A. 210**; **Majid Hosain v. Fazl-un-nissa**, **L. R. 16 I. A. 19**, referred to. **HARDEI v. RAM LAL**

**I. L. R. 11 All. 319**

**68.** ——— and ss. 28 and 60—*Deed on which certificate under s. 60 has been endorsed—Document which should not have been registered under s. 28.* *Semle*: *Per* **PICOT, J.**—A document on which a certificate under s. 60 has been duly endorsed cannot be held to have been duly registered under s. 49 of Act III of 1877, if it appears that the officer who made the certificate should not under s. 28 have registered the document. **BAIJ NATH TEWARI v. SHEO SAHOY BHAGUT**

**I. L. R. 18 Calc. 556**

——— ss. 49 and 50—*Registration—Priority—Unregistered deed accompanied with possession—Subsequent sale by registered deed—Effect of possession—Possession, for purposes of notice, equivalent to registration—Duty of purchaser to inquire as to nature of possession.* On the 16th June 1876 Revapuri mortgaged the lands in suit to the first defendant, with possession, and the latter on the 26th June 1876 leased them to the second defendant for one year. The second defendant remained in possession as tenant after the year had expired. On the 3rd December 1878, while defendant 2 was in possession of the lands as tenant, Revapuri sold to him (defendant 2) her equity of redemption for R95. The deed of sale was not compulsorily registrable under the Act then in force, and, owing to the death of Revapuri, it was not registered. On the 8th December 1895 the heir of Revapuri sold the equity of redemption in the mortgage of 1876, by a registered deed, to the plaintiff. At the date of this sale to the plaintiff the



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second defendant was still in actual possession. The plaintiff brought this suit to redeem the lands from the mortgagee (defendant 1), and added defendant 2 as a party, alleging that he was in possession as a tenant of the first defendant. The lower Courts passed a decree for the plaintiff holding that his registered deed gave him priority over the second defendant, whose deed was unregistered. On appeal:—*Held* (reversing the decree of the lower Courts), that the plaintiff's suit should be dismissed. Possession, in certain cases, for the purposes of notice, has the same effect as registration. The plaintiff, at the date of his purchase, had notice of the possession of the second defendant, and, that being so, it was the plaintiff's duty to inquire of the second defendant under what title he held; and, if the plaintiff had done so, instead of assuming that the second defendant was still holding merely as tenant, he would have discovered that the second defendant had purchased the land. *KONDIBA BIN BABAJI v. NANA SHIDRAO* (1903)

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 408

ss. 49, 87—*Death of executant—Registration at the instance of one of several heirs—Validity—Document if binds immoveable property.* A document, which was presented for registration by one of the heirs of the deceased executant and registered, is not precluded by s. 49 of the Registration Act from affecting the immoveable property specified in it, although the registration might have been irregular. *Quære*: Whether s. 87 of the Registration Act which cures defects in the procedure of the registering officer can be extended also to cure the shortcomings of persons who apply to have documents registered. *Pakran v. Kunhamma*, I. L. R. 23 Mad. 580, followed. *Mujibunnissa v. Abdur Rahim*, I. L. R. 23 All. 233, referred to. *SUJAN BIBI v. ASABA KHATUN* (1909)

13 C. W. N. 722

## s. 50—

See ante, ss. 49 AND 50.

1. s. 50 (1871, s. 50; 1866, s. 505; 1864, s. 68; 1843, s. 2)—*Priority—Operation of section—Meaning of the words "duly registered" in the section—Registration Act (VIII of 1871), s. 50—Contest between instruments executed before Act III of 1877, which are not both optionally registrable—Vendor and purchaser—Purchaser omitting to take possession—Fraud—Estoppel.* S. 50 of the Registration Act (III of 1877) has no retrospective effect. The words "duly registered" under that section mean duly registered under that Act, and not under any prior Act. The section has no application to cases where the contest is between an unregistered instrument whenever executed and a registered instrument executed before the Act came into force. It applies only to cases where the registered instrument is subsequent to the Act. A sold certain land to B by a sale-deed dated 15th July 1871. The deed was optionally registrable,

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and was not registered. A continued in possession after the date of the sale. A sold the same land to the plaintiff by a deed of sale, dated 1st February 1872. The deed was registered, its registration being compulsory. It was unaccompanied with possession. In 1882 B obtained possession of the land from A's sons, and sold it to the defendant by a sale-deed dated 14th October 1882. This deed was registered and accompanied with possession. In 1883 the plaintiff sued for possession of the land in dispute, relying on his registered deed of sale of 1st February 1872. The defendant relied on his vendor's sale-deed on the 15th July 1871. *Held*, that under Act VIII of 1871, which governed the present case, there could be no competition between the sale-deeds of 1871 and 1872, the registration of the one being optional, whilst that of the other was compulsory. The registration of the plaintiff's deed therefore did not give it priority over the earlier deed under which the defendant claimed. *Held*, also, that the defendant's vendor by merely omitting to take possession of the land on his purchase was not guilty of any positive fraud or of any concealment or negligence so gross as to amount to fraud that would entitle the plaintiff to relief against him. *SHIVRAM v. SAYA*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 229

2. *Priority of registered over unregistered deed—Mortgage-deed.* The purchaser under a decree for sale in satisfaction of a registered mortgage is entitled, in priority to the purchaser under another decree, for sale in satisfaction of another unregistered mortgage, although the latter mortgage be of an earlier date. *PRAHLAD MISSEER v. UEDIT NARAIN SINGH*

1 B. L. R. A. C. 197: 10 W. R. 291

3. *Priority of registered over unregistered deed.* Under Act XIX of 1843, a registered deed was entitled to priority over any unregistered deed of an earlier date. *MALESHAPPA BIN KARVIRAPPA v. BASSAPPA BIN NINGAPPA SHETAVNEKAR*

1 Bom. 10

*SUNKUR SAHOY v. SHEO PERSHAD SOOKOOL*

16 W. R. 270

*GOPAL DASS v. DOOMEE CHOWDHRY*

W. R. 1864, 226

*NUZUR ALI v. EMDAD ALI*

1 W. R. 206

A deed of sale held to have no priority over a mortgage unregistered. *MAHESHWAR BUKSH SING v. BHIKHA CHOWDHRY*

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 403

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 122

5 W. R. 61

Nor over another deed of sale where the case is not one of two rival purchasers from the same person. *UMBIKA CHURN KOONDOD v. DHURMO DOSS KOONDOD*

11 W. R. 129

See *GOLLA CHINNA GURURVEPPA NAIDU v. KALI APPEAH NAIDU*

4 Mad. 434

15 B 2



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BISSONATH SINGH v. RAJCHUNDER ROY

W. R. 1864, 141

4. *Priority of registered over unregistered deed—Notice.* A registered deed of sale, though subsequent in date, invalidates, as against the registered purchaser, a prior deed of sale unregistered, notwithstanding that notice of the prior deed be alleged. Act XIX of 1843, s. 2, construed. KRISHNASAMI PILLAI v. VENKATACHELLA AIYAN . . . . . 3 Mad. 89

(Contra) KISHORBHAI GALLABHAI v. JORABHAI DAJI . . . . . 7 Bom. A. C. 56

5. *Bom. Reg. IX of 1827, s. 6—Priority of registered to unregistered deed.* Before the repeal of the first part of cl. 1, s. 6, Regulation IX of 1827, by Act XVI of 1864, a purchaser claiming under a deed of purchase duly registered was entitled to be preferred to a mortgagee claiming under a deed of mortgage executed before his purchase, but not registered until after the deed of purchase had been registered. PARSHOTAM RANCHOD v. JAGJIVAN MAYARAM . . . . . 1 Bom. 60

6. *Priority of deeds—Contract to sell at future time—Deed of sale.* The want of registration of a contract by A to sell land to B at some future time on receipt of balance of the sum agreed on, not then paid, was no bar, *per se*, to B's preferential claim over C, a subsequent purchaser, whose sale had been registered under Act XIX of 1843. RAMTONOO SURMAH SIRCAR v. GOURCHUNDER SURMAH SIRCAR . . . . . 3 W. R. 64

NUDDEAR CHAND SEIN v. KISHOREE LALL CHUCKERBUTTY . . . . . 7 W. R. 463

7. *Priority—Deed of sale of immoveable property.* Held, that the preference given under Act XIX of 1843 to the latter of two deeds of sale of immoveable property, when registered, over the earlier unregistered deed was not confined to cases in which the first deed had not been carried into effect, as every duly registered deed of sale, if authentic, invalidates any other deed of sale which may not have been registered. PARABHUDAS HIRACHAND v. DHONDU . . . . . 2 Bom. 233 : 2nd Ed. 222

8. *Pottahs—Priority.* Act XIX of 1843 did not apply to pottahs; consequently a subsequently registered pottah could not prevail over a prior unregistered pottah. ANUND CHUNDER CHOWDHRY v. CHUNDERNATH ROY . . . . . 5 W. R. 205

9. *Priority of deeds—Unregistered mortgage with possession.* Act XIX of 1843 did not give a registered kobala priority over a prior unregistered mortgage under which enjoyment had actually taken place. FURZUND ALI v. ABDOL RAHIM . . . . . 4 W. R. 30

DENOBUNDHOO SADHOO v. KHETTERNATH TEWARY . . . . . 2 Hay 20

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(Contra) HARNANGIR GURU DHANPATGIR v. SPIERS . . . . . 2 Bom. 213 : 2nd Ed. 204

10. *Priority of deeds—Mortgagee with possession—Suit under Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230.* Held, that a mortgagee whose bond was registered was entitled, under s. 230 of Act VIII of 1859, to recover possession of the mortgaged land of which he had been dispossessed under a decree obtained against his mortgagor by another mortgagee, whose mortgage-bond had been subsequently registered, on condition that he satisfied the claim of the decree-holder; otherwise the defendant to be entitled to possession on his satisfying the plaintiff's mortgage-claim. BHIKAJI v. VALLABHDAS . . . . . 2 Bom. 209

11. *Bom. Reg. IX of 1827—Prior unregistered sale with possession—Subsequent registered mortgage.* On the 15th December 1863 H purchased from D, for valuable consideration, two fields in the Satara district (to which the provisions of Regulation IX of 1827 and of Act XIX of 1843 as to registration were then applicable), and was duly put into possession of the fields. The deed of sale was not registered. On the 14th February 1864 D mortgaged, by a registered mortgage, the same two fields to B, who then knew that H was in possession of the fields as purchaser. Held, that, according to the true construction of Regulation IX of 1827, s. 6, cl. 1, the title of H having been completed by possession, there was no property in the fields left in D to mortgage to B, and that therefore H (the purchaser) had a better title to the fields than B, the mortgagee. *Semle:* The effect would have been the same under the provisions of Act XVI of 1864 or of Act XX of 1865. History of registration given, and the provisions of the different enactments relating to registration compared and discussed. BALARAM NEMCHAND v. APPA VALAD DULU . . . . . 9 Bom. 121

12. *Priority of deeds—Priority of title—Proof of authenticity.* Priority of registration gave priority of title under Act XIX of 1843 only when the authenticity of the document was proved. GANDHAREE DEBEA v. SONATUN PANDAY . . . . . 10 W. R. 215

13. *Registered and unregistered deeds—Priority—Possession—Fraud.* Act XIX of 1843 gave the preference, generally speaking, to a subsequent kobala which was registered over a prior one unregistered. To avoid its operation, a plaintiff had to show that the vendor not only sold and parted with his rights in the property, but actually made over possession to him. If, however, the second sale was illusory, proving fraud on the part of the vendor, it would not stand in the way of plaintiff's right. BUTOOLUN v. OZEERUN . . . . . 8 W. R. 300

14. *Registered and unregistered documents—Priority.* Plaintiff sued for possession of land under an unregistered deed of sale; and one of the defendants claimed the same



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land under a deed of subsequent date registered after the commencement of the suit. The latter deed was found to be fraudulently got up between the defendants. *Held*, that the registration of such a document did not give it the effect of invalidating a former unregistered deed of sale. **NARASANNA v. GAVAPPA** . . . . . 3 Mad. 270

15. ————— *Priority of registered over unregistered deed.* A Civil Court was held to have done right in giving priority to a lease registered under Act XVI of 1864, as against an unregistered conveyance of an earlier date. **GOBIND CHUNDER ROY v. POORNO CHUNDER SEIN** . . . . . 10 W. R. 36

16. ————— *Priority of registered over unregistered deeds.* Under s. 68, Act XVI of 1864, registered deeds were entitled to preference over unregistered deeds, even of that class the registration of which is optional; the practical distinction between the two classes being that deeds the registration of which is compulsory, if unregistered, will not be received in evidence at all; whereas deeds the registration of which is optional will be received in evidence, notwithstanding the absence of registration, though they must give way to registered documents of subsequent dates relating to the same property. **MUNSOOR ALI v. AZMUT ALI** . . . . . 9 W. R. 282

**GOOROO DASS DAN v. KOOSHOM KOOMAREE DOSSEE** . . . . . 9 W. R. 547

17. ————— *Priority of registered over unregistered deed—Possession.* Where two parties claimed the same property by conveyance from the owner under registered deeds of sale of 1272, plaintiff's purchase and registration being of anterior date to those of defendant, who, besides being in possession, pleaded that he had, previously to plaintiff's purchase, obtained possession under a parol contract of sale, it was held, that plaintiff was entitled to a decree, and that defendant could not set up the parol sale against the plaintiffs registered kobala of the same year, in the face of s. 68, Act XVI of 1864. **BOIKUNTONATH SETT v. RUSICK LOLL BURMONO** . . . . . 10 W. R. 231

18. ————— *Impeaching deed of sale registered so as to prevent operation of section.* For the purpose of impeaching a deed of sale registered under Act XVI of 1864, so as to prevent the operation of s. 68, it is necessary to show that the deed was fraudulently executed, and that the purchaser was wilfully and intentionally a party to the fraud of the vendor, or at least that the deed was executed without consideration. **RAM CHAND KOOMAR v. MODHOOSOODUN MOZOOMDAR** . . . . . 7 W. R. 119

19. ————— *Priority of registered instrument—Deed registered under existing law.*—Where an instrument was executed under the Registration Act, XIX of 1843, and was a valid instrument conferring a right or interest on the

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party in whose favour it was made, it does not become invalid by reason of the party not getting it registered within twelve months, nor is priority over it obtained by a subsequent conveyance which is registered under the Registration Law of 1864 or 1866. **DOOLAL BIBEE v. NADA SHAHA** . . . . . 13 W. R. 446

20. ————— *Priority of registered over unregistered deeds.* A genuine deed of sale given by the owner of an estate at a time when registration was not compulsory, cannot be invalidated by a subsequent deed given by that owner's heir and successor, the registration of which was compulsory by Act XX of 1866, merely on the ground that the last deed was registered, and the first was not. **IMRIT SINGH v. KOYLASHOO KOER** . . . . . 11 W. R. 559

21. ————— *Optional registration—Priority of deeds.* A deed the registration of which was not absolutely requisite under s. 49, Act XX of 1866, was not entitled to priority to a duly registered kobala under s. 50 of that Act. **MOFTZEL HOSSEIN v. GOLAM AMBIAH** . . . . . 10 B. L. R. 381 note : 10 W. R. 196

22. ————— *Priority of registered over unregistered deed.* In a suit by a purchaser of a howla tenure which defendant was proceeding to sell under an *ex parte* decree which he had obtained upon a mortgage-bond executed by plaintiff's vendor:—*Held*, that plaintiff's registered purchase, though of a subsequent date, must take effect as against defendant's unregistered mortgage, which might have been registered. **ALI AZIM KHAN v. ISLAM KHAN** . . . . . 14 W. R. 483

23. ————— *Priority of registered over unregistered deed—Lien.* *Held*, that property sold in satisfaction of a superior lien cannot be held to have been sold subject to an inferior lien, and that a registered deed of a subsequent date has preference over an unregistered deed of prior date. **SEETUL PERSHAD v. HUR CHUND SAHOO** . . . . . 1 Agra 263

24. ————— *Priority of deeds—Mortgage-deed—Deed of sale.* A lent B Rs 75 on 6th Asar 1273 (June 19th, 1866), and B executed a mortgage of two bighas of land for the amount in A's favour. On 23rd Asar (July 6th) B sold to C one bigha of the same land. A's mortgage was not registered; C's deed of sale was. A subsequently brought a suit for the amount owed him by B, and sought to attach the land mortgaged to him in execution. C preferred a claim to the property attached, on the ground that the land was his: his petition was allowed. A now sued to have the property mortgaged to him sold in execution of his decree, and to set aside C's purchase. *Held*, that under ss. 18 and 50, Act XX of 1866, C's registered deed of sale must have preference over A's unregistered mortgage. **GAYARAM MAZUMDAR v. MADHUSUDAN MAZUMDAR** . 4 B. L. R. Ap. 73



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25. *Conditional deed of sale—Priority of deeds.* A entered into an agreement with B to convey to him a certain portion of land for a consideration of R98, of which R60 had been paid as earnest-money. The agreement contained a proviso that, on A's refusal to convey the property within the time mentioned in the agreement, this document should operate as a conveyance and A should forfeit his claim to the balance of the consideration. Before the expiry of the time mentioned in the agreement, A sold, by a registered deed, a portion of the property mentioned in the agreement. In a suit by B for possession of the property and for a declaration that the agreement operated as a conveyance:—*Held*, that under cl. 1, s. 18, and s. 50 of Act XX of 1866, the subsequent registered conveyance had priority over the unregistered agreement. SHAMA CHURN NEOGI v. NABIN CHANDRA DHOBA . . . 6 B. L. R. Ap. 1 : 15 W. R. 239

26. *Priority of registered over unregistered instrument—San mortgage without possession in Guzerat.* Under s. 50 of the Registration Act, XX of 1866, a registered instrument takes effect, as regards the property comprised therein, against every unregistered instrument relating to it, whether or not the grantor of those instruments be the same. As between himself and his mortgagor, and also as against any subsequent unregistered assignee of the latter, an unregistered san mortgagee in Guzerat has a perfectly valid charge upon the property mortgaged; but his right against such property is liable to be defeated by the mortgagor, or his heir, or such assignee conveying it to another by a registered instrument while his own title remains unregistered. Lakhmichand Walchand v. Kastur Bechar, 9 Bom. 60, dissented from. MAKANDAS KALIDAS v. SHANKARDAS HARI BHAI . . . 12 Bom. 241

27. *Deeds of different descriptions—Priority.* The rule giving a registered document preference over an unregistered one was held not to apply to deeds of different descriptions. KHETTUR BALSEE v. GOUR HURREE . . . W. R. 1864, 387

28. *Priority—Documents optionally and compulsorily registrable.* The 50th section of the Registration Act, 1866, was applied to instruments of which the registration was optional, giving priority between such instruments to the one which was registered. HAMED BUX v. BINDRABUN . . . 2 N. W. 37

PANHA KHUMAJI v. FATTA UPAJI . . . 12 Bom. 179

But not to a case in which the registration of one instrument was optional, but of the other compulsory. HAMED BUX v. BINDRABUN . . . 2 N. W. 37

29. *Priority of registered over unregistered document—Compulsory and optional registration.* A registered deed of sale

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of which registration was compulsory, did not, under Act XX of 1866, take effect against a prior unregistered mortgage-bond in respect of the same land, the registration of which, it being for a sum under R100, was optional. RYASUTULLA v. DOORGA CHURN PAL 15 B. L. R. 294 : 24 W. R. 121

See OGHRA SINGH v. ABLAKH KOER.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 536 : 3 C. L. R. 434

LAKHMICHAND WALCHAND v. KASTUR BECHAR . . . 9 Bom. 60

MAHOMED ASHRUF v. KUREEMODDEEN . . . 24 W. R. 468

30. *Lease to take juice from date trees—Priority.* A registered lease to take juice from date trees cannot, under s. 50, Act XX of 1866, have priority over an unregistered one of a prior date. JALU NAMDAR v. BEICHA NAMDAR . . . 3 B. L. R. A. C. 394

S.C. JANOO MUNDUR v. HUCHA MUNDUR . . . 12 R. W. 366

31. *Registration Act, XIX of 1843—Priority—Instruments of which registration is optional.* A mortgage-deed registered under Act XX of 1866 is not thereby entitled to priority over a mortgage-deed which might have been, but was not, registered under Act XIX of 1843, in cases where the consideration for the rival deeds exceeds R100. Maleshappa v. Bassappa, 1 Bom. 10; Harnamgir v. Spiers, 2 Bom. 204; and Parabhudas v. Dhondur, 2 Bom. 222, distinguished. *Quære*: Whether, in the case of instruments executed for a consideration less than R100, s. 50 of Act XX of 1866 would operate to give priority to the deed registered under that Act over the deed which might have been, but was not, registered under Act XIX of 1843. KHANDU DULABDAS v. TARACHAND AMARCHAND . . . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 574

32. *Priority—Registered and unregistered deeds—Optional and compulsory registration.* Deeds of sale, dated respectively the 22nd October 1868 and 7th February 1874, and registered, the former under Act XX of 1866 and the latter under Act VIII of 1871, are not thereby entitled to priority over an unregistered mortgage-deed dated the 13th June 1864, the registration of which was optional under Act XIX of 1843, where the consideration for the rival deeds exceeds R100. *Quære*: Whether in Kanara a mortgage without possession can be sustained against a subsequent purchase from the mortgagor with possession. PARMAYA v. SONDE SHRINIVASAPA . . . I. L. R. 4 Bom. 459

33. *Priority—Lien created by sales under registered and unregistered deeds.* Where it appeared that a sale of the share for which plaintiffs held a conditional sale-deed had substantially taken place in satisfaction of two decrees obtained on two bonds, one unregistered



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and the other registered, and of a prior date to that of the plaintiff's mortgage-deed:—*Held*, that the share was not liable to a lien created subsequently to the registered deed; and though the plaintiffs might have, by reason of registration, a preferable right to that possessed by the decree-holder of the unregistered bond, yet they had no claim preferable to that of the decree-holder of the registered prior bond. *MOTEE RAM v. KAISREE*

2 Agra 52

34. ————— *Unregistered mortgage defeated by subsequent registered sale.* *V*, having purchased land from *N* in March 1871 by a registered deed for R10, entered into and retained possession till ousted by *K* in 1880 in execution of a decree obtained by *K* against *N* upon a registered mortgage-deed dated 1869, conditioned to become an absolute sale within a certain date which had elapsed before suit was brought. *Held*, that, under s. 50 of the Registration Act of 1866, *K*'s title was defeated by *V*'s registered sale-deed. *KANTETI VENKAYYA v. BALABHADRAPATRUNI KOTAYYA*

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 153

35. ————— *Priority—Possession.* A registered deed could not, under s. 50, Act XX of 1866, prevail against an unregistered deed under which possession had been delivered to the alienee. *SELAM SHEIKH v. BAIDONATH GHATAK*

3 B. L. R. A. C. 312 : 12 W. R. 217

*SHEODYAL AHEER v. GOOL MAHOMED KHAN*

2 N. W. 296

*MANMAL VALAD SURAT MAL v. DASRATH VALAD NARAYAN* . . . . . 9 Bom. 147

*NAGESH BHAT v. BALVANTRAY* . 9 Bom. 151

36. ————— and s. 100—*Priority.* A purchased certain lands in 1866, and duly registered his bill of sale. *B* had purchased the same lands in 1855 from the persons through whom *A*'s vendors made their title, and had been in possession ever since, but had not registered his bill of sale, as he might have done, under s. 100 of Act XX of 1866. *A* sued to obtain possession. *Held*, that *B* was not bound to register, and his title was good against *A*. *GIRIJA SINGH v. GIRIDHARI SINGH*

1 B. L. R. A. C. 14 : 10 W. R. 65

*FYEZOONNISSA v. SADUTOOLLAH* . 22 W. R. 3

37. ————— *Priority—Possession.* A mortgaged a tank in 1859 to the plaintiff. The mortgage was never registered. *A* in 1867 sold the tank to *C*, and executed a deed of sale thereof. The deed of sale was duly registered, and *C* had been ever since in possession under it. The plaintiff sued *A* on his mortgage, and in that suit *C* intervened and was made a defendant. *A* did not appear in the suit. *Held*, that, *C* having registered his deed of sale and being in possession, his title was good against the plaintiff. *GIRIJA SINGH v. GIRIDHARI SINGH*. 1 B. L. R. A. C. 14, distinguished. *SOODHARAM BHUTTA-CHARJEE v. ODHOY CHUNDER BUNDOPADHYA*

10 B. L. R. 380: 19 W. R. 278

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38. ————— *Priority of registered over unregistered deed with possession.* In July 1864 two undivided brothers executed a mortgage of their joint property to the plaintiff for R500, and in January 1868 they executed another mortgage for R1,000 to the defendant, who registered it under Act XX of 1866. In a suit brought on the mortgage of 1864, a decree was made in October 1871 that, if the sum due were not paid within two months, the property should be sold, and in March 1872 the property was sold in execution of that decree and bought by the plaintiff, who was duly put into possession. The defendant subsequently obtained a decree on the mortgage of 1868; the property was sold in execution of that decree, and was purchased by the defendant, who, dispossessing the plaintiff, was himself put into possession. In a suit brought to eject the defendant:—*Held*, that the mortgage of 1864 did not require to be registered in order to maintain its priority over that of 1868. *VENKATA NARSAMMAH v. RAMIAH*

I. L. R. 2 Mad. 108

39. ————— *Registered and unregistered deed—Priority—Mortgage—Possession.* A mortgage in the Konkan without possession is invalid as against a subsequent mortgagee with possession, but the registration of such a mortgage cures any defect or imperfection arising from the non-completion of the transaction by delivery of possession; and a deed so registered is good against a non-registered mortgage, though accompanied by possession. Previous cases reviewed. *HARI RAMCHANDRA v. MAHADAJI VISHNU*

8 Bcm. A. C. 50

See *KRISHNAPPA VALAD MAHADAPPA v. BAHIRU YADAVRAY* . . . . . 8 Bom. A. C. 55

40. ————— *Possession—Priority of registered deed—Purchaser of mortgaged property.* A purchaser with possession at a Court's sale, whose certificate of sale is registered, buys the right, title, and interest of the debtor burdened with the lien of a prior mortgagee, without possession, whose deed of mortgage is registered. *CHINTAMAN BHASKAR v. SHIVRAM HARI* . 9 Bom. 304

41. ————— *Priority of registered documents—Possession.* The principle that a registered document of posterior date is not to prevail over an earlier unregistered deed where the transfer under such deed has been perfected by possession, was *held* not to extend to a case in which, after such possession, the claimant under the unregistered deed had been dispossessed by the opposite party. *ISSUREE DOSSEE v. LAIL BEHAREE HOLDAR* . . . . . 21 W. R. 421

42. ————— *Unregistered and registered deeds—Possession—Priority.* An unregistered mortgage without possession, upon which a decree has been obtained but not executed, has not, by virtue of such decree, priority over a subsequent deed of sale which is registered. *KANTU KHANDU v. KRISHNA BHULAJI SHET*

5 Bom. A. C. 147



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43. ————— *Registered and unregistered deeds—Possession—Priority.* Held, that an unregistered mortgage, without possession, is not valid against a purchaser with possession. *GANPAT BAJASHET v. KHANDU CHAUGSHET*

4 Bom. A. C. 69

But see *GOLLA CHINNA GURUVUPPA NAIDU v. KALI APPIAH NAIDU* . . . . . 4 Mad. 434  
and *SADAGOPA CHARİYAR v. RUTHNA MUDALI*

5 Mad. 457

44. ————— *Mortgage—Priority over purchaser—Possession.* Held, that a registered mortgagee, although without possession, is entitled to priority over a subsequent purchaser. *SUNDAR JAGJIVAN v. GOPAL ESHVANT*

4 Bom. A. C. 68

*BALAJI NARAYAN KOLATKAR v. RAM CHANDRA GANESH KELKAR* . . . . . 11 Bom. 37

45. ————— *Mortgage—Deed of sale—Priority—Purchaser at Court's sale.* Held, that the rule laid down in *Ganpat Bajashet v. Khandu Chaugshet*, 4 Bom. A. C. 69, "that an unregistered mortgage without possession is not valid against a purchaser with possession," does not apply to a purchaser at a Court's sale whose instrument of purchase is not registered. *MATHURADAS RANCHODDAS v. KALIA KHUSHAL* . . . . . 7 Bom. A. C. 24

46. ————— *Registered and unregistered mortgages—Possession—Priority.* *H* and *U* were mortgagees of one *V*. *U*'s mortgage was prior in point of time and registered. *H* and *U* obtained each a decree against *V*. *U*'s decree was prior; but *H*, having applied for execution sooner, was put into possession. *U* subsequently applied for execution, and dispossessed *H*. Held, in a suit by *H* against *U* to recover possession of the mortgaged premises, that registration made *U*'s mortgage complete, though he did not obtain possession of the mortgaged property at the time when the deed to him was executed, and that any subsequent dispossession of the equity of redemption by the mortgagor would be subject to his mortgage. *UMAJI VALAD MANAJI PALIL DUMALE v. HARI RAMCHANDRA KULKARNI* . . . . . 4 Bom. A. C. 143

47. ————— *Priority of deeds—Notice to purchaser of existence of unregistered mortgage.* *Quære*: Whether notice to the purchaser of the existence of a prior unregistered mortgage would in any way affect the provisions of the Registration Act. *MAKANDAS KALIDAS v. SHANKARDAS HARI-BHAI* . . . . . 12 Bom. 241

48. ————— *Notice to purchaser of prior deed of sale.* In a suit to recover possession of land alleged to have been purchased from two parties (*K* and *D*), one of whom (*D*) had appeared before the Registrar, admitted the sale, and allowed the deed to be registered so far as her interest was concerned, but the other (*K*) when he appeared before the Registrar had denied the deed and subsequently sold his share to the defendant

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by a registered kobala:—Held, that, as there was no evidence of fraud on the part of the defendant purchaser, or that he had purchased with notice, plaintiff was not entitled to a decree for *K*'s share. *SREENATH CHURN DASS v. DWARKANATH GHOSE*

14 W. R. 318

49. ————— *Bonâ fide instruments—Priority.* Per PEACOCK, C.J. All instruments under this section must be *bonâ fide* in order to have priority. *RAHMATULLA v. SARIUTULLA KAGCHI* . . . . . 1 B. L. R. F. B. 58

DOOKHAI MEER v. NASSIR . . . . . 20 W. R. 110

BHIKDHAREE SINGH v. KANHYA LALL

14 W. R. 24

RAMPHUL LALL v. CHUNDEE PURSHAD

1 N. W. 204 : Ed. 1873, 287

50. ————— *Priority—Finding of fraud or collusion.* A Judge should record a distinct finding of fraud or collusion on the part of the holder of a registered deed, with the grounds on which it proceeds, before he gives an unregistered deed priority over it; and unless he does so, the case will be remanded to him for re-trial. *GOURI KANT ROY v. GIRIDHAR ROY*

4 B. L. R. A. C. 8 : 12 W. R. 456

51. ————— *Priority of deeds—Optional registration—Act XIX of 1843.* As Act XIX of 1843 has been repealed, and the Registration Act (VIII of 1871) contains no provision for the priority of registered deeds over any others, save in the cases of optional registration, the ordinary rule applies that the prior conveyance must prevail. *RACHURI VENKUBAIYAMMA v. GUDURU RAMANNA PANTULU* . . . . . 6 Mad. 391

52. ————— *Registered and unregistered documents—Act XIX of 1843.* A document executed while Act XIX of 1843 was in force, and not registered thereunder, cannot be postponed to a document executed in 1873 and registered under Act VIII of 1871. *CHATTAR SINGH v. RAM LAL* . . . . . I. L. R. 3 All. 488

53. ————— *Registered and unregistered documents—Act XVI of 1864.* An unregistered document executed before Act XVI of 1864 came into force is not invalidated or postponed to a document registered under Act VIII of 1871, under the explanation given in s. 50 of Act III of 1877. *RAM BARAN RAI v. MURLI PANDEY*

I. L. R. 3 All. 505

54. ————— *Registered and unregistered documents—Act XVI of 1864.* S. 50 of the Registration Act, III of 1877, does not operate so as to exclude, on the ground of their non-registration, instruments executed before Act XVI of 1864 came into operation. *TIRUMALA v. LAKSHMI*

I. L. R. 2 Mad. 147

*DESAI LALLUBHAI JETHABHAI v. MUNDAS KUBER DAS* . . . . . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 390



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55. ————— *Priority—Deed of sale registered under Act VIII of 1871.* S. 50 of Act III of 1877 is not retrospective in its application; and therefore a deed of sale registered under Act VIII of 1871, and not having, under that Act, priority over unregistered documents relating to the same property, acquires no new rights of priority by the passing of Act III of 1877, though coming within the larger class of registered documents which, by s. 50 of the later Act, have priority over unregistered documents. *KANITKAR v. JOSHI*

I. L. R. 5 Bom. 442

56. ————— *Priority between registered and unregistered documents—Optional and compulsory registration—Acts XVI of 1864, XX of 1866, and VIII of 1871—Interpretation of statutes.* The registration of documents under Act XVI of 1864, XX of 1866, or VIII of 1871 does not give them effect as against documents which might have been, but were not, registered under one of those Acts. S. 50 of Act III of 1877 has no retrospective operation upon such documents: the preference which it gives to registered over unregistered documents is confined to documents registered under Act III of 1877. According to the registration law as it stood before Act III of 1877 came into force, there was no competition grounded upon registration between documents optionally and documents compulsorily registrable. The Legislature, while possessing the power to divest existing rights, is not (in construing statutes) to be understood as intending to exercise that power retrospectively to any greater extent than the express terms of, or necessary implication from, its language requires. *A* and *B* (two brothers) purchased a house on the 19th July 1871, and mortgaged it to the plaintiff for Rs 585, by a mortgage, dated the 21st July 1871, and duly registered. In 1874 the plaintiff sued upon his mortgage and obtained a decree, directing satisfaction of his claim by the sale of the house. The house was accordingly sold by the Court and purchased by the plaintiff for Rs 325. He obtained a certificate of sale, dated the 15th October 1875. The certificate was duly registered. On applying to the Court for possession of the house, the plaintiff was resisted by the defendant, on the ground that he was in possession under two mortgages, dated the 20th July 1871, and executed, the one by *A* and the other by *B*. These mortgages were not registered, both of them being for sums less than Rs 100. The plaintiff's application having been rejected by the Court, he brought a suit for possession of the house. Both the lower Courts allowed his claim holding that his mortgage and certificate of sale, being registered, were entitled to priority over the unregistered mortgages of the defendant under s. 50 of Act III of 1877. On appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, that the case was governed by the law of registration as it stood before Act III of 1877 came into force, and that the registration of the plaintiff's mortgage and certificate of sale, both of which were compulsorily registrable, did not confer upon them

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any priority over the defendants' unregistered mortgages, which were optionally registrable. *ICHHA RAM KALIDAS v. GOVIND RAM BHOWANI-SHANKAR* . . . . . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 653

57. ————— *Sale under registered and unregistered deeds—Innocent purchasers.* *Per GARTH, C.J.*—The only reasonable construction of s. 50 of Act VIII of 1871 is, that where property under the value of Rs 100 is purchased by two innocent purchasers, the one by a registered and the other by an unregistered deed, and there is no fraud shown, or other circumstances which in equity would protect the unregistered purchaser against the registered, the title of the latter shall prevail. The section contains no such qualification as that a purchaser under an unregistered deed who has obtained possession would have priority as against a subsequent purchaser under a registered deed, and the Courts are not at liberty to import such a qualification into the section. *Per PONTIFEX, J.*—S. 50 is intended to apply to the case of two innocent purchasers, giving the preference to the one who has taken the greater precaution to secure his title, but is not intended to apply to the case of a subsequent purchaser who registers, but who at the date of his purchase had actual notice of a prior unregistered purchase. *FUZULUDEEN KHAN v. FAKIR MAHOMED KHAN* . . . . . I. L. R. 5 Cal. 336

*S.C. FAKIR MAHOMED KHAN v. FAZELUDEEN KHAN* . . . . . 4 C. L. R. 257

58. ————— *Priority of registered over unregistered documents.* A registered deed of sale, the registration of which was compulsory, did not, under Act VIII of 1871, take effect against a prior unregistered deed of sale of the same property, the registration of which was optional. *OGHRA SINGH v. ABLAKH KOER*

I. L. R. 4 Cal. 536 : 3 C. L. R. 434

59. ————— *Optional and compulsory registration—Priority of registered over unregistered documents.* Documents the registration of which is optional, executed previous to the Registration Act (III of 1877), will not, if unregistered, take effect against later registered documents. *S*, the owner of a 7 annas share in certain property, on the 19th November 1866 sold a one anna share thereof to *A* for Rs 30, the bill of sale not being registered, as under the provisions of Act XX of 1866, s. 18, the registration thereof was optional. Subsequently, *S* sold the remaining 6 annas to other persons; and then, on the 27th September 1876, sold another 1 anna share in the same property to *B* for Rs 140, the bill of sale with respect to this purchase being duly registered under the provisions of Act III of 1877. In a suit by *A*, who had never obtained possession of the 1 anna share he had purchased, against *S*, *B*, and the purchasers of the other 6 annas shares:—*Held*, that he was not entitled to succeed, as his bill of sale, being unregistered, was not entitled to priority over *B*'s which had been duly registered. *Lachman Das v. Dipchand*, I. L. R.



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2 All. 851, and *Oghra Singh v. Ablakh Koer*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 536, followed. SHIB CHANDRA CHAKRAVARTI v. JOHOBUX

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 570 : 9 C. L. R. 224

60. *Registration Act (XVI of 1864)—Registration, optional and compulsory—Unregistered document of which registration was optional under Act XVI of 1864—Priority of unregistered document.* Held, in the case of a document executed while Act XVI of 1864 was in force, the registration of which under that Act was optional and which was not registered thereunder, and of a document executed after Act III of 1877 had come into force, the registration of which was compulsory and which was duly registered, both documents relating to the same property, that under the provisions of s. 50 of Act III of 1877 the registered document took effect as regards such property against the unregistered document. Held, also, that all that a person seeking the benefit of s. 50 of Act III of 1877 is required to prove is, that his document is a document of the kind mentioned in the first clause of that section, that it has been duly registered under that Act, and that it covers the same property as that covered by any unregistered document against which it is contended that his document shall take effect; and it is not necessary for him to show that he is claiming from a vendor common to both himself and the person claiming under the unregistered document. *Lachman Das v. Dip Chand*, I. L. R. 2 All. 851, and *Shib Chandra Chakravarti v. Joho Bux*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 570 : 9 C. L. R. 224, referred to and followed. GUNGARAM GHOSE SIRDAR v. KALIPODO GHOSE

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 661

61. *Act VIII of 1871, ss. 18, 50—Registered and unregistered documents.* A document creating an interest in immoveable property, the registration of which under Act VIII of 1871 was compulsory, and which was registered under that Act, does not, under s. 50 of that Act, take effect as regards such property against an unregistered document relating to such land, the registration of which under Act VIII of 1871 was optional. Held, that the provisions of s. 50 of Act III of 1877 did not apply to documents executed after the first day of July 1871, and before Act III of 1877 came into operation. *Bhola Nath v. Baldeo* . . . . . I. L. R. 2 All. 198

62. *Registered and unregistered documents—Compulsory and optional registration.* Held, that under s. 50 of Act III of 1877 a document of which the registration was compulsory under that Act, and which was registered thereunder, took effect, as regards the property comprised in the document, as against another document of a prior date relating to the same property executed while Act VIII of 1871 was in force, and which did not require under that Act to be registered, and was not registered under it. *Ganga Ram v. Bansil*. *Gir Prasad v. Bansil*

I. L. R. 2 All. 431

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63. *Optional and compulsory registration—Act VIII of 1871—Act I of 1868, s. 6—Registered and unregistered documents.* Held, in the case of a document executed while Act VIII of 1871 was in force, the registration of which under that Act was optional and which was registered thereunder, and of a document executed after Act III of 1877 had come into force, the registration of which under that Act was compulsory and which was registered thereunder, both documents relating to the same property, that under the provisions of s. 50, Act III of 1877, the registered document took effect, as regards such property, against the unregistered document, the provisions of s. 6 of Act I of 1868 notwithstanding. *Lachman Das v. Dip Chand* . . . . . I. L. R. 2 All. 851

64. *Registered and unregistered documents.* Held (STUART, C.J., doubting), that, under the provisions of s. 50 of the Registration Act, 1877, documents registered under former Registration Acts do not take precedence over all unregistered documents, of which at the time of their execution registration was either optional or not required. *Lachman Das v. Dip Chand*, I. L. R. 2 All. 851, observed on. *Sri Ram v. Bhagirath Lal* . . . . . I. L. R. 4 All. 227

65. *Registered and unregistered documents—Priority.* Held, that a document which was registered under the Registration Act, 1877, took effect, as regards the property comprised therein, as against a document relating to the same property the registration of which under the Registration Act, 1871, was optional, and which was not registered thereunder. *Lachman Das v. Dip Chand*, I. L. R. 2 All. 851, followed. *Abdul Rahim v. Ziban Bibi* . . . . . I. L. R. 5 All. 593

66. *Priority—Compulsory and optional registration.* Held, by the Divisional Bench (STUART, C.J., and BRODHURST, J.), that, under s. 50 of the Registration Act, 1877, an instrument the registration of which under the Registration Act, 1871, was compulsory, and which was registered under that Act, took effect, as regards the property comprised therein, as against an instrument relating to the same property, the registration of which under the Registration Act, 1871, was optional, and which was not registered under that Act. *Habibullah v. Nakched Rai*

I. L. R. 5 All. 447

67. *Registered and unregistered documents—Priority of documents—Registration Act, 1877, s. 50.* Held, by STUART, C.J., that under the explanation to s. 50 of the Registration Act, 1877, a sale-deed, the registration of which under the Registration Act, 1871, was compulsory, and which was duly registered thereunder, took effect, as regards the property comprised therein, against a deed of simple mortgage of a prior date, relating to the same property, the registration of which under the Registration Act, 1871, was optional, and which was not registered



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thereunder. *Ganga Ram v. Bansi*, I. L. R. 2 All. 431, and *Lachman Das v. Dip Chand*, I. L. R. 2 All. 851, observed on. *Sri Ram v. Bhagirath Lal*, I. L. R. 4 All. 227, dissented from. *Held* by STRAIGHT, J., that the former document had no preference over the latter under s. 50 of the Registration Act, 1877. *Sri Ram v. Bhagirath Lal*, I. L. R. 4 All. 227, followed. *DORI LAL v. UMED SINGH* . . . . . I. L. R. 6 All. 164

68. ————— *Priority—Certificate of sale in execution of decree.* A certificate of the sale of land in execution of a decree under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure does not, by registration, entitle the holder thereof to priority over a purchaser of the land under an optionally registrable deed of sale. *NARASAYYA v. JUNGAM* . . . . . I. L. R. 7 Mad. 418

69. ————— *Registered and unregistered documents—Priority.* A vendor sold the same property twice over to different people,—once by an unregistered conveyance (the purchase-money being under R100) giving to his vendee possession, and a second time to another person by a registered conveyance at a time when the first vendee was out of possession. *Held* by the Court (PRINSEP, J., dissenting), in a suit by the first vendee to recover possession, that the fact of a vendor having given possession to the first and unregistered purchaser, even if such possession continued to the date of the second conveyance, did not necessarily prevent the operation of that part of s. 50 of the Registration Act, 1877, which enacts that “a registered document shall take effect, as regards the property therein comprised, against every unregistered document relating to the same property.” The only case in which the title of the prior unregistered purchaser can prevail against the subsequent registered purchaser for value is when the latter takes with notice of the title of the former. *Per* PRINSEP, J.—A purchaser under a registered conveyance subsequently executed cannot succeed in a suit to eject one who holds possession under a prior but unregistered conveyance, registration of which is optional. *NARAIN CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY v. DATARAM ROY* . . . . . I. L. R. 8 Calc. 597; 10 C. L. R. 241

70. ————— *Decrees—Registration Act, 1871, s. 50—Registered and unregistered documents—Priority.* Decrees being excluded from the operation of s. 50, Act VIII of 1871, and s. 50, Act III of 1877, the omission to register does not make them ineffectual as against subsequent registered assignments or decrees. *KOLLURI NAGABHASHANAM v. AMMANNA* . . . . . I. L. R. 3 Mad. 71

71. ————— *Unregistered and registered documents—Priority.* S sued K in 1879 upon an unregistered hypothecation-deed, dated 3rd January 1870, securing repayment of a loan of R85 with interest. V intervened, and, being made second defendant, claimed to be mortgagee of the land hypothecated to S under registered deeds,

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dated 11th September and 30th November 1875, executed by K. *Held*, that, under s. 50 of Act III of 1877, V had a priority over S. *KALLACOLATHURAN v. SUBBAROYA REDDI* . I. L. R. 3 Mad. 73

72. ————— *Priority—Registered and unregistered documents.* S. 50 of the Registration Act, 1877, affects alike documents which it is optional, as well as those which it is compulsory, to register, and its effect is not modified by the fact that the subsequent registered purchaser buys with full notice of a prior unregistered encumbrance. *Fuzludeen Khan v. Fakir Mahomed Khan*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 336, discussed. Opinion of PONTIFEX, J., dissented from. *NALLAPPA GOUNDAN v. IBRAM SAHIB* . . . . . I. L. R. 5 Mad. 73

73. ————— *Priority—Optional and compulsory registration—Possession.* G, having obtained possession of land under an unregistered agreement, the registration of which was optional, executed by S and N in 1872, was ousted in 1880 by K, who claimed the land under a registered sale-deed executed by S and N to him in 1879. *Held*, that G was not entitled to recover the land by virtue of s. 50 of the Registration Act, 1877. *KONDAYYA v. GURUVAPPA* . . . . . I. L. R. 5 Mad. 139

74. ————— *Priority—Registered and unregistered documents.* Certain land was hypothecated to T in 1861 to secure repayment of R2,000 and interest. The deed was never registered. In 1873 the land was mortgaged to K, and the mortgage was registered. In 1879, in execution of a decree—to which T was no party—upon this mortgage, the land was sold and bought by D, and the sale certificate registered. T then sued to recover the amount due upon the deed of 1861 by sale of the land. *Held*, that the claim of T was not defeated by the sale to D. *TIMM v. DEVA RAI* . . . . . I. L. R. 5 Mad. 265

75. ————— *Mortgage—Priority.* A mortgaged certain land to B for R50 on the 13th November 1872 by an unregistered deed. On the 30th September 1876 A mortgaged the same land to C for R300 by a registered deed. On the 20th December 1877 A sold the same land to B for R70 by an unregistered deed. In 1879 C sued A upon his mortgage-deed, obtained a decree, and attached the land in B's possession. B objected, but his claim was rejected. *Held*, in a suit by B to set aside the attachment by C, that C's claim, being based on a document registered within the meaning of s. 50 of the Registration Act, 1877, was superior to B's claim, and that the suit must be dismissed) *KOTA MUTHANNA CHETTI v. ALIBEG SAHIB* . . . . . I. L. R. 6 Mad. 174

76. ————— *Land subject to unregistered mortgage—Certificate of sale registered—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 316—Rights of purchaser.* Where land subject to an unregistered mortgage, the registration of which was optional, was attached and sold in execution of a money-



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decree obtained against the mortgagor, and the purchaser registered his certificate of sale and obtained possession of the land:—*Held*, that no question of priority under s. 50 of the Registration Act, 1877, could arise, inasmuch as the purchaser acquired only the right, title, and interest of the mortgagor subject to the mortgage. *Sobhagchand Gulabchand v. Bhaichand*, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 893, approved and followed. *Semble*: A certificate of sale issued by a Court under s. 316 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if duly registered, takes effect, under s. 50 of the Registration Act, 1877, against all unregistered encumbrances. *RAMARAJA v. ARUNACHALA*. I. L. R. 7 Mad. 248

77. ————— *Priority of mortgages—First and second mortgagees.* S and L held mortgage-bonds executed in their favour by the same person. S's bond was dated the 16th June 1882, and was registered, the registration being compulsory. L's bond was of prior date, the 30th December 1880, and was not registered, the registration being optional. Both instituted suits on their bonds against the obligor, and obtained decrees for sale of the property, the decrees being passed on the same day. The property was attached in execution of both decrees on the 14th August 1882. *Held*, that the registered bond of the plaintiff took effect, as regards the property comprised in it, against the defendant's unregistered bond, under s. 50 of the Registration Act (III of 1877), which gave priority to the incumbrance created by the former bond over the incumbrance created by the latter, and this priority was not affected by the subsequent decrees obtained on the bonds which only gave effect to the respective rights under the bonds. The meaning of s. 295 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, is that, when immoveable property is sold in execution of decrees ordering its sale for the discharge of incumbrances, the sale-proceeds are to be applied in satisfaction of incumbrances according to their priority. *SHAH RAM v. SHIB LAL*. I. L. R. 7 All. 378

78. ————— *First and second mortgages—Payment by purchaser of mortgaged property of first mortgage—Right of purchaser to benefits of first mortgage—Right of second mortgagee to bring to sale mortgaged property—Registered and unregistered instruments—Optional and compulsory registration.* At a sale in execution of a decree, J purchased certain property which was at that time subject to two mortgages, the first under an unregistered deed in favour of M and dated in 1872, and the second under a registered deed in favour of L and dated in 1880. The registration of both deeds was optional, the former under Act VIII of 1871 and the latter under Act III of 1877. J subsequently satisfied the mortgage under the registered deed of 1880, which was delivered to him. M then brought a suit to recover the money due to him under the mortgage-deed of 1872 by sale of the mortgaged property. *Held*, by *OLDFIELD, J.*, that,

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applying the rule laid down by the Privy Council in *Gokaldas Gopaldas v. Purnomal Premsukhdas*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1935, J, having paid off the mortgage under the registered deed of 1880, should have the benefits of that mortgage, and was entitled to set up the deed which he held against the unregistered deed of 1872, against which, under s. 50 of the Registration Act (III of 1877), it would take effect as regards the property comprised in it. *Lachman Das v. Dip Chand*, I. L. R. 2 All. 851, referred to. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*, that the word "unregistered" in s. 50 of the Registration Act, 1877, must, in reference to the circumstances of the present case, be read as "not registered under Act VIII of 1871," and that, so reading the section, the registered mortgage-deed of 1880 was entitled to priority over the unregistered mortgage-deed of 1872. *Lachman Das v. Dip Chand*, I. L. R. 2 All. 851, and *Sri Ram v. Bhagirath Lal*, I. L. R. 4 All. 227, distinguished. *JANKI PRASAD v. MAUTANGUI DEBIA*

I. L. R. 7 All. 577

79. ————— *Registered and unregistered documents—Mortgagee under registered deed not entitled to priority over holder of subsequent decree on prior unregistered deed.* The mortgage under an unregistered hypothecation-bond, of which the registration was optional, obtained a decree thereon, and, in execution of such decree, attached the hypothecated property. *Held*, with reference to the terms of s. 50 of the Registration Act (III of 1877), that the bond, having merged in the decree, was entitled to take effect against a registered bond relating to the same property, and which was executed subsequently to the unregistered bond, but prior to the decree. *Kanhaiya Lal v. Bansidhar*, All. Weekly Notes (1882) 15, and *Shahi Ram v. Shib Lal*, I. L. R. 7 All. 378, distinguished. *BAIJNATH v. LACHMAN DAS*. I. L. R. 7 All. 888

80. ————— *Registered and unregistered documents—Mortgagee under registered deed competing with holder of decree on prior unregistered mortgage-deed.* The words in s. 50 of the Registration Act (III of 1877), "not being a decree or order, whether such unregistered document be of the same nature as the registered document or not," mean that, if a decree has been obtained to bring property to sale under a hypothecation-bond or under a money-bond, and under that decree the property has been attached, that decree cannot be ousted by a subsequent registered instrument. The section cannot in any way make a decree effect a transfer of more than the interest which the judgment-debtor possessed. *Held*, that a mortgage-deed registered under Act III of 1877 was entitled to priority over a decree obtained subsequently to the registration of such deed upon a prior unregistered deed of mortgage. *Kanhaiya Lal v. Bansidhar*, All. Weekly Notes (1882) 15; *Shahi Ram v. Shib Lal*, I. L. R. 7 All. 378; and *Madar v. Subbarayalu*, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 88, referred to. *HIMALAYA BANK v. SIMLA BANK*. I. L. R. 8 All. 23



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81. ————— Registered and unregistered documents—Priority—Mortgagee under registered deed competing with auction-purchaser at a sale under a decree on a prior unregistered mortgage-deed. Under s. 50 of the Registration Act, the decree or order which is not to be affected by a registered document must be a decree or order made prior to the execution and registration of the registered document. Therefore where the plaintiffs, who were mortgagees under a registered instrument, sued to set aside a sale to the defendants under a decree on an unregistered mortgage, the plaintiffs' registered mortgage being subsequent to the unregistered mortgage on which the defendants relied, but prior to the decree thereon:—*Held*, that the defendants, auction-purchasers, must take subject to the right of the plaintiffs as mortgagees. *Himalaya Bank v. Simla Bank*, I. L. R. 8 All. 23; *Madar Saheb v. Subbarayalu Nayudu*, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 88; *Kanhaiya Lal v. Bansidhar*, All. Weekly Notes (1884) 136; and *Shahi Ram v. Shib Lal*, All. Weekly Notes (1885) 63, referred to. *JAGDEEP RAI v. RADHEY SINGH*. I. L. R. 13 All. 288

82. ————— Unregistered mortgage with possession—Subsequent registered mortgage—Notice—Priority. The defendants 1 and 2, in 1877, placed the plaintiff's father (since deceased) in possession of certain land as usufructuary mortgage under an unregistered mortgage-deed for R99, and in 1883 mortgaged the same land to defendant 3 by a mortgage-deed, which was registered. Defendant 3 obtained a decree on his mortgage in 1886, and applied that the mortgaged premises should be sold. The plaintiffs, having opposed his application for an order for sale without success, now sued for a declaration of their title as mortgagees. It was found that defendant 3 took his mortgage with notice of the mortgage of 1877, but had not otherwise acted fraudulently. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were entitled to priority in respect of the mortgage of 1877. *Held*, by the full Bench, that, when it is proved that a subsequent encumbrancer under a registered conveyance had notice of a valid prior unregistered encumbrance and of possession by such encumbrancer, or of such conveyance without possession, the Courts are not bound to interpret the Registration Act of 1877, s. 50, so as to defeat the title of the prior encumbrancer. *KRISHNAMMA v. SURANNA*

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 148

83. ————— Registered and unregistered documents—Priority. The provision of the Registration Act, that a registered document shall take effect, as regards the property comprised therein, against every unregistered document relating to the same property, only applies where the two documents are antagonistic, not where effect can be given to each without infringement of the other: e.g., if A mortgages or sells to B, and afterwards C purchases at a Court's sale the then existing right, title, and interest of A, he (C) buys

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in the first case the equity of redemption and in the second nothing at all. Registration therefore cannot help him, for on the very face of his certificate of sale the property comprised therein is not the property previously conveyed to B, but only the residue of A's estate after such conveyance. *SOBHAGCHAND v. BHAICHAND*. I. L. R. 6 Bom. 193

84. ————— Priority—Effect of registration—Gift of land. Registration gives a donee neither actual, constructive, nor symbolical possession, and therefore cannot be regarded as equivalent to delivery and acceptance. *BASUDEB BHAT v. NARAYAN DAJI DAMLE*

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 131

85. ————— Priority of registered over unregistered documents. A sale-deed of which the registration is optional, being registered, takes effect, under s. 50 of the Registration Act of 1871, as against a similar but unregistered sale-deed prior in date though followed by possession. *BIMARAZ v. PAPAYA*

I. L. R. 3 Mad. 46

86. ————— Priority—Registered conveyance—Unregistered conveyance accompanied by possession. One who holds under an unregistered deed of sale, the registration of which is not compulsory, and is in possession of the property conveyed, has a superior title to one who sets up a registered conveyance of a later date unaccompanied by possession. The second purchaser presumably has notice of the title of the first purchaser from the fact of possession having been given. Authorities on the question of priority discussed. *DINONATH GHOSE v. AULUCK MONI DABEE*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 753; 10 C. L. R. 129

87. ————— Optional registration—Priority—Possession under unregistered deed—Notice. Although the mere fact of possession having been taken by a purchaser under an unregistered conveyance is insufficient of itself to establish a good title to a property as against a subsequent registered purchaser, and is not conclusive evidence of notice as against him, yet, in the majority of cases, such possession is very cogent evidence of notice. *NANI BIBEE v. HAFIZULLAH*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1073

88. ————— Registered purchaser—Notice of prior contract to sell. The words "former part of this section" used in the second paragraph of s. 50 of the Registration Act, 1877, refer to the whole preceding portion of the section. *Held*, therefore, that a registered purchaser of land, who bought with notice of a prior unregistered contract by his vendor to convey to the plaintiff, could not resist a suit for specific performance on the plea of registration. *KADAR v. ISMAIL*

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 119

89. ————— Notice of prior unregistered deed—Priority—Sale—Mortgage. A subsequent registered purchaser or mortgagee is not to be preferred as against the holder of a prior unregistered instrument of purchase or mortgage of



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which he had notice. *HATHISING SOBHAI v. KUVIRJI JAVHER*. I. L. R. 10 Bom. 105

90. ————— Registered and unregistered documents—Priority—Notice of prior sale. *Quære*: Whether the case of a second registered purchaser with notice of a prior sale is an exception to the rule laid down in the Full Bench case of *Narain Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Dataram Roy*. I. L. R. 8 Calc. 597. The Court held that it was not necessary to decide the question in the present case, inasmuch as the facts of the case did not justify them in finding that the purchaser had such notice. *BAMASUNDARI DASSI v. KRISHNA CHUNDER DHUR*. I. L. R. 10 Calc. 424

91. ————— Notice—Mortgagor and mortgagee—Unregistered mortgage—Purchaser with notice of prior unregistered mortgage—Priority. Where property has been mortgaged by a deed the registration of which is not compulsory, a subsequent purchaser of the property, who has duly registered his purchase-deed, but who has bought with notice of the unregistered mortgage, takes the property subject to that mortgage. *ABOOL HOSSEIN v. RAGHU NATH SAHU*

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 70

92. ————— Priority—Registered purchaser competing with holder of decree on prior unregistered deed—Fraud—Notice. A registered purchaser of land who has bought in 1878, with full notice of an unregistered encumbrance of 1872 of which the registration was optional, is entitled to hold the land free of such encumbrance, and the fact that prior to the purchase and to the knowledge of the purchaser a decree has been obtained by the encumbrancer declaring the land liable to be sold in default of payment of the amount of the decree does not affect the title of the purchaser. *MADAR SAHEB v. SABBARAYALU NAYUDU*

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 88

93. ————— Priority of deeds—Purchaser under an unregistered deed—Lease of the land by purchaser to the vendor—Decree for rent obtained by the purchaser against the vendor—Effect of such decree on purchaser's title in competition with the title of subsequent purchaser under a registered deed. On the 7th August 1876 the defendant purchased the property in dispute under an unregistered sale-deed. On the same day he leased it to his vendor. In 1878 he obtained a decree for rent against his vendor. On the 23rd May 1881 the plaintiff purchased the same property from the same vendor under a registered deed of sale. In 1888 the plaintiff sued the defendant to establish his right to the property and to recover possession. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree, his registered deed taking priority to the prior unregistered deed of the defendant. S. 50 of the Registration Act (III of 1877) did not give the defendant priority in virtue of the decree which he obtained in the rent suit, for in that suit the defendant's ownership was not in dispute, and the decree

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merely adjudicated as to the relationship between the defendant and his vendors created subsequently to the sale. The defendant's title as owner was not merged in the decree, but still rested exclusively on his deed of sale. *Kolluri Nagabhushanam v. Ammanna*, I. L. R. 3 Mad. 71, and *Madar Saheb v. Subbarayalu*, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 88, distinguished. *KESHAV PANDURANG v. VINAYAK HARI*

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 355

94. ————— Notice—Fraud—Optionally registrable sale-deed, unregistered, competing with similar deed registered. R sold land to S in 1878 for R54 and put S in possession. In 1879 R sold the same land to N for R24-8-0. N registered his sale-deed. The sale-deed of S was not registered. In 1879 S sued N to have N's sale-deed cancelled on the ground of fraud. The lower Courts held that N's sale-deed was executed exclusively and fraudulently, and decreed the claim. Held, on second appeal, that as there were grounds, apart from notice and knowledge of possession, for holding N's sale-deed to have been executed exclusively, the decision was correct. *NARASIMULU v. SOMANNA*. I. L. R. 8 Mad. 167

95. ————— Conflict between an unregistered hypothecation-bond and subsequently registered conveyance—Notice—Decree on hypothecation-bond. Land was hypothecated to plaintiff by an unregistered bond, dated 29th May 1878, and afterwards sold to the defendant by a registered conveyance, dated 29th June 1879, which recited the previous hypothecation. In a suit brought by the plaintiff to enforce his charge:—Held, that there was no conflict between the instruments and the hypothecation-bond was enforceable, though unregistered. *RAMACHANDRA v. KRISHNA*

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 495

96. ————— Registered and unregistered mortgages—Possession—Priority—Notice. On the 10th December 1866 M mortgaged certain immovable property to the defendant for R95. The mortgage was neither registered nor accompanied with possession. On the 12th September 1869 M executed a mortgage of the same property to K for R200. That mortgage was registered, but not accompanied with possession. In 1876 K sued M on his mortgage of 1866. The defendant was not a party to that suit. While the suit was pending, M, on the 23rd February 1876, executed another mortgage of the property to the defendant for R200, including the amount then due to him (defendant) on his mortgage of 1866. That mortgage was registered and accompanied with possession. On the 3rd March 1876 K obtained a decree against M, directing satisfaction of the mortgage-debt out of the mortgaged property. The property was sold under that decree, and purchased by K himself for R50. He obtained a certificate of sale, dated the 8th March 1877, which was not registered. On the 25th July 1877 K sold the property to the plaintiff for R75-4-0. The deed



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of sale was not registered. In 1878 the plaintiff sued for possession of the property. The defendant relied upon his mortgages of 1866 and 1876. *Held*, that the defendant's unregistered mortgage of 1866, which was optionally registrable, was not over-ridden by K's mortgage of 1869, which was compulsorily registrable, and that therefore the plaintiff, whose title was derived from K, was not entitled to recover the property from the defendant without redeeming the mortgage of 1866, on which he (defendant) was entitled to rely. The registration of K's mortgage in 1869 could not have operated as notice to the defendant when he was taking his mortgage in 1866, and therefore was not such a registration in relation to the defendant's earlier mortgage as to fall within the scope of the rule that registration is equivalent to possession. **LAKSHMANDAS SRUPCHAND v. DASRAT**

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 168

97. — *Acts XX of 1866 and VIII of 1871—Priority—Registered and unregistered documents.* On the 14th February 1869 S and M mortgaged a house and site to the plaintiff for R50. The mortgage was not registered. On the 15th June 1870 S (M being then dead) mortgaged the same property to the father of the defendant for R200. That mortgage was registered. On the 24th June 1871 S further mortgaged the property to the plaintiff for R96, including the amount due on the previous mortgage. This second mortgage was not registered. Possession was not given under any of the mortgages. In 1873 the defendant obtained a decree on his mortgage against S, and in execution of it purchased the property for R20 at a Court sale. The certificate of sale, dated the 9th July 1874, was registered, and the defendant was put in possession of the property under it. The plaintiff sued S on his second mortgage, and obtained a decree upon it in 1875. The defendant was no party to that suit. The plaintiff attached the property in execution of his decree, but the attachment was removed on the application of the defendant. In 1879 the plaintiff sued the defendant on his two mortgages, seeking to enforce them and his decree on the second mortgage against the property. The defendant contended that s. 50 of the Registration Act, III of 1877, operated retrospectively and conferred priority on his mortgage of 1870, in virtue of its registration, even over the plaintiff's earlier mortgage of 1869. *Held*, that the plaintiff's unregistered mortgages, being each for a sum under R100, were, under the Registration Acts of 1866 and 1871, optionally, and not compulsorily, registrable; and that the Registration Act of 1866, under which the defendant's intermediate mortgage of 1870 had been registered, did not bestow any priority on it. *Held*, also, that s. 50 of the Registration Act (III of 1877) was not retrospective in its application, and that, as registered purchaser at a Court sale, the defendant took subject to existing lines. *Held*, further, that the plaintiff's decree did not operate against the defend-

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ant, as he was not made a party to the suit in which that decree was obtained, although the plaintiff had constructive notice of the defendant's mortgage through registration. **RUPCHAND DAGDUSA v. DAVLATRAM VITHALRAV** . I. L. R. 6 Bom. 495

98. — *Act XX of 1866, s. 50—Priority—Notice of prior unregistered mortgage—Possession—Right to redeem—Parties.* On the 24th September 1869 G mortgaged certain land to H. Subsequently, on the 14th June 1870, he mortgaged the same land to P. Both the mortgages were for sums less than R100. The mortgage to H was unregistered, but the subsequent mortgage to P was registered. On the 21st June 1873, in a suit to which P was not a party, H obtained a decree on his mortgage, and at the execution sale he himself became the purchaser, and was put into possession of the land under his certificate of sale. On the 21st September 1874, P assigned his mortgage to the plaintiff. The deed of assignment was not registered; neither P nor his assignee, the plaintiff, ever had possession under the mortgage of 1870. The plaintiff brought this suit to obtain possession of the land. Both the lower Courts dismissed the plaintiff's claim. On special appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, that, if P, at the time of taking his registered mortgage in 1870, had notice of the prior unregistered mortgage to H, he had that which it is the object of the registration law to give, and consequently the non-registration of H's mortgage could not, under Act XX of 1866, avail either P or the plaintiff who claimed under him by an assignment executed subsequently to the decree in H's mortgage-suit. A subsequent registered purchaser or mortgagee cannot avail himself of the registration of his deed against a prior unregistered purchase or mortgage of which he had notice. The High Court reversed the decrees of the Courts below, and remanded the case to the District Judge, to ascertain whether P, at or before the time of the execution of his registered mortgage, had notice of the prior unregistered mortgage to H. **SHIVRAM v. GENU** . I. L. R. 6 Bom. 515

99. — *Acts XX of 1866 and VIII of 1871—Priority—Effect of possession under earlier unregistered document—Notice.* The plaintiff and the defendant claimed certain land, the latter under an unregistered deed of sale dated the 1st April 1877, the former under a registered deed of mortgage of later date, viz., the 19th September 1877. The defendant alleged that immediately after his purchase he was put into possession of the field, and had been in possession ever since. Both the lower Courts held that the plaintiff was entitled to the land. On appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, that, assuming that the defendant had been in possession when the mortgage-deed was executed to the plaintiff, or that the plaintiff had otherwise notice of the defendant's prior purchase, the plaintiff could derive no advantage from the registration of his mortgage,—possession by, or registration of the



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title of, a purchaser or mortgagee prior in point of time being notice of that title to subsequent purchasers and mortgagees. **DUNDAYA v. CHENBA-SAPA** . . . **I. L. R. 9 Bom. 427**

**100.** — *Priority of unregistered mortgage over subsequent registered sale—Notice of prior conveyance.* It is only where notice of a prior conveyance, of which registration is not compulsory, is so clearly proved as to make it fraudulent on the part of a subsequent purchaser to take and register a conveyance in prejudice to the known title of another, that the Courts will suffer the registered deed to be affected. Where therefore a defendant holding an unregistered mortgage of certain property, dated the 23rd March 1867, which was not compulsorily registrable, had obtained a decree thereon on the 4th January 1881, and the plaintiff holding an absolute deed of sale of the same property duly registered and dated the 22nd June 1880, and, having had notice of the mortgage, claimed absolute possession of the property, irrespective of the mortgage:—*Held*, that the plaintiff's purchase was subject to the mortgage of which he had had notice, and that the plaintiff's suit to declare his absolute title to the property must be dismissed. **BHALU ROY v. JAKHU ROY**  
**I. L. R. 11 Calc. 667**

**101.** — *Priority—Possession of mortgagor as tenant to mortgage, effect of—Notice.* By an unregistered deed of sale, dated the 1st June 1881, the first defendants sold to the plaintiff, for R90, certain land which had been previously mortgaged with possession by him to the plaintiff. The first defendant had remained in possession subsequently to the mortgage as the tenant of the plaintiff under a lease which was not registered. On the 16th April 1883 the first defendant sold the property to defendant No. 2, who registered his deed, took actual possession of the land, and got it transferred to his name in the revenue books. The plaintiff now sued to recover possession from defendant No. 2, who contended (*inter alia*) that his deed, being registered, was preferable to the plaintiff's prior, but unregistered, deed of sale. The Court of first instance awarded the plaintiff's claim. The defendants appealed to the District Judge, who reversed the lower Court's decree. On appeal by the plaintiff to the High Court:—*Held*, confirming the decree of the lower Appellate Court, that defendant No. 2, having registered his deed of the 16th April 1883, was entitled, under s. 50 of Act III of 1877, in priority to the plaintiff, whose deeds were not registered, although earlier in date. It was contended for the plaintiff that the possession of the defendant No. 1 as tenant to the plaintiff subsequently to the mortgage and sale of the land to the plaintiff was the possession of the plaintiff, and that such possession operated as constructive notice of the plaintiff's title to defendant No. 2. *Held*, that the possession by defendant No. 1 as mortgagor was not notice to

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defendant No. 2 of the plaintiff's title. Defendant No. 1 being the vendor of the land to defendant No. 2, the latter could have no reason to suppose that he was in possession otherwise than as owner. **MOHESHWAR BALKRISHNA v. DATTU**  
**I. L. R. 12 Bom. 569**

**102.** — *Bombay Regulation IX of 1827, s. 6—Registration Act (XIX of 1843), s. 2—Priority of deeds—Unregistered mortgage with possession and without notice—Mortgage earlier in date, but subsequently registered—Possession—Hindu law.* The plaintiff sued to enforce a mortgage, dated the 8th June 1863, which was registered on the 15th September 1864, but was unaccompanied with possession. The defendant relied on a mortgage of the same property, dated the 9th May 1864. This mortgage was unregistered, but was accompanied with possession. *Held*, that, apart from any special peculiarities of Hindu law, the plaintiff's mortgage of the 8th June 1863, which was registered on the 15th September 1864, was entitled to priority over the unregistered mortgage of the 9th May 1864, although the latter was without notice of the earlier mortgage and was accompanied with possession. *Held*, also, that plaintiff's mortgage was not invalid under Hindu law owing to its not being accompanied with possession. **TRIKAM MADHAV SETH v. HIRJI HARJIVAM SHET**  
**I. L. R. 18 Bom. 332**

**103.** — *Mortgage—Priority—Registration—Notice—Possession of title-deeds—Mortgagor allowed by first mortgage to retain title-deeds—Subsequent mortgage to second mortgage and transfer of title-deeds.* A mortgaged land to B by a mortgage duly registered. A subsequently got back the title-deeds and handed them to C, to whom he mortgaged the same property. B sued C (the second mortgagee) for a declaration of priority. The lower Court found that B had not been guilty of fraud or negligence in parting with the title-deed. *Held*, that B, as first mortgagee, was entitled to priority. The registration of his mortgage was noticed to C, and there was no misrepresentation by B which would relieve C, as subsequent mortgagee, of the duty of inquiry, or destroy the effect of such constructive notice. **BALMAKUNDAS ATMARAM v. MOTI NARAYAN** . . . **I. L. R. 18 Bom. 444**

**104.** — *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 3 and 85—Notice—Effect of registration of subsequent incumbrance.* For the purposes of s. 85 of the Transfer of Property Act, a mortgagee will be deemed to have notice of a subsequent registered incumbrance affecting the property mortgaged to him, inasmuch as it is the duty of such prior mortgagee before suing on his mortgage to search the registry for record of any such subsequent incumbrance, and if he has not done so, he must be taken either to have wilfully abstained from inquiry or search which he ought to have made within the meaning of s. 3 of the above-mentioned Act, or have omitted to do an act which



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a reasonably prudent mortgagee about to bring a suit on his mortgage under Ch. IV of Act IV of 1882 ought to have done, and would have done, which act, inquiry, or search would have resulted in the disclosure of the existence of the subsequent incumbrance. **JANKI PRASAD v. KISHEN DAT**

I. L. R. 16 All. 478

**MEHRBANO v. NADIR ALI**

I. L. R. 22 All. 212

**105.** — *Priority of mortgage—Whether registration is notice—Neglect to take steps to find prior incumbrance. Semble:* The question whether registration is notice or not, is a question of fact, and as each case arises, it should be determined whether the omission to search the register together with the other facts amounts to such gross negligence as to attract the consequence which results from notice. *Torab v. Raud*, 2 Bro. C. C. 652; *Evans v. Bicknell*, 6 Ves. 174; *Martiney v. Cooper*, 2 Russ. 198; *Farrow v. Rees*, 4 Beav. 18; *Hunt v. Elmes*, 2 De G. F. & J. 578; and *Agra Bank v. Barry*, L. R. 7 H. L. 148, referred to. **MONINDRA CHUNDRA NANDY v. TROYLUCKHO NATH BURAT**

2 C. W. N. 750

**106.** — *Priority of registered over unregistered mortgage—San-mortgage optionally registrable, but not registered—Subsequent mortgage registered—Delivery of possession—Purchaser at sale in execution of decree—Notice.* In 1875 the land in dispute was mortgaged to defendant No. 2 under two san-mortgage bonds, which were optionally registrable, but were not registered. In 1885 the land was mortgaged to plaintiff by a registered mortgage accompanied with possession. In 1886 the defendant No. 2 obtained a decree upon his san-mortgage bond, in execution of which the mortgaged property was brought to sale and purchased by defendant No. 3. Defendant No. 3 was afterwards put in possession by the Court. Thereupon the plaintiff sued to enforce his mortgage-lien against the property in the hands of defendant No. 3, who pleaded that the san-mortgages of 1875 were entitled to priority over the plaintiff's mortgage of 1885, and that he as purchaser at a sale under a decree obtained upon the san-mortgages held the property free from the plaintiff's claim. *Held*, that the plaintiff's mortgage, having been executed and registered after Act III of 1877 had come into force, was entitled to priority, over the unregistered san-mortgage bonds under s. 50 of the Act. A san-mortgage is not within the exceptions mentioned in s. 50 of the Act. *Held*, also, that, under s. 47 of the Registration Act (III of 1877), the plaintiff's registered mortgage began to operate from the date of its registration and was not affected by the decree subsequently obtained upon the earlier mortgages. By the custom of Gujarat transfer of possession, which is necessary under general Hindu law, is not essential to validate san-mortgages, and such mortgages have always been held valid charges as between mortgagor and mortgagee, but they are

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liable to be defeated in case of the transfer of interest to third parties under registered instruments. Apart from the doctrine of equitable notice registration under Act XVI of 1864 and Act VIII of 1871 conferred no priority on a registered document as against a document the registration of which was optional. Since Act III of 1877, however, the competition obtains in a more general form, and confers priority on all documents required to be registered, and registered since Act III of 1877 was passed over all prior unregistered deeds of an antagonistic character. **JETHABHAI DAYALJI v. GIRDHAR**

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 158

**107.** — *Registered and unregistered documents—Priority—Notice.* *Held*, that s. 50 of the Registration Act, 1877, will not avail to give the holder of a subsequent registered deed priority in respect of his deed over the holder of an earlier registered deed not being a compulsorily registrable deed, if in fact the holder of the registered deed has at the time of its execution notice of the earlier unregistered deed. *Abool Hossein v. Raghu Nath Sahu*, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 70; *Hathising Sobhai v. Kuvarji Javher*, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 105; and *Krishnamma v. Suranna*, I. L. R. 16 Mad. 148, followed. *Agra Bank v. Barry*, L. R. 7 E. & I. App. 135, and *Ram Autar v. Dhanauri*, I. L. R. 8 All. 540, referred to. **DIWAN SINGH v. JADHO SINGH**

I. L. R. 19 All. 145

Affirmed in appeal . I. L. R. 20 All. 252

**108.** — *Loss of sale-deed—Suit for execution and registration of fresh deed—Subsequent transfer with notice of former sale—Priority—Right to possession.* When a deed of sale of immoveable property for more than R100 is lost within the time allowed for the registration of the same, the purchaser may bring a suit against the vendor to compel the execution and registration of a fresh deed; and if, after the execution of the lost sale-deed, the vendor has resold the property by a registered deed and delivered possession thereof to another who has notice of the sale to the plaintiff, the latter is entitled, as against the subsequent purchaser to a decree for the possession of the property. **NALLAPPA REDDI v. RAMALINGACHI REDDI**

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 250

**109.** — *Unregistered san-mortgage—Sale—Subsequent unregistered mortgage of same property—Decree on latter mortgage and sale in execution—Sale certificate registered—Priority.* One Harilal and his sons Baji and Chhagan executed a san-mortgage of certain ancestral property in plaintiff's favour in 1885. The mortgage was unregistered. In 1886 the same property was mortgaged by Chhagan alone by a deed which was also unregistered. In 1889 Chhagan's mortgagee obtained a decree on his mortgage for sale of the mortgaged property, and in execution put up the property to auction in 1892, when defendant purchased it. Defendant got his sale-certificate registered. In 1894 the plaintiff brought this suit

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to enforce his mortgage-lien by sale of the mortgaged property. The defendant contended that, as to Chhagan's share, his certificate of sale having been registered, his claim had priority to the plaintiff's unregistered mortgage. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree. His claim superior to the defendant's. The defendant had purchased the interest which Chhagan had mortgaged in 1889. But that mortgage was unregistered, and was therefore subject to the plaintiff's mortgage, which, although also unregistered, was earlier in date. The defendant, by registering his certificate of sale, could not enlarge the estate which the certificate conveyed to him. *MAGANLAL v. SHAKRA GIRDHAR* I. L. R. 22 Bom. 945

110. *Notice—Unregistered document under which holder of registered document derives title—Priority.* The plaintiff sued to recover possession from the defendants of certain land which they had purchased from one R by a registered deed of sale dated the 22nd August 1882. R had been given the land by one H by a registered deed of gift dated 15th November 1881. H, however, had purchased the land from one V on the 22nd March 1876, and the deed of conveyance to him of that date was not registered. On the 2nd April 1894, the sons of V (defendants Nos. 1 and 2) sold the land to the third defendant by a deed of that date which was duly registered. The third defendant contended that the plaintiff's title depended on the unregistered deed of the 23rd March 1876, executed by V (father of his vendors), and that his (defendant's) purchase by registered deed dated 2nd April 1894 had priority. *Held*, that the plaintiff's claim must be dismissed. They were mere strangers to the land, unless they could rely on the unregistered conveyance by V to Harichand of the 23rd March 1876, but this conveyance had no effect when brought into competition with the registered conveyance to the third defendant of the 2nd April 1894. Though registration is notice of registered documents, it is not notice of unregistered documents under which holders of registered documents derive title. *CHUNILAL v. PREMJI, MARWADI v. RAMCHANDRA* I. L. R. 22 Bom. 213

111. *Unregistered sale of land valued under R100—Subsequent registered hypothecation—Possession of first purchaser for over twelve years—Registered hypothecation defeated by such possession.* The owner of land, having in 1876 sold and given possession of it for R95 to the plaintiff under an instrument which was not registered, hypothecated it in 1878 to a third party, under a bond that was registered. The land was wrongly represented in the hypothecation-bond as being in the original owner's possession. The third party in 1882 sued the original owner on the hypothecation-bond without making plaintiff a party, and obtained a decree, which in 1893 he assigned to defendant, who purchased the land in the course of execution. On plaintiff suing for a declaration of his right to the land:—*Held*, that the hypothecation

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had been defeated by plaintiff's possession for a period exceeding twelve years prior to the institution of the suit. A hypothecation right so created is liable to be affected not only by lapse of time as between creditor and debtor, but also by possession of the hypothecated property for the requisite period by a third person on a claim inconsistent with the rights of both the creditor and the debtor. Nor does s. 50 of the Registration Act interfere with the operation and effect of limitation and prescription governing such a case as this. *NALLTAMUTTU PILLAI v. BETHA NAICKAN* I. L. R. 23 Mad. 37

112. *Registered and unregistered documents—Transfer of Property Act, s. 52.* B held a decree for sale of the property which had been mortgaged to him by an instrument which was not compulsorily registrable, and was not registered. N purchased the same property *pendente lite* by a registered deed of sale. *Held*, that there was no competition here between a registered and unregistered document to which s. 50 of the Registration Act would apply, and that N's purchase was, by s. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, subject to the decree passed in B's favour. *BHAGWAN DAS v. NATHU SINGH* I. L. R. 6 All. 444

113. *Mortgage—First and second mortgages—Registered and unregistered documents—Fraudulent transfer—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 53.* Apart from any question of equitable estoppel, such as described by LORD CAIRNS in the *Agra Bank v. Barry*, where one person takes a possessory mortgage of property with full knowledge and notice that another is already in possession of such property under an earlier instrument of a similar kind, he cannot be said to be acting in good faith, and the principle of s. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) is applicable to such a transaction. In such a condition of circumstances, *quoad* the prior title, though created by an unregistered instrument, the status of the second mortgagee under his registered document is affected by his own *mala fides*; and as, on the one hand, the first mortgagee might avoid it on the ground that it was executed in fraud of him, so, on the other, the second mortgagee cannot, on the strength of his own fraud, pray in aid the provisions of the registration law to give preference to an instrument which records a transaction that, in its inception, being fraudulent was a *nudum pactum*. Such document would not be a "document" in the sense of s. 50 of the Registration Act, 1877, which terms, as therein used, means a document legally enforceable. *Rahmatulla v. Sariatulla*, 1 B. L. R. F. B. 58, referred to. In a suit for possession of immoveable property by virtue of registered instrument of mortgage executed in 1883, against a defendant in possession of the same property under an unregistered mortgage-deed of 1881 (both deeds being instruments the registration of which was not compulsory), it was found as a fact that at the time of the execution and registration of his mortgage-deed the plaintiff was aware that the defendant



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was in possession under his mortgage. *Held*, that, under these circumstances, the fact that the plaintiff's deed was registered did not entitle him to dispossess the defendant by virtue of the provisions of s. 50 of the Registration Act (III of 1877). *RAM AUTAR v. DHANAURI* . I. L. R. 8 All. 540

114. ————— *Priority—Registered and unregistered documents—Purchaser under a registered deed, whether entitled to priority over purchaser in execution of a subsequent decree obtained by a prior mortgagee under an unregistered deed.* A purchaser of immoveable property under a registered deed of sale is entitled to priority over a purchaser of the same property in execution of a subsequent decree obtained by a mortgagee under a prior unregistered deed. *Baijnath v. Lachman Das*, I. L. R. 7 All. 888, dissented from. *ISHAN CHANDRA DEY v. GONESH CHANDRA PARSII* (1900)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 139  
s.c. 5 C. W. N. 418

115. ————— *Document of which registration is optional—Priority of subsequent registered document over prior unregistered document—Notice of prior document—Onus of alleging and proving notice.* To check fraud, priority is not given by the Courts, in cases to which s. 50 of the Registration Act applies to the holder of a later registered mortgage, if he, at the time when he obtained his mortgage, had notice of an earlier one. But the onus lies on the party alleging such knowledge or notice to aver it in his pleadings and to prove it. *CHINNAPPA REDDI v. MANICKAVASAGAM CHETTI* (1901) . I. L. R. 25 Mad. 1

116. ————— *Conflict between registered and unregistered documents—Long possession by usufructuary mortgagee under an unregistered instrument—Title.* Defendant and his father had taken possession of certain land as usufructuary mortgagees in 1877, and had held possession of it ever since. The document witnessing the mortgage was never registered. The land was subsequently purchased by them. At a date later than the purchase, plaintiff obtained a mortgage over the land, which was duly registered. Plaintiff now sued to recover possession of the land : *Held*, that he was not entitled to recover. Defendant had been in possession as usufructuary mortgagee though under an unregistered document, since 1877; and s. 50 of the Registration Act does not affect the operation of the law of limitation in favour of a person who claims under an unregistered document. *Nallamuttu Pillai v. Betha Naickan*, I. L. R. 23 Mad. 37, referred to. *BUDANKAYALA BALAKRISHNAMMA SUBUDHI v. VINAYAKA RAVA SINGI BISOIYI* (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 72

117. ————— *Prior and subsequent incumbrancers—Notice—Prior incumbrance not compulsorily registrable, but incumbrancer in possession.* *Held*, that, if a person about to take a mortgage which must be made by registered deed,

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finds some person other than the intending mortgagor in possession, the fact of such possession is sufficient to put the would-be mortgagee on inquiry as to the title of such person; and, if such person's title is that of a prior mortgagee under a document not compulsorily registrable, the second mortgagee cannot, by getting his mortgage registered, obtain priority over the first mortgagee. *Barnhart v. Greenshields*, 9 Moo. P. C. 18; *Gunamoni Nath v. Bussunt Kumari Dasi*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 414; *Krishnamma v. Suranna*, I. L. R. 16 Mad. 148; and *Diwan Singh v. Jadho Singh*, I. L. R. 20 All. 252, referred to. *BHIKHI RAI v. UDIT NARAIN SINGH* (1903) . I. L. R. 25 All. 366

118. ————— *Registration—Document.* In a competition between a document which is compulsorily registrable and registered and one which is optionally registrable and unregistered, the former will prevail, whether the unregistered document be of the same nature as the registered document or not. *Shib Chandra Chakravarti v. Johobux*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 570, relied upon. *SRISH CHANDRA ROY v. MUNGRI BEWA* (1905)

9 C. W. N. 14

119. ————— *Act XIX of 1843, s. 2—Act XVI of 1864, s. 68—Registration—Registered and unregistered documents—Priority—Held*, that s. 50 of the Registration Act, 1877, did not give to a registered mortgage executed in 1900 priority over an unregistered mortgage executed in 1861. *Tirumala v. Lakshmi*, I. L. R. 2 Mad. 147, and *Desai Lallubai Jethabai v. Mundas Kuberdas*, I. L. R. 20 Bom. 390, followed. *Hickson v. Darlow*, L. R. 23 Ch. D. 690, referred to. *HARGOVIND v. KISHAN KUNWAR* (1906) . I. L. R. 28 All. 607

120. ————— *Mortgage—Sale of property comprised in an unregistered mortgage—Liability of purchaser—Notice.* Property was purchased, which was the subject of an unregistered mortgage, the registration of which was not compulsory. The purchaser had no notice of the mortgage at the time of execution of the sale-deed in his favour, but received notice before the sale-deed was registered. *Held*, that the mortgage was binding on the purchaser. The principle of *Diwan Singh v. Jadho Singh*, I. L. R. 19 All. 145, and *Bhikhi Rai v. Udit Narain Singh*, I. L. R. 25 All. 356, applied. *KHIALI RAM v. HIMMATA* (1908)

I. L. R. 30 All. 238

————— s. 50 and s. 17—*Registration—Constructive notice—Possession.* A registered document contained a recital of unregistered incumbrances, and a question having arisen as to whether the recital of the unregistered incumbrances amounted to notice : *Held*, that registration is at most constructive notice, and the doctrine of constructive notice cannot be so extended as to cover unregistered documents under which the holders of registered documents derive title. The defendants further relied on their being in actual possession



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Possession amounts to notice of such title as the person in possession may have, and any other person who takes a mortgage or other charge upon, or purchases, immoveable property, without ascertaining the nature of the claim of the person in possession, does so at his own risk. The general consensus of opinion of all the High Courts in India is that possession is at least very cogent evidence of notice which a purchaser cannot with safety disregard, and that s. 50 of the Registration Act (III of 1877) does not do away with the effect of notice in favour of the registration to which, *ceteris paribus*, it gives preference. *SHARFUDIN VALAD TAJUDIN v. GOVIND BHIKAJI BADE* (1902)

**I. L. R. 27 Bom. 452**

**s. 57 (1866, s. 65) and ss. 42, 46 (1866, ss. 44, 46)—Deposit of will—Proof of will when deposited with Registrar.** A testator deposited his will in a sealed cover with the Registrar of Assurances at Bombay under s. 44 of Act XX of 1866, and upon his death, his executors applied to the Registrar to deliver over to them the will, in order to enable them to apply to the High Court for probate thereof. The Registrar gave a copy of the will under s. 46 of the Act, but refused to part with the original. On application by the executors for a citation to the Registrar General to bring the will into Court, and deposit it with the Ecclesiastical Registrar:—*Held*, that the original should be brought into Court, where alone the factum of the will could be tried and determined; and that a copy authenticated under s. 65 of the Act, was not sufficient. The Registrar General should not, after the death of the depositor of a will, part with it otherwise than by order of Court. *In the goods of NAGINDAS* . . . **3 Bom. O. C. 135**

**1. — s. 58 (1871, s. 58) and s. 85—Omission to endorse signature of person admitting execution—Validity of registration—Hindu law—Gift—Possession—Construction of instrument of gift.** S, on the 23rd September 1874, executed an instrument of gift in favour of his two daughters and his adopted son whereby he gave them "his houses and shops, and other moveable and immoveable property, and his loan transactions," in equal one-third shares. At this time he was possessed of a one-third share in a certain partnership business. As S was unable to appear at the registration office by reason of sickness, N, his adopted son, on the same day presented such instrument for registration, and applied for the issue of a commission for his examination, which the registering officer issued. The commissioner went to S's house on the next day, but before he arrived S had died. He examined the attesting witnesses to such instrument, who stated that it had been executed by S, and he was informed by N that it had been so executed. On the next day N and the attesting witnesses and the writer of such instrument appeared before the registering officer, and the witnesses and writer were examined by him. Being satisfied that S had executed such instrument,

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the registering officer admitted registration, recording that the execution was admitted by N. N's signature was not endorsed on such instrument. M, one of S's daughters, subsequently sued N for one-third of her father's property, including his share in such partnership business, basing her suit on such instrument. *Held*, that, inasmuch as N had admitted at the time of registration of such instrument that it had been executed by S, its registration was not invalidated by the mere fact that N's signature had not been endorsed thereon. *MAN BHARI v. NAUNIDH* . . . **I. L. R. 4 All. 40**

**2. — and ss. 59 and 60 and 87—Registration—Unregistered conveyance—Bond confirming conveyance—Registration of conveyance instead of bond—"Defect of procedure"—Claim to attached property, suit to establish.** A deed of sale which required to be registered, not having been registered, and the time for presenting it for registration having expired, the vendor, in order to avoid the effect of the deed of sale being unregistered, gave the purchaser a bond confirming such deed. The bond, with the deed of sale annexed thereto, was presented for registration. By mistake or for some other reason the particulars to be endorsed on a document admitted to registration, and the certificate showing that a document has been registered, were endorsed on the deed of sale and not on the bond. *Held*, that, assuming that the bond had been registered, it was doubtful whether such an obvious attempt to defeat the provisions of the registration law should be permitted to succeed; that, whether there had been a mistake and the certificate of registration really applied to the bond or not, the provisions of ss. 58, 59, and 60 of the Registration Act had not been complied with, and the bond was to all intents and purposes unregistered; and that the defect was not a "defect of procedure" within the meaning of s. 87, which could be passed over. *MATHURA DAS v. MITCHELL* **I. L. R. 4 All. 206**

In the same case on appeal to the Privy Council it was *held*, reversing this decision, that the bond was duly registered, and that the fact that the prior deed had not affected the property, being unregistered, was no reason why the deed afterwards registered should not be admitted as evidence of title. In this there had been nothing contravening the objects of the Registration Act. *MITCHELL v. MATHURA DAS* **I. L. R. 8 All. 6**  
**L. R. 12 I. A. 150**

**s. 59—**

*See ONUS OF PROOF—DOCUMENTS RELATING TO LOANS, EXECUTION OF, AND CONSIDERATION FOR.* **I. L. R. 17 All. 428**

**1. — s. 60 (1871, s. 60)—Certificate of Registrar—Proof of registration.** Where a Registrar of Assurances has intentionally and deliberately issued a certificate of due registration of a document with knowledge of certain facts relied on as affecting



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his power to grant the certificate, the Courts are bound to accept such certificate as due proof of registration, and cannot go behind it for the purpose of satisfying themselves that the registering officer has strictly conformed with all the provisions of the Act. *SHEO SHUNKUR SAHOY v. HIRDEY NARAIN SAHU*. I. L. R. 6 Calc. 25 : 5 C. L. R. 194

**2. —** *Certificate of registration—Evidence of registration—Registration in wrong registration office.* A Civil Court cannot dispute the correctness of the certificate of due registration on a document produced in evidence before it, merely on the ground that the property referred to by the deed is situate out of the jurisdiction of the Registrar by whom the certificate is granted. See *Sheo Shunkur Sahoy v. Hirdey Narain Sahu*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 25 : 5 C. L. R. 194. *RAM COOMAR SEN v. KHODA NEWAZ*

7 C. L. R. 223

**3. —** *Certificate of registration—Document registered by officer having no jurisdiction—Admissibility of evidence.* The Court can go behind a certificate of registration, and where it finds that a document was registered by an officer, who had no jurisdiction to register it, will refuse to receive it in evidence on the ground that it is not duly registered. *Ram Coomarsen v. Khoda Newaz*, 7 C. L. R. 223, distinguished. *BENI MADHUB MITTER v. KHATIB MONDUL*. I. L. R. 14 Calc. 449

**4. —** *Registration of mortgage-deed in district in which the mortgaged property is not situate—Admissibility of document in evidence.* An instrument of mortgage on land, which required to be registered, was presented for registration to a Registrar within whose district no portion of the land was situate, and was registered by such Registrar. In a suit to enforce such mortgage it was objected that such instrument, not having been properly registered, could not be received in evidence. *Held*, following the opinion of *BROUGHTON, J.*, in *Sheo Shunkur Sahoy v. Hirdey Narain Sahu*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 25 : 5 C. L. R. 194, that when a document which purports to have been registered is tendered in evidence, the Court cannot reject it for non-compliance with the registration law : moreover, that the mortgagor could not be allowed to take advantage of an objection which would not have been available but for his own wrongful act. *HAR SAHAI v. CHUNNI KUAR*

I. L. R. 4 All. 14

**5. —** *Presentation of document by agent—Power of attorney not executed and authenticated as required by law—Validity of registration.* A document bearing the certificate required by law showing that it has been registered must be treated as a registered document, notwithstanding the registration procedure may have been defective. *Held*, therefore, where a document bore the certificate required by s. 68 of Act XX of 1866 showing that it had been registered, that, notwithstanding that it had been presented for registration

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by the agent of the person executing it under a power-of-attorney not recognizable under that Act for the purposes of s. 34, it must be treated as a registered document. *Mukhun Lall Panday v. Koondun Lall*, 15 B. L. R. 228, and *Muhammad Ewaz v. Birj Lal*, I. L. R. 1 All. 465, referred to. A document was presented for registration by the agent of the person executing it authorized by a power-of-attorney not recognizable under the registration law, and was admitted to registration. *Held*, that the person executing such document could not be allowed to object to the validity of its registration by reason of its having been registered under a power-of-attorney not recognizable under the registration law, such person being herself responsible for the defect in registration. *Har Sahai v. Chunni Kuar*, I. L. R. 4 All. 14, followed. *IKBAL BEGAM v. SHAM SUNDAR*

I. L. R. 4 All. 384

**ss. 60, 87—Registration of a deed—Omission to seal.** The sealing of a deed is not an essential part of the act of registration. The omission of the Registering Officer to seal a deed is a mere defect of procedure, and the defect is cured by the provisions of s. 87 of the Registration Act. *SITA NATH BANDOPADHAYA v. BISSESSUR ROY CHAUDHURI* (1901)

6 C. W. N. 528

**ss. 64, 65—**

*See ante*, s. 28 . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 50

**s. 69 (1871, s. 69 ; 1866, s. 80)—Rules by Registrar-General—Act XX of 1866, s. 80.** S. 80, Act XX of 1866, in no way empowered the Registrar-General to pass any rule directing by what particular description of evidence a person producing a deed to be registered shall prove his right to have it registered ; nor could it empower him to frame a special law different from the ordinary law of evidence as to what fact shall be proved by oral and what by documentary evidence. Where all the executants of a deed admit before the Registrar-General that they have executed the deed, that officer has nothing to do with the recitals of the deed, or with its possible operation as regards third parties, *e.g.*, a minor whose rights are reserved in the deed. *In the matter of RAM CHUNDER BISWAS*

16 W. R. 180

**s. 72—**

*See FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERAL CASES.*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 604

*See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—REGISTRATION, SUITS FOR.*

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 269

**ss. 72—75—**

*See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—WHERE SANCTION IS NECESSARY OR OTHERWISE.*

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 138

I. L. R. 15 All. 141



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s. 73 (1871, s. 73 ; 1866, s. 84)—

See APPEAL—ACTS—REGISTRATION ACT.

3 Bom. A. C. 104

9 W. R. 122

8 W. R. 266

See FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERAL CASES.

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 604

See REVIEW—ORDERS SUBJECT TO REVIEW

10 B. L. R. 294

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 131

L. R. 3 I. A. 221

Refusal to register—

*Petition by vendor to have document registered—*  
*Person "claiming" under document.* A deed of sale executed by the vendor alone, which recited that the vendor had received the purchase-money and that the purchaser had been put into possession was presented for registration by the vendor, the purchaser not being present. The Registrar refused to register the document, on the ground that the deed had not been delivered and no consideration had passed the vendor having stated that he had not received the purchase-money. In refusing to register, the Registrar believed that the deed was of the vendor's own creation. The vendor applied by petition to the High Court to establish his right to have the document registered. The alleged purchaser repudiated the sale. *Held* (by the majority of the Full Bench), that as it appeared on the face of the document itself that the petitioner was not a person "claiming" under it, the petition could not be entertained under the provisions of s. 73 of the Registration Act. *Per* STUART, C.J.—That the mere fact that it did not appear on the face of the deed that the petitioner could claim under it did not preclude the Court from entertaining the petition, but under the circumstances of the case, the registration of the deed should not be ordered. *Per* OLDFIELD, J.—That it was the duty of the Court to order the registration of the deed, as it was executed and the requirements of the law fulfilled, without entering into the question whether or not the petitioner could claim under it. *In the matter of the petition of* BISH NATH

I. L. R. 1 All. 318

ss. 73, 74, 75, 76 and 77—*Refusal by Sub-Registrar to register, on the ground of denial of execution—Application to Registrar, to order registration, not made within the prescribed time—Suit in Civil Court to compel registration, barred.* When registration of a document has been refused by a Sub-Registrar under s. 71 of the Indian Registration Act, 1877, on the ground of denial of execution by one of the alleged executants, no suit will lie in a Civil Court to compel registration, unless an application has been made to the Registrar under s. 73 of the Act to establish the right of the applicant to have the document registered, and has been made "within thirty days after the making of the order of refusal." In computing the period of thirty days within which such last-mentioned application must be made, the applicant is not entitled to the execu-

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tion of the time necessary for obtaining a copy of the Sub-Registrar's reasons for refusing to register. When, under these circumstances, an application is made to the Registrar after the time limited has expired, and is rejected on the ground of limitation, such rejection cannot be considered as a refusal to register, within the meaning of cl. (b) of s. 76 of the Act. *Bhagwan Singh v. Khuda Bakhsh*, I. L. R. 3 All. 397; *Edun v. Mahomed Siddik*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 150; *Lakhmani Chowdhrair v. Akroomoni Chowdhrair*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 851; *Shama Charan Das v. Joyenoolah*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 750; *Kunhimmu v. Viyyathamma*, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 535; and *Veeramma v. Abbiah*, I. L. R. 18 Mad. 99, referred to. *UDIT UPADHIA v. IMAM BANDI BIBI* (1902)

I. L. R. 24 All. 402

s. 74—*Sub-Registrar holding inquiry under order of the Registrar—Liability of witness giving evidence in such inquiry to prosecution—Registration Act, s. 82.* An inquiry under s. 74 of the Registration Act should be made by the Registrar himself. He cannot delegate his power to any one else. A Sub-Registrar holding such an inquiry under an order of the Registrar cannot be said to be acting in execution of the Registration Act in any proceeding or enquiry under that Act. An order for the prosecution of a witness under s. 82 of the Registration Act, who gives evidence before the Sub-Registrar in such an inquiry, is wrong in law. *MATA DAYAL v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 755

ss. 76, 77—

See REGISTRATION, SUIT FOR.

I. L. R. 29 All. 284

s. 77—

See ante, ss. 73, 74, 75, 76 AND 77.

See APPEAL—ACTS—REGISTRATION ACT.

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 269

See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—REGISTRATION, SUITS FOR.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 445

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 269

1. *Suit to enforce registration—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 7—Suit by infant to enforce registration—Special rule of limitation.* The Registration Act, 1877, being a special Act complete in itself, the provisions of the Limitation Act, s. 7, do not apply to suits instituted under s. 77 for a decree directing a document to be registered. *Held*, accordingly, that a suit by an infant to enforce the registration of a conveyance, having been instituted more than thirty days after refusal on the part of a Registrar to register it, is barred by limitation. *VEERAMMA v. ABBIAH*

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 99

2. *Suit to establish right to registration—Act XX of 1866, s. 84.* In an application for registration made on the 27th March 1866, before the new Registration Law (XX of 1866) came into operation, it was *held* that it was lawful



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for any person interested to institute a regular suit to establish his right to registration under s. 15, Act XVI of 1864, notwithstanding the provisions of s. 84, Act XX of 1866. *BHEEMUL MAHTOON v. OLIMUSSA alias BEGUM JAN* . . . 8 W. R. 423

3. *Suit to enforce registration—Refusal to register.* S. 15, Act XVI of 1864, was held to apply only to cases in which the Registrar had improperly refused to register an instrument. *GOOROO DOSS DUTT v. DWARKA NATH MANNA* . . . 6 W. R. Mis. 61

4. *Suit to enforce registration—Refused to register.* Held, under s. 15, Act XVI of 1864, that a suit to enforce registration lay where one of the parties to the deed refused to register it. *KRISHEN KISHORE CHAND v. MOHOMED ZUKAHOOLLAH* . *Agra F. B. 148 : Ed. 1874, 111*

5. *Suit to enforce registration—Refused to register.* According to s. 15 of Act XVI of 1864, a regular suit, and not a miscellaneous application, must be brought to compel a Registrar to register. *MUTUKDHAREE LALL v. FUZUL HOSSEIN* . . . 6 W. R. Mis. 131

*INAYAT ALI v. FURZUND ALI* . . . 2 *Agra* 21

6. *Refusal to register—Suit for enforcing registration—Act XVI of 1864, s. 17.* Where the Registrar for any cause refused to register a deed of sale presented for registration under the provisions of s. 17 of Act XVI of 1864, the law did not provide that the applicant could bring a suit against the vendor to enforce registration, unless there was an express condition or contract to register. *SOORNUM BUTTY v. BOODHESUREE* . . . 10 W. R. 313

*AHSUNA BEGUM v. KHEERUN SINGH*  
10 W. R. 360

7. *Refusal to register—Suit for possession and for entry of money in register.* A party after purchasing a property, applied to have his deed registered; but the vendor not attending to admit the execution, the Deputy Registrar refused, under Act XVI of 1864, to register, and referred the applicant to the Civil Court. Application was accordingly made, under s. 15, to the Principal Sudder Ameen who, after hearing the vendor's plea that the whole consideration had not been paid, ordered the registration to be made, and this was accordingly done on 2nd February 1866. Held, that, though the Deputy Registrar's order was a proper one, the application to the Civil Court was warranted by the terms of s. 15 and the Civil Court had jurisdiction in the matter. *RAM LAL SINGH v. THAKOOR DYAL* . . . 9 W. R. 576

8. *Suit to compel registration—Deed presented after time.* Under Act XVI of 1864, a decree to enforce registration could not be passed in respect of a deed presented for registration four months after the execution of the deed. *OOJUL MUNDUL v. HERASUTOOLLAH MUNDUL*  
7 W. R. 150

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9. *Procedure in suit to enforce registration.* Where it was necessary to institute a suit under s. 15 of Act XVI of 1864 (Registration Act) in order to enforce registration, the suit was limited to that object. The Court would not, after making the order to compel registration, suspend the further hearing of the case until registration had been effected, and then proceed to consider and decide upon the right of the parties. *KHADAR SAIB v. KHADAR BIBI* . . . 3 *Mad.* 149

10. (1871, s. 76) — *Suit after application for registration is rejected. Quære: Whether, after an order has been made under s. 76 of the Act rejecting an application for registration, it is open to the parties benefited by a deed to propound it in, and to obtain its registration by means of a regular suit. In the matter of the petition of ABDULLAH* . . . I. L. R. 2 *Calc.* 131

*S.C. REASUT HOSSEIN v. ABDOOLLAH*  
26 W. R. 50 : L. R. 3 I. A. 221

11. *Denial of execution, What is—Suit to compel registration.* Refusal to admit execution of a document is a denial of execution within the meaning of the Registration Act of 1877, and so also is a wilful refusal or neglect to attend and admit execution; and where such refusal or neglect occurs a suit will lie under s. 77 for the purpose of having the document registered. *RADHAKISSEN ROWRA DAKNA v. CHOONEELOLL DUTT* . . . I. L. R. 5 *Calc.* 445 : 5 *C. L. R.* 172

12. *Denial of execution—Suit to enforce registration—Right of suit—Registration Act, ss. 35, 73, and 76.* Where the executant of a document did not appear before the Sub-Registrar, although summons was issued to such executant, and the Sub-Registrar thereupon refused to register the document:—Held, in [a suit under s. 77 of the Registration Act to enforce registration of the document,—(i) That the case was one of “denials” of execution within the meaning of ss. 35 and 73 of the Registration Act (III of 1877). *Luckhi Narain Kehtry v. Satcourrie Pyne*, I. L. R. 16 *Calc.* 189, and *Radhakissen Rowra Dakna v. Chooneelall Dutt*, I. L. R. 5 *Calc.* 445, referred to. (ii) That an application to the Registrar made under s. 73 of the Act in this case was properly made under that section. (iii) That the order of the Special Sub-Registrar to whom the case was referred, refusing registration of the document was equivalent to an order by the Registrar. (iv) That the case came under cl. (a) of s. 76 of the Act, and the present suit did lie under the provisions of s. 77. *KUDRATHI BEGUM v. NAJIBUNNESSA* . . . I. L. R. 25 *Calc.* 93

13. and s. 34—*Refusal to register—Time for attendance before Registrar to admit execution.* Although s. 34 of the Registration Act, 1877, lays down that no document shall be registered unless the persons executing the same, their representatives, assigns, or authorized agents, appear before the Sub-Registrar within the periods



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allowed for presentation, yet this section is directly subject to s. 77, and that section nowhere provides any time within which the parties, their representatives, assigns, or authorized agents, shall appear to admit execution. All that is required in order to maintain a suit under s. 77 is that there must be a refusal to register by the Sub-Registrar, an appeal within time to the Registrar, a refusal by the Registrar, and a suit filed in the Civil Court within one month from the order of the Registrar refusing registration. *SHAMA CHARAN DAS v. JOYENGOOLAH*. I. L. R. 11 Calc. 750

14. ———— *Suit for registration of document.* An application having been made under s. 73 of the Registration Act, the Registrar passed the following order: "All the parties have not appeared; the appeal is struck off. It, however, seems to me that the order of the Sub-Registrar was quite correct." *Held*, that the mere fact of the applicant not having adduced any evidence before the Registrar did not make his order one not refusing registration within the meaning of s. 76; nor was the applicant precluded on that ground alone from pursuing his remedy under s. 77 by a civil suit. *SAJIBULLAH SIKKAR v. HAZI KHOSH MOHAMED SIKKAR*. I. L. R. 13 Calc. 284

15. ———— and ss. 72 and 73—*Suit to compel registration.* Under the Registration Act of 1877, a suit to compel registration is maintainable only when the provisions of s. 77 of the Act have been complied with. A person omitting to make an application to the Registrar as provided by s. 73 within the time provided by s. 72 cannot be said to have complied with the conditions precedent to a suit under s. 77. Independently of s. 77 of the Act, no suit will lie. *Bhaqwan Singh v. Khuda Baksh*, I. L. R. 3 All. 397, followed. *Ram Ghulam v. Chotey Lal*, I. L. R. 2 All. 43, dissented from. *EDUN v. MAHOMED SIDDIK*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 150 : 11 C. L. R. 440

16. ———— and s. 74—*Refusal to execute deed—Suit to compel registration.* If the non-registration of a deed has resulted from the refusal of one of the parties to it to execute it, that matter must be inquired into by the Registrar as directed by s. 74 of the Registration Act, before any right to sue under s. 77 can arise; and unless the requirements of the Act have been complied with, no cause of action arises under s. 77. *Edun v. Mahomed Siddik* I. L. R. 9 Calc. 150, followed. *LAKHIMONI CHOWDHRAIN v. AKROOMONI CHOWDHRAIN*. I. L. R. 9 Calc. 851 : 12 C. L. R. 527

17. ———— *Compulsory registration—Execution of document admitted—Cancellation of document.* On the 26th January 1892 the defendant executed a conveyance of certain land to the plaintiff. On the 26th May 1892 the plaintiff presented the conveyance for registration, but registration was refused. The plaintiff now sued for a decree directing that the conveyance be registered under the Registration Act, 1877, s. 77. The

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defendant pleaded that the conveyance had been cancelled. *Held* (without determining the question of cancellation), that the plaintiff was entitled to the decree prayed for. The only question for decision in a suit under this section is the factum of execution. *BALAMBAL AMMAL v. ARUNACHALA CHETTI*. I. L. R. 18 Mad. 255

18. ———— and ss. 36 and 72 to 76—*Compulsory registration—Suit to compel registration.* The plaintiff and defendant agreed that, in consideration of a sum of money already paid and of a further sum to be paid on the completion of the transaction, the defendant should transfer a certain mortgage to the plaintiff, and an instrument of transfer was prepared and executed to give effect to that agreement, but it was not registered. The plaintiff now sued for a decree compelling the defendant to execute and register that or a similar instrument. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree for compulsory registration, and should have proceeded under Registration Act, ss. 36, 72 to 77. *VENKATASAMI v. KRISTAYYA*. I. L. R. 16 Mad. 341

19. ———— *Suit for Registration of a conveyance—Power of Court to inquire into the genuineness as well as the validity of a document—Effect of execution of conveyance by a certificated guardian in contravention of the terms of permission granted by the District Judge—Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), s. 30.* In a suit under s. 77 of the Registration Act, a Court cannot go into any matter affecting the validity of a document apart from its genuineness. The question of its validity must be determined in a suit properly framed for that purpose. *Balambal Ammal v. Arunachala Chetti*, I. L. R. 18 Mad. 255, approved. Where therefore a document was executed by the certificated guardian of a minor in contravention of the terms of permission accorded by the District Judge:—*Held*, that the Court under s. 77 directed its registration, if only the document was proved to be genuine, although the document was voidable at the instance of the minor under s. 30 of Act VIII of 1890. *RAJ LAKHI GHOSE v. DEBENDRA CHUNDRA MOJUMDAR* I. L. R. 24 Calc. 686  
1 C. W. N. 444

20. ———— and s. 73. A Sub-Registrar having refused to register certain documents on the ground that their execution was denied, the plaintiff appealed to the Registrar, who rejected the appeal because it was not preferred within thirty days as required by s. 73 of the Registration Act, 1877. The plaintiff thereupon brought a suit to have the documents registered. *Held*, that, by virtue of the provisions of s. 77 of the Registration Act, the Court was not competent to order registration. *KUNHIMMU v. VIYYATHAMMA*  
I. L. R. 7 Mad. 535

21. ———— *Refusal to register on ground of denial of execution—Suit for registration.* A Sub-Registrar refused to register a bond



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as the obligor denied the execution of it. The obligee, instead of applying to the Registrar under s. 73 of Registration Act in order to establish his right to have such bond registered, sued the obligor, claiming a decree directing the registration of such bond. *Held*, that such suit was not maintainable. *Ram Ghulam v. Chotey Lal*, I. L. R. 2 All. 46, observed upon. *BHAGWAN SINGH v. KHUDA BAKHSH* . . . I. L. R. 3 All. 397

**22. ————— Contract of sale—**

*Suit to enforce registration of conveyance.* *Held*, where a person had agreed to sell to another certain immoveable property, and had conveyed the same to him by a deed of sale which, under the Registration Act of 1877, required registration, and the vendor refused to register such deed, that it was not incumbent on the vendee to take steps under that Act to compel the vendor to register before he sought relief in the Civil Court, but that he was at liberty without doing so to sue the vendor in the Civil Court for the registration of such deed. *RAM GHULAM v. CHOTEY LAL*

I. L. R. 2 All. 46

**23. ————— Lease, suit to**

*compel registration of—Right of suit.* Certain leases, whose lessor had refused to be a party to registering the lease, without applying for registration to the Sub-Registrar or Registrar, brought a suit within four months of the execution of the lease, claiming that the lessor might be ordered to cause the lease to be registered. *Held*, that such a suit would lie independently of the Registration Act (III of 1877) and that s. 77 of the said Act would not apply so as to bar the suit. *Ram Ghulam v. Chotey Lal*, I. L. R. 2 All. 46, approved. *Bhagwan Singh v. Khuda Bakhsh*, I. L. R. 3 All. 397, and *Edun v. Mahomed Siddik*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 151, distinguished. *ABDULLAH KHAN v. JANKEI* . . . I. L. R. 16 All. 303

**24. ————— and ss. 24, 73, 74, 75,**

**76—Order for registration—Finality of order—Refusal to register—Application to establish right to registration—Suit for registration.** Where an application for registration of a sale-deed had been presented after the expiry of the period prescribed by law for registration, and had been dealt with under s. 24 of the Registration Act, and the Registrar had passed an order under that section directing that the document should be registered on payment of the prescribed fine, and such fine had been paid:—*Held*, that the requirements of the law had been complied with, and that it was not competent for the successor in office of the Registrar, dealing with the document under s. 74 of the Registration Act, to go behind the order of his predecessor, nor was it for the Court, in a suit instituted under s. 77, to question the propriety of that order, which was given in pursuance of a discretionary power allowed to a Registrar to accept documents for registration after the time prescribed. *DURGA SINGH v. MATHURA DAS* . . . I. L. R. 6 All. 460

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Under the Registration Acts of 1866 and 1871, a suit to enforce registration after refusal of registration could not be brought; the procedure provided in those Acts was by petition, and, if necessary, appeal. *SEPAHEE SINGH v. CHUNDUN*

2 N. W. 160 : Agra F. B. Ed. 1874, 213

*BEHARI LALL v. KUNDAN LAL* . . . 7 N. W. 103

*TULSI SHAU v. MAHADEO DAS.*

2 B. L. R. A. C. 105

*S.C. TOOLSEE SAHOO v. MOHADEO DOSS*

10 W. R. 483

*RAHMATULLA v. SARIUTULLA KAGCHI*

1 B. L. R. F. B. 58

10 W. R. F. B. 51

*MAHOMED OHID v. KALEE PERSHAD SINGH*

24 W. R. 320

*In the matter of the petition of SANKAR DOBEY*

4 B. L. R. A. C. 65

*S.C. OBHOY CHURN MOHAPATTUR v. SHUNKUR DOBEY* . . . 12 W. R. 500

*Upholding SHUNKUR DOBEY v. OBHEY CHURN MOHAPATTUR* . . . 12 W. R. 385

*FATI CHAND SAHU v. LILAMBER SINGH DAS*

9 B. L. R. 433

14 Moo. I. A. 129

16 W. R. P. C. 26

The remedy, however, given by these Registration Acts by appeal, where a registry officer refused to register, did not affect the remedy by suit to compel the vendor to do all that is legally requisite to complete the sale, including the registration of the deed. *RAMPHUL LALL v. CHUNDEE PERSHAD*  
1 N. W. 204 : Ed. 1873, 287

**25. ————— Suit to compel**

*defendant to register or give up deed to be registered—Right of suit.* On the expiration of a zur-i-peshgi ticca granted to plaintiff by defendant, the latter executed a kobala of the property forming the subject of this suit for a consideration. The kobala was drawn up, signed by defendant, and delivered to plaintiff's servants to be registered with his consent; but the defendant subsequently got it away from them and never went to the registry office, and the deed could not be registered. The defendant denied these facts, and pleaded that he had given a mokurrari lease to a third party six days after the date of the alleged execution of the kobala. The lower Appellate Court found the plaintiff's case established and ordered defendant to restore the deed of sale for the purposes of registration and use, and declared the sale good and valid, plaintiff having already obtained possession. *Held*, that plaintiff had a right to the remedy sought and that his suit was not barred by the Registration Act. *SHUMSHARE ALI v. LUTAFUT KUREEM. LALLA THAKOOR SAHOY v. MAHOMED LOOTFOOLLAH*  
18 W. R. 504



REGISTRATION ACT (III OF 1877)  
—contd.

s. 77—contd.

26. ———— *Suit to enforce registration on refusal of party who ought to register—Implied contract to register.* Whether an action will lie against the maker of an instrument requiring registration to render it valid, for a refusal to get such instrument registered depends upon the question whether there is a contract, express or implied, on the part of the maker to register it. Such a contract is not to be implied in every case. GIRDHAR DALPAT v. HARIBHAI NARAYAN . 7 Bom. A. C. 3

27. ———— *Refusal to register—Suit to enforce contract.* A sold certain property to B, and received part of the purchase-money in advance, the rest to be paid after registration of the deed of sale. When the deed was executed and taken to the registry office, A objected to the registration, on the ground that the full price had not been paid, and the Deputy Registrar returned the deed to him, and he sold the property to other parties. Held, that it was a suit to enforce a contract from which the vendor had receded, and notwithstanding the subsequent sale to a third party and registration of such subsequent deed, there was nothing in the registration law to prevent plaintiff from enforcing this contract. BHEEMUL MATHOON v. OLIMUSSA alias BEGUM JAN . 8 W. R. 423

28. ———— *Suit for possession, for damages for refusal to register, and for enforcing registration—Effect of execution of deed required by law to be registered.* The owner of a share in a talukh granted a se-patni thereof to the plaintiff, but before registration granted a se-patni to the Bengal Coal Company. In a suit against the owner and the Company for possession of the se-patni talukh, for damages caused by the refusal to register, and also for compelling registration of the se-patni pottah :—Held, that the suit was not maintainable in a Civil Court, as the plaintiff's title rested upon an unregistered deed; that there was no cause of action as against the company to enforce registration of the pottah; and that a distinct stipulation is not necessary to bind a person to cause registration of a deed required by law to be registered, but he virtually agrees to do so when he executes a contract, which by the law in force requires registration. PRABHURAM HAZRA v. ROBINSON

3 B. L. R. Ap. 29 : 11 W. R. 398

But see TRIPURA SUNDARI v. RASIK CHUNDRA KANUNGUI . 6 B. L. R. Ap. 134 : 15 W. R. 189

29. ———— *Suit on bond—Failure to register according to agreement—Cause of action.* A executed a bond in favour of B, but failed to cause the registration of the same. Before the amount secured by the bond became due, B sued A for recovery thereof, on the ground that, as A had agreed to get the bond registered, but failed to do so, B was entitled to recover the amount advanced by him. Held, that B had no cause of action. GURU PRASAD ROY v. DHANPUT SINGH

5 B. L. R. Ap. 46 : 14 W. R. 20

REGISTRATION ACT (III OF 1877)  
—contd.

s. 77—contd.

See COURT OF WARDS v. NITTA KALI DEBI  
2 B. L. R. A. C. 353 : 12 W. R. 287

30. ———— *Refusal to register—Suit to enforce registration.* A suit lies against a vendor and another for recovery and registration of a document wrongfully taken back from a Registrar upon such Registrar's refusal to register the same on account of certain false statements made by the parties objecting to the registration. MITTER SEIN v. NARAIN SINGH

1 N. W. 206 : Ed. 1873, 289

31. ———— *Suit to enforce deed.* Where a deed had been registered, though possibly improperly registered, under s. 36, Act XX of 1866, a suit for enforcement of the deed was maintainable. UNMOLE SINGH v. RAM BHUNJAN MISSEER . . . . . 3 Agra 407

32. ———— *Suit to compel registration of document not compulsorily registrable.* Under the Registration Act of 1877, a suit lies by a purchaser to compel registration of his kobala in a case in which the value of the property conveyed is under R100, and in which, therefore, the registration of the deed is not compulsory. TOPA BIBI v. ASHANULLAH SARDAR . I. L. R. 16 Calc. 509

33. ———— and ss. 23, 24, 76—*Limitation for registration or order of refusal of a document admitted for registration by Registrar—Denial of execution—Refusal to attend—Limitation for suit under s. 77 of the Registration Act.* No period is prescribed by Act III of 1877 within which a document which has been admitted for registration may be registered, or within which the order of refusal by the Registrar to register the document must be made. There is nothing in ss. 76 and 77 to compel the Registrar, in cases where there has been no express denial of execution, but where the executant refuses to attend at his office, to make his order of refusal within the time limited for admission of execution by ss. 23 and 24. Limitation in respect of a suit under s. 77 begins to run from the date of such order. Mukhun Lall Panday v. Koodun Lall, 15 B. L. R. 228, L. R. 2 I. A. 210; 24 W. R. 75, and Shamu Churan Das, v. Joyenoolah, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 750, relied on. In the matter of Buttobehary Benerjee, 11 B. L. R. 20, dissented from. LUCKHI NARAIN KHETTRY v. SATCOWRIE PYNE

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 189

Affirming on appeal, SATCOWRIE PYNE v. LUCKHI NARAIN KHETTRY . . . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 538

34. ———— *Suit to compel registration—Discretion of Registrar in acceptance of document for registration under s. 24 of the Registration Act—Registrable document with another document annexed, the latter, if presented by itself, being beyond time—Registration Act (III of 1877), ss. 24, 31, and 75.* A registrable document, which had been executed by the plaintiff on the one part and by the defendants T and one M on the other part, was accepted for registration by the Sub-Registrar of Bombay



## REGISTRATION ACT (III OF 1877)

—*contd.*s. 77—*contd.*

after four months from the date of execution under s. 24 of the Registration Act (III of 1877). *M* subsequently admitted execution and the document was registered as against him; but the defendant *T* objected to its registration, and the Registrar refused to register it. The plaintiff then brought this suit under s. 77 of the Registration Act praying for an order directing the registration of the document. The defendant contended that the document ought not to have been accepted for registration without inquiry as to whether the failure to present it within four months had been caused by urgent necessity or unavoidable accident, and at the hearing of the case counsel for the defendants proposed to ask the Registrar's clerk in his examination whether any such inquiry was made. *Held* (in the original Court by FULTON, J.), following *Durga Singh v. Mathura Das*, I. L. R. 6 All. 460, that the question should be disallowed, the Court having no jurisdiction to inquire into the exercise of the Registrar's discretion under s. 24 of the Registration Act. *Held*, on appeal, by FARRAN, C.J., and STRACHEY, J., that when a Registrar has directed under s. 34 that the document shall be accepted for registration, the Court cannot inquire under ss. 77 and 24 into the propriety of that direction. *Durga Singh v. Mathura Das*, I. L. R. 6 All. 460, approved of and followed. The proviso to s. 34 allows a further period of four months (in addition to the four months allowed by s. 24) within which to appear subject to the conditions set out in the proviso. The defendants executed and delivered two documents, A and B, to the plaintiff, A being an agreement of equitable mortgage, and B an agreement that they would register A and do all things necessary therefor, and, in case they failed to do so, to pay whatever the plaintiff could claim under A if it had been registered. The plaintiff obtained an order for the registration of A, but failed to present it for registration within thirty days after such order as required by s. 75 of the Registration Act, and when he did present it, registration was consequently refused. He subsequently lodged document B for registration with A as an annexure to it, and it was accepted on payment of a penalty under s. 24 of the Registration Act. The Registrar, however, refused to register B on the grounds (i) that without A there would be nothing to show to what property B referred, and (ii) to register A as an annexure to B would be contrary to the provisions of s. 75, which limited the time for registration to thirty days. The plaintiff then brought this suit under s. 77 praying for an order for the registration of B with its accompaniment A within thirty days from the date of decree. *Held* (in the original Court by FULTON, J.), that B, being a registrable document of which execution had been admitted, and it having been presented within time and accepted under s. 24 of the Registration Act, ought to be registered, the document A being copied out as an annexure. Decree accordingly. *Quære*: As to the effect such registration might have on A, and whether it would render it efficacious as a registered document. *Held*, on appeal, by FAR-

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—*contd.*s. 77—*contd.*

RAN, C.J., and STRACHEY, J., that the decree ordering the registration of B was correct. The document was a mere personal covenant to do a particular act with reference to a particular document. There was nothing on the face of it to show that the accompanying document referred to in it related to immoveable property. The registering officer would travel out of his functions if he were to institute an inquiry as to what was the nature of the document referred to. *Held*, also (varying the decree of the lower Court), that document A should not be copied as an annexure to document B. If document A were in the nature of a schedule or appendix to document B, then the two documents could be registered as one; but as they appeared to be two distinct documents separately stamped and executed for different objects, they could not be so registered. The Registrar had no power to inquire what document was referred to in the document he was asked to register. If he could not register the two documents as one, neither could the Court do so under s. 77. *TULLOCKCHAND HARNATH v. GOKULBHOY MULCHAND*. I. L. R. 21 Bom. 724

s.c. in Court below, *GOKULBHOY MULCHAND v. TULLOCKCHAND HARNATH*. I. L. R. 21 Bom. 69

35. — and s. 24—*Suit to compel registration of document—Right of suit*. No suit lies under s. 77 of the Registration Act (III of 1877) against an order made under s. 24 of that Act refusing to direct a document to be accepted for registration. *GANGAVA v. SAYAVA*. I. L. R. 21 Bom. 699

36. — *Limitation—Registration—Suit to enforce registration—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), ss. 6, 14—Period of limitation, computation of*. An executant of a document not admitting execution, the Sub-Registrar refused to register it. There was an appeal to the Registrar, who also refused to register. Within thirty days of the dismissal of the appeal, an application for review was filed to the Registrar, which was also dismissed. On a suit brought in the Civil Court to enforce the registration of the document, after the dismissal of the said application for review:—*Held*, that s. 14 of the Limitation Act had no application to the present case; and that, the suit not having been brought within thirty days from the date of the dismissal of the appeal by the Registrar, it was barred by limitation. *Nogendra Nath Mullick v. Mathura Mohan Parhi*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 368, followed in principle; *Veeramma v. Abbiak*, I. L. R. 18 Mad. 99; *Girija Nath Roy v. Patani Bibee*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 263, referred to; and *Khetter Mohan Chuckerbutty v. Dinabashy Shaha*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 265, discussed. *ABDUL HAKIM v. LATIFUNNESSA KHATTUN* (1903). I. L. R. 30 Calc. 532: s.c. 7 C. W. N. 550

37. — *Making of the order—Date of the order—Date of communication—Running of time for suit*. The expression "making



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—*contd.*

— s. 77—*concl'd.*

of the order" in s. 77 of the Indian Registration Act, III of 1877, means not merely recording the order of refusal in writing, but communicating it to the party concerned so as to bind him by it. Hence a suit brought under the provisions of s. 77 of the Indian Registration Act (III of 1877) for a decree directing a document to be registered, may be filed within thirty days of the date on which the order of refusal was communicated to the party concerned. **ABDUL ALI v. MIRJA KHAN (1904)**

**I. L. R. 28 Bom. 8**

**38.** — *Suit to compel registration—Limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), ss. 5 and 6.* Held, that s. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1877, applies to a suit brought under s. 77 of the Registration Act, 1877, to compel registration of a document. **Beni Prasad Kuari v. Dharaka Rai, I. L. R. 23 All. 277**, followed. **SURAJ BALI PRASAD v. THOMAS (1905)**. **I. L. R. 28 All. 48**

**39.** — *Decree directing registration—Decree not providing for period for registration—Non-presentation of document within thirty days of First Court's decree directing registration—Registration, validity of.* S. 77 of the Registration Act does not enact that the documents, of which registration is directed by a decree made under the section, must be presented for registration within thirty days of the passing of the decree. In a suit under s. 77 of the Registration Act the decree of the first Court simply directed the document to be registered and said nothing about its presentation for registration within thirty days from the passing of the decree; after an unsuccessful appeal the document was presented for registration within thirty days from the passing of the decree on appeal and was registered. Held, that the validity of the registration of the document could not be questioned on the ground that the document had not been presented for registration within thirty days of the passing of the first Court's decree, the decree having imposed no condition to that effect. **GOPINATH ADHIKARY v. GADADHAR DAS (1906)**. **I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1020**

— s. 82 (1871, s. 80; [1868, ss. 91-94])—

*See CHARGE—FORM OF CHARGE—FORGERY*. **I. L. R. 30 Calc. 822**

*See FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERAL CASES.*  
**I. L. R. 10 Calc. 604**  
**I. L. R. 20 Calc. 719**  
**5 C. W. N. 44**

*See FALSE PERSONATION.*  
**7 W. R. Cr. 99**  
**2 B. L. R. A. Cr. 25**

*See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—REGISTRATION ACT.*  
**5 Bom. Cr. 7**

*See SENTENCE—GENERAL CASES.*  
**8 W. R. Cr. 16**

**REGISTRATION ACT (III OF 1877)**  
—*contd.*

— s. 82—*contd.*

**1.** — *Inquiry as to proper possession of receipt to take back document from Registrar's office.* An inquiry made by a clerk of a registry office, with a view to ascertain whether the person who brings a receipt to take back document, which could not be returned in the first instance, and for which a receipt was accordingly given, is the person in whose possession the receipt ought to be, is an inquiry within the meaning of the Registration Act, VIII of 1871, s. 80. *In the matter of the petition of BUNWARY PODDAR*. **23 W. R. Cr. 55**

**2.** — *and s. 83—Sanction to prosecution.* It is not necessary that sanction could be given before instituting a charge under s. 82 of the Registration Act. **GOPI NATH v. KULDIP SINGH**. **I. L. R. 11 Calc. 566**

**3.** — *Act XX of 1866, ss. 93, 94—Trial by Magistrate of charge instituted by him as Sub-Registrar.* The proceedings of a Magistrate who tries prisoners charged with having committed offences under ss. 93 and 94 of the Registration Act, XX of 1866, are not illegal and without jurisdiction, or otherwise bad, merely because the prosecution was (with the sanction of the Registrar to whom he was subordinate) instituted against the accused by the same Magistrate in his capacity of Sub-Registrar. Under such circumstances, where it can be done, it would be better if the case were tried by some other person. **QUEEN v. HIRA LALL DASS**. **8 B. L. R. F. B. 422**

**S. C. GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL v. HIRA LALL DOSS**. **17 W. R. Cr. 39**

*In the matter of RAMDYAL SINGH*. **5 B. L. R. Ap. 89**

**S. C. QUEEN v. RAM LOCHUN SINGH**. **18 W. R. Cr. 15**

*(Contra) In re BHARAT CHUNDRA SEN*. **8 B. L. R. 426 note: 14 W. R. Cr. 74**

**QUEEN v. NADI CHAND PODDAR**. **24 W. R. Cr. 1**

**4.** — *Prosecution under—Time for ordering prosecution—Denial of execution of a document—Refusal to register—Appeal from the refusal—Limitation.* On the petitioner denying the execution of a document in favour of A, before the Sub-Registrar, that officer refused to register the document. Thereupon A lodged a complaint against the petitioner for cheating under s. 417, which was dismissed under s. 203, on the 26th March 1906. On the 27th April 1906, A appealed to the Special Sub-Registrar, who rejected the appeal for not having been preferred within the prescribed period of 30 days from the Sub-Registrar's refusal to register, but at the same time submitted a report to the District Registrar, which ultimately led to an enquiry with the result that a proceeding was drawn up against the petitioner under s. 82 of the Registration Act (III of 1877). Held, that



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under the circumstances the petitioner should not be prosecuted under s. 82 of the Registration Act. That the presentation of an appeal to the Special Registrar after the time limited therefore, against the refusal of the Sub-Registrar to register a document on denial of execution, does not give any *locus standi* for the institution of a proceeding for inquiry as to the execution of the document. **SAKANBARI DEBI v. ADAITYA GANGULI** (1906)

12 C. W. N. 47

ss. 82, 83—

See SANCTION TO PROSECUTION—WHERE SANCTION IS NECESSARY OR OTHERWISE.

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 500

s. 83 (1871, s. 81; 1866, ss. 93 to 95)—

See FALSE EVIDENCE—GENERAL CASES.

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 604

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPECIAL ACTS—REGISTRATION ACT.

5 Bom. Cr. 7

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 347

1. ——— Act XX of 1866,

s. 95—Power of Registrar—Prosecution of offence. A Registrar under Act XX of 1866 was competent under s. 95 to institute a prosecution for any offence under that Act. **QUEEN v. RAMDHARY SINGH**

10 W. R. Cr. 5

2. ——— Act XX of 1866,

s. 95—Offence under Registration Act—Sanction for prosecution. A Sub-Registrar under Act XX of 1866 had no power to investigate regarding the committal of an offence committed before him in the registration of any document, but should cause the complainant to proceed, under s. 66 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Magistrate, or before an officer authorized to receive such complaint. The sanction of the Registrar under s. 95, Act XX of 1866, related to a prosecution to be instituted by the Sub-Registrar for an offence under the Act. **QUEEN v. HARIDAS KUNDU**

4 B. L. R. Ap. 69; 13 W. R. Cr. 21

3. ——— Act XX of 1866,

s. 90—Offence under Registration Act—Jurisdiction of Sessions Judge. The Sessions Judge had jurisdiction to try a case of abetting false personation of a witness before a Registrar of Assurances, under s. 95 of the Registration Act (XX of 1866). The word "instituted" in that section should be construed to mean "commenced." **QUEEN v. SHEOGOLAM DASS**

6 B. L. R. F. B. 692; 15 W. R. Cr. 58

(Contra) **QUEEN v. ASANULLA**

6 B. L. R. 693 note; 10 W. R. Cr. 21

s. 84 (1871, s. 82)—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 3—Sub-Registrar—Offence committed during a judicial proceeding—Meaning of word "Court"—Penal Code, s. 228. By s. 82 of the Registration Act, 1871, a Sub-Registrar was a public

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—*concl'd.*s. 84—*concl'd.*

officer, and proceedings before him were judicial proceedings within the meaning of s. 228 of the Penal Code, and as he was legally authorized to take evidence, he was a "Court" as defined by the Evidence Act, s. 3. *In the matter of the petition of SARDHARI LAL*

13 B. L. R. Ap. 40; 22 W. R. Cr. 10

s. 87—

See ante, ss. 32, 34 AND 87.

See ante, s. 49 . 13 C. W. N. 722

See ante, s. 60 . 5 C. W. N. 528

1. ——— (1871 s. 85; 1866, s. 88)

—Registration after proper time. The accepting of a document for registration, after the expiration of the period mentioned in part IV of Act XX of 1866, is not a mere defect of procedure. The Registrar who registers a document so presented acts without authority. **RAYA' RAGHOB KAMAT v. ANAPURNABAI KOM SUBALBHAT**

10 Bom. 98

2. ——— Presentation for

registration to officer at place where he was officiating in another capacity—Illegal procedure. A bond was presented for registration to a Sub-Registrar, not at his public office, but at a place where he was engaged in his duties as a revenue officer. The Sub-Registrar received the bond and registered it and entered it in the books of his sub-registry. He should only have received it at his public office. As no person had been appointed to act for the Sub-Registrar on the occasion of his absence, and the Sub-Registrar did not act otherwise than in good faith, it was held that his procedure, although erroneous, did not invalidate the registration of the bond. **KALIAN MAL v. BHAWGATI**

7 N. W. 119

s. 90, cl. (d)—Documents purporting to be or to evidence grants or assignments by Government of land or interest in land. The agent to the Governor-General in a letter to the Nawab Bahadur of Moorshedabad announced the intentions of the Government as to his position and income and informed him that he was to have possession of the State lands and jewels. In a suit by the son of the Nawab to recover possession from a person wrongfully in possession of land which was held by the lower Courts to be portion of such State lands, it was, *inter alia*, objected that the letter required registration. Held, that the letter operated as a grant or an authority from Government, and was exempt from registration under the provisions of s. 90, cl. (d), of the Registration Act. **HASSAN ALI v. CHUTTERPUT SINGH DUGARH**

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 742

**REGISTRATION OF TRANSFER.**

See TRANSFER, REGISTRATION OF.

**REGISTRY TICKET.**

— possession of —

See PROSTITUTE . 3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 70



## REGULATION.

See BENGAL REGULATION.

See BOMBAY REGULATION.

See MADRAS REGULATION.

## 1793—III—

See LIMITATION . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 314

## VIII, s. 41—

See CHAUKIDARI CHAKRAN LAND.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 390 ; 596

See CHAUKIDARI CHAKRAN ACT, s. 50.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 596

## XI—

See HINDU LAW . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 6  
I. L. R. 36 Calc. 590

## XIX—

See GRANT . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 931

## XXVII—

See MARKET . I. L. R. 29 All. 740

## 1800—X—

See HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—CUSTOM.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 6

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 590

## 1802—XXV—

See HINDU LAW . 10 C. W. N. 95

s. 4—Land exempted from payment of public revenue at permanent settlement—Resumption of inam—Limitation—Exercise by Government of its prerogative of imposing assessment on land liable to be assessed—No period of limitation. Certain land was exempted from the payment of public revenue at the time of the permanent settlement. S. 4 of Regulation XXV of 1802 declares that the Government at the permanent settlement has “reserved to itself the entire exercise of its discretion in continuing or abolishing” the exemption of such lands from liability to pay assessment to Government, and the permanent settlement of the land revenue was made excluding the said land. *Held*, that it was competent to Government to impose a public assessment on the land. Also, that there is no period of limitation prescribed by any law within which alone the Government should exercise its prerogative of imposing assessment on land liable to be assessed with public revenue. *Collector of Chingleput v. Kosalram Naidu, Second Appeal No. 1352 of 1897*, unreported, approved. *Boddupalli Jagannadham v. The Secretary of State for India (1904)* . I. L. R. 27 Mad. 16

## 1803—II—

See LIMITATION . I. L. 32 Calc. 669

## 1805—II—

See LIMITATION . 9 C. W. N. 673  
I. L. R. 32 Calc. 669

## REGULATION—contd.

## 1805—XII—

See HINDU LAW—CUSTOM.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 590

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 6

9 C. W. N. 676

## 1806—XVII—

See MAHOMEDAN LAW.

I. L. R. 28 All. 496

See MORTGAGE . 10 C. W. N. 778

## 1812—V—

See BENRAL TENANCY ACT, s. 74.

10 C. W. N. 527

## VIII—

See BETTIAH RAJ . 13 C. W. N. 454

## 1814—IV—

See BETTIAH RAJ . 13 C. W. N. 454

See SALTPETRE . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 268

## 1817—XX—

See EVIDENCE ACT, s. 32 (2)

13 C. W. N. 71

## 1818—III, deportation under—

See LIBEL . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 883

## 1819—II—

See LAND REGISTRATION ACT (BENGAL ACT VII of 1876).

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 747

## V—

See PUTNI TENURE.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 140

## VIII—s. 3, cl. (3)—

See RENT . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 140

## s. 134—

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 737

## 1822—VII—

See MARKET . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 740

See PRE-EMPTION . I. L. R. 26 All. 549

## s. 9—

See WAJIB-UL-ARZ . 10 C. W. N. 730

*Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 35—Duties of Collectors and Settlement Officers—Entries in khewats and khataunis.* Under the provisions of Regulation No. VII of 1822 settlement officers had to ascertain “the real nature and extent of the interests held, more especially where several persons may hold interests in the subject-matter of different kinds or degrees,” *held*, that this included the case of mortgagors and mortgagees. *Held*, also, that entries in *khewats* and *khataunis* made at settlement under Regulation No. VII of 1822 are admissible



**REGULATION—contd.****1822—VII—concl'd.**

in evidence under s. 35, Indian Evidence Act.  
1872. **ROBERT SKINNER v. CHANDAN SINGH** (1908)  
I. L. R. 31 All. 247

**1825—IX—**

See LIMITATION ACT (XV OF 1877). SCH.  
II, ART. 45 . . . 12 C. W. N. 910

**1825—XI—Alluvion and diluvion—**

**Accretion—Auction-purchaser at a sale for arrears of revenue, right of, to accretion—Res judicata—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13.** An auction-purchaser of an entire estate at a sale for arrears of revenue is entitled to recover all lands included in the taluk at the time of its settlement as well as all lands which had subsequently accreted thereto by alluvion. Where lands had in fact become dry not naturally by accretion through gradual alluvion, but by the dereliction of the river by reason of the diversion of its water through an artificial channel. *Held*, that the mere fact that an accretion of some lands had commenced before the excavation of the channel would not give the riparian owner a title to the rest of the lands, if it were found that they were not formed by alluvion. **KANTA PROSAD HAJARI v. ABDUL JAMIR SADAGAR** (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 676

**s. 4—**

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 444

**1. Alluvion—Gradual accession**

**—Change of course of a river within a short space of time.** Certain land belonging to village P on the river Gomti was submerged, and after remaining submerged for a not very lengthened period again reappeared. But on its reappearance it was found to be on the opposite side of the river and adjoining village T. *Held*, that the land thus cut off from village P could not be said to have become part of village T by "gradual accession" within the meaning of s. 4 of Bengal Regulation No. XI of 1825, but was rather land merely separated from the village, of which it formed part, by a sudden change in the course of the river, and this being so, no change of ownership had occurred. "Gradual accession" or "alluvion" means an imperceptible increase; and land is said to be acquired by alluvion, when it is acquired so gradually that it cannot be said how much is added at any particular moment of time. **Lopez v. Muddun Mohun Thakoor**, 13 Moo. I. A. 467, and **Hursuhai Singh v. Syed Lootf Ali Khan**, L. R. 2 I. A. 28, referred to. **RAI KRISHAN CHANDRA v. SAIDAN BIBI** (1905) . . . I. L. R. 28 All. 256

**2. cl. (2) Alluvion and diluvion—Act XVIII of 1876—Ownership, change of—Reformation—Principles.** A river, which separated two estates situated respectively on its north and south banks, shifted its course to the north laying bare to its south certain lands which originally belonged to the estate on the north bank, but so as still to leave a channel between this land and the estate on the south bank. *Held*, that this was not

**REGULATION—contd.****1825—XI, s. 4—concl'd.**

a case of slow and gradual accretion by the inch or foot or yard. The original ownership of the reformed land therefore remained unaffected. **Lopez v. Muddun Mohun Thakur**, 13 Moo. I. A. 467, and **The Mayor of Carlisle v. Graham**, L. R. 4 Ex. 361, referred to. **THAKURAIN RITRAJ KOER v. THAKURAIN SARFARAZ KOER** (1905) . . . 9 C. W. N. 889  
s.c. L. R. 32 I. A. 165

**3. Law of alluvion and diluvion (Reg. XI of 1825), s. 4—Non-occupancy raiyat, if entitled to accretion—Dastak, if should be registered—Registration Act (III of 1877), s. 17.** A non-occupancy raiyat is entitled to claim the benefit of cl. 1, s. 4 of Reg. XI of 1825, and when there is an accretion to the land originally let out to him he is entitled to claim it in his right as a non-occupancy raiyat. **AHMUD BEPARI v. TOHI MAHOMED** (1894) . . . 13 C. W. N. 267

**4. Law of alluvion and diluvion (Reg. XI of 1825), s. 4—Non-occupancy raiyat, if entitled to claim an accretion.** A non-occupancy raiyat can claim the benefit of s. 4 of Reg. XI of 1825 and is entitled to claim an accretion to his holding. **AMJAD ALI v. KADERJAN BIBEE** (1908) . . . 13 C. W. N. 269

See FISHERY . . . 10 C. W. N. 540

**1827—XXVII, s. 5—**

See PRESIDENCY SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT . . . I. L. R. 31 Bom. 138

**1828—VII—**

See MADRAS REVENUE RECOVERY ACT s. 59 . . . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 367

**1872—III—**

See APPEAL—REGULATIONS. 6 C. L. R. 555

**ss. 5, 8—**

See COURT-FEE . . . 12 C. W. N. 917

See SETTLEMENT OFFICER. 6 C. L. R. 555

See SONTHAL PERGUNNAHS SETTLEMENT REGULATION.

See SUBORDINATE JUDGE. 5 C. L. R. 128

**1876—IV—**

See JURISDICTION—SUITS FOR LAND—PROPERTY IN DIFFERENT DISTRICTS. I. L. R. 17 All. 483

See TERAJ REGULATION, 1876.

**1877—I—**

See AJMERE COURTS REGULATION. I. L. R. 2 All. 819  
I. L. R. 21 All. 163

See REFERENCE TO HIGH COURT—CIVIL CASES . . . I. L. R. 21 All. 163



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## 1880—II—

See ASSAM FRONTIER TRACTS REGULATION.

## 1882—VII, s. 9—

See HINDU LAW . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 6  
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13 C. W. N. 104

## 1886—I—

See ASSAM LAND AND REVENUE REGULATION.

See PARTITION—JURISDICTION OF CIVIL  
COURTS IN SUITS RESPECTING PARTITION . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 514  
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 751

## 1891—III—

**Jhum cultivation in Sylhet—**  
*Regulation extinguishing proprietary rights and giving compensation—Onus of proof as to applicability of Regulation—Question of fact, concurrent decisions of Courts in India on—Proof of reason for taking profits of jhum lands into account in estimating income of settled estate—Long possession and enjoyment as proof of title.* Regulation III of 1891 (issued under Statute 33 Vict., C. 3) recited in the preamble that “the officers, who effected the permanent settlement of certain estates in Sylhet included for the purposes of assessment among the assets of those estates, under the designation of *jhum*, the income then derived by the proprietors of those estates from shifting cultivation carried on by them or their dependents beyond the limits of those estates; that the cultivation shifted from year to year over immense and altogether undefined areas, and the tracts of land, over which they extended, were not specified at the time of the settlement and in consequence of this right of various, and in some cases vague, descriptions are from time to time asserted by the said proprietors over such areas; that it is thus impossible for any person to obtain a safe and clear title to land in those areas, and the extension of cultivation is in consequence impeded, and that it is expedient that the rights, if any, corresponding to the said *jhum* assets should be commuted.” S. 2 enacted that all such rights should be deemed to have been extinguished; and by s. 3 it was declared that all proprietors of such estates should be entitled to compensation. The Government extended the above Regulation to certain areas under *jhum* cultivation belonging to the appellants, who and their predecessors in title had held them since 1837. In a suit brought against the Secretary of State for India in Council by the appellants, they alleged that the land in dispute appertained to talukhs, which had been settled with their predecessors in title at the time of the permanent settlement, and prayed for a declaration that it did not come within the operation of Regulation III of 1891. *Held*, that as the Government were claiming to apply to lands, which had undoubtedly been

REGULATION—*conclld.*1891—III—*conclld.*

long in the enjoyment of the predecessors in title of the appellants, a Regulation which would have the effect of confiscating proprietary rights and giving compensation in exchange, it lay upon the Government to show that the facts of the case were such as to bring it within the operation of the *jhum* lands Regulation. *Held*, also, that the question whether lay within or without the limits of the settled estates was not a question of fact, on which the concurrent decisions of the Courts in India could be accepted as final. In a sense it was one of fact, but at every point in the process of reasoning considerations of law had to be regarded. It was not disputed that the taluks, held by the appellants had been settled with their predecessors in title at the permanent settlement, and that the profits of the *jhum* lands in dispute had then been brought into account in estimating the assets of the talukhs, but the parties differed as to the reason why they had been so taken into account. *Held*, that on the documentary evidence in the case there was, after such a lapse of time, not sufficient to show whether they had been so taken into account, because the *jhum* lands formed part of the settled estate as contended for by the appellants, or because they had been treated as assets accruing to the owners of the settled estate, but derived from land lying outside it as the Government contended. No confident conclusion, therefore, could be drawn from the evidence as to whether the disputed land was part of the settled estate or was beyond its limits. *Held*, however, that the possession and enjoyment of the disputed land by the appellants and their predecessors in title taken together with the instances in evidence in 1842, 1843, and 1855, in which it had been confirmed by the Government, was sufficient to prove their title. Since the last named date such possession and enjoyment had been continuous. HAIDAR KHAN v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (1908)

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**RELATORS.**

\_\_\_\_\_ *Civil Procedure Code*  
(Act XIV of 1882), s. 539—*Suit by Advocate-General*  
*at instance of relators dismissed—No appeal by*  
*Advocate-General—Appeal by relators—Maintain-*  
*ability.* A suit having been brought by the Ad-  
vocate-General, he is the proper party to appeal  
and not the relators. The relators are not parties  
to the suit and as relators they have no right  
to step in when the Advocate-General, who was  
plaintiff, has not thought fit to appeal against the  
dismissal of the suit. *JAN MAHOMED v. NURUDIN*  
(1907) . . . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 155

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2 N. W. 415

1. \_\_\_\_\_ Foundation for relief—*Facts*  
*and documents not stated or referred to in pleadings.*  
A plaintiff cannot be entitled to relief upon facts  
or documents not stated or referred to by him in his

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pleadings. **MAHOMED ZAHOOOR ALI KHAN v. RUTTA KOOPER** . 9 W. R. P. C. 9 : 11 Moo. I. A. 468

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2 N. W. 182

**VIRASVAMI GRAMINI v. AYYASVAMI GRAMINI**  
1 Mad. 471

2. ———— **Right to relief—Relief consistent with facts stated in plaint.** A plaintiff is entitled to ask for any remedy which the Court may think proper upon the state of facts disclosed in his plaint and established by the evidence and a mistake in asking for a particular remedy will not debar him from some other remedy similar in its nature and not more extensive, provided it requires no change in the facts. **NUDIAR CHAND SHAHA v. PRANNATH SHAHA** . . . . . 21 W. R. 8

3. ———— **Mistake by plaintiff as to relief to which he is entitled—Special relief.** Where a plaintiff mistakes the relief to which he is entitled in his special prayer, the Court may afford him the relief to which he has a right under the prayer for general relief, provided it is such relief as is agreeable to the case made by the plaint. **NISTARINI DASI v. MAKHANLALL DUTT**  
9 B. L. R. 11 : 17 W. R. 432

4. ———— **General prayer for relief—Failure to establish right to special relief asked for.** Although the plaintiff was found not to be entitled to the special relief prayed for, the Court considered he had established a case in which, upon the plaint and the general prayer for relief, he was entitled to a decree. **GOBIND CHUNDER MOOKERJEE v. DOORGAPERSAD BABOO**  
14 B. L. R. 337 : 22 W. R. 248

5. ———— **Prayer for general relief—Ignorance of exact relief entitled to.** It may very well be that a plaintiff, being doubtful as to the precise form of relief to which the facts proved may entitle him, may ask the Court to give him such relief as, under the circumstances, the Court may think fit to give. **GUNGARAM DUTT v. JUMAJOY MULLICK** . . . . . 1 C. L. R. 144

6. ———— **Specific relief—Prayer for general relief.** Under the prayer for general relief, specific relief may be granted of a different description from the specific relief prayed for by the bill; provided the bill contains charges putting in issue material facts which will sustain such relief. **COCKERELL v. DICKENS**  
2 Moo. I. A. 353

7. ———— **Prayer for general relief—Plaint, relief inconsistent with.** Upon a prayer for general relief, a plaintiff is not entitled to any relief which is inconsistent with his plaint; therefore, where a plaintiff brought a suit to set aside his father's will, on the ground that he had no power to dispose of his property, but that the plaintiff was entitled as eldest son and heir-at-law according to Hindu law, the suit should have been

**RELIEF—contd.**

dismissed with costs, and no account should have been decreed to the plaintiff in respect of his interest in a portion of the property, the bequest of which was, in the opinion of the Court below, void for remoteness. **HIRALAL MULLICK v. MATILAL MULLICK** . . . . . 5 B. L. R. 682

8. ———— **Relief inconsistent with pleadings.** A party may have subordinate rights awarded when they arise out of the principal right which he pleads. But when a defendant pleads distinctly a jaghirdar's proprietary right against a malik's proprietary right, a Court cannot award a subordinate right of occupancy in no way arising out of a jaghirdar's proprietary right, but out of a raiyati right never pleaded by the defendant, and in fact incompatible with his case. **PANDAY BISHONATH ROY v. BHYRUB SINGH** . . . . . 7 W. R. 145

9. ———— **Alternative relief—Prayer for relief beyond powers of Court.** Where the plaintiffs claimed possession, but, in the event of the defendants being found entitled to hold as tenants, asked the Court to ascertain at what rate the defendants were entitled to hold, and direct a lease to be executed:—**Held**, that, whether the plaintiffs could obtain the alternative relief prayed for or not, their suit ought not to be dismissed, as they might succeed in proving their title to the substantial relief sought. **LAND MORTGAGE BANK OF INDIA v. NEELOO BHUTTO** . . . . . 21 W. R. 125

10. ———— **Alternative case where there is no inconsistency between alternatives.** Where the title on which a plaintiff sues is put forward in the alternative, and the two parts of the alternative are not inconsistent with each other, he ought to obtain a decree if he makes out either branch of his alternative. **WOODIT SINGH v. BULDEO SINGH** . . . . . 21 W. R. 12

11. ———— **Relief where plaintiff asks for two inconsistent rights. Quare:** Whether, where a plaintiff asks for the establishment of two rights, and it appears that he is entitled to one of them, it would not be sufficient to give him a decree for that one and to insert in the decree a declaration which would bar his right to that which he has failed to establish. **DHUNPUT SINGH v. NARAIN PERSHAD SINGH** . . . . . 20 W. R. 94

See **BIJOY KESHUB ROY v. OBHOY CHURN GHOSE**  
16 W. R. 198

12. ———— **Relief granted different from that prayed for in plaint.** Where the plaintiff purchased two-thirds and the defendant one-third of the right and interest of certain judgment-debtors sold in execution of a decree, and the plaintiff paid his own and the defendant's quota of the purchase-money, and on defendant's failure to reimburse him sued for possession of the whole property, on the ground that he should be considered the sole purchaser, and the lower Court directed the defendant to pay his share of the purchase-money to the plaintiff with interest:—**Held**, that, though the relief granted by the Court was different from that asked for in the plaint, the order should not



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be disturbed on appeal, as it did substantial justice. *BRIJOO RAM MISSEER v. BHUGWAN DASS*

7 W. R. 180

13. ———— *Plaint asking for more than plaintiff is entitled to.* Where a plaintiff asks for more than the plaintiff is entitled to, the Court may give him such relief as is within the Court's jurisdiction, and as the Court may deem him entitled to. *PITAMBUR SHAHA v. RAMJOY GHOSE*

7 W. R. 92

14. ———— *Suit for possession after dispossession—Failure to prove whole claim.* A plaintiff proving a wrong done to him, though not exactly to the extent of which he complains, is entitled to relief, though not to the extent or on the ground on which he asks it. *Bajjnath Chatterjee v. Lakhimani Debi*, 5 B. L. R. 514 note : 12 W. R. 248, explained and distinguished. *BISHNOO PERSHAD BUNNICK v. RAM COOMAR DEB*

22 W. R. 2

15. ———— *Prayer for relief which Court cannot give—Land Registration Act (Beng. Act VII of 1876), s. 89.* The Civil Court has no power to set aside an order passed under the Land Registration Act, and when a prayer for such relief is contained in a plaint which also asks for a declaration of right and title to and confirmation of possession in property, such prayer may be treated as mere surplusage. *LUCHMON SAHI CHOWDHRY v. KANCHUN OJHAIN*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 525

16. ———— *Failure to prove case—Admission by defendants as to portion of claim—Partial relief.* Held per *STUART, C.J.*, (TURNER, J., dissenting), that the plaintiffs, having failed to prove the averments on which their suit was based, were not entitled to any relief in respect of that portion of the property in suit of which the defendants admitted their possession as mortgagees. *RATAN KUAR v. JIWAN SINGH*

I. L. R. 1 All. 194

17. ———— *Title to equitable relief—Conduct of party.* Where a party who, as the facts really stand, would be entitled to equitable relief, misrepresents his case, falsely charges the opposite party with fraud and collusion and does not rely on his equitable rights, he will be debarred by such conduct from obtaining any relief in a Court of equity. *DULI CHAND v. MONOHUR LALL UPADHYA*

2 C. L. R. 18

18. ———— *Form of decree not indicated in the plaint, but indicated in the issues—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 146, 147.* In a suit by the head of an adhinam for declarations that a muth was subject to his control, that he was entitled to appoint a manager, that the present head of the muth was not duly appointed, and his nomination by his predecessor was invalid : and for delivery of possession of the moveable and immoveable properties of the muth to a nominee of the plaintiff, it was admitted that the defendant had succeeded to the management of the muth under the will of his predecessor, and that he was not a disciple of the adhinam, and it was found

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(i) that on the evidence as to the usage in the establishment in question the head of the muth is entitled to appoint his successor, but his election is limited to members of the adhinam : and the head of the adhinam is entitled to enforce this rule, though he is bound to invest a disciple properly nominated by the head of the muth ; (ii) that the defendant not being a disciple of the adhinam, his appointment was invalid, and the head of the adhinam was entitled to see that a competent member of the adhinam was appointed in his stead. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to declarations based on the two last-mentioned findings since they were comprised in the issues framed under ss. 146 and 147 of the Code of Civil Procedure, although the appropriate form in which the decree should be passed was not indicated with precision in the plaint itself. *GIYANA SAMBANDHA PANDARA SAN-NADHI v. KANDASAMI TAMBIRAN*

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 375

19. ———— *Relief not asked for—Variance between pleadings and proof.* The plaintiff, alleging that a certain lane was his property, and that he had been obstructed by the defendants from building a door upon it, sued for an injunction and for damages. The Court held that the plaintiff's title to the land was not established, but passed a decree declaring that both the plaintiff and the defendants were entitled to use the lane by right of easement. Held, that this declaration, which had not been asked for, should not have been made, and that the suit should have been dismissed for want of proof of the title alleged by the plaintiff. *SAMBAYYA v. GOPALAKRISHNAMMA*

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 489

20. ———— *Inconsistent cases set up in the alternative.* Defendant 1 mortgaged certain premises to defendant 2 in 1884 and to the plaintiff in 1885. The mortgage to the plaintiff was a usufructuary mortgage. In 1887 defendant 2 obtained a decree on his mortgage, and in execution brought to sale and himself became the purchaser of the mortgaged premises. The plaintiff, who was in possession under the mortgage of 1885, prayed in this suit that the prior mortgage be declared fraudulent and void, and the sale in execution be set aside, and in the alternative that she be declared entitled to redeem the prior mortgage. The plaint was stamped as in a redemption suit, and the Court of first appeal passed a decree for redemption. Held, that the suit should be dismissed, since after the sale of the mortgaged premises in execution of the decree obtained by defendant 2, the only right which remained to the puisne mortgagee was the right to retain possession until her mortgage should be redeemed. *Semble : Per BEST, J.*—It is open to a plaintiff who is not a party to the transaction in respect of which allegations are made to come into Court seeking relief in the alternative, dependent upon what may be found by the Court to be the true facts of the case. *Quere : Whether the Court can pass a decree for redemption when the plaint seeks only*

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**RELIEF—concl'd.**

a declaration of the right to redeem. *PERUMAL v. KAVERI* . . . **I. L. R. 16 Mad. 121**

**21. ——— Alternative relief—Suit for possession alleging partition, but failing to prove it—Variance between pleading and proof.** The plaintiff sued to recover possession of the northern half of a certain plot of land, alleging that it had fallen to his share at a partition made in 1887, and that he was illegally dispossessed thereof by the defendant in 1890. He also prayed in the alternative that, if the alleged partition were not proved, the land should be partitioned, and his share awarded to him. The suit was dismissed by the lower Courts on the ground that the alleged partition was not proved, and that no order for partition could be made in the face of the plaintiff's distinct allegation that it had already taken place. *Held*, that the plaintiff's allegation of partition did not preclude him from seeking the alternative relief on the strength of his general title. *NINGAPA v. SHIVAPPA* **I. L. R. 19 Bom. 323**

**22. ——— Relief not founded on the pleadings and not prayed for—Rights and title touched in the issues and put in evidence, declaration with regard to—Declaration in a dismissed suit, effect of.** Relief not founded on the pleadings should not, as a rule, be granted. But where substantial matters which constituted the title of all the parties are touched in the issues and have been fully put in evidence and formed the main subject of discussion and decision in the Courts, the case does not come within the rule, and a declaration of the rights of the parties, though not founded on the pleadings, may be made. *GOBIND RAO v. SITA RAM KESHO* . . . **I. L. R. 21 All. 53**  
**2 C. W. N. 681**

**RELIGION.**

*See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURT—RELIGION.*

*See RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY.*

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*See CUSTODY OF CHILDREN.*

**I. L. R. 16 Bom. 307**

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**14 Moo. I. A. 309**

————— interference of religious prejudice with common-law rights—

*See INJUNCTION—SPECIAL CASES—CUTTING TREES* . **I. L. R. 24 All. 499**

————— offence against—

*See MAHOMEDAN LAW—MOSQUE.*

**I. L. R. 12 All. 494**

**I. L. R. 13 All. 419**

————— offences relating to—

*See MISCHIEF* . **I. L. R. 24 All. 155**

**1. ——— Disturbing religious assembly—Penal Code, s. 296—Mahomedan law—Hanifa and Shafia schools—Right to say "Amin" loudly**

**RELIGION—cont'd.**

during worship—*Bengal Civil Courts Act (VI of 1871), s. 24—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 57 (1)—Mahomedan Ecclesiastical law—Judicial notice.* A masjid was used by the members of a sect of Mahomedans called the Hanifis, according to whose tenets the word "Amin" should be spoken in a low tone of voice. While the Hanifis were at prayers, R, a Mahomedan of another sect, entered the masjid, and in the course of the prayers, according to the tenets of his sect, called out "Amin" in a loud tone of voice. For this act he was convicted of voluntarily disturbing an assembly engaged in religious worship, an offence punishable under s. 296 of the Penal Code. The Full Bench (*MAHMOOD, J.*, dissenting) ordered the case to be re-tried, and that, in re-trying it, the Magistrate should have regard to the following questions, namely:—(i) Was there an assembly lawfully engaged in the performance of religious worship? (ii) Was such assembly, in fact, disturbed by the accused? (iii) Was such disturbance caused by acts and conduct on the part of the accused by which he intended to cause such disturbance, or which acts and conduct, at the time of such acts and conduct, he knew or believed to be likely to cause such disturbance? *Held*, by *MAHMOOD, J.*, that the discussion occasioned by the act of the accused having presumably taken place during the interval when the prayers were not going on, the assembly was not at that time "engaged in the performance of religious worship," and was not "disturbed" within the meaning of s. 296 of the Penal Code; that in reference to the terms of s. 39 of the Code, the accused did not disturb the assembly "voluntarily;" that he was justified by the Mahomedan ecclesiastical law in entering the mosque, and joining the congregation in saying the word "Amin" loudly if he thought fit, and his conduct fell within the purview of s. 79 of the Penal Code, and was therefore not an offence under s. 296. *Beatty v. Gillbanks, L. R. 9 Q. B. D. 308*, referred to. Also, *per MAHMOOD, J.*, that having regard to the guarantee given by the Legislature in s. 24 of Act VI of 1871 (*Bengal Civil Courts Act*) that the Mahomedan law shall be administered in all questions regarding "any religious usage or institution," the Court was bound by s. 57 of Act I of 1872 (*Evidence Act*) to take judicial notice of the Mahomedan ecclesiastical law, and the rules of that law need not be proved by specific evidence. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAMZAN* . **I. L. R. 7 All. 461**

**2. ——— Defiling a place of worship—Penal Code, ss. 295, 297—Trespass on a place of sepulture.** R, a Hindu, had sexual intercourse with a woman within an enclosure surrounding the tomb of a Mahomedan fakir. He was convicted under s. 295 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that in the absence of proof that the place was used for worship or otherwise held sacred, the conviction was bad, and that it should be altered to a conviction under s. 297 of the said Code. *In re RATNA MUDALI* **I. L. R. 10 Mad. 126**

**3. ——— "Object" held sacred by any class of persons—Penal Code, s. 295—Killing cows in a public place.** The word "object" in



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s. 295 of the Penal Code does not include animate objects. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. IMAM ALI*

I. L. R. 10 All. 150

4. *Penal Code, s. 295*

—Killing bulls set at large at *sraddha* in accordance with Hindu religious usage. The word "object" in s. 295 of the Penal Code does not include animate objects. A bull dedicated and set at large at the *sraddha* of a Hindu in accordance with religious usage is not an "object" within the meaning of that section. Where such an animal was killed by certain Mahomedans secretly and at night in the presence of none but Mahomedans for the sake of the meat and value of the skin:—*Held*, that no offence has been committed under s. 295. *Queen-Empress v. Imam Ali, I. L. R. 10 All. 150*, followed. *ROMESH CHUNDER SANNYAL v. HIRU MONDAL* . . . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 852

5. —Disturbing a religious assembly—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 296*. The worship referred to in s. 296 of the Penal Code must be real worship and not a cloak for doing something else, and the assembly must be lawfully engaged in worship. If the ceremony is commenced by an act which is not lawful, it cannot be said that the persons engaged in it are lawfully engaged from the mere circumstance of their falling into a posture of worship, though such worship may be real. As to whether a worship is real or not, much must depend upon the circumstances under which it is performed. *Per BANERJEE, J.*—To constitute an offence under s. 296 of the Penal Code (i) there must be a voluntary disturbance caused; (ii) the disturbance must be caused to an assembly engaged in religious worship or religious ceremonies; and (ii) the assembly must be lawfully engaged in such worship or ceremonies, i.e., they must be doing what they have a right to do. *JAIPAL GIR v. DHARMAPALA* . . . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 60

6. —Trespass on burial ground—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 297*—Ploughing up burial ground—*Permission of owner*. *Held*, that persons who entered upon a burial place and ploughed up the graves were liable to be convicted of the offence defined by s. 297 of the Penal Code, notwithstanding that their entry on the land was by the consent of the owner thereof. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SUBHAN* . . . I. L. R. 18 All. 395

7. —Disturbing a religious assembly—Religious procession on highway—*Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 153, 296*—Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot—*Legality*—*Chanting of hymns by ordinary worshippers*. By a decree in a civil suit, the *Tengalai* sect in a certain district were declared entitled to hold certain offices connected with a temple, and as such office-holders it was their duty to recite certain hymns in processions. The rights of the *Vadagalai* sect as ordinary worshippers were not affected by the decree, but the *Vadagalais* were ordered not to interfere with the *Tengalais* in the recital of the hymns otherwise than as ordinary worshippers. Subsequently to this decree, a

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religious procession was being conducted along a public highway. The *Tengalais* walked in front, chanting the hymns. In the rear, at such a distance that the *Tengalais* were not likely to hear them, the *Vadagalais* followed, also chanting hymns. A complaint was in consequence laid by a member of the *Tengalai* sect, charging the *Vadagalais* (i) with wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot, and (ii) with voluntarily disturbing an assembly lawfully engaged in religious worship. *Held*, that neither offence had been committed. *Per DAVIES, J.* (without deciding whether religious processions in public streets in India are "lawful" or not). The *Vadagalais* had not exceeded their rights as ordinary worshippers, and had not intended to provoke a breach of the peace, and were consequently not guilty of an offence under s. 153. Moreover, no "disturbance" had been proved, within the meaning of s. 296. *Per SUBRAHMANIA AYYAR, J.*—The object of s. 296 of the Indian Penal Code presumably is to secure freedom from molestation when people meet for the performance of acts in a quiet spot vested for the time in the assembly exclusively; and not when they engage in worship in an unquiet place open to all the public as a thoroughfare. The user of a highway for religious worship is altogether wanting in lawfulness. There is no peculiar right known to the law as a right of procession. Though the law accords to members of a procession no recognition in their collective capacity, yet the fact that a number of persons use a highway together for some common purpose does not detract in any way from such use being lawful; but, as the circumstances attending a procession may, in consequence of their being inconsistent with the paramount idea of passage, be of such a character as to render the user by the processionists otherwise than lawful, and as carrying on worship on a highway is of that character, it cannot be affirmed that the *Tengalais* on the occasion in question constituted an assembly engaged in worship lawfully, within the meaning of s. 296 of the Indian Penal Code. *Per BENSON, J.*—The contention that the *Tengalais* were not "lawfully" engaged in religious worship because they were engaged in it on a highway, could not be accepted. There is nothing illegal, in India (where highways have from time immemorial been used for the passing of religious processions), in a procession or assembly engaging in worship while passing along a highway. If it were necessary to refer the origin of the use of highways for religious processions to a dedication of the highway to such use, such a dedication could reasonably be presumed, history, literature and tradition showing that such processions have formed a feature of the national life from the earliest times, and it being unreasonable to suppose that a dedicator would make a reservation against religious processions, which would be wholly opposed to the sentiment of the community. A religious procession is entitled to the special protection given by the Penal Code to assemblies engaged in religious worship. In the present case, however, no "disturbance" had been proved, and consequently no offence had been committed. *Per BHASHYAM AYYANGAR, J.* (at the first hearing, the Chief Justice



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— offence relating to—concl'd.

dissenting).—Inasmuch as the *Vadagalais* had acted as ordinary worshippers, which they were not prohibited from doing under the decree, the act complained of was not illegal, within the meaning of ss. 153 and 43 of the Indian Penal Code. With regard to the charge under s. 296, the accused had not been shown, on the facts as found, to have voluntarily caused disturbance to an assembly lawfully engaged in the performance of religious worship. No assembly can be so "lawfully engaged" (within the meaning of that section) on a highway, unless it be established or can reasonably be presumed that the dedication of the highway was subject to such user. User of a highway as a place of worship is not the legitimate user of it as a highway. The conviction was wrong on this ground, and on the ground that in fact no disturbance had been proved. *VIJAYARAGHAVA CHARIAR v. EMPEROR* (F.B. 1903) . . . I. L. R. 28 Mad. 554

**RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY.**

See RELIGION.

**¶ 1.** ——— Suit relating to trust among a community—*Jurisdiction of High Court in charitable trusts—Khoja Mahomedans—Regulation of rights of dissident parties in a religious community.* In a suit by certain members of the Khoja community in Bombay for an account of all property belonging to, or held in trust for, the community, come to the hands of the treasurer and accountant of the community; for a declaration that the treasurer and accountant had ceased to be such officers of the community; for an order directing the treasurer and accountant to deliver all the property of the community in their hands; for a declaration that the property of the community was held and ought to be applied to and for the original charitable, religious and public uses or trusts to or for which they were dedicated and to none other, for the sole benefit of the Khoja sect and none other; and that no person, not being or having ceased to be a member of the same, and in particular no person professing Shia opinions in matters of religion, was entitled to any share or interest therein; for a scheme to carry such declaration into effect, and for an injunction restraining one of the defendants from interfering in the management of the property and affairs of the Khoja community or in the election and appointment of officers, from excommunicating any members of the community, from celebrating marriages, and from demanding or receiving any offering. *Held*, that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. When the Court, in exercise of its charitable jurisdiction, is called upon to adjudicate between conflicting claims of dissident parties in a community distinguished by some religious profession, the rights of the litigants will be regulated by reference to the religious tenets held by the community in its origin, and a minority holding those tenets will prevail against a majority which has receded from them. History given of the sects of Sunis, Shias, and Shia Imami Ismailis; of Aga Khan; and of the

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Khojas and their relations with the hereditary Imam of the Ismailis. Relations of Aga Khan with the Jumats of the Khojas of Bombay discussed. The tenets of Mahomedanism to which the first Khojas were converted were those of the Shia Imami Ismaili sect. In order to enjoy the full privileges of membership in the Khoja community, a person must be one of that sect whose ancestors were originally Hindus, which was converted to, and has throughout abided in the faith of, the Shia Imami Ismailis, and which has always been and still is bound by ties of spiritual allegiance to the hereditary Imams of the Ismailis. There is no public property impressed with a trust, either express or implied, for the benefit of the whole Khoja community. Aga Khan, as the spiritual head of the Khojas, is entitled to exercise a potential voice in determining who, on religious grounds, shall or shall not remain members of the Khoja community. *ADVOCATE-GENERAL OF BOMBAY, ex relatione DAYA MUHAMMAD v. MUHAMMAD HUSEN HUSENI alias AGA KHAN* 12 Bom. 323

**2.** ——— Jews—Beni-Israelite community in Bombay—*Dismissal of officers of the community by resolutions passed at a meeting—Such officers to be given opportunity of defending themselves—Domestic tribunal—Jurisdiction of Court.* The plaintiffs and the defendants were members of the Beni-Israelite community worshipping at a certain synagogue in Bombay. The administration of the synagogue and of the funds was vested in a mukadam or headman and four managers, a treasurer, and a crier. The mukadam succeeded to the office by family right according to the custom of the community, but in matters of management he was bound to keep within his powers, which were co-ordinate with those of his colleagues. The first defendant was the mukadam, the second defendant was the hazan or beadle, and the third defendant was the samost or crier. The first defendant had succeeded to the office of mukadam as the nearest lineal descendant of the founder of the synagogue. The second defendant was appointed by the community, and it did not appear on what terms he held office. The third defendant was merely a paid official of a subordinate character. Disputes arose in the community, which became divided into two parties, to one of which the three defendants belonged. At a meeting of the community held on the 28th October 1884, which was attended by a majority of the community, resolutions were passed, dismissing all three defendants from office; and their dismissal was formally communicated to them by a letter, dated the 30th October. It did not appear that they had been given any notice that the question of their dismissal was to be discussed at the meeting. They had received only the ordinary notice that a meeting was to be held. The defendants refused to recognize the authority of the resolutions passed at the meeting of the 28th October, and the plaintiffs accordingly filed this suit, praying for a declaration that the defendants did not occupy any official position in the synagogue and for the recovery of certain property in



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their hands. *Held*, that the first defendant had not been duly dismissed. He held the office of mukadam not merely at the will of the community, but as long as he duly performed the duties of his office. He could not be dismissed without an opportunity of making his defence and explaining his conduct, and he had been given no notice that his conduct and his dismissal were to be discussed at the meeting of the 28th October. *Held*, also, that the second defendant had not been duly dismissed. No evidence was given as to the exact terms on which he held office; but he was entitled to notice, and to an opportunity of defending himself before dismissal. *Held*, as to the third defendant, that he had been duly dismissed. He was merely a subordinate officer, and the managers had the power of dismissing him. All the managers, save the first and second defendants, concurred in dismissing him, and in doing so they were within their right. Where a domestic tribunal has been appointed for the regulation of the affairs of a community, the Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with its decisions if it acts within the scope of its authority and in a manner consonant with the ordinary principles of justice. *ADVOCATE-GENERAL OF BOMBAY v. HAIM DEVAKER*. I. L. R. 11 Bom. 185

**RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS.**

*See RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS ACT.*

1. ———— **Character of appointment as head of mutt—Hindu law—Lunacy of office-holder—Effect on his position—Practice—Second counsel.** Prior to 1896, first defendant in the present suit had presided over a mutt as its "Swami" or head, having been duly appointed to that office. In 1896 he became and was adjudged a lunatic. Prior to his lunacy he had nominated Vidyasamudra as his successor. In 1898 Vidyasamudra died without nominating a successor. In the same year, and after Vidyasamudra's death, a person, who claimed the right to fill the office in such circumstances purported to appoint plaintiff to it. First defendant was then still alive and only died after the institution of the present suit, which was brought by plaintiff for a declaration that he had been validly appointed and for the recovery of the property belonging to the mutt. *Held*, that plaintiff had not been validly appointed. Assuming that the person, who purported to appoint plaintiff, had the power to do so (which was not decided), there was no vacancy to be filled at the date either of the appointment or of the institution of the suit. The first defendant as head of the mutt was not a mere trustee, and (in the absence of evidence of custom) had not forfeited his position by reason of his having become a lunatic. The appointment relied on by plaintiff in consequence conferred no right on him. The eustodian (or dharmakarta) of a temple is a mere trustee, who is bound to apply the funds at his disposal in carrying out the object of the trust, such as the conduct of daily worship and the performance of ceremonies. The head of a mutt is not a mere trustee, but a "corporation sole" having an estate for life in the permanent endow-

**RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS—concl.**

ments of the mutt and an absolute property in the income derived from offerings, subject only to the burden of maintaining the institution. His power to alienate or charge the corpus of the endowment is limited to purposes necessary for the maintenance of the mutt, and alienations or charges will not be binding on the mutt or on his successors merely because they have been made for general religious and charitable purposes appropriate to the head of a mutt. *Sammantha Pandara v. Sellappa Chetti*, I. L. R. 2 Mad. 175, commented on. Instances of "corporation sole" in India, both ecclesiastical and lay, considered. Appellants as well as respondents have a right to be heard by two counsel. *VIDYAPURNA TIRTHA SWAMI v. VIDYANIDHI TIRTHA SWAMI* (1904). I. L. R. 27 Mad. 435

2. ———— **Trust—Uncertainty—Income of villages to be applied to "charitable purposes" at a dharamsala, which the settlor had founded.** By a deed of trust of *bhentanama*, the owner of seven villages settle the income thereof to the extent of Rs 500 a month to be applied to "charitable purposes" at a dharamsala, which he had founded. In course of time one of the villages mentioned in the deed of trust was alienated by a person, who was at the time acting as trustee. *Held*, on a suit by the trustees to have the sale cancelled and to recover possession of the village, (i) that the trust was not void for uncertainty, and (i) that it was not competent to the Court in the suit as framed to declare that the village in suit was charged with a proportionate part of the total income of the seven endowed villages. *Ranchordas Vandravandas v. Parvatibai*, I. L. R. 23 Bom. 725, referred to. *GORDHAN DAS v. CHUNNI LAL* (1908) I. L. R. 30 All. 111

**RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS ACT (XX OF 1863).**

*See ACT 1863—XX.*

*See LIMITATION ACT (XV OF 1877), s. 2S.*

I. L. R. 27 Mad. 192

——— ss. 5, 14—**Suit to remove mohant on account of misfeasance—Court's power to appoint receiver when right of succession not in dispute—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 32, 375, 539, 582—Power of Appellate Court—Joinder as respondents of persons who were not parties in the original suit—Court's inherent power to add parties in suits relating to public trusts.** In a suit brought under the Religious Endowments Act, a Civil Court has no power to appoint a receiver or manager of debutter properties except under s. 5 of the same Act. A Civil Court has power under that section to appoint a manager only when there is a dispute as to the right of succession. A person electing to proceed under the Religious Endowments Act can be given only such special relief as that special statute says it may give. If he wishes for any relief beyond that, he should proceed under s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code. S. 32 coupled with s. 582 of the Civil Procedure Code gives an Appellate Court power to add as parties to the appeal persons,



**RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS ACT (XX OF 1863)—*contd.*****s. 5—*conclld.***

who were not parties to the original suit. Even if this be not so, s. 32 is not exhaustive and an Appellate Court has inherent power in a case dealing with a public trust to add in the appeal such new parties as may be necessary for the protection of the public interests, the public being interested in the appeal. In this case a decree was passed by the first Court in a suit brought by a worshipper at a Hindu temple under s. 14 of the Religious Endowments Act directing the removal of the defendant, the mohant of the temple, on account of misfeasance. The mohant appealed to the High Court. Whilst the appeal was pending, the parties sought to effect a compromise, which affected the public interests prejudicially and so was held unlawful; and the High Court, upon application made to it, added as respondents certain other worshippers, who were not parties in the first Court, in order that the appeal might be properly contested. *GYANANANDA ASRAM v. KRISTO CHANDRA MUKHERJI* (1904)

8 C. W. N. 404, 405

**ss. 5, 18—**See **ENDOWMENT**. I. L. R. 34 Calc. 587

**s. 7—Rules under—Election—Giving consideration in return for votes, what amounts to—Payment by candidate of expenses to voters, who had undertaking to vote for him, disqualifies candidate.** On general principles, as well as under rule 19 of the rules framed by the Local Government for the conduct of elections under s. 7 of the Religious Endowments Act XX of 1863, a candidate can be held to "give consideration in return for a vote" only when such consideration passes as the result of a bargain. Payment of train fare and carriage expenses by a candidate to voters, who had undertaken to vote for him, will constitute such payment and such candidate will be disqualified from being elected under the rule. It will be otherwise where the provision for payment is a unilateral act, which might be accepted and acted upon or ignored by the other party. The burden lies on the candidate so paying of proving that the payments were otherwise than in return for votes. *Cooper v. Slade*, 6 H. L. C. 746, referred to. *The Bolton Election Petition*, 31 L. T. 194, distinguished. *KRISHNASWAMI AYYANGAR v. SIVASWAMI UDAYAR* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 166

**s. 14—**See **CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE**, 1882, ss. 10, 539 . . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 789See **MADRAS REGULATION** (VII OF 1817), s. 13 . . . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 534

**1.** *Succession to management—Right of appointment in whom vested.* Held, that in the absence of express directions by the founder of an endowment, the right to nominate the manager reverts to the heirs of the founder on

**RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS ACT (XX OF 1863)—*conclld.*****s. 14—*conclld.***

failure of the persons expressly appointed. *Sheoratan Kunwari v. Ram Pargash*, I. L. R. 18 All. 227, approved. *CHANDRANATH CHAKRABARTI v. JADABENDRANATH CHAKRABARTI* (1906)

I. L. R. 28 All. 689

**2.** *Religious endowment, suit concerning—Person interested as worshipper can be added as party.* Persons interested as worshippers in a public religious institution may be added as parties to a suit instituted by a trustee on behalf of the institution against third parties, if such a joinder is considered by the Court as desirable in the interests of the trust. *Narayanasami Gurukkal v. Irulappa*, 12 M. L. J. 355, followed. *CHEDAMBARAM CHETTIYAR v. RANGACHARIYAR* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 106

**3.** *Court may, by decree, direct the appointment by a competent person of a new trustee in lieu of the one removed and order the trustee removed to surrender possession to the trustee so appointed—Trustee to be removed, when he keeps no proper accounts and makes false claims.* It is competent to the Court when in a suit brought under s. 14 of the Religious Endowments Act it directs the removal of a trustee, to order a person competent to appoint a new trustee to make such appointment and to direct the trustee removed to surrender possession of property and pay any damages decreed to the new trustee to be appointed. A trustee ought not to be detained in the trusteeship, when he does not keep proper accounts and misappropriates monies, and further makes false claims against the trust property. *MIYAJI v. AHMED SAHIB* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 212

**s. 18—Appeal—Order granting leave to sue—"Decree"—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 2.** No appeal lies from an order made by the District Judge under s. 18 of Act XX of 1863 granting leave to bring a suit for the purpose of having the accounts taken of a religious endowment. Such an order is not a "decree" within the meaning of s. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Kazem Ali v. Azim Ali Khan*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 382, referred to. *MOZAFFER ALI v. HEDAYET HOSAIN* (1907) . . . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 584

**RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS.**See **Act—1863—XX.**See **HINDU LAW—ENDOWMENT.**See **MAHOMEDAN LAW—ENDOWMENT.**See **RIGHT OF SUIT—CHARITIES.****RELIGIOUS PERSONS.**See **HINDU LAW—INHERITANCE—RELIGIOUS PERSONS.****RELIGIOUS PRIVILEGES.**See **CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE**, 1882, s. 11. I. L. R. 33 Bom. 278



**RELIGIOUS SOCIETY.**

See ACT XXI OF 1860, s. 20.

**RELIGIOUS TRUSTS.**

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—ENDOWMENT.  
I. L. R. 34 Calc. 118

**RELIGIOUS AND RITUAL OBSERVANCES, SUIT FOR.**

See JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURTS.  
I. L. R. 30 Mad. 15; 158

**RELINQUISHMENT.**

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—RELINQUISHMENT.

See RELINQUISHMENT BY HEIR.

See RELINQUISHMENT, DEED OF.

See RELINQUISHMENT OF CLAIM.

See RELINQUISHMENT OF, OR OMISSION  
TO SUE FOR, PORTION OF CLAIM.

**RELINQUISHMENT BY HEIR.**

1. Relinquishment in consideration of grant of maintenance. Where M executed on behalf of N a *ladawinamah*, or deed of disclaimer, disclaiming all right to an estate to which he was one of the heirs-at-law, upon consideration of receiving a monthly allowance for maintenance, and accepted a *perwannah* securing that allowance to himself and his heirs:—*Held*, that the *ladawinamah* and the *perwannah* amounted to a valid contract by which the parties were respectively bound; and that *ladawinamah* being founded on good consideration, was binding on the heirs, who could not set it aside except by returning the money which had been paid in advance on account of the maintenance allowance. OOMRAO BEGUM v. NAWAB NAZIM OF BENGAL. 24 W. R. P. C. 28

2. Relinquishment by mother of her interest in property—*Subsequent suit to recover estate as heiress of son.* A widow, being old, presented a petition in a suit by her daughter-in-law, as guardian of the former's infant son, relinquishing all her rights in the property to the daughter-in-law herself, and as guardian of the infant. The son died, and the mother now sued her daughter-in-law for possession as heiress of her son. *Held*, that by the petition the mother had transferred no rights to the daughter-in-law as proprietor, but that the mother, as heiress of her son, was entitled to the estate. UDEY KUNWAR v. LADU. 6 B. L. R. 283  
15 W. R. P. C. 16  
13 Moo. I. A. 585

Affirming the decision of the lower Court in LADO v. OODEY KOONWUR  
Agra F. B. 22: Ed. 1874, 17

**RELINQUISHMENT, DEED OF.**

See HINDU LAW—PARTITION—REQUISITES FOR PARTITION.  
I. L. R. 1 Mad. 312  
L. R. 5 I. A. 61

**RELINQUISHMENT, DEED OF—concl'd.**

See REGISTRATION ACT, s. 17.  
16 W. R. 56  
9 Bom. 246  
I. L. R. 20 Mad. 367

**RELINQUISHMENT OF CLAIM.**

See ADMISSION—ADMISSIONS IN STATEMENTS AND PLEADINGS.  
15 B. L. R. 10  
L. R. 2 I. A. 113  
I. L. R. 6 All. 395

See PLEADER—AUTHORITY TO BIND CLIENT. 3 B. L. R. Ap. 15  
12 W. R. 279

See RELINQUISHMENT OF, OR OMISSION  
TO SUE FOR, PORTION OF CLAIM.

See WAIVER.

*Reversioner—Release—Stamp.* The relinquishment of his claim by a reversioner is a release and must be stamped accordingly. KRISHNAJI NARAYAN v. BALKRISHNA VENKATESH (1909). I. L. R. 33 Bom. 657

**RELINQUISHMENT OF, OR OMISSION  
TO SUE FOR, PORTION OF CLAIM.**

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—MODE OF  
EXECUTION—MORTGAGE.  
I. L. R. 25 All. 79

See RIGHT OF SUIT—POSSESSION, SUITS  
FOR—CO-DEFENDANTS.

6 C. W. N. 314

1. Splitting cause of action—*Accidental or involuntary omission—Mistake—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* The words "if a plaintiff relinquish or omit to sue for any portion of his claim, a suit for the portion so relinquished or omitted shall not afterwards be entertained." in s. 7, Act VIII of 1859, plainly include accidental or involuntary omission, as well as acts of deliberate relinquishment. The correct test when a second suit is brought for something omitted to be sued for in a previous suit is whether the claim in the new suit is in fact founded on a cause of action distinct from that which was the foundation of the former suit. Where a suit was brought for a large amount of property, consisting partly of Government paper which it was alleged, had been fraudulently appropriated by the defendant and the plaintiff obtained a decree:—*Held* (reversing the decision of the High Court), that the plaintiff was precluded by s. 7 of Act VIII of 1859 from afterwards bringing a fresh suit on a piece of Government paper which might have been, but by mistake was not, included in the previous suit. BUZLOOR RUHEEM v. SHUM-SOONNISSA BEGUM. JUDONATH BOSE v. SHUM-SOONNISSA BEGUM. 8 W. R. P. C. 3  
11 Moo. I. A. 551

s.c. in High Court, SHAMSOONNISSA BEGUM v. BUZLUL ROHIM. Marsh. 286: 2 Hay 190

The suit was held to be barred on the test laid down in this case in SHIB KRISTO DAH v. ABDUOL SOBHAN CHOWDHRY. 15 W. R. 408



# RELINQUISHMENT OF, OR OMIS- SION TO SUE FOR, PORTION OF CLAIM—*contd.*

2. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7—Statement of intention not to relinquish.* The words of s. 7 of the Civil Procedure Code were imperative against the splitting of a claim into parts. The consequences of an infringement of that direction were not that the suit which does not include the whole claim shall for this reason be barred. The words "in bar of suit" referred to any subsequent suit brought for the portion of the claim omitted in the previous suit, and not to such previous suit itself. A plaintiff who omits to sue for a portion of his claim stating that he does not relinquish it, but means to sue again for it, can gain nothing by such a statement. Neither can such a statement furnish a reason for holding the first suit to be barred. *SOONDER BEBEE v. KHILLOO MULL alias RAM LALL* . . . . . **2 N. W. 90**

3. ————— *Suit for arrears of rent for successive years—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* S. 7, Act VIII of 1859, did not require a plaintiff having several distinct causes of action against one defendant to comprise them all in one suit subject to the hazard of forfeiting all those not included in the first suit. The object of the clause was only to provide against splitting a cause of action. *SUTTO CHURN GHOSAL v. OBHOY NUND DOSS* . . . . . **2 W. R., Act X, 31**

*DYARAM v. GOUREE SHUNKER* . . . . . **3 N. W. 20**

4. ————— *Negligent omission of part of claim—Obligation as to enforcing all available remedies.* The 7th section of the Civil Procedure Code, 1859, prohibits the splitting of a claim, but does not require that all remedies by suit on all the securities which a creditor may hold be enforced together. If a plaintiff, from negligence or other cause, omits to prefer a portion of his claim which seeks to charge the land, or, having preferred it, is content to accept an imperfect adjudication, or one which awards him only a portion of the relief claimed, he cannot afterwards bring forward in a fresh suit matter which might well have been then disposed of. *MULUK FUQUEER BUKSH v. LALLER MANOHUR DOSS* . . . . . **2 N. W. 29**

5. ————— *Fresh suit in respect of same subject-matter—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* A party is bound to bring forward his whole case in respect of the matter in litigation and open to him upon the points for decision in the suit. He cannot abstain from relying upon nor abandon a ground of claim which is in question and proper for consideration and decision in the suit and afterwards make it a cause of fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter. *UDAIYA TEVAR v. KATAMA NACHIYAR* . . . . . **2 Mad. 131**

6. ————— *Omission to include all grounds on which suit is based—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* A plaintiff is bound to include in his plaint all the grounds upon which his suit is based. A second suit upon a different ground which existed before the commencement of the first suit would not be alleged, as it would be split-

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ting the cause of action. *ABIRAM DOSS v. SRIRAM DOSS* . . . . . **3 B. L. R. A. C. 421; 12 W. R. 336**

*PREMANUND GOSSAMEE v. RAM CHURN DEB* . . . . . **20 W. R. 482**

7. ————— *Omission to sue for all rights under the same or similar titles—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* S. 7, Act VIII of 1859, required that, if all rights arising out of the same cause of action were not sued for together, the portion abandoned could not be separately sued for afterwards; but it did not enact a similar penalty for all rights under the same or similar titles, the right to sue for which may require different issues to be tried and may arise under different dates and different causes of action, and the defendants as to which different properties may be either only one party or different parties altogether. *MOTHOOR MOHUN MUNDUL v. KHEMUNKUREE DOSSEE* . . . . . **5 W. R. P. C. 182**

*See RAMHURRY MUNDUL v. MOTHOOR MOHUN MUNDUL* . . . . . **20 W. R. P. C. 450**

8. ————— *Omission to put forward case in full—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* A plaintiff suing for the recovery of land is bound to put forward his whole case at once, and cannot be allowed to maintain a second suit for the same cause of action, merely by alleging that the Collector's order sought to be set aside is of a different date and description from that which was sought to be set aside in the former suit. *LUCHMUN DOSS v. PRIAG DUTT* . . . . . **2 Agra 305**

9. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7—Title resting on different and distinct transactions.* The fact that a defendant's title rests upon different and distinct transactions, supported by distinct and separate evidence does not necessarily imply that to a party contesting their title, there are different causes of action warranting separate suits. *RAM SOONDUR SHAHA v. DELANEY* . . . . . **20 W. R. 103**

10. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7—Distinct causes of action.* S. 7 of Act VIII of 1859 applied, whether the omission to sue had been the result of knowledge and intention or not. The test as to whether a suit was barred by s. 7 of Act VIII of 1859 was whether the claim in the new suit was in fact founded on a cause of action distinct from that which was the foundation of the former suit. *BULWUNT SINGH v. CHITTAN SINGH* . . . . . **3 N. W. 27**

11. ————— *Omission to ask for particular relief—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7. Quære:* Whether a relinquishment or omission under s. 7, Act VIII of 1859, extended to cases of omission to ask for any particular description of relief which a plaintiff might intend to seek against the parties to the suit in respect of his cause of action. *SABEER KHAN v. KALLI DOSS DEY* . . . . . **1 W. R. 199**



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12. — *Suit by co-sharers some of whom have before sued—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* Held, by KEMP, J., that, where, as in this case, four suits are brought with the common object of setting aside the sale of a patni talukh by four joint tenants, two of whom are not estopped under s. 7, Act VIII of 1859, this Court cannot in equity declare the sale to be good or bad in part, but must decide as to whether the sale is to stand or fall for the whole talukh. *Per AINSLIE, J.*—But if one of the joint tenants in a former suit claimed a 2-anna instead of a 4-anna share, she cannot now be allowed to supplement her claim or take interests in the patni which she could not have enforced independently of the sale. *RAM CHURN BUNDOPADHYA v. DROPOMOYEE DOSSEE*

17 W. R. 122

13. — *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7—Application to file award.* The privilege given in Act VIII of 1859, s. 7, to a plaintiff in a suit to abandon the excess of a claim applies also to a case where the party comes in with an application to cause an arbitration award to be filed. *In the matter of the petition of GRISH CHUNDER CHOORAMONEE. GRISH CHUNDER CHOORAMONEE v. BROJONATH BHUTTACHARJEE*

20 W. R. 56

S. 7 of Act VIII of 1859 was held to be applicable to rent suits. *BHABOSOONDEREE v. BHUGWAN CHUNDER MOZOOMDAR*

W. R. 1864, Act X, 88

*PURBHOO TEWAREE v. RAMJEAWUN PATUCK*

1 N. W. 65: Ed. 1873, 119

14. — *Claims arising out of same cause of action—Simultaneous suits—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* Held, where two suits were instituted simultaneously, and one of such suits had been determined, that, assuming that the claims in such suits arose out of the same cause of action and should have been included in one suit, the provisions of s. 7 of Act VIII of 1859 were no bar to the entertainment of the second suit. *KALESHAR PARSHAD v. JAGAN NATH*

I. L. R. 1 All. 650

15. — *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 43, 58, 278, 280, and 283—Intervenor claiming attached property by two separate titles—Single order raising attachment—Two suits by judgment-creditors for declaration of their right to attach—Order of filing of suits.* A plaintiff's cause of action consists of every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove such fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved. *Read v. Brown, L. R. 22 Q. B. D. 128*, referred to. The plaintiffs, holding a simple money decree against two persons, *B R* and *M R*, attached in execution thereof (a) their judgment-debtors' mortgagee interest in a certain mortgage; and (b) a house said to belong to their judgment-debtors. Against this attachment one *M* filed objections under s. 278 of

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the Code of Civil Procedure, in consequence of which the property was released from attachment. The plaintiffs thereupon brought two suits under s. 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure, one in respect of the mortgagee interest and the other in respect of the house. Held by the Full Bench (*AIKMAN, J., dissentiente*), that the first essential of the plaintiffs' cause of action was the order made under s. 280 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that, until that order was made, they had no cause of action. The cause of action was the order under s. 280, which had been obtained by *M*, and the right and title of the plaintiffs to bring the subjects of attachment to sale in execution of their decree. The title or titles which the defendant might prove formed no part of the plaintiffs' cause of action, nor would the defendant's allegation of different titles in herself to different portions of the property split up the plaintiffs' cause of action into different and distinct causes of action. Similarly the fact that the plaintiffs' judgment-debtors held or were alleged to hold portions of the property under different titles would not split up the plaintiffs' cause of action into different causes of action. S. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure has nothing to do with the evidence which may be necessary or may be produced to support or defend a cause of action or with the desire of a plaintiff to bring more suit than one or with the devolution of title where the cause of action relates to land or other kind of property. In the above case consequently s. 43 of the Code barred the later of the plaintiffs' two suits. Held, also, that, where two suits are filed on the same day, it must be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that they were presented and admitted in the order in which their numbers appear in the register of civil suits prescribed by s. 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Kaleshar Prasad v. Jagan Nath, I. L. R. 1 All. 650; Appasami v. Ramasami, I. L. R. 9 Mad. 279; and Duncan Brothers & Co. v. Jeetmull Greedharee Lall, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 372*, referred to. *Zahur Husain v. Muhammad Haszin, All. Weekly Notes (1888) 147*, and *Muhammad Ibrahim Khan v. Habib-ullah Khan, All. Weekly Notes (1886) 113*, overruled. *Per AIKMAN, J.* Although it was the single order in the execution department which necessitated the plaintiffs' bringing their suits, the plaintiffs' real causes of action were the separate transactions entered into by the judgment-debtors with the objector under s. 278 of the Code, and they were therefore entitled to bring separate suits. *MURTI v. BHOLA RAM*

I. L. R. 16 All. 165

16. — *Simultaneous suits for balance of account after settlement—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43.* Upon a settlement of accounts between plaintiff and defendants, R3,985-6-9 was found due by the defendants, who agreed to pay the same. They gave to plaintiff an order on their agents to pay R2,500 from the profits of certain land, and promised to pay the balance within a month. Plaintiff filed two suits, one for



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R2,500 and the other for the balance of the debt. Defendants pleaded that both suits should be dismissed, as brought in contravention of the requirements of s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The lower Courts held that there were two distinct causes of action, and decreed both claims. *Held*, on second appeal, that plaintiff had only one cause of action, and that the decree in one of the suits must be reversed. **APPASAMI v. RAMASAMI**

**I. L. R. 9 Mad. 279**

17. ————— *Suit for receipt as security for advance—Suit for balance of account.* A sued B for recovery of a receipt which had been deposited by the former with the latter as security for a certain advance of money. *Held*, that he was not thereby debarred, under s. 7, Act VIII of 1859, from bringing a suit for the balance due on the whole account between them. **MEDHI ULLEE KHAN v. MAHOMED WAJID ULLEE**

**1 N. W. Part II, 10 : Ed. 1873, 70**

18. ————— *Suit for sum due in account book—Addition of claim for same sum due on hath-chitta—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 34.* Where a plaintiff originally sued for a certain sum upon his khatta books and an objection was taken by the defendant that he ought to have sued upon a certain hath-chitta, whereupon the plaintiff amended his plaint by suing for the amount admittedly due upon the hath-chitta, in addition to the amount he claimed upon his khatta books:—*Held*, that, when the plaintiff amended his plaint by suing upon the hath-chitta his causes of action, which, when the suit was originally framed, were distinct, became united; that there was no “relinquishment” in the original suit within the terms of Act VIII of 1859, s. 7 (with which s. 43, Act X of 1877, corresponds), and that the plaint was rightly amended. **RAM TARRUN KOONDOD v. HOSSEIN BUKSH**

**I. L. R. 3 Cal. 785**

**2 C. L. R. 385**

19. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Suit to cancel release, obtained by duress, of all claims against defendants, and to recover amount of one such claim no bar to subsequent suits upon other causes of action so released.* On the 1st July 1878 there was a settlement of accounts between the plaintiff and defendants, and a debt was acknowledged due by the latter to the former, and on the same day the plaintiff and defendants entered into a trading partnership which was carried on till August. On the 30th September the defendants extorted a release from the plaintiff whereby the plaintiff's claims against them arising out of the two transactions mentioned and all other transactions between them were released. On the 23rd November the plaintiff brought a suit against the defendants, and, in the plaint after stating the fact of the settlement of 1st July 1878, the balance found due therein to the plaintiff, the extortion of the release, and the misappropriation of the sums due to the plaintiff by the defendants as

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the cause of action, prayed for cancellation of the release and for recovery of the amount due to the plaintiff by the defendants under the settlement of 1st July 1878. *Held*, in a suit to wind up the partnership of July and August 1878, that the plaintiff was not bound by s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure to have included in his former suit his claim arising out of that partnership and that the former suit being in substance a suit upon the account stated on 1st July 1878, and not for damages for extorting the release, was no bar to the present suit. **SUBBAYYA v. VENKATESAPPA**

**I. L. R. 6 Mad. 49**

20. ————— *Accretion to land—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 9.* The plaintiff sued for a certain specified quantity of land as being between specified boundaries. On measurement, however, it was found there was more land within those boundaries than the plaintiff claimed. He obtained only a decree for what he claimed though he had claimed all the land up to the boundary (the river) on one side: the excess was deducted on that side. *Held*, reversing the decision of the High Court, that a subsequent suit in which he claimed land which had accreted to the excess portion which was not decreed to him in the former suit was not barred by s. 7, Act VIII of 1859. **PAHALWAN SINGH v. MAHESSUR BUKSH SINGH. MAHESSUR BUKSH SINGH v. MEGHBURN SINGH**

**9 B. L. R. 150 : 16 W. R. P. C. 5**

s.c. in High Court, **MEGBURN SINGH v. MOHESSUR BUKSH SINGH** . . . . . **5 W. R. 211**

21. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Breaches of one term in a contract, how sued upon—Cause of action—Contract.* *Per GARTH, C.J.*—A claim for the price of goods sold is a cause of action of a different nature from a claim for damages for non-acceptance of goods pursuant to a contract. Such claims, therefore, although arising under one and the same contract, may be sued upon separately, s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure notwithstanding. *Per WILSON, J.*—Where there is one contract for the purchase of goods and the purchaser takes some of the goods, but breaks his contract in part by not paying for the goods he takes, and in part by not taking and paying for the remainder, and both breaches occur before any suit is brought, the claim of the person suing is one arising out of one cause of action; and the whole claim must be included in one suit. **ANDERSON WRIGHT v. Co. v. KALAGARLA SURJINARAIN**

**I. L. R. 12 Calc. 339**

22. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Breaches of the same contract how sued upon—Contract.* Where a contract for the sale and purchase of goods is broken by the purchaser, in part by refusal to take delivery and in part by refusal to pay for goods delivered, both breaches having occurred before any suit is brought, the vendor is debarred by s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure from bringing two suits against such



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purchaser, his claim being one arising out of one cause of action and based on one and the same contract. The view taken by WILSON, J., in *Anderson, Wright & Co. v. Kalagarla Surjinarain*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 329, approved. PETHERAM, C.J.—“The whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action” in s. 43 means, in the above case, the entire claim which the plaintiff has against the defendant at the time the action is brought in respect of any failure or failures to accept and pay for goods purchased of him by the defendant under one contract, and the whole of such claim must be included in one action. PRINSEP, J.—The expression “cause of action” is to be construed with reference to the substance rather than the form of the action. The claim in both the above cases being for damages on account of breaches of the same contract, s. 43 read with the illustration debars the plaintiff from bringing two suits. *DUNCAN BROTHERS & Co. v. JEETMULL GREEDHAREE LALL* . . . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 372

23. ————— *Suit for demur-  
rage—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* In a suit for demurrage, the cause of action being the detention of a boat, plaintiff is bound to sue for the whole of the demurrage due; failing to claim a portion, he is barred by s. 7, Act VIII of 1859, from suing subsequently for such portion. *MUNGHROO MANJHEE v. GYARAM NUNDEE* . . . 14 W. R. 253

24. ————— *Civil Procedure  
Code, 1877, s. 43—Suit for damages for wrongful dismissal.* A suit having been brought in a Small Cause Court for damages laid at R400 for wrongful dismissal, a decree was given for R75 per mensem, the amount of wages which had been agreed on, up to the filing of the plaint, the Judge intimating that for damages accruing after the filing of the plaint further suits month by month might be brought. Two suits were accordingly brought for the two months next succeeding the date of the first suit, and decrees were obtained. The High Court upon an application made by the defendant, set aside these decrees on the ground that after the first suit no further suits could lie. *SIMPSON v. CLEGHORN* . . . 6 C. L. R. 91

25. ————— *Suit for damages  
—Subsequent suit against another wrong-doer for the same tort.* Where a plaintiff had sued for and obtained damages against one of several persons who had joined together in defaming his character. —Held (PEARSON, J., dissenting), that a similar suit by the plaintiff against another of such wrong-doers would not lie; and that the cause of action in both suits being identical, and satisfaction having been obtained in one, the other was barred by virtue of s. 7, Act VIII of 1859. *MADUD ALI KHAN v. SALEEM AHMED KHAN alias KUMMUN KHAN* . . . 4 N. W. 142

26. ————— *Civil Procedure  
Code, 1882, s. 43—Two successive suits for dam-*

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*ages for tort—Trespass on land—Conversion of moveables lying on land—Grounds of attack.* Defendants having forcibly taken possession of plaintiff's land upon which was (1) standing timber, and (2) logs of timber lying stored on the ground, plaintiff had, in a prior suit, recovered possession and damages. Subsequently to the institution of such prior suit, defendants (1) cut and removed certain standing trees, and (2) removed the logs which lay stored on the ground. Upon plaintiff bringing a second suit to recover damages on both grounds, objection was raised, (1) as to the standing timber, that plaintiff's remedy was under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, and (2) as to the logs, that a claim for their value might have been included in the former suit, since their conversion was effected when the plaintiff was dispossessed of the land upon which they lay, and that, under s. 43, no claim could now be made in respect of them. Held, (i) that the proceeds obtained from cutting and removing saleable timber on the land were in the nature of mesne profits, and these having been taken since the institution of the previous suit, plaintiff could recover; (ii) that a trespass on a piece of land is by itself no proof of any conversion of moveables lying upon the land at the time that the trespass takes place; that, notwithstanding plaintiff's eviction from the land, possession of the timber lying stored upon it should be presumed to have continued in him in the absence of proof of any act on the part of the defendant with special reference to such timber and showing unequivocally that the plaintiff was entirely deprived of the use of them; and that conversion of the logs was not effected by the trespass, but only by their removal subsequently to the institution of the previous suit; and (iii) that the causes of action now relied on were therefore different from those relied on before, and the previous suit did not operate as a bar to the present claim under s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. *MOYI v. AVUTHRAMAN*

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 197

27. ————— *Suit for dam-  
ages.* On the 27th Joist 1286 F.S. (2nd June 1879) the plaintiff brought a suit to recover damages for the breach of a contract on the part of the defendant for not having made over possession to him of certain leasehold properties, the damages claimed being for the profits accrued due for the year 1283 F.S. (1875-76). In this suit he obtained a decree. On the 21st Joist 1287 F.S. (14th June 1880) the plaintiff brought another suit against the defendant to recover damages for the profits accrued for the years 1284, 1285, and 1286 F. S. (1876-77 to 1878-79). Held, that the plaintiff should have included the damages for the years 1284 and 1285 (1876-77 and 1877-78) in his former suit, and that he was debarred by s. 43 of Act X of 1877 from including in his second suit any portion of his claim for damages which had accrued due at the time of the institution of his first suit, and for which he had omitted to sue; but that he was entitled to recover damages for the



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year 1286 (1878-79). *Taruck Chunder Mookerjee v. Panchu Mohini Debya*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 791, followed. *SHEO SUNKUR SAHOY v. HRIDHOY NARAIN*. I. L. R. 9 Calc. 143: 12 C. L. R. 34

*Held*, by the Privy Council on appeal, that the High Court had rightly decided that, in regard to Act X of 1877, s. 43, the plaintiff could not recover so much of the profits as had already accrued at the date of the institution of the prior suit, inasmuch as the claim in respect of such profits might have been included therein, *viz.*, the profits for the two years 1284 and 1285 F., which had expired when that suit was brought. *MADAN MOHAN LAL v. LALA SHEO-SANKER SAHAI*. I. L. R. 12 Calc. 482

28. ————— *Suit for value of cattle—Subsequent suit for damages for taking them away.* A person suing for the value of cattle illegally taken away should include in his plaint whatever claim he wishes to make in respect of damages caused to him by the defendant's wrongful act, and cannot afterwards maintain a new suit for any damages which he might have claimed in the former suit. *MOHUBUT MUNDUL v. SHOORENDRONATH ROY* 4 W. R. S. C. C. Ref. 20

29. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7—Suit for damages after suit for recovery of property.* A suit for damages for wrongful detention of property (in this case a cart and bullocks seized in execution of decree against another party) is barred under s. 7, Act VIII of 1859, after a decree in a former suit for the recovery or value of the same property. *PUNJU v. OODOY*

18 W. R. 337

30. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 13, 43—Damages.* In September 1886 the plaintiff sued in a Munsif's Court certain defendants for possession of one bigha of land, and for damages for the cutting and carrying of certain paddy from such land on the 23rd December 1885. This suit was dismissed on the ground that no dispossession had taken place, the plaintiff being referred to a Small Cause Court for his damages. No appeal was made against this decision. In March 1887 the plaintiff sued these defendants in the Munsif's Court for possession of 5 bighas 6 cottahs of land and for mesne profits, and obtained a decree for possession of 3 bighas 6 cottahs of land with mesne profits; possession of the 1 bigha, the subject of the suit of 1886, being included in the 3 bighas 6 cottahs decreed. He subsequently sued the same defendants in a Small Cause Court for damages for the paddy cut and carried on the 23rd December 1885. *Held*, that such suit was not barred by either s. 13 or s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. *MAHABEER SING v. RAMBHAJJAN SHA*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 545

31. ————— *Suit for mesne profits after setting aside sale for arrears of rent—Subsequent suit for rents wrongly collected.* At a sale for arrears of rent, A became the purchaser of a

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certain patni talukh. B, whose patni right had been sold, sued for and obtained a decree for reversal of the sale on the ground of irregularity. In the meantime A had committed default and the patni was again sold for arrears of rent. The zamindar drew out from the Collectorate the amount due to him. C, who had bought B's right, title, and interest in his decree, now sued A for recovery of the surplus proceeds of sale in the hands of the Collector, and obtained a decree. He afterwards sued A for mesne profits for the time during which he was in possession of the patni talukh. This was a suit by C against A for recovery of the amount drawn out by the zamindar, on the ground that, in consequence of A having collected the rents from the talukh, which were to go towards payment of the rent due to the zamindar, and having fraudulently withheld such payment, he had sustained damage to the extent of the amount taken by the zamindar. *Held*, that the suit was barred by s. 7, Act VIII of 1859. *TARINI PRASAD GHOSE v. KHUDUMANI DABI*

5 B. L. R. 184: 13 W. R. 261

*TARINI PRASAD GHOSE v. RAGHAB CHUNDRABANDHOPADHYA*

5 B. L. R. 187 note: 13 W. R. 205

32. ————— *Suit for refund of excess payment of rent—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* A recovered from B, under the terms of his lease, a refund of the excess of rent paid by him in respect of the years 1861, 1862, and 1863. While that suit was pending, B recovered from A rent at the same rate in respect of the three succeeding years. *Held*, that A was entitled to bring another suit against B for damages in respect of the excess of rent paid by him during the year subsequent to the institution of the prior suit. *NILMANI SINGH v. ANNUNDA PRASAD MOOKERJEE*

1 B. L. R. F. B. 97: 10 W. R. F. B. 41

33. ————— *Suits for mesne profits.* Mesne profits claimed for a period of dispossession are essentially damages, the ground upon which the plaintiff in any case is entitled to ask for them being the wrongful conduct of the defendants in dispossessing and keeping them out of possession; and every suit brought to recover mesne profits must, by Act VIII of 1859, s. 7, include the whole claim arising out of the cause of action which gives the ground for the claim. *ROOKMINEE KOER v. RAM TOHUL ROY*

21 W. R. 223

*RAM RUTTUN AUDO v. RAM CHUNDER PAL*

25 W. R. 113

34. ————— *Suit for mesne profits and possession—Subsequent suit for mesne profits.* The plaintiff brought a suit for possession of land with mesne profits. The suit was dismissed. He appealed on the question of possession only, and obtained a decree for possession without any mention of mesne profits, and in execution of the decree he obtained possession. *Held*, that a subsequent suit to recover mesne profits from the date of the decree for the period of six years next before the commencement of the suit exclusive of the period



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the plaintiff was in possession, was not barred by s. 7 of Act VIII of 1859. *PRATAP CHANDRA BURUA v. SWARNAMAYI. SWARNAMAYI v. PRATAP CHANDRA BURUA*

4 B. L. R. F. B. 113 : 13 W. R. F. B. 15

35. *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 7, 8, 9, 10—Cause of action, including whole claim arising out of—Mesne profits, suit for—Possession, suit for.* Under s. 7, read with ss. 8, 9, and 10 of Act VIII of 1859, a plaintiff suing for mesne profits of land is not precluded from afterwards maintaining a suit for possession of such land. *Pratap Chandra Burua v. Swarnamayi, 4 B. L. R. F. B. 113*, commented on. *MONOHAR LALL v. GOURI SUNKUR*. I. L. R. 9 Calc. 283 12 C. L. R. 434

36. *Civil Procedure Code, s. 43—Claim for mesne profits received prior to date of former suit for land.* Where a suit to recover land was brought, and no claim was made for mesne profits received prior to date of plaint:—*Held*, that s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure was a bar to a subsequent suit for such mesne profits. *VENKOB V. SUBBANNA*. I. L. R. 11 Mad. 151

37. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Suit for land and mesne profits after dismissal of suit for mesne profits of same land.* A leased certain land to B. The lease expired in 1877. B continued to hold over and refused to accept a fresh lease from A. A sued B in 1882 for mesne profits for three years, but did not claim possession of the land. The suit was dismissed on a preliminary point. A then sued B to recover possession of the land and mesne profits. It was argued that A's claim to the land was barred by s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, because he omitted to claim the land in the former suit for mesne profits. *Held*, that the suit was not barred. *TIRUPATI V. NARASIMHA*. I. L. R. 11 Mad. 210

38. *Civil Procedure Code, s. 43—Claims for possession and mesne profits—Distinct claims—Separate suits—Joinder of causes of action—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 44.* Claims for the recovery of possession of immoveable property and for mesne profits are distinct claims, and separate suits will lie in respect of each claim. S. 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure merely permits the joinder in one suit of a claim for recovery of immoveable property with one for mesne profits in regard to the same property. *Kishori Lal Roy v. Sharut Chunder Mozumdar, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 593 : 10 C. L. R. 359 ; Mon Mohun Sirkar v. Secretary of State for India, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 968 ; and Madan Mohun Lal v. Lala Sheosanker Sahai, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 482*, referred to. *Venkoba v. Subbanna, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 151*, dissented from. *LALESSOR BABUI V. JANKI BIBI*. I. L. R. 19 Calc. 615

39. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 43 and 44—Claim for possession and for mesne profits arising out of one cause of action*

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—*Suit for possession—Subsequent suit for mesne profits.* Where a plaintiff sued for possession of immoveable property upon a forfeiture, and for rent in respect of the said property up to the date of the alleged forfeiture, and having obtained a decree, subsequently brought a separate suit for mesne profits including the period from the date of the forfeiture to the date of the institution of the former suit:—*Held*, that the claim for mesne profits for the period abovementioned was barred by s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Lalji Mal v. Hulasi, I. L. R. 3 All. 660*, and *Venkoba v. Subbanna, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 151*, referred to. *MEWA KUTAR v. BANARSI PRASAD*. I. L. R. 17 All. 533

40. *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7—Suit for mesne profits.* The plaintiffs, having been dispossessed of a tank and of land on its banks, recovered possession by a suit under Act XIV of 1859, s. 15. The defendants then instituted a civil suit for determination of title, in which the plaintiffs were successful. The plaintiffs on the 22nd Cheyt 1277 (3rd April 1871) instituted a suit for the recovery of the value of fish taken by the defendants on the 27th Bysack 1276 (8th May 1869), the day of dispossession; but the suit was compromised. The plaintiffs now claimed mesne profits with reference to fish and grass appropriated by the defendants from 1st Bysack 1277 to 7th Bhadro 1278 (12th April 1870 to 22nd August 1871). *Held*, that the present claim for the period preceding 22nd Cheyt 1277 (the date of the former suit) was barred by Act VIII of 1859, s. 7; that the previous suit as well as the present were really suits for damages; and that the previous suit and compromise ought to have included all claims of the plaintiffs arising out of the dispossession. *SAEM SIRDAR v. KAMALUDDY SIRDAR*

22 W. R. 424

41. *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 43—Suit for mesne profits.* The plaintiffs sued the defendants for possession of the land upon which certain trees stood, and for such trees, stating that on the 19th June 1879 the defendants had interfered with their possession of such trees and had wrongfully taken the fruit thereof. The plaintiffs subsequently sued the defendants for the value of the fruit upon such trees, alleging that on the 19th June 1879, the defendants had wrongfully taken such fruit. *Held*, that, as the cause of action—i.e., the taking of such fruit—was in both suits identical, and the plaintiffs not having claimed the value of such fruit as mesne profits in the first suit, the second suit was barred by the provisions of s. 43 of Act X of 1877. *DEBI DIAL SINGH v. AJAIB SINGH*. I. L. R. 3 All. 543

42. *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7—Suit for possession—Subsequent suit for mesne profits.* S, the plaintiff's guardian, and D, the husband of M, one of the defendants in the suit, held a mouzah in equal shares. S sold the half share held by her to M; some portion of the mouzah being in the possession of the other defend-



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ants, *S* and *D* sued them to recover it and also for mesne profits, and obtained a decree. The defendants appealed, whereupon *S* filed a solehnamah. The decree was upheld, however, by the lower Appellate Court. In special appeal the Sudder Court refused to give the renouncing plaintiff any decree for mesne profits of a share. The plaintiff, who had then come of age, was not represented in the litigation in the Court. Shortly afterwards he sued *S* and *M* to set aside the sale to *M* and obtained a decree. On *D*'s death, *M* obtained possession of the land which had been the subject of the suit by *S* and *D*. The plaintiff now sued to recover a half share of the land sued for by *S* and *D*, and of the mesne profits recovered or recoverable by *M* under the decrees of the Sudder Court and the lower Courts, and to set aside the solehnamah. *Held*, that as to *M* the suit was not barred by s. 7, Act VIII of 1859. **RAMLOCHUN LALL v. GOORPERSHAD** . . . . . **5 N. W. 172**

**43.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 43—Suit for recovery of immoveable property—Mesne profits—Mortgage—Specific performance of contract—Compensation.* According to the terms of a mortgage, possession of the mortgaged property was to be delivered to the mortgagee, and he was to take the mesne profits. The mortgagor refused to deliver possession of the property and the mortgagee sued him to enforce specific performance of the contract to deliver possession, and obtained a decree. At the time this suit was brought, the mortgagee had been kept out of possession of the property for two years, during which time the mortgagor had taken the mesne profits. The mortgagee subsequently sued the mortgagor to recover the mesne profits of the mortgaged property for those two years. *Held*, that, as the mortgagee might in the former suit, in addition to seeking the specific performance of the mortgage-contract, have asked for such mesne profits by way of compensation for the breach of it; and as the claim for possession and mesne profits were in respect of the same cause of action,—viz., the breach of the contract to give possession,—the second suit was barred by the provisions of s. 43 of Act X of 1877. **LALJI MAL v. HULASI** . . . . . **I. L. R. 3 All 680**

**44.** ————— *Suit for declaration of title—Right to possession.* The fact that, at the time when the purchaser of certain lands sued, with a view of confirming his title to the land under his purchase, for a decree declaring such title, he was in a position to have sued for possession of the lands, was no bar under the provisions of s. 7, Act VIII of 1859, to his subsequently suing for possession of the same. **TULSI RAM v. GANGA RAM** . . . . . **I. L. R. 1 All. 252**

**45.** ————— *Right to possession—Suit for declaration of title—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* *D*, being able to sue for the possession of certain property, omitted to do so and sued

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in the first instance only for a declaration of her right to such property. The Court refusing to make any such declaration on the ground that she could sue for possession, *D* then sued for possession. *Held*, that the second suit was not barred by s. 7 of Act VIII of 1859. **DARBO v. KESHO RAI** . . . . . **I. L. R. 2 All. 356**

**46.** ————— *Suit for declaration of title—Subsequent suit for possession—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43.* When a suit for a declaration of title and confirmation of possession of certain land has been dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff was not in possession of the land at the time of instituting the suit, a subsequent suit on the same title to recover possession is not barred under s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. A cause of action consists of the circumstances and facts which are alleged by the plaintiff to exist, and which, if proved, will entitle him to the relief or to some part of the relief prayed for, and is to be sought for within the four corners of the plaint. **Jibunti Nath Khan v. Shib Nath Chuckerbutty**, **I. L. R. 8 Calc. 819**, followed. **NONOO SINGH MONDA v. ANAND SINGH MONDA** . . . . . **I. L. R. 12 Calc. 291**

**47.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 43—Splitting remedies—Suit for declaration of title and for possession—Subsequent suit for possession.* Where a previous suit for a declaration of title and confirmation of possession of certain land has been dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff was not in possession at the time of filing the suit, a subsequent suit on the same title for recovery of possession of the land is not barred under s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure. **Buzloor Roheem v. Shumsoonnissa Begum**, **11 Moo. I. A. 551**, discussed. **JIBUNTI NATH KHAN v. SHIB NATH CHUCKERBUTTY** . . . . . **I. L. R. 8 Calc. 819; 10 C. L. R. 537**

**KOMOLA KAMINY DEBIA v. LOKE NATH KUR** . . . . . **I. L. R. 8 Calc. 825 note; 11 C. L. R. 183**

**48.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 43—Splitting remedies—Suit for declaration of title and for possession—Subsequent suit for possession.* Where a previous suit for a declaration of title to immoveable property has been dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff was not in possession at the time of filing the suit, a subsequent suit on the same title for recovery of possession of the land is not barred under s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure. **Jibunti Nath Khan v. Shib Nath Chuckerbutty**, **I. L. R. 8 Calc. 819**, followed. **MOHAN LAL v. BILASO** . . . . . **I. L. R. 14 All. 512**

**49.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.—Suit for declaration of right to share—Suit for share.* A former suit brought by the daughter of one of four brothers of a joint Hindu family against her uncles for a declaration of her



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right to a share in certain bond-debts due to the joint estate (in which suit she obtained a decree is not identical, under s. 2 or 7, Act VIII of 1859, with a subsequent action brought by the same plaintiff against the same defendants for a distinct share in certain moneys which the defendants had since realized upon the bond-debts and had appropriated to themselves, a fresh cause of action accruing to the plaintiff from the time of such appropriation. *BURODA SOONDUREE DOOSEE v. RAJ BULLOB SEN* . . . . . 18 W. R. 202

50. *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 43—Suit for declaration of right—Subsequent suit for possession.* In December 1878 *H*, a Hindu widow, in possession by way of maintenance of a certain estate of which *R* owned one-third and *P*, *B* and *S* one-third jointly, made a gift thereof to *N*. *H* died in January 1879. In February 1879, *R*, *P*, *B*, and *S* joined in suing *N* for a declaration of their proprietary right in two-thirds of the estates and to have the deed of gift set aside. The Court treated the suits as one for a mere declaration of right, and dismissed it with reference to s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, on the ground that the plaintiffs had omitted to sue for possession, although they were able to sue for it. In November 1879 *R*, *P*, *B*, and *S* again joined in suing *N*, claiming possession of two-thirds of the estate, and to have the deed of gift set aside. *Per* STUART, C.J., and STRAIGHT and OLDFIELD, JJ., that the causes of action in the two suits being different, the second suit was not barred by the provisions of s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Per* TYRRELL, J., that the plaintiffs being entitled to only one remedy in the former suit, the provisions of s. 43 were not applicable to the second suit. *RAM SEWAK SINGH v. NAKCHED SINGH* . . . . . I. L. R. 4 All. 261

51. *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 7 and 15—Declaratory decree—Subsequent suit for consequential relief—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 43.* The plaintiffs brought a suit to have themselves declared entitled to an account, and obtained such a declaratory decree without asking for or obtaining any consequential relief. The defendants took no steps to render an account, and the plaintiffs brought another suit against them "for the amount of such Company's papers and other debts that might be found due by the defendants on an adjustment of accounts." *Held*, that the plaintiffs were not barred from bringing such a suit, s. 15 of Act VIII of 1859 being intended to modify the provisions of s. 7 of the same Act. *Tulsi Ram v. Gunga Ram*, I. L. R. 1 All. 252, followed and approved. *KALIDHUN CHUTTAPADHYA v. SHIBA NATH CHUTTAPADHYA* . . . . . I. L. R. 8 Calc. 483: 11 C. L. R. 57

52. *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7—Declaratory decree—Suit for possession of immovable property—Relinquish-*

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*ment of part of claim—Act VIII of 1859, s. 15—“Relief.”* In 1868 *B* made, it was alleged, a gift of a zamindari estate to *K*. In 1869 *B* died, and *K*'s name was recorded in the revenue registers in the place of *B*'s name in respect of the estate. In 1870 *K* died and her daughter *S* applied to have her name recorded in the revenue registers in respect of the estate. *M*, the illegitimate son of *B*, objected, claiming to have his name recorded. His objection having been disallowed and *S*'s name having been recorded, *M*, in 1876, sued *S* for a declaration of his proprietary right to the estate, and on the 29th June 1878 obtained such declaration. In January 1880 *M* sold a moiety of the estate and in December 1880 *S* sold the entire estate. In February 1881 *M*'s transferees sued *S* and her transferee for possession of the moiety of the estate transferred to them by *M*. *Held* by the Full Bench (STUART, C.J., dissenting), that such suit was not barred by the provisions of s. 7 of Act VIII of 1859 by reason that *M* had omitted to claim in the suit of 1876 possession of the estate. *Darbo v. Kesho Rai*, I. L. R. 2 All. 356, and *Kalidhun Chatturpadhya v. Shibo Nath Chatturpadhya*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 483, followed. *Held* by STUART, C.J., that such suit was barred by the provisions of s. 7 of Act VIII of 1859 by reason of such omission. *Darbo v. Kesho Rai*, I. L. R. 2 All. 356, distinguished. The meaning of the term "relief" explained, and the distinction between it and the term "cause of action" pointed out. *SARSUTI v. KUNJ BEHARI LAL* . . . . . I. L. R. 5 All. 345

53. *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7—Fraud—Cause of action.* *S*, as one of the heirs of his brother *M*, sued the sons of *M*, the other heirs of *M*, for, amongst other things, a declaration of his right to share in the rights and interest of *M* as the mortgagee under a deed of mortgage, which he valued at the principal sum advanced under the mortgage, viz., Rs. 600,—stating his cause of action to be obstruction caused by the sons of *M* to his sharing in *M*'s estate. He obtained a decree declaring his title to the share claimed. *L*, one of the sons of *M*, had fraudulently concealed from and kept *S* in ignorance of the fact that previously to the suit he had realized Rs. 624 under the mortgage. On this fact coming to *S*'s knowledge, he sued the sons of *M* to recover his share of that sum. *Held*, that the second suit was not barred by s. 7 of Act VIII of 1859. *Bulwant Singh v. Chittan Singh*, 3 N. W. 27, followed and observed upon. *LACHMAN SINGH v. SANWAL SINGH* . . . . . I. L. R. 1 All. 543

54. *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7—Separate causes of action.* S. 7 of Act VIII of 1859 required that every suit should include the whole of the claim arising out of the cause of action, meaning the whole of the claim arising out of the cause of action upon which the suit was brought, not that every suit should include every cause of action or every claim which the plaintiff had against the defendant. Accordingly



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where a plaintiff had sued to obtain his share of an estate in land, in consequence of having been wrongfully dispossessed by the defendant, whom he afterwards in the present suit sued for his share of personal property, being entitled to both under a will, it was held that the subsequent suit was not barred by reason of the non-claim in the prior one. The claim in respect of the personalty had not arisen out of the cause of action which existed in consequence of the wrongful dispossession; the case was not like one of the conversion of several things; and the causes of action were distinct. *Buzdur Ruheem v. Shamsunnissa Begum*, 11 Moo. 1. A. 551, referred to. **PITTAPUR RAJA v. SURIYA RAAU** . . . **I. L. R. 8 Mad. 520**

**S.C. RAJAH OF PITTAPUR v. VENKATA MAHIPTI SURYA** . . . **L. R. 12 I. A. 116**

**55.** . . . *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Mahomedan law—Succession of a Mahomedan widow by local custom to a life-interest in the estate of her husband—Cause of action in her suit for dower distinguished from that in her suit for such estate.* A decree in a suit brought by a Mahomedan widow against the brother of her deceased husband, declaring her right to possess for life the estate of the latter in accordance with a proved local custom with an order for possession, was affirmed. A decree in a suit previously brought by the widow against the same defendant for her dower gave no occasion for the application of s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code, having been made upon a cause of action distinct from that on which the present suit was founded. *Raja of Pittapur v. Venkata Mahipati Surya*, 1. L. R. 8 Mad. 520; **L. R. 12 I. A. 119**, referred to and followed. **MAHOMED RIASAT ALI v. HASIN BANU**

**I. L. R. 21 Calc. 157**  
**L. R. 20 I. A. 155**

**56.** . . . *Suit for property by person having a right in two capacities.* J had a right to share in a certain estate, as an heir to her father, and also as an heir to her brother. She transferred such right by sale to H. H sued S, who had acquired the whole estate by purchase at sales in execution of decrees against the other heirs of J's brother, for J's share as one of her brother's heirs in such estate, and obtained a decree. H then sued S for J's share as one of her father's heirs in such estate. *Held*, that H was debarred from bringing the second suit by the provisions of s. 43 of Act X of 1877. **SHAFKATUNISSA v. SHIB SAHAI** . . . **I. L. R. 4 All. 171**

**57.** . . . *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7—Different causes of action—Suit for possession of land—Subsequent suit for trees.* In 1869 P brought a suit against his grandmother K and another person for possession of a piece of land which P alleged had descended to him from his grandfather. In 1870 P sued the said K and one E for some trees which he also claimed by right of inheritance from his grandfather. *Held*, that the

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causes of action in the two suits by P were different, viz., unlawful alienations by K of the respective properties, the subject-matter of the different suits. S. 7, Civil Procedure Code, requires that every suit should include the whole of the claim arising from the same cause of action; but although the Civil Procedure Code allows of claims arising from different causes of action being included in the same plaint there is no provision of law which makes it obligatory on the plaintiff to do so. **PRAGJI RUDARJI v. ENDARJI BHIMBHAI** . . . **9 Bom. 257**

**58.** . . . *Separate suits for property acquired under one sale-deed—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 42, 43.* R purchased two houses under the same sale-deed. Four years afterwards he sued for possession of one of the houses, alleging that he had been dispossessed by the ancestor of the defendant. Subsequently he sued the same defendant for possession of the other, alleging that, at the time when he instituted the former suit he had already been dispossessed of the house now in question, and by the same person. *Held*, that, although the plaintiff's title to both houses rested on the title acquired by him under one and the same sale deed, yet the cause of action, viz., his ouster from the two houses on different occasions—gave rise to two separate causes of action, which he was not bound to join in the former suit, there being nothing in the Civil Procedure Code to compel him to do so. *Jardine, Skinner & Co. v. Shama Soonduree Debia*, 13 W. R. 196, and *Ram Sunder Saha v. Delanney*, 20 W. R. 103, referred to. **RIAYATULLAH KHAN v. NASIR KHAN** . . . **I. L. R. 6 All. 616**

**59.** . . . *Suit by heir after suit by his father for same cause of action.* A suit by an heir on the same cause of action on which a suit was previously brought by his father, and for property which, though different, might have been included in that suit, is barred by s. 7, Act VIII of 1859. **SOORUJ PERSHAD TEWARY v. SAHEB LALL TEWARY** . . . **3 W. R. 25**

**60.** . . . *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Relinquishment by guardian of minor of part of claim—Subsequent suit for part relinquished.* While plaintiff was a minor, his guardian had sued for and obtained a decree for arrears of shrotriem in respect of Faslis 1290 and 1291. Having attained his majority, plaintiff now sued for similar arrears alleged to be due in respect of the previous Faslis 1287, 1288, and 1289, contending that the relinquishment of a portion of a claim in a suit by a guardian could not preclude a suit for the portion relinquished from being subsequently brought, on the attainment of his majority, by the person on whose behalf the guardian had acted. *Held*, that it cannot be said that s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no application to a suit in which the plaintiff is a minor. The acts of a guardian in the conduct of a suit must be upheld unless it be shown that they were unreasonable or improper. **GOPAL RAO v. NARASINGA RAO** . . . **I. L. R. 22 Mad. 309**



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**61.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7—Suits for property purchased at different times.* A former suit for a share of property purchased in the name of G, one of the members of a joint family which claimed it to be joint property does not bar the plaintiff from suing for other of the family property which was brought in the name of M, another of the members, at another time, the latter claim being no part of the claim arising out of the cause of action in respect of the property first mentioned so as to come within the meaning of Act VIII of 1859, s. 7. *RAMHURRY MONDUL v. MOTHOR MOHUN MONDUL*. 20 W. R. P. C. 450

**62.** *Suit for share of property not included in former suit because the permission of Government was necessary to sue.* The plaintiff brought a suit in 1860 against the defendants to recover his share in the joint family property. The present claim which was for a share in the rents of certain inam lands, also joint family property, was not included in the suit of 1860. At the date of the former suit the land in respect to which the present suit was brought was subject to the provisions of Regulation IV of 1831, and the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction to try the suit in respect to such land without the permission of the Government. It did not appear that the plaintiff had applied to the Government for permission to sue. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not precluded by s. 7 of the Civil Procedure Code from maintaining the present suit. Meaning of the words "cause of action" discussed. *PATTARAVY MUDALI v. AUDIMULA MUDALI*. 5 Mad. 419

**63.** *Separate claims in same right—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* Where the plaintiff claimed by right of inheritance for partition of one out of a number of villages left by his ancestor, and the lower Court dismissed the claim as untenable under s. 7, Act VIII of 1859:—*Held*, that that section, though it might operate as a bar to any future claim by plaintiff for partition of the remaining villages by right of inheritance, could not be held to bar the present claim. *CHOE SINGH v. BAHADOOR SINGH*. 1 Agra 55

**64.** *Suits for property possessed under different rights—Distinct causes of action.* Where a lessee in one case, after resuming certain rent-free lands on behalf of his landlord, retained them in his own possession, and, in another case, retained portions of land which he had obtained by way of lease:—*Held*, that, though the lessor's title to recover was the same, the causes of action were entirely distinct. *DOORGA ROY NATH CHOWDHRY v. ROY KALEE NARAIN ROY*. 24 W. R. 212

**65.** *Suits by heir to cancel alienations made at various times.* A widow of a deceased Mahomedan alienated her husband's property by two deeds to different persons at different times. A suit was brought by the heirs of the deceased, first to set aside the second alienation, and then a second suit to cancel the first alienation.

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*Held*, that s. 7, Act VIII of 1859, did not bar the second suit. The heir's cause of action against different alienees, who have acquired possession under alienations made at different times and under different circumstances, was not one and the same, the question of right of succession to the deceased and widow's competency to alienate arising equally in both the cases notwithstanding. It was not obligatory on the heirs to make all the alienees parties to the first suit upon pain of forfeiting all future right of suit against them by reason of such omission. *JEHAN BEBEE v. SAIVUK RAM*

1 Agra F. B. 109 : Ed. 1874, 82

**66.** *Suit to set aside alienations of portions of estate.* A Hindu, whose share in an ancestral estate had been alienated by a co-proprietor, instituted simultaneously three different actions against the co-proprietor, and the persons to whom the alienations had respectively been made, to recover several distinct parcels of land which constituted his share. *Held*, that, as the plaintiff had but one single cause of action against the co-proprietor, he ought to have brought but one suit against him, and either included all the alienees in this suit or brought separate actions against the alienees for the several pieces of land in their possession, and caused the proceedings in these suits to be stayed till the suit against the co-proprietor was determined. The course of procedure last indicated is the more correct course. *VITHU v. NARAYAN DABHULKAR*. 5 Bom. A. C. 30

**67.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 43—Act VIII of 1859, s. 7.—Suit for partition of portion of property.* If a person intentionally omit to sue for any portion of his claim, the provisions of s. 43 of Act X of 1877, as well as the provisions of s. 7 of Act VIII of 1859, bar the institution of a second suit for the portion so omitted, so that, where a family property consisted of lands as well as debts, and the plaintiff at first sued for a partition of debts only, and then compromised and withdrew the suit without the permission of the Court, it was *held* that his second suit to demand a partition of the whole property was not maintainable. *UKHA v. DAGA*. I. L. R. 7 Bom. 182

**68.** *Different cause of action—Suit for share of undivided property—Subsequent suit for partition of whole of the property.* In applying the provisions of s. 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, the first thing to be considered is whether the cause of action in the second suit is the same as the cause of action in the first. If the cause of action be the same, the second suit is barred in respect of any portion of the claim omitted from the first suit, but not otherwise. Accordingly where the plaintiff as a member of an undivided Hindu family, sued for a share of a particular portion of the family property leaving the rest undivided, and his suit was rejected, as it had not been brought for his whole share, it was *held* that the suit was no bar to a second suit to



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have the whole property divided, as the causes of action in the two suits were entirely distinct. **KAKAJI BIN RANOJI v. BAPUJI BIN MADHAVRAY**

**8 Bom. A. C. 205**

**69.** ————— *Suit for partition between co-owners—Former suits for partition of parts of property—Different causes of action.* The plaintiff was the Zamorin of Calicut, and he sued in 1887 for a moiety of certain property in Malabar alleged to belong in equal undivided shares to his stanom and that of the defendant and to be in the occupation of tenants. The cause of action was stated to have arisen in 1881 when partition was demanded by the Zamorin and refused by the defendant. In some instances the tenants in occupation represented the family, a member of which was at one time admitted by the Zamorin under a demise or kanom, and had attorned to the defendant; in other instances they were shown to have been admitted by the defendant on paying off the former tenant who had been admitted by the Zamorin. It appeared that the Zamorin had previously brought suits and obtained decrees for partition of certain parcels of land as belonging equally to the two stanoms, the defendant in each suit being the present defendant and the tenant in occupation of the land then in question. And on these facts a defence was raised under the Civil Procedure Code, s. 43. *Held*, that the suit was not barred by s. 43 by reason of the previous suits. **ITTAPPAN v. MANAVIKRAMA** . . . **I. L. R. 21 Mad. 153**

**70.** ————— *Suit for partition of family property—Second suit for partition of property held jointly by family and others—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 13 and 43.* A suit brought by some members of a family against the other members of the same family for partition of the joint family property does not preclude a second suit by the same plaintiffs for partition of other property belonging jointly to their family and strangers. **PURUSHOTTAM v. ATMARAM JANARDAN** . . . **I. L. R. 23 Bom. 597**

**71.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7—Suit for partition omitting mortgaged lands—Subsequent suit for share of mortgaged lands.* The plaintiffs in 1863 sued the defendants for the plaintiffs' share in certain undivided family property, and did not include in their claim certain lands then in the possession of mortgages which lands had been mortgaged by one of the defendants as manager of the family. The defendants subsequently redeemed the mortgaged lands. The plaintiffs then filed a suit to recover their share of the lands so redeemed. *Held*, that they were entitled to maintain such suit, as the mortgaged lands had not been available for an actual partition at the time of the former suit. **BALKRISHNA VITHAL v. HARI SHANKAR** . . . **8 Bom. A. C. 64**

**72.** ————— *Omission of mortgaged field in suit for partition—Subsequent suit.* In 1861 the plaintiff brought a general partition

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suit (No. 1363) to recover his share of the family property in the possession of the first defendants, and did not include in that claim a field then in the possession of a mortgagee. The field was subsequently redeemed by the first defendant, who again mortgaged it to the second defendant. The plaintiff then filed the present suit to recover his share in the field. The first Court allowed the plaintiff's claim, but the District Judge on appeal threw it out, on the ground that it was barred both by s. 7 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1859, and by the "law of limitation." The Judge based the latter finding on certain allegations made by the plaintiff in suit No. 1363, and in another suit brought by him against the first defendant and the then mortgagee of the field, from which allegations the Judge inferred a separation between the plaintiff and the first defendant. *Held*, in special appeal, that the claim was not barred by s. 7 of the Civil Procedure Code, because the mortgaged field was not available for an actual partition at the time of the former suit No. 1363 of 1861. The true question for consideration in cases of this kind is whether the former suit was one in which the plaintiff might have recovered precisely that which he seeks to recover in the second, and where the former suit is one for an actual division of property, the plaintiff is not bound in it to ask for a declaration defining his right in property not then capable of division. **Balkrishna Vithal v. Hari Shankar**, **8 Bom. A. C. 64**, followed. **NARAIN BABAJI DABHOLKAR v. PANDURANG RAMCHANDRA DABHOLKAR** . **12 Bom. 148**

*See KRISTAYYA v. NARASIMHAM*

**I. L. R. 23 Mad. 608**

**73.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 43—Declaration of title to continue to enjoy separate possession of land—Suit for partition.* The plaintiffs, having obtained a declaration of title to continue to enjoy separate possession of certain lands, sued the former defendants again for partition of the same lands. *Held*, that the suit was unnecessary, and should be dismissed. *Per Curiam*. —The claim and the remedy mentioned in s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure have reference to the cause of action litigated in the previous suit. **ANGI v. THATHA** . . . **I. L. R. 10 Mad. 347**

**74.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Relinquishment of part of claim—Suit for maintenance and suit for a share of the inheritance, distinguished—Cause of action—Election, Doctrine of—Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 172, excep.* A testator bequeathed all his property to his nephew, in which he included the share of his brother's widow in the ancestral property, but at the same time made a suitable provision for her maintenance and worship. The widow at first sued for and obtained the allowance allotted to her under the will, and afterwards brought a suit for a share in the ancestral property. *Held*, that, although having regard to the doctrine of election (Succession Act, s. 172) the widow was precluded from again bringing a suit for a share of the ancestral property,



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it could not be said that the suit was barred under the provisions of s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, inasmuch as the two claims were distinct, and indeed inconsistent, and did not arise out of the same cause of action. **PRAMADA DAS v. LAKHI NARAIN MITTER** . . . **I. L. R. 12 Calc. 60**

**75.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 43—Suit to charge maintenance on land after suit for maintenance.* The plaintiff, having obtained a decree against the defendants for the payment to her of a monthly sum for her maintenance, subsequently sued to have it constituted a charge on certain land. *Held*, that the claim in both suits arose out of the same cause of action, and therefore the plaintiff was precluded by s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure from asserting in the second suit the claim which she might have asserted in the first. **RANGAMMA v. VOHALAYYA**

**I. L. R. 11 Mad. 127**

**76.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 43—Maintenance—Suit to declare maintenance fixed by a decree a charge on land.* A Hindu woman, having obtained a decree for maintenance against her husband, now alleged that he had alienated part of his property with a view to defeat her claim for maintenance, and sued him for a declaration that certain land which he had not alienated was liable for her maintenance. *Held*, that no cause of action was shown, but if there were one, it was barred by s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. **SAMINATHA v. RANGATHAMMAL** . **I. L. R. 12 Mad. 285**

**77.** ————— *Suits to recover money misappropriated by manager of joint estate—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* In a suit by members of a Hindu family which had become separate in 1862, to recover certain moneys said to have been misappropriated by the defendant while manager of the joint estate, it appeared that the plaintiffs had previously sued him since the separation to recover certain other moneys belonging to the said joint estate, also said to have been misappropriated by him while manager, and obtained a decree. *Held*, that the present claim should have been included in the former suit; and whether the omission was by mistake or not, it must be taken to have been relinquished, and under s. 7 of Act VIII of 1859 could not now be entertained. **GANESH CHANDRA CHOWDHRY v. RAM COOMAR CHOWDHRY**

**3 B. L. R. A. C. 265**

**S.C. RADHA KISHORE DEBIA v. RAM COOMAR CHOWDHRY** . . . **12 W. R. 79**

**78.** ————— *Suit to recover money misappropriated by agent.* In a suit to recover certain sums of money misappropriated by defendant as plaintiff's general agent, where a similar suit had been brought against the same party upon a like allegation as to other sums of money:—*Held*, that all the acts of misappropriation, having occurred before plaintiff called upon defendant to render an account, constituted a claim arising out of

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one and the same cause of action. **MONOHUR DAS v. SEETUL PERSHAD** . . . **23 W. R. 418**

**79.** ————— *Relinquishment of lands in another talukh—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* Where, in a former suit to set aside the sale of a tenure, the plaintiff in specifying the lands subject to that tenure excluded a portion of the lands once included therein as having been by a survey award included in the adjacent talukh:—*Held* that the exclusion of such land from the former suit was not a relinquishment within the meaning of s. 7, Act VIII of 1859, so as to affect the right of the plaintiff to maintain a suit for the land so excluded. **PROSUNNO CHUNDER BANERJEE v. KALLY PERSAD GHOSE** . . . **W. R. 1864, 134**

**80.** ————— *Estates in different districts—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* The plaintiff claimed two estates as belonging to her deceased husband from which she alleged she was dispossessed by the principal defendant and others claiming under her. The estates were situated in different districts, A and B. She obtained a decree for possession of the estate in A. In a subsequent suit for the estate in B she alleged a different act of dispossession, but the defendants were the same. *Held*, that the cause of action in both suits was the same, and that, as she could have proceeded under s. 12 of the Code, and brought one suit for both estates in either A or B, the suit was barred by s. 7 of the Code. **JUMOONA DASSEE CHOWDHRAÑEE v. BAMASOONDEREE DASSEE CHOWDHRAÑEE**

**2 W. R. 149**

**81.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 43—Suit on mortgage of property in different districts—Former suit on one portion only.* A, B, C, and D were the proprietors of a 2 annas 13 gundas share in mouzah E, and also of a 2 annas 13 gundas share in mouzah F, both in the district of Bhagulpore. On the 19th September 1872 A mortgaged a 1 anna 4 pies share of E to H. On the 20th September 1872 A, B, C, and D mortgaged their shares in E and F, together with property in the district of Tirhoot, to the plaintiff. On the 24th March 1873 A mortgaged his share in E and F to J. On the 13th November 1874 A and B mortgaged their shares in E to K. On the 25th March 1874 J obtained a decree on his mortgage, and the interest of A and B were purchased on the 5th January 1875 by L. On the 17th April 1874 M, to whom the first mortgage had been assigned, obtained a decree and attached the property mortgaged. L objected that he had already purchased the interest of A, and, on the objection being allowed, M instituted a suit against L for a declaration of priority and obtained a decree on the 9th August 1876. In execution of this decree, the property first mortgaged was sold on the 4th March 1878, and after satisfying the mortgage a surplus of R7,664 remained. After the institution of the first suit and before L's purchase, the plaintiff instituted a suit upon his mortgage in the Tirhoot Court without having obtained leave to include that portion of



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the mortgaged property situate in the Bhagulpur district. On the 17th July 1874 a decree was made in this suit. On the 17th January 1877 *K* obtained a decree on his mortgage, and the shares of *A* and *B* in *F* were sold, and purchased on the 3rd September 1877 by *N*. The plaintiff had his decree transferred for execution to the Bhagulpur Court, and he attached the surplus sale-proceeds and a 1 anna 9 gundas share in *E*. This attachment was withdrawn on the objection of *L*, who drew out the surplus sale-proceeds. The share purchased by *N* was also released from attachment. The plaintiff now sued *L*, *N*, and the mortgagors for a declaration that his decree of the 17th July 1874 affected the *E* property, to recover the surplus sale-proceeds from *L* and, in case the decree should not be valid to the extent mentioned, for a decree declaring his prior lien on the property in *E*. *Held*, that the cause of action had been split. *Grish Chunder Mookerjee v. Ramessoree Debia*, 22 W. R. 308, and *Kurun Singh v. Mahomed Fyaz Ali Khan*, 10 B. L. R. 1, followed. *BUNGSEE SINGH v. SOODIST LALL*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 739 : 10 C. L. R. 263

**82.** ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7—Multifariousness.* S. 7 of Act VIII of 1859 does not bar a suit for a declaration that property in the defendant's possession in subject to the mortgagee's lien, on the ground that such property was part of the property mortgaged, and was not included in a previous suit against other parties for other portions of the property. *In the matter of the petition of HURRY MOHUN PARAMANICK*

14 B. L. R. 418 note : 15 W. R. 486

**83.** ———— *Suit to set aside mortgage by Hindu widow—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* A Hindu widow executed deeds of gift in which her late husband's mother, the nearest reversioner, concurred. After the death of the widow, but in the lifetime of the mother, the next presumable reversioner sued to set aside the deeds and for possession. Such suit was held to be no bar to a second suit by the same plaintiff to set aside a mortgage by the widow and the mother of the deceased of a portion of the property which was the subject of the first suit, although in that suit the property was described as subject to the mortgage, and the name of the mortgagee was mentioned. The true test of the application of s. 7 of Act VIII of 1859 is, whether there has been a splitting of the cause of action. *GOLAB SINGH v. KURN SINGH. KURUN SINGH v. MAHOMED FYAZ ALI KHAN*

10 B. L. R. P. C. 1

14 Moo. I. A. 176 ; 187

**84.** ———— *Suit for declaration of lien—Surplus sale-proceeds—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* A mortgagee brought a suit against the mortgagor to have a declaration of his lien over the mortgaged properties, and obtained a decree. He afterwards brought another suit against certain attaching creditors for his mortgage

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to have a declaration of his lien over certain surplus moneys in the hands of the Collector, who, previously to the institution of the first suit, had sold certain of the mortgaged properties free of all incumbrances for arrears of Government revenue. *Held*, that the second suit was not barred under Act VIII of 1859, s. 7. *KRISTODASS KUNDU v. RAMKANT ROY CHOWDHRY*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 142 : 7 C. L. R. 396

**85.** ———— *Suit for redemption—Omission of claim for improvements and accretions—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* A suit for redemption of land, without specification of details, includes a claim for restoration of all accretions and improvements which it may have received while in the hands of the mortgagee; and if the Court omits to adjudicate upon part of the claim, the mortgagor is not precluded, by s. 7 of Act VIII of 1859, from bringing a second suit in respect of that part. *BAKSHIRAM GANGARAM v. DABHU TUKARAM*

10 Bom. 369

**86.** ———— *Suit for overpayments to mortgagee in possession after suit to redeem—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* Where a mortgagor filed a suit to redeem mortgaged lands, alleging that the mortgagee in possession had been overpaid, but did not in that suit claim to recover the overpayments, which were therefore not awarded to him, it was *held* that he could not recover such overpayments in a fresh suit brought for that purpose, as his claim was barred by s. 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *BALAJI TAMAJI POTHAR v. TAMANGOUDA BIN GHANASYAM GOUDA*

6 Bom. A. C. 97

**87.** ———— *Suits for possession of mortgaged property—Civil Procedure Code, 1852, s. 43.* *N* being mortgagee in possession of five-eighths of a pangu (share) of certain land—security for a debt of R400—hypothecated his rights to *M* in 1876. In 1878, *K* bought two-eighths of the said five-eighths from the mortgagor. In 1879 *K* sued *N*, claiming possession of his two-eighths on payment of R400 and obtained a decree and possession thereof. Pending this suit, *N* assigned his mortgage to *M*. *M* was aware of the suit, and *K* was aware of the assignment when he paid R400 into Court for *N*. In 1883 *K* bought the remaining three-eighths from the mortgagor and sued *N* and *M* to recover possession thereof. *M* pleaded that the suit was barred by s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, inasmuch as *K* might have recovered the five-eighths in the suit against *N*. *Held*, that this plea was bad. *BRAHANNAYAKI v. KRISHNA*

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 92

**88.** ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 43—Leave to omit to sue for any remedy—First hearing of suit.* The plaintiff held a mortgage of certain immoveable property given to him by the defendant to secure the repayment of a loan of money with interest. The plaintiff stated the fact of the mortgage, but prayed only for a money-



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decree. The mortgage contained a personal undertaking to repay. Plaintiff's counsel, directly upon the case being called on for hearing and before the case had in any way been gone into, applied (under s. 43 of Act X of 1877, Civil Procedure Code) for leave to reserve his remedies under the mortgage, taking then only a money-decree—an application which, it is provided by that section, must be made "before the first hearing." *Held*, that the application was not too late. *PESTONJI BEZONJI v. ABDOL RAHIMAN* . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 463

89. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 43—Res judicata—Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act XVII of 1879—Mortgagor—Mortgagee—Suit for account merely—Subsequent suit for possession.* Where there has been a suit between an agriculturist mortgagor and his mortgagee for an account merely, a subsequent suit for possession on payment of the money declared to be due is barred under either s. 13 or s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *BAHU BALAJI v. HARI NIL-KANTHRAV* . I. L. R. 7 Bom. 377

90. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 43—Bond for the payment of money hypothecating property as collateral security for such payment—Omission of claim.* The obligee of a bond for the payment of money, hypothecating immoveable property as collateral security for such payment, sued for the moneys due on the bond, but omitted to claim the enforcement of his lien, and obtained a decree only for the payment of the amount of the bond-debt. He subsequently sued to enforce his lien. *Held*, that, under s. 43 of Act X of 1877, as amended by s. 7 of Act XII of 1879, he could not be permitted to sue to enforce his lien. *GUMANI v. RAM PADARAT LAL* . I. L. R. 2 All. 838

91. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 43—Omission to sue for one of several remedies—Mortgage.* A mortgagee had two remedies in respect of the mortgagor's breach to pay the stipulated interest at the time fixed by the contract of mortgage, one being a suit on foreclosure proceedings to convert the mortgage into a sale, and the other a suit to recover his money against the debtor by enforcement of his lien against the mortgaged property. He sued for the first remedy in respect of such breach, omitting the second. His suit was dismissed on the ground that he was not entitled to such remedy until the expiration of the mortgage term. He afterwards sued for the second remedy. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the mortgagee was not at the time of his suing for the first remedy "a person entitled to more than one remedy," not being "entitled" to the first, but only to the second, his omission at that time to sue for the second remedy was not, under s. 43 of Act X of 1877, a bar to his afterwards suing for it. *PIARI v. KHALI RAM* . I. L. R. 3 All. 857

92. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 43—Lease by usufructuary mortgagee*

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*of mortgaged property to mortgagor—Hypothecation of mortgaged property as security for rent—Suit for rent in Revenue Court—Suit for enforcement of lien in Civil Court.* The usufructuary mortgagee of certain land gave a lease of it to the mortgagor, the latter hypothecating the land as security for the payment of the rent. Arrears of rent accruing the mortgagee sued the mortgagor for the same in the Revenue Court and obtained a decree. Subsequently the mortgagee sued the mortgagor in the Civil Court to recover the amount of such decree by the sale of the land, claiming under the hypothecation. *Held*, that the second suit was not barred by the provisions of s. 43 of Act X of 1877. *BANDA HASAN v. ABADI BEGUM* . I. L. R. 4 All. 180

93. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 43—Mortgage—Decree enforcing lien—Suit against purchaser to enforce decree.* The obligee of a bond for the payment of money, in which certain property was mortgaged as collateral security, sued the obligor for the money due on such bond, claiming the enforcement of such mortgage. At the time the suit was brought such property was in the possession of a third person, who had purchased it at a sale in execution of a money-decree against the obligor of such bond. The obligee did not make the purchaser a defendant to the suit. He obtained a decree in the suit for the sale of such property. Being resisted in bringing it to sale by the purchaser he sued the purchaser to have it declared that such property was liable to be sold under his decree. *Held*, that such second suit was not barred by the provisions of s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. *BAHRAICHI CHAUDHRI v. SURJU NAIK* . I. L. R. 4 All. 257

94. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 43—Lease by usufructuary mortgagee of mortgaged property to mortgagor—Hypothecation of mortgaged property as security for rent—Suit for rent in Revenue Court—Suit for enforcement of lien in Civil Court.* The usufructuary mortgagee of certain land granted a lease of such land to the mortgagor, the latter hypothecating the land as security for the payment of the rent. Arrears of rent accruing the mortgagee sued the mortgagor for the same in the Revenue Court and obtained a decree. Subsequently the mortgagee sued the transferee of such land in the Civil Court to recover the amount of such decree by the sale of the land, claiming under the hypothecation. *Held*, following *Banda Hasan v. Abadi Begum*, I. L. R. 4 All. 180, that such claim was not barred by the provisions of s. 43 of Act X of 1877; that it could only be made through the medium of the Civil Court; and that the shape in which it was presented was perfectly regular. *IMAMI BEGUM v. GOBIND PRASAD* . I. L. R. 4 All. 318

95. ———— *Omission to claim compensation-money—Subsequent suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* A, a Hindu widow,



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granted, without legal necessity, a mokurari lease of certain mouzahs, portion of her husband's estate, to *B*. During *B*'s possession part of the lands comprised in the granted mouzahs were taken up by Government, and the compensation-money was lodged in the Collectorate. *A* having afterwards died, the next heirs of *A*'s husband, on the 7th October 1871, sued *B*, to recover possession of the mouzahs, but, not being aware of the facts, did not in that suit claim the compensation-money lying in the Collectorate. While this suit was still pending, *B*, in March 1872, drew the compensation-money out of the Collectorate. The heirs, after obtaining a decree against *B* for possession of the mouzahs, on the 13th September 1875 instituted a fresh suit against him to recover the compensation-money wrongfully drawn out by him from the Collectorate. *Held*, that the suit was not barred by s. 7 of Act VIII of 1859. *Held*, further, that the claim of the heirs was a proper subject for a regular suit, and could not have been heard and determined in the course of the proceedings in execution of the decree which they had obtained against *B* for possession of the mouzahs. *NUND LALL BOSE v. ABOO MAHOMED*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 597

S.C. NUND LALL BOSE v. ABU SYED

5 C. L. R. 45

96. — *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Suit for money paid under Land Acquisition Act.* In 1876 *K* sued *M* on a bond, dated 25th December 1869, for R5,000, by which certain land in the district of South Tanjore was hypothecated as security for the debt, and obtained a decree on the 6th of April 1876 for the sale of the lands which he purchased on the 17th August 1876 for R6,000. *K* then discovered that part of the land hypothecated, situated within the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Court at Kumbakonam, had been acquired by a railway company under the Land Acquisition Act in 1874, and that the compensation R460 (claimed by *M*'s mother, who sold the land to the company) was lodged in the treasury of Kumbakonam in the name of *M*'s mother, *K* having applied to the Subordinate Court for an order, for payment out of this sum, the Court, by order, dated 28th February 1880, directed that the question of title to the money should be decided by suit. *K* then sued *M*, as the sole heir of his deceased mother, in the District Munsif's Court of Tiruvadi (where *M* resided), for a declaration of right to and to recover the said sum of R460. The suit was filed on the 4th September 1880. On the 16th April 1880 *M* assigned his interest in the money sued for to *V*, who was made defendant in the suit on his own application, and pleaded that the land having been acquired by the railway company in 1874, before the suit upon the bond was filed, this suit was barred by s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, that *K* not having known, at the date of his suit on the bond, of the acquisition of the land by the railway company, the suit was not so barred. *VENKATA VIRARAGAVAYYANGAR v. KRISHNASAMI AYYANGAR*

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 344

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97. — *Suit not brought for whole claim—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43.* On the 5th September 1874 *R*, a Hindu, and his sons borrowed R5,000 from *V* and mortgaged to him certain lands, items 1, 2, and 3. On the 7th September 1874 *V* borrowed R5,000 from *R N* and mortgaged his rights in items 1 and 2 and land of his own to *R N*. In 1877 *R N* bought at a sale in execution of a decree against *R* the share of *R* in the said items 1 and 2 subject to the mortgage created by *R* on 5th September 1874, and to another mortgage created by *R* dated 11th January 1875. In 1889 *R N* sued *V* and the sons of *R* for arrears of interest due under his mortgage-bond, but their suit was withdrawn with liberty to bring a fresh suit for the principal and interest due on the bond. In 1885 *R N* sued *V* and the sons of *R* to recover principal and interest due under his mortgage-bond. *Held*, that the claim of *R N* was not barred by s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. *VENKATA SHETTI v. RANGA NAYAK*

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 160

98. — *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Withdrawal of suit with permission to bring a fresh suit on the same cause of action—Civil Procedure Code, s. 373.* Where a suit is withdrawn with permission under the first paragraph of s. 373 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the effect is to leave the parties in the same position as that in which they would have been if the suit had never been brought. A plaintiff therefore who has obtained an order under s. 373 of the Code, will not be debarred by s. 43 from claiming in a subsequent suit a relief which he might have included, but did not in the suit which he was permitted to withdraw. *Venkata Shetti v. Ranga Nayak, I. L. R. 10 Mad. 160*, followed. *BEHARI LAL PAL v. BARAN MAYI DASI*

I. L. R. 17 All. 53

99. — *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Bond with alternative conditions for repayment of loan—Decree for interest—Second suit for further interest.* A bond provided for the repayment of a loan with interest by a stated time. In default of payment by that time, it was provided that the loan might be added to an existing mortgage for a term of years, and repaid at the end of the term, together with the mortgage-debt. After the expiration of the time fixed for the repayment of the loan, the obligee sued and obtained a decree for the interest which had accrued due at the date of the suit. He now sued for the further interest which had since become due. *Held*, that the second suit was not barred by s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for that the first suit being for interest merely, and not for principal and interest, which were then both due, the plaintiff must be taken to have elected, under the bond, to add the principal sum to the previously existing mortgage-debt, in which case he forfeited nothing by suing merely for arrears of interest as they became due. *SHRI SHAILATA v. BALAPA LOKANNA*

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 446



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**100.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Multiplicity of suits.* When money is due on two or more bonds at the time of the institution of a suit, and the bonds appear to have been originally passed in respect of one claim, it is not incumbent upon the plaintiff to sue upon both bonds in one action. There is nothing in s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure which would justify this Court in going behind the bonds to consider the circumstances out of which they sprung, albeit those circumstances might themselves at the time have constituted a cause of action. **UMED DHOLCHAND v. PIR SAHIB JIVA MIYA . I. L. R. 7 Bom. 134**

**101.** ————— *Suit on bond—Part of decree infructuous for want of jurisdiction—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* Where a holder of a bond in which properties are hypothecated as security for money lent brings a suit for the whole claim and obtains a decree, but a part of that decree is infructuous for want of jurisdiction, he is not precluded by Act VIII of 1859, s. 7, from maintaining a second suit to enforce such part of his claim (as was infructuously decreed in the first suit) against a third party who derives his title through the borrower subsequent to the date of the bond. **GRISH CHUNDER MOOKERJEE v. RAMES-SUREE DABEE . . . . . 22 W. R. 308**

**102.** ————— *Promissory note payable by instalments—Act IX of 1850, s. 34.* When two or more instalments of a promissory note, payable on the face of it by instalments, are due, the holder of the note is not at liberty to sue separately for each instalment or for some of them; he must sue for all the instalments due in one action. A judgment recovered in a suit for one instalment when others are due is a bar to a suit subsequently brought for the latter. **MACKINTOSH v. GILL . 12 B. L. R. 37 : 20 W. R. 358**

**103.** ————— *Suit on instalment-bond—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* Plaintiff sued upon an instalment-bond as each successive instalment fell due, and the whole of his claim on each instalment was included in his suit. He recovered the full amount of the first instalment under the first decree and a portion of the second instalment in execution of his second decree. He now sued for the unpaid portion of the second instalment, and for the whole of the third instalment, including the interest. *Held*, that such suit was not affected by s. 7. Act VIII of 1859. **BOLAKEE LAL v. CHOWDHRY BUNSHEE SINGH . 7 W. R. 309**

**104.** ————— *Promise to pay balance found due on accounts stated in instalments—Promissory note—Note of agreement in account book.* In 1876 accounts were stated between B and D, and a balance of RS00 was found to be due from D to B. D gave B an instrument whereby he agreed to pay the amount of such balance in four annual instalments of R200. B at the same time noted in his account book that such balance was "payable in four instalments of R200 yearly." In July 1879

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B sued D upon such instrument for the balance of the first instalment. The Court trying this suit refused to receive such instrument in evidence, on the ground that it was a promissory note, and as such was improperly stamped. Thereupon B applied for and obtained permission to withdraw from the suit, with liberty to bring a fresh one for the original debt. In October 1879 B again sued D, claiming the balance of the first and second instalments, basing his claim upon the note made by him in his account book. He obtained a decree in that suit for the amount claimed by him. In 1880 B again sued D, claiming the amount of the third instalment, again basing his claim upon such note. *Held*, by SPANKIE, J., that the suit last mentioned was barred by the provisions of s. 43 of Act X of 1877, inasmuch as B should in the second suit brought by him against D have claimed the balance of the money found due from D to him upon the accounts stated between them, instead of claiming the balance of the instalments due. *Held* by OLDFIELD, J., that such suit was not so barred, the causes of action therein and in the former suit being different. **BANARSI DAS v. BHIKARI DAS . I. L. R. 3 All. 717**

**105.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7—Suit to enforce claim against representatives of deceased.* *Held*, that s. 7 of Act VIII of 1859, which barred all future suits for the portion omitted or relinquished, had not the effect of prohibiting more than one suit to enforce satisfaction of a claim against the representatives of a deceased person. The creditor had a right to make all the property of the deceased debtor in the hands of the several persons who might have succeeded to it liable for the payment of his debt, but he was not bound to bring his suit in such a shape as to include the whole of the representatives and the whole of the property at the risk of being precluded from all future suits. **PUTRUMSOOKH v. SOOBHAN . 2 Agra 323**

**106.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 43—Stamp Act, 1879, s. 41—Duty and penalty under Stamp Act—Costs—Suit to recover amount paid.* The plaintiff in a suit on an instrument not duly stamped was compelled to pay the amount of duty and penalty: the proper stamp on the instrument ought to have been paid by the defendant. In a suit with reference to s. 41 of the Stamp Act to recover the amount paid:—*Held*, that the plaintiff could not have recovered the amount as costs of the former suit in which it was paid, and that a fresh suit to recover it was maintainable. **ISHAR DAS v. MASUD KHAN . I. L. R. 6 All. 70**

**107.** ————— *Mortgage for securing payment of rent—Decree of Revenue Court for arrears of rent—Suit for sale of mortgaged property—Civil Procedure Code, s. 43.* In 1874 the plaintiff leased certain immoveable property to the defendant, and the latter executed a deed by which he covenanted to pay the annual rent and



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fulfil other conditions of the lease, and gave security in Rs. 3,000 by mortgage of landed property. In 1874 the plaintiff obtained decrees in the Revenue Court for arrears of rent, and the decrees were partially satisfied and then became barred by limitation. In 1884 the plaintiff brought a suit to recover the balance due by enforcement of the mortgage security against the purchasers of the mortgaged property. *Held*, that the plaintiff had two separate rights of action, one on the contract to pay rent and the other on the mortgage security; that he could only enforce the first by a suit in the Revenue Court for arrears of rent, and the second by suit in the Civil Court; and consequently there could be no bar to the latter suit by reason of the suit instituted in the Revenue Court with reference to s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. **CHUNI LAL v. BANASPAT SINGH** . . . . . **I. L. R. 9 All. 23**

**108.** ———— *Suit under colour of suit for rent to try question of title—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* Where a suit for possession would be met by a plea in bar, the plaintiff cannot be permitted to have the question of title tried under colour of a rent suit, such a proceeding being opposed to the principle laid down in Act VIII of 1859, s. 7. **RAM TUNOO KOLOO v. SHARODA PERSHAD MULLICK. GOLAM MAHOMED SHAHA v. SHARODA PROSAD MULLICK** . . . . . **19 W. R. 91**

See **DAYAL CHAND SAHOY v. NABIN CHANDRA ADHIKARI** . . . . . **8 B. L. R. 180 : 16 W. R. 235**

**109.** ———— *Suit for abatement of rent—Subsequent suit for excess of rent paid.* A plaintiff who has sued for and obtained a decree for an abatement of rent payable in respect of a patni held by him may afterwards sue for a refund of the rent paid by him before instituting the suit for abatement of rent, in excess of the amount justly payable, notwithstanding that he might, if he had chosen, have included this claim in his suit for abatement of rent. **OKHOY, KOOMAR CHUTTOPADHYA v. MAHAPAT CHUNDER BAHADOOR** . . . . . **I. L. R. 5 Calc. 24**

**110.** ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Enhancement of rent, suit for—Subsequent suit for rent.* Under ss. 42 and 43 of the Civil Procedure Code, plaintiffs must bring their entire claim and every remedy enforceable in respect of that claim into Court at once, and, if they fail to do that in any suit they cannot afterwards avail themselves of any remedy on which they have not chosen to insist in the first suit. Suits for enhanced rent, and suits for rent, are claims arising in respect of the same subject-matter, and a plaintiff cannot be allowed, after having unsuccessfully sued for rent at an enhanced rate, to sue for the original rent for previous years. **KUNNOCK CHUNDER MOOKERJEE v. GURU DASS BISWAS** . . . . . **I. L. R. 9 Calc. 919 : 12 C. L. R. 599**

**111.** ———— *Suit for enhancement of rent—Dismissal of enhancement suit—Rent suit at old rate for year for which rent had*

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*been sought at enhanced rate.* The dismissal of a suit for rent at an enhanced rate is no bar to a subsequent suit for rent at the rate originally fixed. **KUNNOCK CHUNDER MOOKERJEE v. GURU DASS BISWAS, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 919 : 12 C. L. R. 599**, overruled. **SUDDRUDDIN AHMED v. BANU MADHUB ROY CHOWDHRY** . . . . . **I. L. R. 15 Calc. 145**

**112.** ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7—Suit for arrears of rent.* A suit for arrears of rent was not barred under Act VIII of 1859, s. 7, by the fact that the plaintiff had split his claim, i.e., the jumma; but the circumstances that a part of the jumma had been omitted would be a bar to the plaintiff suing subsequently for such part. **PURUN GOPAL PAUL CHOWDHRY v. POORNANUND MULLICK** . . . . . **21 W. R. 272**

**113.** ———— *Suits for arrears of rent—Rent for separate years—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* Under s. 7 of Act VIII of 1859, it was held that arrears of rent for successive years are several and distinct causes of action, in respect of which a plaintiff may institute separate suits. **SUTTO CHURN GHOSAL v. OBHOY NUND DOSS** . . . . . **2 W. R. Act X, 31**

**RAM SOONDER SEIN v. KRISHNA CHUNDER GOOPTO** . . . . . **17 W. R. 380**

**KRISTO KINKUR PORAMANICK v. RAMDHUN CHATTERJEE** . . . . . **24 W. R. 326**

**114.** ———— *Suit for rent—Rent of separate successive years.* At the close of the Bengal year 1283, which was on the 11th of April 1877, the defendant owed to the plaintiff, his landlord, the rents of his holding for the years 1281, 1282, and 1283. The plaintiff, in the month of April 1878, before the close of the year 1284, instituted a suit for the rent for 1281 only, and obtained a decree. On the 10th of April 1879 he instituted another suit for recovery of the rents for the years 1282, 1283, and 1284. *Held*, that the claim for the years 1282 and 1283 was barred under s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877. The cases of **Sutto Churn Ghosal v. Obhoy Nund Doss**, 2 W. R. Act X, 31; **Ram Soonder Sein v. Krishna Chunder Goopto**, 17 W. R. 380; and **Krishna Kinkur Poramanick v. Ramdhun Chatterjee**, 24 W. R. 326, are overruled by s. 43 of Act X of 1877. **TARUCK CHUNDER MOOKERJEE v. PANCHU MOHINI DEBYA** . . . . . **I. L. R. 6 Calc. 791 : 8 C. L. R. 297**

See **BALAJI SITARAM NAIK v. BHIKAJI SOYARE PRABHU** . . . . . **I. L. R. 8 Bom. 164**

**115.** ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Suit for arrears of rent—Application of the Civil Procedure Code to suits in Revenue Courts—Relinquishment of part of claim.* The plaintiff sued under the provisions of Act X of 1859 to recover arrears of rent for the years 1287, 1288, and 1289 (1880—1882), after having obtained a decree for the rent due for the year 1286 (1879) in a suit instituted after the rent for the year 1289 (1882) had become due. *Held*, that the provisions of



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s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code applied, and that the second suit was consequently barred. *Madho Prakash Singh v. Murli Manohar*, I. L. R. 5 All. 405, cited and approved. *Taruck Chunder Mookerjee v. Panchu Mohini Debya*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 791, cited. *ADHIRANI NARAIN KUMARI v. RAGHU MAHAPATRO* . . . I. L. R. 12 Calc. 50

**116.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Cause of action—Separate suits for rent due for successive years.* Petitioners filed two suits in a Small Cause Court on the same day to recover rent due for two successive years under the same lease. The sum of the two claims exceeded the pecuniary limit of the Court's jurisdiction. The suit for the rent of the first year was dismissed under s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on the ground that the claim ought to have been included in the suit for the second year's rent. *Held*, that, as the petitioners had no intention of abandoning either claim, the proper course was to allow them to withdraw both suits and file a fresh suit in a competent Court. *ALAGU v. ABDOLA*

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 147

**117.** *Suit waiving difference of exchange—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 7.* An auction-purchaser of a zamindari being entitled to be paid his rents in Azeemabad rupees, and having sued for the same in Company's rupees (the former coinage being more valuable than the latter), his omission to sue for the difference of value was held to be an abandonment of claim under s. 7 Act VIII of 1859, and to bar his recovery of it in a fresh suit. *MAHOMED SOADUCK GOLESTAN v. FORBES* . . . 5 W. R. Act X, 90

**118.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 7 and 97—Omission of portion of claim—Withdrawal of suit—Institution of fresh suit including claim omitted.* Where the plaintiffs in a suit were permitted to withdraw from the same with a view to bringing a fresh suit which should include a portion which had been omitted of the claim arising out of the cause of action, and such fresh suit was brought, the additional portion of the claim in that suit was not barred by s. 7 of Act VIII of 1859. *ILAH BAKHSH v. IMAM BAKHSH*

I. L. R. 1 All. 324

**119.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Act XII of 1881 (N.-W. P. Rent Act), s. 140—Case struck off with liberty to plaintiff to bring a fresh suit—Omission to sue for part of claim in case struck off—Fresh suit for omitted claim not barred.* A recorded co-sharer of a mehal sued the lambardar for his share of the profits of the mehal for the year 1286 Fasli. At the time of the institution of the suit, the profits for 1287 and 1288 Fasli also were due, but no claim was then made in respect of them. The suit was struck off on account of the non-appearance of the parties under s. 140 of Act XII of 1881 (N.-W. P. Rent Act) with leave to the plaintiff to bring a fresh suit. Subsequently the plaintiff brought a

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suit against the same defendant for his share of the profits of the mehal for 1287 and 1288 Fasli. *Held*, that the suit was not barred by the provisions of s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. *MULCHAND v. BHIKARI DASS* . . . I. L. R. 7 All. 624

**120.** *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 43—Madras Rent Recovery Act (Mad. Act VIII of 1865), s. 18—Suit by a landlord in the Court of the District Munsif for arrears of rent for two years—Subsequent attachment for rent of a third year accrued due at date of suit.* A zamindar brought a suit in the District Munsif's Court to recover from a tenant on his estate the arrears of rent for two years. Rent for the third year was also due. No claim for it was included in the suit, but the landlord attached the land by summary process under the Rent Recovery Act to recover it. The tenants sued in the Revenue Court under the Rent Recovery Act to have the attachment set aside as illegal. *Held*, that the zamindar was not precluded by Civil Procedure Code, s. 43, from pursuing his remedies under the Rent Recovery Act, and that the attachment was not illegal. *ESWARA DOSS v. VENKATAROYER*

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 236

**121.** *Joint owners—Mortgage of joint property by two co-owners—Subsequent mortgage of part of same property to same mortgagee by one co-owner—Suit by mortgagee on second mortgage and sale in execution—Purchase by mortgagee—Effect of such purchase on first mortgage—Subsequent suit by mortgagee on first mortgage.* By a mortgage-deed, dated the 24th January 1878, S and V, two of three brothers constituting an undivided family, jointly mortgaged to the plaintiff B a part of the family property. On the 28th July 1878 S alone further mortgaged to the plaintiff for a fresh advance a portion of the property already mortgaged. Subsequently the three brothers effected a partition among themselves of all the undivided property, and the property jointly mortgaged by S and V fell, along with other property, to the share of V and the third brother N. In 1881 the plaintiff B sued S on the second of the above mortgages, viz., that of the 28th July 1878. He obtained a decree, and at a sale held in execution of that decree himself purchased the property comprised in that mortgage. In the meantime, on the 27th January 1882 and on the 6th December 1883, V and N respectively mortgaged with possession to the defendant M portions of the land comprised in the first mortgage of the 24th January 1878. In 1883 the plaintiff filed the present suit upon his first mortgage of the 24th January 1878, claiming to recover Rs. 16-14-0 from S and V personally. He also prayed that the defendant M, who had been in possession of the property in dispute, should be prevented from obstructing him in selling the property. S and V did not appear. The third defendant M alone appeared and contended, *inter alia*, that the plaintiff, having sued upon his second mortgage without including the earlier one, was now barred



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from suing on the latter by ss. 13 and 43 of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882). He also contended that the plaintiff, having purchased part of the lands comprised in the mortgage now sued upon in execution of the decree obtained by him upon his second mortgage, could not now seek to burden the remaining lands included in the mortgage with the whole of the mortgage-debt, but that a proportionate part of that debt must be satisfied. *Held*, that the plaintiff's suit was not barred by his previous suit on the second mortgage under the provisions of ss. 13 and 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. *MORO RAGHUNATH v. BALAJI TRIMBAK*

**I. L. R. 13 Bom. 45**

**122.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85—Rights inter se of two mortgagees of the same property from the same mortgagor.* Two persons each held a mortgage over the same property from the same mortgagor. The mortgagees were both executed on the same day. The mortgagees each instituted a suit for sale on the same day and obtained decrees, in execution of which they had the mortgaged property put up for sale, and each purchased it at the sale under his decree respectively. Neither mortgagee made the other a party to the suit on his mortgage. The representative (S) of one of the mortgagee decree-holders got possession of the mortgaged property and held it as against the other mortgagee decree-holder or his representatives. Thereupon the representatives of the other mortgagee brought their suit for possession of a moiety of the property, or in the alternative for redemption of the other mortgage. *Held*, that such suit was not barred either by the provisions of s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or by reason of those of s. 85 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. *BALMAKUND v. SANGARI* . **I. L. R. 19 All. 379**

**123.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 13 and 43—Act XII of 1879, s. 6—Act VIII of 1859, s. 7—Inclusion of whole claim in suit.* The present suit was preceded by others in which the plaintiff sought to establish a right in the same part of the talukhdari estate that he now claimed to redeem from mortgage. The first suit in which he with another claimed as under-proprietors was dismissed in 1866 on the ground that they had not shown themselves to have held such right under the talukhdars within the period since 1841. Proceedings not to be regarded as judicial, subsequently taken under circular 4 of 1867, resulted in a finding that the dismissal was right upon the merits, the property having been transferred to the talukhdar by a conditional sale which had become absolute. Another suit was then brought to recover the talukhdari right, under the terms of circular 106 of 1869, it being alleged that arrears of revenue paid by the talukhdar had been paid on the plaintiff's account. That suit was also dismissed. *Held*, that the present suit to redeem the same property under a mortgage was not barred. The claim to redeem did not arise out of the former cause of action within the mean-

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ing of the sections of Act VIII of 1859 relating to the inclusion of the whole claim in a suit. The plaintiff not then being aware of his right when he sued before, it could not be regarded as a "portion of his claim," and he was not precluded, by having omitted it, from bringing it forward. *AMANAT BIBI v. INDAD HUSAIN* . **I. L. R. 15 Calc. 800**  
**I. L. R. 15 I. A. 106**

**124.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—First suit to redeem—Second suit to eject—Causes of action not identical.* A filed a suit against B to redeem the land in dispute alleging that it had been mortgaged to B, and that the mortgage-debt had been more than paid off. He therefore prayed for an account and restoration of the land on payment of the sum that might be found due. The Court found that the alleged mortgage was not proved, and dismissed the suit. Thereupon A filed a suit in ejectment against B. *Held*, that the ejectment suit was not barred under s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882). Failure in a redemption suit does not bar a subsequent suit in ejectment, the causes of action in the two suits being essentially different. *Shridhas Vinayak v. Narayan, 11 Bom. 224*, followed. *NARO BALVANT v. RAMCHANDRA TUKDEV*

**I. L. R. 13 Bom. 326**

**125.** *Civil Procedure Code, s. 43—"Distinct cause of action"—Suit for possession after cancellation of Court-sale.* In execution of a decree, the defendant, who was sued as the representative of her deceased brother, objected, under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to the attachment of certain lands to which she set up independent title. The objection was disallowed and the land was sold. She then sued the execution-purchaser to set aside the Court-sale, and obtained a decree against which no appeal was preferred. She now sued for possession, and it was found that at the date of the previous suit she was not aware that the execution-purchaser had obtained possession. *Held*, that the suit was not barred by the Civil Procedure Code, s. 43. *AMBU v. KETLILAMMA* . **I. L. R. 14 Mad. 23**

**126.** *Civil Procedure Code, s. 43—"Omit to sue," meaning of.* The plaintiff, having previously obtained against his brother, defendant 1, who had been the managing member of their family, a decree for partition of the family property including certain debts scheduled in the plaint therein, now sued to recover his share of certain other family debts collected by defendant 1, without the plaintiff's knowledge. *Held*, that the claim was not barred by the Civil Procedure Code, s. 43. *MARIATHODI v. APPU*

**I. L. R. 15 Mad. 296**

**127.** *Civil Procedure Code, s. 45—Suit by usufructuary mortgagee excluded from possession for unpaid interest—Subsequent suit for principal and residue of interest.* A deed of mortgage executed in 1879 for a considera-



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tion of R300 provided that the term of the mortgage should be four years certain; that certain interest should be payable; that the mortgagee should have possession; that the profits should be appropriated first in lieu of yearly interest and any balance appropriated in payment of the principal debt; and that the mortgagor should be entitled to redeem if the principal and interest were paid at the expiration of the four years. The mortgagee never obtained possession; and in 1882 he brought a suit against the mortgagor to recover the unpaid interest then due, and obtained a decree, which was satisfied by the sale of property belonging to the judgment-debtor. In 1886 he brought another suit for recovery of the principal, together with the residue of interest up to the date of suit. *Held*, that the cause of action in the suit of 1882 was the mortgagor's non-delivery of possession of the mortgaged property, by reason of which the mortgagee had been unable to realize his interest from the usufruct, that the cause of action accrued to the mortgagee from the moment the instrument came into operation and possession was not delivered, that the cause of action to recover the principal accrued at the same time and was the same cause of action, that the plaintiff was therefore bound in the suit of 1882 to sue for the principal, and that the present suit was consequently barred by s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. **HIKMATULLA KHAN v. IMAM ALI** . . . . . **I. L. R. 12 All. 203**

**128.** . . . . . *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Suit for interest on a bond waiving right already accrued to sue for principal—Second suit for principal and interest subsequently accrued.* Certain Mahomedans hypothecated to the plaintiff, to secure repayment of a debt, their interest in lands, which had been enfranchised as a personal inam—a claim that the lands constituted the endowment of certain mosques having been rejected at the inam inquiry. The hypothecation deed was executed in 1875 and registered, and it contained the following terms with regard to interest and the repayment of the debt. "We (the obligors) shall pay interest at 7 per cent. per annum before the 30th October of each year; we shall pay in full the principal amount on the 30th October 1878, after clearing off the interest, and redeem this deed; should we fail to pay the interest regularly according to the instalments, we shall at once pay the principal together with the amount of interest." Default was made in the payment of interest in 1876, and in 1877 the plaintiff sued in a District Munsif's Court for the interest then due, expressly stating in the plaint that he agreed to accept payment of the principal and the subsequent year's interest at the times fixed in the deed, and he obtained a decree as prayed. The plaintiff in 1888 now sued the executants of the above instrument and their heirs and representatives to recover the principal together with interest up to date. *Held*, that this suit was not barred by the Civil Procedure Code, s. 43, although the creditor's election not to seek a decree for the full amount in the suit of 1877 had not

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been communicated to the debtors before that suit. **BADI BIBI SAHIBAL v. SAMI PILLAI**

**I. L. R. 18 Mad. 257**

**129.** . . . . . *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Covenant to pay interest on mortgage—Suit to recover arrears of interest—Subsequent suit for principal and interest.* The breach of covenant in a mortgage bond to pay interest each year, which covenant is not confined to the fixed period of the mortgage and is distinct from and independent of the claim of the mortgagee to recover the principal sum, and the performance of which is secured in a different manner, gives rise to a distinct cause of action which can be sued upon without suing for the principal, and a decree obtained on such bond for overdue interest does not, under s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), bar a subsequent suit to recover the principal and interest by sale of the mortgaged property. **YASHVANT NARAYAN KAMAT v. VITHAL DIVAKAR PARULEKAR** . . . . . **I. L. R. 21 Bom. 267**

**130.** . . . . . *Civil Procedure Code, s. 43—Decree against three of four uralans of a devasom—Suit to declare the decree binding on the fourth.* The holder of a bond executed by two uralans of a Malabar devasom obtained a decree, declaring that the devasom property was liable for the secured debt, against the executants of the bond and one other uralan; the fourth uralan intervened in execution of the decree, and objected that the devasom property was not liable to be attached. His objection was upheld, and the plaintiff then brought a suit against him for a declaration that the debt was binding on him and on the devasom property. *Held*, that the suit was not barred under the Civil Procedure Code, s. 43. **RAMAN v. SRIDHARAN** . . . . . **I. L. R. 16 Mad. 449**

**131.** . . . . . *Civil Procedure Code, s. 43.* In 1889 the plaintiff sued the defendant for possession of a piece of land which the defendant had included in her homestead by building walls. In that suit the plaintiff alleged that on that land there were two palm-trees which belonged to him, and that the defendant had wrongfully prevented the pasis from going to those trees to tap them, but he asked in his plaint in that suit for the relief in respect of the trees, only stating that he would bring a separate suit for them. The Munsif dismissed that suit on the ground that the land was within the defendant's tenure and his decision was affirmed on appeal. In a suit brought in 1890 against the same defendant for declaration of title to and possession of the two palm-trees and for an injunction restraining the defendant from disturbing his possession of them:—*Held*, that the claim arose out of the same cause of action as that in the former suit, and that the suit was therefore barred by s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure. **MAKSUD ALI v. NARGIS DYE** . . . . . **I. L. R. 20 Calc. 322**

**132.** . . . . . *Civil Procedure Code, s. 43—Joint property, suits for exclusion from and partition of—Co-sharers.* One co-sharer



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suing another for exclusion from joint property, and omitting to exclude in his claim a portion of the property of which he seeks possession, is not debarred by s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure from suing to have the joint estate partitioned including the portion omitted from the former suit, the causes of action in the two suits being different. **ABDUR NASIR v. RASULAN** I. L. R. 20 Calc. 385

**133.** *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 43—Onus of proof.* Where a plaintiff has sustained at the same time an injury in respect of his proprietary or permanent interest in an estate, and also an injury in respect of a temporary or leasehold interest in such estate, and files suits for redress in both causes of action, it cannot be said that the two causes of action are so identical that he is precluded by s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code from filing separate suits. The onus is on the defendant to show that the causes of action are identical. **UPENDRA LAL MUKERJEE v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA** I. L. R. 20 Calc. 716

**134.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Transfer of Property Act, s. 55—Ejectment suit by a mortgagor's vendee against the purchaser under a mortgage decree—Subsequent suit to redeem.* Certain land mortgaged to A was sold to B. A brought a suit on his mortgage without joining B as a party, obtained a decree for sale, and became the purchaser under the decree. B then sued to eject him praying for a declaration that the sale was not binding on him. The suit having been dismissed, he now sued to redeem. *Held*, that the suit was not barred under the Civil Procedure Code, s. 43, and the plaintiff was entitled to redeem. **KUPPU NAYUDU v. VENKATAKRISHNA REDDI** I. L. R. 20 Mad. 82

**135.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Suit for money by mortgagee against sons of a deceased judgment-debtor—Former suit on mortgage against father.* A personal decree on a mortgage was passed against a Hindu (the mortgagor) and his two sons on the 19th October 1877. The decree provided for payment of the secured debt in various instalments by May 1895. The mortgagor died in 1883, having discharged part of the debt. The decree-holder having attached certain family property in execution, the mortgagor's two younger sons, who had not been born at the date of the above decree, objected that their shares were not liable to attachment. This objection prevailed, the Court expressing the opinion that the matter in controversy should be determined in a regular suit. The other defendants in the suit of 1877 had both died in the interval, one of them leaving infant sons. The decree-holder (in whose sole name the mortgage stood) now sued the sons of the mortgagor and their infant nephews for the payment out of the family property of all the unpaid instalments. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not precluded from maintaining the suit against the sons of the mortgagor by the Civil

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Procedure Code, s. 43. **RAMAYYA v. VENKATARAMAN** I. L. R. 17 Mad. 122

**136.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Suit for specific performance of a contract of sale and to execute a sale-deed—Sale-deed subsequently executed by the Court under s. 262 of the Civil Procedure Code—Suit on sale-deed to recover possession.* The plaintiff, claiming specific performance of a contract of sale, sued the defendant to compel him to execute a deed of sale, alleging that he had paid the purchase-money to the defendant and had obtained possession, but was subsequently dispossessed. The plaintiff had claimed the value of standing crops or damages for the same. The Court found that the plaintiff had paid the purchase-money, but had not got possession, and ordered defendant to execute a deed of sale. On failure of the defendant to do so, the Court executed a deed of sale in plaintiff's favour under s. 262 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). The plaintiff thereupon brought the present suit to recover possession on the strength of the deed of sale. Defendants pleaded that this second suit was barred under s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that s. 43 was not applicable and did not bar the present suit, because the alleged cause of action was not the breach of the contract, but a new and distinct one arising from the deed of sale which the defendant had contracted to pass. **NATHU PANDU v. BUDHU BHIKA**

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 537

**137.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Decree for specific performance of a contract for sale of land—Subsequent suit for possession.* The defendant having agreed to sell land to the plaintiff, but failed to execute a conveyance, the plaintiff sued for specific performance and obtained a decree and the Court executed a conveyance of the land to him. He now sued for possession. *Held*, that the right to possession having arisen at the same time of the right to the execution of a conveyance, the suit was not maintainable. **NATHU PANDU v. BUDHU BHIKA**, I. L. R. 18 Bom. 537, distinguished. **NARAYANA KAVIRAYAN v. KANDASAMI GOUNDAN** I. L. R. 22 Mad. 24

**138.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Application for leave to sue in formâ pauperis—Application rejected—Subsequent suit for same relief.* S. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not apply so as to bar a subsequent suit where the so-called previous suit was not a regular suit, but an application for leave to sue in formâ pauperis, which was rejected. **NARAIN SINGH v. JASWANT SINGH** I. L. R. 21 All. 359

**139.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Whole claim in respect of cause of action—Mortgage—Redemption—Mortgage sued on not proved—Admission by defendants of mortgage right—Subsequent suit on admissions.* In a previous suit plaintiff had sued to redeem a kanom of 1859. The kanom not being established,



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the suit failed. At the time of bringing the suit, plaintiff was aware that the defendants in possession had in various documents admitted that they were kanomdars under the plaintiff's predecessor in title. On the plaintiff now bringing a suit based on the admissions referred to:—*Held*, that plaintiff could and should in the previous suit have based his claim in the alternative on the admissions instead of confining that suit to the specific mortgage which he failed to prove. Having chosen to take the course which he did, he was barred from bringing a fresh suit by s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code, as it must be taken that he abandoned or relinquished his claim on the basis of the admissions when he brought his first suit on the kanom specifically alleged. *Krishna Pillai v. Rangasami Pillai*, I. L. R. 18 Mad. 462, referred to. *RANGASAMI PILLAI v. KRISHNA PILLAI* . . . I. L. R. 22 Mad. 259

140. *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 43—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 99—Agreement to pay a debt partly in cash and to secure balance by mortgage, or, in default, to execute mortgage for whole amount—Failure to pay part in cash—Decree for such part—Second suit, to enforce giving of mortgage for balance, barred.* On a settlement of account between plaintiff and defendant No. 1, it was found that Rs. 505 were due by the first defendant to the plaintiff, and an agreement was made between them that Rs. 4,000 of this debt was to be paid off by the first defendant before the 18th September 1895, and that a mortgage on certain specified immoveable property was to be given for the balance; but, in the event of his failing to pay the Rs. 4,000 within the stipulated period, the mortgage was to be for the full amount. The agreement was dated 15th June 1895, was put into writing, and was duly registered. The first defendant failed to pay the Rs. 4,000 as agreed, or to execute the mortgage; and the plaintiff, on the 16th September 1899, brought a suit against him to recover the Rs. 4,000, with interest thereon, and obtained a decree on the 29th September 1899. On the 30th September the plaintiff commenced the present suit against defendant No. 1 and against defendant No. 2, who, as judgment-creditor of defendant No. 1, had attached the property specified in the agreement, praying that either the first defendant should be ordered to pass to the plaintiff a mortgage-bond for the balance due, or that a decree should be passed for the recovery of the said balance by sale of the said property and from the first defendant, and that the property be declared liable for the amount claimed. *Held*, that the suit was barred under s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *GOVIND HARI DEV v. PARASHRAM MAHADEV JOSHI* (1900) . . . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 161

141. *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1872), s. 43—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 97—Suit for specific performance—Subsequent suit for money paid on a consideration that failed.* Defendant having failed to convey

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certain property belonging to himself and his son to plaintiff as agreed, plaintiff obtained a decree for specific performance, in pursuance of which the price was paid and a conveyance executed. Plaintiff was then obliged to sue for possession, when it was found that the sale did not bind the son's interest, and on grounds of convenience plaintiff was awarded the value of defendant's share instead of a decree for partition. He now sued to recover the balance of the price paid, and it was contended that the suit was, in fact, one for damages for breach of the contract to convey, and as such was barred under s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, inasmuch as the damages claimed could have been sued for in the alternative in the previous suit for specific performance. *Held*, that the suit was not barred; it being in fact for the recovery of money paid on a consideration that had failed, and the cause of action being different from that in the suit for specific performance. *Held*, also, that the suit was not barred by limitation, inasmuch as the failure of consideration must be taken to have occurred when it was found, in the suit for possession, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the son's share; which date was less than three years from that upon which the present suit had been instituted. Art. 97 of Sch. II to the Limitation Act, 1877, being applicable. *VENKATARAMA AYYAR v. VENKATA SUBRAHMANYAN* (1900) . . . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 27

142. *Civil Procedure Code, s. 43.* The owners of certain property, wishing to raise a sum of Rs. 10,500 on mortgage, executed two mortgages in favour of the same mortgagees, over the same lands, on the same day; one for Rs. 10,000, and another for Rs. 500. The latter instrument recited the bond for Rs. 10,000 as a prior mortgage. The mortgagees then sued on the mortgage for Rs. 500, and obtained a decree, under which portions of the security were sold, subject to liability under the mortgage for Rs. 10,000. The mortgagees now sued on the mortgage for Rs. 10,000, when it was objected that the suit was not maintainable by reason of s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, that this objection was not sustainable, and that, regarding the case as one of a mere personal claim on the instrument of mortgage, s. 43 did not apply. *SESHA AYYAR v. KRISHNA AYYANGAR* (1900) . . . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 98

143. *Civil Procedure Code, s. 43—Purchaser's suit for specific performance—Former suit for disturbance of possession.* In a suit by purchasers against vendors for specific performance of their agreement, it appeared that both parties had previously sued, praying relief only as regards possession of the property sold or compensations for its disturbance, the purchases in their cross-suit omitting to seek the relief now claimed. *Held*, that it was barred by s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. *RANGAYYA GOUNDAN v. NANJAPA RAO* (1901)

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 491  
s.c. L. R. 28 I. A. 221  
6 C. W. N. 17



# RELINQUISHMENT OF, OR OMIS- SION TO SUE FOR, PORTION OF CLAIM—*contd.*

144. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 43. Quære*: Can a mortgagee who has several mortgages on the same property treat them with respect to the provisions of s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code, as separate causes of action, or must he bring one suit on all his mortgages? *GOPAL v. PIRTHI SINGH* (1902)

I. L. R. 24 All. 429  
s.c. L. R. 29 I. A. 118 : 6 C. W. N. 889

145. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 53—Suit on a mortgage for sale or “any other relief to which the plaintiff might be entitled”*—Subsequent prayer for money decree, relinquishing claim for sale. The plaintiff, a mortgagee, came into Court asking for a decree for sale on his mortgage, or “any other relief to which the plaintiff might be entitled.” The mortgage sued upon contained the usual covenant for payment, in addition to the further covenant that in default of payment proceedings might be taken against the mortgaged property. *Held*, that there was nothing to prevent such plaintiff in the course of the suit relinquishing his claim for sale of the mortgaged property, and asking merely for a simple money-decree. Such an amendment of the pleadings did not amount to a conversion of the suit into a suit of another and inconsistent character. *SUKHDEO PRASAD v. LACHMAN SINGH* (1902) . I. L. R. 24 All. 456

146. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 43, 44—Cause of action—Misjoinder of causes of action—Omission to claim all the reliefs to which plaintiff is entitled on the cause of action.* One *R D* brought a suit against two persons *M* and *G*, claiming to recover certain cash and ornaments belonging to one *Sahai*, deceased. To that suit *B R* and *B*, who had previously brought a suit for certain immoveable property belonging to the same estate, applied to be, and were, added as defendants. After this *H L*, the son of *R D*, brought a suit, claiming possession of a house which originally belonged to *Sahai*, and which was alleged to be then in the possession of *B R* and *B*. *Held*, that the provisions of s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply to these facts so as to bar the suit brought by *H L*. *HINGU LAL v. BALDEO RAM* (1902) . I. L. R. 24 All. 553

147. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 43—Former suit for injunction to restrain defendants from removing shells stored on certain land—Dismissal as not maintainable—Subsequent conversion by defendants of the shells—Suit for their value—Maintainability—Agricultural tenants—Right to dig shells.* Though a tenant of lands for the cultivation of paddy may possibly be justified in digging up shells from the land for the cultivation of the land in a proper and husband-like manner, the property in the shells so dug up is (in the absence of local custom) not in the tenant, but in the landlord; and the tenant has no right to convert them to his use. Defendants, who held land for the cultivation of paddy, had dug up from the land shells which are used for the manufacture

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of lime, and stored them on the land. The landlords had let the right to dig these shells to plaintiff who, in conjunction with the landlords, and while the shells were still on the land, sued for a perpetual injunction restraining defendants from digging shells, and also to restrain them from carrying away those which they had already dug, and which were stored on the land. That case was dismissed, as not being one in which an injunction could be granted. Subsequently to its dismissal defendants removed the shells and converted them to their own use. Plaintiff now sued for their value; when it was pleaded that the suit was barred by s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, that the suit was not barred. *CHALADOM THOLAN v. KAKKATH KUNHAMBU* (1902) . I. L. R. 25 Mad. 669

148. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 43—Omission to include present claim for land in a former suit for other land—Ground of title similar in both suits, but defendants different, and different lands claimed—Maintainability.* *V*, who was possessed of different plots of land, namely, lands *A* and lands *B*, died, leaving a widow and two daughters him surviving. The widow, who enjoyed all the lands during the remainder of her life, also died. The daughters then attempted to take possession of the lands *B* from a person who held possession of them, and who wrongfully refused to relinquish that possession. They, as the heirs of their late father, thereupon, namely, in 1887, instituted a suit and obtained a decree against that person for the recovery of lands *B*. In 1896 the daughters attempted to take possession of the lands *A*, which were in the possession of another person, who also wrongfully refused to relinquish his possession. They thereupon instituted the present suit against that other person, in which they also claimed as the heirs of their late father, to recover possession of the lands *A*. The persons who had withheld possession of the lands *B* and *A*, respectively, were different, and the High Court found as a fact that there had been no combination or privity between them in respect of the lands which they had severally withheld. Upon the objection being raised that the present suit was barred, under s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had omitted to include their present claim in the previous suit:—*Held*, that the suit was maintainable. *DAMPANABOYINA GANGI v. ADDALA RAMASWAMI* (1902)

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 736

# RELINQUISHMENT OF SHARE.

See MAHOMEDAN LAW.

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 271

# RELINQUISHMENT OF TENANCY.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—ABANDONMENT, RELINQUISHMENT OR SURRENDER OF TENANCY.

See RELINQUISHMENT OF TENURE.



**RELINQUISHMENT OF TENURE.**

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—ABANDONMENT—RELINQUISHMENT AND SURRENDER OF TENURE.

1. ——— Lease for specific term—*Act X of 1859, s. 19—Tenant.* S. 19, Act X of 1859, did not apply to a raiyat who had taken a lease for a specific term. *KASHEE SINGH v. ONRAET*

5 W. R., Act X, 81

2. ——— Contract for definite specified interest in land—*Notice of relinquishment—Act X of 1859, s. 19.* Held, that the provisions of s. 19, Act X of 1859, were not applicable to a lessee who had contracted for a definite specified interest in the land, and that the contract or lease must regulate the whole relationship between the lessor and lessee, not only in regard to the time of commencement and continuance, but also in regard to the termination of the holding. *DWARKA DOSS v. GOKUL DOSS*

1 Agra Rev. 22

3. ——— Contract by lessee not to relinquish—*Act X of 1859, s. 19.* A perpetual contract by a lessee for his heirs, reciting that they shall never relinquish the jote, could not operate against s. 19, Act X of 1859, which enacted that any raiyat might relinquish his jote if he did so in a legal manner. *GOPAL PAL CHOWDHRY v. TARINEE PERSHAD GHOSE*

9 W. R. 89

4. ——— Proof of relinquishment—*Onus of proof.* Where a tenant is found to have taken steps required by law in furtherance of his intended relinquishment, it is for the landlord to prove his continued possession notwithstanding. But where it is found that the tenant has not gone through the necessary steps, it will be for him to prove that the landlord took possession of the land and enjoyed the profits by holding it khas, or by letting it to others. *ERSKINE v. RAM COOMAR ROY*

8 W. R. 220

5. ——— Waiver of right to tenure—*Failure to take up mál land after survey and assessment—Forfeiture of claim.* A person who fails at the survey to take up mál land, which he held without assessment before the survey, and allows it to be taken up by another cultivator who pays the assessment upon it, must be held to have forfeited his claim to such land. *BALKRISHNA GOVIND GADGIL v. NARAYAN SAKHARAM*

8 Bom. A. C. 180

6. ——— Relinquishment by mirasidar—*Effect of delivery of possession without reservation—Title, extinction of.* B, a mirasidar, addressed a razinama to the mamlatdar, resigning certain miras land in favour of L (to whom at the same time he delivered possession of the lands), and containing no reservation or qualification. Held, that the transfer to L was complete, and the rights of B wholly extinguished. *TARACHAND PIRCHAND v. LAKSHMAN BHABANI*

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 91

7. ——— Right of ejectment—*Razinama.* A mirasidar who has given in a razinama is entitled to eject the tenant put in possession of his miras lands by the Collector, provided he sue within the period of limitation, and the razi-

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*contd.*

nama contain no stipulation whereby he expressly abandons his miras rights. *JOTI BHIMRAO v. BALU BIN BAPUJI*

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 208

8. ——— Relinquishment after mortgage, effect of—*Right of transferee—Mortgagee's right—Sale for arrears of revenue.* D, widow of a Hindu mirasidar, by a duly registered deed, dated the 24th of November 1869, mortgaged the mirasi land of her deceased husband to R M for Rs 150. Subsequently, on the 5th July 1872, D executed a razinama of the land in favour of R G. Held, that the mortgage bound D's estate in the mirasi land as a Hindu widow; that whether the property was regarded as mirasi or as that of an ordinary occupant, it was transferable under s. 36 of Bombay Act I of 1865: that when D executed the razinama, there was nothing left in her to relinquish or otherwise deal with more than the equity of redemption; that consequently R G took nothing by the razinama executed in his favour by D except this equity of redemption. *TARACHAND v. LAKSHMAN, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 91*, distinguished. The distinction between the present case and the case of a purchase at a sale for arrears of Government land revenue is, that at such last-mentioned sale the purchaser takes the land discharged of all encumbrances, inasmuch as the Government land revenue is the paramount charge upon the land. *RAMACHANDRA MANKESHWAR v. BHIMRAO RAOJI*

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 577

9. ——— Notice of relinquishment—*Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 20.* S. 20, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, does not apply when the raiyat holds under a lease for a limited period which has expired. In such a case no written notice of relinquishment is necessary. *TILAK PATAK v. MAHABIR PANDAY*

7 B. L. R. Ap. 11: 15 W. R. 454

10. ——— *Act X of 1859, s. 19.* Where a raiyat holding a considerable portion of land wishes to relinquish a portion, he must specify in his notice what portion he relinquishes in order to relieve himself of liability to payment. *HABELA SIRCAR v. DOORGA KANT MOZOOMDAR*

11 W. R. 456

11. ——— *Act X of 1859, s. 19.* When a landlord served a notice on an ootbundi raiyat that unless he paid at an enhanced rent for the ensuing year he was to quit the land, and the raiyat thereupon intimated to the landlord's agent his intention to relinquish the land:—Held, that there was a sufficient compliance with s. 19, Act X of 1859. *KENNY v. ISSUR CHUNDER PODDAR*

W. R. 1864, Act X, 9

12. ——— *Act X of 1859, s. 19.* S. 19, Act X of 1859, did not imperatively require an application for service of notice of relinquishment of land by a raiyat to be made to the Collector. The non-service of notice by the Collector cannot affect the rights of the tenant, if he can prove that, previous to his application to the Collector, he had given actual notice direct to the landlord himself or to his authorized agent. The

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*concl'd.*

application to the Collector is not bad because it was not made in the month of Chyet preceding.  
*ERSKINE v. RAM COOMAR ROY* . 8 W. R. 220

13. ——— Relinquishment by some of several co-sharers, effect of—*Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 20, 21, 86, 78, 88—Holding bonâ fide under a person having no title.* A relinquishment made in favour of the landlord by some of several tenants of a joint occupancy holding does not operate by way of enlarging the right of the other co-sharers, who did not relinquish, and depriving the landlord of what ordinarily would belong to him. The rule laid down in the case of *Binad Lal Pakrashi v. Kalu Pramanik*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 708, is based upon the assumption that the tenant entered upon the land and held under a *de facto* proprietor, who might not be the real owner, in good faith. That element being wanting in the present case, plaintiffs cannot get any relief. *PEARY MOHAN MONDAL v. RADHIKA MOHAN HAZRA* (1904) . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 315

**REMAND.**

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**1. POWER OF REMAND.**

1. ——— Appellate Court, power of  
—*Power of Court of special appeal—Irregular order*  
—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 351, 354 and*  
355. A Court of special appeal has indirectly the  
same powers as are vested in a Court of regular  
appeal by ss. 351, 354, and 355, Act VIII of 1859, in  
respect to a wrong order passed by a lower Appellate  
Court. WUZEER ALI v. KALEE COOMAR CHUCKER-  
BUTTY . . . . . 11 W. R. 228

(Contra) s. 354 relating to trial of additional  
issues is only applicable to regular appeals. KEBUL  
KISHEN MOZOOMDAR v. AMBALA . . . . . 7 W. R. 326

KALI KRISTO TAGORE v. JUDOO LAL MULLICK  
24 W. R. 20

2. ——— Special appeal—  
Act VIII of 1859, ss. 351, 354 and 355. In a suit  
on a bond executed under a mukhtarnamah which  
was not produced, the Court of first instance admit-  
ted secondary evidence of it, and decreed the suit.  
In special appeal, the High Court was of opinion  
that the secondary evidence had been improperly  
admitted and therefore the decree in the plaintiff's  
favour could not stand. Upon this it was con-  
tended that the suit should be dismissed, as the Court  
hearing a case in special appeal had no power, under  
such circumstances, either to remand the case or to  
call for additional evidence. Held, that, although  
the powers conferred by ss. 351, 354, and 355 of  
Act VIII of 1859 on the Court of regular appeal are  
not directly given to the Court of special appeal, yet  
the Court, when it found the order of a lower Appel-

**REMAND—contd.****1. POWER OF REMAND—contd.**

late Court was wrong, could point out the error and  
direct the lower Appellate Court to make such order  
as would rectify the error. AZUR ALI v. KALI  
KUMAR CHUCKERBUTTY . . . . . 2 B. L. R. A. C. 315

3. ——— Remand order—  
*Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 562.* An  
Appellate Court has no power to remand a case  
except under the provisions of s. 562 of the Code  
of Civil Procedure. MUDUN MOHUN PODDAR v.  
BHAGGOMANTO PODDAR . . . . . I. L. R. 8 Calc. 923

4. ——— Local investiga-  
tion. An Appellate Court is not competent to  
remand a case for re-trial after a local investigation.  
JEEBUN KISHEN ROY v. DWARKANATH ROY  
CHOWDHRY . . . . . W. R. 1864, 363

5. ——— Powers of Court  
of first and second appeal—*Civil Procedure Code,*  
1882, ss. 574, 578. Observations by MAHMOOD, J.,  
upon the distinction between the duties of the  
Courts of first appeal and those of the Courts of  
second appeal in connection with the provisions of  
ss. 574 and 578 of the Civil Procedure Code, and with  
the remand of cases for trial *de novo*. Ram Narain  
v. Bhawanidin, I. L. R. 9 All. 29 note, and Sheoam-  
ber Singh v. Lal'u Singh, I. L. R. 5 All. 14, referred  
to. SOHAWAN v. BABU NAND . I. L. R. 9 All. 26

6. ——— Civil Procedure  
Code, ss. 562, 564—"Suit." S. 562 of the Civil  
Procedure Code authorizes a remand only where the  
entire suit, and not merely a portion of it, has  
been disposed of by the Court below upon a preli-  
minary point. BANWARI LAL v. SAMMAN LAL  
I. L. R. 11 All. 488

7. ——— Decision of  
lower Court not confined to preliminary point—  
*Civil Procedure Code, s. 562.* Where the Deputy  
Commissioner of Naini Tal decided that a suit was  
barred by limitation, but at the same time also came  
to a definite decision on each of the other issues,  
and the Commissioner in appeal, setting aside the  
finding as to limitation, remanded the case under  
s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure:—Held,  
that the suit between the parties not having been  
confined by the Deputy Commissioner to the preli-  
minary point, it was not, under ss. 562, 564 of  
the Code of Civil Procedure, open to the Commis-  
sioner to make an order under s. 562. HAFIZ  
ABDUL RAHIM v. KHAN HARI RAJ SINGH  
I. L. R. 22 All. 405

8. ——— Civil Procedure  
Code, ss. 562, 564—*Illegality of remand in contra-*  
*vention of s. 564—Construction of statutes—Distinc-*  
*tion between affirmative commands and negative pro-*  
*hibitions—Irregularities and illegalities.* Where a  
Court of first instance decided a suit, not upon a  
preliminary point so as to exclude any evidence of  
facts, but upon the merits, and upon all the evidence  
tendered and issues framed;—Held, by the Full  
Bench, that, with reference to ss. 562, 564 of the Civil  
Procedure Code, the lower Appellate Court had no  
jurisdiction to remand the case under the former



**REMAND—contd.****1. POWER OF REMAND—contd.**

section, and that both the remand order and all proceedings subsequent thereto were *ultra vires* and illegal. As a principle of the interpretation of statutes, a distinction must be drawn between cases in which a Court or an official omits to do something which a statute enacts shall be done, and cases in which a Court or an official does something which a statute enacts shall not be done. In the former case, the omission may not amount to more than an irregularity in procedure. In the latter, the doing of the prohibited thing is *ultra vires* and illegal, and therefore without jurisdiction. **RAMESHUR SINGH v. SHEODIN SINGH** . . . **I. L. R. 12 All. 510**

**9.** . . . *Civil Procedure Code, s. 562—Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act (VII of 1888), s. 49—“Preliminary point.”* It is competent for an Appellate Court to remand a case when the Court of first instance records evidence on all the issues, and at the final hearing decides the suit erroneously on some particular point without expressing any opinion on the other issues. **RAMACHANDRA JOISHI v. HAZI KASSIM** . . . **I. L. R. 16 Mad. 207**

**10.** . . . *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 562, 568, 569.* The defendant in a suit on a mortgage applied, on the day fixed for the hearing, for an adjournment on the ground of illness. Her application was refused and the Court heard the case *ex parte* and passed a decree for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed to the District Judge, who reversed the decree and remanded the case, on the ground that the defendant's application for an adjournment ought to have been granted. On appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, discharging the order of remand, that the suit having been tried on the merits, the District Judge could not remand the case under s. 562, but ought to have proceeded under ss. 568, 569. **PARVATISHANKAR DURGASHANKAR v. BAI NAVAL** . . . **I. L. R. 17 Bom. 733**

**11.** . . . *Civil Procedure Code, Chs. XLI, XLII, ss. 540-587.* The sections in Chs. XLI and XLII, Civil Procedure Code, relating to the hearing of appeals provide the only powers that can be exercised by an Appellate Court in remanding a suit for the consideration of evidence by the Court from which the appeal is preferred. **VENKATA VARATHA THATHA CHARIAR v. ANANTHA CHARIAR** . . . **I. L. R. 16 Mad. 299**

**12.** . . . *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 562, 566, and 582—Order made on appeal to amend plaint.* On appeal from the decision of a District Munsif in favour of the plaintiffs in a suit for the recovery of rent the District Judge set aside the decree of the lower Court, ordered a new trial, and directed the amendment of the plaint by inserting the exact boundaries of the land on which plaintiffs claimed the rent. *Held*, that the order for amendment on the plaint was bad under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure, since the original Court had not “disposed of the suit upon a preliminary point,” and that it was likewise bad under s. 582, since there had been no dispute as to the boundaries

**REMAND—contd.****1. POWER OF REMAND—contd.**

of the land before the original Court. If the information was necessary, the District Judge should have sent down an issue on the point for trial under s. 566 of the Code. **KRISHNAYA NAVADA v. PANCHU** . . . **I. L. R. 17 Mad. 187**

**13.** . . . *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 562, 566.* In a suit for recovery of mesne profits subsequent to the date of suit brought by plaintiff for recovery of possession the Munsif found that defendant was not in possession, and the Subordinate Judge on appeal reversed the decision and remanded the case under s. 562, Civil Procedure Code, for the determination of the question of the amount of mesne profits. *Held*, that s. 562 was not applicable, and that the remand ought to have been made under s. 566. **LALLA CHUNILAL v. MOHIJI SINGH** . . . **1 C. W. N. 340**

**14.** . . . *Suit tried out by Court of first instance—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 562, 566.* When a Court of first instance has tried out a suit, the Appellate Court has no jurisdiction to make an order of remand under s. 562, Civil Procedure Code, but if a new issue has to be tried, it should proceed under s. 566, Civil Procedure Code. **RAM DAS MONDAL v. INDROMONI DAS** . . . **3 C. W. N. 325**

**15.** . . . *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 562—Court to which remand must be made.* When a suit is not disposed of on a preliminary point, it is not competent to a Court of appeal under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882) to remand the case for a fresh trial. The section, moreover, contemplates a remand back to the Court which first disposed of the suit, and to no other Court. **BAI SHRI MAJIRAJBA v. MAGANLAL BHAI SANKAR** . . . **I. L. R. 19 Bom. 303**

**16.** . . . *Remand of case not tried on preliminary issue—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 562 and 578—Irregularity affecting the merits.* Where a District Court reversed the District Munsif's decree and remanded the case for a revised finding on the merits:—*Held*, that this procedure was *ultra vires* and illegal. *Held*, further, that, as the irregularity might have affected the merits of the case, s. 578, Civil Procedure Code, was inapplicable. **MALLIKARJUNA v. PATHANENI** . . . **I. L. R. 19 Mad. 479**

**17.** . . . *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 562—Dismissal of suit for want of cause of action.* Where a District Munsif, without entering into the merits of the case, dismissed a suit on the ground that the plaintiffs had no cause of action, and on appeal the Appellate Court reversed his decree and remanded the case. *Held*, that the suit had been disposed of upon a preliminary point within the meaning of s. 562, Civil Procedure Code, and that the remand was right. **KANAKAMMAL v. RANGACHARIAR** . . . **I. L. R. 20 Mad. 25**

**18.** . . . *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 562, 564, and 566—Refusal of*



## REMAND—contd.

## 1. POWER OF REMAND—contd.

*Court of first instance to record evidence tendered—Refusal of Appellate Court to record additional evidence.* The plaintiffs in the Court of first instance produced both documentary and oral evidence in support of their claim. The Court, being satisfied with the documentary evidence produced by the plaintiffs, declined to record the evidence of the witnesses tendered by them. The defendants appealed and the lower Appellate Court reversed the decree of the Court of first instance, but in its turn declined to allow the plaintiffs, respondents, to produce fresh evidence before it. On appeal by the plaintiffs to the High Court, it was held that, though there was no section of the Code of Civil Procedure strictly applicable to the circumstances of the case, the Court was, notwithstanding s. 554 of the Code, warranted *ex debito justitiæ* in setting aside all proceedings of both Courts below and in directing the Court of first instance to re-try the case admitting all admissible evidence which had previously been tendered to the Court of first instance and which that Court had refused to record. *DURGA DIHAL DAS v. ANORAJI*

I. L. R. 17 All. 29

19. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 566—Issue not disposed of by the lower Appellate Court—Procedure.* In a suit for money due under a bond, the plaintiff tendered three witnesses in the Court of first instance to prove execution of the bond. That Court, having examined one of such witnesses, declined to examine the others, being satisfied on his evidence of the genuineness of the bond, and passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff. On appeal by the defendant the lower Appellate Court disposed of the sole issue in the appeal, viz., execution or non-execution, in the following words: "I do not think the claim made out by the plaintiff on his own evidence." *Held*, that, under the circumstances above described, it was competent to the High Court in second appeal to act under s. 566 of the Code of Civil Procedure and refer an issue as to the execution or non-execution of the bond in suit to the lower Appellate Court, that issue having practically not been tried at all by the said Court. *Kanhai Lal v. Manorath Ram, All. Weekly Notes (1894) 19; Madho Singh v. Kashi Singh, I. L. R. 11 All. 342; and Durga Dihal Das v. Anoraji, I. L. R. 17 All. 29, referred to.* *GANGA PRASAD v. LAL BAHADUR SINGH*

I. L. R. 17 All. 117

20. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882; ss. 562, 564—Ex parte decision in Court of first instance after hearing plaintiffs' evidence—Order by Appellate Court reversing decree and remanding suit for decision after hearing further evidence—Validity of such an order.* One of three defendants failed to appear at the final hearing of a case at the Court of a District Munsif and the other two, though they appeared, adduced no evidence. The District Munsif, after hearing witnesses for the plaintiffs, passed a decree in their favour as prayed. The absent defendant applied unsuccessfully, under s. 108 of the Code of Civil

## REMAND—contd. ¶

## 1. POWER OF REMAND—contd.

Procedure that the decree might be set aside, and then appeared to the Subordinate Judge, who reversed the decree and remanded the suit for decision after taking such further evidence as the said defendants or other parties might produce. On its being contended that, under ss. 562 and 564 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Subordinate Judge had no power to remand the suit for re-trial:—*Held*, that, notwithstanding ss. 562 and 564, an Appellate Court has inherent power, in such a case, not only to reverse a decree passed on evidence given by the plaintiff only, the defendant being *ex parte*, but also to direct a re-trial of the case. *PERUMBRA NAYAR v. SUBRAHMANIAN PATTAR*

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 445

21. *Order reversing decree of lower Court on account of exclusion of evidence.* A trial took place in the Court of the District Munsif who heard evidence, decided issues, and passed a decree. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge reversed the decree and remanded the suit for re-trial, on the ground that certain documentary evidence which had been tendered by a defendant had been excluded, and plaintiff's witnesses who had been cited in the list had not been examined. *Held*, that s. 562 was not applicable to such a case; that the proper course for the Subordinate Judge to take was to act either under s. 568 or 569 by himself taking the evidence which he considered had been wrongly excluded, or to direct the Munsif to take it. *Perumbra Nayar v. Subrahmanian Pattar, I. L. R. 23 Mad. 445, distinguished.* *SESHAN PATTAR v. SESHAN PATTAR*

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 447

22. *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 562, 564, 566—Appeal—Power of Appellate Court to remand for trial on the merits otherwise than under the provisions of s. 562.* S. 564 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be read subject to the other provisions of the Code, for example, those contained in s. 27, s. 32 or s. 53. An Appellate Court has power to make an order under any of those sections; and, in order to give effect to the provisions of the section which is applicable, it is necessary that it should in certain cases send back the case in the Court of first instance. Under such circumstances, s. 564 of the Code will not preclude the Appellate Court from remitting a case to the Court of first instance. *Rameshur Singh v. Sheodin Singh, I. L. R. 12 All. 510; Mahgu Kuar v. Faujdar Kuar, All. Weekly Notes (1891) 105; Mullu Khan v. Than Singh, All. Weekly Notes (1891) 187; Durga Dihal Das v. Anoraji, I. L. R. 17 All. 29; Salima Bibi v. Sheikh Muhammad, I. L. R. 18 All. 131; Mihin Lal v. Imtiaz Ali, I. L. R. 18 All. 332; Rajit Ram v. Katesar Nath, I. L. R. 18 All. 396; Ganesh Bhikaji Juvekar v. Bhikaji Kishna Juvekar I. L. R. 10 Bom. 398; and Kelu Mulacheri Nayar v. Chendu, I. L. R. 19 Mad. 157, referred to.* *HABIB BAKHSH v. BALDEO PRASAD (1901)* . . . I. L. R. 23 All. 167



**REMAND—contd.****1. POWER OF REMAND—contd.**

**23.** ————— **Illegal remand—Limit to remand—Custom opposed to Statutes, validity of—Rent Recovery Act (VIII of 1865), s. 11—Cultivation by wells constructed at tenants' cost, liability to enhanced rent for—Payment of enhanced rent for a number of years, whether an implied contract to pay—Agreement and contract, difference between—Tenant with right of occupancy, right of, to construct wells without permission of landholder.** Ryots with permanent rights of occupancy in a zamindari constructed wells at their own cost without obtaining the permission of the zemindar and cultivated dry lands with garden crops for periods ranging from 1 to 18 years. Suits were brought by the ryots before the Sub-Collector under s. 8 of the Rent Recovery Act to compel the defendant, the zamindar, to grant them proper pattas for fasli 1312, alleging that the pattas tendered were illegal as they charged the higher garden rate for dry lands cultivated by them with the aid of wells constructed at their own cost. The defendant pleaded that he was entitled to the enhanced rate (i) by custom, (ii) by virtue of a contract to be implied from previous payments. No consideration for such a contract was however alleged. The Sub-Collector framed two issues—one as to the existence of the custom set up by the defendant, and another as to whether the previous payments by the plaintiffs operated as an estoppel or evidenced an implied contract to continue to pay the enhanced rates. The Sub-Collector did not record evidence as to custom, holding that such custom even if proved could not deprive the plaintiffs of the benefits expressly given by the Act. He also held that any such implied contract as that set up by the defendant would be illegal as opposed to the provisions of the Act. He passed a decree, that the defendant should grant pattas as claimed by the plaintiffs. On appeal the District Judge held that the payment of rent at the enhanced rate raised a presumption that there was a contract to pay such rent; and that, if there was no contract, express or implied, the rent must be fixed in accordance with the other provisions of s. 11 of the Rent Recovery Act. He reversed the decrees of the Sub-Collector and remanded the cases for re-trial under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On appeal to the High Court:—*Held, per SUBRAHMANYA AYYAR, J.*, that the order remanding the case was not legal as all the questions raised between the parties and on which they went to trial had been decided, and the questions so raised were purely questions of law. A custom can be upheld only so far as it is not in conflict with statute law; and a custom to pay enhanced rent for improvements effected by a tenant at his cost is illegal as opposed to the provisions of the Rent Recovery Act. *Fischer v. Kamakshi Pillai, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 136*, followed. *Gopalasami Chettier v. Fischer, I. L. R. 28 Mad. 328*, referred to. It makes no difference whether a tenant constructed wells at his cost prior to or after the passing of Act VIII of 1865. In either case no additional rent can be claimed. *Nagasami Kamia Naick*

**REMAND—contd.****1. POWER OF REMAND—contd.**

*v. Iyodi Rama Goundan, 6 Mad. R. R. 5.* Payment for a number of years of enhanced rent may be evidence of an agreement to pay at that rate, but it will not be binding as a contract, unless supported by consideration. *Quære*: Whether when the enhanced rate had been paid for a large number of years and when the lapse of time is such as to make it unfair to call on the landlord to prove consideration, a lawful origin may not be presumed. *Gann v. Free Fisheries of Whitestable, 11 H. L. C. 192, 103*, referred to. No such presumption can be made when the payments have been only for a period extending from one to eighteen years. Tenants with permanent rights of occupancy are entitled to construct wells without the permission of the landholder; and a custom requiring such permission may be bad, as unreasonable, and is certainly illegal as opposed to the policy of s. 11 of the Rent Recovery Act. *Venkatanarasimha Naidu v. Dhandamudi Kotayya, I. L. R. 30 Mad. 299*, referred to. *Held, per MOORE, J.*, that the Sub-Collector having disposed of the case on two preliminary issues, the District Judge was right in remanding the cases under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *ARUMUGAM CHETTI v. JAGAVEERA RAMA VENKATESWARA ETTAPPA (1905)*

**I. L. R. 28 Mad. 444**

**24.** ————— **Whether consent of parties can validate an illegal remand under s. 564 of Civil Procedure Code—Waiver, effect of—Effect of illegal remand by lower Appellate Court on points properly decided.** Where the Court of first instance had framed all the necessary issues and decided all those issues, and the lower Appellate Court reversing the decision of the Court of first instance on one of the issues remanded the case for re-trial under s. 564 of the Code of Civil Procedure:—*Held, on second appeal: Per SUBRAHMANYA AYYAR, J.*—An order of remand, contrary to the provisions of s. 564, is not merely irregular, but illegal; but it is not on that account absolutely void so as to render any consent of the parties of no avail. It can be objected to by a party, if he has not given his consent to such a course, and even a party who has not consented may be equitably estopped by subsequent conduct from treating such an order as null and void. Such an order of remand does not necessarily vitiate the decision of the lower Appellate Court on questions properly decided by it, which can be attacked only on grounds legally open to the parties on second appeal. It cannot be treated as void for want of jurisdiction, so as to be incapable of being validated by consent or waiver. *Mohesh Chandra Dass v. Jamiruddin Mollah, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 324*, referred to. *Malikarjuna v. Pathaneni, I. L. R. 19 Mad. 479*, referred to. *Subrahmanya Ayyar v. King-Emperor, I. L. R. 25 Mad. 61, 97*, followed. *Per MOORE, J.*—The order of remand was illegal and no consent of parties could make it valid. **MANAGER OF THE COURT OF WARDS. KALAHASTIE ESTATE v. RAMASAMI REDDI (1905)** . . . **I. L. R. 28 Mad. 437**



REMAND—*contd.*1. POWER OF REMAND—*concl.*

**25. Irregularity—Civil Procedure Code, s. 578—Order for remand.** Where an order of remand by the lower Appellate Court was not strictly in accordance with the provisions of s. 562, Civil Procedure Code:—*Held*, that this amounted to an irregularity such as was covered by the provisions of s. 578, Civil Procedure Code. *Mohesh Chunder Das v. Jahiruddi Mollah*, 5 C. W. N. 509 : 1. L. R. 28 Cal. 524. TRAILOKHYA MOHINI DASI v. KALI PROSANNA GHOSE (1907)

11 C. W. N. 380

## 2. GROUNDS FOR REMAND.

**1. Error in law—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 372.** To justify a remand, it must be shown that the lower Court has committed some error in law, or that the case comes in some other way within the terms of s. 372, Civil Procedure Code. *HURISH CHANDER SHAHA v. HURISH CHUNDER PAUL* . . . . . **25 W. R. 325**

**2. Erroneous decision of first Court—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 354.** Where a Subordinate Judge's decision in appeal was not a right decision (his orders having been impossible of execution), the District Judge was held to have been empowered, under Act VIII of 1859, s. 354, to send the case back, after fixing an issue, for a finding. *UMER ALI v. RUMZAN ALI* **23 W. R. 347**

**3. Decision given when Court was closed.** The fact that the decision of the Court of first instance was passed on a day when the Court was closed does not necessitate the lower Appellate Court remanding the case. *WARRISH ALLY v. LALLA RAM SHAHAYE* . . . **1 Hay 197**

**4. Undervaluation of suit—Pre-emption suit.** Where a pre-emption suit was valued at R31, though the consideration was R2,000, the High Court, in special appeal, refused to remand the case to enable plaintiff to make up the deficient stamp duty. *MEWA LALL v. BEHAREE LALL* . . . . . **14 W. R. 195**

**5. Addition of parties—Rejection of application to make intervenor a party—Act X of 1859, s. 77.** Where a Deputy Collector rejects an application by a third party to intervene under s. 77, Act X of 1859, a Judge has no jurisdiction on that party's appeal to remand the case to the Deputy Collector for re-trial, with directions to make the intervenor a party. *KHONDKAR KEFAE-TOOLLAH v. MAMOHED KABEL* . . . **9 W. R. 345**

**6. Question as to validity of alienation—Improper remand by Appellate Court.** *M*, a Hindu widow, executed a deed of usufructuary mortgage in *J*'s favour, the property hypothecated being the separate property of her husband in which she only had a life-interest. On the latter applying for mutation of names, *B* objected that she was in proprietary possession under a deed of gift executed by *M*, and the objection

REMAND—*contd.*2. GROUNDS FOR REMAND—*contd.*

was allowed. In virtue of a clause in the deed of mortgage that, in case any demand was made in respect of the property within the mortgage term, the mortgagee was entitled to sue for the mortgage-money notwithstanding the term had not expired, *J* sued to recover the money by the sale of the hypothecated property. *B*, in addition to an objection to the validity of the mortgage based on the deed of gift, pleaded that it was invalid under Hindu law as against him, the next reversioner to the property, there being no legal necessity for the alienation. The lower Appellate Court held that the mortgage was valid as against the deed of gift, but invalid as against the next reversioner. Finding that *B* was not the next reversioner, it remanded the case to the Court of first instance, with instructions to make certain persons who had applied to that Court to be made parties to the suit, on the ground that they were the nearest heirs to *M*'s deceased husband, but whose application that Court had rejected, defendants in the suit, as also any other persons who might claim to be near heirs, and to determine as between them who was the next reversioner and to further determine whether such next reversioner had relinquished his rights in favour of *B*, and whether the validity of the mortgage could be questioned on the ground that *M*, having only a limited interest, had alienated for an indefinite period. It was held that the suit was improperly remanded, and the Court decreed *J*'s claim in respect of the property. *BULAKI SINGH v. JAI KISHEN DAS*

7 N. W. 203

**7. Order of remand—Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), ss. 562, 564, and 566—Addition of necessary parties not a ground for remand on a first appeal.** Where a Court of first appeal remanded a case to the Court of first instance for the addition of all necessary parties, and at the same time decided an issue as to the merits, and it appeared that the Court of first instance had not disposed of the case "on preliminary point, so as to exclude any evidence of fact which appeared to the Appellate Court essential to the determination of the rights of the parties":—*Held*, first, that on an appeal from the order of remand, the decision on the merits, on which the order of remand was not based, was not before the High Court on appeal; and, further, that the order of remand was unsustainable under ss. 562 and 564 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), which are strictly binding on all Courts of first appeal. The proper course for the lower Appellate Court would have been to join the parties whom it found to be necessary, and then to raise the proper issues as between the plaintiff and those parties, and, if necessary, to refer the issues to the Court of first instance for trial under s. 566. *GANESH BHIKAJI JUVEKAR v. BHIKAJI KRISHNA JUVEKAR*

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 398

**8. Examination of witness—Application to have witness examined—Omission**



**REMAND—contd.****2. GROUNDS FOR REMAND—contd.**

to make order. Where in the first Court the defendant applied for a witness to be examined, but no order was made on the subject, and on the case coming up on appeal, the Appellate Court, on its notice being called to the omission, remanded the case to the lower Court to entertain the application:—*Held*, that there was nothing illegal in such a remand, though the remand sections of Act VIII of 1859 did not expressly apply to it. **BONOMALEE CHURN MYTEE v. HAFIZUDDIN**  
13 B. L. R. 247 note : 12 W. R. 317

**9.** ————— *Refusal to summon witnesses.* If a defendant's case is not closed, he has a right to have his witnesses summoned and to get an opportunity of producing them if he can do so in time. Where such right was refused to a defendant by the first Court, and his objection on that score was not noticed by the lower Appellate Court, the High Court, on special appeal, remanded the case for a fresh hearing. **BROJO NATH MOOKHOPADHYA v. PROTAB CHUNDER THAKOOR**  
22 W. R. 296

**10.** ————— *In sufficient examination of witness—Bad legal advice.* Where the oral evidence taken fell short of the requirements of the Evidence Act, s. 63, only because the witnesses were not properly questioned, the High Court, on special appeal, *held* it to be unjust to let the plaintiff suffer on account of the inefficiency of his legal adviser, and so remanded the case for re-trial. **LOCHUN SINGH v. HET NARAIN SINGH**  
24 W. R. 232

**11.** ————— *Local inquiry, order for—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 351, 354—Further evidence.* A Judge on appeal in a suit to open roads leading to a kotee, expressing an opinion that the facts had not been sufficiently ascertained, directed a further local inquiry to be made, and remanded the case to the lower Court to be again decided there after such local inquiry. *Held*, that he had no authority upon such a ground to remand the case for re-decision, there being no suggestion under Act VIII of 1859, s. 351, that the lower Court had erroneously decided a preliminary point excluding evidence, and the reference not being on an issue framed by the Appellate Court under s. 354. **NUNDOCOMAR BANERJEE v. BARRY**  
Marsh. 121 : 1 Hay 260

**12.** ————— *Necessity of further evidence—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 351, 352—Cases heard together. Quære:* Whether, under ss. 351 and 352, Act VIII of 1859, when several cases are tried together remand can be allowed for a new trial, on the ground that the plaintiff's evidence had not been completely heard, and that it was an error in the Court below to determine all the cases at once. **SNADDEN v. TODD, FINLAY & Co.**  
7 W. R. 313

**13.** ————— *Defect in pleadings—Jurisdiction.* When it did not appear on the face of the pleadings, or on the evidence, under what kind of

**REMAND—contd.****2. GROUNDS FOR REMAND—contd.**

bastu the land in dispute fell, and no plea to the jurisdiction of the Court under Act X of 1859 had been taken in the Courts below, the High Court would not remand the case to inquire under which class of bastu land the subject-matter of the suit fell nor entertain the point of jurisdiction on appeal. **NAIMUDDA JOWARDAR v. SCOTT-MONCRIEFF**  
3 B. L. R. A. C. 283

**S.C. NYMOODDEE JOARDAR v. MONCRIEFF**  
12 W. R. 140

**14.** ————— *Defect in plaint—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 354.* Where there is a defect in the allegations in a plaint and subject-matter of the absent allegation has not been tried in the Court below, the proper course is for the Judge to frame an issue, and refer it to the lower Court for trial under Act VIII of 1859, s. 354. **KASSEENAUTH MOOR v. REEJOONISSA**. Marsh. 198 : 1 Hay 467

**15.** ————— *Omission to settle issues—Remand for re-trial.* Where no issues have been settled in a suit, the High Court will remand the case for re-trial. **JOGESHUR RAE v. DOOLUN RAE**  
2 N. W. 183

**16.** ————— *Omission to raise material issue—Suit for arrears of rent—Parties.* A case was remanded for re-trial on its merits because it was found, on special appeal, that material error had been committed in consequence of the omission on the part of the lower Appellate Court to frame issues between the parties, *e.g.*, the suit being for arrears of rent, the issue *inter alia* whether the plaintiffs, who were shareholders with others, were entitled to claim the fraction of the rent for which they sued. **SHEO SAHOY SINGH v. BECHUN SINGH**  
22 W. R. 31

**17.** ————— *Improper demand by Appellate Court—Raising fresh issues.* A sued to eject a raiyat on the ground of his holding over after the term of his pottah had expired. The raiyat denied that he had ever held under a pottah from A, and alleged that the jote belonged to B. Plaintiff's allegations were found to be false, and his suit was dismissed. The lower Appellate Court directed B to be made a defendant and remanded the suit to have the question of ownership tried between A and B, at the same time agreeing with the Court of first instance that the allegations in the plaint were false. *Held*, that the lower Appellate Court should have dismissed the case, and was wrong in so remanding it. *Per* CUNNINGHAM, J.—The right of framing new issues arises where the issues framed are insufficient to dispose of the matters raised in the plaint. **Ram Dhun Khan v. Haradhun Puramanik**, 9 B. L. R. 107 note : 12 W. R. 404, cited and distinguished. **BHOOBUN DASS MUNDUL v. BILASHMONEY DASSEE**  
1 C. L. R. 415

**18.** ————— *Remand on point raised on issue in lower Court.* A case ought not, as a rule, to be remanded upon a point which has been framed as an issue by the Court below, and brought



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to the attention of the parties, and where they had failed at the trial to give any evidence upon it. **RAM PROSAD v. ABDUL KARIM**

**I. L. R. 9 All. 513**

**19. Raising fresh issues—Appellate Court—Reference of issues for trial.** An Appellate Court cannot remand a case for trial with instructions to frame new issues. It may refer any issues for trial by the lower Court, whose finding and evidence are to be returned to the Appellate Court for a final decision. **CHUNDERNATH SURMA v. ROMANATH SURMA**

**1 W. R. 69**

**20. Appellate Court—Defective or insufficient issues.** Where no preliminary point has been wrongly decided by the Court of first instance, and no evidence has been excluded, and the Appellate Court considers the issues nevertheless to have been defective or insufficient, it is the duty of the latter not to remand the case, but to re-settle the issues and to determine the case itself. **FUTTEHOOLAH v. OOMDANISSA BIBEE**

**14 W. R. 69**

**21. Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 562 and 566—Illegal Order of remand—Duty of Appellate Court when fresh parties or addition or amendment of issues is necessary.** In a suit by mortgagees to redeem a prior mortgage issues were framed and tried and disposed of in favour of the plaintiffs as to the questions whether the plaintiff's mortgage was valid, whether the mortgage sought to be redeemed had been discharged, and whether the suit was barred by limitation. The Court of first appeal was of opinion that these questions had not been properly considered, and set aside the decree for the plaintiffs, and directed that a fresh trial be held, certain fresh parties being brought on the record. *Held*, (i) that the order of remand was illegal, there being no proper ground for it under ss. 562 and 566 of the Code of Civil Procedure; (ii) that the lower Appellate Court should have joined the persons necessary for the suit, and should have so altered or added to the issues as to raise all questions properly arising, and should have referred them for trial to the Court of first instance. **KELU MULACHERI NAYAR v. CHENDU**

**I. L. R. 19 Mad. 157**

**22. Trial on erroneous issues—Appellate Court.** Where the Munsif, acting erroneously, forced the plaintiffs to amend their plaint and, in consequence of that amendment, the Munsif also amended the issues and tried the suit on an entirely erroneous issue, the Judge of the lower Appellate Court, as a Court of equity, should, of his own motion, have sent the case back to the Munsif directing him to try it on its merits and pointing out that he had taken a wrong view of the law. **GURU PRASHAD ROY v. RAS MOHUN MUKHOPADHYA**

**1 C. L. R. 431**

**23. Wrong issue framed by lower Court—Finding in judgment on the point raised by correct issue.** Where the lower Ap-

**REMAND—contd.****2. GROUNDS FOR REMAND—contd.**

pellate Court framed a wrong issue for decision, but it appeared from its judgment that there was a finding on the point which would have been raised if the correct issue had been framed, the High Court in second appeal refused to remand the case for a new finding on that issue. **VISHNU RAMCHANDRA v. GANESH APPAJI CHAUDHARI**

**I. L. R. 21 Bom. 325**

**24. Illegal remand—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 354.** In a suit for a declaration of plaintiff's title to and possession of a share of certain property, she alleged that her title was derived by purchase from one *R*, who held under a deed of gift from *T*, the wife of the original holder. Defendant's case was that their title was derived from the three grandsons of one *R K* by his daughter *C*. The first Court dismissed the suit, considering that the defendants' title was proved, and that *T* was not competent to dispose of the property by gift to plaintiff's vendor. The lower Appellate Court, finding that it was not satisfactorily proved that the defendants' alleged three vendors were really the daughter's sons of *R K*, remanded the case for a finding on that issue. *Held*, with reference to s. 354, Act VIII of 1859, that the order of remand was illegal. **HUROSOONDUREE DEBIA v. UNNO POORNA DEBIA**

**11 W. R. 550**

**25. Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 566.** The karnavan of a tarwad in Malabar sued to recover property acquired by his sister (deceased) and now in the occupation of the defendants, her children. The parties were Mapillas. The defendants pleaded (i) that the property had been given to them and their mother jointly; (ii) that their mother was not governed by Marumakkatayam law. The Court of first instance found the first mentioned plea to be good, and dismissed the suit, and also found that the family was governed by Marumakkatayam law. The Court of first appeal dissented from the above finding as to the first plea, and, without deciding the second point, remanded the case for the trial of a general issue as to the mode of devolution of self-acquired property in Marumakkatayam Mapilla families in North Malabar, and ultimately it dismissed the suit on that issue. *Held*, that the order of remand was not one which should have been made under the Civil Procedure Code, s. 566, and the proceedings taken under it were irregular. **ILLIKA PAKRAMAR v. KUTTI KUNHAMED**

**I. L. R. 17 Mad. 69**

**26. Dismissal of case on point not arising—Suit under s. 230, Civil Procedure Code, 1859.** Where a lower Appellate Court found that a suit falling substantially under s. 230, Act VIII of 1859, which had been received and numbered as such, had been subsequently dismissed by the Court of first instance upon a point which did not properly arise under that section:—*Held*, that it should have remanded the case to the first Court for trial and decision under that section. **SABIR KHAN v. RAM LUCKHEE CHOWDHRAIN**

**10 W. R. 438**



**REMAND—contd.****2. GROUNDS FOR REMAND—contd.**

**27. — Remand for further evidence—***Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 352, 354.* Held, by JACKSON, J. (whose opinion prevailed), that where a lower Appellate Court is of opinion that further evidence should be taken it may take such evidence itself, or require the first Court to do so, but it is not competent to remand a case for a second decision upon any of the issues, such a course being forbidden by s. 352, Act VIII of 1859. Held, by MARKBY, J. (dissenting), that a lower Appellate Court has power, under s. 354, to send back a case for trial upon an issue not satisfactorily tried by the Court of first instance. *UMBIKA CHURN MUNDUL v. RAMDHUN MORURRI* . . . **11 W. R. 35**

**28. — Remand for re-trial on particular issue—***Improper remand—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 562, 566, 567—Decision by lower Court on the merits.* A decree in a suit having been passed on the merits by the Court of first instance, the Court of appeal being of opinion that an issue not tried by the former Court ought to have been tried, reversed the decree, and under s. 562 of the Civil Procedure Code remanded the case for trial upon that issue. Held, that the order reversing the decree and remanding the case for trial of the issue was improper, and that the proper course for the Appellate Court to have taken was that laid down by ss. 566 and 567 of the Code. *MOKUND LAL v. HURBULLUBH NARAIN SINGH* . . . **12 C. L. R. 136**

**29. — Obscurity in judgment—***Affirming judgment of lower Court.* Where an Appellate Court has considered a case and come to the same conclusion as the Court of first instance, occasional obscurity in the judgment of the former does not constitute a proper ground for a remand. *BROJO NATH SEN v. SOORJA KANT SEN* . . . **25 W. R. 276**

**30. — Omission to try ground of appeal taken—***Review of judgment.* Where a ground of appeal stated in the written memorandum is not alluded to when the appeal comes on for hearing, the Court is not at fault if no decision is passed upon it. If, having had his attention called to it, a Judge fails to decide such point, the proper course for the parties aggrieved is to ask him to review his judgment. In neither case is the omission ground for remand on appeal. *YUSOOF ALI CHOWDHRY v. FYZOONISSA KHATOON CHOWDHRAI* . . . **15 W. R. 296**

**31. — Omission to decide point raised—***Issue, though trifling, left undecided.* Where the lower Courts have come to no decision on a point raised, the plaintiff in special appeal has a right to a remand for the point to be tried, even though very trifling. *MULLICK AMANUT ALI v. UKLOO PASEE* . . . **25 W. R. 140**

**32. — Improper reception of evidence by lower Court—***Ground for decision, consideration of.* On second appeal, the High Court has, generally speaking, no right to look at the

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evidence to decide whether the remaining evidence in a case other than that which has been improperly admitted, is sufficient to warrant the finding of the Court below. The only cases which can be, with propriety, disposed of under such circumstances without a remand, are those where, independently of the evidence improperly admitted, the lower Court has apparently arrived at its conclusions upon other grounds. *WOMES CHUNDER CHATTERJEE v. CHONDEE CHURN ROY CHOWDHRY* . . . **I. L. R. 7 Calc. 293**

**33. — Mistake in admitting or rejecting evidence—***Error affecting merits.* An act done by a party with the view of defeating a claim made against him does not estop him from disputing afterwards the validity of that act. *BYKUNT NATH SEN v. GOBOOLLA SIKDAR* . . . **24 W. R. 392**

**34. — Omission to consider evidence—***Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 372.* When important evidence has not been carefully examined by the Judge in the lower Court, the Appellate Court will, on special appeal, remand the suit under s. 372 of Act VIII of 1859. *DEGUMBER DOSSEE v. KISSEN DHUR NUNDY* . . . **1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 35**

**35. — Omission to decide material issue—***Decree based on point not in issue.* The lower Appellate Court not having decided material issues and having based its decree on a document not recorded in the case, the decree was reversed and the case remanded for a fresh decision on the merits. *NICHHABHAI PRAGJI v. ISSE KHAN HAJI ABDULL KHAN* . . . **2 Bom. 313 : 2nd Ed. 267**

*DALPAT SINGH v. NANABHAI.* . . . **2 Bom. 323 : 2nd Ed. 306**

*BAI VIJGOR v. FAKIRBHAI.* . . . **2 Bom. 335 : 2nd Ed. 317**

*CHANDRABHAGABHAI v. KASHINATH VATHAL.* . . . **2 Bom. 341 : 2nd Ed. 323**

*BALAJI VISHVANATH JOSHI v. DHARMA.* . . . **2 Bom. 385 : 2nd Ed. 363**

*LUCHEE RAM v. MAHANI RAM* . . . **1 Agra 10**

*GOOLJEHAN v. BUNNO* . . . **1 Agra 252**

*SHAMA NUND v. RAMAVATAR PANDEY.* . . . **1 Agra Rev. 1**

*SAJAN v. ROOP RAM* . . . **2 Agra 61**

*SHIAM LALL v. NARAIN DASS* . . . **2 Agra 106**

*SHADEE RAM v. SURMA* . . . **2 Agra 110**

*LUTCHMUN v. JOGUL KISHORE* . . . **3 Agra 99**

*MUHAMMAD VALAD ABDUL MULNA v. IBRAHIM VALAD HASAN* . . . **3 Bom. A. C. 160**

*PARVATI v. BHIKU* . . . **4 Bom. A. C. 25**

*AJURAM MANIRAM v. KUSAJI* . . . **4 Bom. A. C. 43**

*GOLUCK CHUNDER DUTT v. ANUNT KISHORE GOSSAIN* . . . **25 W. R. 38**



**REMAND—contd.****2. GROUNDS FOR REMAND—contd.**

**36. — Civil Procedure Code.** After a case is closed in the lower Court and is brought up on appeal to the superior Court, it cannot be remanded for re-trial on fresh evidence on the ground that the Judge below failed to try one of the issues. The Court of appeal is bound, under s. 353, Act VIII of 1859, to decide the case itself. **FUZULUN BEEBEE v. OMDAH BEEBEE** 10 W. R. 469

**37. — Omission to try issue—Reversal of finding on first issue—Omission to decide second issue.** The finding of the Court below on the first issue being reversed, the suit was remanded for trial of the second issue, the Judge having omitted to determine that, and the defendant not having given the evidence upon it, in consequence of the first issue being found for him on the evidence given by the plaintiff. **MAGANBHAI HEMCHAND v. MANCHABHAI KALLIANCHAND** 3 Bom. O.C. 79

**38. — Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 351, 352.** In remanding a case to a Court of first instance for the trial of an issue which that Court had been directed to try, but had not tried, a Judge was held to have acted with strict propriety and in conformity with the provisions of ss. 351 and 352, Act VIII of 1859. **RAM CHAND MOOKERJEE v. KAMENEE DEBEA** 10 W. R. 236

**39. — Finding on issues framed.** The High Court will not in a special appeal remand the case where there has been a distinct finding by the District Judge on the only issue framed by him, though he may have omitted to find on another issue raised before the Munsif, but not called for by other party on appeal. **MOTI BHAGVAN v. HARJIVAN GIRDHURDAS** 2 Bom. 34 : 2nd Ed. 32

**40. — Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 352.** Where the lower Court had decided a case on the merits and the Appellate Court did not find that there had been any omission to try any issue or determine any question essential to the decision of the case on the merits, or that further evidence was necessary to enable it to determine any such issue or question:—*Held*, that the Appellate Court was in error in remanding the case under s. 352 for a fresh trial. **MAHESH CHUNDRA DAS v. MADHAB CHANDRA SIRDAR** 2 B. L. R. S. N. 13 : 10 W. R. 388

**41. — Insufficiency of evidence for decision of material issue—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 351, 354.** Where there is no sufficient evidence before the Appellate Court for the disposal of an issue which is material to the determination of the suit, the proper course to be followed is to remand the case under s. 354 and not under s. 351. **RAM PERSHAD v. KISHNA** 3 Agra 146

**42. — Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 354.** Where an Appellate Court finds that there is no evidence upon the record to enable it to decide a question at issue between the parties,

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and remands the case under s. 354 of the Code for additional evidence, it ought to require such evidence with the finding of the first Court to be sent up to it for decision. **SHUMBOO CHUNDER SURNOKAR v. RUSSICK CHUNDER CHUNG** 15 W. R. 346

**43. — Absence of evidence on material issue.** The lower Appellate Court has no power to remand a case, which has come before it on appeal, to the Court of first instance for a second trial, except where the first Court has decided the case upon a preliminary issue in such a way as to cause an absence of material evidence bearing upon the issues on the merits between the parties. **LALLA SHOOBH NARAIN v. NURSINGH NARAIN** 20 W. R. 148

**44. — Case decided on preliminary point—Hearing on entire evidence.** Where all the evidence has been taken and the case decided on a preliminary point, no remand should be made. **RAMA KOER v. LALA BHUGWAN LALL** 22 W. R. 224

**45. — Point not raised in Court below—Sufficiency of evidence for decision.** The Appellate Court will not remand a case for re-trial on a point not raised in the Court below if the evidence already recorded is sufficient to enable the Appellate Court itself to decide the point. **HARIDAS PERSHOTAM v. GAMBLE** 12 Bom. 23

**46. — Decision on sufficient evidence—Appellate Court—Improper remand.** A case should not be remanded when the Appellate Court is of opinion that the lower Court cannot properly come to a different decision upon the evidence than that to which it has already come. **BONOMALEE CHURN MYTEE v. SHORROOP HOOTAIT** 14 W. R. 60

**47. — Decision on preliminary point—Appellate Court having all the evidence before it.** Where a lower Appellate Court has before it all the evidence which the parties wish to adduce and decides upon a preliminary point (e.g., the genuineness of a pottah), it has no authority to remand the case, but should itself try it. **RAM JOY SEIN v. NUNDO MOYEE DABEA** 10 W. R. 374

**48. — Decision on one issue out of many—Decision after hearing all the evidence—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 562, 565, 566—Illegal order of remand.** A District Munsif, having taken all the evidence offered on the issue in a suit, disposed of the suit upon his finding on one of the issues without deciding the rest. On appeal the District Judge reversed the decree and remanded the suit for the trial of the issues left untried. *Held*, that, under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the order of remand was illegal. **AMMA v. KUNHUNNI** I. L. R. 9 Mad. 355

**49. — Trial on one of several issues—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 562, 563, 564, 566—Reversal on that issue on appeal.** In a suit



**REMAND** *contd.***2. GROUNDS FOR REMAND—contd.**

for possession of property by right of inheritance the Court framed six issues, four of which it tried and decided. With reference to its finding upon the principal of these issues, which related to the plaintiff's legitimacy, the Court dismissed the suit, observing that in the view which it took of the case, the determination of the remaining issues was unnecessary. Some of the defendants had filed a statement of defence upon which no issues were framed, and no evidence taken, apparently in consequence of the attention of the Court being directed almost exclusively to the main issue as to the plaintiff's legitimacy. There was no formal order excluding evidence on any point. On appeal, the High Court reversed the first Court's finding on the issue with reference to which the suit had been dismissed below. *Held*, by *EDGE, C.J.*, and *MAHMOOD, J.* (*STRAIGHT, J.*, dissenting), that s. 562 of the Civil Procedure Code applied not only to cases where the first Court had expressly excluded evidence, but also to cases where the parties were or might have been misled by the act of the Court as to the issues or the evidence necessary, and where, in consequence of the Court erroneously considering one issue only, the parties did not tender or bring forward their evidence; and that, as in the present case, evidence had been excluded in this broad sense, s. 562 (the operation of which in such cases should be rather expanded than limited) was applicable, and the case should be remanded for trial of the remaining issues. *Held*, by *STRAIGHT, J.*, *contra*, that, with reference to ss. 562, 563, and 564, the case could not be remanded under s. 562, because it had not been disposed of upon a preliminary point, so as to exclude evidence of fact, and the Court should therefore proceed to dispose of it upon the evidence on the record, if any; and that an issue should be remitted to the lower Court under s. 566. *MUMAMMAD ALLAHADAD KHAN v. MUHAMMAD ISMAIL KHAN* . **I.L.R. 10 All. 289**

**50. Omission to decide on point for decision.** The District Judge not having come to any positive finding in his decree on the point for decision laid down by himself on appeal, the suit was remanded for a trial on the merits. *RAMDAS SAKHARLAL v. GANGADHAR RAGHUNATH DONGRE*

**2 Bom. 186 : 2nd Ed. 178**

**51. Order of execution on insufficient evidence—Duty of Appellate Court.** When a lower Court, on insufficient evidence of a decree having been kept in force, orders execution, the Appellate Court should not summarily reverse the order, but should remit the case, that the decree-holder may give further proof of the fact. *NILKUNT CHUCKERBUTTY v. SHEO NARAIN KOONWAR*

**8 W. R. 276**

**52. Omission to decide on merits of case—Suit dismissed on preliminary point—Power to decide case if reversed on that point on appeal—Remand.** When a Court of first instance, after taking evidence, dismisses a suit upon a preliminary objection without giving a

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decision upon the merits of the case, and the decree is reversed on appeal, the Court of appeal, if it considers the evidence on record sufficient, may decide the case and is not bound to remand it for trial under s. 562 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1877. *BANDI SUBBAYYA v. MADALAPALLI SUBANNA*

**I. L. R. 2 Mad. 96**

**53. Decision by lower Court of preliminary point—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 351.** An Appellate Court is not justified in sending back a case for re-trial under s. 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure, merely because the lower Court has disposed of it upon a preliminary point, unless such point has been so disposed of as to exclude evidence of fact which appears to the Appellate Court essential to the rights of the parties. *JOOGMAYA DEBIA v. RAMCHUNDER CHATTERJEE*

**10 W. R. 378**

**54. Evidence insufficient for decision on merits—Decision in favour of suit proceeding, reversing lower Court's.** The Judge after disposing of the case on the only point on which the Munsif had decided,—*viz.*, whether there was a cause of action,—and having satisfied himself that there was not sufficient evidence on the record to enable him to pass a proper decision upon the merits, was *held* clearly right in remanding the case to the Munsif. *BROMMO MOYEE DEBIA v. KOOMODINEE KANT BANERJEE. BURODA KANT BANERJEE v. KOOMODINEE KANT BANERJEE*

**17 W. R. 466**

**55. Evidence sufficient, but further inquiry necessary—Reference of issue for trial—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 351.** S. 351, Act VIII of 1859, is meant for those cases in which a lower Court has disposed of a case on a purely preliminary point. When abundant evidence has been taken, if the lower Appellate Court think any further inquiry necessary, the proper course is not to remand the case to the lower Court, but to frame an issue and to refer the same to the lower Court for trial under s. 354. *RAM CHUNDER GOOPTA v. BHAGESSUR SURMA*. **W. R. 1864, 357**

*LUCHMUN LALL DOOBEX v. HURSOROY LALL*.

**W. R. 1864, 361**

*HUREENARAIN GOSSAIN v. SUMBHONATH MUNDUL* . . . . . **1 W. R. 6**

*HERRIKOSIMA v. STEPHENSON* . . . . . **1 W. R. 298**

*HILLS v. OSMAN BISWAS* . . . . . **25 W. R. 35**

*BUNGO CHUNDER BANERJEE v. CHUNDER NATH CHUCKERBUTTY* . . . . . **25 W. R. 47**

*GOLUCK CHUNDER SEN v. PURES HAHOMED*.

**25 W. R. 284**

**56. Preliminary issue as to right to bring suit—Remand for trial on merits.** Where a suit for rent was decided and dismissed by the lower Court, on the issue whether or not the plaintiff's title to sue could be made out:—*Held*, that it was not competent to the lower Appellate Court to remand the case in order that it might be



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tried on its merits. GOPAL CHUNDER GOOHO v. JUGGODUMBA DOSSIA . . . 10 W. R. 411

57. — Dismissal of suit as brought in wrong Court—*Suit instituted in Revenue instead of Civil Court—Appellate Court, duty of—N.-W. P. Rent Act, 1881, s. 208.* Where a suit instituted in the Revenue Court is dismissed by the Court of first instance, on the ground that it should have been instituted in the Civil Court, and the Appellate Court affirms the decision of the first Court, the Appellate Court should, under s. 208 of the N.-W. P. Rent Act, 1881, remand the case to the Civil Court competent to entertain it for disposal on the merits. AHMAD-UD-DIN KHAN v. MAJLIS RAI . . . I. L. R. 5 All. 438

58. — *N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1881), s. 208—Jurisdiction, suit dismissed on ground of want of.* An Assistant Collector dismissed a suit without considering the merits, on the ground that it was not cognizable by a Revenue Court. On appeal, the District Judge held that it was unnecessary to determine the question of jurisdiction, as he had power in any event, under s. 208 of the N.-W. P. Rent Act, to remand the suit to the Assistant Collector, and he remanded it accordingly. Held, that the Judge had rightly construed s. 208 of the Rent Act, and that the remand was proper. Ahmad-ud-din Khan v. Majlis Rai, I. L. R. 5 All. 438, distinguished. GIRWAR SINGH v. SITA RAM . . . I. L. R. 10 All. 31

59. — *Suit instituted in Revenue instead of Civil Court—N.-W. P. Rent Act, 1881, ss. 207, 208.* In a suit instituted in the Court of an Assistant Collector, an objection was taken that the suit was not maintainable in the Revenue Court. The objection was allowed and the suit dismissed. On appeal by the plaintiff, the Assistant Collector's decision was affirmed. The Appellate Court had not before it the materials necessary for the determination of the suit. Held, reading together ss. 207 and 208 of Act XII of 1881 (N.-W. P. Rent Act), that though the objection to the jurisdiction was taken in the first Court and repeated before the Appellate Court, the latter should only have *pro tanto* entertained it for the purpose of determining to what Court it should direct its order of remand, and should not have passed an order the effect of which was to maintain the dismissal of the suit. DEBI SARAN LAL v. DEBI SARAN UPADHYA . . . I. L. R. 6 All. 378

SHEO PRASAD v. ANRUNDH SINGH.

I. L. R. 6 All. 440

60. — Reversal of lower Court on point of limitation—*Trial on merits and limitation—Remand for trial on merits.* The lower Court found the suit barred by limitation, but also heard and dismissed the suit on its merits. Held, that, though in appeal limitation be held not to bar the suit, there should be no remand for re-trial on the merits. KERTEENARAIN CHOWDHRY v. PERTHENARAIN CHOWDHRY . . . 1 W. R. 32

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61. — Suit held not barred by limitation—*Trial on merits—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 351.* Where an Appellate Court decides that a suit is not barred by limitation after it has taken evidence and gone into the whole case the decision is not one within s. 351, and the Court is not competent to remand the case, but ought to try it upon the evidence. HUSSUN ALI CHOWDHRY v. MANOOWAR ALI . . . 21 W. R. 413

62. — Decision on limitation and on the merits—*Insufficiency of evidence—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 353, 357—Power to remand.* Where the Court of first instance decides both on the general merits and the plea of limitation, and the Judge of the Appellate Court considers that the evidence upon the record is not sufficient to allow of a satisfactory judgment, and that he is in a position legally to order further evidence to be taken, he ought to proceed in the manner provided in ss. 354 to 357 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but has no right to set aside the first Court's decree and remand the case for re-trial. GOOROO PERSHAD DUTT v. SREENATH BANERJEE . . . 15 W. R. 314

63. — Decision on merits—*Insufficiency of evidence—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 354.* When the decision of a lower Court is not on a preliminary point, the lower Appellate Court cannot remand the suit to that Court with directions to take further evidence and to re-try the case, but the appeal must be kept pending on the file, and the record must be sent to the lower Court, with orders to take the necessary evidence. KALLEE SUNKUR ROY v. KISHTO DOOLAL CHOWDHRY . . . W. R. 1864, 296

64. — Additional evidence—*Issue, trial of, by lower Court—Defect of parties—Successor of Judge making remand, power of.* When an Appellate Court remands a case under s. 351 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1859, for the trial of an issue which the lower Court may have omitted to raise or to try, it is not limited to the evidence then on the record, but may keep the case pending on its own file until the return of the first Court's finding on the issue, with the evidence recorded on the trial thereof, or the Appellate Court may itself try the issue so raised. Where the evidence is accepted by a Subordinate Judge as sufficient to warrant a decree, and the case is only remanded for a defect of parties, his successor is justified, when the case is returned by the first Court, in respecting the former judgment and looking upon the evidence as *prima facie* good and sufficient. WISE v. ISHAN CHUNDER BANERJEE . . . 14 W. R. 380

65. — Decision as to costs—*Power to remand case for trial on merits where appeal is only as to costs.* On an appeal as to costs only, the Appellate Court had no jurisdiction to return the case for trial on its merits. MUTHRA PERSHAD v. BUNDEE ROY . . . 4 N. W. 20

66. — Decision on second trial—*Insufficiency of evidence—Evidence taken at first*



**REMAND—contd.****2. GROUNDS FOR REMAND—contd.**

*trial.* In a suit to obtain possession of miras land the Court of original jurisdiction decreed for plaintiff on the evidence, but on appeal its decision was reversed, on the ground that the claim had not been properly valued, and plaintiff was permitted to bring a fresh action. At the trial of the second action the Munsif recorded his previous decree and some additional evidence, which the District Judge on appeal considered to be insufficient. *Held*, that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the Judge, if not satisfied with the evidence taken at the second trial, should have allowed the plaintiff to give again the evidence adduced at the former trial. The lower Court's decree was therefore reversed, and the suit remanded in order that this might be done. *JOTI BIN NIMBAJI v. SOMAJI BIN BAPAJI GURAV* . . . . . **1 Bom. 166**

**67.** ————— **Decision as to admission of evidence—Additional evidence—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 354.** The defendant pleaded payment and produced a letter of acknowledgment said to have been written by the plaintiff. The plaintiff denied its genuineness, and the Principal Sudder Ameen rejected the testimony of two pyadas who deposed to the payment. On appeal the Judge remanded the case, requiring the lower Court to give the appellant the opportunity of proving the letter, and after recording a fresh finding to return the case to his Court. *Held*, that the lower Court was bound to pronounce a distinct opinion as to the value of the evidence and not to have rejected it altogether. *Held*, also, that the Judge was wrong in remanding the case under s. 354, Act VIII of 1859, as he could have decided the case himself taking such additional evidence as might appear necessary. *RUNPAL SINGH v. JOY MUNGUL SINGH* . . . . . **11 W. R. 106**

**68.** ————— **Finding on evidence—Improper remand—Duty of Appellate Court.** Where the ground of regular appeal to the lower Appellate Court was that the Court of first instance ought to have found that an *ijara* existed it was the duty of the Appellate Court to determine whether that fact had been proved and not to remand the case for re-trial. *MAHOMED AHSAN v. MAHOMED YASIN* . . . . . **9 W. R. 106**

**69.** ————— **Issue of minority raised on appeal—Facts entitling mortgagee to decree.** Where, in a suit to make absolute a conditional sale and to obtain a share in a certain village mortgaged to plaintiff (the usual year of grace having been given and money been paid into Court in satisfaction considerably after the term allowed by law), there is no issue respecting the minority of some of the mortgagors, the case will not be sent back to the Appellate Court for inquiry whether certain of the mortgagors were minors, or whether the others mortgaged for such purposes as would bind the minors, notwithstanding one of the lower Courts has found the fact of the minority of one of the mortgagors. *SUBDUL v. BULDEO* . . . . . **2 N. W. 23**

**REMAND—contd.****2. GROUNDS FOR REMAND—concl'd.**

**70.** ————— **Case inconsistent with plaintiff—Power of Appellate Court to remand—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 354.** If the Appellate Court is of opinion that the plaintiff, in argument before itself, is endeavouring to obtain something other than what he claims in the plaint, it is bound to dismiss the suit; but if it thinks that the plaint can be reconciled with the argument used on the appeal, and the case resulting is supported by the evidence, it is bound to determine the appeal—not to make an order under Act VIII of 1859, s. 354. *TILUCK CHUNDER DUTT CHOWDHRY v. BROJO SOONDUR MITTER* . . . . . **24 W. R. 121**

**71.** ————— **Decision of only portion of claim—Improper order of remand—Confirmation of portion of case while remanding substantial issue.** A lower Appellate Court which remanded a suit to the first Court for decision of the substantial part of the dispute should not have confirmed the decision of the first Court regarding only one part of the claim. *MADHUB CHUNDER DEY v. RAM DYAL GUHO* . . . . . **8 W. R. 303**

**72.** ————— **Remand—Preliminary point—Suit decided with reference to some only of several issues framed.** *Held*, that it is competent to an Appellate Court to remand a case under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure where the Court of first instance having framed issues and recorded all the evidence has decided the suit with reference to its finding upon one or more of the issues framed by it, leaving other issues undecided. *Sheoambar Singh v. Lallu Singh, I. L. R. 9 All. 30 foot-note*, and *Ramchandra Joishi v. Kazi Hassim, I. L. R. 16 Mad. 207*, followed. *MATA DIN v. JAMNA DAS (1905)* . . . . . **I. L. R. 27 All. 691**

**3. SECOND REMAND.**

**1.** ————— **Power of Appellate Court—Decree reversed on appeal—Error or defect affecting merits of case or jurisdiction.** An Appellate Court can remand a case a second time on account of error, defence, or irregularity of procedure in passing a decree or order, provided the error, defect or irregularity be such as to affect the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. When a suit has been regularly heard and determined, and on appeal the decree is reversed, the Appellate Court has the discretionary power to remand the case only if the decree should have been upon a preliminary point, and have the effect of excluding the consideration of evidence essential to the rights of the parties. *MUNIAPPAH NAIDU v. IYASAMY MUDELY* . . . . . **5 Mad. 313**

**2.** ————— **Omission to carry out first order of High Court—Substantial trial on the merits.** Where the lower Court had not fully carried out an order of the High Court remanding the case, but the case appeared to have been substantially tried fully on its merits, the High Court thought there should not be a second remand. *KASHEENATH DEB v. SHIBESSUREE DEBIA* . . . . . **8 W. R. 503**



**REMAND—contd.****3. SECOND REMAND—concl'd.**

**3. ——— Remand after trial and decision on evidence—Appellate Court, powers of—Objection taken on appeal—Act VIII of 1859, s. 351—Costs.** A lower Appellate Court is not competent to remand a case for a second decision, except as provided by s. 351, Act VIII of 1859, and therefore has no power to remand a case when a Court of first instance has investigated the merits of the case and passed its judgment upon the evidence. The objection that a case has been improperly remanded by the lower Appellate Court can be taken in special appeal from the decree passed upon the remand, although a special appeal might have been preferred from the order of remand, but the appellants were held not entitled to their costs. *MAJORAM OJHA v. NILMONEY SINGH DEO* 13 B. L. R. 198 : 21 W. R. 326

*BRINDABUN DEY v. BISONA BIBEE*

13 B. L. R. 200 note : 13 W. R. 107

**4. ——— Form of second order of remand—Defects in lower Court's judgment on first remand.** A lower Appellate Court, in remanding a case a second time, ought to state what the main requirements of the first order were, and how the lower Court's decision shows that they have not been carried out. *RADHABULLUB SURMA v. ANUND-MOYEE DEBEA* . . . W. R. 1864, Mis. 39

**4. PROCEDURE ON REMAND.**

**1. ——— Order of remand, effect of—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 354.** An order of remand to a lower Appellate Court implies a reversal of the first judgment of that Court. *KEBUL KISHEN MOZOOMDAR v. AMBALA* . . . 7 W. R. 623

**2. ——— Re-opening of entire case.** The effect of an order of remand for a new trial is entirely to nullify the first decision and to re-open the whole case. *TARINEE KANT LAHOREE v. KOONJ BEHAREE AWASTEE* 12 W. R. 112

**3. ——— Remand for re-trial—Re-opening of whole case.** Where a suit was remanded by the lower Appellate Court for a "re-trial" the intention of the order of remand was held to be that the whole case was to be gone into *de novo*, the plaintiff being allowed to prove her case in any way she could. *GUDADHUR DUTT v. SHUSHEE MONEE DOSSIA* . . . 21 W. R. 7

**4. ——— Re-opening of case as regards limitation—Res judicata.** Where a case is sent back for trial on its merits, the order of remand shuts out objections regarding limitation or *res judicata*. *SHEO SAHOY TEWAREE v. RAM PERSHAD NARAIN TEWAREE* . . . 24 W. R. 333

**5. ——— Power of Court hearing remanded cases—Remand on particular issue—Power to proceed on other issues.** A Court to which a case is remanded for re-trial on a particular issue amongst others, cannot, on remand, allow that issue to be abandoned, and proceed to try the case upon

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the other issues raised. *SHIB CHUNDER LAHIRI v. JOYMALA DAS* . . . 7 C. L. R. 103

**6. ——— Remand on one point—Re-opening of others.** When a case is remanded to the lower Appellate Court for decision of a question,—e.g., one of title,—that Court has no authority to go beyond the order of remand and re-open a matter already adjudicated upon between the parties. *SHAHEB TEWAREE v. KISHOREE SAHOY SINGH* . . . 24 W. R. 230

**7. ——— Remand for trial of issue under s. 354, Civil Procedure Code, 1859, effect of.** Where an Appellate Court, in pursuance of Act VIII of 1859, s. 304, sends an issue down to the first Court in order that such evidence as the parties desired to adduce upon it may be taken and returned, the result is not to remand the case for re-trial, the first Court being *functus officio* in respect to such portion of the matter as it had already considered and determined. *GOSSAIN DOW-LUT GEER v. BISSESSUR GEER* . . . 22 W. R. 207

**8. ——— Case remanded for consideration except on one point—Finding of error on that point.** Where a case was remanded for reconsideration of the whole evidence with the exception of one specified point, and the Judge after consideration came to the conclusion that his finding on that point had been erroneous, it was held that he could not, without a miscarriage of justice, allow that finding to remain unchanged. *HUREE NATH SHAHA v. ISSEN CHUNDER SHAHA* 24 W. R. 316

**9. ——— Absence of Judge who passed decree—Jurisdiction of his successor.** Where a case is remanded to the lower Court to record reasons for its judgment, if the Judge who passed the decree is absent, the superior Court should be informed of it by his successor. Under such circumstances, his successor has no jurisdiction. Application should be made to the Bench which granted the order of remand for an order for the present Judge to re-try the case *de novo*. *MANICK SETT v. KHETTERMOHUN GOSSAMEE* 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 101

**10. ——— Remand for record of reasons—Re-trial de novo by Judge's successor.** When a case is remanded to a particular Judge merely for him to record the reasons for his finding, his successor, if the deciding Judge has left the district, acts without jurisdiction when he re-hears the whole appeal *de novo*. *BHYRUB SHEET v. KHETTER MOHUN GOSSAIN* . . . 5 W. R. 124

*LALLA BHOYRO LALL v. LALLA MOKOOND LAL* 2 W. R. 275

**11. ——— Remand for particular issue—Right to open case in full.** A rent case having been remanded to a lower Appellate Court with a view to its being ascertained whether an amulnamah produced by the plaintiff was the same as a pottah filed in a survey case, the Judge found that it was the same, but the pottah was not



**REMAND—contd.****4. PROCEDURE ON REMAND—contd.**

the one which the defendant had given to the plaintiff to file in the survey case. He accordingly reversed his predecessor's decree for rent, and adjudged plaintiff to pay damages under s. 3, Act VI of 1862. *Held*, that the additional finding was not opposed to the order of remand; that the whole case was reopened; and that the Judge had authority to award the damages without appeal on that point. **RAM CHANDRA SURMA CHOWDHRY v. DAGOO KHAN** . . . . . **10 W. R. 339**

**12.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 562—Order of remand—Issues undecided—Procedure.* A Subordinate Judge decided a suit on the ground (i) that it was *res judicata*; (ii) that it was barred by limitation. On appeal, the Assistant Judge upheld the decree on the first-mentioned ground without deciding the point of limitation. On second appeal, the High Court reversed the Assistant Judge's decision, holding that the suit was not *res judicata*, and remanded the case to be tried on the merits. On receipt of the order of the High Court, the Assistant Judge reversed the decree of the Subordinate Judge without giving any decision on the point of limitation and remanded the case to the Subordinate Judge to be tried on the merits. From this order the defendant appealed to the High Court. *Held*, that the order of remand by the Assistant Judge was unauthorized under s. 562 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). When the High Court remanded the case to be tried on the merits, the whole case was left open to the Assistant Judge, and, before he could reverse the Subordinate Judge's decree, he was bound, under s. 562 of the Code, to determine whether the decision of the Subordinate Judge on the question of limitation was right or not. **RAISINGJI v. BALVANTRAO**

**I. L. R. 11 Bom. 663**

**13.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 566—Power of Court to disregard findings returned—Appeal under Letters Patent, High Court, N.-W. P., cl. 10.* A single Judge of the High Court hearing a second appeal made an order of reference under s. 566 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the return of the reference the appeal came before another Judge, who, holding that the reference was unnecessary and that the original findings of fact in the Court below were sufficient to dispose of the appeal, disregarded the findings on the reference, and dismissed the appeal. In appeal under s. 10 of the Letters Patent, it was *held*, that it was competent to the Judge before whom the appeal had subsequently come to disregard the findings on the order of reference. **MUBARAK HUSAIN v. BIHARI** . **I. L. R. 16 All. 306**

**14.** ————— *Case remanded on issue of limitation—Right to open whole appeal.* In a case remanded to the lower Appellate Court for trial, by the Court of first instance, of the issue of limitation, which the appellant had not been allowed the opportunity of meeting, it was ruled that, upon the decision of that issue, it would be

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open to the parties to appeal upon the whole case, notwithstanding the appeal already had. **RUGHOO NUNDUN PERSHAD SINGH v. CHUTTUR PAUL SINGH** **10 W. R. 335**

**15.** ————— *Re-opening of case.* Under an order of remand in a boundary suit in which the Privy Council had made an order in a former appeal:—*Held*, that the High Court had no power to go behind the order of the Privy Council, and that so much of the High Court's decision as re-opened on fresh evidence what had previously been decided must be set aside, but that the evidence that had thus been brought to bear on the case was entitled to consideration so far as it bore on those portions of the suit in respect of which the former decision of the Privy Council was not conclusive. **COURT OF WARDS v. LEELANUND SINGH** . . . . . **25 W. R. P. C. 157**

**16.** ————— *Case sent by Judge to lower Court for further evidence.* In a suit for enhancement of rent, which had been remanded to the lower Appellate Court, with the instruction that the defendant had produced sufficient evidence to raise the presumption that he held his tenure at a fixed rate from the Permanent Settlement, and that it was for the Judge to give an opinion how far the plaintiff was able to rebut that presumption. *Held*, that there was nothing objectionable in the Judge directing the first Court to hear further evidence upon the point. **RAKHAL CHUNDER TEWAREE v. KINOORAM HALDAR** . . . . . **10 W. R. 442**

**17.** ————— *Giving evidence on issue raised on remand.* Where a case is remanded for the trial of an issue which had not been laid down by the Court which tried the case, the parties are entitled to have the opportunity of giving evidence upon it, although the order of remand contains no express direction to that effect. **KISTO CHURN CHUCKERBUTTY v. MUGGUN CHUCKERBUTTY** **10 W. R. 491**

**18.** ————— *Additional evidence, power to take.* Where a case is remanded with a view to some special evidence being taken, the Court receiving the order of remand is not at liberty to allow the parties to produce other additional evidence. **RAM JEEWAN LALL v. ARJUN CHOWBEY** . . . . . **10 W. R. 303**

**19.** ————— *Object of remand—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 354.* The object of a remand under s. 354, Act VIII of 1859, is not that the Judge should try the issues on the evidence already taken, because that the Court sitting in regular appeal can do for itself, but that he should take such evidence as the parties may have to offer for the determination of the issues. **ABDOOL KHYRAT v. JUMALOODDEEN HOSSEIN** . **10 W. R. 244**

**20.** ————— *Remand to Appellate Court—Power to take additional evidence.* Where a case is remanded to a lower Appellate Court under s. 354 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1859, the Judge may, under s. 355, admit additional



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evidence, provided he records his reasons for doing so on the proceedings of the Court. **KALIKRISTO TAGORE v. JUDOO LALL MULLICK . 24 W. R. 20**

**21. ——— Taking evidence on remand—Power to take additional evidence on remand where order of remand does not so order—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 562, 566, and 568.** Suit by the adoptive daughter of a temple dancing woman, deceased, to compel the trustees of the temple to permit the performance of a certain ceremony, in view to her entering on the duties and emoluments attached to the office of her adoptive mother. On second appeal, the High Court directed the return of a finding on the issue (previously framed, but not tried) whether the plaintiff's adoption was valid. Fresh evidence was taken, and the finding was that the adoption was made with the intention that the girl should be prostituted while she was still a minor. *Held*, that the lower Court had power to take additional evidence on the issue remanded, although not specially authorized to do so by the order of remand. **KAMALAKSHI v. RAM-SAMI CHETTI . . . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 127**

**22. ——— Civil Procedure Code, s. 506—Remand for decision of particular issues.** When a case is remanded, under s. 566 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to the lower Appellate Court for findings on certain issues, it is not competent to that Court to delegate the decision of those issues to a Court subordinate thereto. **SABRI v. GANESHI . . . I. L. R. 14 All. 23**

**23. ——— Remand with fresh issues—Fixing day for further evidence.** When fresh issues are fixed by the Appellate Court, and remanded to the lower Court to be tried, the parties are entitled to have a day fixed for the reception of any further evidence which they may wish to adduce thereon. **WATSON v. KUNHYE BAHADOOR . . . 9 W. R. 294**

**24. ——— Examination of witnesses—Fresh evidence.** In a case remanded for a finding as to whether a confirmatory pottah had been really given or not, it was held that, as the order of remand did not restrict the Judge to the evidence on the record, he was at liberty to examine the witnesses who were in Court. **RAM SUNKER SEIN v. NILKANT BISWAS . . . 20 W. R. 392**

**25. ——— Hearing fresh evidence—Hearing defendant who did not appear on original hearing.** When a suit has been dismissed upon a preliminary point, and the decision on that point has been reversed by the Appellate Court, and the case goes down with a view to trial on its merits, evidence may properly be received even from defendant who had appeared, and *à fortiori* from a defendant who had not appeared. **KOONJ BEHARY AWUSTEE v. TARINEE KANT LAHOREE . . . 8 W. R. 285**

**26. ——— Objection taken at former hearing and disposed of—Remand for re-hear-**

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*ing—Objection to chitta.* Where a review had been granted for the purpose of seeing whether a chitta ought not to be used, and the case was remanded for re-hearing, the party was held to be concluded from objecting that the chitta was improperly made use of upon the re-hearing. **MAKHUN KOORER v. TINCOWREE DUTT . . . 14 W. R. 22**

**27. ——— Remand assuming possession—Power of Judge to try question of possession.** Where the High Court, proceeding on the assumption that appellants (plaintiffs) were in possession, remanded a case to a Zillah Court, with instructions to pass a declaratory decree, if that Court was satisfied that the act complained of was so recent and of such a nature as to entitle plaintiffs to a declaratory decree, it was held (by **KEMP, J.**, decreeing the appeal) that the Zillah Judge was wrong in re-opening the whole question of possession. *Held*, (by **JACKSON, J.**), that the issue of possession being one which clearly arose on the statements of the parties, the Zillah Judge was not in error in trying it. **PUREE JAN KHATOON v. BYKUNT CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY . . . 9 W. R. 380**

*Held* on appeal under the Letters Patent that the lower Appellate Court was competent, under the terms of the order of remand, to inquire into the question of possession. **BYKUNT CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY v. PUREE JAN KHATOON . . . 11 W. R. 77**

**28. ——— Alteration of law since remand—Full Bench ruling.** Where a Full Bench ruling is brought to the notice of a Judge re-trying a case on remand, he is bound, whether the ruling has been published or not, either to ask the pleader to produce the decision relied on, or to take other means for satisfying himself as to the ruling of the High Court, so as to apply the correct law to the case. **TMEEZOODDEEN KHOND-KAR v. MOHIMA CHUNDER MOOKERJEE . . . 11 W. R. 227**

**29. ——— Trial on issue not stated in order of remand—Effect of irregularity.** Where the High Court had been misled into making an order of remand upon an issue other than that on which the case at the time ought to have been made to depend as between the parties, and the lower Appellate Court on remand came to a finding of fact which correctly disposed of the case, it was held that though the latter did not deal properly with the evidence on the record with reference to the precise issue sent down to it, its default ought not to govern the final result between plaintiff and defendant. **MAHOMED HASHIM v. KALEECHURN BANERJEE . . . 13 W. R. 91**

**30. ——— Reference of remanded case to arbitration—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 351—Irregularity in remand order and trial—Objection on special appeal.** An Appellate Court, in referring a case under Act VIII of 1859, s. 354, has no power to order the first Court to call upon the parties to the suit to agree to arbitration, or, on their failing to do so, to appoint arbitrators.

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Where this is done, and the parties waive the irregularity and consent to the matter being tried by arbitrators, they cannot afterwards on special appeal object to the proceedings. *PUNA BIBEE v. KHODA BUKSH BEPAREE*. 22 W. R. 396

31. ———— **Effect of repeal—Suit for rent instituted under Act X of 1859—Remand after Beng. Act VIII of 1869 (s. 108) came into operation.** A suit was instituted under Act X of 1859, and after Bengal Act VIII of 1869 came into operation it was remanded by the High Court and tried by the Munsif and District Judge. Held, that, under Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 108, all proceedings should have been continued under the older Act and the remand should have been to the Collector, and that the proceedings before the Munsif and Judge were nullities. *DEELUN CHOWDHRY v. JEETOO KAIJEE*. 24 W. R. 353

**5. OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS ON REMAND.**

1. ———— **Time for filing objections—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 354.** Sufficient time must be allowed to the parties under s. 354, Act VIII of 1859, to file their objections to the revised finding of the lower Court. *BUKHTOUREE v. MEHEEN LALL*. 3 Agra 96

2. ———— **Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 354—Objections taken after remand and not within time fixed.** Where the Appellate Court remanded a case to the lower Court, and, under the provisions of s. 354, Act VIII of 1859, allowed the parties a week's time within which to file objections:—Held, that the terms of the section were merely permissive, and that, though no objections had been taken within the time specified, there was nothing in the law to the effect that an objection taken after the time fixed shall not be listened to. *MUNRAKHUN LALL v. RAHEEM BUKSH*. 4 N. W. 72

3. ———— **Alteration of findings to which no objection is taken—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 354—Objections taken after time.** When a case has been remanded under s. 354, Act VIII of 1859, and a time fixed within which objections to the findings on remand are to be taken, the Appellate Court is not competent to alter such of the findings in respect of which no objection is preferred within the time fixed. *NOORUN v. KHODA BUKSH*. 1 Agra 50

\* Nor will the parties be allowed to take objections filed after time. *SHEO GHOLAM v. RAM JEAWUN SINGH*. 5 N. W. 114

4. ———— **Objections taken after time—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 354—Memorandum of objections—Procedure.** Where an Appellate Court, under s. 354 of Act VIII of 1859, refers issues for trial to a lower Court and fixes a time within which, after the return of the finding, either party to the appeal may file a memorandum of objections to the same, neither party is entitled,

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without the leave of the Court, to take any objection to the finding, orally or otherwise, after the expiry of the period so fixed without his having filed such memorandum. *RATAN SINGH v. WAZIR*. I. L. R. 1 All. 165

5. ———— **Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 567—Discretion of Court.** Where a first Appellate Court has remanded a case to the Court of first instance for the trial of issues, and where, on the return of findings on these issues, objections under s. 567 of the Civil Procedure Code have not been filed until after the expiration of the prescribed period, the Appellate Court, though not bound to entertain the objections, should nevertheless, upon the hearing of the remand allow the party filing them to be heard with regard to them. *Ratan Singh v. Wazir*, I. L. R. 1 All. 165, and *Akbari Begam v. Wilayat Ali*, I. L. R. 2 All. 908, referred to. An Appellate Court, because it remands issues, does not therefore, in the absence of subsequent objection by either or both of the parties to the findings when returned, divest itself of its power to exercise its judicial mind as to the propriety of such findings; but apart from any objection by the parties, it should examine and test them to see whether or not they ought to be accepted. *Akbari Begam v. Wilayat Ali*, I. L. R. 2 All. 908, followed. *Umed Ali v. Salima Bibi*, I. L. R. 6 All. 383, referred to. *MUMTAZ BEGAM v. FATEH HUSAIN*. I. L. R. 6 All. 361

6. ———— **Reference of issue to lower Court—Memorandum of objections—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 354.** In a case in which an issue referred under s. 354 of Act VIII of 1859 to the lower Court was tried there, and the finding was returned with the evidence, as no memorandum of objections was filed within the time fixed by the Court, the Court declined to allow objections to be taken when the appeal came on for final determination. *ASHRUFOONISSA BEGUM v. STEWART*. 9 W. R. 438

7. ———— **Findings to which no objection is preferred—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 566—Appellate Court, powers of—Error or irregularity.** Held, that an Appellate Court is not bound to accept a finding returned to it by a Court of first instance, under s. 566 of Act X of 1877, merely because no objections to such finding are preferred, but is competent to examine the evidence on which such finding is founded, and to satisfy itself that it is correct and fit to be accepted. *Noorun v. Khoda Baksh*, 1 Agra 50, dissented from. *Ratan Singh v. Wazir*, I. L. R. 1 All. 165, followed. Held, also, that, assuming that an Appellate Court, in deciding a case in a manner inconsistent with and opposed to the finding returned to it by the Court of first instance under that section, in the absence of objections, acted irregularly, its decree could not be reversed or the case remanded on account of such irregularity, such irregularity not affecting the



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merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court.  
*AKBARI BEGAM v. WILAYAT ALI*

**I. L. R. 2 All. 908**

**8. ————— Duty of Appellate Court—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 567, 574.** Where a first Appellate Court has remanded a case to the Court of first instance for the trial of issues, and where, on the return of the findings on these issues, no objections have been preferred under s. 567 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Appellate Court, after the period fixed for presenting objections, may, at its discretion, receive or decline to receive any written objection, but is, in any case, bound to consider the findings of the lower Court on the merits, and is not precluded from hearing arguments for and against the findings at the hearing of the appeal. *Akbari Begam v. Wilayat Ali, I. L. R. 2 All. 908*, followed. The imperative provisions of s. 574 of the Civil Procedure Code apply alike to cases remanded by the first Appellate Court for the trial of issues and to those in which no such remand has taken place. *UMED ALI v. SALIMA BIBI*

**I. L. R. 6 All. 383**

**9. ————— Lower Appellate Court, power of, on remand—Possession, suit for—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 561, 566.** The plaintiff's suit for possession of certain lands after determination of the boundary between two estates was partially decreed by the Munsif. The defendant appealed, but the plaintiff did not appeal, nor file any objection under s. 561 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Subordinate Judge, on appeal, modified the decree in favour of the defendant. Plaintiff then appealed to the High Court, and the case was remanded for trial on a fresh investigation. The Subordinate Judge after a fresh enquiry passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff giving him more lands than what was given by the Court of first instance. On second appeal by the defendant: *Held*, that under the circumstances, the Subordinate Judge had no power to award to the plaintiff more than what he recovered in the Munsif's Court. *Bikramjit Singh v. Hossaini Begam, I. L. R. 3 All. 643*, distinguished. *AGILUL HOSAIN v. DINO NATH DUTT (1907)*

**I. L. R. 34 Calc. 996**

**(f. CASES OF APPEAL AFTER REMAND.**

**1. ————— Remand for specific purpose—Statement on merits of whole case.** Where the Appellate Court remands a case for a specific inquiry, it will not receive any statement on the part of the Zillah Judge as to what he considers the merits of the whole case. *DONZELLE v. RAMNARAIN SINGH* . . . . . **1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 51**

**2. ————— Appeal from order of remand—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 562—What questions can be raised—Extent of appeal from order of remand.** An appeal from an order on appeal

**REMAND—contd.****6. CASES OF APPEAL AFTER REMAND—contd.**

remanding a suit for re-trial is not to be confined to the question whether the remand has been made contrary to the provisions of s. 562 of Act X of 1877 or not, but the question whether the decision of the Appellate Court on the preliminary point is correct or not may also be raised and determined in such an appeal. *BADAM v. IMRAT, I. L. R. 2 All. 675*

**3. ————— Power of Appellate Court to deal with whole appeal after return of findings—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 561, 566.** In a second appeal by the defendant, in which the plaintiff filed objections to the decree under s. 561 of the Civil Procedure Code, the High Court, without giving judgment on the appeal, stated (giving reasons) the opinion that the appellant would be entitled to succeed and at the same time remitted an issue under s. 566 of the Code with reference to the plaintiff's objections. At that time the appeal was apparently not argued out, and the true meaning of the facts as found was obviously not present to the mind of the Court. *Held*, that, upon the return of the findings on remand, the Court could not treat the appeal as already decided and the objections the sole matter for consideration, but must consider both appeal and objections and decide the whole case. *Held*, however, that where Judges have heard arguments on some of the issues and have expressed their views thereon and have remitted another issue or issues under s. 566, they are not bound, on the return of findings, to hear the case *de novo*, but may confine counsel to argument upon the findings. *LACHMAN PRASAD v. JAINA PRASAD* . . . . . **I. L. R. 10 All. 162**

**4. ————— Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 562—Power of the High Court to go into the merits on appeal from a remand order.** The Court of first instance dismissed a suit as barred by limitation. In appeal that decision was reversed, and the case was remanded under s. 562 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). Against the order of remand the defendant appealed to the High Court under cl. 28 of s. 588 of the Civil Procedure Code. It was contended by the plaintiff that the High Court had no power to decide the point of limitation, but could only consider whether the order of remand satisfied the requirements of s. 562 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, by the Full Bench, that in an appeal against such an order of remand the power of the High Court is not confined to the question whether that order satisfied the requirements of s. 562; but may also determine the correctness of the lower Appellate Court's decision on the preliminary point on which the Court of first instance disposed of the case. *Badam v. Imrat, I. L. R. 2 All. 675*, followed. *BHAU BALA v. BAPAJI BAPUJI* . . . **I. L. R. 14 Bom. 14**

**5. ————— Disposal of suit on preliminary point—Reversal by Appellate Court of decree on such point and irregular remand of case under s. 562, Civil Procedure Code, 1877, for trial of a certain issue—Power of succeeding Judge**



**REMAND—contd.****6. CASES OF APPEAL AFTER REMAND—  
contd.**

of Appellate Court to re-try such point. A Court of first instance dismissed a suit upon a preliminary point. On appeal by the plaintiff against the decree of such Court, the then Judge of the Appellate Court, Mr. B, reversed the decree upon such preliminary point and remanded the suit under s. 562 of Act X of 1877 for the trial of a certain issue. The Court of first instance tried such issue and made a decree in accordance with its finding thereon. On appeal against the decree of the Court of first instance, the defendant again raised such preliminary point. The then Judge of the Appellate Court, Mr. K, dismissed the suit upon such preliminary point. *Held*, that, as, although Mr. B had irregularly remanded the suit under s. 562 of Act X of 1877, his decision disposed of such preliminary point, and only left open for trial the issue which he had directed to be tried, Mr. K was not competent to re-try and decide such preliminary point. *SURAJ DIN v. CHATTAR*

**I. L. R. 3 All. 755**

**6.** *Practice—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 588.* Upon an appeal under s. 588, cl. (w), of the Civil Procedure Code, from an order of an Appellate Court under s. 562, remanding a case which has been disposed of upon a preliminary point in the Court of first instance, the High Court may enter into the merits of the adjudication by the Court of first instance on the preliminary point, and may, if it finds the order of the lower Appellate Court defective, allow the party who had the benefit of a decree in the first Court to retain that benefit. *LOKI MAHTO v. AGHOREE AJAIL LALL*

**I. L. R. 5 Calc. 144: 4 C. L. R. 465**

**7.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 562, 564, 566, 584, 588 (28), 590.* Where a lower Appellate Court, instead of remanding a suit under s. 566 of the Civil Procedure Code, erroneously remands it under s. 562, and the party aggrieved by its order appeals to the High Court under cl. (28), s. 588, the High Court cannot deal with the case as if it were a first appeal from a decree. All that the High Court can do is to rectify the procedure of the lower Appellate Court, and to direct that it decide the case itself on the merits. *Badam v. Imrat, I. L. R. 2 All. 675*, distinguished. *Ramnarain v. Bhawanidin, All. Weekly Notes (1882) 194*, and *Sheoamber Singh v. Lallu Singh, All. Weekly Notes (1882) 158*, referred to. *SOHAN LAL v. AZIZ-UNNISSA BEGAM*

**I. L. R. 7 All. 136**

**8.** *Power of successor of Judge to set aside order of remand.* An order of remand by a Subordinate Judge is final so far as the purpose of the remand goes, and cannot be set aside by his successor. *LULEET PANDEY v. BYJNATH SINGH*

**14 W. R. 285**

**9.** *Power of successor to alter order—Remand a second time on mistake of Judge on first remand.* An Acting District Judge, having made a decree reversing the decree

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contd.**

of the Munsif, who threw out plaintiff's claim, omitted to pass a decree himself in favour of the plaintiff, which his finding showed he intended to do. The case was remanded on special appeal by the High Court to the District Judge (who had meanwhile returned to his appointment), who re-opened the whole case, and passed a decree directly opposed to that of his predecessor, in which he confirmed the Munsif's decree. *Held*, that the decree of the Judge should be reversed, and the suit again remanded, in order that he might pass a decree for the plaintiff, in accordance with the view of the case expressed by the Acting Judge, with which the High Court saw no ground, upon the special appeal before it, to interfere. *BABAJI BIN RAMJI v. KASIM-BHAI VALAD AZAMBHAI*

**3 Bom. A. C. 60**

**10.** *Procedure when case comes on appeal after remand—Erroneous order of remand.* A Subordinate Judge on appeal, having framed an issue, remanded the case under s. 351, Civil Procedure Code, 1859, to the first Court for trial thereof, but, instead of directing that the finding should be returned to his own Court, he directed the Munsif to give the plaintiff a decree in accordance with the finding at which he might arrive. The Munsif having decided the case accordingly, it went up on appeal to the Additional Judge. *Held*, that the proper course for the Additional Judge was simply to confine himself to considering whether the decision of the Court below on the issue directed was correct or not: he had no power to go behind the order of the Subordinate Judge on the previous occasion. *BODUN BUROOH v. ABDOL GUNNY*

**19 W. R. 281**

**11.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 588, 590—Objections to its validity taken in appeal against final decree—Omission to appeal from the order.* A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order of remand may object to its validity in his appeal against the final decree, though he might have appealed against the order under s. 588 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) and has not done so. *SAVITRI v. RAMJI*

**I. L. R. 14 Bom. 232**

**12.** *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 588 (28), 591—Remand illegal where in contravention of s. 564—Omission to appeal from remand order—Objection to order allowed on appeal from final decree.* Where a Court of first instance decided a suit, not upon a preliminary point so as to exclude any evidence of facts, but upon the merits, and upon all the evidence tendered and issues framed:—*Held*, by the Full Bench, that, with reference to ss. 562, 564 of the Civil Procedure Code, the lower Appellate Court had no jurisdiction to remand the case under the former section, and that both the remand order and all proceedings subsequent thereto were *ultra vires* and illegal. *Held*, further, that the legality of the remand order and the subsequent proceedings could, under s. 591 of the Code, be questioned in second appeal from



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decree in the suit, though no appeal had been preferred against the order itself under s. 588, cl. 28. **RAMESHUR SINGH v. SHEODIN SINGH**

**I. L. R. 12 All. 510**

**13. ———— Practice—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 562, 588, cl. 28.** Upon an appeal under cl. 28 of s. 588 of the Civil Procedure Code, against an order of remand under s. 562, the High Court is not restricted to the consideration of the form of the order, but may examine it on its merits. Where an Appellate Court passed an order under s. 562, remanding a case which had been disposed of in the Court of first instance upon points which were not preliminary points, but points directed to the merits of the case, the High Court on appeal set aside the remand order, directing the lower Appellate Court to hear the appeal according to law. **ABRAHIM KHAN v. FAIZUNNESSA BIBI. ABRAHIM KHAN v. KHAIRUNNESSA BIBI**

**I. L. R. 17 Calc. 168**

**14. ———— Civil Procedure Code, ss. 562, 591—Objection to previous order in the case—Such objection to be taken in memorandum of appeal.** Unless such objection is taken in his memorandum of appeal it is not open to an appellant at the hearing of an appeal from the decree to question the validity of an order of remand previously made in the case under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure. **TILAK RAJ SINGH v. CHAKARDHARI SINGH**

**I. L. R. 15 All. 119**

Nor of an order under s. 32 adding a defendant. **BANSI LAL v. RAMJI LAL**

**I. L. R. 20 All. 370**

**15. ———— Civil Procedure Code, s. 562—Effect of findings of facts and findings of law.** On an appeal from an order of remand under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court is bound to accept the findings of fact of the Court which made the remand, that Court being a Court of first appeal, provided that there is evidence to support them; but where the High Court has decided a question of law in an appeal from an order under s. 562 of the Code, that decision of the question of law will be final for all purposes in the suit and in any appeal which may subsequently be made to the High Court. **Deo Kishen v. Bansilal v. KARIMA BIBI**

**I. L. R. 15 All. 413**

**16. ———— Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 562—Appeal from order of an Appellate Court—Findings of fact of the Court below.** In an appeal from an order of an Appellate Court the High Court is bound to accept, as in a second appeal from a decree, the findings of fact arrived at by the lower Appellate Court. **Gauri Shankar v. Karima Bibi, I. L. R. 15 All. 413**, approved. **TIKA RAM v. SHAMA CHARAN**

**I. L. R. 20 All. 42**

**17. ———— Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 562—Decree in appeal from order of remand dismissing appeal from decree in the suit**

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—contd.**

—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 13—Res judicata.* It is competent to a High Court in an appeal from an order of remand under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure to pass a decree dismissing the appeal preferred to the lower Court from the decree in the suit. **Bhau Ba'a v. Bapaji Bapuji, I. L. R. 14 Bom. 14**, and **Abraham Khan v. Faiz-un-nessa, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 168**, referred to. **HASAN ALI v. SIRAJ HUSAIN**

**I. L. R. 16 All. 252**

**18. ———— Civil Procedure Code, s. 566—Power of High Court in second appeal.** A revenue-paying talukh was sold for arrears of dāk cess under the Public Demands Recovery Act. The sale was set aside on appeal by the Revenue Commissioner, but on an application for review made to his successor, the sale was confirmed, and the purchaser took possession. In a suit to recover possession of an 8 annas share of the talukh on the grounds, among others, that the order on review was passed without jurisdiction and without notice to the plaintiffs, and as such conferred no title on the purchaser, the District Judge, on appeal, held that the order on review, not having been set aside, remained in force, but he remanded the case under s. 566 for trial of the question of notice. On the case coming back to the Appellate Court before another Judge, he held the order on review to be *ultra vires*, and the trial of the question of notice to be unnecessary. The defendants preferred a second appeal against the last judgment. *Held*, that on the hearing of the appeal the entire case, including the order of remand, was open to consideration, and that the High Court had power to determine whether that order or the order subsequently passed was correct on the merits. **LALA PRYAG LAL v. JAI NARAYAN SINGH**

**I. L. R. 22 Calc. 419**

**19. ———— Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 562, 590, and 591—Power of High Court in second appeal.** On an appeal from a decree of a District Munsif, it appeared that he had decided all the issues framed in the suit, but in the opinion of the District Judge he had based his judgment upon evidence improperly taken. The District Judge remanded the case to be retried, and in the event a decree was passed dismissing the suit which was affirmed on appeal by the Subordinate Judge:—*Held*, on second appeal, that the order of remand was illegal, and, although it had not been appealed against, the subsequent proceedings should be treated as non-existent and the appeal to the District Court should be remanded to be disposed of in accordance with law. **Savitri v. Ramji, I. L. R. 14 Bom. 232**, and **Rameshar Singh v. Sheodin Singh, I. L. R. 12 All. 510**, referred to. **SUBBA SASTRI v. BALACHANDRA SASTRI**

**I. L. R. 18 Mad. 421**

**20. ———— Omission to appeal from remand order—Objection to order allowed in appeal from final decree.** The contention that a map was admissible in evidence was held to be open.



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to the appellant on second appeal, although he had not appealed against an order of remand made by the lower Appellate Court, rejecting the map as not being admissible. *Savitri v. Ramji*, I. L. R. 14 Bom. 232, and *Rameshar Singh v. Sheodin Singh*, I. L. R. 12 All. 510, followed. *KANTO PRASHAD HAZARI v. JAGAT CHANDRA DUTTA*

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 335

**21.** ——— *Finding of fact—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 584 and 588.* Where an appeal is preferred against an appellate order under s. 588, Civil Procedure Code, the finding of fact by the lower Appellate Court is conclusive as between the parties on the proper construction of ss. 584 and 588, Civil Procedure Code. *VEN : A-NAYYAN v. RAMASAMI AYYAN*

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 422

**22.** ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 562, 588, and 591—Conditions under which an order passed in the course of a suit may be questioned in an appeal from the decree in such suit—Limitation.* An order made under the Code of Civil Procedure from which an appeal is given under s. 588 of that Code may be questioned under s. 591 in an appeal from the decree in the suit if the ground of objection is stated in the memorandum of appeal. So held, by the Full Bench, following *Rameshar Singh v. Sheodin Singh*, I. L. R. 12 All. 510. *Muzhar Hossein v. Bodha Bibi*, I. L. R. 17 All. 112, distinguished. Held, (by *EDGE C. J.* and *AIKMAN, J.*), that s. 591 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not enable an appellant to avoid limitation by coming up under s. 591 when the only ground of appeal is an order made under s. 562. S. 591 contemplates two things—there being a regular appeal about something else, and in that appeal the insertion of a ground of objection under s. 591. *SHEO NATH SINGH v. RAM DIN SINGH*

I. L. R. 18 All. 19

**23.** ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 591—Appeal from decree in suit, the grounds of appeal being solely directed against an interlocutory order in the suit.* No appeal will lie where, the appeal being ostensibly against the decree in the suit, the grounds of appeal were solely directed against an interlocutory order passed in the suit. *Sheo Nath Singh v. Ram Din Singh*, I. L. R. 18 All. 19, followed. *SHER SINGH v. DIWAN SINGH*

I. L. R. 22 All. 366

See *HEM KUNWAR v. ANBA PRASAD*

I. L. R. 22 All. 430

**24.** ——— *Appeal from order of remand—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 53, 562—Remand order, informal—Appeal.* When an Appellate Court directs the Court of first instance to do what could be directed only under s. 562, Civil Procedure Code, but the order is informal in that the decree of the first Court is not set aside:—Held, that the order in substance is one under s. 562, Civil Procedure Code, and is

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concl'd.**

therefore appealable. *LALA RAM SARAN LAL v. NEM NARAIN SINGH* (1902) . 6 C. W. N. 326

**25.** ——— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 588 (28)—Appeal against order remanding case for disposal—Decision by Sub-Collector in summary suit under Rent Recovery Act—Remand by District Court—Appeal—Rent Recovery Act (Mad. Act VIII of 1865), s. 69—"Judgment."* In a summary suit under the Rent Recovery Act, the Sub-Collector held a *patta* to be improper, and released certain property from attachment. On an appeal being preferred, the District Judge reversed the finding of the Sub-Collector, and remanded the case, under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for disposal according to law. Plaintiff appealed to the High Court against the order of remand, when it was objected that no appeal lay: Held, that an appeal lay. It was competent to the District Judge to make the order of remand under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The adjudication by the Collector was a formal expression of an adjudication on a right claimed, within the meaning of the definition of "decree" contained in s. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was also a formal expression of a right claimed in a Civil Court. *VEERASWAMY v. MANAGER, PITTAPUR ESTATE* (1902) I. L. R. 26 Mad. 518

**26.** ——— *Validity of order of remand—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 562, 566, 578, 588—Jurisdiction, meaning of the term—Remand order in contravention of s. 564—Whether the remand and the subsequent proceedings null and void—Whether legality of the remand order could be questioned on an appeal from the final decree.* The term "jurisdiction" in s. 578 of the Civil Procedure Code is used in the sense of pecuniary or local jurisdiction, or jurisdiction relating to the subject-matter of a suit. It does not mean the legal authority of a Court to do certain things. A suit having been decided by the Court of first instance, not upon a preliminary point, but upon the merits, the lower Appellate Court reversed the decision of the first Court and remanded the case under s. 562 of the Civil Procedure Code. On remand a partial decree was passed by the Court in favour of the plaintiff. On appeal the decree was modified by the lower Appellate Court. On a second appeal by the plaintiff to the High Court:—Held, that, having regard to the provisions of s. 578 of the Civil Procedure Code, the remand order and the subsequent proceedings were not null and void, as by the remand there was no error affecting the jurisdiction of the Court or the merits of the case. *Rameshar Singh v. Sheodin Singh*, I. L. R. 12 All. 510, dissented from. Held, also, that the legality of a remand order and the subsequent proceedings could be questioned on second appeal from the final decree, although no appeal had been preferred against the order itself under s. 588, cl. (28), of the Civil Procedure Code. *MOHESH CHANDRA DASS v. JAMIRUDDIN MOLLAH* (1901)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 324 :  
s.c. 5 C. W. N. 509



**REMAND—contd.****7. CRIMINAL CASES.**

1. — **Object of remand—Criminal Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1869), s. 422—Act X of 1872, s. 282—Power of Appellate Court.** A remand of a case under s. 422, Act VIII of 1869, could only be for the purpose of taking further evidence, and certifying the result thereof to the Appellate Court, and not for the purpose of retrying the case upon such fresh evidence. After remand under this section, the Appellate Court could only try the case as an ordinary appeal, and had no power to enhance the punishment. ANONYMOUS

3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 62

2. — **Ground for remand—Improper admission of examination of accused—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 205.** When the examination of the prisoner had not been recorded in full as required by s. 205 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, and was therefore inadmissible without further proof of it, but, if admissible, would either alone or with other evidence be sufficient for the conviction of the accused, the proper course was held to be to remand the case to the Court of Session, in order that proof might be taken of the examination. When the evidence, exclusive of the inadmissible examination, is sufficient to support the conviction, it may be affirmed by the High Court without remanding the case. REG. v. KALLA LAKHMAJI

2 Bom. 419: 2nd Ed. 395

REG. v. PEVADI BIN BASAPPA

3 Bom. 420: 2nd Ed. 397

REG. v. VITHOJI. 2 Bom. 421: 2nd Ed. 398

REG. v. GANT BAPU

2 Bom. 422: 2nd Ed. 398

3. — **Remand for further evidence—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 422 and ss. 169 and 171—Jurisdiction of Magistrate.** When an Appellate Court directed further evidence to be taken by a subordinate Court under s. 422 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it was competent to the subordinate Court before which such evidence was given, if any offence against public justice as described in s. 169 was committed before such Court by a witness whose evidence was being recorded therein, to send the case for investigation to a Magistrate under the provisions of s. 171. QUEEN v. BAKTEAR MAIFARAZ

6 B. L. R. F. B. 698: 15 W. R. Cr. 64

4. — **Remand for further inquiry—Power to remand—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 422—Omitting to give information of an offence.** Where a person had been found guilty by a Magistrate of the offence of intentionally omitting to give information of an offence which he was bound to give, and on appeal the Judge found that there had been no evidence given of the omission:—Held, per KEMP, J. (GLOVER, J., contra), the Judge could not remand the case for additional inquiry under s. 422 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In the matter of the petition of UDAI CHAND MUKHOPADHYA . . . . . 9 B. L. R. Ap. 31

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s.c. In re WOODOY CHAND MOOKHOPADHYA

18 W. R. Cr. 31

5. — **Detention of prisoner in custody pending remand—Power of Magistrate.** A remand properly made after taking sufficient evidence given on oath or solemn affirmation is the only ground on which a Magistrate can retain an accused person in custody. In the matter of the petition of ZUHURUDEEN HOSSEIN

25 W. R. Cr. 8

See MUTHOORANATH CHUCKERBUTTY v. HEERA LALI DOSS . . . . . 17 W. R. Cr. 55

6. — **Appeal—Sessions Judge, power of—Jurisdiction—Practice.** A Sessions Judge, while disposing of a criminal appeal, has no authority under the Code of Criminal Procedure to remand the case when the judgment of the Court below is unsatisfactory, directing it to write out a proper judgment after rehearing the parties, if they so desire. It is the duty of the Sessions Judge in such a case to go fully into the whole facts and dispose of the appeal. He cannot devolve this duty on the Court below. TARA CHAND SINGH v. EMPEROR (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 1069

**RE-MARRIAGE.**

See HINDU LAW—DISQUALIFICATIONS—RE-MARRIAGE.

**REMOTENESS.**

See DAMAGES—REMOTENESS OF DAMAGES.

See HINDU LAW—WILL—CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS—PERPETUITIES, TRUSTS, BEQUESTS TO A CLASS, AND REMOTENESS.

See WILL—CONSTRUCTION.

**RENT.**

See ABATEMENT OF RENT.

See APPEAL . . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 580

See APPEAL—N.-W. P. ACTS—N.-W. P.

RENT ACT . . . I. L. R. 13 All. 193

I. L. R. 16 All. 51

I. L. R. 18 All. 302

I. L. R. 21 All. 247

See APPORTIONMENT OF RENT.

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, 1885, s. 3, CL. (5).

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, 1885, s. 52. 10 C. W. N. 46

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, 1885, s. 74. 12 C. W. N. 175

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, 1885, s. 170. 10 C. W. N. 547

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, 1885, s. 182. 9 C. W. N. 416



**RENT—contd.**

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, 1885, s. 188.  
9 C. W. N. 34

See CESS . . . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 82

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE (ACT XIV OF 1882), ss. 13, 373.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 979, 990

See CO-SHARER LANDLORD.

10 C. W. N. 1042

See DEBUTTER PROPERTY.

12 C. W. N. 63

See DECREE, LANDLORD AND TENANT.

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 463; 972

See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT.

See ILLEGAL CESS.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 834

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—RENT.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

I. L. R. 31 Calc 707

9 C. W. N. 96

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 786; 837

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 737

See LIMITATION ACT (XV OF 1877), SCH. II, ART. 109 . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 996

See MADRAS RENT RECOVERY ACT.

See MESNE PROFITS.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 996

See PARTIES . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 182

See RENT, SUIT FOR.

See RES JUDICATA.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 979

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—JURISDICTION—RENT.

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882, s. 50 . I. L. R. 33 Bom. 96

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, s. 73.

9 C. W. N. 11

————— additional, for additional area—

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT—

s. 52 . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 247

6 C. W. N. 318; 360

s. 158 . . . 6 C. W. N. 592

————— appeal in suit for—

See APPEAL—ACTS—BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 153 . . . 7 C. W. N. 908

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—SMALL CAUSE COURT SUITS—RENT.

————— arrears of—

See APPEAL—N.-W. P. ACTS—N.-W. P. RENT ACT . I. L. R. 1 All. 366

I. L. R. 4 All. 237

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, SCH. III—ART. 2.

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————— arrears of—concl'd.

See INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES—ARREARS OF RENT.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 110.

See RENT, SUIT FOR.

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT.

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—IMMOVABLE PROPERTY.

5 C. W. N. 497

See SPECIAL OR SECOND APPEAL—ORDERS SUBJECT OR NOT TO APPEAL.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 532

5 C. W. N. 515

See VENDOR AND PURCHASER—BREACH OF CONTRACT . . . 7 C. W. N. 905

————— arrears of, suit for—

See BENGAL RENT ACT, 1869, s. 29.

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See CO-SHARERS—SUITS BY CO-SHARERS WITH RESPECT TO THE JOINT PROPERTY—RENT.

See JURISDICTION OF REVENUE COURT.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 110 (1859, s. 1, cl. 8).

See ONUS OF PROOF—LANDLORD AND TENANT.

————— arrears of, suit for ejectment for—

See BENGAL RENT ACT, 1869, s. 52.

decree against registered tenant, if binds unrecorded tenant—

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13 C. W. N. 746

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————— decree for arrears of two tenu- res—

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13 C. W. N. 650

————— deposit of, in Court—

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 61.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 680

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 166

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 289

See BENGAL TENANCY ACT, SCH. III, ART. 2 (a) . . . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 283

————— enhancement of—

See ENHANCEMENT OF RENT—RIGHT TO ENHANCE.

————— evidence as to rate of—

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- in lieu of interest—  
     *See* MORTGAGE—CONSTRUCTION—USUFRUCTUARY MORTGAGE.  
         I. L. R. 29 I. A. 148
- kattubadi—*Charge on the land.*  
     Kattubadi is rent, and does not constitute a charge on the land. GAJAPATI RAJAH *v.* SURYANARAYANA  
         I. L. R. 22 Mad. 11
- *See* MUTTAPUDI BALAKRISHNAYYA *v.* VENKATANARASINHA APPA RAU . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 329
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- liability for—  
     *See* INHERITANCE . 5 C. W. N. 189  
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         OBLIGATION OF LANDLORD TO GIVE  
         AND MAINTAIN TENANT IN POSSESSION . 5 C. W. N. 816  
         LIABILITY FOR RENT;  
         HOLDING OVER AFTER TENANCY.  
         I. L. R. 27 Bom. 262  
     *See* SALE FOR ARREARS OF RENT—RIGHTS  
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         I. L. R. 28 Calc. 166
- non-payment of—  
     *See* LANDLORD AND TENANT—PAYMENT  
     OF RENT—NON-PAYMENT.  
     *See* RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—LOSS OR  
     FORFEITURE OF RIGHT.
- payment of—  
     *See* LANDLORD AND TENANT—  
         CONSTITUTION OF RELATION—ACKNOWLEDGMENT  
         OF TENANCY BY  
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         PAYMENT OF RENT.
- payment of, for a number of  
     years—  
     *See* LEASE . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 604
- payment and acceptance of—  
     *See* LANDLORD AND TENANT—CONSTITUTION  
     OF RELATION—ACKNOWLEDGMENT  
     OF TENANCY.
- presumption as to amount of—  
     *See* BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 51.  
         6 C. W. N. 589
- presumption as to fixity of—  
     *See* BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 50.  
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- rate of—  
     *See* KHOTI SETTLEMENT ACT, s. 8.  
         I. L. R. 27 Bom. 71  
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         10 C. W. N. 1084
- receipts for—  
     *See* BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 88.  
         I. L. R. 16 Calc. 155  
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     *See* EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—RENT RECEIPTS.  
     *See* LANDLORD AND TENANT—CONSTITUTION  
     OF RELATION—ACKNOWLEDGMENT  
     OF TENANCY BY RECEIPT OF RENT.
- receipt of proportionate parts  
     of, from various tenants—  
     *See* BENGAL TENANCY ACT, s. 88.  
         6 C. W. N. 823
- receipt recognising mortgage—  
     *See* OCCUPANCY HOLDING.  
         13 C. W. N. 833
- recovery of—  
     *See* LAND REGISTRATION ACT (BEN. ACT  
     VII OF 1876), s. 78 . 5 C. W. N. 360  
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- sale—  
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- suit for—  
     *See* RENT, SUIT FOR.
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     OF 1881), s. 23 . I. L. R. 24 All. 465
- system of—  
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     ACT . I. L. R. 31 Bom. 138
- to whom payable—  
     *See* LANDLORD AND TENANT—TRANSFER  
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10 C. W. N. 820

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See JURISDICTION—SUITS FOR LAND—  
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13 C. W. N. 635; 1110

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8 C. W. N. 721

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—  
LIABILITY FOR RENT;

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See LAND REGISTRATION ACT, s. 42.

8 C. W. N. 193; 196

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 22.

13 C. W. N. 186

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART.  
110 . . . . . 8 C. W. N. 162

8 C. W. N. 695

See N.-W. PROVINCES RENT ACT (XII OF  
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TENANT.See PARTIES—PARTIES TO SUITS—RENT,  
SUITS FOR, AND INTERVENORS IN SUCH  
SUITS.

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6 C. W. N. 66

MATTERS IN ISSUE—ILLEGAL CESS.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 17

**RENT, SUIT FOR—cont'd.**See RESUMPTION—EFFECT OF RESUMP-  
TION—EFFECT ON PATTAS.

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See SMALL CAUSE COURT—MOFUSSIL—  
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SUBJECT OR NOT TO APPEAL.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 116

**— rent of tank, suit for—**

See RENT, SUIT FOR.

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 937

**under ₹100—**

See BENGAL RENT ACT, 1869, s. 102.

**1. — Nature of suits under Act X of 1859—Regular suits.** Suits for rent under Act X of 1859 were not summary suits, but to all intents and purposes regular suits, only tried by Collectors. *NUBO TARINEE DOSSEE v. GRAY*

11 W. R. 7

S.C. BHABATARINI DAS v. GREY

2 B. L. R. A. C. 152

**2. — Suits cognizable under Rent Act—Suit partly for rent in district where Act not in force.** Held, that a suit brought to recover rent, partly due in respect of estates situate in a district in which the Act was not in force, could be brought under the Rent Act. *OOSMAN KHAN v. CHOWDHRY SHEORAJ SINGH*

5 N. W. 42

**3. — Basis of suit—Jurisdiction of Collector.** A suit for rent was cognizable only by the Collector under cl. 4, s. 23, Act X of 1859, whether it was based upon a kabuliati or agreement, or neither. *DHUNPUT SINGH v. MILLS*

7 W. R. 473

**4. — Suit for rent of lands held in excess.** The Revenue Courts had under Act X of 1859 jurisdiction in a suit for rent in respect of lands held in excess of the lands for which the defendant was paying rent, where there was no lease or express contract limiting the lands of the tenancy. *SHAM JHA v. DOORGA ROY*

7 W. R. 122

**5. — Suit for rent payable under agreement—Variable rate.** A suit will lie under the Rent Act for rent payable under an agreement that land taken and occupied without an actual demise should be paid for at certain rates. A variation in the rates of rent in accordance with the crops under a distinct agreement to that effect is not in the nature of enhancement of rent. *JADOOBUR SINGH v. BEHAREE SINGH*

2 N. W. 437

**6. — Suit for rent in kind—Beng. Act VIII of 1869.** A suit for rent in kind is cognizable under Bengal Act VIII of 1869. *MULLICK AMANUT ALI v. UKLOO PASEE*

25 W. R. 140

*KRISHTO BUNDHOO BHUTTACHARJEE v. ROTISH SHAIKH* . . . . . 25 W. R. 307



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See *LACHMAN PRASAD v. HOLAS MAHTOON*.

2 B. L. R. Ap. 27; 11 W. R. 151

and *RAIKISORI DASI v. BONOMALI CHARAN MAITI*

1 B. L. R. S. N. 14; 10 W. R. 209

7. ———— *Suit for rent in kind.* The Rent Act applies where rent is reserved in kind, just the same as in the case of suits for rent in money, but not where articles are to be delivered under a separate agreement unconnected with the question of rent. *BHUBO SOONDUREE DEBIA v. JYNUL ABDIN* . . . . . 8 W. R. 393

8. ———— *Suit for rent in kind—Beng. Act VIII of 1869—Jurisdiction.* The defendant took from the plaintiff's ancestor a small portion of endowed land for a garden, and in consideration thereof paid him a certain fixed amount of grain for his maintenance and support, and subsequently that payment was commuted into a monthly allowance of R3-8, which was regularly paid till 1276, and then stopped. To a suit under Bengal Act VIII of 1869 to recover the amount, the defence was that a suit for a claim of such a nature could not be brought under that Act; but the objection was overruled, and the plaintiff held entitled to recover the amount sued for. *JAILALODDEN v. BURNE* . 15 B. L. R. 261 note; 18 W. R. 99

9. ———— *Suit for rent in kind—Damages.* Held, that damages on account of the wanton destruction of trees, though stipulated for in a kabuliat, cannot be claimed as rent; but that a stipulation to supply a number of mangoes yearly is one to pay a part of the rent in kind, and the value of the mangoes is realizable as rent in a Revenue Court. *NUBO TARINEE DOSSEE v. GRAY* . . . . . 11 W. R. 7

S.C. *BHABATARINI DASI v. GREY*

2 B. L. R. A. C. 152

10. ———— *Suit to maintain money-rent and prevent substitution of rent in kind.* Held, that a suit for maintenance of money-rent, and to prevent the zamindar from substituting a rent in kind for the money-rent previously paid, is not a suit cognizable under the Rent Acts (Act X of 1859 or Act XIV of 1863). *BAINEE v. MAHOMED ALI KHAN* . . . . . 2 Agra 307

11. ———— *Suit to enhance julkur tenure.* A suit for enhancement of a julkur tenure is cognizable under the Rent Act. *PUKAN SAUTRA v. TAJOODDEEN* . 5 W. R., Act X, 20

*ALLUM CHUNDER SHAHA v. BHURUT BABOO*

5 W. R., Act X, 92

And so is a suit for a kabuliat for payment of the rent of a fishery. *KOYLASH CHUNDER DEY v. JOY NARAIN JALOOAH* . . . . . 7 W. R. 93

12. ———— *Suit for rent of land in a town—Beng. Act VIII of 1869.* Bengal Act VIII of 1869 relates only to agricultural holdings, and its provisions have no application to lands forming part of a street in a town. *COLLECTOR OF MONGHYR v. MADAR BUKSH* . . . . . 25 W. R. 136

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13. ———— *Suit for rent of house situated in town.* A suit for a kabuliat or surkhut will lie under Bengal Act VIII of 1869 in the case of a house situated in a town. *RAM LALL v. CHUMMON GHUTTUCK* . 24 W. R. 271

14. ———— *Enhancement of rent of a dwelling-house in village.* A suit for enhancement of rent of a dwelling-house in a village is cognizable under the Rent Act. *ABDOOL HAMID v. DONAGRAM DEY* . . . . . 3 B. L. R. Ap. 133

15. ———— *Suit for rent of land with buildings.* A suit for the rent of land is not altered by the fact of houses or buildings standing thereon, and therefore such a suit is one cognizable under the Rent Act (X of 1859). *MATHURANATH KUNDU v. CAMPBELL* . . . . . 9 B. L. R. 115 note; 15 W. R. 463

16. ———— *Suit for rent of land with buildings—Jurisdiction.* The Revenue Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for rent of land with buildings upon it, when the rent included the rent of the buildings as well as of the land. *DHIRAJ MAHATAB CHAND BAHADUR v. MAKUND BALLABH BOSE* . . . . . 9 B. L. R. Ap. 13; 14 W. R. 246

17. ———— *Suit for house-rent including ground-rent.* Where house-rent includes the rent of the ground upon which the house stands, and the ground-rent can be separated from the other items forming the aggregate of the house-rent, the claim to the extent of the ground-rent may be cognizable by the Revenue Court under Act X of 1859. *RAM CHURN SINGH KETTREE v. MEADHUN DURJEE* . . . . . 8 W. R. 90

18. ———— *Liquidated damages under agreement with respect to house.* The defendant bought a house belonging to the plaintiff and standing on his own land, on the condition that, as long as the house was not removed, he would pay the plaintiff a certain sum per month. The house not having been removed, the plaintiff sued for the stipulated sum from date of purchase. Held, that this was not an action for rent, but a suit for liquidated damages, and as such cognizable in the Civil Court. *DEBNATH ROY CHOWDHRY v. KALLY KISTO ROY CHOWDHRY* . . . . . 1 W. R. 2

19. ———— *Jurisdiction under Beng. Act VIII of 1869—Suit for rent of houses.* The rulings applicable to suits for rent of houses or of portions of land covered with houses or markets have no reference to suits in which rent is claimed in respect of a mouzah or of an entire estate or the aliquot part of an estate. Hence a suit for rent of 8 annas of a mouzah which was part of the plaintiff's zamindari held in farm as a whole by the defendant may be properly brought in a Civil Court under the provisions of Bengal Act VIII of 1869. *GANEEMUT HOSSEIN v. RUNGOO SAHOO* . . . . . 3 C. L. R. 8

20. ———— *Suit for rent of lands appurtenant to dwelling-house.* The defendant had been declared entitled, under s. 9, Bengal



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Regulation XIX of 1814, to hold certain lands as attached to his dwelling-house, at an equitable rent payable to the landlord. The landlord subsequently sued under the Rent Act for enhancement of rent of these lands. *Held*, that a suit for the rent of such lands could not be maintained under that Act. **KHAIRUDDIN AHMED v. ABDUL BAKI**

**3 B. L. R. A. C. 65: 11 W. R. 410**

**21. ——— Suit for house and ground.** If a house and two parcels of ground were held and enjoyed together, forming, as it were, one compound or set of premises, the suit as to the whole was not cognizable under the Rent Act. If one of the parcels of land lies at a distance, or is wholly separate and distinct from the other, the suit as to the former was cognizable under that Act. **BIPRODOSS DEY v. WOLLEN**

**1 W. R. 222**

**TAREENY PERSAUD GHOSE v. BENGAL INDIGO COMPANY**

**2 W. R., Act X, 9**

**22. ——— Suit for rent of land let for purpose of factory and dwelling-house.** A suit lies under Act X of 1859 for the rent of land let for the purposes of a factory including the dwelling-house of the proprietor of the factory, it being immaterial for what purposes the lands were demised. **TAREENY PERSAUD GHOSE v. BENGAL INDIGO COMPANY**

**2 W. R., Act X, 9**

**23. ——— Suit for rent of lands covered by arhâts, ghâts, and bazars.** A suit for rent of land where the rent comes from arhâts, ghâts, and bazars situated upon it, as well as from the land, was held not to lie under the Rent Act. **HARI MOHAN SIRKAR v. MONCRIEFF**

**9 B. L. R. Ap. 14: 15 W. R. 464 note**

**MADAN SING v. MADAN RAM DEB**

**1 B. L. R. S. N. 11**

**24. ——— Suit for ground rent of land on which golah is built.** A suit for ground-rent of the land on which a golah stands is not cognizable under the Rent Act. **DELAHUR ALI v. DABEE PERSHAD**

**11 W. R. 203**

**25. ——— Suit for ferry tolls.** The rent law in Bengal does not apply to ferry tolls. **Hari Mohan Sirkar v. Moncrieff**, 9 B. L. R. Ap. 14, applied. **RACHHEA SINGH v. UPENDRA CHANDRA SINGH**

**I. L. R. 27 Calc. 239**

**26. ——— Suit for rent of bastu lands.** Where the rent for bastu lands was paid by the raiyats to their landlord separately from the rent paid for the cultivated lands, but the tenure of the bastu lands was a raiyatwari tenure, it was held that, as a matter of law, the distinction in the mode of paying the rent did not exclude those lands from the operation of Act X of 1859 or Bengal Act VIII of 1869. **POGOSE v. RAJOO DHOPEE**

**22 W. R. 511**

**27. ——— Suit for rent of garden attached to a house.** *Held*, that a suit by a lessee against a sub-lessee to obtain rent of a garden which was attached to a house, and was ancillary to

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the enjoyment of the house, was not cognizable by the Revenue Court, but by the Civil Court. **SHYAM SINGH v. PUNCHUM MAJEE**

**2 Agra 243**

**28. ——— Suit for rent of land on tenancy not strictly agriculturable.** The class of cases cognizable under the Rent Act includes suits for rent in cases of tenancies not strictly agriculturable, provided the subject of the lease is land and the rent issues out of the land, and is due on account of, and for the use of, the land, whatever may be the purpose for which the surface of the land is used. **WATSON v. GOBIND CHUNDER MOZOOMDAR**

**W. R. 1864, Act X, 46**

**29. ——— Garden land where trees are removed—Suit to fix rent of—Act X of 1859, s. 23, cl. 1.** Where land has been held as a bagh, and no other right or interest therein is shown, it becomes ordinarily, on removal of the trees, a portion of the malguzari land of the village, and the occupant who brings it under cultivation is liable to the payment of rent. If the landowner and himself cannot by agreement fix the rent, a suit for the determination of the rate was maintainable under cl. 1, s. 23 of Act X of 1859. But where the occupant who brings the bagh under cultivation sets up a right inconsistent with the existence of the relation of landlord and tenant, and there is a contest between the parties as to their respective rights and positions, the clause was inapplicable. **SHEOPAL SINGH v. RAI SEETARAM**

**3 N. W. 18**

**30. ——— Suit for tolls from persons coming to hât—Beng. Act VIII of 1869.** A suit for rent derivable by a lessor from tolls collected by the lessee from persons resorting to a hât is not cognizable under Bengal Act VIII of 1869. **SAVI v. ISSUR CHUNDER MUNDUL**

**20 W. R. 146**

**31. ——— Suit to enforce right to erect golahs at ghâts and to collect duties—Act X of 1859, s. 23.** A suit for enforcing an alleged right to erect golahs at certain ghâts, and to collect duties from persons using them, was not a suit "on account of any right of pasturage, forest right, fisheries, or the like," within s. 23 of Act X of 1859, and the Collector had no jurisdiction to entertain it. **FURLONG v. JOHURREE LOLL**

**Marsh. 194: 1 Hay 453**

**32. ——— Suit for rent from a toll on river or canal—Act X of 1859, s. 23, cl. 4.** A suit to recover rent on lease of toll arising from a canal or river navigation was not cognizable under cl. 4, s. 23, Act X of 1859. **GARLAND v. RAI MOHUN HAZRAH**

**1 W. R. 15**

**33. ——— Suit for tolls for use of a ferry—Act X of 1859, s. 23, cl. 4.** A suit for tolls for the use of a ferry belonging to the plaintiff was not maintainable under Act X of 1859, s. 23, cl. 4. **FURLONG v. TREELOCHUN SINGH**

**Marsh. 504: 2 Hay 598**

**34. ——— Suit for dustoorut—Beng. Act VIII of 1869—Objection on appeal.** A suit for dustoorut is not a suit for rent, and is therefore



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not cognizable under Bengal Act VIII of 1869. The ground that, even supposing the suit was not a suit for rent, it was not liable to be dismissed in order that a fresh suit might be instituted under Act VIII of 1859, not having been taken in the Court below, nor in the grounds of special appeal, was overruled at the hearing of the special appeal. *RAM CHURN BANERJEE v. TORITA CHURN PAUL*  
18 W. R. 343

35. ——— Suit for rent of stone quarries—*Act X of 1859, s. 23, cl. 4*. In a suit for rent under a lease of 8 annas of a certain hill and of 14 bighas of land by which the lessee reserved a yearly rent of R200 for the land, and the right of levying a yearly tax on the parties who were employed in quarrying the stone:—*Held*, that this was not a suit cognizable under Act X of 1859. *Khalut Chunder Ghose v. Minto, 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 426*, considered and approved. *SHALGRAM v. KUBIRUN*  
3 B. L. R. A. C. 61: 11 W. R. 400

36. ——— Suit to recover payment for use of land for stacking timber. In a suit to recover money due, or payment in kind, for the use of the plaintiff's land by stacking timber thereon and keeping it there for a specified time:—*Held*, that the claim was of the nature of one for rent and governed by the law of limitation applicable to money claims of that kind. Where there are well known terms upon which the use of land for stacking timber is permitted by its owner, and a party with the knowledge of this custom or practice uses the land in this way, he is bound as by an implied agreement to pay accordingly for such use. *JUMNA DOSS v. GAWSEE MEAH* . 21 W. R. 124

37. ——— *Huqajiri—Usufructuary mortgage—Reserved rent*. The plaintiff had borrowed money on security of a *zur-i-peshgi* lease of property which, after some years, he sued to redeem by payment of an alleged balance, claiming credit for *huqajiri* of the hypothecated land owing to him for the intervening period. *Held*, that *huqajiri* is not rent (see *Hyder Buksh v. Hossein Buksh, 4 W. R. 103*), and if it were it was not claimed as such in this case; moreover, there being a rent reserved would not alter the essential character of the arrangement, which was one of usufructuary mortgage. *Held*, that the words of s. 25, Act X of 1859, imply that a suit by a zamindar to recover a rent reserved on land which has been let out on a *zur-i-peshgi* lease should be brought in a Civil Court. *Held*, also, that the plaintiff was justified in bringing his suit in a Court where he could obtain substantial relief, although the remedy sought by him involved in its details different jurisdictions. *SHEO GOLAM SINGH v. ROY DINKUR DYAL* . 12 W. R. 215

38. ——— *Huq-i-zamindari—Deposit as security for rent*. The fact that a sum of money was deposited by the lessee with the lessor as security for the payment of the rent did not remove a suit for rent from the jurisdiction of the Revenue Courts. A claim for *huq-i-zamindar* was not cognizable under Act X of 1859. *JOWAHUR LALL v. SULTAN ALI* . 12 W. R. 214

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39. ——— Suit for zamindari dāk charges. A suit by a zamindar against a patnidar for zamindari dāk charges, under Bengal Act VIII of 1862, for which the latter is liable under his *kabuliat*, was not cognizable under Act X of 1859. *RUTTUNMONEE DOSSEE v. JOTENDROMOHUN TAGORE* . 6 W. R., Act X, 31

40. ——— Suit for sum in nature of rent-charge—*Act XIV of 1863, s. 1, cl. 4—Nuzzerana*. A certain sum was paid to Government as nuzzerana during the existence of the *maafee* grant through a *lambardar*. After the *maafee* was resumed and a Government *jumma* assessed upon it, the nuzzerana continued to be paid until the interest of the holder of the resumed *maafee* was confiscated for rebellion and sold at auction. After the confiscation, the Government allowed the amount to the *lambardar* by deducting it from the amount of Government revenue paid by him. *Held*, that, under the circumstances, the payment of nuzzerana being a present in acknowledgment of proprietary title in the nature of a rent charge, the suit was cognizable under cl. (4), s. 1, Act XIV of 1863. *ZAHOR HOSSEIN v. ASSUD ALI*  
2 Agra Pt. II, 178

41. ——— Suit for arrears of cess. A suit for arrears of a cess, which is not in the nature of rent, could not be brought under Act X of 1859. *KASIM ALI v. SHADEE* . 3 N. W. 21

42. ——— *Suit to recover cesses in excess of rent—Jurisdiction*. Act X of 1859 gives no jurisdiction in suits to recover cesses over and above the rent. *ORJOON SAHOO v. ANUND SINGH* . 10 W. R. 257

43. ——— Suit to recover *lambardari* right—*Act XIV of 1863*. *Held*, that a suit to recover *lambardari* right, or 10 per cent. allowance provided for in the administration paper, being other than a commission on actual collection, was not cognizable under Act XIV of 1863. *KHOOBEE v. AKBAR* . 2 Agra 322

44. ——— Suit for price of trees—*Act X of 1859, s. 23, cl. 4*. A suit for half the price of trees cut down by the tenant, and claimed by the landlord by right of usage, was not cognizable under cl. 4, s. 23, Act X of 1859. *TOHUL ROY v. MAHADEO DUTT* . W. R. 1864, 327

45. ——— Suit for rent of *zerait* lands. A suit for rent from a party holding lands as *zerait* in his own possession was one for rent as between landlord and tenant, and cognizable under Act X of 1859. *CROWDY v. SREE MISSEER*  
12 W. R. 4

46. ——— Suit for rent of land covered by buildings. *L* having claimed certain lands as lessee from the zamindar and *A* having pleaded that he held them under a *mirasi* tenure from the zamindar, the Court held that the two leases could co-exist, and that *L* was entitled to recover actual possession and to pay to *A*, as an intermediate holder, the rent due to the zamindar. In execution of the decree *L* was put in possession of all the land



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except a portion covered by factory buildings in the possession of *A*, which buildings the Court held did not go with the land. Unable to get possession, *I* brought a suit to recover rent for the land covered by the building. *Held*, that no suit for rent could lie, *A*'s representative being a trespasser and his mere statement of willingness to pay rent being insufficient to constitute the relation of landlord and tenant. *LYONS v. BETTS* . 13 W. R. 94

47. ———— **Payment by one co-sharer to others—Beng. Act VIII of 1869.** A co-sharer in an estate who cultivates a portion belonging to himself and the other shareholders should *pro tanto* be considered their tenant, and payment by such co-sharer for land so cultivated, by whatever name it be called, is substantially rent and a suit for such rent comes properly under the provisions of Bengal Act VIII of 1869. *ALLADINEE DOSSEE v. SREENATH CHUNDER BOSE* . 20 W. R. 258

48. ———— **Suits for rent by goondahs against under-tenants.** Suits for rent between "goondahs" and those cultivating under them were cognizable under the Rent Act. *LIKHUN PATHUK v. ROOP LAL* . 3 N. W. 48

49. ———— **Suit against co-sharer for share of rent—Act X of 1859, s. 23.** S. 23, Act X of 1859, was not applicable to a suit in which the plaintiff claimed as entitled to a moiety of the rent of certain land in the possession of his co-sharer. *MITTUNLAL SAHOO v. NADUE* . 1 W. R. 53

*KALEE PERSHAD v. LUTAFUT HOSSEIN* . 12 W. R. 418

50. ———— **Suit for share of rent against tenant and co-lessors.** A suit for a share of rent against a tenant and co-lessors was not cognizable as a suit for rent within the meaning of cl. 4, s. 23, Act X of 1859. *LALIA ISREE PERSHAD v. STUART* . W. R. 1864, Act X, 28

51. ———— **Suit for rent and damages against co-sharers for sub-lease.** Suit against co-sharers and dar-ijaradar for rent and damages in respect of a mehal of which a sub-lease was granted by the defendant co-sharers. As plaintiff did not get possession of his share until after the expiry of the sub-lease, and then only by the aid of the Civil Court, and as his title during the subsistence of the lease was merely nominal, and as he exercised no rights of a landlord during this period, and could not have sustained against the dar-ijaradar an action for rent under Act X of 1859:—*Held*, that his suit was properly brought in the Civil Court. *RADHAJEEBUN MUSTAFEE v. DENONATH BANERJI* . W. R. 1864, Act X, 49

52. ———— **Suit by patnidar for his share of rent.** A suit by one of a body of partnidars against his co-patnidars for his share of the rents collected by them was cognizable under the Rent Act. *SOOBHUL SINGH v. MEETO SINGH* . W. R. 1864, Act X, 12

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*HYDER ALI v. OMRI CHOWDHRY* . W. R. 1864, Act X, 42

53. ———— **Shikmi talukdars—Permanent settlement.** Where shikmi talukhs at the time of the permanent settlement were comprised within the zamindar's estate, the talukhdars were subordinate to the zamindar, and the zamindar could therefore sue them for their rents in the Revenue Courts. *CHUNDER KANT CHUCKERBUTTY v. DUKHEEANE ODEA* . 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 6: 4 W. R., Act X, 41

*CHUNDER KANT CHUCKERBUTTY v. MAHOMED HOSSEIN* . 6 W. R., Act X, 1

54. ———— **Suit for money advanced to naib for works on salaries.** Money advanced to a naib for the construction of a bund, or for the payment of the salaries of tahsildars and peadahs, comes within the terms of s. 23, Act X of 1859, with regard to the management of land, and a suit by a manager of an estate to recover such advance was cognizable by the Revenue Courts. *RAM DYAL BANERJEE v. COURT OF WARDS* . 12 W. R. 269

55. ———— **Suit for profits of misappropriated property.** A suit for profits of property alleged to have been appropriated by a wrong-doer was cognizable by the Civil Court, and not by the Collector. *ROOP MUNGUL SINGH v. ANUND ROY* . 3 W. R. 111

56. ———— **Suit on bonds secured by assignment of rent.** *A* lent money to *B* on bonds, payment of which was secured by assignment of the rents of *B*'s estate. *A*, instead of liquidating the bonds from the collections of the estate assigned, brought a suit on the bonds, and obtained a decree. *B* then sued for a refund of the collections made and not appropriated to the payment of the bonds. *Held*, that such a suit was not one for rent, and was not cognizable under the Rent Act. *ALI MAHOMED v. KANARAM GHOSE* . 8 W. R. 128

57. ———— **Suit for rent against purchaser of crops—Purchase of crops on condition that they were subject to claim for rent.** Where a party purchases crops belonging to a raiyat at auction sale with notice and assenting to the condition of sale that the crops were subject to the landlord's claim for rent, and the landlord also being aware of the terms of sale allows the purchaser to remove the grain on the understanding that the purchaser assented to, and became liable to pay, the rent, a suit to recover the amount from the purchaser is a suit as an implied contract between the landlord and the purchaser and was not cognizable under the Rent Act. *ACHUL v. GUNGA PERSHAD* . 2 Agra 73

58. ———— **Suit against sezawul to recover loss—Default of sezawul.** A lease empowered the landlord, on default of payment of any of the kists by the tenants, to appoint a kuruk sezawul, the tenants being responsible for any loss accruing. A default having occurred and a kuruk



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sezawul having been appointed, the landlord sued to recover the loss sustained by him. *Held*, that such a suit would not lie under the Rent Act. **ANUND MOYEE DEBIA v. KHIRODHUR HALDAR**

2 W. R., Act X, 46

59. ——— Suit to settle future rate of rent. A suit to settle the rent of future years between owner and occupier of land will not lie. **MUDHOOSOODUN ROY v. SREEPUTTY BHUTTA-CHARJEE**

25 W. R. 488

60. ——— Suit to determine future rates of rent—*Beng. Act VIII of 1869, ss. 28, 29, 35*. A suit to determine not merely current, but prospective rates of rent will lie under the rent law. A pottah is not necessarily mokurari because it confers a contingent holding on the lessee and his posterity. **ASGUR ALI v. WOOMA KANT MOOKERJEE**

25 W. R. 318

61. ——— Suit to collect rents as a sharer or representative sharer. The Civil Court had jurisdiction in a suit which involved the right to collect rents as a share or representative or as deriving from a sharer, and the decision of which depended on proof of a certain alleged partition. **HURROCHUNDER ROY v. OBHOY CHURN SIRCAR**

2 W. R., Act X, 72

62. ——— Suit raising question of extent of share as kutkeenadar. Where the kutkeenadar of an alleged share sued the kutkeenadar of the remaining portion for a proportion of rent, and defendant, while admitting himself to be plaintiff's tenant, disputed the extent of the alleged share:—*Held*, that the question of the extent of the shares of the parties as co-kutkeenadars could only be decided by a Civil Court, which could give complete relief on the whole case with reference both to shares and rent. **VERASUT HOSSEIN v. JUGH-DHAREE SING**

13 W. R. 59

63. ——— Disputed title to rent—*Intervenor*. In a suit for rent paid in kind in which defendant did not deny plaintiff's right as landlord, but in which intervenors appeared and objected that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction, and pleaded also that defendant was their tenant and paid rents to them:—*Held* (by LOCH, J.), that neither defendant's appropriation of the rent, nor the fact of his disputing plaintiff's share, nor the act of the intervenors in raising a question of right, altered the nature of the suit, or took it out of the cognizance of a Revenue Court. *Held*, also (by PHEAR, J.), that whatever might have been the case before the intervention, as soon as the intervenor was made a defendant, and issues of right and title were raised by the Court between him and the plaintiff, there was matter which the Court had jurisdiction to decide. **GOLAM MAHOMED AKBUR v. RADHA KISHEN MOHUNT**

9 W. R. 287

64. ——— Suit by assignee of right to recover rent. A claim to rent made by a person to whom the zamindar has assigned the right to recover the rent was cognizable under the Rent Act. **SHAMASOONDEREE DOSSEE v. BINDABUN CHUNDER MOZOOMDAR**

Marsh. 199: 1 Hay 574

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65. ——— Suit for rent after assignment of rent in consideration of loan. In a suit for rent where the original landlord had, in consideration of a loan from his tenant, made to him an assignment of the rents to some extent, plaintiff alleged that that arrangement had been put an end to, and the assignment had dropped by reason of the defendants having recovered the money in another way. *Held*, that the Deputy Collector had full jurisdiction to enquire into the allegation, because plaintiff's cause of action was the original cause of action of the landlord, and the only effect of subsequent events was to deprive defendants of an answer to the claim. **ISHAN CHUNDER SEIN v. KENARAM GHOSE**

12 W. R. 381

66. ——— Suit for rent against benami and actual cultivator—*Act X of 1859, s. 23, cl. 4*. A suit for rent against two persons, one as the benami and the other as the actual farmer, was cognizable under cl. 4, s. 23, Act X of 1859. In such a suit the plaintiff could only obtain a decree against one or other not both of the defendants. **HEERALALL BUKSHEE v. RAJKISHORE MOZOOMDAR**

W. R. F. B. 58: 1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 81  
1 Hay 449

S.C. RAJKISHORE MOZOOMDAR v. HEERALALL BUKSHEE

Marsh. 188

67. ——— Suit to recover rent wrongfully collected by unauthorized person. A suit would not lie, under Act X of 1859, to recover rent wrongfully collected by a person not the agent of the landholder, and without his authority. **SEETAL KISTO ROY v. GOSSEENATH SHAH**

Marsh. 465

68. ——— Suit raising questions of payment by burrat. In a suit for rent, where payment by a burrat is pleaded by the tenant and execution of it is proved by the landlord, the Revenue Court had jurisdiction to try the question of burrat. **POORNO CHUNDER ROY v. NUND LALL GHOSE**

7 W. R. 25

and of payment. **DARIMBA DEBIA v. NILMONEE SINGH DEO**

13 W. R. 266

69. ——— Claim to deduction of rent—*Bond*. In an action for rent before the Collector, the tenant set up that, by a tamasook entered into between himself and his landlord after his lease, it was stipulated that in consideration of an advance of money by him to the landlord a part only of the rent should be paid and the residue applied in satisfaction of the debt, and he claimed to be entitled to the benefit of that stipulation. *Held*, that the Collector had jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the alleged tamasook, and to allow the deduction, if satisfied that it was genuine. **EDUN v. BEECHUN**

Marsh. 409

70. ——— Mode of payment of rent—*Revenue*. In a suit by the Court of Wards, on the part of the Durbhunga Rajah, for unpaid instalments of rent where the agreement under which the defendant held his zamindari was that he should pay his Government revenue into the



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Collectorate through the Rajah :—*Held*, that the rule which prevailed in that part of the country amongst ordinary tenants of paying rent month by month was not applicable to defendant, and that the instalments of rent and interest thereon were to be calculated according to the Government rules for the payment of revenue. *GRIDHAREE SINGH v. COURT OF WARDS* . . . 10 W. R. 368

**71. ——— Apportionment of rent.**

Where a tenant held lands in six villages under a patnidar at an admitted rent, and the patnidar subsequently granted dar-patnis to two different parties of two and four of the said villages respectively, the tenant having admitted a certain sum to be the rent payable in respect of the lands situated in the two villages, the rent payable to the dar-patnidar of the four villages was properly estimated as the difference between the admitted rent of the land in all six villages and the admitted rent of the land situated in the two villages. *BRAJA LAL ROY v. SYAAMA CHARAN BHUTTO*

6 B. L. R. 523 : 15 W. R. 20

**72. ——— Suit for arrears of rent instituted before, but decided after, the abolishing of Revenue Courts—*Suit for arrears of rent.*** A suit for arrears of rent which had been instituted in the Civil Court before Bengal Act VIII of 1869 came into operation was decided by that Court after the jurisdiction of the Revenue Courts had ceased to exist. *Held*, that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction in the case. *KULLYANESSUREE DOSSEE v. NARAIN KYBURTO*

15 W. R. 241

*See DHIRAJ MAHATAB CHAND BAHADOOR v. MAKUND BULLABH BOSE*

9 B. L. R. Ap. 13 : 14 W. R. 246

**73. ——— Suit for arrears of phulkur—*Suit for arrears of rent—Jurisdiction of Civil Court.*** A suit for arrears of rent of the description known as *phulkur*, being of a nature cognizable by a revenue officer when Act X of 1859 was in force, can now be brought before a Munsif : a Small Cause Court has no jurisdiction to try it. *GOBIND SOOKOOL v. GOKOOL BHUKUT*

23 W. R. 304

**74. ——— Suit for rent of a hât—*Suit for arrears of rent—Act X of 1859, s. 23, cl. 4.*** A suit for arrears of rent of a hât was cognizable under cl. 4, s. 23, Act X of 1859. *GAETERE DEBEA v. THAKOOR DOSS* . . . W. R. 1864, Act X, 78

**75. ——— Suit for arrears of rent of indigo factory—*Suit for arrears of rent—Act X of 1859, s. 23, cl. 4.*** A suit for arrears of rent due on account of an indigo factory was not a suit for arrears of rent due on account of land within cl. 4, s. 23, Act X of 1859. *ODDIT CHUNDER PAUL v. COMOLO KANTO PAUL*

Marsh. 401 : 2 Hay 529

**76. ——— *Suit for arrears of rent—Suit for rent of land with indigo factories on it.*** A suit by a lessor for arrears of rent was triable under Act X of 1859, if the principal matter

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demised under the lease was land, and if indigo factories on such land were merely the adjuncts or appurtenances. *SHARODA PERSHAD MOOKERJEE v. SREENATH MOOKERJEE* . . . 15 W. R. 520

**77. ——— Suit on covenant in lease to recover arrears of rent of mine—*Suit for arrears of rent.*** A leased to B for 25 years, commencing from October 1855, certain aurungs, or pieces of ground, at certain rent payable monthly, B entering into a covenant to pay the rent. The property leased was a loha mehal or iron mine, and the lessee used it as such and erected smelting furnaces. *Held*, that a suit by A against B, on the covenant in the lease to recover arrears of rent was properly not brought under the Rent Act ; that "land," as understood in reference to Act X of 1859, had a limited signification, and referred to such as is made use of for the purposes of vegetable or animal reproduction. *KHALUT CHUNDER GHOSE v. MINTO*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 426

**78. ——— Suit for arrears of rent under assignment—*Suit for arrears of rent.*** A suit for arrears due under an assignment of rent was a suit to recover arrears of rent, and as such was only cognizable under cl. 4, s. 23, Act X of 1859. *KISHEN KOOMAR MITTER v. MOHESH CHUNDER BANERJEE* . . . W. R. 1864, Act X, 3

**79. ——— Suit against mortgagee for rent—*Mortgagee executing lease to mortgagor.*** A mortgagee who executes a lease in favour of a mortgagor, stipulating to pay him a certain amount annually as rent, is, as far as the payment of that sum is concerned, a tenant of the mortgagor, and must be sued under the Rent Act for any arrears of such rent. *BISSOROOP DUTT v. BINODE RAM SEIN* . . . W. R. 1864, Act X, 93

**80. ——— Suit to recover money due for jumma between dates of resumption and settlement.** A suit by Government to recover what the defendants have by a writing agreed to pay in respect of Government jumma between the date of resumption and settlement, was not a suit for arrears of rent cognizable under Act X of 1859. *GOVERNMENT v. HUSHMUTOONISSA BIBEE* . . . 2 W. R., Act X, 106

**81. ——— Suit for damages—*Suit for arrears of rent.*** Plaintiff, having paid arrears of rent to defendant as his landlord's authorized agent, was afterwards sued for those arrears by the landlord, who obtained a decree, the Courts holding that the payment to the mukhtear was one which did not bind the landlord. Plaintiff then sued the mukhtear who had received the money. *Held*, that the suit was an action for damages, and not one cognizable under the Rent Act. *BYKUNT NATH SANDYAL v. KALEE CHURN PAUL*

13 W. R. 359

**82. ——— Suit for arrears of rent after kabuliât had been given up, and after default in payment under agreement.** The defendant gave up a lease of certain property which he had taken from the plaintiff. On doing so, he agreed in writing that what-



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ever rent was due to the plaintiff should be paid in a certain time. Having failed to carry out the agreement, the plaintiff sued him on the kabuliat for arrears of rent. *Held*, that the suit was not cognizable under the Rent Act. **JAIRAM GEER v. SHEO SUMPUT DOOBEY** . . . . . **5 N. W. 84**

**83.** ——— **Suit against talukhdar for arrears of rent.** A suit against a talukhdar for arrears of rent at an enhanced rate would lie under Act X of 1859, even though it were not brought for determination of the rate at which defendant should be required to give a kabuliat. **ROWSHUN BIBEE v. CHUNDERMADHUB KUR** **16 W. R. 177**

**84.** ——— **Suit for arrears of enhanced rent.** A took a farming lease from B by which he agreed to pay B a certain yearly rent, and stipulated further to pay to B half of any enhanced rent which he might succeed in realizing from the raiyats. *Held*, that a suit by B to recover arrears of this moiety of enhanced rent would lie under the Rent Act. **BHABATARINI DAS v. GREY** . . . . . **2 B. L. R. A. C. 152**

**S.C. NUBO TARINEE DOSSEE v. GRAY**  
**11 W. R. 7**

**85.** ——— **Suit for rent against lessee in possession.** A Collector could give a decree for arrears of rent against the real lessees in possession, although no previous realization of rent directly from them was established, and no written agreement was shown to have been executed by them, in their own names, another party being the ostensible holder of the lease, and not denying liability. **JUDONATH PAUL v. PROSUNNO-NATH DUTT** . . . . . **9 W. R. 71**

**86.** ——— **Suit for rent against lessee and surety—Act X of 1859, s. 23, cl. 4.** A suit for arrears of rent under cl. 4, s. 23, Act X of 1859, could be entertained both against the lessee who was made originally liable, and against the surety who would be liable on the default of the lessee. **BHOOBUN MOHUN alias PROLAD SANDYAL v. BHUBO SOONDEREE DEBIA CHOWDHRAIN** **8 W. R. 452**

**87.** ——— **Suit for arrears of rent—Suit against lessees and their sureties—Decree against lessees.** There was no provision in Act X of 1859 which conferred on the Collector jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit against the sureties of a lessee. Although in a suit under Act X of 1859 against lessees and their sureties for arrears of rent, the decree passed against the sureties could not be maintained, still the decree passed against the lessees themselves was good. **DOORGA PERSHAD v. SHEORAJ SINGH** . . . . . **5 N. W. 222**

**GUNESH KOOR v. OOMDUTOONNISA BEGUM**  
**6 N. W. 77**

**88.** ——— **Suit for arrears of rent—Act X of 1859, s. 23—Surety for payment of rent—Decree, form of.** In a suit for arrears of rent in a Revenue Court under Act X of 1859, the lessors joined as defendants the lessee and another

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person whom they alleged to be a surety for the payment of the rent. An *ex parte* decree was made in favour of the plaintiff's, but it did not expressly make the alleged surety liable for the money awarded. In execution of the decree, certain of the alleged surety's land was sold, and the decree-holders were the purchasers at the sale. An application under Bengal Act VII of 1876 for the registration of their names as proprietors of the land purchased having been rejected, the decree-holders brought the present suit to establish their title to, and to recover possession, of the land. *Held*, that the plaintiff's title was bad, on the ground that the decree did not purport to bind the surety for the payment of the money awarded, and on the ground that a Revenue Court is not competent to entertain a suit against a person who has become surety for payment of rent. **BHUGWAN CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHRI v. MANICK BIBEE**

**I. L. R. 9 Calc. 383: 11 C. L. R. 577**

**89.** ——— **Benami lease—Suit for arrears of rent—Landlord and tenant—Act X of 1859.** A brought a suit in the Collector's Court against B, C, D, and E for arrears of rent in respect of land demised under a pottah to F. He joined G and H as defendants. According to the terms of the pottah, they were sureties for F. It was admitted that F's name was used benami in the pottah, and that he took no interest. A sued B, C, D, and E as the parties interested and in possession. C objected that a new settlement had been made and a new pottah granted; that he held a moiety only of the lands, and was not liable for more; and that D was his raiyat, and ought not therefore to have been made a defendant. D and E contended that they were liable in respect of the lot comprised under the pottah, and had already paid rent for it to A under a decree, but objected that they ought to have been sued separately from B, and B did not appear. The lower Court held that C had failed to make out his case, and that D and E were liable in this suit, and passed a decree ordering them to pay the amount admitted by them to be due from them and the other defendants to pay the remainder of the claim. C appealed. On the appeal, **PEACOCK, C.J. (MITTER, J., contra)**, held that the plaintiff's suit must be dismissed, the lease being to H and not to the defendants; that the Court below had founded its decision on matters extraneous to the lease, which it had no jurisdiction to inquire into. *Held*, per **MITTER, J.**, that the suit was properly brought against the actual tenants and not against the benamidar, and that the Collector had jurisdiction. *Held* by both Judges, that the suit should be dismissed as against the sureties, who could not as such be sued under Act X of 1859. **ROY PRIYANATH CHOWDHRY v. BEPINBEHARI CHUCKERBUTTY**  
**2 B. L. R. A. C. 237**

**S.C. PREONATH CHOWDHRY v. BEEPIN BEHAREE CHUCKERBUTTY** . . . . . **11 W. R. 120**

C appealed under s. 15 of the Letters Patent. *Held*, by **KEMP and JACKSON, JJ.**, that the Collector had full jurisdiction to entertain the suit, which was properly brought against those who were in



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the actual possession of the land, and that these persons were really the tenants; that the form of the decree passed by the Collector was correct, the plaintiff having consented to the decree being given in that form; that the sureties had really made themselves responsible for those who were really interested under the lease, and not for *F*. *Prosunno Coomar Pal Chowdry v. Koylash Chunder Pal Chowdry*, *B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 759*, distinguished. *Held*, by NORMAN, J. (dissenting), that the terms of the lease under which *F* was alone interested could not be contradicted by oral evidence; that *F* alone was bound to the lessor under the lease; that the defendant could not be sued as tenant, unless subsequent to the pottah and kabuliat something had occurred creating the relation of landlord and tenant between them and the lessor; that no such relation or any contract creating such relation between the parties could be implied from the circumstances of the case, and the suit should be dismissed. The Revenue Court had therefore no jurisdiction. But whether in the Revenue or Civil Court, *D* and *E* could not be sued jointly with *B* and *C*, nor could *G* and *H*. *BIPINBEHARI CHOWDRY v. RAM CHANDRA ROY* . 5 B. L. R. 234: 14 W. R. 12

**90.** ————— *Benami lease—Beneficiary interest.* In a suit for arrears of rent on a lease granted to one of two defendants in the name of the other, where the former admitted benami execution of the agreement, but the latter denied that any relation of landlord and tenant existed between himself and the landlord:—*Held*, that the question whether the latter defendant was the party beneficially interested in the lease was not one which was intended by the Legislature to be tried by the Revenue Court. *KISHEN BUTTEE MISRAIN v. HICKEY* . . . . . 11 W. R. 406

**91.** ————— *Questions relating to rent—Suit for arrears of rent.* In execution of a decree of the Revenue Court in a suit brought by *K* for arrears of rent of a certain patni, the patni was put up for sale and purchased in the name of *G*. The rent having again fallen into arrear, *K* took proceedings against *G*, under Regulation VIII of 1819, for the sale of the patni; but the arrears having been paid, the patni was not sold. In a suit for arrears of rent of the same patni subsequently brought by *K* against *G*, *P*, and *B* (the wife of *P*) jointly, on the allegation that the patni had been purchased by *G* benami for *P* and *B*:—*Held*, that the Collector had no jurisdiction to try questions relating to rent depending upon equitable rights and liabilities arising from circumstances other than those of the relationship of landlord and tenant. *PROSONNO COOMAR PAL CHOWDRY v. KOYLASH CHUNDER PAL CHOWDRY*

*B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 758*  
2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 327: 8 W. R. 429

*PROSONNO COOMAR PAL CHOWDRY v. MUDDUN MOHAN PAL CHOWDRY*  
11 B. L. R. Ap. 31 note: 13 W. R. 390

*HURISH CHUNDER ROY v. POORNA SOONDUREE DEBEE* . . . . . 18 W. R. 35, 125

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**92.** ————— *Title—Suit for arrears of rent—Title.* *A* died, leaving four sons, *B*, *C*, *D* and *E*, by a wife deceased, and a widow, *K*, and three other sons, *F*, *G*, and *H*, by her. *K* brought a suit against *B*, *C*, *D*, and *E*, and against her three sons, *F*, *G*, and *H*, to establish her title to a certain talukh which she alleged had been conveyed to her by *A* under a deed of gift. *B*, *C*, *D*, and *E* set up a prior deed of partition, whereby the property of the deceased, including this talukh, was divided between all his sons in the proportion of ten annas to *B*, *C*, *D*, and *E*, and six annas to *F*, *G*, and *H*. The High Court, on appeal, held that the deed of partition was genuine and rendered the subsequent deed of gift inoperative. Afterwards *B*, *C*, *D*, and *E* instituted a suit in the Collector's Court for arrears of rent in respect of another talukh, also included in the deed of partition, against the raiyats and *F*, *G*, and *H*. The raiyats admitted that they held at the rent claimed, but stated that they had not paid their rent on account of a dispute between the brothers as to the shares in which they were entitled to the same. *F*, *G*, and *H* raised the defence that this suit could not be maintained in the Collector's Court: a suit in the Civil Court should be brought for the determination of their shares, and the decision in their prior suit was no evidence against them. *Held*, that the question was really one of title between the brothers, and such suit could not be maintained in the Revenue Courts. *GIRISH CHANDRA ROY CHOWDHRY v. RAJ CHANDRA ROY CHOWDHRY*

2 B. L. R. A. C. 1

**93.** ————— *Suit for arrears of rent—Question of joint title.* In a suit for arrears of rent under Act X of 1859, where defendant, admitting plaintiff's interests in the land, alleged that it was the ijmali property of himself and the plaintiff, the Revenue Court dismissed the suit on the ground that it had no jurisdiction. The Judge on appeal reversed the decision and gave plaintiff a decree. *Held*, that, even if the Judge had gone simply into the question of title and decided whether the estate was joint or separate, and on that decision based a decree, he would not have been wrong. *MOHESH DUTT v. BEG NARAIN SINGH*

16 W. R. 82

**94.** ————— *Suit for arrears of rent and for possession.* Where a claim for arrears of rent was joined to a claim for recovery of possession, the suit could not be brought under the Rent Act. In such cases a plaintiff was not to be forced into two Courts for the purpose of obtaining the full relief he required. *BISHOON DYAL SINGH v. SARUB NARAIN SINGH* . . . . . 4 N. W. 32

**95.** ————— *Act X of 1859—Mining lease—Land—Act X of 1859, s. 23, cl. 4—Revenue Courts, jurisdiction of—Suits, cognizance of.* The word 'land,' in s. 23, cl. 4, of Act X of 1859, refers to land granted for agricultural or horticultural purposes, and not to land granted for mining purposes and for purposes of building, making roads and so forth. The words 'or the like,' in the same clause, must be taken *ejusdem generis* with the rights spoken of therein, and do not cover the right of taking coal



**RENT, SUIT FOR—contd.**

from the land demised. *ROOKE v. BENGAL COAL COMPANY, LTD.* (1901) . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 485 ; s.c. 5 C. W. N. 840

96. ———— **Rent of tank, suit for—Revenue Court—"Land"—Fishery, right of.** A suit for recovery of arrears of rent of a tank, which is not a part of an agricultural holding, but is used for rearing and preserving fish is not maintainable in a Revenue Court, the provision of Act X of 1859 not being applicable to such a suit. The term "land" in s. 6 of Act X of 1859 means cultivated land and does not include a tank regarded as land covered with water. *Siboo Jelya v. Gopal Chundra Chowdhry*, 19 W. R. 200 ; *Nidhi Krishna Bose v. Ram Doss Sen*, 20 W. R. 341 ; *Nidhi Krishna Bose v. Nistarini Dossee*, 21 W. R. 386 ; and *Doorga Soonduree Dossee v. Oomdutoonissa*, 18 W. R. 235, referred to. *Semble* : Where the grant is merely of a right of fishery, the lessee acquires no interest in the sub-soil nor is he entitled to retain possession when the water dries up. *Duke of Somerset v. Fogwell*, 5 B. & C. 875 ; 26 W. R. 449 ; *Suroop Chunder Mozoomdar v. Jardine Skinner & Co., Marsh*, 334 ; *Bessen Lal Dass v. Khyrunissa Begum*, 1 W. R. 79 ; *Munohur Chowdhry v. Nursingh Chowdhry*, 11 W. R. 272 ; *Radha Mohun Mundul v. Neel Madhub Mundul*, 24 W. R. 200 ; and *David v. Girish Chunder Guha*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 183, referred to. *MAHANANDA CHAKRAVARTI v. MONGALA KEOTANI* (1904) . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 937 s.c. 8 C. W. N. 304

97. ———— **By what Court triable—Jurisdiction—Munsif, jurisdiction of—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 144—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 15 and 17—Civil Courts Act (XII of 1887), s. 19—Cause of action—Pecuniary limitation—Second appeal.** S. 144 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is controlled by ss. 15 and 17 of the Civil Procedure Code. A suit for rent is therefore to be instituted, subject to pecuniary limitations, in the Court of the lowest grade competent to try it. *FAZLUR RAHIM ABU AHMED v. DWARKA NATH CHOWDHRY* (1903) . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 453 ; s.c. 7 C. W. N. 402

98. ———— **Right of suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 12—Suit for cancellation of patni and for mesne profits—Rent for the same period—Maintainability of such a suit.** Plaintiff, in the first instance, sued the defendant for cancellation of the *patni* lease which the latter held under him, and for mesne profits. He also brought a second suit against the defendant, to recover arrears of rent for the same period. *Held*, that s. 12, Civil Procedure Code, was no bar to the maintainability of the second suit, and that plaintiff could simultaneously prosecute the two suits. The decree of the second suit was not, however, allowed to be executed till the first suit was finally decided in appeal. Plaintiff brought the suit in the double capacity, *viz.*, in his own right and as *shebait* of a certain deity, though his name was not registered in that double capacity under Bengal Act VII of 1876 (Land Registration). *Held*, that it was sufficient for the purpose of bringing the suit that plaintiff's

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name was registered as *shebait* of the deity. *RANSGIT SINGHA v. BHAGABUTTY CHARAN ROY* (1900) . . . . . 7 C. W. N. 720

99. ———— **Suit for rent and enhanced rent—Landlord and tenant—Maintainability of suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 45—Onus—Raiyat at fixed rate.** A suit for both enhancement and arrears of rent at an enhanced rate is maintainable. The causes of action, although separate, may be combined under s. 45, Civil Procedure Code. In a suit for enhancement of rent, the *onus* is upon the defendant to prove that he is a *raiya*t at a fixed rate. *GURDAR TEWARY v. BRIJ NANDAN PERSHAD* (1901) . . . . . 5 C. W. N. 880

100. ———— **Settlement proceedings—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), Ch. X—Record of rights—Publication of record—Rate of rent.** In a suit for rent which accrued due after the final publication of a record-of-rights, the plaintiff relied upon the proceedings of the Settlement-officer, and the defendant relied upon a rent-decree, passed previous to those proceedings, declaring a lower rate of rent. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to claim the rate of rent as stated in the Settlement proceedings. *PUDMANUND SINGH v. GHANSHYAM MISSEER* (1902) . . . . . 6 C. W. N. 914

**RENTAL OF LANDS.**

*See* COMPENSATION.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 599

**RENTS AND PROFITS.**

*See* HÂT . . . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 665

**RENUNCIATION AND RETRACTATION.**

*See* PROBATE, APPLICATION FOR.

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 156

**RENUNCIATION OF REVERSIONARY RIGHTS.**

*See* LIMITATION ACT, SCH. II, ART. 127.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 201

**RENUNCIATION OF RIGHTS.**

*See* WAIVER.

**REPAIRS.**

*See* MORTGAGE . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 32

**REPEAL OF ACT, EFFECT OF.**

*See* ABATEMENT OF SUIT—APPEALS.

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 195

*See* APPEAL—RIGHT OF APPEAL, EFFECT OF REPEAL ON.

*See* BENGAL REGULATION VII OF 1799.

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 626

*See* CALCUTTA MUNICIPAL ACT, 1899, ss. 391 AND 449 . . . . . 7 C. W. N. 374

s. 449 . . . . . 7 C. W. N. 554

*See* CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 3 (1877, s. 3).



**REPEAL OF ACT, EFFECT OF—concl'd.**

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—EFFECT OF  
REPEAL OF LAW PENDING EXECUTION.

See LIMITATION—STATUTES OF LIMITA-  
TION—ACT XXV OF 1857.

13 B. L. R. 445

See LIMITATION—STATUTES OF LIMITA-  
TION—ACT IX OF 1871.

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 287 ; 295

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 230

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 331

7 Mad. 283 ; 288 ; 298

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, ART. 146 (1871,  
ART. 149) . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 283

See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—SPE-  
CIAL ACTS—MADRAS ACT III OF 1865.

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 223

See MAMLATDARS' COURTS ACT (BOM. II  
OF 1906), SS. 7, 23.

I. L. R. 32 Bom. 337

See OFFENCE BEFORE PENAL CODE CAME  
INTO OPERATION.

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 225

I. L. R. 1 All. 599

See PETROLEUM ACT (VIII OF 1899),  
SS. 1 (3), 11 AND 15 . 7 C. W. N. 658

See STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF.

3 Bom. O. C. 45 ; 49

6 N. W. 373

1 Hay 369

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 340

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 333

1. ———— Effect of change of law on  
pending suit—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 387.*  
A suit was held to be pending under s. 387, Act  
VIII of 1859, if anything remained to be done which  
might have been done under the old law ; and a  
party in such a case was entitled to ask the Court to  
proceed under the old law, inasmuch as the applica-  
tion of the new Code would deprive him of a  
right, in reference to the procedure of the case,  
which but for the passing of the Code would have  
belonged to him. *PARROTT v. RAM SUHAY SINGH*  
W. R. 1864, 35

2. ———— *Suit before Act*  
*VIII of 1859—Re-hearing.* A defendant in a suit  
instituted before the passing of Act VIII of 1859  
was entitled, under s. 387, to any advantage of  
right which he might have possessed under the  
old procedure ; but this did not bar him from avail-  
ing himself of any advantages which he might ob-  
tain from the new procedure, e.g., a re-hearing  
under s. 119, in the case of an *ex parte* decree.  
*RUSOOLUN v. FUZEELUT-ONNISSA*

W. R. 1864 Mis. 36

**REPEALED STATUTE.**

——— *Mamlatdars' Court Act*  
*(Bom. Act III of 1876), s. 4—Mamlatdars' Courts*  
*Act (Bom. Act II of 1906), s. 5—Mamlatdars' Court*  
*—Suit for possession of a house situate within a town*  
*Jurisdiction—Act of procedure. Per Curiam :—*

**REPEALED STATUTE—concl'd.**

The repealed statute is, with regard to any further  
operation, as if it had never existed. *VAJECHAND*  
*v. NANDRAM* (1907) . I. L. R. 31 Bom. 545

**REPLY, RIGHT OF.**

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, SS. 288-  
292 . . . 8 C. W. N. 528

See RIGHT OF REPLY.

**REPORT.**

——— from Record Office—

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—PRE-  
VIOUS CONVICTIONS. 6 B. L. R. Ap. 15

——— of ameen—

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—REPORTS  
OF AMEENS AND OTHER OFFICERS.

——— of Commissioner—

See COMMISSIONER FOR TAKING AC-  
COUNTS . . . 5 C. W. N. 692

——— of Indian Law Commissioners  
and Select Committee—

See STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF.

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 852

I. L. R. 14 All. 145

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 207

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 732

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 788

L. R. 22 I. A. 107

——— of Magistrate on inquiry into  
cause of death—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 176  
(1872, s. 135) . I. L. R. 3 Calc. 742

——— of Registrar of High Court—

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—REPORT OF  
REGISTRAR.

——— of police—

See POLICE REPORT.

——— post mortem—

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—MEDI-  
CAL EVIDENCE . . . 6 C. W. N. 98

**REPORTS OF CASES.**

See LAW REPORTS ACT (XVIII OF 1875),  
s. 3 . . . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 289

——— The proper use to be  
made, by Courts, of Reports of cases, considered.  
*SOURINDRA MOHUN TAGORE v. SIROMONI DEBI*  
(1900) . . . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 171  
s.c. 5 C. W. N. 307

**REPRESENTATION, RIGHT OF.**

See HINDU LAW—PARTITION.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 348



**REPRESENTATIVE.**

See *BENGAL TENANCY ACT* (VIII OF 1885),  
s. 106 . . . 12 C. W. N. 8

See *CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE*, 1882, s. 244  
—PARTIES TO SUIT.

See *CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE*, 1882, ss. 244,  
583 . . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 857  
10 C. W. N. 247

See *EXECUTION OF DECREE—EXECUTION  
BY AND AGAINST REPRESENTATIVES.*

See *HINDU LAW—DEBT.*  
11 C. W. N. 163

See *RES JUDICATA—PARTIES—SAME PARTIES  
OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES.*

**REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEASED PERSON.**

See *APPEAL—EXECUTION OF DECREE—  
PARTIES TO SUITS.*

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 101

See *EXECUTION OF DECREE—EXECUTION  
BY AND AGAINST REPRESENTATIVES.*

See *PARTIES—SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES.*

— appeal by—

See *MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.*  
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 499

— execution of decree—

See *EXECUTION OF DECREE—EXECUTION  
BY AND AGAINST REPRESENTATIVES.*

— not made party—

See *APPEAL—ORDERS.*  
I. L. R. 24 All. 532

See *SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—  
INVALID SALES—DEATH OF JUDGMENT-  
DEBTOR BEFORE SALE.*

I. L. R. 6 All. 255

I. L. R. 12 All. 440

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 276

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 686

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 424

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 119

— suit against—

See *HINDU LAW—DEBTS.*

See *JURISDICTION—CAUSES OF JURISDICTION—  
CAUSE OF ACTION—MINOR.*

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 574

See *LIMITATION ACT*, 1877, s. 17 (1871,  
s. 18) . . . 3 B. L. R. A. C. 233

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 627

See *LIMITATION ACT*, 1877, SCH. II, ART.  
120 . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 55

See *MAHOMEDAN LAW—DEBTS.*

See *SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—  
DECREES AGAINST REPRESENTATIVES.*

**REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEASED PERSON—*contd.***

— suit by—

See *CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION—  
RIGHT TO SUE OR EXECUTE DECREE  
WITHOUT CERTIFICATE.*

See *CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE*, 1882, s. 424.  
I. L. R. 25 All. 187

1. ———— “Representative,” meaning  
of—*Civil Procedure Code*, 1859, s. 203. A person  
may be a representative within the meaning of s. 203  
of Act VIII of 1859 (corresponding with s. 252  
of Act X of 1877) so as to make the decree effectual  
for the purpose therein stated, although that person  
is not the heir. *ASSAMATHEM NESSA BIBEE v.*  
*LUTCHMEET SINGH*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 142 : 2 C. L. R. 223

2. ———— “Legal representative”—  
*Civil Procedure Code*, 1882, s. 234—A stranger to  
a decree against a deceased person in possession of  
his property. The words “legal representative”  
in s. 234 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not  
include any person who does not in law represent  
the estate of the deceased person. Consequently, a  
stranger in possession of property of a deceased  
person who was not a party to a decree against such  
person cannot be proceeded against in execution  
otherwise than by a regular suit. *CHATHAKELAN  
v. GOVINDA KARUMIAR* . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 186

3. ———— Liability of representative  
for papers of deceased. The heirs of a de-  
ceased person are liable for papers in their custody  
for which a claim is established against the estate  
of the deceased, as well as for debts due therefrom  
to the extent of assets taken by them. *LUCHMEE-  
PUT SINGH v. NUND COOMAR GOOPTO*

22 W. R. 388

4. ———— *Civil Procedure  
Code*, 1882, s. 252—Suit against the heir and posses-  
sor of the assets of a deceased person. Where a  
party is sued for money as the heir and possessor  
of the assets of a deceased debtor, and it is proved  
that he has received sufficient assets to meet the  
debt, a personal decree therefor can be passed  
against him. *NATHURAM SIVJI SETT v. KUTTI  
HAJI* . . . I. L. R. 20 Mad. 446

5. ———— Hindu estate, person taking  
possession of—*Liability for debt—Executor de  
son tort.* Where a Hindu died leaving a widow and  
brother, and the brother took possession of the de-  
ceased's estate during the widow's lifetime :—*Held*,  
that the brother was liable to pay a debt of the de-  
ceased out of the estate come into his hands. *Held*,  
also, that he was liable as legal representative of de-  
ceased, the widow having relinquished her rights as  
heirress. *Quare* : Is any stranger who takes a de-  
ceased's estate liable under Hindu law, to pay his  
debts as executor *de son tort* ? *JOGENDER NARAIN  
DEB ROYKUT v. TEMPLE* . 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 234

6. ———— Subsequent proof  
of will by executor—*Liability of estate in hands  
of executor—Creditor's right to execute decree or  
bring suit against executor.* The person taking



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possession of the estate of a deceased Hindu (who has left a will, of which, however, no probate has been granted) must, in the present state of the law, be treated for some purposes as his representative, until some other claimant comes forward. A judgment obtained against such a person, even if it cannot be executed against the estate in the hands of an executor when he has taken out probate, is at any rate sufficient to enable a plaintiff to bring a suit against the executor in order to have the decree satisfied. *PROSUNNO CHUNDER BHUTTACHARJEE v. KRISTO CHYTUNNO PAL*

**I. L. R. 4 Calc. 342 : 3 C. L. R. 154**

**7. ——— Suit by creditor against estate of deceased debtor—Heirs of intestate debtor—Parties.** In a suit by a creditor against the estate of a deceased debtor, who has died leaving a will, his heirs on intestacy do not represent his estate and the suit is bad unless the estate is represented. *MATANGINI DASSEE v. CHOONEYMONEY DASSEE*

**I. L. R. 22 Calc. 903**

**8. ——— Administrator appointed under Bom. Reg. VIII of 1827, s. 10—Act XIX of 1841, s. 9—Administrator General's Act (II of 1874), s. 18—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 365 and 582—Death of appellant—Abatement of appeal.** An administrator appointed under s. 10 of Bombay Regulation VIII of 1827 does not, by such appointment, become the legal representative of the deceased or entitled to continue an appeal filed by him. *MALAPA SIDAPA DESAI v. DEBI NAIK*

**I. L. R. 21 Bom. 102**

**9. ——— Heir of deceased Hindu allowing stranger to enter into possession of deceased's property—Effect of decree against party in possession.** If the heir of a deceased Hindu stands by and allows a stranger to enter into possession of the deceased's property, every person claiming under him will be bound by the decree in a suit of which he had notice, instituted *bona fide* against the party in possession for the recovery of a debt due by the deceased to the plaintiff. *UMA SUNDARI v. NITTYANUND SHAHA RAI*

**3 C. L. R. 157**

**10. ——— Liability of representative—Money-debts—Damages for breach of contract.** The heirs and representatives of a deceased person are liable, according to equity and good conscience, to pay not merely the actual debts of the deceased, but also the damages which arise from his breaches of contract. *DELANNEY v. BIBEEJAN*

**22 W. R. 449**

**11. ——— Widow of deceased Hindu—Creditor's right on decree against widow as representative.** Where a Hindu died leaving a childless widow and a separated brother, it was held that until a legal representative was appointed to the deceased's estate, his widow was the only person who could defend a suit as his representative; and that, while a decree obtained against the widow would enable a creditor to attach and sell, not only the widow's life-estate in the immoveable property, but also the reversionary estate of the remainderman,

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yet a decree obtained against the remainderman would not enable the creditor to touch the estate in the hands of the widow. *NATHA HARI v. JAMNI*

**8 Bom. A. C. 37**

**12. ——— Sale in execution of decree against estate of deceased—Suit against representatives of deceased husband's estate.** In 1862 a suit for mesne profits was brought against certain persons as being the heirs of one *R L*, deceased, among whom were his widow and two infant sons. During the pendency of this suit the two infant sons died, and the widow was made a defendant as representing the estate of her deceased sons. The suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiffs in 1875; and on the plaintiffs applying for execution, the widow objected that five-sixteenths of the properties, against which execution was sought, was the property of her adopted son, whom she alleged to have adopted in 1874. The adopted son was not made a party to the suit. This objection was overruled, but the same objection was taken by the adopted son through his natural father as his guardian and next friend, and the Court released the five-sixteenth share from attachment, and allowed the objection. Against this order some of the plaintiffs appealed, but pending the appeal another of the plaintiffs applied to the High Court under s. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure to have the order set aside. The Court, whilst refusing to interfere with the order inasmuch as there appeared to be no material irregularity therein, pointed out to the lower Court that the decree of 1875 having been obtained on account of a debt of *R L*'s, and being against the widow as representing her husband's (*R L*'s) estate, the estate would be answerable for the debt, whether the widow or the adopted son represented the estate, supposing the decree to have been properly obtained. The principle in *Ishan Chunder Mitter v. Buksh Ali Soudagur*, *Marsh. 614*, followed. *SOTISH CHUNDER LAHIRY v. NILCOMUL LAHIRY*

**I. L. R. 11 Calc. 45**

**13. ——— Sale in execution of decree against deceased Mahomedan's estate—Representation of deceased by some only of his next-of-kin—Civil Procedure Code, s. 234—Sale held to be valid.** *V*, a Mahomedan woman, died leaving her husband and several minor children as her representatives. In execution of a money decree obtained against *V* the creditor attached certain land which belonged to *V* and made her husband and two of her children parties to the execution proceedings. The land was sold and purchased by the decree-holder. Held, in a suit brought by the children of *V* to set aside the sale on the ground, *inter alia*, that some of them were no parties to the proceedings in execution, and that the others, being minors at the time, had not been represented by a guardian appointed by the Court, that the sale was valid. *KUNHAMMAD v. KUTTI*

**I. L. R. 12 Mad. 90**

**14. ——— Representation of estate by mother—Decree against mother when adopted son in existence, null.** Plaintiff obtained a decree on



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a bond executed by *S* against the mother of *S* whom he believed to be the heiress of *S*. In attempting to execute this decree against the estate of *S*, plaintiff was obstructed by the defendant, who was the adopted son of *S*. Plaintiff sued the defendant for a declaration that he was entitled to execute his decree against the estate of *S* in the hands of the defendant. *Held*, that the suit must fail, inasmuch as the estate of *S* was not properly represented in the former suit. *Sotish Chunder Lahiry v. Nil Comul Lahiry*, I. L. R. 11 Cal. 45, distinguished. *SUBBANNA v. VENKATAKRISHNAN*

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 408

15. ——— Son as representative of father—*Suit against son—Assets*. Where a suit is brought against a Hindu son, personally and as representative of his father, to recover a debt due by the father, a decree ought to be given against his son, whether he has inherited any property or not, the result of such a decree in the case of non-inheritance being that it cannot be executed against the non-inheriting son. *BAPUJI AUDITRAM v. UMED-BHAI HATHE SING* . . . 8 Bom. A. C. 245

17. ——— Son's liability for father's debts—*Decree against legal representatives of a deceased debtor—Assets*. Where a suit is brought against the son and legal representatives of a deceased Hindu for debts contracted by the latter, the Court ought to pass a decree, although the deceased debtor may have left no assets. *Bapuji v. Umedbhai*, 8 Bom. A. C. 245, followed. *LALLU BHAGVAN v. TRIBHUVAN MOTIRAM*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 653

17. ——— Suit against legal representative—*Assets—Decree—Execution—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 252*. A plaintiff is entitled to sue the legal representative of his deceased debtor, and to obtain a decree against him, without proving that assets have come into his hands. It is sufficient if there are assets of which he may become possessed. The decree should mention that it is against the defendant in that character, and should be executed as directed by s. 252 of the Civil Procedure Code, Act XIV of 1882. *Rayappa Chetti v. Ali Sahib*, 2 Mad. 335, followed. *GIRDHARLAL v. BAI SHIV* . I. L. R. 8 Bom. 309

18. ——— Suit against heir for debts of ancestor—*Onus probandi*. In a suit against an heir for debts of his ancestor, in the absence of special circumstances, it lies upon the plaintiff in the first instance to give such evidence as would *prima facie* afford reasonable ground for an inference that assets had or ought to have come to the hands of the defendant. Plaintiff having laid his foundation for his case, it then lies upon the defendant to show that the amount of such assets is not sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's claim, or that he was entitled to be satisfied out of them, or that there were no assets, or that they had been disposed of in satisfaction of other claims. *KOTTALA UPPI v. SHANGARA VARMA*

3 Mad. 161

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19. ——— Liability of representative with assets to account—*Mesne profits*. When a party is proceeded against as the representative of a deceased judgment-debtor, and it is proved that property which belonged to the deceased judgment-debtor has come into his hands, it lies upon him to account for such property and to include in his accounts mesne profits, whether accruing in the shape of rents or of interest. *ASEEMOONNISSA v. AMEER-ONNISSA* . . . 15 W. R. 285

20. ——— Denial of assets—*Decree against estate—Costs*. In a suit brought against the representatives of a deceased Mahomedan, alleged to be in possession of his estate for recovery of the amount of a bond-debt due by the deceased, the plaintiff should first be allowed to establish his right of suit against the estate, although the defendants plead that they possess no property belonging to the deceased to satisfy the claim. Such a plea, if established, is one to be regarded in framing the decree. The decree in such a case should be for payment out of the property of the deceased. And ordinarily the Court should not direct payment of the costs by the defendant personally, but out of the estate. *MADHO RAM v. DILBUR MAHUL* . . . 2 N. W. 449

21. ——— Person in possession of estate without assets—*Act VIII of 1859, s. 203*. The plaintiff sued the defendants on the ground that they were in possession of his deceased debtor's property. It being found that the defendants received no assets from the deceased:—*Held*, that the suit was rightly dismissed. If the suit had simply been against the defendants as heirs or personal representatives of the deceased, and if they had alleged that no assets had come to their hands, the plaintiff would have been entitled to a decree against them as representatives of the deceased (if he had prayed for such a decree), without going to a trial on the question whether or not the defendants had assets; and in that case he might have proceeded, in enforcement of his decree, under the provisions of s. 203, Act VIII of 1859. *In the matter of the petition of HIRALAL MOOKERJEE*

6 B. L. R. Ap. 100

S.C. HEERA LAL MOOKERJEE v. DIGUMBUREE KULOONEE . . . 14 W. R. 431

22. ——— Representatives of debtor—*Right to decree to extent of assets against heirs*. A decree was obtained against *A*, and on his death execution was taken out against his widows. *B* came in, and, alleging that *A* was merely a benami holder for *B*, applied to be substituted for the widows as defendant. *Held*, that the Court was not right in exempting from liability *A*'s heirs to the extent of any assets which might have come into their hands. *DOORGA SOONDUREE DEBIA v. SOORJOMONEE DEBIA* . . . 8 W. R. 101

23. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 203—*Right to have decree executed out of property coming to hands of representative*. Plaintiff sought to recover the amount of a bond executed by the father of the defendant, and prayed for



**REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEASED PERSON—contd.**

a judgment against certain land which belonged to the defendant's father and the right to which passed by succession to the defendants. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for payment by the defendants of the amount of the bond out of any property which passed to them as the representatives of their father; the plaintiff, in execution of the decree, being at liberty to proceed in respect of the immoveable property, if there should be no moveable property left, or if it should prove insufficient when sold to satisfy the decree. *RAYAPPA CHETTI v. ALI SAHIB* . . . 2 Mad. 336

24. ———— *Execution of decree against son—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 203—Issues.* Where the defendant in a suit for the payment of money died before decree, his sons were made parties and a decree for the debt due by the deceased was given against them. In execution of this decree, the decree-holder attached certain property in the hands of one of the sons, who objected on the ground that it was his self-acquired property. *Held*, that the proper issues to be determined were (i) whether the property attached by the decree-holder had formed a part of the estate of the deceased debtor; and if not, (ii) whether if it was separate property of the son, that son had misapplied any property received by him from his father, and, if so, to what extent. *MOORAREE SINGH v. PURYAG SINGH* . . . 2 C. L. R. 189

25. ———— *Responsibility of representative—Rights of creditors.* When a defendant against whom a decree was passed in his representative capacity has made payments in satisfaction of the decree to the full value of the property of the deceased which has come, or but for the default of the defendant might have come, to his hands, the decree can no longer be executed even although the decree-holder may be able to prove that the defendant still has in his possession property which originally belonged to the deceased. If the heir of a deceased Hindu or Mahomedan has sold to a *bonâ fide* purchaser property which he has inherited, he is responsible for the assets received, but the property cannot be followed in the hands of the purchaser. *RAM GOLAM DOBEY v. AYMA BEGUM* . . . 12 W. R. 177

26. ———— *Liability of representatives—Onus probandi—Mode of accounting.* Before judgment-debtors can claim exemption from a decree-holder's claim, on the ground that they only received a small sum from their ancestor's estate, or that what they have received has been paid in satisfaction of their ancestor's debts, they should prove and file an inventory of the whole estate descended to them, and prove how it has been applied. In a claim of this kind, the onus of proof is on the judgment-debtors, and, on their failure to sustain it, a presumption arises in favour of the decree-holder. *JOOGUL KISHORE SINGH v. KALEE CHURN SINGH* . . . 25 W. R. 224

27. ———— *Payment of debt to representative—Refusal to pay uncertificated re-*

**REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEASED PERSON—contd.**

*presentative.* The defendant gave a bond on unstamped paper to the plaintiff's eldest brother. On the obligee's death, the succession was disputed, and the obligor refused to pay the subsequent interest to the plaintiff. *Held*, that, as the plaintiff had failed to take out a certificate of succession to the obligee, the obligor was justified in such refusal. *Held*, also, that the plaintiff could not recover the stamp penalty from the obligor. *GARUDA REDDI v. GUDI JANAKAYYA REDDI, GUDI JANAKAYYA GARU v. GARUDA REDDI* 1 Mad. 124

28. ———— *Payment of debts to heir of deceased without certificate—Certificate subsequently granted—Liability of debtor—Bom. Reg. VIII of 1827.* A defendant who is sued by the holder of a certificate of heirship to a deceased Hindu for a debt due from the defendant to the deceased is at liberty to show, notwithstanding the certificate of heirship, that he has paid the debt he owed the deceased to the actual heir of the latter before the grant of the certificate of heirship. It will not, however, be sufficient for such defendant to show that he has paid his debt to a person whom he *bonâ fide* believed to be such heir. *PURSHOTAM MANSUKH v. RAMCHHOD PURSHOTAM*

8 Bom. A. C. 152

29. ———— *Succession Act (X of 1865), s. 187—Hindu Wills Act (XXI of 1870), s. 2—Estate of deceased Hindu—Legal representative—Right of suit.* A Hindu, who was of one of the defendants in a suit, died leaving a will. The executors appointed by the will did not take out probate; and the property of the deceased came into the possession of his divided brothers, who were thereupon brought on to the record of the suit as the representatives of the deceased defendant. A decree was passed for the plaintiff by consent. The mother of the deceased, who would, apart from the will, have been his legal representative, then sued to set aside the above decree, having previously obtained a declaration that she was entitled to the property of the deceased in the suit against his brothers above referred to. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not entitled to maintain the suit. *JANAKI v. DHANU LALL* . . . I. L. R. 14 Mad. 454

30. ———— *Certificate under Act XXVII of 1860—Suit to set aside certificate granted by the Resident at Cochin—Jurisdiction of Foreign Court—Right of suit.* Defendant 1, who was domiciled in the Native State of Cochin, obtained from the Resident a certificate to collect the debts of the deceased karnavan of the plaintiff's tarwad. The plaintiff, whose domicile was the same as that of defendant 1, then sued in British Cochin for a declaration of his right to receive the interest accrued due on certain Government promissory notes, being the property of his deceased karnavan. *Held*, that the suit did not lie, and that the appellant should either have established his representative right by suit in the Court of Native Cochin and then applied to the Resident for a certificate or have brought his action against the



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Government of India, joining defendant 1 as a party to such action. *AMMUNNI v. KRISHNA*

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 405

31. ————— *Decree for maintenance obtained by wife against her husband—Appeal by husband against decree—Death of wife pending appeal—Legal representative of the deceased for the purpose of the appeal.* A Hindu wife obtained a decree against her husband for maintenance. He appealed, and while the appeal was pending, the wife died leaving two daughters. The question then arose whether her husband or his daughters should represent the deceased in the appeal. *Held*, that the daughters of the deceased were the legal representatives for the purposes of the appeal. *MANILAL REWADAT v. BAI REWA*

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 758

32. ————— *Representative of insolvent debtor—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 252—Suit against widow of insolvent as his legal representative.* The husband of the defendant was adjudicated an insolvent in 1891, and the usual order was made vesting his estate in the Official Assignee. He subsequently died without having filed his schedule, and no schedule had ever been filed. After his death, a suit was brought by a creditor against the defendant as the "widow, heiress, and legal representative" of the deceased insolvent, in which suit a decree was made against her, "the amount to be levied out of the assets of the deceased in her hands." In an application by the defendant to have the decree set aside on the grounds that the Official Assignee was a necessary party to the suit, and that the decree should have been against him as her husband's representative, as his estate was in his lifetime, and since had continued to be, vested in the Official Assignee:—*Held*, that on the death of the insolvent his widow, the defendant, became his legal representative within the meaning of s. 252 of the Civil Procedure Code, and that the existence of the vesting order in no way affected her position as such representative. *Greender Chunder Ghose v. Mackintosh*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 897; *Girdharlal v. Bai Shiv*, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 309; and *Kashi Prasad v. Miller*, I. L. R. 7 All. 752, referred to. *CHANDMULL v. RANEESOONDERY DOSSEE* I. L. R. 22 Calc. 259

33. ————— *Death of plaintiff subsequent to decree—Right of survivorship vested in defendant—Effect on vested right of plaintiff's representative.* A decree for partition operates as a severance of the joint ownership. Where, therefore, *M*, a minor and only son, by his next friend sued his father and certain alienees of the family property for partition and obtained a decree, and subsequent to decree and pending appeal the plaintiff died, and *M*'s mother was brought on the record as deceased plaintiff's legal representative:—*Held*, that any right of survivorship which the defendant might have had, if the plaintiff had died before decree, was extinguished, and did not affect the rights of his mother, who

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properly represented him. *SUBBARAYA MUDALI v. MANIKA MUDALI* . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 345

34. ————— *Death of the judgment-debtor leaving minor sons—Widow in possession—Sons not parties to execution proceedings—Sale in execution after judgment-debtor's death—Minor sons represented by their mother and guardian on record—Purchase of judgment-debtor's interest by decree-holder—Subsequent suit by sons to recover the property—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 210—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 234.* Under s. 210 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), an execution sale of the property of a deceased judgment-debtor was binding, if the estate of the deceased was sufficiently represented *quoad* such property. A Hindu judgment-debtor died, leaving a widow and two sons, who were minors. His widow was placed on the record as his heir, and not his sons. Certain property of the deceased was sold in execution. The sale certificate issued to the purchaser stated that he had purchased the right, title, and interest of the judgment-debtor in the property. In a suit subsequently brought by the sons:—*Held*, that they were bound by the sale. The widow of the deceased judgment-debtor, who as natural guardian of the minor sons was in possession of the property, was upon the record, and it was clear that it was the interest of the judgment-debtor, and not that of the widow, that was intended to be sold. *ACHUT RAMCHANDRA PAL v. MANJUNATH VENKATNARAYANA* I. L. R. 21 Bom. 539

35. ————— *Heir-at-law and residuary legatee—Decree-holder—Judgment-debtor—Substitution of heir-at-law and residuary legatee as legal representative—Residuary legatee in possession, effect of—Executor de son tort—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), ss. 4, 12, 14, 15, 19, 38, 82, 187—Succession (Act X of 1865), s. 190—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 234.* Pending the execution of a decree, the judgment-debtor died, leaving a will under which *R K* was the residuary legatee. She took possession of the estate, and applied for letters of administration with the will annexed. The will was ultimately found to be true, and letters ordered to be granted. In the meantime, *R K* and the heir-in-law were substituted in place of the judgment-debtor in the execution proceedings, and an order was made between the parties in the matter of the execution. *Held*, that the order was a good and binding order. *Held*, further, that a residuary legatee in possession of the estate of a deceased judgment-debtor could not be regarded as an executor *de son tort*, so that his acts would not be binding upon the legal representative. *Prosunno Chunder Bhattacharjee v. Kristo Chytunno Pal*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 342; *Janaki v. Dhanu Lall*, I. L. R. 14 Mad. 454; *Chathakelan v. Govinda Karumiar*, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 186, referred to. *CHUNI LAL BOSE v. OSMOND BEEBY* (1903) . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1044

36. ————— *Hindu estate—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 45—Right of succession by legal representative—Aliyasantana law—Fund settled on*



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*marriage of husband and wife—Interest payable to both jointly—Death of husband—Claim by widow by right of survivorship—Right of husband's legal representative to his share.* Upon the marriage of first defendant with K, a sum of money was settled by first defendant's mother on first defendant or on K. This money was lent on mortgage, and, by the terms of the mortgage, interest was payable by the mortgagors to first defendant and to her husband K, jointly, with the exception of that which would accrue in respect of the last year of the term, which, together with the principal sum secured by the mortgage, was to be paid to first defendant herself. K died, whereupon plaintiff, as K's legal representative, brought the present suit to recover the interest due under the mortgage. *Held*, that plaintiff was entitled, under s. 45 of the Contract Act, as the legal representative of K, to a moiety of the interest which had accrued since the death of K, first defendant being entitled to the other moiety, and that the right to the whole of the interest did not pass by survivorship to first defendant. The circumstance that K and first defendant intended to live and did in fact live together as husband and wife under the *Aliyasantana* law was insufficient to raise the presumption of a contract that there was to be a right of succession by survivorship between K and first defendant in respect of the settled fund. *KANTHU PUNJA v. VITAMMA* (1901)

I. L. R. 25 Mad. 385

37.

*Hindu law—Rights of unsecured creditors by way of charge or lien on the inheritance—Position of legal representative—Distribution of assets.* The unsecured creditors of a deceased Hindu have no charge or lien on the inheritance. If payments are not made by the heir rateably, it does not follow that he has failed to apply the assets duly. Every payment on account of a debt is perfectly lawful, irrespective of its effect upon the other creditors, and is a due application of the assets, within the meaning of s. 252 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is no analogy between the case of an executor who is governed by the special provisions of the Succession Act, and that of a legal representative under the Hindu law, with reference to the question of the distribution of the assets among creditors. Where property of a deceased remains in the hands of the legal representative, it does not necessarily follow that a creditor is entitled to proceed against it as assets in the hands of the legal representative. The question to be considered is the real effect of what has been done, and, where payments have been made by the legal representative to the extent of the full value of the property of the deceased which has come into his hands, a decree cannot be executed, even although he may still have in his possession property which originally belonged to the deceased. *VEERASOK-KARAJU v. PAPIAH* (1902) I. L. R. 26 Mad. 792

**REPRESENTATIVE OF JUDGMENT-DEBTOR.**

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 244.  
11 C. W. N. 433

**REPRESENTATIVE OF JUDGMENT-DEBTOR—concl'd.**

*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244—Rent-sale of occupancy holding—Application to set aside sale by mortgagee—Transferable holding—Representative of judgment-debtor.* A person to whom a transferable occupancy holding was mortgaged before its sale in execution of a rent-decree is a representative of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, and may apply to set aside the sale under that section. *Ishan Chunder Sirkar v. Beni Madhub Sirkar*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 62, and *Asgar Ali v. Asaboddin Kazi*, 9 C. W. N. 134, followed. *NISSA BIBI v. RADHA KISHORE MANIKYA* (1906) . . . 11 C. W. N. 312

**REPUBLICATION OF SEDITION-ARTICLES.**

See SEDITION . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 141

**REPUDIATION.**

See COMPROMISE . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 70

**REPUTE.**

— evidence of—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 123.  
13 C. W. N. 318

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.  
11 C. W. N. 413

— proof of—

See MARRIAGE . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 232

**RE-SALE.**

See CONTRACT—BREACH OF CONTRACT.  
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 124; 177  
I. L. R. 19 All. 535  
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 505  
I. L. R. 23 Mad. 18  
7 C. W. N. 562

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—RE-SALES.

— of goods, notice of—

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 73.  
15 B. L. R. 276

**RESCUE.**

See ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY.  
13 W. R. Cr. 75  
21 W. R. Cr. 22  
I. L. R. 11 Mad. 441

**RESCUE FROM LAWFUL CUSTODY.**

See PENAL CODE (ACT XLV OF 1860),  
s. 225 . . . I. L. R. 29 All. 575

*To deter public servant from discharge of duty—Arrest by duffadar for theft not committed in his presence—Theft, whether a continuing offence—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 225, 353 and 379—Village Chaukidari Act (Bengal Act VI of 1870), s. 39, cl. (2). The arrest by a duffadar of a person for theft on complaint*



**RESCUE FROM LAWFUL CUSTODY—**  
*concl'd.*

made to him, but not committed in his presence, is illegal under s. 39 (2) of Bengal Act VI of 1870; and neither the rescue of such person from his custody nor the threat to beat him does amount to any offence under s. 225 or s. 353 of the Penal Code. The offence of theft is not a "continuing" one. *BOLAI DE v. EMPEROR* (1907)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 361

**RESERVATION.**

——— grant—

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

10 C. W. N. 425

**RESERVED ACCOMMODATION.**

See RAILWAY COMPANY.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 417

**RESERVOIR.**

See PENAL CODE, s. 277.

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 383

**RESIDENCE.**

See FOREIGN COURT, JUDGMENT OF.

5 C. W. N. 741

See HINDU LAW—

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 751

MAINTENANCE—RIGHT TO MAINTENANCE—SON'S WIDOW.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 557

See INSOLVENCY ACT, s. 5.

See JURISDICTION—CAUSES OF JURISDICTION—DWELLING OR CARRYING ON BUSINESS OR WORKING FOR GAIN.

See LUNATIC . 2 B. L. R. A. C. 246  
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 133

See RECOGNIZANCE TO KEEP PEACE.

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 344

I. L. R. 6 All. 26

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 737

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 133

I. L. R. 14 All. 49

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 32

See SECURITY FOR COSTS—SUITS.

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 227

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 244

See SECURITY FOR GOOD BEHAVIOUR.

5 C. W. N. 29

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—JURISDICTION—DWELLING OR CARRYING ON BUSINESS.

——— condition for—

See WILL—CONSTRUCTION.

12 B. L. R. 1

14 B. L. R. 60

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 15

——— constructive—

See FOREIGN COURT, JUDGMENT OF.

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 112

**RESIDENCE—concl'd.**

——— proximity of—

See CERTIFICATE OF ADMINISTRATION—ISSUE OF, AND RIGHT TO, CERTIFICATE.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 411

——— right of—

See HINDU LAW—FAMILY DWELLING-HOUSE.

See HINDU LAW—MAINTENANCE—RIGHT TO MAINTENANCE—WIDOW.

12 B. L. R. 238

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I. L. R. 4 Bom. 261

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 218

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 490

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 236

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 52

See HINDU LAW—WILL—CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS—PERPETUITIES, TRUSTS, BEQUESTS TO A CLASS, AND REMOTENESS.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 543

——— stipulation as to—

See RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS.

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 670

**RESIDENT'S COURT.**

See ADEN COURTS ACT (II OF 1864), ss. 8, 9.

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 708

**RESISTANCE.**

See RESISTANCE OR OBSTRUCTION TO EXECUTION OF DECREE.

——— to execution—

See LIMITATION . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 491

——— to execution of warrant of attachment issued by Civil Court—

See WARRANT OF ATTACHMENT.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 244

**RESISTANCE OR OBSTRUCTION TO ARREST.**

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ss. 75, 76.

13 C. W. N. 1091

See WARRANT OF ARREST—CIVIL CASES.

5 C. W. N. 843

6 C. W. N. 845

**RESISTANCE OR OBSTRUCTION TO EXECUTION OF DECREE.**

See APPEAL—ORDERS.

2 B. L. R. A. C. 303 note

W. R. 1864, Mis. 24

1 W. R. 140

5 Mad. 183

13 W. R. 264

21 W. R. 39

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 127

I. L. R. 21 Bom. 392

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 830



**RESISTANCE OR OBSTRUCTION TO EXECUTION OF DECREE—contd.**

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 11 . . . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 440

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 82

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 146

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 491

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 144—ADVERSE POSSESSION.

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 37

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 167 . . . I. L. R. 5 Calc. 331

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 113

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 473

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 504

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 179—PERIOD FROM WHICH LIMITATION RUNS—CONTINUOUS PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 294

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 175

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 345

See MANLATDARS COURTS ACT, s. 17.

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 157

See ONUS OF PROOF—POSSESSION AND PROOF OF TITLE I. L. R. 10 Calc. 50

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 967

See PENAL CODE, s. 183.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 564

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 274

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 78

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—MORTGAGED PROPERTY.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 25

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—OBJECTION TO SALE.

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 729

1. ——— Application by decree-holder on obstruction being made—*Month—English calendar—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 226.* The word "month" in s. 226 of the Code of Civil Procedure means a month according to the English calendar. An applicant under that section had a clear calendar month, exclusive of the day of dispossession, within which to prefer his application. *DADU VALAD ANSAR v. BALGOUDA BIN SHANKARAPPA* . . . 5 Bom. A. C. 39

2. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 226—Procedure.* The Court could not be put in motion under s. 226 of the Code of Civil Procedure without an application from the decree-holder under that section. *In the matter of MAHTAB KOOMAREE* . . . 19 W. R. 62

3. ——— Remedies of decree-holder—*Obstruction in execution of decree—Decree-holder, option of, to proceed under s. 328 or by a separate suit.* S. 328 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) does not make it obligatory on a decree-holder, who is obstructed in execution of the decree, to pursue his remedies under that section. Consequently his failure to do so does not prevent him

**RESISTANCE OR OBSTRUCTION TO EXECUTION OF DECREE—contd.**

from proceeding against the defendant by a regular suit. *BALVANT SANTARAM v. BABAJI*

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 602

This was the case under s. 226 of Act VIII of 1859. *JUGMOHUN TEWAREE v. BULDEO NAIK*

3 Agra 162

4. ——— Proof of obstruction—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 226, 227.* In order to bring a case under ss. 226 and 227 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1859, it was necessary to show that obstruction had been offered arising from the circumstance that lands had been taken which were not included in the decree. *PRANNATH ROY CHOWDHRY v. PREONATH ROY CHOWDHRY*

8 W. R. 398

5. ——— Procedure—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 226, 227—Obstruction in execution of decree for immoveable property.* Procedure to be observed where, while execution of a decree was going on against immoveable property, the decree-holder alleged that he was obstructed in getting possession of certain lands included in the decree. *BROJO MOHUN SUTPUTTY v. SHOODA MONEE DABEE*

8 W. R. 79

6. ——— Objection to investigation by Ameen under order of remand—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 226, 227.* Where the order of remand directed the lower Court to ascertain from the settlement chittahs the situation of the lands in dispute, and the chittahs were found not to give the expected information :—*Held*, that the Judge should, when the Ameen's investigation was objected to, have proceeded under ss. 226 and 227 of Act VIII of 1859, and allowed both parties to adduce proofs of their claims. *SHADHOO SURAN v. BHUGGO LALL* . . . 12 W. R. 98

7. ——— Power of Courts—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 329.* The power given by s. 329 of the Civil Procedure Code to make such order as the Court shall see fit must be construed with regard to the circumstances in respect of which the power is to be exercised. An order under s. 329 should be the result of the fact that the defendant in the suit, who is precluded by the decree from disputing plaintiff's right, unjustly instigates a third party, who has no real interest in the property, to prevent the plaintiff from getting the benefit of his execution. A Court has no power under this section to determine, as between the judgment-creditor and a third party obstructing the execution of the decree, important questions on the merits which are wholly unconnected with, and cannot be affected by, the fact that the obstruction is made at the instigation of the defendant. *GOVINDA NAIR v. KESAVA*

I. L. R. 3 Mad. 81

8. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 331 and 647—Civil Courts Act, Madras, 1873, s. 12—Jurisdiction—Claim below ordinary pecuniary limit.* A Court executing a decree obtains, by virtue of s. 331 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a special jurisdiction which enables



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it to try a claim of which the value of the subject-matter falls below the pecuniary limit of its ordinary jurisdiction. By virtue of s. 647 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a superior Court may, for sufficient cause, transfer a claim, registered under s. 331, to a subordinate Court for trial. *SITHALAKSHI v. VYTHILINGA* I. L. R. 8 Mad. 548

9. ——— Person put into formal possession—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 229 and s. 224—Execution of decree for possession.* The provisions of s. 229 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, are not applicable to the case of a person put in possession of land under a decree in the manner prescribed by s. 224 of the same Code. *GUNESH PERSHAD v. JYKISHUN*

1 N. W. 134 : Ed. 1873, 218

10. ——— Bonâ fide claimant other than debtor—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 229.* Under s. 229, a bonâ fide claimant other than the defendant, obstructing the execution of the decree, instead of being looked upon as an intervenor, must be regarded as one of the substantial parties to the suit. *DHIRAJ MAHTABCHAND v. NADUROON-NISSA BEBEE* . . . . . 4 W. R. 82

11. ——— Obstruction otherwise than to officer of Court—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 229—Resisting execution of decree—Jurisdiction.* A and B obtained a decree for possession of land against C. On their proceeding to execute their decree, D, who was in possession, presented a petition to the Munsif, complaining that they were thereby attempting unlawfully to interfere with his possession. The case was tried, on remand from the Judge, as a suit under the provisions of s. 229 of Act VIII of 1859. *Held, per JACKSON, J.,* that as the decree-holder had not complained that the officer of the Court had been obstructed or resisted by the claimant the case did not fall within s. 229 of Act VIII of 1859; and therefore the Court had no jurisdiction to take summary cognizance of the case. *BUHAL SING CHOWDHRY v. BEHARILAL* 1 B. L. R. A. C. 206 : 10 W. R. 318

12. ——— Right to question legality of decree—"Claimants" under *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 229.* In claims arising under s. 229 of Act VIII of 1859, there was nothing to prevent the "claimants" from questioning the legality of the decree obtained by the decree-holder against the judgment-debtor. *MAHOMED ALI KHAN v. KALUNDER ALI KHAN* . . . . . 4 N. W. 81

13. ——— Question for trial—*Title—Possession—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 229, 230—Procedure.* In suits framed under the provisions of ss. 229 and 230 of Act VIII of 1859, the question of title is to be tried, and not the mere question of bonâ fide possession. The matter in dispute is to be investigated in the same manner and with the like powers, as if a suit for the property had been instituted by the appellant against the decree-holder. *RUCHA RAE v. PERMESHR DYAL* . . . . . 2 N. W. 252

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14. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 229, 230—Question of title.* *Held,* that the principle of the Full Bench ruling in *Radha Pyari Debi v. Nabin Chandra Chowdhry*, 5 B. L. R. 708 : 13 W. R. F. B 50,—that a suit under s. 230 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be treated as an ordinary suit for the recovery of property, and that the whole question of title between the parties ought to be gone into,—is equally applicable to a case under s. 229. *ABDOOS SOBHAN v. BRAHMA DEO NARAIN* . 14 W. R. 140

(*Contra*) *TALEB HOSSEIN KHAN v. GOOROO PERSHAD ROY* . . . . . 20 W. R. 57

15. ——— *Purchaser of under-tenure—Plea of limitation.* Where a decree-holder sought to execute his decree against an under-tenant which had been sold for arrears of rent, and the purchaser objected on the plea of limitation:—*Held,* that the purchaser, being no party to the suit, was not entitled to contend that execution was barred: he could only be heard under s. 229 or s. 230, Act VIII of 1859; and if under the former, a very wide discretion could be exercised by the Court. *MOHESH CHUNDER BANERJEE v. CHINDRA MONEE DEBIA* . . . . . 9 W. R. 486

16. ——— Order on application made after time limited—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 229, 231—Right to bring fresh suit.* The holder of a decree for land, having been resisted in obtaining possession thereof by a person other than the defendant claiming to be in possession of such land on his own account, complained under Act VIII of 1859 of such resistance to the Court executing the decree. The Court rejected such application on the ground that it had been made after the time limited by law. *Held,* that the order rejecting such application could not be regarded as one under s. 229 of Act VIII of 1859, which would under s. 231 preclude such decree-holder from instituting a suit against such person for such land. *BENI PRASAD v. LACHMAN PRASAD* . . . . . I. L. R. 4 All 131

17. ——— Nature of investigation—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 229—Subject-matter of suit—Execution—Appeal—District Judge, jurisdiction of.* The plaintiff obtained a decree against T, A, and J in a suit the subject-matter of which exceeded Rs. 5,000, and in part execution thereof attached property worth less than that amount. D having resisted the execution of the decree, the plaintiff's claim was numbered and registered as a suit under s. 229 of Act VIII of 1859. Upon investigation, the first class Subordinate Judge made an order staying execution of the decree. The plaintiff appealed to the District Judge, who held that no appeal lay to him, as the subject-matter of the original suit out of which the execution suit arose exceeded Rs. 5,000. The plaintiff appealed against this decision to the High Court. *Held,* that the investigation of a claim under s. 229 of Act VIII of 1859 was not to be regarded as a fresh suit, but was merely a continuation of the original suit, and that there was therefore no appeal against the order



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in question to the District Judge. *RAVLOJI TAMAJI v. DHOLPA RAGHU* . . . **I. L. R. 4 Bom. 123**

(*Contra*) *MUTTAMMAL v. CHINNANA GOUNDEN* . . . **I. L. R. 4 Mad. 220**

in which it was held that such a claim was a fresh suit, and not a continuation of the suit in which the claim had been made.

**18. ——— Question of possession—**  
*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 331*  
—*Investigation under that section—Question of title.* The investigation of claims under s. 331 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882) is not limited to the fact of possession. Any question of title arising between the contending parties in connection with their right of possession may be finally determined in such investigation as in an ordinary action of ejectment. *MOULAKHAN v. GORIKHAN* . . . **I. L. R. 14 Bom. 627**

**19. ——— Civil Procedure**  
*Code, ss. 13, 278, 331—Munsif, jurisdiction of.* The plaintiff, having obtained a decree for possession of certain land, applied for execution by delivery of possession, whereupon a third party filed an objection in the Court of the Munsif that he held a prior decree for possession of the same land, and therefore the plaintiff's decree was incapable of execution. This objection was allowed, and the plaintiff then sued for establishment of his right to possession of the land jointly with the objector, making the former judgment-debtor and the objector defendant to the suit. The Subordinate Judge in first appeal held that the Munsif had acted under s. 331 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and, applying s. 13 of the same Code, dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The plaintiff then appealed. *Held*, that circumstances did not exist to give the Munsif jurisdiction to act under s. 331, and that his order must be taken to have been made, as it purported to have been made, under s. 278. *Buhal Singh Chowdhry v. Behari Lal*, 1 B. L. R. A. C. 206, referred to. The scope and application of s. 331 of the Civil Procedure Code commented upon. *MAHABIR PRASAD v. PARMA* . . . **I. L. R. 14 All. 417**

**20. ——— Civil Procedure**  
*Code, ss. 328, 331—Obstruction offered by a tenant—Decree for partition—Possession, decree for.* Obstruction was offered to the execution of a decree for partition of certain property by a person claiming to be entitled to occupy part of the land in question as a mulgeni tenant. The decree-holder presented a petition to the Court under the Civil Procedure Code, s. 328: this petition was rejected, and the claim was not numbered and registered as a suit. *Held*, that the decree for partition was a decree for possession of property within the meaning of the Civil Procedure Code, s. 328; and that that section was not rendered inapplicable by the fact that the obstructor claimed to be a mulgeni tenant. *GOPALA v. FERNANDES* . . . **I. L. R. 16 Mad. 127**

**21. ——— Decree in possessory suit**  
—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230—Decree in*

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*suit under Act XIV of 1859, s. 15.* A had been dispossessed of certain land in execution of a decree which B had obtained in a suit against C under s. 15, Act XIV of 1859. A applied, under s. 230, Act VIII of 1859, to recover the land. *Held*, that the decree obtained by B was a decree within the meaning of s. 230 of Act VIII of 1859 and therefore A had rightly applied under that section.  *BRAHMA MAYI DEBI v. BARKAT SIRDAR* . . . **4 B. L. R. F. B. 94**

*S.C. BROHMO MOYEE DABEE v. BURKUT SIRDAR* . . . **12 W. R. F. B. 25**

(*Contra*) *GOBIND CHUNDER BAGDEE v. GOBIND GHOSE MUNDUL* . . . **7 W. R. 171**

**22. ——— Defendants dispossessed in execution, objection by—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230. S. 230, Act VIII of 1859, does not authorize the registry as a suit of objections by defendants or purchasers from defendants dispossessed of immoveable property in execution of a decree, and disputing the right of the decree-holder to be put into possession of such property. *HURO PERSHAD ROY v. RAM LOCHUN MUNDUL* . . . **6 W. R. 148****

**23. ——— Claimant to right of way over land taken in execution—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230. A plaintiff claiming a right of way over land taken possession of in execution of a decree could not intervene under s. 230, Act VIII of 1859, but had to bring a regular suit to establish his right. *NOBIN CHUNDER MOZOOMDAR v. JUTADHAREE HOLDAR* . . . **2 W. R. 289****

**24. ——— Person other than defendant as to particular portion of land in dispute—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230—Suit on dispossession by Ameen—Cause of action, period from which it accrues. S. 230, Act VIII of 1859, was applicable to the case of a person who, though personally the defendant in the original suit, was legally other than the defendant as regards the particular portion of land in dispute in execution. Where an Ameen was appointed to measure and give possession of land in execution of a decree, the one month allowed for preferring a claim under that section must be calculated from the date when the Ameen gave over possession, and not from the date of his final report. *KASHEENATH DOSS v. BHOWANEE DOSSEE* . . . **W. R. 1864 Mis. 18****

**25. ——— Intervenor—Party to suit—Right to apply under Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230. D having sued to recover possession of certain lands, P intervened, and D's claim was decreed without prejudice to P's rights. In execution of that decree, D took possession, and thereupon P applied to be heard under the provisions of s. 230, Act VIII of 1859. *Held*, that, having been a party to the decree, P had no remedy under that law. *RAMGOPAL CHUCKERBUTTY v. POORNACHUNDER BANERJEE* . . . **12 W. R. 475****

**26. ——— Possession by receipt of rent—Personal occupation—Civil Procedure Code,**



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1859, s. 230. Possession by receipt and enjoyment of rent is as good in law as actual occupation, and s. 230, Act VIII of 1859, was not restricted to cases of personal occupation. *BHYRUB SIRCAB v. SHAM MANJEE* . . . . . 15 W. R. 70

27. ————— Objector with *bonâ fide* title—*Right to apply under Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230.* An objector who did not claim to be in possession "on his own account, or on account of some person other than the defendant," but whose sole ground of intervention was that he held a *bonâ fide* title derived from the defendant, was not entitled to be heard under s. 230. *EUSUF ALI KHAN v. SHIB SHUNKUR SHUHAYE. KURIM BUKSH v. SHIB SHUNKUR SHUHAYE* . . . . . W. R. 1864, 384

28. ————— Claimant to possession through mortgagee—*Right to apply under Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230.* Possession through a mortgagee is sufficient to bring a claim under this section. *ASGUR ALI v. ASGUR ALI* . . . . . 20 W. R. 373

29. ————— Party not in actual occupation of land—*Right to benefit of s. 230, Civil Procedure Code, 1859.* A party who has parted with the actual occupation of land to another, was not thereby, as an absolute rule without restriction, barred from taking advantage of Act VIII of 1859, s. 230. *BANEE MADHUB DUTT v. NUND LALL MOJOOMDAR* . . . . . 22 W. R. 123

30. ————— Mortgagee in possession—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 332—Execution of decree—Act VIII of 1859, s. 230—Repeal.* A mortgagee who is in possession of the mortgaged property under the mortgage is in possession "on his own account" within the meaning of s. 230, Act VIII of 1859, and s. 332 of Act X of 1877. Where, in pursuance of an order made in the execution of a decree while Act VIII of 1859 was in force, certain persons were dispossessed of certain property after that Act was repealed and Act X of 1877 came into force, and such persons applied under s. 332 of Act X of 1877 to be restored to the possession of such property on certain of the grounds specified in that section:—*Held*, that such persons were entitled to the benefit of that section. A person claiming under s. 332 of Act X of 1877 need not prove his title, but only the fact of possession. *SHAFI-UD-DIN v. LOCHAN SINGH* . . . . . I. L. R. 2 All. 94

31. ————— Nature of evidence requisite—*Possession and dispossession, proof of—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230.* To entitle a party to come in under s. 230, Act VIII of 1859, by petition, and have his case tried in like manner as if he had paid full stamp duty on a regular plaint, he must prove that he was in possession of the land in suit, and was dispossessed by another party, alleging the land to form part of land decreed to him. *NEEL MADHUB DUTT v. RADHA MOHUN* . . . . . 3 W. R. 205

32. ————— Failure to show dispossession—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230—Suit to confirm possession.* Where, in an application professedly under the provisions of s. 230, Act VIII of

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1859, plaintiff affirmed that he was in possession and sued to have his rights affirmed:—*Held*, that, as plaintiff was not dispossessed, he had no cause of action, and that he was not entitled to be heard; nor had the Court jurisdiction to hear and determine his cause under the extraordinary provisions of that section. *KALEE NARAIN SINGH v. PROTAPCHUNDER BUROOAH* . . . . . 12 W. R. 231

33. ————— Dispossession, evidence of—*Sufficiency of proof—Planting bamboo and making proclamation—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230.* Planting a bamboo and making proclamation to the occupants of an estate that it has been adjudged to some other is sufficient dispossession of a landlord to warrant him in applying to the Court under s. 230. *COLLECTOR OF BOGRA v. KRISHNA INDRA ROY* . . . . . 2 B. L. R. A. C. 301  
11 W. R. 191

34. ————— Procedure on application—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230—Examination of applicant.* When an application is made by a party on the ground that he was in possession and that he has been dispossessed in execution of a decree in a suit in which he was not a party, the proper order to be made under s. 230, Act VIII of 1859, is in the first instance to examine the applicant. *OBHOY CHURN DEY v. RAJENDRO COOMAR GHOSE* . . . . . 16 W. R. 288

35. ————— Dispossession under decree of person not a party to it—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230.* A party dispossessed of land under colour of a decree to which he was not a party, applying to a Judge under the provisions of s. 230, Act VIII of 1859, is entitled to an investigation, and, if his title is established, to a decree. *HASSUN ALY v. NAIB AHMED* . . . . . 11 W. R. 146

36. ————— Trial as regular suit—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230.* Where a party complains, under s. 230, Civil Procedure Code, of having been dispossessed in execution of a decree to which he was not a party, and there are reasonable grounds for thinking that his claim is *bonâ fide*, it is the duty of the Court to treat the case as a regular suit between the claimant as plaintiff and the decree-holder and judgment-debtor as defendants. *LULEET NARAIN GOSSAMEE v. KESHUB DEB GOSSAMEE* . . . . . 15 W. R. 209

*BANEE MADHUB DUTT v. NUND LALL MOZOOMDAR* . . . . . 22 W. R. 123

*YUSAN KHATUN v. RAMNATH SEN* . . . . . 7 B. L. R. Ap. 26

*S.C. ESHAN KHATOON v. RAMNATH SEN LUSHKUR* . . . . . 15 W. R. 327

*AJOO KHAN v. KISTO PERSHAD LAHOORY* . . . . . 8 W. R. 477

*SAHOO GOKUL PERSHAD v. ZYNUB* . . . . . 1 N. W. 176 : Ed. 1873, 255

The express provisions of the later Acts of 1877 and 1882, s. 332, are in accordance with these cases.



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37. ———— **Question of title—Question of possession—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230.** Where an objection takes the form of a suit under s. 230 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the real question to be tried is, whether the objector has a better right to the property in dispute than the decree-holder. *SHEERO COOMAREE DABEE v. KESHUB CHUNDER BOSE*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 188 : 5 W. R. 224

Under Act VIII of 1859, s. 230, it was held that the title might be gone into, as well as the question of possession. *YUSAN KHATUN v. RAMNATH SEN* . . . . . 7 B. L. R. Ap. 26

*S. C. ESHAN KHATOON v. RAMNATH SEIN LUSHKUR* . . . . . 15 W. R. 327

*RADHA PYARI DEBI v. NABIN CHANDRA CHOWDHRY* . . . . . 5 B. L. R. 708 : 13 W. R. F. B. 80

*NUGENDER CHUNDER GHOSE v. RAM COMUL MUNDUL* . . . . . 3 W. R. 213

*JADUNATH SING v. KALIPRASAD* . . . . . 6 B. L. R. Ap. 55 : 14 W. R. 358

*AJOO KHAN v. KISTO PERSHAD LAHOORY* . . . . . 8 W. R. 477

38. ———— **Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230—Claim—Possession.** When a person making a claim to certain property under s. 230 of Act VIII of 1859 had been allowed to bring a suit under that section to try his right to the property, it was held to be sufficient, in the first instance, for him to prove his possession, without proof of title; but if he took this course, it was open to the defendant to show that, although possession might be in the plaintiff, yet he had no good title to the property, and that he (the defendant) had a better title. *DILBASSEE KOONWAREE MOTHEE v. GUNGA PERSHAD* . . . . . I. L. R. 5 Calc. 278

39. ———— **Possession—Limitation—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230.** The defendant purchased in 1856 from the Official Assignee certain property belonging to one D. In 1867 he brought a suit against the heirs of D for possession of the property purchased; he obtained a decree in May 1869, under which he obtained possession in May 1870. In June 1870 the plaintiff filed a petition under s. 230, Act VIII of 1859, alleging that he had purchased the property claimed from the heirs of D in 1864, and had been in possession until he was ousted by the defendant, and that he was not a party to the suit brought by the defendant in 1867. Held, that the title of the defendant was barred, more than twelve years having elapsed from the date of his purchase and that the plaintiff was entitled on mere proof of *bonâ fide* possession, and that he was not a party to the suit by the defendant in 1867 to put the defendant to proof of his own title and, on the defendant's failing to prove his title, to be restored to possession. *BRINDABUN CHUNDER ROY v. TARACHAND BANDOPADHAY*

11 B. L. R. 237 : 20 W. R. 114

40. ———— **Separate adverse claims—Dispossession—Procedure—Civil Procedure Code,**

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1859, s. 230. Four persons made separate applications to the Court under s. 230, Act VIII of 1859, alleging that the defendant, having obtained a decree against Government for possession of fisheries in a suit to which they were no parties, had in execution dispossessed them of fisheries of which they were severally in possession. On inquiry it appeared that each and several of the four applicants claimed possession of the same portions of the fisheries. The lower Court, holding that it was impossible for each of several parties setting up adverse claims to the same property to show that it had been *bonâ fide* in his possession, and that he had been dispossessed from it, referred all parties to a regular suit. Held, that the Judge should have tried each case by itself as between the applicant and the decree-holder. *SARADAMAYI CHOWDHRAIN v. NABIN CHANDRA ROY CHOWDHRY*

2 B. L. R. A. C. 333 : 11 W. R. 255

41. ———— **Dispute between mokuraridar and dar-patnidar—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230.** In a dispute between a mokuraridar and dar-patnidar, it was held that the khas possession of the dar-patnidar, having been established by a decree under s. 230, Act VIII of 1859, could not be disturbed, except by a regular suit by the mokuraridar for confirmation of his title as mokuraridar and for direct possession. *SHERO COOMAREE DEBEE v. KESHUB CHUNDER BOSE* . . . . . 8 W. R. 131

42. ———— **Transfer of land in dispute from one jurisdiction to another—Intervenor—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 230.** In a suit brought by an intervenor under s. 230, Code of Civil Procedure, if during the pendency of the execution case the land in dispute is passed by transfer from one district to another, and thereby the Court is deprived of jurisdiction, it is the duty of the Court to transfer the record to the Court of the district to which the land has been transferred. *KALEE DOSS NEOGY v. HURONATH ROY CHOWDHRY* . . . . . 3 W. R. 4

43. ———— **Purchaser at execution sale—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 269, 268.** A person coming in under s. 269, Act VIII of 1869, more than a month after dispossession, had no *locus standi* under that section. S. 268 of Act VIII of 1859 was solely for the benefit of purchasers at a sale in execution, and no person had any ground to come in under the application of a purchaser except the party who was complained of as resisting or obstructing the purchaser in obtaining possession. *HEERA LALL BANERJEE v. BURODA KANT ROY. ONOOKOOL CHUNDER MOOKERJEE v. BURODA KANT ROY* . . . . . 13 W. R. 467

44. ———— **Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 269—Objection to khas possession made before attempt to deliver possession in execution of decree—Construction of decree for possession.** M obtained a decree against J, and in execution attached and sold his lands, which were bought by the decree-holder. The sale was confirmed and a writ of possession directed. After the decree, but prior to attachment, the original judgment-debtor



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had executed and registered a patni pottah for a three annas share of one of the zamindaris in dispute, and granted it to *D*, who having objected under s. 246, Civil Procedure Code, 1859, to the above sale, an order was made at the time of the auction sale that it should be proclaimed that *D* claimed a patni right, and this was accordingly done. Before *M* was put into actual possession, she was required to find security. Delaying to do this, the lands were attached and sold under a judgment obtained by others who purchased and entered into possession. *M*, having furnished security, petitioned to be put into possession, but her petition was rejected. She then brought a suit to cancel the order refusing her possession. In her plaint she claimed khas possession, but did not refer to the patni claimed by *D*. Her plaint was decreed, the decree was appealed, and it was finally upheld by the Privy Council; but throughout the litigation no issue was raised as to the patni. In the proceeding to execute the decree *M* claimed actual possession. Before process had been issued, *D* objected to khas possession being given of his patni mouzah. The Judge ruled that the objection fell within the spirit of s. 269, Act VIII of 1859, and that he had therefore jurisdiction to entertain it. *Held*, that s. 269 did not apply, inasmuch as no attempt had been made to deliver possession. *Held*, also, that the only intention of the decree was to confirm the plaintiff in the position which she occupied when the property was sold in execution of her original decree, after proclamation of *D*'s claim, and that she was not entitled to khas possession. *SHARODA PERSHAD MULLICK v. DHUNPUT SINGH* . . . . . 19 W. R. 219

45. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 269 and 264 (1882, s. 334)—Delivery of possession—Resistance or obstruction to giving possession.* \* Delivery of possession under s. 264, Code of Civil Procedure, was complete as soon as the steps prescribed by that section had been taken; and any subsequent act of resistance on the part of the claimant to the land was not the resistance or obstruction referred to in s. 236, and could in no way give the Court a right to interfere in the summary way provided by that section. *WAJED HOSEIN v. ABDOL KADIR* . . . . . 13 W. R. 418

46. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 269—Suit by auction-purchaser for possession.* An auction-purchaser of the right, title and interest of his judgment-debtor, plaintiff, got an award under s. 269, Code of Civil Procedure, but in attempting to get actual possession was successfully resisted by defendant, who claimed to have purchased the property previous to plaintiff's purchase. Upon this the plaintiff sued to obtain possession. *Held*, that, as there was no dispossession, the terms of s. 269 would not apply. *SUDARAM MAJEE v. MIRTUNJOY DEY* . . . . . 12 W. R. 509

47. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 269—Dispossession in execution of decree against another party.* A person dispossessed of property in execution of a decree against another person, and claiming to be entitled to possession, was

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not bound to proceed under s. 269 of Act VIII of 1859. *PROTAB CHUNDER CHOWDHRY v. BROJOLAL SHAHA*. B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 638 : 7 W. R. 253

*JADOONATH CHOWDHRY v. RADHAMONEE DOSSE*  
B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 643 : 7 W. R. 256

48. ———— *Person dispossessed in execution of decree—His remedy by suit or application under s. 332 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882).* A person, dispossessed of his land in execution of a decree of a Civil Court against a third party, should proceed for the alleged obstruction of his possession, not by a suit in the Mamlatdar's Court, but by an application under s. 332 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), or by a regular suit. *GULABBHAI GOPALJI v. JINABHAI RATANJI* . . . . . I. L. R. 13 Bom. 213

49. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 269—Suit by auction-purchaser to recover possession.* It was not compulsory upon an auction-purchaser under a decree, when resistance was offered to his taking possession of the property purchased, to proceed under s. 269 of the Civil Procedure Code. It was open to him to proceed at once by regular suit against the person in possession of the property purchased by him. *MADAREE v. BULLOO KOOREE* . . . . . 2 N. W. 450

50. ———— *Inquiry as to right to possession—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 269.* Where a Subordinate Judge, proceeding under Act VIII of 1859, s. 269, looked into the circumstances of a case with reference to the relative rights of the parties, and came to the conclusion that he could not refuse possession to the execution-purchaser, he was held to have made the kind of inquiry contemplated by the section. *HURO PERSHAD ROY CHOWDHRY v. RAMESH MISSRY MALIA* . . . . . 24 W. R. 461

51. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 269—Proof of title—Onus probandi of.* When the defendant was in possession by virtue of an order under s. 269 of Act VIII of 1859, the plaintiff could only succeed on the strength of his own title. *KALLAPA v. VENKATESH VINAYAK*  
I. L. R. 2 Bom. 676

52. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 246 and 269—Order as to right to possession.* An application under s. 246, Act VIII of 1859, having been disallowed on the ground of unnecessary and improper delay, the attached property was sold; but on the attempt to take possession the purchaser was obstructed by the applicant, who alleged himself to be in possession. The Court made an investigation under s. 269, and determined that, as applicant's claim had been disallowed under s. 246, he had no right to remain in possession. *Held*, that this order was judicious and proper. *In the matter of the petition of BANEEMADHUB ROY*  
13 W. R. 431

53. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 269—Limitation—"Suit to establish his right"—Right contradictory to summary order*



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or consistent with it. The words "suit to establish his right" in s. 269 of the Civil Procedure Code meant a suit to establish his right to present possession; but where there was a subsisting right which was contradicted by the summary order under that section, and which was to be properly asserted by such a suit, the suit, by the person dispossessed or refused possession to establish his right, had to be brought within one year from the date of the order, failing which he could not sue afterwards on any portion of such right. It was otherwise where his right was consistent with the order and the possession given under it. **RANGO VITHAL v. RIKHIVADAS BIN RAYACHAND** . . . . . **11 Bom. 174**

**54.** ————— *Order not made against parties to proceedings—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 268, 269.* A purchaser of immovable property at a Court-sale, having been obstructed by the defendant, made an application to the Court under s. 268 of Act VIII of 1859 for the removal of the obstruction, but subsequently withdrew his application. The Court thereupon made an endorsement on the application to the effect that, as the applicant did not wish to proceed further, no investigation was made. *Held*, that no such order had been made as was contemplated by s. 269, that section contemplating at least an order against one party or the other. **BHIKA v. SAKARLAL** . . . . . **I. L. R. 5 Bom. 440**

In **HARASATOULLAH v. BROJONATH GHOSE** . . . . . **I. L. R. 3 Calc. 729 ; 1 C. L. R. 517**

In a case governed by the Civil Procedure Code, 1877, it was *held* that, there being no provision in that Code similar to that contained in s. 269 of Act VIII of 1859 enabling the Court to do so, the Court could not enquire into a complaint made by a person other than the defendant on the ground of dispossession in the delivery of possession to the purchaser of immovable property sold in execution of a decree; and therefore the only remedy of a person so dispossessed was by regular suit. This omission in the Code of 1877 was rectified by the amending Act XII of 1879, and under the present Code, Act XIV of 1882, a person other than the defendant may make an application for an inquiry.

**55.** ————— *Application against a claimant resisting execution, how treated—Order under Civil Procedure Code, s. 331, nature of.* An application in furtherance of execution of a decree for possession against a person who resists execution, claiming the property as his own, is an application within s. 331 of the Civil Procedure Code, and should be treated as a plaint. **FONINDRO DEB RAIKUT v. JUGODISHWARI DEBI** . . . . . **I. L. R. 14 Calc. 234**

**56.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 335—Effect of order unappealed from.* An order rejecting a claim petition under s. 335 of the Civil Procedure Code, not being appealed against within one year, acquires the force of a

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decree. **VELAYUTHAN v. LAKSHMANA, I. L. R. 8 Mad. 506**, followed. **ACHUTA v. MAMMAVU** . . . . . **I. L. R. 10 Mad. 357**

**57.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 331, 335—Order under s. 335—Decree—Dispossession.* An order under s. 335, Civil Procedure Code, is not a decree; a person in whose favour such an order is made is not entitled to claim the benefit of s. 331, Civil Procedure Code. If a purchaser of immovable property, at an execution sale, who has obtained delivery of the same from Court, is subsequently dispossessed, he is not entitled to claim the benefit of s. 335 as such purchaser. **SRINATH GHOSH v. ANNODA PROSAD ROY** . . . . . **1 C. W. N. 192**

**58.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 319, 335—Land in the occupancy of raiyat—Symbolical possession under s. 319—Dispossession of a third party.* Where a person is found to be in possession of any land by receipt of rent from tenants, delivery of possession thereof under s. 319 of the Civil Procedure Code to a third party being a purchaser at an execution sale does not cause dispossession of the original possessor, within the meaning of s. 335, Civil Procedure Code, so as to entitle him to complain within the meaning of that section. **KISORI LAL GOSWAMI v. LALA SHIB LAL** . . . . . **1 C. W. N. 343**

**59.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 318, 335—Suit to recover possession of property sold in execution of decree.* *S* attached certain land and a house in execution of a decree against *R*. *M* put in a claim, under s. 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure, alleging that he was in possession as purchaser from *R*. The claim was rejected. No suit was brought by *M* to contest this order. *S* purchased the said land and house in execution and obtained a sale-certificate. In 1884 *S* sued *M* to recover possession of the land and house, alleging that in execution proceedings in 1882 he had been put into possession of the land, but not of the house which was found locked up by the Court Ameen, and that *M* prevented him from enjoying both the land and house. *M* pleaded that *S* had never been put into possession, and again set up his title as purchaser from *R* and possession under such title. The Munsif found that *S* had been put into formal or constructive possession of the land but not of the house, and decreed the claim. On appeal, the District Judge held that *S* was bound to proceed according to the provisions of s. 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure to recover possession, and could not bring a separate suit. *Held*, that, whether there had been legal delivery or not, the suit was not barred. **SEVU v. MUTTUSAMI** . . . . . **I. L. R. 10 Mad. 53**

**60.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 234, 332, 588—Death of judgment-debtor between order for possession in execution of decree and delivery of possession—Appeal against appellate order reversing an order under s. 332.* A decree-holder in a District Munsif's Court obtained an order for possession of land in execution of his decree on 20th August, on which day the judgment-debtor



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died. Possession was delivered on 28th August. The person dispossessed presented a petition under s. 332 of the Code of Civil Procedure disputing his right to be put into possession, on the ground, *inter alia*, that the judgment-debtor was not represented on the record. On appeal against the appellate order of the District Judge:—*Held*, assuming that the order for possession was made prior to the death of the judgment-debtor, there was no necessity for the decree-holder to bring any other person on to the record between the date of that order and the date on which the order was executed. *Ramasami v. Bagirathi*, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 180, distinguished. *BIYYAKKA v. FAKIRA*. I. L. R. 12 Mad. 211

**61.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 335—Joint managers—Mortgage by one of such managers—Sale by mortgagee in execution of decree on mortgage and dispossession of the other manager—Application for restoration of possession by other joint manager.* K, the owner of certain property, gave the management of it to his three nephews, G, A, and N. A mortgaged the property, and the mortgagee sued on the mortgage and got a decree. In execution of the decree, the property was sold and purchased by L, who was put in possession by the Court. G, one of the managers, then applied for possession under s. 335 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) alleging that he had been wrongfully dispossessed. *Held*, that the mortgagee got no title to the property by his mortgage from A against the real owner K; and G, who was in actual possession as his manager (whether or not there were others equally entitled to share in the management), was entitled to prevent the purchaser L taking possession, and having been dispossessed had a claim to be restored to possession under s. 335 of the Civil Procedure Code. *GOBIND BALVANT SHIVNEKAR v. LAKSHMAN BIN NANA TELI*. I. L. R. 18 Bom. 522

**62.** *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 334 and 335—Application by usufructuary mortgagee ejected by auction-purchaser to be restored to possession—Representative of party to suit—Auction-purchaser who was also assignee of decree—Judgment-debtor.* In a suit for sale upon a mortgage, the plaintiff, having obtained a decree, assigned the same, and the assignee brought the property decreed to be sold to sale, and purchased it himself and obtained possession. A usufructuary mortgagee of the property who had been a party to the suit, and in whose favour the decree was, in so far that it declared his right to continue in possession, applied to be restored to possession, and obtained an order in his favour. Thereupon the assignee, auction-purchaser, applied in revision to have the order restoring the usufructuary mortgagee to possession set aside. *Held*, that the order in question was an order which could properly be made under s. 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and, being unappealable, an application for revision thereof might lie. The auction-purchaser, though he happened also to be the assignee of the decree, was not a representative of a party to the suit within

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the meaning of s. 244, nor was the usufructuary mortgagee a judgment-debtor within the meaning of s. 334 or s. 335, but he was a person other than a judgment-debtor within the meaning of s. 335. *SABHAJIT v. SRI GOPAL*. I. L. R. 17 All 222

**63.** *Resistance or obstruction to execution—Limitation—Renewal of resistance or obstruction—Fresh cause of action.* The period of limitation provided for in s. 328 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a limitation which governs a cause of action arising out of a particular resistance or obstruction. So far as that resistance or obstruction is concerned, the decree-holder, if he wishes to take proceedings under s. 328, must do so within one month from the time of such resistance or obstruction. But the bar created by the limitation imposed by this section does not extend to and hold good so as to bar complaints against acts of resistance or obstruction made upon fresh proceedings taken by the decree-holder. *Ramasekara v. Dharmaraya*, I. L. R. 5 Mad. 113, followed. *Balvant Santaram v. Babaji*, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 602, and *Vinayak Rao Amrit v. Devrao Govind*, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 473, distinguished. *NARAIN DAS v. HAZARI LAL*. I. L. R. 18 All. 238

**64.** *Dispossession—Symbolical possession, effect of—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 318, 335—Jurisdiction.* Symbolical possession does not amount to dispossession as contemplated by s. 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *IBRAHIM MULLICK v. RAMJADT RAKSHIT* (1903). I. L. R. 30 Cal. 710

**65.** *Obstruction—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 331—"Possession"—Constructive possession—Obstruction to possession in execution of decree—Construction.* The word "possession," as used in s. 331 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), is not limited to actual physical possession. It includes also constructive possession, such as possession by a tenant. So held by *CANDY and TYABJI, JJ.* (*WHITWORTH, J.*, dissenting). Where premises sought to be recovered in execution are in the occupation of tenants, and the landlord of such tenants obstructs the officer executing the decree, the claim of such landlord may be investigated under s. 331 of the Civil Procedure Code. *MANCHARAM v. FAKIRCHAND* (1901). I. L. R. 25 Bom. 478

**66.** *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 331—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 9—Suit for possession—Execution of decree—Obstruction—Application for removal of obstruction registered as a suit—Questions arising in such suit.* In the case of a claim numbered and registered, under s. 331 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), as a suit between a decree-holder and an obstructing claimant, the only issues arising are whether the person obstructing was in possession of the property in question on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor (*i.e.*, the defendant in the original suit). No question requiring the decree



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to be reopened can be raised. *MAHOMED ISUB v.  
BASHOTAPPA BIN TAKAPPA* (1903)

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**1. GENERAL CASES.**

1. ——— **Requisites for plea of res judicata—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—Parties—Subject-matter of suit and cause of action identical.** To plead *res judicata* under s. 2, Act VIII of 1859, it is necessary that the parties should be the same or their representatives, that the subject-matter of the suit should be the same, and the cause of action the same. **MAHARAJ SINGH v. BEELA KOORER** . . . . . **W. R. 1864, 320**

**MUNNA JHUNNA KOONWUR v. LALJEE ROY** . . . . . **1 W. R. 12**

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**RAJ DOOLLUB SIRCAR v. OOMA CHURN BISWAS** . . . . . **21 W. R. 109**

2. ——— **Final decision granting or withholding relief.** To conclude a plaintiff by a plea of *res judicata*, it is not sufficient to show that there was a former suit between the same parties for the same matter upon the same cause of action; it is necessary also to show that there was a decision finally granting or withholding the relief sought. **SAIKAPPA CHETTI v. KULANDA PURI NACHIYAR alias KATTAMA NACHIYAR** . . . . . **3 Mad. 84**

3. ——— **Final decision in former suit.** To give effect to the plea of *res judicata*, the Court must be satisfied that the ground of legal right on which the plaintiff sues was a point raised and opened for decision in the former suit, and that it was finally dealt with by the judgment and decree therein. **UDAIYA TEVAR v. KATAMA NACHIYAR** . . . . . **2 Mad. 131**

Affirmed in **RAGHOONADDA PERYA OODYA TAVER v. KATTAMA NAUCHEAR** . . . . . **10 W. R. P. C. 1**

**S.C. VIJAYA RAGANADHA BODHA GOOROO SAWMY PERIYA ODAYA TAVER v. KATAMA NACHIYAR** . . . . . **11 Moo. I. A. 50**

4. ——— **Execution proceedings—Execution of decree—Principal of res judicata as applied to execution proceedings—Succession certificate—Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889), s. 4.** The principle of *res judicata* applies to prevent parties raising a second time in the same suit, or in the same execution proceedings, an issue which, in that suit or in the execution proceedings, in that suit, had previously been determined. The principle of *res judicata* does not depend for its application upon the question whether the decision which is to be used as an estoppel was a right decision or a wrong decision in law or on facts. A de-

**RES JUDICATA—contd.****1. GENERAL CASES—contd.**

fendant-respondent cannot avoid the application of the principle of *res judicata* by saying that he did not appear at the trial of the suit and a plaintiff who has got an *ex parte* decree on proof of his title or on failure of the defendant to prove a defence, the *onus* of proving which was on him, cannot be deprived of the full benefit of the decree which he has obtained by the fact that the defendant did not appear in Court to protect his own interest. **Ram Kirpal v. Rup Kuari, I. L. R. 6 All. 269**, referred to. **BEHARI LAL v. MAJID ALI (1897)** . . . . . **I. L. R. 24 All. 138**

5. ——— **No decision in previous suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13.** Where a certain matter was not really dealt with and decided in a previous suit, although an issue was raised in regard to that matter, a subsequent suit involving the same matter would not be barred by reason of the previous suit. **UMESH CHUNDER DEY v. SHARBESSUR CHUNDER (1901)** . . . . . **5 C. W. N. 304**

6. ——— **Court of Agent of Governor—Appeal to Governor in Council—Dismissal of suit on ground of political expediency—Legality—Res judicata—Jurisdiction, want of—Consent of parties—Act XXIV of 1839, ss. 2, 3, 4—Rules XXI and XXII.** A suit instituted in the Court of the Agent to the Governor at Vizagapatam was, upon application to the defendant and without opposition from the plaintiff, transferred by the High Court to the District Court. The District Court dismissed it on the ground that no sufficient evidence had been given to establish the plaintiff's case. Subsequently the High Court decided that it had no jurisdiction to order such a transfer and the consent of parties could not confer jurisdiction. The plaintiff thereafter instituted a fresh suit in the Agent's Court on the same cause of action. The Agent dismissed the suit as *res judicata*, and an appeal to the Governor in Council was rejected on the ground that it would be inexpedient and set a bad example and encourage a multitude of suits for the same cause of action. *Held*, by the Judicial Committee, that the legal right to bring a suit and to have it determined by the proper Court created for the purpose of determining such suits cannot be barred upon considerations of policy or expediency. *Held*, also, that the former decision of a Court adjudged by the High Court to be without jurisdiction cannot be treated as *res judicata*, and the plaintiff was entitled to have his suit tried on the merits by the Agent's Court. **SRI VIKRAMA DEO MAHARAJU-LUGARU MAHARAJA OF JEYPORE v. GUNAPURAM DEENABANDHU PATNAICK (1905)** . . . . . **I. L. R. 28 Mad. 42**

**s.c. 9 C. W. N. 257**

7. ——— **Agra Tenancy Act (Local II of 1901), s. 199—Suit for ejectment in Revenue Court—Omission on part of defendant to plead title in himself—Res judicata.** In a suit for ejectment under Act No. II of 1901 the defendants



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*I. GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

did not plead their own title to the plot in suit, and in fact did not oppose the suit for ejectment. *Held*, that a subsequent suit brought in a Civil Court by the then defendants for proprietary possession of the same plot was barred by the principle of *res judicata*. *Rani Kishori v. Raja Ram*, *All. Weekly Notes* (1904), 109; *Ashrafunnissa v. Ali Ahmad*, *All. Weekly Notes* (1904), 141, and *Inayat Ali Khan v. Murad Ali Khan*, *I. L. R.* 27 *All.* 569, distinguished. *Salig Dube v. Deoki Dube*, *All. Weekly Notes* (1907), 1, and *Beni Pande v. Raja Kausal Kishore Prasad Mal Bahadur*, *I. L. R.* 29 *All.* 160, referred to. *Gokul Mandar v. Pudmanund Singh*, *I. L. R.* 29 *Calc.* 707, discussed. *BIHARI v. SHEOBALAK* (1907)

**I. L. R. 29 All. 601**

8. ———— *Bengal Tenancy Act*, ss. 107, 109, 109A, 192—*Settlement of rent, objection to*. Where a tenant in his appeal before the Special Judge against an order for the settlement of rent purporting to have been made under s. 192 of the Bengal Tenancy Act did not take the objection that the settlement of rent was made contrary to the provisions of that section and without jurisdiction, and the decision of the Settlement Officer was affirmed by the Special Judge:—*Held*, that the matter was *res judicata* and could not be reopened in the Civil Court owing to the operation of ss. 107, 109 and 109A of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *MOHIM CHANDRA RAY v. KALITARA DEBYA* (1906) . . . **11 C. W. N. 939**

9. ———— *Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 13, 562—*Decision disallowing permanent tenure, no res judicata in a subsequent suit to receive allowance—Adimayavana, nature of—Grant of allowance, presumption of—No remand when suit not determined on a preliminary point—Suit by A to recover adimayavana allowance from B*. In a previous suit by B against A for redeeming land, A had set up an irredeemable *adimayavana* tenure in the land, which contention was overruled and a decree for redemption was made. The Court of first instance held that the suit was barred by *res judicata*, that the right to *adimayavana* allowance was not proved, and dismissed the suit. The lower Appellate Court reversed the judgment on both the points and remanded the suit for re-trial. *Held*, by the High Court on appeal, that the decision in the previous suit disallowing the tenure was no bar under s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the present suit for the allowance. The word *adimayavana*, when applied to a tenure of land, imports a permanent tenure, but it may be used with reference to an allowance of money or grain rent charged on the land, and in that case it will not imply any tenure in favour of the grantee, but only an allowance. The fact that an allowance had been received out of certain lands for a long period from several successive owners, is proof of a grant of perpetual allowance charged on such land. *Vythilingam Pillay v. Kuthireratala Nair*,

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*I. GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

*I. L. R.* 29 *Mad.* 501, referred to and followed—*Held*, further, that the decision of the Munsif on the right of the plaintiff to the perpetual allowance was not a decision on a preliminary point and the lower Appellate Court ought not to have remanded the suit under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *MANA VIKRAMA v. GOPALAN NAIR* (1906)

**I. L. R. 30 Mad. 203**

10. ———— *Redemption of mortgage, suit for—Civil Procedure Code, s. 13—Hindu law—Joint Hindu family—Nature of son's title*. *Held*, that the dismissal of a suit for redemption of a mortgage of joint family property brought by the father in a joint Hindu family alone, would not be a bar to a subsequent suit for redemption by the sons, in as much as the son's title was not through their father, but was separate and independent. *Ram Narain v. Bisheshwar Prasad* *I. L. R.* 10 *All.* 411, referred to. *SUNDAR LAL v. CHHITAR MAL* (1906) . . . **I. L. R. 29 All. 1**

11. ———— *Res judicata—Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13, *Expl. II—Suit for redemption—Transfer of Property Act* (IV of 1882), ss. 89 and 92—*Valid tender—Subsequent suit for recovery of damages on account of wrongful detention of the property by the mortgagee*. A executed a usufructuary mortgage in favour of B, and undertook to redeem the mortgage on a certain date. On the day fixed for repayment A made a valid tender of that which was due on the mortgage, and the tender was improperly refused by B. A suit was brought for redemption by A, which was decreed on condition of payment within six months of what was due on the date of tender. The amount was deposited in Court, and A was put in possession of the property. Subsequently A brought a suit for recovery of damages on account of wrongful detention of the property by B, between the date of tender and the date of delivery of possession. The defence was that the suit was barred by *res judicata*. *Held*, that inasmuch as the claim now set up might and ought to have been put forward in the redemption suit, and the mortgagee might and ought to have been called upon to account for the profits, which he has received from the mortgaged premises, up to the date fixed in the redemption decree, the subsequent action for recovery of damages was barred. *SATYABADI BEHARA v. HARABATI* (1907)

**I. L. R. 34 Calc. 223**

12. ———— *Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13, *Expl. II and s. 42—Res judicata—Person claiming property as heir of another might and ought to set up all the kinds of relationship in one suit*. On the question whether a person who sued to recover property as the reversionary heir of the deceased on an alleged relationship to the deceased is, when such suit is dismissed, debarred by s. 13, *Expl. II* of the Civil Procedure Code, from bringing another suit for the same property as reversionary heir under a different kind of relationship:—*Held*, by WALLIS



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*1. GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

and MILLER, JJ. (Chief Justice dissenting), that such subsequent suit was barred. *Per* SIR ARNOLD WHITE, C.J.—The question whether a matter “ought” to have been made a ground of attack within the meaning of s. 13, Expl. II of the Civil Procedure Code, will depend on the facts of each case. Where the two different kinds of heirship under which a person claims property cannot co-exist, he is not bound, in a suit based on one kind of heirship, to join the other in the alternative, when the former, if proved, will necessarily negative the latter. It cannot be said that a party “might and ought” to have claimed alternatively in the view that the ground of title set up was false or that he would be unable to prove it. *Per* WALLIS, J.—The question of what “ought” to be made a ground of attack under s. 13, Expl. II, must be determined by the provisions of s. 42 of the Civil Procedure Code. The first question to be considered in such cases is whether the provisions of s. 42 required the plaintiff to join in the former suit the ground of attack in the subsequent suit. Where a person claims as heir, the “matter” within the meaning of s. 42 is his heirship, and he is bound to include in one suit all the different grounds on which he bases his heirship “as far as practicable.” It will not be practicable to join in one suit the different grounds only when the evidence in support of one ground will be destructive of the other. *Ramaswami Ayyar v. Vythinatha Ayyar*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 760, followed. MILLER, J.—The construction of the word “ought” in s. 13, Expl. II of the Code of Civil Procedure, must, to a great extent, depend on considerations of hardship and inconvenience caused to the parties. There is no hardship or inconvenience in requiring a plaintiff suing as heir to state all the facts on which he bases his heirship, even though it may result in the presentation of an alternative case, while great inconvenience and hardship may be caused to the defendant by allowing the plaintiff to keep a ground in reserve. *Muthumadeva Naik v. Sivattamuthumadeva Naik*, 7 Mad. H. C. 160, approved. MASILAMANIA PILLAI v. TIRUVENGADAM PILLAI (1908) . . . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 385

13. ————— *Successive purchase of the same land at two execution sales—Suit to set aside one such sale—Purchaser’s defence—Whether he is bound to set up title acquired at the other sale—Ground of defence which “ought to” have been taken.* A purchased village S in execution of a decree obtained by him against C in the Small Cause Court. Subsequently A through B instituted a mortgage suit against C and in execution of the decree obtained therein purchased some lands in the same village S. C instituted two suits, one to set aside the sale in execution of the Small Cause Court decree and the other to set aside the decree and s. le in the mortgage suit. The latter suit was dismissed for default, but the former succeeded. In this suit, A did not set up as a

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*1. GENERAL CASES—*concll.*

ground of his defence the title obtained<sup>7</sup> by him at the mortgage sale. *Held*, that A was not bound to do so, and a suit by A to recover the lands in village S purchased at the mortgage sale is not *res judicata* under Expl. II of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Per* BRETT, J.—Expl. II of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code refers to the title litigated in the former suit as distinguished from the relief claimed. When several independent grounds of action are available, a party is not bound to unite them all in one suit, though he is bound to bring before the Court all grounds of attack available to him with reference to the title which is made the ground of action. This rule equally applies to the converse case of a defendant, when pleading in his defence. *Pittapur Raja v. Venkatta Mahipati Surja*, L. R. 12 I. A. 116, and *Ramaswami Aiyar v. Vithinathi Aiyar*, I. L. R. 26 Mad. 760, relied on. *MOHABIR TEWARI v. PURBHOO NATH CHOWBEY* (1908) . . . 12 C. W. N. 292

14. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Plea of res judicata can prevail even where its effect is to sanction what is illegal—Bhagdari and Narwadari Tenures Act (Bom. Act V of 1862), s. 3.* A plea of estoppel by *res judicata* can prevail even where the result of giving effect to it will be to sanction what is illegal in the sense of being prohibited by statute. *CHHAGANLAL v. BAI HARKHA* (1909)

I. L. R. 33 Bom. 479

## 2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT.

1. ————— *Rule as to estoppel by judgment—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2.* The doctrine laid down in the *Duchess of Kingston’s Case*, 2 Smith’s L. C. 6th Ed. 679, as to estoppel by judgment is applicable to cases tried under Act VIII of 1859, the second section of which is consistent with that rule. But the Judicial Committee, reversing the decision of the Court below, considered that the doctrine had no application in the present case, the judgment relied on not being the judgment of a Court of concurrent jurisdiction directly upon the point upon the same matter; and, after an examination of the whole evidence, restored the judgment of the first Court. *KHUGOWLEE SING v. HOSSEIN BUX KHAN*

7 B. L. R. 673 : 15 W. R. P. C. 30

2. ————— *Judgment not inter partes—Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 11, 13, 40, 41, 43—Admissibility in evidence of judgments not “inter partes.”* *Per* GARTH, C.J., JACKSON, PONTIFEX, and MORRIS, JJ. (MITTER, J., dissenting).—A former judgment, which is not a judgment *in rem*, nor one relating to matters of a public nature, is not admissible in evidence in a subsequent suit, either as a *res judicata*, or as proof of the particular point which it decides, unless between the same parties or those claiming under them. In a suit between A and B the question was whether C or D was the heir of H. If C was the heir of H, then



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—*contd.*

A was entitled to succeed; otherwise not. The same question had been raised in a former suit brought by X against A and decided against A; and this former judgment was admitted in evidence in the suit between A and B, and dealt with by the Courts below as conclusive evidence against A upon the point so decided. *Held* (MITTER, J., dissenting), that the former judgment was not admissible as evidence in the suit between A and B either as "a transaction" under s. 13, or as "a fact" under s. 11, or under any other section of the Evidence Act. *GUJJU LALL v. FATTEH LALL*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 171 : 6 C. L. R. 439

3. ———— Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 11, 13, 40, 41, 42, and 43—*Onus probandi*. Judgments and decrees recognizing rights between parties to a suit or between persons whom they represent, although they are not conclusive under the Evidence Act (I of 1872), as they were before that Act came into operation, are yet admissible in evidence under s. 13 of the Act, even if the parties in the former suit be entire strangers. Where the parties are the same, or representatives of those in the former suit, such judgments and decrees may be evidence so nearly conclusive as, when produced by the party in whose favour they are, to shift the burden of proof from him to his opponent. *Semble*: Under s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), the law is now the same as it was under Act VIII of 1859, prior to the passing of the Evidence Act. *NARANJI BHIKABHAI v. DIPA UMED*

I. L. R. 3 Bom. 3

4. ———— Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 11 and 13—*Admissibility in evidence of judgment in former case. The subject-matter of the former suit not being identical with that of the latter suit.* The rule laid down in the cases of *Gujju Lall v. Fatteh Lall*, I. L. R. 6 Cal. 171, and of *Surender Nath Pal Chowdhry v. Brojo Nath Pal Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 352, has been materially qualified by the decisions of the Privy Council in the cases of *Ram Ranjan Chakerbutty v. Ram Narain Singh*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 533 : L. R. 22 I. A. 60, and *Bitto Kunwar v. Kasho Pershad*, I. R. 24 I. A. 10. Under certain circumstances, in certain cases, the judgment in a previous suit to which one of the parties in the subsequent suit was not a party may be admissible in evidence for certain purposes and with certain objects in the subsequent suit. In a case where the previous suit was to recover a two-thirds share of the property in question, and the subsequent suit was by a different plaintiff to recover the remaining one-third share of the same property :—*Held*, that in the subsequent suit, the judgment in the previous suit was not admissible in evidence, the subject-matter in the two suits not being identical. *TEPU KHAN v. RAJANI MOHAN DAS*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 522  
2 C. W. N. 501

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—*contd.*

5. ———— *Ex parte decree—Finality of, with regard to its subject-matter—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 13, Expl. 4.* A decree obtained *ex parte* is not final within the meaning of Expl. 4, s. 13 of Act X of 1877. *NILMONEY SINGH v. HEERA LALL DASS*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 23 : 8 C. L. R. 257

6. ———— *Suit for arrears of rent—Onus probandi.* In a suit for arrears of rent of a half-share of land, the plaintiffs relied upon an *ex parte* decree for rent at a certain rate, which they had obtained in 1869 against the tenants of this share. The defendants relied upon a subsequent decree in a contested suit by the plaintiffs against the tenants of the other half share, in which a lower rate of rent had been given. No other evidence than the decrees was produced on either side. It did not appear whether the *ex parte* decree had ever been executed. *Held*, that it was open to the defendants to dispute the rate of rent claimed, and that the plaintiffs were bound to prove that they were entitled to recover it. *Nilmoney Singh v. Hera Lall Dass*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 23, followed. *BHUGIRATH PATONI v. RAM LOCHUN DEB*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 275 : 10 C. L. R. 159

7. ———— *Suit for rent.* A decree obtained *ex parte* is, in the absence of fraud or irregularity, as binding for all purposes as a decree in a contested suit. *BIRCHUNDER MANICKYA v. HURRISH CHUNDER DOSS*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 383 : 1 C. L. R. 585

8. ———— *Decrees in rent suits—Suit for arrears of rent—Subsequent suit for enhancement.* The plaintiff sued the defendant in the year 1873 for arrears of rent at a certain rate per bigha. The defendant pleaded that the land had been held by him at a uniform rent for more than twenty years, and this contention was supported by the Court. The plaintiff then gave the defendant notice of enhancement, and sued to recover rent for two years at the rate stated by the defendant, and for one year at an increased rate. To this suit the defendant raised substantially the same defence. *Held*, that the decision in the previous suit was not a bar to the present suit, there being two questions for consideration : one, whether there had been a uniform payment of rent for twenty years; and if so, whether the presumptions which the law directs to be drawn from a uniform payment of rent for twenty years had been rebutted by the plaintiff; neither of which questions were concluded by the previous decision. *GOPEE MOHAN MOZOOMDAR v. HILLS*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 789

9. ———— *Decision as to amount of land held as tenant.* In an action for rent defendant pleaded, by way of estoppel to part of the plaintiff's claim, that, in a prior action for rent previously due, brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, it had been found that the defendant



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—*contd.*

was tenant to the plaintiff of a less quantity of land only than that in respect of which the plaintiff claimed rent in his suit. *Held*, that there was no estoppel and that the plaintiff might show, notwithstanding such previous judgment, that the defendant was in occupation of the larger quantity. **OJODHYA PERSAD v. BHUGWANTAJAH. Marsh. 1**

S.C. BHUGWANTAJAH v. OJODHYA PERSAD.

1 Hay 31

10. ———— *Decision as to amount of land held as tenant—Suit for arrears of rent.* A brought a suit against B for arrears of rent. B admitted the sum claimed, but contended that the rent was due for a larger area of land than that specified in the plaint. An issue was framed on such contention, and decided against B. In a subsequent suit by B to have it declared that a sum of money, equal in amount to the sum paid on admission in the former suit, comprised the rent due on all the lands held by him under A.—*Held* (on appeal under the Letters Patent, reversing the decision of the Court below), that such suit was barred as being *res judicata*. **BUSSUN LALL SHOOKUL v. CHUNDER DASS**

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 686 : 4 C. L. R. 1

11. ———— *Decision as to measurement of land held.* In a previous suit the present plaintiff had sued the defendant for the amount of rent originally fixed in the lease and the defendant claimed in that suit to have the rent reduced in accordance with the term of the lease, and a measurement was thereupon made, which showed that the quantity of land held by the defendant was in excess of that named in the lease; that suit was decided in favour of the plaintiff for the rent claimed. *Held*, that the measurement adopted by the Court in the former suit was not, as regards the amount of the excess, binding upon the defendant. **EKRAM MUNDUL v. HOLODHUR PAL**

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 271

**LUCHMUN PERSAD GORGO v. LUKHUN CHURN KUR**

3 C. L. R. 74

12. ———— *Suit for refund of excess of rent after suit for arrears of rent.* The defendant (a zamindar) refused to receive rent from the plaintiffs, talukdars, at the rate asserted by the latter, who therefore deposited the amounts from time to time in the Zillah Court. The zamindar, having drawn out these amounts, sued for arrears of rent, alleging that the money paid into Court covered only the principal and interest for a certain period, and obtained an *ex parte* decree. In a suit brought for a refund of the money paid into Court, which had without the plaintiff's consent been irregularly carried to the account of interest.—*Held*, that the claim was barred as *res judicata*. **GOBINDNAUTH SUNDYAL v. ROMANAUTHA THAKOOR**

1 Hay 501

13. ———— *Decision as to right to rent—Dismissal of former suit for rent.*

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—*contd.*

*Held*, that, the plaintiff having failed in a regular suit in 1853 to establish his right to rent, a subsequent suit for rent was not admissible, unless since that date rent was paid or his title recognized in some way. **SOOKHEND v. NUNDO SINGH**

2 Agra 221

14. ———— *Decision as to amount of rent—Subsequent suit for abatement of rent.* The plaintiff obtained a patni lease of certain villages from the defendant in 1861 at an annual rent, and in 1865 was evicted from a portion of the property. She took no steps to obtain an abatement; but inasmuch as she did not pay any rent for the year 1871, the defendant brought a suit against her for the rent of that year. The plaintiff set up the defence that she was entitled to an abatement of R155 from her rent, the R155 representing the annual value of the property which she had lost in consequence of the eviction. In that suit it was decided that the amount of abatement she was entitled to was R42. No appeal was made against that decision. In a suit brought by the plaintiff for the purpose of obtaining a permanent abatement of her rent she claimed the precise measure of abatement, viz., R155, which she had claimed in the suit brought against her by the defendant. *Held*, that the question was *res judicata*, it having been raised and decided in the former suit. **NOBO DOORGA DOSSEE v. FOYZBUX CHOWDHRY**

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 200 : 24 W. R. 40

15. ———— *Decision as to amount of rent.* Where the plaintiff sued the defendant for a year's rent at the same rate which had been decreed to him for the previous year in a suit which he had brought against the same defendant for rent of the same property, and relied upon the former decree, which had been obtained *ex parte*, as evidence of the rent due to him from the defendant:—*Held* (following **Nobo Durga Dossee v. Foyz Buksh Chowdhry**, I. L. R. 1 Calc. 200), that the decree in the first suit determined the amount of rent due from the defendant to the plaintiff. *Held*, further, that the decree was properly admissible as evidence, though the plaintiff had not taken out execution upon that decree and his right to take out execution was barred by limitation. **BIRCHUNDER MANICKYA v. HURRISH CHUNDER DASS**

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 383 : 1 C. L. R. 585

16. ———— *Decree as to amount of rent payable in former years—Decree on admission.* The plaintiff in a suit for rent having failed to prove the amount of rent claimed by him, the Court in trying the issue "What is the proper amount of rent payable to the plaintiff" gave the plaintiff a decree for the amount admitted by the defendant, that amount being less than that claimed by the plaintiff. In a later suit the plaintiff sued the defendant in respect of the same holding for the rent of a subsequent year, and he claimed at the same rate as he had claimed



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—*contd.*

in the previous suit. *Held* (MITTER, J., dissenting), that the decree in the former suit was *res judicata* as to the proper rent payable by the defendant. *Punnoo Singh v. Nirghan Singh*, I. L. R. 7 Cal. 298; 8 C. L. R. 310, explained and distinguished. *JEO LAL SINGH v. SURFUN*. 11 C. L. R. 483

17. ————— *Decision as to possession as tenants—Admissibility in evidence of decree in former suit.* The plaintiffs, as purchasers of a share of an estate, sued to recover their share of the rent of certain tenures held in that estate by the defendants. The defendants denied being in possession as alleged. Another co-sharer in the same estate had previously brought a suit against the same defendants for the rent of the same tenures, and in that suit the present plaintiffs and other co-sharers of the estate were made co-defendants, and the decision in that suit was that the present defendants were in possession and were liable to pay to the then plaintiff his share of the rent. *Held* (MITTER, J., dissenting), that the decree in the former suit was not a *res judicata* or even admissible as evidence in the present suit. *SURENDER NATH PAL CHOWDHRY v. BROJO NATH PAL CHOWDHRY*. I. L. R. 13 Cal. 352

18. ————— *Decision in former suit—Decision as to right to property—Subsequent suit for rent.* It having been decided in a former suit, wherein the present plaintiff and appellant was defendant and the present defendant was plaintiff, that the latter could not claim from the former a share of certain property set apart for the maintenance of a samsthan:—*Held*, that, after that decision, it was not competent to the present defendant to collect the rents of the property. He was accordingly ordered to make them over to the present plaintiff. *DADO RAVJI v. DINANATH RAVJI*. 2 Bom. 77; 2nd Ed. 72

19. ————— *Decision as to title to drain—Suit for trespass—Proceedings between same parties in another suit.* B had instituted a suit in the Court of the Munsif of the 24-Parganas against A on account of an alleged trespass to a certain drain, which B then alleged to be his property: that suit was dismissed on the ground that B had not proved his title to the drain in question. In a suit arising out of an alleged trespass to the same drain brought by A against B, in which A stated it was his property, the judgment of the Munsif in the former suit was tendered in evidence on behalf of the plaintiff, and it was contended it was an estoppel. The Court admitted it in evidence, but doubted whether it would be an estoppel. *MAHOMED SHAHABOODEEN v. WEDGEBERRY*. 10 B. L. R. Ap. 31

20. ————— *Decision on title in proceedings under Land Acquisition Act, 1870.* In proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1870, to apportion the compensation payable, a decision by the Judge on a question of title does not operate as *res judicata* between the parties

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—*contd.*

to those proceedings. *MAHADEVI v. NEELA MANI*. I. L. R. 20 Mad. 269

21. ————— *Judgment of Foreign Court—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 14—International law.* An *ex parte* judgment of a French Court against a native of British India not residing in French territory upon a cause of action which arose in British India imposes no duty on the defendant to pay the amount decreed so as to bar a suit in British India. *HINDE & Co. v. PONNATH BRAYAN*. I. L. R. 4 Mad. 359

22. ————— *Judgment on award—Finality of arbitrator's award when judgment is passed thereon—Question dealt with by such award raised in a subsequent suit.* Where a case was referred to arbitration, and the award was subsequently filed and judgment passed in accordance therewith and subsequently, in another suit between the same parties, a question dealt with in the award was raised:—*Held*, that such question was *res judicata* between the parties, the judgment on the award having the same effect as an ordinary judgment of a Court and being conclusive on the point. *WAZEER MAHTON v. CHUNI SINGH*. I. L. R. 7 Cal. 727; 9 C. L. R. 377

23. ————— *Judgment and decree upon an award—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 13 and 522.* A judgment and decree passed in terms of an award under s. 522 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) constitute a *res judicata*. *Wazeer Mahton v. Chuni Singh*, I. L. R. 7 Cal. 727, followed. *VYANKATESH CHIMAJI JOSHI v. SAKHARAM DAJI*. I. L. R. 21 Bom. 465

24. ————— *Decision as to status of endowment—Suit for possession.* In 1801 A, the shebait and proprietor of the gaddee of a debsheba at K, alienated part of the land by deed of gift to B, for the purpose of founding a sheba at C, which was accordingly done. In 1823 the then shebait of the debsheba of K instituted a suit for the recovery of the alienated lands against the then shebait of the sheba at C, and in that suit it was declared that the sheba was independent of the debsheba, and thus the plaintiff was referred to a regular suit. In 1861 the then shebait of debsheba brought a suit for recovery of the lands against the then shebait of the sheba. *Held*, that the decree in the former suit operated as an estoppel against the plaintiff. *KISSNOOND ASHROM DUNDY v. NURSING DASS BYRAGEE*. Marsh. 485

25. ————— *Order dismissing claim for maintenance—Subsequent suit for maintenance—Agreement as to amount of maintenance—Decree limited to agreed amount.* An allowance for the maintenance of a younger member of a family was charged upon the inheritance to which the eldest male member alone succeeded. In a suit for such an allowance brought by a younger brother against the elder who had succeeded their deceased father in the possession of the estate:—*Held*, that an order made dismissing a claim for maintenance



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—*contd.*

preferred by such younger brother against their father in his lifetime. founded on an ikrarnama, did not afford a defence under s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, also, that the brothers having made an agreement fixing the allowance for maintenance at a certain sum, the younger brother agreeing to receive a less sum for a defined period, he could only obtain a decree for the allowance so reduced. **ARMED HOSSEIN KHAN v. NIHAL-UD-DIN KHAN** . I. L. R. 9 Calc. 945 L. R. 10 I. A. 45

**S.C. MAHOMED HOSSEIN KHAN v. MAHOMED NEHLUDDIN KHAN** . 13 C. L. R. 330

26. ——— Order as to payment of maintenance—*Subsequent suit for maintenance charged on estate of Sovereign Prince—Former suit making maintenance charge on estate in British territory.* In a suit against the Maharaja of Hill Tipperah, which is an independent Sovereign State for maintenance, it appeared that in a former suit tried in British India in respect of the same claim the Court had ordered the amount of the maintenance for which he gave a decree to be paid by the defendant Maharaja from his estate in *R.* which was in British India. *Held*, that the decree in the former suit was not *res judicata* to show that the maintenance claimed in the present suit was a charge on the zamindari of RS0 as to give the Court jurisdiction. **BIR CHUNDER MANIKHYA v. ISHAN CHUNDER TAGORE** . 12 C. L. R. 473

27. ——— Decree awarding fixed money allowance in lieu of maintenance—*Subsequent suit for partition.* A former decree decided that the plaintiff (a widow) always received a certain fixed amount, and was not entitled to recover more in the shape of profits in respect of the share claimed. *Held*, that it was not a decision that such fixed payment represented a mere claim to maintenance, and not a substantial right or interest in the property itself, so that on partition she must be regarded as having no claim to share in the land. It should be inquired into (the decree being so construed) whether the acceptance of a fixed payment was on forfeiture of all rights to the property, and whether it extended only so far as the widow's right is concerned, or whether it affected the son's right likewise. **MAN KOONWER v. DILAWAR HOSSEIN KHAN**

1 Agra Rev. 36

28. ——— Decision on question of fact—*Subsequent suit between other parties.* On a question of fact the decision of one Court cannot bind another in a suit between other parties. **ASSANOOLLAH v. KALEE MOHAN MOOKERJEE**

18 W. R. 469

29. ——— Attempt to control the descent of property. Two brothers having divided their family estate, each took a share consisting of villages which they held separately agreeing in the instrument of partition that "the villages of the shares of both of us should in future descend only

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—*contd.*

to the sons and grandsons, and so on of us both, but must not go to any others." On the death of one brother leaving a widow and daughters, the widow obtained possession of the villages which formed her husband's share, and a suit brought against her by the other brother to recover them was dismissed on the ground that the divided shares descended according to law. The widow then transferred the villages to her elder daughter, whose right to the possession, as against the brother, was declared in the present suit on the ground that, as between the widow and the brother, the question of the widow's title was *res judicata*. **VENKATADRI APPA RAU v. PEDAVENKAYAMMA** . I. L. R. 10 Mad. 15

30. ——— Benami transaction for purpose of defrauding creditors—*Deed of conveyance not in real purchaser's name—Collusive suit by nominee against real owner—Decree obtained by fraud—Subsequent suit by real owner against nominee for possession—Right of party to fraud to set fraudulent decree aside—Collusive transaction when held binding and when set aside.* In 1874 the plaintiff *P* bought a house from *G*, but caused the conveyance to be executed by *G* in the defendant *C*'s name. This was done with the object of protecting the property against the claims of the plaintiff's creditors. The plaintiff occupied the house, ostensibly as tenant to the defendant for a nominal rent. In 1880 the defendant brought a suit against the plaintiff to recover possession of the house, and obtained an *ex parte* decree. He applied for execution of the decree, but allowed the execution-proceedings to drop. In 1883 he made a fresh application for execution. Thereupon the plaintiff filed the present suit for a declaration of his title to the house in question, and of his right to retain possession alleging that the defendant was a mere benamidar: that the sale-deed and the *ex parte* decree were sham and collusive transactions in fraud of the plaintiff's creditors, and that the defendant was merely a trustee for him. *Held*, that the plaintiff was bound by the decree passed in 1880 in the defendant's favour, though it was a collusive decree. The plaintiff could not get the judgment set aside which the defendant had obtained against him by his own contrivance. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant held in trust for him: the object of that trust being to protect the plaintiff's property in fraud of his creditors. Even if such a trust enforceable by the Court could arise out of such a *turpis causa*, the question was whether this continued to subsist and would be enforced when the original relations of the parties had become merged in the decree obtained by the defendant against the plaintiff. The general principle is that where a defendant has suffered a judgment to pass against him, the matter is then placed beyond his control. *Held*, also, upon the general principle of *res judicata*, that the plaintiff was estopped from raising the question of fraud in the present suit which he might and ought to



**RES JUDICATA—contd.****2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—contd.**

have urged in the former litigation. **CHENVIRAPPA BIN BIRBHADRAPPA v. PUTTAPPA BIN SHIVBASAPPA**  
**I. L. R. 11 Bom. 708**

**31. — Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13—Matter adjudged in a former suit—Purchase pendente lite.** A zamindar, having granted a patni lease, mortgaged the zamindari to the patnidar, who having afterwards obtained a decree against the zamindar upon the mortgage, attached and purchased, at the sale in execution, the zamindari interest subject to the mortgage. Before that purchase, though after the attachment, another holder of a decree against the zamindar brought the right, title, and interest in the zamindari to sale in execution of his decree, and himself became the purchaser. He then, claiming to have obtained the zamindari estate, sued the patnidar for rent due under the lease. This suit was dismissed, save as to rent due for the time intervening between the two sales in execution, on the ground that the relation of zamindar to lessee had ceased on the purchase by the latter. The present suit was brought by the purchaser from the zamindar stating his title, acquired at the prior of the two sales, and claiming to redeem the mortgage. *Held*, that the dismissal of the rent-suit, which involved the title, barred the present one; and the opinion was expressed that the plaintiff had been rightly adjudged in the rent-suit to be bound by the proceedings taken by the mortgagee, pending which the purchase relied upon had been made. **RADHAMADHUB HOLDAR v. MONOHUR MUKERJI**

**I. L. R. 15 Calc. 756**  
**L. R. 15 I. A. 97**

**KASISWAR MUKHOPADHYA v. MOHENDRA NATH BHANDARI**  
**I. L. R. 25 Calc. 136**

**32. — Identity of cause of action with that of prior suit, to which the plaintiff in a subsequent suit had been a party—Effect of judgment, that a will had been revoked to bar, between the parties, any claim founded solely on the will.** The widow of a talukhdar, acting under his supposed will, appointed the present appellant to succeed to the talukh and other estate which had belonged to the deceased. The heir of the deceased, under the Oudh Estates Act, I of 1869, obtained the judgment of the Judicial Committee, declaring that he was entitled to the talukhs as against the present appellant whose title was under the will, which had been revoked as the Committee found. Another suit brought by the present appellant for a decree declaring that, in virtue of his appointment by the widow under the will, he was entitled to the whole of the estate of the deceased, talukhdari and non-talukhdari, was dismissed by the Judicial Committee on the ground that he had no such title to the whole or any part of the estate. *Held*, that this prior judgment was conclusive to bar the present suit, which, being founded entirely upon the appellant's appointment in pursuance of the will, was brought for possession of all the estate of the deceased as

**RES JUDICATA—contd.****2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—contd.**

well as a declaration of right thereto. Although the heir was not entitled to possession of the estate of the deceased other than talukhdari, inasmuch as the widow took her estate therein, nevertheless, the claim of the present appellant being only founded upon her appointment under the will, as if unrevoked, and not being a claim for property as descending to the widow upon her husband's intestacy, the prior judgment was binding in the present suit. **TRILOKI NATH SINGH v. PERTAB NARAIN SINGH**

**I. L. R. 15 Calc. 808**  
**L. R. 15 I. A. 113**

**33. — and s. 43—Act XII of 1879, s. 6.** The present suit was preceded by others in which the plaintiff sought to establish a right in the same part of the talukhdari estate that he now claimed to redeem from mortgage. The first suit, in which he with another claimed as under-proprietors, was dismissed in 1866 on the ground that they had not shown themselves to have held such right under the talukhdars within the period since 1841. Proceedings not to be regarded as judicial, subsequently taken under Circular 4 of 1867, resulted in a finding that the dismissal was right upon the merits, the property having been transferred to the talukhdar by a conditional sale which had become absolute. Another suit was then brought to recover the talukhdari right under the terms of Circular 106 of 1869, it being alleged that arrears of revenue paid by the talukhdar had been paid on the plaintiff's account. That suit was also dismissed. *Held*, that the present suit to redeem the same property under a mortgage was not barred under s. 13 of Act X of 1877, as amended by s. 6 of Act XII of 1879. **AMANAT BIBI v. IMDAD HOSAIN**  
**I. L. R. 15 Calc. 800**  
**L. R. 15 I. A. 108**

**34. — Clause of conditional sale in mortgage—Suit by mortgagee for declaration of title—Decree ordering delivery of property to mortgagee in default of payment of mortgage-debt by mortgagors within one month—Default of payment by mortgagors—Effect of such default—Mortgaged property taken by mortgagee in execution of such decree not as mortgagee, but absolutely—Subsequent suit for redemption.** In 1863 B and C mortgaged certain land to one G under a mortgage-deed, which provided that, if the mortgage-debt was not paid at the stipulated time, the land should become the absolute property of G, the mortgagee. In 1871 G filed an ejectment suit against B and C and one H alleging that he had become owner of the land by operation of the above clause, and that he had subsequently let it to H, who now, in collusion with the other two defendants (the mortgagors), denied his title. The ejectment suit was subsequently converted into one for a declaration of G's title as owner as against the mortgagors, B and C, who claimed a right to redeem. A decree was passed in 1872 ordering B and C to pay Rs 100 to G within one month, or



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—*contd.*

in default, to deliver up to him possession of the land. The money was not paid, and V, as purchaser from G, got possession in execution of the above decree in August 1873. In September 1885 the plaintiff, as B's heir and legal representative, filed a suit against G and V to redeem the property. The Court of first instance dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiff's claim was *res judicata* by virtue of the decree passed in 1872, and that the right to redeem was lost. On appeal, the Court reversed this decision and passed a decree for redemption on payment of R100 by the plaintiff within six months. The defendant V then applied to the High Court under its extraordinary jurisdiction. *Held*, that the plaintiff's claim was *res judicata*. In the suit brought by G (the mortgagee) in 1871, he had claimed the land as owner through the forfeiture clause in the mortgage-deed, and the mortgagors insisting in that suit on a right still to redeem, the decree plainly meant to give them, by way of indulgence, one month within which to regain the land by payment of R100 to G. It renewed the mortgage, but with a condition, which was a material part of the decree. They having failed to pay, the mortgage was extinguished. After the lapse of the month, G could not have recovered the R100. Had he sought to recover that money, he would have been met by the terms of the decree. He was entitled to the land, and nothing else. So, too, was V as his vendee. As, then, there was no debt that could be recovered, there was and could be no subsisting mortgage that could be redeemed. *VISHNU CHINTAMAN v. BALAJI BIN RAGHUJI* . . . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 352

35. ———— *Partition suit—Declaratory decree.* A suit for partition of certain land was withdrawn as against one of the defendants who was entitled to part of the land. The plaintiff and the remaining defendants entered into a compromise in the terms of which the Court passed a decree for delivery of a share of the land to the plaintiff. The decree-holder having died without executing the decree, his heir now sued for partition of the land and delivery of the above share, joining as defendants the various persons entitled to shares. *Held*, that the decree in the former suit could only operate as a declaratory decree, and did not preclude the plaintiff from bringing the present suit. *BEEMABAI v. YAMUNABAI* . . . I. L. R. 13 Mad. 313

36. ———— *Landlord and tenant—Service-tenure with rent—Enhancement of rent—Resumption.* In a suit brought in 1886 by a zamindar to recover an estate granted by his predecessor to the predecessor of the defendant on a service tenure, a small money-rent being also reserved, it appeared that in 1864 the right of the plaintiff's predecessor to rent had been established by suit, but there was no evidence that the service was then dispensed with, but in 1885 it was intimated to the defendant that the service

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—*contd.*

was dispensed with, and a notice to quit was given to him; the option of holding the estate at an enhanced rent was, however, given to him at the same time. *Held*, that the suit was not precluded by the Civil Procedure Code, s. 13 or s. 43. *MAHADEVI v. VIKRAMA* . I. L. R. 14 Mad. 365

37. ———— The dismissal of a suit to have set aside an order made in one district, for the sale of the plaintiff's interest in property therein, is not a bar under ss. 13 and 43 of the Civil Procedure Code to another suit to obtain relief against an order in another district for the sale of property therein belonging to the same plaintiff or of other property not included in the order for sale against which the dismissed suit was directed. *RADHA PRASAD SINGH v. LAL SAHAB RAI* . . . I. L. R. 13 All. 53  
L. R. 17 I. A. 150

38. ———— *Judgment in rem—Decision of Court as to construction of will and ordering grant of letters of administration—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), ss. 19 and 59—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 41.* The High Court of the North-Western Provinces on the 2nd February 1890, in determining under s. 19 of Act V of 1881 the question whether certain persons were entitled to letters of administration with the will annexed, construed the testator's will, and, finding that the applicants were residuary legatees under the will, held that they were entitled to such letters of administration. The widow of the testator, who had unsuccessfully opposed the grant in the Court of the North-Western Provinces, then filed a suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of the 24-Parganas for, amongst other things, the construction of her late husband's will. *Held*, on appeal in such suit, that the application for letters of administration was not a suit properly so called, and that the finding on the construction of the will by the Court of the North-Western Provinces, being incidental and for the purpose of determining the question of the representative title of the applicants, could not be regarded as concluding the plaintiff by *res judicata* from obtaining a construction of the will in the suit brought by her. *ARUNMOYI DAS v. MOHENDRA NATH WADADAR*

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 888

39. ———— *Application by executors for probate—Order refusing probate—Subsequent suit by executors as persons entitled under will to property of deceased—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), s. 12, Ch. V, ss. 59 and 83.* The plaintiffs applied to the District Court at Poona under the Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881) for probate of a will of which they were appointed executors. The defendants opposed their application, and on appeal the High Court rejected it, holding that on the evidence the execution of the will was not proved. The plaintiffs thereupon filed the present suit, as the persons beneficially entitled under the



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—*contd.*

will for a declaration that the property of the deceased belonged to them, and for an injunction to restrain the defendant from obstructing them in the enjoyment of it. The defendant contended that the suit was barred as *res judicata*. *Held*, that the suit was not barred by the order refusing probate of the will. The refusal to grant probate does not conclusively show that the will propounded is not the genuine will of the testator. **GANESH JAGANNATH DEV v. RANCHANDRA GANESH DEV**  
**I. L. R. 21 Bom. 563**

40. ———— *Suit by reversioners—Former suit by widow—Suit for construction of will.* A suit by reversioners after the death of the widow of a testator for the construction of his will and codicil and for a declaration of the plaintiff's rights was held under the circumstances of the case not to be barred, as being *res judicata*, by the dismissal of a former suit which had been brought by the widow claiming the estate on the ground that the will and codicil were forgeries, and in which they were found to be genuine. **CHUKKUN LAL ROY v. LOLIT MOHAN ROY**  
**I. L. R. 20 Calc. 906**

41. ———— *Suit to set aside sale for arrears of rent accrued due against female heir after death of last full owner—Subsequent suit by reversioner to recover immovable property sold.* A previous suit brought by a female heir to set aside a sale in execution of a decree for arrears of rent accrued due against her after the death of the last full owner was dismissed. In a subsequent suit by the reversioner for recovery of possession of the immovable property so sold, the defence was that the suit was barred as *res judicata*. *Held*, that the dismissal of the previous suit, which was for recovery only of the limited estate of female heir, would not be a bar to the subsequent suit which was for the recovery of the absolute estate, which vested in the reversioner. **BRAJA LAL SEN v. JIBAN KRISHNA ROY**  
**I. L. R. 26 Calc. 286**

42. ———— *Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 41—Judgment in rem—Judgment in personam—Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), s. 48—Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), s. 62.* On an application for probate of a will under the Probate and Administration Act, 1881, which was opposed by the widow of the alleged testator and her father, it appeared that an application had previously been made under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, on behalf of the widow for a declaration that she was the guardian of the person and the property of the infant son of the alleged testator, and that that application had been opposed by the present petitioners who claimed to be testamentary guardians of the property appointed by the will now propounded, and that the will had then been found to be a forgery. *Held*, that the question of the genuineness of the will was not *res judicata* for the purpose

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—*contd.*

f the proceedings under the Probate and Administration Act. **CHINNASAMI v. HARIHARABADRA**  
**I. L. R. 16 Mad. 380**

43. ———— *Agreement not to execute regarded as satisfaction of decree.* *M* and *A* were partners, and as such were indebted to *H*. *A* died, and subsequently the debt was settled between *H* on one side and *M* and *A*'s widow, as guardian of her minor sons, on the other. For a moiety of the debt a bond was passed by *M* to *H* and for the other moiety by the widow of *A*. *H* filed a suit against *M* and got a decree, which was satisfied. *H* then sued the widow on her bond. The Court allowed her objection that she was not competent to give a bond binding her sons personally, and of its own accord made *M* a defendant, and passed a decree against *M* and *A*'s estate. *H* assigned this decree to *R*, who applied for execution against *M*. *M* thereupon filed this suit against *H* and *R* praying for an injunction against the execution of the said decree and for damages against *H*. He alleged that during the pendency of the suit in which the said decree had been passed, *H* had agreed that he would not obtain a decree against him, and that, if such a decree were passed he would not execute it. The lower Appeal Court rejected the plaint, holding (i) that, as between the plaintiff *M* and the defendant *R*, the question in issue was *res judicata*, and (ii) that there was no cause of action against the defendant *H*. On appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, that, as between *M* and *R*, the suit was not *res judicata*. The alleged agreement by its very terms provided for the event of the decree being passed, and was only intended to prevent its being executed. **Chenwirappa v. Puttappa, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 708**, distinguished. **MUKUND HARSHET v. HARIDAS KHENJI** . **I. L. R. 17 Bom. 23**

44. ———— *Mesne profits, ascertainment of—Execution of decree—Deductions claimed.* The Court having awarded a particular sum as annual mesne profits without setting forth in the judgment the details thereof, and it having therefore become impossible to say that the right to a particular deduction therefrom claimed by the defendant was adjudicated on by the Court:—*Held*, that the rule of *res judicata* did not apply to the question as to the payment by the defendant. **KACHAR ALA CHELA v. OGHADDBHAI THAKARSHI**. **OGHADDBHAI THAKARSHI v. KACHAR ALI CHELA**  
**I. L. R. 17 Bom. 35**

45. ———— *Soundness in law of previous decision immaterial.* Where a judicial decision, pleaded as constituting *res judicata*, in all other respects fulfils the requirements of s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and no appeal has been preferred against it within limitation, it is immaterial whether such decision is or is not sound law. **Parthasaradi Ayyangar v. Chinna-krishna Ayyangar, I. L. R. 5 Mad. 304**, dissented from. **PHUNDO v. JANGI NATH**  
**I. L. R. 15 All. 327**



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—*contd.*

46. ————— *Erroneous decision in point of law in previous case.* An erroneous decision on a pure question of law in a previous suit may operate as *res judicata*. *Goursi Koer v. Audh Koer*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1087, and *Phundo v. Jangi Nath*, I. L. R. 15 All. 327, followed. *Parthasaradi v. Chinnakrishna*, I. L. R. 5 Mad. 304, dissented from. *RAI CHURN GHOSE v. KUMUD MOHON DATTA CHAUDHURI*. 1 C. W. N. 687

Same case on review. I. L. R. 25 Calc. 571  
2 C. W. N. 297

47. ————— *Bengal Municipal Act (Beng. Act III of 1864), s. 10—Public highways—Roads vesting in Commissioners—Sub-soil of roads, right to.* A suit brought by the plaintiff's predecessor in title to recover certain land from a Municipality (which had been taken up as a public road and vested in the Municipality subsequently under Bengal Act III of 1864, s. 10), on the ground that the plaintiffs had been ousted therefrom by reason of the Municipality stacking stones on a portion thereof, having been dismissed:—*Held*, that the decision in such suit was not operative as *res judicata* in another suit brought by the plaintiffs for ejectment and declaration of title to such land against a purchaser of the land from the Municipality. *MODHU SUDAN KUNDU v. PROMODA NATH ROY*. I. L. R. 20 Calc. 732

48. ————— *Rent suit—Evidence—Estoppel—Ex parte decree, effect of—Rate of rent.* A mere statement of an alleged rate of rent in a plaint in a rent-suit in which an *ex parte* decree had been obtained is not a statement as to which it must be held that an issue within the meaning of s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure was raised between the parties, so that the defendant is concluded upon it by such decree. Neither a recital in the decree of the rate of rent alleged by the plaintiff, nor a declaration in it as to the rate of rent which the Court considers to have been proved, would operate in such a case so as to make that matter a *res judicata*, assuming that no such declaration were asked for in the plaint as part of the substantive relief claimed, the defendant having a proper opportunity of meeting the case. *MODHU-SUDUN SHAHA MUNDUL v. BRAE*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 300

49. ————— *Rent, suit for—Decree as to rent payable for former year—Rate of rent payable—Decree on admission of defendant.* The plaintiff, in a suit for rent which was contested, having failed to prove that the rent was payable at the rate claimed by him, the Court in trying the issue "what is the amount of the jama," after considering the whole of the evidence and the circumstances of the case, held that the plaintiff had entirely failed to prove his allegation of the jama, and gave him a decree for the amount admitted by the defendant, which was less than that claimed by the plaintiff. In a later suit the plaintiff sued the defendant, in respect of the

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—*contd.*

same holding, for rent for a subsequent year, and he claimed at the same rate as he had claimed in his previous suit. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that the question as to the rate at which the rent was payable was *res judicata*, it not being alleged that there had been any agreement subsequent to the first suit by which the rate was altered. *Held*, that the question as to the rent payable for the period covered by the first suit was *res judicata*; but that it did not follow that the decree in that suit operated as *res judicata*, and conclusively determined the rate of the rent payable for the year in respect of which the subsequent suit was brought. That depended on whether the previous decision was that the plaintiff should recover from the defendant the sum admitted by him to be due, or that the sum so admitted to be due was the proper amount of rent payable for the period in question. *Held*, that in this case the previous decision was to the latter effect, and that the question of the rate at which the rent was payable by the defendant was *res judicata*. *Punnoo Singh v. Nirghin Singh*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 298, and *Jeo Lal Singh v. Surjun*, 11 C. L. R. 483, referred to. *HURRY BEHARI BHAGAT v. PARGUN AHIR*

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 656

50. ————— *Rent, suit for—Decree as to rent payable for former years—Evidence of rent payable.* The plaintiffs sued the defendants for rent of a certain jote claiming a higher rent than the defendants admitted. The High Court in second appeal gave a decree at the lesser rate admitted by the defendants. Subsequently the plaintiffs again sued the defendants in regard to the same jote for arrears of rent for subsequent years at the rate claimed in the former suit. The defendants contended that the rate of the rent as regards this jote was, by virtue of the judgment of the High Court in the previous suit, *res judicata* as between themselves and the plaintiff. *Held*, that where in a rent suit a Judge tries the question and gives judgment on the question "what is the yearly rent," and makes that the foundation of his judgment, that decision is *res judicata* between the parties. The previous judgment of the High Court therefore operated as *res judicata*. *Hurry Behari Bhagat v. Pargun Ahir*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 656, followed. *Per* NORRIS, J.—Even if the judgment of the High Court did not operate as *res judicata*, still it was some evidence of the rate of the rent of the previous year. *BURSHI v. NIZAMUDDI*

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 505

DICTUM OF NORRIS, J., in above case followed in *MADHU MUNJARI CHOWDHURANI v. JHUMAR BIBI*  
1 C. W. N. 120

51. ————— *Rent, suit for—Decree as to amount of land—Rent payable for former years—Rate of rent payable.* The plaintiff sued the defendant for rent of certain lands. The defendant contended that he was not liable for the entire rent, as part of the land was in the plaintiff's



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—*contd.*

possession. The defendant failed to prove his contention, and a decree was given for the full amount claimed. Subsequently the plaintiff again sued the defendant in regard to the same property for arrears of rent for subsequent years at the rate claimed in the former suit. The defendant had the land measured, adduced evidence, and endeavoured to raise the same defence as he had in the previous suit. No allegation was made to the effect that the rent had been altered in consequence of anything that had happened since the previous decision. The lower Courts, without considering the evidence adduced by the defendant, held that the defendant could not again raise the same contention as the question had already been considered and determined in the previous suit, and was *res judicata* between the parties. *Held*, that the previous decision did not operate as *res judicata*, and that the lower Courts ought to have determined on the evidence adduced what the amount of rent in question was. *NIL MADHAB SIRCAR v. BROJO NATH SINGHA*. I. L. R. 21 Calc. 236

52. ————— *Rent, decision as to amount claimed in a previous suit, if res judicata in a subsequent suit—Fresh evidence and defence in a subsequent rent suit, admissibility of.* The previous decision in a suit for rent does not operate as *res judicata* in a subsequent suit where the amount of rent subsequently accrued due is in issue. It is open to the defendant to raise fresh defence and adduce fresh evidence, and the Court must determine upon the evidence adduced as to whether the rent claimed in the particular suit is or is not due. *Hurry Behari Bhagat v. Pargun Ahir*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 656, and *Nil Madhab Sircar v. Brojo Nath Singha*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 236, followed. *JOTINDRA MOHAN TAGORE v. SHUMBHU CHUNDER BHUTTACHARJEE*

4 C. W. N. 43

53. ————— *Decree by ijaradar whether evidence when the superior landlord sues for rent—Ex parte decree not deciding rate of rent.* A decree obtained in a previous suit for rent by an ijaradar does not operate against the tenant as *res judicata* on the question whether the relation of landlord and tenant exists in a subsequent suit for rent brought by the superior landlord. The decision in that suit where the rate of rent was not in issue does not operate as *res judicata*, in the subsequent suit against the tenant, as regards the rate of rent. *Hurry Behari Bhagat v. Pargun Ahir*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 656, and *Bakshi v. Nizamuddin*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 505, followed. *BALARAM MONDUL v. KARTICK CHANDRA ROY*

4 C. W. N. 161

54. ————— *Different subject-matters claimed—Malikana—Recurring liability—Judgment in first suit going to root of plaintiff's title—"Final" judgment—Judgment liable to appeal or under appeal—Effect of final decree in first suit pronounced subsequent to decision in second suit of Lower Appellate Court, but before hearing of second*

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—*contd.*

*appeal in second suit.* For the purposes of the rule of *res judicata* it is not essential that the subject-matters of the present and the former litigations should be identical. Where a recurring liability is the subject of claim, a previous judgment dismissing a suit between the same parties upon findings which do not go to the root of the title on which the claim rests, but relate merely to a particular item or instalment, cannot operate as *res judicata*. But if such previous judgment negatives the title and the main obligation itself, the plaintiff cannot re-agitate the same question of the title by claiming a subsequent item or instalment. *Rajah of Pittapur v. Sri Rajah Rau Buchi Sittaya Garu*, L. R. 12 I. A. 16, referred to. A judgment liable to appeal or under appeal is only a provisional and not a definite or final adjudication and cannot operate as *res judicata* during the interval preceding the appeal or the interval preceding the decision of the appeal. Explanation IV of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code commented on. *Kakralapudi Suriyanarayanarazu v. Chellamkuri Chellama*, 5 Mad. 176, and *Nilvaru v. Nilvaru*, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 116, referred to. The rule of *res judicata* contained in s. 13 of the Code applies equally to appeals and miscellaneous proceedings as to original suits. Having regard to its main object so far as it relates to the re-trial of an issue, it refers not to the date of the commencement of the litigation, but to the date when the Judge is called upon to decide the issue. Where after the commencement of the trial of an issue, a final judgment upon the same issue in another case is pronounced by a competent Court (the identity of parties and other conditions of s. 13 being fulfilled), such judgment operates as *res judicata* upon the decision, original or appellate, of the issue in the later litigation. On the 17th August 1885 a suit was instituted for recovery of an annual malikana allowance for the years 1290, 1291, and 1292 Fasli. On the 5th October 1885 the Munsif dismissed the suit. On the 10th March 1886 the Subordinate Judge on appeal reversed the Munsif's decree and decreed the suit. On the 21st June 1886 the defendant appealed to the High Court, which, on the 4th July 1887, reversed the Subordinate Judge's decree and restored that of the Munsif, on the ground that the plaintiff had never received and was not entitled to malikana. Meanwhile, on the 8th June 1886, the plaintiff brought another suit against the defendant for recovery of malikana for the year 1293 Fasli, which accrued after the institution of the former suit. By judgments dated respectively the 21st August and 27th November 1886, the lower Courts decreed this suit, holding that the Subordinate Judge's decree of the 10th March 1886 in the former suit operated as *res judicata*, and was conclusive in favour of the plaintiff's title to the malikana. On the 17th May 1887 the defendant appealed to the High Court, and on the 16th May 1888 (the High Court having, in the interval, dismissed the former suit by its judg-



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—*contd.*

ment of the 4th July 1887) the appeal came on for hearing. *Held*, that the lower Courts were wrong in holding that the Subordinate Judge's decree of the 10th March 1886 in the former suit, which, at the date of the institution of the present suit on the 8th June 1886, was liable to appeal, and, at the dates of the decisions of those Courts in August and November 1886, was the subject of a second appeal pending in the High Court, could operate as *res judicata* in favour of the plaintiff's title to malikana. (i) That the High Court's judgment dismissing the former suit on the 4th July 1887, though passed after the decisions of the lower Courts in the present suit and after the institution of the second appeal in the present suit, was nevertheless binding on the High Court in deciding such second appeal, and, being final, was conclusive as *res judicata* against the plaintiff's title to malikana. (ii) That the effect of the High Court's judgment dismissing the former suit on the 4th July 1887 was not affected by the circumstance that the second suit was brought for recovery of malikana for a different year, inasmuch as that judgment went to the root of the plaintiff's title to malikana, and its scope was not limited to the particular item then claimed. *BALKISHAN v. KISHAN LAL*

I. L. R. 11 All. 148

55. ——— Fact in issue not heard and "finally decided" therein—*Proceedings in a prior suit*. To support the defence of *res judicata*, it is not enough that the parties to the suits are the same, and that the same matter is in issue. The matter must have been heard and finally decided (s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code). In 1885 relations of a deceased proprietor, alleging their right to the inheritance, sued for a declaration that they were his next of kin. The defendant set up a title as direct descendant, claiming to be the son of that proprietor's daughter. The first Court decided that this was his true parentage, and dismissed the suit. The High Court maintained the dismissal, not upon the merits, but on the grounds that the suit was defective for want of parties, and that a declaratory decree could not be made. In 1888 the same plaintiffs, having purchased the interest of the parties not joined in the previous suit, brought the present suit with the same object, against the same defendant, whom the Subordinate Judge (not the same officer that disposed of the former suit) now found not to have been the son of the said daughter. A Bench of the High Court (composed of Judges other than those that heard the former appeal), having examined the record of the former suit, reversed the Subordinate Judge's decision. They declined, however, to decide whether or not the latter suit was barred on the ground of *res judicata*. But intimating that they would have affirmed the judgment of the lower Court in the former suit had it, on the merits, come before them, they preferred that judgment to the one before them, and gave

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effect to this opinion by reversing the latter. *Held*, that the question of parentage had not been heard and finally decided in the suit of 1885. The appeal in that suit had put an end to any finality in the decision of the first Court, and had not led to a decision on the merits. There was therefore no *res judicata*; but unless treated as such, the judgment in the former suit had little or no bearing on the question as afterwards put in issue in this. That issue had been rightly decided by the Subordinate Judge on the evidence, and his judgment was accordingly maintained. *SHEOSAGAR SINGH v. SITARAM SINGH*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 617

L. R. 24 I. A. 56

1 C. W. N. 290

56. ——— *Prior decree between the same parties in the same claim—Not arriving at a final decision*. In a former suit between the same parties that were now in litigation, in which the same claim upon title was made, a decree dismissed the suit. But the judgment in the former suit stated that it was left open to the plaintiff to sue again, and that no matters affecting the rights of the parties were decided between them. *Held*, that the prior decree was not a final decision within the meaning of s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the defence of *res judicata* was not maintained. *PAR-SOTAM GIR v. NARBADA GIR*

I. L. R. 21 All. 505

L. R. 26 I. A. 175

3 C. W. N. 517

57. ——— Possession known and acquiesced in, prior to adjudication—*Sivaganga sanad of 1803—Fraud*. A suit was brought in 1886, grounded on fraud attributed to the lineal ancestor of the principal defendant in obtaining in 1803 the grant of the sanad of the Sivaganga zamindari, to which the plaintiff claimed title. The plaintiff's case was that the defendant's ancestor, the younger of two brothers, had fraudulently caused the sanad to be made out in his own name, whereas it was intended to be, and ought to have been, a grant to the elder brother, who was the plaintiff's lineal ancestor. Those through whom the plaintiff claimed had not made any such charge, although they had knowledge of all the facts connected with the grant of the sanad of 1803 to the younger brother, and with the long possession by him and his descendants, among whom there had been litigation, resulting in a decision adverse to the plaintiff's claim as to the ownership. The lower Appellate Court and the High Court both found that the alleged fraud had not been proved. *Held*, that this suit could not be maintained to re-open the question. *BALA GOURI VALLABA TEVAR v. PERIASAMI UDAYAR TEVAR* . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 384

S.C. BALA GOURI VALLABHA TEVAR v. ZAMINDAR OF SHIVAGANGA . L. R. 21 I. A. 93

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RES JUDICATA—*contd.*2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—*contd.*

58. ———— **Circumstances and evidence to establish existence of trust.** A claim made for a share of property by inheritance from a deceased relation who had been in joint possession of it with the defendant was met by the defence that the estate had been jointly held for religious and charitable purposes under a will, the deceased having had no beneficial or heritable interest. The defendant alleged that the original owner of the property had bequeathed the property in trust for these purposes. The claimant alleged a revocation of the will, and denied that there was such a trust. One of the contentions upon this appeal was that the plaintiff was estopped from denying the existence of a trust by there having been a judgment of the High Court, in a prior suit, between the present defendant and the widow of the deceased, that judgment having stated that the trust had been recognized by him who was now defendant. *Held*, that this was not within s. 13, Civil Procedure Code, the matter not having been tried and determined in that suit. *Held*, also, that another prior judgment, in a suit brought by others interested in the trust, which judgment found the will to have been revoked, was admissible, though not conclusive, evidence against him. *BITTO KUNWAR v. KESHO PRASAD MISR* . . . I. L. R. 19 All. 277

L. R. 24 I. A. 10  
1 C. W. N. 265

59. ———— **Judgment obtained by fraud—Failure to appear and resist order granting certificate.** *P* died in 1889, leaving a daughter *B*. *P*, it was alleged, had made a will appointing certain persons his executors. The executors applied for a certificate under the Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1889) to recover a debt due to the deceased's estate from one *N*. *B* opposed this application, and claimed the certificate for herself by a separate application. The District Judge rejected *B*'s application, and issued a certificate to the executors on the 14th September 1892. In the meantime, one *M* obtained a decree against *B* as legal representative of *P*, and in execution bought *P*'s right, title, and interest in the debt due from *N*. On the 12th September 1892 *M* applied for a certificate under Act VII of 1889 to recover this debt. The District Judge rejected this application. *M* appealed to the High Court. To this appeal the executors were made parties at their own request. The High Court reversed the District Judge's order, and remanded the case for disposal on the merits. Upon the remand the executors did not appear before the District Judge to contest *M*'s application, and the District Judge granted him a certificate. Thereupon he applied for revocation of the certificate previously granted to the executors; and the executors in their turn applied for revocation of the certificate granted to him. The District Judge revoked *M*'s certificate on the ground that he had fraudulently concealed from the Court the previous grant of a certificate to

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—*contd.*

the executors. Against this order *M* appealed to the High Court, contending, *inter alia*, that the executors, not having resisted his application for a certificate after the case had been remanded by the High Court, were estopped, on the principle of *res judicata*, from applying for a revocation of the certificate granted to him. *Held*, that the executors were not stopped. The executors, having applied to be made parties to the appeal proceedings, were bound to appear in the Court below, and their failure to do so disabled them from pleading objection such as the collusive character of the decree and *B*'s want of title, but it did not operate as *res judicata*, especially when there was reason to suspect fraud on the part of *M*. The order obtained by him could not have the effect of *res judicata*, unless the executors, being called on to dispute it, had failed to do so. A party to a proceeding is never disabled from showing that a judgment or order has been obtained by the adverse party by fraud. *MANCHHARAM v. KALIDAS* . . . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 821

60. ———— **Decree in previous suit defining rights of a party to a subsequent suit—Effect of such decree as against such party until set aside by proper procedure.** Where there is a subsisting decree in a previous suit which, as regards the subject-matter of a subsequent suit, would take effect under s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is not open to the party whose rights are affected by such decree to question in the subsequent suit the validity of such decree, though it might have been open to such party in a separate suit to get the decree set aside. *Karamali Rahimbhoy v. Rahimbhoy Habibhoy*, I. L. R. 13 Bom. 137, referred to. *BANSI LAL v. RAMJI LAL*

I. L. R. 20 All. 370

61. ———— **Assignment of revenue—Assignee of Government revenue—Interest on arrears—Act XII of 1881 (N.-W. P. Rent Act), s. 93 (i)—Act XVIII of 1873 (N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act), s. 148—Civil Procedure Code, s. 13—Act VIII of 1859 (Civil Procedure Code), s. 2.** *Held* by *BANERJEE* and *AIKMAN, JJ.*, that an assignee of government revenue cannot sue for interest on arrears. *Bithal Das v. Harphul*, I. L. R. 6 All. 503, referred to. Where *A*, assignee of Government revenue, sued *B* for arrears of revenue and interest thereon in regard to one *khata*, and got a decree which included interest, and in a subsequent similar suit in regard to another *khata* *B* again resisted *A*'s claim for interest:—*Held*, by *BANERJI, J.*, that the fact that the reasoning upon which the former judgment was based was equally applicable to the second case did not give the former judgment the force of *res judicata* in the second case. *Held* by *AIKMAN, J.*, that the former judgment did operate as *res judicata*. *Balkishan v. Kishan Lal* I. L. R. 11 All. 148, and *Pahlwan Singh v. Risal Singh*, I. L. R. 4 All. 55, referred to. *CHANDI PRASAD v. MAHENDRA MAHENDRA SINGH* (1900)

I. L. R. 23 All. 5



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—*contd.*

62. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 13—Assignment of the Government revenue of a village divided into "khatas"—Claim for interest on revenue in arrears—Decision as to one khata res judicata in respect of other khatas.* The plaintiff was assignee of the Government revenue of a certain village. The village was divided into *khatas*, but the title to the revenue in respect of each and every *khata* was one and the same. The plaintiff sued to recover arrears of revenue due in respect of *khata* No. 29, with interest. On his right to receive interest being disputed, it was held that a previous decision of a competent Court between the same parties, but dealing with a claim for interest due on arrears of revenue payable in respect of *khata* No. 47, operated as *res judicata* as to the claim with regard to *khata* No. 29. *Ex parte Ador*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 571; *Madhavi v. Kelu*, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 264; *Kunji Amma v. Raman Menon*, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 494, and *Balkishan v. Kishan Lal*, I. L. R. 11 All. 148, referred to. *CHANDI PRASAD v. MAHENDRA MAHENDRA SINGH* (1901)

I. L. R. 24 All. 112

63. ———— *Decrees for cesses—Evidence—Presumption—Landlord and tenant—Decrees in suit for road and Public Works cesses.* Previous decrees for cesses at a certain rate, obtained by a landlord against a tenant, do not operate as *res judicata* in a subsequent suit for cesses claimed at a higher rate, although they are admissible as evidence in the suit and may raise a presumption in favour of the tenant. *RICKETS v. RAMESWAR MALLIA* (1900)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 109

64. ———— *Judgment of higher Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Suit by A against B in City Civil Court—Subsequent suit in High Court by B against A, raising same questions—Decision first arrived at in High Court—Subsequent trial of A's suit in City Civil Court—Effect of High Court judgment as res judicata.* A instituted a suit against B in the Madras City Civil Court. B subsequently instituted a suit, in the Madras High Court on its Original Side, against A. The parties in both Courts were the same, and the matters in controversy between them were substantially the same. The latter related to the prescriptive right of B to light and air in respect of certain windows situated in a wall abutting on A's house. Issues were framed in both Courts relating to this question. By consent A's suit in the City Civil Court was adjourned from time to time to await the final decision of the High Court. This was duly arrived at in a judgment of an Appellate Court, after which A's suit came on for hearing in the City Civil Court. The question then first raised and considered was whether the decision of the High Court barred the trial of the suit, it being contended on behalf of A that, inasmuch as A's suit had been filed prior to B's, the decision in B's suit did not operate as a bar. *Held*, that the

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—*contd.*

suit was barred. The doctrine of *res judicata* so far as it relates to prohibiting the re-trial of an issue, refers, not to the date of the commencement of the litigation, but to the time when the Judge is called upon to decide the issue. *Balkishan v. Kishan Lal*, I. L. R. 11 All. 148, approved and followed. *GURURAJAMMAH v. VENKATAKRISHNAMA CHETTI* (1901)

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 350

65. ———— *Mistake of law—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13.* D and R were divided brothers. R, in conjunction with the senior of his two wives, and to the exclusion of the junior wife, adopted a son of D on 27th October, 1879. On the same day, R settled some properties on his junior wife for life, with remainder to his daughter by her. In 1885 R died: his senior wife died shortly after, and in 1886 his adopted son also died, unmarried. D in 1890 sued the surviving widow and daughter for a declaration that he, as the reversionary heir of the deceased adopted son, was entitled to succeed to the properties left by R (including those settled on the widow and daughter) after the lifetime of the widow. The claim was dismissed in so far as it related to the settled property, but D was declared to be entitled, as reversioner, to the other properties left by R, after the lifetime of the widow. In 1891 D died. In 1897, the surviving sons of D brought the present suit, in which they claimed to be entitled to immediate possession of the properties to which D had been declared, in the former suit, entitled subject to a life interest in the widow. They contended that the decree in the former suit had been obtained under a mistake of law, and that it was no bar to the present suit. *Held*, that the matter was *res judicata*. *KAVERI AMMAL v. SASTRI RAMIER* (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 104

66. ———— *Mortgage—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 60, 92 and 93—Mortgage—Redemption—Decretal money not paid in within the time limited by the decree—Decree not in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act—Subsequent suit for redemption not barred—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 13, 244.* The plaintiffs brought a suit for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage, and obtained a decree for redemption, conditioned on their paying a certain sum within a time specified in the decree. This decree, however, instead of going on to direct that in default of payment by the due date the property should be sold, directed that if payment was not made within the time fixed the judgment should be deemed to be non-existent. The plaintiffs did not pay the decretal amount within the time fixed, but some years afterwards brought a second suit for redemption: *Held*, that the second suit was not, under the circumstances, barred, either by reason of anything contained in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, or by s. 13 or s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *David Hag v. Razi-ud-din*, I. L. R. 19 All. 202, overruled. *Sami Achari v. Somasund-*



## RES JUDICATA—contd.

## 2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—contd.

*ram Achari*, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 119; *Periandi v. Angappa*, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 423; *Karuthasami v. Jaganatha*, I. L. R. 8 Mad. 478; *Ramunni v. Brahma Dattan*, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 366; *Ramasami v. Sami*, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 96; *Vallabha Valiya Rajah v. Vedapuratti*, I. L. R. 19 Mad. 40; *Nainappa Chetti v. Chidambaram Chetti*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 18; *Chaita v. Purum Sookh*, N.-W. P. H. C. Rep. (1867), 256; *Doobee Singh v. Jowkee Ram*, N.-W. P. H. C. Rep. (1868) 381; *Sheikh Golam Hoosein v. Musumat Alla Rukheeb Beebee*, N.-W. P. H. C. Rep. (1871) 62; *Anrudh Singh v. Sheo Prasad*, I. L. R. 4 All. 481; *Muhammad Samiuddin Khan v. Mannu Lal*, I. L. R. 11 All. 386; *Dondh Bahadur Rai v. Tek Narain Rai*, I. L. R. 21 All. 251; *Gan Savant Bal Savant v. Narayan Dhond Savant*, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 467; *Hari Rarji Chiplunkar v. Shapurji Hormasji Shet*, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 461; *Maloji v. Sagaji*, I. L. R. 13 Bom. 567; *Roy Dinkur Doyal v. Sheo Golam Singh*, 22 W. R. 172; and *Nawab Azimut Ali Khan v. Jowahir Sing*, 13 Moo. I. A. 404, referred to. *SITA RAM v. MADHO LAL* (F. B. 1901)

I. L. R. 24 All. 44

67. ———— Question of title raised in rent suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13. Where a question of title was decided in a suit for rent, in which the issue was as to whether the relation of landlord and tenant existed between the parties: Held that in a subsequent suit brought by the same plaintiff for establishment of his title, the decision in the rent suit does not operate as *res judicata*. *Dwarka Nath Roy v. Ram Chand Aich*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 428, followed. *Radha Madhab Holdar v. Monohur Mukerji*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 756, distinguished. NITYA NUNDA SARKAR v. RAM NARAIN DAS (1901)

6 C. W. N. 66

68. ———— Findings necessary to support decree—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 14—'Unable to entertain suit'—'Other causes of a like nature'—Dismissal of previous suit for non-joinder—Sch. II, Arts. 142 and 144 of Act XV of 1877—Possession under decree subsequently reserved—Act XV of 1877, Sch. II, Art. 29. An appellate judgment operates by way of estoppel as regards all findings of the lower Court, which though not referred to in it, are necessary to make the appellate decree possible only on such findings. A plaintiff is not entitled under s. 14 of the Limitation Act to exclude the time spent in prosecuting a previous suit when such suit was dismissed for non-joinder on findings arrived at after trial and not without trial, because the Court was unable to entertain the suit. Under Art. 142, Sch. II, of the Limitation Act, limitation runs from the date of dispossession, and no fresh starting point is given because the party dispossessed subsequently obtains possession under the decree and is ousted from possession, when the decree is reversed. *Sayad Nasrudin v. Venkatesh Prabhu*, I. L. R.

## RES JUDICATA—contd.

## 2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—contd.

5 Bom. 382, followed. *Degumbury Dossee v. Raja Anundnath Roy*, W. R. (1864) 43; *Firingee Sahoo v. Sham Manjhee*, 8 W. R. Civil Rule 373, and *Dagdu v. Kalu*, I. L. R. 22 Bom. 733, referred to. Sch. II, Art. 9, does not apply when the suit is substantially for possession of property, though the plaintiff avers that an instrument relied on by the defendant is a forgery. *Sundaram v. Sithammam*, I. L. R. 16 Mad. 311, and *Abdul Rahim v. Kirparam Daji*, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 186, followed. *NARAYAN CHETTY v. KENANAMMAI ACHI* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 28 Mad. 338.

69. ———— Bar only when jurisdiction concurrent as regards pecuniary value as well as subject-matter—Effect of augmentation of claim by subsequent interest—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85. A judgment in a previous suit does not operate as *res judicata* in a subsequent suit in respect of the same subject matter, if the value of the matter of relief in the subsequent suit is above the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, which decided the previous suit. In order to create an estoppel the jurisdiction of the two Courts must be concurrent as regards pecuniary limit as well as subject-matter. *Rajah Run Bahadur Singh v. Mussumut Lachoo Koer*, L. R. 12 I. A. 23, followed. The augmentation of the claim in the first suit by subsequent accrual of interest will prevent the estoppel operating. *Gopi Nath Chobey v. Bhagwat Pershad*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 697, distinguished. *Pathuma v. Salimamma*, I. L. R. 8 Mad. 83, distinguished. Mortgage suits do not form an exception to this rule and the Legislature cannot, in the absence of apt provisions, be presumed to have intended to modify the rule of *res judicata* by enacting s. 85 of the Transfer of Property Act. *Obliter*: S. 209 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to mortgage decrees. *GIRIYA CHETTIAR v. SABAPATHY MUDALIAR* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 65.

70. ———— *Res judicata*—Suit. Where after a remand by a higher Court, an issue was raised and accepted by the parties and the decision become final owing to the abandonment of an appeal. *Quære*: Whether the decision was *res judicata* in a subsequent suit notwithstanding that the raising of the issue on remand in the previous suit might have been open to objection. *TIRBHUVAN BAHADUR SINGH v. RAMESWAR BAKSH SINGH* (1906) . I. L. R. 28 All. 727  
10 C. W. N. 1065.  
s.c. L. R. 33 I. A. 156.

71. ———— *Res judicata*—Suit dismissed in defendant's absence on plaintiff's failure to adduce evidence—Fresh suit, if barred. S. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code is no bar to a fresh suit, when the previous suit was dismissed in the defendant's absence on the failure of the plaintiff to adduce evidence. *Radha Prosad Singh*



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*2. ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT—*concl'd.*

*v. Lal Sahab Rai, I. L. R. 13 All. 53, referred to. DOMA RAM v. RAGHU NATH PANDIT (1905)*  
10 C. W. N. 40

72. ————— *Decision in previous suit that an agreement barred plaintiff's right*—Such decision *res judicata* though agreement time barred at date of subsequent suit. A decision in a previous suit for possession of property, that an agreement to sell executed by the owner of such property in favour of the defendant and a tender of performance by the defendant, disentitled the plaintiff (who was found to have purchased with knowledge of the agreement and tender) to possession, will operate as *res judicata* in a subsequent suit between the same parties on the cause of action. The fact that at the time the subsequent suit was instituted such contract of sale had become unenforceable by the Law of Limitation will not prevent the operation of the bar, when it is clear from the judgment in the previous suit, that the Court did not intend that the defendant should bring a suit for specific performance of the contract. *ADAKKALAM CHETTIYAR v. RAMALINGA CHETTIAR (1906)*

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 320

## 3. ADJUDICATIONS.

1. ————— *Mention of cess in survey proceeding—Judicial determination.* Held, that the mention of a cess in the *wajib-ul-urz* and settlement proceeding was not equivalent to a judgment on a question raised so as to preclude adjudication on the merits. *RAM CHUND v. ZAHOR ALI KHAN*

1 Agra 135

*See RAM CHUND v. ZAHOR ALI KHAN*

1 Agra 134

2. ————— *Entry in wajib-ul-urz—Limitation.* Held, that an entry in the *wajib-ul-urz* is only good for what it may be worth as evidence, and cannot be held to be like a judgment or to require to be set aside by a regular suit subject to a limitation calculated from the date of the instrument. *BHOLA SINGH v. BULRAJ SINGH*

1 Agra 233

3. ————— *Application under Administrator-General's Act (XXIV of 1867), order on—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1887), s. 13—Act II of 1874, s. 63—"Suit."* An application by petition under s. 63 of Act II of 1874 was a "suit" within the meaning of s. 13 of Act X of 1877, and therefore such an application was barred by the disposal of a former application in the same matter under the same section, or under s. 60 of Act XXIV of 1867, which the Act of 1874 repealed: this was so whether the order was one for payment of money or one dismissing the petition. S. 63, Act II of 1874, contemplates that the money, which is the subject of the petition, may be claimed by parties other than the applicant, and that those parties may appear and be represented at the hear-

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*3. ADJUDICATIONS—*contd.*

ing; and the words "binding on all parties" were intended to make the order binding upon such parties as well as on the petitioner. *SMITH v. SECRETARY OF STATE. In the matter of ACT II OF 1874* . . . . . I. L. R. 3 Calc. 340

4. ————— *Adjudication in accordance with Oaths Act—Oaths Act (X of 1873), ss. 9 and 11—Question of title.* The decision of a question of title in issue between the parties to a suit in accordance with the provisions of the Oaths Act is not an adjudication which will operate as an estoppel when the same question of title is again raised in another suit between the same parties. *KESHAVA THARAGAN v. RUDRAN NAMBU-DRI* . . . . . I. L. R. 5 Mad. 259

5. ————— *Order apportioning compensation-money—Question of title—Land Acquisition Act, s. 39.* Under s. 39 of the Land Acquisition Act, it is the duty of the Judge, in apportioning the compensation money which he is directed to apportion, to decide the question of title between all persons claiming a share of the money. *Semble*: No decision under the Land Acquisition Act should be treated as *res judicata* with respect to the title to other parts of the property belonging to persons who may come before the Judge under s. 39. *NOBODEEP CHUNDER CHOWDHRY v. BROJENDRO LALL ROY*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 403: 9 C. L. R. 117

6. ————— *Investigation under s. 331, Civil Procedure Code, 1877—Title, question of—Possession.* An investigation under s. 331 of the Civil Procedure Code (prior to the Amendment Act of 1879) was limited to the fact of possession, and was no bar to a subsequent suit brought to try the title to the land in dispute. *CHINNASAMI PILLAI v. KRISHNA PALLAI* . I. L. R. 3 Mad. 104

7. ————— *Order for abatement of suit—Difference of procedure under Civil Procedure Codes, 1859 and 1877, s. 371.* Certain property, having been mortgaged, was sold in execution of a decree against the mortgagor, and the decree-holder became the purchaser. The mortgagee subsequently sued upon his mortgage, making the purchaser a defendant, but pending the suit the latter died, and the suit was not revived against his representatives. A decree was, in 1876, obtained, and in execution of that decree the property in question was purchased by the plaintiff, who now sued to recover possession of the same from the representatives of the purchaser at the former execution sale. Held, that the matter was not *res judicata* by reason of the mortgage suit, inasmuch as, that suit having been under Act VIII of 1859, the abatement had not the effect which such an abatement under Act X of 1877 would have had, *viz.*, being a bar to a fresh suit in the same cause of action. *NISTARINI DEBI v. BROJO NATH MOOKHOPADHYA* . . . . . 10 C. L. R. 229



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*3. ADJUDICATIONS—*contd.*

8. ———— Withdrawal from suit with permission to bring a fresh suit—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 97.* A suit is not barred as *res judicata* because, in a former case between the same parties, and in the same cause of action, the plaintiff, after the evidence had been recorded, but before final judgment was passed, obtained the Court's permission to withdraw the suit with reservation of leave to bring another. *MONA BIBEE v. OOMED ALI* . . . 16 W. R. 276

9. ———— Dismissal of plea of set-off—*Subsequent suit for same claim.* The plea of set-off is one form of bringing a suit, the defendant becoming in regard thereto a plaintiff, and he cannot therefore be allowed to set up a claim for which a suit had been previously brought by him and dismissed. *ABDOOLLAH KHAN v. SREEKANTO PERSAD HAJRAH* . . . 15 W. R. 252

10. ———— Landlord and tenant—Sale for arrears of rent—Deposit to protect under-tenure—Set-off—Voluntary payment. *L* and *R*, the holders of a patni estate, granted in 1856 a dar-patni lease to *S* at an annual rent, the lease stipulating that *S* should have full power of sale and gift, but should not sub-let without the patnidar's consent. The lease contained no stipulation for the registration of any vendee or donee. In 1860 *S* sold the dar-patni lease to *K*, the deed of sale, which was duly registered, providing for mutation of names in the patnidar's books. No such mutation was ever effected by *K*, who was never recognized as their tenant by *L* and *R*, the rent of the dar-patni being paid in the name of *S*. In 1864 the rent due from the patnidars being in arrear, the zamindar proceeded to sell the patni under Regulation VIII of 1819. Thereupon *K*, in order to protect his under-tenure, deposited in the Collectorate, on 17th November 1864, a sum of money, on which the sale was stayed. *K*, being then in arrear in the payment of his dar-patni rent, claimed to set-off the amount deposited in the Collectorate against the rent due to *L* and *R*. This *L* and *R* refused to allow and they brought a suit in the Collector's Court against *S* and his sureties to recover the arrears of rent. In that suit *K* intervened, claiming the benefit of the set-off, to which, however, the High Court, on 26th June 1866, on appeal, held that he was not entitled, the deposit being merely a voluntary payment by *K*. On 30th October 1867 *K* brought a regular suit against *S* and *L* and *R* to recover the amount of the deposit and obtained a decree, but the decision was reversed on appeal and the suit dismissed for want of jurisdiction. On 6th June 1869 *K* filed his plaint in the proper Court. Held, that he was entitled to recover the amount deposited by him in the Collectorate, and that the suit was not barred as being *res judicata* by the decision of 26th June 1866. *LUCKINARAIN MITTER v. KHETTRO PAL SINGH ROY*

13 B. L. R. P. C. 146 : 20 W. R. 380

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*3. ADJUDICATIONS—*contd.*

11. ———— Set-off, plea of, in respect of claim dismissed in former suit—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13.* In a suit to recover a sum of money due as wages, the plaintiff alleging that the defendant had engaged him to sell cloth on his account at a monthly salary, the defendant claimed a set-off as the price of cloth which he alleged the plaintiff had sold on his account on commission. It appeared that the defendant had previously sued the plaintiff to recover the same amount as was now claimed by way of set-off, as being due for the price of cloth sold and delivered by the defendant to him; and the plaintiff (then defendant) pleaded that there had been no sale to him, but the cloth had been delivered to him on commission sale. The suit was dismissed on the ground that there was no proof of a sale of cloth, and the question whether any sum was due for cloth sold on commission sale was not gone into. The cloth now alleged to have been delivered on commission sale was the same as that alleged in the former suit to have been actually sold to the plaintiff. Held, that the claim for such set-off was not barred under the provisions of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. *AMIR ZAMA v. NATHU MAL* . . . I. L. R. 8 All. 396

12. ———— Order of former Magistrate for maintenance—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1872), s. 536—Maintenance of wife—Adultery of wife subsequent to order for maintenance.* A husband, upon whom an order to make an allowance for the maintenance of his wife had been made under s. 536 of Act X of 1872, objected to the payment of the allowance on the ground that his wife was living in adultery. The Magistrate, entertaining this objection, disallowed it, on the ground that the charge of adultery against the wife was not established. The husband subsequently again objected to the payment of the allowance on the same ground. The Magistrate, entertaining the second objection, allowed it, and directed the husband to discontinue paying the allowance. His order was based on proof of adultery by the wife before the date of the order of the former Magistrate. Held, on the general principle of the rule of *res judicata*, that the second Magistrate was wrong in law in re-opening matters already adjudicated upon, and his order directing the discontinuance of the allowance on the ground of facts antecedent to the former Magistrate's order must be held to be illegal. *LARAITI v. RAM DIAL* . . . I. L. R. 5 All. 224

13. ———— Application to set aside decree after refusal by Court to set it aside—*Attachment under ex parte decree.* A suit was brought against *T* and an *ex parte* decree obtained against him. An application by *T* to have the decree set aside was dismissed. The defendant afterwards applied to have the attachment and all the proceedings set aside and declared null and void. *Quære*: Whether the former refusal to



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*3. ADJUDICATIONS—*contd.*

set it aside would be a bar to prevent the setting aside by the Court. **LADKUVARBHAI v. SANSANGJI PARTABSANGJI** . . . 7 Bom. O. C. 150

14. ——— Previous suit by next friend dismissed for default—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 158 (Act VIII of 1859), s. 148—Evidence of fraud of next friend—Limitation.* A sued in 1885 to recover certain estate from B, alleging claim under his adoption which took place in 1865. A suit to recover the same estates had been filed on behalf of A by his next friend and had been dismissed for default in 1872. In 1875 A, being still a minor, relinquished by deed his claim to the estates for Rs. 12,000, but now alleged that he thought he was relinquishing it only in favour of the defendant's predecessor in title, who died in 1883 having been in possession of the estates since 1867. The plaintiff attained his majority in 1878. *Held*, that the claim was *res judicata*, the plaintiff having failed to prove fraud on the part of his next friend, and that, whether the cause of action arose in 1865 or 1867, it was equally barred from 1879. *Per Curiam*—The plea of *res judicata* ordinarily presupposes an adjudication on the merits; but s. 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act VIII of 1859) contains a statutory direction that, in case the plaintiff neglects to produce evidence and to prove his claim as he is bound to do, the Court do proceed to decide the suit on such material as is actually before it, and that the decision so pronounced shall have the force of a decree on the merits, notwithstanding the default on the part of the plaintiff. **VENKATACHALAM v. MAHALAKSHMAMMA** . . . I. L. R. 10 Mad. 272

15. ——— Judgment liable to appeal—*Finality of judgment.* A judgment liable to appeal or under appeal is only a provisional and not a definitive or final adjudication, and cannot operate as *res judicata* during the interval preceding the appeal or the interval preceding the decision of the appeal. Expl. IV of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code commented on. *Kakarlapudi Suryanarayana Razu v. Shellamkuri Shellamma*, 5 Mad. 176, and *Nilvaru v. Nilvaru*, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 110, referred to. The rule of *res judicata* contained in s. 13 of the Code applies equally to appeals and miscellaneous proceedings as to original suits. Having regard to its main object, so far as it relates to the re-trial of an issue, it refers not to the date of the commencement of the litigation, but to the date when the Judge is called upon to decide the issue. Where, after the commencement of the trial of an issue, a final judgment upon the same issue in another case is pronounced by a competent Court (the identity of parties and other conditions of s. 13 being fulfilled), such judgment operates as *res judicata* upon the decision, original or appellate, of the issue in the later litigation. **BALKISHAN v. KISHAN LAL** . . . I. L. R. 11 All. 148

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*3. ADJUDICATIONS—*contd.*

16. ——— Award as to partition in prior arbitration proceedings, effect of—*Subsequent suit for partition.* Disputes having arisen in a joint Hindu family, the parties submitted the question of partition to arbitrators, who passed an award thereon. Both parties objected to the award and it was never carried into effect. On a suit for partition being filed:—*Held*, that such an award was equivalent to a final judgment and binding on the parties in the absence of positive evidence that both parties agreed that the former state of things should be restored, and that therefore the present suit for partition could not be maintained. **KRISHNA PANDA v. BALARAM PANDA** . . . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 290

**SUBBARAYA CHETTI v. SADASIVA CHETTI**

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 490

17. ——— Refusal to file award—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 13 and 525.* The refusal of an application for the filing of an award under s. 525, Civil Procedure Code, merely leaves the award to have its own ordinary legal effect, and it cannot be contended that an award is not to be relied on as a defence in a suit relating to the subject-matter dealt with by it, only because such an application has not been granted. Separable claims, viz., (a) to share property by right of inheritance, and (b) for the office of lambardar, had been disposed of, on the reference of the present parties, without the intervention of a Court by an arbitrator's award between them. An application under s. 525 had been rejected, for the reason, among others, that (b) was not a matter of civil jurisdiction. *Held*, however that the present suit, which was grounded on (a), was barred by the award made. **MUHAMMED NEWAZ KHAN v. ALAM KHAN** . . . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 414  
L. R. 18 I. A. 73

18. ——— Consent decree—*Decree dismissing party from suit.* In 1839, in contemplation of a marriage between M and G, a deed of settlement was executed which provided that, during the lifetime of M's father, half of the rents and profits of two houses in Calcutta, held for a term of years, should be taken by him and half by G; that after the death of M's father, the rent and profits should go to G and M, and upon the death of either of them to the survivor; and after the death of the survivor to the use absolutely of the issue of the marriage, if any. The father of M died in 1841, and G on the 23rd of November in the same year. M, on the 21st December 1841, shortly after the death of her husband, married A S. and on the 8th of April 1842 gave birth to a child, who was named E and afterwards married to T. M died in 1850. By A S she had two children, the plaintiff and a son G S. On the 7th November 1859 E and her husband filed a bill of complaint in the Supreme Court, Calcutta, against the trustees of the settlement of 1839, and against A S and G S, who was then an infant,



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*3. ADJUDICATIONS—*contd.*

in which she claimed to be entitled to the properties absolutely. On the 21st of June 1860 a decree was made dismissing the suit against *G S*, and declaring that the properties covered by the deed of settlement were personalty. In the present suit it was objected that the decree of the Supreme Court could not bind *G S*, as he was dismissed from the suit, and because the decree was a decree by consent. *Held*, that the decree was binding upon *G S* and persons claiming to derive their title from him. A consent decree is as binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is made as a decree made after a contentious trial. *In re South American and Mexican Co.*, [1895] 1 Ch. 37; *The Belcairn*, L. R. 10 P. D. 161; *Nilakanand v. Padmanabha*, I. L. R. 18 Mad. 1; and *Gajapathi Radhika v. Gajapathi Nilamani*, 13 Moo. I. A. 497, referred to. NICHOLAS v. ASPHAR

I. L. R. 24 Cal. 216

19. ————— *Estoppel*. A judgment by consent raises an estoppel just in the same way as a judgment after the Court has exercised a judicial discretion in the matter. LAKSHMISHANKAR DEVESHANKAR v. VISHNURAM

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 77

20. ————— *Evidence—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13*. A consent decree in a previous suit to which the parties in a subsequent suit are parties, being a decree of a Court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit and over the parties is admissible in evidence in the latter suit. LALA SHIB LAL v. LALA GOURI PRASAD

2 C. W. N. 174

21. ————— *Division of produce—N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1881), s. 43—Landholder and tenant—Suit to recover rent in kind—Duty of officer appointed to divide produce or appraise standing crops*. Where, under s. 43 of the North-Western Provinces Rent Act, 1881, an officer is appointed to divide produce, or estimate or appraise a standing crop, as between a landholder and his alleged tenant, such officer is not empowered to come to any decision as to the liability of the tenant to pay rent, if such liability is denied. If, therefore, an officer appointed for the purposes of s. 43 should take upon himself to determine any question as to the liability of the tenant to pay rent, his decision will not in any subsequent suit between the parties be *res judicata*. *Harnarain Singh v. Ram Nihora Lal*, All. Weekly Notes (1903) 40, followed. JAFAR KHAN v. GHULAM MUHAMMAD (1903)

I. L. R. 25 All. 282

22. ————— *Execution of decree—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 179—Application in execution more than three years after previous application—Omission on part of judgment-debtor to set up bar by limitation—Adjudication on application—Subsequent application in execution—Objection on ground that*

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*3. ADJUDICATIONS—*contd.*

*previous application was barred*. A decree was obtained on 16th March, 1893, and a petition in execution was presented on 8th February, 1894. The next petition in execution was presented on 2nd July, 1897, when the judgment-debtor, though he had notice of it, did not raise the defence of limitation. An order was passed on the petition, for the issue of a warrant for the arrest of the defendant, and the warrant was duly issued. Within three years of that petition the present application in execution was made, when it was objected that, as the application in 1897 had been presented more than three years from the previous application in 1894, it was barred, and that in consequence the present application must also be barred. *Held*, that it was not open to the judgment-debtor now to raise the objection that the application of 1897 was barred. He had had notice of that application and had raised no objection to it. Execution had been ordered in pursuance of it, which was an adjudication on the application; that order was acted on, and no appeal was preferred against it. The question whether the application of 1897 was barred was therefore *res judicata*. As the Court which had ordered the execution had jurisdiction to determine whether the decree was barred, and had made an order in execution of the decree, it must be considered to have determined that it was not barred. *Mungul Pershad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri Chowdhry*, L. R. 8 I. A. 123, followed. LAKSHMANAN CHETTI v. KUT-TAYAN CHETTI (1901) . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 669

23. ————— *Oath—Oaths Act (X of 1873)—Decree upheld in appeal on strength of oath—Final adjudication*. A suit of 1898 had been affirmed on appeal, on the strength of an oath taken under the Oaths Act. *Held*, that it was a confirmation of the original decree. As between the parties, a decree arrived at after the taking of an oath on a question of fact in the case is none the less a final adjudication. AHMED v. MOIDIN (1901) . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 444

24. ————— *Redemption—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 92—Decree for redemption—Omission to execute—Maintainability of subsequent suit on same mortgage—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 13, 244*. Where a suit for redemption has been instituted, and a decree for redemption has been passed therein, but not executed, a subsequent suit is not maintainable for the redemption of the same mortgage. VEDAPURATTI v. VALLABHA VALIYA RAJA (F. B., 1902) . I. L. R. 25 Mad. 300

25. ————— *Summary proceeding—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 105 (103 A), s. 106—Distinction between order under s. 105 (103 A) and s. 106*. When a Revenue-officer disposes of an objection summarily under s. 105 (103 A of the amended Act) of the Bengal Tenancy



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*3. ADJUDICATIONS—*contd.*

Act (VIII of 1885), without adopting the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for the trial of suits, his order will not be open to appeal or second appeal, nor will it have the effect of *res judicata*. *Dengu Kazi v. Nobin Kissori Chowdhurani*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 462, discussed and explained. *KURBAN ALI v. JAFAR ALI* (1901) I. L. R. 28 Calc. 471

26. ————— **Incidental or collateral issues**—*Res judicata in rent suits*—*Adjudication upon title to the land in rent suits, when res judicata in a subsequent title suit.* Where in a suit for rent the defendant denies the relationship of landlord and tenant and either sets up the title of a third person to the land for which rent is claimed, or pleads that she is not in occupation of the land or that the tenancy which existed has expired, the only material issue to be decided in the suit is whether the relationship of landlord and tenant subsisted between the parties for the period covered by the suit and the issue, if any, raised as to the title to the land is an incidental or collateral issue not necessary for the decision of the suit; therefore the adjudication on this latter issue cannot operate as *res judicata* in a subsequent suit between the parties for the establishment of title to the land. *Srihari Banerjee v. Khitish Chandra Roy Bahadur*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 569, *Run Bahadur v. Lucho Koer*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. (P. C.) 301, and *Dwarka Nath Roy v. Ram Chand Aich*, 3 C. W. N. 266: s.c. I. L. R. 25 Calc. (F. B.) 428, referred to. But where in a rent suit, the alleged tenant denies the plaintiff's title to the land and sets up his own title to the same, the issue as to the title to the land becomes a substantial issue in the suit, and the decision of the Court on the question of title becomes *res judicata* in a subsequent suit between the parties for establishment of title to the land. *Raj Krissen Mukerjee v. Radhamadhab Haldar*, 21 W. R. 349, *Radhamadhab Haldar v. Monohur Mukerjee*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 756, and *Kasiswar Mukhopadhyaya v. Mohendra Nath Bhandari*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 136, referred to. Where in a suit brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for rent in respect of an alleged *jama* of R7 the defendant pleaded that he did not hold any separate *jama* of R7 under the plaintiff, but that the lands covered by the suit were included in a *jama* of R33 and odd, which they held under the plaintiff, and the Court held that the defendant did not hold any separate *jama* of R7 under the plaintiff and the lands of the alleged *jama* were included in the defendant's *jama* of R33 odd: *Held*, that the decision that the lands were included within the defendant's *jama* of R33 odd, was not necessary for the decision of the suit, and consequently could not be *res judicata* in a subsequent suit brought by the plaintiff against the defendant for the declaration of his title to those lands and for *khas* possession thereof. *SAHADEB DEHALI v. RAM RUDRA HALDAR* (1906) . . . 10 C. W. N. 820

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*3. ADJUDICATIONS—*contd.*

27. ————— **Adjudication in previous suit between co-defendants, in active opposition, res judicata in subsequent suit between such defendants.** An adjudication between co-defendants in a previous suit on a point actively contested between them, operates as *res judicata* in a subsequent suit between them, in which they are arrayed as plaintiff and defendant. *Zamorin of Calicut v. Narayanan Mussad*, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 323, followed. *Ramanuja Ayyangar v. Narayana Ayyanagar*, I. L. R. 18 Mad. 374, distinguished. *KANDIYIL CHERIYA CHANDU v. ZAMORIN OF CALICUT* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 515

28. ————— **Decision in previous suit binding as res judicata between the co-defendants if the matter in issue in the subsequent suit actively contested at previous trial.** A decision in a previous suit on a matter raised and actively contested between co-defendants in such suit will operate as *res judicata* in a subsequent suit in which such co-defendants are arranged as plaintiff and defendant. *Kandiyil Cheriya Chandu v. The Zamorin of Calicut*, I. L. R. 29 Mad. 515, followed. The fact that the defendant in the previous suit had no right of appealing against the decision because the suit was dismissed will not affect the operation of the bar, when such defendant having the right to be joined as a plaintiff chose to contest the suit as a co-defendant. The Full Bench decision in *Somasundara Mudali v. Kulandai Velu Pillai*, I. L. R. 28 Mad. 457, is not in conflict with *Kandiyil Cheriya Chandu v. The Zamorin of Calicut*, I. L. R. 29 Mad. 515. Where a decision dismissing a suit is in fact wholly against the defendant, such defendant can appeal against it. *Krishna Chandra v. Mohesh Chandra Saha*, 9 C. W. N. 584, approved. *YUSUF SAHIB v. DURGI* (1907) . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 447

29. ————— **Fraud—Res judicata—Suit to set aside a decree on the ground of fraud—Sole question raised in the suit already decided in proceedings under s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure.** In a suit to set aside a decree as having been obtained against the plaintiff by fraud, substantially the only ground relied upon was that the suit had been improperly instituted against the plaintiff as of full age when in fact he was a minor. This had been decided against the plaintiff in earlier proceedings between the parties under s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, that the suit was not maintainable. *Puran Chand v. Sheodat Rai*, I. L. R. 29 All. 212, followed. *Khagendra Nath Mahata v. Pran Nath Roy*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 395, distinguished. *NIADAR MAL v. RAUNAK HUSAIN* (1907) . . . I. L. R. 29 All. 608

30. ————— **Collector's decision—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Collector's decision under s. 13 of Act III of 1895 not questionable in subsequent suit in Civil Courts.** Under s. 13 of Act III of 1895, the Collector has jurisdiction to determine whether lands are the emoluments of an office or not, and the parties to the proceed



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*3. ADJUDICATIONS—*contd.*

ing are debarred by s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code and the general principles of *res judicata* from re-agitating the same question subsequently in a Civil Court. *BALIJEPALE SESHAYYA v. BALIJEPALE SUBBAYYA* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 30 Mad. 320

31. ———— Decision of Court under Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)—*Res judicata*—Apportionment of compensation—Property held under the same title. A decision of the Court with respect to the apportionment of compensation money under the Land Acquisition Act should not be treated as *res judicata* affecting other parts of the claimant's property held under the same title. *Nobodeep Chunder Chowdhry v. Brojendro Lall Roy*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 406, and *Mahadevi v. Neelamani*, I. L. R. 20 Mad. 269, referred to. *Ram Chandra Singh v. Madho Kumari*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 484, distinguished. *DIRGAJ DEO v. KALI CHARAN SINGH* (1907) . . . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 466

32. ———— Suit by person representing debutter estate—Representation in suit by person acting under the authority of shebait—*Res judicata*—Identity of subject—Judgment in previous suit—Admissibility—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 13. A decision obtained in a suit instituted in his own name by a person who was in possession of, and had authority to represent the debutter estate under an *arpannama* from the shebait and who in fact did represent the debutter estate, is binding on a succeeding shebait on the principle of the case of *Prosunno Kumari v. Golab Chand*, L. R. 2 I. A. 145; *Gora Chand v. Makhun Lall*, 11 C. W. N. 489; s.c. 6 C. L. J. 404; *Venkayya v. Suramma*, I. L. R. 12 Mad. 235; *Radhabai v. Anantrav*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 198, referred to. For purposes of *res judicata* it is not essential that the subject-matter of litigation should be identical with the subject-matter of the previous suit. *Raja of Pittapur v. Raja Rao Buchi*, L. R. 12 I. A. 16; *Balkishan v. Kishan Lal*, I. L. R. 11 All. 148; *Moni Roy v. Rajbunsee Kooer*, 25 W. R. 393, referred to. The scope of the former litigation and the question raised and decided therein must be determined by reference not merely to the decree, but also to the judgment, and it need be, to the pleadings. *Kurratulain v. Peara Saheb*, 9 C. W. N. 938; s.c. L. R. 32 I. A. 244, referred to. Held, that the previous judgment relied on in this case did not operate as *res judicata*, but was admissible in evidence, if not under s. 13, Evidence Act, in proof of all the facts found therein, at least to the extent indicated by GEIDT, J., in *Abinash Chandra v. Paresh Nath*, 9 C. W. N. 402. *RANJIT SINHA BAHADUR v. BASUNTA KUMAR GHOSE* (1908) . . . 12 C. W. N. 739

33. ———— Questions not necessary for determination—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13. The decision, in a former suit, of questions not absolutely necessary for the determination of that suit, cannot be regarded as

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*3. ADJUDICATIONS—*concl.*

*res judicata* between the same parties in a later suit. *POORENDRA NATH SEN v. HEMANGINI DASSEE* (1908) . . . 12 C. W. N. 1002

## 4. JUDGMENTS ON PRELIMINARY POINTS.

1. ———— Dismissal without trial on the merits—Hearing and determination of cause of action. A suit on the same cause of action and between the same parties, as a former suit which was summarily dismissed without being tried on its merits, is not one on a cause of action which has been heard and determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction in a former suit. *SHOKHBE BEWA v. MEHDEE MUNDUL* . . . 9 W. R. 327

2. ———— Decision without trial on merits—Former judgment on technical defect or irregularity. A former judgment which proceeded wholly upon a technical defect or irregularity in the proceedings, and not upon the merits of the case, is not a bar to a subsequent suit for the same cause of action. *RAM NATH ROY CHOWDHRY v. BHAGBUT MOHAPUTTAR* . . . 3 W. R. Act X, 140

3. ———— Case decided on technical ground. The cause of action between two parties cannot be said to be a *res judicata* if the first case was disposed of on appeal on a purely technical point, even though the suit was decided on its merits in the Court of first instance. *MOKOOND NARAIN DEO v. JONARDON DEY BURNICK* . . . 15 W. R. 208

4. ———— Suit dismissed as being premature—Suit for same subject subsequently brought. A suit dismissed as being prematurely brought is not a *res judicata* in a subsequent suit brought at the proper time. *ELAHEE BUKSH v. SHEO NARAIN SINGH* . . . 17 W. R. 360

5. ———— Previous suit dismissed as premature—Civil Procedure Code, s. 13—Omission to give notice under Transfer of Property Act, s. 132. A suit by the assignee of a mortgage bond against the mortgagor was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff was not entitled to sue for want of notice to the defendant under s. 132 of the Transfer of Property Act. The plaintiff then gave express notice of the assignment to the mortgagor, and sued on the bond again. Held, that the claim was not *res judicata*, and the second suit was accordingly not precluded by s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *RAMIREDDI v. SUBBAREDDI* . . . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 500

6. ———— Suit dismissed as not being proper remedy—Subsequent suit on same cause of action—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 2 and 7. The first defendant mortgaged certain lands to plaintiff by way of *zur-i-peshgi* lease, under which the latter entered into possession. The first defendant afterwards gave a *ticca* of the lands to the second defendant, who turned the plaintiff out of possession before the term of the *zur-i-peshgi*



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*4. JUDGMENTS ON PRELIMINARY POINTS  
—*contd.*

lease had expired. Plaintiff then sued the first and second defendants, basing his cause of action on the dispossession by the second defendant, and praying for the recovery of the mortgage-money by sale of the mortgaged property. The suit was dismissed, the Judge observing that plaintiff's proper remedy was to bring a suit for possession. Plaintiff then brought a subsequent suit for possession against the same parties and on the same cause of action. The defendants objected that the suit was barred under ss. 2 and 7, Act VIII of 1859, but the contention was overruled. **DEODHARI SINGH v. LALLA SEWSARUN LAL** . . . . . **3 C. L. R. 395**

7. ——— Suit struck off for default—*Beng. Reg. XXVI of 1814—Decision of suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 148.* Where a suit had been struck off the file on default under the old law, Regulation XXVI of 1814 ("kharij" being the word used), it was held that there was no "decision" such as is contemplated by s. 148 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1859. **GUNGA RAM v. KHEM NARAIN POOREE** . . . . . **11 W. R. 250**

8. ——— Dismissal of suit for default in appearance of parties—*Remanded case.* When a suit has been remanded by the Appellate Court and then dismissed by the Court of first instance for non-appearance of the parties, the plaintiff is not debarred thereby from bringing another suit upon the same cause of action against the same defendant. **RAGHUNATH SINGH v. RAM KUMAR MANDAL** . . . . . **5 B. L. R. Ap. 64: 14 W. R. 81**

9. ——— Dismissal of suit for default in appearance—*Suit for rent—Subsequent suit for possession—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 13.* In 1870 two plots of land numbered 155 and 147, belonging to the same owner, were sold in execution of a decree. The purchaser of plot 155 sold it to A, who in 1873 sued the tenant of a portion of the land for rent. In this suit A prayed that it might be declared that he was the owner. The tenant alleged that B, the purchaser of plot 147, was the owner of the land in respect of which rent was sought to be recovered, and B was made a party to the suit. At the hearing A did not appear, and the suit was dismissed for default. Subsequently A sold plot 155 to the present plaintiff, who now sued for possession. Held, that the suit was not barred as *res judicata*. **GOBIND CHUNDER ADDYA v. AFZUL RABBANI** . . . . . **I. L. R. 9 Calc. 426: 12 C. L. R. 29**

10. ——— Suit for share of joint family property. A, one of three members of an undivided Hindu family, mortgaged his share in the immoveable family property to B. The mortgage recited that the money was raised in order to enable A to sue his co-parceners for partition of the family property and possession of his share

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*4. JUDGMENTS ON PRELIMINARY POINTS  
—*contd.*

therein. A subsequently did bring a suit with that object against his co-parceners, but allowed it to be dismissed against him for default. B now brought a suit against A and his co-parceners for possession of A's share in such family property. Held, that, as it was not made out that A in bringing his suit had acted as the agent of B and at B's request, B's suit was not barred by the dismissal of B's suit. **KRISHNAJI LAKSHMAN RAJVADE v. SITARAM MURARRAV JAKHI** . . . . . **I. L. R. 5 Bom. 496**

11. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 2 and 170—*Hindu widow—Reversioner.* A, a Hindu widow, brought a suit to recover possession of her husband's share of certain joint property. After partially examining some other witnesses, she cited the defendant as a witness, and, on his failure to attend, her suit was dismissed. After the death of the widow, her daughter sued the same defendant on behalf of her two minor sons, as being entitled in reversion to their grandfather's share, to recover the share which was the subject of the former suit: the defendant was summoned as a witness, but failed to attend. Held, that the suit was not barred under s. 2, Act VIII of 1859, as being *res judicata*, until it was shown that the former decree had been obtained after a fair trial of the right, so as to bind not only the widow, but the reversioners. The defendant having failed to attend and give evidence on this point, the Court was justified in giving the plaintiff a decree under s. 170, Act VIII of 1859. **BRAMMOYE DASSEE v. KRISTO MOHTUN MOOKERJEE** . . . . . **I. L. R. 2 Calc. 222**

12. ——— Rejection of plaint for non-appearance of plaintiff—*Possessory suit in Mamlatdar's Court and in Civil Court—Bom. Act III of 1876, s. 13—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 9—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 13.* A plaintiff, whose plaint has been rejected for default of appearance in the Mamlatdar's Court under Bombay Act III of 1876, s. 13, cannot bring another possessory suit on the same cause of action in the Civil Court under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act I of 1877; for the rejection of a plaint under s. 13 of Bombay Act III of 1876, by reason of the failure of the plaintiff to attend with his proofs on the day appointed, is a hearing and final decision of the suit within the meaning of s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act X of 1877), and upon the rejection of the plaint the question in the suit becomes *res judicata*. **RAMCHANDRA v. BHIKIBAI** . . . . . **I. L. R. 6 Bom. 477**

See **RAMCHANDRA BALAJI PHADMI v. NARSINHA-CHARYA NEDUNATH ACHARYA KATTI** . . . . . **I. L. R. 24 Bcm. 251**

where the above decision was dissented from.

13. ——— Dismissal of suit for default—*Difference in cause of action—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 13, 102, 103.* The dismissal of



**RES JUDICATA—contd.****4. JUDGMENTS ON PRELIMINARY POINTS—contd.**

a suit in terms of s. 102, Civil Procedure Code, is not intended to operate in favour of the defendant as *res judicata*. When read with s. 103, it precludes a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action, referring, irrespectively of the defence or the relief prayed, entirely to the grounds, or alleged media, on which the plaintiff asks the Court to decide in his favour. Brother's sons, as nearest agnates of a deceased proprietor, sued for a decree, declaring that a gift, before then made by the widow in favour of her daughter's son, of the estate of her late husband, would not operate against their right of succession on her death. A prior suit before the date of the gift, brought by two of the plaintiffs for a declaratory decree, and an injunction restraining the widow from alienating the same estate had been dismissed under the provisions of ss. 102 and 103, Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877). *Held*, that the causes of action in the two suits were not identical, and the fresh suit was not precluded by s. 103, the gift having afforded the new ground of claim which also had subsequently arisen. **CHAND KOUR v. PARTAB SINGH**

**I. L. R. 16 Calc. 98**  
**L. R. 15 I. A. 156**

**14. ———— Order of Mamlatdar dismissing suit—Mamlatdar's Courts Act (Bom. Act III of 1876), s. 13—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 28, and Sch. II, Art. 47.** In 1891 the plaintiff brought this suit to eject the defendant from certain land. In 1883 the defendant's predecessor and vendor *S* had sued the plaintiff's tenant *A* in the Mamlatdar's Court, alleging that *A* had disturbed his possession by putting sweepings upon the land and asking to be protected in his enjoyment. He did not appear on the day fixed for hearing, and his suit was dismissed under s. 13 of Bombay Act III of 1876. He did not file a suit to set aside this order of dismissal. It was contended in the present suit now brought by the plaintiff that after three years, by the combined operation of art. 47 and s. 28 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877), the defendant's vendor *S* had lost his title to the land which thus became vested in the plaintiff. *Held*, that except as evidence of the plaintiff's title to the land, the proceedings in the Mamlatdar's Court in 1883 and his decree did not affect the present suit in ejectment. As such evidence they were before the lower Court. **Ramchandra v. Bhikabai. I. L. R. 6 Bom. 447, referred to. RAJARAM v. GANESH HARI KARKHANIS**

**I. L. R. 21 Bom. 91**

**15. ———— Dismissal of first application for non-appearance and want of prosecution.** Where, on an application being made for execution of a conditional decree, the judgment-debtor did not appear to oppose the decree-holder's application for attachment and sale, but the application was dismissed for default of prosecution:—*Held*, on a subsequent application for execution, that as the question whether the conditional decree was capable of execution before

**RES JUDICATA—contd.****4. JUDGMENTS ON PRELIMINARY POINTS—contd.**

it was made absolute was never before in issue, and was not judicially treated on the occasion of the former application, there was no *res judicata* on the point. **RAM LAL v. NARAIN**

**I. L. R. 12 All. 539**

**16. ———— Refusal of execution where opportunity to obey the decree had not been afforded by the decree-holders—Execution under s. 260, Civil Procedure Code, 1882—Effect of such refusal—Subsequent order for execution.** An order of a Court dismissed a petition for execution under s. 260 of the Civil Procedure Code, because the petitioning decree-holders had not then afforded to the judgment-debtor an opportunity of obeying the decree, which directed him to do specific acts. *Held*, that another application made after such opportunity had been afforded to him, was not barred as having been matter of prior adjudication within s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. **KISHORE BUN MOHUNT v. DWARKANATH ADHIKARI**

**I. L. R. 21 Calc. 784**  
**L. R. 21 I. A. 89**

**17. ———— Suit struck off for absence of defendant in jail on criminal charge—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 97.** A suit struck off by reason of the defendant being then in jail on a criminal charge cannot be set up as *res judicata* in a subsequent suit, there having been no determination in favour of one party or the other, nor can it be treated as a case of withdrawal under s. 97, Act VIII of 1859. **LUCKHEE RAM DOSS v. JOY SUNKUR GOOHO**

**7 W. R. 236**

**18. ———— Dismissal for undervaluation.** A suit was brought in the Civil Court of a Munsif, who gave judgment for the plaintiffs, but his decree was reversed by the District Judge, on the ground that the claim was improperly valued. A second suit, on the same cause of action, was then brought in the Court of the Munsif, who again decided for the plaintiffs; but his decree was reversed by the District Judge, on the ground that the suit was prohibited by Bombay Regulation II of 1827, s. 21. The High Court, on special appeal, reversed that decision, and remanded the suit, and the District Judge then threw out the claim, under s. 2 of Act VIII of 1859, on the ground that the cause of action had already been heard and determined. In a second special appeal against this decision:—*Held*, that the plaintiffs were not precluded from presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action, and that the case came within the spirit of s. 36 of Act VIII of 1859, as, there being no express power given by the Code to reject a plaint after it had been registered by reason of the claim being improperly valued, the doing so ought to have only the same effect as if the plaint has been originally rejected. **DULLABH JOGI v. NARAYAN LAKHU**

**4 Bom. A. C. 110**

**19. ———— Dismissal of suit—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 13, 373—Decree containing clause**



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*4. JUDGMENTS ON PRELIMINARY POINTS  
—*contd.*

stating that a fresh suit might be instituted as to a part of the subject-matter. A suit for possession of immoveable property was wholly dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff had not made out his title to the whole of the property claimed, though he had proved title to a one-third share of such property. The decree included an order in these terms: "This order will not prevent the plaintiff from instituting a suit for possession of the one-third interest of Musammatt Lachminia in the fields specified in the deed of sale," upon which the suit was based. No appeal was preferred from this decree. Subsequently the plaintiff brought another suit upon the same title to recover possession of the one-third share referred to in the order just quoted. *Held*, by the Full Bench, that the Court in the former suit had no power to include in its decree of dismissal any such reservation or order; that the fact that the decree was not appealed against did not give the order contained in it, which was an absolute nullity, any effect; that as in the former suit the plaintiff could have obtained a decree for the one-third share now claimed, and the whole of the claim in that suit was dismissed, the decree in that suit was a decision within s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code; and the present suit was consequently barred as *res judicata*. *Kudrat v. Dinu*, I. L. R. 9 All. 155; *Ganesh Rai v. Kalka Prasad*, I. L. R. 5 All. 595; *Salig Ram Pathak v. Pirbhawan Pathak*, All. Weekly Notes, (1885), 171; and *Muhammad Selim v. Nabain Bibi*, I. L. R. 8 All. 282, explained *SUKH LAL v. BHIKHI*  
I. L. R. 11 All. 187

20. — Dismissal of suit for want of jurisdiction—*Suit for ejectment—Subsequent suit for damages*. The dismissal, on the ground of want of jurisdiction, by the Civil Court of a suit to eject the defendants from the fishing ground of the plaintiffs, situate below low-water mark, does not operate as a bar to a subsequent suit by the plaintiffs to recover damages from the defendants for fixing their fishing stakes and nets too near to those of the plaintiffs. *BABAN MYACHA v. NAGU SHRAVUCHA*  
I. L. R. 2 Bom. 19

21. — Suit on a mortgage against several defendants—*Dismissal of suit as against some of the defendants for want of jurisdiction—Subsequent suit on the mortgage against same defendants in another Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 13, 43*. The plaintiff brought a suit in the High Court of Bombay (No. 169 of 1887) against three defendants on a mortgage executed at Surat of certain property situated there. The second and third defendants in that suit (the defendants in the present suit) who were inhabitants of Surat, pleaded that as against them the Court had no jurisdiction. The suit was accordingly dismissed as against them for want of jurisdiction, but as against the first

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*4. JUDGMENTS ON PRELIMINARY POINTS  
—*contd.*

defendant, who resided in Bombay, the Court passed a decree for the plaintiff. The plaintiff then brought the present suit against the defendants in the Surat Court to enforce their liability under the mortgage. The defendants pleaded that the claim against them was barred by the dismissal of the former suit. *Held*, that the suit was not barred. In the former suit there had been as against these defendants no decision on the merits, and the proceedings against them were a nullity. *BHUKANDAS VIJBHUKANDAS v. LALLUBHAI KASHIDAS*  
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 562

22. — Omission to get Collector's certificate—*Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 13*. The plaintiff brought in 1876 a suit against the defendant in respect of the same subject-matter and founded on the same cause of action as the present suit. Issues of fact arising on the merits were inquired into; but a certificate of the Collector under s. 6 of the Pensions Act (XXIII of 1871), which was necessary to give jurisdiction to the Court, not having been obtained, the claim was rejected on that ground. *Held*, that the Court not having legally pronounced on the merits of the former case, the opinions expressed on the issues were not *res judicata* so as to bar the maintenance of the present suit. *PUTALI MEHETI v. TULJA*  
I. L. R. 3 Bom. 223

23. — Dismissal of suit for want of heirship certificate—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 13 and 158*. In a suit to recover principal and interest due on a bond executed by the defendants in favour of the plaintiff's father (deceased), it appeared that the plaintiff had previously brought a similar suit which was dismissed for the reason that the plaintiff produced no succession certificate. *Held*, that the previous proceedings did not bar the present suit. *Putali Meheti v. Tulja*, I. L. R. 3 Bom. 223, referred to. *PETHAPERUMAL CHETTI v. MURUGANDI SERVAI-GARAN*  
I. L. R. 18 Mad. 466

24. — Rejection of claim to attached property as too late—*Subsequent claim*. The rejection of a claim to attached property, simply on the ground that it had been presented too late, was held to be no legal bar to the adjudication of the claim when it was again advanced after attachment made under decree. A claim of this kind may be admitted even after proclamation of sale, provided it has not been designedly and unnecessarily to obstruct the ends of justice. *MAHOMED MUBSON v. SUMPUTTEE SAHOON CHOWDHRAIN*  
10 W. R. 305

25. — Dismissal of suit as barred by limitation—*Suit against Municipal Commissioners for possession of land*. Previous to the institution of the present suit, one of the shareholders of a piece of land brought a suit against the Chairman of the Municipality for recovery of possession of his share. The other shareholders



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*4. JUDGMENTS ON PRELIMINARY POINTS  
—*contd.*

were made *pro forma* defendants in the suit. This suit was dismissed as barred by the law of limitation. After the dismissal of the suit, the plaintiff brought the present suit for recovery of his share of the land, on the allegation that his tenant had relinquished the land within three months, in consequence of his having been dispossessed by the Municipal Commissioners. *Held*, that the suit was not barred by s. 2, Act VIII of 1859. PRICE *v.* KHILAT CHUNDR A GHOSE

5 B. L. R. Ap. 50 : 13 W. R. 461

26. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), s. 2—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 13.* The plaintiff sued for a declaration of mirasi mokurari rights to certain lands and for mesne profits, alleging that he had been wrongfully ejected by the predecessors in title of the defendants. A previous suit on the same cause of action had been heard and dismissed on the ground of limitation. *Held*, that the present suit was not barred (as *res judicata*) under s. 2 of Act VIII of 1859 (corresponding with Act X of 1877, s. 13), inasmuch as, the first suit having been brought after the period allowed by law, the Court in which it was instituted was not competent to hear and determine it. BRINDABUN CHUNDER SIRCAR *v.* DHUNUNJOY NUSHKUR

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 246 : 4 C. L. R. 443

27. ———— *Dismissal of suit for multifariousness—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2.* The dismissal of a suit for multifariousness is not a hearing and determination of the suit within the meaning of s. 2, Act VIII of 1859. FATTEH SINGH *v.* LACHMI KOOR

13 B. L. R. Ap. 37 : 21 W. R. 105

TRILUCHUN CHUTTOPADHYA *v.* "NOBO KISHORE GHUTTUCK . . . . . 2 C. L. R. 10

28. ———— *Dismissal of suit for non-joinder of parties.* The dismissal of a suit because it is considered that all the proper parties have not been joined in it, though a decision of the suit, is not a decision on the merits within the meaning of Act VIII of 1859, s. 2. PURSUN GOPAL PAUL CHOWDHRY *v.* POORNANUND MULLICK

21 W. R. 272

29. ———— *Dismissal of suit on failure of plaintiff to pay summons costs—Suit subsequently brought for same property.* In June 1878 the plaintiffs brought a suit to establish their title to the property attached, and for confirmation of possession. Pending this suit, the principal defendant died, and the plaintiffs applied for an order to substitute certain persons as defendants. The Court thereupon directed the issue of a summons on the defendants proposed by the plaintiffs to appear and defend the suit, but the plaintiffs failing to pay the costs of the service of this summons, the suit was dismissed on the 14th March 1879. On the 4th March 1880 the plaintiffs again brought a suit to establish

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—*contd.*

their title to the same property and for confirmation of possession. *Held*, that, as the first suit had not been dismissed upon the merits, the plaintiffs were entitled to maintain the second suit. BESSESSUR BHUGUT *v.* MURLI SAHU

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 163 : 11 C. L. R. 409

30. ———— *Dismissal for non-payment of Court-fees.* The dismissal of a suit for non-payment of Court-fees is no bar to a subsequent suit in which the relief sought is substantially the same. NAGATHAL *v.* PONNUSAMI

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 44

31. ———— *Dismissal for default in payment of Commissioner's fee—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 13, 102, 158.* A suit for land was dismissed in 1886 on the plaintiff's failure to comply with an order to pay a fee for the appointment of a Commissioner to value the land. No issues were framed in the suit, and the order directing payment of the fee prescribed no time within which it was to be made. The plaintiff now sued the defendants again for the same land. *Held*, that the claim was not *res judicata*. SHAIK SAHEB *v.* MAHOMED

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 510

32. ———— *Dismissal of suit on default of plaintiff to give security for costs—Defendant precluded from pleading matter which is res judicata—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 13, 381.* The plaintiff sued the defendants on a promissory note. The defendants filed a written statement, alleging that the note had been obtained by the plaintiff by fraud and false representation. Previously to the filing of the present suit by the plaintiff, the defendants had brought a suit against the plaintiff, in which they prayed that the said promissory note might be delivered up to be cancelled. Their plaint in that suit contained allegations of fraud and want of consideration identical with those contained in their written statement in the present suit. The plaintiffs in the former suit (the present defendants) having failed to give security for costs, the suit was dismissed under s. 381 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877). It was now contended that the defendants were estopped from pleading, as a defence to the present suit, the fraud and want of consideration which had been alleged by them as plaintiffs in the former suit which had been dismissed. *Held*, that the defence might be pleaded, and that the question of fraud and want of consideration was not *res judicata* within the meaning of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. The previous suit had been dismissed by reason of the plaintiffs' (the present defendants') failure to give security for costs; and a Court cannot be said to "hear and decide" a matter which it is relieved from hearing and deciding by the plaintiff's default. Under s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), a defendant may be precluded from pleading as a defence matter which is *res judicata*. *Quare* :



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Whether a plaintiff, whose suit has been dismissed under s. 381, can again litigate the subject-matter of the dismissed suit. *RUNGRAV RAVJI v. SIDHI MAHOMED EBRAHIM*

**I. L. R. 6 Bom. 482**

**33. — Dismissal of suit "in present form"**—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 13, expl. III.* K, the purchaser of certain immoveable property in execution of a decree, sued for possession of the same. The suit was dismissed "in the form in which it was brought" because the plaintiff had not filed with the sale-certificate. K subsequently brought a fresh suit. *Held*, that the dismissal of the former suit "in the form it was brought" did not amount to permission to sue again contemplated by s. 373 of the Civil Procedure Code, and such dismissal must be regarded as a "decision" thereof in the sense of s. 13, expl. III, and therefore as a bar to the fresh suit. *GANESH RAI v. KALKA PRASAD*

**I. L. R. 5 All. 595**

**34. — Suit dismissed "as brought"**—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 13.* In a suit in which the plaintiffs claimed exclusive possession and in the alternative joint possession of certain land, evidence was taken upon the issues raised; but the Court, without discussing the evidence, held that the alternative claims were "contradictory," and the plaintiffs' claim therefore "uncertain," and accordingly ordered "that the plaintiff's claim, as brought, be dismissed with costs." The plaintiffs did not appeal from this decision, but subsequently brought a suit against the same defendants, claiming joint possession of the same property. *Held*, that the suit was barred by s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court in the former suit not having reserved to the plaintiffs the right to bring a fresh action. *Ganesh v. Kalka Prasad, I. L. R. 5 All. 595; Muhammad Salim v. Nabian Bibi, I. L. R. 3 All. 282, and Watson v. Collector of Rajshahye, 13 Moo. I. A. 169, referred to by TYRRELL, J. KUDRAT v. DINU*

**I. L. R. 9 All. 155**

**35. — Dismissal of suit for misjoinder**—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 13—Dismissal of suit—Court Fees Act, s. 10, cl. (ii).* The purchaser of certain immoveable property in execution of a decree sued for possession of the same. The suit was dismissed "in its present form" (*bahaisiyat maujuda*) upon two grounds: first, with reference to s. 10 of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870) that the suit was undervalued and the plaintiff had failed to pay, within the time fixed, additional court-fees required by the Court; and, secondly, for misjoinder. The purchaser subsequently brought a second suit. *Held*, that the dismissal of the former suit was not, under the circumstances, a decision within the meaning of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code such as could bar the second suit by way of *res judicata*. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*—The object of s. 10 and indeed of the whole of the Court-Fees

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Act is to lay down rules for the collection of one form of taxation, and the rule that statutes which impose pecuniary burdens or encroach upon, or qualify the rights of, the subject must be strictly construed, applies with special force to such provisions of the Act as provide a penalty, whatever its nature may be. S. 10 is simply a penal clause to enforce the collection of the Court-fees, and dismissal of a suit under its provisions cannot operate as *res judicata*. Also *per MAHMOOD, J.*—The condition in s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, that the former suit must have been "heard and finally decided," means that a former judgment proceeding wholly on a technical defect or irregularity, and not upon the merits, is not a bar to a subsequent suit for the same cause of action. It is not every decree or judgment which will operate as *res judicata*, and every dismissal of a suit does not necessarily bar a fresh action. It is necessary also to show that there was a decision finally granting or withholding the relief sought. *Ramnath Roy Chowdhry v. Bhagbut Mohaputter, 3 W. R., Act X. 140; Shokhee Bewah v. Mehdee Mundul, 9 W. R. 327; Dullub Jogi v. Narayan Lakhu, 4 Bom. A. C. 110; Rungrav Ravji v. Sidhi Mahomed Ebrahim, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 482; Fatteh Singh v. Lachmi Koer, 13 B. L. R. Ap. 37; Roghoo-nath Mundul v. Jugut Bundhoo Bose, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 214; and Saikappa Chetti v. Kulandapuri Nachiyar, 3 Mad. 84, referred to.* Also *per MAHMOOD, J.*—The words *bahaisiyat maujuda* must be taken as amounting to a permission to the plaintiff to bring a fresh suit within the meaning of s. 373 of the Civil Procedure Code, and could only mean that the Judge using them in his decree had no intention to decide the case finally so as to bar the adjudication upon the merits of the rights of the parties in a future litigation between them. The procedure provided by Ch. XXII of the Code is not the only manner in which a plaintiff can come into Court for the second time to ask for adjudication upon the merits of his rights, which were not adjudicated upon on the former occasion owing to some technical defect which proved fatal to the former suit. *Ganesh Rai v. Kalka Prasad, I. L. R. 5 All. 595, dissented from. Watson v. Collector of Rajshahye, 13 Moo. I. A. 60, and Salig Ram v. Tibhawan, All. Weekly Notes (1885), 151, referred to. MUHAMMAD SALIM v. NABIAN BIBI*

**I. L. R. 8 All. 282**

**36. — Striking off case for discrepancy in statement**—*Variation in plaint and deposition of plaintiff.* A case struck off on the ground of discrepancy between the plaint and the plaintiff's deposition cannot operate as a *res judicata*. *GUNGA NARAIN DASS v. PUNCHANUNEE DASSEE*

**W. R. 1864, 163**

**37. — Dismissal of joint claim on ground that liability is several**—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2.* Where a suit against several defendants for a joint jumma is dismissed on the ground that the jumma is several, and not



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joint. the plaintiff is not precluded by Act VIII of 1859, s. 2, from afterwards suing each of them severally for the separate jumma. *TELOKDHAREE SAHOO v. BISSENDRO NARAIN SAHEE*

*Marsh. 418 : 2 Hay 528*

38. — Dismissal of suit for balance of account, no balance being proved. *A* and his brothers made consignments of indigo to *B*, who sued *A* for the balance of an account due to him in respect of advances made by him to *A* and his brothers, and that suit was dismissed on the ground that no balance was proved to be due. *Held*, that the dismissal of the former suit was not a bar to a subsequent suit by *A* to recover the proceeds of the indigo or his share of such proceeds. *PUNCHANUN ROY v. MODOOSOODUN ROY* . . . *W. R. 1864, 245*

39. — Dismissal of suit on deed of sale when found to be a mortgage only—*Refusal of leave to bring fresh suit*. The dismissal of a suit on the ground that a deed put in by the plaintiff was a mortgage, and not a deed of sale, does not preclude him from treating it as a mortgage in a subsequent suit, notwithstanding the former suit was dismissed after refusing plaintiff permission to withdraw it and bring a fresh suit. *RAMKRISTO SHAHA v. NEMY CHURN CHOLHAI*

*W. R. 1864, 110*

40. — Dismissal of suit on failure to produce evidence. Dismissal of a claim for failure on the part of the plaintiff to produce evidence to substantiate it is of the same effect as a dismissal founded upon evidence, for the purpose of barring a subsequent suit as *res judicata*. *RAMA RAO v. SURIYA RAO* . *I. L. R. 1 Mad. 84*

Reversed by Privy Council in *ZAMINDAR OF PITTAPURAM v. PROPRIETORS OF KOLANKA*

*I. L. R. 2 Mad. 23 : L. R. 5 I. A. 200*

41. — *Non-production of witnesses and insufficiency of proof*. In a suit for removal of an alleged nuisance, which was dismissed because plaintiff did not produce his witnesses and failed to prove his case, it was *held* that there had been an adjudication, and that another suit would not lie on the same cause of action. *SAHADEO PANDEY v. NOKHID PANDEY*

*15 W. R. 573*

*MOFIZOODDEEN v. AMOODDEEN* . *23 W. R. 58*

42. — Dismissal of suit on failure to prove same title to different property—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2*. A plaintiff's failure in a former suit to establish his claim with reference to a different property from which he was dispossessed on a different date cannot render a subsequent suit inadmissible under the provisions of s. 2, Act VIII of 1859, even though the title set forth in both the suits is identical. *BOOA RUSSOOLEE v. NAWAB NAZIM OF BENGAL*

*11 W. R. 382*

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—*contd.*

43. — Dismissal of suit for dissolution for want of proof of partnership—*Suit for money due for losses in partnership business*. In 1878 plaintiff sued the defendants for moneys due on 10th April 1878 on account of an alleged partnership entered into on 3rd July 1876 for the purchase and sale of salt. This suit was dismissed on the ground that no partnership was proved. In 1880 plaintiff sued defendants for money due on account of a partnership entered into on 12th July 1876 for the sale of salt, and continued down to the end of 1878. *Held*, that the plaintiff, having failed to prove in the former suit that any partnership existed between him and the defendants, was barred from bringing the present suit. *SAMARAPURI CHETTI v. SHANMUGA CHETTI* *I. L. R. 5 Mad. 47*

44. — Finality of order—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 244—Competency of Court*. *S S* brought a suit under a mortgage-bond, making *R S*, a subsequent incumbrancer, a defendant, and obtained a decree for a sale of the whole of the mortgaged premises. After the decree, a compromise was effected between all the parties with the exception of *R S* by the terms of which in consideration of the judgment-debtors (mortgagors) undertaking to do certain acts, *S S* promised to execute his decree against only a 3 annas 12 dams share of the mortgaged premises. The judgment-debtors (mortgagors) having failed to carry out the compromise, *S S* applied for a sale of the whole of the mortgaged premises, but on the petition of *R S* setting out the terms of the compromise to which he was no party, the Subordinate Judge, by an order of the 7th September 1885, held that under the agreement *S S* was entitled to sell only a 3 annas 12 dams share of the mortgaged premises, which was accordingly directed to be sold. That order was not appealed against, but subsequently in March 1886 *S S* made a fresh application for a sale of the remainder of the premises, *R S* objecting. *Held*, that the order of the 7th September was one which the Court was competent to make under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and, by reason of that order not being appealed from, it became final. *BASUDEO NARAIN SINGH v. SEOLOJY SINGH*

*I. L. R. 14 Calc. 640*

45. — Decree against mortgaged property—*Liability of judgment-debtor to arrest under such decree—Principles of res judicata applicable to execution proceedings*. A decree cannot be extended in execution beyond the real meaning of its terms. A decree obtained on a mortgage directed that the judgment-debtor should pay the sum adjudged out of the property mortgaged. After executing the decree against the mortgaged property, the decree-holder made an application for execution against the person of the judgment-debtor. A notice was issued calling upon him to show cause why execution should not be further proceeded with. But the notice did not give him any



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—*contd.*

intimation of the application for the arrest of his person. He did not appear, and, in his absence, an order was made for his personal arrest; but the order was not executed, as the decree-holder did not pay the process-fee. Subsequently a fresh application was made for execution against the person of the judgment-debtor. *Held*, that the question as to the personal liability of the judgment-debtor to satisfy the decree was not concluded by the order made in the previous execution-proceedings for execution to issue against his person. The order would have operated as a *res judicata* if the judgment-debtor had been called upon to contest the right claimed by the decree-holder to hold him personally liable under the decree, and had then failed in his contention to the contrary, or allowed the judgment to go by default. The order was *res judicata* as to the legal possibility of further execution in terms of the decree, but not as to the special construction which the judgment-creditor sought to impose on it. *BUDAN v. RAMCHANDRA BHUNJGAYA*. I. L. R. 11 Bom. 537

46. — Application for execution struck off in consequence of non-payment of talbana—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 158 and 647—Civil Procedure Amendment Act (VI of 1892), s. 4—Subsequent application for execution.* An application for execution of a decree by attachment of immoveable property having been presented by a decree-holder, the Court executing the decree ordered that the costs of such attachment should be deposited by the decree-holder on or before a certain specified date. The costs of attachment were not deposited by the day named in the order above referred to, and the Court thereupon passed the following order: "This case came on for hearing to-day: as the decree-holder has not deposited the costs of attachment, etc., therefore it is ordered that the case be struck off for default." *Held*, that, whether this second order was an order under s. 158 of the Code of Civil Procedure deciding the application for attachment, or whether its effect was merely to remove the application from the file of pending applications without deciding it, in either case no fresh application (being of a precisely similar nature) was entertainable, though in the latter case possibly the former application might be renewed. *PHEKU v. PIRTHI PAL SINGH*

I. L. R. 15 All. 49

47. — Striking off of execution proceedings. *Per* EDGE, C.J., TYRRELL, KNOX, BLAIR, BURKITT, and AIKMAN, JJ.—When an order is made striking an execution case off the file of pending cases, or dismissing it on grounds other than a distinct finding that the decree is incapable of execution, that the decree-holder's right to get the decree executed is barred by limitation, or by any other rule of law, or on some similar ground on which the application has clearly been dismissed on the merits, whether the word "dismissed" or the words "struck off the file" or any other similar

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words have been used in the order, the decree-holder is not barred by the force of any such order from presenting and prosecuting a fresh application for the execution of his decree. *DHONKAL SINGH v. PHAKKAR SINGH*. I. L. R. 15 All. 84

48. — Dismissal for default of application for execution of decree—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 158—Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act (VI of 1892), s. 4.* The dismissal of a petition for execution for default does not bar a fresh application, s. 158 of the Code of Civil Procedure being inapplicable, since by reason of s. 4 of Act VI of 1892 it does not apply to proceedings in execution. *Dhonkal Singh v. Phakkar Singh*, I. L. R. 15 All. 84; *Hajrat Akramnissa Begam v. Valiunnissa Begam*, I. L. R. 18 Bom. 429; and *Delhi and London Bank v. Orchard*, L. R. 4 I. A. 127, followed. *TIRTHASAMI v. ANNAPPAYYA*. I. L. R. 18 Mad. 131

## 5. ORDERS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE.

1. — Summary order in execution—*Subsequent suit.* A summary order rejecting plaintiff's claim in an execution case to the property in dispute, when it had been attached by a decree-holder, which order was not followed by the sale of the property attached, cannot in any manner affect a subsequent suit against parties other than the decree-holder brought for a different purpose and on a different cause of action. *BOOA RUSSOOLIE v. NAWAB NAZIM OF BENGAL*. 11 W. R. 382

2. — Order rejecting application for execution of decree on the ground of limitation—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2.* An order passed by a Court rejecting a *bona fide* application by a judgment-creditor for the execution of his decree, on the ground that the period allowed by law for execution had expired, *held* not to be an adjudication within the rule of *res judicata* or within s. 2, Act VIII of 1859. *DELHI AND LONDON BANK v. ORCHARD*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 47; L. R. 4 I. A. 127

3. — Order refusing to execute decree—*Adjudication.* An order refusing an application to execute a decree is not an adjudication within the rule of *res judicata*. *HURROSOONDARY DASSEE v. JUGOBUNDHOO DUTT*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 203; 7 C. L. R. 61

*JEETOSHUR DHURN DEB v. FOOSSEE SINGH*

1 Hay 515

4. — Orders as to construction of decree not appealed from—*Application for execution by defendant—Objection by plaintiff to continued execution on behalf of defendant.* Although a decree does not in terms give a certain relief, yet if it is construed in orders passed upon it as having given that relief, it is not competent to the Court on subsequent applications to treat those orders as erroneous and put another construction

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RE JUDICATA—*contd.*5. ORDERS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE  
—*contd.*

on the decree. VENKATANARASINHA NAIDU v. PAPAMMAH . . . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 54

5. ——— Application for execution of maintenance decree—*Previous application held to be barred by limitation.* On an application made in 1891 for the execution of a decree passed in 1870, it appeared that the decree directed the payment of maintenance to the plaintiff annually on a specified date, and the present application related to the period of three years from 1888 to 1891. There had been an application for execution in 1873. The next application was made in 1879, and it was dismissed as being barred by limitation. *Held*, that the question whether the application was barred by limitation was not *res judicata*. KUPPU AMMAL v. SAMINATHA AYYAR . . . I. L. R. 18 Mad. 482

6. ——— Order refusing to execute decree—*Attachment without sale—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 67.* The plaintiff, a judgment-creditor, had in the High Court obtained a decree against the defendant, whereby it was ordered that the defendant should pay to the plaintiff a sum of R1,68,123, and that the said sum should be a charge on certain immoveable properties situated in the mofussil and specified in a schedule to the decree. In August 1894 the plaintiff obtained an order for transfer of the decree to a mofussil Court and sent a copy of the decree for execution there. He obtained in that Court an order for attachment and sale of the property, but that order was reversed on appeal in May 1895, the High Court holding that the properties could not be sold in execution of the decree, but that a separate suit must be brought under s. 67 of the Transfer of Property Act. The plaintiff then applied to the Court that passed the decree for an order for transmission of the decree to the mofussil Court with a view to execution. That application was refused by SALE, J., who held that the decision of May 1895 was conclusive as to the plaintiff's right to attach the property as distinct from a sale or to sell it except after a suit under s. 67 of the Transfer of Property Act. *Held*, on appeal (reversing the decision of SALE, J.), that the application was not *res judicata*. GOURI SUNKER PANDAY v. ABHOYSESWARI DABEE . . . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 262

7. ——— Order refusing to award mesne profits under decree—*Proceedings in execution.* *Held*, by the Full Bench, that the law of *res judicata* does not apply in proceedings in execution of decree. *Held*, therefore, by the referring Bench, where on an application for the execution of a decree the question was raised whether the decree awarded mesne profits or not, and the Court executing it determined that it did not award mesne profits, that such determination was not final, but such question was open to re-adjudication on a subsequent application for execution of the decree. RUP KUARI v. RAM KIRPAL SHUKUL . . . I. L. R. 3 All. 141

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*5. ORDERS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE  
—*contd.*

8. ——— Refusal to execute decree—*Re-opening questions by successor to judge who decided them.* On an application being made for the execution of a decree, the judgment-debtor made three objections to its execution. The first of these objections the Court executing the decree, the Subordinate Judge allowed, and refused to execute the decree. On appeal by the decree-holder, the District Judge disallowed all three such objections, holding that the decree should be executed, and remanded the case for that purpose. When the case came back to the Subordinate Judge, the judgment-debtor again raised the second and third of such objections, but the Subordinate Judge refused to entertain them, on the ground that they had already been determined by such District Judge. On appeal by the judgment-debtor, the successor of such District Judge ordered the Subordinate Judge to determine all three such objections. *Held*, that such succeeding Judge could not re-open such questions, his predecessor having already finally determined them, and his predecessor's order, so far as such application for execution of the decree was concerned, was final. BALLABH SHANKAR v. NARAIN SINGH . . . I. L. R. 3 Ail. 173

9. ——— Refusal to execute decree as being barred—*Application for execution of decree subsequently made.* When a Court, upon an application for execution, has decided that the execution is barred by limitation, and that order has become final in consequence of no appeal having been preferred therefrom, such order will, upon a subsequent application for execution of the same decree, operate as a bar to execution. BANDEY KARIM v. ROMESH CHUNDRABUNDOPADHYA . . . I. L. R. 9 Calc. 65 : 11 C. L. R. 145

See MUNGUL PERSAD DICHIT v. GRIJA KANT LAHIRI . . . I. L. R. 8 Calc. 51  
L. R. 8 I. A. 123 : 11 C. L. R. 113

10. ——— Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 13 (Act VIII of 1859), s. 2. The decision, by a competent Court, that an application for the execution of a decree is barred by limitation, has the effect of *res judicata*; and although such decision may be erroneous, yet so long as it remains unreversed in appeal it is valid and binding, and the question cannot be re-opened. A decision that an application for execution is not time-barred has a similar effect. On the 15th April 1868 the plaintiff applied for the execution of a decree held by him against the defendant, and certain houses were thereupon attached. In April 1869 the attachment was raised on the intervention of a third person. The plaintiff then brought a suit to establish his right to attach the houses, and obtained a decree on the 28th February 1871. An appeal was made, and the suit was finally decided in the plaintiff's favour in April 1873. After the plaintiff had obtained his original decree, and while the appeal was pending, he applied for the sale of the houses in execution on the 30th November 1871,



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*5. ORDERS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE  
—*contd.*

and subsequently made three other applications within three years of each other, the last of which was dated the 30th October 1876. The Court rejected this last application on the 28th November 1876, on the ground that the execution of the decree was barred, as more than three years had elapsed between the first and second applications (i.e., the applications of the 15th April 1868 and 30th November 1871). The plaintiff appealed against the order, but his appeal was rejected because he had failed to produce with it a copy of the order appealed against. The plaintiff took no further steps in that proceeding, but made a fresh application for execution on the 10th August 1878. The Subordinate Judge rejected it, on the ground that the execution was barred, the matter being *res judicata*. On appeal the District Judge reversed that order and allowed execution. On appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, on the authority of *Mungal Pershad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 8 Cal. 51, that the rule of *res judicata* applied, and that the application of the 30th November 1871 was time-barred, and, *a fortiori*, every subsequent application was barred. *Semble*: A proceeding in execution is a proceeding which terminates in a decree as defined by s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), and is therefore a suit within the meaning of the Code. *MANJUNATH BADRABHAT v. VENKATESH GOVIND SHANBHOG*

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 54

11. ——— Order construing decree—*Order as to possession and mesne profits—Subsequent suit for possession.* Certain lands having been divided under a batwara between A and B, who together took one portion, and C, who took the remainder, A in 1847 mortgaged his share to B under a usufructuary mortgage. In 1851 a dispute arose as to the boundaries under the batwara, and ended in C surrendering 51½ bighas, which B was allowed to take possession of under an ikrarnamah executed by A to secure the costs incurred by B in the dispute. In 1874 A sued to recover possession of a moiety of the lands held jointly by him with B, and in 1875 obtained a decree for possession and wasilat, no specific mention of the 51½ bighas being made in the decree. In execution of the decree, wasilat in respect of a moiety of the 51½ bighas was allowed an objection by the defendant to such wasilat being charged having been overruled. In 1878 B sued to recover possession of the moiety of the 51½ bighas which had been taken by A under his decree. *Held*, that, in rejecting the objection raised by B and allowing wasilat in respect of the 51½ bighas, the Court had interpreted the decree passed and declared that under it possession of a moiety of the 51½ bighas had been decreed and given to A, and that the suit instituted in 1878 was therefore barred. *Held*, also, that this matter, having been decided under s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861, between the parties in execution of a decree, could not be made the subject of a suit. *KALI MUNDUL v. KADER NATH CHUCKERBUTTY*

6 C. L. R. 215

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*5. ORDERS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE  
—*contd.*

12. ——— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 230—Limitation—Vatandars (Bombay) Act, III of 1874, s. 10—Collector's certificate.* A decree of a District Court, dated 5th October 1863, declared the plaintiff to be a hereditary deputy vatandar of a certain deshpande vatan vested in the ancestors of the defendant as hereditary vatandars, and that the plaintiff, as such deputy, was entitled to receive a certain sum annually out of the income of the vatan. The decree did not explicitly deal with the claim to future payments then set up by the plaintiff as hereditary deputy vatandar. The plaintiff received moneys from time to time under the decree until 1875, but he neglected to have himself registered as a representative vatandar under Bombay Act III of 1874, s. 56. In 1875 he made a claim for certain arrears of the allowance which he alleged to be due under the decree, and he attached certain moneys out of the income of the defendant's vatan. The Collector issued a certificate under s. 10 of the Vatandars Act (III of 1874) for the removal of the attachment and the attachment was accordingly removed by the Subordinate Judge. The plaintiff appealed from the order of removal, but the Appellate Court confirmed that order. On second appeal to the High Court, it was held on 23rd June 1879 that the lower Courts were right in raising the attachment; that the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction to register the plaintiff as a representative vatandar, and that the Collector was the proper authority to be referred to. Thereupon the plaintiff applied to the Collector to cancel the certificate which had removed the attachment, and to register him as a representative vatandar. The Collector rejected the plaintiff's application on 31st March 1881. In 1881 the plaintiff presented a fresh darkhast to attach the same vatan property in virtue of the said decree of 1863, but the application was rejected as *res judicata* by both the lower Courts. They held that the certificate of the Collector, which remained uncanceled, operated as a bar. On second appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, reversing the order of the lower Courts, that the decree was one capable of execution. *Held*, as regards the Collector's certificate, that under s. 10 of the Vatandars Act (Bombay), III of 1874, the certificate was exhausted in operating on the execution which it stopped, and that the lower Court ought to have dealt with the case apart from that certificate. *GOPAL HANMANT DESHKA v. KONDO KASHINATH*

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 328

13. ——— Withdrawal of application for execution—*Effect of such withdrawal.* Orders in execution-proceedings, if not appealed from, are binding on the parties to the suit in all subsequent proceedings in that suit, on principles analogous to those of *res judicata* strictly so called. It is therefore necessary to constitute a bar that there should be a hearing and final decision. Where an application for execution is allowed to be withdrawn, the matters in dispute are not heard and

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RES JUDICATA—*contd.*5. ORDERS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE  
—*contd.*

decided. There is therefore no *res judicata*. **HARI GANESH v. YAMUNABAI**. I. L. R. 23 Bom. 35

14. — Principle of *res judicata* as applied to execution-proceedings—*Civil Procedure Code*, s. 373. Where a judgment-debtor, being entitled and having an opportunity to plead s. 373 of the Code of Civil Procedure as a bar to execution of the decree against him, neglects to do so, and the application in respect of which such objection might have been taken is entertained by the Court and orders passed thereupon, the principle of *res judicata* will apply to such proceedings, and the judgment-debtor cannot at a subsequent stage of the same execution proceedings object that such previous application for execution ought, in fact, to have been held to be barred by the operation of s. 373 above mentioned. **SHER SINGH v. DAYA RAM**. I. L. R. 13 All. 564

See **KISHAN SAHAI v. ALADAD KHAN**.  
I. L. R. 14 All. 64

15. — Orders disallowing objection to party representative—*Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 13 and 244. *G* brought a suit against *I* for the establishment of her rights as purchaser of certain immoveable properties sold in execution of a decree obtained against *I* and for possession of the same. After the settlement of issues, but before the suit was finally disposed of, *I* died, and his brother *J* was made defendant as his legal representative. *J* consented to the suit being tried on the defence raised by *I* and upon the issues already settled. The suit was decreed, it being held that *G* was the purchaser. In execution of this decree, in which *G* sought to obtain possession, *J* objected that he was entitled to a half share of some and to the entire sixteen annas of the other properties, and that his brother *I* had no right whatever in the same. This objection was disallowed by the Court executing the decree on the ground that it had not been raised in the original suit, and that, as the decree had been passed in the presence of the party then objecting, he was not entitled to urge it. Thereupon *J* brought a suit against *G* to establish his rights. The defence was that the order passed in the execution-proceedings, disallowing the plaintiff's objection, was a bar to the suit under s. 13 and s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. Held, that the order disallowing the plaintiff's objection did not operate as *res judicata* under s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. *The Delhi and London Bank v. Orchard*, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 47; I. L. R. 4 I. A. 127, relied on. Held, also, that this order was no bar to the suit under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Kanai Lal Khan v. Shashi Bhusun Biswas*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 777; 8 C. L. R. 117, followed. **GOURMANI DABEE v. JUGUT CHANDRA AUDHIKARI**

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 57

16. — Order in execution-proceedings that deed was valid—*Sale of two plots of land by one sale-deed—Validity of deed questioned in dispute as to one of the plots—Subsequent*

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*5. ORDERS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE  
—*contd.*

*dispute as to second plot included in deed—Question of validity of deed again raised—Orders in execution-proceedings how far final—Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 13 and 283. The plaintiff purchased two distinct plots of land (A and B) from one *G* by a deed of sale dated 30th September 1875. In 1884, in execution of a decree against *G*, plot A was attached and sold as his property and purchased by the defendant. The plaintiff did not intervene, and at that time took no steps to establish his alleged right to this land. In 1885 the defendant obtained another decree against *G*, and in execution, attached plot B. The plaintiff intervened, and claimed the property attached as his own under the sale-deed of 30th December 1875. The defendant disputed the sale, but the Court found in favour of the validity of the sale-deed and allowed the plaintiff's claim. The defendant did not file a suit to set aside this order. The plaintiff then filed a suit to establish his title to plot A, relying on his sale-deed of the 30th December 1875. The defendant again disputed the sale, pleading that it was a colourable and fictitious transaction. Held, that the order in the execution-proceeding did not operate as *res judicata*, and did not estop the defendant from contesting the validity of the sale-deed in the present suit. *Per JARDINE, J.*—If the decision as to the validity of the deed had been a final decision in a suit as distinguished from an execution-proceeding, it would have created an estoppel by *res judicata*. Between the parties the orders to which s. 283 of the Civil Procedure Code refers are subject to the result of a suit, if any, conclusive, but this conclusiveness exists only as regards the particular property in dispute. **DINKAR BALLAL CHAKRADEV v. HARI SHIRDHAR APTE**

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 206

17. — Application for two reliefs—*Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13, Expl. III—*Application in execution for two reliefs—Order passed granting one relief and making no reference to the other—Subsequent application for the other relief; power of Court to grant.* A decree awarded a plaintiff possession of land, together with mesne profits. Plaintiff subsequently applied, in execution, for delivery of the land and for the mesne profits. The Court passed an order on this application, directing plaintiff to be put into possession of the land, but making no reference whatever to the mesne profits. Plaintiff subsequently made another application for mesne profits, when it was contended that, inasmuch as the prayer for mesne profits had not been granted when the previous application was dealt with, it must be taken that the application for mesne profits had been refused, and that the matter was consequently *res judicata*. Held, that the application was not barred, and that the law of *res judicata*, as laid down in Expl. III to s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure had no application to the case. **NITYANANDA GANTAYET v. GAJAPATI VASUDEVA DEVU** (1901)

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 681



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*5. ORDERS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE  
—*contd.*

18. ———— *Limitation—Order in execution of decree—Limitation—Previous application for execution refused, and judgment-debtor's objection as to limitation disallowed—Effect of such an order in a subsequent application for execution.* On an application for execution, an order for attachment having been issued, the judgment-debtor objected to the execution on the ground that it was barred by limitation. After several adjournments, granted at the instance of the decree-holder, neither party having appeared at the date of hearing the Court by its order refused the application for execution and disallowed the objection of the judgment-debtor. On a subsequent application by the decree-holder, the judgment-debtor again objected to the execution on the ground that, inasmuch as the previous application was barred by limitation, the subsequent application was also barred. *Held*, that the judgment-debtor was not precluded from raising the objection that the previous application was barred by limitation. *Mungul Pershad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 51, distinguished. *BHOLANATH DASS v. PRAFULLA NATH KUNDU CHOWDHRY* (1900)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 122; s.c. 5 C. W. N. 80

19. ———— Although the execution of a decree may have been actually barred by time at the date of an application made for its execution, yet, if an order for execution is made by a competent Court having jurisdiction to try whether such execution is barred by time or not such order, although erroneous, must, if unreversed, be treated as valid. An application for execution of a decree was struck off on the 15th of January 1894. The next application for execution was not made until the 29th of May 1897. Notice of this application was served on the judgment-debtors and they filed objections, but on the day fixed for hearing failed to support them, and they were dismissed. The application for execution was, however, ultimately struck off by reason of the non-payment of process fees, by the decree-holders. *Held*, that it was not open to the judgment-debtors, on a subsequent application for execution being made, to plead limitation in respect to the application of the 29th May 1897, as a bar to the execution of the decree. *Mungul Pershad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri Chowdhry*, L. R. 8 I. A. 123; *Behari Lal v. Abdul Majid*, All. Weekly Notes (1897) 29; *Lakshmanan Chetti v. Kuttayan Chetti*, I. L. R. 24 Mad. 669; *Bholanath Dass v. Prafulla Nath Kundu Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 122; and *Dhonkal Singh v. Phakkar Singh*, I. L. R. 15 All. 84, referred to. *Tilashar Rai v. Parbati*, I. L. R. 15 All. 198, and *Onkar Singh v. Mohan Kuar*, All. Weekly Notes (1898), 96, distinguished. *SHEORAJ SINGH v. KAMESHAR NATH* (1902). I. L. R. 24 All. 282

20. ———— *Order permitting withdrawal of execution upon condition—Civil Procedure Code, s. 13—Execution proceeding—Condition illegal and not bearing on any issue raised be-*

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*5. ORDERS IN EXECUTION OF DECREE  
—*contd.*

*between parties—Subsequent application for execution—Right of decree-holder to disregard condition.* Where a decree-holder having put up certain properties of the judgment-debtor to sale in execution of his decree, bid R600 for it, but failed to deposit the earnest-money and then applied to withdraw the execution; and the Court being of opinion that this was a dodge to avoid paying the earnest-money, allowed the application, but subject to the condition that the same properties should be put up for sale first at the next application for execution and the decree-holder must bid R600 for it:—*Held*, that the Court had no power to make such an order and it was not binding on the decree-holder so as to preclude him from proceeding to execute the decree against the other properties of the judgment-debtor. The order did not operate as *res judicata*. *Mungul Prosad Dichit v. Grija Kant Lahiri*, L. R. 8 I. A. 123; I. L. R. 8 Calc. 51, distinguished. *JNANADA SUNDARI CHOWDHURANI v. NOKULESSWAR ROY CHOWDHURY* (1906) 11 C. W. N. 236

## 6. CAUSES OF ACTION.

1. ———— *Nature of cause of action—Obligation to disclose title.* A plaintiff's cause of action is a very different thing from his title; the one being something done contrary to his interest, which obliges him to seek the aid of a Court of Justice, the other being the proof that that something affords him a valid ground for relief. *DUDSAR BIREE v. SHAKIR BURKUNDAZ* 15 W. R. 168

2. ———— *Identity of bases of claim—Dismissal of claim on failure to produce evidence.* Where the relief sought for in respect of certain property in a suit is different from the relief sought for in respect of the same property in a prior suit (between the same parties or their privies), but the title on which the relief sought for is based is the same in both suits, the dismissal of the former suit for failure to establish such title is a bar to the second suit. *RAM RAO v. SURYA RAO*

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 84

s.c. on appeal to Privy Council, *ZAMINDAR OF PATTAPURAM v. PROPRIETORS OF KOLANEA*

I. L. R. 2 Mad. 23; L. R. 5 I. A. 200

3. ———— *Difference in rights on which claim is made—Omission to assert every title.* Act VIII of 1859, s. 2, does not require a plaintiff at once to assert all his titles to property, or to be thereafter estopped from advancing them. The maxim, *nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa*, cannot apply where the right on which the second suit is brought is not the same as that asserted in the former suit. *SADAYA PILLAI v. CHINNI*

I. L. R. 2 Mad. 352

4. ———— *Omission to decide part of case—Suit as to part of case raised in former suit.* A plaintiff is bound to raise every title on which he can succeed and to obtain a decision upon every



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

part of his case, and if it is found that any part of the case which he made has been neglected by the Court which tried the suit, he is not at liberty to bring a fresh suit in respect of such part. *SREEKRISTO BISWAS v. JOY KRISTO BISWAS*

24 W. R. 304

5. ——— Obligation to assert every title—*Reservation of right*. A litigant is bound to disclose all his titles at once. He cannot be allowed to keep back one, and then, years after, to bring a fresh suit on the ground that he had still a right in reserve. *BROJO LALL ROY v. KHETUR NATH MITTER*

12 W. R. 55

*DUDSAR BIBEE v. SHAKIR BURKUNDAZ*

15 W. R. 168

6. ——— Civil Procedure Code, s. 13, Expl. II—*Idem corpus, alia causâ petendi*. In 1876 A sued K and others to recover certain lands, alleging that he was the karnavan of their tarwad, and that the lands were granted to them for maintenance under an oral agreement, which had been broken by K having mortgaged some of the lands. This suit was dismissed. In 188 A sued the same defendants to recover the same lands, on the ground that as karnavan of the tarwad he was entitled to resume possession of the lands. *Held*, reversing the decrees of the lower Courts, that the suit brought by A in 1881 was not barred by s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877. *Per MUTTUSAMI AYYAR, J.*—Expl. II to s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877, refers to the title litigated in the former suit as distinguished from the relief claimed. Where several independent grounds of action are available, a party is not bound to unite them all in one suit, though he is bound to bring before the Court all grounds of attack available to him with reference to the title which is made the ground of action. *ALLUNNI v. KUNJUSHA*

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 264

7. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1882—*Suit for land based on plaintiff's title—Previous suit as lessor—Omission to make title a ground of attack in previous suit—No denial of plaintiff's title as landlord—Maintainability of suit*. In a previous suit, brought in 1890, plaintiff had sued for the recovery of certain land which he alleged to have been let verbally to the defendants in 1886. Defendants denied the verbal letting, and pleaded that they held the land from plaintiff's predecessor under a written agreement of 1876. The Court passed a decree in plaintiff's favour, holding that the lease under the written agreement had expired prior to 1886, and that the subsequent enjoyment of the land was under a verbal agreement. No steps were taken to execute that decree. Plaintiff now sued defendants for the recovery of the same land, together with arrears of rent basing his claim on the same written agreement of 1876, and also on his title as owner thereof. The District Court held the claim on the written agreement to be *res judicata*, and that plaintiff could not now

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

sue upon his title, as that should have been made a ground of attack in the former suit. On appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, that, inasmuch as plaintiff's title as landlord was recognised in the suit of 1890, the defendants could not have acquired a prescriptive title as against him in 1898, when the present suit was filed; and that plaintiff was therefore entitled to recover the land upon his title independently of any letting by him to the defendants. That the claim for arrears of rent under the old written agreement was *res judicata* by reason of the former suit, but that plaintiff's omission to sue on the strength of his general title in the former suit was no bar to the present suit, inasmuch as his title as landlord had never been disputed. *Zamorin of Calicut v. Narayanan Mussad, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 323*, referred to. *KUTTI ALI v. CHINDAN*

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 629

8. ——— Dismissal of suit for proprietary right to land—*Subsequent suit for possession of portion of same land as planter of the trees on it*. The dismissal of a suit in which the plaintiff had claimed a proprietary title in certain land held not to bar a subsequent suit in which he prayed for a declaration that, as planter of the trees and constructor of a tank in a garden forming a portion of the land, he was entitled to retain possession of the garden and tank. *GOSHAIN JUGOOPOOREE v. BISHEN DYAL CHUND*

2 Agra 32

9. ——— Dismissal of suit on demise as continuation of prior demise—*Subsequent suit on prior demise*. In 1883 plaintiff sued to recover certain land from the defendant on a demise of 1856 which he alleged was a renewal of a prior demise of 1835. The suit was dismissed on the ground that the demise of 1856 was not proved. Plaintiff then sued to recover the same land on the demise of 1835 and on title. *Held*, that the decree in the former suit was no bar to this suit. *KANDUNNI v. KATTAMMA*

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 251

10. ——— Suit for land based on plaintiff's title—*Prior suit alleging that defendants held on lease from plaintiff*. In a previous suit in which plaintiff had been a party, it had been attempted to assert plaintiff's title to a piece of land occupied by the defendants by proving that they held the same by virtue of an alleged specific lease. The Court had held that no such lease had been executed. Plaintiff now claimed the land as belonging to his devasom, and sued to recover it on the strength of his title; he also set up the alleged lease once more. *Held*, that, though the question of the validity of the lease was *res judicata*, plaintiff was at liberty to sue also on the strength of his title, independently of the lease, and he was not estopped from so suing by the fact that the former suit had been based on the lease alone. If the relation of landlord and tenant were shown to have existed prior to the specific lease sued upon, it was for the tenant to prove that such relation had ceased to exist. In the absence of such proof, the relation would be presumed to continue, and the tenant's



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possession in that case could not be adverse.  
**ZAMORIN OF CALICUT v. NARAYANAN MUSSAD**  
**I. L. R. 22 Mad. 323**

**11. —** Suit for same property on different cause of action—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2*. The plaintiff sued to recover certain land, on the ground that he had been forcibly dispossessed of it by the defendant. As the plaintiff did not prove the alleged dispossession, his claim was rejected, but the Court suggested that he might recover in a fresh suit, treating the defendant as a trustee, and offering to make certain payments to him. The plaintiff then filed a fresh suit, framing it in the manner indicated by the Court. *Held*, that the latter suit, being based on a different cause of action from the former, was not barred, and that the question at issue between the parties was not *res judicata*. **BISTO SHANKAR PATIL v. RAMCHANDRARAY RAGHUNATH JAHAGIRDAR**

**8 Bom. A. C. 89**

**12. —** *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—Decision as to nature of document*. In 1864 the original plaintiff, *L*, as heir of *F*, brought a suit against *J* (the guardian of *F*), *A*, *B*, and *C*, to recover a piece of land. The suit was rejected, as it was proved that (though the plaintiff was the heir of *F*) *F*'s guardian had mortgaged the land for necessary purposes to *C*, the two defendants *A* and *B* being merely tenants of *C*. The plaintiff then sued *C* for redemption of the mortgaged premises. *Held*, that the second suit was not barred under s. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, also, that the fact of the document under which *C* held the land being described in the Court's judgment in the earlier suit as an instrument of sale was not conclusive in the second suit as to the real nature of the instrument. **VALLABH BHULA v. RAMA**

**9 Bom. 65**

**13. —** Suit by sons to set aside alienation by widow as guardian—*Former suit by widow against purchaser*. Where the mother and guardian of minor sons had once sued a certain party in order to set aside certain kobalas by which she had conveyed away to him the property of her late husband, on the ground that her action may have been injurious to the interests of her sons, and the said suit had been thrown out by the Judges, and the sons subsequently brought another suit with substantially the same object in view, but making the mother a co-defendant with the original defendant:—*Held*, that the validity of the kobalas having once been decided, the only ground on which the subsequent suit could lie would be that the mother had, in giving the kobalas, acted collusively with the defendant, of which, however, there was no evidence whatever. **GUNGA RAM SADHOOKHAN v. PANCH COWREE PORAMANIK**

**25 W. R. 366**

**14. —** Decision as to genuineness of document—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—Co-defendants*. A former judgment, in which

**RES JUDICATA—*contd.*****6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.***

a certain document has been held to be genuine between a third person as plaintiff and the present plaintiff and present principal defendant as defendants, was held to be conclusive in this suit on the point of authenticity of the document, though not a *res judicata* under s. 2, Act VIII of 1859, in other respects. **KALLY PERSAD SEIN CHOWDHRY v. MOHESH CHUNDER BHUTTACHARJEE**

**15. —** *Sanction for forgery in respect of document in another suit*. A former decision in a civil suit in which the issue was the genuineness or otherwise of a kabuliati, and the Court held that it was not genuine, but added (as an *obiter dictum*) that the pottah produced by the other side was authentic, does not bar the jurisdiction of a Civil Court in sanctioning a commitment for forgery in respect of the pottah. **JUGGUT MISSER v. BABOO LAL**

**5 W. R. Cr. 50**

**OOMANATH ROY CHOWDHRY v. RAGHOONATH MITTER**

**Marsh. 43 : W. R. F. B. 10**

**1 Hay 75**

**16. —** *Subsequent suit in which same question arose*. Where a Court in a former suit against the present plaintiffs to set aside a mortgage decided that the mortgage as to a certain share of the property was invalid, although it was not a matter for adjudication then before the Court:—*Held*, that that decision was no bar to a subsequent suit for recovery of the mortgage-debts as to that share, and that the question of the genuineness or otherwise of the mortgage by defendants to plaintiffs was open to be decided on the merits. **BUSTEE RAM v. NEWAZ SINGH**

**2 Agra 62**

**17. —** Decision as to validity of document—*Matter in issue—Defence not relied on*. A suit was brought by *A* to recover property, in which, on appeal to the Privy Council, two questions arose, viz., whether the property was to pass as divided or undivided property, and whether such property was conveyed away to *A*'s father by a deed of testamentary disposition. The lower Court had decided only the latter point, and the Privy Council remanded the case for determination of the former point. On a second appeal to the Privy Council, that Committee were about to enter upon the question as to the validity of the testamentary paper, when *A* gave up the point that the paper was in any sense testamentary in its character, and disclaimed having any title under it as a testamentary devise, and the Privy Council therefore did not decide that question. *Held*, that a subsequent suit by *A*, in which he sought to recover the property by setting up the paper as a valid will and testament, was a suit instituted without *bonâ fides*, and could not be allowed to proceed, because the nature of the paper was in issue in the former suit, and what was in issue must be taken to have been decided by the judgment. **RAGHOONADHA PERYA OODYA TAVER v. KATTAMA NAUCHEAR**

**10 W. R. P. C. 1**



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

S.C. VIJAYA RAGHANADHA BODHA GOOROO SAWMY  
PERIYA OODYA TAVER *v.* KATAMA NATCHIAR  
(RAJAH OF SHIVAGUNGA) . 11 Moo. I. A. 50

Affirming s.c. in High Court, UDAIYA TEVAR  
*v.* KATAMA NACHIYAR . 2 Mad. 131

18. ———— *Deed of sale or mortgage—Parties—Question decided in former suit.* *R* obtained, on the 7th January 1862, a decree declaring a deed of sale in his favour, dated the 7th January 1854, to be a genuine, authentic, and valid instrument. The question whether the sale was changed into a conditional sale or mortgage by an agreement entered into by him with the vendors on the same day that the deed of sale was executed, could not be raised by any of the parties to that suit or their representatives in a suit brought by *R* to obtain proprietary possession of the subject of the sale, in virtue of the deed and the decree. *DHUNDI v. RAM LAL* . 7 N. W. 149

19. ———— *Suit for possession under deed of gift—Subsequent suit by heir of donor to set aside deed of gift as invalid.* *G* executed a deed of gift of his whole property in favour of *J*. *J* sued for possession and obtained a decree. On the death of *G*, his heir sued to set aside the deed of gift, alleging that, notwithstanding the decree, *J* did not obtain possession till after the death of *G*, and that the deed of gift was, under the Imames law, invalid. *Held*, that this might have been a good defence on the part of *G* to the suit brought against him by *J*, but that, after the decision of that suit, it was not open to *G* to dispute the title of *J*, nor was it now open for his heir to do so. *FURZUND ALI v. JAFFREE BEBEE* . 5 N. W. 118

20. ———— *Deed of gift—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—Matter not determined in former suit—Suit on different cause of action.* *M* brought a suit to obtain her share of the entire property of *A*, her deceased father. It was pleaded, with respect to a certain portion of the property, that *A*, had made it over by parol gift to his minor son. The case came before the High Court on special appeal, when it was contended on behalf of *M*, the appellant, that the gift was not proved, and that some portion of the property was “mush’a” (undivided), and the gift in regard to it invalid. The High Court refused to allow the last plea, which had not been taken in the Court of first instance, to be taken in appeal, the point raised being one of fact, and, as the gift had been established by evidence, dismissed the appeal. *F*, the purchaser of the rights and interests in *A*’s estate of *W*, a defendant in the suit brought a suit against his vendor, *M*, and the guardian of the minor, to obtain possession of the property conveyed by the sale in which property affected by the gift was included, and claimed the setting aside of the gift because a portion of the property conveyed by it was undivided. *Held*, that his suit was not barred by s. 2 of Act VIII of 1859. *IMAMAN v. FAZUL KARIM* 7 N. W. 251

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

21. ———— *Suit to compel execution of release from document—Suit to declare document executed for nominal purpose.* On 23rd March 1878 plaintiff executed to defendant a document purporting to be a deed of gift. In 1886 plaintiff sued to cancel the document, alleging that defendant on 11th May 1881 had agreed to execute release, but had not done so; that suit was dismissed for non-payment of duty due under the Court Fees Act. The plaintiff now sued in 1887 for a declaration that the document “was executed for nominal purposes and was not intended to take effect.” *Held*, that, since the cause of action in the suits of 1886 and 1887 were not the same, the claim in the latter suit was not *res judicata*. *NAGATHAL v. PONNUSAMI* . I. L. R. 13 Mad. 44

22. ———— *Suit for same object on different cause of action—Decision in former suit.* Plaintiff, claiming as grandson of one *S M*, the only undivided brother of *S*, sought to recover half of the village sold by *S* to first defendant’s father in 1885; the village having been (as alleged) family property, and sold without the consent of plaintiff’s father, who succeeded his father *S M*, and not for family purposes. In a former suit (No. 3 of 1855), brought by the plaintiff’s father against *S* and *R*, the father of the present first defendant, and the present second defendant the paternal nephew of the first defendant, for possession of the whole of the family property belonging to him and *S* as co-parceners, and to rescind the sale to *R*, the plaintiff stated, amongst other things, that *S* was imbecile; and that the sale-deed was obtained by taking a fraudulent advantage of his imbecility, and that it was invalid as being made without plaintiff’s consent. The Court decided that *S* was “both physically and mentally qualified to manage and legally competent to deal with the estate, supposing it to be undivided, to the extent of his own share,” and dismissed the suit. In 1862 the plaintiff again sued the present defendant for the whole of the village on the same ground of imbecility and fraud. The Civil Court decided that the suit was barred by the decree in the first suit, and on appeal the decree was affirmed. *Held*, that the present cause of action—namely, the plaintiff’s right as to co-parcener to a moiety of the property and the invalidity of the instrument of sale to pass that right to the defendant—was not *res judicata*. *CHINNIYA MUDALI v. VENKATACHELLA PILLAI* 3 Mad. 320

23. ———— *Former suit on same cause of action—Suits stating different grounds for right to succeed to estate.* Plaintiff sued to recover a zamindari from his step-brother, alleging that the zamindari was hereditary property belonging to the family, the succession thereto being governed by the law of primogeniture; that his father died in 1859, leaving the plaintiff, defendant, and another, his sons, the former by the first wife, and the latter two by the second wife; and that the defendant (respondent) unlawfully enjoyed the estate, while



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

plaintiff as the eldest son, had a legal claim thereto. In defence it was pleaded that the claim was *res judicata* by the decree in a suit which was brought by plaintiff to obtain declaration of his status as the son of his father's pattaba stri, or royal wife, in which suit the plaintiff's father was first defendant, and defendant's mother was second defendant, and wherein they both denied that plaintiff was son of the pattaba stri and affirmed that second defendant was first defendant's first wife, and that her sons were preferential heirs to the zamindari. Among the points recorded was for "plaintiff to prove his status and right as alleged," and that issue was set down for defendants to rebut. The Judge disbelieved that plaintiff was the son of his father's first wife, and added, "Plaintiff further pleads that he is the eldest son, a position not denied, but one which cannot confer on him the status he now claims." The Judge decided that plaintiff had failed to prove that his mother was the pattaba stri, and that he was heir to the exclusion of second defendant's sons. On appeal to the Sudder Adawlat, the decree below was confirmed and the Court made the following observation: "It has been attempted at the hearing of the appeal to maintain the plaintiff's right to succeed as being the eldest son. This, however, was not the position taken in the Court below, where the succession was allowed to depend on another circumstance,—namely, the mother being the pattaba stri; and the Court therefore held the argument to be an inadmissible one." *Held*, on appeal, that the present suit was barred by *res judicata*, a different *causa* to the former not having been adduced. To the judgment in *Chinnaya Mudali v. Venkata Pillai*, 3 *Mad.* 326, after the words in page 334, "in favour of the defendant all the objective grounds of the decision which have led to the dismissal of the suit," the following ought to be added: "and without the establishment of which the suit could not have been logically or legally dismissed." *MUTHUMADEVA NAIK v. SEVATTAMUTHUMADEVA NAIK* 7 *Mad.* 160

24. ——— Suit for enhancement of rent—*Subsequent suit for admitted rent.* A suit for enhanced rent after notice having been dismissed on appeal, plaintiff sued to recover rent for the same year at the rate admitted by the defendant in the former suit. *Held*, that the cause of action in the subsequent suit was not the same as in the former, and that the law of *res judicata* did not apply in bar. *KHEDARONISSA BEEBEE v. BOODHEE BEEBEE*

13 W. R. 317

25. ——— Suit for rent against same tenant as in former suit—*Decision in former suit.* A and B were co-sharers in a certain talukh to the extent of 7 annas and 4 annas, respectively. B died in 1868, and in 1872 A, who used to collect the rents on behalf of B, brought a suit against one of the raiyats for the rent of the 11 annas. An issue having been raised as to the extent of A's share omitting that of B, it was decided to be 7 annas only and he got a decree accordingly. In a subsequent

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

suit by A's widow against the same tenant for the rent due for the 11 annas share:—*Held*, that the decision in the former suit did not debar her from showing that she was entitled to the rent due on account of B's 4 annas share. *SHAMADANISSA BEEBEE v. FERASUTOOLLAH SIRDAR*

2 C. L. R. 23

26. ——— Claim as heir to property as joint and undivided—*Subsequent claim as reversioner on death of widow.* A, a brother's son, in 1847, claimed, on the ground that he had title as heir to the moiety of the estate, prior to the other brother's widow, on the plea that it was joint and undivided, and that suit was dismissed. In a subsequent suit accepting the decision of 1847, and regarding the widow's title to be prior to his, and as holding a life-interest in the whole estate before him, A claimed as heir next in reversion after the widow, regarding her property as separate, with a view to a declaration of his right as such heir to have a certain alienation by the widow (alleged by him to be illegal under Hindu law) set aside. *Held*, that the two cases and causes of action were essentially different. *SUNKUR DYAL SINGH v. PURMESSUR DYAL SINGH*

6 W. R. 44

27. ——— Dismissal of former suit to set aside assignments—*Subsequent suit for possession by reversioner.* C, the reversioner expectant in the life-interest of a Hindu widow, instituted a suit in her life-time to set aside sales of the estate. It had first been sold in execution of a decree against the widow and purchased by A, and then for arrears of revenue due by A, and had been purchased by B; but this suit was dismissed under Act I of 1845, s. 24, on the ground that more than a year had elapsed since the sale for arrears of revenue. After the death of the widow, the reversioner sued B for recovery for possession of the lands. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not barred by the dismissal of the suit instituted in the life-time of the widow: the object of that suit being to set aside the assignment of the widow's interest, and not for the assertion of the plaintiff's right to the reversion. *DOORGA CHURN v. KASSY CHUNDER MOITREE*. *Marsh.* 539: 2 *Hay* 646

28. ——— Suit to set aside alienation by widow—*Subsequent suit to recover property as reversioner.* A widow (a life-tenant of an ancestral estate), having executed an ikrar transferring a share to N, her granddaughter, afterwards sued to set it aside on the ground that N had not conformed to its terms. While the suit was in the appeal stage, the widow died, and her reversioner applied to be made, and was admitted, as, her kaem mukam, to carry on the appeal on her behalf. He afterwards sued to recover possession of the share as reversioner, alleging that the succession opened out to him on the death of the widow. *Held*, that the causes of action in the two suits were different, and that it was not necessary for the reversioner, when he took up the widow's case in its appeal



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

stage, to disclose his title and claim as reversioner as he was not competent then to introduce any pleas arising out of a new state of facts not existing when the suit was instituted. *DEORANEL KOOWAR v. INDURJEET KOOWAR* . . . **12 W. R. 234**

**29.** ——— Dismissal of suit to establish plaintiff's adoption—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 13—Representation of estate by Hindu widow—Decree in favour of widow—Admission by widow subsequent to decree.* In 1877, *S*, claiming to be the adopted son of *M*, sued *A*, the widow of *M*, to recover his estate. *A* denied the adoption. *S* failing to adduce any evidence, the suit was dismissed under s. 158 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1877. In 1882, by an agreement made between *A* and *S*, *A* acknowledged the title of *S*, as adopted son of *M*. *A* having died, a suit was brought against *S* by a reversioner of *M* to recover the estate of *M*. *Held*, that *S* was estopped by the decree in the former suit from setting up his claim as adopted son against the plaintiff, and that the subsequent agreement between *A* and *S* did not affect plaintiff's right. *ARUNACHALA v. PANCHANADAM*

**I. L. R. 8 Mad. 348**

**30.** ——— Second suit for restitution of conjugal rights—*Decree not executed—Subsequent voluntary cohabitation followed again by desertion—Satisfaction of decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13—Husband and wife.* Plaintiff obtained a decree against his wife for restitution of conjugal rights in 1885, which was never executed. In 1887, however, she returned to his house, and stayed with him for two months. She afterwards deserted him again. Thereupon the plaintiff filed a second suit for restitution of conjugal rights. *Held*, that the suit was not barred under s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882). A second withdrawal from cohabitation constitutes a fresh cause of action. *KESHAVALAL GIRDHARLAL v. BAI PARVATI* . . . **I. L. R. 18 Bom. 327**

**31.** ——— Suit on bond—*Failure to prove execution—Subsequent suit for same money on account.* A previous suit against the same defendant on a bond having been dismissed on the ground that plaintiff had failed to prove the execution of the bond, defendant sued to recover the identical sum as a balance due on a khatta account. *Held*, that the second suit was not brought on a cause of action previously tried and determined between the parties, and was cognizable by the Court of Small Causes. *AUGHORE NATH GHOSAL v. ROOP CHAND MUNDUL* . . . **13 W. R. 97**

**33.** ——— Deed inadmissible as being unregistered—*Subsequent suit on registered bond.* *I*, to whom the obligee of a bond for the payment of money in which immovable property was hypothecated had assigned by sale her right thereunder, sued in virtue of the deed of sale on such bond for the money due thereunder, claiming to recover by the sale of the hypothecated property. This suit was dismissed on the ground that

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

the deed of sale, not being registered, could not be received in evidence, and consequently *I*'s right to sue on such bond failed. *I*, having procured the execution of a fresh deed of sale and caused it to be registered, brought a second suit on such bond in virtue of such deed of sale, claiming as before. *Held*, that the second suit was not barred by the provisions of s. 13 of Act X of 1877. *ISHRI DAT v. HAR NARAIN LAL* . . . **I. L. R. 3 All. 334**

**34.** ——— Dismissal of suit for amount due on document—*Subsequent suit for same amount.* The defendants and two others jointly executed a document (*A*), whereby they promised on the 27th April 1874, to pay to the plaintiff *R* 25 at the end of April 1875, and also to give to the plaintiff, in April 1875, a certain quantity of grain by way of interest. *Held*, on a suit on the document (*KERNAN, J.*, dissenting), that the suit was not barred by the dismissal of a suit in 1877, in which the plaintiff sued the defendants for a proportionate amount due by them under the document (*A*), alleging a verbal promise by the defendants, in November 1876, to pay such proportionate amount. *MUTTU CHETTI v. MUTTIN CHETTI* . . . **I. L. R. 4 Mad. 296**

**35.** ——— Suit for sum due on mortgage—*Decisions in former suit for interest—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 13—Sale of mortgaged property in execution of decree.* Certain immovable property was mortgaged to *R* and then sold to *N*. It was then brought to sale in execution of a decree against *N* and was purchased by *H*. The balance of the sale-proceeds after satisfaction of that decree was paid to *N*. Under the terms of the mortgage to *R*, interest on the principal amount was payable annually and its payment was charged on the property as well as the payment of the principal amount. The mortgagors having failed to pay the interest annually, *R* in 1875 sued them and *N* and *H* to recover the interest due. It was decided in that suit that *N* was primarily and personally liable for the interest then due on the mortgage, as he had received the sale-proceeds of the property, and that the property was only liable in case he failed to satisfy the claim. *N* subsequently paid into Court the sale-proceeds he had received, and *R* was paid the same. In 1878 *R* again sued same persons for interest, and again *N* was declared primarily and personally liable, on the ground that he had not at once made over the sale-proceeds to *R*. In 1880 *R* sued the same persons to recover the principal amount and interest due on the mortgage, by the sale of the mortgaged property. *Held*, that, whatever might have been the rights and relations of the parties so long as any portion of the sale-proceeds remained with *N*, their position towards him assumed an entirely different character when once he had discharged himself of those moneys, and with this change in the situation the *ratio decidendi* of the suits of 1875 and 1878 no longer existed, and therefore the decisions in those suits did not preclude *R* from bringing a suit to recover the principal and



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

interest due on his mortgage from the mortgaged property. *RATAN RAI v. HANUMANDAS*

I. L. R. 5 All. 118

36. ——— Mortgage-deed passing possession of certain parcels of land and hypothecating others—*Remedy of mortgagee—Previous decrees for rent obtained against mortgagors.* The obligee under an instrument, dated 1878, by which certain land was usufructually mortgaged and other land merely hypothecated to him, having obtained against the mortgagors decrees for rent due on part of the land under the terms of pattamchits executed by them on the date of the mortgage, now sued to recover the principal and interest due under that instrument. *Held*, that he was not precluded from obtaining a decree by reason of his previous suits, and was entitled to a decree for the amount due, and in default of payment for the sale of the mortgaged premises. *NANU v. RAMAN*

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 335

37. ——— Suit for personal decree against some members of tarwad—*Subsequent suit against tarwad for mortgage-debt.* A suit seeking to enforce liability for a mortgage-debt on a Malabar tarwad is not barred by a previous personal decree obtained against certain members of the tarwad for the same debt. *GOVINDA v. MANA VIKRAMAN. MANA VIKRAMAN v. GOVINDA*

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 284

38. ——— Suit declaring right to redemption—*Subsequent suit by representative for redemption.* Where *D* sued for redemption and obtained a conditional decree, and subsequently the plaintiff sued *D* to establish his right to the mortgaged property and obtained a decree:—*Held*, that a suit by the plaintiff for redemption was not barred by s. 2, Act VIII of 1859. *BHOOP SINGH v. NURSINGH RAI*

3 Agra 144

39. ——— Dismissal of suit for ejectment—*Subsequent suit for redemption.* Failure in a suit of simple ejectment does not bar a subsequent suit for redemption, notwithstanding that the defendant had asserted the existence of his mortgage in the former suit. *SHRIDHAR VINAYAK v. NARAYAN VALAD BABAJI*

11 Bom. 224

40. ——— Suit for redemption—*Issue as to sale of equity of redemption—Subsequent suit under a different title for same object.* In 1870 the plaintiff sued to redeem a mortgage of certain lands from the defendants' predecessors in title. The suit was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs' equity of redemption had been sold in execution of a decree to *A B*. The plaintiffs, having repurchased the equity of redemption from *A B*, brought a second suit to redeem the lands in the defendants' possession. *Held*, that the question whether the equity of redemption of the lands in suit had been sold to *A B* was *res judicata* and could not be reopened by the defendants on the ground that the plaintiffs were litigating under a different title in the

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

former suit. *ALI MOIDIAN RAVUTHAN v. ELAYACHANIDATHIL KOMBIA ACHEN*

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 239

41. ——— Foreclosure in the Central Provinces. By a bond, dated 10th February 1857, a certain village was mortgaged by one *G* to the appellants and their father as security for a loan; the bond providing that, "if I fail to pay the money as stipulated, I and my heirs shall, without objection, cause the settlement of the said village to be made with you." The interest of *G* in the village was described as that of a malguzar, and his proprietary right therein was declared by the revenue authorities shortly after the execution of the mortgage; but his payments of revenue being in arrear, the Board of Revenue granted a lease of the village for ten years to the appellant's father. The mortgagees in a suit on the bond obtained the following decree on 3rd November 1860: "As the defendant acknowledges the plaintiff's claim, it is ordered that a decree be given to the plaintiffs for principal and interest and costs against the defendant and the mortgaged property." In proceedings in the Civil Court taken under this decree, the mortgagees asked for possession of the village, and obtained, on 17th July 1862, an order, in pursuance of which they were put in possession, an appeal by *G* being rejected. *G* took various steps to recover possession of the mortgaged property, or a declaration of his proprietary interest therein, but failed in his endeavours; an application for a grant of the proprietary right in the village, and an appeal from an order cancelling his pottah, being rejected by the revenue authorities on 8th December 1864 and 27th July 1865, respectively; and on 12th August 1867, *G* conveyed the village by deed of sale to the respondents. In a suit brought by them to redeem the mortgage and obtain possession of the property:—*Held*, that the suit was not barred by the order of the Civil Court of 17th July 1862, nor had the orders of the revenue officers of 8th December 1864 and 27th July 1865 effected such a transfer of any right which *G* might have had to the appellants as to render the sale to the respondents invalid. *GOKULDAS v. KEIPARAM*

13 B. L. R. P. C. 205

42. ——— Limitation—*Declaratory mortgage-decree for redemption not executed for 15 years.* In 1866 *S* obtained a decree authorising him to recover certain property on payment of a certain sum to the mortgagee, but not declaring that *S* would be foreclosed if he did not exercise his right of redemption. *Held*, that *S* was not debarred from bringing a suit to redeem the same property in 1881. *SAMI ACHARI v. SOMASUNDRAM ACHARI*

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 119

43. ——— Decree for redemption—*Second suit to redeem—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 13, 244.* A decree obtained by a mortgagor, which declared that the mortgagee should deliver up possession on payment of the sum found due to him, not having been executed for three years, a purchaser of the equity of redemption sued



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

the mortgagee to redeem. *Held*, that this suit was not barred by the former decree, and that the plaintiff was entitled to redeem. *Sami v. Soma-sundram*, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 119, approved. *Gan Savant Bal Savant, v. Narayan Dhond Savant*, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 467, dissented from. *KARUTHASANI v. JAGANATHA* . I. L. R. 8 Mad. 478

44. ————— *Conditional decree—Failure of mortgagor to pay in accordance with decree—Subsequent suit for redemption—Civil Procedure Code, s. 13—Foreclosure—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 93.* In a suit for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage, a decree for redemption was passed conditional upon the plaintiff paying the defendants, within a time specified, a sum which was found still due to the latter, and the decree provided that, if such sum were not paid within the time specified, the suit should stand dismissed. The plaintiff failed to pay, and the suit according lystood dismissed. Subsequently he again sued for redemption, alleging that the mortgage-debt had now been satisfied from the usufruct. *Held*, having regard to the distinction between simple and usufructuary mortgages, that the decree in the former suit only decided that, in order to redeem and get possession of the property, the mortgagor must pay the sum then found to be due by him to the mortgagee, and did not operate as *res judicata* so as to bar a second suit for redemption, when, after further enjoyment of the profits by the mortgagee, the mortgagor could say that the debt had now become satisfied from the usufruct. Having regard to s. 93 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), in a suit brought by a usufructuary mortgagor for possession on the ground that the mortgage-debt has been satisfied from the usufruct, and in which the plaintiff is ordered to pay something because the debt has not been satisfied as alleged, the decree passed against such a mortgagor for non-payment has not the effect of foreclosing him from all time from redeeming the property. The decision in *Golam Hossein v. Alla Rukhee Beebe*, 2 N. W. 62, treated as not binding since the passing of the Transfer of Property Act. *Chaita v. Purun Sookh*, 2 Agra 256, and *Anrudh Singh v. Sheo Parsad*, I. L. R. 5 All. 481, referred to. *MUHAMMAD SAMI-UD-DIN KHAN v. MANNU LAL*

I. L. R. 11 All. 386

45. ————— *Second redemption suit—Kanom, nature of—Transfer of Property Act, ss. 58, 67, 92, 93.* The jenmi of land in Malabar sued in 1886 to redeem a kanom of 1849 to which it was subject, and obtained a decree which merely directed the surrender of the land to the plaintiff, on payment of the kanom amount and the value of improvements, within three months of the date of the decree. This decree remained unexecuted the money not being paid. The jenmi now brought another suit to redeem the same kanom. *Held*, that the present suit was not barred by the former decree. The nature of a kanom discussed. *RAMUNNI v. BRAHMA DATTAN*

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 366

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

46. ————— *Decree for redemption—Mortgagors' failure to pay amount due within period fixed—Subsequent suit for redemption—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 92 and 93.* A decree under s. 92 of the Transfer of Property Act becomes a final decree on the expiry of the time limited thereby, although no order is passed under s. 93: accordingly, no subsequent suit for redemption can be maintained. *RAMASAMI v. SAMI* . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 96

47. ————— *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 92 and 93—Decretal money not paid within the time limited—Second suit for redemption—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13—Right of suit—Decree barred by limitation.* *Held*, that a mortgagor, whether under a simple or a usufructuary mortgage, who has obtained a decree for redemption and allows such decree to lapse by reason of his not paying in the decretal amount within the time limited for payment by the decree, cannot subsequently bring a second suit for redemption of the mortgage in respect of which such infructuous decree was obtained. *Golam Hossein v. Alla Rakhee Beebe*, 3 N. W. 62, and *Maloji, v. Sagaji*, I. L. R. 13 Bom. 567, followed. *Hari Ravji Chip-lunkar v. Shapurji Hormasji Shet*, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 461, referred to. *Muhammad Samiuddin Khan v. Mannu Lal*, I. L. R., 11 All. 386; *Sami Achari v. Soma-sundram Achari*, I. L. R. 6 Mad. 119; *Periandi v. Angappa*, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 423; and *Ramunni v. Brahma Dattan*, I. L. R., 15 Mad. 366, dissented from. *HAY v. RAZI-UD-DIN*

I. L. R. 19 All. 202

48. ————— *Ejectment suit by mortgagor treated as suit for redemption—Subsequent suit for redemption—Civil Procedure Code ss. 12, 13.* A zamindar mortgaged his estate under four successive instruments to the same creditor who was subsequently placed in possession. On the death of the mortgagor, his son, claiming to have succeeded by the law of primogeniture to the zamindari as an impartible estate, sued to eject the mortgagee; and a decree was passed declaring what was the sum due on a date named and how far it was binding on the estate, and decreeing that, on payment of what might be due on taking an account, the mortgagee should give up possession. Many years later the zamindar applied to the Court to carry out this decree, and a like application was put in by the present plaintiff to whom seven-eighths of the equity of redemption had been assigned. Both of these applications were rejected in the High Court as barred by limitation, and the applicants applied for leave to appeal to the Privy Council against the order of the High Court. Meanwhile the plaintiff brought the present suit to redeem the mortgages of the late zamindar. *Held*, (i) that the suit was not barred under Civil Procedure Code, s. 12 by reason of the pendency of the application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council; (ii) that, as there was no decree for foreclosure passed in the previous suit which had been treated as a suit for redemption, the present suit was not precluded by the decree therein;



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

(iii) that the findings in the previous suit as to the amount of the debt and the extent to which it bound the estate were *res judicata*. *NAINAPPA CHETTI v. CHIDAMBARAM CHETTI* I. L. R. 21 Mad. 18

49. — *Usufructuary mortgage—Non-payment at the proper time of the whole mortgage money—Dismissal of suit—Second suit for redemption accompanied by payment in full—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 92, 63.* Held, that a decree in a suit for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage, not being a conditional decree for redemption under s. 92 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, but simply dismissing the suit on the ground that the mortgagor had not, prior to its institution, paid or tendered the whole of the mortgage-money at a time authorized by the deed, did not have the effect of foreclosure or of *res judicata* so as to bar a second suit for redemption, the deed expressly authorizing redemption on payment of the mortgage-money in a particular month in any future year after due date, and the plaintiff having tendered the whole in that month between the dismissal of the first suit and the institution of the second. *Inman v. Wearing*, 3 De. Gez. & S. 729; *Marshall v. Shrewsbury*, L. R. 10 Ch. Ap. 250; *Curtis v. Holcombe*, 6 L. J. (N. S.) Ch. 156; *Collinson v. Jeffery*, [1896] 1 Ch. 611; *Karuthasami v. Jaganatha*, I. L. R. 8 Mad. 478; *Nainappa Chetti v. Chidambaram Chetti*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 18; *Roy Dinkur Dyal v. Sheo Golam*, 22 W. R. 172; *Muhammad Sami-ud-din Khan v. Mannu Lal*, I. L. R. 11 All. 386; and *Golam Hoosein v. Alla Rukhee Beebee*, 3 N. W. 62, referred to. *Hay v. Raziuddin*, I. L. R. 19 All. 202, distinguished. *DONDH BAHADUR RAI v. TEK NARAIN RAI* . . . I. L. R. 21 All. 251

50. — *Omission to direct foreclosure—Neglect to redeem—Second suit to redeem—Hindu family—Suit by manager in his own name—Representative character—Practice—Parties—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 50.* In 1856 V, a member of an undivided Hindu family, sued the defendants, and obtained a decree for the redemption of certain immoveable property, but the decree was never executed. At the date of that suit V was the manager of the family, consisting of himself and the plaintiff N who was then a minor. The decree did not provide for the foreclosure of the mortgage in the event of V failing to redeem. In 1878 N brought another suit to redeem the same property. The lower Court held that, as the former decree did not direct foreclosure, the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee continued between the parties, and that the plaintiff's suit was not barred by the former decree. The defendant appealed. Held (PINHEY, J., *dissentiente*), reversing the decree of the lower Court, that the plaintiff's suit was barred. A decree for redemption on the default of the decree-holder to pay the money declared to be due within the time fixed by the decree or if none be fixed, within the time allowed by the law for the execution of the decree, operates as a judg-

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

ment of foreclosure, and debars the mortgagor from afterwards bringing a second suit to redeem the same property. *GAN SAVANT BAL SAVANT v. NARAYAN DHOND SAVANT* I. L. R. 7 Bom. 467

51. — *Dismissal of former suit for rent of portion of estate—Suit to establish proprietary right to whole estate.* The dismissal of suit for the declaration of plaintiff's right to receive rent from a tenant of a portion of an estate cannot be pleaded as an estoppel in a suit to establish plaintiff's general right as proprietor of the whole estate. *KISHEN DHUN NUNDEE v. BHOOKTO POLLY* . . . 9 W. R. 461

52. — *Dismissal of suit for rent—Subsequent suit for possession.* A suit for rent in which the sole defendant denied the plaintiff's title, alleging that B and A were his landlords, having been dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to prove his title another suit was brought by the plaintiff against A, B, and C for possession. Held, that the suit was barred under s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882. *GOPAL DASS v. Gopi NATH SIRCAR* . . . 12 C. L. R. 38

53. — *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Suit for rent—Suit for establishment of title.* A decision in a suit for rent brought by a plaintiff against a person who is alleged to have been his tenant in respect of certain land does not operate as *res judicata* in a subsequent suit brought by the same plaintiff for establishment of his title to the land, not only against the alleged tenant, but also against the person whose title as landlord the tenant defendant had set up in the rent suit. *Gopal Dass v. Gopi Nath Sircar*, 12 C. L. R. 38, dissented from. *DWARAKANATH ROY v. RAM CHAND AICH* I. L. R. 26 Calc. 428

3 C. W. N. 266

54. — *Suit for enhancement of rent—Suit for rent of succeeding years.* A decree passed in a suit as to the propriety of enhancement of rent in a preceding year is no bar to a suit for enhancing the rent in a subsequent year, nor does it preclude a comparison of the rents paid by actual cultivators for the year in respect of which the second enhancement was made. *GUNGA PERSHAD v. BULDEO SINGH* . . . 3 Agra 310

55. — *Civil Procedure Code, s. 2—Declaratory decree.* Where in a suit for enhancement of rent the plaintiff failed to prove notice of enhancement, but the Court enquired into and gave a declaratory decree as to his right to enhance, such decree is decisive of the right in a subsequent suit for enhancement of the rent of the same tenure founded on a valid notice. *NUFFERCHUNDER PAUL CHOWDRY v. POULSON*

12 B. L. R. P. C. 53 : 19 W. R. 175

*RAKHAL DOSS BOSE v. GOLAM SURWAR*  
2 W. R., Act X, 69



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

56. ————— *Former suit in which right to enhance was declared.* The plaintiff sued to enhance the rent of the defendant's holding. In a former suit between the parties which the defendant had brought to determine the plaintiff's right to enhance it was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to enhance. Held, that the decision in the former case was rightly admitted as conclusive evidence in the present case as to the plaintiff's right to enhance. *MANICK SINGH v. PIRTHEE SINGH*

5 N. W. 163

*SREEDHESSURY CHOWDRY v. MUDDUN KOOWAR JHA* . . . . . 1 W. R. 128

57. ————— *Declaration of right in suit for enhancement.* Where a Munsif, in a suit for enhancement of rent, found that the tenure was not protected from enhancement, but granted a decree for rent at the old rate, because the grounds on which enhancement was claimed had not been established:—Held, that, as the Munsif was competent to make a declaration between the parties, his finding that the tenure was liable to enhancement although not forming a portion of the first decree, was binding in a second suit for enhancement of rent. *ENAEETOOLAH v. AMEER BUKSH alias MOHEEOOLAH* . . . . . 25 W. R. 225

58. ————— *Suit for khas possession.* The plaintiffs, as talukhdars, brought a suit against their tenant *M* for recovery of rent at enhanced rates of land held by him as to two cottahs of which he denied that they were part of his holding, but alleged that they were part of the lakhiraj holding of one *H*, and *H* intervened in that suit and claimed the two cottahs as lakhiraj. The result of that suit was that the rent was assessed on the land admitted by *M* to be in his possession, excluding the two cottahs. The plaintiffs then brought a suit against *H* for a declaration that these two cottahs were their mal lands, and obtained a decree simply declaring their mal rights over the land in dispute. In a suit brought by the plaintiffs against *H*, after serving him with notice to quit, for recovery of the khas possession of the two cottahs with mesne profits, and praying that he might be ordered to remove a mud house erected by him on the land, the defence was that, as the plaintiffs had already claimed khas possession and obtained a decree simply declaring their right to receive rent, the suit was barred, and that, as *H* had been twenty years in possession and had erected a house without any opposition from the plaintiffs, they had no right now to sue for khas possession. Held, that the suit was not barred by s. 2, Act VIII of 1859, and the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree for khas possession. *ESHAN CHUNDER GHOSE v. HURRISH CHUNDER BANERJEE* 10 B. L. R. Ap. 5 : 18 W. R. 19

59. ————— *Suit for declaratory decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 13—Dismissal of suit for declaratory decree and to have deed set aside—Subsequent suit for possession with respect to same property and to set aside same deed.* In De-

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

cember 1878 *H*, a Hindu widow, in possession by way of maintenance of a certain estate, of which *R* owned one-third, and *P*, *B*, and *S* one-third jointly, made a gift thereof to *N*. *H* died in January 1879. In February 1879 *R* and *P*, *B*, and *S* joined in suing *N* for a declaration of their proprietary right to two-thirds of the estate and to have the deed of gift set aside. The Court trying this suit treated it as one for a mere declaration of right and dismissed it with reference to the provisions of s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, on the ground that the plaintiffs had omitted to sue for possession although they were not in possession and were able to sue for it. In November 1879 *R* and *P*, *B*, and *S* again joined in suing *N*. In this suit they claimed possession of two-thirds of the estate and to have the deed of gift set aside. Held, by the full Bench (reversing the judgment of *PEARSON, J.*, and affirming that of *OLDFIELD, J.*), that the decision in the former suit was no bar to the determination in the second suit of the question as to the validity of the deed of gift. *RAM SEWAK SING v. NAKCHED SINGH*

I. L. R. 4 All. 261

60. ————— *Suit for declaration of title—Subsequent suit to recover arrears—Deshpande vatan—Suit by one sharer against other.* Where a person having previously obtained a decree declaratory of his title sues his co-sharer in a deshpande vatan, who is bound by the decree to recover arrears, the previous decree operates as *res judicata* as regards the plaintiff's title, except so far as circumstances subsequent to decree may affect it. *DULABH VAHUNJI v. BANSIDHAR RAI*

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 111

61. ————— *Suit for moveables after former suit declaring right to them.* Where a suit for a share of ancestral property was decreed, but the decree was modified on appeal as regards certain immoveables so far as to be made declaratory of plaintiff's right to a specified share without any specific declaration of value, and plaintiff subsequently brought a second suit for the value of the moveables:—Held, that the second suit was not barred by Act VIII of 1859, s. 2. *SHEORAJ NUNDUN SINGH v. RAJCOOMAR BABOO DEO NUNDUN SINGH* 24 W. R. 23

62. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 13—Instalment-bond—Hypothecation—Declaratory decree.* In 1864 the obligee of an instalment bond, in which certain immoveable property was hypothecated as collateral security for the payment of the instalments, brought a suit upon such bond "against *Z* and *A* (the obligors) and the property hypothecated in the bond, defendants, claiming to recover instalments which were due and unpaid, and a declaration of his right to recover instalments which were not due, as they fell due. He obtained a decree in such suit for "the amount claimed" against the "two defendants." It was also provided in such decree that, "until the satisfaction of the entire amount of the bond, the plaintiff can realize the amount of each instalment by



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

executing this decree." The obligee applied in execution of such decree to recover, by the sale of such property, which had passed into the hands of third parties after the passing of such decree, instalments which had become due after the passing of such decree, and had not been paid. Such execution having been refused on the ground that such decree was a money-decree, the obligee brought a second suit upon such bond to recover such instalments by the enforcement of the lien therein created on such property. *Held*, that, although the enforcement of such lien was claimed in the former suit, yet, inasmuch as it was very questionable whether the Court was competent to grant the second relief claimed in that suit, *viz.*, a declaration of right to recover instalments which were not due in execution of a decree for instalments which were due, and the claim in the second suit was not the same as that in the former suit, the plaintiff asking for instalments said to be actually due, and not for a declaratory decree for instalments not due, the second suit was not barred by s. 13 of Act X of 1877. **UMRAO LAL v. BEHARI SINGH** . . . **I. L. R. 3 All. 297**

**63.** ——— *Suit for partition—Right of widow—Subsequent suit to get rid of partition.* Where a widow was treated as an equal sharer in her husband's estate with her sons, and in conjunction with one son applied for partition as a sharer and objections taken to the partition were overruled, and no appeal made to the Civil Court:—*Held*, that a suit to declare the widow only entitled to maintenance was not maintainable. **OODIA v. BHOPAL** . . . **3 Agra 137**

**64.** ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 2 and 3—Admission—Revision of judgment.* Plaintiffs, having purchased the rights of a widow in certain properties, sued the defendants for partition of the share purchased; defendants admitted the widow's right to a certain extent, but the suit was dismissed on the ground that plaintiffs, before they could obtain partition, must establish the extent of their right and the validity of the purchase. *Held*, on plaintiffs' second suit, that it being between the same parties, and for the same property on the same cause of action, was barred by s. 2, Act VIII of 1859; that defendants' admission, which was merely an admission in plaintiffs' favour, gave no new cause of action; and that, if the Courts failed to decide all the matters in dispute which they had before them in the former suit, their judgment could not be revised in a new suit; such revision being contrary to the provisions of s. 3, Act VIII of 1859. **GHASEE KHAN v. KULLOO** **1 Agra 152**

**65.** ——— *Bom. Act V of 1864.* In 1871 the plaintiff sued to establish his sole right to a portion of a field on the ground that it had been allotted to him by partition. The defendant also claimed it as his share obtained by partition. The Court rejected the plaintiff's claim, holding that no partition had taken place, and that the field was the joint property of five co-parceners, including the plaintiff and defendant. In 1878 the

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

plaintiff brought a second suit for a partition of the field, including the portion for which his former suit had been instituted. *Held*, that the present suit for partition was not barred by the previous suit which was brought to establish the plaintiff's sole right to the lands in question. **SHIBRAM v. NARAYAN**

**I. L. R. 5 Bom. 27**

**66.** ——— *Former suit for declaration of right to partition, Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), s. 2.* A Hindu of the Southern Maratha Country having two sons undivided from him died in 1871, leaving a will disposing of ancestral estate substantially in favour of his second son, excluding the elder, who claimed his share in this suit. In 1861 a suit brought by this elder son against his father and brother to obtain a declaration of his right to a partition of the ancestral estate was dismissed, on the ground that he had no right in his father's lifetime to compel a partition of moveables; and that, as to the immoveables, the claim failed, because they were situate beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. In a suit by the elder son against his brother after the father's death for a share of the property on the ground that it was ancestral estate:—*Held*, that this suit was not barred under Act VIII of 1859, s. 2, the proceedings of 1861 not having amounted to an adjudication between the brothers as to their rights in the estate arising on their father's death. **LAKSHMAN DADA NAIK v. RAMCHANDRA DADA NAIK** **I. L. R. 5 Bom. 48**  
**L. R. 7 I. A. 181 : 7 C. L. R. 320**

**67.** ——— *Effect of unexecuted decree for partition in subsequent suit for partition of same property—Mortgage of share—Purchase by a stranger of portion of the lands included in the decree—Suit by him for partition.* A and B were the joint owners in equal shares of certain property. In 1869 B mortgaged his share to A under a mortgage-deed drawn up in the English form. Later on, in 1869, A brought a suit against B for partition, and in 1870 obtained a decree appointing a commissioner of partition and directing the partition. No return was made to this commission, and no actual partition was come to. In 1873 A obtained a decree for an account, and for payment, or in default, for sale of the property. In 1878 B's share was put up for sale, and purchased by C, and C was put into possession. In 1881 C brought a suit against A for partition. *Held*, that the decree obtained by A in 1873 put an end to B's right to redeem, unless he paid the amount found due against him, and therefore at the time of the sale to C, B's right to redeem had ceased to exist and the property was no longer subject to partition under the decree of 1870, and therefore the partition asked for under the suit of 1881 could be granted **KIRTY CHUNDER MITTER v. ANATH NATH DEY**

**I. L. R. 10 Calc. 97 : 13 C. L. R. 249**

**68.** ——— *Suit for declaration of right to partition—Decree not executed—Subsequent suit for same purpose.* Where a decree declaring a right to partition has not been



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

given effect to by the parties proceeding to partition in accordance with it, and the decree has become, by lapse of time or otherwise, unenforceable, it is competent to the parties, or any of them, if they still continue to be interested in the joint property, to bring a fresh suit for a declaration of their right for partition. Such a suit will not be barred by reason of the former decree for partition though that decree may operate as *res judicata* in respect of any claim or defence which was or might have been raised in the suit in which it was passed. *NAZRAT-ULLAH v. MUJIB-ULLAH* . I. L. R. 13 All. 309

69. ————— *Decree in former suit for partition—Partial and general partition—Account.* In a previous suit between the plaintiff and the defendant, the plaintiff alleged that there had been a partition of the family property into two parcels, and under a deed of partition drawn up at the time claimed one of these parcels. The deed being held invalid, the suit was rejected, with liberty to the plaintiff to sue for a general partition. In the second suit the plaintiff prayed for a general partition as a member of an undivided Hindu family. *Held*, that the second suit was not *res judicata*; for, although the plaintiff might in the first suit have made an alternative case and prayed for a general partition in case he failed to establish the previous partition which he alleged, yet it could not be said that he ought to have done so. *Held*, also, that in the case of joint enjoyment by the members of the whole family, or enjoyment by different members of different portions of the family property, the Court will not, except under special circumstances, order an account to be taken of past transactions, but will make division of the property actually existing at the date of partition. *Lakshman Dada Naik v. Ramchandra Dada Naik*, I. L. R. 5 Bom. 48, followed. *KONERRAY v. GURRAY* I. L. R. 5 Bom. 589

70. ————— *First suit based on the general right of a co-parcener to claim partition of the joint estate—Refusal of Judge in first suit to allow plaint to be amended so as to include claim to partition based on an award—Second suit based on an award—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13, expts. I, II.* In 1874 the plaintiffs' father filed a suit against the defendants for partition of joint family property. The subject-matter of the suit was referred to arbitration out of Court. The arbitrators made an award to the effect that partition should be postponed till the family debts were paid off. The award was accepted by all the sharers, and so the plaintiffs' father withdrew his suit. In 1880 the debts were paid off. Thereupon the plaintiffs' father demanded partition, but was refused. He therefore filed a partition suit in 1883 against the defendants. In his plaint he made no mention of the award of 1874 but relied on his right as a co-parcener to enforce partition. After the settlement of issues, he applied for amendment of the plaint, so as to include his claim on the award. The Court refused the amendment, on the ground that it would materially alter

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

the character of the suit, and dismissed the suit, as barred under s. 373 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882). Against this decision plaintiffs' father did not appeal. In 1884 the plaintiffs filed the present suit for partition, relying expressly on their title under the award of 1874. *Held*, that the suit was not barred by the plea of *res judicata*. *THAKORE BECHARJI RANAJI v. THAKORE PUJAJI VAKTAJI* . I. L. R. 14 Bom. 31

71. ————— *Suit for mesne profits—Former suit for possession.* The plaintiff sued to recover possession of land and for wasilat from the period at which he alleged he was dispossessed; and he obtained a decree for possession of the lands and for wasilat from the date of the plaint. He afterwards sued the defendant for wasilat from the date of the alleged dispossession to the date of the plaint. *Held*, that wasilat having been claimed in the previous plaint for that period, and there having been an adjudication upon his claim for wasilat and no evidence that wasilat was withheld for the period for which it was now claimed, through inadvertence or by mistake, the case was within Act VIII of 1859, s. 2, excluding from the jurisdiction of the Court causes of action "which shall have been heard and determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction to a former suit between the same parties." *LUTEEOFONISSA BIBEE v. LUCKEEMONEE DOSSEE* Marsh. 93 : 1 Hay 161

72. ————— *Where a plaint prayed for possession and wasilat, and a decree was given for possession without mention of the wasilat and on application for review it was urged, though not in the written grounds of application, that the question of wasilat ought to have been disposed of, but no decision was given as to it either by the High Court or by the Court of first instance, to which application was afterwards made:—Held*, that the fact that a prayer for wasilat was contained in the plaint in the suit in which only a decree for possession was given was not a bar to a subsequent suit for mesne profits within s. 2, Act VIII of 1859. *GAURI BAIJNATHPRASAD v. BUDHU SINGH* 2 B. L. R. S. N. 16

S.C. BYJNATH PERSHAD v. BADHOO SINGH 10 W. R. 486

73. ————— *Former suit alleging tenancy—Suit for mesne profits.* D sued R for an arrear of rent, but R denied his tenancy and D's title to the land, and was successful in that defence. D then sued in the Civil Court to recover possession with wasilat, which he estimated at the rate of the rent previously claimed, and obtained a decree for possession without wasilat. *Held*, that the second suit was not for the same thing as the first under a different name, and that plaintiff was entitled to wasilat as well as possession. *DATARAM v. RAM KRISTO* . 9 W. R. 594

74. ————— *Suit for ejectment—Former suit deciding as to relinquishment of the land.* *Held*, that a former suit which decided the question of



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

relinquishment of the land by defendant, a raiyat, did not bar a subsequent suit which was brought on the allegation that, the land being sir land, the defendant, the occupant, had no right of occupancy, and should consequently be ejected. **NAIPAL SINGH v. RAM NARAIN** . . . **2 Agra 93**

**75.** ———— *Suit to recover possession, dismissal of—Subsequent suit to enhance rent.* In a suit to recover khas possession of land, of which the plaintiff alleged he had been fraudulently dispossessed by the defendant, the defendant claimed to be entitled to the possession of the land under a deed of gift at a fixed rent. The Judge found upon the facts that the deed of gift was invalid; that the land was mal; and that the defendant was entitled to retain the possession, and thereupon dismissed the suit. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not precluded by the decision in that suit from afterwards maintaining a suit against the defendant to enhance the rent. **NEELMONEY SINGH DEO v. SHOBHAN BEBEE** . . . **Marsh. 600**

**76.** ———— *Suit for same land on different title—Failure in former suit.* Plaintiff, after failing in a former suit to establish her right to certain land as belonging to her patni talukh, was not allowed to fall back on a different title and bring a separate suit claiming the same land as belonging to her mirasi, the cause of action in both cases being really the same. **ATUNGO MOHUN DEB v. UNNODA DOSSEE** **17 W. R. 351**

**77.** ———— *Suit for possession—Dismissal of former suit for possession as heir.* A suit for possession as the heir of S is not barred by s. 2, Act VIII of 1859, because plaintiff's former claim to the same property as the heir of S's father was dismissed. **GOOROO DUTT v. SOOROO** **16 W. R. 264**

**78.** ———— *Suit on title derived by gift—Subsequent suit as heir.* *Held* (**MITTER, J., dubitante**), that suit claiming property on a title by inheritance was barred by ss. 2 and 7, Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, where plaintiff's claim on a title derived by gift had already been adjudicated upon. **DUDSAR BIBEE v. SHAKIR BUKUNDAZ** . . . **15 W. R. 168**

**79.** ———— *Suit for ejectment based on alleged lease—Subsequent suit to eject tenant as trespasser founded on ownership.* The present plaintiffs in 1896 sued the present defendants to eject the latter from a certain piece of land, alleging that the defendants held it under certain leases dated July 1864. The genuineness of the alleged leases was put in issue in that suit, and was decided by the Subordinate Judge in favour of the plaintiffs, who accordingly obtained a decree. On appeal the District Judge reversed that decree, being of opinion that the alleged leases were not proved. In 1874 the plaintiffs brought the present suit to eject the defendants. In this suit the plaintiffs sued simply as owners, and alleged that the defendants were in occupation as tenants paying

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

rent to the plaintiffs, and that they (the defendants) had refused to give up possession. *Held* (**MELVILL, J., dissentiente**), that the plaintiffs were not barred by the judgment in the former suit. The fact of both the suits being against the defendants as tenants of the plaintiffs did not imply that the suits were on the same cause of action. The term "tenancy" may be applied to a great many different relations between the occupier and the owner of property, agreeing perhaps only in the single circumstance of a holding by the one of the property of the other. The test in each case is not whether a tenancy has in both suits been sued on, but whether the particular contract or relation put forward in the first case was the same specific contract sued on in the second. A cause of action reduced to the concrete form in a contest between individuals implied a specific right and a specific infringement of the right; and a judgment that one such specific right had not been made out was not a trial and determination of a cause of action resting on another specific right. The specific rights on which the plaintiffs relied in the two suits were different, and would have to be proved by different evidence. **GIRDHAR MANORDAS v. DAYABHAI KALABHAI** . . . **I. L. R. 8 Bom. 174**

**80.** ———— *Suit for accretion—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—Different cause of action.* A suit for a declaration of the plaintiff's right to a chur, which they claimed as an accretion to mouzah L, was *held* to be barred under Act VIII of 1859, s. 2, by a judgment in a former suit, in which they had claimed the same land as an accretion to mouzah R, because, whether by accretion to the one estate or to the other, the question in both suits was that of title by accretion. A complainant is bound to bring forward in this suit all the grounds of origin of his right. A difference in the origin of the right is not a matter which makes a different cause of action. **KASHEE KISHORE ROY CHOWDHRY v. KRISTO CHUNDER SANDYAL CHOWDHRY** **22 W. R. 464**

**81.** ———— *Decision as to quantity of land held—Former suit for kabuliati.* In a previous suit the plaintiff sought to obtain a kabuliati from the defendant in respect of land held by him alleging the quantity to be 8 bighas and 17 cottahs. It was therein determined that the defendant held only 7 bighas and no more. In the present suit brought to eject the defendant from 1 bigha 17 cottahs of land:—*Held*, that it was not maintainable, as it was for the determination of a question decided in the former suit. **GOPAL CHANDRA ROY v. NABIN CHANDRA BHANDARI** **3 B. L. R. Ap. 34**

**82.** ———— *Decision as to quantity of land held—Suit for rent—Suit for measurement—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 13.* In a suit by raiyats against their zamindar, praying for measurement of certain land, and for a declaration of the amount of yearly rental, it appeared that, in a previous suit for rent by the zamindar against



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

the raiyats, the raiyats had alleged that the amount of rent and the extent of land had been overstated by the zamindar, but the Court decided that the raiyats were bound by a jumma bundi signed by them, and refused to try whether the extent had been overstated. *Held*, that the present suit was not barred as *res judicata*. **ROGHONATH MUNDUL v. JUGGUT BUNDHOO BOSE**

**I. L. R. 7 Calc. 214 : 8 C. L. R. 393**

**83.** ———— *Decision as to boundaries of land—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 13.* The plaintiff sued to recover certain lands, claiming them as a portion of A and alleging that A was portion of a mouzah which had been leased to him in patni by the zamindar. The suit was dismissed, on the ground that, though A was known as a part of the plaintiff's mouzah, yet it had been included in a patni lease of an adjoining mouzah, which the zamindars had granted to the defendants previously to the date of the plaintiff's lease. The plaintiff brought a second suit claiming another portion of A on the same title. *Held*, that the claim was barred as *res judicata*. **Mohidin v. Muhammad Abrahim**, 1 Mad. 245; **Nundkishore Singh v. Huree Pershad Mundul**, 13 W. R. 64; **Prannath Sandyal v. Ramcoomar Sandyal**, 2 C. L. R. 33; and **Gobind Chunder Koondoo v. Taruk Chunder Bose**, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 145, followed. **SUNDHYA MALA v. DABI CHURN DUTT**

**S.C. SUNDHYAMULA v. DEVI CHURN DUTT**

**9 C. L. R. 216**

**84.** ———— *Failure of suit for possession.* Where a party failing to obtain judgment for the possession of land claimed by her in her first suit as taffir, brought a fresh suit claiming the land as property belonging to her talukh according to the true boundary line:—*Held*, affirming the decision of the High Court, that her suit was barred by s. 2 of Act VIII of 1859. **WOOMATARA DEBIA v. UNNOPOORNA DASSEE**

**11 B. L. R. P. C. 158 : 18 W. R. 163**

**S.C. in High Court. UMATARA DEBIA v. KRISHNA KAMINI DASI**

**2 B. L. R. A. C. 102**

**S.C. WOOMATARA DABEE v. UNNOPOORNA DOSSEE**

**10 W. R. 426**

**SHIB SHUNKUR NEOGY v. HURO SOONDUREE GOOPTA**

**13 W. R. 209**

**85.** ———— *Suit for possession and to set aside sale in execution of decree—Subsequent suit on the ground that sale was ab initio void.* When a plaintiff sues for possession and determination of right to a certain property, and set aside an execution sale of a portion of the property on the ground of irregularity, and his suit is dismissed on the merits, a subsequent suit for possession of the property sold, on the ground that the sale was void *ab initio*, is barred as *res judicata*. **Wooma Tara Debia v. Unnopoorna Dassee**, 11 B. L. R. 158, and **Periya Odaya Taver v. Katama Nat-**

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

*chiar*, 11 Moo. I. A. 50, cited and followed. **Pigov v. MOHAMED ABOO SYED**

**3 C. L. R. 253**

**86.** ———— *Sales under different decrees—Reversal on appeal of decision setting aside sale—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2.* In execution of a decree, the right, title, and interest of A in a certain property were sold and purchased by B. In execution of another decree, the right, title, and interest of A and C in the same property were sold and purchased by D. In a suit by A the sale to B was set aside, but on appeal the decision of the Court of first instance was, upon consent of the parties, set aside, and the sale allowed to stand good. D sued for possession of the share of A and C in the property purchased by him, and obtained a decree for possession of the share of C only. D now sued to set aside the sale to B and for possession of the share of A. *Held*, that the suit was not barred by s. 2, Act VIII of 1859. **CHANNA LAL SAHU v. MANU LAL**

**5 B. L. R. 220 : 13 W. R. 343**

**87.** ———— *Subsequent suit on different grounds for same property—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11.* On the 30th June 1855 S, a Lingayat priest, died possessed of moveable and immoveable property. The right of succession to it being disputed, the District Judge placed it under the management of the nazir, under Bombay Regulation VIII of 1827, s. 9. In 1869, B, representing himself as the disciple of S, and claiming as such to be entitled to the whole of the property left by S, brought a suit (No. 962 of 1869) against the defendant to establish his right to the property in question, and to recover possession of it. The suit was compromised by an agreement, upon which the Court passed a decree on the 23rd March 1870, dividing the property of S in certain shares between B and the defendant. When B and the defendant applied for possession of the property in execution of this decree, the nazir, who had it in his charge, resisted them. The execution-proceedings dropped in consequence of the death of B. The plaintiff thereupon (as a disciple of B deceased) and the defendant sued the nazir separately, each claiming the whole property of S. The plaintiff's suit was rejected on the ground that he failed to prove himself the disciple of B. In that suit the plaintiff produced neither the compromise made between B and the defendant, nor the decree passed on it in suit No. 962 of 1869. The defendant succeeded in his suit, and obtained possession of the whole property. The plaintiff then sued, as the disciple of B, to recover from the defendant the portion of the property of S which fell to the share of B according to the compromise on which the decree in suit No. 962 of 1869 was made. *Held* by WEST, J., that the suit was barred, first, because the plaintiff had been judicially pronounced not to be the disciple of B in his suit against the nazir to which the defendant was a party as the true successor or *primâ facie* successor represented by the nazir in that suit. It was not open to those who had as



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

heirs sued the official representative of an estate, and failed, to sue the owner, when ascertained, a second time on the same right. Secondly, because the plaintiff, in his suit against the nazir, was bound to bring forward every ground on which he could claim the property; and if the compromise effected by *B* was such a ground, that compromise and the decree founded on it ought to have been brought forward to sustain the claim, as it would have shut out a ground of defence consisting of the defendant's superior right. As the plaintiff omitted to do so, the more recent decree, which pronounced him not entitled to any part of the property of *S*, superseded the earlier one, which ineffectually awarded *B* a moiety of that property as against that person not in possession; and while that decree was unreversed, another decree could not be made awarding to the same plaintiff one-half of the same property in the same right as against the defendant whom the nazir represented in the earlier suit. *Held* by PINHEY, J., that the property claimed in the present suit had been specifically awarded to *B* by the decree of the 23rd March 1870, and if that decree were not time barred, *B* or his legal representative could obtain possession by taking out execution-proceedings on that decree. The present suit therefore was barred alike by s. 2 of Act VIII of 1859 and s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861, and the fact that execution of the decree in suit No. 962 of 1869 was time-barred did not confer on *B* or any legal heir of his a new right to sue for the estate of *S* or any part of it. SHIVALINGAYA v. NAGALINGAYA *59*. . . I. L. R. 4 Bom. 247

88. ——— Suit for same property on different cause of action—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2*. In 1856 the plaintiff, the zamindar of Tarla (who had attained his majority in 1853), instituted suits for the recovery of the two villages claimed in the present suit on the ground that the villages were jera-yati, and had been temporarily alienated, and he claimed a right of resumption. It was decided that the villages had formed a mokasa jaghir from a date prior to that of the permanent settlement, and that, as they did not constitute a portion of the assets of the zamindari at the date of the settlement, there was no right of resumption. Pending those suits, an order was issued by Government which plaintiff construed as a transfer to him of the Government right in the villages, and he founded the present suit upon the lapse of the mokasa to Government, and the order transferring the right to him:—*Held*, that the present suit was not *res judicata*. RAMA CHANDRA SURYA ARICHANDRANA DEO v. DARVADA RAMANNA CHANDIRI 3 Mad. 207

89. ——— Suit for same property on same cause of action—*Suit for possession—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 223, 224*. Where a suit was preferred for the purpose of recovering possession of defendants' lands, for possession of which plaintiff had already obtained a decree against the same defendants and others, the suit was *held* to

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

be barred, as the cause of action was not different from that which had been previously determined. Instead of asking for delivery of possession under s. 224, plaintiff's proper course would have been a resort to the provisions of s. 223 of the Civil Procedure Code. RAM SURN MUHTON v. JINONAUTH BHUGGUT . . . 10 W. R. 396

90. ——— Suit for confirmation of sale—*Subsequent suit for certificate of sale*. The purchaser at the sale of a talukh sold under a judgment upon a decree, sued to reverse the order of a Judge annulling the sale, and in that suit he craved confirmation of the sale, that he might be put into possession of the talukh, and for a decree for mesne profits. This suit being dismissed on the merits, he instituted another suit, in which he craved a bynamah, or certificate of sale. *Held*, that the second suit was brought for the same causes and subject-matter as the first, and that the plaintiff was therefore precluded by the dismissal of the first suit from obtaining it. LAMB v. DEWAN PUDDUM LOCHUN . . . Marsh. 96 : W. R. F. B. 28 1 Hay 168

91. ——— Suit for right to share in ancestral property—*Cause of action different—Judgment in former suit*. A suit to establish the plaintiff's right to a share of ancestral property, part of which was in his sole possession cannot operate as a *res judicata* in a subsequent suit to recover possession of a part of the ancestral property which was as, he alleges, in his sole possession, and from which he was forcibly evicted by the defendant during the pendency of that suit. HURONATH ROY v. GOOROO DOSS ROY. GOOROO DASS ROY v. HURONATH ROY . . . 7 W. R. 423

92. ——— Causes of action identical—*Title—Test for determination as to res judicata*. The plaintiff purchased certain lands from the heirs of a Mussalman proprietor; the defendant *M* purchased other lands of the same estate from their co-heirs. In 1864 the plaintiff sued to have the sale to the defendant *M* set aside. In the course of the suit, however, he admitted that he was in possession of all the lands he had brought, and his claim was therefore rejected. In 1869 the plaintiff brought a suit, in the form of a partition-suit, praying for demarcation of the lands bought by the defendant *M* and himself. It was treated as substantially an ejectment suit, and rejected on the same grounds as the first suit, namely, his admission as above stated. In appeal to the High Court it was urged by the plaintiff that, since the date of his admission in the first suit some of his tenants had attorned to the defendant *M*, and thus deprived him of part of his land; but as this allegation had not been made in his plaint, the Court refused to allow the point to be raised. The present suit was founded on the attornment of plaintiff's tenants to the defendant *M*, alleged to have been made in 1868. The plaintiff contended that, although the cause of action was in existence when the second suit was brought in 1869, yet that it had



**RES JUDICATA—contd.****6. CAUSES OF ACTION—contd.**

not been adjudicated upon, and that in appeal he had been prevented from arguing it. *Held*, that the plaintiff was stopped. The causes of action in the second and third suit were identical. Having striven to establish his title by one means and failed, the plaintiff could not establish the same title by other means which were equally at his command when the previous suit was instituted and which were so connected with the grounds on which he in that suit relied, that they ought to have been submitted together for the consideration of the Court. In determining whether a question is *res judicata*, the Court will have regard to the substance of the previous suit rather than its form. If the cause of action is based on a right identical in both suits, or on the same group of facts infringing that right, the second suit is barred. **HASAM IBRAHIM v. MANCHARAM KALLIANDAS** . I. L. R. 3 Bom. 137

**93.** ———— **Suit for share of joint property under an agreement—Subsequent suit as heir.** A Hindu of the Sudra caste died in 1850, leaving him surviving his two widows, *B* and *S*, a son *M*, and daughter *D*, the children, respectively, of *B* and *S* and an illegitimate son, the plaintiff. The plaintiff and *M* continued to live together for some time after their father's death. But subsequently, owing to domestic quarrels, they lived separately, and the plaintiff was allowed by *M* a portion of the family property, under an agreement in writing. They were, however, joint and undivided in estate, and continued to be so until the death of *M* in 1865. In 1866 the plaintiff brought a suit on the agreement and obtained a decree against *B*, *S*, *D*, and *R* (a lessee of *B*) for the property mentioned in the agreement. In 1870 the plaintiff brought a second suit as heir of his father and brother, and claimed the whole of the ancestral property. Both the lower Courts rejected his claim as barred by the previous suit. *Held*, in special appeal by **MELVILL and NANABHAI HARIDAS, J.J.**, that the claim was not barred, inasmuch as the former suit was brought on the agreement, while the latter was instituted to establish plaintiff's general rights as heir of his father and brother. **SADU v. BAIZA**

I. L. R. 4 Bom. 37

**94.** ———— **Suit on a family arrangement—Second suit for the same subject-matter as co-sharers—Causes of action.** The defendant's great-grandfather was uncle of one *B H*, who was the great-grandfather of the plaintiffs, and they (*i.e.*, the defendant's great-grandfather and his nephew *B H*) were entitled in equal half shares to a certain vatan property. The defendant and his brothers now represented the former, and were entitled to his half share, and the plaintiffs represented the latter, and were entitled to his half share. The plaintiffs' father, *B R*, lived with the defendant and the defendant's brothers, *M* and *K*, as members of an undivided family up to the year 1845, in which year the plaintiffs' father, *B R*, being then absent from the village, the defendant's brothers, *M* and *K*, executed a deed of partition whereby they divi-

**RES JUDICATA—contd.****6. CAUSES OF ACTION—contd.**

ded the ancestral property into two equal shares, one-half of which the plaintiffs' father was to receive, the other half going to the defendant and his brothers. The deed, among other recitals, contained a clause to the effect that the plaintiff's father being then absent from the village, the defendant's brothers would manage his share during his absence, and on his return hand the same over to him on his paying the expenses incurred by them in such management. In 1873 the plaintiffs' undivided brother brought a suit against the defendant and others on an agreement alleged to have been executed between him (plaintiffs' brother) and the defendant and his brothers by which the said brothers had bound themselves to return one-third share to him (the plaintiffs' brother). This suit was dismissed as against the defendant, as he had not been a party to that agreement, and plaintiffs' brother was referred to a separate suit for partition against the defendant. The plaintiffs therefore now brought the present suit claiming their share in the vatan estate. The defendant (*inter alia*) contended that the suit was barred as *res judicata* by the former suit, that neither the plaintiffs nor their forefathers had enjoyed the property during the previous 150 years, and that the claim was barred by limitation. Both the lower Courts allowed the plaintiffs' claim. The defendant preferred a second appeal to the High Court. *Held*, confirming the decree of the lower Court, that the former suit having been brought on an alleged agreement, it did not bar the present suit, which was based on the plaintiffs' hereditary right to sue as members of the family. **NILO RAMCHANDRA v. GOBIND BALLAL**

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 24

**95.** ———— **Suit under will—Subsequent suit in right of heirship—Former suit on different grounds.** *N* sued *M* and *K* claiming proprietary possession under the Mahomedan law of a share in certain property by right of heirship to her deceased husband. She had previously sued the same persons to recover a portion of the same property under a will of her husband, and obtained a decree which was reversed on the ground of the will being invalid. *Held* (in accordance with the opinion of the Full Bench), that the second suit was not barred by s. 2, Act VIII of 1859. **NOUSHA BEGUM v. UMRAO BEGUM** . . . . . 7 N. W. 60

**96.** ———— **Suit for possession as heiress—Subsequent suit on ground of family custom.** In a suit governed by the Mitakshara, in which *A*, a Hindu widow, was the plaintiff, and *B* was one of the defendants, the plaintiff sought and obtained a decree for possession of certain lands to which she claimed to be entitled as mother and heiress of her deceased son. *B* subsequently brought a suit against *A*, alleging that he, and not *A*, had become entitled thereto on the death of *A*'s son, under a kulachar, or family custom, which excluded female heirs, and gave him a preferential



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

right among male heirs, and thereby sought to recover from her possession of the same lands, and alternatively to obtain a declaration that he was as such heir if then living, entitled to possession of them on her death, and that a deed executed by her alienating a portion of them was valid only for her life-time. *Held*, that the decision in the former suit that *A* was entitled to the lands as mother and heiress of her deceased son, was conclusive against *B*'s claim or possession during her life-time, on the ground that she was not the heiress; but that the plaintiff was not barred by the adjudication in the former suit from setting up the family custom with the object of showing that on *A*'s death he would be entitled to succeed her, if living, and was by reason of such heirship entitled to obtain a declaratory decree as to the deed of alienation. *DOORGA PERSAD SINGH v. DOORGA KONWARI*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 190 : 3 C. L. R. 31  
L. R. 5 I. A. 149

97. ——— Suit for property in right of inheritance—*Ground of claim disposed of in former suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2.* In a suit to recover, in virtue of a right of inheritance, a share of a deceased father's estate from which plaintiff had been ousted in 1858:—*Held*, that, as the plaintiff had brought a suit in 1853 in which she claimed the same properties as belonging to her father's estate, and had accepted and acted upon the decree then passed, which excluded the property in question from her claim, her present suit was barred by s. 2, Act VIII of 1859; and further that she could not claim the property on the ground of a solenamah by which it was admitted and declared that the property belonged to her father's estate, when it had been already decided in the former suit that it ought not to appertain to that estate. *SYD- OONISSA v. FEDA HOSSAIN*

12 W. R. 182

98. ——— Compromise of suit—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—Suit on same cause of action as former suit.* A suit between two brothers, *A* and *B*, respecting ancestral property, was compromised, and the particulars of the compromise embodied in a razinama presented in Court by both parties. *A* having died, his widow and *B* presented in Court another razinama embodying the particulars of an arrangement respecting the property in which she had become interested as widow, and which was comprised in the former razinama; and of this second razinama they subsequently put in an amended copy. *Held*, that a claim arising out of such agreement could not, within the meaning of Act VIII of 1859, s. 2, be considered to have been a cause of action heard and determined in the former suit. *LAKSHMI AMMAL v. TIKARAM TOVAJI*

1 Mad. 240

99. ——— Suit for property as joint—*Former suit for same property as separate—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2.* The plaintiffs in the present suit claimed, as the heirs of *J*, certain property from *M*, the daughter of *R*, alleging that such

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

property was the joint and undivided property of *R* and *J* to which, on *R*'s death, *J* had succeeded. The plaintiffs had formerly, after the death of *J*, sued *M* for such property, alleging that it was the separate property of *R*, and that, on the death of *R*'s widow, they were entitled to succeed thereto. *Held*, that the decision in the former suit that such property was the separate property of *R* to which *M* was entitled to succeed on the death of his widow was a bar to their present suit. *RADHIA v. BENI*

I. L. R. 1 All. 580

100. ——— Suit for property as heirs—*Failure to put forward all grounds—Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), s. 2—Former suit to recover same property on different grounds.* Certain property, originally belonging to the husband of the plaintiff, was conveyed by him by deed of gift to his daughter, after her marriage with the defendant, as her stridhan. Some years after the daughter's death, the plaintiff brought a suit to recover the property, on the ground that the deed of gift was a forgery, and that she was entitled to the property as heiress of her husband; but her suit was dismissed, the deed of gift being found to be genuine. In a suit subsequently brought to recover the same property, on the ground that the plaintiff was heiress of her daughter:—*Held*, by the majority of a Full Bench (*GARTH, C.J.*, dissenting), that the suit was barred. *DENOBUNDHOO CHOWDHRY v. KRISTOMONEE DOSSEE*

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 152

101. ——— Suit for specific sum of money—*Act VIII of 1859, s. 2.* In a suit for a specific sum of money, it was *held*, in accordance with the Full Bench decision in *Dinobundhoo Chowdhry v. Kristomonee Dossee*, I. L. R. 2 Calc. 152, that the plaintiff was bound to put forward every right under which he claims. *BHEEKA LALL v. BHUGGOO LALL*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 23

102. ——— Subsequent suit for same cause of action, but larger amount—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 13.* The decision of a District Judge deciding that the plaintiff in not entitled to sue in a suit for road cess, where the amount claimed is less than R100, and therefore no second appeal lies to the High Court, is a bar to a second suit in which the amount claimed is above R100. *DAVID v. GRISH CHANDER GUHA*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 183 : 11 C. L. R. 305

103. ——— Suit for account—*Subsequent suit for balance due—Principal and agent.* In the *mofussil*, if a principal, in a suit against his agent, prays merely that the defendant be ordered to render accounts to the plaintiff, a second suit brought by him for the recovery of the money found due by the defendant on examining the accounts will not be barred as *res judicata*. *GOBIND MOHUN CHUCKERBUTTY v. SHERIFF*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 169 : 8 C. L. R. 357

104. ——— Suit to recover property from *zur-i-peshgidars*—*Subsequent suit alleging discharge of mortgage—Civil Procedure Code, 1859—*



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

8. 2—*Different cause of action.* The plaintiffs had brought a former suit to recover possession of certain property which had been mortgaged to the defendants under a zur-i-peshgi lease, and obtained a decree for possession on their depositing the sum which the Court found to be due on the mortgage. The plaintiffs delayed applying for execution till four years after, when they alleged that the money had been paid off by the usufruct of the land. Their application having been refused they brought the present suit for possession, alleging that the debt had been discharged by the usufruct. *Held*, that the present cause of action within the meaning of Act VIII of 1859, s. 2, was a fresh cause of action as compared with the former one, which was for an adjudication of the state of the accounts between the parties up to a certain date, whereas the latter had reference to the accounts since that date.

ROY DINKUR DOYAL *v.* SHEO GOLAM SINGH

22 W. R. 172

105. ——— Suit to set aside attachment, dismissal of—*Subsequent suit to recover property.* The plaintiff sued to raise an attachment placed upon a certain house, but failed in the lower Court, and the decision of the lower Court was confirmed upon appeal. The house was then sold. The plaintiff sued the purchaser to recover possession of it. *Held*, that he was not estopped from suing by the decision in the former suit refusing to raise the attachment, and that such decision could not be given in evidence in the latter suit. MORO BALKRISHNA MULE *v.* SHEK SAHEB VALAD BADRUDDIN KAMBLE . . . 5 Bom. A. C. 199

106. ——— Suit to establish title—*Former suit to raise attachment.* K sued to establish his title to a house purchased by him from D D's guardians during minority, alleging that the greater part of the purchase-money was employed in paying of a mortgage claim upon the house; that after he had obtained possession under his deed one D S, the holder of a decree against D D's guardians, attached the house; and that he brought the suit to raise the attachment, in which having failed he paid into Court the amount of D S's claim. *Held*, that K was not estopped from bringing this suit against D D, by the decree in his former suit to raise the attachment, which declared that the deed of sale now relied upon was fraudulent and void as against D S. DAGDU BIN DAUD TELI PARDESHI *v.* SHEK SAHEB VALAD BADRUDDIN KAMBLE . . . 2 Bom. 369 : 2nd Ed. 348

107. ——— Suit to set aside order releasing from attachment properties as to which a former suit has been dismissed—*Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), ss. 2 and 7—Relinquishment—Mortgage made during infructuous attachment—Subsequent attachment and sale.* R, on the 30th December 1870, obtained an *ex parte* decree against D, in execution of which he attached properties X and Y on the 4th January 1871. D applied for a re-hearing, which was grant-

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

ed; and on the 30th December 1871 a decree was again passed against D, in execution of which the same properties were attached on the 9th of August 1872, and purchased as the execution-sale on the 1st August 1874 by R. On the 14th February 1871, D had executed a solehnama and mortgage in favour of G, pledging, among other properties, X and Y as security for a loan made to him by G. D having made default in payment, G obtained a decree against him in terms on the solehnama on the 28th February 1871. Subsequently, D granted another mortgage of the same properties in favour of G. G sold his decree and mortgage to the plaintiff, who in execution of the decree attached properties X and Y. In these execution-proceedings R brought forward the fact of his purchase of the same properties in August 1874, and his claim was allowed, and the properties X and Y released from attachment on the 4th March 1876. The plaintiffs had, on the 8th March 1872, obtained a mortgage from D, on which they had obtained a decree on the 28th September 1874, in execution of which they had attached X and Y; but on R claiming them under his purchase in August 1874, an order was made on the 10th April 1875 releasing X and Y from attachment and in a suit by plaintiff to set aside that order, they failed as to properties X and Y, on the ground that those properties were not included in the mortgage of March 1872. In a subsequent suit brought by the plaintiffs against R and D to set aside the order of the 4th March 1876, and to have X and Y declared liable to be sold under the decree of the 28th February 1871:—*Held*, that the suit was not barred under s. 2 of Act VIII of 1859 by the decree in the previous suit, nor was it barred by s. 7 of the same Act. *Held*, also, that the purchase by R in August 1874 was subject to the mortgage to G of the 14th February 1871. RADHANATH KUNDU *v.* LAND MORTGAGE BANK OF INDIA . . . I. L. R. 6 Calc. 559 : 8 C. L. R. 10

108. ——— Attachment, application to remove—*Removal of attachment unknown to applicant—Failure of application—Second attachment—Second application to remove—New cause of action.* The plaintiff, mortgagee in possession of certain property, applied for the removal of an attachment placed on it by the defendant in execution of a decree against a third party. In default of payment of Court-fees by the defendant, the attachment was removed, but in ignorance of this fact the plaintiff's application was proceeded with, and ultimately rejected. The plaintiff then brought a suit for a declaration of his right, but it was dismissed, on the ground that the attachment had already been removed. Subsequently the defendant placed a second attachment on the property, which the plaintiff again applied to remove. The defendant contended that the plaintiff's application was barred by the proceedings on the first attachment. *Held*, that the decision on the plaintiff's first application having no object existing on which to operate, the attachment having then been re-



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

moved, it could not properly be regarded as *res judicata* at all, since no one was seriously interested in having it decided in a different way; and that supposing submission to that decision on the part of the plaintiff for a certain time could have given it a final effect, there had, as a matter of fact, been no such submission, the plaintiff having done all that was incumbent on him to get the summary inquiry and orders replaced by a formal trial and judgment; and that there was nothing therefore in these proceedings disentitling the defendant to oppose the second attachment. *Held*, also, that the second attachment, after the first had been removed, was a new and distinct act, giving rise to a new cause of action, or complaint, to the plaintiff, on which, in any case, he was entitled to a fresh inquiry and decision. *KASHINATH MORSHETH v. RAMCHANDRA GOPINATH*. I. L. R. 7 Bom. 408

109. ——— Suit for 'declaration' of title—*Subsequent suit for possession—Application to remove attachment*. B sold to J a turuf of which 3½ kanes were subsequently attached on a decree obtained by M. After objecting unsuccessfully to the attachment, J brought a suit against the auction-purchaser, joining B as a defendant, to have it declared that the 3½ kanes belonged to himself; but failed on the ground that he was holding it benami for B. Subsequently the auction-purchaser bought from B the rest of the talukh and sued her for possession. J got himself entered as a defendant under s. 73, Act VIII of 1859. *Held*, that there was no identity between the subjects of the two suits, and J's former suit for all that he was then entitled to sue for on the cause of action that he had on the attachment did not deprive him of his right to a fresh and independent judgment in the present case. *Held*, also, that the former judgment did not create an adjudication of the cause in the latter suit, and if evidence, it was not conclusive evidence or binding on the Judge. *RAM CHUNDER CHOWDHRY v. KASHEE MOHUN*

21 W. R. 57

110. ——— Suit for declaration of liability to sale in execution—*Joint property, liability of, to sale in execution of decree against one member of a family—Hindu law—Joint family—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 278, 280, and 283—Limitation—Right of suit*. In execution of a decree for rent against a lessee, who was one of the members of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, property other than the tenure was attached by the decree-holder. Objection was raised under s. 278 of the Civil Procedure Code by other members, and an order was passed under s. 280 releasing the interest of all members except the lessee. Within one year of the order, the present suit was brought by the decree-holder to bring to sale the whole property, on the ground that all the defendants being members of a joint family were benefited by the lease, and were liable for the decretal money. The

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

defendant pleaded, *inter alia*, that the suit was barred by *res judicata*, and that the suits decreed having been for rents of the years 1884 to 1887, the present suit brought in 1891 against the additional parties was barred by limitation. *Held* (*per PRINSEP and GHOSE, JJ.*), that the suit would lie, and neither the plea of limitation nor the bar of *res judicata* was applicable to it. *Held* (*per PRINSEP, J.*)—Ss. 278 to 283 of the Civil Procedure Code contemplate the liability of the property to sale, because of its being the property of the judgment-debtor or because it is liable to the decree passed against him as sued in a representative capacity; they do not contemplate a suit to establish the liability of third persons. *Nuthoo Lall Chowdhry v. Shoukee Lall*, 10 B. L. R. 200 : 18 W. R. 458, and *Nobin Chandra Roy v. Magantara Dassya*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 923, referred to. *Sitanath Koer v. Land Mortgage Bank of India*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 888, dissented from. *Held* (*per GHOSE, J.*), that having in view the principle which underlies the cases of *Bissessur Lall Shahoo v. Luchmessur Singh*, L. R. 6 I. A. 233 : 5 C. L. R. 477, and *Jeo Lal Singh v. Gunga Pershad*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 996, as also the cases of *Sitanath Koer v. Land Mortgage Bank of India*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 888, and *Nobin Chandra Roy v. Magantara Dassya*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 924, the present suit was maintainable; the suit being regarded as one for declaration that the decree was obtained against the lessee in his representative capacity, and that the other members were therefore liable to satisfy it. *Nuthoo Lall Chowdhry v. Shoukee Lall*, 10 B. L. R. 200 : 18 W. R. 458, and *Hemendro Coomar Mullick v. Rajendro Lall Moonshee*, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 353, distinguished. *RADHA PERSHAD SINGH v. RAMKHELAWAN SINGH*

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 302

111. ——— Continuing contract—*Suit for damages*. A, on the 1st of February 1868, entered into a contract with B to supply him with straw for twelve months, the supplies to be sent as ordered daily. On the 12th of March B brought an action in the Small Cause Court against A for damages sustained by the plaintiff by reason of A's having failed to supply straw as agreed upon. The Judge decided the questions in issue (namely, of the factum of the contract and the authority of the person who executed it in A's behalf) in favour of B, and gave him a decree. On the 21st of April, a second suit was brought by B against A on the same contract. The claim was for damages sustained by the plaintiff by reason of A's having failed to supply straw as agreed from the 20th of February to the 17th April. That suit was dismissed, the Judge holding that the matter was *res adjudicata*, as he considered that the contract was an entire one, and that B had shown by suing on it for general damages, that he treated it as such, and had elected to rescind it. On the 9th of May a rule *nisi* was granted for a new trial, and on the 16th of May the rule was made absolute. On the 12th June, at the new trial, a decree was made in favour of B for so



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

much of the damages claimed as had been sustained subsequently to the date of the decree of the 25th March. In an action brought by *B* on the same contract for damages sustained between the 17th April and the 16th of June, by reason of *A* having failed to supply straw according to the terms of the same contract, *A* denied that there had been any such contract and further pleaded that the matter of the contract, if there had been one, had already been adjudicated upon. On a reference from the Small Cause Court:—*Held*, that the finding of the Judge upon the contract in the action brought on the 12th of March was conclusive between the parties, and that *A*'s plea of *res adjudicata* was not well founded. *COOK v. JADUB CHUNDRA NANDI*. . . . . **2 B. L. R. O. C. 48**

**112.** ——— *Suit on joint contract—Civil Procedure Code, s. 2—Suit on joint bond.* *D* and *B* executed a bond, by which they mortgaged certain lands as security for a loan taken by them from the plaintiffs. A suit was brought and a decree was obtained by the plaintiffs against *D* and *B*, under which they recovered a portion of the amount due on the bond. The plaintiffs now sued *S* and others, on the ground that they were joint proprietors of the land mortgaged, that the loan was taken by *D* and *B*, as managers for the use of all the parties interested, and for carrying on their joint business and trade, and that therefore they were all jointly liable. *Held*, that the suit could not be maintained. *Ramnath Roy Chowdhry v. Chunder Sekhur Mohapattur*, 4 W. R. 50, dissented from. *NUTHOO LALL CHOWDHRY v. SHOUKEE LALL*. . . . . **10 B. L. R. 200 : 18 W. R. 458**

**113.** ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 13 and 43—Joint owners—Suit against one sharer—Decree against property—Claim by other co-sharer allowed—Suit against both sharers.* Through ignorance of the position of affairs, one only of two persons joint owners in a property, was sued for a debt for which the property had been pledged by the person sued, and a decree was obtained and execution issued against the property: and in such execution-proceedings the other sharer put in a claim, and obtained an order releasing her share of the property from attachment. A second suit was then brought by the judgment-creditor against both sharers, for the purpose of making the share of the co-sharers, who had not been previously sued, available to satisfy the defendant, and praying that the order releasing the property from attachment might be set aside. *Held*, that such a suit would lie, and would not be barred as *res judicata*. *NOBIN CHUNDRA ROY v. MAGANTARA DASSYA*. . . . . **I. L. R. 10 Calc. 924**

**114.** ——— *Suit for arrears of rent—Joint and joint and several liability.* In the year 1877, *A*, who was the owner of a fractional share of a zamindari, which was let in patni, and of a 4 annas share in the patni, sued his co-sharers in the patni for his share of the arrears of

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

rent for the years 1873 to 1875, after deducting the rent of his 4 annas share. Before the hearing of the suit, *B* intervened, alleging that he had purchased a 6 annas share of the patni, and he was made a defendant. *A* then discovered that his co-sharers in the patni had sold their remaining shares to *C*. *A* applied to make *C* a party to the suit, and subsequently for leave to withdraw the suit. Both these applications were refused, and a decree for the arrears of rent was made. *A*, alleging that he did not wish to enforce the decree in the previous suit, then instituted this suit against *C* and the defendants in the former suit, for the purpose of recovering arrears of rent for the years 1874 and 1875 from *C* in proportion to the share purchased by him. *Held*, that the relative position of *C* to the defendants, whose share he had purchased, resembled that which exists between persons who have made themselves jointly and severally liable to perform a particular contract; and that, as a decree obtained against one of the joint and several promisors without satisfaction is no bar to a suit against another, the present suit was not barred by the decree obtained in the suit of 1877. *Nuthoo Lall Chowdhry v. Shoukee Lall*, 10 B. L. R. 200, and *Hemendro Coomar Mullick v. Rajendro Lall Moonshree*, 1. L. R. 3 Calc. 353, distinguished. *DHUNPUT SINGH v. SHAM SOONDER MITTER*

**I. L. R. 5 Calc. 291 : 4 C. L. R. 501**

*See DHARAM SINGH v. ANGAN LALL*

**I. L. R. 21 Ail. 301**

**115.** ——— *Judgment against one co-sharer, effect of, on interest of other co-sharers—Code of Civil Procedure (Act X of 1877), s. 13, expln. (5)—Repeal. effect of.* Expln. 5 to s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not make a judgment obtained in a suit against one co-sharer binding on another co-sharer no party to such suit in respect of the rights enjoyed in common by such co-sharers in their common property. Nor could such explanation be applied to a case instituted, or the judgment delivered in such case, during the time when the old Code of Civil Procedure was in force. *HAZIR GAZI v. SONA-MONEE DASSEE*

**I. L. R. 6 Calc. 31 : 6 C. L. R. 516**

**116.** ——— *Suit on mortgage—Right of mortgagee to exercise another remedy after obtaining decree for sale.* A mortgagee can resort to all his remedies on the mortgage at the same time, and is not estopped in an action on the covenant to pay the mortgage-money by the fact of his having obtained a decree for sale. *MAKINNON v. GUNNES CHUNDER DEY*. . . . . **1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 370**

**117.** ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—Suit to set aside sale under mortgage-decree—Subsequent suit to declare property liable to sale.* Certain property having been sold in execution of a money-decree against the representative of a mortgagor, a suit was instituted and a decree obtained setting aside the sale as being



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

that of land in which the mortgagor had no interest. The holders of the original money-decree then again brought a suit to obtain a declaration that the said property was liable to be sold in satisfaction of the said decree. *Held*, that, the matter in issue having been heard and determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction, the suit was barred by s. 2, Act VIII of 1859. *NUFUR CHUNDER PAUL CHOWDHRY v. LUCKHEE MONEE DABEE*. 9 W. R. 300

118. *Taking money-decree on mortgage—Registration Act, XX of 1866, s. 53—Suit on mortgage-bond.* A proceeding under s. 53 of Act XX of 1866 was a suit of a civil nature within the meaning of s. 1, Act VIII of 1859, independently of any peculiarities in the special procedure to be adopted. Therefore, where a creditor had resorted to the summary procedure provided by s. 53, and had recovered a portion of his claim in execution of the decree so obtained, a regular suit subsequently brought to enforce his remedies on the bond, giving the defendant credit for the amount already recovered, was barred by s. 2, Act VIII of 1859. *EMAM MONTAZOODEEN MAHOMED v. RAJCOOMAR DOSS. HARAN CHUNDER GHOSE v. DINORUNDHOO BOSE*

14 B. L. R. F. B. 408 : 23 W. R. 187

*MOTHOORA MOHUN ROY CHOWDHRY v. PEAREE MOHUN SHAHA* . . . . . 23 W. R. 344

But See *UTSHUB NARAYAN CHOWDHRY v. CHITTRA RAKA GUPTA* . . . . . 8 B. L. R. Ap. 92

*S.C. OOTSHUB NARAIN CHOWDHRY v. CHITTRA RECKA GOOPTA* . . . . . 17 W. R. 154

where it was *held* that a regular suit will lie for a declaration that property mortgaged by a bond on which a simple money-decree had been obtained by the mortgagee under the provisions of Act XX of 1866 continues liable for the decree, though in the hands of a third person.

119. *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—Suit on mortgage-bond—Registration Act, 1866, s. 53.* A, having a simple mortgage-bond, which was specially registered, obtained a summary decree under the provisions of the Registration Act, and attached the lands under mortgage to him. Prior to A's decree, these lands had been attached by other creditors, and subsequently to A's decree they were sold to B. After such sale A, under his attachment, sold the right, title, and interest of the mortgagor, which he himself purchased. A now sued the mortgagor and B to enforce his mortgage lien against the mortgaged properties. *Held*, that, according to the decision of *Eman Momtazooddeen Mahomed v. Rajcoomar Dass*, 14 B. L. R. 408, the suit should be dismissed. *Doss MONEY DOSSEE v. JONMENJOY MCLICK*

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 363 : 1 C. L. R. 446

120. *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—Suit to enforce lien on bond after suit in which money-decree has been obtained.* B sued on a bond to recover its amount and to

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

enforce a mortgage lien. He obtained only a money-decree on the 26th of August 1871. D, who also held a decree against the same debtor, caused a portion of the property which had been included in the plaintiffs' mortgage to be brought to sale. B instituted a second suit on the 21st of January 1873 to enforce the lien. *Held*, in accordance with the opinions of TURNER, OLDFIELD, and BRODHRST, JJ. (STURAT, C.J., and PEARSON, J., dissenting), that the suit was unmaintainable. *BHAO SINGH v. HET RAM* . . . . . 7 N. W. 17

121. *Suit to enforce lien on mortgaged property—First and second mortgages.* In 1870 M granted a certain person a lease of a certain zamindari share, for a term of years, at an annual rent, L, as the lessee's surety, hypothecating a mouzah called A as security for the payment of such rent. In 1871, L gave B a bond for the payment of certain moneys, hypothecating mouzah A as security for their payment. In 1872 and again in 1873, M obtained a decree in the Revenue Court against his lessee and L, his surety, for arrears of rent. In execution of the decree of 1872, M caused L's rights and interests in mouzah A to be put up for sale and purchased them himself. In 1874 B sued L and M to enforce his lien on mouzah A. M defended this suit on the ground that he was the holder of a prior lien on the property. The Court gave B a decree in 1875 holding that he was entitled to an order for the sale of the property, but that it would be competent to M to sue to enforce his lien, and that, when he did so, the purchaser under B's decree would have the option of discharging the first incumbrance. The property was accordingly put up for sale in execution of B's decree, and was purchased by B himself. In 1876 M sued L and B to enforce his lien on the property, claiming to recover by the sale thereof the amount of the arrears of rent awarded by the decrees of 1872 and 1873, together with the costs awarded him in the Revenue Court, and interest. *Held*, affirming the judgment of STURAT, C.J., that the decree of 1875 did not preclude M from claiming to enforce his lien on mouzah A, nor was his claim affected by the circumstance that he had brought to sale in execution of the decree of the Revenue Court the rights and interest of L in that mouzah. All that was then sold was the equity of redemption, which was sold to satisfy the money decree held by M. No doubt, the proceeds of the sale would, after satisfaction of the costs of the decree, go *pro tanto* to the satisfaction of the sums secured by the first incumbrance, but M, by selling in execution the mortgagor's equity of redemption, did not forego his incumbrance. *Held*, also, that M could not enforce his lien for the recovery of the costs incurred by him in the Revenue Courts, as the surety-bond did not provide for the payment of such costs; that he could enforce his lien for the recovery of interest, as that bond did provide for the payment of interest; and that the moneys realized by the sale of the equity of redemption of the property in the execution of the Revenue Court's decree of 1872 must be



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

applied, in the first place, in satisfaction of the costs of the suit in which that decree was made, and then in satisfaction of the arrears sued for in that suit, or the balance of that arrear, and of the arrear sued for in the second suit, with interest at the rate agreed upon in the surety-bond from the date of the accrual of those arrears until realization. *BABULAL v. ISHRI PRASAD NARAIN SINGH*

I. L. R. 2 All. 582

122. — Suit for possession—*Agreement not to appeal*—Suit for possession in terms of agreement. *A*, having sued *B* for possession of a piece of land and obtained a decree for possession of portion only, entered into an agreement, by the terms of which he was to take a greater part of the land than he was entitled to under the decree upon the condition that he (*A*) should not prefer an appeal, and that, in the event of his doing so, the whole land claimed in the suit should become the property of *B*. In contravention of this agreement, *A* appealed and obtained a decree for possession of the entire piece of land, whereupon *B* instituted a suit claiming to have possession of the same in terms of the agreement. *Held*, that the agreement was valid, although its effect was practically to render the former suit inoperative, and further, that the previous suit between the parties was no bar to *B*'s suit, a new cause of action having arisen upon the breach of the agreement. *JATI RAM TALUKHDAR v. DASS RAM KOLITA*

3 C. L. R. 574

123. — Damages—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 13, 43*. In September 1886 the plaintiff sued in a Munsif's Court certain defendants for possession of one bigha of land, and for damages for the cutting and carrying of certain paddy from such land on the 23rd December 1885. This suit was dismissed on the ground that no dis-possession had taken place, the plaintiff being referred to a Small Cause Court for his damages. No appeal was made against this decision. In March 1887 the plaintiff sued these defendants in the Munsif's Court for possession of 5 bighas 6 cottahs of land and for mesne profits, and obtained a decree for possession of 3 bighas 6 cottahs of land with mesne profits; possession of the one bigha, the subject of the suit of 1886, being included in the 3 bighas 6 cottahs decree. He subsequently sued the same defendants in a Small Cause Court for damages for the paddy cut and carried on the 23rd December 1885. *Held*, that such suit was not barred by either s. 13 or s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. *MAHABEER SINGH v. RAMBHAIJAN SHA*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 545

124. — Suit on judgment in a Native territory—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 12—Jhansi and Morar Act (XVII of 1886), s. 8—Decree made in British India—Cession of territory to British Government pending suit*. Prior to the cession of the town of Jhansi to the British Government, plaintiff had instituted a suit in the Subah's Court in the Gwalior State on a judgment of the British Court in Jhansi district. After the cession,

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

the suit was made over for trial to the Court of the Assistant Commissioner of the Jhansi district. The suit was dismissed by the first Court as barred by s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but remanded by the lower Appellate Court for trial on the merits. *Held*, that the recital in Part II of Act XVII of 1886 shows that it was intended that suits pending in the Courts of the Gwalior State prior to the cession of the town of Jhansi to the British Government should be continued in the Courts of the Jhansi district after the cession thereof; therefore the present suit which, if it had been originally instituted in a Court of British India, could not have been maintained, being an action on a judgment of a Court of British India, was a good and maintainable action in the Court where it was instituted, and is to be deemed to be a properly instituted suit to which in other respects the law of the Courts of British India may now be applied. *King v. Hoare, 13 M & W. 504: 14 L. J. Ex. 29*, referred to as illustrating the distinction between an original cause of action founded upon a judgment recovered on the original cause of action. *SALONI v. HAR LAL*

I. L. R. 10 All. 517

✓125. — Continuing guarantee—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Suit for arrears of maintenance—Former suit for arrears for a different period—Surety—Continuing guarantee—Pleadings by surety denying liability in a suit do not operate as notice of revocation of suretyship—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 130*. By a settlement executed in 1896, the first defendant agreed, *inter alia*, to pay maintenance to the plaintiff (his wife) at the rate of R91 per annum. The second defendant signed the deed as surety. In 1898 the plaintiff sued both defendant to enforce her rights under the settlement, and (*inter alia*) for arrears of maintenance for ten months and sixteen days from the 10th November, 1897. The defendants pleaded that the deed was void for want of consideration. The first Court found that the settlement was not void, and passed a decree against both the defendants, but, as to the payment of arrears of maintenance, the decree was against the first defendant only. The second defendant appealed against the decree, so far as it was against him, contending that the settlement was not in any way binding on him. The plaintiff filed cross-objections to the decree, contending that the second defendant ought to have been held liable for the arrears of maintenance. At the hearing of the appeal, however, the plaintiff withdrew her cross-objections, and the decree of the first Court was confirmed with costs. In 1901 the plaintiff filed this suit against both defendants, to recover arrears of maintenance for two years and nine months, commencing from the 27th September, 1898. The second defendant pleaded that, inasmuch as he had not been held liable for maintenance in the former suit, the plaintiff's claim was *res judicata*. The lower Courts passed a decree for the plaintiff,



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*contd.*

holding that her claim was not *res judicata*. On appeal to the High Court :—*Held*, confirming the decree of the lower Courts, that the plaintiff's claim against the second defendant in this suit was not *res judicata*. The only point that was *res judicata* against her by the former suit was her right to the arrears therein claimed; but that did not bar her right to sue the second defendant as surety in respect of the subsequent arrears claimed in the present suit. It was contended for the second defendant that the pleadings in the former suit operated as notice under s. 130 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872), and put an end to his contract of guarantee. *Held*, that the denial by the second defendant of his liability in the pleadings in that suit was made for the purposes of pleading, and could not have any other effect than was given to it in the suit itself. It could not operate as notice under s. 130 of the Contract Act. **BHIKABHAI RATANCHAND v. BAI BHURI (1903)** . I. L. R. 27 Bom. 418

126. ——— Joinder of causes of action—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Competency of Court to try subsequent suit—Pecuniary jurisdiction—Suit of Small Cause Court nature—Issue decided in a previous suit not subject to second appeal*. In order to make a matter *res judicata*, it is not necessary that the two suits must be open to appeal in the same way. *Rai Charan Ghose v. Kumud Mohan Dutt*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 571, followed. A plaintiff cannot evade the provisions of s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure by joining several causes of action against the same defendant in the subsequent suit and instituting it in a Court of superior jurisdiction. **BHUGWAN-BUTTI CHOWDHURI v. FORBES (1900)**  
I. L. R. 28 Calc. 78 : s.c. 5 C. W. N. 483

127. ——— Security for costs—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 381—Order that plaintiff should give security for costs—Failure to comply with order—Dismissal of suit—Subsequently, fresh suit brought on same cause of action—Dismissal of first suit no bar—First suit to recover property direct from defendants—Second suit to recover same property from same defendants, but alleging it to have been settled in trust for them, and making trustees of settlements party defendants*. The plaintiff and one Naranji Virji were (it was alleged) cousins and the only members of a joint Hindu family. The plaintiff left Bombay and went to Cutch to avoid the plague, and, in 1900, during his absence, Naranji died; and his widows took possession of his estate. The plaintiff returned to Bombay, and as surviving member of the joint Hindu family sued (No. 124 of 1900) the widows for the property. They alleged that he was not a resident of British India, and obtained an order under s. 380 of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), directing that he should give security for costs, or in default his suit should be dismissed. Being unable to comply with the order, his suit was dismissed under s. 381 of the Code. Having

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*6. CAUSES OF ACTION—*concl.*

learned for the first time during the course of that suit that, in his absence from Bombay, the deceased Naranji Virji had executed two deeds of settlement, by one of which he purported to settle some of the family property in charity and by the other to settle another portion on his widows, the plaintiff subsequently brought this suit to recover the joint family property from the widows. He made the trustees of the two deeds of settlement defendants to the suit, and prayed for a declaration that Naranji had no right to settle any of the property, and that the deeds should be cancelled. The first and second defendants (the widows) contended that the former suit was for the same relief, and that, it having been dismissed under s. 381 of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), this suit was not maintainable. *Held*, that the dismissal of a suit under s. 381 of the Civil Procedure Code does not bar a fresh suit for the same cause of action. *Per Curiam*.—If I had been of opinion that a fresh suit on the same subject-matter could not be brought, I should have held that in respect of all matters included in the deed of settlement it was not a suit on the same subject-matter. **HARIRAM MOHANJI v. LALBAI (1902)**  
I. L. R. 26 Bom. 637

## 7. MATTERS IN ISSUE.

✓ 1. ——— Reasons for decision—*Estoppel by former judgment—Final decision of same question*. A party to a suit is not estopped, merely by the reasons which a Judge may give for his decision. In order to make out that a decision in a former suit is an estoppel, it must be established that the same identical question has been formerly raised and finally decided. **NUGENDUR NARAIN v. RUGHONATH NARAIN DEY**  
W. R. 1864, 20

2. ——— Collateral mat-  
ters. Such matters only as are decided between the parties by the decree in the suit ought to be treated as binding against them in subsequent litigation. No part of the reasoning on the findings of facts which have induced the Court to come to its decision is binding as between the parties further than for the purposes of the particular decision. **ACKHIL CHUNDER MOOKERJI v. SHIB NARAIN GHOSE**  
15 W. R. 527

**HURO DASS DOSTEDAR v. HURO PRA**

21 W. R. 30

**RAMASAMI PADEIVATCHI v. VIRASAMI PADEIV-  
ATCHI** . . . . . 3 Mad. 272

3. ——— Opinions not material to decision—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 13—Judgment—Decree*. In order to see whether a question is "*res judicata*" within the meaning of s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the former decree and the questions decided thereby must alone be considered. The words in s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, "has been heard and finally decided



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

by such Court "do not apply to an opinion expressed in the judgment on other issues not material for the purpose of the decree, though properly determined under s. 204 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the Court of first instance. *Niamut Khan v. Phadu Buldia*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 319, and *Lackman Singh v. Mohan*, I. L. R. 2 All. 497, dissented from. *DEVARAKONDA NARAS AMMA v. DEVARAKONDA KANAYA* I. L. R. 4 Mad. 134

4. ———— Decree not in conformity with judgment—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13*—*Omission to make reservation in decree though in judgment.* It is by the decree and not by the judgment that a question of *res judicata* must be decided. In 1881 *A* sued *K* and others claiming a declaration of his title to certain land and an injunction against interference with his possession. *K* claimed part of the land by purchase from *M*. The Munsif decreed for *A*, and this decree was confirmed on appeal by the District Judge, but in his judgment the District Judge recorded that *K*'s claim was not adjudicated upon, and that he should bring a fresh suit if he had any claim. In 1883 *K* sued *A* to recover the land, which he claimed by purchase from *M*. *A* pleaded that the claim was *res judicata* by virtue of the decree in the former suit. The District Munsif and, on appeal, the District Judge held that the claim was not *res judicata*, and decreed for *K*. *Held*, on appeal to the High Court, that as no reservation was made in the decree of *K*'s right to bring another suit, the plea of *res judicata* was good, but that, under the circumstances, an opportunity should be given to *K* to apply to the District Court to have the decree in the former suit brought into conformity with the judgment. This having been done, the decree of the lower Courts was confirmed. *AVALA v. KUPPU* I. L. R. 8 Mad. 77

5. ———— Finding in judgment not embodied in decree—*Suit for enhancement of rent—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 13.* *N* brought a suit against *P* for enhancement of rent. *P*'s defence was, first, that no notice of enhancement had been given; secondly, that the rent was not enhanceable, as he and his predecessors in title had held it at a fixed rent from the date of the permanent settlement. The suit was dismissed on the ground that no notice had been given; but the Munsif stated in his judgment that he considered the rent enhanceable, because he did not believe in the genuineness of the documentary evidence produced by *P*. The decree merely ordered that the suit should be dismissed, the portion of the judgment as to the enhanceability of the rent not being embodied in the decree. *P* therefore had no right of appeal against that portion of the judgment. In a subsequent suit by *N* against *P* for enhancement of rent of the same tenure:—*Held*, that, on the rule laid down by the Privy Council in *Soorjeemonee Dayee v. Suddanund Mohapatra*, 12 B. L. R. 304, and *Krishna Behari Roy v. Bunwari Lall Roy*, I. L. R. 1 Calc. 144, *P* was precluded, by the decision in the former suit, from denying that the

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rent of the tenure was enhanceable, although the decision on that point was not embodied in the decree. The material findings in each case should be embodied in the decree, and, if they are not, it is incumbent on the parties, to avoid their being bound by decisions against which they have no right of appeal, to apply to amend the decree in accordance with the judgment. *NIAMUT KHAN v. PHADU BULDIA* I. L. R. 6 Calc. 319

S.C. NIAMUT KHAN v. BHADU BULDIA  
7 C. L. R. 227

But see *RUN BAHADUR SINGH v. LUCHO KOER*  
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 301: L. R. 12 I. A. 23

6. ———— Objections by respondent to decree—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 13, 540, 561, 584.* In a suit to obtain possession of certain property, and to set aside a deed called a deed of endowment (*wakfnama*), on the ground that the defendant had fraudulently obtained its execution, the defendant pleaded (i) that the deed was a valid one, and (ii) that she was in possession of the property in satisfaction of a dower-debt, and her possession could not be disturbed so long as the debt remained unsatisfied. The Court of first instance held that the deed was valid, but that the defendant was entitled to remain in possession of the property till her dower-debt was satisfied and the Court passed a decree which merely dismissed the suit, without embodying the finding as to the deed. On appeal by the plaintiff to the District Judge, the defendant filed objections under s. 561 of the Civil Procedure Code in regard to the first Court's decision that the deed of endowment was invalid. The Judge dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, affirming the finding as to dower, and, refusing to decide the question of the validity of the deed as being unnecessary for disposal of the claim, disallowed the defendant's objections. The defendant appealed to the High Court. *Held* by the Full Bench (OLDFIELD and MAHMOOD, JJ., dissenting), that if a decree is, upon the face of it, entirely in favour of a party to a suit, such decree being the thing which by law is made appealable, and nothing else, that party has no right of appeal therefrom. If, in the judgment of which such decree is the formal expression, findings have been recorded upon some issues against that party and he desires to have formal effect given to them by the decree, so as to allow of his filing objections thereto under s. 561 of the Civil Procedure Code or of appealing therefrom under s. 540, he must take steps under s. 206 to have the decree properly brought into conformity with the judgment, so that there may be matter on the face of it to show that something has been decided against him; but if he fails to take this course, the decree, though in general terms, will stand good as finally deciding the issues raised by the pleadings upon which the ultimate determination of the cause and the decree itself rested. The findings in a judgment upon matters which subsequently turn out to be immaterial to the grounds upon which a suit is finally disposed of as to the



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plaintiff's right to any portion of the relief sought by him as declared by the decree amount to no more than *obiter dicta*, and do not constitute a final decision of the kind contemplated by s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, also, that in the present case the Judge was right in holding that the question as to the validity or otherwise of the deed of endowment was wholly immaterial. The judgment of STRAIGHT, J. in *Lachman Singh v. Mohon*, I. L. R. 2 All. 497, approved and followed. *Per* OLDFIELD, J. (*contra*), that the decree, to agree with the judgment and fulfil the requirements of s. 206 of the Civil Procedure Code, should contain the material points for determination arising out of the claim and material for the decision thereon; that if this has not been done, the defect is a good ground of appeal, notwithstanding that the decree, on its face, may be altogether in favour of the appellant, and notwithstanding that he may not have applied for amendment of the decree under s. 206, or for review of judgment; and that, in the present case, the defeat in the decree would afford a good ground of appeal. *Per* MAHMOOD, J., that inasmuch as the provisions of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code relate as well to the trial of issues as to the trial of suits, and in the present case the validity or otherwise of the deed was a matter directly and substantially in issue between the parties, and was adjudicated upon, the finding of the first Court upon that issue was not a mere *obiter dictum*, but he would be binding upon the defendant as *res judicata* notwithstanding the fact that the suit against her was dismissed on the ground that she held possession of the property in lieu of dower; that whatever has the force of *res judicata* is necessarily appealable; that the word "from" as used in s. 540 or s. 584, and the expression "objection to the decree" in s. 561 refer not only to matters existing upon the face of the decree, but also to those which should have existed, but do not exist there; and that the defendant in the present case was aggrieved or injured by the omission in the decree of the first Court, and was therefore entitled to file objections to it, and for the same reason, to appeal to the High Court from the decree of the lower Appellate Court. Also *per* MAHMOOD, J., that it was doubtful whether the reliefs contemplated by ss. 206 and 623 were open to the defendant; but that, even conceding that she ought to have sought her remedy under either of those sections, her neglect to do so did not make her incapable of obtaining the same result by the exercise of her right of appeal. *Anusuyabai v. Sakhrum Pandurang*, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 484; *Man Singh v. Narayan Das*, I. L. R. 1 All. 480; *Mohon Lal v. Ram Dayal*, I. L. R. 2 All. 843; *Niamat Khan v. Phadu Buldia*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 319; and *Pan Koor v. Bhagwant Koor*, 6 N. W. 19, referred to. *JAMAITUNNISSA v. LUTFUNNISSA*

I. L. R. 7 All. 606

7. ———— *Incidental finding—Appeal from favourable decree.* The plaintiff sued for a declaration that certain lands were his, and for possession of them. Defendant No. 1 claimed the

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ownership of the lands; defendant No. 2 claimed to be mortgagee in possession. The decree simply dismissed the suit; but the lower Court found, as a fact, that the ownership of the lands was in the plaintiff, although the plaintiff was not entitled to possession of them by reason of the mortgage to defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 1 now appealed on the ground that, although the decree itself was entirely in her favour, she would be prejudiced in any future proceedings if the finding of fact as to the ownership of the lands were left unchallenged. *Held*, that the appeal would not lie; for the decree is what must be looked to see what was conclusively decided, and there was nothing in the decree actually passed which the plaintiff could afterwards use as *res judicata* in his favour; and an appeal is not admissible on any point not having the authority of *res judicata*. An adjudication is only conclusive evidence of the facts established therein or properly tending thereto; hence from a simple judgment against him a party cannot deduce anything in his favour as *res judicata*, for nothing in his favour can have been essential element of an adverse decree. *ANUSUYABAI v. SAKHARAM PANDURANG*

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 484

8. ———— *Collateral issue—Dismissal for want of notice.* Where a suit for arrears of rent at enhanced rates for a certain year was dismissed for want of notice, but the Court also found that the patta set up by defendant was not genuine:—*Held*, that the decision was not bar to a subsequent suit by the same plaintiff for arrears of rent at enhanced rates for a subsequent year. A matter which is directly adjudicated upon by a Court of competent jurisdiction can be treated as *res judicata*, but not matters determined for collateral or incidental purposes only. *JARDINE, SKINNER & Co. v. DWARKANATH CHUCKERBUTTY*

14 W. R. 412

9. ———— *Finding in former suit.* A finding in one suit to which A was a party is no bar against A in another suit, unless it is shown that the issue in question in the latter was raised in the former suit, and was a material issue in it. *DAHOO MUNDER v. GOPEE NUND JHA*

2 W. R. 79

*NANAH alias NARAIN RAO v. JUMNA BAE*

2 Agra 192

*SALAHMUNISSA KHATOON v. MOHESH CHUNDER ROY*

16 W. R. 85

10. ———— *Issue material to rights of parties.* Any issue which is material to the rights of parties in the matter of the suit between them, whether actually contested or not, shall not afterwards be raised in a subsequent suit between the same parties. *DEOKEE NUNDEN ROY v. KALEE PERSHAD*

8 W. R. 366

*RAMSOOKH v. TARA SINGH*

3 Agra 40

11. ———— When a Court of competent jurisdiction in deciding upon a particular subject-matter thinks it necessary to go into collateral facts for the purposes of its decision, its



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opinion on those facts is not conclusively binding in a subsequent suit which relates to a different subject-matter. *MADHOO RAM DEY v. BOYDONATH DOSS* . . . . . **9 W. R. 592**

**12.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—Matter incidentally in issue.* The cause of action in a suit cannot be said to have been heard and determined in a former judgment, unless it was put in issue and directly determined. Any finding or observations merely bearing on such issue or any opinion incidentally expressed cannot be considered a finding upon the issue so as to make that judgment a determination of the cause of action within the meaning of Act VIII of 1859, s. 2. *SHIB NATH CHATTERJEE v. NUBO KISHEN CHATTERJEE* . . . . . **21 W. R. 189**

**13.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—Trial and determination of issues unnecessary for disposal of suit.* A Court of competent jurisdiction, having tried and determined an issue arising in a suit on which the suit might have been disposed of proceeded to try and determine another issue which also arose out of the pleadings, but the determination of which in that suit was not required for its disposal. *Held*, that such Court was not bound under the circumstances to refrain from trying and determining such last-mentioned issue, and that the trial and determination of it could not be treated as a nullity and the issue could not again be tried and determined in another suit. *MAN SINGH v. NARAYAN DAS* . **I. L. R. 1 All. 480**

✓ **14.** ————— *Issue not affirmed and denied—Requisites for res judicata.* In order to constitute the bar of *res judicata*, it is not sufficient merely that an issue on the same point should have been raised in the former suit, although that issue may have been incidentally decided; but it must appear that the matter referred to was alleged by one party, and either denied or admitted expressly or impliedly by the other. *SHAMA CHURN CHATTERJEE v. PROSONO COOMAR SANTIKAREE* . . . . . **5. C. L. R. 251**

**15.** ————— *Suit to set aside will—Question as to validity of will—Suit for possession—Cause of action.* *C*, a Hindu subject to the Mitakshara law, adopted *S*, and afterwards *B*, and made a will, where by, after providing for his widow, the family worship, etc., he made a division of his real and personal property between his two adopted sons. Provision was also made for forfeiture by either of the sons in case they disputed the will, in which event the whole estate was to go to the other son. This will was registered and filed in the Collector's Court. *S* was subsequently disowned by *C* and declared to have forfeited his right to anything under the will. In 1859 *S* brought a suit against *C*, *B*, and certain persons who claimed portions of the property under deeds executed by *C*, to cancel those deeds, to cancel the will, to set aside adoption of *B*, and for maintenance. In this suit he alleged that *C* had no power to make any of the devises of real estate contained in the will, inasmuch

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as the whole estate, consisting of property inherited by *C* and property acquired by him from the income of such inherited property, was ancestral. The only issue raised in that suit referring to the will was whether it was assented to by *S*. The first Court found that it had been so assented to; that the adoption of *B* was valid; and that *S*'s conduct justified *C* in disinheriting him: the suit was accordingly dismissed. *S* appealed to the High Court, and in his grounds of appeal raised the same contention as before, *viz.*, that the whole of the real property was ancestral, and therefore *C* had no power to dispose of it without his consent. The High Court in 1863 varied the decree of the first Court, and held that the will must be set aside so far as it affected the right of *S* in the ancestral property, but that the ancestral property only included that inherited, and not that acquired by *C* with the income of the inherited property. In a suit brought by *S*, after the death of *B* and *C*, against *B*'s widow and the parties to the former suit, or their representatives, to obtain possession of the whole estate of *C* on the ground that both the inherited property and the property acquired from the income thereof were ancestral:—*Held* (reversing the decision of the High Court), that, although the issue as to the assent of *S* to the will clearly embraced only a portion of the controversy between the parties, the Court had jurisdiction, and indeed was bound, to decide whether or not the will was operative as to all or to any and what portion of the property, and that its decision on that point was binding on the parties. According to the general law relating to *res judicata*, where a question has been necessarily decided in effect, though not in express terms, between parties to a suit, they cannot raised the same question as between themselves in any other suit in any other form. S. 2, Act VIII of 1859, does not prevent the operation of this general law. The words "cause of action" in that section must be construed in reference to the substance rather than the form of the action. *SOORJOMONEE DAYEE v. SUDANUND MOHAPATTER* . . . . . **12 B. L. R. P. C. 304: 20 W. R. 377**  
**L. R. I. A. Sup. Vol. 212**

reversing the decision of the High Court in *SUDANUND MOHAPATTUR v. SOORJOMONEE DEBEE* . . . . . **8 W. R. 455**  
and on review . . . . . **11 W. R. 436**

**16.** ————— *Suit for mesne profits—Suit by C for mesne profits of land as devisee under will of A—Will held valid and C's claim allowed—Application by C as legal representative of A for execution of decree obtained by A—Question of validity of will again raised.* *A* obtained a decree against *B* for possession of certain land, and then died. Thereupon *C* applied for execution of the decree as *A*'s legal representative, relying upon a will made by *A* in his favour. At the same time, *C* filed a suit to recover R140 as mesne profits of the land. The execution-proceedings were stayed till after the disposal of the suit for mesne profits. In this



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suit *B* contended that the will in question<sup>7</sup> was not executed by *A*, and that *A* was not of sound disposing mind at the time of the alleged execution of the will. The Subordinate Judge found on both these points against *B*, and passed a decree for mesne profits. This decree was upheld, on appeal, by the District Judge. After the decision of this suit, the Subordinate Judge took up *C*'s application for execution of the original decree obtained by *A*. This application was resisted by *B* on the same grounds on which he had defended the suit for mesne profits. He impeached the validity of the will on the grounds of non-execution by, and unsoundness of mind of, the testator. The Subordinate Judge held that the matter was *res judicata*; he therefore overruled this objection, and ordered execution to issue. The District Judge held that, as the suit for mesne profits was in the nature of a Small Cause Court suit, in which there was no second appeal, the decision passed in that suit did not operate as *res judicata* in the present execution-proceedings. He therefore reversed the Subordinate Judge's order, and remanded the case for a fresh decision. *Held*, reversing the remand order, that the question whether *C* was entitled to execute the decree as *A*'s representative fell within the last clause of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, *viz.*, "determined in a separate suit." The Subordinate Judge, who had raised an issue as to the validity of the will relied upon by *C* in the suit for mesne profits, was entitled to act upon his determination of that issue in the execution-proceedings. *BHAVANISHANKAR v. NARANSHANKAR* ! 11. L. R. 23 Bom. 536

17. — Suit to set aside adoption—*Decree in former suit*. In a suit brought to set aside the adoption of the first defendant, to declare plaintiff's title to certain lands and for possession, the first defendant pleaded that the question of his adoption was *res judicata* in a former suit. In that suit between the present plaintiff's son as plaintiff and his father (the present plaintiff) as the first defendant, and the present first defendant, the alleged adopted son, as second defendant, the latter was found to be the adopted son of the undivided brother of the present plaintiff. *Held*, that the first defendant's adoption was not *res judicata*. *Ayyavu Muppanar v. Niladachi Ammal*, 1 *Mad.* 45, and *Udaiya Tavar v. Katama Nachiyar*, 2 *Mad.* 131, distinguished. *GOPALAYYAN v. RAGHUPATI AYYAN alias AIYAVAYYAN* . 3 *Mad.* 217

18. — Failure to prove adoption. *A* claimed certain property as the adopted son of *B*, and it was decided in that suit that *A* had failed to prove that he was the adopted son of *B*. *Held*, that this decision was no legal bar to *A*'s proving in another suit that he was the adopted son of *B*, in which *A* sought to obtain a different property upon a different cause of action, though the parties to the suit were the same. *KRIPARAM v. BHAGWAN DASS*

1 B. I. R. A. C. 68 : 10 W. R. 100

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19. — Suit to set aside adoption. *B*, as adopted son and heir of *G*, instituted a suit to set aside certain patni leases under which certain persons claimed to hold land, which had belonged to *G*. The defence was that *B* was not the legally adopted son of *G*, and an issue on this point having been settled, *K*, who claimed to be the reversionary heir of *G*, was made a defendant under s. 73 of Act VIII of 1859; and it was eventually decided in that suit that *B* was the duly adopted son of *G*. *Held*, that a subsequent suit by *K* against *B* to set aside the adoption could not, on the principles laid down in the case of *Soorjeemonee Dayee v. Sultanund Mohapatter*, 12 B. L. R. 301, be maintained. *Kripam v. Bhagwan Das*, 1 B. L. R. A. C. 68, overruled. *KRISHNA BEHARI ROY v. BUNWARI LALL ROY*

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 144 : 25 W. R. 1

S.C. *KRISHNA BEHARI ROY v. BROJESWARI CHOWDHARANEE* . L. R. 2 I A. 283

affirming the decision of the High Court in *KRISTO BEHAREE ROY v. BUNWAREE LALL ROY*

19 W. R. 62

Followed in *RUN BAHADUR SINGH v. LUCHO KOER* . I. L. R. 11 Calc. 301  
L. R. 12 I. A. 23

20. — Civil Procedure Code, s. 2—Cause of action. *A*, a Hindu of Gya, died, leaving a sister, *B*, and *C*, the son of a deceased sister. On *A*'s death, *B* took possession of the property left by *A*. In a suit by *C* against *B* for recovery of possession thereof as heir to his maternal uncle, the Court of first instance held that *B* should retain possession of the property during her lifetime without power of waste, and that on her death *C* should be entitled to the possession thereof. This was reserved by the High Court on appeal, who held that the decree should have been simply a decree of dismissal of the plaintiff's suit. *B* died, leaving an adopted son, *D*. *C* sued *D* for recovery of possession of the property, the subject-matter of the former suit, on the ground that *D* was not the adopted son of *B*, and that *C*, who came within the class of bandhus, was entitled to succeed to the property left by *A* and *B*, there being no nearer heir in existence. *Held*, that s. 2, Act VIII of 1859, did not bar the suit. *MOHUN LAL BHAYA GYAL v. LUCHMAN LAL*

5 B. L. R. 683 : 14 W. R. 73

21. — Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13—Estoppel—Privity in estate. A competent Court having decided upon an issue directly raised in a suit brought by a person alleging himself to have been adopted that this adoption had not taken place, it was held that the present suit was barred under Act X of 1877, s. 13, as *res judicata*, having been brought by the son of the defendant in the former suit, claiming through his father, to establish the same adoption; and that the section applied, although the suits related to different properties. The establishment of the adoption



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alleged in the first suit would have obliged the father of the present plaintiff to share with the adopted son his ancestral estate. That adoption having been negatived, the son, in this suit, ought to be estopped from making title on the ground that the adoption had placed the person, from whom he claimed to inherit, in the relation of father's brother to him. **VENKATA MAHIPATI GANGADHARA RAMA RAU v. BUCHI SITAYYA. PITTAPUR RAJA v. BUCHI SITAYYA** . . . . . **I. L. R. 8 Mad. 219**

**S.C. RAJAH OF PITTAPUR v. BUCHI SITAYYA GARU** . . . . . **L. R. 12 I. A. 16**

**22.** — — — Issue in former suit—*Former decree in favour of plaintiff, but issue as to adoption found against him—No appeal open to plaintiff against that finding—Subsequent suit to recover property on strength of adoption.* One S died in September 1878, leaving a widow B. The year before his death his only son (Bala), a child eight years old, had left his home and was never heard of again. A few days before his death, S adopted the plaintiff (his nephew) and executed a deed of adoption, which stated that he had no hope that his son Bala was alive, and that he had therefore adopted the plaintiff. The deed further declared the plaintiff to be the owner of all S's property with all the rights of a natural son, but provided that, in the event of the lost son returning, he should have half. In 1892 the plaintiff, as S's adopted son, brought this suit to recover some of S's property, which was in the hands of the defendants, who claimed it as S's heirs. They (*inter alia*) impeached the plaintiff's adoption. The plaintiff had previously sued one K, the father of the defendants, in another suit (No. 804 of 1885) to recover certain other lands. In that suit it had been held that the plaintiff was not the adopted son of S, but that nevertheless he was entitled to recover the lands sued for on the strength of the above-stated deed of adoption, and a decree was passed for the plaintiff. *Held*, that the issue as to adoption in that suit was not *res judicata* in the present suit. In the former suit the plaintiff recovered upon the deed. He could not have appealed from the decree which was in his favour, not could he, under the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), appeal from the finding upon the adoption issue which was against him. Upon that issue there had not been a final decision. **RANGO BALAJI v. MUDIYEPPA**

**I. L. R. 23 Bom. 296**

**23.** — — — Pending suits—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 12 and 13—Malikana—Different reliefs claimed.* For the purpose of the rule of *res judicata*, it is not essential that the subject-matters of the present and the former litigations should be identical. Where a recurring liability is the subject of claim, a previous judgment dismissing a suit between the same parties upon findings which do not go to the root of the title on which the claim rests, but relate merely to a particular item or instalment, cannot operate as *res judicata*. But if

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such previous judgment negatives the title and main obligation itself, the plaintiff cannot re-agitate the same question of the title by claiming a subsequent item or instalment. **Rajah of Pittapur v. Buchi Sittya Garu, L. R. 12 I. A. 16**, referred to. The pendency of litigation regarding rent, malikana, or other demand for one year does not, under s. 12 of the Civil Procedure Code, bar a suit between the same parties in which the same demand is made for a subsequent year, inasmuch as the reliefs claimed in the two cases are different. Ss. 12 and 13 of the Code compared. On the 17th August 1835 a suit was instituted for recovery of an annual malikana allowance for the years 1290, 1291, and 1292 Faslis. On the 5th October 1885 the Munsif dismissed the suit. On the 10th March 1886 the Subordinate Judge on appeal reversed the Munsif's decree, and decreed the suit. On the 21st June 1886 the defendant appealed to the High Court, which on the 4th July 1887 reversed the Subordinate Judge's decree, and restored that of the Munsif, on the ground that the plaintiff had never received and was not entitled to malikana. Meanwhile, on the 8th June 1886, the plaintiff brought another suit against the defendant for recovery of malikana for the year 1293 Fasli, which accrued after the institution of the former suit. By judgments dated respectively the 21st August and 27th November 1886, the lower Courts decreed this suit holding that the Subordinate Judge's decree of the 10th March 1886, in the former suit, operated as *res judicata* and was conclusive in favour of the plaintiff's title to the malikana. On the 17th May 1887 the defendants appealed to the High Court, and on the 16th May 1888 (the High Court having in the interval dismissed the former suit by its judgment of the 4th July 1887) the appeal came on for hearing. *Held*, that the trial of the present suit by either of the lower Courts was not barred by s. 12 of the Civil Procedure Code by reason of the fact that, at the time of such trial in August and November 1886, the previous litigation between the parties was pending in second appeal before the High Court. **BALKISHAN v. KISHAN LAL**

**I. L. R. 11. All. 148.**

**24.** — — — *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 12, 48, 244—Proceeding in execution.* A suit, according to s. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, must commence with a plaint, and a proceeding which is capable of terminating in a decree or an order having the force of a decree cannot, on that ground alone, be deemed to be a suit within the meaning of the Code, if it has not commenced with a plaint. Such a proceeding is, in strictness, only a proceeding in a suit. *Semble*: That a proceeding under s. 244 is not a suit within the meaning of s. 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure. **VENKATA CHANDRAPPA NAYANIVARU v. VENKATARAMA REDDI** . . . . . **I. L. R. 22 Mad. 256**

**25.** — — — Issue as to rate of rent—*Possession—Suit for kabuliati—Decision on right of occupancy.* A suit for a kabuliati in which the rate of rent is the subject-matter, and the question



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of the right of occupancy is not the main point, is not an estoppel to a suit for repossession under cl. 6, s. 23, Act X of 1859. *KHODA BUKSH v. AKOOL GAZZE* . . . . . 9 W. R. 595

26. ——— Issue as to amount of rent—*Suit for rent—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2. Held*, with reference to Act VIII of 1859, s. 2, that where the cause of action is the same in substance in both suits, and where the former suit was so constituted that the parties to the present suit were in direct contest with each other and had full opportunity of asserting their rights, the decision in the former suit is *res judicata*, e.g., decrees passed in suits for patni rent in which the jumma payable is put in issue are decisive as to the amount of such jumma. *RAKHAL DOSS SINGH v. HEERA MOTEE DOSSEE* . . . . . 22 W. R. 282

27. ——— Issue as to title—*Subsequent suit for declaration of right*. In a former suit *A G* (appellant) sought to establish his right, in execution of his decree against *R R*, to have a talukh sold as belonging to *R R*. *D S*, a defendant in that suit, pleaded that the whole talukh had been conveyed to him absolutely by his father *R R* under a hibbanamah. An issue was raised and tried whether the talukh belonged to *D S* or not; and it was expressly decided that it did not, and that the zamindari was liable to be attached and sold in execution of *A G*'s decree as belonging to *R R*. *Held*, that it was not open to *D S* or to plaintiff claiming under him in a subsequent suit to come into Court and ask for a declaration of his right to a half share of the talukh as against *A G*. *ABDOOL GUNNEE v. KISHANUND DOSS alias KEBUL RAM DOSS* . . . . . 17 W. R. 350

28. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 13, expts. I and II, and s. 44*. *L* was the owner of a 4-anna share in a village. On the 1st March 1880, his childless widow *R*, and his nephew *B*, who had separated from his two brothers and lived for some years with both *L* and *R*, sold to *S* one-third of the 4-anna share. The brothers of *B* sued the vendors and the vendee to enforce a right of pre-emption, alleging that they, as well as *B*, had acquired and entered into exclusive possession of the estate of *L* as his heirs. In the second appeal in this suit the High Court held that, as it was proved that the 4-anna share was *L*'s separate estate, and *R* had succeeded to it and was in possession of it, and thus the plaintiffs had not established a title to, or acquired possession of, any part of the share, the plaintiffs were not in a position to assert a preferential claim to purchase the property in dispute. The plaintiffs also pleaded that the question of the right and title asserted by them as the actual heirs of *L* should have been tried and determined in the suit; but the High Court rejected this plea on the ground that the suit had been based merely on the allegation of *de facto* possession, and that their claim was to obtain by purchase one-third share only, and not for any remedy in respect of their right to

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possession by inheritance of the entire 4-anna estate. Subsequently to this decision, the same plaintiffs, alleging equal rights with *B* as reversionary heirs of *L*, sued the same defendants for a declaration of the incompetence of *R*, the widow, to alienate the property, and that the sale-deed might be declared, as against them null and of no effect. The cause of action was stated to be the execution, on the 1st March 1880, of the deed of sale. *Held*, that the plea of *res judicata* failed. The matter now substantially in issue between the parties, viz., the presumptive title of the plaintiffs to possession of the property, had not been "heard and finally decided" in the sense of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. Such title was not "alleged and denied" by the parties in that suit, within expl. I, s. 13. It was not matter which "might and ought" to have been made the ground of attack in the former suit, within expl. II. The law does not require a plaintiff at once to assert all his titles to property, or to be thereafter estopped from advancing them. A plaintiff may with the leave of the Court (s. 44, Civil Procedure Code) join causes of action, but he is nowhere compelled to do so. The cause of action in the second suit, although the date of its accrual was the same, was separate and distinct from the cause of action asserted in the previous suit. *SHEO RATAN SINGH v. SHEOSAHAI MISR* . . . . . I. L. R. 6 All. 358

29. ——— Issue as to account—*Suit for money due on bond—Act X of 1877, s. 13*. *M* sued *R* in the Court of the Munsif for a bond, alleging that he had satisfied the bond-debt, and for a certain sum which he alleged had been paid by him to *R* in excess of the bond-debt. On the 24th November 1875 the Munsif, having taken an account and found that R188-7-4 of the bond debt were still due, made a decree dismissing the suit. *R* appealed to the Subordinate Judge, who on the 16th September 1876, finding that R520-2-2 of the bond-debt were still due, affirmed the Munsif's decree. *M* appealed to the High Court on the ground that an appeal by *R* did not lie to the Subordinate Judge, as *R* was not aggrieved by the Munsif's decree. The Division Bench before which the appeal came, on the 10th August 1877, holding that *R* was not competent to appeal to the Subordinate Judge, set aside the proceedings of the Subordinate Judge. In deciding the case the Division Bench made certain observations to the effect that the account between the parties was not finally settled, but might be taken again in a fresh suit. In November 1877, *M* instituted a fresh suit against *R* to recover the bond on payment of R188-7-4, the sum found by the Munsif in the former suit to be due by him to *R*. *Held*, on the question whether the finding of the Munsif in the former suit was final and conclusive between the parties or the account might be again taken, that that finding, being a finding on a matter directly and substantially in issue in the former suit, which was heard and finally decided by the Munsif, was final and conclusive between the parties, and



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the account could not be again taken. *Held*, also, that the observations of the Division Bench in the former suit were mere "*obiter dicta*" which did not bind the Courts disposing of the fresh suit. MOHAN LALL *v.* RAM DIAL. I. L. R. 2 All. 843

30. — Issue as to satisfaction of money-bonds—*Subsequent suit on bonds—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 45—Matter directly and substantially in issue—Meaning of "suit" in Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13.* S sued K for four bonds, alleging that the same had been satisfied. K had formerly sued S on two of these bonds. S had alleged in defence of that suit that those two bonds, as also the other two, had been satisfied. It was decided in that suit that not one of the bonds had been satisfied. *Held* by PETHERAM, C.J., and OLD-FIELD, BRODHURST, and DUTHOIT, J.J., that the only issue in the former suit which had to be decided being whether the bonds on which that suit was brought had been satisfied or not, the second suit was, under s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, *res judicata* only in respect of those bonds, and not in respect of the other two bonds. The Court which tried the former suit had not jurisdiction to try the subsequent suit. *Per* MAHMOOD, J.—This being so, if the word "suit" in s. 13 were taken literally, it might, with some plausibility be contended that there was no *res judicata* in respect of any of the bonds. The word "suit," however, must be understood to mean such a matter as might have formed the subject of a separate suit independently of the special provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, such as s. 45, which enables this plaintiff to unite several causes of action in one and the same suit. Adopting this interpretation, it was clear that the two bonds which were the subject of the former suit could not be allowed to form the subject of litigation again. As to the other two bonds, which were not the subject-matter of the former suit, they did not, in the former suit, constitute a "matter directly and substantially in issue" within the meaning of s. 13, and, even if they were "directly and substantially in issue," the decision in the former suit would not support the plea of *res judicata*, because the Court which tried that suit was not a Court of jurisdiction competent to try the subsequent suit, in which the plea was raised. SHEORAJ RAI *v.* KASHI NATH. I. L. R. 7 All. 247

31. — Issue as to validity of mortgage—*Suit for possession—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 13, expts. I and II.* H, the proprietor of a one-third share of a certain undivided estate, made a gift of such share to P. He subsequently, in February 1875, gave a mortgage of such share, in his capacity as P's guardian, to N and S, the two other co-sharers of such estate. In March 1878 P, having attained his age of majority, brought a suit, as a co-sharer of such estate, under such gift, against N and S for possession of certain land appertaining to such estate, on the ground that they were using such land as if they were the sole proprietors thereof.

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The lower Appellate Court, observing that such land was the property of the three co-sharers, that the mortgage of P's right to N and S did not affect those rights as such, and that N and S were not justified in using such land as if they were the exclusive proprietors thereof, gave P a decree for possession of one-third share of such land. N and S appealed to the High Court on the ground that P should not have been awarded possession, as they were in possession of such land as mortgagees. The High Court remanded the cases for the determination of the issue thus raised by N and S, and the lower Appellate Court found that N and S were in possession of P's share of such estate as mortgagees under the mortgage made by H above referred to and of such land as such. P did not take any objection to this finding; and it was adopted by the High Court and embodied in its final decree. In October 1879 P sued N for possession of his share in such estate, claiming under the gift from H and alleging that the mortgage of such share by H to N was invalid. *Held*, that, inasmuch as such mortgage was matter substantially in issue in the former suit, the matter in issue in the second suit was *res judicata* under expts. I and II, s. 13 of Act X of 1877. NIRMAL SINGH *v.* PHULMAN SINGH. I. L. R. 4 All. 65

32. — Issue as to interest on instalment bond—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 13—"Subject-matter" of suit.* The obligee of a bond payable by instalments sued the obligor for four instalments, claiming, with reference to the terms of such bond, interest on such instalments from the date of such bond. The obligor contended in that suit that, on the proper construction of the bond, the interest on such instalments should be calculated from the dates of default. The obligee obtained the decree for interest as claimed. The obligee subsequently again sued the obligor for four instalments, again claiming interest on such instalments from the date of such bond. The obligor contended again in the second suit that interest should only be calculated from the dates of default. *Held*, that the question as to the date from which interest due on the defaulting instalments was exigible under the terms of such bond was *res judicata*. It is the "matter in issue," not the "subject-matter," of the suit, that forms the essential test of *res judicata* in s. 13 of Act X of 1877. PAHLWAN SINGH *v.* RISAL SINGH. I. L. R. 4 All. 55

33. — Issue as to right to property—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 13, expl. I—Issue previously determined.* N sued W for a moiety of a brick-kiln, claiming by right of inheritance, and alleging in respect of the other moiety that it was his own property. W in her defence to the suit denied that N had any right in the kiln, and that a moiety of the kiln belonged to him. An issue was framed on the point whether a moiety of the kiln belonged to W, which the Court of first instance decided in N's favour. N eventually obtained a decree for a moiety of the kiln, which



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he claimed by right of inheritance. *W* appealed, contending, *inter alia*, that it was not proved that a moiety of the kiln belonged to *N*. The appeal was decreed, and the decree of the Court of first instance in *N*'s favour was set aside. *W* subsequently sued *N* for the value of bricks which he had wrongfully taken from the kiln. *N* set up as a defence to the suit that a moiety of the kiln belonged to him. *Held*, that the issue whether a moiety of the kiln belonged to *N* was *res judicata* under s. 13, expl. I, of the Civil Procedure Code. *WILAITI BEGUM v. NUR KHAN* . I. L. R. 5 All. 514

34. — Issue as to possession—*Suit for recovery of produce of land—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 12—Matter in issue in former suit.* Pending the final hearing in appeal of a suit for confirmation of possession of certain land, and for the recovery of the produce of such land alleged to have been carried away by the defendants, the plaintiff brought a suit again asking for confirmation of possession, but also for the recovery of the produce which had arisen since the institution of the other suit. *Held*, that the second suit, so far as it sought for the recovery of the produce, was not barred by the previous suit. *BISSESSUR SINGH v. GUNPUT SINGH* . . . 8 C. L. R. 113

35. — Issue of law erroneously decided—*Decree prohibiting erection of temple—Rights of rival religious sects—Right to open temple for worship.* The erroneous decision by a competent tribunal of a question of law directly or substantially in issue between the parties to a suit does not prevent a Court from deciding the same question, arising between the same parties in a subsequent suit, according to law. In a suit in 1850 between the Tenkalais and Vadakalais, rival religious sects, represented by the plaintiffs and defendants respectively, the Vadakalais having endeavoured to open a temple for public worship in a certain public street, were; by the decree of the Sudder Court, prohibited from erecting a temple or instituting public worship on the spot of ground objected to by the Tenkalais and which lay within range of the Tenkalais temple, *i.e.*, within the usual range of the processions conducted in connection with the temple worship. In 1879 the Vadakalais opened a temple for public worship on another site, their private property, in the same street. *Held*, that the decree of the Sudder Court in the former suit was no bar to the action of the Vadakalais. *PARTHASARADI v. CHINNAKRISHNA*

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 304

Dissented from in *RAI CHURN GHOSE v. KUMUD MOHUN DUTTA CHAUDHARI* . 1 C. W. N. 687

✓ Same case in review . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 571  
2 C. W. N. 297

36. — Point of law decided in previous suit between same parties. A point of law, though decided in a suit between the same parties, can never be *res judicata*. *CHAMANLAL v. BAPUBHAI* . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 669

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

37. — Issue as to validity of grant—*Issue not decided in former suit.* In a suit to recover, with mesne profits and other incidents a jerayati village alleged by the plaintiff to form part of the zamindari, and to be wrongfully held by defendant by virtue of the execution of a decree of the late Commissioner of the Northern Circars passed in 1844, the defendant pleaded that he held on a permanent lease subject to a fixed quit-rent, that he and his ancestors had held on that tenure since and previously to the permanent settlement, and that the quit-rent had been received from him by the plaintiff. The Agent dismissed the suit, on the ground that the matter had become *res judicata* against the plaintiff by a former decree in 1807. *Held*, that the matter of the present claim was not *res judicata*, because the question of the existence and validity of the alleged grant, on which the defendant relied, was not determined in the former decree. *VAIRICHARLA SURYA NARAYANA v. NADIMINTI BHAGAVAT PATANJALI SHASTRI* 3 Mad. 120

38. — Issue as to proprietorship of land—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 13—Suit to recover land under rental agreement—Subsequent suit for ejectment.* In 1874 *V* sued *P* to recover certain lands held by him, under a rental agreement dated 1873. *S* was made a defendant on the ground that he held one plot as under-tenant to *P*. *S* claimed to hold under *N*. As to this plot, the issue, raised was whether the land was held by *S* under *P*; the decision, that *S* did not hold under *P*, but under *N* since 1828; the decree, that *V*'s suit be dismissed as to this plot. *Held*, in a suit brought in 1881 by *V* against *N* and *S* to recover the same plot of land, that the suit was not barred by reason of the previous decision in 1874. *ANANDA RAMAN VATHIAR v. PALIYIL VITTIL NANU NAYAR*

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 9

39. — Issue as to tenancy—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13—Question decided by decree.* A landlord, having tendered a pottah at a certain rate, sued his tenants in the Court of the District Munsif to recover rent for Fasli 1289 (1879-80). The tenants pleaded that they were not bound to accept the pottah tendered by virtue of an implied contract, which entitled them without exchange of pottah and muchalka to hold the land permanently at a lighter rent. The District Munsif and, on appeal, the District Court decided that no implied contract had been proved by the tenants. The suit was dismissed on the ground that the pottah tendered was not one which the tenants were bound to accept under Act VIII of 1865 (Madras). The landlord then sued in the Revenue Court to compel the tenants to accept a pottah for Fasli 1291 (1881-82), and the tenants again put forward the same plea. *Held*, that the question whether the tenants were entitled to hold permanently at a lighter rate without exchange of pottah and muchalka was not *res judicata* by virtue of the decree in the former suit. *MUTTUKUMARAPPA REDDI v. ARUMUGA PILLAI*

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 145



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40. ——— Issue as to transferability of tenure—*Estoppel—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 13.* Plaintiff having brought a suit to recover damages for the removal by the defendants of certain crops, alleging (i) that he was transferee of the jote upon which the crops were, and (ii) that he had purchased the crops, it was objected that the transfer to the plaintiff was invalid. It being found that the crops in question had been purchased by the plaintiff as alleged by him, he obtained a decree for damages for their removal. The plaintiff now brought a second suit as transferee of the jote to recover possession of it from the defendants, who again pleaded that the transfer was invalid. *Held*, reversing the decision of FIELD, J., that the defendants were not estopped, under s. 13, expl. II, of the Civil Procedure Code, from setting up that defence, inasmuch as the question of the transferability of the jote was immaterial in the first suit and had not in fact been determined, and the question of estoppel was not raised by the parties themselves. CHURN MANJEE v. ISHAN CHUNDER DHUR . . . . . 9 C. L. R. 474

41. ——— Issue as to right of pre-emption—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 562, 588 (28)—Second appeal—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 565, 566—Determination of case by High Court.* In a suit for pre-emption, based on the *wajib-ul-urz* of a village, the Court of first instance dismissed the claim on the ground that no right of pre-emption had been proved to exist in the village. The lower Appellate Court, dissenting from this opinion, reversed the first Court's decree, and remanded the case under s. 562 of the Civil Procedure Code for a decision on the remaining question of fact, *viz.*, the amount of the consideration for the sale. On appeal from the order of remand, the High Court, on the 3rd January 1884, observed that it was not disposed to interfere with the finding of fact that the plaintiffs had a right of pre-emption, and accordingly dismissed the appeal, but added that the Judge was in error in remanding the case under s. 562 of the Code, that his order must so far be set aside, and that he should proceed under s. 565 or s. 566, as might be applicable. The Judge, on receipt of this order, replaced the case on his file, remitted an issue to the Court of first instance, under s. 566, as to the amount of consideration, and, accepting the first Court's finding upon that issue, decreed the plaintiff's claim. In second appeal by the defendants the High Court was of opinion that the Judge had disposed of the case upon a condition of things which the plaintiffs had never asserted, inasmuch as he had treated the right of pre-emption which was in issue as one arising from custom, and not, as alleged by the plaintiffs, as arising from a contract between the ancestors of the parties. All the evidence necessary to the determination of the case was on the record. *Held* by the Full Bench, that the defendants were not prevented by the operation of the High Court's order of the 3rd

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January 1884 from disputing the right of pre-emption, inasmuch as that order was a decision of a merely interlocutory character passed in the same suit, and the questions of fact involved therein were decided only so far as was necessary for the purpose of passing the order, and it could not be regarded as determining the main question in the suit which was still open, and must be decided in the final decree in the suit. *Per* STRAIGHT, J., that the jurisdiction of the High Court in appeal under s. 588 of the Code from the Judge's order of remand was, like the jurisdiction of the Judge in passing the order, limited by the terms of s. 562; and hence the remark made in the High Court's order, dealing with the plaintiff's right of pre-emption, could only be regarded as an *obiter dictum*, and not as determining any question as to the pre-emptive right. DEOKISHEN v. BANSI

I. L. R. 8 All. 172

42. ——— Question of title—*Question collaterally in issue.* A suit to have a declaration of right and to set aside a thakbust proceeding in respect to certain lands is not barred by s. 2, Act VIII of 1859, by reason of the decision in a previous suit for the value of fruit growing on that land in which the question of title to the land came collaterally in issue. MAHIMA CHANDRA CHUCKERBUTTY v. RAJKUMAR CHACKERBUTTY

1 B. L. R. A. C. 1 : 10 W. R. 22

43. ——— *Incidental decision of title—Suit afterwards for possession.* A, alleging himself the owner of a certain garden, brought a suit for damages against B and C for forcibly carrying off fruit grown in such garden. In this suit the question whether A was exclusively in possession of the garden was incidentally raised and decided against A. Thereupon A, who in the meantime had been ousted from possession, brought a subsequent suit in which B and C together with others were co-defendants, in which he claimed an undivided share in the same garden. *Held*, that, under the circumstances, the doctrine of *res judicata* did not apply, and that such suit was maintainable. DOORGA RAM PAL v. KALLY KRISTO PAUL

3 C. L. R. 549

44. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 13—Former suit on different cause of action for same land.* In 1878 plaintiff sued to recover certain land from defendants on the ground that she, being the owner, had made an oral lease of the land to the defendant in 1876. Issues were framed both as to title and as to the letting, but the Munsif, without trying the question of title, dismissed the suit on the ground that the oral lease was not proved. *Held*, that a fresh suit to recover possession of the land on the ground of title was not barred as being *res judicata*. Expl. (3) of s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure refers to relief applied for which the Court is bound to grant with reference to the matters directly and substantially in issue. RHEEKA LALL v. BHUGGOO LALL, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 23, and



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*Dinobundhoo Chowdhry v. Kristomonee Dossee*, I. L. R. 2 Calc. 152, dissented from. THYILA KANDI UMMATHA v. THYILA KANDI CHERIA KUNHAMED I. L. R. 4 Mad. 308

45. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—Collateral decision on title.* K died leaving a widow, M, as his heir. M also died leaving a will in favour of B, who accordingly applied for letters of administration with the will annexed. This application was refused by the District Judge, who granted a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860 to one G. Upon this B sought his remedy in a suit before the Subordinate Judge, who held that, the property being that of the husband, the widow's will passed nothing to plaintiff, and that, although the evidence in favour of G was doubtful, yet the Court could not say that the was not her heir. In a suit by G against B for the rents of the property accruing since the widow's death, where G contended that the decision of the Subordinate Judge operated as a bar to the questioning of his title:—*Held*, that the principle of *res judicata* did not apply. GOOROO CHURN SIRCAR v. BRIJA NATH DHUR . . . . . 24 W. R. 111

46. ————— *Issue incidentally raised—Suit for possession.* In 1852, T acquired a plot of land, X under a Government grant. In 1851 N, claiming to be the owner of the adjoining plot Y, granted a lease of it to R; but in 1853 another lease of the same plot was granted by an agent of N to G. In 1859 G sued T to recover possession of lot X as being part of plot Y, and obtained a decree, against which T appealed to the Privy Council. Pending the appeal, R sued G for possession of plot Y, and obtained a decree against G. Meanwhile, R having failed to pay rent, plot Y was put up for sale, and purchased by the present respondent. In 1872, the respondent, who was unable to get possession of his purchase, obtained leave to be admitted a party respondent in the appeal to the Privy Council, and filed a case averring that the interests of the original respondents had ceased, and that he was, pending the appeal, precluded from enforcing his rights. The Privy Council held that the plaintiff G had not proved that plot Y included plot X, but they stated that they did not adjudicate upon any question of title between the respondents on that appeal, or N or any other person's interest in plot Y. The present respondent subsequently sued T's representative for possession of plot X as being parcel of plot Y. *Held*, reversing the judgment of the High Court, that the respondent's claim was *res judicata* by reason of the previous judgment of the Privy Council. BELCHAMBERS v. ASHOOTOSH DHUR . . . . . 7 C. L. R. 308

47. ————— *Order of remand—Decision of question of title—Suit for possession.* In 1814 litigation commenced between a zamindar and his tenants by reason of his having dispossessed them of lands held under a jote tenure, and a decree having been obtained by the ten-

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

ants, the zamindar assessed the jote lands at a certain rent. Subsequently this rent fell into arrear, and under a decree the jote lands were in 1836 sold in satisfaction of the arrears to J, who was put in possession in 1839. Another suit, which was pending between the tenants and their mortgagee, in which a question arose whether these jote lands were included in the mortgage, was decided in favour of the mortgagee in 1841. J, the then jote tenant, was no party to that suit, and continued in possession of his jote lands. Disputes arose, and by order of the Sudder Court in 1845 the jote lands were directed to be put in possession of the mortgagee. In 1856 a suit was brought by J's representative to set aside that order and to recover possession of the jote lands. The Privy Council held that, as J, the jote tenant, was not a party to the suit under which the decree was made in 1841, the decree was not binding upon him or those deriving title through him, and remanded the case in order that the issue whether the land was parcel of the jote or not might be tried. *Held*, that this order of remand was conclusive that the question of the title of the representatives of J to the jote lands could not be re-opened. JEGGODUMBA DOSSEE v. TARAKANT BANERJEE . 6 C. L. R. 121

48. ————— *Suit for possession dismissed on ground of want of title in vendor—Suit for recovery of purchase-money in which title set up as a defence.* On 8th February 1889 the defendant sold to the plaintiff, under a registered conveyance containing no express covenant for title, land of which he was not in possession and the purchase-money was paid. The plaintiff and the defendant sued to recover possession, but failed on the ground that the vendor had no title. The plaintiff now sued on 7th February 1895 to recover with interest the purchase-money and the amount of costs incurred by him in the previous litigation. *Held*, that the defendant was not entitled to give evidence of his alleged title, and that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief sought by him. KRISHNAN NAMBIAR v. KANNAN I. L. R. 21 Mad. 8

49. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13—Suit for right to malikana and for registration of names—Decision in previous suit—Court of competent jurisdiction.* Previous to 1825 dearah X accreted to mouzah Y, and some time before 1860 the maliks of Y executed two conveyances in favour of A and B respectively. In 1860 A sued B in the Munsif's Court for possession of a share in X, which B claimed under his conveyance. In that suit A succeeded on the ground that B's conveyance did not cover the share claimed by him in X, but merely covered the share in the mouzah itself, whereas by his conveyance A had acquired the right to the share in X, which he claimed. In 1866 the Collector refused to recognize B's right to malikana payable in respect of the share in X which had been the subject of the suit in 1860 or to register his name in respect thereof, but



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

acknowledge *A*'s right thereto, relying on the decision of the Civil Court in the suit between *A* and *B*. Subsequently *B*'s representatives, *C* and *D*, in 1876 sought to have their names registered in respect of the same malikana, but they were opposed by *E*, who alleged that *A* had been acting throughout as his benamidar. Their application was eventually disallowed on reference by the Collector to the Civil Court. *C* and *D* thereupon instituted the present suit against *E* in the Court of the Subordinate Judge for a declaration of their right to the malikana and for a reversal of the order refusing to allow their names to be registered in respect thereof. *Held*, that the suit was barred as *res judicata*, on the ground that the right to malikana was substantially the same question as the proprietary right to the share in the dearah, and that this issue had been tried and decided in the suit in 1860 in favour of *A*, who must be taken to be *E*. In a suit for malikana the issue between the parties substantially raises the question of the proprietary right to the estate in respect of which the malikana is claimed, and when the question of the proprietary right has been decided in a previous suit between the same parties, a subsequent suit for malikana will be barred as *res judicata*. **GOPINATH CHOBEY v. BHUGWAT PERSHAD . I. L. R. 10 Calc. 697**

**50.** ————— *Finality of decision—Suit for possession—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 13.* In a suit to recover possession of certain land, where it appeared that there had been a previous suit between the same parties with respect to the same land, in which the then plaintiffs sought to have their possession confirmed, and that in that suit the lower Courts had decided the case both on the question of title and of possession, but on special appeal the High Court had dealt only with the question of possession, and in dismissing the appeal had not gone into the question of title, and the defendant in that suit subsequently sued to recover possession of the land:—*Held*, that the question of title was still open between the parties, and had not been heard and finally decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction in a former suit within the meaning of s. 13 of Act X of 1877. **GUNGABISHEN BHUGUT v. ROGHONATH OJAH**

**I. L. R. 7 Calc. 381 : 9 C. L. R. 34**

**51.** ————— *Landlord and tenant—Suit for ejectment—Issue previously heard and determined—Estoppel—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13.* In a suit by a landlord against his tenant for ejectment the defences were (1) no notice to quit had been served; and (2) the tenant was a permanent one. The suit was dismissed on the first ground, the Court holding at the same time that the tenure was not a permanent one. In a subsequent suit for ejectment from the same holding brought by the same plaintiff against the same defendant the defences were: (i) the tenure was permanent; and (ii) the plaintiff was estopped by the conduct of his predecessor in title from asserting as against the defendant that the tenure was not a

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

permanent one. The lower Appellate Court found the question of estoppel in favour of the defendant and dismissed the suit. On appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, that the decision was right, and must be affirmed. *Semble*: That where a former suit between the same parties in respect of the same subject-matter has been dismissed on a preliminary point, a finding in that suit on the merits in the plaintiff's favour will not bar the defendant from putting forward the same defence on the merits in a subsequent suit by the same plaintiff against the same defendant. *Semble*: That the case of *Niamul Khan v. Phadu Buldia, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 319*, has been impliedly overruled by the case of *Run Bahadoor Singh v. Luchu Koer, L. R. 12 I. A. 23 : I. L. R. 11 Calc. 301*. **NUNDO LALL BHUTTA-CHARJEE v. BIDHOO MOOKHY DEBEE**

**I. L. R. 13 Calc. 17**

**52.** ————— *Suit for ejectment—Plea of right of occupancy—Issue not finally decided.* *A* as ticcadar brought a suit to eject *B* from certain lands which he claimed as majhes land or land which is ordinarily cultivated by the landlord himself or by the ticcadar. *B* pleaded his right of occupancy. The Court found that the land was majhes land, but dismissed the suit on the ground that *A* had failed to prove notice to quit. Afterwards *A* brought a suit against *B* for ejectment from the same land. *B* again pleaded his right of occupancy. *Held*, that *B* was not precluded from raising the same plea, inasmuch as the finding in the previous suit upon the issue whether *B* was an occupancy tenant was not conclusive against him nor could that issue be said to have been "finally decided" in that suit within the meaning of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. **Run Bahadur Singh v. Luchu Koer, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 301**, and **Nundo Lall Bhuttacharjee v. Bidhoo Mookhy Debee, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 17**, relied on. **THAKUR MAGUNDEO v. THAKUR MAHADEO SINGH . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 647**

**53.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, Act X of 1877, s. 13—Matters directly and substantially in issue in a suit.* Where a decree awarding to one of the parties money deposited in a treasury by a third party as the compensation for land taken by the latter for railway purposes, was based upon the right to the land, the question of title having been directly and substantially in issue between the parties:—*Held*, that the contest of title was conclusive between them under s. 13 of Act X 1877. In a suit brought by a ghatwal to resume, as determinable at will, an under-tenure granted by one of his ancestors of land, part of the ghatwali mehal, it was alleged for the defence that the under-tenure was permanent. A prior judgment upon conflicting claims made by the ghatwal and the under-tenure-holders to receive the above-mentioned compensation-money, which had been paid in respect of lands in part comprised in the under-tenure, determined that the ghatwal was entitled to the money being founded on the under-tenure holders



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

having been in possession of it by the mere sufferance of the ghatwal who could put an end to it at any time. *Held*, that the question whether the latter had a permanent tenure, having been directly and substantially in issue in the former suit, could not be contested in another. **RAM CHUNDER SINGH v. MADHO KUMARI**

**I. L. R. 12 Calc. 484 : L. R. 12 I. A. 188**

**54.** ——— *Question incidentally decided—Boundary dispute.* Where, in a suit for some land, a Judge had considered it necessary to find out the boundary between two villages, and had given a decision in favour of one of the parties, who in a second suit of the same kind, but with reference to some other land, brought in the former decision to show that the land in dispute in the second suit must be his if the finding as to the village boundary in the former suit was correct:—*Held*, that the finding as to the village boundary in the former suit was conclusive only as to the land in dispute in the former case, but did not make the former decision conclusive as to the boundary line itself. **MONT ROY v. RAJBUNSEE KOOR**

**25 W. R. 393**

**55.** ——— *Defence not raised in previous suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 13, expl. (ii)—Estoppel.* Expl. (ii) of s. 13 of Act X of 1877 was meant to apply to a case where the defendant has a defence which, if he had so pleased, he might, and ought to, have brought forward; but as he did not bring it forward, the suit has been decreed against him. Under such circumstances, the defendant is as much bound by the adverse decree as if he had set up the defence, and he is equally estopped from setting up that defence, in any future suit under similar circumstances. The explanation was never intended to enable a party to treat a point of law as having been decided in his favour in a former suit which was in fact not so decided, and which it was not necessary, for the purposes of the suit, to decide at all. **GHURSOBHIT AHIR v. RAMDUT SINGH**

**I. L. R. 5 Calc. 923 : 6 C. L. R. 537**

**56.** ——— *Party raising only one defence, having others—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2.* When a plaintiff claims an estate and the defendant being in possession and knowing that he has two grounds of defence, raises only one, he shall not, in the event of the plaintiff obtaining a decree, be permitted to sue on the other ground to recover possession from the plaintiff. **Woomatara Debia v. Unnopoorna Dassee, 11 B. L. R. 158.** Where therefore the defendants purchased an estate in the plaintiff's possession and sued him to recover possession of it, and the plaintiff resisted the suit merely on the ground that he was the auction-purchaser of it, and the defendants obtained a decree and the plaintiff then sued claiming a right of pre-emption in respect of the property, a claim which he might have asserted in reply to the former suit:—*Held*, that he was debarred from suing to enforce such claim. **BALDEO SAHAI v. BATESHAR SINGH**

**I. L. R. 1 All. 75**

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

**JADU LAL v. RAM GHOLAM . I. L. R. 1 All. 316**

**57.** ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2, and 1877, s. 13—Omission to raise defence—Subsequent suit.* In a suit for rent and for ejectment, the defendant pleaded that his tenure was transferable and istemrari, and consequently protected by the rent law. In a former suit for arrears of previous years in which the defendant pleaded that his tenure was istemrari, the plaintiff obtained a decree for ejectment on non-payment of rent within fifteen days. In that case the defendant saved his tenure by payment within the time stated. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the defendant might in the former suit, in which the nature of the tenure was put in issue, have urged that his tenure was both transferable and istemrari, he could not in the present suit be allowed to alter his defence and rely upon the tenure being transferable. **Woomatara Debia v. Unnopoorna Dassee, 11 B. L. R. 158.** cited and followed. **DINOMOYI DABIA CHOWDHRAIN v. ANUNGO MOYI**

**4 C. L. R. 599**

**58.** ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2.* If the plaintiff's cause of action might and ought properly to have been made a ground of defence in a former suit, brought against him by the defendant, his suit is barred by s. 2 of Act VIII of 1859. The father of A and B having died, A, alleging that his father's assets amounted in value to R12,000 and admitting that he (A) had received R1,000, part thereof, in 1866, sued B, whom he alleged to be in possession of the rest of the property, for R5,000, as the residue of A's share, and obtained a decree for a half share in immoveable property of their father of the value of about R700, and no more. In 1871 B sued A for a moiety of the R1,000 which A, in his suit in 1866, had admitted to be in his possession. *Held*, that such a suit could not be maintained, as the claim on which it was founded must be deemed a *res judicata* in A's suit in 1866. **MAKTUM VALAD MOHIDIN v. IMAM VALAD MOHIDIN**

**10 Bom. 293**

**59.** ——— *Suit to enforce rights not raised.* Where a party claiming certain land by right of pre-emption failed to set up her rights in a suit in which the purchaser of that land sued her for possession and obtained a decree, it was *held* that she was not entitled to bring a fresh suit to enforce the same rights. **ASGUR MAHOMED v. NUZEEMA BIBEE**

**14 W. R. 272**

**60.** ——— *Former suit deciding right of lien for dower.* Where a widow who had taken possession of her husband's property was ejected by means of a suit in which her defence raised no right of lien for dower, in which suit an absolute decree of right was given to his heirs, the right of lien, as between her and them, is a *res adjudicata*. **WAFAH v. SAHEEBA . 8 W. R. 307**

(*Contra*) **JANEB KHANUM v. AMATOOL FATIMA KHANUM**

**8 W. R. 51**



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

61. ————— *Code of Civil Procedure, s. 13—Omission to bring forward in a prior suit what then would have been a defence—Accounts between mortgagor and mortgagee.* A mortgage between parties who had accounts together comprised lands which also were leased by the mortgagors to the mortgagees, who in 1878 obtained a decree upon the mortgage, although at the time they owed to the mortgagors a considerable sum for rents. The mortgagors did not then set up the defence that they were entitled to have a general account taken and to have the mortgagee's decree limited to such balance as might be found to exist in favour of the latter. But the mortgagors alleged a specific agreement, which they failed to prove, that the rents were to be set off against the mortgage-debt; and they also stated their intention to sue separately for the rents due. No deduction was made in the decree upon the mortgage on account of these rents, for which, moreover, afterwards the mortgagors did obtain a decree. But the mortgagees executed their decree upon the mortgage, notwithstanding objections (which were disallowed in 1882), and, having obtained leave to bid at the judicial sale, purchased the property. In the present suit brought by the mortgagors to have the judicial sale set aside and to have the mortgage-debt extinguished, by having set off against it the rents which had already accrued, or might afterwards accrue, and for possession of the lands on the expiry of the lease:—*Held*, that, although an equity had been raised in favour of the mortgagors, that an account would have been taken, and that the rents payable should have been credited against the sums due by them, yet this equity could not be enforced in this suit. The proper occasion for enforcing it would have been in defence of the suit upon the mortgage; the present claim was within the meaning of s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and the plaintiffs were now barred from insisting on it, *exceptione res judicata*. *MAHABIR PERSHAD SINGH v. MACNAGHTEN*. . . . . **I. L. R. 16 Calc. 682**  
**L. R. 16 I. A. 107**

62. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13, expl. II—Suit for dower debt after previous suit for partition amongst heirs—Omission to bring forward defence in former suit.* Two of the daughters of a deceased Mahomedan sued the remaining heirs for partition of the inheritance, and a decree for partition was made, which was confirmed on appeal by the High Court. Pending the appeal to the High Court, two other daughters of the deceased, who had been parties defendants in the suit for partition, brought a suit by which they claimed a large share in the estate of the deceased as part of the dower debt due to their mother. In this suit they impleaded as defendants all the surviving descendants of their deceased father. *Held*, that the claim for dower should have been made a ground of defence in the former suit by the plaintiffs who had been defendants in the suit for partition, and that, as no

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

such defence had been set up in that suit, the claim in respect of the dower debt fell within the purview of expl. II to s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the suit was barred, not only as against the plaintiffs to the former suit, but as against the other defendants to that suit. *DOST MUHAMMAD KHAN v. SAID BEGUM*

**I. L. R. 20 All. 81**

63. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13, expl. II—Matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence in a former suit—Mortgage—Prior and subsequent mortgagees.* *Held*, that the holder of three prior mortgages over the same property, who in answer to suits brought by the holders of other mortgages over that property of dates subsequent to his, had pleaded his rights under one only of the mortgages held by him, was barred by reason of expl. II to s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure from afterwards bringing a suit for sale upon one of the remaining mortgages, which he might and ought to have pleaded as an answer *pro tanto* to the suits of the other mortgagees. *Mahabir Prasad Singh v. Macnaghten*, **I. L. R. 16 Calc. 682**; **L. R. 16 I. A. 107**; *Kameswar Parshad v. Raj Kumari Ruttan Kuar*, **I. L. R. 20 Calc. 79**; **L. R. 19 I. A. 234**; *Kailash Mondul v. Baroda Sundari Dasi*, **I. L. R. 24 Calc. 711**; *Sheosagar Singh v. Sita Ram Singh*, **I. L. R. 24 Calc. 616**; and *Mata Din Kasodhan v. Kazim Husain*, **I. L. R. 13 All. 432**, referred to. *SRI GOPAL v. PIRTHI SINGH*

**I. L. R. 20 All. 110**

64. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 13—Ancestral property—Partition—Omission to insist on property being brought into hotchpot—Property out of the jurisdiction—Subsequent suit for partition.* The three defendants, G, R, and K, and their brother M, the grandfather of the plaintiff, were members of one family possessing undivided ancestral property consisting of the villages of B, P, and S, the two former being situated in the Poona Zillah and the latter in the Satara Zillah. In 1866 the three defendants (each in a separate suit) sued M in the Poona Courts for partition of the villages of B and P. They in their plaints alluded to the village of S, stating that it was their own and not subject to partition. M in his answer contented himself with denying the right to partition of the villages of B and P, and made no claim, in the alternative, to a share in the ownership of S. The plaintiff, the grandson of M, now sued the defendants in the Satara Courts for partition of the village of S, contending that he was not concluded from so doing by the former proceedings in the Poona Courts. *Held*, that the plaintiff's claim was *res judicata*, and that his suit was concluded under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 13, expls. I and II. A member of an undivided family, suing his co-parceners for partition of family property, is bound to bring into hotchpot any undivided property in his own possession, in order that there



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

may be a complete and final partition, and cannot claim to withhold any such property on the ground that it is situated without another jurisdiction. That being so, the plaintiff's grandfather *M* having neglected in the previous suit to make the exception of the village of *S* a ground of defence, the judgment which followed involved that decision of every claim of title upon the cause of action, and must be taken between the parties as amounting to a positive adjudication of all such claims, including the claim to the village of *S*. *HARI NARAYAN BRAHME v. GANPATRAV DAJI*

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 272

65. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 13.* *S* and *B* jointly sued *N* for the redemption of a mortgage of an 8-anna share of a village, *B* suing as the purchaser from the mortgagor of a moiety of such share. *N* did not in defence of such suit assert a right of pre-emption in respect of such moiety, although such right had accrued to him on its sale by the mortgagor to *B*. *S* and *B* obtained a decree in such suit, and the mortgage was redeemed. *N* subsequently sued *B* and his vendor to enforce his right of pre-emption in respect of such moiety. *Held*, that it was incumbent upon *N* in the former suit to have asserted in defence his right of pre-emption in respect of such moiety, inasmuch as, if that right had been established, it must, so far as *B* was concerned, have proved fatal to his title to redeem; and that, as he had not done so, the suit to enforce his right of pre-emption was barred by the provisions of s. 13 of Act X of 1877, expl. II. *NARAIN DAT v. BHAIRU BUKHSHPAL*

I. L. R. 3 All. 189

66. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 13.* *B*, who held a decree for money against *I*, caused certain property to be attached in execution of such decree as the property of his judgment-debtor. *M*, the wife of *I*, objected to such attachment, claiming such property as her own. Her objection was disallowed, and she consequently brought a suit against *B* to establish her right to such property. She died while that suit was pending, leaving by will such property to her sons. That suit proceeded in the names of her sons, who claimed such property under such will. The lower Courts only decided in that suit that such property belonged to *M*, and not to *I*, and it was therefore not liable to be sold in execution of *B*'s decree against the latter. They did not consider the question whether *M*'s sons were entitled to such property under their mother's will. In second appeal in that suit *B* contended that *I*, as heir to *M*, was entitled to a fourth share of such property, and such share was liable to be sold in execution of such decree. *M*'s sons did not contend before the High Court that they were entitled to the whole of such property under their mother's will to the exclusion of *I*. The High Court allowed *B*'s contention. *B* brought a fourth share of such property to sale in execution of his decree and purchased it himself. Thereupon *M*'s sons sued him for such share, claim-

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

ing it under their mother's will. *Held*, that their mother's will was a matter which should have been made a ground of defence by *M*'s sons in the course of the trial of the second appeal in the former suit between them and *B*, and that, not having been so made, it was *res judicata* in the sense of s. 13, expl. II, Act X of 1877. *SULTAN AHMAD v. MAULA BAKHSH*

I. L. R. 4 All. 21

67. ———— *Relinquishment of part of claim—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 13 and 43—Dekkan Agriculturists' Relief Act, XVII of 1879—Mortgagor—Mortgagee—Suit for account merely—Subsequent suit for possession.* Where there has been a suit between an agriculturist mortgagor and his mortgagee for an account merely, a subsequent suit for possession on payment of the money declared to be due is barred, under either s. 13 or s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *BHAU BALAJI v. HARI NILKANTHARV*

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 377

68. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 13 and 43—Right of karnavan to recover tarwad property in possession of anandravan.* A karnavan of a Malabar tarwad, having the right at any time to demand restoration of the property of the tarwad in the hands of the anandravan, is not debarred by s. 13 or s. 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure from bringing a second suit to recover lands in the wrongful possession of an anandravan, either by the fact that in a former suit between the same parties the karnavan only laid claim to some of the lands sued for, or by the fact that the former suit was dismissed upon the joint petition of the parties, alleging a compromise and a surrender of the lands, which, as a fact, were not surrendered, but wrongfully retained by the anandravan. *URAMKUMARATH KANNAN NAYAR v. URAMKUMARATH TENJU NAYAR*

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 1

69. ———— *Question not decided—Hindu widow, power of, to bind reversioners—Chur land—Jungleburi tenure.* *R*, a Hindu widow, granted a jungleburi tenure to certain tenants in respect of a chur belonging to her husband's estate. An amulnama was granted to the tenure signed by a karpardaz of *R* in respect of the tenure. *R* died in January 1861, and was succeeded by *J* and *P*, two daughters, the last of whom died on the 31st December 1880. On her death, the grandsons succeeded to the estate. On *R*'s death, *J* and *P* got possession of all estate papers, and amongst them a dowl granted by the tenants in return for the amulnama. In 1865 proceedings were taken by the tenants to obtain kabulyats on the footing of those documents which proceedings came to an end in 1868. In 1873 *J* and *P* instituted suits against the tenants, alleging the amulnama and dowl to be forgeries and seeking to enhance the rents payable to them as well as to have it declared that *R*'s acts did not bind them. In these suits it was found that *J* and *P* had all along been aware of the claim made by the tenants that they



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

held a permanent tenur, and the suits were dismissed on the ground that it was too late for *J* and *P*, after the lapse of twelve years from *R*'s death, to raise the question. In 1884 *D*, a receiver, instituted a suit in the names of the grandsons to eject the tenants on amongst other grounds that the grandsons (reversioners) were not bound by *R*'s acts, and that the jungleburi tenure was not binding on them; that the tenants were middlemen and had no right of occupancy; that at all events the plaintiffs were entitled to rent on the area of land then held by the defendants, as there had been large accretions to the amount covered by the amulnama and dowl. The defendant, amongst other things, pleaded *res judicata*, and that *R* had the power to grant the jungleburi tenure so as to bind the reversioners. *Held*, that the suit was not barred by *res judicata*, as in the suits brought by *J* and *P* the question of whether *R*'s acts bound the reversioners was never decided.

DROBOMOYI GUPTA v. DAVIS

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 323

70. ——— Specific performance—*Decree in favour of plaintiff—Rectification of decree on application of defendant—Motion to set aside decree dismissed—Subsequent application to rectify decree.* The plaintiff sued in 1877 for specific performance of an agreement, dated 27th September 1871, by which certain landed properties were to be divided, as specified in the agreement, between them and the defendants. The case came on for hearing on the 13th September 1878. The defendant did not appear, and a decree *ex parte* was made, which declared that the plaintiffs were entitled to have the agreement of the 27th September 1871 specifically performed, and referred the suit to the Commissioner for the preparation of conveyances, etc. The decree was sealed on the 9th October 1878. No further steps were taken by any of the parties for six years, and in September 1884 the matter was first brought before the Commissioner. He then directed the defendants to lodge with him all the title-deeds of the properties which by the agreement were to go to the plaintiff as their share. The defendants thereupon applied that the plaintiffs should be directed to lodge the title-deeds of the properties which by the agreement were to go to them, but the Commissioner refused to make this order, being of opinion that he was not authorized to do so under the decree which contained no direction to him in respect thereof. The defendants on the 10th November 1884 gave notice to the plaintiffs that they would apply to the Court—(i) “to set aside or vary its order of the 13th September 1878 so far as it related to the lodging of title-deeds, etc.; (ii) to appoint a receiver of certain properties mentioned in the agreement; (iii) to order the plaintiffs to deliver up to the defendants the properties which belonged to their share under the agreement; (iv) to order certain accounts to be taken.” This motion was

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

not brought on until the 10th September 1885, on which day it was dismissed with costs, the Judge holding that the defendants had not shown sufficient cause to justify the setting aside of the decree under s. 108 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). The plaintiffs having still kept possession of certain of the properties which by the agreement were to go to the defendants, notice was given by the defendants to the plaintiffs on the 28th April 1887 that they would apply to the Court for an order that the plaintiffs should perform their part of the agreement of the 27th September 1871, so far as it remained unperformed by them, by giving up to the defendants possession of certain properties and by accounting for the rents thereof, etc., etc. At the hearing of this motion, counsel for the defendants asked that the decree should be rectified by directing that the agreement should be specifically performed by the plaintiffs and defendants respectively. The defendants contended that the application was barred by lapse of time, and that the question was *res judicata* by the order of the 10th September 1885. *Held*, also, that the motion was not *res judicata* by reason of the previous order of the 10th September 1885. Although the notice of motion then served by the defendants on the plaintiffs included matters in respect of which the defendants sought relief by their present application, the Judge in making the order dealt with them as ancillary to the first and main point raised in that motion, viz., the defendants' right to set aside the decree under s. 108 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). Having decided that point against them, he did not really consider the other points at all, and did not adjudicate upon them, and therefore the present application in respect of these matters was not *res judicata*. KARIM MAHOMED JAMAL v. RAJOOMA . . . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 174

71. ——— Suit for specific performance of a contract of sale and to execute a sale deed—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13, expl. 2—Sale-deed subsequently executed by the Court under s. 262 of the Civil Procedure Code—Suit on sale-deed to recover possession.* The plaintiff, claiming specific performance of a contract of sale, sued the defendant to compel him to execute a deed of sale alleging that he had paid the purchase-money to the defendant and had obtained possession, but was subsequently dispossessed. The plaintiff had claimed the value of the standing crop or damages for the same. The Court found that the plaintiff had paid the purchase-money, but had not got possession, and ordered defendant to execute a deed of sale. On failure of the defendant to do so, the Court executed a deed of sale in plaintiff's favour under s. 262 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). The plaintiff thereupon brought the present suit to recover possession on the strength of the deed of sale. Defendant pleaded that this second suit was barred under s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that the suit was not barred by s. 13,



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

and that expl. 2 of that section was not applicable, because the object of that explanation would seem to be to compel the plaintiff to rely on all grounds which were open to him in support of the claim made by his plaint, which in the first suit was confined to obtaining a regular deed of sale. *NATHU PANDU v. BUDHU BHKA*

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 537

72. ——— Substantial matters in issue decided in a former suit—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 13—Right of shebaitship of a family deb-sheba under a will.* A testator, who died leaving widows and a daughter, also three surviving brothers bequeathed all the residue, after certain legacies, of his acquired estate, to maintain the worship of a family deity, appointing his three brothers and his eldest widow to be shebait, and providing that "the family of us five brothers shall be supported from the prosad, 'offerings to the deity.'" One or other of the brothers then for some years managed the estate as shebait, and the survivor of them was succeeded by his son one of the defendants in the present suit, which was brought by the testator's only daughter as heiress to his estate, claiming that the Court should determine "those provisions which were valid and lawful, and those which were invalid and illegal." She claimed possession and an account, and also to be the shebait. In a previous suit the present shebait had obtained a decree, to which the daughter, now plaintiff, was a party defendant, affirming the validity of the will and the rights of the members of the family to be maintained under it. *Held*, that the question of the validity of all the provisions of the will having been substantially decided in the decree in the former suit, which pronounced that the will was wholly valid, passing the entire estate of the testator to the deb-sheba and maintaining the rights of members of the family under the will, this suit was barred under s. 13 of Act X of 1877 as to all but the claim to be shebait. *KAMINI DEVI v. ASUTOSH MUKERJI. ASUTOSH MUKERJI v. KAMINI DEBI*

I. L. R. 16 Calc 103  
L. R. 15 I. A. 159

73. ——— Estoppel by judgment—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Act IX of 1847—Alluvion.* To apply the law of estoppel by judgment, stated in s. 6 of Act XII of 1879 and in s. 13 of Act XIV of 1882, it must be seen what has been directly and substantially in issue in the suit and whether that has been heard and finally decided, for which purpose the judgment must be looked at. The decree is usually insufficient for showing this, as, according to the Code, it only states the relief granted, if any, or other disposal of the suit, without the ground of decision and without affording information as to what may have been in issue and decided. The suit was to establish a right to land, and for possession, against two defendants, who alleged their rights retrospectively. The claimant had previously

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

obtained a decree against one of the defendants, and in that decree the land now claimed had been excepted. *Held*, that the matter now in issue, not having been directly and substantially in issue in the prior suit, the present suit was not barred under s. 13. Act XIV of 1882, Civil Procedure Code. *KALI KRISHNA TAGORE v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 173  
L. R. 15 I. A. 186

74. ——— Reference to previous judgment to explain decree—*Title of nearest reversioner.* In a prior suit a decree of the High Court awarded to the plaintiff the substantial relief claimed by him as reversionary heir entitled to inherit after the mother of the last male owner, then deceased, she holding her limited estate in the property; and the decree declared that certain alienations made by her were invalid against the reversionary heir. In the present suit the same plaintiff, as nearest reversioner, claimed possession of the property from the daughter of the mother, the latter having died since the prior suit; the daughter alleging title through her:—*Held*, that the judgment in the prior suit was admissible, and ought to be examined in the present suit, in order to see what that suit decided as to the reversioner's title. *Kali Krishna Tagore v. Secretary of State for India, L. R. 15 I. A. 186; I. L. R. 16 Calc. 173*, referred to and followed. The judgment showed that the question whether the plaintiff was the nearest reversioner, having been raised in the prior suit, had been finally determined in the affirmative, and this was sufficient proof of his title in the present suit. *LAKSHMI KANTAIYAMMI v. INTANTI RAJAGOPAL RAU* . . . . . I. L. R. 21 Mad. 344  
L. R. 25 I. A. 102  
2 C. W. N. 337

75. ——— Suit for redemption—*Decree for redemption without proviso for foreclosure of payment within a fixed time—Subsequent suit by mortgagee for sale—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13, expl. II.* A decree for redemption which does not provide for payment of the mortgage-debt within a fixed time, or for foreclosure in case of default, operates of itself as a foreclosure decree, if not executed within three years, after such a decree is passed, it is not open to the mortgagee to file a suit to recover the mortgage-money by sale of the mortgaged property, his right of sale being barred under s. 13, expl. II, of the Code of Civil Procedure. On 12th November 1883 A obtained a decree for redemption on payment of a certain sum of money to B (the mortgagee). The decree contained no direction as to foreclosure or as to the time within which the payment was to be made. On 26th November 1884 B, the mortgagee, sued to recover the mortgage-debt by sale of the property mortgaged. On 8th April 1885 A paid into Court the sum directed to be paid by the redemption decree. B refused to accept the payment, and insisted upon his right of



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

sale. *Held*, that the mortgagee having neglected to obtain a provision for sale in the redemption suit, as he might and ought to have done, if he wished to preserve the right of sale that right must be held, under expl. II of s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in the former suit, and to have been in effect negatived by the judgment. *MALOJI v. SAGAJI*. I. L. R. 13 Bom. 567

76. ——— Rival suits for pre-emption—*Each pre-emptor made defendant in the other's suit—Suits tried together, but decided by separate decrees—Decree allowing pre-emption in one case only on condition of default by other pre-emptors—Finality of decree in superior pre-emptor's suit—Appeal by inferior pre-emptor in his own suit—Appellate Court, power of, to alter decree so as to affect superior pre-emptor's right.* In two rival suits for pre-emption each pre-emptor was made a defendant in the other's suit. The suits were tried together upon the same evidence, and were disposed of by a single judgment, but by separate decrees. In one of the suits the pre-emptor obtained a decree in the terms of s. 214 of the Civil Procedure Code. In the other, the pre-emptor obtained a decree, subject to the condition that, in the event of the first pre-emptor, failing to execute his decree, the second pre-emptor should be entitled to execute it. The decree in the first suit was not appealed, and became final. The second pre-emptor appealed from the decree in his own suit, upon the grounds that the amount ordered to be paid was excessive, and that the first pre-emptor had lost his right, and the decree in the second suit should not have been made subject to the condition above stated. *Held*, that, the appellant, if he desired to get rid of the decision regarding the first pre-emptor's preferential right, should have appealed against the first pre-emptor's decree, but that, that decree having become final, the question between the two pre-emptors could not be reopened on appeal from the second pre-emptor's decree. *CHAJJU v. SHEO SAHAI*

I. L. R. 10 All. 123

77. ——— Issue as to proprietorship of lands—*Suit as to title to waste lands—Subsequent suit as to right to cultivated lands.* In a suit by A, the inamdar, against B, the khot of a certain village, it was decided that A was the proprietor of the forest or waste lands attached to the village. *Held*, that this decision did not operate as *res judicata* between A and B so as to estop B in a subsequent suit for setting up a proprietary title as against A to the cultivated lands in the village. *MORO ABAJI v. NARAYAN DHONDBHAT PITRE*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 325

78. ——— Suit in respect of different portion of joint family property—*Material issue in former suit.* In 1876 the plaintiffs, alleging a partition of the family estate in 1864, sued their uncle (father of the present defendants) to recover

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

their share of the rent of a certain piece of land which had formed part of the family estate. The plaintiffs relied in that suit upon a memorandum or agreement of partition executed in 1864. The defendant in that suit, however, contended that the family was still joint, and that the plaintiff could not claim a share of any particular piece of land, but must sue for partition of the whole property. At the hearing of that suit an issue was raised as to whether partition had taken place. The Court found in the affirmative and awarded the plaintiff's claim. In the present suit the plaintiffs sued the defendants (the sons of the defendants in the former suit) to recover possession of certain property which they alleged formed part of the share awarded to them at the partition of 1864, but of which they had been dispossessed by the defendants in 1873. The defendants denied that there had been any partition of the family property. *Held*, that the question of partition was *res judicata* and could not be raised again by the defendants. The question had been directly and substantially in issue in the former suit. No doubt, the dispute in that suit was as to a different piece of land, but there was no allegation that that land was held on any different tenure to the land now in suit. The plaintiffs there as now alleged that there had been a partition, and that they had a separate share. The defendants there contended, as the defendants now contended that there was no partition, and that the family estate was joint. The decree in that suit depended on that issue, and where the decree depends on an issue, the finding on that issue is binding as *res judicata*. The status of the family, having been thus tried and determined in the former suit, was binding on the parties in subsequent suits. *ANANTA BALACHARYA v. DAMODHAR MAKUND*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 25

79. ——— Suit by a woman for a share of property alleging herself to be A's widow—*Prayer for declaration of her marriage to A—Denial of her marriage to A by defendant—Arbitration—Award of a certain sum in satisfaction of plaintiff's claim—Decree on award—No declaration as to her marriage—Subsequent suit by her as widow—Release—Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), s. 13.* The plaintiff F in this suit alleged that both she and the defendant A had been the wives of one H, a Cutchi Memon Mahomedan, who died intestate in 1878, leaving them his widows and other members of his family him surviving. The plaintiff had a daughter named M. Both plaintiff and defendant had since H's death filed separate suits, in which they respectively claimed parts of his estate. In 1879 the defendant had filed a suit (No. 616 of 1879) against the executors of her father-in-law's will to recover certain money belonging to her husband. She obtained a decree, and the suit was referred to the Commissioner to make enquiries. In 1882 the present plaintiff F and her daughter M filed a suit (No. 227 of 1882) against the present defendant A, claiming a share of the estate of her



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

deceased husband *H*. In that suit she alleged that she had been lawfully married to *H* and ever since cohabited with him, and that her child *M* was his legitimate daughter; and she prayed, *inter alia*, for declaration that she was the lawful wife, and that *M* was the lawful daughter of *H*. In the written statement filed by *A* in that suit, she alleged that *F* was not the lawful wife of *H*, but only his kept mistress, and she denied that *F* was entitled to a share in his property. On the 3rd May 1882, an order of reference was made by which both the above suits, *viz.*, No. 616 of 1879 and No. 227 of 1882, "and all matters in difference therein" were by consent of all parties thereto referred to arbitration. The arbitrators were the respective attorneys of the parties. Awards were duly made, and on the 1st October 1883 decrees were passed in both suits in accordance with the said awards. By the decree and award in suit No. 227 of 1882 *F* was to be paid by *A* a sum of Rs55,000 in full satisfaction of all the claims of *F* and her daughter *M* upon the estate of *H*, the rest of the estate being declared the sole property of *A*. The material part of the decree was as follows: "This Court doth by consent pass judgment according of the said award . . . and doth order that the said *A* do pay for the said *F* to her attorneys, Messrs. Tyabji and Dhyabhai, within seven days after the date of this decree, the sum of Rs55,000 in full settlement of all and singular the claims and claim of the said *F* and *M* or either of them against or upon the estate of the said *H* whatsoever and whatsoever . . . and doth declare that upon the payment of the said sum of Rs55,000 by the said *A* to the said *F* as aforesaid, all claims whatsoever of the said *F* and *M* or either of them upon the estate of the said *H* in the hands of any person whatsoever or upon the said *A* as heir of the said *H* personally or otherwise howsoever, shall be considered to have been fully satisfied by the said *A* and absolutely waived for ever by the said *F* and *M*; and both further declare that the said *A* is entitled absolutely to all the rest of the estate and effects of the said *H* as her sole property as against the said *F* and *M*." The defendant *A* in 1882 also filed another suit (No. 198 of 1882) against her father-in-law's executors, and recovered certain ornaments which she alleged to be her stridhan. In October 1886 *A* married again, and in December 1887 *F* filed the present suit against her, alleging that by the law and custom of Cutchi Memons *A* had by reason of such second marriage forfeited all rights and interests to, and in the property of, her first husband *H*, and also to the ornaments which she had recovered in the last-mentioned suit, and she claimed that the said property and ornaments now belonged to her (*F*) as sole surviving widow of the said *H*. She prayed for a declaration that *A* had by her second marriage forfeited her right to the said property and ornaments, and that she (the plaintiff) was now entitled thereto; that the defendant might be ordered to deliver, etc., etc. The defendant *A* filed a written statement in which (*inter alia*) she

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

contended that the plaintiff was never the wife of *H*, but had been merely his kept mistress; that in suit No. 227 of 1882 she (the defendant) had denied that the plaintiff *F* was the widow of *H*; that the award and decree in that suit were not made upon the basis of her (*F*'s) being such widow, and she (the defendant) submitted that the said award and decree were a bar to the present suit. It was contended for the defendant (i) that the plaintiff had in the former suit prayed for a declaration that she had been the lawful wife of *H*; that the decree in that suit contained no such declaration, and that her prayer must therefore be taken to have been refused under s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), and that she was consequently not now entitled to sue as his widow—her claim to be his widow being *res judicata*; (ii) that the decree in suit No. 227 of 1882 expressly declared that the Rs55,000 awarded to the plaintiff by that decree was in full settlement of all her claim; and that she was therefore precluded from claiming against the estate in any possible contingency; and that therefore the defendant's re-marriage gave her no right to sue; (iii) that the latter part of the decree amounted to a release and assignment by the plaintiff *F* to the defendant of all her (the plaintiff's) right to the property in question. *Held*, that the status of the plaintiff as widow of *H* was not *res judicata*. The question of the plaintiff's marriage with *H* had not been controverted before the arbitrators and finally decided in a manner sufficient to establish *res judicata*. An award can only operate as an estoppel in respect of questions properly brought before and considered by the arbitrators. Expl. III of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) does not apply where the Court is silent on a head of relief only claimed as ancillary to the main relief, and which by implication is rather granted than refused. It only applies where the Court is silent on an independent head of relief claimed and duly controverted. But *held*, that the award and release contained in the decree constituted a binding agreement, by which the plaintiff *F* for the sum of Rs55,000 waived all her rights against *A*, including the claim made in the present suit, which existed at the time of the award as a present right dependent on a contingency, and the suit therefore should be dismissed. *FATMABAI v. AISHABAI*

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 454

*Held*, on appeal, affirming the decision of Scott, J., that the present suit was not barred under s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) by reason of the former suit No. 227 of 1882. Although *F* litigated in the former suit as widow of *H* as she did in the present suit, the matters "substantially in issue" in the two suits were quite distinct. In the former suit she claimed her share in the estate of *H* as one of his lawful heirs entitled to succeed to him on his death. In the present suit her claim was based on a subsequent event, by reason of which she contended that *A*'s share was by law and custom forfeited, and reverted to the estate of *H*. *Held*, also (affirming the decision of Scott, J.), that the



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

status of plaintiff as widow of *H* was not *res judicata*. The plaint in suit No. 227 of 1882, no doubt asked for a declaration that she was the widow of *H*, and no such declaration had been made. But the declaration was not sought for by way of specific relief, but simply as the ground for the real and substantial relief to obtain which the suit was instituted, *viz.*, the payment by *A* of *F*'s share of *H*'s estate. Expl. III of s. 13 was not intended to apply to such a case. *Held* (reversing the decision of *SCOTT, J.*), that the declaration in the former decree, that the Rs5,000 were paid to the plaintiff in full settlement of all her claims upon the estate, did not bar the present suit. The words of the award and decree were to be read with reference to the character in which the parties were litigating as widows of the deceased *H* claiming to succeed to his property on his death. Such general language was to be controlled by the circumstances of the case. Upon the proper construction of the award there was no such clear intention shown to include in the settlement a contingent claim of the special nature now made as to preclude the plaintiff from setting it up in the present suit. *FATMABAI v. AISHABAI*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 242

80. ———— Claim in part included in former suit which was dismissed—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 13, 42, 43, and 212—Reference to pleadings and judgment to explain decree—Omission of portion of claim in former suit—Mesne profits—Oudh Rent Act (XIV of 1868), s. 111.* That a claim has been included in a previous suit without its having been directly and substantially put in issue and decided, does not upon the dismissal of that suit preclude a subsequent suit upon it. A consent decree of 1873 decided that alluvial land belonged to the plaintiff's village Sipah. The area was judicially determined in 1876 on a map of 1874, but actual possession was not obtained from the defendant, who owned villages on the opposite side of the river. The decree-holder in 1877 included a claim for part of the same land in a suit for an accretion to another of his riparian villages, Khasapur, and the latter suit was wholly dismissed. To get possession of the land decreed in 1873, he then brought rent-suits against two tenants upon it, the defendant intervening under s. 111 of the Oudh Rent Act, 1868. Both the rent-suits were dismissed; and according to the right reserved in the latter section the plaintiff, to establish his title in the competent Court, brought the present suit, including in it the land which he had made part of his claim in the dismissed suit of 1877. *Held*, on the question whether the dismissal of the suit of 1877 precluded a further suit for that part of the land which had been included in it, that it did not, and that s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code was inapplicable. The pleadings and judgment in the suit of 1877 were referred to, showing that what belonged to Sipah had not been in issue, and that nothing respecting it had been heard or decided. *Held*, also, as to the rest of the land claimed in this suit, that there was no bar on account of its omission from the suit of

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

1877. As to mesne profits, it would have been open to the High Court to direct an enquiry under s. 212 of the Civil Procedure Code. *JAGATJIT SINGH v. SARABJIT SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 157  
L. R. 18 I. A. 165

81. ———— Suit for land identical with land given in previous decree—*Proof of identity where decree did not specify boundaries—Long possession.* The proprietary possession of alluvial land was claimed upon the averment that, having been gained as an accretion to the plaintiff's village, it had been wrongly excluded from settlement with the latter, in consequence of a prior decree which, however, had not decreed the land to the defendants, as they alleged it to have done. In pursuance of that decree, which was made in 1865, the land had been, according to the evidence taken by the defendants in whose possession it was in 1868; from which date till 1883, when the present suit was brought, that land had been treated, alike by the Government authorities and by the defendants, as belonging to the latter. Had the question been one of limitation, the possession of the defendants for a period of twelve years would not have been sufficient to exclude this claim by the plaintiff, the Government, to recover whatever could have been shown to be its property. The question, however, was not one of limitation; and the fact of the possession having been retained for so long a period was used by the defendants, not to make a title, but to define or identify the land which the decree of 1865 had awarded to them. Although the specification of the boundaries (which had been merely by reference to the plaint which mentioned adjoining villages) had been ineffectual, the acts of the parties had been such as to fix the meaning of the terms used; and it was established by the evidence that the land now claimed was identical with that which had been made over under the decree of 1865, to which it related. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. DURBIJOY SINGH*

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 312  
L. R. 19 I. A. 69

82. ———— Transfer of interest—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 13—Appointment of a creditor as agent to collect rents and appropriate part towards the debt.* In a suit to redeem a kanom on certain land, the jenm of a devasom in Malabar, it appeared that the plaintiff held a melkanom in respect of the same land executed to him (subsequently to the date of the kanom sought to be redeemed), by defendant 3, the samudayam of the devasom. Defendant 3 represented one *C*, in whose favour the uralers had in 1741 executed a document appointing him samudayam and stating that they had received from him a kanom of 18,000 fanams on the devasom properties, and providing that he should appropriate part of the rents towards the loan. It appeared that in a suit to eject tenants, the uralers had sued as co-plaintiffs with the samudayam; in subsequent suits, however, two of the uralers had sued other tenants for rent and the samudayam for an account; both of these suits



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

were dismissed on second appeal, and in the judgments of the High Court the samudayam was described as a mortgagee in possession. *Held*, (i) on its appearing that no opinion was expressed in the former suits as to the construction of the document of 1741, that the former decisions had not the force of *res judicata*; (ii) in view of the conduct of the parties and on the terms of the document of 1741, that the samudayam was not thereby constituted a mortgagee in possession, and that the melkanom set up by the plaintiff was invalid. KRISHNAN v. VELOO . . . I. L. R. 14 Mad. 301

83. — Creditor of a devasom placed in possession as samudayam—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 13*. In a suit brought by the uralers of a devasom in Malabar to recover certain land in the possession of the defendant it appeared that the defendant held under an instrument dated 1741, whereby his predecessor in title was appointed samudayam, and was authorized to appropriate part of the rents of the devasom properties to the interest on a loan made by him to the uralers. Two of these uralers had brought a previous suit against the defendant for an account of the rents received by him and for an injunction; that suit was dismissed on second appeal when the High Court described the defendant as a mortgagee in possession, but the question whether or not he was a mortgagee with or without possession was not then directly and substantially in issue. *Held*, that the status of the defendant was not *res judicata* by reason of the judgment in the previous suit. RAMAN v. SHATHANATHAN . . . I. L. R. 14 Mad. 312

84. — Matter which should have been ground of attack in former suit—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 13, 43*. The widow daughter and divided brother of a deceased Hindu executed an instrument which provided for the distribution of his property, both moveable and immoveable, as to which they had disputed. The document was not registered. The widow set up a will made by the deceased in her favour; the brother sued the widow for a declaration that the will was a forgery, but the Court held that it was genuine. He now sued the widow and daughter on the above instrument to recover his agreed share of the moveable property of the deceased. The widow set up the will, which the plaintiff averred was invalid according to the custom governing the family. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not precluded by the decree in the former suit from impugning the validity of the will. THANDAVAN v. VALLIAMMA . . . I. L. R. 15 Mad. 336

85. — Question as to whether decree is binding—*Decree amended after execution to conform with judgment—Decision in suit to set aside sale under amended decree*. In a suit for money against the karnavan and two anandravans of a Malabar tarwad, the judgment directed a "decree for the plaintiffs as prayed," but the decree ordered payment by one anandravan only. Property of the tarwad was attached and sold. The decree was then amended and brought into conformity with the judgment. Other members of the

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

tarwad sought to have the sale set aside, but it was found that the judgment-debt had been contracted for proper tarwad purposes, and that suit was dismissed. Application was now made for the attachment of other property of the tarwad in further execution of the amended decree. *Held*, that the members of the tarwad were not entitled to contend that the decree was not binding on them, that matter being *res judicata*. CHATHAPPAN v. PYDEL I. L. R. 15 Mad. 403

86. — Usufructuary mortgage—*Suit by mortgagee for possession—Decree for possession—Subsequent suit by mortgagor for redemption*. In 1864 the lands in dispute were mortgaged under an agreement that the mortgagee should hold the lands and apply the profits towards the satisfaction of the mortgage-debt. In 1869, the mortgagor having obstructed the mortgagee, the latter filed a suit for removal of the obstruction and for confirmation of his possession. He obtained a decree ordering that he should retain possession till the debt was paid off from the usufruct. In 1885 the mortgagor filed a suit for redemption. The defence to this suit was that it was barred by the decree in the former suit. *Held*, that the suit was not so barred, the relative rights of mortgagor and mortgagee not having been adjudicated upon in the former suit. NARSINHA MANOHAR v. BHAGVANTRAY I. L. R. 14 Bom. 327

87. — Suit by purchaser against mortgagee for possession—*Issue raised by mortgagor impeaching bonâ fides of sale—Decree for plaintiff without recording finding on issue—Subsequent suit for redemption by mortgagor against mortgagees impeaching sale as fraudulent and void*. In 1874 the plaintiff mortgaged certain property to R D and R L. In 1877 the mortgagees sold it by auction to one K who in the following year sued the mortgagor for possession. The defendants in that suit filed a written statement impeaching K's title under the alleged sale—and at the hearing an issue was raised as to whether the plaintiff (K) was the purchaser of the premises *bonâ fide* and for valuable consideration. The plaintiff (K) obtained a decree in that suit, but no finding on the said issue was recorded. The plaintiff in the present case was the son of the mortgagee, and he now sued to redeem the property and for a declaration that the alleged sale by the mortgagees was fraudulent and void as against him. He contended that in the former suit he did not intend to allege that the sale was not *bonâ fide*, but merely that it took place without due notice and was impeachable on that ground, and he relied on the fact that there had been no finding on the issue. *Held*, that the present suit was barred by the issue and decree in the former suit. In that suit the plaintiff (K) had given evidence that he was the *bonâ fide* purchaser of the property. Though no actual finding on that issue was recorded, the decree passed for the plaintiff necessarily involved the finding of the issue in the affirmative. RAMKRISNA JAGANNATH v. VITHAL RAMJI I. L. R. 15 Bom. 89



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

88. ——— Cross-appeals heard separately—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 13.* The plaintiff and defendant in a suit each appealed separately and defendant's appeal first came on for hearing, and an issue as to whether the plaintiff or the defendant had title to the land in dispute was decided on the facts by the Appellate Court adversely to the defendant. Subsequently, the plaintiff's appeal, involving the same issue, came on for hearing before the same Court. *Held*, that, although s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code did not apply, still the principle of *res judicata* applied, and the finding on the former appeal barred the trial of the same issue in the latter. *Ram Kirpal v. Rup Kuari, I. L. R. 6 All. 269; L. R. 11 I. A. 37*, referred to. *RAM LAL v. CHHEB NATH . . . I. L. R. 12 All. 578*

89. ——— Finding in judgment in conflict with terms of decree—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 13—Immaterial issue in suit.* The decree in a suit gave the plaintiff an unrestricted right to the property claimed by him, but in the judgment on which that decree was based it was stated the finding apparently not being a finding on any material issue in the suit, that the defendants were entitled to certain rights in respect of the property decreed to the plaintiff. No application was made to bring the decree into conformity with the judgment, and the decree as it stood was affirmed on appeal. *Held*, that the defendants, as plaintiffs in a subsequent suit between the same parties relating to the same property, could not plead the finding in their favour in the judgment as constituting *res judicata* in the face of the clear wording of the decree. *INDARJIT PRASAD v. RICHHA RAI . . . I. L. R. 15 All. 3*

90. ——— Decree not in accordance with judgment—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 13, 244—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 88, 89—Interpretation of decree.* Where a mortgagee in suing upon his mortgage included in his plaint certain property which was not included in the mortgage-deed, and this fact was apparently overlooked by the defendant who defended the suit, and where, while the judgment declared "that a decree be given against the hypothecated estate," in the decree the property affected was described as "the property specified in the plaint." *Held*, that the decree must be held to mean the hypothecated property mentioned in the plaint, and that neither s. 13 nor s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure concluded the defendant from subsequently suing to recover the property wrongly included in the plaint. *RAM CHANDER v. KONDO . I. L. R. 22 All. 442*

91. ——— Contentions not raised by way of defence in former suit—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 13, 43.* In a suit to recover possession of the impartible zamindari of Sivaganga, it appeared that the istimrar zamindar died in 1829, and that after an interval of wrongful possession by his brother and his descendants, his daughter established her title to succeed him and was placed in possession in 1864. She died in 1877, leaving the

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

present plaintiff, her son, and three daughters her surviving. A suit was then brought by the father of the present defendant, who was the son of her elder sister (deceased), against the present plaintiff and the daughters of the late Rani for possession of the zamindari, to which he claimed to be entitled by right of inheritance. A decree was passed for the plaintiff in that suit, under which he obtained possession of the zamindari and retained it until his death in 1883, when he was succeeded by the present defendant. The plaintiff now sued as above, claiming that the right to the zamindari had devolved on him, and not on the defendant, on the death of the plaintiff in the former suit. *Held*, (i) that the defendant's father had not succeeded to a qualified heritage nor to a mere right of management of joint family property in which the plaintiff had a right of survivorship, but that he had succeeded to the estate as full owner and had therefore become a fresh stock of descent; (ii) that accordingly nearness or remoteness of relationship to the istimrar zamindar was immaterial, and the defendant's right of succession was not affected by the fact that the whole class of the istimrar zamindar's daughters' sons had not been exhausted. *Held*, also, that the plaintiff was not precluded from raising the contentions to which the above rulings relate by reason of their not having been raised by way of defence to the suit brought against him by the defendant's father. *MUTTUVAIDUGANATHA TEVAR v. PERIASAMI . . . I. L. R. 16 Mad. 11*

92. ——— Execution-proceedings—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 13, 272—Matter which ought to have been raised as a ground of defence.* A and B obtained a decree against X and Y, on which about R9,000 was due. Z obtained a decree against A and B, on which about R9,400 was due, and in execution attached the first-mentioned decree. A and B first alleged in the matter of the execution of their decree for the first time that the suit against them had been instituted really by X, though in the name of his son Z, and consequently contended that the decree amount, which they paid into Court, was the property of X and so liable to satisfy their claim. The above allegation was substantiated, and Z's claim on the money in Court was disallowed on appeal. *Held*, (i) that A and B were not precluded from asserting their claim to the money in Court by reason of the above allegation not having been made by way of defence to the suit of Z; (ii) that A and B were entitled to enforce any claim which X might enforce, for the purpose of satisfying their decree, and accordingly that Z's claim on the money in Court was rightly disallowed. *ATCHAYYA v. BANGARAYYA . . . I. L. R. 16 Mad. 117*

93. ——— Question substantially in issue in former suit—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13, expl. 2—Reversioner.* A widow purported to charge land which she held for her widow's estate with payment of a debt,



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

and afterwards surrendered her estate to the next heir, or reversioner, on condition that he should pay all her debts, and a suit was brought by the creditor after the death of the widow against the reversioner to recover the debt. This suit had been preceded by another one brought by the creditor against both the widow, then alive, and the reversioner, the cause of action against the latter being that in his hands was the property chargeable. That suit was dismissed as against him, but decreed against the widow. In the present suit payment was claimed from him of a balance of the deceased widow's debt, on the ground that he had agreed, on taking the surrender of the estate from her, to become responsible for her debts. *Held*, that this "might and ought to have been made ground of attack" in the former suit within the expl. 2 of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, and must accordingly be deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue in the former suit, and therefore that this suit was barred. The Acts of 1877 and 1882 did not alter the previous state of the law. *KAMESWAR PERSHAD v. RAJKUMARI RUTTAN KOER*. I. L. R. 20 Cal. 79. L. R. 19 I. A. 234

94. ——— Matter which might have been a ground of defence in a former suit—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13, expl. 2*. A defendant in a suit for the recovery of possession of immovable property pleaded only a right to the proprietary possession of the property in suit in himself. This defence failed, and a decree was given in favour of the plaintiff. Subsequently the plaintiff sold a portion of the property so decreed to them, and the *quondam* defendant brought a suit for pre-emption. *Held*, that the suit must fail, inasmuch as the plaintiff's claim was one which he might have made when defendant in the former suit as an alternative to his defence of title. *Moottoo Vijaya, etc. v. Katama Natchiar*, 11 Moo. I. A. 50; *Kameswar Pershad v. Raj Kumari Ruttan Koer*, I. L. R. 20 Cal. 79; L. R. 19 I. A. 234, and *Baldeo Sahai v. Bateshar Singh*, I. L. R. 1 All. 75, referred to. *PULANDAR SINGH v. JWALA SINGH*. I. L. R. 20 All. 516

95. ——— Unnecessary issue—*Finding on an unnecessary issue inserted in decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13*. The plaintiff attached certain property in execution of a decree obtained by him against one J, the widow of one R. The defendant G intervened and claimed the house as having been purchased by him from one S, to whom, he alleged, J had sold it before the date of the decree against her. The plaintiff's attachment was removed, and the plaintiff thereupon brought a suit (No. 670 of 1886) to establish his right to sell the house in execution. The Court found that the house was not J's and dismissed the suit on that ground, but it also recorded a finding that the sales set up by the defendant were fraudulent and collusive. Subsequently the plaintiff obtained a decree against M, the son of R, and in execution again attached

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

the house. The defendant again intervened, alleging that the house was his, and the attachment was removed. Thereupon the plaintiff filed this suit to establish his right to sell in execution. The defendant again pleaded that he was owner of the house by reason of the sales set up by him in the former suit. It was argued that these sales had been proved to be collusive and fraudulent in an issue raised in that suit, and that the defence in the present suit was therefore *res judicata*. *Held*, that the defence was not *res judicata*. The former suit had been decided on the finding that the property in question was not J's. The finding in that suit on the issue as to the sales to the defendant was not necessary for the determination of the suit. Where an issue is not necessary for the decision of the suit in which it is raised, the decree couched in general terms does not cover the finding on that issue, nor can the insertion of such finding in the decree give it the force of *res judicata*. The Civil Procedure Code does not contemplate findings on issues being inserted in it (see ss. 2 and 6 and sch. IV), and there is no section in the Code which makes it necessary to appeal from the decree, because such finding has been inserted in it. *GHELA ICHHARAM v. SANKALCHAND JETHA*. I. L. R. 18 Bom. 597

96. ——— Finding in judgment not embodied in decree and not essential to the making of the decree as framed—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13*. A finding in a judgment to operate as *res judicata*, the Court being a Court of jurisdiction competent to try the subsequent suit must be material and necessary to support the precise and particular ground or grounds on which the decree or some operative part of it was made, otherwise the finding must be considered either as superseded by the decree, or as entirely immaterial, or as no more than incidental and subsidiary to the main question in the suit, although in the latter case the finding may have been necessary to the decision of the suit. The finding of fact to operate as *res judicata* need not have been the sole finding of fact upon which the decree was made, but it must have been a material and necessary finding of fact, material and necessary in the sense that the fact must have been found as it was found in the judgment, and could not have been found otherwise, for the decree as it was made to have been a good result in law from the fact or facts so found. Further, if there were two findings of fact either of which would justify in law the making of the decree which was made, that one of such two findings of fact which should in the logical sequence of necessary issues have been first found, and the finding of which would have rendered the other of such two findings unnecessary for the making of the decree which was made, is the finding which can operate as *res judicata*. A matter cannot be said to be "directly and substantially in issue" within the meaning of the first paragraph of s. 13 of Act XIV of 1882 unless and until it is, or becomes, material for the decision of the suit to find as to it. The framing of issues



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

under s. 146 of Act XIV of 1882, on which at that stage of the suit the right decision of the case appears to depend, does not of itself make the matter to which such issues relate "directly and substantially in issue" within the meaning of s. 13, although when the finding upon any one or more of the issues is sufficient for the decision of the suit, it may be desirable that the Court should state in its judgment its finding or decision upon each separate issue which it had framed. The following cases were referred to : *Krishna Behari Roy v. Brojeswari Chowdranee*, L. R. 2 I. A. 283 ; I. L. R. 1 Calc. 144 ; *Soorjomonee Dayee v. Suddanand Mohapatter*, 12, B. L. R. 304 ; L. R. I. A. Sup. Vol. 212 ; *Run Bahadoor Singh v. Lachoo Koer*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 301 ; L. R. 12 I. A. 23 ; *Radha Madhub Holdar v. Manohar Mukerji*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 756 ; L. R. 15 I. A. 97 ; *Enaetollah v. Ameer Baksh*, 25 W. R. 225 ; *Niamut Khan v. Phadu Buldia*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 319 ; *Jamait-un-nissa v. Lutf-un-nissa*, I. L. R. 7 All. 606 ; *Man Singh v. Narayan Das*, I. L. R. 1 All. 489 ; *Lachman Singh v. Mohan*, I. L. R. 2 All. 497 ; *Ram Gholam v. Sheotahal*, I. L. R. 1 All. 266 ; *Anusuyabai v. Sakharan Pandurang*, I. L. R. 7 Bom. 264 ; *Devarakonda Narasamma v. Devakonda Kanaya*, I. L. R. 4 Mad. 134 ; *Ghela Ichkaram v. Sankalchand Jetha*, I. L. R. 18 Bom. 597 ; *Tarakant Banerjee v. Puddomoney Dassee*, 10 Moo. I. A. 476 ; and *Robinson v. Dalip Singh*, L. R. 11 Ch. D. 798. *SHIB CHARAN LAL v. RAGHU NATH*

I. L. R. 17 All. 174

97. — Dismissal of suit for want of notice, and also upon the merits—*Civil Procedure Code* (1882), s. 13, expl. 2—*Bengal Municipal Act* (Beng. Act III of 1884), s. 363. In a suit brought by one A against C for damages for not removing certain offensive matter from his land, the questions raised were, whether there was notice, and whether the defendant was bound to remove the filth from the plaintiff's property. The Court having found that there was no notice, which in its opinion was a ground sufficient for dismissal of the suit under s. 363 of the Bengal Municipal Act and also upon the merits, having come to the conclusion that the defendant was not bound to remove the offensive matters from the plaintiff's land, dismissed the suit. In a subsequent suit between the same parties, the plaintiff claiming the same relief as in the previous suit, the defence was that the suit was barred as *res judicata*. Held, that, inasmuch as the matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit was directly and substantially in issue in the previous suit, and as it was finally heard and decided between the same parties, notwithstanding the fact that the previous suit failed by reason of the decision of the Court upon some other matter as well, the subsequent suit was barred as *res judicata*. *Shib Charan Lal v. Raghu Nath*, I. L. R. 17 All. 174, distinguished. PEARY MOHUN MUKERJEE v. AMBICA CHURN BANDOPADHYA

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 900

98. — Different subject-matter of suits—*Code of Civil Procedure*, 1882, s. 13,

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

expl. 2—*Suit for declaration of baradari rights—Subsequent suit for assertion of khadimi rights*. S. 13, expl. 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, applies only to cases in which the plaintiff, having on a former occasion sued for certain relief on the strength, of one title, afterwards claims the same relief on the ground of another title of which he might have availed himself in the former suit. It does not apply to cases where the subject-matters of the two suits are different. The plaintiffs, in the year 1881, instituted a suit for a declaration of private baradari rights in connection with the daily receipts and offerings at a certain Mahomedan place of worship, alleging that the defendants had dispossessed them on the 27th September 1881; but they did not assert any claim as khadims. The suit was decreed, but the decree was reserved on appeal. On the 7th March 1892, the plaintiffs instituted a suit for a declaration that they were the khadims of a certain durga and, as such, entitled to perform the duties attached to that office for 21 days in each month, and during that period to receive the offerings made by worshippers at the durga. They also claimed an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with them in the exercise of that office. The plaintiffs claimed their khadimi rights partly by inheritance and partly by purchase, a custom of transferability by sale having been long recognized. Held, that the relief claimed in the second suit was not *res judicata*, the subject-matters of the two suits being distinct. *Denobundhoo Chowdhury v. Kristomonee Dossee*, I. L. R. 2 Calc. 152 ; *Woomatara Debi v. Unnapoorna Dassee*, 11 B. L. R. 158 ; *Kameswar Pershad v. Rajkumari Ruttan Koer*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 79 ; L. R. 19 I. A. 234 ; *Doorga Pershad Singh v. Doorga Konwari*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 190 ; L. R. 5 I. A. 149 ; *Vijaya Raghunadha Bodha v. Katama Natchiar*, 11 Moo. I. A. 50 ; *Soorjomonee Dayee v. Suddanand Mohapatter*, 12 B. L. R. 304 ; L. R. I. A. Sup. Vol. 212 ; and *Krishna Behari Roy v. Bunwari Lal Roy*, I. L. R. 1 Calc. 144 ; L. R. 2 I. A. 283, distinguished. SARKUM ABU TORAB ABDUL WAHEB v. RAHAMAN BUKSH

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 83

99. — Suit for rent—*Code of Civil Procedure*, 1882, s. 13—*Landlord and tenant—Question of title incidentally raised in a previous suit—Subsequent suit for declaration of title to land purchased*. A suit was brought by A against B and others for rent; and the matter directly and substantially in issue was as to what the share was for which A was entitled to rent. The plaintiff obtained a decree for the whole rent. In a subsequent suit by B and others against A for declaration of title to land purchased by them in execution of their mortgage decree, the defence was that the former decree for rent operated as *res judicata*. Held, that, as the issue in the rent suit was for what share the plaintiff was entitled to rent, and not to what share of the property was the plaintiff entitled as owner, the question of title could be said to have been in issue in that suit only incidentally and not directly, and it could not have been entertained in the form in which it was now



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

raised ; therefore the subsequent suit was not barred as *res judicata*. *Run Bahadur Singh v. Lucho Koer*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 301 : L. R. 12 I. A. 23, followed. *Radhamadhub Holdar v. Monohur Mukerji*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 756 : L. R. 15 I. A. 97, distinguished. *Nanack Chand v. Telukdye Koer*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 265, and *Dirgopal Lal v. Bolakee*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 269, referred to. *SRIHARI BANERJEE v. KHITISH CHANDRA RAI* . . . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 569  
1 C. W. N. 509

100. ————— *Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, s. 13, expl. 2*—Whether the question that the plaintiff was a mere benamidar could be raised in a subsequent suit for rent, it not having been raised in a suit previously brought by the same plaintiff against the same defendant. In a previous suit brought by the plaintiff for rent the defendant denied the relationship of landlord and tenant, but he did not plead that the plaintiff was a mere benamidar. The plaintiff obtained a decree. In a subsequent suit by the same plaintiff against the same defendant for rent for subsequent years, the defendant, *inter alia*, contended that the plaintiff was a mere benamidar. The plaintiff objected that the previous decree was a bar to defendant's contention. *Held*, that, even if the matter in issue might and ought to have been made a defence in the former suit, yet as it was not finally heard and decided by the Court within the meaning of s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the defendant was not precluded in this suit from raising the objection that the plaintiff was a mere benamidar. *KAILASH MONDUL v. BARODA SUNDARI DASI*  
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 711  
1 C. W. N. 565

101. ————— Matter which might have been made ground of attack in a former suit—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13, expl. 2*. Where a plaintiff sued for possession of immoveable property as owner, having no title as owner, but a possible title as mortgagee, it was *held*, that he could not in a subsequent suit between the same parties for possession of the same property claim as mortgagee ; inasmuch as his title as mortgagee might have formed an alternative ground of attack in the former suit. *Amolak Ram v. Champa Lal*, *All. Weekly Notes* (1891) 132 ; *Mathura Prasad v. Sambhar Singh*, *All. Weekly Notes* (1892) 224 ; *Hasan Ali v. Siraj Husain*, I. L. R. 16 All. 252 ; *Atchayya v. Bangurayya*, I. L. R. 16 Mad. 117 and *Kameswar Pershad v. Rajkumari Rattan Koer*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 79 : L. R. 19 I. A. 234, referred to. *IMAM KHAN v. AYUB KHAN* . . . I. L. R. 19 All. 517

102. ————— Suit for money—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 12*—Application by defendant for an account of dealings with plaintiff—Defendant's right to bring a separate suit for an account. In a suit for money the defendant admitted that there had been money dealings between him and plaintiff, but averred that the taking of an account would show that the plaintiff was indebted to him. The Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit,

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

but declined to take an account against the plaintiff. *Held*, that the defendant was not entitled to have an account taken in the suit, and that Civil Procedure Code, s. 12, would not have precluded him from suing for an account during the pendency of the plaintiff's suit. *RAMALINGA CHETTI v. RAGHUNATHA RAU* . . . I. L. R. 20 Mad. 418

103. ————— Suit for rent—*Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13*—Landlord and tenant—Issue whether land was *mâl* or *lakhiraj*—Question raised in a rent suit, whether directly and substantially in issue in that suit—Subsequent suit for *khas* possession. In a previous suit brought by the predecessor in title of the plaintiff against the defendants for rent, one of the questions raised was, whether the land, in respect of which rent was claimed, was *mâl* or *lakhiraj*, and that question was decided in favour of the defendants. In a subsequent suit by the plaintiff against the same defendants for *khas* possession of certain land, the defence was that the land in dispute was their *lakhiraj* land, and that the judgment in the previous suit operated as *res judicata*. *Held*, that, though the previous suit was one for rent, yet the issue upon the question whether the land was *mâl* or *lakhiraj* was raised directly in that suit, and therefore the subsequent suit was barred as *res judicata*. *Radhamadhub Holdar v. Monohur Mukerji*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 756 : L. R. 15 I. A. 97, followed. *Srihari Banerjee v. Khitish Chandra Rai*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 569, distinguished. *KASISWAR MUKHOPADHYA v. MOHENDRA NATH BHANDARI* . . . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 136

104. ————— Sanction to compromise a suit against a minor—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13*—Suit to set aside a consent decree for want of sanction—Previous suit to set aside decree on the ground of fraud on guardian *ad litem*. A suit instituted in 1879 against a minor was compromised by the plaintiff and the guardian *ad litem*, and a decree for the plaintiff was passed by consent. In 1882 the minor sued by his next friend to have the consent decree set aside on the ground that it had been obtained by fraud practised on the guardian *ad litem*. That suit was dismissed. In 1884 an application was unsuccessfully made in the original suit objecting that the compromise had been entered into without the sanction of the Court. The minor, having attained majority, now sued to have the consent decree set aside on the ground that it had not been sanctioned by the Court under Civil Procedure Code, s. 462. *Held*, that the suit was barred by the decree in the suit of 1882 for the reason that the want of sanction might and ought to have been made a ground of attack in that suit. *ARUNACHALAM CHETTY v. MEYYAPPA CHETTY*  
I. L. R. 21 Mad. 91

105. ————— Right to a temple-office and its endowments—Issue as to adverse possession—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13 expl. 2*. Certain offices in a temple and the endowment attached thereto were held jointly by the members of two branches of a family, represented



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

respectively by the plaintiff and the defendant. Long previously to 1872, the defendant's branch got into sole possession, and in that year a family settlement was arrived at by which it was arranged that the offices should be held in rotation and the lands in equal shares; and, in accordance with this settlement, a certain village forming part of the endowment was delivered to the plaintiff's branch of the family. In 1889 the defendant brought a suit to recover a moiety of that village, and an issue was raised whether he enjoyed the offices and the landed property in his independent right or as a servant for wages. His suit was dismissed on the ground that the offices and emoluments were indivisible and went by right to the older branch of the family. The plaintiff now sued in 1895 to establish his right to the entire offices and to recover possession of the other village. *Held*, that it was open to the defendant to assert in this suit a title by adverse possession as that had been made a ground of attack, though not the basis of his claim in the former suit. *ALAGIRISAMI NAICKAR v. SUNDARESWARA AYYAR*

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 278

106. Suits by different partners for specific sums of money on adjustment of accounts—*Partnership—Accounts adjusted by Ameen appointed in previous suits—Civil Procedure Code, s. 13, expls. 2 and 3, and s. 43—Contract Act, s. 265.* After dissolution of a certain partnership, two separate suits were brought in 1889 by different partners for specific sums of money due to them, and, in the alternative, for such other amount as might be found due on an adjustment of accounts. Objections were raised against these suits on the grounds, *inter alia*, (i) that the suits were barred by the provisions of s. 265 of the Indian Contract Act; (ii) that separate suits for the same matter were not maintainable; (iii) that the suits would not lie in the Munsif's Court; and (iv) that, accounts having been already adjusted, there was no cause of action. The Munsif overruled the first three objections, and held, as regards the fourth that the adjustment pleaded had been ratified by the plaintiffs; he appointed an Ameen, who examined the accounts and ascertained the respective claims of the partners, and the plaintiffs in those suits obtained decrees on the basis of the Ameen's adjustment of account. The present suits were brought in 1891 by certain other partners, who were defendants in the suits of 1889, on the allegation that the partnership account had been already adjusted by the Ameen appointed in the suits of 1889, and that the debts and dues of all parties had been determined by the Court. The plaintiffs prayed for recovery of the amount due to them under the Ameen's adjustment, and, in the alternative, for such other relief as might be deemed proper by the Court to grant them against any of the defendants. *Held*, by NORRIS and BANERJEE, JJ. (RAMPINI, J., dissenting).—That neither s. 13 nor s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code was a bar to the present suits, the issue now in suit not having been determined in the former suits.

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*7. MATTERS IN ISSUE—*contd.*

*Held*, by RAMPINI, J.—That there was ground for contending that, under expls. 2 and 3 to s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, the present suits were barred. *DHANI RAM SHAHA v. BHAGIRATH SHAHA*

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 692

107. Ground of defence not raised in previous suit—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 43—Relief not asked for in previous suit—Circumstances giving right to such relief not known at date of previous suit—Constructive notice of possession.* The plaintiffs, who were the junior members of a Malabar edom, of which defendants Nos. 3 to 5 were the senior members, sued to recover with mesne profits possession of certain property offering to pay the amount of a kanom advanced by defendant No. 1. It appeared that the land had been the subject of a kanom demise in 1865, and that defendant No. 3, the then karnavan, had obtained in 1878 a decree for its redemption, the right to execute which he assigned to a stranger, who executed it, and took possession of the property, taking from the karnavan a new kanom deed. Subsequently defendants Nos. 4 and 5 obtained a decree for possession and the cancellation of both the assignment and the kanom deed; but this decree was attached in execution-proceedings in another suit and purchased by defendant No. 1, who executed it, purchased the property, deposited the kanom amount, and took possession on the 8th March 1884. The plaintiffs, who had meanwhile taken abortive proceedings to defeat the first defendant's title, instituted a suit in August 1884, praying for a decree that the sale to him be set aside without praying for possession. It was now found that the plaintiffs at that time were not aware that defendant No. 1 was in possession, and he did not plead that fact as a defence to the suit for a declaration merely. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were not affected by constructive notice of the defendant's possession in 1884 by reason of the fact that their karnavan, with whom they were not acting, was aware of the defendant's previous application for execution, and that the suit was not barred by the Civil Procedure Code, s. 43. *Semle*: That apart from the question of the plaintiffs' notice of the first defendant's possession, since he had not pleaded possession in the suit of 1884, he could not fall back upon the fact that his possession dated from March 1884, as a ground of defence to the present action. *SANKARAN v. PARVATHI*

I. L. R. 19 Mad. 145

108. Incidents of tenancy, application to determine—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 158—Dispute as to tenancy—Landlord and tenant.* The object of s. 158 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is merely to provide a summary procedure for setting disputes between landlord and tenant in regard to the particulars referred to in cls. (a), (c), and (d) of the section. Though cl. (b) does authorize the Court to determine the name and description of the tenant, this was not intended to,



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and does not authorize the Court to decide conclusively disputes as to the right to possession of the land. An issue therefore regarding a dispute as to the existence of the relation of landlord and tenant between the parties in a proceeding under s. 158 can only be decided collaterally, and does not arise between the parties in such a manner as to make the decision upon it *res judicata* between them in a subsequent regular suit. *Bhopendra Narayan Dutt v. Nemy Chand Mondul*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 627, and *Debendra Kumar Bundopadhyaya v. Bhupendra Narain Dutt*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 182, referred to. *PEARY MOHUN MUKERJI v. ALI SHEIKH*

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 249

109. ———— Decision as to genuineness of deed. In a suit to establish the plaintiff's right to a standing crop on the basis of his title to the land, it was held that, where the plaintiff's title depended upon the genuineness of a kobala in respect of the land, a finding with regard to such genuineness is binding as *res judicata* in a subsequent suit between the same parties with regard to the title to the same land, although no issue was distinctly raised in the former suit on the question of genuineness. *Soorjamonnee Dayee v. Suddanand Mohapatra*, 12 B. L. R. 304 : L. R. I. A. Sup. Vol. 212, referred to. *DAK-HYANI DEBEA v. DOLEGOBIND CHOWDHRY*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 430

110. ———— Illegal cess—*Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13, Explan. II—Illegal cess not objected to in former suit for rent—Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, s. 74.* Where, in a suit for rent, the rent claimed expressly includes an item which is objected to as an illegal cess, the mere fact that, in a previous rent-suit, between the same parties regarding the same tenure, the defendant did not raise the same plea, although he could have done so, would not, in the absence of a judicial determination of the point in the previous suit, preclude him from raising the plea in the subsequent suit. *Kailash Mondul v. Baroda Sundari Dasi*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 711, followed. *Radha Prosad Singh v. Bal Kowar Koeri*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 726, referred to. *WOOMESH CHANDRA MAITRA v. BARADA DAS MAITRA* (1900). I. L. R. 28 Calc. 17

111. ———— Matter for ground of attack—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13, Explan. II—Matter which might and ought to have been made ground of attack in former suit.* On a sale of land by plaintiff to defendant, part of the purchase-money was paid, and a mortgage was given by the defendant in plaintiff's favour for the balance of the purchase-money, which balanced amounted to Rs. 100. Plaintiff sued on his mortgage, but that suit was dismissed by reason of its being unregistered. Plaintiff now brought the present suit for the amount, framing his claim as for the enforcement of a lien for unpaid purchase-money. Held, that the suit was barred by Explan. II of s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff might have sued, in his former suit, on the basis of his lien for

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balance of unpaid purchase-money, and he ought to have done so to avoid the necessity for a second suit in the event of the mortgage being held invalid for want of registration. *Kameswar Pershad v. Rajkumari Ruttan Koer*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 85, followed. *AKIYI KUNHI v. AYISSA BI* (1903)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 645

112. ———— Matter not in issue as between defendants—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Previous suit in which same matter was in issue between plaintiff and the respective defendants, but not as between the defendants themselves—Suit by one of the then defendants to establish his priority over one of the other defendants—Maintainability.* In a former suit, the question whether each of the defendants had mortgages upon certain property was a matter which was in issue between the plaintiff and the respective defendants therein, but not as between the defendants themselves, no question of priority being gone into, and the rights of the parties not being dealt with further than by making a decree for sale subject to certain incumbrances, of which that of the fifth defendant therein was one. The fifth defendant in that suit now sued, as plaintiff in the present suit, for a declaration that a sale of the same mortgaged property was invalid. His present claim was based on the allegation that his mortgage had priority over the mortgage on which the decree had been obtained, in execution of which the property had been sold; and that mortgage was held by one of his co-defendants in the previous suit. Held, that the claim was not *res judicata*. *MAHAMMAD KUNI ROWTHAN v. VISVANATHAIYAR* (1902)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 337

113. ———— Mesne profits—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13, Explan. II and III—Redemption suit—Decree in such suit, making no order as to mesne profits—Subsequent suit by plaintiff for surplus mesne profits accrued due prior to former suit.* In a redemption suit brought in 1894, the plaintiff prayed for possession of the mortgaged property and for payment of such sum as should be found due to him on account of surplus profits received by the defendant. The Court held that the whole mortgage-debt had been paid off in 1883, and awarded possession to the plaintiff, but made no order as to surplus profits. The defendant appealed. The plaintiff did not appeal, nor did he file objections to the decree, which was confirmed by the Appellate Court. In 1897 the plaintiff, having obtained possession of the land, filed this suit, in which (*inter alia*) he claimed to recover mesne profits which had accrued due prior to the former suit. Held, that the claim was *res judicata*, and was barred. *KACHU v. LAKSHMANING* (1900)

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 115

114. ———— Mortgage—*Decree for redemption—Payment of the amount of decree of lower Court, and recovery of possession by mortgagors—Subsequent enhancement in appeal of amount ordered to be paid by decree—Subsequent*



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suit by the mortgagee to recover profits of the mortgaged property for period between recovery of possession by mortgagor and payment of amount of appellate decree—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13, Expl. II.* On the 25th September, 1893, a decree in a redemption suit directed the plaintiffs (mortgagors) to pay to the defendant (mortgagee) Rs. 200 and costs within six months from its date, and to redeem the mortgaged property. The plaintiffs paid Rs. 200 and costs on 4th December 1893, i.e., within the six months, and obtained possession in March, 1894. In the meanwhile the defendant preferred an appeal, and the judgment in appeal, dated the 2nd September, 1895, varied the decree by substituting Rs. 9,809-9-9 for Rs. 200, and directed that the six months' time should run from its date. The balance of Rs. 1,609-9-9 was paid by the mortgagors in March, 1896. Subsequently the legal representatives and heirs of the mortgagee brought the present suit against the representatives of the mortgagors to recover the profits of the mortgaged property for the period intervening between the date at which they obtained possession (March, 1894) and the date at which they paid the full amount ordered by the appellate decree (March, 1896). The first Court allowed the claim, but on appeal by the defendants the Judge varied the decree by reducing the amount awarded. On second appeal:—*Held*, that the matter was *res judicata* and the suit was barred, the question raised being one arising directly out of the mortgage transaction which was the subject-matter of the litigation in the former suit. *VINAYAK SHIVRAO DIGHE v. DATTATRAYA GOPAL (1902)*

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 661

115. ———— Omission to set up mortgage bond—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 13, Expl. II*—*Omission to set up mortgage-bond as a defence in former suit—Subsequent suit on mortgage-bond—Civil Procedure Code, s. 43—Relinquishment of part of cause of action.* Where, to a suit by a mortgagee on a mortgage-bond of certain property, a prior mortgagee of the same property is made a party, and omits to set up his prior charge and claim to have it redeemed, a suit subsequently brought by him for that purpose is barred by Expl. II to s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. In the same way, if, being a party in a suit on a mortgage prior to his own, he omits to claim his right to redeem such prior mortgage, he cannot afterwards sue for that purpose on the mortgage he has omitted to plead. *Quære*: Can a mortgagee who has several mortgages on the same property treat them, with respect to the provisions of s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code, as separate causes of action, or must he bring one suit on all his mortgages? *GOPAL v. PIRTHI SINGH (1902)*

I. L. R. 24 All. 429  
s.c. L. R. 29 I. A. 118 : 6 C. W. N. 889

116. ———— Relief not claimed in former suit—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13, Expl. II.* A sued B as his agent and trustee in possession of certain lands, complaining

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that B had been dealing with the lands as if he (B) were the owner, and had mortgaged them to C. C was made a defendant in the suit. B pleaded that he was the owner of the land, and not merely agent of A. C also pleaded that B was owner, and he produced the mortgage-deed and stated that if he were paid his debt he would not dispute A's claim. The term in C's mortgage-deed was one year, at the end of which, if the debt were not paid, C was to be at liberty to enforce his charge. A prayed merely for possession, and no issue was raised or relief asked in respect of C's mortgage. The Court held that B was agent, not owner, and gave A a decree for possession. Subsequently, on the expiration of the year allowed in the mortgage-deed, C sued A and B to enforce his mortgage, alleging that, even though B might not be owner, A had allowed B to deal with the land and to hold himself out as owner, and that thus the mortgage was valid. Both the lower Courts held that the suit was *res judicata*, under Expl. II of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, on the ground that C's present claim might and ought to have been made a ground of defence in the former suit brought by A. *Held*, reversing the decisions of the lower Courts, that the suit was not barred, as no relief was asked or granted as against C in the former suit, though he was a party to it. *RAMDAS v. VAZIRSAHEB (1901)*

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 589

117. ———— "Subjects in dispute"—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 13 (Expl. II), 42, 43.* The phrase "the subjects in dispute," in s. 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure, signifies the jural relation between the parties to the suit, for the determination of which the suit is brought. The object of the section is to require the plaintiff to bring forward his whole case as to the matter of litigation on the question of right involved in the suit, and not to require him to unite all the causes of action which he may have against the defendant in respect of the *corpus* or object-matter of the suit. Though the subject of *res judicata* is dealt with more comprehensively in the present Code than in the former Code, yet ss. 42 and 43 are not exhaustive of the law of *res judicata*. That law has been the same under both the old and the new Codes, and it is substantially the same as the English law. The decision of the Privy Council in *Kameswar Pershad v. Rajkumari Ruttan*, 1. L. R. 20 Calc. 79, explained. Neither of the decisions of the Privy Council in *Woomatara Debia v. Unnopoorna Dassee*, 11 B. L. R. 158, and *Kameswar Pershad v. Rajkumari*, 1. L. R. 20 Calc. 79, supports the proposition that a plaintiff who seeks to redeem a specific mortgage or to eject on a specific lease, and fails in such because the mortgage or lease is not proved, is thereby precluded from seeking to redeem the same property or a portion thereof from another specific mortgage, or to eject on the strength of his title the person in possession. The real test is whether the cause of action or transaction on which the two suits are based is the same, and not whether the transaction is sought to be established in different modes or



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by different means. In a previous suit the present plaintiff, claiming as the legal representative of a deceased mortgagor, sued substantially the same defendants to redeem a usufructuary mortgage alleged to have been executed in 1856 over about 50 *cawnies* of land. The defendants denied the genuineness of the mortgage, and pleaded that 14 out of the 50 *cawnies* had been usufructuarially mortgaged to them in 1853, and they claimed that these 14 *cawnies*, as well as the remaining 36, had been sold to them subsequently. That suit was dismissed on the ground that the mortgage sued on had not been proved (the question of plaintiff's position as legal representative, which was challenged, not being decided). In 1897, plaintiff brought the present suit to redeem the 14 *cawnies* on the footing of the mortgage of 1853 which had been pleaded by the defendants in the previous suit. *Held*, that the suit was not barred by s. 43 or s. 13, Expl. II, of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Arunachalam Chetty v. Meyyappa Chetty*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 91, and *Rangasami Pillai v. Krishna Pillai*, I. L. R. 22 Mad. 259, discussed. *Guddappa v. Tirkappa*, I. L. R. 25 Bom. 189, dissented from. *RAMASWAMI AYYAR v. VYTHINATHA AYYAR* (1903)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 760

✓ 118. — Suit for rent—*Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—*Khoti Settlement Act* (Bom. Act I of 1880), s. 33—*Suit to recover thal* (rent in kind) for 1898-99—*Previous suit to recover thal* for 1897-98. The plaintiff, a *khot*, sued to recover *thal* (rent in kind) from the defendants for the year 1898-99. He also claimed rent for the betel-nut trees growing on the land. The defence was that, under the *botkhat* (statement) prepared by the Settlement-officer under the *Khoti Settlement Act* (Bom. Act I of 1880), the plaintiff was not entitled to claim any rent in respect of the betel-nut trees. A previous suit (No. 718 of 1898) had been brought by the plaintiff against the defendants to recover *thal* for the year 1897-98. In it the plaintiff had claimed (*inter alia*) rent (*thal*) in respect of the same betel-nut trees, alleging that the present defendants were "liable to pay *thal* to the plaintiff according to practice." The defendants appeared, and applied for time to put in their written statement, but their application was refused. The only issue raised in the case was whether the *abharani* (estimated produce) was proved. The Judge held it proved, and decreed the claim. It was contended in the present suit that the decision in that suit (No. 718 of 1898) operated as *res judicata*. *Held*, by *FULTON, J.*, that the decision in suit No. 718 of 1898 did not bar the defence based on s. 33 of the *Khoti Settlement Act* (Bom. Act I of 1880). The mere fact that in the former suit *thal*, or the produce of betel-nuts, may have been wrongly awarded could not alter the provisions of the law, and therefore, under the circumstances, no question of *res judicata* arose. *Held* by *CHANDAVARKAR, J.*, that the claim in respect of the betel-nut trees was not *res judicata* by the decision in the previous suit. The plaintiff, in his plaint in that suit, did not allege

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what was the rate according to practice, or that according to practice the defendants were liable to pay *thal* in respect of betel-nuts. He merely specified betel-nuts as one of the items in respect of which *thal* was payable to him for the year 1897-98, and the rate at which it was payable that year. The question of defendants' liability in respect of betel-nuts, not only for the year 1897-98, but for all years, according to practice was not alleged, and was therefore not directly and substantially in issue in the previous suit. All that the former suit decided was that *thal* was payable in respect of betel-nuts for the year 1897-98 as alleged and claimed in the plaint, and not according to practice. *Held*, also, on the merits, that, having regard to the Collector's *botkhat* (statement), the plaintiff was not entitled to recover rent in respect of betel-nuts. The rule of English law, that where the allegation on the record is uncertain there is no *res judicata*, is also the rule embodied in Expl. I to s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). *VISHNU VASUDEVA JUVEKAR v. RAMLING BHILING GURAV* (1901) . . . I. L. R. 26 Bom. 25

119. — "Matter directly and substantially in issue"—*Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13, Expl. II. In a previous suit brought by the defendant's husband against the plaintiff, for a declaration of his title to a moiety of a garden purchased from the ancestors of the plaintiff, and for partition, the suit was not defended, and an *ex parte* decree was passed. In a subsequent suit by the plaintiff, to have his title to the said garden declared, to have the sale to the defendant's husband set aside as having been made without legal necessity and to recover possession, the defence was that the suit as regards the moiety of the land was barred by the operation of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that the question of the validity of the sale to the defendant's husband ought to have been raised by way of defence to the previous suit, and it must therefore, by virtue of Expl. II to s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, be treated as having been directly and substantially in issue in that suit, and was consequently *res judicata*. *Sundar v. Parbuti*, I. L. R. 12 All. 51 : I. L. R. 16 I. A. 186, distinguished. *Mahabir Pershad Singh v. Macnaghten*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 682 : I. L. R. 16 I. A. 107, and *Kameswar Persad v. Rajkumari Ruttan Koer*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 79 : I. L. R. 19 I. A. 234, referred to. *SHYAMA CHARAN BANERJI v. MRINMAYI DEBI* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 79

✓ 120. — *Matters in issue*—*Issue of law erroneously decided*—*Causes of action*. In a previous suit for rent against a permanent tenure-holder in a permanently-settled area : *Held*, following a ruling of the High Court that the plaintiff could recover interest on the arrears only at the rate of 12 per cent. per annum, as s. 67 of the Bengal Tenancy Act controlled s. 179 of the Act and was a bar to his recovering at the higher rate mentioned in the *kabuliat*. The ruling referred to was subsequently overruled by a Full Bench. In a subsequent suit between the same parties on the same



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*kabuliat* for rent for a subsequent period: *Held*, that the case must be decided upon the law as it stood when judgment was pronounced and that the plaintiff could recover the larger sum for interest; the decision in the previous suit would not be *res judicata*. The subsequent suit having been brought on a fresh cause of action, no question as to the construction of the *kabuliat* had arisen, and the law since the decision of the former suit had been determined by judicial decision to be otherwise than what it was formerly regarded to be. A point of law may constitute *res judicata*. *Parthasaradi Ayyangar v. Chinna Krisna Ayyangar*, I. L. R. 5 Mad. 304; *Chamanlal v. Bapubhai*, I. L. R. 22 Bom. 669; *Yenku v. Mahalinga*, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 393; *Rai Churn Ghose v. Kumud Mohon Dutt Chaudhuri*, 1 C. W. N. 687; and *Bishnu Pria Chowdhurani v. Bhaba Sundari Debya*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 318, referred to *Gouri Koer v. Audh Koer*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1087, and *Phundo v. Jangi Nath*, I. L. R. 15 All. 327, distinguished. *ALIMUNNISSA CHOWDHURANI v. SHAMA CHARAN ROY* (1905)

I. L. R. 32 Calc. 749

121. ———— *Civil Procedure Code*, s. 13—*Res judicata*—*Erroneous decision in a former suit*—*Bengal Tenancy Act* (VIII of 1885), ss. 67, 74, 179—*Mukarari lease*—*Abwab*—*Illegal cesses*—*Stipulation to pay*. Where the plaintiff in a suit for recovery of rent claimed certain cesses, which the defendant had stipulated to pay in his *kabuliat* and which the defendant said he was not liable to pay, inasmuch as in a previous suit for recovery of rent of a previous period, it had been held that the same was not recoverable according to law:—*Held*, that the present claim was barred by the rule of *res judicata*. *PADMANAND SINGH v. RADHA SINGH* (1905) . . . 9 C. W. N. 469

122. ———— *Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—*Joint trial*—“*Matter directly and substantially in issue*”—“*Former suit*”—*Suits disposed of in one judgment*—*Title*. *M* and *J*, two Mahomedan co-widows, brought two separate suits for recovery of their dowers from the estate of their deceased husband. A question was raised in these suits, whether two houses belonged to the estate of the husband. By consent of parties the Subordinate Judge tried both the suits together and disposed of them in one judgment, it being found that the two houses belong to *M*, as her separate property. But two separate decrees were drawn up in accordance with that judgment. *J* preferred an appeal to the District Judge against the decree in her own suit mainly on the ground that the conclusion arrived at by the Subordinate Judge in the suit of *M*, respecting the title of the two houses, was erroneous; but no appeal was preferred in *M*'s suit. At the hearing of this appeal a question was raised on behalf of *M*, the respondent, that the judgment in *M*'s suit not having been appealed against operated as *res judicata*. The District Judge overruled this plea, and allowed the appeal of *J*. On second appeal to the High Court:—*Held* (RAMPINI,

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*J.*, dissenting), that there was no bar of *res judicata* to the hearing of the appeal preferred by *J. Abdul Majid v. Jew Narain Mahto*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 233, referred to. *MARIAMNISSA BIBI v. JOYNAB BIBI* (1906) . . . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1101  
s.c. 10 C. W. N. 934

123. ———— *Civil Procedure Code* (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—*Consent decree*—*Fraud*—*Defence*—*Limitation*. On the 4th June 1893, the defendant signed an acknowledgment (*Ruzu*) for R11,534-15-0 in favour of the shop of Bakhatram Nanuram, represented in the suit by the plaintiff. On the 19th June, 1894, the defendant paid R400 cash, and a hundi for R600 and for the balance R10,534-15-0 he passed an instalment-bond payable at yearly instalments of R1,000 with interest at 6 per cent. on overdue instalment. The hundi for R600 was dishonoured in 1895 and the firm sued the defendant for its amount plus R45 interest in Suit No. 249 of 1895. The defendant pleaded want of consideration for the hundi, and further said that the acknowledgment had been passed in ignorance of the true state of accounts and because the facts had been concealed and misrepresented. A Commissioner was appointed to examine the plaintiff's account. He reported that the debt really due on the 4th June, 1893, was R3,016-3-0 and not R11,534-15-0 as stated in the *Ruzu*. Upon this the claim in the suit was decreed without an adjudication of other questions raised by the defendant. In 1897, the firm sued the defendant for the first and second instalments, which had become due under the instalment-bond. This was Suit No. 105 of 1897 and was for R2,000 and interest. The defendant admitted the claim, which was decreed accordingly by consent. In 1898, the defendant instituted Suit No. 412 of 1898 against the Bakhatram firm for cancellation of the instalment-bond alleging that it was obtained by misrepresentation and fraud, and was void in law having been passed in respect of wagering transactions and that nothing was due under it. The final decision in the case was passed by the High Court, who, without giving any decision on the merits, dismissed the suit as time-barred. Pending the above proceedings, the plaintiff filed this suit in 1902 against the defendant on the instalment-bond to recover the 3rd, 4th and 5th instalments amounting in all to R3,000 and interest. The defendant pleaded *inter alia* that the instalment-bond and prior *Ruzu* were obtained from him by fraud and misrepresentation and that the debt due was one arising from wagering contracts unenforceable by law. No findings were recorded on these points, as the Subordinate Judge held that the defendant was precluded by the decrees in suits Nos. 249 of 1895 and 105 of 1897 from raising any of these contentions. The claim was decreed with costs. On appeal, the District Judge also came to the conclusion that the bar of *res judicata* operated against the defendant, but held that the claim as to the 3rd and 4th instalments was barred by limitation. Both the parties preferred appeals to the High Court.



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*Held*, by ASTON, J.—(i) that, unless it be established that the pleas, which the defendant had raised in the present suit and had not been allowed to prove if proved in the Hundi Suit No. 249 of 1895, have reduced the amount actually due by him in June, 1893, to less than R600, plus the R400 paid in cash, the decision in the hundi suit could not operate, as *res judicata* in respect of the said pleas, for the matter which might and ought to be made a ground of defence in the hundi suit must be a ground of defence to “the claim actually made” in the said former suit; (ii) that the plea that the consideration for the instalment-bond partly failed, because of the reasons set up in the pleas aforesaid, would have been irrelevant in the later suit No. 195 of 1897 for the first two instalments of R1,000 due under that bond, unless by setting up these pleas and proving them the claim in that later suit for R2,000, the amount of the first two instalments, would have been reduced. *Held*, by SCOTT, J.—(i) that before the present suit was brought the issue as to consideration had not been raised, except with reference to the hundi and had been heard and determined in suit No. 249 of 1895 with reference to that document alone. The defendant was, therefore, not barred by *res judicata* from pleading in this suit that the bond was no longer supported by consideration; (ii) that the lower Court was wrong in holding that the defendant was barred by s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) from raising the questions of fraud or wager as vitiating the bond as a security for the payment of the remaining instalments. The issue in suit No. 249 of 1895 was a sufficient issue for the disposal of the case on the hundi and in that suit the defendant's liability under the hundi was the only matter in issue. In suit No. 105 of 1897 there was no hearing and disposal of any matter in issue and the provisions of s. 13 had, therefore, no application. Regard must be had to the reason and scope of the consent decree. A defendant is entitled to resist a claim made against him by pleading fraud, and he is entitled to urge that plea though he may have himself brought an unsuccessful suit to set aside the transaction, and is not under certain circumstances like those in hand precluded from urging that plea by lapse of time. *Rangnath v. Govind*, I. L. R. 28 Bom. 639, followed. *Mahomed v. Ezekiel*, 7 Bom. L. R. 772, not followed. MINALAL SHADIRAM v. KHARSETJI (1906)

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 395

124. — Application for review to have compromise-decree set aside—*Res judicata*—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Suit instituted before Munsif—Compromise-decree on appeal before District Judge—Decision, if bars fresh suit before Subordinate Judge—Ground for setting aside compromise-decree not raised in review—Fresh suit on such ground, if lies—Procedure for setting aside decree—Rule issued by the High Court—Discharge—Effect. Plaintiffs had instituted three suits against the defendants in the Court of the Munsif. Pending appeals preferred before the

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District Judge against the decrees of the Munsif, a compromise was filed and decrees made thereon. The plaintiffs then applied for review of the decrees alleging that their pleader had no authority to agree to the compromise. The District Judge rejected the application on the ground that the pleader had the requisite authority. The plaintiffs obtained rules from the High Court against this order, but they were discharged. Plaintiffs now instituted a fresh suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge praying that the compromise and the decree made thereon be set aside on the ground that the pleader had no authority to compromise and that the terms of the compromise went outside the subject-matter of the suit. *Held*, that in order to have the compromise-decree set aside it was open to the plaintiffs to proceed either by way of suit or by an application for review the latter being the more regular mode of procedure. *Ashutosh Chandra v. Tara Prosanna Roy*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 612, followed. That the effect of the discharge of the rules issued by the High Court was to leave the order of the District Judge undisturbed. That the question regarding the pleader's authority to compromise was directly and substantially in issue in the proceeding for review and was heard and finally decided by the Court of the District Judge which was a Court of jurisdiction competent to try the present suit. The suit in consequence is barred by the rules of *res judicata*. *Koylash Chandra De v. Tarack Nath Mandal*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 571; *Bhagwanbuttee Chowdhurain v. A. H. Forbes*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 78, relied on. An independent suit would not lie merely because a ground is alleged for setting aside the decree, which was not taken in the application for review. The plaintiffs having elected to proceed by way of review, ought to have raised upon their application all the grounds upon which they relied for setting aside the decree. RAM GOPAL MAZUMDAR v. PRASUNNA KUMAR SANIAL (1905) 10 C. W. N. 529

125. — Property not included in the former suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13, Explanation II—Right as heir decided in the former suit with respect to other property—The decision does not bar the second suit. K brought a suit against A and others to recover some property as heir of one S praying for a partition of the properties specified in the plaint and for allotment to him of S's share therein. A denied K's heirship and asserted himself to be heir of S. It was decided that A was the heir of S and the suit was dismissed. A then brought another suit against K to establish his right as S's heir to property not included in the plaint in the first suit. The lower Appellate Court negatived the claim upon the ground that as A failed to make the omission by K to include the property in dispute in the previous suit for partition a ground of defence, A's right to the property was in the second suit barred under Explanation II to s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882). On appeal to the High



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Court, *held*, that *A*'s right to maintain the suit was not barred by *res judicata*. Explanation II to s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) must be read in conjunction with and as part and parcel of the leading provisions of the section itself. According to those provisions, several conditions are necessary to constitute a matter *res judicata*. Two of those conditions are: (i) that the matter must have been in the former suit directly and substantially in issue; and (ii) that it must have been heard and finally decided in that suit. The explanation does no more than lay down that if a matter, which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence in the former suit, is not made such a ground, it shall be dealt with as falling within the first of the abovementioned conditions. That is, the omission shall have the same effect given to it as it would have had if it had been made a ground of defence. But to constitute *res judicata*, a second condition is necessary—it must have been finally decided and if the former suit went off on a preliminary ground not calling for adjudication on other grounds of defences whether raised or not, those grounds remain undecided. The same effect must be given to a matter which might and ought to have been, but has not been, made a ground of defence in the former suit, as must be given to it if it had been made a ground of defence in the former suit. *ABDULLAKHAN v. KHANMIA* (1908) . . . **I. L. R. 32 Bom. 315**

**126.** ———— **Previous rent suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13, Expl. II—Rent, suit for—Decree, ex parte.** The limitation that for Explanation II of s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure to have any application, the subject-matters of the two suits must be the same is not to be found in s. 13 itself. *Rajendra Nath Ghose v. Tarangini Dassi*, 1 C. L. J. 248, explained. The words "the matter directly and substantially at issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit" cannot and do not lay down that both the issues and the subject-matters of the two suits must be the same before Explanation II can be applied. *Sarkum Abu Torab Abdul Waheb v. Rahaman Buksh*, 1 L. R. 24 Calc. 83; *Kailash Mondul v. Baroda Sundari Dasi*, 1 L. R. 24 Calc. 711; *Woomesh Chundra Moitra v. Baroda Das Moitra*, 1 L. R. 28 Calc. 17; and *Surjiram Marwari v. Barhamdeo Persad*, 1 C. L. J. 337, referred to. It is not required for Explanation II to be applicable to a case that the matter, which might and ought to have been raised in the former suit, but was not so raised, must have been heard and finally decided in the previous suit. *Sri Gopal v. Piithi Singh*, 1 L. R. 20 All. 110, followed. *JANADAR SINGH v. SERAZUDDIN AHAMAD CHAUDHURI* (1908)

**I. L. R. 35 Calc. 979**  
**s.c. 12 C. W. N. 862**

**8. PARTIES.****(a) SAME PARTIES OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES.**

**1.** ———— **Judgment not inter partes**  
—Questions of fact. A judgment *inter partes* be-

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tween *A* and *B* cannot be considered to conclude *A* in a suit between *A* and *C*, and is not admissible in the second suit as evidence of the truth of the facts adjudicated in the former one. *BALAJI VISHVANATH JOSHI v. DHARMA*

**2 Bom. 385; 2nd Ed. 363**

**2.** ———— **Judgment inter partes—Point decided in former suit.** In a foreclosure suit in which *A* was plaintiff and *B*, *C*, and *D* were defendants:—*Held*, that a verdict on the point in issue in an ejectment suit in which *C* and *D* were plaintiffs and *A* was defendant, was a bar to the suit. *MOHIDIN v. MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM*

**1 Mad. 245**

*NUND KISHORE SINGH v. HUREE PERSHAD MUNDUL* . . . . . **13 W. R. 64**

**3.** ———— **Suit to recover purchase-money of the decree of ejectment from purchase.** Where the plaintiff purchased land from *A* and on taking possession was made defendant in an ejectment suit brought by a third person:—*Held*, in a suit against *A* to recover the purchase-money, that the decision in the ejectment suit—to which *A* was no party—was not a *res judicata*. *Ram Ranjan Chuckerbutty v. Ram Narain Singh*, 1 L. R. 22 Calc. 533, and *Ritto Kunwar v. Kisho Pershad*, 1 L. R. 19 All. 277, referred to. *GOOL KHAN v. TETAR GOALA* . . . . . **4 C. W. N. 63**

**4.** ———— **Judgment in rem—Decree obtained by fraud—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 13—Evidence Act, s. 44.** Where a decree in a suit has been honestly obtained without fraud it cannot be subsequently disputed by the parties thereto or their privies, or by persons who were represented by such parties. Strangers to the suit, (*i.e.*, persons neither privies to, nor represented by, the parties thereto) are not bound by such a decree if it be a decree *inter partes*; but if it be a decree *in rem* and passed by a competent Court, they are bound by it and cannot controvert it. Where a decree has been obtained by means of the fraud of one party against the other, it is binding on parties and privies, and on persons represented by the parties, so long as it remains in force, but it may be impeached for fraud, and may be set aside if the fraud is proved. In the case of judgments *in rem* the same rule holds good with regard to persons who are strangers to the suit. Where a decree has been obtained by the fraud and collusion of both the parties to the suit, it is binding upon the parties. It is also binding upon the privies of the parties,—except, probably, where the collusive fraud has been on a provision of the law enacted for the benefit of such privies. But persons represented by, but not claiming through, the parties to the suit may in any subsequent proceeding, whether as plaintiff or defendant, treat the previous judgment so obtained by fraud and collusion as a mere nullity, provided the fraud and collusion be clearly established. The same rule applies with regard to strangers where



**RES JUDICATA—contd.****8. PARTIES—contd.****(a) SAME PARTIES OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES—contd.**

the previous judgment is a judgment *in rem*. S. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877) is not exhaustive as to the effect of *res judicata*. It does not deal with the case of judgments *in rem*, nor with that of parties represented by, though not claiming under, the parties to a former suit. *Quære*: As to the proper construction of s. 44 of the Evidence Act. **AHMEDBHAY HUBIBHAY v. VULLEEBHAY CASSUMBHAY** . . . . . **I. L. R. 6 Bom. 703**

**5. ————— Decree against Hindu widow—Fraud—Reversioner.** Upon the death of *R*, a Hindu, who was separate from his brother *S*, his widow *G* became life-tenant of his estate, and his daughter *B* became entitled to succeed after *G*'s death. In 1882 a suit was brought by *S* and *G* against *V* to recover the value of a branch of a mango tree wrongfully taken by the defendant, and for maintenance of possession over the grove in which the tree was situate. The suit was dismissed, and it was decided that *R* was not the owner of the grove, nor was *G* the owner. In 1885 *B* brought a suit against *G*, *S*, *V*, and *A*, to whom *V* had sold some of the trees, claiming a declaration of her right and possession of the grove, upon the allegation that the proceedings of 1882 were carried on in collusion between *S* and *G* on the one hand and *V* on the other, for the purpose of improperly preventing her from asserting her rights. *Held*, that, if the suit of 1882 was a genuine suit and was properly contested by the then plaintiffs, though *S* might have been improperly joined as plaintiff any decision then passed against *G* would be binding upon the present plaintiff, and estop her again litigating questions which were then decided. *Held*, also, that, if the plaintiff's specific allegation of fraud and collusion in the proceedings of 1882 were established, and even if the decree of 1882 did dispose of the question now sought to be re-opened, the decision in that suit would not be binding on the plaintiff under the circumstances. *Katama Natchiar's Case*, 9 Moo. I. A. 539; *Adi Deo Narain Singh v. Dukharan Singh*, I. L. R. 5 All. 532; and *Sant Kumar v. Deo Saran*, I. L. R. 8 All. 365, referred to. **SACHIT v. BUDHUA KUAR** . . . . . **I. L. R. 8 All. 429**

**6. ————— Reversioners—Effect on successors in estate to widow of decree against her—Bonâ fides.** The rule whereby decrees obtained against a Hindu widow succeeding to her husband's estate as heir are binding by way of *res judicata* against all who in the order of succession came after her, and in that sense may be dealt with as her representatives, is limited to decrees fairly obtained against the widow in a contested and *bonâ fide* litigation, and would not apply to a compromise which could scarcely be regarded as on a higher footing than an alienation which the widow in possession of her husband's divided estate might have made, and which the plaintiff distinctly alleged had

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not been fairly obtained. *Anund Koer v. Court of Wards*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 764; *Nand Kumar v. Radha Kuari*, I. L. R. 1 All 282; and *Katama Natchiar's Case*, 9 Moo. I. A. 539, referred to. Also that *M*'s withdrawal of her suit was not a bar to the suit of the plaintiff. **SANT KUMARI v. DEO SARAN** . . . . . **I. L. R. 8 All. 365**

**7. ————— Reversioner.** On her husband's death, a Hindu widow obtained possession of his estate as his heir, and, in a suit against her for possession thereof by certain persons claiming to succeed to the estate as rightful heirs, a decree was obtained by them. *Held*, that such decree was a bar to a new suit against those persons by the daughter claiming the estate in succession to the widow, the decree having been fairly and properly obtained against the widow. **NAND KUMAR v. RADHA KUARI** . . . . . **I. L. R. 1 All. 282**

**8. ————— Decree in suit by Hindu widow—Reversioners, suit by—Alienation by life-tenant—Adverse possession.** A daughter succeeded to a share of her father's estate, and transferred it in full property by a formal instrument or *ikrarnama*, dated March 1849, to her granddaughter, expressly naming her and treating her as her heiress,—the transfer being in the nature of a release, reserving maintenance and other advantages to the donor. Upon the application of the granddaughter before the Collector for the mutation of names according to the terms of the *ikrarnama*, the reversioners (collateral heirs of the father) affected to contest the unauthorized nature of the alienation, but dropped their opposition. In 1857 the diaras, or alluvial lands attached to the estate, were perpetually settled with the granddaughter. The alienor quarrelled with her granddaughter, and in 1857 brought a suit against her to set aside the *ikrarnama*, upon the ground of the non-performance of a condition subsequent. The plaintiff succeeded in the first Court, but the judgment was reversed (October 1858) on appeal to the Zillah Judge. Pending the appeal, the plaintiff died (February 1858), and reversioners applied to be, and were, admitted as her heirs to conduct the appeal. The granddaughter remained in possession from the date of transfer until 1866, when she died. In April 1867 the present suit was brought by the surviving reversioner, who claimed to be entitled to recover possession of the property by right of inheritance from the alienor's father. He was one of the reversioners who had been admitted to conduct the appeal in the former suit upon the death of the alienor. *Held* (on special appeal and review), that there had been no adverse possession; the instrument enured as a transfer of the donor's lifetime only; the judgment in the former suit brought to set it aside did not bind or affect the reversioners, who in that suit merely represented the interest of their predecessors, the life-tenant. **RAJ KUNWAR v. INDURJIT KUNWAR** . . . . . **5 B. L. R. 585: 13 W. R. 52**



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9. ———— *Suit against remote reversioner—Subsequent suit for possession by reversioner.* A Hindu widow and her son, the then presumptive heir to property claimed by the widow, obtained a decree against a more remote reversionary heir. The son predeceased his mother, and the person against whom the decree had been obtained became the next reversionary heir. *Held*, in a suit for possession by him, that the decree in the previous suit did not operate as a *res judicata*. *RAM CHUNDER PODDAR v. HARI DAS SEN*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 463

10. ———— *Reversioners entitled to succeed successively on death of Hindu widow—Suit by some of such reversioners to set aside alienations made by widow in possession—Similar suit afterwards brought by others.* Where there are several reversioners successively entitled to succeed to property for the time being in the possession of a Hindu female, a decree in a suit by some of such reversioners seeking to set aside alienations made by the female in possession will not constitute *res judicata* in respect of a similar suit brought by other reversioners. *Bhagwanta v. Sukhi*, I. L. R. 22 All. 33; *Jumona Dassya Chowdhrahi v. Bama-soonderi Dassya Chowdhrahi*, L. R. 3 I. A. 72; and *Isri Dut Koer v. Hansbutti Koerain*, L. R. 10 I. A. 150, referred to. *CHHIDDU SINGH v. DURGA DEI* . . . . . I. L. R. 22 All. 382

11. ———— *Decree against member of joint family—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—Former suit by one of several parties who afterwards sue through a receiver.* A previous decision against one member of a family suing to recover his own share of certain property is no bar, under s. 2, Act VIII of 1859, to a suit by the receiver in the name of the whole family to recover the whole property. *JUGGUNNATH PERSHAD DUTT v. HOGG*

12 W. R. 117

12. ———— *Decree in suit by manager of joint family—Manager of joint family as representative of other members—Subsequent suit by another member on same cause of action.* A Hindu family is regarded as a corporation whose interests are necessarily centred in the manager, the presumption being that the manager is acting for the family, unless the contrary is shown. Before the introduction of the Civil Procedure Code, this was so equally with regard to litigation as to other transactions, and it was not then obligatory, or even customary, for a Hindu manager to set forth that he sued in a representative character (as now required by the Code, s. 50), or to add the co-owners as parties to the suit (as required by English law). A suit therefore brought in 1856 by the manager of a joint Hindu family consisting of himself and the plaintiff, and no fraud or collusion being alleged, bound the plaintiff, though then a minor,

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and he could not afterwards bring a second suit on the same cause of action. *GAN SAVANT BAL SAVANT v. NARAYAN DHOND SAVANT*

I. L. R. 7 Bom. 467

13. ———— *Decree against manager of joint family—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 13—Karnavan of Malabar tarwad, decree against.* A decree against a karnavan of a Malabar tarwad, as such, is binding upon the members of that tarwad, though not parties to the suit, in the absence of fraud or collusion. Expl. 5 of s. 13, Civil Procedure Code, is not limited to the case of a suit under s. 30. The members of a tarwad claim under a karnavan, suing as such, within the meaning of expl. 5 of s. 13. *VARANAKOT NARAYANAN NAMBURI v. VARANAKOT NARAYANAN NAMBURI*

I. L. R. 2 Mad. 328

14. ———— *Karnavan of Malabar tarwad, decree against.* A decree against a person who happens to be the karnavan of a Malabar tarwad is not necessarily binding on the tarwad in the absence of fraud. *ELAYACHANIDATHIL KOMBI ACHEN v. KENATUMKORA LAKSHMI AMMA*

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 201

15. ———— *Decree against karnavan of Malabar tarwad—Necessary parties to suits against property of Malabar families—Malabar Law—Nambudri family, Status of—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 13, expl. 5, s. 30.* The plaintiff, a member of a Malabar Nambudri family, sued for certain land, claiming it as the property of his family, the Vadasheri illam. He had been dispossessed by the defendants under a decree declaring their title to the land against the plaintiff's elder brother, who claimed it on behalf of the Vadasheri illam. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not estopped by the former decree from recovering the land. *Per INNES, J.*—The question whether a decree obtained against the karnavan of a Nayar tarwad or of a Nambudri illam in Malabar is binding on the family is purely one of procedure. The dictum in *Varanakot Narayanan Namburi v. Varanakot Narayanan Namburi*, I. L. R. 2 Mad. 328, that in the absence of fraud or collusion a decree against the karnavan, as such, is binding on the anandravans of the tarwad, is not warranted by any provision of the Code of Civil Procedure. Every member of the tarwad is entitled to be made a party, or to have notice under s. 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in any suit the object of which is to affect the tarwad property. Expl. 5 of s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not refer to *bonâ fide* defences, but to *bonâ fide* claims, and does not make a decree binding on a person not a party to it where the actual defendant was jointly interested with such person in the subject-matter of the suit and defended the suit *bonâ fide*. *Hazir Gazi v. Sonamonee Dassei*, I. L. R. 6 Calc.



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31, approved. KUNNATHURILLATH VASUDEVAN NAMBUDRI v. NARAYANAN NAMBUDRI  
I. L. R. 6 Mad. 121

16. ———— *Effect of decree on other members though not parties to the suit.* In 1870 A sued B for a piece of land, and obtained a decree against him in the original suit and appeal. Subsequently, in 1875, C and D, the nephews of B, brought a suit against A and B for their shares in the land, alleging that there was collusion between A and B in the previous suit. It was found that C and D and their uncle B had lived together as members of an undivided Hindu family at the time of the former suit, and that he (B) was the manager of the family and assisted by his nephews, C and D, in defending the former suit. C and D made no allegation in their plaint that they were minors at the time of the former suit, nor did they assign any reason for not asking to have been made co-defendants in it. Their allegation of collusion between A and B was not proved. *Held*, that the plaintiff's suit, under those circumstances, was barred by the former suit under s. 2 of Act VIII of 1859. *Jogendra Deb Furkut v. Funindro Deb Furkut*, 11 B. L. R. 244, and *Mayaram Sevaram v. Jayvant Pandurang*, I. L. R. 5 Bom. 687 note, referred to. NARAYAN GOP HABBU v. PANDURANG GANU  
I. L. R. 5 Bom. 685

17. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 13, expl. V—Joint Hindu family—Suit against two members—Second suit against third member.* The plaintiff sued the father and brother of the defendant for trespass to a wall. His right to the wall was denied, but he obtained a decree. On executing the decree, he was resisted by the defendant, who claimed the wall as his ancestral property, and alleged that he was no party to the suit in which the decree had been obtained against his father and brother. His claim was registered as a suit under s. 331 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff contended that the defendant was concluded by the decree obtained against the father and brother. *Held*, that a Hindu son in a joint family becomes entitled by reason of his birth and in his own right, a right which he can enforce against his father; he does not claim under his father within the meaning of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, also, that the defendants in the former suit did not claim any right in common for themselves and others within the meaning of expl. V. of s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The case of *Narayan Gop Habbu v. Pandurang Ganu*, I. L. R. 5 Bom. 685, distinguished. RAM NARAIN v. BISHESHAR PRASAD . . . I. L. R. 10 All. 411

18. ———— *Sale in execution of decree—Mitakshara law—Alienation, voluntary and involuntary, by the members of a family governed by the Mitakshara law.* A, a Hindu

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(a) SAME PARTIES OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES—*contd.*

governed by the Mitakshara law, after the attachment of a property, part of his ancestral estate, to which he and his minor son B were jointly entitled as members of a joint Hindu family, conveyed by a deed of gift the whole of his interest in the ancestral property, including the property under attachment, to B. Five days after the execution of the deed of gift, the property was sold in execution for the decree of the attaching creditor C, and was purchased by C at such sale. Ten days after the sale, A instituted proceedings under s. 256 of Act VIII of 1859 to set it aside on the ground of irregularity. These proceedings were afterwards continued in the name of A, but virtually on behalf of the minor B, under the control and direction of the Collector, who had taken charge of his estate, and appointed a manager under Act XL of 1858. These proceedings terminated in 1874 by the application to set aside the sale being dismissed, and the sale was therefore confirmed, and C took possession of the property. In 1877 a suit was instituted on behalf of D by the manager appointed by the Collector against C and A to recover possession of the property, on the grounds—(i) that when it was sold it was not the property of A, the judgment-debtor, and (ii) that the property of a joint Hindu family could not be sold or alienated by, or taken in execution of, a decree against a single member of that family. *Held*, that the fact that the plaintiff, through his guardian, had actively intervened in the proceedings under s. 256 of Act VIII of 1859, was no bar to the institution of the present suit on his behalf. COLLECTOR OF MONGHYR v. HURDAI NARAIN SHAHAI . . . I. L. R. 5 Calc. 425

S.C. RUDER PERKASH MISSER v. HURDAI NARAIN SAHU . . . 5 C. L. R. 112

19. ———— *Decree against member of joint family as representing minor son—Alienation made without consent of co-sharers—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 13—"Same parties."* G sold an estate nominally to the minor son of K, but in reality to K. H brought a suit in his minor son's name against N, the mortgagee of such estate to redeem the same. N set up as a defence to such suit that such sale was invalid under Hindu law, as such estate was a share of certain undivided property of which he was a co-sharer, and had been made without his consent. It was finally decided in that suit that such estate was a share of such undivided property and not the separate property of G, and that such sale was invalid, having been made without the consent of N, a co-sharer of such undivided property. G subsequently redeemed such estate, and, having done so, sold it a second time to K. N thereupon sued K to set aside such sale on the same ground as that on which he had defended the former suit. *Held*, that the issue in such suit whether such estate was a share of undivided property or the separate property of G was *res judicata*, inasmuch as K, though not in name, yet



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in fact was a "party" to the former suit in which such issue was raised and finally decided. **KHUB CHAND v. NARAIN SINGH . I. L. R. 3 All. 812**

**20. — Dismissal of former suit to have property declared joint—Subsequent suit for partition.** Where a plaintiff's claim to have a property declared *ijmali* had been dismissed in a former suit, his suit for a partition of the same property was *held* to be barred against a defendant who had been a party to that suit, as well as against defendants who were not in possession. **BESHARUTOOLLAH v. AJOO . 14 W. R. 195**

**21. — Suit against defendants as principals—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—Subsequent suit against them as agents.** A previous suit in which the plaintiff elected to sue the defendants as principals bars a second suit on the same contract in which the defendants are charged as responsible agents under a trade usage. **DEVRAV KRISHNA v. HALAMBHAI . I. L. R. 1 Bom. 87**

**22. — Suit not between same parties.** *Held*, on the facts, that the suit not barred by s. 2, Act VIII of 1859, not being between the same parties. **UMES CHANDRA ROY v. NABIN CHANDRA MAZUMDAR . 5 B. L. R. 327 note**

**S.C. WOOMESH CHUNDER ROY v. NOBIN CHUNDER MOZOOMDAR . 10 W. R. 457**

**ABDOOL GUFFOOR KHAN CHOWDHRY v. GOLAM NUJUF . 16 W. R. 298**

**23. — Decision as to validity of will.** *S* died in 1865, leaving two sons *N* and *G*. *M* took possession of the property of *S* under a will alleged by her to have been executed by *S*. In 1867 *G* brought his suit as one of the heirs of *S*, to set aside the will and made his brother *N* a co-defendant. The Principal Sudder Ameen dismissed the suit, finding on the evidence that the will was genuine. In 1869 *N* brought this suit for his share as heir of *S* against *M*. The first Court found that the will was a forgery, and gave the plaintiff a decree. On appeal, the Judge held that *N*'s claim was barred by the decision in the former suit brought by his brother and reversed the decision of the first Court. *Held*, on special appeal, that it was not barred by the finding of the Court in *G*'s suit, as *N* was no party to that suit, and he could not in any manner have availed himself of a decree in that suit to enforce a claim to his share. **NABIN CHANDRA MAZUMDAR v. MUKTA SUNDARI DEBI 7 C. L. R. Ap. 38 : 15 W. R. 309**

**24. — Former suits on ikrar between several parties.** Five brothers *A*, *B*, *C*, *D*, and *E*, executed in *ikrar*, by which talukh *N* and others were to remain in their possession and under the management of *A*. On refusal to give his brothers their shares of the profits, they sued separately and obtained decrees against him

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(a) SAME PARTIES OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES—*contd.*

for the amount due to them. In a suit by *A*'s son against *B* for the sums which his father was compelled under the *ikrar* to pay his other brothers, on the allegation that *B* alone was in possession of talukh *N* and appropriated the rents wrongfully :—*Held*, that the suit was not barred by the former suits under the *ikrar*, except so far as *B*'s share in talukh *N* was concerned. **KHETTRO NATH DEY v. GOSSAIN DOSS DEY . 7 W. R. 188**

**25. — Decree declaring impartibility—Subsequent suit for partition.** The plaintiff's mirasidars of a village, held on *pungavaly* tenure, sued their co-mirasidars, the owners of the remaining shares, and others, occupants of land in the village, for a partition of the common lands of the village and an allotment to the plaintiffs of specific parts thereof proportionate to the shares which they represented. In a former suit to which all the present mirasidars were parties, either actually or as privies to those through whom they claim, it was decided that no right existed in any individual shareholder of the village to have allowed to him a distinct portion of the common lands in proportion to his share or shares. *Held*, that the former decree declaring the impartibility of the common land of the village was conclusive in the present suit between the present shareholders upon the same question of right. **SITARAMAIYAR v. ALAGIRY IYER . 4 Mad. 285**

**26. — Decree in suit to establish right—Subsequent suit for possession—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—Suit between same parties.** The plaintiff sued to recover possession of certain houses and grounds as belonging to his zamindari, setting forth that the premises in question had been occupied by his paternal grandmother, on whose death the defendants had taken wrongful possession. The defendants claimed to be legally entitled to the premises in question, and contended that the plaintiff's suit was barred under s. 2, Act VIII of 1859, by reason that the plaintiff had already, during his grandmother's lifetime, brought a suit against her and the defendant's father as a co-defendant, to establish his right to the same premises, which suit had been dismissed. The defendants also pleaded limitation. It appeared that in the former suit the relief sought by the plaintiff was substantially to restrain his grandmother from acts of waste in alienating property which had belonged to her deceased husband by assigning it to her co-defendant; but that, as regards the property now claimed, although it was mentioned in the plaint, no charge had been made that she had assigned it, or intended to assign it, to her co-defendant, nor any allegation to show that the co-defendant had any interest in it. *Held*, reversing the decisions of the lower Court, that under the circumstances the decision in the former suit was not a decision in a suit between the same parties, or parties under whom they claimed, and that the cause of action in the present suit was not.



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determined in the former suit. *Held*, also, that the defendant's plea of limitation could not be determined without a finding as to whether the plaintiff's grandmother, who died within the period of limitation, had held the premises with the plaintiff's leave, or as a trespasser. *ZAMINDAR OF PITTAPURAM v. PROPRIETORS OF KOLANKA*

I. L. R. 2 Mad. 23  
L. R. 5 I. A. 200

## S.C. RAMA RAO v. SURIYA RAO 3 C. L. R. 265

Reversing the decision of the High Court in *RAMA RAO v. SURIYA RAO* I. L. R. 1 Mad. 84

27. ———— Decree in suit by first mortgagee for sale of mortgaged property—*Second mortgagee not made a party—Subsequent suit by second mortgagee on mortgage—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13—Meaning of "between parties under whom they or any of them claim."* Upon the death of *G*, a Mahomedan, his estate was divisible into eight shares, two of which devolved upon his son, *A*, one upon each of his five daughters, and one upon his widow, *B*. The name of *B* only was recorded in the revenue registers in respect of the zamindari property left by *G*. In 1876 *A* and *B* gave to *X* a deed of simple mortgage of 2½ biswas out of a 5-biswas share of a village included in the said property. In 1878 *A* and *B* gave to *S* a deed of simple mortgage of the 5 biswas, which were described in the deed as the widow's "own" property. In 1882 *X* obtained a decree upon his mortgage for the sale of the mortgaged property, and it was put up for sale and purchased by *X* himself in January 1884. In February and November 1884 the daughters of *G* obtained *ex parte* decrees against *A* and *B* in suits brought by them to recover their shares by inheritance in the 5 biswas. In 1885 *S* brought a suit upon his mortgage of 1878, claiming the amount due thereon and the sale of the whole 5 biswas. To this suit he made defendants *A* and *B*, *G*'s daughters, and *X*, alleging that the decrees of February and November 1884 were fraudulently and collusively obtained; and as to the auction sale of January 1884 that the 2½ biswas were sold subject to his mortgage, he not having been made a party to the suit brought by *X* upon the deed of 1876, and therefore not being bound by any of the proceedings taken therein or consequent thereto. On behalf of the daughters it was contended (*inter alia*) that the decrees obtained by them against *A* and *B* in February 1884 were conclusive, by way of *res judicata*, against the plaintiff, who, as mortgagee from *A* and *B*, claimed under a title derived from them. *Held*, that, there being no evidence to show that the decrees of February and November 1884 were fraudulently and collusively obtained, the Court of first instance was right in exempting the shares of the daughters from the lien sought to be enforced by the plaintiff; and that, inasmuch as the deed of 1876 was prior in date to the plaintiff's

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(a) SAME PARTIES OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES—*contd.*

deed of 1878, and there was no allegation of fraud or collusion in regard to it, the decree and sale in enforcement of the former deed would defeat the rights of the plaintiff under the latter. *Khush Chand v. Kalian Das*, I. L. R. 1 All. 240, and *Ali Hasan v. Dhirja*, I. L. R. 4 All. 518, referred to. *Per MAHMOOD, J.* The decrees of February and November 1884 did not operate as *res judicata* against the plaintiff, inasmuch as a mortgagee cannot be bound by a decision relating to the mortgage property in a suit instituted after his mortgage, and to which he was not a party. After a mortgage has been duly created, the mortgagor, in whom the equity of redemption is vested, no longer possesses any such estate as would entitle him to represent the rights and interests of the mortgagee in a subsequent litigation, so as to render the result of such litigation binding upon and conclusive against such mortgagee. The plaintiff in the present suit could not be treated as a party claiming under his mortgagors within the meaning of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, and that section must be interpreted as if, after the words "under whom they or any of them claim," the words "by a title arising subsequently to the commencement of the former suit" had been inserted. *Duma Sahu v. Jeonarain Lall*, 3 B. L. R. A. C. 407; 12 W. R. 362, and *Bonomalee Nag v. Koylash Chander Dey*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 692, referred to. *Outram v. Morewood*, 3 East. 346; *Boykuntnath Chatterjee v. Ameeroonissa Khatoun*, 2 W. R. 191; *Katama Natchiar v. Moottoo Vijaya Raganadha*, 9 Moo. I. A. 539; and *Ram Coomar Sein v. Prosunno Coomar Sein*, W. R. 1864, 375, distinguished. The principles of the rule *res judicata*, as part of the law of civil procedure properly so-called, and those of the rule of estoppel, as part of the law of evidence, explained and distinguished. *SITA RAM v. AMIR BEGAM*

I. L. R. 8 All. 324

28. ———— Illegitimacy, question of—*Execution of decree—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11.* The questions which, under s. 11, Act XXIII of 1861, may be determined by a Court executing a decree, must be between parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, and must relate to the execution of the decree. A person who was not on the record when the decree was made does not constitute himself a party to the suit by applying for execution and a question as to his legitimacy is consequently not one which the Court executing the decree is competent to entertain. A declaration by a Court in execution-proceedings, that a person not a party to the suit applying for execution is legitimate, since it is made without jurisdiction, cannot, under s. 2, Act VIII of 1859, be pleaded as a bar to a regular suit in which it is sought to establish the illegitimacy of the applicant. *ABI-DUNNISSA KHATUN v. AMIRUNNISSA KHATUN*

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 327  
L. R. 4 I. A. 66



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(a) SAME PARTIES OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES—*contd.*

29. ————— *Suits in right of inheritance.* *M*, in 1866 brought a suit against *A*, her son *S*, *B*, and *C*, who, like her, all claimed a right to inherit the estate of *K*, deceased for her share by inheritance in *K*'s estate, alleging that she had been lawfully married to him. She only denied *A*'s right to inherit, who claimed as *K*'s adopted son; admitting the right of *S*, who claimed as her lawful son by *K*, and that of *B* and *C*, who claimed as wife and daughter respectively of *K*. *S* supported his mother's claim. *A*, *B*, and *C* denied that *M* had been lawfully married to *K*, and alleged that *S* was the son of *M*, not by *K*, but by another person. It was decided in that suit that *M* had been lawfully married to *K*; that *S* was the lawful son of *K* by *M*; and that *A* was not the adopted son of *K*. In 1880 *S* sued *A* for possession of *C*'s share in such estate, *C* having died, claiming as *C*'s step brother and heir. *A* set up as a defence that *M* was not *K*'s wife, nor was *S* *K*'s son. *Held*, that, inasmuch as, although in the former suit *A* and *S* stood together in the same array, they were in fact opposed to each other, *S* being on the side and supporting the case of his mother, and *A* being the true defendant, such suit was one between the same parties as the second, and the matter of *S*'s legitimacy, having been raised and finally decided in the former suit by a competent Court, was *res judicata*, and could not be again raised in the second suit. *SHADAL KHAN v. AMIN-ULLA KHAN*

I. L. R. 4 All. 92

30. ————— *Party as representative.*—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 13, 244.* In 1872 *A* brought a suit on a mortgage against the mortgagor, a Hindu widow, who died pending the suit. *A* then applied that the suit should be revived against *B* as the representative of the defendant. *B* denied that he was such representative, but the Judge refused to go into the question, made *B* a party, and gave *A* a decree for the sale of the mortgaged property. *B* subsequently brought a suit to have it declared, *inter alia*, that the mortgage and decree only covered the widow's life-interest. *Held*, that the suit was not barred either as *res judicata* or under the provisions of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *KANAI LALL KHAN v. SASHI BHUSON BISWAS*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 777; 8 C. L. R. 117

31. ————— *Mortgage—Purchaser of mortgagor's interest—Sale in execution of decree—Omission to revive suit.* *A* mortgagee brought a suit on his mortgage against his mortgagor and against *A*, a person who had purchased the right, title, and interest of the mortgagor in execution of a money-decree obtained against him subsequently to the mortgage. Pending the mortgage-suit and before decree, *A* died, but the suit was not revived against his representatives. The usual mortgage-decree was passed in favour of the mortgagee, who, in execution thereof, sold a portion

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(a) SAME PARTIES OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES—*contd.*

of the mortgaged property to *B*. In a suit brought by *B* against the representatives of *A* for the property purchased and for general relief:—*Held*, that the decree in the mortgage-suit was not binding on the representatives of *A*; nor, under the provisions of Act VIII of 1859, did the failure to revive such mortgage-suit prevent *B* from bringing the second suit against *A*'s representatives. *BEPINBEHARI BUNDOPADHYA v. BROJONATH MOOKHOPADYA*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 357

32. ————— *Suit for ejectment—Lessor and lessee.* An ejectment suit by *B*'s tenant against the defendant having been dismissed, a second ejectment suit was subsequently, after *B*'s death, brought in respect of the same land against the defendant by the successor in title of *B*. *Held*, that inasmuch as a lessor cannot be considered as claiming under his own lessee, the principle of *res judicata* did not apply. *RAMBROHO CHUCKERBUTTY v. BUNSI KURMOKAR* . 11 C. L. R. 122

33. ————— *Former decree declaring status of occupiers of holding—Suit not between same parties.* An attempt having formerly, on the cessation of the services rendered by some palki-bearers, been made to oust them from certain chakran lands which they had held for many years and which they had claimed to hold rent-free for the future; and it having been held on that occasion that, though theirs was not a rent-free tenure or an uninterrupted tenure from the time of the decennial settlement, yet they had clearly acquired a right of occupancy:—*Held*, on a suit being brought by the zamindar against the same bearers for recovery of rent, that, although the former suit had not been brought by the zamindar personally, but by the persons to whom he had attempted to transfer the lands, yet the decision in that suit clearly established, as between the zamindar and the palki-bearers, a relation of landlord and tenant, which empowered him to recover arrears of rent from them. *SUROOP SIRDAR v. BEER CHUNDER MANIKHYA*

25 W. R. 370

34. ————— *Suits between representatives—Document found conclusive.* Where *A* sued *B* for moneys alleged to be due under certain documents, and *B* pleaded that the demands had been included in a settlement of accounts, embodied in a document which he set forth in his answer, and the suit was dismissed, on the ground that, being included in the settlement, the demands no longer existed as causes of action:—*Held*, that *A*'s representative was not estopped from disputing the document in a subsequent action brought by him against the representative of *B*. *Eastmore v. Laws*, 5 Bing. N. C. 444, concurred in. *TIRUMALA RAU SAHIB v. PINGALA SUNKARA RAU* . 1 Mad. 312

35. ————— *Purchaser from party to suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13—Vendor and purchaser—Purchase pendente lite.* Certain



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(a) SAME PARTIES OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES—*contd.*

persons, claiming by right of inheritance to *C*, sued *B*, *N*, *A*, *K*, and others for possession of certain immoveable property, and on appeal to the High Court in August 1876 their claim was decreed in full. In the course of the litigation which ended in that decree, *Z* purchased certain immoveable property from *B*, *N*, *A*, and *K*. *Z* was subsequently dispossessed of such property in execution of the decree of August 1876. He thereupon sued the holders of that decree for possession of the same, alleging that his vendors had inherited it from *D*; that the figures of the total of *C*'s property given in the plaint in the former suit were erroneous; that the property now in suit was not affected by that decree and that he had been improperly dispossessed of it. It appeared that there was, in fact, a mistake in the total of the extent of *C*'s property as stated in the plaint in the former suit. *Held*, that the plaintiff, having purchased *pendente lite*, was bound by the decree of the High Court against the persons through whom he claimed; that the claim in the former suit having been decreed in full, the property now in suit was then decreed to the present defendants; and that the claim of the plaintiff to go behind that decree could not be entertained. *HUKM SINGH v. ZAUKI LAL I. L. R. 6 All. 506*

36. — Suit by son not claiming through his father—*Gift to Hindu widow—Separate property.* *C*, a Hindu, subject to the Mitakshara law, died leaving a widow, *R*, but no issue. In his lifetime he had transferred to *R* by gift mouzah *R*, a portion of his real estate. After his death, *J* and *P*, his brothers, sued *R* for the possession of *C*'s real estate, on the ground that it was ancestral property. This suit was dismissed, it being held by the Sudder Court that *C*'s real estate was separate property, to which his widow would be entitled to succeed by inheritance. The Sudder Court determined that *R* had acquired mouzah *R* by gift from *C*, and that *R* took under the gift a life-interest in the property only. *J* and *P* having died, *R* made a gift of mouzah *R* to her agent as a reward for his faithful services. *N*, the son of *J*, sued as the heir of his uncle *C*, to set aside this gift to the agent as illegal. *Held*, that the decision in the former suit did not make the question as to the interest *R* took under the gift from her husband *res judicata*, inasmuch as *N* did not claim through his father when suing as heir to his uncle. *RUDI NARAIN SINGH v. RUP KUAR I. L. R. 1 All. 734*

37. — Representation of the estate of a Hindu talukhdar by his widow in a suit for the succession—*Act 1 of 1869—Act XXIV of 1870, s. 25.* Issues substantially the same as those raised in the present suit, relating to the succession to a talukhdari estate, had been decided in a former suit, in which an order of Her Majesty in Council declared who had the right to succeed. *Held*, that a claimant, whose interest was such

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(a) SAME PARTIES OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES—*contd.*

as would vest in him only upon the death of the widow of the last talukhdar, was bound by the order so made, on the ground that he was privy to the former suit, the whole estate, for the purpose of representing it, being vested in the widow, who was a party to that suit. *Ka'ama Nachiar v. Raja of Shivagunga, 9 Moo. I. A. 539*, referred to and followed. That order declared that a will made by the last talukhdar, whereby a power to appoint a successor in the talukhdari had been given to the widow, had been revoked, and determined the right to succeed as upon intestacy. The person whom the widow had appointed by her will, now contending that he was not bound by the order, having been, when the former suit was instituted, a minor, without any duly appointed guardian, it was held that, whether he had, or had not, by acts after attaining full age (having been nominally a party), become estopped from setting up the above, he was, at all events, bound by the order; on the ground that the widow, holding an estate at least as large as that of the Hindu widow in her husband's property, was the full representative of the estate in the former suit; the appointment made by her being such as would operate only on her death. *Held*, also, that, although a manager of the estate had been appointed under the provisions of Act XXIV of 1870 (the Oudh Talukhdars' Relief Act), but had not been made a party to the suit, this omission did not, under s. 25, affect the validity of the decree between the parties. *PERTABNARAIN SINGH v. TRILOKINATH SINGH I. L. R. 11 Calc. 186: L. R. 11 I. A. 197*

38. — Benami proceedings—*Decision in former suit.* In execution of a decree of the Revenue Court in a suit brought by *K* for arrears of rent of a certain patni, the patni was put up for sale and purchased in the name of *G*. The rent having again fallen into arrear, *K* took proceedings against *G* under Bengal Regulation VIII of 1819 for the sale of the patni, but the arrears having been paid the patni was not sold. In a suit for arrears of rent of the same patni subsequently brought by *K* against *G*, *P*, and *B* (the wife of *P*) jointly, on the allegation that the patni had been purchased by *G* benami for *P* and *B*:—*Held*, that the suit was not barred by the former proceedings instituted by *K* against *G* under Regulation VIII of 1819. *PROSONNO COOMAR PAL CHOWDRY v. KOY-LAS CHUNDER PAL CHOWDRY B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 759 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 327: 8 W. R. 428*

39. — *Suit for confirmation of possession and declaration of title.* *A* brought a suit for a debt against *B*, obtained a decree, and attached certain land in execution. *C* intervened, claiming the property as his, but on the 28th March 1868 his claim was disallowed, on the ground that in two suits previously brought against *C* and others for possession of the same property, on



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(a) SAME PARTIES OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES—*contd.*

the 30th December 1863, by X and Y, whose interest had, pending the suit, been purchased by B, it had been decreed that the land belonged to B. The decrees in these suits were dated 13th and 19th January 1864; they were in favour of B, and ran in his name alone. C had purchased a moiety of the property at an auction sale on the 7th March 1859; X and Y claimed under a pre-existing mortgage over the same property, the equity of redemption under which had been foreclosed. C now brought a suit against A and B for confirmation of his possession and a declaration of his title to the property. He alleged that B was his servant, and had purchased the interest of X and Y in the property benami for him; that he (C) had made the purchase with his own money in the name of B; that the suits originally brought by X and Y had really been compromised; that while the decrees of the 13th and 19th January 1864 were nominally in favour of B, they were really in his (C's) favour; and that the suit brought by X and Y had been allowed to proceed in B's name, in order that C's title might be strengthened by a decree in his favour, B being only nominally the decree-holder. C also stated that, since his purchase on 7th March 1859, he had always been in possession, and he dated his cause of action from the 28th March 1868, when his claim to the property which had been attached by A in his suit against B was disallowed. The Subordinate Judge gave a decree in favour of the plaintiff C. B alone appealed to the High Court. *Held*, that C, not having been disturbed in his possession, and seeking a declaration of his title only and no relief, should have stated clearly and precisely what that title was; that as against A, who had not appealed, the decision of the Subordinate Judge was final; that as between B and C the matter was *res adjudicata*; that C could not go behind the decrees of the 13th and 19th January 1864 which had been passed in favour of B, and show that the purchase by B and subsequent decrees were really benami for C and in his favour. BHAWABAL SINGH v. RAJENDRA PRATAP SAHOY 5 B. L. R. 321: 13 W. R. 157

40. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 13—Suit by benamidar.* In a suit to recover a parcel of land, the plaintiff's case was that it had been purchased by him benami in the name of his brother, who had sued the present defendants to obtain possession in 1887, but had been negligent in the conduct of the suit, which was consequently dismissed. It was found that there had been no negligence in the conduct of the suit, and that it had been instituted with the plaintiff's knowledge. *Held*, that the plaintiff was bound by the decree in the former suit, and could not recover on his secret title. SHANGARA v. KRISHNAN . I. L. R. 15 Mad. 267

41. ———— *Suit for share of estate of Mahomedan—Lien for dower.* A Mahomedan died, leaving among others a widow and a sister entitled to shares in his estate. The widow got pos-

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(a) SAME PARTIES OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES—*contd.*

session of the whole. The sister died, and after her death her husband, on behalf of himself and grandson, sued the widow to obtain the shares to which the deceased sister was entitled, and obtained a decree for payment of the same, after satisfaction of the widow's lien for dower, in certain proportions to himself and grandson. The husband's interest in the decree was subsequently confiscated by Government for having taken part with the enemy in the Mutiny. He subsequently died leaving his grandson. The widow died during the Mutiny, and her brother was put into possession of the property by the Government as her heir. The grandson now sued the widow's brother to recover his own and his grandfather's share, alleging that the lien for dower had been satisfied. *Held*, the suit was not barred by Act VIII of 1859, s. 2. MAHOMED AMEENODEN KHAN v. MOZUFFER HOSSEIN KHAN

5 B. L. R. 570: 14 W. R. P. C. 5

42. ———— *Auction-purchaser—"Representative."* A purchaser at an execution-sale is not as such the representative of the judgment-debtor within the meaning of s. 115 of the Evidence Act. A Hindu, governed by the Mitakshara School of Law, died on the 12th May 1867, leaving him surviving a widow B and a brother R who was admittedly the next reversioner. In July 1867 B purported to adopt a son D to A, and subsequently in September 1867 obtained a certificate under Act XL of 1858. In 1872 B obtained a loan from the plaintiff M of R9,000, and to secure its repayment executed a mortgage of seven mouzahs in favour of M as guardian of D. The money was advanced and mortgage executed at the instigation of R and with his consent, and upon his representation that D was the duly adopted son of A, and it was admitted that the money was specifically advanced for, as well as applied towards, the payment of decrees obtained against A in his lifetime and against his estate after his death. B died in 1878. On the 14th August 1880 M instituted a suit against D upon his mortgage, and in that suit he made S a party-defendant as being the purchaser of the mortgagor's interest in one of the mouzahs included in his mortgage. On the 26th June 1882 M obtained a decree declaring that he was entitled to recover the amount due by sale of the mortgaged mouzahs. In the proceedings taken in execution of that decree M was opposed by L, who was afterwards held to be a benamidar for S, who claimed that he had, on the 8th November 1880, purchased five out of the seven mouzahs at a sale in execution of certain decrees against R. On the 29th February 1884 L's claim was allowed, and on the 11th August 1884, M brought this suit against L, S, R, and D, and the decree-holders in the suits against R, for a declaration of his right to follow the mortgaged property in the hands of S. It was found as a fact that the adoption of D was invalid; that the advance by M to B was justified by legal necessity; and that L was the benamidar of S. It also ap-



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(a) SAME PARTIES OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES—*contd.*

peared that *M* had himself become the purchaser of one of the mortgaged mouzahs. The lower Court gave *M* a decree declaring him to be entitled to recover the full amount of the mortgage-money from the five mouzahs in the hands of *S*. *L* and *S* appealed, and *M* filed a cross-appeal, alleging the adoption to be valid and binding on *S*. It was contended that *S*, as the representative of *R*, was estopped from denying the validity of *D*'s adoption, and that, having been a party to *M*'s first suit, the question as to the liability of the mouzahs to satisfy the mortgage lien was *res judicata* as against him. *Held*, that, as *S* was merely a party to *M*'s original suit as purchaser of one mouzah, and as he, subsequently to the institution of that suit, acquired *R*'s interest in the five mouzahs, and as *R* was not a party to that suit, nor was his interest represented in any way, the decree was in no way binding against *R*, and therefore *S* was not barred by *res judicata* from setting up the interest of *R* in the five mouzahs so acquired by him. *LALA PARBHU LAL v. MYLNE*  
I. L. R. 14 Calc. 401

43. Suit by a judgment-creditor to establish his judgment-debtor's right to property so as to make it subject to attachment in execution of his decree—*Dismissal of such suit—Judgment-debtor not represented by judgment-creditor in such suit—Subsequent suit by judgment-debtor to recover the same property.* A judgment-creditor of the plaintiff having obtained a decree against the plaintiff, attached the house in dispute. The defendant intervened in 1878, and set up a previous purchase of the house by himself from the plaintiff. The attachment was removed. The judgment-creditor brought a suit against the defendant for a declaration that the property belonged to the plaintiff, and, as such, was liable to be attached and sold in execution. At the hearing of this suit the judgment-creditor did not appear. The defendant appeared and produced a sale-deed, which the Court found proved, and dismissed the judgment-creditor's suit. The plaintiff now brought the present suit against the defendant to recover possession of the house. The defendant contended (*inter alia*) that the dismissal of the former suit brought by the plaintiff's judgment-creditor operated as *res judicata* under s. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). Both the lower Courts disallowed the defendants' contention holding that the suit was not barred. On appeal by the defendant to the High Court:—*Held*, confirming the lower Court's decree, that the dismissal of the former suit did not operate as *res judicata* in the absence of any evidence to show that the judgment-creditor, in point of fact, represented the plaintiff so as to constitute him a party to the suit. *SHIVAPA v. DOD NAGAYA*  
I. L. R. 11 Bom. 114

44. Party to proceedings in execution—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 13, 283—Order in execution—Estoppel.* A claim in

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(a) SAME PARTIES OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES—*contd.*

execution to a house which had been attached was dismissed, and the claimant then sued the decree-holder to establish her title to it. It appeared that the house had been previously attached in execution of another decree obtained by *A* against the same judgment-debtor and his father (since deceased); that the present plaintiff had then preferred a claim, which was allowed; that the judgment-debtor had taken no steps to have the order allowing the claim set aside; and that a suit filed by *A* with that object had been dismissed. *Held*, that the plaintiff's claim was not *res judicata*, although she had been a party to the former proceedings, and the defendant, not having been a party to the former proceedings, was not estopped from contesting it. *GNANAMBAL v. PARVATHI*  
I. L. R. 15 Mad. 477

45. Suit against *de facto* manager or trustee by *de jure* trustees—*Dismissal of such suit as barred by limitation—Subsequent suit against same defendant with sanction of Advocate-General—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 539.* In 1887 certain persons, alleging that they had been appointed trustees of a temple and its property by its founder Purshotam, brought a suit to evict Purshotam's son from the premises, alleging that he had been their gumasta, that they had dismissed him, and that he refused to give up the property. The High Court dismissed that suit on the ground that it was barred by limitation. In 1892 the plaintiffs brought the present suit with the consent of the Advocate-General, under s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code, against the same defendant, alleging that after Purshotam's death the defendant had entered into possession of the property and for some years had carried out the trusts created by his father Purshotam; but that latterly he had claimed the property as his own and refused to perform the trusts. They prayed that trustees might be appointed and the property made over to such trustees. The defendant contended that the plaintiffs in both the suits were the same, *viz.*, persons representing the same *cestues que trustent*, *i.e.*, the devotees of the temple or the general public; that they sued in the same right, and as the plaintiffs in the former suit were held barred by limitation, the plaintiffs in the present suit were also barred. *Held*, that the present suit was not barred. The plaintiffs in the former suit had no general warrant, such as is conferred on plaintiffs suing under s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code, to represent the public, the objects of the charity. They based their title to sue on their particular appointment by Purshotam, and when it was found that they had by limitation lost their rights to the title derived from that appointment, they ceased to represent the public just as though they had been removed from their office. The *de jure* managers and trustees of a public charity losing their right by limitation to oust the *de facto* trustee does not confer on the latter immunity from suit on the part of the Advocate-General



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(a) SAME PARTIES OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES—*contd.*

or the temple. LAKSHMANDAS RAGHUNATHDAS v. JUGALKISHORE . . . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 216

46. ——— Suit brought by one of several trustees after dismissal of suit brought by the others—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 13, expl. V.* Where the uraima right over a certain devasam was vested in five trustees representing different illams, and a suit was brought by one of the trustees to recover certain property alleged to have been illegally alienated by three other trustees to a stranger and dismissed:—*Held*, that the decree in such suit was a bar to a second suit brought for the same purpose by the fifth trustee, who had not been a party to the former suit, on the ground that he must be deemed to claim under the plaintiffs in the former suit within the meaning of s. 13, expl. V, of the Code of Civil Procedure. MADHUVAN v. KESHAVAN . . . I. L. R. 11 Mad. 191

47. ——— Representation of minor by manager of estate—*Madras Boundary Act, 1860, s. 25—Mad. Reg. V of 1840—Decision of boundary officer, effect of, if not contested by suit.* A survey officer in 1875 held an enquiry under the Boundary Act, 1860, and demarcated certain land out of a zamindari. At that time the zamindar was a minor under the Court of Wards, and he was represented at the enquiry by the manager of his estate appointed under s. 8 of Regulation V of 1804. In a suit brought by the zamindar to recover the land it was contended that the decision of the survey officer was not binding on the zamindar because he was not properly represented by his guardian at the enquiry. *Held*, that the decision of the survey officer was binding on the zamindar, and that the matter in dispute was *res judicata*, no appeal by way of suit as provided by the Boundary Act, 1860, s. 25, having been brought. KAMARAJU v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 309

48. ——— Decree in suit by a karnam, effect of, as regards his successor—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 13.* The karnam in a certain mitta sued to recover certain land as part of the mirasi property attached to his office. It appeared that the plaintiff's father and predecessor in office had sued by virtue of his office to recover the same land, and that his suit had been dismissed. *Held*, that the plaintiff's claim was *res judicata*. VENKAYYA v. SURAMMA . . . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 235

49. ——— Suits not between same parties—*Suit for declaration of right to office, dismissal of.* Certain land was attached and sold in execution of a decree against the dharmakarta of a devasthanom. One claiming to be the lawful successor in office of the judgment-debtor now sued the purchaser for a declaration that the sale was invalid. *Held*, that the suit should not be dismissed on proof that the plaintiff had failed to obtain a declaration of his right to the dharmakartaship

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(a) SAME PARTIES OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES—*contd.*

against another claimant to the office, in a suit to which the present defendant was not a party. RAMALINGAM v. THIRUGNANA SAMMANDHA

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 312

50. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 13.* One N brought a suit against a lambardar for her share in the profits of a certain mehal, her claim being based upon an assignment executed in her favour on the 29th of July 1889 by one B as heir to one M, deceased. Prior to that assignment, namely, on the 3rd of June 1887, a suit had been commenced by the lambardar against B and one K for possession of other property alleged to have belonged to M in her lifetime, and in this suit it was ultimately found, but subsequently to the above-mentioned assignment in favour of N, that K, and not B, was the heir to M. *Held*, that the suit commenced on the 3rd of June 1887 did not operate as *res judicata* in respect of the present plaintiff N's claim under her assignment from B. *Foster v. Earl of Derby, 1 Ad. & E. 790*, referred to. NIAZULLAH KHAN v. NAZIR BEGAM

I. L. R. 15 All. 108

51. ——— Party for purpose of discovery only—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 13, 43—Joint wrong-doers—Judgment against one of several—Contract Act, s. 43.* Prior to and in the year 1865 the defendant's brother B carried on an extensive business in Bombay and China. The defendant and another brother A carried on a separate business under the name of A H. In December 1866 B became insolvent, and his property vested in the official assignee. The present suit was brought in 1887 against the defendant by the official assignee to recover certain property which he alleged belonged to the insolvent, and ought to be distributed amongst his creditors. The plaintiff alleged that in 1865 the insolvent was possessed of a very large amount of property, and that, being unwilling to meet his liabilities, he and his son and his two brothers, viz., A and the defendant B, fraudulently concealed his property from his creditors, and in September 1866 he himself went to Damar beyond British jurisdiction. In 1881 the plaintiff, having obtained information that some of the insolvent's property was in the possession of his brother A, filed a suit (473 of 1881) against A to recover it. That suit was referred to arbitration, and the plaintiff obtained a decree for Rs. 3,60,000. The plaintiff now alleged that, shortly before the hearing of that suit, and subsequently, he had obtained information which led him to believe that the defendant had obtained some of the insolvent's property for which he was accountable. The defendant had been made a party to the former suit (473 of 1881) for the purpose of discovery only, and it was in the course of such discovery being given that some of the above information had been obtained. The plaint then set forth, in detail, the



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(a) SAME PARTIES OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES—*contd.*

various items of claim in respect of which the plaintiff sought to make the defendant liable. The defendant pleaded that the said claims had been in issue in the former suit (473 of 1881), and were adjudicated upon, and that this suit was therefore barred by s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code; that the plaintiff was barred by s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code, the plaintiff having omitted to include these claims in the former suit, to which defendant was a party; that the decree in the former suit (473 of 1881) was (*inter alia*) in respect of the matters alleged in this suit, and that, as according to the plaintiff's allegation the defendant in that suit was a joint wrong-doer with the defendant in this suit in respect of these matters, the said decree was a bar to this suit. *Held*, by SCOTT, J., that the suit was not barred either by s. 13 or s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. The defendant was made a party to the former suit for certain limited purposes only. No relief was asked from him; no decree was made against him. He was merely a nominal defendant. He was not a party to the former suit in such a way as to bring the present suit within the section. *Held*, also, that the rule of *King v. Hoare*, 13 M. & W. 491, applies in India, *viz.*, that a judgment recovered against any one of several joint-debtors merges the remedy for the joint debt, and is a bar to an action against a co-debtor upon the joint liability; and, similarly, in a matter of *tort-feasance*, a judgment against one of several wrong-doers is a bar to an action on the same matter against the others. Such of the wrongs therefore alleged in the present suit as were of a joint character, and were adjudicated upon the previous suit, were extinguished by the former judgment. Applying the above rule, the Judge disallowed some of the items of the plaintiff's claim, and allowed others, and directed an account in respect of the latter. The Court of appeal confirmed the decree of the Court of first instance *RAHMUBHOY HUBIBBHOY v. TURNER*

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 408

52. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 13, 43—Account.* In a suit brought by the official assignee it was held that the defendant having been "made a party" but only "for the purpose of discovery," to a prior suit brought by the plaintiff, according to an order in that suit, in which, however, there was no decree against him as a party, and no order as to his costs:—*Held*, that this irregular proceeding had not rendered him a party to that suit so as to make applicable either s. 13 or s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. A decree that the defendant should account to the official assignee for the assets received by him from the insolvent after the date of the insolvency was affirmed. *RAHMUBHOY HABIBBHOY v. TURNER*

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 341  
L. R. 20 I. A. 1

53. ———— *Estoppel—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13—Privity between execution-creditor*

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(a) SAME PARTIES OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES—*contd.*

and purchaser at sale in execution of decree. Where all the conditions prescribed by s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure as necessary to bar the trial in a subsequent suit of an issue adjudicated upon in a previous suit exist, the fact that in the first suit the defendant was an execution-creditor, and in the second he is a purchaser at an execution-sale, makes no difference as to the second suit being *res judicata*. A privity exists between an execution-creditor and a purchaser at a Court-sale, the latter representing the former in so far as he had a right to bring the property to sale in execution of his decree. Thus, when the plea of estoppel is available to a decree-holder, it is likewise available to the purchaser at the execution sale, as his representative or as one claiming under him. *Sarat Chunder Dey v. Gopal Chunder Laha*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 295; *L. R. 19 I. A. 203*, followed. *KRISHNABHUPATI DEVU v. VIKRAMA DEVU* . . . I. L. R. 18 Mad. 13

54. ———— *Decree-holders in case of claim to attached property—Civil Procedure Code 1882, ss. 278 and 283—Effect of order under s. 278.* An order in favour of one of several decree-holders on an objection under s. 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not enure for the benefit of other decree-holders who are not parties to the proceedings under s. 278. *Badri Prasad v. Muhammad Yusuf*, I. L. R. 1 All. 352, referred to. *JAGAN NATH v. GANESH* . . . I. L. R. 18 All. 413

55. ———— *Allegation of different titles—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13, Expt. II—Different suits for the same land, alleging different titles.* The plaintiffs sued to recover certain land, alleging that on the death of the widow of the former owner they became entitled as reversioners. They had previously sued the defendant for the same land, claiming as the surviving members of the joint family to which the former owner belonged. That suit had been dismissed. *Held*, that the present suit was barred by the provisions of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882. *GUDDAPPA v. TIRKAPPA* (1900)

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 189

56. ———— *Parties all claiming under one party in former suit—Decision in former suit—Parties in subsequent suit all claiming under one party only in former suit—Deeds, construction of—What passes under deed in absence of words reserving rights—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 8.* The decision in a suit by one of two zamindars against the other as to the right to the profit rental of a bazar, was held not to be *res judicata* in a subsequent suit for possession of a share of the bazar, in which suit all the parties, plaintiffs and defendants, claimed under the plaintiff in the former suit. Such a plea, however, might well be a defence to a hostile claim by persons asserting a title under the defendant-zamindar in the former suit against those claiming under the plaintiff-zamindar in that suit. *Held*, on the true construction of deeds of



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(a) SAME PARTIES OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES—*contd.*

mortgage, and of sale, and a certificate of sale, of shares in a *zamindari*, where the documents contained no words of exception or reservation, that they conveyed all the interests of the mortgagor, vendor, and judgment-debtor, respectively, in the *zamindari*. Their interests in the houses on the land, and in the profit rents derived from them, passed, in the absence of any words showing an intention to retain or exclude them. *ASGHAR REZA KHAN v. MAHOMED MEHDI HOSSEIN KHAN* (1903) **I. L. R. 30 Calc. 556**  
**s.c. L. R. 30 I. A. 71**  
**7 C. W. N. 482**

57. ———— *Shebaitis—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Hindu idol or deity—Shebait*. The decision in a suit brought by one *shebait* is binding on a succeeding *shebait*. *TULSIDAS MAHANTA v. BEJOY KISHORE SHOME* (1901) **6 C. W. N. 178**

58. ———— *Suit for redemption—Res judicata*. To support a plea of *res judicata* it must appear from inspection of the record that the person whose interest it is sought to bind was in some way a party to the suit. A mortgagor, of an undivided share may redeem the entirety, if the mortgagee does not object and may be compelled to do so, if required by the mortgagee. Therefore the fact that a suit for redemption of the entire property instituted by such a person was dismissed cannot affect the right of a co-sharer, who was not a party to that suit. In a suit for redemption it was ordered that the mortgagor should recover possession on depositing the mortgage-money in the Government Treasury. The money was deposited, but before it could be made over to the mortgagee, the Sepoy Mutiny broke out and the Treasury was looted:—*Held*, that the decree having become incapable of execution owing to *vis major*, a fresh suit for redemption was required to give effect to the rights of the parties and do justice between them; and such a suit was not barred under s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code. *CHAUDHURI AHMED BAKSH v. SETH RAQHUBER DYAL* (1905) **10 C. W. N. 115**

59. ———— *Erroneous decision upon a point of law—Res judicata*. An erroneous decision upon a point of law may yet, as between the parties to it but no further, be a sufficient *res judicata* to preclude them from re-agitating it. *WAMAN v. HARI* (1906) **I. L. R. 31 Bom. 128**

60. ———— *Purchaser at a sale for arrears of revenue—Res judicata—Representative in interest—Persons claiming under paramount title*. The purchaser of an entire estate at a sale for arrears of revenue does not claim title through the defaulting proprietor but claims under a paramount title, and a decree against the latter cannot constitute *res judicata* as against him.

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(a) SAME PARTIES OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES—*contd.*

*Moonshee Buzloul Rahman v. Pran Dhun Dutt*, 8 W. R. 222, and *Radha Gobind Koer v. Rakhal Das Mukherji*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 82, followed. *Boykuntanath Chatterjee v. Ameeroonissa Khatoon*, 2 W. R. 191, and *Tara Pershad Mitter v. Ram Nursing Mitter*, 14 W. R. 283, referred to. *GADADHAR BOSE v. RADHA CHARAN PODDAR* (1907) **I. L. R. 34 Calc. 868**

## (b) INTERVENORS.

61. ———— *Intervenor added in former suit—Suit against other parties*. A suit to recover possession of land, on the ground of purchase from the admitted owners, is not barred by Act VIII of 1859, s. 2, simply because plaintiff's claim as against the same defendant was dismissed in a former suit in which he (defendant) appeared as an intervenor. *TUKHEA v. DEO NARAIN SINGH* **24 W. R. 248**

62. ———— *Reservation of intervenor's rights—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2*. In a former suit against a party and his vendor, in which an intervenor was made a defendant, plaintiffs obtained a decree with a reservation of intervenor's rights. The decree was not a *res judicata* in a subsequent suit by a purchaser from the intervenor against the said vendee, the reservation being a mere *obiter dictum*. *BUKSH ALI v. NITYANUND DOSS* **5 W. R. 227**

63. ———— *Suit for rent—Enjoyment of and receipt of rent, proof of*. Plaintiff sued for rent of land alleged to be a 3 annas 15 gundahs share held by him on a defined right. Defendant admitted the claim. An intervenor appeared, alleging that the land was situate in the 7 annas share of the talukh, and that he had purchased 3 annas 15 gundahs of this share, for which a decree had been given to him, and that he held it is a joint co-parcener. *Held*, that, as the decree did not state patently the subject-matter to be that of this suit, the principle laid in the case of *Syud Ahmed Reza*, 5th August 1863, did not apply; and that, as it did not clearly adjudicate against the plaintiff's right, the principle laid down in the case of *Tarinee v. Bamundoss Moakhef*, 1 W. R. 331, had no bearing. Accordingly the intervenor was bound to show actual and *bona fide* receipt of rent as required by s. 77, Act X of 1859. *GUGUN CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY v. AJMUL ALI* **11 W. R. 91**

64. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—Suit for rent*. A sued B and C in the Civil Court to recover possession of certain lands, of which he alleged that they had dispossessed him, under a decree obtained by them in a suit in which he had previously sued B in the Civil Court, before Act X of 1859 had been passed for rent, in which suit C had been added as a party, and had proved his title to the land against A. *Held*, that A's suit must fail on the ground that it involved a material issue of fact which had already been deter-



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(b) INTERVENORS—*contd.*

mined by a Court of concurrent jurisdiction in the former suit, which was between the same parties and which issue disposed of the present suit. CHOWDHARI NILKANTH PRASAD SINGH v. DIG-NARAYAN SINGH

1 B. L. R. A. C. 30 : 10 W. R. 75

65. ———— *Judgment in suit for rent.* In a suit by plaintiff for arrears of rent against one set of tenants defendant intervened, claiming a moiety of the whole estate. His claim was dismissed in lower Courts, and the case came up on special appeal. Meanwhile plaintiff brought suits against another set of tenants on the same estate, in which defendant again intervened on the same ground as before. *Held*, that the decision in the former set of cases, unless and until set aside in special appeal, was binding on the intervenor, even though the estate was of such value that the Court which passed the decrees in the rent suits would not have jurisdiction to try the title which was in dispute. PRAN NATH SANDYAL v. RAM COOMAR SANDYAL . . . . . 2 C. L. R. 33

66. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—Suit for rent.* The plaintiffs brought this suit to establish, as against the defendants, their title to certain land in the occupation of a tenant. In a previous suit instituted by one of the present defendants against the tenant for rent, one of the present plaintiffs (representing the right now claimed by all of them) intervened as a defendant, on the ground that he was the person entitled to the rent, and failed to establish his claim. *Held*, following the Full Bench case of *Hurri Sunker Mookerjee v. Muktarum Patro*, 13 B. L. R. 238, that the plaintiffs in this suit were barred by the judgment in the former suit. When once it is made clear that the self-same right and title is substantially in issue in two suits, the precise form in which either suit was brought, or the fact that the plaintiff in the one case was the defendant in the other becomes immaterial. GOBIND CHUNDER KOONDOL v. TARUCK CHUNDER BOSE

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 145 : 1 C. L. R. 35

67. ———— *Rights under partition under Beng. Reg. XIX of 1806—Suit for arrears of rent.* A sued B to establish his rights of possession to certain lands allotted him under a batwara made in accordance with the provisions of Regulation XIX of 1806. In a previous suit by B instituted after the batwara against a tenant for arrears of rent due for a portion of the lands now in dispute, A intervened and was made a defendant on the sole ground that he was the person entitled to the rent, but failed to establish his claim. *Held*, following the Full Bench case of *Gobind Chunder Koondool v. Taruck Chunder Bose*, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 145, that A's present suit was barred by the judgment in the former suit. BEMOLASOONDURY CHOWDERAIN v. PUNCHANTUN CHOWDHRY

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 705

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(b) INTERVENORS—*contd.*

68. ———— *Rights as between original defendant and intervenors—Suit for possession.* Where a plaintiff claimed certain property, and two persons intervened and were allowed to put in their claim to a portion of it, which claim, at the hearing, the intervenors, however, refrained from pressing, and the suit was decided in favour of the plaintiff, the original defendant alone appealing (unsuccessfully) against the decree:—*Held*, that it was not open to the intervenors to institute any fresh proceedings to obtain the property against the original defendant, the decree in the suit is which they intervened being conclusive as between them and such defendant. *Sivagnana Tevar v. Periasami*, I. L. R. 1 Mad. 312, distinguished. SHEO CHURN SINGH v. FAKERA DOOBAY

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 91 : 7 C. L. R. 69

The principle of this case was held applicable in UMBICA CHURN BHUTTACHARJEE v. PROSONNO COOMAR SEN . . . . . 9 C. L. R. 365

69. ———— *Want of jurisdiction as to valuation of suit—Subsequent suit between the same parties—Competent Court—Rent suits.* A judgment of a Court not competent to try the case in which the judgment is pleaded as *res judicata* must nevertheless be held to be the judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction within the rule as laid down in the maxim *nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa* and s. 13 of Act X of 1877; more especially where the first suit is tried, decided, and affirmed on regular appeal by a Subordinate Judge who would have been competent to decide the suit (had it been brought before him) in which the judgment was pleaded. The rule of *res judicata* ought to be held to apply to judgments in rent suits, at least until interventions in such suits are authoritatively prohibited. RUN BAHADUR SINGH v. LUCHO KOER

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 406 : 7 C. L. R. 251

Reversed on this point by the Privy Council in RUN BAHADUR SINGH v. LUCHO KOER

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 301

L. R. 12 I. A. 27

See PURBHOO TEWARREE v. RANJEEAWUN PATUCK  
1 N. W. 65 : Ed. 1873, 119

70. ———— *Rent suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 13.* A sued B for rent in the Court of the Deputy Collector of Tipperah under the provisions of Act X of 1859. C intervened, claiming that the land in respect of which the rent was claimed was his property, and the suit was dismissed. On appeal, the District Judge of Tipperah reversed this decision and decreed the claim, on the ground that C had no right whatever to the land. In a subsequent suit brought by C against A and B for possession of the same land:—*Held*, that the previous decree of the District Judge did not constitute the plaintiff's claim as *res judicata* and was no bar to the suit. *Dinanath Bose v.*



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(b) INTERVENORS—*concl.*

*Kalikumar Roy, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 364*, followed.  
*MAHOMED AFSURUDDIN v. BEER CHUNDER MANIKYA*  
**I. L. R. 8 Calc. 470 : 10 C. L. R. 416**

71. ———— *Suit for possession—Co-defendants—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 13.* A leased lands to B, who sued C for possession of a certain mouzah, alleging it to be a portion of the lands leased. A was made a defendant, and supported the case of the plaintiff, who obtained a decree. C appealed, making A and B respondents when the decree was reversed and the suit dismissed, on the ground that the mouzah sued for was the property of C, and that ruling was upheld on special appeal to the High Court. Subsequently A brought a suit against C for the same mouzah, making B a defendant. *Held*, that the title to the mouzah was *res judicata* between A and C, and that the suit would not lie. *Gobind Chunder Koondoo v. Taruck Chunder Bose, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 145*, followed. *BISSORUP GOSSAMY v. GORACHAND GOSSAMY* . . . . . **I. L. R. 9 Calc. 120**

72. ———— *Rent suit—Dismissal for default—Questions of title—Issues—Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, s. 13.* In a suit for arrears of rent and possession of certain property a person intervened and was made defendant on his alleging that he was entitled to an 8 annas share of the property in question, and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any portion thereof. Issues were fixed on the questions of title, but the plaintiffs failed to adduce evidence, and their suit was dismissed. They afterwards brought a suit for possession of the same property, on the same title, against the intervenor in the former suit. *Held*, that the second suit was barred as *res judicata*. *KARTICK CHANDRA PAL v. SRIDHAR MANDAL* . . . . . **I. L. R. 12 Calc. 563**

## (c) PARTY ERRONEOUSLY IN DECREE.

73. ———— *Party ordered to be struck out of suit—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—Mistake in decree.* S. 2, Act VIII of 1859, was held not to apply to a case where the present plaintiff's name was ordered by the High Court to be expunged from the list of defendants in a former suit, but, notwithstanding that order, her name by some mistake still appeared some two years afterwards in the decretal order, the onus being on the present defendant to show how that happened, and that the former suit was decided in her presence. *KALEE COOMAR DUTT ROY v. PRAN KISHOREE CHOWDHRAIN* . . . . . **18 W. R. 29**

## (d) PRO FORMÂ DEFENDANTS.

74. ———— *Parties made defendants by way of caution—Effect of former decree.* A decree made in favour of a plaintiff in a suit

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(d) PRO FORMÂ DEFENDANTS—*concl.*

is binding upon the defendants collectively and severally, notwithstanding any of them was made a defendant only *ikhteatun*, i.e., by way of precaution. *DEOKEE NUNDUN ROY v. KALEE PERSHAD* . . . . . **8 W. R. 366**

75. ———— *Nominal party—Suit against surety of defaulting tenant.* A landlord sued his tenants and his tenants' surety in the Collectors' Court for arrears of rent, the surety being merely treated as a nominal party, and the decree being given against the tenants. He afterwards sued the surety in the Civil Court on the bond given by him, and in the lower Court obtained a decree, not only for the arrears of rent, but also for the costs in the Act X suit. *Held*, on special appeal, that the suit was, as regards the arrears of rent, not barred by s. 2, Act VIII of 1859, but that the costs in the Collector's Court could not be recovered. *RAMTANU ACHARJI v. KOMAL LOCHAN ROY* . . . . . **3 B. L. R. Ap. 37**

*S.C. RAM TANOO ACHARJEE v. RADHA GOBIND* . . . . . **11 W. R. 407**

76. ———— *Party added as landlord in a suit between tenants—Subsequent suit for possession by landlord—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13.* A brought a suit against B, claiming certain property as tenant of C, who was also made a defendant in the suit; this suit was on the merits decided in favour of B. C then brought a suit against B for possession of the same property. *Held*, that such suit was not barred by s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. *BROJO BEHARI MITTER v. KEDAR NATH MOZUMDAR* **I. L. R. 12 Calc. 580**

## (e) CO-DEFENDANTS.

77. ———— *Decision in former suit, effect of, as between co-defendants.* A decision in a former suit cannot operate as an estoppel as between co-defendants in that suit, or parties claiming under them. *MODHOO MOKEE DABEE v. GUNGA GOBIND MUNDLE* . . . . . **W. R. 1864, 299**

*RAM CHAND SOMARDAR v. KALA CHAND CHUCKERBUTTY* . . . . . **1 W. R. 287**

*MADHOO PERSHAD v. LALLJEE SHAHOO* . . . . . **9 W. R. 557**

*KHELUT CHUNDER GHOSE v. KISHEN GOBIND DEB* . . . . . **16 W. R. 128**

*NUBIN CHUNDER DOSS v. NIM CHAND DOSS* . . . . . **17 W. R. 191**

*RAMESSUR GHOSE v. AZEEM JOARDAR* . . . . . **17 W. R. 373**

*AIN ALI v. JUGGUT CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHRY* . . . . . **25 W. R. 416**

*OBHOY CHURN NUNDEE v. BHOOBON MOJOOMDAR* . . . . . **12 W. R. 524**

*KALLY PERSAD SEIN CHOWDHRY v. MOHESH CHUNDER BHUTTACHARJEE* . . . . . **1 Hay 430**



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(e) CO-DEFENDANTS—*contd.*

78. ————— *Finding on unnecessary issue between co-defendant.* A finding between co-defendants unnecessary for the determination of the suit, or the rights of the parties involved in the suit, is not *res judicata*. *BAPU v. BHABANI* . . . . . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 245

79. ————— *Decision when binding between co-defendants.* Where an adjudication between the defendants is necessary to give the appropriate relief to the plaintiff, the adjudication will be *res judicata* between the defendants as well as between the plaintiff and defendants. But for this effect to arise, there must be a conflict of interest between the defendants and a judgment defining the real rights and obligations of the defendants *inter se*. Without necessity, a judgment will not be *res judicata* amongst defendants, nor will it be *res judicata* amongst them by mere inference from the fact that they have been collectively defeated in resisting a claim to a share made against them as a group. *RAMCHANDRA NARAYAN v. NARAYAN MAHADEV* . . . . . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 216

80. ————— A suit which was brought by A against B and C, and dismissed cannot be pleaded as *res judicata* in a subsequent suit brought by B against C. *HURO MONEE DEBIA v. TUMEEZOODEEN CHOWDHRY* . . . . . 7 W. R. 181

81. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13.* Two-thirds of a village were sold by T, P, and B. B was the widow of S, her name being recorded in respect of the property formerly recorded in his name, and what she sold was his one-third share in the village, the other one-third being sold by T and P. The vendors having refused to give possession of the property, the purchasers sued them for possession of it and joined as defendants to the suit C, D, and M, to whom belonged the remaining one-third share in the village. These latter persons contended, *inter alia*, that the family was a joint one, and that B was not competent to alienate her deceased husband's share in the village. The Court decided that the family was joint. After B's death, her daughter K, whose name had been recorded in place of her mother's, made a usufructuary mortgage of another village in which her deceased father had formerly owned a share. A suit was brought by certain persons who had purchased the right in the same village of the representatives in interest of C, D, and M against K, her mortgagee, and their vendors, to set aside the mortgage and recover the interest which they had purchased. They contended that the family was joint, and that the question whether it was joint or divided was *res judicata* by reason of the decision in the former litigation. *Held*, that the question whether the family was joint or divided had not, in the former suit, been determined among the defendants *inter se*, but simply as against the plaintiff, and could only be *res judicata* against him or

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(e) CO-DEFENDANTS—*contd.*

parties claiming under the same title; and the decree in that suit was therefore not binding against K in the hands of the present plaintiffs, who were not the assignees of the plaintiff in the former suit, but of persons who were arrayed in it as defendants along with B, K's mother, and on the same side. *Shadal Khan v. Amin-ullah Khan*, I. L. R. 4 All. 92, referred to by STRAIGHT, J., and distinguished by TYRRELL, J. *Narain Kuar v. Durjan Kuar*, I. L. R. 2 All. 738, referred to by STRAIGHT J. *BHAGWANT SINGH v. TEJ KUAR* . . . . . I. L. R. 8 All. 91

82. ————— *Suit for pre-emption.* M sued K and J to enforce a right of pre-emption in respect of property which he alleged K had sold to J. K denied that she had sold such property to J. J set up as a defence that M had waived his right of pre-emption. The suit was dismissed on the ground that the sale had never taken place. *Held*, that the finding as to the alleged sale was one between the plaintiff and the defendants in the suit, and not between the defendant-vendor and the defendant-vendee, who were not litigating and would not bar adjudication of the matter in issue between them in a suit brought by the latter for the establishment of the same. *JUMNA SINGH v. KAMARUN-NISA* . . . . . I. L. R. 3 All. 152

83. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 13—Issue decided in former suit, in which parties were rival defendants claiming under different titles.* B sued L N and P V to recover certain property claimed under a nuncupative will of his father N. P V denied the will, and alleged that the property was ancestral and had vested in him by survivorship. L N set up title to the property under a will in writing executed by N and denied the title both of B and of P V. The question whether P V was divided or not from N was tried. It was found that the will in writing was valid, that P V was divided, and that B's title was not proved. In a suit by L N against P V to recover certain land granted to her by the will executed by N:—*Held*, that the question whether P V was divided from N was *res judicata* under s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure by reason of the decision in the former suit, although in that suit P V and L N were both defendants. *VENKAYYA v. NARASAMMA* . . . . . I. L. R. 11 Mad. 204

84. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 13, expl. V—Suit for possession of a share in the property of a Mahomedan family.* In a suit in 1882 between the members of a family following the Mahomedan law of inheritance, in which the plaintiffs sued as sharers for the recovery of their share in certain property, one of the defendants pleaded that a paramba, part of the property in dispute, was not subject to division, but this plea was unsuccessful, and a decree was passed for the plaintiffs. The present suit was brought by a mortgagee from one of the defendants in the



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(e) Co-DEFENDANTS—*contd.*

former suit (against whom it had been decided *ex parte*) to recover his share of the above-mentioned paramba, the subject-matter of his mortgage; the mortgagor was joined as defendant, among others, including the defendant who had raised the plea above stated. This plea was repeated by the same person. *Held*, that the claim that the paramba was not subject to division was *res judicata* by virtue of the Civil Procedure Code, s. 13, expl. V. **CHANDU v. KUNHAMED**

**I. L. R. 14 Mad. 324**

As to the effect of a partition decree as constituting *res judicata* between co-defendants, see **DOST MUHAMMAD KHAN v. SAID BEGUM**

**I. L. R. 20 All. 81**

**85.** ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 13, expl. V—Suit for possession of land.* The plaintiff, a junior member of a Malabar tarwad, alleged that her karnavan had assigned to her his kuikanom right over certain land, and that she had obtained a fresh demise from the jenmi and placed a tenant in possession. The tenant was dispossessed by the present karnavan, and in 1886 sued him and the plaintiff to recover possession of part of the land. That suit was dismissed on the ground that the above allegations of the plaintiff were unfounded. She now sued the present karnavan for possession of the entire land. *Held*, that the claim of the plaintiff was *res judicata* so far as it related to the land in question in the former suit, but not as to the rest. **MADHAVI v. KELU**

**I. L. R. 15 Mad. 264**

**86.** ————— *Plea raised in former suit.* A Mapilla, alleging that certain "family property" had been enjoyed by herself and the defendants (who were her relations on the mother's side) in common till one year before suit, when she was excluded from possession, now sued to recover the share to which she claimed to be entitled under the Mahomedan law of inheritance. It appeared that the property had been acquired in the lifetime of the plaintiff's maternal grandfather, who had died more than thirty years before suit, and that one of his sons had obtained a decree for his share of it in a suit to which, among others, the plaintiff and the father of the present contesting defendants were parties as defendants, and that a plea then raised by the latter to the effect that the property had been acquired by him was overruled. The present claim was sought to be resisted on the same ground, which was the subject of the second issue; and it was held by the lower Courts that the defendants were estopped from raising the plea, but there was no evidence as to whether this matter had been in controversy between the present plaintiff and her uncle in the former suit, which was decided *ex parte* as far as she was concerned. *Held*, on second appeal, without finding on the question of *res judicata*, that in the absence of evidence no

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(e) Co-DEFENDANTS—*contd.*

finding on the second issue should be called for. **ABDUL KADER v. AISHAMMA I. L. R. 16 Mad. 61**

**87.** ————— *Plaintiff and defendants co-defendants in former suit decreed against them ex parte.* In a suit to recover the plaintiff's share of lands appertaining to an agra-haram, the defendants pleaded that the lands in question were their own and were not subject to partition. It appeared that in a previous suit brought by a third party against the present plaintiff and defendants and others to recover his share of the agra-haram lands it was held that the lands now in question formed part of the lands of the agra-haram, and they were divided in execution of the decree in that suit. Against the present plaintiff that suit was decreed *ex parte*. *Held*, that the defendants were precluded under the Civil Procedure Code, s. 13, from raising the above plea. **LATCHANNA v. SARAVAYYA I. L. R. 18 Mad. 164**

**88.** ————— *Party through whom plaintiff claimed, and defendant, co-defendants in former suit.* In a suit for land the plaintiff claimed under a conveyance executed to him by defendant No. 1. The property had previously belonged to the father, since deceased, of the first defendant's wife, and her sister, defendant No. 2. Shortly after the father's death, a suit for maintenance was brought by his sister-in-law against his widow and two daughters, in which the then defendants alleged that the property now in question had been given by him to the wife of the plaintiff's vendor, and the Court recorded a finding that the gift was valid. Defendant No. 2 now raised a plea that the gift to her sister had not been accompanied by possession and was invalid, and she asserted title in herself under the will of her mother, under which title she had been in possession for ten years. *Held*, that the second defendant was not precluded by the proceedings in the former suit, in which defendant No. 2 and the wife of defendant No. 1 had been co-defendants, from raising the plea above referred to. **RAMANUJA AYYANGAR v. NARAYANA AYYANGAR I. L. R. 18 Mad. 374**

**89.** ————— *Parties to subsequent suit arrayed on the same side as co-defendants in previous suit—Necessary adjudication between co-defendants—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13.* Where an adjudication between the defendants is necessary to give the appropriate relief to the plaintiff, there must be such an adjudication, and in such a case the adjudication will be *res judicata* between the defendants as well as between the plaintiff and the defendants. But for this effect to arise there must be a conflict of interests amongst the defendants and a judgment defining the real rights and obligations of the defendants *inter se*. Without necessity, the judgment will not be *res judicata* amongst the defendants. **Ram Chandra Narayan v. Narayan Mahadev, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 216**, followed. **Cottingham v. Earl of Shrewsbury, 3**



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(e) CO-DEFENDANTS—*contd.*

*Hare* 627, referred to. AHMAD ALI v. NAJABAT KHAN . . . I. L. R. 18 All. 65

90. ———— *Proceedings in former case not between same parties—Admissibility in evidence of finding in former case.* S granted to G and A a patni of a certain share in a zamindari, and thereupon P brought a suit against G, S, and A for specific performance of an agreement to grant to him (P) a patni of the same share. That suit was decreed with costs, the whole of which were realized from G. In a suit for contribution brought by G against S and A the lower Appellate Court found that G, S, and A had conspired in setting up a false defence in the former suit in order to defeat P's claim. The only evidence on which the lower Appellate Court had acted as establishing such collusion was the finding of the Court in the former suit (gathered from the grounds of appeal in that suit). Held, that that finding was inadmissible in evidence, as laid down in *Sunder Nath Pal Chowdhry v. Brojo Nath Pal Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 352, being the finding in a case in which G, S, and A were all co-defendants, and a third party the plaintiff; and the case was remanded for the determination of the question whether G, S, and A were wrong-doers, and were as such held liable for the costs of the former suit. GOBIND CHUNDER NUNDY v. SRIGOBIND CHOWDHRY

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 330  
1 C. W. N. 179

91. ———— *Under what circumstances a decision may be res judicata as between defendants.* Where an adjudication between defendants is necessary to give the appropriate relief to the plaintiff, the adjudication will be *res judicata* between the defendants as well as between the plaintiff and defendants. But for this effect to arise there must be a conflict of interest between the defendants and a judgment defining the real rights and obligations of the defendants *inter se*. Without necessity a judgment will not be *res judicata*, amongst defendants, nor will it be *res judicata* amongst them by mere inference from the fact that they have been collectively defeated in resisting a claim to a share made against them as a group. *Ramchandra Narayan v. Narayan Mahadev*, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 216; *Ahmad Ali v. Najabat Khan*, I. L. R. 18 All. 65; and *Madhavi v. Kulu*, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 264, followed. *Bishnath Singh v. Bisheshar Singh*, All. Weekly Notes (1891) 34, referred to. CHAJJU v. UMRAO SINGH

I. L. R. 22 All. 386

92. ———— *Decision in previous suit in which parties were co-defendants, when binding—Such decision not binding when one defendant was only a nominal party.* A judgment in a previous suit is not *res judicata* as between co-defendants, so as to bar a subsequent suit brought by one of them, unless there was a conflict of interest between them and the judgment determines the real

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*8. PARTIES—*contd.*(e) CO-DEFENDANTS—*concl'd.*

rights and obligations of the defendants *inter se*. Such previous judgment is not *res judicata* when the plaintiff in the subsequent suit was only a nominal party in the prior suit. *BALAMBHAT v. NARAYANBHAT* (1900) . . . I. L. R. 25 Bom. 74

93. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13.—Res judicata between co-defendants.* In a suit for a declaration of title to certain property, when the Court makes a declaration in favour of the plaintiff as to a certain share of the property, and a declaration as to certain other shares in favour of some of the defendants, the latter declaration is not binding on the other defendants. *RAJ NARAIN v. KHOBDARI RAI* (1901) 5 C. W. N. 724

94. ———— *Co-defendants—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13.—“Former suit”—“Between the same parties”—Judgment—Contribution, right to, as between purchasers of mortgaged properties—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) ss. 56, 81, 82—Marshalling—Inverse order, rule of.* There is nothing in s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure to prevent an issue raised and decided as between co-defendants in a former suit from being *res judicata* in a subsequent suit in which they are arrayed as plaintiff and defendant; but the issue raised in the former suit must directly and substantially involve the matter in issue in the subsequent suit. *Cottingham v. Earl of Shresbury*, 2 *Hare* 627; *Ramchandra Narayan v. Narayan Mahadev*, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 216; *Ahmad Ali v. Najabat Khan*, I. L. R. 18 All. 65; and *Sheikh Khoorshed Hossein v. Nubbee Fatima*, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 551, followed. To decide whether a question was determined by the decree in a former suit, it is open to the Court to refer to the judgment on which the decree was based. *Kali Krishna Tagore v. Secretary of State for India*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 173, and *Jagajit Singh v. Sarabjit Singh*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 173, followed. When two properties X and Y are mortgaged to secure one debt and subsequent to the mortgage the property X is purchased by A and then the property Y by B, if the entire mortgage debt is satisfied by the sale to A of the property Y in execution of the mortgage decree, B is entitled to contribution against A in proportion to the values of the properties X and Y; and the rule of inverse order does not apply to such a case. A claim for contribution is an equitable claim, and in determining the amount the Court must take an equitable view of all the circumstances and must not give effect to what is only an apparent and not the real state of things. *MAGNIRAM v. MEHDI HOSSEIN KHAN* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 95

## (f) DIFFERENT PARTIES.

95. ———— *Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 106—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13.* Plaintiffs initiated proceedings under s. 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act,



RES JUDICATA—*concl'd.*8. PARTIES—*concl'd.*(f) DIFFERENT PARTIES—*concl'd.*

against the landlord and the defendants Nos. 2 to 9, who claimed to be rival tenants of the land, to have their names recorded as tenants in the Settlement proceedings. The Settlement-officer held that the plaintiffs were the tenants, and made an order in their favour. On appeal by defendants Nos. 2 to 9, and not by the landlords, the Special Judge reversed the decision and ordered that the names of defendants Nos. 2 to 9, who he held were the tenants be registered. The plaintiffs thereupon brought the present suit, to have their rights declared as tenants of the land. *Held*, that, the previous decision of the Special Judge not having been a decision between the parties, *i.e.*, the tenants on the one hand and the landlord on the other, it could not operate as *res judicata* in the present suit. **MOHUNT JAGANNATH RAMANUJ DAS v. CHANDRA KUMAR BOSE (1900)** . . . . . **5 C. W. N. 421**

## 9. COMPETENT COURT.

## (a) GENERAL CASES.

## 1. ——— Court without jurisdiction

—*Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 13.* The decision of a Court, in order to be conclusive in another Court, must have been that of a Court which would have had jurisdiction to decide the question raised in the subsequent suit in which the decision is given in evidence as conclusive. The words "Court of competent jurisdiction," used in s. 13 of the Court of Civil Procedure, include the meaning that the first Court must not have been precluded by the pecuniary limit of its jurisdiction from deciding the question raised in the other. The two Courts must exercise such concurrent jurisdiction in regard to the pecuniary limit of their powers that the subject-matter of the second suit would not have been beyond the powers of the Court which disposed of the prior one. The defence made to a suit on a bond for R12,000 and interest thereon, in a Court having no pecuniary limit of jurisdiction, was that in a prior suit for R1,665, balance of interest, brought in a Court with power to try suits not exceeding R5,000 in value, the principal sum due on that bond had been decided to be R4,790. *Held*, that the issue as to the amount of principal due on the bond had not been heard and finally decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction within the meaning of s. 13. **MISIR RAGHO BARDIAL v. SHEO BAKSH SINGH**

**I. L. R. 9 Calc. 439 : 12 C. L. R. 520**  
**L. R. 9 I. A. 197**

2. ——— *Act VIII of 1859,*

s. 2—*Act X of 1877, s. 13—Cross-appeal—Practice.* The decision in a suit in order to be final and conclusive as *res judicata* upon an issue raised in another suit must be the decision of a Court which would have had jurisdiction to decide the question raised in the subsequent suit in which the prior decision is given in evidence as conclusive. This

RES JUDICATA—*cont'd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*cont'd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*cont'd.*

proposition, stated in the judgment in *Edun v. Bechun*, 8 W. R. 175, and affirmed by the Judicial Committee in *Misir Raghobardial v. Sheo Baksh Singh*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 439, is applicable equally to cases under Act VIII of 1859, s. 2 (as supplemented by the general law), and to cases under the more complete enactment in Act X of 1877, s. 13, which is not to be construed as having altered the former law. A suit was brought in the Court of a Subordinate Judge by a Hindu against the widow of a deceased brother, claiming his property by right of survivorship, the issue being whether, at the death of the latter, the ownership of the brothers was joint or separate. An order under Act XXVII of 1860, granting a certificate to the widow, did not, on the above issue, operate as *res judicata* in the widow's favour, being a proceeding of representation, and not otherwise of title. *Held*, also, that a decision of the same issue in a Munsif's Court in a rent suit brought by the widow, the surviving brother, on his application, having been made a party defendant under s. 73 of Act VIII of 1859, did not constitute *res judicata* in her favour. **Krishna Behari Roy v. Brajeswari Chowdhurani**, L. R. 2 I. A. 283, referred to and followed. *Held*, also, that the brother having appealed against a decree dismissing the suit as *res judicata* (the judgment which that decree followed having nevertheless found that the widow was disentitled by reason of the brothers having been in fact joint in estate), the widow could have supported the decree without filing a cross-appeal as to that finding on the ground that the decree had been rightly made (though not for the reason given) in her favour. **RUN BAHADUR SINGH v. LUCHO KOER**. I. L. R. 11 Calc. 301 : L. R. 12 I. A. 23

Reversing as far as the question of *res judicata* was concerned, the decision of the High Court in **RUN BAHADUR SINGH v. LUCHO KOER**

**I. L. R. 6 Calc. 406 : 7 C. L. R. 251**

3. ——— Courts without concurrent jurisdiction—*Court not having jurisdiction to decide question of title.* Where the Court trying the case, in which the judgment is set up as *res judicata*, has not concurrent jurisdiction with the Court trying the subsequent case, the principle of *res judicata* cannot apply. So the judgment in a suit before the Deputy Collector which decides merely questions of rent—in other words a rent-suit—pronounced by a Court not having jurisdiction to decide the question of title to the property itself cannot be regarded as amounting to *res judicata* in a subsequent suit brought to decide the question of title to that property. **Run Bahadoor v. Lucho Koer**, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 301 : L. R. 12 I. A. 23, followed. **KHETTER KRISTO MITTER v. DINENDRA NARAIN ROY**

**3 C. W. N. 202**

4. ——— Court without power to make final decision—*Issue decided in a suit not subject to appeal—Same issue raised in a subsequent suit subject to appeal—Small Cause Court suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—*



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

*Meaning of the words "competent to try such subsequent suit."* In 1879 the plaintiff brought a suit against the defendants to recover R119 which he alleged had been wrongfully exacted from him by the defendants as enhanced rent of certain land in his occupation. He claimed to be owner of the land subject to a quit-rent payable to the defendants. The defendants denied his ownership, and asserted their right to levy the enhanced rent. The lower Court held that the defendants were entitled to the enhanced rent, and dismissed the plaintiff's claim, and the decree was confirmed on appeal by the District Court. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court, which held that the plaintiff's claim being for an amount less than R500 and within the cognizance of a Court of Small Causes, no second appeal lay. In 1883 the plaintiff brought the present suit in the District Court to recover from the defendants the sum of R689 alleged to have been wrongfully exacted from him by the defendants as enhanced rent of the land in question. He made the same allegations as in the former suit. The District Judge dismissed the suit, holding it to be *res judicata*. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court. *Held*, that, although the material question in both suits was the same—*viz.*, as to the defendant's right to enhance the plaintiff's rent,—yet the decision of the District Court upon that point in the previous suit was not *res judicata* so as to prevent the question being again raised between the parties. From the decision in the former suit there was no appeal by reason of the suit being one for an amount less than R500. Had that suit been for a larger amount, the decision of the District Court would have been subject to an appeal to the High Court. It could not have been intended by the Legislature that a decision should acquire a conclusive importance from the fact of its being made in a suit for a small amount which it could not have had if the amount was larger. The former decision could not be appealed against to the High Court, and thus, though the District Court which gave that decision was in one sense "competent to try" the second suit, and did try it, yet it was not competent to try the second suit with final effect, as it had tried the earlier one. In s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) the words "competent to try such subsequent suit or issue" must mean "competent to try the suit or issue with conclusive effect." The District Court could not in the present suit have tried with conclusive effect, and disposed of the issue tried in the first suit, and hence the prior decision was not *res judicata*. *BHOLABHAI v. ADEsang. BHOLABHAI v. COLLECTOR OF KAIRA* I. L. R. 9 Bom. 75

5. ———— *Court not of competent jurisdiction.* A brought a suit against B for R3,152, that is, for one instalment due under a bond. The suit was heard and decided by a Subordinate Judge of second class, who had been deputed to assist a Subordinate Judge of the first

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

class. A obtained a decree for the amount claimed. A then brought a second suit against B in the Court of a Subordinate Judge of the first class to recover R6,525, being the amount of two instalments due under the bond. In this suit B raised the same contentions as in the former suit. *Held*, that the decision in the first suit did not operate as *res judicata* in the second suit, as the Court that tried the first suit had no jurisdiction to try the second suit. *RAMDAYAL v. JANKIDAS* I. L. R. 24 Bom. 456

6. ———— *Decision in superior Court of suit cognizable by inferior Court—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 13.* In a suit for possession of immoveable property before the Subordinate Judge, it was objected that the suit ought to have been instituted before the Munsif, the value of the property being less than R1,000. An issue having been framed on this point, other issues were also framed as to the sanity of the plaintiff, his having had possession of the property, and evidence upon all the issues was gone into. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit on the first issue, but expressed his opinion that the other issues ought also to have been decided against the plaintiff. In a subsequent suit by the plaintiff for the same relief in the Court of the Munsif. *Held*, that the questions depending on the issues raised, other than the issues as to the valuation of the suit, were not *res judicata*. *RAM GOBIND JHA v. MUNGAR RAM CHOWDHRY* 13 C. L. R. 83

7. ———— *Powers of Court deciding suit—Decision on question of title—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 13.* When a question of title has to be, and is, decided by a Court of competent jurisdiction with reference to the value of the subject-matter in dispute, such decision, or the ultimate decision upon the appeal from such decision is final, and the question of title becomes *res judicata* as between the parties to the suit, although it may have the effect of determining the title to an estate or estates the value of which exceeds the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit was instituted. *Per WHITE, J.*—In considering, on the hearing of an appeal, the competency of a Court for the purpose of deciding upon a question of *res judicata*, the powers of the Court in which the suit was instituted, and not those of the Court in which the suit was decided on appeal, must be looked to. *TOPONIDHEE DHIRJ GIR GOSAIN v. SREEPUTTY SAHANEE* I. L. R. 5 Calc. 832: 6 C. L. R. 305

8. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13—Decree of competent Court.* In 1875 P sued in Munsif's Court to eject a tenant from a house and to recover arrears of rent. S intervened and claimed the house under a deed of gift. The value of the property comprised in the deed of gift exceeded the limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsif's Court. The suit was dismissed, but on appeal the claim of S under the deed of gift was adjudicated upon and rejected, and P obtained a



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

decree for the land. In 1882 *S* sued *P* to recover all the property comprised in the deed of gift. *Held*, that *S* was estopped by the decree in the former suit from claiming the house. It was contended by *P* that the deed of gift was invalid. *Held*, that, as to validity of the deed of gift, the decree of the Munsif's Court was not the decree of a competent Court within the meaning of s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, and therefore that *S* was not estopped from showing that the deed was valid and claiming the rest of the property comprised therein. *PATHUMA v. SALIMAMMA*  
I. L. R. 8 Mad. 83

9. ——— Jurisdiction of Court at time suit is brought—*Decision of Munsif—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13.* In a suit for malikana the issue between the parties substantially raises the question of the proprietary right to the estate in respect of which the malikana is claimed; and when the question of the proprietary right has been decided in a previous suit between the same parties, a subsequent suit for malikana will be barred as *res judicata*. The fact that the previous suit had been brought in a Munsif's Court, whereas the present suit was brought before a Subordinate Judge did not affect the question, inasmuch as the property was the same, and it was not shown that the present suit, if brought in 1860, would not have been within the jurisdiction of the Munsif, nor was it alleged that the suit in 1860 was beyond his jurisdiction. In s. 13 of Act XIV of 1882 the words "in a Court of jurisdiction competent to try such subsequent suit" refer to the jurisdiction of the Courts at the time the first suit is brought. Thus, when the first suit is within the jurisdiction of a Munsif, and the subsequent suit, by reason of an increase in value of the property, is beyond his jurisdiction, such subsequent suit would nevertheless be barred, inasmuch as, if the subsequent suit had been brought at the time when the first suit was brought, the Munsif would have been competent to try it. *GOPI NATH CHOBEY v. BHUGWAT PERSHAD* . . . I. L. R. 10 Calc. 697

10. ——— Decision of Deputy Collector—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882 s. 13—Meaning of the words "Court of jurisdiction competent to try such subsequent suit."* The words of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, "in a Court of jurisdiction competent to try such subsequent suit," refer to the jurisdiction of the Court at the time when the first suit was brought. Where therefore a suit was brought and decided in 1867 in the Court of a Deputy Collector, that Court being at the time of suit the only Court competent to try suits of the nature of the one brought, and subsequently a second suit, regarding the same subject and between some of the same parties and the representatives of others, was brought in 1881 in the Court of a Munsif, which latter suit, if it had been brought in 1867, would have been cognizable by a Deputy Collector alone:

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

—*Held*, that the decision of the Deputy Collector was a bar to the second suit under s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. The principle in *Gopinath Chobey v. Bhugwat Pershad*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 697, approved. *RUGHUNATH PANJAH v. ISSUR CHUNDER CHOWDHRY* . . . I. L. R. 11 Calc. 153

11. ——— Former judgment in Court without jurisdiction—*Property situate out of jurisdiction.* *Held*, that the judgment of the Lucknow Civil Court, in a suit for property situate within the jurisdiction of that Court, was no bar to a subsequent suit in respect to property situate at Allahabad. There was no splitting of the claim, inasmuch as the former suit was for the entire property, situate in Lucknow and Allahabad, though leave was not obtained to sue in the Lucknow Court. *THAKOOR PERSHAD v. KALIKA PERSHAD*  
2 Agra 104

12. ——— Property situate out of jurisdiction—*Suit for land.* *A* brought a suit in the Court of *S* against *B* for certain land as being an accretion to an estate in the district of *S*. *B* claimed it as being part of his estate in the district of *G*, to which district he alleged the land had, in a former decision, been found to belong. The Court of *S* held that the land was an accretion to *A*'s estate in the district of *S*. In a subsequent suit brought by *B* in the Court of *G* against *A* for the land to which the subject of the former suit had been found to be an accretion:—*Held*, that the holding in the former suit necessarily decided that the land claimed by *B* was in the district of *S*, and therefore that the Court of *G*, under Act VIII of 1859, s. 14, had no jurisdiction. *PAHALWAN SINGH v. MAHESSUR BUKSH SINGH*  
12 B. L. R. P. C. 391: 18 W. R. 182

13. ——— Decree in claim for rent—*Subsequent suit to remove attachment—Decision by Court without jurisdiction.* Where a Court, without jurisdiction, decreed a claim by a landholder for arrears of enhanced rent, and the tenant subsequently sued to remove an attachment based on the decree, it was held that the decree could not be regarded as binding on the parties, and the second suit should have been tried and disposed of on its merits. *KALKA PARSHAD v. KANHAYA SINGH* . . . 7 N. W. 99

14. ——— Court of Rajah of Independent Tipperah. The Court of the Rajah of Independent Tipperah was not a competent Court within the meaning of s. 2, Act VIII of 1859. *MAHOMED AHMED v. ALIBUR GAZEE* 10 W. R. 337

15. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—*Competent Court.* The Tipperah Rajah's Court was a Court of competent jurisdiction within the meaning of s. 2, Act VIII of 1859, A decision given there bars a fresh suit in respect of the same matter in a British Court. *MODHOO BIBEE v. RAM MANICKO DEY* . . . 6 W. R. Civ. Ref. 31



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

16. ——— Agent to Governor-General, Court of—*Beng. Reg. XIII of 1833, s. 2—Order of Agent previous to the Regulation.* By Regulation XIII of 1833, s. 2, the Courts of Dewanny Adawlut of Zillahs Ramghur and Jungle Mehals were abolished. By the 4th section the administration of civil and criminal justice was vested in an officer appointed by the Governor General in Council, to be denominated Agent to the Governor General. By the 5th section authority was conferred on the Governor General to determine in Council, *inter alia*, "to what extent the decision of the Agent in civil suits shall be final." In 1834, by an order of the Governor General, it was ordered that no appeal should lie from the orders of the Agent to the Sudder Court. *Held*, that an order of an Agent within the districts to which the Regulation applied, made previous to the passing of the Regulation, declaring A to be the rightful heir of B, was not affected by the Regulation, and was not judicial in its nature; and that therefore, in a subsequent suit relating to the inheritance to the same property, the heir of A could not set up the order as conclusive. *BINODE KOOMAREE v. PURDHAN GOPAL*

Marsh. 80: W. R. F. B. 26: 1 Hay 148

17. ——— Joint contract—*Liability of partners—Joint liability—Judgment recovered against one partner—Judgment of a foreign Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 13 and 14—Consent decree.* The defendants were partners trading in the name of Vishnuram Gopinath and Company. On 6th July 1895, at Ahmedabad the first defendant borrowed from the plaintiff, for the purposes of the partnership business a sum of R10,000 and passed a khata in the name of his firm. On 25th April 1896, at Baroda he passed another agreement to plaintiff, under which the plaintiff was to recover the debt due to him from the partners jointly and severally. On 2nd October 1896, plaintiff obtained a decree on an award against the first defendant in the Civil Court at Baroda for R13,909-4-0, and in execution of this decree he recovered a sum of R7,000. In 1897 plaintiff filed this suit in the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge at Ahmedabad to recover the balance, *viz.*, R6,909-4-0, from all the partners (defendants Nos. 1 to 8). Defendants Nos. 6 to 8 resided in Baroda territory, the rest in British India. Defendants Nos. 2, 3, and 4 defended the suit. The rest did not appear. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit, holding, on the authority of *King v. Hoare, 13 M. & W. 491*, that the judgment of the Baroda Court against one partner (the first defendant) was a bar to a fresh suit against the other partners on the same cause of action. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court. *Held*, that the principle of *King v. Hoare* did not apply, and that the suit was not barred. The Baroda Court had no jurisdiction over the defendants, who were British subjects

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

residing in British territory. The judgment of the Baroda Court was therefore no bar to the present suit under s. 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *LAKSHMIN SHANKAR DEVSHANKAR v. VISHNURAM*

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 77

18. ——— Foreign Court—*Judgment of a Native Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13, expl. VI—Meaning of the words "a Court of jurisdiction competent to try such subsequent suit."* The words in s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), "a Court of jurisdiction competent to try such subsequent suit," mean a Court having concurrent jurisdiction with the Court trying the subsequent suit, whether as regards the pecuniary limit of its jurisdiction, or the subject-matter of the suit, to try it with conclusive effect. Reading expl. VI with the earlier part of s. 13, the term "Court of competent jurisdiction" includes a foreign competent Court. The plaintiff sued as the adopted son of O to recover certain property in British territory. The defendants disputed the plaintiff's adoption. The plaintiff relied on a decree of a Native Court which he had obtained against defendant No. 2 in a suit for possession of certain other property belonging to O and situate within the territorial jurisdiction of the Native Court. In that suit the question of plaintiff's adoption had been raised and decided in plaintiff's favour. In the present suit both the lower Courts, without attaching any weight to this decree of the Native Court, held that the plaintiff's adoption was not proved, and dismissed the suit. *Held*, on second appeal, that the question of plaintiff's adoption was *res judicata* as between him and defendant No. 2, the judgment of the Native Court being one on the merits and conclusive between the parties within the territory of the Native State. *BABABHAT v. NARHARBHAT*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 224

19. ——— Pecuniary valuation of suit—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 13.* A suit for two declarations filed in a Subordinate Court was valued by the plaintiffs at a sum in excess of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Munsif. It was pleaded that the matter in dispute was *res judicata* by reason of decrees passed in District Munsif's Courts. No objection was taken in the Subordinate Court to the valuation of the suit. *Held*, that the plea of *res judicata* failed. *GANAPATI v. CHATHU*

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 223

20. ——— Finality of order—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 241.* S S brought a suit under a mortgage-bond, making R S, a subsequent incumbrancer, a defendant, and obtained a decree for a sale of the whole of the mortgaged premises. After the decree, a compromise was effected between all the parties, with the exception of R S, by the terms of which, in consideration of the judgment-debtors (mortgagors) undertaking to do certain acts, S S promised to execute his decree against



**RES JUDICATA—contd.****9. COMPETENT COURT—contd.****(a) GENERAL CASES—contd.**

only a 3 annas 12 dams share of the mortgaged premises. The judgment-debtors (mortgagors) having failed to carry out the compromise, *S S* applied for a sale of the whole of the mortgaged premises, but on the petition of *R S* setting out the terms of the compromise to which he was no party, the Subordinate Judge, by an order of the 7th September 1885, held that under the agreement *S S* was entitled to sell only a 3 annas 12 dams share of the mortgaged premises, which was accordingly directed to be sold. That order was not appealed against, but subsequently, in March 1886, *S S* made a fresh application for a sale of the remainder of the premises, *R S* objecting. *Held*, that the order of the 7th September was one which the Court was competent to make under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure and by reason of that order not being appealed it became final. *BASUDEO NARAIN SINGH v. SEOLJOY SINGH*. I. L. R. 14 Cal. 640

**21. — Separate suit on disallowance of objection to execution—Evidence Act, s. 44.** In execution of decree the defendant, who was sued as the representative of her deceased brother objected under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the attachment of certain lands to which she set up independent title. The objection was disallowed, and the land was sold. She then sued the execution-purchaser to set aside the Court sale, and obtained a decree, against which no appeal was preferred. She now sued for possession. *Held*, that, as against the execution-purchaser, the decree in the former suit was *res judicata* and therefore final. *Per Curiam*: The words "not competent" in s. 44 of the Evidence Act refer to a Court acting without jurisdiction. *KETILAMMA v. KELAPPAN*

I. L. R. 12 Mad. 228

**22. — "Court of competent jurisdiction"—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 13, 98, 103—Landlord and tenant—Suit for damages against lessor—Joinder of one of two co-lessees as defendant—Suit dismissed against such lessee.** In 1883 *A*, the trustee of a certain charity, executed in favour of *X* and *Y* an agricultural lease for nine years and delivered over possession of the lands comprised in it, being part of the trust property. The lease contained a provision that it should be cancelled on default being made in payment of the rent and kist, and it contained no express covenant for quiet enjoyment. In 1887 default was made in payment of the rent and kist. *A* thereupon cancelled the lease and sued *X* and *Y* in a subordinate Court and obtained a decree for the arrear, the total amount of his claim being R2,807. In that suit *X* alleged that *Y* was merely a name lender for *A*, who desired to benefit himself at the expense of the charity, and also that certain raiyats setting up a false claim had evicted *X* from the lands demised at the instigation of *A*, who had subsequently sought unsuccessfully to obtain further advantages for himself. The Subordinate Judge framed an issue on each of these allegations and recorded findings

**RES JUDICATA—contd.****9. COMPETENT COURT—contd.****(a) GENERAL CASES—contd.**

in the negative. In the same year *X* filed a suit for damages for breach of contract against *A* and *Y* in the High Court, repeating in his plaint the above allegations. When that suit came on for hearing, it was dismissed for default, *Y* being the only party who appeared. *X* now sued *A* again on the same cause of action, making the same allegations. *Y* was subsequently brought on the record as being a necessary party to the suit, being joined as second defendant, but he applied to be and was struck off the record on the ground that the dismissal of the former suit in the High Court was final as against him. *Held*, that the matters put in issue in the subordinate Court were not *res judicata* by reason of the decision of that Court; and that the plaint disclosed a good cause of action against the lessor. *VITHILINGA PADAYACHI v. VITHILINGA MUDALI*

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 111

**23. — Suit against a Sovereign Prince—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), ss. 13, 433.** A suit for a declaration of the title of the plaintiffs' tarwad to certain land was filed in a District Court against the Maharaja of Cochin and others, including the trustees of a devasom. It appeared that the same land was the subject of a suit instituted in a subordinate Court on the 6th August 1877, to which the representatives of both the plaintiffs' tarwad and the devasom were parties, and that the land was then found to be the property of the devasom, and a decree was passed accordingly. It was contended that the present claim was not *res judicata* by reason of that decree, because, under the provisions of Act X of 1877, s. 433, which came into operation during the pendency of that suit, no Sovereign Prince could be sued in any Court subordinate to a District Court, and the Court which passed that decree was not therefore "a Court of jurisdiction competent to try" the present suit within the meaning of Civil Procedure Code, s. 13. *Held*, that, although these words, must be taken to refer to the jurisdiction of the Court at the time the suit was heard and determined, yet the present claim was *res judicata*, since the title to the land was a matter in issue within the cognizance of the Subordinate Judge and was adjudicated on by him. *KUNJI AMMA v. RAMAN MENON*. I. L. R. 15 Mad. 494

**24. — Munsif, jurisdiction of—Valuation of suit—Evidence Act, s. 44—Power of guardian to alienate land—Compromise of litigation.** In 1882 the daughter of a deceased Hindu brought a suit in the Court of a District Munsif for a declaration that the defendant was not the adopted son of her father (deceased) as he claimed to be. It was found that the alleged adoption was valid, and the suit was dismissed. The then defendant now brought in 1889 a suit in the same Court to recover possession of land from the then plaintiff alleging that it had been wrongfully transferred to her by way of gift by his adoptive mother. The defendant denied the adoption and asserted



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

that the transfer was valid as having taken place in accordance with an arrangement made by her father in his lifetime. It was admitted that the value of the whole property, to which the plaintiff was entitled by virtue of his adoption, if it was a valid adoption, exceeded R2,500. The Court of first appeal held that the question of the adoption was not *res judicata*, and observed that the transfer to the defendant was apparently made to induce her to abandon her litigation as to the adoption. *Held*, that the defendant was not at liberty to question the plaintiff's adoption, that matter being *res judicata*, and that the Court should try whether the transfer was made *bona fide* by the plaintiff's mother as his guardian for his benefit. *VENKATARAGHAVA v. RANGAMMA*

I. L. R. 15 Mad. 498

25. ———— *Decision in suit of the nature of Small Cause suit.* Decisions in previous suits which were in the nature of Small Cause suits, and in which there was no right of second appeal, held not to operate as *res judicata*. *Bholabhai v. Adesang*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 75, followed. *GOVIND v. DHONDBARAV* I. L. R. 15 Bom. 104

26. ———— *Munsif, jurisdiction of—Resistance to execution of decree for possession—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 13, 331.* The plaintiff, having obtained a decree for possession of certain land, applied for execution by delivery of possession; whereupon a third party filed an objection in the Munsif's Court that he held a prior decree for possession of the same land, and that therefore the plaintiff's decree could not be executed. This objection was allowed, and the plaintiff then sued for establishment of his right to possession of the land jointly with the objector, making the former judgment-debtor and the objector defendants to the suit. The Subordinate Judge in first appeal held that the Munsif had acted under s. 331 of the Code and applying s. 13 of the Code dismissed the suit. *Held*, on appeal, that under the circumstances the Munsif had no jurisdiction to act under s. 331, and therefore his order was not a *res judicata* in the proceedings. *MAHABIR PRASAD v. PARMA*

I. L. R. 14 All. 417

27. ———— *Suit by a urulan against an agent of a devasom—Repudiation of agency—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Munsif, jurisdiction of.* In 1873 a predecessor of the plaintiff claiming to be the urula of a devasom brought a suit in a District Munsif's Court against the present defendant, whom he alleged to be an agent to the devasom, and the defendant disputed the uraima right of the plaintiff and denied that he had been appointed agent as alleged. Issues as to both of these matters were decided in favour of the defendant, and the suit was dismissed in 1874. A suit was now brought in 1890 for a declaration of the plaintiff's title as urulan, and to

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

recover from the defendant as such agent property of a value which exceeded the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of a District Munsif, the suit being therefore instituted in the Subordinate Judge's Court. *Semble*: The decision in the prior suit did not constitute a bar to the present suit on the ground of *res judicata*. *SANKARAN v. KRISHNA*

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 456

28. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 13 and 43—Suit by mortgagee for personal remedy in one Court—Subsequent suit against mortgaged property in another Court—Latter suit not within jurisdiction of former Court—Munsif, jurisdiction of—Transfer of Property Act, s. 99.* A bond, whereby certain immoveable property was hypothecated as security for a debt, was executed at the place of residence of the obligor, which was within the jurisdiction of a Court other than that within the jurisdiction of which the property hypothecated was situate. The obligee brought a suit in the former Court to recover the principal and interest due on the bond against the obligor personally, on the covenant to pay contained in the bond, and prayed also for sale of the property hypothecated. That Court dismissed that suit so far as it related to the property, and also so far as the claim for principal was concerned, but awarded the plaintiff the interest claimed against the defendant personally. Subsequently the obligee brought a suit in the Court within the jurisdiction of which the property was situate for recovery of the principal money due on the bond by sale of the hypothecated property. *Held*, that the latter suit was not barred by reason of the former suit, either under s. 13 or under s. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. *NARASINGA RAU v. VENKATANARAYANA*

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 481

29. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13.* The term "competent jurisdiction" in s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code has regard to the pecuniary limit as well as to the subject-matter. There is no authority for the general proposition that the competency of one Court as compared with another is affected by the circumstance that in the one case an appeal lies in the first instance to the District Court and in the other directly to the High Court. *Misir Raghobardial v. Sheo Buksh Singh*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 439, cited and followed. *Vithilinga Padayachi v. Vithilinga Mudali*, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 111, qualified. *SUBHAMMAL v. HUDDLESTON* I. L. R. 17 Mad. 273

30. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13—"Court of jurisdiction competent to try such subsequent suit."* The words "a Court of jurisdiction competent to try," as used in s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, mean a Court having jurisdiction not only as to the nature, but also as to the amount of the suit. *Misir Raghobardial v. Sheo Bakhsh Singh*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 439: I. L. R. 9 I. A. 197, referred to. *HASSU v. RAM KUMAR SINGH* I. L. R. 16 All. 183



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

31. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13—Jurisdiction of Munsif.* Defendants, against whom the District Munsif had wrongly passed a decree in 1877 in a suit in a mortgage of certain land, were held to be not precluded from the right to have their shares in the land exonerated in a subsequent suit relating to the same mortgage which the District Munsif has no jurisdiction to try. *BADI BIBI SAHIBAL v. SAMI PILLAI* I. L. R. 18 Mad. 257

32. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13.* In a suit for arrears of rent brought against A in a Munsif's Court, B intervened as a defendant, alleging that he, and not A, was the true tenant in possession. B succeeded in the first Court, but on appeal it was decided that B had no right in or possession of the tenure. In a second suit for arrears of rent brought against A, the tenure was sold in execution of decree, and the landlords purchased and took possession of it. B brought the present suit (valued at more than R1,000) in the Court of the Subordinate Judge for declaration of his right and recovery of possession. The lower Court of appeal held that the decision in the former suit, in which B intervened, operated as *res judicata* upon the question of title raised in the present suit, and in support of that decision it was contended that the word "suit" in s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code included an appeal, and that, as the District Judge who tried the appeal in the former suit had jurisdiction to try the present suit and it was the decision of that Court which was pleaded in bar, the defence on the ground of *res judicata* was good and valid, *Held*, that the contention was not right, and the present suit was not barred by *res judicata*, the former suit having been brought in a Court which was not a Court of jurisdiction competent to try the present suit. *Run Bahadur Singh v. Lucho Koer*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 301; L. R. 12 I. A. 23, followed. *Misir Raghobardial v. Sheo Baksh Singh*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 439; L. R. 9 I. A. 197; *Toponidhee Dhirji Gir Gossain v. Sreeputty Sahane*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 822; *Pathuma v. Salimamma*, I. L. R. 8 Mad. 83, referred to. *BHARASI LAL CHOWDHRY v. SARAT CHUNDER DASS*

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 415

33. ———— *Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Issue decided in a previous suit not subject to second appeal—Same issue raised in a subsequent suit subject to appeal.* In a previous suit for rent valued at less than R100 by the plaintiff against the defendants, one of the questions raised was, in how many instalments the rent was payable and it was held that it was not payable in instalments. In a subsequent suit for rent valued at more than R100 between the same parties, the question of instalment was again raised, as the plaintiffs claimed the rent to be payable in four instalments. The defendants *inter alia* pleaded that the question as to instalment was barred as *res*

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*contd.*

*judicata.* The Munsif held that it was so barred. On appeal the Subordinate Judge reversed the decision of the Munsif. On a second appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, that the judgment in the previous suit operated as *res judicata*, notwithstanding that no second appeal was allowed by law in that suit. *Vithilinga Padayachi v. Vithilinga Mudali*, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 111, and *Bhola Bhai v. Adesang*, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 78, dissented from. *Misir Raghobardial v. Sheo Baksh Singh*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 439; L. R. 9 I. A. 97; *Edun v. Bechun*, 8 W. R. 175, distinguished. *David v. Grish Chunder Guja*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 183, referred to. *RAI CHARAN GHOSE v. KUMUD MOHUN DUTT CHOWDHRY*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 571  
2 C. W. N. 297

34. ———— *Court competent to try suit.* The plea of *res judicata* should be given effect to if the Court which passed the decree in the first suit is a Court of jurisdiction competent to try the subsequent suit, whenever its inability to entertain the subsequent suit arises, not from incompetence, but from the existence of another Court with preferential jurisdiction. *GHULAPA v. RAGEVENDRA* (1904) . . . I. L. R. 28 Bom. 338

35. ———— *Previous suit in Munsif's Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Suit in Subordinate Court—Valuation of a suit for declaration as to membership of tarwad—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 42.* A suit was brought in the Court of a Subordinate Judge for a declaration that the plaintiffs and defendants therein had no community of interest, and were not members of a *tarwad* having joint property. The property of the *tarwad* was valued by plaintiffs at R3,000, and this was held to be a true valuation, but it appeared that the value of the plaintiffs' interest in it was R2,000 only. In a previous suit between the parties, which had been brought in the Court of a District Munsif it had been held that the parties belonged to the same family; and this finding had been upheld on appeal. Plaintiffs did not ask, by way of further relief, for possession of a portion of the property, which was in the enjoyment of the defendants. *Held*, that the suit was barred, both as *res judicata*, and by s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. The value of a suit for declaration that certain persons are or are not members of a *tarwad* is the value of the share of the *tarwad* property which would be allotted to them if a partition were made by common consent. *PANGA v. UNNIKUTTI* (1900) . . . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 275

36. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Competency of Court to try the previous and the subsequent suit—Concurrent jurisdiction.* Under the present Code of Civil Procedure, in order to establish the plea of *res judicata*, it has to be shown that the Court of concurrent jurisdiction, which decided the former suit, was a Court of jurisdiction competent to try



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(a) GENERAL CASES—*concl.*

the subsequent suit. *Topondihee Dhirj Gir Gosain v. Sreeputty Sahanee*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 832, distinguished. *B* sold a certain property to *C*; *A* brought a suit against *B*, *C* and others in the Court of the Munsif, for recovery of possession of property so conveyed, and to have the *kobala* granted by *B* to his vendee set aside; the suit was decreed in favour of *A* on the ground that *B* had no share in the disputed land and that no relationship existed between *A* and *B*. In a subsequent suit brought by *B* in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, for a declaration of his title to an eight annas share in a certain property a portion of which was covered by the aforesaid *kobala*, and for joint possession thereof with *A*, the defence was that the suit was barred by *res judicata*, or at least it was so with respect to that portion of the disputed property, which was the subject-matter of the previous litigation. *Held*, that the suit was not so barred. *Bhugwanbhatti Chowdhurani v. A. H. Forbes*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 78, distinguished. *SHIBO RAUT v. BABAN RAUT* (1908) I. L. R. 35 Calc. 353 s.c. 12 C. W. N. 359

## (b) SMALL CAUSE COURT CASES.

37. ——— Question of title—Decree of Small Cause Court. A decree passed in a suit in Small Cause Court in which a question of title is incidentally dealt with is not a bar to a suit for a general declaration of title. *KHANDU VALAD KHRU v. TATIA VALAD VITHOBA* . . . 8 Bom. A. C. 23

38. ——— Suit for rent of the nature cognizable in a Small Cause Court—Determination of title. The incidental determination of an issue of title in a suit for rent of the nature cognizable in a Court of Small Causes does not finally estop the parties to such suit from raising the same issue in a suit brought to try the title. *INAYAT KHAN v. RAHMAT BIBI* I. L. R. 2 All. 97

*CHUNDER NARAIN MOZOOMDAR v. PRITHANUND ASRUM* . . . 12 W. R. 290

39. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 13—Question of title. *Per INNES, J.* The decree of a Small Cause Court in a case where a question of title is raised incidentally is no bar to a suit upon the title under s. 13, expl. II of the Civil Procedure Code, because the Small Causes Court is not competent to pass a decree upon the title. *MANAPPA MUDALI v. MCCARTHY* I. L. R. 3 Mad. 192

40. ——— Decree for money due on bond—Subsequent suit in which execution and *bona fides* of bond are contested. In a suit to enforce a lien created by a mortgage-bond on property which was sold by the mortgagor (*R*) ten months later to the defendant, the lower Appellate Court held that the defendant, as standing in his vendor's shoes, was concluded by a judgment obtained in the Small Cause Court by the plaintiff against *R*

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(b) SMALL CAUSE COURT CASES—*contd.*

a month after the date of the bond. *Held*, that, as the Small Cause Court could not have jurisdiction to decide as to the lien, its decree would only be relevant as showing that the defendants at the time owed the money to the plaintiff, and that it would be open to the defendant to question the execution and *bona fides* of the bond as affecting the property which he had taken by conveyance. *POHOLI MULLICK v. FUKBER CHUNDER PATNAIK* . . . 22 W. R. 349

41. ——— Suit for rent in Small Cause Court—Question of title. The plaintiff in a suit to establish her lakhiraj right to lakhiraj land, stated in her plaint that she was in possession of certain land by virtue of the will of her husband; that, while in possession of the land, a suit was brought against her in the Small Cause Court for rent by the defendants who obtained a decree; and that, there being no appeal against the decision, the lakhiraj rights in respect of the lands were consequently injured; she therefore brought the present suit. *See also Per JACKSON, J.*, dismissing the suit, that the plaintiff might, if a fresh suit for rent be brought, again raise the question of her lakhiraj title, because the Small Cause Court had no power to determine finally a question of right. *PORAN SOOKH CHUNDER v. PARBUTTY DOSSEE* . . . I. L. R. 3 Calc. 612 : 1 C. L. R. 404

42. ——— Decree in suit of Small Cause nature—Subsequent suit for declaration of title and to set aside agreement—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13. The plaintiff, claiming to be entitled together with two of the defendants to the office of *arehaka* of a temple, sued in 1889 for a declaration of his title, and for a declaration that an agreement entered into by them in 1886 with the other defendants was void as having been executed under coercion and because part of the consideration was the withdrawal of a pending criminal charge of trespass and theft against them. The defendants pleaded that the validity of the agreement was *res judicata* for the reason that they had brought a previous action upon it against the plaintiffs and had obtained a decree for Rs. 75. *Held*, that the validity of the agreement was not *res judicata*, because the previous suit was of a Small Cause nature. *SRIKANGACHARIAR v. RAMASAMI AYYANGAR* I. L. R. 18 Mad. 189

*NAMASIVAYA GURUKKAL v. KADIR AMMAL* I. L. R. 17 Mad. 168

43. ——— Claim by mortgagor in execution-proceedings in Small Cause Court—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 278—Presidency Small Cause Court, Rules of Practice, 49, 50, 51—Tiled huts—"For the purposes of execution," meaning of—Question of title—Presidency Towns Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1882), ss. 28, 37. An order made upon a claim to attached property filed in the Small Cause Court of Calcutta in a proceeding under



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(b) SMALL CAUSE COURT CASES—*concl'd.*

s. 278 of the Civil Procedure Code is "an order made in a suit" within the meaning of s. 37 of the Presidency Small Cause Court Act (XV of 1882), and is final, subject only to the right to apply for a new trial. *Ismail Solomon Bhamji v. Mahomed Khan*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 296, followed. The words of s. 28 (Act XV of 1882), "for the purpose of execution," must mean for all purposes of execution, inclusive of the purpose of determining objections made to attachments. Tiled huts for all the purposes of execution are therefore moveable property under that section. The Small Cause Court has full power and authority to determine the question of title under a mortgage over attached property, and that question is therefore *res judicata*. *DENO NATH BATABYAL v. NUFFER CHUNDER NUNDY*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 778  
3 C. W. N. 590

This case was, however, reversed on appeal.

See *DENO NATH BATABYAL v. ADHOR CHUNDER SETT* . . . . . 4 C. W. N. 470

44. ———— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Denial of plaintiff's title in a suit for rent—Decree in favour of defendants—Subsequent suit by same plaintiff against same defendants for possession.* In 1898 *A* sued *B, C, D* and *E* in a Munsif's Court to recover six years' rent alleged by *A* to be due in respect of certain land on a registered deed of lease. *B, C* and *D* denied *A*'s title, and pleaded that they were not liable for rent, and that the land belonged to and was in the possession of *E*. This defence was upheld by the Court of first instance and on appeal. In 1899 *A* brought the present suit against *B, C, D* and *E*, in the same Court, on the same deed of lease; this time claiming possession of the same land together with rent for less than two years. It was contended that the suit was not barred under s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, inasmuch as the Court which had tried the former suit was not a Court competent to try the present suit within the meaning of the section referred to, for the reason that the former suit was cognizable by a Small Cause Court, whereas the present suit was for the recovery of land, and a second appeal would lie from a decree passed in it. *Held*, that the Court which had tried the former case was a Court competent to try the present suit, within the meaning of s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Subbammal v. Huddleston*, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 273, and *Bhagwanbhatti Chowdhurani v. Forbes*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 78, followed. *Srirangchariar v. Ramasami Ayyangar*, I. L. R. 18 Mad. 189, referred to. *AHMED v. MOIDIN* (1901) . . . . . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 444

## (c) REVENUE COURTS.

In early decisions it was *held* that a decision of a Revenue Court in a case under the Rent Act, 1859,

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(c) REVENUE COURTS—*contd.*

was in some circumstances binding in a Civil Court. *WOOMESH CHUNDER SOOTEE v. RAM CHUNDER MOWREE* . . . . . 4 W. R., Act X, 40

*OOMA CHURN DUTT v. BECKWITH*

5 W. R., Act X, 3

*EESHOOREE SINGH v. HUNTER* . . . . . 2 N. W. 53

45. ———— *Decision of Revenue Court—Suit for rent—Jurisdiction of Collector.* The decision of the Collector in a suit for rent of certain land is conclusive in a subsequent suit between the same parties in a Civil Court for a declaration that the land is liable to pay rent. *MOHESH CHUNDER BUNDOPADHYA v. JOYKISHEN MOOKERJEE*

15 B. L. R. 248 note : 22 W. R. 362

46. ———— *Suit for resumption of invalid lakhiraj—Act X of 1859, s. 28—Beng. Reg. II of 1819, s. 30.* That a rayat's holding was of a date prior to 1790 once decided in the zamindar's suit under s. 28, Act X of 1859, must be considered as *res judicata* in a subsequent suit under s. 30. Regulation II of 1819. *KALLEE PERSHAD HOLDAR v. SOOBHOGEA DABEA*

1 W. R. 218

Most of the later cases, however, decided that a decision of the Revenue Court was not conclusive on a matter of title in a subsequent suit in the Civil Court.

47. ———— *Decision of Collector on question of possession.* The decision of a Collector on a question of possession and of the right to receive the rent does not bar an action in the Civil Courts to try the title of the parties. *KALIDASS GHOSE v. CHANDRAMOHINI DAS* 8 W. R. 68

48. ———— *Entry in revenue record under order of Collector—Suit in ejectment to determine title—N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), s. 102.* An entry in a revenue record which is based solely on the fact of possession cannot operate as *res judicata* on a question of title subsequently raised in a civil suit. *Dukhna Kunwar v. Unkar Pande*, I. L. R. 19 All. 452, referred to. *KALIANI v. DASSU PANDE*

I. L. R. 20 All. 520

49. ———— *Suit for declaration of title after suit for rent in Revenue Court.* *A*, suing *B* for arrears of rent on the allegation that *B* held an utbundee jote from him on certain lands of plaintiff's jote jumma, obtained a decree for rent for one year, the period for which he sued. *B* then brought an action in the Civil Court for a declaration of his right to the jote jumma in question, alleging that he held the land direct from the zamindar, and was not *A*'s raiyat; *A* pleading that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction after the Revenue Court had declared *B* to be his raiyat. *Held*, that the Revenue Court's decree was not conclusive as to the question of title, i.e., as to whose right it was to have the particular jote jumma as his property. *DHONAYE MUNDUL v. ARIF MUNDUL* . . . . . 9 W. R. 306



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50. ————— *Decree of Revenue Court for arrears of rent—Suit for declaration of title as lakhirajdar.* A decree of a Revenue Court awarding arrears of rent for a certain year under a kabuliat against a raiyat does not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in a suit brought by him for a declaration of his title as lakhirajdar in the same land. *TARA CHAND MYTEE v. NILAMBUR MUNDUL* . . . . . 3 W. R. 227

51. ————— *Suit for possession after ejectment—Jurisdiction of Collector.* In a suit to recover possession on the ground of illegal ejectment, a Collector has no jurisdiction to inquire into any matter having reference to the rights of the parties so as to bar a subsequent suit for them. *SHEEB CHUNDER MAHNEEAH v. BROJONATH ADITYA* 14 W. R. 301

52. ————— *Suit in Revenue Court under s. 23, Act X of 1859—Title—Subsequent suit for possession.* A decision in a suit to recover occupation where the plaintiff is found to have been illegally ejected under Act X of 1859, s. 33, cl. 6, does not bar a regular suit for possession by the defendant in the former suit grounding his claim on title, and in which the question of title is to be tried. *SOORJEE KANTO ROY v. FORLONG* 1 Ind. Jur. N S. 382: 6 W. R., Act X, 44

53. ————— *Decision of Deputy Collector in suit for ejectment.* Where a Deputy Collector declined jurisdiction in a suit for ejectment under s. 28, Act X of 1859, and the appeal against this decision to the Judge was dismissed:—*Held*, that that decision was no bar to a suit for ouster in the Civil Court, either in the way of *res judicata* or otherwise. *BASER MAHOMED v. SUDDER GHAZEE* . . . . . 7 W. R. 97

54. ————— *Possessory suit under Rent Act.* A possessory suit under cl. 6 of s. 23 of the Rent Act, 1859, by a raiyat against his zamindar did not bar a suit for confirmation of title by the intervenor in that suit. *TARA CHAND GHOSE v. RADHAMONEE DOSSEE* . . . 7 W. R. 469  
reversing on review . . . . . 5 W. R., Act X, 9

55. ————— *Suit for rent—Jurisdiction of Collector.* In a suit for rent under Act X of 1859, the Collector had no jurisdiction to decide a question of mokurari title otherwise than so far as it might be incidental to the determination of the amount of rent, if any, due; and his decision on such a question was therefore not binding in a subsequent suit to establish the mokurari right. *BABUR ALI v. DOWLUT ALI* 15 B. L. R. 242: 19 W. R. 217

*DOSS MONRE DOSSEE v. HURONATH ROY* 4 W. R. 2

*NEYPAL SINGH v. GUYADUT* . . . 3 Agra 311

56. ————— *Decision of Collector on reference from Deputy Collector. Held,*

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(c) REVENUE COURTS—*contd.*

that reference to the Collector in a suit pending before the Deputy Collector was irregular, and his opinion and order on such reference had no weight at all, and could not amount to a decision which, not having been appealed against, would operate as a bar to the adjudication on the point referred. *SAHIB SINGH v. PUT RAM* . . . . . 1 Agra Rev. 17

57. ————— *Same parties in different character.* The decision in a suit under Act X of 1859 against the defendants as the plaintiff's tenants did not bar a suit brought in the Civil Court against the same defendants as the plaintiff's vendees, the parties being accidentally the same persons, but legally different persons, with different rights and interests. *GOLAM AHMED v. SHAM SOONDUR ROY* . . . . . 5 W. R., Act X, 9

58. ————— *Suit to assess or resume invalid lakhiraj land—Jurisdiction of Collector—Act X of 1859, s. 28.* A suit by a zamindar to assess or resume land alleged to be invalid lakhiraj, under s. 28 of Act X of 1859, had to be brought in the Revenue Courts. *GUNGA HURRY DHOBEY v. TRIFF* . . . . . 1 W. R. 31

In such a suit a Collector had no jurisdiction to try whether a title under a grant made prior to the 1st of December 1790 was valid or not. *MOOROOBEE SAHOO v. LATOO (OOMAR)* . . . W. R. F. B. 70

59. ————— *Act X of 1859, s. 28—Jurisdiction of Collector.* If it was established, in a suit under s. 28, Act X of 1859, that the defendant's lakhiraj tenure was created prior to 1790, it was immaterial whether it was within plaintiff's talukh or not. Therefore the finding upon the question of parcel or no parcel by a Deputy Collector in such a suit was not binding on the Civil Court in any suit which might thereafter be brought to resume the land as invalid lakhiraj created prior to 1790, or in any other suit. *RAMNEEDHY BOYDE v. NEAMUT* . . . . . Marsh. 355: 2 Hay 437

60. ————— *Suit for rent—Act X of 1859—Beng. Act VIII of 1869—Jurisdiction of Collector. Held* (JACKSON, J., dissenting), that a judgment by a Collector, in a suit under Act X of 1859, declaring the plaintiff entitled to assess rent upon land alleged by the defendant to be lakhiraj, is not conclusive in a subsequent suit between the same parties for arrears of rent under Bengal Act VIII of 1869. *Per JACKSON, J.*—A decision in a previous and similar suit upon an issue raised substantially in the same manner by parties in a Revenue Court is binding upon them as evidence in a subsequent suit, which, but for the passing of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, would also have been brought in a Revenue Court. *HURRI SUNKUR MOOKERJEE v. MUKTARAM PATRO* 15 B. L. R. F. B. 238: 24 W. R. 154

61. ————— *Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 106—Decision of a Revenue Officer under s. 106.* A question heard and decided



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(c) REVENUE COURTS—*contd.*

by a Revenue Officer under s. 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, is *res judicata* between the same parties in a subsequent suit in a Civil Court. *Hurri Sunker Mookerjee v. Mukhtaram Patro*, 15 B. L. R. 238, not applied. *GOKHUL SAHU v. JODU NUNDUN ROY. GOBIND SAHU v. LUCHMI NARAIN ROY*

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 721

62. ———— *Order of Settlement Officer fixing rate of rent—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 104, cls. 2 and 3; s. 107—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13—Objection—Dispute.* Where a Settlement Officer of his own motion settled what appeared to him to be a fair and equitable rent in respect of the lands held by the plaintiffs and other tenants under s. 104, cls. 2 and 3, of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and the plaintiffs preferred an objection under s. 105, cl. 1, to certain entries in the record enhancing their rents, on the ground that their rents were not liable to be enhanced, which objection was disallowed and the record finally published under s. 105 (2):—*Held*, that the proceedings of the Settlement Officer were of an executive, rather than of a judicial, character, and did not operate either as a *res judicata* under s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure or as a final decree under s. 107 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, estopping the plaintiffs from having the same matters tried by the regular Civil Court. The words "objection" and "dispute" in ss. 105 and 106 of the latter Act are not synonymous terms. *SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. KAJIMUDDY*

I. L. R. 23 Calc 257

63. ———— *Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 103, 106, 107—Record-of-rights—Landlord and tenant—Cadastral survey.* The decision of a revenue officer under s. 106 of the Bengal Tenancy Act operates as *res judicata* between the parties in a subsequent suit between the same parties regarding lands which formed the subject-matter of the proceeding under s. 106. *Pandit Sardar v. Meajan Mirdha*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 378, distinguished. *Gocul Sahha v. Jodu Nundun Roy*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 721, relied upon. *JOYPAL DHOBI v. PALUKDHARI DAS* . 2 C W. N. 491

See *RAM AUTAR SINGH v. SANOMAN SINGH*

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 167

64. ———— *Decision in rent suit—Beng. Act VIII of 1869—Jurisdiction of Civil Court.* The decision of the Civil Court in a suit for rent under Bengal Act VIII of 1869 was binding in a suit between the same parties for a declaration that the land, the rent of which was the subject of the former suit, is lakhiraj. *MOHIMA CHUNDER MOZOOMDAR v. ASRADHA DASSIA*

15 B. L. R. 251 note : 21 W. R. 207

65. ———— *Question of title in Civil Court in rent-suits since the passing of Beng. Act VIII of 1869.* The old Privy Council and Full Bench rulings, that a Revenue Court's decision on title in a rent-suit under Act X of 1859

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(c) REVENUE COURTS—*contd.*

is not conclusive, went upon a Collector's incompetency to determine a question of title, but do not now apply to the decision of a competent Civil Court hearing a rent suit under the Rent Act, 1869. *RAM DOSS NUSHKUR v. RASH MONEE DOSSEE*

25 W. R. 189

66. ———— *Decision in suit declaring title—Subsequent suit for rent.* A decree of a Civil Court in a suit concerning the title is not of itself in all cases a bar to a suit against a tenant for rent by the person against whom such decree has been obtained. When the decree clearly adjudicates against the plaintiff's right and the Collector sees that it relates to the property in question and is in force, the Collector should give effect to the decree as a bar to the plaintiff's suit for rent, notwithstanding that the plaintiff may have an actual receipt of rent prior to the institution of the suit. *TARINEE v. BAMUNDOS MOAKHEE* . 1 W. R. 331

67. ———— *Decision as to validity of pottah—Decision of Revenue Court—Title—Collateral issue.* The trial and determination by the Revenue Court of the amount of rent which the plaintiff is entitled to under a mokurari pottah, in which the genuineness of the pottah only comes collaterally in issue in determining the amount of rent, was not a bar to a subsequent suit in the Civil Court to try the validity of the pottah. *JANESWAR DAS v. GULZARI LAL*

5 B. L. R. 666 note : 11 W. R. 216

*TEKAITNE GOWRA KUMARI v. BENGAL COAL COMPANY* 5 B. L. R. 667 note : 13 W. R. 129

Affirmed by the Privy Council in *TEKAETNE GOURA COOMAREE v. SAROO COOMAREE*

19 W. R. P. C. 252

68. ———— *Decision of Revenue Court—Suit for ejectment.* A Collector's judgment as to the genuineness of a pottah could not be pleaded as an estoppel in the Civil Court in an action for ejectment on account of trespass. *ARADHUN DEY v. GOLAM HOSSEIN* . 8 W. R. 487

69. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—Suit for declaration of title—Order of Collector under Act X of 1859, s. 23.* In a suit for declaration of title to land from which a raiyat had been ejected at the suit of his zamindar by the order of a Collector under s. 23, Act X of 1859, and wherein the genuineness of the pottah upon which the suit was brought was at issue, the order of the Collector could not be pleaded in bar. *BHAIRO SINGH v. UDIKARAN SINGH* . 3 B. L. R. Ap. 139

S.C. *BHYRO SINGH v. OODEE KURN SINGH*

12 W. R. 284

70. ———— *Suit to declare pottah forged.* The proceedings in a suit under Act X of 1859, in which the Collector did not finally adjudicate upon the genuineness of a pottah, although he accepted it as genuine, were no bar to a subsequent suit in the Civil Court for a declaration



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(c) REVENUE COURTS—*contd.*

that the pottah was a forgery. PITAMBUR SHAHA  
v. RAMJOY GHOSE . . . . . 7 W. R. 92

SHIB PERSHAD PANAH v. MUDDUN MOHUN DOSS.  
15 W. R. 415

71. ———— Decision as to validity of  
kabuliat—*Court of competent jurisdiction—Question of title, decision of, by Revenue Court.* Where, for the purposes of a rent suit, a Revenue Court found that a kabuliat propounded by the plaintiff was a genuine document, such finding was no bar to a Civil Court trying the question of right between the parties, and for that purpose trying the validity and genuineness of the kabuliat. BOISTUR CHURN SEN v. TRAHEE RAM SEIN . . . . . 15 W. R. 32

72. ———— Decision as to validity of  
bond—*Court of competent jurisdiction—Concurrent jurisdiction—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2.* A brought a suit against B in the Collector's Court, for rent. In answer, B set up a bond, by the terms of which A, in consideration of a loan of R10,000 stipulated that B should apply a certain portion of the annual rent to the reduction of the loan, and the payment of the interest thereon. A alleged that the bond was false. The Collector, in an issue directed by the High Court, decided that it was genuine, and this decision was affirmed on appeal. B afterwards sued A in the Civil Court upon the bond. *Held per* PEACOCK, C.J., and PHEAR, J. (CAMPBELL, J., dissentiente), that the Collector's decision as to the genuineness of the bond did not operate as an estoppel. The two Courts were not Courts of concurrent jurisdiction. *Per* PEACOCK, C.J.—*Quære*: Is a judgment of a Court of concurrent jurisdiction between the same parties on the same point conclusive between the parties in another Court in the country? EDUN v. BECHUN . . . . . 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 264: 8 W. R. 175

73. ———— Decision as to genuineness  
of document—*Decision by Deputy Collector—Jurisdiction of the Revenue Courts.* A, a raiyat, brought a suit in the Court of the Deputy Collector against B, his zamindar, for recovery of possession, of a piece of land, on the ground that he was the holder of a mirasi pottah, and that he had been illegally ejected by B. The Deputy Collector held that the mirasi pottah was genuine, and that B had illegally ejected A. He passed a decree in favour of A, in execution of which A obtained possession of the land in dispute. In a suit brought by B against the heirs of A in the Civil Court for recovery of possession of the said piece of land on the ground that the mirasi pottah was a spurious document and that no mirasi pottah had been granted to A.—*Held* (JACKSON, J., doubting), that the decision of the Deputy Collector was not conclusive between the parties. CHUNDER COOMAR MUNDUL v. NUNNEE KHANUM . . . . . 11 B. L. R. F. B. 434: 19 W. R. 322

UNNODA PERSHAD MOKERJEE v. SOORENDRONATH PAL CHOWDHRY . . . . . 20 W. R. 105

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(c) REVENUE COURTS—*contd.*

GUNGA GOBIND ROY v. KALA CHAND SURMA GANGOOLY . . . . . 20 W. R. 455

(*Contra*) HURO LALL SAHA v. TIRTHANUND THAKOOR . . . . . 11 B. L. R. 437 note: 13 W. R. 417

74. ———— Decision as to validity of  
document—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—Former suit in Revenue Court.* In a suit by a tenant to recover possession of land from which he had been dispossessed by defendant under colour of a sub-lease alleged to have been exported by force, it appeared that plaintiff had, on the very cause of action, sued the defendant in the Court of the Collector, who had found the sub-lease to be good and valid and had dismissed the suit. *Held*, that the suit, having once been dismissed by a Court of competent jurisdiction, could not again be entertained by the Civil Court. HOLLOWAY v. ASMAN ROY . . . . . 10 W. R. 325

75. ———— Order of Revenue Court  
for ejectment—*Suit for possession—Act X of 1859, s. 25.* The defendant had obtained an order under s. 25, Act X of 1859, to eject the plaintiff, who now sued in the Civil Court for recovery of possession. *Held*, that s. 2, Act VIII of 1859, did not bar the suit. AMANAT ALI CHOWDHRY v. MUSSEN ALI . . . . . 2 B. L. R. Ap. 36: 11 W. R. 145

76. ———— Suit for ejectment—*Order on application under Act X of 1859, s. 25.* A suit for ejectment from land assigned for building purposes under a contract was not barred under s. 2, Act VIII of 1859, by reason of a previous order for ejectment obtained on an application under s. 25, Act X of 1859, such an application not being a suit. RAM NARAIN MITTER v. NOBIN CHUNDER MOORDAFARASH . . . . . 18 W. R. 208

77. ———— Suit for ejectment, dismissal of—*Subsequent suit for ejectment.* A suit for ejectment, on the ground that the defendant had entered the plaintiff's land wrongfully and forcibly, having been dismissed by the Court, which found that the defendant was not a trespasser, but a tenant.—*Held*, that a subsequent suit by the same plaintiff on the allegation that the defendant was a trespasser, though lately a tenant, was not prohibited by s. 2, Act VIII of 1859. The suit, however, was dismissed on other grounds. HEERA RAWUT v. RACHA RAWUT . . . . . 22 W. R. 115

78. ———— Refusal of Collector in suit  
under s. 25, Act X of 1859—*Subsequent suit for ejectment.* A Collector's refusal to give assistance under s. 25, Act X of 1859, was not a determination by a Court of competent civil jurisdiction in a former suit within the meaning of s. 2, Act VIII of 1859. GOCOL CHUNDER v. ALI MAHOMED . . . . . 10 W. R. 6

See MUDUN MOHUN ROY v. GOURMONEE GOPTO . . . . . B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 31: W. R. F. B. 126

79. ———— Order by Revenue Courts  
for registration of name—*Suit for declaration*



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(c) REVENUE COURTS—*contd.*

*of title.* In a suit for declaration of title, the mere fact that the Revenue Courts decreed the registration of the plaintiff's vendor's name as a joint sharer of the estate, and that no steps were taken during twelve years to set aside that decree, was held to operate as an estoppel. *NITTANUND ROY v. BYDONATH MOHAPATHUR* . W. R. 1864, 350

80. — *Proceedings under s. 27, Act X of 1859.* Two purchasers of holdings in the defendant's zamindari at a sale for arrears of revenue applied to the Collector to have the transfer registered in the zamindar's sherista, under Act X of 1859, s. 27. Their application was refused, and then they brought a suit in the Civil Court to set aside the Collector's order and register their names. *Held*, that proceedings authorized to be taken in the Collector's Court under s. 27, Act X of 1859, were not proceedings in a suit; and consequently that such proceedings were no bar to a suit in the Civil Court under s. 2, Act VIII of 1859. *CHANDRA NARAYAN GHOSE v. KASINATH ROY CHOWDHRY* . 4 B. L. R. F. B. 43

*S.C. CHUNDER NARAIN GHOSE v. KASHEENATH ROY CHOWDHRY* . 12 W. R. F. B. 30

81. — *Orders of Collector amending Collectorate record, and refusing partition—Adjudication of rights.* Two applications before a Collector, the one by defendants, asking an amendment of the Collectorate record by expunging therefrom plaintiffs' names, as being out of possession, and which, after evidence taken was ordered to be done, and the other by plaintiffs, praying a partition under Act XIX of 1863, which was refused, on the ground that they had not established their possession, were held not to be such an adjudication of rights as to be a bar to a suit by the plaintiffs for establishment of right to and possession of the land referred to in such application. *KISHUN SAHAI v. RAGHOO SINGH* . 2 N. W. 64

82. — *Order by Settlement Officer—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13—Act XIX of 1873, ss. 56, 62, 64, 241 (g).* *Held*, that an order by a Settlement Officer directing that certain persons should be recorded as the sub-proprietors of certain land, as they claimed to be, and not as lessees, as certain persons asserted that they were, did not operate as *res judicata* in a suit by the latter persons against the former for a declaration that the former were not sub-proprietors of the land, but lessees thereof, the Settlement Officer not being competent, under Act XIX of 1873 (N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act), to try such a question of right. *TOTA RAM v. HAR KISHEN* . I. L. R. 7 All. 224

83. — *Decision of Collector in measurement proceedings—Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 18—Jurisdiction of Collector.* If a Collector professing to proceed under the provisions of s. 38, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, does not ascertain the existing rates of rent, but proceeds to assess

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(c) REVENUE COURTS—*contd.*

the rents,—in other words, to determine what rates are in his opinion fair and equitable,—he exceeds his jurisdiction and his proceedings are null and void. But if he has properly exercised the jurisdiction conferred on him by that section, his proceedings are conclusive between the parties in a subsequent suit for rent. *MERJAH JANAND v. KRISTO CHUNDER alias KINOO LAHARY* . I. L. R. 10 Calc. 507

84. — *Decision as to surety in rent suit—Jurisdiction of Revenue Court—Suit against sureties of lessee—Competent Court, decision by.* When a person became security for the due payment of rent by a third party, and on default of such payment the creditor sued both the principal debtor and the surety in the Revenue Courts for the amount owing, and such suit as against the surety, was on appeal thrown out by the High Court on the ground that the Revenue Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain it, and the creditor then sued the surety in the Civil Courts:—*Held*, that the proceedings instituted in the Revenue Courts were no bar to the entertainment of this suit. *GUNESH KOORER v. OOMDUT-DOON-NISSA BEGUM*

6 N. W. 77

85. — *Dismissal of suit for rent—Subsequent suit for possession with mesne profits.* The dismissal of a suit for rent is no bar to suit for title and possession with mesne profits. *GOUR HURREE DOSS v. MUTTEEOOLAH* . 1 W. R. 99

86. — *Dismissal of suit in Revenue Court for want of jurisdiction.* The dismissal of a suit for rent in the Revenue Court for want of jurisdiction (the plaintiff not having proved that he was *de facto* landlord in possession) was held not to bar a suit in the Civil Court for declaration of right to the same rent. *DHURONY MOJOOMDAR v. BISSANBHUR MOOKERJEE* . 2 W. R., Act X, 103

*BHIKAREE PANDAH v. AJOODHYA PERSHAD*

3 W. R. 176

87. — *Decree for rent at enhanced rate—Suit for declaration of right to same land.* A decree in a suit for a kabuliat at an enhanced rate was no bar, under s. 2, Act VIII of 1859, to a suit for a declaration of the rights of the present plaintiff to hold the land in lieu of maintenance on payment of a quit-rent, which could not be tried by a Collector. *KRISTO CHUNDER MURDRAJ v. POOROSUTTUM DOSS* . 15 W. R. 424

88. — *Decision as to liability for rent—Subsequent suit for declaration of title.* The decision of a Revenue Court that a party was liable for rent to another as his tenant did not bar that party suing in a Civil Court to obtain a declaration of title on his general civil rights, either as proprietor by purchase or as mukaridar. *JUDDOO NATH SEIN v. RAM COOMAR CHATTERJEE*

9 W. R. 359

*ISHAN CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHRY v. BHYRUB CHUNDER DOSS* . 21 W. R. 25



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(c) REVENUE COURTS—*contd.*

89. ———— Decision as to tenancy agreement. A Deputy Collector having in a suit for rent given plaintiff (M) a decree, determining adversely to defendant (K) an issue which he had raised as to an arrangement of tenancy:—*Held*, that K could not succeed as plaintiff in a new suit in the same Court in which he set up the same arrangement and asked to have it declared as that under which he held the land from M. KALEE DASS GHOSAL *v.* MUDDOOSOODUN ROY

10 W. R. 465

90. ———— Suit in Revenue Court on a lease—*Subsequent suit for same sum as damages.* When a suit for rent due on a certain stipulation in a patni lease was dismissed in the Revenue Courts:—*Held*, that another suit could not be brought in the Civil Court as for damages laid at the amount of rent which would have been realized. GOPALKISTO MOOKERJEE *v.* MUDHOOSOODUN PAUL CHOWDHRY . . . W. R. 1864, Act X, 82

91. ———— Suit in Revenue Court to set aside attachment—*Subsequent suit in Civil Court to assess rent on same land.* A suit was brought in the Revenue Court to set aside an attachment for rent, on the ground that such attachment was for rent at a higher rate than was due. The landholder claimed the higher rate under an alleged assessment of a Batwara Amcen. The Collector made a decree setting aside the attachment, on the ground that the landholder failed to prove that the higher amount was due. *Held*, that the landholder could not maintain a suit in the Civil Court to assess the land at the higher rate claimed for the year for which the attachment had issued, on the ground of prior service of notice of demand of the higher rate, under Bengal Regulation V of 1812, that question having been already adjudicated upon by a Court of competent jurisdiction. REAZOON-NISSA KHANUM *v.* DOYANAUTH JHA . Marsh. 638

92. ———— Decision of Revenue Court as to possession—*Former suit by lessee against zamindar.* *Held*, that a decree of the Revenue Court, in a suit for possession brought by one lessee against the zamindar, was no bar to a suit in the Civil Court brought by another lessee to obtain possession against both the zamindar and the first lessee. RUN SINGH *v.* MAHOMED ABID

2 Agr 127

93. ———— Dismissal of suit for ejectment—*Suit for removal of trees—Jurisdiction of Revenue Court—Act X of 1859, s. 23.* The dismissal of a previous suit brought by plaintiff for ejectment of defendant, his cultivator, on account of breach of contract under cl. 5, s. 23, Act X of 1859, as being barred by limitation, was *held* not to operate as a bar to a suit for removal and possession of certain trees, and avoidance of sale-deed executed by cultivator, which was of a different nature from the one dismissed, and did not come within the suits defined in s. 23, Act X of 1859, and therefore was not

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(c) REVENUE COURTS—*contd.*

cognizable by the Revenue Court. JOGEL KISHORE *v.* CHUTTER SINGH . . . 1 Agr 27

94. ———— Refusal of application for ejectment—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13—Landholder and tenant—Application for tenant's ejectment for building on land—Suit for demolition of building.* A decision of a Revenue Court disallowing an application to eject a tenant, because he has built on his land, does not, under s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, bar a suit in the Civil Court to have the building demolished. AMRIT LAL *v.* BALBIR

I. L. R. 6 All. 68

95. ———— Decision ordering ejectment—*Jurisdiction of Revenue Court—N.-W. P. Rent Act (XVIII of 1873), s. 93—Landlord and tenant—Determination of title.* The decision of a Revenue Court, in a suit by a landholder against a tenant under s. 93 (b) of Act XVIII of 1873 for the ejectment of the tenant on the ground of misconduct in constructing a well, that the tenant could not be ejected from his holding without compensation being given to him for his outlay in constructing it, is not a determination of the landholder's right to demolish the well as having been constructed by a person not having a right to construct it; and consequently such a decision is not a bar to a suit by the landholder in the Civil Court for the demolition of the well as having been so constructed. RAJ BAHADUR *v.* BIRMA SINGH I. L. R. 3 All. 85

96. ———— Decision as to existence of relation of landlord and tenant—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 13—Suit for arrears of rent—Determination of title—N.-W. P. Rent Act (XVIII of 1873), ss. 93, 95, 148.* The question whether the parties to a suit in a Court of revenue for arrears of rent stand in the relation of landlord and tenant is one which it is necessary for such Court to try incidentally for the purpose of disposing of such suit, but not one which such Court has special jurisdiction to determine, and its determination of that question is not that of a competent Court. Consequently, where a Court of revenue determines in such a suit that the parties do not stand in such relation, such determination does not bar the party alleging that the parties do stand in such relation from suing in the Civil Court to establish such relation. GOPAL *v.* UCHABAL

I. L. R. 3 All. 51

97. ———— Decree of Revenue Court in suit as to rate of rent—*Suit for arrears of rent.* A Revenue Court cannot entertain a suit to determine the rate of rent payable by an ex-proprietary tenant, but an application only. *Held*, therefore, where a landholder sued an ex-proprietary tenant for arrears of rent at a certain rate, and obtained an *ex parte* decree for arrears of rent at that rate, and again sued the tenant for arrears of rent at the same rate, that the Revenue Court had not jurisdiction to determine the rate of rent in the first suit, and that therefore the tenant was not



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(c) REVENUE COURTS—*contd.*

precluded from setting up as a defence to the second suit that it was not maintainable, as the rate of rent had not been fixed. *PHULAHRA v. JEOLAL SINGH* . . . . . **I. L. R. 6 All. 52**

98. ———— **Determination of question of title—Act XIX of 1863, ss. 8, 9.** Where *M*, the recorded proprietor of an estate, applied to have his share of such estate separated, and an objection was made to such separation by *H*, another recorded proprietor of the estate, which raised the question of *M*'s proprietary right to a portion of his share, and the Collector proceeded under s. 8, Act XIX of 1863, to inquire into the merits of such objection, and decided that *M*'s interest in such portion of his share was that of a mortgagee and not a proprietor, and *M* did not appeal against such decision and it became final:—*Held*, in a suit in the Civil Court by *M* against *H* in which he claimed declaration of his proprietary right to such portion, that a fresh adjudication of his right was barred. *HAR SAHAI MAL v. MAHARAJ SINGH* . . . **I. L. R. 2 All. 294**

99. ———— **Partition—Appeal—Act XIX of 1873 (N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act), ss. 113, 114.** Where in proceedings for partition under Act XIX of 1873 a question of title to land is raised between the parties to the partition, and there is an adjudication of such question, such adjudication will operate as a bar to a suit between the same parties in the Civil Courts to contest the title to such land, notwithstanding that in some respects such adjudication may have been irregular or defective. *Har Sahai Mal v. Maharaj Singh*, **I. L. R. 2 All. 294**, and *S. A. No. 129 of 1881*, decided the 27th July 1881, followed. *Held*, in this case, on consideration of the partition proceedings, that the question of title raised therein had been adjudicated on, and therefore the rule mentioned above applied. *BATESHAR NATH v. FAIZ-UL-HASAN*

**I. L. R. 5 All. 280**

100. ———— **Determination of proprietary right—N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), ss. 113, 114.** In the case of an objection to a partition raising a question of title, it is only when the Collector or Assistant Collector records a proceeding declaring the rights of the parties, after an adjudication of the objection on its merits, that his order becomes an order under s. 113 of Act XIX of 1873 within the meaning of s. 114 of that Act. Where therefore an Assistant Collector made an order disallowing an objection to a partition raising a question of title, on the ground that such question had been determined against the objector in a suit for profits between the parties:—*Held*, that such order was not a decision of a Court of Civil Judicature within the meaning of s. 114 of Act XIX of 1873, but that it could be contested by a suit in the Civil Court. *Rameshwar Rai v. Subhoo Rai*, **1 N. W. Ed. 1873, 134**; *Bukhta v. Ganga*, **3 Agra 161**; and *Harsahai Mal v. Maharaj Singh*, **I.**

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*L. R. 2 All. 294*, distinguished. *ASHGAR ALI SHAH v. JHANDA MAL* . . . . . **I. L. R. 2 All. 839**

101. ———— **N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1881), ss. 36, 39, 95 (e), and 96 (b)—Suit in a Civil Court for a declaration on a question of title decided by a Court of revenue under s. 39 of Act XII of 1881—Jurisdiction of Civil and Revenue Courts.** The defendants served a notice of ejectment under s. 36 of Act XII of 1881 on the plaintiffs, alleging the plaintiffs to be their sub-tenants and themselves to be tenants with a right of occupancy. The plaintiffs objected that they, and not the defendants, were the tenants-in-chief of the land in question. This objection was decided, under s. 39 of the said Act, by a Court of Revenue adversely to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs thereupon sued in a Civil Court for a declaration that they were tenants with a right of occupancy and for maintenance of possession. *Held*, that, inasmuch as s. 96 (b) of Act XII of 1881 gave to a decision of a Court of revenue under s. 39 the effect of a judgment of a Civil Court, the hearing of the plaintiff's present suit by a Civil Court, was barred. The principle of the decision in *Tarapat Ojha v. Ram Ratan Kuar*, **I. L. R. 15 All. 387**, affirmed. The jurisdiction of Civil Courts and Courts of Revenue in the North-Western Provinces considered. *SHEO NARAIN RAI v. PARMESHWAR RAI*

**I. L. R. 18 All. 270**

102. ———— **Civil Procedure Code, s. 13—Partition—N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), ss. 113, 114—Irregular procedure.** Upon an application made under Ch. IV of the N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873) for partition of common land in which the owners of six pattis were interested, into six equal parts, an objection was raised that the land should be divided into parts proportionate to the size of the different pattis. The Assistant Collector, before whom the objection was made, disallowed it with reference to the provisions of the *wajib-ul-urz* in which the custom of the village was recorded, and made the partition in the manner prayed. No appeal was preferred by the objectors to the District Judge. The Collector confirmed the partition, and, after an appeal to the Commissioner, the Assistant Collector's decision was upheld. The objectors then brought a suit in the Civil Court for a declaration that the defendants were only entitled to a share of the common land proportionate to the area of their pattis. *Held*, that the objection which was raised in the Revenue Court was one which raised a question of title or of proprietary right in respect of the common land within the meaning of s. 113 of the N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act; that the decision of the Assistant Collector was a decision within the meaning of s. 114 of the Act; and that consequently the suit was barred by s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, also, that the question was not affected by any mistakes in procedure that had



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(c) REVENUE COURTS—*contd.*

been made in the Revenue Courts. *AMIR SINGH v. NAIMATI PRASAD* . . . I. L. R. 9 All. 388

103. ————— *Estoppel—Suit*

*for a declaration of proprietary right.* In 1864 the defendants served a notice upon the plaintiff demanding rent for land in his possession for which the plaintiff had not paid them rent previously. The plaintiff thereupon instituted a suit in the Revenue Court contesting his liability to pay rent for such land on the ground that he was the proprietor thereof. A decree was made in that suit on the 16th August 1865, directing the plaintiff to execute a kabuliati to pay the defendants rent for such land at a certain rate. The plaintiff did not appeal from that decree, but from its date until August 1877 paid the defendants rent for such land. On the 8th August 1877 the plaintiff instituted the present suit against the defendants in the Civil Court, in which he claimed a declaration of his proprietary right to such land, and to be maintained in possession thereof as proprietor, free from the liability to pay rent, and to have the decree of the Revenue Court dated the 16th August 1865 declared null and inoperative. *Held*, that the plaintiff's suit in the Revenue Court not being one which that Court was competent to entertain, the decision in that suit could not be held final on the question of title raised in the present suit; and that there was nothing in the conduct of the plaintiff which estopped him from instituting the present suit. *DEBI PRASAD v. JAFAR ALI* . . . I. L. R. 3 All. 40

104. ————— *Jurisdiction of*

*Revenue Courts—Landlord and tenant—N.-W. P. Rent Act (XVIII of 1873), ss. 36-39.* The question of title raised in a suit for a declaration that the defendant holds an estate paying revenue to Government as a manager subject to ejectment at will, and for ejectment, is not concluded by the orders of the Revenue Courts establishing the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, on an application having been made by the defendant under s. 39 of Act XVIII of 1873, upon a notice having been served upon him by the plaintiff under s. 36 of that Act, objecting to his ejectment. *MUHAMMAD ABU JAFAR v. WALI MUHAMMAD*

I. L. R. 3 All. 81

*See CHOTU v. JITAN* . . . I. L. R. 3 All. 63

105. ————— *Landholder and*

*tenant—Decision of Revenue Court on an application under s. 39 of Act XVIII of 1873.* The plaintiffs in this suit, landholders, had caused a notice of ejectment to be served on the defendants, their tenants under a lease, on the ground that the tenancy had expired. The defendants applied to the Revenue Court, under s. 39 of Act XVIII of 1873, contesting their liability to be ejected, on the ground that the lease was a perpetual lease. The Revenue Court held, with reference to the word "istemrari" contained in the lease, that the lease was perpetual, and defendants were not liable to be

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(c) REVENUE COURTS—*contd.*

ejected. The plaintiffs thereupon sued in the Civil Court for the cancelment of the word "istemrari" in the lease, on the ground that it had been inserted fraudulently. *Held*, on appeal from the decree of the lower Appellate Court dismissing the suit as barred by the decision of the Revenue Court, that it was not so barred, the matter in dispute being peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, and not one which a Revenue Court was competent finally to determine on an application under s. 39 of Act XVIII of 1873. *HUSAIN SHAH v. GOPAL RAI* . . . I. L. R. 2 All. 428

106. ————— *Civil Procedure*

*Code, 1877, s. 13—N.-W. P. Rent Act (XVIII of 1873), s. 39.* S caused a notice of ejectment to be served upon K in respect of certain land, alleging that he held the same by virtue of a lease which had expired. K contested his liability to be ejected under s. 39 of Act XVIII of 1873, denying that he held the land by virtue of such lease, and alleging that he had a right of occupancy. The Revenue Court decided that K held the land under a right of occupancy, and not under such lease. S thereupon sued K in the Civil Court, claiming possession of such land, on the allegation that K was a trespasser wrongfully retaining possession thereof after the expiration of his lease. *Held*, that the decision of the Revenue Court did not render the matter in issue *res judicata*. The provisions of s. 13 of Act X of 1877 do not apply to applications such as those under s. 39 of Act XVIII of 1873. *SUKH-DAIK MISR v. KARIM CHAUDHRI*

I. L. R. 3 All. 521

107. ————— *Jurisdiction of*

*Civil Court—Act XVIII of 1873 (N.-W. P. Rent Act), ss. 36-39.* The defendants, claiming to be occupancy tenants of certain land and alleging that the plaintiff was their sub-tenant, caused a notice of ejectment to be served on the plaintiff under ss. 36-39 of Act XVIII of 1873. The plaintiff thereupon, under the provisions of s. 39 of that Act, preferred an application contesting his liability to be ejected, alleging that he had a right of occupancy in such land jointly with the defendants and was not their sub-tenant. The Assistant Collector trying the case finally decided that the plaintiff was the sub-tenant of the defendants, and the plaintiff was ejected. The plaintiff then sued the defendants in the Civil Court for a declaration of his right as an occupancy tenant to such land and possession of the same. *Held*, that the decision of the Assistant Collector as to the respective rights of the parties could only be regarded as incidental and ancillary to the main point to be determined by him, *viz.*, whether, assuming the relation of landlord and tenant to exist between the parties, the plaintiff was liable to be ejected; and such decision was not a bar to a fresh determination of such rights in the Civil Court. *BIRBAL v. TIKA RAM* . I. L. R. 4 All. 11

108. ————— *Decision as to liability to*  
*ejectment—Landholder and tenant—Ejectment*



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*3. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(c) REVENUE COURTS—*contd.*

*of tenant—Suit by tenant for declaration of right.—Jurisdiction—Act XVIII of 1873 (N.-W. P. Rent Act), s. 93 (b).* An occupancy-tenant, who had been ejected under ss. 34 and 93 (b) of the N.-W. P. Rent Act, on the ground that he had committed an act mentioned in those sections which rendered him liable to ejectment, sued in the Civil Court for a declaration of his right of occupancy, and to have the decree of the Revenue Court directing his ejectment declared of no effect, on the ground that his act was not one of those rendering him liable to ejectment, being authorized by local custom. *Held*, that the question of the plaintiff's liability to ejectment on account of the act in question being a matter the cognizance of which was limited to the Revenue Courts, and the decision of the Revenue Court against him having become final, the plaintiff's suit was barred by s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Raj Bahadur v. Birmha Singh, I. L. R. 3 All. 85*, distinguished. *RADHA PRASAD SINGH v. SALIK RAI I. L. R. 5 All. 245*

109. ———— *Act XVIII of 1873, s. 95—Determination of title under cl. (n).* *S* applied to the Revenue Court, under cl. (n) of s. 95 of Act XVIII of 1873, for the recovery of the occupancy of certain land, alleging that the occupancy of such land had devolved upon her by inheritance, and that the landholder had wrongfully dispossessed her. The landholder set up as a defence to this application that *S* was not entitled to the occupancy of the land by inheritance, but that she was a trespasser. The Revenue Court determined that *S* was entitled to the occupancy of the land by inheritance, and granted her application. The landholder then sued *S* in the Civil Court for the possession of the land. *Held, per PEARSON, J., and TURNER, J.,* that the question of *S*'s title to the occupancy of the land was, with reference to the decision of the Revenue Court, *res judicata*, and could not again be raised in the Civil Court. *Per SPANKIE, J., and OLDFIELD, J. (contra).* *SHIMBU NARAIN SINGH v. BACHCHA. I. L. R. 2 All. 200*

110. ———— *Decision as to liability to ejectment—N.-W. P. Rent Act, 1881, ss. 36, 40, 95.* The plaintiffs, who claimed to be tenants of certain land under a lease from the zamindar alleging that the defendant was their sub-tenant, under s. 36 of the N.-W. P. Rent Act, 1881, caused a notice of ejectment to be served upon the latter under the provisions of that Act. The defendant did not make an application under that Act contesting his liability to be ejected, and the plaintiffs applied under ss. 40 and 95 (f) of that Act for assistance to eject him. The Revenue Court trying this application rejected it, on the ground that the defendant was not a sub-tenant of the plaintiffs, but a co-sharer in their tenancy. The plaintiffs thereupon sued the defendant in the Civil Court for a declaration that the latter was not a partner with them in the lease, and for possession of the land by his ejectment therefrom. *Held*, that the relief

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sought in the suit by the plaintiffs was not one which a Revenue Court could give under any of the clauses of s. 95 of the Rent Act, which presupposes an admitted relation of landholder and tenant; and therefore the determination by the Revenue Court of the plaintiff's application for ejectment of the defendant was not the decision of a Court competent to try the suit, and was no bar to its maintenance in a Civil Court within the principle of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. *LODHI SINGH v. ISHRI SINGH. I. L. R. 6 All. 295*

111. ———— *Resumption of rent-free grant—Suit for declaration that land is "garden land" and for possession—Act XII of 1881, ss. 10, 30, 95, (a), (c), (n).* A zamindar applied to the Revenue Court under s. 30 of the N.-W. P. Rent Act, and obtained an order for the resumption of certain plots of land, on the finding that they were resumable rent-free grants. The occupiers of the land were ejected, and the zamindar obtained possession. Subsequently the occupiers brought a suit in the Civil Court to obtain a declaration that they held plots in question, under a license from the zamindar's predecessor in title, as orchard land, without payment of any rent or other allowance to the landlord, and that they were entitled to retain the land on this footing so long as it should continue to be occupied with trees. They sought to recover possession of the soil and timber, asking also for "a determination of the nature of their tenure" therein. *Held*, that the cognizance of the suit by the Civil Court was not barred by the provisions of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain it was not ousted by s. 95 of the Rent Act, since the "matter" presented by the plaintiffs was not one "on which an application of the nature mentioned in that section could by them have been made to a Court of revenue, cls. (a), (c), and (n) of the section not being applicable to the case. *AJUDHIA PRASAD v. SHEODIN I. L. R. 6 All. 403*

112. ———— *Suit to contest demand of distrainer—Act XII of 1881 (N.-W. P. Rent Act), ss. 84, 148.* A decree of a Rent Court passed upon enquiries made under ss. 84 and 148 of the Rent Act (XII of 1881) is not conclusive as between the parties to the enquiry, upon the question of title, in a suit instituted in a Civil Court for declaration of right to, and possession of, the land, in respect of which the Rent Court decree was passed. The period of limitation for instituting a suit in the Civil Court, as prescribed in these sections, applies only to suits brought by plaintiff or unsuccessful intervenor to have it declared that plaintiff had a title to receive the particular rent claimed, and which the Rent Court has refused to give him, and not to suits for declaration of title to, and possession of, the land in respect of which the rent accrued due. In 1881 the plaintiffs had under the provisions of the Rent Act (XII of 1881), made a distraint for rent alleged to be due by



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(c) REVENUE COURTS—*contd.*

One of their tenants. The tenant contested the legality of the distraint by a proceeding in the Rent Court, and the defendant intervened on the ground that he had been actually and in good faith in receipt and enjoyment of the rent of the land occupied by the tenant. On the 28th of June 1881 the Rent Court decided against the defendant; but owing to some irregularity, the distraint was withdrawn. Plaintiffs subsequently instituted a suit in the Rent Court against the tenant for recovery of arrears of rent, and the defendant again intervened, and upon enquiry, under s. 148 of the Rent Act (XII of 1881), plaintiffs' suit for arrears of rent was dismissed. Plaintiffs then instituted this suit in the Civil Court for declaration of their right to, and possession of, the land in respect of which distraint proceedings had been taken, and suit for recovery of arrears of rent instituted. The Court of first instance dismissed the suit on the merits. The plaintiffs appealed and urged (*inter alia*) that the defendant was estopped, by the decision of the 28th June 1881, from contesting plaintiff's title. *Held*, that the decision of the 28th June 1881 in the inquiry held under s. 84 of the Rent Act (XII of 1881) was not conclusive between the parties in a subsequent suit between them to determine their title to the land in respect of which the distraint proceedings had been taken. *GANGA PRASAD v. BALDEO RAM*. . . I. L. R. 10 All. 347

113. ———— "Court of jurisdiction competent to try the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised"—N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), ss. 113 and 114—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13—Mortgage—Foreclosure—Suit for redemption. One H S mortgaged in 1864, by two mortgages of the same date, certain immoveable property to one A S. In 1877 A S applied for foreclosure of these mortgages and obtained an order under s. 8 of Regulation XXVII of 1806, but these proceedings were, it was alleged, never brought to a legal conclusion. Subsequently, the mortgagee applied in a Court of Revenue for partition in his favour of the mortgaged property. The mortgagor resisted that application on the ground that the foreclosure proceedings had not been completed; but the Court, acting under ss. 113 and 114 of Act XIX of 1873, overruled that objection and granted partition in favour of the mortgagee. In 1892 the mortgagor sued the representatives of the original mortgagee in a Civil Court for redemption of the mortgages of 1864. The defendants resisted the suit principally on the plea that s. 13 of Act XIV of 1882 applied and was a bar to the suit; but no plea of *res judicata* outside s. 13 was raised. The plaintiff's suit was dismissed as stated by the principle of *res judicata*. The plaintiff appealed. *Held* by TYRRELL, J., that the Court of Revenue being incompetent to determine the suit in which the issue whether the mortgages had been foreclosed or not was subsequently raised, s. 13 of Act XIV of 1882 did not apply, and no plea

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(c) REVENUE COURTS—*contd.*

of *res judicata* outside s. 13 could be entertained, inasmuch as no such plea had been put forward in the Court below or in the High Court. *Misir Raghobar Dial v. Sheo Buksh Singh*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 439, referred to. *Per* BURKITT, J. (*contra*).—The provisions of s. 13 of Act XIV of 1882 are not exhaustive, and, the plaintiff not having appealed therefrom, the decision of the Court of revenue must be held, upon the principle of *res judicata*, to be a bar to the present suit. *Ram Lal v. Chhab Nath*, I. L. R. 12 All. 578, and *Ram Kirpal v. Rup Kuari*, I. L. R. 6 All. 269, referred to. *HAR CHARAN SINGH v. HAR SHANKAR SINGH*. . . I. L. R. 16 All. 464

*Held* in the same case by KNOX, BLAIR, and BANERJI, JJ., on appeal under the Letters Patent, that where a Court of Revenue, acting under s. 113 of Act XIX of 1873, has decided a question of title or of proprietary right, such decision, being the decision of "a Court of civil judicature of first instance," will operate as *res judicata* in a subsequent civil suit in which the same question is being litigated. *HAR CHARAN SINGH v. HAR SHANKAR SINGH*

I. L. R. 18 All. 59

114. ———— *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 99—Sale by a Court of revenue in contravention of s. 99—Subsequent suit for partition in a Civil Court based upon rights acquired under such sale—Co-sharers.* A Court of Revenue, in execution of a decree for rent, sold the mortgagor's interest in a certain house which had been mortgaged together with other property, and the sale was upheld on appeal to the Board of Revenue. Subsequently the auction-purchaser at the sale above referred to sued in a Civil Court for partition of the share purchased by him. *Held*, that the co-sharers in the property in question could not dispute the validity of the sale notwithstanding that the decree and the sale in pursuance thereof were in direct violation of s. 99 of Act IV of 1882. *TARA CHAND v. IMDAD HUSAIN*

I. L. R. 18 All. 325

115. ———— *Decision of Revenue Court—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13.* A zamindar distrained for rent under the Rent Recovery Act of 1865. Thereupon the tenant filed a summary suit under that Act in a Revenue Court, and the distraint was annulled on the ground that the zamindar had not tendered a proper pottah as required by s. 7. The zamindar now sued in the Court of the District Munsif to recover the arrears of rent. *Held*, that the question of the propriety of the pottah tendered was not *res judicata*. *RANGAYYA APPA RAU v. RATNAM*. . . I. L. R. 20 Mad 392

116. ———— *Decision of Collector under Mad. Reg. V of 1822 when unappealed.* A case decided by a Collector under Regulation V of 1822, from whose decision no appeal was made, was held to be *res judicata*, and could not be re-opened before a Small Cause Court Judge. *UPPALAPATI GANAKAYA GARU v. BALAVI RAMUDU*

2 Mad. 475



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(c) REVENUE COURTS—*contd.*

But see *ADMULAM PILLAI v. KOVIL CHINNA PILLAI* . . . . . 2 Mad. 22

117. ———— Decision as to rate of rent—*Decision on agreement set up by tenant.* In a suit brought in a Revenue Court by a landlord against his tenant to enforce acceptance of a pottah at certain rates, for a certain year, the tenant pleaded that by virtue of a special agreement he was entitled to hold at favourable rates, but failed to establish this plea and a decree was passed in favour of the landlord. The tenant then sued in the Civil Court to establish his right to compel the landlord to grant him a pottah at favourable rates for the next year, by virtue of the special agreement put forward by him in the suit in the Revenue Court. *Held*, that the decision of the Revenue Court was no bar to the suit. *HARIKA RAMAYYAR v. SINDU TIRTASAMI*

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 61

118. ———— Former suit under Madras Rent Recovery Act (Mad. Act VIII of 1865)—*Jurisdiction of Revenue Court—Question of title.* In a suit for land it appeared that the defendant had obtained, under the Madras Rent Recovery Act, a judgment that the present plaintiff should accept from him a pottah for the land in question and deliver to him a corresponding muchalka and subsequently an order for ejectment, which was executed. The present plaintiff did not appear when the above orders were made. The defendant relied on these proceedings as constituting a bar to the present suit. *Held*, following *Harika Ramayyar v. Sunder Tirtasami*, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 61, that the decision of the Revenue Court was no bar to the suit. *GANGARAJU v. KONDIREDDI-SWAMI*

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 106

119. ———— Decision as to right to possession—*Dismissal of application by Collector to raise attachment.* S, the mortgagee of a talukhdari village, obtained a decree upon his mortgage against his mortgagor, the talukhdar of the village, under which S attached the village. The Collector of the district in which the attached village was situated thereupon came in under s. 246 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1859, and sought to raise the attachment, but, as he failed to appear when the matter came on for adjudication, his application was dismissed. The village was then sold under the decree and was purchased by S, the mortgagee. Upon S seeking to obtain possession of the village, he was resisted by the Collector, whereupon S (after proceedings ineffectually taken by him under s. 269 of the Code) filed a suit against the Collector praying to be put in possession of the village. *Held* by the Appellate Court (affirming the decision of *TUCKER, J.*), that the right of S to be put in possession of the village was, as between him and the Collector, *res judicata* by reason of the dismissal of the Collector's application under s. 246 of the Code (to set aside which dismissal the Collector had not filed a suit within the year allowed for that purpose),

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(c) REVENUE COURTS—*contd.*

and that S ought therefore to have been at once put in possession of the village without further proof of his title. *COLLECTOR OF AHMEDABAD v. SAMALDAS BRCHARDAS* . . . . . 9 Bom. 205

120. ———— Order of Mamlatdar under Bom. Act V of 1864—*Effect of order on mortgagee.* A mortgagee is not affected by the order of a Mamlatdar made under Bombay Act V of 1864 on the application of the mortgagor for possession subsequent to the date of the mortgage. *KISHNAJI NARAYAN v. GOVIND BRASKAR* . . . . . 9 Bom. 275

121. ———— Dismissal of suit by Mamlatdar on the merits—*Possessory suit in Mamlatdar's Court—Subsequent suit in Civil Court under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)—Mamlatdars' Act (Bom. Act III of 1876), s. 18—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 9.* A possessory suit filed in the Mamlatdar's Court was dismissed by the Mamlatdar on the merits. The plaintiff thereupon filed another suit under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) in a Civil Court which allowed the claim and passed a decree in his favour. The defendant applied to the High Court in its extraordinary jurisdiction and contended that the plaintiff's claim was *res judicata*, and that the Mamlatdar's decree barred the second suit. *Held*, that having regard to s. 18 of the Mamlatdars' Courts Act (Bom. Act III of 1876), the Mamlatdar's decision was not conclusive, and that the plaintiff was entitled to bring the second suit under s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act. *RAMCHANDA BALAJI PHADNIS v. NARSINHACHARYA YEDUNATHACHARYA KATTI*

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 251

122. ———— Decision of Revenue Court as to landholder's title—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 13—Madras Rent Recovery Act, s. 9.* In a summary suit filed by a landlord against his tenant in the Court of the Deputy Collector under the Madras Rent Recovery Act, s. 9, to enforce acceptance of a pottah by the defendant, it appeared that in a former suit between the same parties in the same Court, it had been decided that the defendant was the plaintiff's tenant, and as such bound to accept a pottah from him in respect of the land in question in the present suit. *Held*, that the defendant was not entitled in the present suit to dispute the plaintiff's title since the former decision constituted it *res judicata*. *VENKATACHALAPATI v. KRISHNA* . . . . . I. L. R. 13 Mad. 287

123. ———— Denial of relationship of landlord and tenant—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 103—Record-of-rights—Ejectment.* When there is a total denial of relation of landlord and tenant by one of the parties, a Revenue-officer has jurisdiction, in a proceeding under s. 103 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, to decide that question; but his decision, although it may have the force of a decree, cannot operate as *res judicata* in a subsequent suit in ejectment and for declaration of the



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(c) REVENUE COURTS—*contd.*

title, brought in a Civil Court. *DHARANI KANTA LAHIRI v. GABER ALI KHAN* (1902)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 339  
s.c. 7 C. W. N. 33

124. ———— *Ejectment—Act XII of 1881 (North-Western Provinces Rent Act), ss. 93, 95—Jurisdiction—Civil and Revenue Courts—Suit to eject as a trespasser a person who claimed to be entitled to succeed to the holding of a deceased occupancy-tenant.* Upon the death of an occupancy tenant, a person, who alleged that he was entitled to succeed the deceased in his holding, obtained mutation of names in his favour, and also got possession of the holding. The *zamindars* thereupon brought a suit in the Civil Court for ejectment of such person, as a trespasser who had no right whatever to succeed to the holding of the late occupancy-tenant. *Held*, that such a suit was properly brought in a Civil Court, and could not have been instituted in a Court of Revenue, and, further, that the decision of the Court of Revenue allowing mutation of names in the defendant's favour could not operate as *res judicata* in respect of the present suit. *Subarni v. Bhagwan Khan*, I. L. R. 19 All. 101, distinguished. *Sheo Narain Rai v. Parmeshar Rai*, I. L. R. 18 All. 270; *Dukhna Kuar v. Unkar Pande*, I. L. R. 19 All. 452, and *Kaliani v. Dassu Pande*, I. L. R. 20 All. 529, referred to. *BARU MAL v. NIADAR* (1901)

I. L. R. 23 All. 360

125. ———— *Act XII of 1881 (North-Western Provinces Rent Act), ss. 93, 95—Act XIX of 1873, s. 102—Jurisdiction—Civil and Revenue Courts—Suit to eject, as a trespasser, a person who claimed to be entitled to the holding of a deceased occupancy-tenant.* Upon the death of an occupancy-tenant, a person, who alleged that he was entitled to succeed to the deceased occupancy holding, obtained from the revenue-authorities, by means of an application under s. 102 of the North-Western Provinces Land-revenue Act, mutation of names in his favour, and also got into possession of the holding. The *zamindars* thereupon brought a suit in a Civil Court for his ejectment, on the allegation that he was a mere trespasser, who had no right whatever to succeed to the holding of their late occupancy-tenant. *Held*, that such suit was properly brought in a Civil Court, and could not have been instituted in a Court of revenue, and the decision of the Revenue-authorities, allowing mutation of names in the defendant's favour, could not operate as *res judicata* in respect of such suit. *Subarni v. Bhagwan Khan*, I. L. R. 19 All. 101, distinguished. *NIADAR v. BARU MAL* (1901)

I. L. R. 24 All. 153

126. ———— *Genuineness of document—Civil Procedure Code, s. 13—Decision by a Court of Revenue, in a suit for rent, as to the genuineness of a document, no bar to the determination of such issue by a Civil Court.* In a suit for rent brought in a Court of Revenue, the plaintiff produced in

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(c) REVENUE COURTS—*contd.*

support of his claim the counterpart of a lease alleged to have been executed by the defendant. The defendant denied execution; but the Revenue Courts, both original and appellate, decided against him that the counterpart was genuine. The defendant then brought a suit in a Civil Court, asking for a declaration that the counterpart in question was not executed by him, and was not a genuine document. *Held*, that the decision of the Revenue Courts could not operate as *res judicata*, such Courts having no jurisdiction to try the subsequent suit, and s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure being exhaustive on the subject of what constitutes a *res judicata*. *Gokul Mandar v. Pudmanund Singh*, 6 C. W. N. 825, referred to. *Rai Krishn Chand v. Mahadeo Singh*, All. Weekly Notes (1901) 49, distinguished. *GOMTI KUNWAR v. GUDRI* (1902)

I. L. R. 25 All. 138

127. ———— *Jurisdiction—Decision of Revenue Court, effect of—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13.* Under s. 13, Civil Procedure Code, a decree in a previous suit cannot be pleaded as *res judicata* in a subsequent suit, unless the Judge by whom it was made had jurisdiction to try and decide, not only the particular matter in issue, but also the subsequent suit itself in which the issue is subsequently raised. In this respect this section goes beyond the law laid down in the *Duchess of Kingston's Case*, 2 Smith's Leading Cases, 10th Ed. p. 713. *GOPAL MONDUL v. PUDMANUND SINGH* (1902)

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 707  
s.c. 6 C. W. N. 825  
L. R. 29 I. A. 196

128. ———— *Settlement Proceeding—Record-of-rights—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), Ch. X, ss. 105, 106—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Settlement Proceeding—Entry of rent—Procedure.* S. 105 of the Bengal Tenancy Act lays down that, during the pendency of the draft publication, any person affected by an entry in the record may raise an "objection" with regard to it, which the Revenue Officer is to "receive" and "consider" and dispose of in a summary manner. From an order disposing of such an "objection," there would be no appeal and no second appeal, and the order cannot have the effect of *res judicata*. A "dispute" under s. 106 is to be "heard" and "decided" by the Revenue Officer under the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for the trial of suits, and is subject to appeal and second appeal; and an order disposing of such a "dispute" will have the effect of *res judicata*. *Dengu Kazi v. Nobin Kishore Chowdhraiz*, 1 C. W. N. 291, considered and explained. *KARBAN ALI v. JAFAR ALI* (1901)

5 C. W. N. 798

129. ———— *Status of tenant and nature of holding—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 104, cl. (2), 107—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13.* During the preparation



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(c) REVENUE COURTS—*contd.*

of a record-of-rights of an estate under s. 103 of the Bengal Tenancy Act by a Settlement Officer, the landlord put in a petition under s. 104, cl. (2), of the Act for settlement of rent of a certain tenant's holding. The tenant, notwithstanding the fact that notice was served upon him, did not adduce any evidence, and the Settlement Officer decided that the tenant was an occupancy raiyat, and fixed a fair and equitable rent for the holding. Against this decision of the Settlement Officer, no appeal was preferred to the Special Judge. Subsequently, a suit was brought in the Civil Court by the tenant to have the class to which he belonged and the nature of his holding, *i.e.*, whether the rent was enhanceable or not, determined. The defence of the landlord was that, having regard to the decision of the Settlement Officer, the question could not be re-opened. *Held*, that, under the provisions of s. 104, cl. (2), and s. 107 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the decision of the Settlement Officer amounted to a decree, and the matters determined by that decision could only be re-opened on an appeal to the Special Judge. As no appeal was preferred, the decision became final, and the questions decided in that could not be re-opened in this suit. *DURGA CHURN LAL v. HATTEEN MANDAL* (1901) . I. L. R. 29 Calc. 252 s.c. 6 C. W. N. 238

130. ————— *Madras Rent Recovery Act (VIII of 1865), s. 72—Decision of Revenue Court on terms of pottah—Confirmation on appeal to District Court—Subsequent suit for rent—Res judicata.* The decision of a Revenue Court in a suit brought to settle the terms of the pottah for a certain fasli, that decision being confirmed on appeal by a District Court, is final and binding in all Courts in respect of rent recoverable for that fasli. *Villiamnalachie v. Sre Gulam Gouse Sahib* (Appeal No. 113 of 1900, unreported), followed. *VEDACHALA GRAMANI v. BOOMIAPPA MUDALIAR* (1904) . I. L. R. 27 Mad. 65

131. ————— *Question of title decided by a Court of Revenue.* The decision by a Court of Revenue of a question of title, though such decision was necessary for the disposal of the case before it, cannot prevent the same question being again litigated between the same parties in a Civil Court. *Debi Prosad v. Jafar Ali*, I. L. R. 3 All. 40 ; *Husain Shah v. Gopal Rai*, I. L. R. 2 All. 428 ; *Ajudhia Prosad v. Sheodin*, I. L. R. 6 All. 403 ; and *Gomti Kinwar v. Gudri*, All. Weekly Notes (1902) 230, referred to. *Rai Krishna Chand v. Mahadeo Singh*, All. Weekly Notes (1901) 49, and *Subarni v. Bhagwan Khan*, I. L. R. 19 All. 101, distinguished. *RANI KISHORI v. RAJA RAM* (1904)

I. L. R. 26 All. 468

132. ————— *Gujrat Talukdar's Act (Bombay Act VI of 1888), ss. 10, 11, 16 and 17—Talukdari Settlement Officer—Decision—Appeal—Second appeal—Subsequent suit in a Court of com-*

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*contd.*(c) REVENUE COURTS—*concl.*

*petent jurisdiction.* Certain proceedings, which had arisen out of an application to the Talukdari Settlement Officer under s. 11 of the Gujrat Talukdars' Act (Bombay Act VI of 1888) went up to the High Court in second appeal. Subsequently the same question having arisen between the same parties in a regular suit in a Court of competent jurisdiction : —*Held*, that the question was not *res judicata*. A Talukdari Settlement Officer is not a Court of jurisdiction competent to try the suit. He is an administrative officer according to the machinery prescribed by the Bombay Legislature. "In considering the competency of a Court for the purpose of deciding on a question of *res judicata*," the Court "must look to the powers of the Court in which the suit was instituted, and not to the powers of the Court by which that suit was decided on appeal." *Toponidhee Dhiraj Gir Gosain v. Sreeputty Sahanee*, I. L. R. 5 Calc. 832, 838, followed. *MALUBHAI v. SURSANGJI* (1905) . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 220

133. ————— *Finding of Revenue Court that there was no proper tender of patta is not res judicata in a civil suit for rent for the fasli.* A landlord tendered a patta twice to his tenant, the second tender being made two months after the first. In an action by the landlord in the Revenue Court to enforce acceptance of the second patta, the Revenue Court held that the second tender made more than a month after the first with a view to taking proceedings under s. 9 of the Madras Rent Recovery Act, was not legal. In a suit in the Civil Court by the landlord under s. 7 of the Rent Recovery Act to recover rent for the fasli on proving the second tender : *Held*, that the decision of the Revenue Court even if it amounted to a decision that there was no proper tender of patta, would not operate as *res judicata* as the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to decide the suit brought in the Civil Court. *Vedachella Gramany v. Boomiappa Mudaliar*, I. L. R. 27 Mad. 65, distinguished. *KIDAMBI VENKATACHARIAR v. LAKSHMI DOSS* (1907)

I. L. R. 31 Mad. 62

## (d) CRIMINAL COURTS. 1

134. ————— *Decision of Criminal Court—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 13—Suit by Hindu father for compensation for the loss of his daughter's services in consequence of her abduction—Compensation for costs of prosecuting abductor.* A Hindu sued for compensation for the loss of his daughter's services in consequence of her abduction by the defendant, and for the costs incurred by him in prosecuting the defendant criminally for such abduction. The defendant was convicted on such prosecution. *Held*, that the decision of the Criminal Court did not operate under s. 13 of Act X of 1877 to bar the determination in such suit of the question whether the defendant had or had not abducted the plaintiff's daughter. *RAM LAL v. TULA RAM*

I. L. R. 4 All. 97



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*9. COMPETENT COURT—*concl'd.*(d) CRIMINAL COURTS—*concl'd.*

135. ——— Conviction in Criminal case—*Subsequent civil suit for damages.* The conviction in a criminal case is not conclusive evidence in a civil suit for damages in respect to the same act. *BISHONATH NEOGY v. HURO GOBIND NEOGY* . . . . . 5 W. R. 27

136. ——— Decision as to validity of document in criminal case—*Subsequent suit in Civil Court.* A Civil Court is not bound by a Magistrate's view of the genuineness of a document. *NITTYANUND SURMAH v. KASHEENATH NYALUNKAR* . . . . . 5 W. R. 26

*JUGGUT MISSEER v. BABOO LALL* 5 W. R. Cr. 50

*OOMANATH ROY CHOWDERY v. RAGHOONATH MITTER*

Marsh. 43 : W. R. F. B. 10 : 1 Hay 75

## 10. RELIEF NOT GRANTED.

1. ——— Dismissal of suit without leave to bring fresh suit—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 373—Withdrawal of suit.* Expl. III of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code contemplates a decree which does not expressly grant the relief claimed: the termination of a suit by the plaintiff being allowed to withdraw it, without leave to bring a fresh one, is not a bar, under expl. III, to a subsequent suit in which the same matter is in issue. *KAMINI KANT ROY v. RAM NATH CHUCKERBUTTY* . . . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 265

2. ——— Refusal to give relief not claimed in plaint—*Subsequent suit for possession of the land not claimed—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2.* A B instituted a suit against V B to recover possession of one-half of a field. S N and B N, on their application, were made plaintiffs in that suit, but no alteration in the amount either of stamp or claim was made in the plaint. The Principal Sudder Ameen awarded to A B one-fourth of the field, and to S N and B N conjointly he awarded one-fourth, but as to the remaining one-half he passed no decree, as it had not been claimed in the plaint. S N and B N thereupon filed a fresh suit to recover possession of their remaining one-fourth of the field, and the Principal Sudder Ameen passed a decree in their favour. This decree was confirmed by the Joint Judge. Held, that the decrees of the lower Courts were erroneous, and that the claim of the plaintiffs was barred by the provisions of s. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, but leave was granted to them to apply to the Court below for a review of the decree passed in the former suit. *VYASRAV BALAJI v. SUBHAJI NARAYAN* . 5 Bom. A. C. 173

3. ——— Plaint in former suit, description of property in—*Variance between body of plaint and schedule.* The father of the appellant obtained a decree against G's widow and his reversionary heirs, who had intervened in the suit for possession of property mortgaged by the widow.

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*10. RELIEF NOT GRANTED—*contd.*

In the schedule annexed to the plaint the mortgaged property was described as "Mouzah B, usli with dakhili,"—that is, Mouzah V K and Mouzah M B,—but in the body of the plaint it was described simply as "Mouzah B." On the death of plaintiff in that suit, the reversionary heirs of G sued the appellant for an adjudication of their right to 16 annas of Mouzah M B, and it was found that Mouzahs B K and M B were not usli with dakhili, but distinct mouzahs, and that the mortgage-deed did not include mouzah M B. Held, affirming the judgment of the High Court, that in the first suit the Court was called on to adjudicate upon the property as described in the body of the plaint, and not as described in the schedule annexed thereto, and that the question in the latter suit was therefore not *res judicata*. *HET NARAIN SINGH v. RAM PERSHAD SINGH* . . . . . 7 C. L. R. 404

4. ——— Refusal to decide question of title—*Reference of party to another suit.* In a suit between A and B a question of title was raised and decided in B's favour in the Court of first instance, but on appeal the Judge refused to go into it, saying that B might bring a fresh suit. Held, that a subsequent suit by B raising the same question was not barred as *res judicata*. *Watson v. Collector of Rajshahye*, 3 B. L. R. P. C. 48 : 12 W. R. P. C. 43, cited and distinguished. *EMAMOODEEN SHOWDAGHUR v. FUTTEH ALI* . . . . . 3 C. L. R. 447

5. ——— Suit to determine issue left untried by Judge—*Fresh suit.* A fresh suit will not lie to determine an issue left untried by the Judge. The plaintiff's remedy, where such is the case, should be by special appeal to the High Court. *JUGGESSUR NUNDEE v. CHUNDER GOBIND SINGH* . . . . . 9 W. R. 524

6. ——— Declaratory decree—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 13—Maintenance suit, decree in—Annual payments.* A Hindu widow obtained a decree in 1876 which provided that she should receive future maintenance annually at a certain rate, but did not specify any date on which it should become due. In 1887 she filed the present suit claiming arrears of maintenance at the rate fixed in the decree of 1876. Held, that the suit did not lie. *Sabhanatha v. Lakshmi*, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 80, distinguished. *VENKANNA v. AITAMMA* . . . . . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 183

7. ——— Issue advisedly left undecided in former suit. In 1878 A, as the auction-purchaser of a talukh, sued 35 persons for possession of a part of this talukh. In this suit the issues raised were—(i) whether A had purchased the whole talukh, or an 8-anna share of the right, title, and interest of the judgment-debtors therein; (2) as to the correctness of the boundaries of the talukh as given in the plaint. The Court held that A had purchased the right, title, and interest of the judgment-debtors in the talukh, and as it appeared that some of the defendants were not judgment-debtors, and as it did not appear what portions of the talukh were held by the several defendants, the



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*10. RELIEF NOT GRANTED—*contd.*

lower Appellate Court dismissed the suit, with liberty to the plaintiff to bring a fresh suit within the proper time. In 1880 *A* brought a fresh suit against 16 of the same defendants and 19 others for possession of a portion of the same talukh. The issues raised were—(i) whether the suit was barred under s. 13 of the Code; (ii) whether *A* had purchased the whole or a portion of the talukh; (iii) whether the defendants were in possession of all the disputed land, and, if not, what portions of the talukh were held by the several defendants; (iv) as to the correctness of the boundaries of the talukh. The Munsif held that the suit was not barred, and on the merits gave *A* a decree. The Subordinate Judge held that the suit was barred, and refused to go into the merits. *Held*, that the question whether *A* had purchased the whole or only a portion of the talukh was *res judicata*, but that the question as to what lands *A* was entitled to by virtue of his purchase having been left undecided in the former suit, *A* was entitled to a decision on that point. *RAM CHARAN BUHARDAR v. REAZUDDIN*. I. L. R. 10 Calc. 856

8. ——— Judgment in former suit appealed from—*Stay of execution pending appeal—Review.* *Held*, that a former judgment by a Court of competent jurisdiction upon the same cause of action was conclusive between the same parties in a subsequent suit brought in another Court, notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal against it; but that the Judge passing a decree in the subsequent suit might, upon application made to him and security being given, stay the execution of it until the appeal in the former suit was decided, and might, if the decree in the former suit was reversed, entertain an application for the review of his own decision in the subsequent suit. *BULKIRAM NATHURAM v. GUJARAT MERCANTILE ASSOCIATION*

4 Bom. A. C. 81

9. ——— Affirming judgment in special appeal—*Affirmation in general terms by rejecting appeal.* In a special appeal the general affirmation of a judgment can only refer to the points raised by the appellant, the rejection of the appeal not necessarily affirming the other findings of fact or law incidentally arrived at by the lower Appellate Court. *AHMED HOSSEIN v. BANDEE*

15 W. R. 91

10. ——— Decision on issue not afterwards appealed from—*Preliminary issue.* The decision of an Appellate Court, on a preliminary issue of fact, which was not at the time appealed against, and which on a subsequent special appeal was not altered or noticed by the Special Appellate Court, is conclusive between the parties, and the issue determined cannot be re-opened on a second special appeal. *SUBHANJI BIN BAHIRJI v. BHAVANRAV BIN ANANDRAV*

1 Bom. 173

11. ——— Omission to appeal against adverse decision in one suit—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Effect of omission*

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*10. RELIEF NOT GRANTED—*contd.*

on decision in appeal in another. The decision of an issue in one of two suits tried together, which is not appealed against, cannot be treated as *res judicata* so far as the same issue is concerned in an appeal from the decision in the other suit. *A*, a ticcadar, sued *B* for rent in respect of a holding in the ticca. In that suit *B* pleaded that he was a partner of *A* in the ticca transaction, and that no rent was due from him in consequence thereof. *B* then sued *A* for an account of the partnership in the same transaction, and *A* in that suit denied the partnership. Both suits were heard together by the Munsif, who held *A* was not a partner. *B* appealed against the judgment and decree in the account-suit, but did not appeal against that in the rent-suit. It was contended on the appeal that the question as to whether *A* was or was not a partner was *res judicata*, by reason of the decision in the rent-suit not being appealed against and having become binding. *Held*, that s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply, and that the question was not *res judicata*. There was no bar at the time the issue was tried and decided by the Munsif, and the Appellate Court was bound to decide the appeal upon the evidence. *ABDUL MAJID v. JEW NARAIN MAHTO*

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 233

12. ——— Suit for possession and mesne profits—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 13, 211, 244—Decree for possession and mesne profits up to date of suit—Separate suit for subsequent mesne profits.* In a suit for recovery of possession and mesne profits, the Court has power under s. 211 of the Civil Procedure Code either to award mesne profits up to the date of the institution of the suit or up to the date of delivery of possession. And where a decree for possession is silent as regards mesne profits which have accrued between the date of the institution of the suit and delivery of possession, a separate suit will lie for such subsequent mesne profits, ss. 13 and 244 of the Code being no bar to it. *Sadasiva Pillai v. Ramalinga Pillai*, L. R. 2 I. A. 219; 15 B. L. R. 383; *Fakharuddin Mahomed Ashan Chowdhry v. Official Trustee of Bengal*, L. R. 8 I. A. 197; I. L. R. 8 Calc. 178; *Byjnath Pershad v. Badhoo Singh*, 10 W. R. 486; *Pratap Chandra Burua v. Swarnamayi*, 4 B. L. R. F. B. 113; 13 W. R. F. B. 15; and *Haramohini Chowdhurani v. Dhanmani Chowdhurani*, 1 B. L. R. A. C. 138, referred to. *MON MOHUN SIKKAR v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA*

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 968

13. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 13, 211, 244—Claim as to which judgment is silent—Mesne profits subsequent to suit.* In a suit for the partition of the zami dari, the plaintiffs asked (*inter alia*) for "ten years' past profits and for subsequent profits." The Judge passed a decree for partition, in which mesne profits for three years prior to the suit were decreed to the plaintiffs, but his judgment and decree were silent with regard to the subsequent profits claimed in the plaint. The defendant appealed against the decree, and the



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*10. RELIEF NOT GRANTED—*contd.*

plaintiffs preferred a memorandum of objections against part of it, but did not object to it so far as it omitted to provide for subsequent mesne profits. The plaintiffs instituted the present suit to recover from the defendants mesne profits from the date of the above suit. *Held*, that the plaintiffs' claim so far as concerned mesne profits, accrued since the decree in the former suit was not *res judicata*, and the suit to that extent was not precluded by the Civil Procedure Code, s. 13. **RAMABHADRA v. JAGANNATHA** . . . . . **I. L. R. 14 Mad. 328**

14. ———— *Ex parte decree for possession without mention of mesne profits—Subsequent suit for same mesne profits and for subsequent mesne profits—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13.* A suit was instituted for recovery of possession and for mesne profits. An *ex parte* decree for possession only was made, but that decree was silent as regarded the mesne profits. Subsequently a second suit was instituted for the same mesne profits as well as for mesne profits for a subsequent period. *Held*, that the claim for mesne profits prior to the institution of the first suit was barred under s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. **JIBAN DAS OSWAL v. DURGA PERSHAD ADHIKARI** . . . . . **I. L. R. 21 Calc. 252**

15. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 13, expl. III—Suit for possession of land and mesne profits past and future—Future mesne profits not granted—Subsequent suit for such future mesne profits.* *Held*, that, where a suit has been brought for possession of immoveable property and for mesne profits both before and after suit, the mere omission of the Court to adjudicate upon the claim for future mesne profits will not, by reason of s. 13, expl. III, of the Code of Civil Procedure, operate as a bar to a subsequent suit for mesne profits accruing due after the institution of the former suit. **Mon Mohun Sirkar v. Secretary of State for India**, **I. L. R. 17 Calc. 968**, followed. **Jiban Das Oswal v. Durga Pershad Adhikari**, **I. L. R. 21 Calc. 252**; **Pratap Chandra Burua v. Swarnamayi**, **4 B. L. R. A. C. 113**; **Julius v. Bishop of Oxford**, **L. R. 5 Ap. Cas. 214**; **In re Baker**, **L. R. 44 Ch. D. 262**; **Bhivray v. Sitaram**, **I. L. R. 19 Bom. 532**; and **Thyila Kandi Ummatha v. Thyila Kandi Cheria Kunhamed**, **I. L. R. 4 Mad. 308**, referred to. **Ramabhadra v. Jagannatha**, **I. L. R. 14 Mad. 328**, discussed. **Narain Das v. Khan Singh**, **Al. Weekly Notes (1884) 159**, overruled. **RAM DAYAL v. MADAN MOHAN LAL** . . . . . **I. L. R. 21 All. 425**

16. ———— *Dismissal of application to set aside ex parte decree and sale in execution on ground of fraud—Right to bring suit for same purpose without appealing against order.—Effect of not appealing against an appealable order—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 13, 108, 244, and 311.* The plaintiff, having applied unsuccessfully under ss. 108 and 311 of the Civil Procedure Code to set aside an *ex parte* decree against him and the sale of his property in execution there

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*10. RELIEF NOT GRANTED—*contd.*

of on the ground of fraud, and without preferring an appeal against the order rejecting his said application under s. 108 of the Code, instituted this suit praying for the same relief. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit as not maintainable. *Held*, that such a suit was maintainable, and that ss. 13 and 244 of the Civil Procedure Code were no bar thereto. The facts that his application under s. 108 was unsuccessful, and that he did not appeal against the order rejecting that application, did not disentitle him from prosecuting his remedy by suit on the ground of fraud. **Aad l Mazmdar v. Mahomed Gozi Chowdhry**, **I. L. R. 21 Calc. 605**, approved. *Held*, also, that, when there is an appeal against a decision, the effect of not appealing is that the decision holds good for what it is worth; so far as concerns any other modes of relief available, the person not appealing is in no worse position than if he had appealed and failed. **Raj Kishen Mookerjee v. Modhoo Soodun Mundle**, **17 W. R. 413**, distinguished. **PRAN NATH ROY v. MOHESH CHANDRA MOITRA** . . . . . **I. L. R. 24 Calc. 546**

17. ———— *Dismissal of application to set aside ex parte decree as barred by limitation—Suit to set aside as obtained by fraud—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 130 and s. 13.* An *ex parte* decree was passed against a defendant. The defendant judgment-debtor applied under s. 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure to have such *ex parte* decree set aside, but his application was dismissed as barred by limitation. *Held*, that the defendant was not thereafter precluded from bringing a suit to set aside the *ex parte* decree as having been obtained by fraud. **Pran Nath Roy v. Mohesh Chandra Moitra**, **I. L. R. 24 Calc. 546**, followed. **DWARKA PRASAD v. LACHHOMAN DAS** . . . . . **I. L. R. 21 All. 289**

18. ———— *Point decided by lower Court, but not dealt with on appeal—Issue as to enhancement of rent—Subsequent suit for enhancement.* In a suit for enhancement of rent, the Munsif found that the service of notice was sufficient, but that the rent could not be enhanced. On appeal, the District Judge found that the service was insufficient, and dismissed the suit, expressly declining to consider the question whether the rent was enhanceable. In a subsequent suit for enhancement by the same plaintiff against the same defendant, the Munsif found that no sufficient ground for enhancement had been made out, and dismissed the suit. On appeal, the District Judge agreed with the Munsif on this point, and held also that the decision of the Munsif in the first suit, that the rent could not be enhanced, was *res judicata*. *Held*, that, where the decision of a lower Court is appealed to a superior tribunal, which for any reason does not think fit to decide the matter, the question is left open, and is not *res judicata*. **CHUNDER COOMAR MITTER v. SIB SUN-DARI DASSEE** . . . . . **I. L. R. 8 Calc. 631 : 11 C. L. R. 22**



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*10. RELIEF NOT GRANTED—*contd.*

19. ———— **Effect of appealing against a judgment**—*Civil Procedure Codes (Act VIII of 189, s. 2; Act X of 1877, s. 13, expl. 4)*—*Title—Trespass—Damages*. When the judgment of a Court of first instance upon a particular issue is appealed against, that judgment ceases to be *res judicata*, and becomes *res sub judice*; and if the Appellate Court declines to decide that issue, and disposes of the case on other grounds, the judgment of the first Court upon that issue is no more a bar to a future suit than it would be if that judgment had been reversed by the Court of Appeal. *NILVARU v. NILVARU*. I. L. R. 6 Bom. 110

20. ———— **Effect of judgment pending appeal**—*Dismissal of appeal for want of prosecution*. The plaintiff sued to recover two villages from the defendants, claiming title from C, the purchaser. The first defendant alleged that her husband, not C, was the purchaser. This question was determined in a former suit, in which the present first defendant was plaintiff, and the present plaintiff defendant, in favour of the present plaintiff by the Civil Judge and the decision was confirmed on appeal by the Sudder Court. An appeal to Her Majesty in Council was dismissed for want of prosecution. *Held*, that the matter in issue was *res judicata*. *Quære*: Whether the former judgment could be deemed conclusive whilst an appeal was pending. *KARKARLAPUDI SURIYANARAYANARAZU GARU v. CHELLAMKURI CHELLAMMA*. 5 Mad. 176

21. ———— **Decision on a point of law subsequently disapproved of by a Full Bench**—*Suit as to same subject-matter*. Where a Division Bench of the High Court decided, as a point of law, that a property had not passed under a certain deed of sale, and subsequently the decision on that point of law was in another case disapproved of by a Full Bench, the decision of the Division Bench (where the same plaintiff has again sued to recover the same property, relying on the same deed of sale) is no less a *res judicata* because it may have been founded on an erroneous view of the law, or a view of the law which a Full Bench has subsequently disapproved. *GOWRI KOER v. AUDH KOER*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1087

Followed in *RAI CHURN GHOSE v. KUMUD MOHON DUTTA CHAUDHURI*. 1 C. W. N. 687

Same case on review. I. L. R. 25 Calc. 571  
2 C. W. N. 297

22. ———— **Application in execution for two reliefs**—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13, expln. III—Order passed granting one relief and making no reference to the other—Subsequent application for the other relief, power of Court to grant*. A decree awarded a plaintiff possession of land, together with mesne profits. Plaintiff subsequently applied, in execution, for delivery of the land, and for the mesne profits. The Court passed an order on this application, di-

RES JUDICATA—*contd.*10. RELIEF NOT GRANTED—*concl.*

recting plaintiff to be put into possession of the land, but making no reference whatever to the mesne profits. Plaintiff subsequently made another application for mesne profits, when it was contended that, inasmuch as the prayer for mesne profits had not been granted when the previous application was dealt with, it must be taken that the application for mesne profits had been refused, and that the matter was consequently *res judicata*. *Held*, that the application was not barred, and that the law of *res judicata*, as laid down in expln. III to s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, had no application to the case. *NITYANANDA GANTAYET v. GAJAPATI VASUDEVA DEVU* (1901)

I. L. R. 24 Mad. 681

23. ———— **Prior mortgage, omission to plead as a defence in a former mortgage suit**—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13, expln. II—Mortgage suit—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 85*. If a prior mortgagee is made a party to a suit brought by a subsequent mortgagee on a mortgage-bond of certain property, but omits to enter appearance and set up his prior right and claim that he should be paid off or that the property should be sold subject to his mortgage, his mortgage lien must be deemed to be extinguished. A suit subsequently brought by him or his heirs on his mortgage, is barred by expln. II of s. 13 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Sri Gopal v. Pirthi Singh*, I. L. R. 24 All. 429; I. L. R. 29 I. A. 118. *GOPAL LAL v. BENARSI PERSHAD CHOWDHURY* (1904)

I. L. R. 31 Calc. 428

24. ———— **Taking money decree on mortgage—Causes of action—Suit on mortgage—Refusal of relief—Relief claimed, but not granted—Second suit for sale**—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13, Expln. (3)*. Where a mortgagee had previously instituted a suit to enforce his security and was content in that suit to take merely a money decree, but failed to obtain satisfaction of the decree:—*Held*, that having regard to s. 13, expln. (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the decree operated as *res judicata*, and he was not entitled to bring another suit to realize the debt by the sale of the mortgaged property. *Jon-menjoy Mullick v. Dossmoney Dossee*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 714, and *Rajkishore Shaha v. Bhadoo Noshoo*, I. L. R. 7 Calc. 78, distinguished. *SHIBU BERA v. CHANDRA MOHUN JANA* (1906)

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 849

## 11. PRIVATE RIGHTS.

1. ———— **Prescriptive right**—*Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 13, expln. 5*. Expln. 5 of s. 13 of Act X of 1877 only applies to cases where several different persons claim an easement or other right under one common title, —as, for instance, where the inhabitants of a village claim by custom a right of pasturage over the same tract of land, or to take water from the same spring or well. Where therefore A, in defending



RES JUDICATA—*contd.*11. PRIVATE RIGHTS—*contd.*

a suit brought against him by *B* to have it declared that he had a right to build a wall across a drain, set up a prescriptive right to use the drain, and it was decided that no such prescriptive right existed in *A*, and subsequently *C* brought a suit against *B*, claiming to use the same drain as an easement, and asking for the removal of the wall in question in the former suit, and *B* set up the judgment in the suit between himself and *A* as a bar to the suit:—*Held*, that the right claimed by *C*, not being one which he and other inhabitants of the neighbourhood claimed under one common title, but a prescriptive right which he claimed individually in respect of his own house and premises and depending upon the length of time he had used the right, was a separate claim, and that the judgment in the suit between *B* and *A* did not operate as a bar to his suit. *KALISHUNKUR DOSS v. GOPAL CHUNDER DUTT*

I. L. R. 6 Calc. 49 : 6 C. L. R. 543

2. ———— *Right to use of water—Decision in former suit.* A decision in a former case, in which a mere question as to the use of the water in a water-course arose, cannot operate as *res judicata* in a subsequent case, in which the subject-matter is whether the defendants have the right of throwing up an embankment and obstructing the water-way. *MUNMOHUN SINGH v. AMRITNATH CHOWDHRY* . . . W. R. 1864, 167

3. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 2—Suit on same cause of action—Suit to obtain right of way.* Where a suit for right of way was once thrown out on the specific ground that according to plaintiff's own statement, the road in suit was a public one, and that the Court had no jurisdiction:—*Held*, that, as the real cause of action—namely, the obstruction of the road—was not decided in the first trial, s. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not bar a second suit for the removal of the obstruction. *NUREEM MUNDLE v. BORAMDY SIRDAR* . . . 25 W. R. 208

4. ———— *Right to fees for hereditary services—Decision in former suit.* In an action to recover fees claimed for services as an hereditary family and village priest, it appeared that a deceased brother of the plaintiff had recovered judgment against one of the defendants and others in an action for similar fees. *Held*, that the former judgment was not conclusive in favour of the plaintiff, nor as against a brother of one of the original defendants. *KRISHNAMBHAT BIN SHIVRAMBHAT v. LAKSHUMANBHAT BIN GANESHBHAT*

1 Bom. 141

5. ———— *Right to receive honours as priest of temple—Right decided in former suit.* Plaintiff sued to establish his right to receive certain honours in a temple as appertaining to his office of officiating priest of the temple, and to recover damages for the invasion of his right. In a former suit between the predecessor and the plaintiff and the first defendant, the claim to sit at the right side of the idol at festivals was admitted, but

RES JUDICATA—*concl.*11. PRIVATE RIGHTS—*concl.*

the right to receive a cake on the same occasion was disallowed. *Held*, that the claim of the plaintiff, so far as it sought to establish the plaintiff's right, was *res judicata*. *ARCHAKAM SRINIVASA DIKSHATULU v. UDAYAGIRY ANANTHA CHARLU*

4 Mad. 349

6. ———— *Right to water for irrigation—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 13n, expl. 5.* In 1881 *A* sued *B*, *C*, and others for damages for the loss of his crops by the diversion of a water-channel by the defendants. *A* claimed a right common to himself and other raiyats of his village to use the water during the day-time under an arrangement by which *B*, *C*, and the other defendants in the suit were entitled to use the water during the night time. In 1882 *A* and four other raiyats, not parties to the former suit, sued *B*, *C*, and thirteen others, not parties to the former suit, for a decree declaring that the plaintiffs were entitled to the exclusive use of the water in the channel by day. The lower Courts held that the suit was barred by s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, that, as between the plaintiffs other than *A* and the defendants and as between *A* and the defendants other than *B* and *C*, the suit was not barred by s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *THANAKOTI v. MUNIAPPA* . . . I. L. R. 8 Mad. 496

## RES NULLIUS.

See CRIMINAL MISAPPROPRIATION.

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 145

See STOLEN PROPERTY, OFFENCES RELATING TO . . . I. L. R. 11 Mad. 145

I. L. R. 8 All. 51

I. L. R. 9 All. 348

See THEFT . . . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 852

## RESPONDENT.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 368. 8 C. W. N. 442

See COSTS—SPECIAL CASES—RESPONDENTS.

See MESNE PROFITS.

I. L. R. 33 Calc. 329

See PARTIES—ADDING PARTIES TO SUITS—RESPONDENTS.

See PARTIES—SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES—RESPONDENTS.

See RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS ACT, s. 5.

8 C. W. N. 404

assent of—

See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—CASES IN WHICH AN APPEAL LIES OR NOT—SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW.

5 C. W. N. 193

cost of—

See PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—COSTS.

9 B. L. R. 460

11 B. L. R. 158

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 187

L. R. 24 I. A. 191

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**RESPONDENT—concl'd.**

## ——— death of—

See ABATEMENT OF SUIT—APPEALS.

I. L. R. 23 All. 22

I. L. R. 26 Bom. 203

See PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—  
DEATH OF PARTY ON RECORD.

I. L. R. 19 Calc. 513

L. R. 19 I. A. 108

## death of, pending appeal—

See LIMITATION. I. L. R. 34 Calc. 1020

## ——— not appearing in lower Court—

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—APPEAL.

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 228

## ——— notice to—

See PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF RE-  
HEARING. I. L. R. 19 All. 209

L. R. 24 I. A. 49

## ——— objections by—

See APPEAL—OBJECTIONS BY RESPON-  
DENT.See APPELLATE COURT—OBJECTIONS TAKEN  
FOR FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 5.

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 249

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—APPEAL.

See PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—PRAC-  
TICE AS TO OBJECTIONS.

## ——— withdrawal of, from appeal—

See INSOLVENCY ACT, s. 73.

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 189

**RESTITUTION.**See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, ss. 244,  
583. I. L. R. 33 Calc. 857See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 583.  
12 C. W. N. 642**RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS.**See BURMA CIVIL COURTS ACT, 1875, s. 49.  
I. L. R. 13 Calc. 232See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, ss. 258,  
260 (1859, s. 200).

I. L. R. 1 All. 501

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 101

11 Moo. I. A. 551

See HINDU LAW—HUSBAND AND WIFE.

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 751

See HINDU LAW—MARRIAGE—RESTRAINT  
ON, OR DISSOLUTION OF, MARRIAGE.

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 305

See HINDU LAW—MARRIAGE—VALIDITY  
OR OTHERWISE OF MARRIAGES.

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 400

See JURISDICTION—CAUSES OF JURISDIC-  
TION—CAUSE OF ACTION—RESTITUTION  
OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS.

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 316

**RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS**

—cont'd.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 23.

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 714, 715 note

I. L. R. 13 All. 126

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 307

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART.  
35. I. L. R. 25 Bom. 644

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 307

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—DOWER.

I. L. R. 1 All. 483

I. L. R. 2 All. 831

I. L. R. 8 All. 149

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 327

I. L. R. 30 Bom. 122

See MAHOMEDAN LAW—RESTITUTION OF  
CONJUGAL RIGHTS.

See MARRIAGE. I. L. R. 12 Calc. 706

See PARSIS. I. L. R. 23 Bom. 279

See VALUATION OF SUIT—SUITS.

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 232

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 378

## ——— second suit for—

See RES JUDICATA—CAUSE OF ACTION.

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 327

1. ——— Right of suit—*Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Suit by husband against wife for restitution of conjugal rights.* A suit by husband, against wife for restitution of conjugal rights will lie in the Civil Courts. *JHOTUN BEEBEE v. AMEER CHAND*. 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 317

S.C. CHOTUN BEBEE v. AMEER CHUND

6 W. R. 105

2. ——— Suit to recover possession of wife. Held, that a suit by a husband to recover possession of the person of his wife will lie *HUR SOOKHA v. POORUN*. 2 Agra 115

(Contra) *MELARAM NUDIAL v. THANOORAM BAMUN*. 9 W. R. 552

3. ——— Parsis—*Ecclesiastical law.* A suit for the restitution of conjugal rights, which is strictly an ecclesiastical proceeding cannot, consistently with the principles and rules of ecclesiastical law, be applied to parties who profess the Parsi religion. *ARDASEV CURSETJEE v. PEROZEBOYE*. 6 Moo. I. A. 348; 4 W. R. P. C. 91

4. ——— Suit for restitution by Mahomedan before payment of dower. A suit will not lie by a Mahomedan to enforce the return of his wife to his house, even after consummation with consent, until her dower (prompt) has been paid. *ABDOOL SHUKKOAR v. RAHEEM-ON-NISSA*. 6 N. W. 94

5. ——— Suit by Mahomedan husband against wife—*Procedure—Beng. Reg. IV of 1793, s. 15.* A Mahomedan husband may institute a suit in the Civil Courts of India to enforce his marital rights by compelling his wife against her will to return to cohabitation with him, and such suit must, under the imperative words of s. 15,



**RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS**—*contd.*

Regulation IV of 1793, and the nature of the thing be determined according to the principles of Mahomedan law. *JUDDOONATH BOSE v. SHUMSOONISSA BEGUM. BUZLOOR RUHEEM v. SHUMSOONISSA BEGUM*. 8 W. R. P. C. 3: 11 Moo. I. A. 551

6. ——— **Hindu husband, convert to Christianity.** A Hindu husband who has been repudiated by his wife on his conversion to Christianity cannot sue for the restitution of conjugal society. *MUCHOO v. ARZOON SAHOO* 5 W. R. 235

7. ——— **Mahomedan converted to Christianity.** *Semble*: That where persons of Mahomedan faith are married according to the Mahomedan law, and either party becomes a convert to Christianity, a claim for restitution of conjugal rights cannot be supported. *ZUBURDUST KHAN v. HIS WIFE* . . . . . 2 N. W. 370

8. ——— **Right to decree—Marriage complete except one ceremony which would have altered status of woman as to caste.** Where a man who had been married to a woman, but had failed to go through the second ceremony, without which, according to the customs of his caste, the woman would have been defiled had he obtained possession of her, and had actually married a second wife, and left the first woman to believe that she was at liberty to contract another marriage, which she did, brought a suit against her for restitution of conjugal rights:—*Held*, that, though after a first marriage a man's right to the person of his wife was complete, yet where, as in the present case, there were other ceremonies which were usual, but had been neglected, and the claimant had not shown cause for his neglect, he was not entitled to a decree. *BOOLCHAND KOLTA v. JANOKEE* . 25 W. R. 386

9. ——— **Custom as to child-wife living apart from husband till puberty.** Where it was the universal custom of the community to which the plaintiff belonged that a child-wife should remain away from her husband until a certain event had occurred, a Court was *held* to have been justified, while such contingency had not happened, in refusing to order such a wife to go to her husband, although the marriage was valid. *SUN-TOSH RAM DOSS v. GERU PATUCK* . 23 W. R. 22

10. ——— **Agreement to separate, suit to set aside—Consent of wife.** Where a husband and wife (Hindus) thirteen years previously had agreed to separate, the husband having treated his wife with cruelty, and kept his sister-in-law as his mistress, and was still so keeping her at the date of the institution of the suit, and further, had not contributed to the maintenance of his wife during the period of the separation:—*Held*, that the husband was not entitled, without his wife's consent, to have that agreement set aside or to insist upon restitution of conjugal rights. *MOOLA v. NUNDY* . . . . . 4 N. W. 109

11. ——— **Specific performance of contract of marriage made in infancy—Suit**

**RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS**—*contd.*

by a husband—*Marriage during wife's infancy—Non-consummation of marriage—Hindu law—Poverty of husband.* A, Hindu, aged nineteen years, was married by one of the approved forms of marriage to B, then of the age of even years, with the consent of B's guardians. After the marriage, B lived at the house of her step-father, where A visited from time to time. The marriage was not consummated. Eleven years after the marriage,—viz., in 1884,—the husband called upon the wife to go to his house and live with him, and she refused. He thereupon brought the present suit, praying for restitution of conjugal rights, and that the defendant might be ordered to take up her residence with him. *Held*, that the suit was not maintainable. *DADAJI BHIKAJI v. RUKHMABAI* I. L. R. 9 Bom. 529

*Held*, on appeal, reversing the decree, that the suit was maintainable, and that the case should be remanded for a decision on the merits. *DADAJI BHIKAJI v. RUKHMABAI* . I. L. R. 10 Bom. 301

12. ——— **Plea of impossibility of sexual intercourse—Legal defences to suit for restitution—Discretion of Judge to refuse decree except when legal plea is proved—Husband and wife.** A plea by a wife that sexual intercourse with her is impossible owing to her incurable disease or physical malformation is not in itself a good defence to a suit by the husband for restitution of conjugal rights. A Judge has no discretion to refuse a decree for restitution of conjugal rights for other causes than those which in law justify a wife from refusing to return to live with her husband, and he cannot abstain from passing a decree in favour of a plaintiff-spouse, because he considers that it would not be for the benefit of either side that the decree should be granted. *Dadaji v. Rukhmabai*, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 301, followed. Where, therefore, the lower Appellate Court found that there was no cruelty, but that the suit was brought by the husband as a counter-move to defeat the claim of his wife for separate maintenance, and a considerable time after she had ceased to live in his house, and because on the last occasion when she returned to live with him she left the house crying:—*Held*, that these circumstances were not sufficient in law to justify the Court in refusing the husband's claim for restitution of conjugal rights. *PURSHOTAMDAS MANICKLAL v. BAIMANI* I. L. R. 21 Bom. 610

13. ——— **Suit by Hindu husband out of caste at time of suit—Husband and wife—Hindu law—Decree for restitution conditional on plaintiff's obtaining restoration to caste.** In a suit by a Hindu, a Sunar by caste, against his wife for restitution of conjugal rights, it was found that the plaintiff, in consequence of having left his wife and cohabited with a Mahomedan woman (whom, however, he had left at the time of suit), had been turned out of caste, but that the misconduct of which he had been guilty was not of such a character as to render him liable to perpetual excommunication, and upon making certain



### RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS —*contd.*

amends, he could obtain restoration to his caste. *Held*, that, while the plaintiff was entitled to come into Court for the relief prayed, unless, in the circumstances above stated the marriage had, under the Hindu law, been dissolved, the Court was bound, when asked to employing coercive process to compel a wife to return to her husband, not to disregard any reasonable objection she might raise to such process being granted, either on the ground that she had been subjected before to personal injury or cruelty at the hands of her husband, or that she went in fear of one or the other, or that the husband was actually living in adultery with another woman, or that, if she resumed cohabitation or association with him, he being outcasted, she would herself incur the risk of being put out of caste. *Held*, therefore, that in decreeing a claim of this description a Court was entitled, if it saw good reason to do so, while recognizing the civil rights of husband to his wife to put such conditions upon the enforcement of his rights by legal process as the circumstances of the case might fairly demand; and that, applying this principle to the present case, the defendant might reasonably ask the Court, before compelling her return to her husband, to make it a condition that he should first obtain his restoration to caste. *Held*, also, that, under the Hindu law, the fact that a husband had had adulterous intercourse with another woman, which had ceased at the time of suit, was not an answer to a claim by him for restitution of conjugal rights. *PAIGI v. SHEONARAIN*

I. L. R. 8 All. 78

14. ———— *Ground for suit—Mahomedan law—Dower—Lien of wife for dower.* In a suit brought by a husband for restitution of conjugal rights, the parties being Sunni Mahomedans governed by the Hanafi law, the defendant pleaded that the suit was not maintainable, as the plaintiff had not paid her dower-debt. The plaintiff thereupon deposited the whole of the dower-debt in Court. It appeared that the defendant's dower had been fixed without any specification as to whether it was to be wholly or partly prompt. It also appeared that she had attained majority before the marriage, and that she had cohabited with the plaintiff for three months after marriage, and there was no evidence that she had ever demanded payment of her dower before the suit was filed, or that she had refused cohabitation on the ground of non-payment. Besides the plea already mentioned, she also relied upon allegations of divorce and cruelty, but these allegations were found to be untrue. The lower Appellate Court dismissed the suit, holding that, inasmuch as the plaintiff had not paid the dower-debt at the time when he brought his suit, he had no cause of action under the provisions of the Mahomedan law. *Held*, by the Full Bench, that the lower Appellate Court's view of the Mahomedan law relating to conjugal rights and the husband's obligation to pay dower was erroneous; and that the plaintiff, under the circumstances of the case, had a right to maintain the suit. *ABDUL KADIR v. SALIMA*

I. L. R. 8 All. 149

### RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS —*contd.*

15. ———— *Mahomedan law—Dower—Prompt dower—Stipulation as to residence.* In a suit by a Mahomedan husband for restitution of conjugal rights the defendant, his wife, pleaded first that he had entered into a stipulation at the time of the marriage to reside with her in the house of her father and that he had not done so; and, secondly, that he had not paid the exigible portion of the dower due to her, the marriage having been consummated:—*Held*, as to the first point, upon the facts (after referring to the authorities, but without deciding whether a stipulation of this kind can be valid in any case), that the stipulation relied upon was not a sufficient answer to the plaintiff's claim. *Held*, upon the authorities, that the non-payment of prompt dower is not a sufficient plea in bar of such a suit. *ABDUL KADIR v. SALIMA*, I. L. R. 8 All. 149, approved. *HAMIDUNNESSA BIBI v. ZOHIRUDDIN SHEIK*

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 670

16. ———— *Hindu law—Defence to suit—Cruelty of husband.* A suit for restitution of conjugal rights may be maintained by a Hindu: but, *quære*, if the same state of circumstances which would justify such a suit or which would be an answer to such a suit in the case of a European would be equally so in the case of a Hindu. Where cruelty on the part of the husband has been condoned by the wife, a much smaller measure of offence would be sufficient to neutralize the condonation than would have justified the wife, in the first instance, in separating from her husband. But the act or acts constituting the offence must be of such a nature as to give the wife just reason to suppose that the husband is about to renew his former course of conduct, and consequently to entertain well-founded apprehension for her personal safety. *JOGENDRONUNDINI DOSSEE v. HURRY DOSS GHOSE*

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 500 : 5 C. L. R. 65

17. ———— *Defence to suit—Cruelty of husband.* If the wife raise a defence of cruelty, she must prove violence of such a character as to endanger or cause a reasonable apprehension of danger to her personal health or safety. The *ratio decidendi* in such a case considered and laid down. *JUDOO NATH BOSE v. SHUMSOONNISSA BEGUM*, *BUZLOOR RUHEEM v. SHUMSOONNISSA BEGUM*

8 W. R. P. C. 3 : 11 Moo. I. A. 551

18. ———— *Husband and wife—Cruelty—Action for harbouring wife—Civil Procedure Code, 1853, s. 200.* In a suit by a Hindu husband against his wife for the restitution of conjugal rights, the criterion of legal cruelty, justifying the wife's desertion, is the same in this country as in England, *viz.*, whether there has been actual violence of such a character as to endanger personal health or safety, or whether there is the reasonable apprehension of it. Every person who receives a married woman into his house, and suffers her to continue there after he has received notice from the husband not to harbour her, is



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liable to an action for damages or injunction, unless the husband has by his cruelty or misconduct forfeited his marital rights, or has turned his wife out of doors, or has by some insult or ill-treatment, compelled her to leave him. *YAMUNABAI v. NARAYAN MORESHWAR PENDSE*. I. L. R. 1 Bom. 164

19. ————— *Suit by husband—Leprosy.* To a suit brought by a Hindu husband against his wife for the restitution of conjugal rights, the fact that he is at the time of such suit suffering from a loathsome disease, such as leprosy, is a good defence. *BAI PREMDEVAR v. BHUKA KALLIANJI*. 5 Bom. A. C. 209

20. ————— *Divorce—Hindu law—Custom.* Where a Hindu sued his wife for restitution of conjugal rights and the defendant pleaded divorce, it was held that, though the Hindu law does not contemplate divorce, still in those districts where it is recognized as an established custom it would have the force of law. *KUDOMEE DOSSEE v. JOTEERAM KOLITA*. I. L. R. 3 Calc. 305

21. ————— *Declaration of nullity of marriage—Divorce Act, s. 53.* It is competent to the Court in a suit for restitution of conjugal rights to make a declaration of nullity of marriage if the respondent shows himself entitled to such relief. *LOPEZ v. LOPEZ*. I. L. R. 12 Calc. 706

22. ————— *Presumption of validity of marriage—Consent of lawful guardian—Non-performance of ceremonies.* The ceremony of nandimukh or bridhishradh is not an essential of Hindu marriage, nor would the want of consent by the lawful guardian necessarily invalidate such marriage. In a suit for restitution of conjugal rights, the fact of the celebration of marriage having been established, the presumption, in the absence of anything to the contrary, is that all the necessary ceremonies have been complied with. *BRINDABUN CHUNDR KURMOKAR v. CHUNDR KURMOKAR*. I. L. R. 12 Calc. 140

23. ————— *Form of decree—Order for restitution—Order for recovery of wife's person.* A Civil Court cannot pass a decree for the recovery of the person of a wife, the proper order being for the restitution of conjugal rights. *MELARAM NUDIAL v. THANOORAM BAMUN*. 9 W. R. 552

24. ————— *Declaratory order—Order for delivery of wife to husband.* Held (by JACKSON, J., and MACPHERSON, J.), that the decree in a suit for restitution of conjugal rights ought to be declaratory only, and to be enforced in case of disobedience by attachment. Held (by SETON-KARR, J.), that the wife may be ordered to be delivered over to her husband. *JHOTUN BIBEE v. AMEER CHUND*. 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 317

*CHOTUN BEBEE v. AMEER CHUND*  
6 W. R. 105

25. ————— *Order enjoining wife to return to husband—Order to abstain from preventing her return.* In a suit for restitution of

**RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS**—*contd.*

conjugal rights brought against a wife and certain persons said to be detaining her from her husband, the proper form of decree is one enjoining the wife to return to her husband, and the other co-defendants to abstain from preventing her return. *JAFFREE KHANUM v. IMDAD HOSSEIN*

2 N. W. 314

*KUROONAMOYEE DEBEE v. GUNGADHUR SURMAH*  
20 W. R. 50

*LALL NATH MISSER v. SHEOBURN PANDEY*  
20 W. R. 92

26. ————— *Order for bodily delivery of wife to husband.* *Quære:* Whether the Court can enforce its order on a wife to return to her husband by giving her over bodily into her husband's hands. *JUDONATH BOSE v. SHUMSOONNISSA BEGUM. BUZLOOR RUHEEM v. SHUMSOONNISSA BEGUM*

8 W. R. P. C. 3 : 11 Moo. I. A. 551

27. ————— *Execution of decree—Order for return of wife, and against interference to prevent return.* Held, that a decree for restitution of conjugal rights should be passed in the form that the husband is entitled to conjugal rights, that his wife do return to live with him, and that her parents do not interfere in any manner to prevent her so doing. *RAM TAHUL v. MADHO*

2 Agra 111

*KOOBUR KHANSAMA v. JAN KHANSAMA*  
8 W. R. 467

28. ————— *Order for return of wife—Procedure on failure to comply with order.* In suits for restitution of conjugal rights the decree should be in the form that the wife do return to her husband, with which decretal order if she fails to comply, she may be dealt with under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to attachment and imprisonment for non-performance of the act decreed, for a wife cannot be delivered in execution as a chattel. *TOOFFEAH v. JUSSOUDA*

2 Agra 337

*IMAMUN v. MAHOMED MAJEEDOOLLAH*  
3 Agra 88

29. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (VIII of 1859), s. 200.* Per MARKBY, J.—In a suit by a husband for restitution of conjugal rights, a decree that “the case be decreed awarding the plaintiff to take defendant as his married wife,” is not a proper form of decree. The decree may order the wife to return to her husband's protection, but such a decree is not one which can be enforced in the manner provided by s. 200, Act VIII of 1859, as being an order “for the performance of a particular act.” *GATHA RAM MISTREE v. MOOHITA KOCHIN ATTEAH DONOONEE*

14 B. L. R. 298 : 23 W. R. 179

30. ————— *Execution of decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 200.* *Semble:* That a decree for restitution of conjugal rights between Mahomedans or Hindus may be enforced under



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s. 200 of Act VIII of 1859. *YAMUNABAI v. NARAYAN MORESHWAR PANDSE*. I. L. R. 1 Bom. 164

31. ————— Decree under *Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act (XV of 1865)*, s. 36—*Enforcing decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 200.* A decree for restitution of conjugal rights under the *Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act* is enforceable only in the manner provided in s. 36 of the Act; such provision is in substitution of, and not in addition to, the ordinary remedies provided by s. 200 of the *Code of Civil Procedure*. *ARDESAR JAHANGIR FRAMJI v. AVABAI*. 9 Bom. 290

32. ————— Maintenance order obtained by a wife against husband—Subsequent decree for restitution of conjugal rights obtained by a husband—Effect of such decree on previous order of maintenance—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882)*, s. 488. A decree of a Civil Court for restitution of conjugal rights supersedes any previous order of a Magistrate for maintenance, if the wife should persist in refusing to live with her husband. A Magistrate ought to cancel a previous order of maintenance made by him, or rather treat it as determined, if the wife failing to comply with the decree for restitution refuses to live with her husband. *In re BULAKIDAS*

I. L. R. 23 Bom. 484

*LUPOFEE DOOMONY v. TIKHA MOODOI*

13 W. R. Cr. 52

33. ————— Minority of wife—Husband and wife—Hindu law—Marriage—Right of suit—Jurisdiction of Civil Courts—Suit by husband for possession of wife—*Limitation Act (XV of 1877)*, s. 23, and Sch. II, Arts. 35 and 129—Cause of action—Demand and refusal—Restitution conditional on restoration to caste—Dispute as to validity of marriage—Proof of rites and ceremonies. In a suit for the restitution of conjugal rights between Hindus, the lower Courts having found that the defendant wife was of sufficient age to be fit to live with her husband as wife, it was held that the suit was maintainable, in spite of the fact that the wife was a minor, although in some cases it might be necessary to impose suitable terms on the husband. The *Limitation Act* is not intended to define or create causes of action, but only to prescribe the period within which existing rights may be enforced. When, in a suit for the restitution of conjugal rights, the validity of the marriage itself is disputed, it is not enough to find that the marriage took place, leaving it to be presumed that the rites and ceremonies necessary to constitute a legal marriage in the particular case were performed. The Court must find specifically what these rites and ceremonies are, and whether they were performed. Art. 35, Sch. II, of the *Limitation Act* does not apply to suits for restitution of conjugal rights between Hindus. *SURJYAMONI DAS v. KALI KANTA DAS* (1900)

I. L. R. 28 Calc. 37  
s.c. 5 C. W. N. 195

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34. ————— Suit by an excommunicated member of a caste—Husband and wife—Mussalman Kharwa Community of Broach—Custom. The plaintiff, an excommunicated member of the Mussalman Kharwa community of Broach sued his wife (defendant No. 1) for restitution of conjugal rights. At the time of their marriage, the parties were members of the caste; but subsequently the plaintiff was excommunicated from his caste. The defendant contended that she should not be compelled by the Court to go and live with him as his wife before the plaintiff was re-admitted into the caste. Held, upholding the contention, that at the time of marriage she was not only a Mahomedan by faith but also a member of the Kharwa community; occupying that status, she married the plaintiff. It was, therefore, of the essence of the marriage contract that they married because they were members of that particular community and they must be regarded as having entered into the marital relation on the basis of that status. *BAI JINA v. KHARWA JINA* (1907)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 366

35. ————— Jurisdiction of Munsif—Bengal, North-Western Provinces and Assam Civil Courts Act (XII of 1887), ss. 18, 19, 21—Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), ss. 9, 11—Valuation of suit—Jurisdiction—Mahomedan marriage, requirements of. A suit for restitution of conjugal rights is not triable by a Munsif under s. 19, sub-s. (1) of Act XII of 1887, but is triable by a District Judge or a Subordinate Judge under s. 18 of that Act. *Matra Mondol v. Hari Mohun Mullick*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 157; *Golam Rahman v. Fatima Bibi*, I. L. R. 1 Calc. 232; *Mowla Nawaz v. Sujidunnissa Bibi*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 378; and *Shire v. Shire*, 5 Moo. P. C. 81, referred to. Where a Court of first instance exercised jurisdiction with respect to a suit by reason of an arbitrary valuation and no objection to jurisdiction was taken in that Court:—Held, that the suit ought not to be dismissed by an Appellate Court on the ground of want of jurisdiction, regard being had to s. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act. *Semble*: When a Judge has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a suit, the parties cannot by their mutual consent convert it into a proper judicial process. *Ledgard v. Bull*, I. L. R. 9 All. 191; I. L. R. 13 I. A. 134; *Meenakshi Naidoo v. Subramaniya Sastri*, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 26; I. L. R. 14 I. A. 160, and *Raja Har Narain Singh v. Chaudhurain Bhagwant Kuar*, I. L. R. 13 All. 300; I. L. R. 18 I. A. 55, referred to. The formal requirements of a valid Mahomedan marriage discussed. *Badal Aurat v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 79, referred to. *AKLEMANNESSA BIBI v. MAHOMED HATEM* (1904). I. L. R. 31 Calc. 849  
8 C. W. N. 705

36. ————— Restitution of conjugal rights—Appeal—Jurisdiction—Valuation of suit—Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), ss. 1, 21—Jurisdiction of Munsifs—Civil Courts Act (XII of



## RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS —*contd.*

1887), ss. 18, 19, 21—*Practice*. An appeal from a decree in a suit for restitution of conjugal rights, valued at less than 1,000 rupees and instituted in the Court of a Subordinate Judge without any objection by the defendant, lies to the District Court and not to the High Court. The plaintiff in a suit for restitution of conjugal rights is the proper person to value his suit; but if from improper motives he undervalues or overvalues it, the Court must decide what should be the proper value. The decision in *Aklemannessa Bibi v. Mahomed Hatem*, I. L. R. 31 Calc. 849, as to the jurisdiction of a Munsif to entertain such a suit is an *obiter dictum*. *Zair Husain Khan v. Khurshed Jan*, I. L. R. 28 All. 545, referred to. *Golam Rahman v. Fatima Bibi*, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 236, and *Mowla Newaz v. Sajidunnissa Bibi*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 378, discussed and distinguished. *JAN MAHOMED MANDAL v. MASHAR BIBI* (1907) . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 352

37. ——— *Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), ss. 9 and 21—Valuation of suit—Jurisdiction*. A suit for restitution of conjugal rights is not a suit, which is of necessity excluded from the jurisdiction of a Munsif. The value of such a suit is, as a rule, the value which the plaintiff chooses to put upon it, provided that the suit be not unwarrantably undervalued or overvalued from improper motives. *Aklemannessa Bibi v. Mahomed Hatem*, I. L. R. 31 Calc. 849, dissented from. *Golam Rahman v. Fatima Bibi*, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 232, *Mowla Newaz v. Majid-un-nissa Bibi*, I. L. R. 18 Calc. 378, *Shire v. Shire*, 5 Moo. P. C. 81, and *D'Orliac v. D'Orliac*, 24 Moo. P. C. 374, distinguished. *Sheodeni Ram v. Tulshi Ram*, I. L. R. 15 All. 378, *Jag Lal v. Hur Narain Singh*, I. L. R. 10 All. 524, *Mahabir Singh v. Bekari Lal*, I. L. R. 13 All. 320, *Madho Das v. Ramji Pathak*, I. L. R. 16 All. 286, and *Lakshman Bhatkar v. Babaji Bhatkar*, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 31, referred to. *ZAIR HUSAIN KHAN v. KHURSHED JAN* (1906) I. L. R. 28 All. 545

38. ——— *Cruelty—Matrimonial offence—Restitution of conjugal rights—Hindu Law—Husband and Wife—Safety of wife in peril*. *Per HARRINGTON, J.*—It would not be safe to say that whatever is a defence to an action for restitution of conjugal rights in the case of a European would also be in every case a defence in the case of a Hindu, but the Court is not bound, in the case of Europeans and Indians alike, to order a wife to return to her husband if there is reasonable ground for apprehending that a return to that husband will imperil her safety. *Per MOOKERJEE, J.*—The conduct of a Hindu husband, who brings a low caste woman as his mistress in the house to live with him as a member of the family, and expels his wife and son from the family residence, amounts to cruelty within the meaning of the law, which justifies the wife to live separate from her husband and deprives the husband of his rights to a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. The husband would not be entitled to succeed even if his conduct

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did not amount to cruelty but constituted a grave matrimonial offence. *DULAR KOER v. DWARKA NATH MISSEER* (1905) . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 971

39. ——— *Mahomedan law—Suit for restitution of conjugal rights—Legal cruelty—Other misconduct of the plaintiff pleaded as a defence to the suit*. In a suit for restitution of conjugal rights, the parties being Mahomedans, if the defendant raises a plea of legal cruelty, the facts to be proved to establish such a plea are similar to those which must be proved to establish a similar plea under the English law. *Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem v. Shumsoonnissa Begum*, 11 Moo. I A. 551, referred to. But in a suit for restitution brought by the husband, misconduct of the plaintiff falling short of legal cruelty may be a ground for the Court refusing relief. Thus where the plaintiff apparently only brought his suit on account of his wife having filed another suit against the plaintiff's father, and in his plaint accused his wife of immorality of the most serious kind, a charge which he totally failed to substantiate, it was held that the Court would be justified in refusing him relief. *Mackenzie v. Mackenzie*, [1895] A. C. 384, referred to. On the general facts of the case also it was found that the defendant had reasonable grounds for believing that her health and safety would be endangered if she returned to her husband's house, which was situated in a native State. *HUSAINI BEGAM v. MUHAMMAD RUSTAM ALI KHAN* (1907). I. L. R. 29 All. 222

## RESTITUTION OF PROPERTY.

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, ss. 244, 583 . I. L. R. 29 All. 348

## RESTITUTION OF RIGHTS BY MOTION.

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 179—

### NATURE OF APPLICATION—GENERALLY.

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 448

1. ——— *Restitution of rights by motion where the appellate decree does not mention restitution—Execution pending appeal of decree set aside on appeal—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 553*. Where a decree made by a Court of first instance is executed pending an appeal, and on appeal such decree is set aside, the appellant is entitled by motion to obtain restitution, even though the decree of the Court of appeal is silent as to such restitution. *A*, the owner of a 15 odd pie share of certain indigo land, brought a suit for partition against his co-sharer *B*, the owner of the rest of the land, and obtained a decree, from which *B* appealed. *A*, without waiting for the disposal of the appeal, executed his decree and obtained possession of his share, settling it with tenants. The decree was subsequently set aside on *B*'s appeal, but no order as to restitution was made in it. Held, on motion by *H*, that he was entitled to be put into the same position as before the partition was made (i.e., joint possession with *A*) and to remove



**RESTITUTION OF RIGHTS BY MOTION—*contd.***

any tenants who refused to vacate. **ROHNI SINGH v. HODDING** . . . **I. L. R. 21 Calc. 340**

2. ——— Restitution of an advantage obtained by virtue of a decree of High Court subsequently reversed on appeal to Privy Council—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 583—Right of suit—Parties, Non-joinder of.* The holder of a decree of the High Court for costs assigned his rights under that decree. The assignee caused his name to be brought on to the record as transferee in place of the decree-holder, and he, and after him his legal representative, executed the decree against the judgment-debtor. The decree was appealed to the Privy Council, but the assignee was not a party to the record in that Court. The Privy Council reversed the decree. Thereupon the successful plaintiff applied under s. 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure to obtain restitution from the representative of the assignee of the amount realized in execution of the decree of the High Court. *Held*, that, whether or not the amount realized by the assignee was recoverable by suit, it was not recoverable by proceedings under s. 583 of the Code, inasmuch as the assignee was no party to the decree of the Privy Council. **BHAGWATI PRASAD v. JAMNA PRASAD** . . . **I. L. R. 19 All. 136**

3. ——— Restitution of benefit obtained under a decree which is reversed in appeal—*Restitution sought by means of execution of appellate decree against a person not a party to the appeal.* *Held*, that appellants in the Privy Council, who had, antecedently to filing their appeal to Her Majesty in Council, paid to the assignee of the decree appealed against, which was for costs only, the amount then payable under that decree could not, on succeeding in their appeal, obtain restitution, merely by virtue of and in execution of the order of Her Majesty in Council, of the amount so paid, from the assignee when that assignee had been no party to the appeal to Her Majesty in Council. **Bhagwati Prasad v. Jamna Prasad**, **I. L. R. 19 All. 136**, referred to. **SADIQ HUSAIN v. LALTA PRASAD** . . . **I. L. R. 20 All. 139**

4. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 583—Interest on amount so recovered.* Where, in consequence of a decree having been reversed on appeal, the decree-holder is entitled to recover under s. 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure any sum which before such decree was reversed he had been obliged to pay in execution of that decree, such decree-holder is entitled also to receive interest on the amount so recoverable. **Rodger v. Comptoir D'Escompte de Paris**, **L. R. 3 P. C. 465**; **Jaswant Singh v. Dip Singh**, **I. L. R. 7 All. 432**; **Ram Sahai v. Bank of Bengal**, **I. L. R. 8 All. 262**; **Bhagwan Singh v. Ummatul Hasnain**, **I. L. R. 18 All. 262**; **Ayyaryar v. Shastram Ayyar**, **I. L. R. 9 Mad. 506**; and **Hatti Prasad v. Chatarpal Dube**, **All. Weekly Notes (1888) 287**, referred to. **Mewa Kuar v. Banarsi Prasad**, **All. Weekly Notes 1897) 76**, dissented from. **PHUL CHAND v. SHANKAR SARUP** . . . **I. L. R. 20 All. 430**

**RESTITUTION OF RIGHTS BY MOTION—*concl.***

5. ——— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 583—Interest—Mesne profits.* *Held*, that a person who is entitled under s. 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the restoration of a benefit of which he has been deprived by reason of a decree which has been subsequently reversed in appeal, is entitled, if the thing to be restored is money, to interest for the time during which he has been deprived of the use of it, or, if the thing to be restored is land, to mesne profits for the time during which he has been kept out of possession. **Phul Chand v. Shankar Sarup**, **I. L. R. 20 All. 430**, approved. **HARDAT v. IZZAT-UN-NISSA** **I. L. R. 21 All. 1**

6. ——— *Petition for restitution—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 583—Property taken from petitioner by process of Court under decree—Subsequent reversal of decree—Custody of third party—Principles on which restitution is ordered.* Two trustees of a temple having been removed from office, a suit was brought against them by the newly-appointed trustees and a decree obtained restraining them from interfering with the affairs of the temple. In accordance with that decree, property of the temple was taken from them by process of the Court and handed to the new trustees. On appeal to the High Court, however, the decree was reversed and restitution was now applied for by the survivor of the late trustees, from whom the property had been taken. In the meanwhile a third party had been appointed an additional trustee to the newly-appointed trustees. *Held*, that the principle of the doctrine of restitution is that on the reversal of a judgment the law raises an obligation on the party to the record who received the benefit of the erroneous judgment to make restitution to the other party for what he had lost; and it is the duty of the Courts to enforce that obligation, unless it be shown that restitution would be clearly contrary to the real justice of the case. That with reference to the position of innocent third parties, the rule that a plaintiff in an action to recover land cannot, by his writ of restitution or assistance, dispossess a stranger to the proceeding holding possession on an independent title or claim of title and not in collusion with the defendant, does not apply where the party seeking to be restored to possession has been wrongfully dispossessed by the agency of the Court. *Held*, therefore, that the trustee who had been dispossessed must be given an opportunity to prove whether any and which of the temple properties were in his custody as alleged, and whether he was deprived of such custody under the decree which was reversed, and whether the newly-appointed trustees acquired the custody of them thereunder, and that, if substantiated, the claim for restitution could not be successfully resisted. **DORASAMI AYYAR v. ANNASAMI AYYAR** . . . **I. L. R. 23 Mad. 306**

**RESTRAINT.**

*See WRONGFUL RESTRAINT.*



**RESTRAINT—concl'd.**

— on anticipation—

See MARRIED WOMAN, PROPERTY OF.  
I. L. R. 30 Mad. 378

**RESTRAINT OF TRADE.**

See COMPANY . I. L. R. 29 Bom. 107

See CONTRACT . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 354

— Agreement—Contract Act (IX of 1872, ss. 23 and 27—Continuous cause of action—Damages—Transfer of business to a limited Company—Effect. In March 1902, certain Ice Manufacturing Companies in Bombay entered into an agreement relating to the manufacture and sale by them of ice. The agreement fixed, *inter alia*, the minimum price at which ice was to be sold by the parties, the proportion of the manufacture which each was to bear, and the proportion of the profits which each was to receive. It further created a monthly obligation to pay into, and a corresponding right to receive from, a general common fund the difference, if any, between the profits actually received by the parties and those to which they were, under the agreement, entitled. On a suit being instituted for breach of the agreement, in which damages, sustained prior to and pending the hearing of the suit, were claimed:—*Held*, the fact that an agreement, if carried out, would limit competition and keep up prices, did not necessarily bring it within the terms of s. 27 of the Contract Act (IX of 1872): to succeed in the defence under that section it was necessary to establish that the agreement was one, whereby a person was restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind. FRASER AND COMPANY v. BOMBAY ICE MANUFACTURING COMPANY (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 107

**RESULTING TRUST.**

See TRUSTS ACT . I. L. R. 31 Bom. 222

**RESUMPTION.**

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| 1. RIGHT TO RESUME . . .      | 10786 |
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I. L. R. 20 Calc. 577

**1. RIGHT TO RESUME.**

1. — Right to resume mokurari tenure—*Death of grantor without heirs.* A mokurari tenure granted in perpetuity cannot be resumed by the grantor even if the grantee dies without heirs. HIMMUT BAHADOOR v. SOONEET KOER . . . 15 W. R. 549

2. — Grant in lieu of maintenance—*Limitation.* Although a grant of a mokurari lease in lieu of maintenance may be resumable by the grantor and his heirs, yet, if the grantor or any of his successors receives distinct notice of a claim on the part of the grantee to hold in perpetuity and not subject to resumption, and allows twelve years to go by without contesting such claim, he (such grantor or successor) will be barred for the time of his own enjoyment. PETAMBAR BABOO v. NILMONEY SINGH DEO

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 793

3. — Grant in lieu of maintenance—*Hindu Law—Alienation—Impartible estate.* The mere fact of the impartibility of an estate, or rather the mere fact that the succession to a zamindari is governed by the law of primogeniture, does not deprive the zamindar of his ordinary right to alienate it, or any portion of it, during his lifetime. Accordingly, an ordinary mokurari lease, granted by a zamindar of lands forming portion of a zamindari the succession to which is governed by the law of primogeniture, is valid, and the lands comprised in it cannot be resumed on the death of the grantor by his successor. But a mokurari khorposh, or allowance for maintenance, or an estate for life in lieu of maintenance, granted by the owner of a zamindari impartible by special custom, but otherwise subject to Bengal law, to a member of his family, is resumable by his successor on the death of the grantor. UDOY ADITYA DEB v. JADUBAL ADITYA DEB

I. L. R. 5 Calc. 113 ; 4 C. L. R. 181

See WOODOYADITTO DEB v. MUKOOND NARAIN ADITTO . . . 22 W. R. 225



**RESUMPTION—contd.****I. RIGHT TO RESUME—contd.**

4. ———— **Right to resume julkurs in navigable rivers—***Beng. Reg. II of 1819.* A suit for resumption of julkurs in navigable rivers not forming part of settled estates is cognizable only in the ordinary Courts, (i) because of the total absence of the word "julkur" in any of the Resumption Regulations, either before or after Regulation II of 1819; and (ii) by reason of the difference in the nature of the claims between one to take possession of julkur and one to resume lands. *COLLECTOR OF MALDAH v. SUDUROODDEEN* . 1 W. R. 116

5. ———— **Right to resume jaghir—***Alienation by grantee.* A zamindar cannot sue to resume a jaghir on the ground of its alienation by the grantee, so long as there are heirs male of the grantee existent. *RAMESWAR NATH SINGH v. HARAILAIL SINGH* . 1 B. L. R. A. C. 170

6. ———— **Right to resume permanent tenure—***Forfeiture of tenure—Non-payment of Government revenue.* Where an ancient and permanent tenure is held by several persons in separate shares, and some of the sharers make default in the payment of their quota of the Government assessment the portion of the tenure held by the sharers who paid their shares of the assessment cannot be resumed or forfeited by the Government. In such a case the onus lies on the Government to make out by clear evidence under what special contract or agreement, or regulation, it forfeits the entire tenure. *BRETT v. ELLAIYA*

12 W. R. P. C. 33; 13 Moo. I. A. 104

affirming the decision of the High Court in *ELLA YA v. COLLECTOR OF SALEM* . 3 Mad. 59

7. ———— **Right to resume village—***Village entered as jaghir in accounts of permanent settlement—Zamindars, right of.* Where a village, part of a zamindari, has been entered as a jaghir in the accounts of the permanent settlement, the zamindar cannot resume the village, and is entitled in respect thereof only to the usual kuttubandi *HARISCHANDANA DEVA v. RAMANNA (HANDRI)*  
1 Mad. 355

8. ———— **Right to resume Neemuk Sayer mehals—***Beng. Regs. VIII and XXVII of 1793—Right of Government as Sovereign.* The resumption by Government of Neemuk Sayer mehals (saltpetre-duty estates) upheld, the sanads of the Subadar of Behar, the ruling power previous to the Company's accession to the Dewanny, purporting to grant the Government as mokurari istemrari at a permanent fixed rent, being declared forgeries. *Quære*: Whether the Neemuk Sayer mehals being a sayer right was not wholly abolished by Bengal Regulation XXVII of 1793, and the Bengal Government in its Sovereign character had not an absolute right to resume. The settlement by the Government with a proprietor of the soil under the decennial settlement made perpetual by Bengal Regulation VIII of 1793 relates to land revenue only, and not to sayer duties claimed by a party

**RESUMPTION—contd.****I. RIGHT TO RESUME—contd.**

not a land proprietor. *GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL v. JAFUR HOSSEIN KHAN* . 5 Moo. I. A. 467

9. ———— **Right to resume subordinate tenure by istemrardar—***Customary right.* A custom was alleged entitling a Patwi Thakur, or chief belonging to the Rathor clan of Rajputs, who was the istemrardar of an ancient and impartible taluk in Ajmere, to resume land formerly part of it, but granted some generations back as a subordinate estate to a collateral relation of the chief. The ground of the resumption claimed was that the last successor to the estate so granted had died without issue and without adopting. *Held*, that the Commissioner's judgment, which was that a right of resumption exercisable merely on the above-ground had not been established, was correct, being supported to some extent certainly by answers received by the Chief Commissioner on enquiry from the neighbouring Durbars of Rajputana chiefs, and on the whole by the balance of the evidence. *RAO BAHADUR SINGH v. JOWAHIR KUAR*  
I. L. R. 10 Calc. 887; L. R. 11 I. A. 75

10. ———— **Right of maafidar—***Recognition of right to resume—Limitation—Cause of action.* *Held*, that mere recognition of right to resume contained in the wajib-ul-urz, where the grant existed many years previous to the date of that document, does not re-grant to a maafidar so as to give plaintiff a new starting point from which his right to resume should date. *DAYUM KHAN v. TUNSOOKH RAI* . 2 Agra 189

11. ———— **Right of manager of religious endowment—***Beng. Reg. XIX of 1793.* The manager of a religious endowment consisting of the profits of a number of villages after paying revenue, was not a zamindar under Regulation XIX of 1793, and could not sue for resumption of invalid lakhiraj land. *NOBIN CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHRY v. PEAREE KHANUM* . 3 W. R. 143

12. ———— **Right of talukhdars—***Limit of area in suit for resumption.* Talukhdars had no legal right to sue for resumption of areas containing more than 100 bighas of land. *GOPAL CHUNDER ROY v. OODHUB CHUNDER MULLICK*  
W. R. 1864, 156

13. ———— **Right of Government as agent for zamindar—***Limit of area in suit for resumption.* The Government, when acting as agent of a zamindar, could only sue to resume invalid lakhiraj lands under 100 bighas. *RAM LOCHUN SIRCAR v. DENONATH PAUL* 2 W. R. 279

14. ———— **Right of zamindar—***Presumption—Land held under different sanads—Limit of area in suit for resumption.* When land beyond 100 bighas in extent is admittedly held by a lakhirajdar, the presumption is that it is held under one grant, and that it is resumable by Government, and not by the zamindar. To rebut the presumption, the zamindar must show that the land, though beyond 100 bighas in extent, is



**RESUMPTION—contd.****1. RIGHT TO RESUME—contd.**

held under different sanads. **JOGENDRO NARAIN Roy v. HURRY DOSS ROY** . W. R. 1864, 145

**15.** ———— *Right of zamindar to assess and resume invalid lakhiraj tenures—Limit of area in suit for resumption.* When a zamindar engaged to pay a certain amount of revenue on certain lakhiraj lands, on condition of Government stopping resumption proceedings in respect to such lands, he had a right under that engagement to resume invalid rent-free tenures below 100 bighas in extent, whatever had been the nature of agreement with Government in previous years, but he had no right to resume lands of greater extent than 100 bighas covered by one sanad. **BEER CHUNDER JOOBRAJ v. UMAKANT SEIN**

W. R. 1864, 232

See **BEERCHUNDER JOOBRAJ v. SHIBJOY TAKOOR** . W. R. 1864, 8

**16.** ———— *Beng. Reg. II of 1809, s. 30—Limit of area in suit for resumption.* To bar a zamindar's right to resume, as invalid lakhiraj under s. 30, Regulation II of 1890, lands in excess of 100 bighas, it must be shown that the lands are held under a sanad in excess of 100 bighas, or under different sanads, each in excess of 100 bighas. **MAHOMED MUNSOOR v. UMBICA CHURN ROY** . W. R. 1864, 132

**17.** ———— *Beng. Reg. XIX of 1793—Limit of area in suit for resumption.* A zamindar is not precluded by Regulation XIX of 1793 from suing for the resumption of invalid lakhiraj lands exceeding 100 bighas held under several sanads, provided none of them singly is a grant for more than 100 bighas. The release of lands covered by one such sanad from the claim of Government to resume, on the ground that they were under 50 bighas, does not bar the zamindar's right to resume them. **ELIAS v. MAHOMED PEEZEER** . W. R. 1864, 217

**18.** ———— *Beng. Reg. X of 1793, s. 19—Limitation in suit for resumption.* A zamindar suing for resumption of alleged invalid lakhiraj land under s. 19, Regulation X of 1793, was not limited to time, provided he could prove that, at some time subsequent to the decennial settlement, the land sought to be resumed was part of his mal estate, and had paid rent. **GOPAL CHUNDER SHAHA v. BHABO TARINEE DOSSEE** 7 W. R. 240

**19.** ———— *Service inam lands.* The combination of an interest in land and an obligation as to service may fall under three heads, viz., (i) there may be a grant of land burdened with service; (ii) there may be a grant in consideration of past and future service; and (iii) there may be the grant of an office the services attached to which are remunerated by an interest in land. In either of the first two classes of grants it may be made a condition that the interest in the land should cease when the services are no longer required,

**RESUMPTION—contd.****1. RIGHT TO RESUME—conclld.**

but in the absence of a provision to that effect lands held under those grants are not resumable at will. Where a plaintiff inamdar asserts that he has a right to resume, to establish that the combination is such as permits of resumption, and where there has been long and undisturbed possession enjoyed by the defendant and his predecessors, it will require strong evidence on plaintiff's part to make out his case. **LAKHAMGAUDA v. KESHAV ANNAJI** (1904) . I. L. R. 28 Bom. 305

**2. PROCEDURE.**

**1.** ———— *Assessment of resumed lands—Beng. Reg. XIX of 1793—Beng. Reg. II of 1819, s. 30—Suit for rent.* Unless the holder of a resumption-decree took steps under Regulation XIX of 1793 to have the revenue fixed by the Collector, and the defendant consented to pay the revenue required of him, he had no *locus standi* on holding the lands to bring suits for rent. The rule to be followed in determining in what manner and under what regulation the assessment of resumed lakhiraj land should be conducted was, first, to ascertain whether the existence of the lakhiraj prior to 1791 had been decided by the decree for resumption. It could not be presumed that every case instituted under s. 30, Regulation II of 1819, dealt with an estate which was held lakhiraj prior to 1791. **POGOSE v. EKRAM HOSSEIN**

15 W. R. 483

**2.** ———— *Question of validity of grant—Limitation—Existence of tenure before 1790.* In a suit for resumption, where the defendant pleads a lakhiraj tenure before 1790, the validity of the grant is not open to the Judge's consideration, but only whether the tenure was in existence before 1790, and if so to apply the law of limitation. **SAGORE MONEE DOSSEE v. BIPRO DOSS DEY** . 1 W. R. 249

**3.** ———— *Limitation—Beng. Reg. II of 1819, s. 30—Lakhiraj—Beng. Reg. XIX of 1793, s. 10.* A suit for resumption under s. 30, Regulation II of 1819, must be assumed to refer only to lakhiraj created prior to the 1st of December 1790, and therefore was not exempt from limitation under s. 10, Regulation XIX of 1793. **HEERA MONEE DABEE v. KOONJ BEHARY HOLDAR**

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. Ap. 8 : 2 W. R. 207

**4.** ———— *Beng. Reg. XIX of 1793, s. 10—Beng. Reg. II of 1819, s. 30.* Regulation II of 1819, s. 30, did not apply to a suit in a Civil Court for resumption under s. 10 of Regulation XIX of 1793. The decisions in *Sonatan Ghose v. Abdool Farar*, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 109, and *Heera Monee Dabee v. Koonj Behari Holdar*, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. Ap. 8, upheld. **HARIHAR MUKHOPADHYA v. MADAB CHANDRA BABU. NABA KRISHNA MOOKERJEE v. KAILAS CHANDRA BHUTTACHARJEE** . 8 B. L. R. 566 : 20 W. R. 459  
14 Moo. I. A. 152



**RESUMPTION—contd.****2. PROCEDURE—concl'd.**SONATUN GHOSE *v.* ABDUL FARAR**B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 109 : 2 W. R. 91**

5. ———— **Notice to parties—Party not in possession.** In resumption-proceedings it is not necessary to give notice to a party not in possession or to make him a formal party to the suit. **RAM CHUNDER SHAHA *v.* COLLECTOR OF MYMENSINGH** . . . . . **22 W. R. 48**

6. ———— *Beng. Reg. II of 1819, s. 16—Omission to give notice.* Where the resumption officer, as directed by s. 15, Regulation II of 1819, supplied the defendant in a resumption suit with a copy of his reasons for considering the lands in question liable to resumption, and subsequently, in the absence of the defendant, declared the lands liable to assessment:—*Held*, that, as defendant failed to appear either in person or by agent, it was impossible for the resumption officer to give him the warning mentioned in s. 16 of the same law, and the legality of the proceedings was not affected by the omission. **BURODA KANT ROY *v.* COMMISSIONER OF THE SOONDURBUNS** . . . . . **13 W. R. 180**

7. ———— **Right to intervene in suit—Beng. Regs. II of 1819 and III of 1828—Decree of Special Commissioners.** In a suit by Government under Regulation II of 1819 to resume invalid lakhiraj land held by a mohunt, as the interests of the zamindar, who claimed a portion of the lands sought to be assessed, as forming part of his permanently-assessed estate, were liable to be affected by the decision of the Collector:—*Held*, that he had a right to intervene and become a party to the suit, and to prefer an appeal from the decree. The decree of the Special Commissioners under Regulation III of 1828 was final, if no appeal or petition of review was presented within a reasonably sufficient period. **MOHESHUR SINGH *v.* GOVERNMENT OF INDIA** . . . . . **3 W. R. P. C. 45 : 7 Moo. I. A. 283**

**3. EFFECT OF RESUMPTION.**

1. ———— **Finality of proceedings—Injury to parties—Diluvion.** Resumption proceeding are final and not liable to question by the Civil Courts. But when proceedings take place in the nature of extensive settlements with other parties after intermediate and temporary settlements, and acts are done wholly without jurisdiction, or lands are taken not included in the original decree, there should be a remedy to parties deeming themselves to have been wronged thereby. If lands adjudged to Government in a resumption suit diluviate and re-form on the same site, Government does not thereby lose its rights to them, nor is it obliged to institute wholly new proceedings. Diluvion does not create any new right. **COLLECTOR OF DACCA *v.* KISHEN KISHORE CHATTERJEE. JUGO BUNDHOO BOSE *v.* COLLECTOR OF DACCA** . . . . . **W. R. 1864, 273**

**RESUMPTION—contd.****3. EFFECT OF RESUMPTION—contd.**

2. ———— **Finality of resumption-decree—Settlement proceedings—Jurisdiction of Civil Court.** The ruling of the late Sudder Court as to the final and conclusive character of a resumption-decree was held not to apply to what was subsequently done administratively by a Settlement Officer, the proper distinction being that the decree of the Resumption Court as to the liability of the resumed mehal to be passed with a Government demand is final; but the subsequent dealing by the Settlement Officer with alleged proprietary right and claim to land not mentioned in the decree, is open to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. **MAHOMED GAZEE CHOWDHRY *v.* LALL BEBEE** . . . . . **10 W. R. 103**

**RAM CHUNDER SHAHA *v.* COLLECTOR OF MYMENSINGH** . . . . . **22 W. R. 48**

3. ———— **Effect on contract between zamindar and tenant—Resumption of lakhiraj tenure by Government—Under-tenants, rights of.** The mere resumption of a lakhiraj tenure by Government does not dissolve the contract between the zamindar and tenant. The tenant has the option to determine his tenancy, or he may consent that the amount of revenue which the landlord must pay to Government, or a portion of it, shall be added to his original jumma. **FARZHARA BANU *v.* AZIZUNNISSA BIBI** . . . . . **B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 175 : 3 W. R. 72**

4. ———— **Effect on tenant—Illegal assessment of revenue—Mad. Reg. XXVII of 1802.** In a suit against a Collector for an illegal seizure and subsequent usurpation of plaintiff's shares in an agharam village for non-payment of tirvai due from other tenants of the village, and to recover the increased tirvai imposed by the Collector:—*Held*, that the plaintiff's right to enjoy his share of the village lands under the original pottah was not legally determined by resumption; and that, continuing liable only to the fixed rent, the plaintiff was entitled to the return of the amount paid under compulsion, in excess of such rent, at the date of the suit. **MADRAS Regulation XXVII of 1802 considered. ELLAIYA *v.* COLLECTOR OF SALEM** . . . . . **3 Mad. 59**

Affirmed by the Privy Council on appeal in **BRETT *v.* ELLAIYA**

**13 Moo. I. A. 104 : 12 W. R. P. C. 33**

5. ———— **Effect on howladar—Rights of howladars.** The resumption by Government of a parent estate did not nullify the existing rights of a howladar within the estate, or deprive him of the benefit of the presumption arising under s. 16 of Act X of 1859. **MOTHOORA NATH GUNGOPADHYA *v.* SHEETA MONEE** . . . . . **9 W. R. 354**

6. ———— **Effect on sub-tenure—Sub-tenures before decennial settlement.** A sub-tenure created before, and in existence at the time of, the decennial settlement cannot be invalidated by any subsequent settlement of the mehal in which it is



**RESUMPTION—contd.****3. EFFECT OF RESUMPTION—contd.**

situated. Resumption of lakhiraj land under the revenue law does not destroy any such sub-tenure in the estate resumed. *ABDOOL ALI v. RAMGUTTY*

12 W. R. 128

7. ———— **Effect on lakhirajdars—Rights of lakhirajdars—Settlement—Cause of action.** A resumption-decree does not destroy the proprietary right of the lakhirajdars, which continues unless and until they are dispossessed in due course of law. By obtaining a permanent settlement they acquire no new right; a cause of action accruing to them if ousted before settlement. *THAKOOR DASS ROY CHOWDHRY v. NUBEEN KISHEN GHOSE*

15 W. R. 552

8. ———— **Effect on charitable trust—Omission of mention of existence of charitable trust or endowment.** The resumption of lands by Government, and the making a fresh settlement of the resumed lands without any allusion to their being held in trust for charitable purposes prior to the resumption proceedings, are not conclusive proof that there was no such trust. The only question decided by the Government in resuming was that those who claimed the land as lakhiraj had not been able to prove that the land was held under any such religious or charitable trust as would debar Government from resuming. *LEELANUND SINGH BAHADOOR v. ISHUREE NUNDUN DUTT JHA*

8 W. R. 316

9. ———— **Effect on rights acquired previous to resumption—Liability of purchaser of rent-free holding to pay rent or revenue.** Where the plaintiff's ancestor purchased a certain quantity of land from a rent-free holder of the mouzah, who on the resumption of the maafi tenure by Government was admitted to a proprietary settlement of the mouzah and acquired a good prescriptive title:—*Held*, that the resumption by the Government did not affect the right which the plaintiff's ancestor had previously acquired in the land and the land not having been assessed with revenue by the Government, the plaintiff could not be treated as a mere cultivator, and liable to pay either rent or revenue. *AHMED v. GUNAISH PERSHAD*

2 Agr 9

10. ———— **Effect on right of collection or profits—Maafi lands.** Where maafi lands are, after resumption and assessment, left in the possession of the ex-maafidars, the persons entitled to collection or profits are, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, the ex-maafidars, and not the lambardar of the village. *DAL CHUND v. SEETA KOONWAR*

2 Agr 152

11. ———— **Liability to pay rent—Resumption and assessment by Settlement Officer.** Where land is resumed and assessed by a Settlement Officer, the tenant is bound to pay rent at the rate assessed by the Settlement Officer. *WOOMANATH ROY CHOWDHRY v. DEBNATH ROY CHOWDHRY*

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*D'SILVA v. RAJ COOMAR DUTT* . 16 W. R. 153

12. ———— **Effect on mortgagee under zur-i-peshgi lease—Omission to call in advance—Acquiescence in liability of profits for revenue.** When property granted in a zur-i-peshgi lease was originally rent-free, but subsequently resumed and assessed by Government, the mortgagee was held bound either to make a fresh agreement to take the profits, minus the Government revenue, as his security, or to call in his money. His not adopting either course for a long period was construed into assent on his part to receive the profits, minus the Government revenue, as security. *JOY PROKASH NARAIN v. RADHA KISHEN* . W. R. 1864, 227

13. ———— **Effect of resumption and settlement of lakhiraj on the holder of a mokurari lease from the lakhirajdar—Lakhiraj tenure—Settlement of invalid lakhiraj.** Assessment of revenue by Government on invalid lakhiraj land after resumption does not confer a new estate on the lakhirajdar, and does not cancel or extinguish a mokurari lease granted by the lakhirajdar previous to the settlement, and during the time he was in possession of the land as lakhiraj. *PRATAB NARAYAN MOOKERJEE v. MADHU SUDAN MOOKERJEE* . 8 B. L. R. 197 : 16 W. R. 35

14. ———— **Effect of resumption on mortgages created by inamdar—Inam lands.** An inamdar, having granted several mortgages upon his inam lands, died. The right to hold the lands rent-free was ruled by Government to have ceased upon the death, but the inam was continued to his representatives, subject to the payment of assessment, under the Government circular of 1854. *Held*, that the original estate in the lands was not destroyed; that no new title in the inamdar's representatives was created; and that the lands continued chargeable in their hands with any valid specific liens created upon them by the inamdar. *VISHNU TRIMBAK v. TATIA alias VASUDEV PANT* . 1 Bom. 22

15. ———— **Effect on inamdar—Inam—Landlord and tenant.** On the resumption of an inam, the inamdar's right to exemption from the payment of the Government assessment ceases, and the inamdar becomes liable to pay such assessment; but all his other rights remain unaffected, and therefore those who were his tenants before the resumption do not thereby cease to be so, and can be ejected if they are not permanent tenants or are not otherwise entitled to remain in possession. *GANGABHAI v. KALAPA DARI MUKRYA*

I. L. R. 9 Bom. 419

16. ———— **Resumption of inam village and re-grant, effect of—Acts of State—Waikars, status of—Treaties of 1820—effect of grant of inam under construction—Attachment by Government of such village, effect of.** From the year 1820 down to the year 1872, the Waikar family had been in the enjoyment of the village of Pasarni under a treaty between the East India Company and one M.

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**RESUMPTION—contd.****3. EFFECT OF RESUMPTION—contd.**

*A* and *K M* were brothers and the last male descendants of *M*. For an alleged fraud of *K M* Government restricted the enjoyment of the said village to his lifetime only. *A* predeceased *K M*. On the death of *K M*, Government, on the 31st December 1872, placed an attachment over the village. On the 13th July 1874, a judgment-creditor of *A* caused the lands in dispute, which were mirasi lands of the Waikar family situated at Pasarni, to be sold in execution of his decree against *A*, and they were purchased by the defendants, who was put in possession on the 22nd April 1876. In the meanwhile, Government, having chosen to recognize the plaintiff as a representative of the Waikar family, had removed the attachment, and re-granted the village to the plaintiff shortly before, viz., on the 3rd April 1876. The plaintiff, being dispossessed, sued the defendant, contending (*inter alia*) that *A*, having predeceased his brother, had no interest in the lands, which had been purchased by the defendant. The Court of first instance awarded the plaintiff's claim, and directed the defendant to pay the plaintiff's costs. The defendant appealed to the District Judge, who was of opinion that the proceedings of Government since the attachment in 1872 and restoration of the village were acts of State, and he varied the decree of the lower Court by cutting down the plaintiff's costs, made payable by the lower Court's decree, to half. On appeal by the defendant to the High Court:—*Held*, reversing the decree of the lower Appellate Court, that the plaintiff's claim should be dismissed. The attachment placed by Government on the death of *K M* in December 1872 was limited to an exemption from assessment, and the resumption and re-grant to the plaintiff did not give the plaintiff any title to the lands in question. The proceedings of Government in 1873 and 1876, by which the plaintiff was recognized as the representative of the Waikar family, were not acts of State. The status of the Waikars and other persons, with whom the agreements of 1820 were entered into, was not that of an independent sovereign. They (the Waikars) were merely powerful saranjamdars subordinate to the Raja of Satara, and after the annexation of the territory of the Raja in 1849 they held their lands under the East India Company. *Secretary of State for India v. Narayan Balbhart Bhosle, Printed Judgments for 1883 p. 244. HARI SADASHIV v. AJMUDIN*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 235

**17. ——— Resumption of saranjam by British Government, effect of, on position and rights of the saranjamdar—Occupancy rights of a saranjamdar—Inam, resumption of—Public and private property of an absolute Chief—Landlord and tenant—Tenancy created by Chief prior to resumption of land by Government—Effect of resumption on rights of landlord—Adverse possession—Recognition of tenant by Government officers, as occupant paying assessment, does not prejudice landlord's rights. *A*, the Chief of Kagvad, let certain land to the defendant for a term**

**RESUMPTION—contd.****3. EFFECT OF RESUMPTION—contd.**

of twelve years by a lease dated 12th June 1857. *A* died in the same year without male issue, and his saranjam was resumed by the British Government. In 1858 the Collector treated the defendant as occupant of the land in question for the purposes of assessment, and again in 1860 entered his name as occupant in the Government books. In January 1868 the widow of *A* adopted the plaintiff as his son. In 1881 the plaintiff sued the defendant to recover possession of the land let to the defendant in 1857. The defendant contended that the land was not the private land of *A*, but belonged to the State of Kagvad, which was resumed on his death by the Government; and that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the law of limitation. The Subordinate Judge allowed the plaintiff's claim, holding that the land was the private property of *A*, and that the claim was not barred. The District Judge, on appeal, held that the land was not the private property of the Chief, but was the property of the State, and that, on the resumption of the State by the British Government, the defendant's lease came to an end, and the relation of landlord and tenant, previously existing between the Chief and the defendant, ceased. He also held that the plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation, and reversed the decree of the Subordinate Judge. On appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, that no distinction could be drawn between the public and private property of an absolute Chief, which *A* was. That, in the absence of a contrary intention, the resumption by the British Government of a saranjam or inam leaves the occupancy rights of the saranjamdar or inamdar untouched; that a saranjamdar or inamdar may acquire occupancy rights during the continuance of the saranjam or inam. *Held*, also, that the fact that the revenue officers placed the defendant's name in the Government books as the occupant paying assessment, did not make the defendant's possession adverse, and could not prejudice the plaintiff's rights as landlord. *GANPATRAV TRIMBAK PATWARDHAN v. GANESH BAJI BHAT* . . . I. L. R. 10 Bom. 112

**18. ——— Effect on patta—Bengal Act VIII of 1879, s. 10—Resumption of lands included in a patta—Re-settlement with grantor of patta—Liability for rent—Parties. *Held*, that, when lands are re-settled with the original holder or his heirs, s. 10 of Ben. Act VIII of 1879 does not, on its true construction, interfere with the contractual rights of a subordinate holder. The respondent having a permanent *ganti* tenure, subject to a fixed rent for the whole of it, under a patta executed in 1867, the Government resumed lands comprised in the tenure, and settled in 1884 with the heirs of the respondent's grantor in respect thereof. In an action by the appellant, as purchaser of the resumed and re-settled lands, to recover the rent thereof as fixed in 1884:—*Held*, that the respondent's liability was under the *patta* and not under the settlement, and that all in right of the lands granted by the *patta* were necessary parties to an action for**



**RESUMPTION—contd.****3. EFFECT OF RESUMPTION—contd.**

the rent sued for. *PRIA NATH DAS v. RAM TARAN CHATTERJI* (1903) . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 811  
s.c. L. R. 30 I. A. 159  
7 C. W. N. 601

19. ——— **Enfranchisement—Enfranchisement of inam service land in name of office holder—Hindu law—Effect of enfranchisement—Liability to partition.** Three items of land, numbered 5, 6, and 7, were originally village service *inams*, having been annexed by the State as emoluments to the office of *karnam* in a *raiyatwari* village, *R*, the father of plaintiff and first defendant and grandfather of second defendant, in March 1889, established his right, as the heir to the late incumbent to this office of *karnam*; and the lands were, in November 1889, ordered to be delivered to *R*, and were actually delivered to him in December 1889. Before the actual delivery, *R* applied that the lands might be registered and a title-deed be issued in his name, as the Government were taking steps to enfranchise service *inams* in the district, and the *Inam* Commissioner, in November 1889, notified to *R* that his name was included in the register. In January 1890, second defendant's father, the eldest son of *R*, died; and in February 1890, *R* resigned the office of *karnam* in favour of his grandson, second defendant, who was duly appointed by the Collector. Item No. 5 was enfranchised, and a title-deed issued to and in the name of *R*. The *Inam* Commissioner, in 1891, passed an order that items 6 and 7 had been "resumed and fully assessed." *R* had died at a date prior to this, and second defendant was holding the office. On a suit being instituted by plaintiff for partition:—*Held, per BHASHYAM AYYANGAR, J.*—That, when a personal *inam* is enfranchised by the imposition of a quit-rent, the resumption by Government simply consists of so much of the assessment or *melvaram* as is equal to the quit-rent, neither the land nor the assessment in excess of the quit-rent being resumed. Similarly, the enfranchisement of a service *inam* does not operate as a resumption and fresh grant by Government subject to the payment of a quit-rent, any more than it is so in the case of the enfranchisement of a personal *inam*. It stands on the same footing, so far as the family in which the village office is hereditary is concerned. The enfranchisement only converts the *inam* into ordinary property. *Narayana v. Chengalammal*, I. L. R. 10 Mad. 1, followed. *Venkata v. Rama*, I. L. R. 8 Mad. 249, explained. *Dharnipragada v. Kadambari*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 47, and *Venkatarayadu v. Venkata Ramayya*, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 284, dissented from. *Per MOORE, J.*—Even assuming item No. 5 to be the self-acquisition of *R*, according to *Dharnipragada v. Kadambari*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 47, and *Venkatarayadu v. Venkata Ramayya*, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 284, the plaintiff was entitled, as his son, to his share. As to items 6 and 7, there was no enfranchisement and no fresh grant or title-deed in favour of second defendant. They were liable to partition, and it was unnecessary, therefore,

**RESUMPTION—concl'd.****3. EFFECT OF RESUMPTION—concl'd.**

to decide whether *Narayana v. Chengalammal*, I. L. R. 10 Mad. 1, or *Dharnipragada v. Kadambari*, I. L. R. 21 Mad. 47, and *Venkatarayadu v. Venkata Ramayya*, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 284, were correctly decided. *Venkata v. Rama*, I. L. R. 8 Mad. 249, explained. *Per Curiam.*—That items 5, 6 and 7 were liable to partition. *GUNNAIYAN v. KAMARACHI AYYAR* (1902) . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 339

**4. MISCELLANEOUS CASES.**

1. ——— **Illegal resumption by Government—Liability to account.** The Government having seized certain *chur* lands and dispossessed the proprietor in possession, and having entirely failed to establish any claim for assessment or resumption during the period of attachment following the dispossession of the proprietor:—*Held*, that the Government must be regarded as a wrong-doer for the whole period, and must account to the proprietor for all the collections made by its officers up to the time of the restitution. *SURNO-MOYEE v. COLLECTOR OF RUNGPORE*

W. R. F. B. 4 : Marsh. 13  
1 Hay 37

2. ——— **Right of mortgagee or transferee of *maafi* land on resumption—Right to question *bona fide* character of proceedings.** Where a mortgagee of *maafi* land was no party to resumption proceedings under Act X of 1859, s. 28, and the land was resumed with the mortgagor's consent:—*Held*, that the mortgagee or transferee from him was entitled to question the *bona fide* character of the resumption proceedings. *TOOLUN v. OOMAN SHUNKER* . . . . . 2 Agra 117

3. ——— **Purchases before resumption—*Jagir*.** Where the evidence showed that certain arms and stores seized had been purchased by the *jaghirdar* before the resumption, and there was no authority or evidence to show that those who held by *jaidad* were not entitled to things so purchased:—*Held*, that the representatives of the *jaghirdar* were entitled to recover the value of the arms and stores so seized. *FORESTER v. SECRETARY OF STATE*

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C.J.—“I have no doubt should the accused be  
again convicted, the Court in estimating what  
would be the proper sentence, will have regard to  
the detention already suffered by him.” *EMPEROR*  
*v. NAKUL KABIRAJ* (1909) . 13 C. W. N. 754

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— *Revenue Recovery Act II of 1861, s. 35—Applies only where party paying is tenant, mortgagor, or incumbrancer—Unregistered owner not bound to pay the revenue.* The revenue due on land owned by one who is not the registered holder is not money which such owner is bound to pay under the Revenue Recovery Act, though it may be to his interest to do so and the registered holder voluntarily paying such revenue cannot recover it under s. 69 of the Contract Act. Neither can he recover it under s. 35 of the Revenue Recovery Act unless he is a tenant, mortgagor or incumbrancer of such land. *BOJA SELLAPPA REDDY v. VRIDHACHALA REDDY (1906)*

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— s. 4, Proviso—Grant—Civil Court—  
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s. 4. The proviso to s. 4 of the Bombay Revenue  
Jurisdiction Act (X of 1876) contains no exception  
in respect of holdings unaccompanied by proprie-  
tary right in the soil, and there is no saving clause,  
which would suggest that such a claim to such hold-  
ings might fall within the purview of the Pensions  
Act. The right of an alienee of the revenue to sue for  
disturbance of his possession by a stranger or by  
Government is clearly recognised by the proviso  
above cited, and the only condition required is that  
the claim should be under an enactment, instru-  
ment, sanad, written grant or judgment such as is  
described in the proviso. *BALVANT RAMCHANDRA  
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Revenue sent by money-order—Estate, wrong description of—Mistake—Revenue in arrear—Revenue Sale Law (Act XI of 1859), ss. 8, 20, 33—Land Revenue rules in the Land, Revenue and Cesses in Bengal, rule 29—Jurisdiction. Where the actual amount of revenue remitted by money-order reached the Collectorate in time, but the remitter made a mistake in the towji number and the name of the registered proprietor, but was right as to the name of the estate and the amount of revenue payable in respect thereof. Held, that it was the duty of the officer of the Collectorate to rectify the mistake under rule 29 of the Land Revenue Rules, and not to put up the property to sale which, if held, would be without jurisdiction and ought to be set aside. *Bal Krishna Das v. Simpson*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 833; L. R. 25 I. A. 151, referred to. *HAMID HOSSEIN v. MUKHDUM REZA* (1905)

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ss. 2, 3—Panchannagram, tenure in—Sale for arrears—"Latest day of payment"—"Arrears"—Survey and Settlement Manual, Part III, Ch. XVI, Rule 7. S. 2 of Act XI of 1859 is applicable to revenue-paying estates, the revenue of which is payable in monthly instalments. It does not apply to tenures such as those in Panchannagram paying a yearly jama. In the *kabuliyat* of the tenant executed on the 18th February 1874, the jama was stipulated to be paid on the 28th June every year:—Held, that under Rule 7 of Part III, Chap. XVI of the Survey and Settlement Manual, the jama became payable on the first day of the financial year, i.e., 1st April. On failure to pay it by the 28th June, the latest day fixed by the Board of Revenue under s. 3 of Act XI of 1859, the tenure became liable to sale under the Act. The undertaking in the *kabuliyat* did not have the effect of extending the time for payment of the revenue from 1st April to 28th June. It was no more than a promise by the tenant to pay arrears accrued due on the first day of the financial year by the latest day of payment as fixed by the Board of Revenue *DURLABH CHANDRA KAR v. BUKSH ELLAHI* (1908)

13 C. W. N. 633

**REVENUE SALE LAW (BENG. ACT XI OF 1859)—contd.**

s. 3—Advertisement and notification of circular orders of the Board, if necessary—Latest days of payment of Government revenue in the case of new estates Board's Rules of 1859, Rule 1—Sale for arrears of revenue—No arrears—Sale not legal, setting aside of. The latest days for the payment of Government revenue in the case of any new estate formed after partition of a parent estate must be fixed in accordance with the provision contained in Rule No. 1 of the Board's Rules issued under the powers conferred by s. 3 of Act XI of 1859 and any Revenue Circular issued by the Board or any Rule framed by the same, in any way affecting Rule No. 1 must be advertised and notified as required by s. 3 of Act XI of 1859, before such a circular or a rule may have the force of law and when not so published, it is *ultra vires*. Any sale held for arrears of revenue, which would not have been due if the *kists* were fixed under Rule 1 of the Board's Rules, is invalid and illegal and therefore liable to be set aside. *MAHOMED JARIP v. SHYAMA SUNDARI DAS* (1904)

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8 C. W. N. 757; 337

ss. 5, 6, 13, 33—Suit to set aside sale—Sale brought about by fraud of a co-sharer—Purchase by co-sharer—Remedy—Right to sue for damages or reconveyance—Notice of sale—Names of proprietors, entry of, if necessary—Entry of name of a deceased person, not a proprietor—Irregularity—Non-entry of shares excluded when share sold—Notice under s. 5 not a condition precedent to sale—Ground not taken before Commissioner. Plaintiff sued to set aside a revenue-sale, as having been brought about by the fraud of a co-sharer, the defendant, upon the allegation that two days before the sale the latter told the plaintiff and induced him to believe that he would pay up the arrears, that he never intended to do so as is shown by the fact that he did not pay up the arrears though the Collector had agreed to receive them, and that he bought the estate himself at a very inadequate price. It appears that the plaintiff was present at the sale, and by paying up the arrears himself might have prevented the sale from taking place. Held, that the fraud, if any, might give the plaintiff a good claim against the defendant for damages for breach of contract or for a reconveyance of the plaintiff's share in the estate purchased by him, but it was not such a fraud as brought about the sale and the sale could not be set aside. *Amirunnesa Khatoon v. Secretary of State*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 63, referred to. It being found that with the defendant there were other innocent and *bona fide* purchasers, who were no parties to the fraud: Held, that no equitable relief, such as was granted in the case of *Bhooban Chandra Sen v. Ram Soondar Surma*, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 300, could be given in this case. It is not necessary, under the law, in a notice under s. 6 of the Revenue Sale Law, to enter the names of any proprietors at all. The entry in such notice of the names of a deceased person, who was not a



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proprietor, was not an illegality, which rendered the sale a nullity. *Ram Narain Koer v. Mahabir Prasad Singh*, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 208, referred to. In a notice issued under s. 13 of the Revenue Sale Law, the details of the shares about to be sold were fully given, but certain separate account shares, which were excluded, were not mentioned. It was, however, explained in a note at the foot of the notice that "when in certain columns of the notice there is an entry that only a share is to be sold, then it ought to be understood that there is a separate account in respect of such a share and that other share or shares will be exempted from sale," and in this notice there was such an entry in the columns mentioned. *Held*, that the provisions of s. 13 had been complied with. The issue of a notice under s. 5 of the Revenue Sale Law is not a condition precedent to the sale taking place, the non-compliance with which makes the sale no sale. The non-issue of such a notice is only an irregularity. *Mahabeer Pershad v. Collector of Tirhoot*, 15 W. R. 137, explained. *Raja Gobinda Lal Roy v. Ram Janam Misser*, L. R. 20 I. A. 165, referred to. The non-issue of a notice under s. 5 is an irregularity of the nature contemplated in s. 33 of the Revenue Sale Law, and, if not specified in an appeal to the Commissioner, cannot be urged in a subsequent suit. *DENONANDAN SINGH v. MANBODH SINGH* (1904) . 8 C. W. N. 757

**ss. 5, 6, 7, 14, 17, 33**—"Year," "current year" meaning of—Estate under attachment by order of judicial authority—Estate under attachment or managed by a revenue officer—Common manager under the Bengal Tenancy Act, effect of appointment of—Proceeding when share of estate is not sold at auction sale—Declaration of sale of entire estate—Notice of declaration—Notification of sale—Sale of separate share—Specification—Suit to set aside sale—Certificate of sale—Bengal Act VII of 1868, s. 8—Irregularity in serving or posting notice. The word "year" in the Revenue Sale Law means the official year; and "current year" is the official year within which the different *kists* of revenue have to be paid. The case of an estate managed by a common manager appointed under the Bengal Tenancy Act is excluded from the operation of s. 5 of Act XI of 1859, nor does management by such common manager fall within s. 17 of the Act. Non-publication of notice under s. 7 of Act XI of 1859 does not affect the sale. Under s. 8 of Bengal Act VII of 1868 after the grant of certificate the Court is precluded from going into the question whether notice were duly served or posted provided that they were issued. It is not necessary under s. 14 of Act XI of 1859 to give notice to the co-sharers of the declaration which has to be made under the section calling on them to buy up the shares in arrears within the period of ten days. *Gossain Chutturbhooj Das v. Ishri Mul*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 844, referred to. *BHAWANI KOER v. AFZAL HUSSAIN* (1907)

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 381

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**ss. 5, 13**—Arrears of revenue—*Kist*—Payment after last day of one *kist* and on the last day of the next *kist*—Appropriation—Implication from amount paid—Notice—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 59, 60. Where the revenue for the January *kist* of a *mahal* was not paid on the last day of payment and subsequently the Collector issued a notification, under ss. 5 and 13 of Act XI of 1859 that, if arrears of revenue be not paid on or before the 28th March ("the next latest day for payment of revenue") the *mahals* mentioned therein would be sold and where the amount remitted by the defaulting proprietor and received by the Collector on the 28th of March was very much less than the revenue for the March *kist*, but somewhat in excess of the arrear in question. *Held*, that the payment was by implication intended for the January *kist*, and should have been so appropriated by the Collector. *Held*, further, that there being nothing specific on such a matter in Act XI of 1859, we must fall back upon the general law, which is practically the same as embodied in ss. 59 and 60 of the Contract Act. *Ganga Bishun Singh v. Mahomed Jan*, I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1193, not followed. *JOGENDRA MOHAN SEN v. UMA NATH GUHA* (1908) . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 636 s. c. 12 C. W. N. 646

**ss. 5, 31, 33**—Bengal Act VII of 1868, s. 1—"Malikana"—"Land revenue"—Sale for arrears accruing subsequently to notification of sale—Point not taken in Court below or before Commissioner. *Malikana* comes under the definition of "Land Revenue" given in s. 2 of Act XI of 1859 and s. 1 of Bengal Act VII of 1868. The revenue authorities are entitled to calculate them together; and where part of the arrears for which a sale takes place under Act XI of 1859 is *malikana*, no separate notice under s. 5 of the Act in respect of such portion is necessary. A sale for arrears of revenue is not necessarily bad, because it was held not only for arrears specified in the notice under s. 5 of Act XI of 1859, but also for arrears that accrued subsequently. Where it appeared that the Collector had acted under s. 31 of the Act, and that the objection to the sale had not been taken either in the Court below or before the Commissioner, and therefore could not under s. 33 be taken on appeal, the objection was not sustained. Under the circumstances the High Court *held* that there had been no irregularity in the sale, and the judgment of the High Court was upheld by the Judicial Committee. *BAGESWARI PRASAD SINGH v. MAHOMED GOWHAR ALI KHAN* (1904) . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 256

s. c. 8 C. W. N. 649 : L. R. 31 I. A. 52

**ss. 6, 7, 13**—Description of property in the sale notification. *Held*, that in the notification of sale in the present case the specification of the property to be sold (which was a share of an estate) was sufficient and the notification contained all the particulars required by s. 3 of Act XI of 1859. *Ram Naran Koer v. Mahabir Prasad Singh*, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 208, referred to. *Hem Chandra Chowdhry*



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*v. Sarat Kamini Dasya*, 6 C. W. N. 526; *Annada Charan Mukuti v. Kishori Mohan Rai*, 2 C. W. N. 479, distinguished. *DILCHAND MAHTO alias LOOTAL MAHTO v. BAIJNATH SINGH* . 8 C. W. N. 337

**ss. 6, 33 and 58—Public Demands Recovery Act (Bengal Act VII of 1868), s. 11—Sale under s. 11 of Act VII (B. C.) of 1868—Arrears of rent due from a dakhali situated in a Government khas mehal—Highest bid offered by the defaulters' agent—Collectors closing the bid and purchasing the property at that bid, legality of.** A dakhali situated in a Government khas mehal fell into arrears, and it was advertised for sale under Act XI of 1859 pursuant to the provisions of s. 11 of Act VII of 1868 (B. C.). Before the sale the agent of the defaulter offered to deposit the arrears, but the Collector refused to receive the money. The Collector began with a bid of one rupee; the agent of the defaulter followed with a bid of ten rupees, but the Collector enquired whether any one was willing to increase the bid, and as one came forward, the Collector forthwith closed the bid and declared that he had purchased the property on account of Government on the bid of ten rupees, under s. 58 of the Revenue Sale Law (Act XI of 1859), inasmuch as that bid was insufficient to cover the arrears realizable. Upon a suit to set aside the sale: *Held*, that the sale was bad, inasmuch as the procedure followed by the Collector and the purchase made by him were not in accordance with the provisions of s. 58 of the Revenue Sale Law (Act XI of 1859). *HALIMANNISSA CHOWDHURANI v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA* (1904)

**I. L. R. 31 Calc. 1036  
s.c. 8 C. W. N. 880**

**ss. 7, 18, 33—Collector's order exempting from sale—Conditional order, effect of—Notice of sale on raiyat—Irrregularity in issue and service—Proof—Onus—Presumption—Bengal Act VII of 1868, s. 8—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 114 (e)—Substantial injury—Collector's grounds for exempting from sale—Court's power to examine.** The plaintiff-respondents (proprietors of a mehal) defaulted to pay the June instalment of the revenue of 1898, namely, R22-9-2, the latest day of payment of which sum was the 28th June, 1898. On the 19th August 1898, they remitted to the Collector by postal money order a sum R30-1-0 on account of the revenue of the mehal without specifying for which instalment it was intended; but on the 3rd September following, they presented an application to the Collector praying that the amount remitted might be received on account of the June instalment and the mehal be released from liability to sale. The total amount of Government dues upon the estate at the time including revenue, cesses and other fees, being R46-8-6; the Collector on the 16th September, 1898, made the order "... Accept all dues, if paid within 3 days and exempt." Six days later the Collector further ordered "applicant has not appeared since, so payment not accepted." Before the passing of these two orders on the 12th Sep-

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tember, 1898, the respondents had sent to the Collector by postal money order R30-1 anna for revenue of the mehal, without any specification as to instalment for which it was intended and this sum had been credited in the Collectorate books against the September instalment of R30-1-4. The fact of this payment had not been brought to the notice of the Collector when he made his order of the 16th September 1898. On the 22nd September 1898, the estate was put up to auction and was purchased by the appellants for an inadequate price. *Held*, that, as there was no order of exemption from sale within s. 18 of the Revenue Sale Law, the estate was liable to sale under its provisions. The conditional order made on the 16th September was not an order under s. 18 of the Act. *Per MOOKERJEE, J.*—It is not open to the plaintiff in a suit to set aside a revenue sale, to urge, under cover of a general ground taken in his appeal before the Commissioner, specific irregularities other than those urged before the Commissioner. *Bal Mukond Lal v. Jirjuthun Ray*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 271, commented on. It is not open to a Civil Court to examine the reasons of an order of the Collector purporting to be made under s. 18 of the Revenue Sale Law and to hold that the Collector ought to have made an order different from that made. The operation of s. 8 of Bengal Act VII of 1868, in curing defects in the issue and service of notices under s. 7 of the Revenue Sale Law considered. The onus is on the person, who seeks to have a sale set aside, to establish that the requirements of the Statutes had not been complied with by the Collector. The fact that notice under s. 7 of the Act was not served in accordance with the provisions of that section does not necessarily lead to an inference of substantial injury to the proprietor. *MOHAMMED AGA v. JADUNANDAN JHA* (1905)

**10 C. W. N. 137**

**s. 13—**

*See post*, s. 54 .

**13 C. W. N. 407**

**ss. 15, 33, 37—**

*See SALE* . 8 C. W. N. 115; 649; 757

**s. 25—Sale for arrears of revenue—Bengal Act XI of 1859, s. 25, as amended by s. 2 of Bengal Act VII of 1868—Order setting aside a sale—Review—"Final," meaning of—Commissioner, power of.** The word "final" in s. 25 of Bengal Act XI of 1859, means at least "not open to review." A Commissioner or any Revenue authority has no power to review his order annulling a sale held for arrears of Government revenue. *Lalu Pryag Lal v. Jai Narayan Singh*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 419, referred to. *BAIJNATH RAM GOENKA v. NAND KUMAR SINGH* (1907)

**I. L. R. 34 Calc. 677**

**ss. 28, 30—Liability of an auction-purchaser to pay arrears of Government revenue—Date of sale—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 59.** The liability of an auction-purchaser at the sale



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held under Act XI of 1859 to pay arrears of Government revenue arises from the date of the sale, when the title vests in the purchaser and not from the date of the sale certificate. Laws regulating the relations of an ordinary creditor and debtor do not apply to the realization of land revenue. Where therefore a proprietor of an estate makes a payment expressly for a later period, when there were earlier arrears, the Collector was fully competent to set off the amount paid against the earliest arrears due. *GANGA BISHUN SINGH v. MAHOMED JAN* (1906)

**I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1193**  
**s.c. 10 C. W. N. 948**

**s. 33—Setting aside sale—Suit by minor—Limitation—Fraud—Purchase by co-sharer in benami—Limitation Act (XV of 1887), s. 7 and Sch. II, Arts. 12, 95—Consequential relief—Re-conveyance of share—Pleadings.** The provisions of Act XI of 1859 are complete and therefore s. 7 of the Limitation Act has no application to a suit to set aside a revenue sale, although s. 33 of the Revenue Sale Law provides the same limitation as Art. 12 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act. A suit by a co-sharer of a revenue-paying estate for a declaration that the sale of such an estate does not affect his interest on the ground that his co-sharer purchased it fraudulently in the *benami* of another, is not barred by the one year's rule of limitation as provided for in the Revenue Sale Law, such a suit being governed by Art. 95 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act. *PANCHKOURI GHOSH v. PRAN GOPAL MUKERJEE* (1909).

**13 C. W. N. 518**

**s. 37—**

**1. Assignee of an auction purchaser of an entire estate, if entitled to avoid an encumbrance.** An assignee of an auction-purchaser of an entire estate sold for arrears of revenue can exercise the privileges given to an auction-purchaser under the provisions of s. 37 of the Revenue Sale Law to avoid incumbrances. *Koilas Chandra Dutt v. Jabbar Ali*, 20 W. R. 29, followed. *SOSHI BHUSAN MAJUMDAR v. KRAMATULLAH SHEIKH* (1905) . . . **10 C. W. N. 148**

**2. Act XI of 1859, s. 37—Suit for ejectment by purchaser—Occupancy raiyat—Defence—Onus—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 21.** A purchaser of an estate at a revenue sale sued an occupancy raiyat for the recovery of some lands, which were situate within the ambit of the estate. *Held*, that the onus is, in the first instance, on the raiyat to make out a *prima facie* case, that at the time when the revenue sale took place and the plaintiff purchased the estate, he held the land in suit as a raiyat within the meaning of the proviso in s. 37 of the Revenue Sale Law or within the meaning of s. 21 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. *AMBIKA CHURN CHAKRAVARTI v. DYA GAZI* (1906) . . . **10 C. W. N. 497**

**REVENUE SALE LAW (BENG. ACT XI OF 1859)—contd.****s. 37—contd.**

**3. Occupancy right, if can be acquired in a share of an undivided property—Bengal Act VIII of 1869—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885)—Original purpose of grant—Subsequent dealings, effect of.** Under Bengal Act VIII of 1869 a raiyat could acquire a right of occupancy within the meaning of the proviso to s. 37 of the Revenue Sale Law, in a share of an undivided property. *Jardine Skinner & Co. v. Rani Surut Soondari Debi*, 3 C. L. R. 140, referred to. There is nothing in the Bengal Tenancy Act to take away a right of occupancy acquired under leases granted at a time when Bengal Act VIII of 1869 was in force. *Hurry Churn Bose v. Rajah Ranjit Singh*, 1 C. W. N. 521; *Haribole Brohmo v. Tusimuddin Mondul*, 2 C. W. N. 680; and *Asud-ulla Sheikh v. Gogan Molla*, 6 C. W. N. 1224, distinguished. A tenancy, which was originally created for the purpose of cultivation and not for collection of rent, was partly held *nij-jote* and partly let out to sub-tenants. *Held*, that this did not change to original character of the grant, which was raiyati even in respect of the portion let out. *BAIDYA NATH MONDAL v. SUDHA RAM MISRI* (1904) . . . **8 C. W. N. 751**

**4. Share in a tank appertaining to agricultural holding—Right of occupancy, if can be acquired in—Ejectment.** *Held*, on a finding that a share in a tank formed an integral portion of an agricultural holding situated on its bank, that a right of occupancy could be acquired in such share, and when acquired would be protected under s. 37 of the Revenue Sale Law. *Hari Charan Bose v. Runjit Singh*, 1. L. R. 25 Calc. 917, explained and distinguished. *Jardine Skinner & Co. v. Surut Soondari Debi*, 3 C. L. R. 140, relied on. *UMA CHARAN BAROAH v. MONI RAM BAROAH* (1902) . . . **8 C. W. N. 192**

**5. The words "under the law in force" in the proviso to that section, meaning of—Ejectment suit—Lands—Rent Act (XI of 1859)—Occupancy raiyat—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 20, 21, and 195, cl. (c).** The words "under the laws in force" in the proviso to s. 37 of Act XI of 1859 have reference to assessment or enhancement of rent, and not to the rules as to the mode of acquisition of occupancy rights and mean "under the laws for the time being in force." A purchaser of an entire estate sold for arrears of revenue, sued the cultivating raiyats in ejectment. The defendants contended that their interests were protected by the proviso to s. 37 of Act XI of 1859. It was found that the holdings of the defendants consisted of land held by them partly for more than twelve years, and partly for less than twelve years, at the date of the sale, and that the two classes of lands were undistinguishable. Upon an objection that the defendants "under the law in force," i.e., Act XI of 1859, could not acquire rights of occupancy to all the lands held by them and as such they were not protected by the proviso to s. 37 of Act XI of 1859. *Held*, that



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the defendants were protected by the proviso to s. 37 of Act XI of 1859, inasmuch as they were settled raiyats under s. 20 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), the law for the time being in force, and had under s. 21 of the said Act occupancy rights in all lands for the time being held by them. *SARAT CHANDRA ROY CHOWDHURY v. ASIMAN BIBI* (1904) . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 725 s.c. 8 C. W. N. 601

6. ————— “Permanent Settlement,” meaning of—*Suit to avoid tenures—Burden of proof—Proof that tenure dates from the Permanent Settlement—Presumption backward. Semble:* The expressions “permanently settled” and “permanent settlement” in s. 37 of the Revenue Sale Law contemplate the Permanent Settlement of 1793. *Koowar Singh v. Gom Sundar Persad Singh*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 887, and *Raj Chunder Chowdhry v. Sheikh Bashir Mahomed*, 24 W. R. 476, referred to. In a suit to avoid certain tenures by a purchaser at a revenue sale of an estate, which was once permanently settled in 1793, purchased by Government at a sale under Act I of 1845 and again permanently settled in 1864, the plaintiff contended that these tenures, were liable to be avoided, unless the defendants proved by positive evidence the existence of the tenures from the Permanent Settlement of 1793. The defendants proved that the tenures were mentioned in the Survey Chitta of 1839, that they were not avoided on purchase by Government and were again recognised by Government in 1864, that rents had been paid at a uniform rate for at least 60 years, and that there had been sales of the tenures. *Held*, that the Court may and ought to presume backwards and hold that the defendants have discharged the onus thrown on them by s. 37 of the Revenue Sale Law. *Upendra Krishna v. Ismail Khan*, L. R. 31 I. A. 144: s.c. 8 C. W. N. 889, followed. *NAGENDRA LAL CHOWDHURY v. NAZIR ALI* (1906). . . . . 10 C. W. N. 503

7. ————— s. 37, exceptions (3) and (4)—*Talukdari tenures created since Permanent Settlement, on portions of which permanent dwelling-houses, gardens, tanks, etc., made—Suit by auction-purchaser to avoid tenure—Pleadings in defence—Decree, directing executing Court to determine portions built on.* The plaintiff, a purchaser of an estate at a revenue sale, sued to recover *khas* possession of certain lands included within it, alleging that the defendants held those lands as a taluk created since the Permanent Settlement. The defendants pleaded that the lands were their raiyati lands created before the Permanent Settlement and that consequently they could not be ejected under exception (3) of s. 37 of Act XI of 1859. The lower Appellate Court found that the lands formed a taluk created after the Permanent Settlement, but that on portions of it permanent dwelling-houses, tanks and gardens had been made. *Held*, that the plaintiff is entitled to get *khas* possession of the lands

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held by the defendants excepting such portions of them as are occupied by the dwelling-houses, gardens and tanks, etc. *Kiron Chunder Roy v. Naimuddi Talukdar*, I. L. R. 30 Calc. 498, distinguished. *Bhago Bibee v. Ramkanto Ray*, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 293; *Ajgur Ali v. Asmat Ali*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 110, and *Gobind Chundra v. Joy Chundra*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 327, followed. That, although the defendants did not adduce evidence in the case as to the exact position of the portions covered by the dwelling-houses, tanks, gardens, etc., the direction of the Lower Appellate Court for the determination of those portions in the execution proceedings is, in the circumstances of the case, just and proper. *Brij Sundar v. Goury Persaud*, S. D. A. (1852) 645, referred to. Though a person may fail to prove a defence under exception (3) of s. 37 of Act XI of 1859, it is still open to him to plead that he is protected under the 4th exception. *NAJEMODDEEN MOONSHI v. HASSAN HYDER CHOWDHRY* (1905) . . . . . 9 C. W. N. 852

8. ————— Act XI of 1859, s. 37, Exc. 4—*Houses, and tank built by incumbrancer—Suit to avoid incumbrance—Assignee from purchaser—Right of suit—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 121.* Where a person claims exemption from the provisions of the Revenue Sale Law, which entitled a purchaser to annual incumbrances in respect of land in his possession. The benefit of the 4th exception to s. 37 of the Act must be limited only to such portions of land as are covered by buildings, tanks, etc., and cannot be extended to cover those lands included in the lease, on which buildings and tanks, etc., have not been constructed. An assignee of a purchaser of an estate sold under the Revenue Sale Law is entitled to bring a suit to avoid incumbrances, Art. 121 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act applying to such a suit. *WAHID ALI v. RAHAT ALI* (1908) . . . . . 12 C. W. N. 1029

9. ————— ss. 37, 53—*Sale for arrears of revenue—Encumbrance, avoidance of.* A purchased an estate at a sale for arrears of revenue in the name of his servant. Thereupon one of the defaulting proprietors brought a suit against the said servant and other persons for setting aside the sale and obtained a decree for reconveyance on certain terms. Owing to this litigation another default occurred in repaying of revenue and the estate was again put up for sale and purchased by A. *Held*, in a suit by A to recover *khas* possession by annulling certain alleged incumbrances, that he was not entitled to do so, as the second sale was owing to his default and the case fell within s. 53 of Act XI of 1859. *MAFIZUDDIN v. KORBAD ALI CHOWDHURY* (1904) . . . . . I. L. R. 31 Calc. 393 s.c. 8 C. W. N. 115

s. 53—*Purchase at execution sale after default in payment of revenue—Purchase at revenue-sale by purchaser, if purchase by “proprietor”*



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—*Incumbrances, purchase subject to—Debtor and creditor—Assignment by debtor to creditor of debt due to debtor by third person—Failure of creditor to realise debt—Debtor's accountability—Practice—Leave to apply for further hearing on fresh materials on a point not raised in the lower Courts.* An estate was purchased at a revenue sale by a person, who had purchased the same at an execution sale before the revenue sale took place, but after default occurred in the payment of revenue: *Held*, that the purchase was a purchase by a "proprietor" within the meaning of s. 53 of the Revenue Sale Law and the purchaser took subject to incumbrances. *Abdool Bari v. Ramdass Coondoo*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 707, referred to. *SHAM KUMARI v. RAJA RAMESWAR SINGH* (1904) . . . 8 C. W. N. 786  
s.c. I. L. R. 31 I. A. 176

s. 54—

1. ———— *Revenue Sale Law (Act XI of 1859), ss. 13, 54—Sale of a share—Purchaser's right to eject person in adverse possession for over 12 years before sale—Encumbrance.* The purchaser of a share of a revenue-paying estate at a sale for arrears of revenue is entitled to that share, even if a person other than the recorded proprietor has acquired a title by 12 years' adverse possession previously to the sale. *Kumar Kalanand Singh v. Syed Sarafat Hossein*, 12 C. W. N. 528, followed. Adverse possession for 12 years does not constitute an encumbrance on the share. It might be an encumbrance on the right of the recorded proprietor, but at a sale under s. 13 of Act XI of 1859 it is not merely the rights of the recorded proprietor that pass but the share itself. *Karmi Khan v. Brojo Nath Das*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 244, distinguished. *Bhowani Koer v. Mathura Prasad*, 7 C. L. J. 1, referred to. *RAHIMUDDI MUNSHI v. NALINI KANTA LAHIRI* (1909) 13 C. W. N. 407

2. ———— *Separate accounts—Sale of a share of revenue-paying estate in possession of Hindu lady, as female heir—What interest passes—Reversionary interest, if an incumbrance.* When a share in a revenue-paying estate in respect of which a separate account had been opened was inherited by a Hindu lady from her father and was then sold for default in paying Government revenue: *Held*, that the complete owner's interest and not merely a life-estate in the share passed to the purchaser. The interest of a reversionary heir is not an incumbrance within the meaning of s. 54 of Act XI of 1859. *BANALATA DAS v. MONMOTHA NATH GOSWAMI* (1907) . . . 11 C. W. N. 821

3. ———— *Act XI of 1859, s. 54—Purchaser of share—Right to recover from person, who has acquired title by adverse possession previous to default.* Whether adverse possession is completed before or after the date of default, a purchaser at a revenue sale of a share of an estate, in respect of which a separate account has been opened in the Collectorate, becomes entitled to possession of the

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share. If the adverse possession was completed before default the default must be treated as the default of the person, who has acquired title by adverse possession and the sale must be held to pass his interest. *KALANAND SINGH v. SARAFAT HOSEIN* (1908) . . . 12 C. W. N. 528

**REVENUE SERVANTS.**

See MADRAS REVENUE RECOVERY ACT, s. 52 . . . I. L. R. 15 Mad. 35

**REVERSAL OF DECREE ON APPEAL**

See EXECUTION OF DECREE.

I. L. R. 30 All. 476

**REVERSIONER.**

See ADVERSE POSSESSION.

I. L. R. 30 Mad. 145

See DECLARATORY DECREE, SUIT FOR—REVERSIONERS.

See HINDU LAW . I. L. R. 28 All. 241  
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See HINDU LAW—

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6 C. W. N. 912

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## 1. ORDERS SUBJECT TO REVIEW.

1. ———— Decrees—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 376—Orders, review of.* S. 376 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorized reviews of judgment in respect to decrees of Court, and also in respect to orders which are not decrees. DEEN DYAL PURAMANI v. RAM COOMAR CHOWDHRY

10 W. R. 345

2. ———— Order relating to execution of decree. A Judge has power to review an order relating to the execution of a decree. (MORGAN, J. dissenting.) HARADHUN MOOKERJEE v. CHUNDER MOHUN ROY . Marsh. 205 : W. R. F. B. 66

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3. ———— Review of an order dismissing an execution case—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 623, 647.* The scope of s. 623, Civil Procedure Code, is wide enough to admit of the review of an order dismissing an execution case. Ramu Rai v. Dayal Singh, I. L. R. 16 All. 390, and Hajrat Akramnissa Begam v. Falianissa Begam, I. L. R. 18 Bom. 429. ASOKA KUMAR ROY CHAUDHURI v. KHETRAMONI DAS . 2 C. W. N. 606

4. ———— Order in proceedings under Act XXVII of 1860. A review of judgment is admissible in proceedings under Act XXVII of 1860, although no express provisions for reviews are contained in the Act. *In the matter of the petition of POONA KOOR*

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 101; 24 W. R. 376

*In the matter of RUKMIN . I. L. R. 1 All. 287*

(*Contra*) SIVU v. CHENAMMA . 5 Mad. 417

5. ———— Order under Administrator General's Act (II of 1874), s. 63—*Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 623.* The order passed under s. 63 of Act II of 1874 (s. 60 of Act XXIV of 1867) can be reviewed under s. 623 of Act X of 1877. SMITH v. SECRETARY OF STATE. *In the matter of Act II of 1874 . . . . . I. L. R. 3 Calc. 340*

6. ———— Order rejecting application for registration—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 376—Registration Act, 1871, s. 76—Act XXIII*



**REVIEW—contd.****1. ORDERS SUBJECT TO REVIEW—contd.**

of 1861, s. 38. S. 38, Act XXIII of 1861, which enacted that "the procedure prescribed by Act VIII of 1859 shall be followed as far as it can be in all miscellaneous cases and proceedings which, after the passing of the Act, shall be instituted in any Court, rendered the whole procedure of Act VIII of 1859, including the power of admitting a review, applicable to a proceeding to compel registration under the Registration Act. An order rejecting an application for registration under s. 76 of the Registration Act of 1871, being, in respect of the Court pronouncing it, a final order of adjudication between the parties, is so far in the nature of a "decree" within the meaning of Act VIII of 1859 as to fall within the operation of the sections of that Act which provide for the admission of a review. *In the matter of the petition of ABDOOLLAH. REASUT HOSSEIN v. ABDOOLLAH*

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 131 : L. R. 3 I. A. 221

reversing the decision of the High Court *In the matter of the petition of ABDOOLLAH*

10 B. L. R. 394 : 19 W. R. 303

**7. ——— Order admitting appeal to Privy Council.** An appeal to the Privy Council being once admitted, whether properly or erroneously, the High Court has no further jurisdiction to review its order and declare the appeal rejected. *AMEERUNISSA BEGUM v. INDURJEET KOONWUR*

6 W. R. Mis. 97

*In re WOOMATARA DEBEA* . 6 W. R. Mis. 120

**8. ——— Order granting leave to appeal to Privy Council.** *Per PRINSEP, J.*—An order granting leave to appeal to the Privy Council is open to review. *GOPINATH BIRBAR v. GOLUCK CHUNDER BOSE* . I. L. R. 16 Calc. 292 note

**9. ——— Order refusing to admit special appeal—Act VIII of 1859, ss. 376 and 378—Power of High Court to grant a review—Notice of application for review.** An order refusing to admit a special appeal is open to review, and the application for review may be made without notice to the other side. *JOY COOMAR DUTTA JHA v. ESHAREE NUND DUTTA JHA*

10 B. L. R. 155 : 18 W. R. 475

*See In re BARMUTOLLAH*

10 B. L. R. 156 note

where, however, under the circumstances, the Court refused the application.

*S.C. BURRAMOOLLAH v. NIL CHAND DUTT.*

17 W. R. 484

**10. ——— Judgment passed on compromise.** No review can be admitted of a judgment passed on a compromise. *PURNESSUREE NARAIN SINGH v. ROMEEZOODDEEN AHMED*

5 W. R. 226

**11. ——— Order refusing leave to sue as a pauper—Suit in formā pauperis—Court of original jurisdiction.** A Court of original jurisdiction has power to entertain an application to review

**REVIEW—contd.****1. ORDERS SUBJECT TO REVIEW—contd.**

an order refusing a petition for leave to sue *in formā pauperis*. *In the matter of the petition of UMA-SUNDARI DEBI* . . . 5 B. L. R. Ap. 29

*See MAHOMED GAZEE CHOWDHRY v. DULLAB BIBEE* . 5 B. L. R. 318 note : 11 W. R. 22

**12. ——— Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), ss. 409, 413, 541, 623, 625.** An order made under s. 409 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877) refusing leave to sue as a pauper is subject to review under s. 623. The provisions of s. 413 do not affect the right of a person, against whom such order has been made, to obtain a review. A petitioner applying for such review must file a copy of the order of which he seeks a review, together with a memorandum of objections (ss. 541 and 625). *ADARJI EDULJI v. MANIKJI EDULJI* . . . I. L. R. 4 Bom. 414

**13. ——— Order disallowing claim to attached property—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 246.** A Court has power to grant a review of an order which it has passed under s. 246, Civil Procedure Code, 1859, disallowing a claim made to property attached in execution of a decree. The order granting the review is final under s. 378. *COCHRANE v. HEERA LAL SEAL* . . . 7 W. R. 79

**14. ——— Order for probate—Probate and testamentary matters.** When once probate in solemn form has been granted, no one who has been cited or has taken part in the proceedings, or who was cognizant of them, can afterwards seek to have it cancelled. *Quare* : Whether a review may not be granted. *In the matter of PITAMBER GIRDHAR* . . . I. L. R. 5 Bom. 638

*See In the goods of BHAGGOBATTY DASSEE. PRO-SUNNOMOYEE DASSEE v. ADHORE CHANDRA DUTT* . . . 4 C. W. N. 757

**15. ——— Order on reference from Small Cause Court.** An application for a review of judgment by the High Court on a reference from a Small Cause Court was not admissible under the Code of 1859. *DOYLE v. KHOSAL MUNDLE*

3 W. R. S. C. C. Ref. 8

**16. ——— Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 617, 619, and 623—Judgment on reference from Subordinate Judge with Small Cause Court powers.** The High Court has no power to review a judgment passed by it on a reference from a Subordinate Judge with Small Cause Court powers. Cl. (c) of s. 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882) allows of a review of judgment on a reference only from a Court of Small Causes. The judgment of the High Court in such a case is not a decree or order within the meaning of cl. (b) of the section, but is simply a statement of the grounds in conformity with which the lower Court is to dispose of the case, as provided by s. 619. *RAMCHANDRA BABAJI v. SITARAM VINAYAK* . . . I. L. R. 10 Bom. 68

**17. ——— Small Cause Court suit.** *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 622, 623, 626 and 629—*



**REVIEW—contd.****1. ORDERS SUBJECT TO REVIEW—contd.**

*Review of judgment—Application for review rejected—Revision.* An application for review of judgment in a Small Cause Court suit was rejected, wrongly, on the ground of a supposed deficiency in the Court-fee paid upon the application. *Held*, that this order was open to revision. *Ram Lal v. Ratan Lal*, I. L. R. 23 All. 672, distinguished. *Willis v. Jawad Husain* (1907) . I. L. R. 29 All. 468

**18.** ———— *Order in rent suit—Bengal Rent Act (VIII of 1869)—Orders in rent suits previous to passing of Act.* Orders in rent suits were not subject to review until the passing of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, which made the Civil Procedure Code applicable to such suits. *MAHOMED TUCKEE v. AHMUDEE BEGUM* . . . 3 N. W. 22

*MONEEKURNIKA CHOWDHRAIN v. COLLECTOR OF MYMENSINGH* . . . 16 W. R. 159

*RADHA PERSHAD SINGH v. SANSAR ROY* . . . 14 W. R. 27

Though it was held in some cases that the admission of a review in such a case was not illegal. *HURCHUND SINGH v. ROOPA KOOR* . . . 4 N. W. 171

*ALI AZIM v. RAM MANICK ROY* 12 W. R. 195

*RAM JEEBUN DOSS v. DOYALEE DOSSEE* . . . 11 W. R. 246

*SREENATH DUTT v. RAMGOPAL CHATTERJEE* . . . 11 W. R. 108

*SOOBUL CHUNDER GOOHO v. TUMEEZOODDEEN CHOWDHRY* . . . 14 W. R. 414

**19.** ———— *Order on appeal from Collector under Mad. Act VIII of 1865—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 376, 378.* A Civil Court, in hearing an appeal from the decision of a Collector under Madras Act VIII of 1865, must be guided by the Civil Procedure Code, and the judgment of the Civil Court may be reviewed under s. 376 of the Code. The order granting a review is final. *SUBRAMANIYA PILLAY v. PERUMAL CHETTY* . . . 4 Mad. 251

**20.** ———— *Ex parte decree—Civil Procedure Code, s. 625.* It is competent to a party against whom an *ex parte* decree has been made to apply for review of judgment. *MUTTO v. ILAHI BEGAM* . . . I. L. R. 6 All. 65

*PORESH NATH MUNDUL v. KHETTRAMONEE DEBIA* . . . 20 W. R. 284

*ALI AZIM v. RAM MANICK ROY* 12 W. R. 195

(*Contra*) *MOTEE CHAND v. RADHAMADHUB CHAND* . . . 2 W. R. Mis. 34

**21.** ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 623—Application of section.* S. 623 of the Civil Procedure Code applies to all cases, whether they are disposed of in the presence of the parties or *ex parte* in the absence of the defendants.

**REVIEW—contd.****1. ORDERS SUBJECT TO REVIEW—concl.**

*HARI HUR PERSHAD NARAIN SINGH v. BUDDU PERSHAD* . . . 13 C. L. R. 254

**22.** ———— *Order dismissing suit for default of prosecution—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 119, 376—Re-admission of suit.* The plaintiff's suit was dismissed "in default of prosecution," on the ground that he had failed to deposit talabana, although time had been allowed him for that purpose. He was represented by a pleader at the adjourned hearing. He subsequently applied for the re-admission of the suit on the ground that he had been prevented by illness from depositing the money. *Held*, that the application should not have been treated as one under s. 119, Civil Procedure Code but might fairly be regarded as an application for review of judgment under s. 376, and in that view the misconstruction by the Munsif of the nature of the application was not a sufficient reason for depriving the plaintiff of the relief which he not inequitably obtained by the order passed in it; and the Court of first instance was directed to call on the plaintiff to pay the fee payable on his application for a review of judgment, and in the event of his complying with the requisition, to give effect to the Munsif's order for re-admission of the suit. *RAM SUNDAR SINGH v. RAM BANDHAN SINGH* . . . 7 N. W. 126

See also *MAHOMED AZEEMOULLAH v. ALI BUKSH* . . . 5 N. W. 74

**23.** ———— *Order for dismissal for default of appearance on order for local investigation.* A case was remanded on appeal (in the presence of both parties) for a local investigation. A reasonable time was given, after the records had come, to the parties to appear and conduct their case. The petitioner not having appeared, the lower Court treated it as a case of default, whereupon the petitioner made an application under s. 376, Act VIII of 1859. *Held*, that an application for a review was not the proper course in such a case. *In re KALEE MOHTJ DOSS* . . . 17 W. R. 70

**2. POWER TO REVIEW.**

**1.** ———— *Power of High Court to review or alter its own decree—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 623—Ground for review.* The High Court has no power to alter its own decree, except under the provisions of either s. 206 or s. 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The ground of review must have been existing at the time of the decree, the s. 623 not authorizing review of a decree, which was right, on the happening of a subsequent event. *KOTAGHIRI VENKATA SUBBAMMA RAO v. VELLANKI VENKATARAMA RAO* . . . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 1  
L. R. 27 I. A. 197

**2.** ———— *Power where appeal is admitted by superior Court—Civil Procedure Code, 1859.* Under the Code of 1859, a Judge was



REVIEW—*contd.*2. POWER TO REVIEW—*contd.*

not competent to hear a review in a case in which a special appeal had been admitted by the higher Court. *SHEO NATH SINGH v. RAM THUL RAE*  
N. W. Pt. II, 39 : Ed. 1873, 97

*JUGGURNATH SINGH v. AFZUL KHAN.*  
17 W. R. 130

*LALLMUN v. MANICK CHUND* . 1 Agra 133

*LUCAS v. STEPHEN* . 9 W. R. 301

*NARAYAN BIN SIDOJI v. DAVUDBHAI VALAD FATEBHAI* . 9 Bom. 238

3. ——— Power of Judge to review order made in course of liquidation of company—*Companies Act (VI of 1882), s. 169.* S. 169 of Act VI of 1882 is not intended to refer to a case in which a Judge upon the discovery of fresh matter considers it expedient to pass a fresh order or to review an order passed by him. *In re National Assurance and Investment Association ; Ex parte Munday, 31 Beav. 206*, referred to. *MUSSOORIE BANK v. HIMALAYA BANK* . I. L. R. 16 All. 53

4. ——— Order of Revenue Commissioner setting aside sale—*Public Demands Recovery Act (Beng. Act VII of 1880)—Beng. Act VII of 1868—Review of order setting aside sale.* A revenue-paying talukh was sold for arrears of dak cess under the Public Demands Recovery Act. The sale was set aside on appeal by the Revenue Commissioner, but on an application for review made to his successor, the sale was confirmed, and the purchaser took possession. In a suit to recover possession of an 8 annas share of the talukh on the grounds, among others, that the order on review was passed without jurisdiction and without notice to the plaintiffs, and as such conferred no title on the purchaser, the District Judge, on appeal, held that the order on review, not having been set aside, remained in force, but he remanded the case under s. 566 for trial of the question of notice. On the case coming back to the Appellate Court before another Judge, he held the order on review to be *ultra vires* and the trial of the question of notice to be unnecessary. The defendants preferred a second appeal against the last judgment. *Held*, that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to reviews of judgment were not extended to proceedings under Bengal Act VII of 1868 and VII of 1880, and that, in the present case, the order passed on review, confirming the sale, was *ultra vires* and of no effect. *LALA PRAYAG LAL v. JAI NARAYAN SINGH* . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 419

5. ——— Power after admission and hearing of special appeal—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 376.* A Judge is right in refusing to entertain an application for review where a special appeal has been admitted, tried, and disposed of. The words of s. 376, Act VIII of 1859, "special appeal shall have been admitted," referred to cases which had advanced beyond the inchoate stage of appeals, and in which it had been shown *prima*

REVIEW—*contd.*2. POWER TO REVIEW—*contd.*

*facie* that there were errors in law. *RAJ DHAREE LALL v. MOHADEO SINGH* . 11 W. R. 511

6. ——— Correction of clerical errors. A lower Appellate Court has a right to grant a review of its own judgment for the purpose of correcting a clerical error, even after a special appeal from its decision has been heard and determined by the High Court. A lower Appellate Court has no jurisdiction to review its own judgment so as to modify its substance, as, for example, to alter an award of costs after a special appeal from its decision has been heard and determined by the High Court. *OOMANUND ROY v. SUTTISH CHUNDER ROY* . 9 W. R. 471

7. ——— Power of lower Appellate Court after dismissal of special appeal—*24 & 25 Vict., c. 104, s. 15.* Upon the dismissal of a special appeal by the High Court, the appellant in special appeal applied to the High Court for a review of judgment upon the ground of discovery of fresh evidence. This application was rejected, on the ground that the Court could not take cognizance of the merits of a case in special appeal, and therefore could not admit a review upon fresh evidence. The special appellant then applied to the lower Appellate Court for a review of its judgment on the ground of discovery of fresh evidence. This application was admitted, and a review of the judgment was allowed. On application to the High Court under s. 15 of the Charter Act :—*Held*, that the lower Appellate Court had no jurisdiction to admit the application for review. *In the matter of the PETITION OF JADUNATH MOOKERJEE*  
6 B. L. R. 333

*S.C. JODOONATH MOOKERJEE v. PUNCHANUN MOOKERJEE* . 14 W. R. 438

*See also In re GUNGA BISHEN SAHU*

6 B. L. R. 334 note.

*BROJONATH KOONDOL CHOWDHRY v. JUMEEROONISSA BIBEE* . 7 W. R. 218

8. ——— Power where one of several defendants has appealed—*Application for review on behalf of other defendants.* The preferring of an appeal against a decision by one defendant does not deprive another defendant of his right to apply for a review of the same decision with reference to s. 376, Act VIII of 1859. *BUNKOO LALL SINGH v. BASSOOMUNISSA BIBEE* . 7 W. R. 166

9. ——— Power to proceed with review where appeal is subsequently brought.—*Act VIII of 1859, ss. 375 and 376.* A Judge is bound to proceed with an application for a review of his judgment, even though a petition of appeal has been filed subsequently to the application for review. *BHARAT CHANDRA MAZUMDAR v. RAM-GUNGA SEN*

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 362 : 5 W. R. 59

10. ——— Power of inferior mofussil Courts to review judgments—*Review before Civil Procedure Code, 1859—Beng. Reg. XXVI of*



REVIEW—*contd.*2. POWER TO REVIEW—*contd.*

1814. Whereas by the law in force previous to the Code of Civil Procedure the subordinate Courts could not review their judgment without the permission of a superior Court, the Code removed that inability, and the removal extended to suits, past and pending, as well as future. A party petitioning, after the Code of Civil Procedure came into force, for the review of a judgment in appeal passed in 1849, is entitled to be governed by the terms of the old law (Regulation XXVI of 1814), which allows a review in respect to a decree from which "no further appeal" may have been admitted by a superior Court: and a "further appeal" included both a second or special appeal and a summary appeal. *JOOGUL KISHORE SINGH v. OOGUR NARAIN SINGH* . . . . . 8 W. R. 483

11. ——— The inferior Courts in the mofussil have no jurisdiction to review their own judgments, except under the circumstances and with the limitations set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure. *BURRA FUKER DOSS BERA v. FUKER DOSS BERA* . . . . . 20 W. R. 180

12. ——— Power of Insolvency Court—*Insolvency Court, Bombay—Jurisdiction.* The Court for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors at Bombay has jurisdiction to review its own orders. *In the matter of THUCKER BHAGVANDAS* . . . . . I. L. R. 4 Bom. 489

13. ——— Power of Judge of mofussil Small Cause Court—*Mofussil Small Cause Courts Act (XI of 1865), s. 21—Code of Civil Procedure (Act X of 1877), s. 63, and Ch. XLVII, Sch. II.* The Judge of a mofussil Small Cause Court may grant an application for a review of judgment under the Code of Civil Procedure. *ISAN CHUNDER BANERJEE v. LUCHUN GOPE. KEMP v. PREM NARAYAN SING* . . . . . I. L. R. 5 Calc. 699 : 5 C. L. R. 539

14. ——— Application for re-admission of appeal dismissed on failure to deposit costs of paper book—*High Court Rules, Part II, Ch. VIII, Rule 17—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 726.* The appellant in an appeal from an original decree having failed to deposit the estimated amount of costs for the preparation of the paper book, the appeal was dismissed under rule 17 of the High Court Rules, Part II, Ch. VIII. An application for re-admission of the appeal was then made on behalf of the appellant; and a rule granted by a Division Bench calling upon the opposite side to show cause. *Held* (by PETHERAM, C.J., and PRINSEP and GHOSE, JJ., reversing the decision of BEVERLEY, J.), that the matter before the Court was not an application for review of judgment, and could not be disposed of by a single Judge of the High Court under s. 627 of the Civil Procedure Code. *RAMHARI SAHU v. MADAN MOHAN MITTER* . . . . . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 339

15 ——— Order dismissing appeal for default in depositing costs of paper book—

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REVIEW—*contd.*2. POWER TO REVIEW—*contd.*

*High Court Rules, Part II, Ch. VIII, Rule 17—Procedure to set aside order—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 623 and 626.* A decree of a Division Bench of the High Court, dismissing an appeal for default in depositing the estimated costs of preparation of the paper book under rule 17 of the High Court Rules, Part II, Ch. VIII, can only be set aside by an order under s. 626 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) *Ramhari Sahu v. Madan Mohan Mitter, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 339*, so far as it decides the contrary, is wrongly decided. *FATIMUNNISSA alias KANIZ FATIMA v. DEOKI PERSHAD* . . . . . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 350

*IKBAL HOSSAIN v. DEOKI PROSHAD* . . . . . 1 C. W. N. 21

16. ——— Decree properly made against minor—*Right of minor to impeach decree on attaining majority—Form of decree against minor—Practice—Procedure.* A testator in his will directed his daughter-in-law L (defendant No. 1) to adopt his nephew K (defendant No. 2), and he devised the residue of his estate to him. The executors of the will subsequently brought this suit to have the will construed and the rights of K in the testator's estate ascertained and declared. A decree was made on the 1st October 1887, by which it was declared that K's adoption was a condition precedent to his inheritance, and that unless he was adopted, he was not entitled to any part of the testator's property. On the 22nd October 1894 K filed a petition of review, stating that at the date of the decree he was a minor and had only recently, viz., on the 14th December 1894, attained the age of eighteen years. He contended that there was error apparent on the face of the decree, inasmuch as it did not provide that he should have an opportunity of showing cause against it in so far as it affected his interest after he attained his majority. *Held*, that the review could not be granted. The Courts in India, after deciding an issue in which an infant, party to suit, is interested, have no power to reserve to the infant the right of questioning such decision. At all events, a decree is not erroneous for not containing such a provision when the issue in which the infant is interested has been fully gone into and argued before the Court. A decree passed against an infant properly represented is binding upon him like a decree passed against an adult, but it is open to the infant to impeach such decree by a suit in cases where his guardian has been guilty of fraud or negligence in allowing the decree to be passed against him. *CHRSANDAS NATHA v. LADKAVAHU* . . . . . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 571

17. ——— Dismissal of suit for default—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 98, 99, and 623—No application to re-instate suit—Application barred by negligence.* When a suit was dismissed for default under s. 98, Civil Procedure Code, and the plaintiff neglected to make an application within thirty days from the date of dismissal to get the suit restored to the file:—*Held*, that the Court had no jurisdiction under s. 623, Civil Procedure Code,

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**REVIEW—contd.****2. POWER TO REVIEW—contd.**

to re-instate the case where a person by his own negligence has allowed his rights under s. 99 to be barred. *KOILASH MUNDAL v. NABADWIP CHANDRA KAR* . . . . . **2 C. W. N. 318**

**18. — Dismissal of a suit for default under s. 102—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 102, 103, and 623—Review of judgment without applying to re-instate the suit under s. 103 of the Code.** When a suit was dismissed for default under s. 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and an application for review of judgment was made by the plaintiff without a previous application to have the order of dismissal set aside under s. 103 of the Code :—*Held*, that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the application for review of judgment. *Koilash Mundal v. Nabadwip Chandra Kar*, 2 C. W. N. 318, distinguished. *RAJ NARAIN PURKAIT v. ANANGA MOHAN BHANDARI*

**I. L. R. 26 Calc. 598**

**19. — Order for review—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 626—Omission to record reasons for granting—Validity of order.** An order intended to operate as an order for review is not invalidated by an irregularity in its form by reason of which it purports to be an order made on an application to set aside a decree and restore a suit for trial. The provision in s. 626 of the Code of Civil Procedure that a Judge granting an application for a review "shall record with his own hand his reasons for such opinion," is directory, and an order is not necessarily invalidated by the fact that the reasons are not recorded, though there may be cases in which it is necessary in the interests of justice that the reasons should be recorded, and in such cases the record would be essential to the validity of the order. *Gyanund Asram v. Bepin Mohan Sen*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 734, referred to. *MANICKA MUDALIAR v. GURUSAMI MUDALIAR*

**I. L. R. 23 Mad. 496**

**20. — Power of Special Judge to review ex parte order—Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879), s. 53—Discretion of Court.** The Special Judge under the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879) has power to review an ex parte order made by him. *RAMCHANDRA NARAYAN KULKARNI v. DRAUPADI*

**I. L. R. 20 Bom. 281**

**21. — Review of first Court's order—Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879), ss. 53, 73, and 74—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, Application of—District Judge, jurisdiction of—Assistant Judge, jurisdiction of—Discretion of Court.** An Assistant Judge having found that the defendants in a suit pending before him were not agriculturists, the defendants presented a petition for review of that finding, and in review the Assistant Judge came to a contrary conclusion. *Held*, that, as s. 74 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879), only makes the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) applicable to suits before the Subordinate Judge, the conduct of proceedings

**REVIEW—contd.****2. POWER TO REVIEW—contd.**

before a District or Assistant Judge when sitting in revision under s. 53 of Act XVII of 1879 is within his own discretion, and the granting of a review on the ground of mistake as to the nature of a defendant's income is a reasonable exercise of such discretion. *BADARICHARYA v. RAMCHANDRA GOPAL SAVANT* . . . . . **I. L. R. 19 Bom. 113**

**22. — Power of Special Judge to review his own decree—Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879), ss. 53, 73, and 74—Application of Civil Procedure Code, 1882, to proceedings of Special Judge—Discretion of Court—Superintendence of High Court—Civil Procedure Code, s. 622.** The Special Judge appointed under the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879), (the defendant not appearing) reversed, in revision under s. 53 of that Act, the decree of a Subordinate Judge and passed a decree for the plaintiff. One of the defendants, who, it appeared, had not been served with notice of the previous application for review, subsequently applied to the Special Judge to review his decree, and that application was granted on the ground that the applicant had not had notice of the former review. On this subsequent review, the Special Judge discovered that he made a mistake with reference to the date of certain documents, and that this mistake had led him to a wrong conclusion upon the merits of the case. He consequently reversed his former order and dismissed the suit, confirming the original decree of the Subordinate Judge. The plaintiff then applied to the High Court under its extraordinary jurisdiction (s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code, Act XIV of 1882). *Held*, that in granting a re-hearing the Special Judge had exercised a reasonable discretion with which the High Court could not interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction. The Civil Procedure Code is not applicable to proceedings before the Special Judge, and the conduct of such proceedings rests within his discretion. *Badaricharya v. Ramchandra Gopal Savant*, I. L. R. 19 Bom. 113, approved. *PARSONS, J.*—The Special Judge cannot, under the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act, review his decree and order a new trial on the ground of discovery of fresh evidence, but he has discretionary power to review his decree in order to correct a mistake into which he has fallen. *RAMSINGH v. KISANSINGH* . . . . . **I. L. R. 19 Bom. 116**

**23. — Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 103, 143—Rules framed under s. 189 of the Bengal Tenancy Act—Whether proceedings under s. 103 of the Bengal Tenancy Act are suits between landlord and tenant—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882).** Proceedings under s. 103 of the Bengal Tenancy Act are suits between landlord and tenant within the meaning of s. 143 by virtue of the rules framed under s. 189 of that Act; therefore the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to review of judgment are applicable to such proceedings. *ACHHA MIAN CHOWDHRY v. DURGA CHURN LAW* . . . . . **I. L. R. 25 Calc. 146**

**2 C. W. N. 137**



**REVIEW—contd.****2. POWER TO REVIEW—concl'd.**

**24. ——— Power to grant second review—***Civil Procedure Code, 1859.* A Court has no jurisdiction to grant a second review of judgment on the application of the same party under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859. *VENCAMA SHETTY v. PAMOO SHETTY* . . . . . **5 Mad. 323**

**25. ——— First review not appealed from nor shown to be erroneous.** A second review of judgment was refused as not contemplated either by the law itself or the Full Bench ruling of 12th February 1866, the first review being neither appealed against nor shown to be wrong. *TARANATH ROY v. RAJ BULLUB BHUNJE* **7 W. R. 464**

*NASIRUDDIN KHAN v. INDRONARAYAN CHOWDHRY* . **B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 367 : 5 W. R. 93**  
**1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 147**

**26. ——— Admission of review after prior order rejecting it—***Act VIII of 1859, ss. 376, 377, 378, and 380—Order rejecting review.* An order rejecting a review is not conclusive, and the Court may, in the exercise of its discretion, admit a review even after a prior order rejecting it. *SETON-KARR, J.,* differed. *NASIRUDDIN KHAN v. INDRONARAYAN CHOWDHRY*

**B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 367**  
**1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 147 : 5 W. R. 93**

*KASHEENATH ROY v. LUCKHEENARAIN CHATTERJEE* . . . . . **W. R. 1864, 91**

*FUKHEEROODEEN v. KALACHAND SIRDAR*  
**1 W. R. 287**

*NEEDOO MONEE DOSSEE v. SARODA MONEE DOSSEE. DOORGANATH SHOOR v. SOOKHMY BISWAS*  
**2 W. R. 61, 62**

*RASH BEHAREE SINGH v. KOONJ BEHAREE SINGH*  
**W. R. 1864 Mis. 31**

*ASUDOODEEN HYDER v. ABDOL KUREEM*  
**6 W. R. 110**

**27. ——— Second application for review—***“Final”—Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), s. 378—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 623, 629.* There is nothing in the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882) which prevents a second application for a review being made after a previous application for review has been made and rejected, and such an application can therefore be entertained. The word “Final” in s. 629 of Act XIV of 1882 bears the same meaning, and ought to have the same construction put upon it as was put upon the same word in s. 378 of Act VIII of 1859 by the Full Bench in *Nasiruddin Khan v. Indronarayan Chowdhry*, **B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 367.** *GOBINDA RAM MONDAL v. BHOLANATH BHATTA* . . . . . **I. L. R. 15 Calc. 432**

**3. FORM OF, AND PROCEDURE ON, APPLICATION.**

**1. ——— Form of application.** Applications for review of judgment should set forth concisely the grounds of objection to the decision of

**REVIEW—contd.****3. FORM OF, AND PROCEDURE ON, APPLICATION—concl'd.**

which a review is sought, without argument or narrative, and such grounds should be numbered consecutively. *MAHADAJI RAMCHANDRA MULE v. VITHAL VISHVANATH* . . . . . **1 Bom. 185**

**2. ——— To what Court to be made—***Review of judgment of Sudder Court rejecting special appeal.* An application for a review, on the ground of the discovery of new evidence, of a judgment of the late Sudder Court rejecting a special appeal, ought not to be made to the High Court, but to the Court of original jurisdiction. *RAO BANEE-RAM v. NEWAZ BIBEE* . . . . . **8 W. R. 511**

**3. ——— Presentation of application to munsarim instead of Judge.** On the 26th January 1889 an application was presented to the Munsarim of the District Judge's Court for review of a judgment passed on the 19th December 1888. The application was insufficiently stamped, and the Munsarim endorsed on it “stamp insufficient.” On this a dispute ensued between the pleader for the applicant and the Munsarim as to the sufficiency of the stamp. On the 25th April 1889 the deficiency pointed out by the Munsarim was made good. On the 26th May the Judge admitted the application, on the applicant paying the Court-fee payable on an application presented on or after ninety days from the date of the decree. *Held,* that the application should have been presented to the Judge, and not to the Munsarim. *MUNRO v. CAWNPORE MUNICIPAL BOARD*  
**I. L. R. 12 All. 57**

**4. ——— Application for review by minor—***Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 376, 377.* An infant is as much bound by a judgment in his own action as if of full age, and if an application for review is made on his behalf, it must be subject to the conditions of the 376th and 377th sections of the Code of Civil Procedure. *MODHOO SOODUN SINGH v. PRITHEE BULLUB PAUL* . **16 W. R. 231**

**5. ——— Admission of review without notice.** A proceeding admitting a review, without notice to the opposite party, as required by s. 378 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, is wholly vitiated by such defect, and not binding on that party. *GOLABOO v. RAMDYAL SINGH*  
**8 W. R. 304**

**6. ——— Application for review—***Copy of judgment, decree, or order sought to be reviewed—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 541 and 625—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 12.* It is not necessary that an application for review of judgment should be accompanied by a copy of the decree, order, or judgment sought to be reviewed. *WAJID ALI SHAH v. NAWAL KISHORE*  
**I. L. R. 17 All. 213**

**4. REVIEW BY JUDGE OTHER THAN JUDGE IN ORIGINAL CASE.**

**1. ——— Proper Court to review judgment—***Power of one Judge to review another's*



**REVIEW—contd.****4. REVIEW BY JUDGE OTHER THAN JUDGE IN ORIGINAL CASE—contd.**

*judgment.* As a general rule, the Court which pronounces a judgment is the only Court that can review that judgment. *RAM NATH v. GOWHUR* 2 N. W. 230

2. ——— **Hearing of application by different Judge when allowable—Delay.** A review was intended to be a consideration of the same subject by the same Judge, as distinguished from an appeal, which is a hearing before another tribunal. A review therefore should be presented with as much expedition as possible with a view to the re-hearing before the same Judge. The exceptions to this rule are allowable only *ex necessitate*, that is, from death of the original Judge or some unexpected and unavoidable cause which prevents him from hearing the review. The causes accounting for delay in applying for a review must, to justify the grant of it, be of grave importance. *MOHESHUR SINGH v. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA*

3 W. R. P. C. 45 : 17 Moo. I. A. 283

See *SURUT SOONDUREE DEBIA v. RAJENDUR KISHORE ROY CHOWDHRY* 9 W. R. 125

3. ——— **Power of Judge to review judgment of predecessor—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 379.** The law makes no distinction between the power of a Judge who originally heard a case, and subsequently has an application for review before him, and the power of a Judge subsequently succeeding to the same office who has such an application before him, and is not barred by the circumstances stated in s. 379, Act VIII of 1859, from considering that application. *AMAN ALI CHOWDHRY v. KASIM ALI* 6 W. R. 316

4. ——— **Power to review judgment of predecessor—Ground of review.** A lower Court acts without jurisdiction if it admits a review of its predecessor's judgment, unless either the party apply for review within ninety days or the Court is satisfied that there is just and reasonable cause for not having preferred the application within the limited period. *GOSSIE DOSS v. NARAIN DOSS* W. R. 1864, 287

*PURMESSUREE NARAIN SINGH v. ROMEZOOD-DEEN AHMED* 5 W. R. 226

*SREENATH CHOWDHRY v. KRITATTOMOYE DOSSEE* 18 W. R. 286

5. ——— **Exercise of power.** A Subordinate Judge has the power under the law to review the decision of his predecessor, although the power is one which should be exercised very sparingly. *KANGALEE CHURN JOSHI v. DURSUNEE DOSSEE* 18 W. R. 198

6. ——— **Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 376, 378—Power of Judge to review judgment of his predecessor.** A Judge has no power to allow a review of his predecessor's judgment on the ground that he comes to a different conclusion on the facts of the case. The general words used in ss. 376 and 378 of Act VIII of 1859 are controlled

**REVIEW—contd.****4. REVIEW BY JUDGE OTHER THAN JUDGE IN ORIGINAL CASE—contd.**

and restricted by the particular words, and it is only the discovery of new evidence, or the correction of a patent and indubitable error or omission, or some other particular ground of the like description which justifies the granting of a review. *ROY MEGHRAJ v. BEEJOY GOBIND BURRAL*

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 197 : 23 W. R. 438

See *In the matter of the petition of MATHRA PARSHAD* I. L. R. 1 All. 296

*BANEE MADHUB BOSE v. KALI CHURN SINGH ROY* 24 W. R. 387

*MUNEEROODEEN v. KADIR BUKSH* 24 W. R. 410

*WOLFUT v. NUSRUTOOLLAH* 25 W. R. 48

7. ——— **Ground for review—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 376-378.** Where a Judge allowed a review of his predecessor's judgment on the sole ground that it appeared to him that the judgment of his predecessor had done injustice :—*Held*, by the High Court (*MORGAN, C.J.*, and *INNES, J.*), that, though the generality of the terms used in the sections of the Procedure Code, Act VIII of 1859, relating to review of judgment—*viz.*, "other good and sufficient reason" (s. 376), "and otherwise requisite for the ends of justice" (s. 378),—confers a wide jurisdiction, this jurisdiction could not be held to authorize a Judge to revise and reverse his predecessor's decree on the ground above mentioned. If the review is asked for in reference to the conclusions of fact drawn from the evidence, it should not be granted, simply upon the same evidence. *Reasut Hossein v. Abdoollah, I. L. R. 2 Calc. 131*, discussed. *RAMAN v. KURNATHA THARAKAN* I. L. R. 2 Mad. 10

8. ——— **Power of Judge to review case after transfer to his file—Order dismissing suit.** A Judge cannot, by transferring a case to his own file, confer on himself the power to review an order of dismissal pronounced by a Principal Sudder Ameen. *GOLAM ESHA v. HURRISH CHUNDER MOOKERJEE* W. R. 1864 Mis. 29

9. ——— **Case transferred to another Court on abolition of original Court—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 623, 624.** S. 624 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be read as a proviso to s. 623. *Held*, therefore, that, when a Court had been abolished and its business transferred to a Court presided over by another Judge, such Judge should not entertain an application for review of judgment except in the case provided for by s. 624. *SARANGAPANI v. NARAYANASAMI*

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 567

10. ——— **Application presented to original Judge—Grant of application, Notice of—Hearing by successor—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 624.** An application for review of judgment, upon a ground other than those mentioned in s. 624 of the Civil Procedure Code, if presented to the Judge who delivered it, and who thereupon directs notice to be given to the oppo-



**REVIEW—contd.****4. REVIEW BY JUDGE OTHER THAN JUDGE IN ORIGINAL CASE—contd.**

site party, may be heard and disposed of by his successor. *Pancham v. Jhinguri*, I. L. R. 4 All. 278, dissented from. *Karoo Singh v. Deo Narain Singh*. I. L. R. 10 Calc. 80; 13 C. L. R. 261

11. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 624—Execution-case struck off in absence of decree-holder and without giving him notice of day fixed for hearing it—Ground for review by another Judge—Practice.* In the absence of the decree-holder and without giving him notice of the day fixed for the hearing of the darkhast, the Subordinate Judge struck off an execution-proceeding. *Held*, that, under s. 624 of the Civil Procedure Code, an application to review the order could not be heard by the successor of the Judge who made it. *KHEMA KANUJI v. DHANJI FRAMJI*. I. L. R. 14 Bom. 101

12. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 624, 626 (c)—Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act (VII of 1888), s. 59—Notice of hearing review.* An application for review of judgment upon grounds other than those mentioned in s. 624 of the Code of Civil Procedure (as amended by Act VII of 1888), if presented to the Judge who delivered it and who has thereupon directed notice to be given to the opposite party may be heard and disposed of by his successor. *GANPAT v. JIVAN*. I. L. R. 16 Bom. 603

13. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 424—Application for review heard by successor to Judge who passed the decree.* When an application for review is presented to the Judge who made the decree, and he thereupon issues notice to the other side, the application is "made" to him within the meaning of s. 624 of the Civil Procedure Code, and may be heard and disposed of by his successor in office. *Karoo Singh v. Deo Narain Singh*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 80, followed. *FAZEL BISWAS v. JAMADAR SHEIK* I. L. R. 13 Calc. 231

14. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 623, 624—To whom application may be made—Meaning of "made."* The term "made" in s. 624 of the Civil Procedure Code does not mean "presented," but means and includes the hearing and determination of the application for review of judgment. *Held*, therefore, where an application for a review of judgment on the ground, not of the discovery of new and important matter or evidence as mentioned in s. 623 of the Civil Procedure Code, or of a clerical error apparent on the face of the decree, but on other grounds, was presented to the District Judge who delivered the judgment, and such Judge was transferred before he could entertain such application, that his successor was not competent to entertain it. *PANCHAM v. JHINGURI*. I. L. R. 4 All. 278

15. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 623 and 624—"New and important matter"—Money paid into Court*

**REVIEW—contd.****4. REVIEW BY JUDGE OTHER THAN JUDGE IN ORIGINAL CASE—contd.**

*under a decree to abide the result of an appeal to the Privy Council from a former decree on which it is based—Application to recover the money on the reversal of the former decree.* By a deed of sale, dated 9th May 1858, certain lands belonging to a minor talukhdar were sold by his mother and natural guardian to the plaintiff's father. The lands were described as nakri (i.e., held free of assessment), and the sale-deed provided that in case the vendee were at any future time compelled to pay assessment to Government in respect of the nakri lands the vendor would recoup the vendee for any payment so made. In 1872 Government for the first time levied assessment on the nakri lands. In 1876 the plaintiff filed a suit against the talukhdar to recover the amount of assessment paid by them in respect of the nakri lands for the years 1872—76. The High Court passed a decree in plaintiffs' favour in March 1883. Against this decree the talukhdar appealed to the Privy Council. In April 1883 the plaintiffs filed a second suit on the same cause of action to recover from the talukhdar the amount of assessment levied on the nakri lands for the years 1877—82. In this suit a decree was passed against the talukhdar solely on the strength of the High Court's decree in the former suit. In execution of this decree, the plaintiffs attached the talukhdar's property. Thereupon the talukhdar deposited in Court the amount due under the decree, and applied to the Court for removal of the attachment, and for stay of further proceedings in execution pending the disposal of his appeal to the Privy Council in the former suit. This application was granted. In March 1887 the Privy Council decided the appeal in favour of the talukhdar, and reversed the High Court's decree. Thereupon the talukhdar applied for a refund of the money he had deposited in Court. The Court suggested that his proper remedy was by an application for review of the decree in the second suit. The talukhdar accordingly presented a petition of review. This petition was rejected by the District Judge, on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to grant a review of his predecessor's decision, except on the grounds set forth in s. 624 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, that the District Judge had jurisdiction to entertain the application for review. The decision of the Privy Council, reversing the decree of the High Court in the first suit, having been passed subsequently to the decree in the second suit, which depended on the reversed decree of the High Court, was "new and important matter" within the meaning of ss. 623 and 624 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *WAGHELA RAISANGJI SHIVSANGJI v. MASLUDIN*. I. L. R. 13 Bom. 330

16. ————— *Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 623, 627—Practice.* A second appeal was decided on the 1st June 1888 in favour of the respondent by two Judges of the High Court. On the 24th July 1888 an application for review was filed with the Registrar. Various



**REVIEW—contd.****4. REVIEW BY JUDGE OTHER THAN JUDGE IN ORIGINAL CASE—concl'd.**

reasons prevented the two Judges from sitting together until the month of March 1889. On the 6th March the matter came up before them, when a rule was issued calling upon the other side to show cause why a review of judgment should not be granted, being made returnable on the 28th March 1889. On the 28th March one of the two Judges had left India on furlough, and the rule was taken up, heard, and made absolute by the other sitting alone. *Held*, that he had jurisdiction to hear the rule. *AUBHOY CHURN MOHUNT v. SHAMONT LOCHUN MOHUNT* . . . **I. L. R. 16 Calc. 788**

**17. — Civil Procedure Code, s. 624—Grant of application for review by successor of original Judge.** An application for review of judgment was presented on other grounds than those specified in s. 624 to a District Munsif who had delivered the judgment, and he thereupon ordered the decree to be produced. The District Munsif having resigned, his successor heard and determined the application. *Held*, that it was not competent to the District Munsif who had not delivered the original judgment to entertain the application for review. *CHERU KURUP v. CHERU KANDA KURUP* . . . **I. L. R. 12 Mad. 509**

**18. — N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1881), s. 185—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 623.** S. 623 and the following sections of the Code of Civil Procedure which deal with reviews of judgments have no application to suits and proceedings under the N.-W. P. Rent Act, 1881. Where s. 185 of Act XII of 1881 applies, it is only in cases where there is no right of appeal that a review can be granted, and that only on the special ground provided for in the Act itself. *WAZIR SINGH v. KISHORI RAWANJI* . . . **I. L. R. 19 All. 522**

**5. GROUNDS FOR REVIEW.**

**1. — Good and sufficient reason—Change of incumbent of office of Judge.** A Court has the power, for any reason that it may consider good and sufficient, to grant a review of its judgment; and if the application is made within ninety days, the Court's estimate of those reasons cannot be interfered with by an Appellate Court. The procedure is not different when there has been a change (during the ninety days) of office incumbents. *MONTOORA v. ABLAK ROY* . **11 W. R. 197**

**2. — Unfairness of decision—Power to admit review.** When once a Civil Court has passed a final decision between the parties, it loses jurisdiction over the suit, except for the purposes of executing the decree; and it cannot hold a new trial of the same unless, for some reason within the Procedure Act, the first trial appears to have been unfair between the two parties. *LULEET MOHUN ROY CHOWDHRY v. SOWTRA BEEBEE* . . . **10 W. R. 42**

**3. — Correction of error or omission—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 376-378.**

**REVIEW—contd.****5. GROUNDS FOR REVIEW—contd.**

**PINHEY, J.**—A review may be admitted on any ground, whether urged at the original hearing of the appeal or not, whenever the Court considers that it is necessary to correct an evident error or omission, or is otherwise requisite for the ends of justice; following *Chintamani Pal v. Pyari Mohun Mookerjee*, 6 B. L. R. 126. *KALU BIN BHIWAJI v. VISHRAM MAWAJI* . . . **I. L. R. 1 Bom. 543**

**4. —** The ground of review of a decree must have been existing at the time of the decree, s. 623 not authorizing a review of a decree, which was right on the happening of a certain event. *KOTAGHIRI VENKATA SUBBAMMA RAO v. VELLANKI VENKATARAMA RAO* . . . **I. L. R. 24 Mad. 1**  
**L. R. 27 I. A. 197**

**5. — Error in law.** An error on a point of law is a ground for a review of judgment. *KOH POH v. MOUNG TAY* . . . **10 W. R. 143**

**6. — Omission to try material issue—Act VIII of 1859, s. 376.** The omission of a Court to take into consideration a material issue is a sufficient ground to admit an application for review of judgment. *BIHARI LAL NANDI v. TRAILAKHOMAYI BARMANI* . . . **3 B. L. R. A. C. 346 : 12 W. R. 223**

*HUSSUN ALI CHOWDHRY v. NASIROODDEEN* . . . **16 W. R. 134**

*WISE v. HURO LALL GIREE GOSSAIN* . . . **16 W. R. 150**

**7. — Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 623—Reasons for applying for review—Error in fact or law.** A Divisional Bench of the High Court, sitting as a Court of second appeal, being of opinion that the Court of first appeal had omitted to determine a certain issue of fact, determined such issue itself and decided the appeal in accordance with its determination of such issue. An application for review of judgment was made on two grounds, viz., (i) that the Bench was wrong in thinking that such issue had not been determined by the Court of first appeal; and (ii) that the Bench sitting as a Court of second appeal, was not empowered to determine an issue of fact which the Court of first appeal had omitted to determine, but should have referred such issue to that Court for determination under s. 566 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, that, looking to the provisions of that Code relating to review of judgment, such application ought not to be allowed on the grounds mentioned, which virtually disclosed reasons for appeal from the judgment. *SHEO RATAN v. LAPPU KUAR* . . . **I. L. R. 5 All. 14**

**8. — Omission to decide issue.** The absence of a formal finding on an issue tried and decided by a Court of first instance is not an error calling for review of judgment in the High Court. *SABAPATHI v. SUBRAYA* . . . **I. L. R. 2 Mad. 58**



REVIEW—*contd.*5. GROUNDS FOR REVIEW—*contd.*

9. ——— Omission to consider effect of documentary evidence—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 376-378.* Where a Judge has, in deciding a case, omitted to consider the effect of important documentary evidence filed with the plaint which was not taken issue upon, and which materially affects the merits of the case, he is competent, under ss. 376 to 378 of Act VIII of 1859, to grant a review and re-hear the case. *MAHADEVA RAYAR v. SAPPANI* . . . I. L. R. 1 Mad. 396

10. ——— Erroneous decision on immaterial point. *Held*, that, when an issue which decides the case on the merits has been found in favour of either party, a review of judgment will not be granted merely because there has been an erroneous decision on a point affecting an issue which, in consequence of the finding, has become immaterial. *RAKUB DOSS v. SOORAJ MULL*

*Bourke O. C. 131*

11. ——— Summarily discrediting documentary evidence without inspection—*Report of Commissioner to make local inquiry.* An application for a review of judgment was made to a Court of appeal on the ground that certain very material documents on which the Court of first instance had relied had been summarily discredited without being inspected by the Court of appeal, and that the Court of appeal had erred in declaring the report of a Commissioner appointed by the Court of first instance for the purpose of making a local inquiry to be unworthy of reliance, because he was a mohurrir of the Court of first instance. *Held*, that, in granting the review applied for, the lower Appellate Court had not exceeded the discretion vested in it by law. *ABDUL RAHIM v. RACHA RAI*

I. L. R. 1 All. 363

12. ——— It may be competent to a Judge to entertain an application for a review, although such application contains no distinct allegation of an error in law in the orders sought to be reviewed nor any suggestion of the discovery of new evidence. *In the matter of the petition of ABDOOLLAH. REASUT HOSSEIN v. ABDOOLLAH*

I. L. R. 2 Calc. 131 : L. R. 3 I. A. 221

13. ——— Omission to examine witness—*Objection not taken on appeal.* That the lower Court should have improperly neglected to examine a witness is not a ground for a review of judgment, if the objection was not taken when the case was heard by the Court in regular appeal. *MUNSHAD BIBEE v. LUCHMEEPUT SINGH*

9 W. R. 129

14. ——— Error in not remanding case. The fact that the High Court ought to have remanded the case on the ground that the Judge had wrongly decided a point of law is no ground for review. *PROSUNNONATH DUTT v. JUDONATH PAUL* . . . 9 W. R. 589

15. ——— Further consideration of evidence—*Probability of different conclusion.* It

REVIEW—*contd.*5. GROUNDS FOR REVIEW—*contd.*

is not a proper ground for granting a review of judgment that a Judge, by going through the evidence a second time, might arrive at a different conclusion. *CHUNDER CHURN AUGGRODANY v. LOODUNRAM DEB* . . . 25 W. R. 324

16. ——— Opportunity to re-argue case—*Chance of altering decision.* A review cannot be given merely for the purpose of allowing the parties to re-argue the case upon the evidence, upon the chance of eventually throwing doubt upon the decision already passed. *KOLEEMOODEEN MUNDUL v. HEERUN MUNDUL* . . . 24 W. R. 186

17. ——— Error in decision—*Additional evidence.* Where a Subordinate Judge admitted a review on the representation of plaintiff that he (the Judge) had made a mistake as to the subject of a certain *dagh* in a Government *halabadee chitta*, the applicant filing with his petition for review another *chitta* and other evidence for the purpose of convincing the Court that it had made an error:—*Held*, that an error of this kind was sufficient to found the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the review. *GUNESH RAM SURMAH v. ROHINEE DASSEE* . . . 14 W. R. 236

18. ——— Erroneous refusal to admit additional evidence. Where a Judge on appeal declined to admit additional evidence, on the ground that the application should have been made to the lower Court.—*Held*, that it was a ground for applying for a review of his order pointing out his mistake. *RAM LALL v. RUNG LALL* . 17 W. R. 47

19. ——— Decision of special appeal on ground not taken in lower Courts—*Review of special appeal.* It is not a sufficient ground for a review of judgment passed on special appeal that the point which was then raised, and on which the Court's decision was based, was one not raised in either of the Lower Courts, and especially, as in this case, where the question was pointedly raised in the special appeal and the respondent had ample time to prepare himself to meet the statement therein. *COWELL v. MOHADEV MUNDUL*

17 W. R. 182

20. ——— Necessity of review for ends of justice—*Omission to raise issue.* A case having been remanded for the trial of an issue under the specific provisions of cl. 1, s. 4, Bengal Regulation XI of 1825, an application for review was made on the ground that it was requisite for the ends of justice to remand the case upon an issue under cl. 2, which, it was alleged, was the issue to which the applicant had directed all his evidence. *Held*, that as the correctness of this allegation could not be ascertained without going through the record again, the application could not be granted for to grant it would, in fact, be to grant a second special appeal, which is not the object of a review. *JUGGOBUNDHOO BOSE v. WISE* . . . 12 W. R. 409

21. ——— Later Privy Council decision—*Facts not fully placed before Court.* A review cannot be granted on the ground that if the facts



**REVIEW—contd.****5. GROUNDS FOR REVIEW—contd.**

had been better or more fully placed before the Court, the judgment would have been different, or even on the ground of a subsequent decision of a question of law by the Privy Council in another suit where there has been no discovery of new evidence such as is contemplated in s. 376 of Act VIII of 1859. *JADUB RAM DEB v. RAM LOCHUN MUD-DUCK* . . . . . **19 W. R. 189**

**22. — Subsequent Full Bench ruling.** A lower Court admitted a review of judgment on the ground that the decision of a Divisional Bench of the High Court which it had followed in that judgment had subsequently been overruled by the Full Bench. *Held*, that the lower Court was not authorized to admit a review of judgment on such ground. *AMRIT LAL v. MADHO DAS* **I. L. R. 6 All 292**

**23. — New contrary ruling—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 623.** Although the discovery of a new ruling may not entitle a party to a review of judgment, yet when a Court is satisfied that its judgment has proceeded upon an erroneous view of the law, the provisions of s. 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure allow a review of judgment. *VELLAYA v. JAGANATHA* **I. L. R. 7 Mad. 307**

**24. — Different decisions of Division Benches.** That one Division Bench of the High Court has decided a point at variance with the decision of another Division Bench is no reason for granting a review of judgment. *NOBEEN KISHEN MOOKERJEE v. SHIB PERSHAD PATTUCK* **9 W. R. 161**

*FERGUSSON v. GOVERNMENT. GOVERNMENT v. FERGUSSON* . . . . . **9 W. R. 158**

**25. — Production of authority on law not before produced—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 376—Error in law.** The production of an authority which was not brought to the notice of the Judge at the first hearing, and which lays down a view of the law contrary to that taken by the Judge, is not a sufficient ground for granting a review. *ELLEM v. BASHEER* **I. L. R. 1 Calc. 184 : 24 W. R. 382**

**26. — Errors of law—Law, "Mistaken view of—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 623.** A review of judgment may be granted (if it is necessary for the ends of justice that the judgment should be reviewed) where there is an error of law on the face of the judgment, or where the decision of the Court has proceeded upon a mistaken view of the law. *Rewa Mahton v. Ram Kishen Sing*, **I. L. R. 14 Calc. 18 : L. R. 13 I. A. 106**, referred to. In this case, without deciding whether there was or not any error in law, the application for review of judgment was refused on the ground that it did not appear there was any danger of its causing a miscarriage of justice. *In the matter of the petition of SHARUP CHAND MALA. SHARUP CHAND MALA v. PAT DASSEE* **I. L. R. 14 Calc. 627**

**REVIEW—contd.****5. GROUNDS FOR REVIEW—contd.**

**27. — Subsequent publication of report of case—Case not brought forward at hearing.** Where a review of judgment was applied for on the ground of the subsequent publication of the report of a High Court decision on a point of law which governed the case, but which had not been urged at the previous hearing, it was considered that the applicant was not to blame for his omission to bring the decision to the notice of the Court at the first hearing, and the application for review of judgment was granted. *ACHUTA v. MAMMAVU* **I. L. R. 10 Mad. 357**

**28. — "Any other sufficient reason"—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 623—Power to grant review.** S. 623 gives a more extensive right of review than existed in England, where a review could only be obtained by showing that there was apparent on the record error in law, or that new and relevant matter had been discovered after the judgment which could not possibly have been used when the judgment was given, or that judgment was obtained by fraud. The words "or for any other sufficient reason" mean that the reason must be one sufficient to the Court or Judge to whom the application for review is made, and they cannot be held to be limited to the discovery of new and important matter or evidence or the occurring of a mistake or error apparent on the record. Whether or not there is in such cases "any other sufficient reason" may depend on a question of law or a question of fact, or a mixed question of law and fact. *Reasat Hosein v. Hadjee Abdullah*, **I. L. R. 2 Calc. 131**, referred to. In cases where a stay of execution or an injunction is granted on an *ex parte* application, liberty to apply to the Judge to vary or set aside his order must be implied, if not expressed. *Fritz v Hobson*, **L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 542**, referred to. On the 29th July 1886 an application was made by a party against whom the High Court, on second appeal, had passed a decree dated the 18th March 1816, for review of judgment. On the 28th August the applicant made a further application that execution of the decree might be stayed pending the determination of the application for review, and an order was passed *ex parte* granting this application. Subsequently the opposite party applied under s. 623 of the Civil Procedure Code for a review of the *ex parte* order on the grounds (i) that the Court had no jurisdiction to make it, and (ii) that the application of the 29th July was beyond time, and therefore there could be no review of judgment, and no order for stay of execution pending such review. *Held*, that the Court had power, under s. 623 of the Code, to review the *ex parte* order of the 28th August, and that such order had been made without jurisdiction and ought to be reviewed. *Held*, that, having regard to the circumstances that the order of the 28th August was made without jurisdiction, and upon an *ex parte* application, of which the opposite party had no notice, and interfered perhaps indefinitely with his right to obtain the money in Court under the final and unappealable decree



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in his favour, as to which no application for review had been granted, and that the application for review of judgment was made after the statutory period of ninety days had expired, and contained no explanation of the delay sufficient reason for reviewing the order of the 28th August had been shown. **AMIR HASAN v. AHMAD ALI**

**I. L. R. 9 All. 36**

**29. — Civil Procedure Code, s. 623—Omission to serve notice of hearing of appeal on applicant—Practice—Notice to show cause—Right to begin.** An appeal which was referred to the Full Bench for disposal was heard and determined by the Full Bench, and judgment given in favour of the appellant in the absence of the respondent. Subsequently the respondent applied for a review of judgment, and proved that his absence at the hearing before the Full Bench was due to a mistake which had been made in not serving him with notice of the reference. *Held*, by the Full Bench, that under the circumstances the applicant's absence at the hearing came within the words "any other sufficient reason" in s. 623 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the review should be granted and the appeal re-heard. Upon the hearing of an application for review of judgment, upon which an order has been passed directing the opposite party to show cause why the application should not be granted, counsel for the opposite party should begin. **GHANSHAM SING v. LAL SING**

**I. L. R. 9 All. 61**

**30. — Question of general commercial importance—Special ground.** Where the point sought to be raised in review had not been raised or argued by either party, but was first taken by the Court itself in giving its opinion upon the case referred to it, the Court granted a review, observing as follows: "The question arising in this case is not a question merely between two parties, but is one of great general commercial importance, and under the circumstances, and on the very special grounds I have mentioned, we think that the review ought to be granted." **SULLEMAN HUSSEIN v. NEW ORIENTAL BANK CORPORATION**

**I. L. R. 15 Bom. 287**

**31. — Application for review of an order contrary to law—Attachment of person in execution of decree—Liability of married woman—Waiver.** R, as surety for her husband, joined with him in executing a bond for Rs 90. In a suit brought upon the bond, a decree was passed against both. R was arrested in execution of the decree, and brought before the Court. She was then asked if she desired to apply to be declared an insolvent under the insolvency sections of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), but not doing so she was committed to jail. Subsequently, however, she applied to be declared an insolvent, but her application was rejected. She then claimed to be released on the ground of her coverture. The Judge rejected her application as being too late. On reference to the High Court:—*Held*, that her

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application for release was virtually an application for review of the order for her imprisonment, on the ground that it was contrary to law; that her mere omission to take the objection at the time of her arrest could not be regarded as a waiver of her right of exemption from arrest; and having regard to the nature of the right claimed, it was one which the Court could not properly decline to consider on review, however late the application might have been. *In re the petition of RADHI*

**I. L. R. 12 Bom. 228**

**32. — Erroneous application of s. 575, Civil Procedure Code—Civil Procedure Code, s. 623.** One of the cases to which s. 575 of the Code does not apply is where a preliminary objection being taken to the hearing of a first appeal before the High Court on the ground that the appeal is time-barred, the Judges of the Division Bench differ in opinion as to whether the appellant has shown sufficient cause, within the meaning of s. 5 of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877), for not presenting the appeal within the prescribed period. The decision of such a preliminary objection is not a "hearing" of the appeal, but precedes the hearing or determines that there is no appeal which the Court can hear or decide. Where such a preliminary objection is allowed, it cannot be said that the Court which, by reason of the Limitation Act, has no jurisdiction to hear the appeal, should nevertheless "affirm" the decree of the Court below. In the case of such a preliminary objection and such a difference of opinion (the Bench being equally divided, the opinion of the senior Judge should, under s. 27 of the Letters Patent, prevail. *Appaji Bhivray v. Shervall Khubchand*, **I. L. R. 3 Bom. 204**, and *Gridhariji Maharaj Tikait v. Purushotum Gossami*, **I. L. R. 10 Calc. 814**, distinguished. Where, in such a case the provisions of the second paragraph of s. 575 of the Code were erroneously applied, and the judgment of the junior Judge, holding that the appeal should be dismissed as time-barred, prevailed, and the Court, on appeal under s. 10 of the Letters Patent, affirmed such judgment:—*Held*, that, under the circumstances, there was a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, and that there was sufficient cause for granting a review of the Court's decree under s. 623 of the Code. **HUSAINI BEGAM v. COLLECTOR OF MUZAFFARNAGAR**

**I. L. R. 11 All. 176**

**33. — Production of new document.** The objection to the admission of a review of judgment on the strength of a new document was not allowed to prevail in a case where the so-called new document was not the sole reason for the admission of the review. **HURO GOBIND PAL v. HURO SOONDAREE CHOWDHRAIN** . **18 W. R. 316**

**34. — Reversal of decree on which decision was based.** Where claims for rent were decreed by a Deputy Collector on the basis of a decree for a kabuliati, which latter decree was subsequently set aside, the proper remedy was



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an application to the Deputy Collector for a review of his decision. *MOORAREE MOOBAJIM v. MAHOMED AKMAL* . . . . . **22 W. R. 161**

**35. ———— Discovery of new evidence**  
—*Grounds for admission of review in special appeal.* The High Court has no authority to admit a review of a judgment passed in special appeal merely on the ground that new evidence to prove a fact has been discovered. *BHYRUB NATH TYE v. KALLY CHUNDER CHOWDHRY* . . . . . **16 W. R. 112**

*Ex parte* *BASHIYAGARULU NAYADU* **1 Mad. 254**

*JACKAMMAL v. PALNEAPPA CHETTY* **5 Mad. 464**

*PANCHANAN, MOOKERJEE v. RADHA NATH MOOKERJEE* . . . . . **4 B. L. R. A. C. 213**

**36. ———— Special Judge,**  
*power of, to review his own order on ground of discovery of fresh evidence—Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act, s. 53.* The Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the Special Judge under the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879). The Special Judge has therefore no jurisdiction to grant a review of a decree or order once made by him on the ground of the discovery of new evidence. *BABAJI v. BABAJI*  
**I. L. R. 15 Bom. 650**

**37. ———— Discovery of fresh evidence**  
—*Evidence showing want of jurisdiction—Ground of review.* As a general rule, the discovery of new evidence is not a ground for the admission of review of a judgment passed in special appeal. *Quere*: Whether this is so when such new evidence might affect the jurisdiction of the Court which tried the case. When new evidence is discovered, the proper course for the appellant to adopt is to ask leave to withdraw his special appeal, and to apply to the lower Court for a review of its judgment. *NANABHAI VALLABHDAS v. NATHABHAI HARIBHAI* . . . . . **9 Bom. 89**

*PANDURANG SADASHIV v. MORO VASUDEV*  
**6 Bom. A. C. 68**

**38. ———— Proof that evidence was not before available.** Before a review can be granted upon the ground of the discovery of new matter, it must be stated in the petition and proved that the new matter was not within the applicant's knowledge, or could not be adduced at the time when the decree was passed. *DWARKA-NATH CHOWDHRY v. KISHENLALL CHOWDHRY*  
**Marsh. 553; 2 Hay 650**

*RADHEY KOONWER v. AJOODHYA PANDEY.*  
**3 Agra 69**

*NUBO KISHORE BISWAS v. JADUB CHUNDER SIRCAR* . . . . . **20 W. R. 426**

**39. ———— Act VIII of 1859, s. 376—Proof of alleged ground of review.** A review of judgment under s. 376 of Act VIII of 1859, on the ground of discovery of new evidence not within the applicant's knowledge at the hearing of the case, should not be admitted without proof

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of the truth of the ground alleged. *UMRAO THAKUR v. GAKUL MUNDAL*  
**8 B. L. R. Ap. 34; 16 W. R. 7**

*NOLITA MOHAN ROY CHOWDHRY v. DINONATH MOOKERJEE* . . . . . **13 B. L. R. 427 note**

*KHELUT CHUNDER GHOSE v. PRANKISTO GHOSE*  
**11 B. L. R. 428 note; 12 W. R. 461**

*NAFFAR CHAND PAL CHOWDHRY v. SANDES*  
**8 B. L. R. Ap. 35 note; 10 W. R. 432**

*RAMDHAN CHUCKERBUTTY v. JAINARAYAN PANJA*  
**8 B. L. R. Ap. 36 note; 12 W. R. 536**

*SITANATH GHOSE v. SHAMASHUNDARI DAS*  
**8 B. L. R. Ap. 37 note; 14 W. R. 26**

*NUDARCHAND BHOOYA v. REEDOY MUNDUL*  
**11 B. L. R. 424 note; 17 W. R. 458**

*SHUNSHAIR ALI KHAN v. RAM CHUNDER GOOPTO*  
**2 W. R. 174**

Otherwise the application will be refused. *RAKUB DOSS v. SOORAJ MULL. Bourke O. C. 131*

*JHUBHOO SAHOO v. JUSODA KOER*  
**17 W. R. 230**

*AMRITRAV P. KOKDI v. MANAJI J. JAGTAP*  
**3 Bom. A. C. 49**

*BROJENDRO COOMAR ROY CHOWDHRY v. WISE*  
**19 W. R. 130**

*NISSA BIBEE v. ABDOOR RUHMAN*  
**18 W. R. 413**

**40. ———— Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 376.** During the pendency of a suit for rent a plaintiff applied for postponement on the ground that he was unable to obtain a copy of a document which he had applied for from the Collectorate. The Munsif refused postponement and gave him a modified decree. The plaintiff subsequently obtained a review of judgment and a decree in full. The Judge on appeal decided that the Munsif was wrong in admitting the review, because the plaintiff had not mentioned that he was previously unacquainted with the existence of the document. *Held*, that the review was properly admitted under Act VIII of 1859, s. 376. *GOOR DYAL ROY v. DEKA NOONYA* . . . . . **22 W. R. 446**

**41. ———— Nature of evidence—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 376.** The new evidence referred to in s. 376, Act VIII of 1859, is evidence that would probably alter the decision of the Court. The affidavit on which an application for review is grounded must state what the new evidence to be relied on is: in such an affidavit no reliance can be placed on a statement of belief of good defence on the merits, but the facts to be relied on as such must be set out. *DHUNSOOK DASS v. HURRY BABOO* . . . . . **Bourke O. C. 115**

**42. ———— Fresh evidence**  
*Nature of, requisite for review.* Where new evidence is adduced in an application for review, it need not be, *per se*, sufficient to show that the previous



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decision is wrong or such as to cause an overmastering balance of evidence. If there is sufficient ground for receiving the new evidence, the case is to be heard as if it were being originally heard with the materials then before the Court. **SAHEBJAN BIBEE v. SUFDUR ALI** 22 W. R. 288

43. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 623—Review of judgment on second appeal—Alleged discovery of new and important documentary evidence—Ground which could not be relied on on second appeal.* In a suit on a mortgage it was held by the lower Appellate Court and by the High Court on second appeal that the properties comprised therein were under attachment at the time of its execution, and that it was accordingly void under the Civil Procedure Code, s. 276, as against the claims of judgment-creditors enforceable under the attachment. The plaintiff, who was the appellant on second appeal, sought a review of the judgment pronounced therein on the ground of the discovery of new and important documentary evidence from which it would appear that the properties in question were not under attachment at the date of the mortgage. *Held*, that the application for review could not be entertained for the reason that the ground relied upon could not be successfully relied upon on a second appeal. **RARU KUTTI v. MAMAD** . I. L. R. 18 Mad. 480

44. ———— *Error in adjudication of costs—Other ground for application untenable—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 206.* When an application for a review of judgment is made upon several grounds, one of which refers only to the question of adjudication of costs, and the Court to whom the application is made holds all the other grounds to be untenable, but is of opinion that there has been a clerical mistake in that part of its order or judgment which refers to costs, it may reject the application absolutely and permit the applicant to apply, under s. 206 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1877, for a rectification of the clerical mistake. **JOYKISHEN MOOKERJEE v. ATAOR ROHOMAN** . I. L. R. 6 Calc. 22 : 6 C. L. R. 575

45. ———— In granting a review, the Court should not travel beyond the grounds mentioned in the application for review. **PURNA CHANDRA SARKAR v. NIL MADHUB NANDI (1901)** . . . . . 5 C. W. N. 485

46. ———— *Grounds of appeal—Review of judgment—Appeal from order granting a review.* When an application for review of judgment has been granted for "any other sufficient reason," the sufficiency or otherwise of the reason for granting it is not a ground of appeal within the meaning of s. 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Per* RICHARD, J.—But the fact that the Court-fee on the plaint, at first held to be inadequate, is afterwards found to be sufficient is a good ground for granting a review of judgment. **ALI AKBAR v. KHURSHED ALI (1905)**

I. L. R. 27 All. 695

REVIEW—*contd.*

## 6. REVIEWS AFTER TIME.

1. ———— *Power to grant review after time.* A Judge has power to grant a review after the lapse of the ninety days within which the application ought to be made. **RAMGUTTEE DOSS v. GHOLAM AHMED KHONDEAR** W. R. F. B. 84

2. ———— *Just and reasonable ground for delay.* A Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an application for review after the lapse of ninety days of the judgment to be reviewed unless just and reasonable cause for the delay be given. **SHAMA CHURN CHUCKERBUTTY v. BINDABUN CHUNDER ROY**

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**MAHOMED GAZI CHOWDHRY v. DULLAB BIBI**  
5 B. L. R. 318 note : 11 W. R. 22

**KASHEENATH ROY v. LUKHEENARAIN CHATTERJEE** . . . . . W. R. 1864, 91

**JHUBHOO SAHOO v. JUSADA KOER**  
17 W. R. 230

**FAKIRA v. BASAPA MAHADAN SHETTI**  
8 Bom. A. C. 234

3. ———— *Petition for correcting decree—Just and reasonable ground for delay.* A petition for the rectification of a decree is not different from an application for a review when the object of the rectification is to alter the decision of the Court, and such a petition cannot be received after ninety days without just and reasonable cause for the delay being shown to the satisfaction of the Court. **ASSUR ALI v. WOOLFUTOONISSA**  
13 W. R. 33

4. ———— *Improper grant of review after time—Act VIII of 1859, s. 377.* Where a party applying for a review of judgment after the expiry of the period of ninety days allowed by s. 377, Act VIII of 1859, had not, as required by that section, shown any just and reasonable cause for not preferring his application within the prescribed period, the order admitting the review was held to have been improperly granted, and was set aside with all subsequent proceedings thereon. **LUCHMUN SINGH v. TIRBANI BAKSH** . 14 B. L. R. 373

**S.C. LUCHMUN SINGH v. SHUMSHERE SINGH**  
L. R. 2 I. A. 58

**LULEETMOHUN ROY CHOWDHRY v. SOWTRA BEE-BEE** . . . . . 10 W. R. 42

**GOUR PERSHAD SURMAH v. ANJUB ALI**  
24 W. R. 294

**FAKIRA v. BASAPA MAHADAN SHETTI**  
8 Bom. A. C. 234

**GUNGANARAIN ROY v. GOONOMONEE**  
8 W. R. 184

**BETTS v. BONSI MUNDUL** . . . . . 25 W. R. 343

**KRISTO GOBIND JAORDAR v. JUGOBUNDHOO SIRCAR** . . . . . 12 W. R. 94

**SREENATH CHOWDHRY v. KRITATTOMYEE DOSSEE**  
18 W. R. 286



**REVIEW—contd.****6. REVIEWS AFTER TIME—contd.**

5. ———— **Admission of review after time for good grounds.** There seems to be no limit to the time after the expiration of ninety days at which the application for review may be filed provided the applicant can satisfy the Court that there is just and reasonable ground for review. *JOOGUL KISHORE SINGH v. OOGUR NARAIN SINGH* 8 W. R. 483

6. ———— **Reversal by High Court of decision in similar case—Review granted on insufficient grounds.** Where an application for review of an order in execution, made after ninety days from the order, was granted simply on the ground that in the execution case of another person upon the same decree the decision, which apparently proceeded upon the same ground as the decision in this case, had been reversed by the High Court:—*Held*, that the order admitting the review was open to appeal, and must be set aside. *ROY GOODUR SUHAYE v. ACHEBUR LALL* . 13 W. R. 120

7. ———— **Different construction of law by High Court—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 377.** Where the only cause for admitting a review after the ninety days prescribed by s. 377, Act VIII of 1859, was that the High Court construed the law differently from the way in which it had been laid down in the decision admitted to review:—*Held*, that the cause alleged was no excuse for the delay. *PRAN KISHEN BHUTTACHARJEE v. BUKSHEE CAZEE* . 10 W. R. 26

8. ———— **Subsequent varying decision of law—Order on remand—Ground for review.** A remand order made on special appeal is (unless a review of it be obtained within the prescribed time) a conclusive determination of the points of law involved in it; and the correctness of the law laid down upon a remand cannot be questioned on a second special appeal; nor is the fact of the Courts adopting a different view of the law after an order has been made, in general a good ground for allowing a review of such order after the time for a review has elapsed. *RAMKUVARBAI v. DAMODHAR NARBHERAM* . 6 Bom. A. C. 146

9. ———— **Subsequent Full Bench decision—Ground for review.** A Full Bench judgment after the original judgment has been given in a suit is not a ground of review, a Full Bench judgment being prospective, and not retrospective. *MADHUB CHUNDER GHOSE v. RADHIKA CHOWDHRAIN* . 7 W. R. 405

*DWARKANATH DOSS BISWAS v. MANICK CHUNDER DOSS* . 9 W. R. 102

(*Contra*) *FORBES v. DYANUTOOLLAH* 10 W. R. 415

10. ———— **A new exposition of the law by a Full Bench after the passing of the original decree is not "just and reasonable cause" for admitting a review after the prescribed period.** When a review has been granted, the Court is bound to decide the case according to any new

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exposition of the law by a Full Bench made since the original decision. *SHAMA CHURN CHUCKERBUTTY v. BINDABUN CHUNDER ROY*

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*BURA BOODHO v. KOYLASH CHUNDER NUNDEE* 6 W. R. 100

*ALLADMONEE DOSSIA v. JOY SUNKAR ROY* 7 W. R. 408

11. ———— **Ground for review—Suit by mortgagee to declare lien—Subsequent suit for possession.** The plaintiff, a mortgagee, obtained a money-decree against the defendant. A third party, in execution of another decree obtained against the same defendant, put up for sale the property included in the plaintiff's mortgage, and himself brought the right, title, and interest of his judgment-debtor in the property mortgaged to the plaintiff. The plaintiff subsequently, in execution of his decree, bought in the same property himself, and brought a suit against the defendant and the third party to have it declared that the latter held the property subject to his mortgage. The suit was decreed by the Subordinate Judge, but eventually dismissed by the High Court, on the ground that the plaintiff, by suing for his money-decree only, had deprived himself of the benefit of his lien as against the third party. The plaintiff thereupon brought another suit against the same parties to recover possession of the mortgaged property, which suit eventually came up before a Full Bench, where it was decided that the plaintiff had no right to bring the suit for recovery of possession, but that his proper course was to sue to have his lien upon the property declared, the Court intimating that it would be open to the plaintiff to apply for a review of judgment in the suit originally brought by him. On the review coming on to be heard, it was *held* that the plaintiff was entitled to a review of that judgment, and that the case was distinguishable from the general rule as to reviews laid down in *Madhub Chunder Ghose v. Radhika Chowdhraim*, 7 W. R. 405; *Dwarkanath Doss Biswas v. Manick Chunder Doss*, 9 W. R. 102; and *Shama Churn Chuckerbutty v. Bindabun Chunder Roy*, *B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 892*,—inasmuch as the granting the review did not interfere with previous decisions of the Court in other cases between other parties. *JONMENJOY MULLICK v. DASMONEY DASSEE*.

*I. L. R. 8 Calc. 700*

12. ———— **Decision of High Court or Privy Council modifying the law.** An application for review of judgment of a lower Court is not admissible after the limited period, merely in consequence of a decision of the High Court or of the Privy Council modifying the law or practice which prevailed at the time when the judgment sought to be reviewed was passed. *ONOO CHUNDER PAUL v. EKKOWREE SINGH* . 6 W. R. 167

13. ———— **Subsequent decision of Privy Council—Right to re-trial of case.**



## REVIEW—contd.

## 6. REVIEWS AFTER TIME—contd.

Where the decision of a lower Court follows a view of the law taken by the High Court, and that view is set aside by a ruling of Her Majesty in Council, the judgment-creditor has a right to have his case retried upon that ruling. *BANEE PERSHAD v. RADHA PERSHAD SINGH* . . . 15 W. R. 143

14. ———— **Decision of Privy Council**—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 379*—*Ground for review out of time.* A decision of the Privy Council in 1871 as to a question of fact in another suit, or the pendency of the appeal in the High Court, was held to be no cause (under s. 379, Act VIII of 1859) for not having preferred an application for review of a judgment passed in May 1866 within ninety days from the date of the decree. *BOLAKEE LALL v. MONJEE LALL* . . . 17 W. R. 163

15. ———— **Application for review after appeal by party who did not appeal**—*Act VIII of 1859, s. 377*—*Just and reasonable cause for delay in filing petition of review.* Upon the appeal of one of the defendants to the Privy Council the judgment of the High Court was reversed. Another defendant, whose defence was the same as that of the defendant who had appealed, applied to the High Court to review its judgment after a lapse of several years from the date of the judgment of the High Court, but within three months from the date on which he became aware of the decision of the Privy Council. The application was refused. *Satto Saran Ghosal v. Tarini Charan Ghose, 3 B. L. R. A. C. 287*, doubted. *PANCHANAN BOSE v. GURUDAS ROY* 9 B. L. R. 187: 18 W. R. 317

16. ———— **Analogous cases.** An application for review of judgment of three out of five analogous cases decided by the High Court, the judgment in two of which had been reversed by the Privy Council, was made after a lapse of more than ninety days from the date of judgment. *Held*, that a lapse of ninety days, under the circumstances, would not be a bar to the granting of the review. *SATTO SARAN GHOSAL v. TARINI CHARAN GHOSE* . . . 3 B. L. R. A. C. 287

*S.C. SUTTO SURUN GHOSAL v. TARINEE CHURN GHOSE* . . . 12 W. R. 154

17. ———— **Execution of decree against wrong person**—*Act VIII of 1859, ss. 376, 377*—*Reasonable ground for review*—*Appeal by one defendant, right of review by another.* A decree for *wasilat* was passed against "the defendant" in a case where there were several defendants; and as soon as one of them, who was not the person against whom the plaintiff sought for *wasilat* in the original plaint, found that the decree was to be executed against him, he applied to the Court for a review, though after the time prescribed by s. 377, Act VIII of 1859. *Held*, that the Court was quite right in holding that there was reasonable cause, within the meaning of that section, for the application for review not being preferred within the limited time. *BUNKOO LALL SINGH v. BASSOOMUNISSA BIBEE* 7 W. R. 166

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## 6. REVIEWS AFTER TIME—contd.

18. ———— **Pendency of special appeal**—*Ground for delay*—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 377.* Where an application for review is not made within the ninety days provided by Act VIII of 1859, the pendency of a special appeal is not "a just and reasonable cause" for the loss of time, such as the Court to which the application is made is bound to arrive at under s. 377, before it can entertain the application at all. *LUCAS v. STEPHEN* . . . 9 W. R. 301

*FAKIRA v. BASAPA MAHADAN SHETTI* 8 Bom. A. C. 234

19. ———— **Mistake of counsel**—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 623*—"Sufficient cause." In a suit between A and B heard to the 29th January 1883, a certain conveyance was filed with the plaint, but up to the hearing this conveyance had been protected from discovery. B's counsel had, however, had a copy thereof delivered to him at the time B's written statement was being drawn, and a copy briefed to him at the hearing. At the hearing, A's counsel stated that the effect of the conveyance was to vest the entirety of a certain property in A; this view was accepted by B's counsel, who did not read the conveyance. The only issue in the case was "who was in possession of the property" and the Court decided this issue on the 5th February in favour of the plaintiff. On the 26th February B brought a suit against A to set aside this conveyance on the ground of fraud. And in certain proceedings in this case taken on the 31st March, B's counsel discovered, as he alleged for the first time, that under the conveyance a moiety of a seven-twenty-fourth share remained in B. On that day instructions were given to B's counsel to draw up a petition of review of the judgment of the 5th February. This petition, owing to the Easter vacation, was not, and could not have been, presented till the 9th April. *Held*, that the words "sufficient reason" in s. 623 of the Code should receive a liberal construction, and should be construed so as to do substantial justice to the parties: that as in this case it appeared to the Court that the construction placed upon the conveyance by B's counsel was the correct one, "sufficient reason" had been shown for making the application. *In the matter of the petition of SOLOMON. GOPAUL CHUNDER LAHIRI v. SOLOMON* . . . I. L. R. 11 Calc. 767

*Held*, on the appeal, *per GARTH, C.J.*—Although it is difficult, and perhaps undesirable, to attempt to define precisely the meaning of the words "any other sufficient reason" in s. 623 of the Civil Procedure Code, yet from the earlier part of the clause it is clear that a point which might have been, but which was not, discovered at the trial by the exercise of due diligence, was not intended by the section to afford any sufficient reason for review. *Per WILSON, J.*—*Semle*: If at a trial all parties, counsel on both sides, and the Judge are under a misapprehension as to the contents of a document, or even if the Judge alone is misled on such a point,



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and in consequence a wrong decree is made, the mistake ought to be corrected on review. **GOPAL CHANDRA LAHIRI v. SOLOMON**

**I. L. R. 13 Cal. 62**

**20. ———— Discovery of new evidence—Lapse of time.** The discovery of new evidence may make it proper to grant a review, but the circumstances must be very special,—the more so when the application for review is made many years after the date of the decree, and the evidence discovered must be of a clear and conclusive character. **HEERA LALL GHOSE v. RAM TARUCK DEY**

**23 W. R. 323**

**21. ———— Ground for delay—Effect of ignorance of effect of judgment.** An applicant for review cannot plead his ignorance of the effect of the judgment as a justification for his delay. **GULAM HUSEN MAHAMED v. MUSA MIYA HAMAD ALI**

**I. L. R. 8 Bom. 260**

**22. ———— Adoption of daughter's son—Custom—Breaches of custom—Practice—New case set up in special appeal.** An application for review was presented to the High Court more than eighteen months after time, the applicant alleging that, soon after the decision sought to be reviewed, he was engaged in collecting instances of the special custom relied upon by him in support of his claim. The special custom was not set up in the Courts below, but an objection was taken for the first time in special appeal that an issue regarding it should have been raised in the lower Courts. No instance of such special custom had been given in evidence. It was urged that the applicant was a minor until shortly before the making of the High Court decree, and was only represented by his adoptive mother as his guardian. The High Court considered that there was no sufficient excuse for the delay, and rejected the application, observing that, unless upon very strong grounds and under very special circumstances, the Court would hesitate to permit a party at such a stage of his suit to set up a case which was not set up for him in the Courts below, where his professional representative must have been well aware whether such a case could be legitimately set up, and abstained from any attempt to do so. **GOPAL SAFRAY v. HANMANT SAFRAY**

**I. L. R. 6 Bom. 107**

**23. ———— Just and reasonable cause.—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 377.** The plaintiff in a suit applied, more than two years after the proper time, for a review of judgment in such suit, filing with his application a copy of a decision by the High Court, which had been passed subsequently to the date of such judgment, in support of a contention contained in his application which should have been, but was not, urged at the hearing of his suit. Such contention and the other arguments and statements contained in his application might have been adduced within the time allowed by law for an application for a review of judgment. *Held*, that, as such contention might have been

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urged at the first hearing of the case, there was no "just and reasonable cause" for preferring the application after time, and the Court of first instance was therefore not warranted in granting the application and reviewing its judgment. **MADHO DAS v. RUKMAN SEWAK SINGH**

**I. L. R. 2 All. 287**

**24. ———— Necessity for review not arising—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 376.** Though a certain issue in a suit was decided against the plaintiff, the suit was decreed, and the defendants obtained a review on which that decree was set aside and the plaintiff's suit declared barred by limitation. On this the plaintiff applied for a review of both judgments. *Held*, that, though his application in relation to the former judgment was not in time, yet as he had no occasion to ask for a review until the latter judgment was passed, the words of s. 376, Civil Procedure Code, 1859, entitled him to ask the Court to reconsider both judgments. **BAGOO JAN v. CHOWDHRY ZUHOORUL HUQ**

**13 W. R. 69**

**7. QUESTIONS WHICH MAY BE RAISED ON REVIEW.**

**1. ———— Raising new grounds—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 374.** A party wishing to be heard in support of new grounds must apply for permission under s. 374, Act VIII of 1859: he cannot be permitted to raise them in an application for review. **FUKUROODDEEN MAHOMED AHSAN CHOWDHRY v. ANNUNDNATH ROY**

**9 W. R. 370**

**2. ———— Issue not raised in lower Courts—Application for review after special appeal.** In an application for review after special appeal, the Court will not entertain a question not raised before at a former stage of the suit. *In re* **TUFANI SINGH**

**6 B. L. R. Ap. 141**

**3. ———— New arguments—Matter previously adjudicated on.** The Judges are not required to re-adjudicate points considered and adjudicated when brought before them by a pleader then employed, though they may be better argued, and put in a different light by another pleader subsequently, but are to be guided in their admission of reviews by the definite terms of ss. 377 and 378 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1859. **CHOONEE MUNDUR v. CHUNDEE LALL DASS**

**14 W. R. 334**

**4. ———— Issue not noticed in the lower Court—Arguments on appeal and review.** In the first Court an issue was raised whether or no the hearing of this suit was barred by the law of limitation. One of the grounds of appeal to the Judge was, that the Principal Sudder Ameen ought to have held the suit barred as regards the diaras under the special limitation of three years from the date of the Collector's settlement. The Judge did not notice this ground in his judgment. The same ground of appeal was repeated on the special appeal to the High Court, but that Court refused to enter-



**REVIEW—contd.****7. QUESTIONS WHICH MAY BE RAISED ON REVIEW—contd.**

tain it, for the reason that it did not appear to have been raised in argument before the Judge or in the first Court. On application for review, it was urged that the Court ought to have listened to this ground, but the Court adhered to its former decision. Counsel should not be heard to re-argue a case on review upon the same points as were argued on special appeal. *RAJ KUNWAR v. INDIRJIT KUNWAR* . 5 B. L. R. 585 : 13 W. R. 52

**5. ——— Points for argument—Questions already discussed and decided—New points.** On application for review of judgment :—*Held*, that a party applying for the review of judgment must show that there is good and sufficient cause for granting the review before he can be heard to argue that the decision is erroneous. In so showing cause, *first*, no point can be raised which has been already discussed and decided on the original hearing of the appeal; and, *secondly*, no new point which has not been raised at the hearing of the appeal can be argued on the application for review. *BHAWABAL SINGH v. RAJENDRA PRATAP SAHOY* 5 B. L. R. 321

*RAJENDRO PRATAP SAHEE v. BHOWABUL SINGH* 14 W. R. 105

Upholding on review, *BHOWABUL SINGH v. RAJENDRO PRATAP SINGH* . 13 W. R. 157

*JANAB ALI v. CHANDI CHARAN DEY* 5 B. L. R. 334 note : 11 W. R. 202

*GUNGAPERSHAD v. AGRA AND MASTERMAN'S BANK* . 5 B. L. R. 340 note

*S.C. AGRA AND MASTERMAN'S BANK v. GUNGA PERSHAD* . 15 W. R. F. B. 5 note

*HAZRA BEGUM v. HOSSEIN ALI KHAN* 5 B. L. R. 341 note

*COLLECTOR OF TIPPERAH v. MAFZUNNISSA BIBI* 5 B. L. R. 341 note : 14 W. R. 84

*GARIB HOSSEIN CHOWDHRY v. WISE* 5 B. L. R. 342 note

*S.C. MEHURONISSA KHATOON v. WISE* 15 W. R. F. B. 2 note

*BENI MADHAB GHOSE v. GANGA GABIND MANDAL* 5 B. L. R. 345 note : 15 W. R. F. B. 3 note

**6. ——— Points for argument—Act VIII of 1859, s. 376—Arguments and grounds to be raised on review.** It cannot be treated as a universal rule that no point can be raised on an application for a review which has been already discussed and decided on the original hearing of the appeal; or that no new point which has not been raised on the hearing of the appeal can be argued on the application for a review. In each case the Court to which the application is made must consider and decide whether a review is necessary to correct any evident error or omission, or is otherwise requisite for the ends of justice. *In the matter of the petition of CHINTAMANI PAL. CHINTAMANI PAL v. PYARI MOHUN MOOKERJEE. In the matter*

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*of the petition of SALEH SHABI SABI-UD-DIN ABU SALEH. SALEH SHABI SABI-UD-DIN ABU SALEH v. ASADUNISSA BIBEE*

6 B. L. R. 126 : 15 W. R. F. B. 1

**7. ——— Points already decided—New points—Discretion of Court.** Parties applying for a review of judgment are not absolutely debarred from asking for a re-hearing of a matter which has been already argued and considered, nor are they debarred from raising a point which has not, but which might have been, raised previously; but in every such case it lies upon the party making the application to show the Court some good ground upon which that indulgence is asked for, and it is in the discretion of the Court to allow or to refuse such an application. *HUREE PERSHAD MUNDUL v. NUND KISHORE SINGH*

17 W. R. 479

**8. ——— Question raised and abandoned.** A party who not only had an opportunity of raising a question, but who did raise it on appeal and on argument abandoned it, cannot, under ordinary circumstances, be allowed to agitate the question on review. *SARAPATHI v. SUBRAYA RAMANADHA* . I. L. R. 2 Mad. 58

**9. ——— Admissibility of admitted documents.** Whether certain documents which have already been admitted as evidence were so admissible or not, is not a point which can be urged in review. *KOLEEMOODDEEN MUNDUL v. HEERUN MUNDUL* . 24 W. R. 186

**8. GRANT OR REFUSAL OF REVIEW.**

**1. ——— Reasons for granting order for review—Record of reasons.** Before a review of judgment is granted, an order granting the application for review and the reasons for granting the same should be recorded. *BHAIRON DIN SINGH v. RAM SAHAI* . I. L. R. 3 All. 316

**2. ——— Effect of refusal to grant review—Judgment of refusal.** A mere refusal to grant a review of judgment cannot alter the judgment sought to be reviewed or the decree founded on it, and nothing which the Judge says with reference to his refusal to grant review can be binding so as to alter such judgment or decree. *RAM-HURRY MUNDUL v. MOTHOR MOHUN MUNDUL*

20 W. R. P. C. 450

**3. ——— Second Appeal.** Application for review granted and the case directed to be restored to the file and re-heard. *RAJ NARAIN DAS v. SHAMANANDA DAS CHOWDHRY (1900)* . I. L. R. 33 Calc. 1362

**4. ——— Negligence—Discovery of fresh evidence—Laches—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 623, 568.** S. 623 exacts very strict conditions, so as to prevent litigants being negligent and enjoins the Court to require the facts as to the absence of negligence to be strictly proved. Where the defendants on the day after



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concl'd.**

judgment had been given against them discovered fresh evidence which with diligence they might under the circumstances have obtained before or during the trial of the suit, and even after such discovery delayed for two weeks before making an application for review of judgment:—*Held*, that the application was rightly dismissed. *KESSOWJI ISSUR v. GREAT INDIAN PENINSULA RAILWAY COMPANY* (1907)

I. L. R. 31 Bom. 381: L. R. 34 I. A. 115

**9. APPEALS AND PROCEDURE IN APPEALS.**

1. ———— **Orders rejecting review—  
—Orders on review—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 378—Application of section.** S. 378 (s. 626 of Civil Procedure Code, 1882) does not apply to judgments on review, but only to orders rejecting reviews. *APCAR v. HOWAH BYE*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 231

*RUGHONATH ROY v. ANUNDO PAURAY*

10 W. R. 387

2. ———— **Appeal by some only of several defendants—Application for review by some only of defendants in separate interests—Effect of decree on review modifying decision on appeal.** In a suit, in which several defendants were joined, to set aside alienations made at different times and to different persons, plaintiff succeeded in the first Court partly, and on appeal wholly, and obtained a decree ordering the alienated property to be restored to him. Then the defendants, their interests being separate, brought separate special appeals, which were dismissed. After this, two of them applied for a review, and the decrees were modified (a portion of the claim being declared barred by limitation), but on a ground not applicable to all the defendants. *Held*, that, if these decrees were separate decrees in each appeal, the High Court had no power to modify the decrees in which there was no application for review, and which therefore remained in force, and should be executed. *PEGOO JAN v. MULLICK WAIZOODDEEN*

18 W. R. 464

3. ———— **Order other than order rejecting applications for review—Order modifying original decree—Right of appeal.** Any order made upon an application for a review of judgment, except an order absolutely rejecting the application, becomes, if it in any way modifies or alters the original order, although the modification or alteration extends only to the rectification of a clerical mistake, the final order in the case; and the party aggrieved by the original decree is entitled, although the modification or alteration was made in his favour, to treat the order upon review of judgment as the final decree or order in the case; and if it was made by a Court, an appeal from which lies to the Court of a District Judge, he is entitled to prefer his appeal at any time with-

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in thirty days from its date. *JOYKISHEN MOOKERJEE v. ATAOR ROHOMAN*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 22: 6 C. L. R. 575

4. ———— **Order rejecting review—  
Finality of order.** An order rejecting a review is final. *NOBIN CHUNDER CHOWDHRY v. GRIDHAREE LALL*

11 W. R. 264

*BANEE RAM v. HOSSEIN ALI*

11 W. R. 184

5. ———— **Order granting review on insufficient ground—Act VIII of 1859, ss. 376 to 378—Appeal—"Final."** Where a Subordinate Judge, after deciding a regular appeal, granted an application for review of judgment on the ground that new evidence had been discovered, but without any inquiry or proof that such evidence was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not have been adduced by him at the time the decree was passed:—*Held*, that this was an error or defect in the procedure or investigation of the case which affected the decision, and was a ground of appeal when the decision upon review was brought before the High Court on special appeal. The word "final" in s. 378 of Act VIII of 1859 means that the order rejecting the application or granting the review shall not by itself be open to appeal. *BHYRUB CHUNDER SURMAH CHOWDHRY v. MADHUBRAM SURMAH*

11 B. L. R. F. B. 423

20 W. R. 84

*NUBO KISHORE BISWAS v. JADUB CHUNDER SIRCAR*

20 W. R. 426

*DHUNKA DEVLIA v. HIRA RAMLA*

4 Bom. A. C. 57

6. ———— **Decision as to what is just and reasonable ground—Application for review after ninety days—Act VIII of 1859, ss. 363, 377, and 378.** The decision of a subordinate Court as to what constitutes "just and reasonable cause" for admitting a review after prescribed period is appealable. The words in s. 378, Act VIII of 1859, "its order in either case, whether for rejecting the application or granting the review, shall be final," are applicable only to the order for rejecting the application or granting the review, and not to the decision as to whether there was just and reasonable cause for allowing the application to be made after the period of ninety days prescribed by s. 377 had elapsed. *SHAMA CHURN CHUCKERBUTTY v. BINDABUN CHUNDER ROY*

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*GEORGE v. HAMILTON, BROWN & Co.*

4 N. W. 74

7. ———— **Presumption as to performance of preliminaries to review.** The Court will presume that the proper preliminaries have been observed in admitting the review, and unless anything appears to have been done contrary to law, will not set aside the decision. *AKKUL SAHOO v. ABDOL GUFFOOR*

18 W. R. 15



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See GURUMURTHI NAYUDU v. PAPPANAYUDU  
1 Mad. 164

8. ——— Objection taken on appeal—*Objection as to improper grant of review—Civil Procedure Code, 1859 s. 376.* Although the order itself for granting a review of judgment is final, yet on appeal against the decision passed in review, objection may be taken that the review was improperly granted. ABDUL RAHIM v. RACHA RAI  
I. L. R. 1 All. 363

9. ——— Objection that evidence was within knowledge of applicant. Where, owing to the conduct of the opposite party, who, though served with notice, made no objection, an applicant for review had no opportunity of showing that a new piece of evidence which he adduced was not within his knowledge and could not be adduced by him when the decree was passed, such opposite party cannot afterwards be allowed to object on the ground of the Full Bench ruling in *Bhyrub Chunder Surmah Chowdhry v. Madhubram Surmah*, 11 B. L. R. 423 : 20 W. R. 84. RAM JOY GOOPTO v. JUGODESSUREE . . . 22 W. R. 399

10. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 378—*Appeal against review not justified by evidence.* The Full Bench ruling, *Bhyrub Chunder Surmah Chowdhry v. Madhubram Surmah*, 11 B. L. R. 423 : 20 W. R. 84, that a special appeal would lie to determine whether in an order granting a review there had been any irregularity, and that the word "final" in the Civil Procedure Code, s. 378, would not prevent the Appellate Court from considering afterwards the legality of the order, was held to apply to cases in which a regular appeal is preferred on the ground that the admission of the review was not justified by the evidence. JOY KISHEN MOOKERJEE v. PARBUTTY CHURN GHOSAL . . . 22 W. R. 183

11. ——— Fresh evidence—*Error in granting review.* The Munsif dismissed a suit. Afterwards he issued a rule calling upon the defendant to show cause why a review of judgment should not be granted. The defendant showed cause, but his objections were overruled; the review was granted, both plaintiff and defendant adduced new evidence, and a decree was given for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge reversed this decision on the ground relied upon by the defendant in showing cause in the lower Court, namely, that the defendant had not established that with due diligence he could not have brought forward in the original trial the evidence upon which his application for review was based. *Held*, on special appeal, that the fact of the defendant having adduced fresh evidence in the Court below did not debar him from objecting before the Subordinate Judge that the review was wrongly granted, because the order admitting it was final. PRAN-NATH BHADOORY v. SREEKANT LAHOORY  
2 C. L. R. 257

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—*contd.*

12. ——— *Discovery of fresh evidence—Second appeal—Withdrawal of second appeal—Review petition—Practice.* When on coming to the High Court under second appeal it is discovered that there is evidence, which ought to have been placed before the lower Courts, the proper practice to pursue is to allow the second appeal to be withdrawn in order that a review petition may be presented to the lower Appellate Court. But this course cannot be pursued when the review petition has been already presented to and rejected by the lower Court. RAMCHANDRA v. KRISHNAJI (1904) . . . I. L. R. 28 Bom. 4

13. ——— Effect of order on review—*Review of judgment—Appeal from original decree.* Where an application for review of judgment is granted, the result is a new decree superseding the original decree, and not merely some amendment thereof. An appeal was filed pending an application for review of judgment in the Court below; the review was granted, and an order passed which purported merely to amend the decree then under appeal. *Held*, that the order for review superseded the original decree; the decree under appeal had ceased to exist and the appeal could not be heard. Kuar Sen v. Ganga Ram, *All. Weekly Notes* (1890) 144, followed. KANHAIYA LAL v. BALDEO PRASAD (1905) . . . I. L. R. 28 All. 240

14. ——— Dismissal of appeal, effect of—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 551, 623—Decree passed by first Court, allowing plaintiff's claim—Appeal by defendant—Application by defendant to the first Court for review—Jurisdiction.* Plaintiff having obtained a decree in the first Court, the defendant appealed, but his appeal was summarily dismissed under s. 551 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). Subsequently the defendant applied to the first Court for review of judgment under s. 623 of the Code on the ground of discovery of new and important evidence. *Held*, that as the defendant had preferred an appeal and it was dismissed under s. 551 of the Code, his application to the first Court for review of judgment could not be entertained. It is open to the person aggrieved, after an appeal has been preferred, to apply for a review, provided his appeal is withdrawn. As by the cancellation of the order for admission of an appeal it is to be taken that no appeal was admitted, so by withdrawal of the appeal it must be treated as though no appeal was preferred. But when an appeal is actually dismissed, it was in fact preferred and cannot be regarded as not having been preferred. RAMAPPA v. BHARMA (1906)  
I. L. R. 30 Bom. 625

15. ——— Order rejecting application for review—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 623 and 626—Order in execution—Decree—Appeal.* An order in execution, being a decree under the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), was passed on the 20th November, 1902,

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—contd.

and a supplementary order as to costs was made on the 20th December following. On the 3rd August 1903, the party aggrieved by the latter order applied under s. 623 of the Civil Procedure Code for a review of judgment. Notice was issued to the opposite party and the application for review was heard with the result that the Judge after disposing of certain technical objections proceeded to deal with the case on the merits and having done so he rejected the application for review with costs on the 14th September 1903. Against the said order the applicant having appealed:—*Held*, that the order rejecting the application for review was not appealable. The proper procedure would be to appeal from the order of the 20th December 1902, relating to costs. A petition of review involves three stages of procedure. The first stage commences ordinarily with an *ex parte* application under s. 623 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Court may then either reject the application at once, or may grant a rule calling on the other side to show cause why the review should not be granted. In the second stage the rule may either be admitted or rejected and the hearing of the rule may involve to some extent an investigation into the merits. If the rule is discharged then the case ends. If, on the other hand, the rule is made absolute, then the third stage is reached. The case is re-heard on the merits and may result in a repetition of the former decree or some variation of it. Though in one aspect the result is the same whether the rule be discharged or on the re-hearing the original decree be repeated, in law there is a material difference, for in the latter case, the whole matter having been re-opened, there is a fresh decree. In the former case the parties are relegated to, and still rest, on the old decree. **VADILAL v. FULCHAND (1906)** . . . . . **I. L. R. 30 Bom. 421**

**10. PROCEDURE ON RE-HEARING OF CASE.**

**1.** ———— **Effect of order for review**  
—*Re-opening of whole case.* When a review of a decision has been admitted, the whole case is thereby re-opened. **SAINAL RANCHHOD v. DULLABH DVARKA** . . . . . **10 Bom. 360**

**2.** ———— **Re-trial by different Judge**  
—*Point directed by order of review.* When a case is admitted to review by the deciding Judge, and tried afterwards by another Judge, the new Judge ought to try only the point directed by the order of review. **HURRO CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY v. RAMKISHORE CHUCKERBUTTY** . **W. R. 1864, 142**

**3.** ———— **Review granted on particular ground—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 630—Discretion of Court as to re-hearing whole case or not.** Where a review of judgment is granted on a particular ground, the Court is not bound to re-hear the whole case under s. 630 of the Civil Procedure Code: it is in the discretion of the Court to re-hear the whole case; or only the

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particular point on which the review has been granted. **HURBANS SAHYE v. THAKOOR PURSHAD**  
**I. L. R. 9 Calc. 209**

**S.C. THAKOOR PROSAD v. BALUCK RAM**

**12 C. L. R. 64**

**4.** ———— **Review of portion of case—Power to re-hear case on another point.** Where a Judge, who had ordered a certificate of guardianship to be granted under Act XL of 1858 granted a review of his order on one point:—*Held*, that he had no power to re-open another question which he had already decided finally, and on which no application for review was made. **BYJNATH SAHOY v. WUZEER NARAIN** . **24 W. R. 427**

**5.** ———— **Power to entertain another objection without remand.** In a suit to recover possession of certain land, which, though described in the plaint as partly bastoo and partly agricultural land was treated by both parties as agricultural only, it was found by the Court of first instance that the defendants had acquired a right of occupancy. This finding having been confirmed by the lower Appellate Court, an application was made for a review, and on review that Court reversed its former decree on the ground that no right of occupancy could be acquired. *Held*, that on review the lower Appellate Court ought not to have entertained the objection that the land was not agricultural without remanding the case for the trial of a fresh issue on that point. **KHORESH MAHOMED v. MAHOMED TAKEE** . . . . . **10 C. L. R. 106**

**6.** ———— **Power to reverse order for re-hearing of suit—Re-hearing before another Judge.** Where one Judge decided that the suit was not barred as a *res judicata*, and directed the suit to be re-tried on the merits and after another trial it came on appeal to the same Court before another Judge:—*Held*, that whatever power he would have had to review the order of his predecessor had nothing been done on it, he could not reverse the order at that stage, one Court having no power to reverse an order of a co-ordinate Court. **PALAVARAPU MUTANNA v. CHANDURI NARAPPA**  
**2 Mad. 349**

But see **MURDAN ALI v. TUFUZZUL HOSSEIN**

**16 W. R. 78**

**SALAHMUNISSA KHATOON v. MOHESH CHUNDER ROY** . . . . . **16 W. R. 85**

**7.** ———— **Admission of review by one Judge only of Bench who heard the case—Objection to propriety of order admitting review.** Where a review has been admitted by the sole remaining Judge of the Bench which heard the case originally, it is not open to counsel, on the re-hearing of the appeal, to question the propriety of the order for admission. If such order is wrong, the error cannot be corrected by the Bench appointed to hear the appeal after its restoration to its original number on the file. **JARDINE, SKINNER & Co. v. DHUN KISHEN SEIN** . . . . . **13 W. R. 82**



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—*contd.*

8. ———— **Qualified order for admission of review**—*Discretion of Court as to extent case should be reopened.* *Held*, that Judges of the Sudder Court admitting an application for review were competent to make a qualified order leaving in the Court which was to review the decision a discretion as to the extent to which the review should be carried. *BHUGWANDEEN DOOBEEY v. MYNA BAE* 9 W. R. P. C. 23: 11 Moo. I. A. 487

9. ———— **Admission of additional evidence on re-hearing**—*Act VIII of 1859, s. 376.* When an application for review is admitted upon other grounds, fresh evidence not produced at the trial may be received, although no reason as required by s. 376, Act VIII of 1859, had been assigned for the non-production at the trial. *BEHARI LAL NANDI v. TRAILAKHOMAYI BARMANI* 3 B. L. R. A. C. 346

10. ———— **Question as to genuineness of pottah.** In a suit for confirmation of title to a village alleged to be in the possession of plaintiff under a mokurari pottah, the first Court found the pottah to be genuine and gave plaintiff a decree. The lower Appellate Court at first doubted the genuineness of the pottah and reversed that decision, but, on an application for review, admitted additional evidence on both sides and dismissed the appeal. *Held*, that the lower Appellate Court ought not to have allowed points to be explained away in the review stage by admitting additional evidence thereon though in this particular case injustice was not done. *TEKAET KHOOD NARAIN SINGH v. TOOL-SEE ROY* . . . . . 15 W. R. 9

11. ———— **Reasons for different opinion**—*Duty of Court on review.* A Court should give reasons, on review of judgment, for coming to a different conclusion from that which it had previously formed. *ANUNDMOYEE DOSSIA v. KALEE COOMAR ROKHEET* . . . . . 6 W. R. 18

12. ———— **Notice of proceedings**—*Special Judge appointed under Dekkan Agriculturists' Relief Act.* It is illegal on the part of the Special Judge, appointed under Act XVII of 1879, to reverse the decree of a Subordinate Judge on review without giving a proper and sufficient notice to the party in whose favour the decree was passed. *RUPCHAND KHEMCHAND v. BALVANT NARAYAN* I. L. R. 11 Bom. 591

13. ———— **Admission of review and dismissal of appeal, effect of.** One of the Judges of a Division Bench, which gave a decision on special appeal in favour of plaintiff, having left the Court, the remaining Judge heard an application for the admission of a review. The review having been admitted, the case was re-heard before the Judge last mentioned and another Judge, and a conclusion was arrived at contrary to the former decision. An application was made by the plaintiff for a review of this judgment, and notice was issued to the defendant who came in thereupon, and judg-

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—*concl.*

ment was then delivered at considerable length, in which the Judge delivering it said that no sufficient ground had been made out for the admission of a review, and that he dismissed the appeal. *Held*, that the last judgment was a re-hearing, and that it dismissed, not the application for the admission of a review, but the case itself on its merits. *LEKRAJ ROY v. KANHYA SINGH* . . . . . 18 W. R. 494

## 11. CRIMINAL CASES.

*See* CHARGE TO JURY—MISDIRECTION.

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 642

*See* REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES.

1. ———— **Power of review**—*Judgment in criminal appeal.* The High Court cannot review its judgment passed in a criminal case before it on appeal. *QUEEN v. GODAI RAOUT* B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 436: 5 W. R. 61

*KRISTO CHUNDER MAHATA v. OBINESSUREE DEBIA* . . . . . 11 W. R. 532

*In the matter of the petition of KRISHNO CHURN* 17 W. R. Cr. 2

2. ———— **Criminal Procedure Code.** The Code of Criminal Procedure contains no provision for a review of an order passed in a criminal case. *REG. v. MEHTARJI GOPALJI* 7 Bom. Cr. 67

*QUEEN v. TILOKE CHUND* . . . . . 3 N. W. 273

3. ———— **Review of judgment of High Court**—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1832), s. 369.* The verdict and judgment of a Divisional Bench of a High Court, coupled with the sentence in a criminal case, are absolutely final, and as soon as they have been pronounced and signed by the Judges, the High Court, is *functus officio*, and neither the Court itself nor any Bench of it has any power to revise that decision or interfere with it in any way. *In the matter of the petition of GIBBONS* . . . . . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 42

4. ———— **Application to set aside order of third Judge agreeing with junior Judge where there is difference of opinion between the Judges of Division Bench.** *Held* by MORGAN, C. J. and TURNER, J. (ROSS and SPANKIE, J.J., dissenting), that an application to set aside an order made by the junior Judge of a Division Bench and a third Judge contrary to the opinion of the senior Judge of the Division Court in a case where the two Judges differed in opinion is not in the nature of a review of judgment, and is cognizable by the Court. Where an order has been actually issued by the High Court, a Division Bench will not disturb the same, unless in the opinion of a majority of the Court the order is bad. *QUEEN v. NYN SINGH*

2 N. W. 117: s.c. Agra F. B. Ed. 1874, 196



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5. ———— Review of sentence once passed. A sentence duly passed and recorded cannot be revised by the Judge. ANONYMOUS

4 Mad. Ap. 19

ANONYMOUS . . . 5 Mad. Ap. 18

ANONYMOUS . . . 6 Mad. Ap. 8

(*Contra*), ANONYMOUS . . . 5 Mad. Ap. 20

6. ———— Order obtained on misstatement of facts—*Forfeited property—Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), ss. 184, 185.* Where an order for the release of the property of an absconding offender, which had been attached under s. 184 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), had been obtained from the High Court on an *ex parte* application, and on an incorrect statement of facts, the High Court, on the application of the Government cancelled such order. *In the matter of the petition of the GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL* . . . 9 B. L. R. 342

7. ———— Order dismissing application by accused person for revision—*Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 369, 434—Letters Patent, High Court, N. W. P., cls. 18 and 19.* The High Court had no power under s. 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code to review an order dismissing an application for revision made by an accused person, and the only remedy was by an appeal to the prerogative of the Crown as exercised by the local Government. *Per BRODHURST, J.*—The Legislature has not conferred in express words upon a High Court the power of reviewing its judgments in all criminal cases as it has done under the Civil Procedure Code in civil cases; and the provisions of s. 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code, so far as they affect the High Court, apply merely to questions of law arising in its original criminal jurisdiction and which are reserved and are subsequently disposed of under the provisions of s. 434 of the Criminal Procedure Code and ss. 18 and 19 of the Letters Patent for the High Court of the N.-W. P. *Queen v. Godai Raout, B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 436,* referred to. *QUEEN EMPRESS v. DURGA CHARAN* I. L. R. 7 All. 672

8. ———— Order made on revision—*Power of High Court—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 439.* A Division Bench of the High Court has not, under s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882), any power to review its judgment pronounced on revision in a criminal case. *Queen Empress v. Durga Charan, I. L. R., 7 All., 672,* followed. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. FOX*

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 176

See *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GANESH RAM KRISHNA*  
I. L. R. 23 Bom. 50

9. ———— Order rejecting appeal as barred by limitation—*Review of such order—Finality of judgments in criminal matters—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 421 and 430.* A Sessions Judge dismissed an appeal on the ground that it was barred by limitation. On a subsequent

REVIEW—*contd.*11. CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*

application by the accused, the Judge admitted the appeal and at the hearing acquitted him. The High Court sent for the record in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. *Held*, that the order of acquittal was *ultra vires* under s. 430 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The order dismissing the appeal was final and not open to review. It was argued that s. 421 of the Criminal Procedure Code only applies to orders passed on the merits, and that, as the order rejecting the appeal was not of that class, it was an order "upon appeal" and was not final under s. 430. *Held*, that s. 421 was not limited to orders passed on the merits, and that the order in question was an order upon appeal and final under s. 430. The Criminal Procedure Code makes no provision for review of judgments in criminal matters by subordinate Appellate Courts. The jurisdiction of revision is vested in the High Court, which has ample powers under Ch. XXXII to rectify any inadvertent failure of justice. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BHIMAPPA BIN RAMANNA*

I. L. R. 19 Bom. 732

10. ———— Power of review by District Magistrate. Where a District Magistrate on 12th June 1897 made an order after hearing an inquiry as to the possession of some missing property supposed to have been stolen and afterwards on 3rd August 1897 reversed the order as erroneous:—*Held, per RANADE, J.*, that the District Magistrate had no power to review his own previous order of the 12th June 1897, passed on full inquiry and after hearing both parties. The power of reversion in criminal cases is very strictly confined, and the same consideration which prevent subordinate Courts from altering their judgments on review hold good in respect of final orders which are of the nature of a judgment. *In re HARILAL BUCH*

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 949

11. ———— Power of review by High Court in Criminal cases—*Finality of order of High Court—Order not sealed—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 107 and 110—Security for keeping the peace—Security for good behaviour.* An application from jail—worded as an appeal—against an order passed under ss. 110 and 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was summarily rejected by means of the following order:—"No appeal lies in this case, and no sufficient ground appears for interference in revision. The application is dismissed." This order was signed by the Judge, who passed it, but was not sealed with the seal of the Court. *Held*, that the Judge, who had passed the order quoted above, was not under the circumstances precluded from entertaining an application for revision presented by counsel in relation to the same matter. *Queen-Empress v. Lalit Tiwari, I. L. R. 21 All. 177,* followed. *Held*, also, that where it appears from the evidence that there is an apprehension of any one using violence towards a particular person or particular persons, he ought to be bound over to keep the peace as provided by s. 107, and not be proceeded against under s. 110 of



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the Code of Criminal Procedure. *EMPEROR v. KALLU* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 27 All 192

¶ 12. — Subordinate Judge, power of—*Criminal Procedure Code* (Act V of 1898), s. 195—Application for sanction to prosecute—Dismissal of the application for default—Appellate Court cannot grant sanction on appeal—Dismissal of application for default not permissible—Review of order not permissible under the Code. An application was made by the Public Prosecutor of Belgaum to the Subordinate Judge of Gokak for sanction to prosecute one G for offences committed in his Court. The Public Prosecutor failed to appear in the Court on the day and at the hour fixed for the hearing of the application. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the application as for default. On an application being made to review this order, the Subordinate Judge declined to do so. On appeal, however, the District Judge granted the sanction under s. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898). *Held*, that the Subordinate Judge had no power to review his order, because the Criminal Procedure Code contained no provision giving jurisdiction to a Court to review orders passed under it. *In re GOPAL SIDDHESHWAR DESHPANDE* (1907). . . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 203

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## 1. GENERAL CASES.

Power of High Court—*Rules 18, 20, made under Act XXVI of 1839—Agent to the Governor at Vizagapatam.* The Agent to the Governor at Vizagapatam dismissed an appeal under the Agency Rules, No. 18. The appellant preferred a petition to the High Court against the order of the Agent. *Held*, that the High Court had no power to interfere. *JAGANNADHA v. GOPPANNA*  
I. L. R. 16. Mad. 229

## 2. SMALL CAUSE COURT CASES.

1. Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (IX of 1887), s. 25—*Circumstances under which the High Court will exercise its revisional powers.* S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (IX of 1887) was not intended to give in effect a right of appeal in all Small Cause Court cases, either on law or fact. The revisional powers given by that section are only exercisable where it appears that some substantial injustice to a party to the litigation has directly resulted from a material misapplication or misapprehension of law, or from a material error in procedure. *Muhammad Nizam-ud-din Khan v. Hira Lull*, *All. Weekly Notes* (1890), 121, and *Masum Ali v. Mohsin Ali*, *All. Weekly Notes* (1890), 201, approved. *MUHAMMAD BAKAR v. BAHAL SINGH* . I. L. R. 13 All. 277

2. Civil Procedure Code, s. 622—*Superintendence of High Court—Wrong decision on a question of limitation.* An application under s. 25 of Act IX of 1887 to set aside a decree ought not to be entertained except in cases in which a similar application under s. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be allowed. Such an application will not lie where the sole ground is whether the first Court was or was not right in its decision on a question of limitation. *Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 6, referred to. *RAGHU NATH SAHAI v. OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR OF THE HIMALAYA BANK.*

I. L. R. 15 All. 139

3. Discretion of Court—*Superintendence of High Court under Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 622.* S. 25 of Act IX of 1887 was not intended to give what would practically be an appeal in every case from the decision of a Court of Small Causes, but the discretion to be exercised thereunder should be guided by the same considerations as those which govern the application of s. 622 of Act XIV of 1882. *Muhammad Bakar v. Bahal Singh*, I. L. R. 13 All. 277, and *Raghunath Sahai v. Official Liquidator of the Himalaya Bank*, I. L. R. 15 All. 139, referred to. *SARMAN LAL v. KHUBAN* I. L. R. 16 All. 476

4. Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 622—*Superintendence of High Court—Ground for revision—Question of limitation.* It is no ground for revision under s. 25 of Act IX of 1887 that the Court whose order it is sought to revise may have come to an erroneous decision on a point of limitation. *Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh*

REVISION—CIVIL CASES—*contd.*2. SMALL CAUSE COURT CASES—*contd.*

*Singh, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 6*, referred to. *SARMAN LAL v. KHUBAN* . I. L. R. 17 All. 422

5. Jurisdiction and superintendence of the High Court—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 622—Practice.* An error of law or procedure in the Small Cause Court confers jurisdiction upon the High Court to exercise the power committed by s. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act (IX of 1887). The powers conferred by the section are, however, purely discretionary, and the section does not give a right of appeal in all Small Cause Court cases either on law or on fact. The High Court is to determine in what cases it shall exercise the powers conferred upon it. It is not the practice of the Bombay High Court to interfere under s. 25 of the Act when there are no substantial merits in the case of the applicant. It interferes to remedy injustice. It is slow to interfere where substantial justice has been done by the subordinate Court, although that Court may technically have erred. The provisions of s. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882) do not afford a safe guide for the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under s. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The wording of the two sections is wholly different, that of s. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act being of the widest description and conferring the most ample discretion on the High Court, while it has been held by the Privy Council that s. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code ought to be construed in a very restricted and limited sense. *POONA CITY MUNICIPALITY v. RAMJI RAGHUNATH*  
I. L. R. 21 Bom. 250

6. Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 622—*Discretion of Court in dealing with applications under s. 25 of Act IX of 1887.* Although s. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure may properly be taken as indicating the lines along which a Judge would do well to exercise his discretion in admitting an application under s. 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act, a Judge is not absolutely bound to refuse any application under s. 25 of the latter Act which could not be admitted under s. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Sarman Lal v. Khuban*, I. L. R. 17 All. 422, referred to and explained. *VIAS RAM SHANKAR v. RALLA RAM MISIR* . I. L. R. 21 All. 89

7. Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 203—*Decree not according to law—Substantial failure of justice—Interference under extraordinary jurisdiction.* The plaintiff, a Hindu widow, sued for Rs. 74-4-0, being the balance due on an account. She called six witnesses to prove her claim. The defendant did not appear to defend the suit. The Judge, however, dismissed the suit, the only judgment recorded by him being as follows: "Claim not proved. Claim rejected with costs." The plaintiff thereupon applied to the High Court under its extraordinary jurisdiction and the above decree was set aside, and a decree passed for the plaintiff with costs. *Held*, that



REVISION—CIVIL CASES—*contd.*2. SMALL CAUSE COURT CASES—*contd.*

the decree, being founded on a judgment not in accordance with s. 203 of the Civil Procedure Code, was not according to law, and therefore the High Court, under s. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, had jurisdiction to pass such order in the matter as it thought fit. *Per FARRAN, C.J.*—In a case where there is nothing to excite suspicion, and where the plaintiff had given such proof of her claim as the law requires, the plaintiff is entitled, and this Court is entitled, to have some indication from the Judge of the point upon which he dismisses the suit, to show that he is not acting from mere caprice or in ignorance of the rules of law which regulate the proof requisite to establish a plaintiff's claim. *Per FULTON, J.*—The ground on which I would base our decision is that the error under s. 203 brings the case within our jurisdiction, and that the case being thus before us we are entitled, on being convinced that a failure of justice has occurred, to pass an order which will rectify the mistake. *BAI JASODA v. BAMANSHA MANCHERJI*. I. L. R. 23 Bom. 334

8. *Calcutta Municipal Consolidation Act (1888), ss. 135 and 157—“Valuation,” Meaning of—Re-valuation made by the Municipality within six years from the date of the valuation made after hearing objection, legality of—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), s. 622—Stat. 24 & 25 Vict., c. 104, s. 15—Superintendence of High Court.* The word “valuation” in s. 135 of the Calcutta Municipal Consolidation Act (Bengal Act II of 1888) means, not “the amount of the valuation” only, but also the process or act of valuation. A valuation was made by the Calcutta Municipality of a holding, the rate-payer objected to the amount, and the Vice-Chairman of the Municipality, on hearing the objection, fixed the valuation at a certain amount. Within six years from this valuation fixed after objection, a re-valuation was made by the Municipality, and the rate-payer objected to the legality of such valuation on the ground that the Municipality had no power to make a re-valuation within six years from the date of the last valuation. The Vice-Chairman overruled the objection, and the rate-payer appealed under s. 157 of the Act to the Judge of the Court of Small Causes at Sealdah, who allowed the appeal. *Held*, that, inasmuch as the objection raised by the rate-payer was an objection to the valuation within the meaning of s. 135 of the Act, the Judge of the Small Cause Court had jurisdiction to deal with it. That being so, it was not open to the High Court to interfere either under s. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, or under s. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure, or under s. 15 of 24 & 25 Vict., c. 104. *CORPORATION OF CALCUTTA v. BHUPATI ROY CHOWDHURY*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 74  
3 C. W. N. 70

9. *Review of judgment, application for—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 622, 623, 626, 629—Small Cause*

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*Court suit.* An application for review of judgment in a Small Cause Court suit was rejected, wrongly, on the ground of a supposed deficiency in the court-fee paid upon the application. *Held*, that this order was open to revision. *Ram Lal v. Ratan Lal*, I. L. R. 26 All. 672, distinguished. *WILLIS v. JAWAD HUSAIN* (1907). I. L. R. 29 All. 468

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TION IN GRANTING SANCTION.

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I. L. R. 36 Calc. 45

**1. GENERAL RULES FOR EXERCISE OF  
POWER.**

1. ——— Cases where appeal lies—  
*Appeal preliminary to application for revision.*  
Where there is a Court of appeal, resort should be  
had thereto before application is made to the High

**REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*****1. GENERAL RULES FOR EXERCISE OF  
POWER—*contd.***

Court for the exercise of its powers of revision.  
*EMPRESS v. NILAMBHAR BABU.*

I. L. R. 2 All. 276

2. ——— *Appeal by Local  
Government—Application for revision by Local  
Government—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 417,  
439.* It is not an inflexible rule that where either  
Government on the one side or an accused on the  
other has a right of appeal, and does not exercise  
it, the powers of the High Court under s. 439 of the  
Criminal Procedure Code cannot be exercised ; but,  
in such cases these powers should be sparingly used  
and save in very exceptional circumstances, not at  
all in reference to questions of fact. *QUEEN-EM-  
PRESS v. ALA BUKSH . I. L. R. 6 All. 484*

3. ——— *Error which cannot be cor-  
rected by appeal—Power of High Court.* The  
High Court may act as a court of revision after it  
has acted as a Court of appeal in order to correct an  
error which cannot set be right by appeal. *QUEEN  
GORA CHAND GOPE . B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 443*  
1. Ind. Jur. N. S. 177  
5 W. R. Cr. 45

4. ——— *Power of High Court on  
revision—Letters Patent, High Court, N.-W. P.,  
cl. 27, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 104, s. 13.* S. 13 of 24  
& 25 Vict., c. 104, and s. 27 of the Letters Patent  
of the High Court, apply to the High Court in its  
revisional as well as in its appellate jurisdiction.  
*QUEEN v. NYN SINGH.*

2 N. W. 117 : s.c. *Agra, F. B. Ed. 1874, 196*

5. ——— *Criminal Proce-  
dure Code, 1882, s. 439.* The provisions of s. 439 of  
the Criminal Procedure Code in no way affect the  
powers of the High Court as a court of revision  
vested in it by the High Courts Act. *CHAKOWRI  
LALL v. MOTI KURMI . 13 C. L. R. 275*

6. ——— *Irregularity or illegality in  
proceedings—Ground for revision.* A fair *prima  
facie* case as to the irregularity of those proceedings,  
or the illegality or impropriety of the sentence or  
order, must appear before the Court will call for or  
direct a return of the record of the proceedings.  
*QUEEN v. SUBBAYYA GAUNDAN . 1 Mad. 138*

7. ——— *Application by private pro-  
secutor—Act X of 1872, s. 297—Power of private  
prosecutor to move the Court in a case of acquittal.*  
A private prosecutor can move the High Court, in  
the case of an acquittal, to exercise its powers of  
revision under s. 297 of Act X of 1872. *SUKHO v.  
DURGA PRASAD . I. L. R. 2 All. 448*

*See In the matter of HARDEO*

I. L. R. 1 All. 139

8. ——— *Power of High Court to  
act on private information—Revision by High  
Court, power of—Ground for revision.* In the course  
of a serious riot one S was killed by a shot from  
a gun. The first prisoner and others were charged  
with murder. The Sessions Judge believing the



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statement of the first prisoner and his witnesses that he had fired in self-defence, acquitted him of the charge. Upon a petition presented by the widow of the deceased praying the Court to exercise their powers of revision:—*Held*, that, under the provisions of s. 297 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court might exercise its powers of revision upon information in whatever way received. *In the matter of AUROKIAM* . I. L. R. 2 Mad. 38

9. — Revision by the High Court—*Practice—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 435—Revision where lower Court has concurrent jurisdiction with High Court.* The High Court will not entertain an application for revision in cases where the District Court or Magistrate has concurrent revisional jurisdiction with the High Court, save on some special ground shown, unless a previous application shall have been made to the lower Court; but in cases in which concurrent jurisdiction is not possessed by the lower Courts, no such general rule exists. *In the matter of the QUEEN-EMPRESS v. REOLAH.*

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 887

10. — Defect in enquiry by lower Court—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 435, 439.* The High Court will exercise its powers under ss. 435 and 439 in the interests of justice, in exceptional cases, as where the enquiry in the lower Court has been faulty. *BHAWOO JIVAJI v. MULJI DAYAL*

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 377

11. — Exercise of revisional power during hearing of case—*Illegal prosecution by Municipal Commissioners under the Penal Code.* Where, during the hearing of proceedings in a prosecution by certain Municipal Commissioners under the Penal Code of a man who had made a false statement in an application for a license the High Court stayed the proceedings, and issued a rule to show cause why they should not be quashed, it was contended at the hearing of the rule that the High Court should not interfere at that stage of the proceedings under its revisional jurisdiction. *Held*, that the High Court has power to interfere at any stage of a case, and that, when it is brought to its notice that a person has been subjected, as in this case, for over two months, to the harassment of an illegal prosecution, it is its bounden duty to interfere. *CHANDI PERSHAD v. ABDUR RAHMAN*

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 131

12. — Power of interference by the High Court—*Test as to whether case is of exceptional nature or not—Practice in criminal case.* The High Court will not interfere in a case during its pendency in a subordinate Court, unless it is of an exceptional nature; and one test of its being of such a nature is that a bare statement of the facts of the case without any elaborate argument should be sufficient to convince the High Court that the case is a fit one for its interference at an intermediate stage. *Chandi Pershad v. Abdur Rahaman, I. L. R.*

REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*1. GENERAL RULES FOR EXERCISE OF POWER—*contd.*

22 Calc. 131, discussed. *CHOA LAL DASS v. ANANT PERSHAD MISSE* . I. L. R. 25 Calc. 233

13. — Interference in pending case, grounds for. It is inadvisable to interfere in a pending case unless there is some manifest and patent injustice apparent on the face of the proceedings and calling for prompt redress. *JAGAT CHANDRA MOZUMDAR v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 786  
3 C. W. N. 491

14. — Power of High Court on revision—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 439—Setting aside conviction.* In exercising its powers under s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is open to the High Court to alter any finding and confirm a conviction, and if the evidence on the record in a case be sufficient to warrant a conviction the Court would not be justified in setting such conviction aside, merely because the view taken of the evidence by the lower Court is not sustainable or some fact which ought to have been found by that Court is not found or found incorrectly. *BALMAKAND RAM v. GHANSAMRAM*

I. L. R. 22 Calc. 39

15. — Power to interfere with interlocutory orders of subordinate Courts. The High Court can interfere with an interlocutory order passed by a Magistrate. *Abdul Kadir Khan v. Magistrate of Purneah 11 B. L. R. Ap. 8 : 20 W. R. Cr. 23, and Chandi Pershad v. Abdur Rahman, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 131, followed. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. NAGESHAPPA PAI*

I. L. R. 20 Bom. 543

16. — Conviction under Cattle Trespass Act (I of 1871)—*Appeal—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 435 and 438.* There being no appeal from a conviction under the Cattle Trespass Act, the High Court refused to revise the proceedings of the lower Court under ss. 435 and 438, Criminal Procedure Code, since, there being evidence to support the conviction, to adopt such a course would be to substantially allow an appeal. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. LAKSHMI NAYAKAN* . I. L. R. 19 Mad. 238

17. — Power of Local Legislature—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 145, 435—Order concerning a ferry purporting to be made under s. 145.* The local Legislature has power to overrule a statutory power conferred on the High Court; but this was not the object and result of the legislation expressed in s. 435 of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. *Empress v. Burah I. L. R. 4 Calc. 172 : L. R. 5 I. A. 178, referred to.* The terms of s. 435 mean that orders under the exempted sections mentioned in cl. (3) must have been passed with jurisdiction. If such orders are challenged as made without jurisdiction, the mere fact of their purporting to be passed under the exempted sections would not bring them within those sections so as to debar the exercise of power by the High Court under s. 15 of the Charter Acts.



REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*1. GENERAL RULES FOR EXERCISE OF POWER—*contd.*

*Abayeswari Debi v. Sidheswari Debi*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 80; *Ananda Chandra Bhattacharjee v. Stephen*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 127; *Roop Lal Das v. Manook*, 2 C. W. N. 572; and *Queen-Empress v. Pratap Chunder Ghose*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 852, followed. *HURBULLUBH NARAIN SINGH v. LUCHMESWAR PROSAD SINGH* I. L. R. 26 Calc. 188 3 C. W. N. 49

See *LALDHARI SINGH v. SUKDEONARAIN SINGH* 4 C. W. N. 613

18. ——— Rule to show cause—*Power of Court in dealing with evidence in rule—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 429, 439.* Where a rule was issued by the High Court on a Magistrate to show cause why the conviction and sentence should not be set aside on the ground that there was no evidence on the record connecting the accused with the offence:—*Held*, that the rule ought to be read reasonably in favour of the accused, and it should be read with the materials which were before the Court at the time it was granted, and that the High Court had complete power to deal with it as a Court of revision, and is not limited to the question whether there was what is described in England as any evidence to go to the jury. *RAKHAL NIKARI v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* 2 C. W. N. 81

19. ——— Power at hearing of rule to consider matter in respect of which rule was not granted—*Discretion of Court.* The High Court in revision at the hearing of a rule has a discretion to consider and decide matters in respect to which the rule had been prayed for, but not granted, and need not confine itself only to the matters in respect of which the rule was granted. *DURGA DASS RUKHIT v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 820

20. ——— Accused not appealing—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 423, 439—High Court, power of, to deal with accused person not appealing—Conviction, setting aside of, of accused not appealing, while dealing with an appeal on behalf of persons appealing.* The High Court has power under s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in a proper case, to deal with the case of accused persons not appealing against their conviction, while considering and trying the appeal preferred by some other persons and sub-s. (5) of the section does not in any way affect the jurisdiction vested in the High Court to deal with their case. *BROJA RAKHAL MOZUMDAR v. EMPRESS* (1900). 5 C. W. N. 330

21. ——— Criminal Procedure Code, Ch. XII (Disputes as to immoveable property)—*Statute 24 & 25 Vic., cap. 104, s. 15—Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 145, 435, 429—Order of Magistrate in case of a dispute relating to immoveable property—High Court's powers of revision.* *Held*, that the High Court cannot exercise revisional powers in respect of proceedings under Ch. XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure unless in a case

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where the Magistrate has acted without jurisdiction. *Doulat Koer v. Rameswari Koeri*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 625, followed. *In the matter of the petition of NATHU MAL* (1902) I. L. R. 24 All. 315

22. ——— Party having no right to present possession—*Criminal Procedure Code, s. 145—No decision come to by Magistrate as to party in possession—Application for revision at instance of party who could not in his own right be entitled to immediate possession—Practice.* *Held*, that where a Magistrate, after entertaining proceedings under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, had declined to make any order declaring one or other of the contending parties in possession, the High Court would not interfere in revision at the instance of a person who, though apparently the next reversioner to the estate, could for the time being have no possible right on his own behalf to present possession. *Laldhari Singh v. Sukhdeo Narain Singh*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 892, and *Anesh Mollah v. Ejaharuddi Mollah*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 446, distinguished. *In the matter of the petition of BEHARI LAL* (1902), I. L. R. 24 All. 443

23. ——— Discretionary power—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 192—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 435, 439—Perjury—Contradictory statements.* The controlling power of the High Court is a discretionary power, and it must be exercised with regard to all the circumstances of each particular case, anxious attention being given to the said circumstances, which vary greatly. This discretion ought not to be crystallized, as it would become in course of time, by one Judge attempting to prescribe definite rules with a view to bind other Judges in the exercise of the discretion, which the Legislature has committed to them. This discretion, like all other judicial discretions, ought, as far as practicable, to be left untrammelled and free, so as to be fairly exercised, according to the exigencies of each case. *EMPEROR v. BANKATRAM LACHIRAM* (1904). I. L. R. 28 Bom. 533

24. ——— Revision—*Practice—Discretion of Court as to entertainment of application in revision.* *Held*, that it is not the practice of the High Court to entertain an application for revision on the criminal side, where there exists a lower Court having concurrent revisional jurisdiction unless a similar application has first been made to the lower Court and has been rejected. *Emperor v. Kali Charan*, All. Weekly Notes (1904) 233, and *Gullay v. Bakar Husain*, I. L. R. 28 All. 268, followed. *SHAFATQAT-UL-LAH v. WALI AHMED KHAN* (1907) I. L. R. 30 All. 116

25. ——— Restoration of immoveable property—*High Court, revisional jurisdiction over immoveable property—Duty of Magistrate to pass orders under ss. 417 and 522 in favour of a party forcibly dispossessed—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 423 (1) (d), 439, 517, and 522.* Under s. 423 (1) (d) of the Criminal Procedure Code the High Court has power, as a Court of Revision, to



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interfere with an order passed by a Magistrate under s. 522 of the Code. *Manki v. Bhagwanti*, I. L. R. 7 All. 415, followed. *Ram Chandra Mistry v. Noman Mirdha*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 630, referred to. Where a party was found to have been assaulted and dispossessed of a bungalow and its contents by the opposite party, who was, in consequence, convicted under s. 323 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that it was the duty of the Magistrate to have passed orders under ss. 522 and 517 directing restoration of the bungalow and its contents to the party thus forcibly dispossessed. *AHMED ALI v. KEENOO KHAN* (1908) . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 45

## 2. DELAY.

1. ———— Necessity of immediate application for relief—*Criminal Procedure Code*, 1861, s. 404.—*Application to set aside proceedings under s. 318.* The High Court refused to interfere, under s. 404, *Criminal Procedure Code*, 1861, on an application by a party who had, in proceedings under s. 318 of the Code, been found not to be in possession, to set aside the proceedings, on account of the great delay that had taken place in making it. Such applications ought to be made at once. *GOGUN PRAMANICK v. SURNOMOYEE* 19 W. R. Cr. 39

2. ———— Irregular summary rejection of appeal—*Rejection without giving reasons.* Where a Sessions Judge rejected an appeal summarily under s. 421 of the *Criminal Procedure Code*, 1882, by an order consisting merely of the words "Appeal rejected," and an application for revision of such order was made to the High Court nearly nine months thereafter, on the ground that the Judge was wrong in rejecting the appeal without assigning his reasons for so doing:—*Held*, that his objection, if taken within a reasonable time, would have been valid, but as the application for revision was made with very great delay, the Court should not interfere. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAM NARAIN* I. L. R. 8 All. 514

3. ———— Application to revise order of acquittal. Where an application was made by the Local Government to the High Court for revision of an order of acquittal, under s. 439 of the *Criminal Procedure Code*, 1882, nearly ten months after the Sessions trial and upwards of twelve months after the commission of the alleged crime, and where there was, upon the face of the Judge's judgment, no error in law, and no appeal had been preferred upon a question of fact:—*Held*, that, under such circumstances the Court did not feel called upon to enter into the case at large upon the merits, under a petition for revision. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ALA BAKHSH* I. L. R. 6 All. 484

## 3. QUESTION OF FACT.

Under the former Code of 1872 the Court had power to deal on revision with questions of law, not

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with questions of fact. *MUNGLO v. DURGA NARAIN NAG* . . . 25 W. R. Cr. 74

*In the matter of the petition of DEBI CHURN BISWAS* . . . 20 W. R. Cr. 40

*EMPRESS v. DONNELLY. In the matter of the petition of DONNELLY* . . . I. L. R. 2 Calc. 405

1. ———— Power to go into facts—*Discretion of Court—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 435.* Under s. 435 of the *Criminal Procedure Code*, the High Court has power to go into questions of fact, but it will only exercise this power in cases in which it finds that it will be in the interests of justice to do so. *NOBIN KRISHNA MOOKERJEE v. RASSICK LALL LAHA.* I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1047

2. ———— Power of High Court in revisional cases—*Criminal Procedure Code*, 1882, s. 439. Under s. 439 of the *Code of Criminal Procedure*, 1882, the High Court has power to consider the facts of a case in revision. *RAM BRAHMA SIRCAR v. CHANDRA KANTA SHAH.* I. L. R. 21 Calc. 931

3. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code 1882, s. 439.* The interference of the High Court in revision is not limited to matters of law; it is fully competent to the High Court to enter into matters of fact if it thinks fit. But the mere application of a party to examine the evidence in any case would not be a sufficient ground for doing so. There must appear, on the face of the judgment or order complained of, or of the record, some ground to induce the High Court to think that the evidence ought to be examined in order to see that there has been no failure of justice. But no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down; each case will have to be dealt with according to its own circumstances. *KESHAB CHUNDER ROY v. AKHIL METEY* I. L. R. 22 Calc. 998

4. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code*, 1882, ss. 435, 439—*High Court's powers of revision in criminal cases.* Under ss. 435 and 439 of the *Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882)*, the High Court can, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, interfere with the findings of fact of inferior Courts, and will do so if there are very exceptional grounds for its interference, in the interests of justice. *Per JARDINE, J.*—As a rule, the Court refuses to interfere (i) where the Legislature intended the original or appellate decision on the facts to be final; (ii) where the relief sought might be got from a lower Court of concurrent revisional jurisdiction; and (iii) where the lower Court's judgment on the fact is not shown to be clearly and manifestly wrong. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. CHAGAN DAYARAM* . . . I. L. R. 14 Bom. 331

5. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 439.* Although it is not usual for the High Court to interfere in revision with the decision of the lower Courts, when it is based on a consideration of the evidence yet where



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the lower Courts have not considered the evidence from the point of view that the witnesses were accomplices, and where hearsay evidence has been improperly admitted on important points, the Court will go into the facts of the case. *ROJONI KANT BOSE v. ASAN MULLICK* . 2 C. W. N. 672

## 4. EVIDENCE AND WITNESSES.

1. ——— Conviction inconsistent with evidence—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 439 and 423—Court of Appeal—Appellate powers—Discretion.* In cases in which the law allows no appeal, the High Court, as a Court of revision, will not, except on very exceptional grounds, exercise the powers of an Appellate Court; but where such exceptional grounds exist, as where the conviction is not in any degree supported by the evidence, the High Court will exercise its discretion under s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and reverse the conviction and sentence. *EMPRESS v. BADRUDIN* . . . I. L. R. 8 Bom. 197

Also where there is no evidence to support the conviction. *In the matter of the petition of RAMJOY KURMOKAR* . . . 25 W. R. Cr. 10

*In the matter of KRISHNANAND BHUTTACHARJEE* . . . 3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 50

s.c. *In the matter of KISHEN SOONDUR BHUTTACHARJEE* . . . 12 W. R. Cr. 47

*EMPRESS v. NAROTAM DAS* . I. L. R. 6 All. 98

*REG. v. GANU BIN KRISHNA GURAV* . . . 4 Bom. Cr. 25

2. ——— Laxity in weighing and testing evidence. Under the former Code, the Court would interfere in the case of great laxity in weighing and testing evidence. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. MURLI* . . . I. L. R. 2 All. 336

But not on a mere error in the appreciation of evidence. *REG. v. SAKHARAM MANOHAR* . . . 11 Bom. 125

*In the matter of AUROKIAM* . I. L. R. 2 Mad. 38

ANONYMOUS CASE . . . 5 Mad. Ap. 10

3. ——— Case depending on consideration and appreciation of evidence—*Abatement of appeal.* Two persons, M and N, were convicted of criminal breach of trust, and each was sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000. Both prisoners filed an appeal to the High Court. N died pending his appeal. On M's appeal, the High Court passed an order acquitting him and reversing his conviction and sentence. Thereupon one of the relatives of the deceased N applied to the High Court to set aside the conviction and sentence passed in his case and order the fine to be refunded. *Held*, that on N's death his appeal abated under s. 431 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882), and as the case turned on the appreciation of evidence, the High Court declined to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction

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referring the legal representatives of the deceased to the Governor in Council for redress. *In re NABI-SHAH* . . . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 714

4. ——— Improper estimate of evidence by the Magistrate. The High Court would only interfere on revision if it came to the conclusion that the Magistrate had illegally and improperly underrated the value of the evidence. *LACHMAN v. JAULA* . . . I. L. R. 5 All. 161

5. ——— Decision that evidence is insufficient.—*Refusal of Magistrate to proceed further in revision case.* As a Court of revision, the High Court will not enter upon a consideration of the value of the evidence on which the Magistrate decided not to proceed further in a case under s. 521, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872. *SHONAI PORAMANICK v. JOGENDRO SHAHA*. 1 C. L. R. 486

6. ——— Questions depending on conflict of evidence. Questions of fact depending upon conflicting evidence which has been considered by the Judge who has given his opinion upon it are not cases for revision. *In the matter of the petition of DEBI CHURN BISWAS* 20 W. R. Cr. 40

*See BHARUT CHUNDER BOSE v. DWARKANATH CHOWDRY* . . . 15 W. R. Cr. 86

7. ——— Conflict of opinion on evidence.—*Ground for exercise of power of revision—Difference of opinion between Magistrates.* The difference of opinion on a question of proof between a Magistrate who did, and another who did not, hear the witnesses, is not a ground on which the High Court will be disposed to exercise its powers of revision. *NUNDO KISHORE HALDER v. ANUNDO CHUNDER CHATTERJEE* . . . 23 W. R. Cr. 64

Nor are questions of the credibility of evidence. *In the matter of the petition of HURI PERSHAD* . . . 24 W. R. Cr. 60

s.c. on further hearing. *In the matter of the petition of HURRI PROSAD DUTTA* . 25 W. R. Cr. 61

*GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL v. KAZIMUDDIN* . . . 18 W. R. Cr. 3

8. ——— Omission to take material evidence.—*Decision on discrepant evidence.* Omission to take very material evidence proffered by the accused was *held* to have prejudiced him and to afford ground for the High Court's interference under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872. s. 297. *In the matter of the petition of HUR PERSHAD* . . . 24 W. Cr. 60

9. ——— Omission to give available evidence for prosecution—*Material "error"—Error in appreciation of evidence—Act X of 1872, s. 297.* It was not a ground for revision by the High Court that all the evidence for the prosecution which might have been brought before the Sessions Judge had not been brought before him. The words "material error" in that section could not be held to include error in the appreciation of evidence. Under the 1st clause of s. 297, Act X of 1872, the



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High Court" could not set aside findings of fact except in case of an appeal from a conviction. *In the matter of AUROKIAM*. I. L. R. 2 Mad. 38

10. Irregularity in dealing with evidence—*Withholding admissible statement of witness from the jury.* Where a statement by a witness for the defence, that a witness for the prosecution was at a particular place at a particular time, and consequently could not then have been at another place where the latter states he was and saw the accused persons, after being admitted, was withheld from the jury, the High Court ordered a new trial. *REG. v. SAKHARAM MUKUNDJI*  
11 Bom. 166

11. Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, ss. 426, 439—*Misconception of evidence.* Misconception of evidence was a defect or irregularity within the meaning of ss. 426 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861. *QUEEN v. BEHAREE DOSADH*  
7 W. R. Cr. 7

12. Criminal Procedure Code, 1891, s. 426—*Admission of illegal evidence—Act II of 1855, s. 57—New trial.* The Appellate Court, where it finds that illegal evidence has been admitted, should consider whether it is such as is likely to have exercised prejudicial influence on the minds of the jury; and if the Court be of opinion that it is so, it will treat the case as if it had been tried by a Sessions Judge with the aid of assessors. If the evidence (after omitting that portion of it which should not have been admitted) is sufficient to sustain the verdict, the conviction will be upheld. In exceptional cases, where the evidence is of such a character as to suggest the consideration that its real value cannot fairly be appreciated except by a Court which has heard that evidence given a new trial will be directed. *REG. v. RAMSWAMI MUDLIAR*  
6 Bom. Cr. 47

13. Discretion of Sessions Judge—*Power of Appellate Court.* The exercise of the discretion which the Sessions Judge had under s. 249 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, to determine whether the deposition taken before the Magistrate at the preliminary inquiry are to be evidence at the hearing before the Sessions Court, was open to review by the High Court on appeal. *REG. v. ARJUN MEGHA*  
11 Bom. 281

14. Improper admission in evidence of examination of prisoner. When the examination of the prisoner by the Magistrate had not been recorded in full as required by s. 205 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, and was therefore inadmissible in evidence, and the other evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, the fact that such examination had been admitted by the Sessions Court was not a ground for setting aside the trial on revision. *REG. v. KALLA LAKHMAJI*  
2 Bom. 419 : 2nd Ed. 395

*REG. v. PEVADI BIN BASSAPPA*

2 Bom. 421 : 2nd Ed. 397

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*REG. v. VITHAJI* 2 Bom. 422 : 2nd. Ed. 39g

*REG. v. GANU BAPU*

2 Bom. 422 : 2nd Ed. 398

15. Error in mode of recording evidence. Where the evidence was taken down by the Magistrate in English, and no memorandum was attached to it (as required by s. 199, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861), stating that the evidence was read over to the witness in a language which he understood, it was held that the accused was materially prejudiced, and the Court interfered on revision. *QUEEN v. ISSUR RAUT*

8 W. R. Cr. 63

16. Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 297—*Evidence in dispute regarding land.* In a case of a dispute regarding land commenced under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861, but continued under the Code of 1872 where the evidence was not recorded in the manner provided for by s. 334 and the following sections of the Code, the Court set the order aside on revision. *KHETROMONY DASI v. SREENATH SIRCAR*

24 W. R. Cr. 14

17. Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, ss. 426, 439—*Irregularity not prejudicing prisoner—Madras Police Act, 1859, s. 41.* A police constable was tried and convicted by the Assistant Agent of Vizagapatam under s. 44 of Act XXIV of 1859, and sentenced to fine and imprisonment. On appeal, the agent reversed the conviction and sentence, on the ground that there had been irregularity of procedure on the part of his assistant in not recording evidence for the prosecution, and in only taking down the substance of the prisoner's statement and not the full statement as made. Held, that the question was whether there had been such error and irregularity on the part of the Assistant Agent as to prejudice the accused and to occasion a failure of justice, that if not, the order reversing the conviction was rendered bad in law by ss. 426 and 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code; that the accused did not appear to have been prejudiced: consequently the order of the Appellate Court was set aside, and a re-hearing directed. *ANONYMOUS*  
6 Ap. Mad. 45

18. Irregularities concerning witnesses—*Irregularity in taking evidence of witnesses.* The High Court refused to interfere where a witness for the prosecution was examined after the defence was over, where the prisoner had notice of the evidence to be given by the witness, and therefore was not prejudiced by it in his defence. *QUEEN v. SHAM KISHORE HOLDAR*

13 W. R. Cr. 36

But see *QUEEN v. ASSANOOLLAH*

13 W. R. Cr. 15

19. Omission to examine and reduce to writing evidence of complainant. The not examining a complainant and not reducing his examination into writing is not such an



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irregularity as to require the interference of the High Court in a trivial case, unless it appears probable (of which there was no suggestion in the present case) that a fresh investigation would produce a different result. *KABIL NUSYO v. BAHARULLAH* 17 W. R. Cr. 37

20. ———— *Omission to examine witnesses.* Where a Magistrate omitted to examine all the complainant's witnesses before declaring the accused not guilty, the Court dealt on revision with the omission. *SREENATH MUNDLE v. SREERAM RAJPUT* 24 W. R. Cr. 62

*SANTOO MUNDLE v. ABDOL BISWAS* 13 W. R. Cr. 35

21. ———— *Omission to give opportunity to produce witnesses—Error or defect in trial—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 426.* Where the accused had not his witnesses in attendance, and did not apply to the Magistrate to summon them (ss. 352 and 353, Code of Criminal Procedure), the omission of the Magistrate to require him to produce his witnesses was held not to prejudice the accused, or so as to call for interference on revision. *QUEEN v. TOTARAM* 11 W. R. Cr. 15

22. ———— *Power of High Court—Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861), s. 366—Examination of accused—Postponement of trial for summoning a witness—Discretion of Judge.* A Deputy Magistrate committed certain prisoners for trial on a charge of dacoity. Some of the prisoners had confessed before the Deputy Magistrate but he failed to record the examination of the prisoners, or to attest it as required by s. 205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Sessions Judge therefore refused to admit the examination of the prisoners by the Deputy Magistrate in evidence, and also refused to postpone the trial for the purpose of summoning the Deputy Magistrate and taking his evidence in the matter. *Held*, that, it being wholly within the discretion of the Judge, under s. 366, to say whether or not he should postpone the trial, or summon any witness to give his evidence, the High Court as a Court of revision would not interfere or order a new trial. *QUEEN v. RADHA JANA* 3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 59 : 12 W. R. Cr. 44

23. ———— *Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, ss. 426, 439.* Where the evidence of witnesses given on a previous trial was read over and used in a subsequent trial at the express request of the prisoners, instead of the witnesses being examined *de novo*, the High Court declined to interfere, as the irregularity of procedure was one by which the prisoners were not prejudiced. *PURMESSUR SINGH v. SOROOP AUDHIKAREE* 13 W. R. Cr. 40

24. ———— *Refusal to allow witnesses to be cross-examined by accused.* The refusal of the Judge to allow to be cross-examined, by the accused, witnesses whose depositions have been taken by the Magistrate, but whose evidence is dispensed with at the trial, was held not to be a

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matter for revision. *REG. v. FATTECHAND VASTACHAND* 5 Bom. Cr. 85

25. ———— *Order of Magistrate refusing to recall witnesses for prosecution for cross-examination.* An order of the Deputy Magistrate refusing to recall the witnesses for the prosecution for the purpose of cross-examination is one which can be immediately corrected by the High Court under its general powers of superintendence and revision. *In the matter of the petition of BELILIOS. BELILIOS v. QUEEN* 19 W. R. Cr. 53

26. ———— *Power of High Court—Penal Code, ss. 283, 291—Evidence not taken on oath.* In exercise of its powers as a Court of revision, the High Court quashed convictions by a Joint Magistrate and Assistant Magistrate of certain persons for offences under s. 283 (danger, obstruction or injury to any person in a public way or line of navigation) and s. 291 (repeating or continuing public nuisance) of the Penal Code, in which it appeared that the complainants' statement was not made on oath or before a Magistrate, and in which there was no statement of charge or evidence of any kind. *In the matter of MOHESH CHUNDER* 20 W. R. Cr. 55

## 5. ACQUITTALS.

1. ———— *Acquittal from which Government may appeal—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 297.* It is not the practice of the High Court to interfere by way of revision under s. 297 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1872, with an acquittal against which the Government may appeal. *EMPRESS v. CHEDI RAI* 7 C. L. R. 142

2. ———— *Improper acquittal—Acquittal on erroneous ground.* Where the senior Assistant Sessions Judge, on the hearing of a charge of false evidence, without taking evidence acquitted the accused after calling upon him to plead, the prosecutor being unable to say that the alleged false statements of the accused were material to the trial on which they were made, the High Court reversed the order of acquittal, and directed the trial to be proceeded with. *REG. v. DAMODHAR RAM CHANDRA* 5 Bom. Cr. 68

3. ———— *Trial on evidence taken in another case.* The Court set aside an order of acquittal passed by a Deputy Magistrate in a case which he tried, not on evidence taken before himself in the case, but entirely on evidence in another case before another officer (the Joint Magistrate). *TUKHEYA RAI v. TUPSEE KOOR* 15 W. R. Cr. 23

4. ———— *Order for detention of accused pending appeal from acquittal—Power of High Court on revision.* Where, an appeal having been preferred to the High Court against a judgment of acquittal, a Magistrate made an order on the parties having been arrested and brought before him that they should be detained in custody pending the decision of the appeal:—*Held* by TURNER,



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*O.C.J.*, and PEARSON, J. (SPANKIE and OLDFIELD, J.J., dissenting), that the High Court had no power as a Court of revision to interfere with the order. *QUEEN v. GHOLAM ISMAIL* . . . I. L. R. 1 All. 1

5. ——— Order by High Court for re-trial after acquittal on appeal—*Criminal Procedure Code*, ss. 423 (a), 439—*High Court's powers of revision*. The High Court has power under s. 439 of the *Criminal Procedure Code* to revise an order of acquittal, though not to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. In reference to orders of acquittal passed by a Court of Session in appeal, the High Court may, under s. 439, reverse such order and direct a re-trial of the appeal, the proper tribunal to conduct which is the Sessions Court of appeal, or such other Court of equal jurisdiction as the High Court may entrust, under s. 526 of the Code, with the trial of the appeal. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. BALWANT*

I. L. R. 9 All. 134

6. ——— Petition to revise a judgment of acquittal—*Criminal Procedure Code*, ss. 435, 439, 440. An appeal against an acquittal, by way of revision is not contemplated by the Code, and it should, on public grounds, be discouraged. *THANDAVAN v. PERIANN*

I. L. R. 14 Mad. 363

7. ——— High Court's power of revision—*Criminal Procedure Code*, 1882 s. 439—*Practice*. Though the High Court has the power, under s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882), to revise an order of acquittal, yet ordinarily it does not interfere with such an order in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, because an appeal can always be made by the Local Government under s. 417 of the Code. *HEERABAI v. FRAMJI BHIKAJI* . . . I. L. R. 15 Bom. 349

8. ——— Acquittal of accused, effect of, with regard to others similarly charged—*Revival of proceedings against absent accused*—*Indian Penal Code* (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 147, 341, 379. Petitioners were charged, along with two others, with having committed certain offences under ss. 379, 341 and 147, *Indian Penal Code*; the latter, who were sent up by the police, were tried and acquitted, and the Magistrate remarked in his judgment that the case against the petitioners was not a true one. *Held*, that, until this decision was set aside by higher authority, the petitioners could not be prosecuted; and the order of the Sessions Judge directing their prosecution was bad. *Panchu Singh v. Umor Mahomed Sheikh*, 4 C. W. N. 346, and *Bishun Dass Ghose v. King-Emperor*, 7 C. W. N. 493, followed. *KEDAR NATH BISWAS v. ADHIN MANJI* (1903) 7 C. W. N. 711

9. ——— District Magistrate's discretion to move Local Government against acquittal—*Effect of order of acquittal on other persons charged, but not sent up for trial*—*Criminal Procedure Code* (Act V of 1898), s. 258. A charge had been preferred against the petitioners and

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several other persons under ss. 143, 342 and 323, *Indian Penal Code*. The police did not send up the petitioners for trial, as they thought the evidence against them was weaker than that against the others, and they sent up these; but they were acquitted by the trying Magistrate, who entered the case as "doubtful false." Subsequently the District Magistrate called for the records and issued notices against all the accused persons to show cause why further proceedings should not be taken against them. After hearing them, he disagreed with the decision of the trying Magistrate. But, not considering the case as of sufficient importance to move the Local Government, he ordered the petitioners only who had not been tried, to be placed on their trial. *Held*, that the District Magistrate should, in the proper exercise of his discretion, have moved the Local Government against the order of acquittal which he disapproved. *Held*, further, that no proceedings could be taken against the petitioners so long as the trying Magistrate's judgment declaring the case to be false was not set aside. *BISHUN DAS GHOSE v. KING-EMPEROR* (1902) . . . 7 C. W. N. 493

## 6. COMMITMENTS.

1. ——— Power to quash commitments—*Power of revision by High Court*—*Criminal Procedure Code*, 1872, s. 472. *Held per* STUART, C.J. (SPANKIE, J., doubting), that the High Court was competent, in the exercise of its power of revision under s. 297 of Act X of 1872, to quash a commitment made by a Court of Session under the provisions of s. 472 of that Act. *EMPRESS v. LACHMAN SINGH* . . . I. L. R. 2 All. 398

But see *QUEEN v. SHAMA SUNKER BISWAS*

10 W. R. Cr. 25

and *QUEEN v. SHEETARAM CHOWDHRY*

2 W. R. Cr. 44

2. ——— Power of High Court in revision to order person convicted and sentenced to be committed for trial—*Penal Code* (Act XLV of 1860), s. 326—*Grievous hurt*—*Inadequate sentence*—*Presidency Magistrate, duty of*—*Criminal Procedure Code*, ss. 423, 439. The accused was tried by a Presidency Magistrate on a charge of voluntarily causing grievous hurt with an instrument for cutting. He was convicted and sentenced, under s. 326 of the *Penal Code*, to rigorous imprisonment for two years. The Local Government, being of opinion that the sentence was inadequate, moved the High Court, under s. 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1882), to quash the Magistrate's proceedings, and ordered the accused to be committed for trial to the High Court. It was contended for the prisoner that, as the offence was not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the High Court had no power, under s. 423 (b) of the Code to order the accused to be committed for trial. *Held* dissenting from



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*Queen-Empress v. Sukha*, I. L. R. 8 All. 14, that s. 423 (b) gives to an Appellate Court the power to order an accused person to be committed for trial when it considers that that is the procedure that should have been adopted by the Magistrate in the case. *Held*, also, that the offence of which the prisoner was convicted, being one punishable under s. 326 of the Penal Code with transportation for life, or rigorous imprisonment for ten years and fine, the Presidency Magistrate ought to have committed the accused for trial to the High Court.

QUEEN-EMPRESS *v.* ABDUL RAHMAN

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 580

3. *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 209, 213, 215, 436—Order of discharge—Subsequent order of commitment—Revisional power of High Court.* Where a Sessions Judge, under s. 436, ordered the commitment of an accused who had previously been discharged under s. 209, Criminal Procedure Code, by the Deputy Magistrate, on evidence which was unreliable and insufficient:—*Held*, that the High Court had authority to set aside the order of commitment on the merits of the case, and that the order was bad and should be set aside. The High Court, in the exercise of its powers of revision, can, on the merits of a case, set aside an order of commitment passed by a District Magistrate or Sessions Judge under s. 436, Criminal Procedure Code, where such order of commitment setting aside a previous order of discharge is made on insufficient or unreliable evidence. *PIRTHI CHAND LAL v. SAMPATIA* (1903) . . . . . 7 C. W. N. 327

## 7. DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED.

1. *Improper discharge—High Court's powers of revision—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 439—Power to order commitment—Revival of prosecution.* The High Court has power under s. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, if it considers that an accused person has been improperly discharged to order him to be committed for trial. *EMPRESS v. RAM LAL SINGH*

I. L. R. 6 All. 40

This was also the case under the former Act. *In the matter of the petition of PROSUNNO COOMAR GHOSE* . . . . . 19 W. R. Cr. 56

*EMPRESS v. GOWDAPA* . . . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 534

*In the matter of the petition of MOHESH MISTREE*  
I. L. R. 1 Calc. 282; 25 W. R. Cr. 30; 67

*EMPRESS v. DONNELLY. In the matter of the petition of DONNELLY* . . . I. L. R. 2 Calc. 405

*EMPRESS v. HARY DOYAL KARMOKAR*  
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 16

*S.C. ISHEN CHUNDER KURMOKAR v. HURRY DOYAL KURMOKAR* . . . 3 C. L. R. 263

*In the matter of TROYLOKHYANATH MITTER*  
1 C. L. R. 83

REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*7. DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED—*contd.*

2. *Dismissal of charge against accused—Dismissal of case of breach of contract on the ground that Act XIII of 1859 did not apply.* The High Court declined to exercise their extraordinary powers of revision in a case in which the Joint Magistrate dismissed a complaint of breach of contract under Act XIII of 1859, on the ground that that Act did not apply to the contract, which was a contract to work at a certain factory. *LYALL & Co. v. RAM CHUNDER BAGDEE* 18 W. R. Cr. 53

3. *Improper discharge—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 436, 410, 209—Preliminary inquiry—Order for further inquiry or subsequent commitment to Sessions—Consideration of evidence on record.* At a preliminary inquiry, a Magistrate before committing an accused person to the Sessions Court under s. 210 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should have sufficient grounds for doing so, and among such grounds may properly be placed a consideration as to whether, on the evidence before him, a conviction will be arrived at. A Sessions Judge or District Magistrate, in considering whether an accused person has been "improperly discharged," within the terms of s. 436 of the Criminal Procedure Code, is bound to consider all the grounds upon which such order of discharge has been passed, including a consideration of the evidence which has not been believed or held to be sufficient to establish a *prima facie* case, before ordering the commitment of the accused person or directing a further inquiry. Where an accused had been discharged under s. 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and subsequently the Sessions Judge directed the accused to be committed to the Sessions under s. 436 of the Code of Criminal Procedure without considering the evidence on the record which he thought he could not do without "prejudging the case, thus making it difficult for him to hear it with a jury":—*Held*, that the Sessions Judge's order directing the commitment of the accused was bad, inasmuch as it had not been made on full consideration of the merits of the case, as disclosed by the evidence before the Magistrate. *HARBANS SINGH v. FAKIR DAS* (1902) 7 C. W. N. 77

4. *Jurisdiction—Revisional jurisdiction of High Court—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 423, 439—Presidency Magistrate—Discharge of accused person under s. 209 of Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898)—Order of discharge set aside by High Court, and order made that accused be arrested and committed for trial at the Sessions of the High Court—Practice—Procedure.* Under ss. 439 and 423 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court has jurisdiction to set aside an order of discharge passed by a Presidency Magistrate, if such preliminary be necessary and to direct that a person improperly discharged of an offence be arrested and forthwith committed for trial. The fact that, by s. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), the



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High Court in its revisional jurisdiction may exercise all the powers given to it as a Court of Appeal (by s. 423), except (see paragraph 4) the power of converting a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, seems to point to the conclusion that all other powers not expressly excluded may be exercised by the High Court as a Court of Revision, *EMPEROR v. VARJIVANDAS* (1902)

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 84

## 8. REVIVAL OF COMPLAINT AND RE-TRIAL.

1. ——— Power of High Court to revise order reviving a complaint after discharge—*High Court Charter Act (24 & 25 Vict., c. 104), s. 15—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 439.* The High Court has ample powers, under the Charter Act, if not under the Code, to revise an order reviving a complaint after discharge by a Presidency Magistrate. In this particular case it was held that the Presidency Magistrate has exercised a proper discretion in reviving the complaint. *OPOORBA KUMAR SETT v. PROBODH KUMARY DASSI* 1 C. W. N. 49

See *CHAROOBALA DABEE v. BARENDRA NATH MAJOOMDAR* . . . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 126  
3 C. W. N. 601

2. ——— Power of High Court to re-try case after setting aside a conviction on ground of misdirection to jury. *Quære*: Whether in setting aside a conviction on the ground of misdirection to the jury, the High Court has any power to re-try the case having regard to s. 423 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *SADHEE SHEIKH v. EMPRESS* . . . 4 C. W. N. 576

3. ——— Power to order re-trial—*Power of High Court as Court of Revision and Appeal—Act XI of 1874, s. 28.* The High Court has full power as a court of revision to order a re-trial when necessary. As a Court of appeal, it has the like power under Act XI of 1874, s. 28, in cases tried with assessors. *In the matter of the petition of LUCKHY NARAYAN NAGORY* . . . 24 W. R. Cr. 24

4. ——— Ground for re-trial—*Improper discharge of accused.* Per MARKBY, J.—When the discharge has been improper the only proper course open to a Magistrate is to report the case to the High Court for orders, and that Court if of opinion that the accused has been improperly discharged, will order a re-trial. *EMPRESS v. DONNELLY.* *In the matter of the petition of DONNELLY* I. L. R. 2 Calc. 405

5. ——— *Improper discharge of accused.* As the case was one of improper discharge and came before the Magistrate under s. 295 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, the proper and only course for him was to report it for orders to the High Court, which, if of opinion that the accused were improperly discharged, might under s. 297, have directed a re-trial. The case of *Sidya*

REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*8. REVIVAL OF COMPLAINT AND RE-TRIAL—*concl'd.*

*bin Satya* (Unreported), differed from. *In the matter of the petition of MOHESH MISTREE*

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 282: 25 W. R. Cr. 30, 67

6. ——— Sentence almost undergone—*Ground for not ordering re-trial.* Where a rule was issued to show cause why the conviction should not be set aside and a re-trial ordered, and it appeared that the accused had already suffered the whole imprisonment, less one day, the Court in setting aside the conviction did not direct a re-trial. *ABDUL BISWAS v. KHATER MONDAL*

3 C. W. N. 332

## 9. JUDGMENTS, DEFECTS IN.

1. ——— Judgment without giving reasons—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 421—Appeal, summary rejection of—Judgment of Criminal Appellate Court.* The powers conferred by s. 421 of the Criminal Procedure Code should be exercised sparingly and with great caution, and reasons, however concise, should be given for rejecting an appeal under that section. Where a Sessions Judge rejected an appeal summarily under s. 421 by an order consisting merely of the words "Appeal rejected" and an application for revision of such order was made to the High Court after great delay:—*Held*, that the Judge was wrong in rejecting the appeal without assigning any reasons for so doing, and if it had been taken within a reasonable time it would have been a valid objection. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAM NARAIN* . . . I. L. R. 8 Ail. 514

2. ——— Judgment not containing substance of evidence relied on—*Omission, to comply with s. 228, Criminal Procedure Code—Irregularity in proceedings—Error or defect.* K was tried by a Magistrate in a summary way and convicted. He appealed to the Court of Session, which quashed his conviction, on the ground merely that the substance of the evidence on which the conviction was had was not embodied in the Magistrate's judgment. *Held*, that the Court of Session should not have quashed the conviction merely by reason of such defect, but, if it found it impossible to dispose of the appeal because of such defect, it should have required the Magistrate to repair the same by recording a judgment in which the substance of the evidence should be fully embodied, and, if necessary, re-examining the witnesses for that purpose, or to have ordered a re-trial with that view. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. KARAN SINGH*

I. L. R. 1 All. 680

3. ——— Judgments not giving the best reasons for conviction. Where the record contains ample evidence of the guilt of the accused, the conviction ought not to be set aside merely on account of the weakness of the reasons assigned for it. *QUEEN v. PEARI RAUR* . . . 8 W. R. Cr. 40

4. ——— Omission to record reasons for conviction—*Omission to take notes of evidence in non-appellable case—Criminal Procedure*



REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*9. JUDGMENTS, DEFECTS IN—*concl'd.*

*Code, 1882, ss. 370, 537.* In a case where the accused was convicted of theft and sentenced to six months' rigorous imprisonment the notes of the evidence taken by the Magistrate did not afford sufficient materials upon which the prisoner could be legally convicted, and the Magistrate had omitted to record his reasons for the conviction under s. 370 cl. (i), of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *Held*, by the High Court as a Court of revision, that the conviction and sentence must be set aside, notwithstanding the provisions of s. 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *In the matter of the petition of YACOOB.* YACOOB v. ADAMSON

I. L. R. 13 Calc. 272

See SENTENCE—Power of High Court  
AS TO SENTENCES.

## 10. SENTENCES.

1. ——— Case in which sentence has expired—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 439*—*High Court's powers of revision*—*Revision of case in which term of imprisonment has been served.* The High Court is competent, in the exercise of its powers of revision under s. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code, to interfere with a conviction, even though, in consequence of the expiry of the sentence it may not be possible to interfere with the latter. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SINHA* . I. L. R. 7 All. 135

2. ——— Enhancement of sentence on appeal—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 423, 439.* A head constable was convicted under s. 330 of the Penal Code, and at a trial before a Sessions Judge sentenced to four months' simple imprisonment. The prisoner appealed. The High Court, in dismissing the appeal, directed, as a Court of revision, that the sentence passed should be enhanced. *METHER ALI v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 11 Calc. 530

See *QUEEN v. GORACHAND GOPE*

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 443

3. ——— Enhancement of sentence so as to alter its nature—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 439.* The High Court, in the exercise of its powers of revision, can enhance a sentence so as to alter its nature. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAM KURIA* . I. L. R. 6 All. 622

4. ——— Setting aside conviction and sentence, and directing trial on graver offence—*Power of High Court*—*Conviction of lesser offence by Court having no jurisdiction to convict of a graver one.* When the evidence, upon which a prisoner is convicted by a subordinate tribunal of an offence within its jurisdiction, discloses an offence of a graver character beyond the jurisdiction of that tribunal, the High Court may quash the conviction and sentence for the minor offence, and direct a trial before the tribunal having jurisdiction for the graver offence. Whether it will do so or not, is a question not of law, but of expediency on the facts of each particular case. *ANONYMOUS*

7 Mad. Ap. 5

REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*10. SENTENCES—*contd.*

5. ——— Ground for enhancing sentence—*Sentence clearly inadequate*—*Charge improperly framed.* In a case in which the Magistrate referred the proceedings to the High Court with a recommendation that they should be set aside because the sentence was inadequate, it was *held* that it is not merely because circumstances occur to the Magistrate which would render necessary a more severe sentence or a different charge that the High Court should interfere. There must be matter on the record of the case showing that a charge has been improperly framed, or that the sentence passed is clearly inadequate to the offence. *QUEEN v. HARNATH SINGH* . 20 W. R. Cr. 22

6. ——— Ground for refusing to enhance sentence—*Reference by Commissioner having jurisdiction*—*Inadequate sentence.* The High Court refused to interfere on a reference made to it by a Deputy Commissioner in a case which was sent up for heavier punishment to the Deputy Commissioner under s. 46, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1861, by a Magistrate of the 2nd class, as the Court was of opinion that the Deputy Commissioner, instead of referring the case, ought, under that section, to have tried the prisoners himself, and convicted them of any offence which he thought was made out against them by the evidence. *SOBIL DASS v. CHUNDRA DEB* . 20 W. R. Cr. 15

7. ——— Setting aside improper sentence—*Escape from illegal confinement.* Where a party was sentenced by order of the Magistrate to ten months' imprisonment for escaping from a confinement which he was undergoing without warrant of law and without having committed an offence, the High Court, in the exercise of its powers of interference, set aside the order. *QUEEN v. RUGHOOBUR SINGH* . 25 W. R. Cr. 1

8. ——— Severity of sentence—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 404.* The severity of a sentence is not of itself a ground on which the High Court should call for the record of a trial or other judicial proceeding under the general power of revision. *QUEEN v. NARAPUREDDY.* 4 Mad. 242

See *In the matter of KRISHNANAND BHUTTA-CHARJEE* . 3 B. L. R. A. Cr. 50

S.C. *In the matter of KISHEN SUNDUR BHUT-TACHARJEE* . 12 W. R. Cr. 47

9. ——— Necessity for alteration of conviction from one section of Penal Code to another—*Reference to High Court.* The necessity for altering a conviction from one section to another for cognate offences, when the accused has not been prejudiced by any such error, is no sufficient ground for a reference to the Court of revision. *EMPRESS v. ISHAN CHUNDRA DE*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 847: 12 C. L. R. 451

10. ——— Conviction under repealed law—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 426.* Where a Magistrate convicted under certain repealed sections of law the High Court refused to set aside the conviction, having regard to s. 426, Code of Cri-



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riminal Procedure, as the conviction and sentence might have been passed under sections of the Penal Code and no substantial injury had been done to the accused. *RUGHOOONATH DASS v. CHUCKERDHUN RAUT* . . . . . 15 W. R. Cr. 49

11. ——— Conviction under Penal Code of offence committed before Penal Code came into operation—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 426—Act XVII of 1862, s. 4*. In a case in which the accused was charged under the Penal Code with an offence which was committed before the Penal Code came into operation it was held that, having regard to s. 4, Act XVII of 1862, and s. 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the error of procedure was not sufficient to vitiate the conviction so long as the punishment awarded as under the Penal Code did not exceed that which was a legal penalty for the offence before the Penal Code became law. *In the matter of the petition of MOHA-BEER SINGH* . . . . . 15 W. R. Cr. 48

12. ——— Conviction for separate offences—*Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 380, 456, 457—New trial*. The prisoner was convicted by the Magistrate of two separate offences under ss. 456 and 380 of the Penal Code, and sentenced for both. On appeal, the Sessions Judge, holding that the offence proved was under s. 457, ordered a new trial for offences under ss. 457 and 380. *Held*, that there ought not to be a new trial, but that the conviction and sentence under s. 380 should be set aside. *QUEEN v. RAMCHARAN KAIRI*

B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 488 : 6 W. R. Cr. 39

13. ——— Sentence for different offence than that committed—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 426*. On reference by a Sessions Judge in reviewing the monthly magisterial returns, where the conviction by the Magistrate was for cheating by personation and the offence appeared to the High Court to be furnishing false information for which the punishment awarded was legal :—*Held*, that the Court, under s. 426 of the Criminal Procedure Code, ought not to interfere with the conviction or sentence. *REG. v. RAGHOJI BIN KANOJI*

3 Bom. Cr. 42

*REG. v. BABAJI BIN BHAU* . . . . . 4 Bom. Cr. 16

14. ——— Conviction without jurisdiction—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, ss. 426, 434—Revision by High Court*. In a case referred by a District Magistrate under s. 434 of the Criminal Procedure Code, on the ground that the sentence was illegal, because the charge should have been under s. 324 of the Penal Code, for causing hurt by means of a heated substance, an offence which the 2nd class Subordinate Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try, and not under s. 323, for causing hurt, of which offence the accused had been convicted, the Court passed no order, as it did not think it right, under the circumstances of the case, to direct the re-trial of the accused on the proper charge. *REG. v. AMBA KOM GIRSOJI* . . . . . 4 Bom. Cr. 1

REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*10. SENTENCES—*contd.*

15. ——— *Offence not cognizable by Magistrate convicting*. In a case referred by a District Magistrate under s. 427 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, on the ground that the charge should have been under s. 324 of the Penal Code—an offence not within the cognizance of a 2nd class Subordinate Magistrate, and not under s. 323—the Court passed no order, and remarked that the case should not have been referred under s. 427, which applies only to the Court of Session acting on appeal from a Court subordinate to it. *REG. v. NAVAJI VALAD VITHOJI* . . . . . 4 Bom. Cr. 2

16. ——— Trial on wrong charge—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 404*. Where a person scourged another with nettles in order to extract property from the sufferer, and the Magistrate tried the case as one of hurt (under s. 323, Penal Code) and extortion (s. 384), although the accused ought to have been charged under s. 327, and tried by the Court of Session, the High Court declined to interfere under s. 404, Code of Criminal Procedure, and direct a new trial, believing that substantial justice had been done in the case. *In the matter of the petition of TARINEE PROSAUD BANERJEE*

18 W. R. Cr. 8

*In the matter of the petition of BUNKABEHAREE SEIN* . . . . . 18 W. R. Cr. 23

*In the matter of ROOPNARAIN DUTT*

18 W. R. Cr. 38

17. ——— Trial under wrong charge—*Conviction of non-cognizable offence*. In a case referred by a District Magistrate, on the ground that the accused had been convicted, under s. 403 of the Penal Code, of dishonest misappropriation of property, whereas the charge should have been, under s. 406, of criminal breach of trust an offence not within the cognizance of the 2nd class Subordinate Magistrate who passed the sentence, the Court annulled the conviction and sentence, and directed the case to be tried before a proper Court. *REG. v. GANU VALAD RAMCHANDRA* 4 Bom. Cr. 3

18. ——— Erroneous conviction under wrong section of Penal Code. Where a Magistrate, erroneously holding that the offence committed was one under s. 406, Penal Code, over which he has jurisdiction, instead of under s. 409, which was cognizable only by the Court of Session, tried and sentenced the accused, it was held by the High Court as a Court of revision that his proceedings were contrary to law, and he was directed to commit the case for trial by the Court of Session. *In the matter of RAM SOONDER PODDER* . . . . . 2 C. L. R. 515

19. ——— Sentence under special Act instead of Penal Code—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 297—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 426—Sentence under Post Office Act (XIV of 1866)*. The accused, being entrusted to put a proper amount of stamps on a letter and return such as might not be required, did not return them, but misappropriated stamps to the value of two annas, and was convicted and punished under s. 49 of the

15 x 2



REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*10. SENTENCES—*concl'd.*

Post Office Act (XIV of 1866), instead of under the Penal Code for criminal breach of trust. As the accused had not been sentenced to a larger amount of punishment than could have been awarded for criminal breach of trust, nor shown to have been prejudiced by the error of convicting him under the Post Office Act, the High Court refused to reverse or alter the sentence, pointing out at the same time that this was one of those cases in which it was a mistake to look at the smallness of the amount misappropriated rather than to the gravity of the offence. *In the matter of NOBIN CHUNDER DUTT* 17 W. R. Cr. 50

See *In the matter of the petition of TARINEE PROSAUD BANERJEE* . . . 18 W. R. Cr. 8

## 11. VERDICT OF JURY AND MISDIRECTION.

1. ———— Ground for interference with verdict—*Power of High Court—Verdict of jury not manifestly erroneous.* The Court will not interfere with the finding of a jury unless their verdict is shown to be manifestly erroneous. A prisoner was charged under ss. 302 and 304 of the Penal Code, and the Judge at the trial added a further charge under s. 325. The Judge in his charge to the jury directed them that in the event of their finding the charges under ss. 302 and 304 unsustainable, they might find the prisoner guilty under s. 325. The jury unanimously acquitted the prisoner under the charge framed under s. 302, and a majority of them acquitted him under the charge framed under s. 304; but a majority of them found him guilty under the charge framed under s. 325. The Judge disagreed with their finding as regarded the charge framed under s. 304, and referred the case to the High Court under s. 307 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The High Court refused to interfere with the verdict, on ground that the verdict could not be said to be manifestly erroneous, the Judge having heard the evidence and having expressed his opinion to the jury that they might find the prisoner guilty under s. 325. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. JACQUIET* . . . I. L. R. 11 Cal. 85

2. ———— Conviction on evidence not amounting to proof. A jury may be satisfied with a minimum of proof, and it is beyond the power of the High Court in such cases to interfere with its verdict; but when there is nothing which can, if believed, amount to proof, the case should not be put to the jury at all, as a verdict of guilty cannot under such circumstances be sustained. Under such circumstances, the Court will set a conviction aside. *QUEEN v. RUTTON DASS* 16 W. R. Cr. 19

3. ———— Finding of jury as to grave and sudden provocation—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 297—Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 426—Question of fact—Power of High Court.* Under excep. 1, s. 300 of the Penal Code, the finding of a jury as to whether the offence of murder was committed under grave and sudden

REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*11. VERDICT OF JURY AND MISDIRECTION—*contd.*

provocation sufficient to prevent the offence from amounting to murder, is a question of fact with which the High Court cannot interfere. *QUEEN v. SOHRAIE* . . . 13 W. R. Cr. 33

4. ———— Omission to charge jury properly—*Power of High Court to set aside verdict.* Omission to sum up properly to the jury is, if the prisoner is thereby prejudiced, an error in law such as to justify a Court of appeal in setting aside the verdict. *REG. v. FATTECHAND VASTACHAND* . . . 5 Bom. Cr. 86

5. ———— Misdirection—*Trial by jury—Power to go into facts of case—Mode of dealing with directions of Judge to jury.* In a case tried by jury the High Court has no power to go into the facts of the case in order to see whether or not the conviction was right, that standing entirely upon the verdict of the jury. The Court has only to consider the facts in order to see whether the Judge has done his duty in laying the case before the jury for their consideration. The mode of dealing by the High Court with the Judge's summing up to the jury pointed out, first as regards the law and then as regards the facts. *QUEEN v. NIMCHAND MOOKERJEE* . . . 20 W. R. Cr. 41

6. ———— Error in law—*Prejudice to accused—New trial.* Improper advice given by the Judge to the jury upon a question of fact, or the omission of the Judge to give that advice which a Judge in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion ought to give the jury upon questions of fact, amounts to such an error in law in summing up as to justify the High Court on appeal or revision in setting aside a verdict of guilty. The power of setting aside convictions and ordering new trials for any error or defect in the summing up will be exercised by the High Court only when the Court is satisfied that the accused person has been prejudiced by the error or defect, or that a failure of justice has been occasioned thereby. *QUEEN v. ELAHI BAX* . B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 459: 5 W. R. Cr. 80

7. ———— Omission to leave material facts to jury. The verdict of the jury was reversed on the ground of misdirection by the Judicial Commissioner in not having left the cause of death and the prisoner's connection with certain attempts at bribery as questions for the consideration of the jury. *QUEEN v. KALI CHURN GANGOOLY* 7 W. R. Cr. 2

8. ———— Prejudice to prisoner from erroneous summing up. Where there is a failure of justice, or where the prisoner has been prejudiced by the defective summing up of the Judge, the High Court can interfere either by discharging the prisoner, if the evidence on the record is not sufficient to convict him, supposing the trial to have taken place with the aid of assessors, or to direct a fresh trial. *QUEEN v. MUTHOORA SINGH* . . . 18 W. R. Cr. 66



REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*11. VERDICT OF JURY AND MISDIRECTION—*concl'd.*

9. ————— Sessions Judge, opinion of —Criminal Procedure Code, s. 307—High Court, power of. In the exercise of its powers under s. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court will form and act upon its own view of what the evidence in its judgment proves; but in doing so the opinion of the Sessions Judge, no less than verdict of the jury, is entitled to its proper weight. *Reg. v. Khanderav Bajirav*, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 10; *Queen v. Mukhan Kumar*, 1 C. L. R. 275; *Empress v. Dhunum Kaze*, I. L. R. 9 Calc. 53; *Queen-Empress v. Mania Dayal*, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 497; *Queen v. Ram Churn Ghose*, 20 W. R. Cr. 33; *Queen v. Sham Bagdi*, 13 B. L. R. Ap. 19; 20 W. R. Cr. 73; *Queen v. Huro Manjhee*, 14 B. L. R. Ap. 2; 21 W. R. Cr. 4; *Queen v. Wuzir Mundal*, 25 W. R. Cr. 25; *Queen v. Nobin Chunder Banerjee*, 13 B. L. R. Ap. 20; 20 W. R. Cr. 70, referred to. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. ITWARI SAHO*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 269

10. ————— Verdict, partial record of—Trial by jury—Procedure—Delivery of verdict—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 300, 1, 303—Prejudice—New trial. Where, after the delivery of an unanimous verdict of the jury, convicting the accused of the charge of rioting in connection with certain land and the crops thereon, possession of which was claimed by the complainant as well as by the accused, the foreman of the jury attempted to add that "the land and the crops are all theirs" (meaning that they belonged to the accused), but was stopped by the Sessions Judge on the ground that the verdict was quite clear in its terms, and it was therefore unnecessary to hear anything further from them: *Held*, that it was undesirable to stop the jury at such a stage of the proceedings; that the words the foreman attempted to add to the verdict were very material; and that, the accused having been seriously prejudiced by the procedure adopted by the Sessions Judge, there should be a new trial. *NARAYAN CHANGA v. EMPEROR* (1902)

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 485

## 12. MISCELLANEOUS CASES.

1. ————— Order by Collector under Penal Code—Power of revision by High Court. A Collector as such not being subject to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court in criminal matters, that Court, in the exercise of such jurisdiction, is not competent to deal with an alleged illegal order made under the Penal Code by a Collector. *In the matter of DIANUT HOSEN*. 10 C. L. R. 14

2. ————— Order made under s. 58 of the Forests Act (VII of 1878) for confiscation—Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, s. 297. The High Court was competent, under s. 297 of Act X of 1872, to revise an order made by a District Judge under s. 58 of the Forests Act, 1878, on appeal from the order of a Magistrate made under s. 54 of that Act, the jurisdiction of the High Court under s. 297

REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*12. MISCELLANEOUS CASES—*contd.*

of Act X of 1872 not being expressly taken away by s. 58 of the Forests Act, 1878. *EMPRESS v. NATHU KHAN* . . . . . I. L. R. 4 All. 417

3. ————— Valid conviction in case improperly instituted—Reference to Local Government. *Per MACLEAN, J.*—The High Court has power, without reference to the Local Government, to set aside a conviction in a case improperly originated. *In the matter of the petition of NOBIN CHUNDRAN BANIKYA*. *EMPRESS v. NOBIN CHUNDRAN BANIKYA* . . . . . I. L. R. 8 Calc. 580

S.C. NOBIN CHUNDER BANIKYA v. EMPRESS

10 C. L. R. 369

4. ————— Acting without proper discretion—Order for prosecution. That a Magistrate has acted without proper discretion in ordering a prosecution is no ground for reversing his order. *EMAM ALI v. SUDDERUDEEN* . 9 W. R. Cr. 18

5. ————— Order in bona fide exercise of discretion—Conviction under Municipal Act (III of 1864). The Court declined to quash proceedings held under a bona fide exercise of discretion in a case where a fine was imposed under Bengal Act III of 1864, s. 68, for keeping a piggery in a filthy state. *In the matter of AMAN CHINAMAN*

17 W. R. Cr. 58

6. ————— Order passed by Magistrate without jurisdiction. The High Court may interfere with and quash an order passed by a Magistrate when the order is one that was beyond the power and out of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to make. *LALOO v. ADAM SIRCAR. GOVERNMENT v. SURJAKANT ACHARJIA. DENGGO SHAIKH v. ADAM SIRCAR* . . . . . 17 W. R. Cr. 37

EMPRESS OF INDIA v. BERRILL

I. L. R. 4 All. 141

7. ————— The Deputy Magistrate adjourned the case to the 21st, on which day he ordered the case to be dismissed for non-attendance of the complainant; but on the following day cancelled the order, and revived the case on the ground of his having dismissed it by mistake in ignorance of the complainant having petitioned for an adjournment by reason of sickness. The Magistrate on appeal reversed the order of the Deputy Magistrate. As the order of the Deputy Magistrate was manifestly wrong, the High Court set aside the whole of the proceedings, and restored the case to the position in which it stood before the 21st. *QUEEN v. RAM NARAIN GHOSE* . 8 W. R. Cr. 5

8. ————— Magistrate acting under section of Code under which he has no jurisdiction. *Held*, that where a Magistrate professes to act under one section of the Criminal Procedure Code under which he has no jurisdiction, but it is found that he has jurisdiction under some other section of the Code, the mistake is one which does not justify interference with the Magistrate's order, if otherwise good, and if the accused has not been prejudiced thereby. *QUEEN v. FRANKISTO PAL*

14 W. R. Cr. 41



REVISION—CRIMINAL CASES—*contd.*12. MISCELLANEOUS CASES—*contd.*

9. ——— Order passed under s. 146 on proceedings taken under s. 145, Criminal Procedure Code—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 145—Power of Court on revision—Evidence on revision.* Where a Magistrate has passed an order under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, whereas the proper order in the case should have been one under s. 146, the High Court on revision will make the order which the lower Court ought to have made. Case in which the High Court on revision entered into the whole of the evidence in the case. *Raja Baboo v. Muddun Mohun Lall, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 169*, explained. *REID v. RICHARDSON . . . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 361*

10. ——— Unreasonable order for security to keep the peace—*Power of revision of High Court—Material error.* In a case of apprehended breach of the peace, the Magistrate bound over the parties in sums of money aggregating on the whole to Rs. 60,000 or upwards. The High Court quashed the order, holding that it was altogether unreasonable. *In the matter of JUGGUT CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY . . . I. L. R. 2 Calc. 110*

11. ——— Alteration of conviction—*Setting aside proceedings—Trial by jury where case was not so triable.* The High Court will not alter a conviction by a Sessions Court, aided by a jury, on a charge only triable by a jury, to one of a nature not triable by such a tribunal, but will annul the proceedings, and leave the prosecution to take fresh proceedings against the prisoner on any other charge it may be advised. *REG. v. NARO GOPAL . . . 5 Bom. Cr. 56*

12. ——— Conviction in case where no appeal is given by Act on point of repeal—*New Act giving appeal—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 408 and 439—Jurisdiction of High Court.* On the 9th December 1882 a person was convicted under ss. 457 and 109 of the Penal Code, and sentenced to three years' rigorous imprisonment by a Deputy Magistrate in Assam, exercising special powers under s. 36 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1872). The new Code came into force on the 1st January 1883. The prisoner presented an appeal to the High Court from the conviction and sentence abovementioned on the 23rd January 1883. *Held*, that there was no appeal, the case being governed by s. 408 of the new Code, but that the case was a fit one for the exercise of the High Court's revisional jurisdiction, and should be dealt with under the powers conferred on the High Court by virtue of that jurisdiction. *RONGAI v. EMPRESS . . . I. L. R. 9 Calc. 513*

s.c. *In the matter of RANGAI . 12 C. L. R. 500*

13. ——— Defect in form of summons to persons to show cause why they should not give security for keeping the peace—*Defect not prejudicing persons required to show cause.* Certain persons were convicted by a Magistrate of the 1st class of assault, an offence punishable under s. 352 of Act X of 1877. The case was

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brought to the knowledge of the High Court by the complainant preferring a petition to it, together with a copy of the Magistrate's order. This petition was laid before STRAIGHT, J., who, observing that the case was one in which the Magistrate should have taken security from such persons for keeping the peace, as provided by s. 489 of Act X of 1872, directed the Magistrate to summon such persons to show cause why they should not be required, under s. 491 of that Act, to enter into a bond to keep the peace. The Magistrate accordingly summoned such persons as directed, the summonses setting forth that they were issued "under the orders of the High Court." The Magistrate took evidence on behalf of such persons and eventually made an order requiring such persons to enter into a bond to keep the peace. Such persons were fully aware of the order made by STRAIGHT, J. Such persons applied to the High Court to set aside the order requiring them to enter into a bond to keep the peace, on the ground that the Magistrate had not proceeded of his own motion, but under the order of STRAIGHT, J., which was made without jurisdiction; and on the ground that the summonses had not set forth the report or information on which they were issued. *Held*, by STUART, C.J., that, inasmuch as STRAIGHT, J., when he made his order, represented the full authority and jurisdiction of the High Court, such order was final and the application could not be entertained. *Held*, by PEARSON, J., SPANKIE, J., and OLDFIELD, J. (SPANKIE, J., doubting whether such order could be questioned), that the order of STRAIGHT, J., was one which he was competent to make as a Court of revision under s. 297 of Act X of 1872. *Held*, by PEARSON, J., and SPANKIE, J., that, inasmuch as such persons had not been in the slightest degree prejudiced by the defect in the summonses which were issued to them, such defect was not a ground on which to set aside the Magistrate's order requiring them to enter into a bond to keep the peace. *EMPRESS v. MUHAMMAD JAFIR . . . I. L. R. 3 All. 545.*

14. ——— Order confirming order for security for good behaviour—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, ss. 404, 408.* An order of a Sessions Judge confirming an order directing security for good behaviour made by the Magistrate was *held* to be open to revision. *In re JUSWUNT SINGH . 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 301: 6 W. R. Cr. 18*

Also an order for maintenance. *REG. v. THAKUR BIN IRA . . . 5 Bom. Cr. 81*

15. ——— Order rejecting appeal without calling for record and proceedings—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1872, ss. 278, 285—Order under s. 278.* An order under s. 278 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Appellate Court, rejecting an appeal on a perusal of the petition of appeal and the copy of the judgment or order appealed against, and without calling for the record and proceedings of the case is a final order falling within the scope of s. 285, and is not subject to revision. *EMPRESS v. MAHOMED YASHIN . . . I. L. R. 4 Bom. 101.*



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16. — Jurisdiction of High Court in revision to quash orders under s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 195, 423, 439, 476.* The High Court is competent, in the exercise of its revisional powers, to interfere with an order of a subordinate Court, whether made under s. 195 or under s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code, directing the prosecution of any person for offences referred to in those sections. The High Court under s. 439 has the powers conferred on a Court of appeal by s. 523 to alter or reverse any such order. *In the matter of the petition of KHEPU NATH SIKDAR. KHEPU NATH SIKDAR v. GRISH CHUNDER MUKERJI* I. L. R. 16 Calc. 730

17. — Order directing prosecution—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 195, 439, and 476.* Under the general revisional powers conferred by s. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a High Court has power to consider the propriety of an order which purports to be passed under s. 476 of the Code. *Queen-Empress v. Rachappa, 1. L. R. 13 Bom. 109*, dissented from. *In the matter of the petition of MATHURA DAS* I. L. R. 16 All. 80

18. — Jurisdiction of High Court to quash orders under s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code—*Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 195, 476—Sanction to prosecution—Preliminary inquiry.* The High Court has jurisdiction to interpose in the case of an order made by a Court under s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and has also the power to determine whether the discretion given by that section has or has not been properly exercised. *In the matter of the petition of Khepu Nath Sikdar v. Girish Chunder Mukerjee, 1. L. R. 16 Calc. 730*, relied on. *CHAUDHARI MAHOMED IZHARUL HUQ v. QUEEN-EMPRESS* I. L. R. 20 Calc. 349

19. — Power of High Court in revision to revoke an order of a subordinate Court under ss. 195, 476, Code of Criminal Procedure—*Order sanctioning prosecution—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 439.* A High Court, as a Court of revision, has power under s. 439 to revoke an order made by a subordinate Court under s. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SRINIVASALU NAIDU* I. L. R. 21 Mad. 124

20. — Power of High Court to revise an order as to sanction under s. 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 197 and s. 439—Charter Act (24 & 25 Vict., c. 104), s. 15.* A pleader applied to the Chief Presidency Magistrate for sanction under s. 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code to prosecute an Honorary Magistrate for using insulting and defamatory language towards him in the course of the trial of a case and sanction was refused. On application to the High Court:—*Held*, under the revisional powers conferred by the Cri-

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minal Procedure Code, that the High Court has no authority to interfere with an order made by a subordinate Court granting or refusing sanction under s. 197 of the Code, but it has sufficient authority for that purpose under s. 15 of the Charter Act (24 & 25 Vict., c. 104). *NANDO LAL BASAK v. MITTER* . . . . . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 869  
3 C. W. N. 539

21. — Order under s. 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 435—Disputed possession of temple—Magistrate, jurisdiction of.* The District Temple Committee dismissed the trustees of a certain temple and appointed others. The dismissed trustees retained possession. A breach of the peace having become imminent in the opinion of a Deputy Magistrate, he made an order under the Criminal Procedure Code, s. 144, directing the newly appointed trustees not to interfere with the temple or its management. *Held*, that the Magistrate had jurisdiction to make the order, and therefore the High Court had no power to interfere in revision under the Criminal Procedure Code, s. 435. *PALANIAPPA CHETTI v. DORASAMI AYYAR* I. L. R. 18 Mad. 402

22. — High Court's criminal revisional jurisdiction—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 144, 145, 435, and 439—Dispute about right to perform service in a public temple.* The High Court ordinarily has no jurisdiction to interfere with an order under Ch. XII of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), which is not a proceeding within the meaning of s. 435 of the Code; but when the Magistrate exceeds his jurisdiction under s. 144 or 145, the High Court has power to interfere under its revisional jurisdiction (s. 439). *In re PANDURANG GOVIND* I. L. R. 24 Bom. 527

23. — Power to revise Presidency Magistrate's proceedings—*Order for further inquiry—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 423, 435, and 439—Letters Patent, High Court, 1865, cl. 28.* The High Court has, under ss. 435 and 439, read with s. 423 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the power to revise the proceedings of a Presidency Magistrate and order a further inquiry to be made. It has the same power under cl. 28 of the Letters Patent of 1865. *COLVILLE v. KRISTO KISHORE BOSE* . . . . . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 746  
3 C. W. N. 598

24. — High Court's power of revision—*Presidency Magistrate, proceedings of—Order for further inquiry—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 423, 435, 439—Charter Act (24 & 25 Vict., c. 104), s. 15—Letters Patent, High Court, 1865, cl. 28.* The High Court has powers of revision in respect of an order of discharge passed by a Presidency Magistrate by reason not of s. 28 of the Letters Patent, 1865, but of s. 15 of the Charter Act (24 & 25 Vict., c. 104). That section has always been interpreted in a very extended meaning so as to give ample powers of superinten-



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dence, that is to say, powers of revision over proceedings of subordinate Courts. But the High Court has no power under the Code of Criminal Procedure to interfere in revision with an order of dismissal or discharge passed by a Presidency Magistrate. *Colville v. Kristo Kishore Bose*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 746, dissented from. *Opoorba Kumar Sett v. Probod Kumary Dass*, 1 C. W. N. 49, referred to. A Presidency Magistrate acting under s. 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code dismissed a complaint on the report of the police without examining the complainant and without finding on such examination that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding. The High Court, acting under s. 15 of the Charter Act, ordered a further inquiry to be made into the matter of the complaint. *CHAROBALA DABEE v. BARENDRA NATH MOZUMDAR*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 6

*CHAROBALA DABEE v. EMPRESS*

3 C. W. N. 601

25. ——— Act XIII of 1859, ss. 2 and 3—*Breach of contract by workmen—Procedure—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), s. 370.* In the trial of a case under the Workman's Breach of Contract Act (XIII of 1859) a Presidency Magistrate is not bound to frame his record in accordance with the provisions of s. 370 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is doubtful whether a proceeding under the first clause of s. 2 and under s. 3 of Act XIII of 1859 is a criminal proceeding. There is no offence committed, and there is no accused. The provisions of s. 370 of the Criminal Procedure Code are therefore inapplicable to a case of this nature, and the High Court will not interfere in revision with the Presidency Magistrate's proceedings, on the ground that he has not followed the provisions of that section. *AVERAM DAS MOCHI v. ABDUL RAHIM* . . . . . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 131

4 C. W. N. 201

26. ——— Contempt of Court—*Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 439, 476—Power of High Court to revise an order under s. 476—Circumstances under which such power should or should not be exercised.* The High Court has power, in revision, to set aside an order passed by a Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court under s. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; but such power should not be exercised where the Court below has arrived at a judicial opinion on evidence that there is ground for inquiring into an offence referred to in s. 195, merely because the High Court disagrees with that opinion. *In the matter of the petition of ALAMDAR HUSAIN* (1901) . . . . . I. L. R. 23 All. 249

27. ——— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 439, 476—Jurisdiction of High Court to interfere when a Court has taken action under s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code.* Where a Court has taken action under s. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the High Court, as a Court of Revision, has no power to interfere under s. 439. The reasons for the decision in *Queen-Empress v. Srinivasulu Naidu*, I. L. R. 21 Mad.

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124, are not applicable to the amended Code *ERANHOLI ATHAN v. KING-EMPEROR* (F.B. 1902)

I. L. R. 26 Mad. 98

28. ——— Dispute as to possession of immovable property—*Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 145 (5) and 435 (3)—Order of Magistrate on dispute as to possession of immovable property—Jurisdiction of High Court.* The order to which finality is given under ss. 145 (5) and 435 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be an order which not only purports to be, but is in reality, an order under s. 145, and has been passed with jurisdiction. Where the Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in making the order, it is null and void, and the High Court, in the exercise of its revisional powers, is competent to interfere with it. *Hur-bullubh Narain Singh v. Luchmeswar Prosad Singh*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 188; *In re Pandurang Govind*, I. L. R. 24 Bom. 527; and *Agra Bank v. Leishman*, I. L. R. 18 Mad. 41, referred to. Where a Magistrate, under circumstances which would apparently have justified his taking action under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, took action in fact under s. 107, and having passed an order seemingly under s. 118, added, as it were, as an appendix to this order:—"Bisu Ahir put in possession under s. 145, Code of Criminal Procedure"—it was held that this order passed without any of the procedure prescribed by s. 145 being adopted, was more than an irregularity, and was an order passed without jurisdiction, and liable to revision by the High Court. *Mohesh Sower v. Narain Bag*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 981, and *Sakor Dusadh v. Ram Purgash Singh*, 7 C. W. N. 174, referred to. *MAHADEO KUNWAR v. BISU* (1903)

I. L. R. 25 All. 537

29. ——— Notice to accused—*Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 435, 437—Petition by complainant for re-trial of accused after discharge—No notice to accused—Order by Sessions Judge, directing further inquiry—Revision petition to High Court—Jurisdiction—Necessity for notice before order passed to prejudice of accused.* A person charged with having committed criminal breach of trust was discharged, whereupon the complainant petitioned the Sessions Judge, under s. 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to direct a re-trial of the case. Notice of the application was not given to the accused. The Sessions Judge, acting under s. 347, ordered a further inquiry to be made. On a criminal revision petition being preferred by the accused in the High Court against that order:—*Held*, that it was competent to the High Court to revise the order; and that, without laying down a general rule that the omission to give notice of such an application renders an order under the section bad, the order must be set aside, as it had not been shown that in this case there was any difficulty in giving notice, or that there was any reason why the general rule should not be followed that an order should not be made to a man's prejudice without giving him an opportunity for being heard. *ALA-*



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GIRISAMY NAIDU *v.* BALAKRISHNASAMI MUDALIAR (1902) . . . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 41

**30.** ————— Sanction for prosecution—*Practice—Criminal Procedure Code, s. 195—Sanction to prosecute—Application for sanction refused by Magistrate—Independent application subsequently made to the Sessions Judge.* Certain persons, who had been discharged after a complaint against them of the offences of kidnapping and extortion, applied, to the Magistrate who had discharged them, for sanction to prosecute the complainants. This application was refused by the Magistrate. The applicants then, instead of appealing or applying in revision to the Sessions Judge against the order of the Magistrate, made a fresh and independent application to the Sessions Judge for sanction to prosecute the complainants. The Sessions Judge declined to entertain this application. On application under s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure being made to the High Court against both the orders above referred to, the High Court refused to interfere, on the ground that the applicants had not pursued their proper remedy in the Court below. *HARBANS RAI v. CHUNNI LAL* (1902) . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 126

**31.** ————— *Practice—Procedure—Sanction to prosecute—Stay of criminal proceedings pending disposal of civil suit—High Court—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 195, 439, 476.* The High Court is competent, in the exercise of its revisional power under s. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), to interfere with an order made by a subordinate Court, under s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), directing the prosecution of any person for the offences referred to in that section. The High Court in this case refused to stay criminal proceedings directed by a subordinate Court under s. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) until an appeal in the civil suit in connection with which the criminal charges were made had been decided. *In re BAL GANGADHAR TILAK* (1902) . . . I. L. R. 26 Bom. 785

**32.** ————— *Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 195, 435, 439—Jurisdiction of High Court, under Criminal Procedure Code, to revise order according sanction which has been granted by a Civil Court.* The High Court has no jurisdiction, under ss. 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to revise an order passed by any Court other than a Criminal Court under cl. (b) or (c) of sub-s. (1) of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, according sanction to institute a prosecution; or an order passed under sub-s. (6) of s. 195 revoking or refusing to revoke a sanction which has been given, or granting a sanction which has been refused. It may be open to the High Court, under s. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to revise such proceedings of a Civil Court, in cases which come within the terms of that section. *In re CHENNAAGAUD* (1902) . I. L. R. 26 Mad. 139

**REVIVAL.**

See REVIVOR.

———— of complaint—

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 203.  
13 C. W. N. 193

———— of criminal case—

See COMPLAINT—DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT—EFFECT OF DISMISSAL.

See DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED—REVIVAL OF PROCEEDINGS.

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—STRIKING OFF PROCEEDINGS . . . 6 C. W. N. 923

———— of suit—

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 371.  
9 C. W. N. 369

**REVIVOR.**

See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 180 . . . I. L. R. 30 Calc. 979  
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 551  
I. L. R. 22 Calc. 921  
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 244

See PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—REVIVOR OF APPEAL.

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 997  
L. R. 21 I. A. 163

———— of judgment—

See LIMITATION ACT, XV OF 1877, SCH. II, ART. 180 . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 543

———— substitution of parties as—

See PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—DEATH OF PARTY ON RECORD.  
I. L. R. 16 Calc. 184

**REVOCATION.**

See WILL . . . I. L. R. 29 All. 82

See WILL—REVOCATION.

———— of probate—

See ADMINISTRATOR.  
I. L. R. 35 Calc. 955 : 12 C. W. N. 802

See PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION ACT (V OF 1881), s. 50 . . 12 C. W. N. 6

See WILL—REVOCATION.

———— of sanction—

See SANCTION FOR PROSECUTION—REVOCATION OF SANCTION.

———— of Will—

See HINDU LAW—WILL—REVOCATION OF WILL.

**RIGHT OF APPEAL.**

See APPEAL—RIGHT OF APPEAL, EFFECT OF REPEAL ON.

See ASSIGNMENT OF CHOSE IN ACTION.



**RIGHT OF APPEAL—contd.**

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 3.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 825

See CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 244

—PARTIES TO SUIT . 2 C. L. R. 545

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—EXECUTION  
BY AND AGAINST REPRESENTATIVES.

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 371

See NAWAB NAZIM OF BENGAL DEBTS ACT.  
21 W. R. 59

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—APPEAL.

I. L. R. 3 Calc. 228

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 738

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 520

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, MOFUSSIL—  
JURISDICTION—MESNE PROFITS.

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 85

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—  
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 622.

I. L. R. 8 Mad. 192

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 445

— deprivation of—

See CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 18

1. ———— Appeal from favourable decision. There is nothing in strict law to prevent a party, acting for himself or through his guardian, from appealing against a decision in his favour. STEPHENSON *v.* UNNODA DOSSEE

6 W. R. Mis. 18

2. ———— Appeal by defendant from decision as dismissing suit on wrong ground—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 332, 334, 337*—*Decree—Decision*. Although s. 332 of Act VIII of 1859 provides that an appeal shall lie from the decrees of the Courts of original jurisdiction, ss. 334 and 337 show not less clearly that the decisions of the Court may be impugned in the appeal and considered by the Appellate Court. Where a suit was dismissed, therefore the defendant was held entitled to appeal from the decision, though the decree was in his favour, as he contended it had been dismissed on a wrong ground. SHEO GHOLAM SINGH *v.* NURSINGH

4 N. W. 120

(*Contra*) CHOWDHRY MAHOMED MOMIN *v.* LUTAFUT HOSSEIN

13 W. R. 239

(*Contra*) SHAMA SOONDUREE DEBIA *v.* DIGAMBUREE DEBIA

13 W. R. 1

3. ———— Change of jurisdiction during suit—*Munsif with powers of Small Cause Court*—*Effect of change on right of appeal—Bengal Civil Courts Act (VI of 1871), s. 29*. The investiture of a Munsif with the powers of a Small Cause Court under s. 29, Act VI of 1871, does not deprive parties to pending suits of any right of appeal which they might have had; the general rule being that the law as it existed when the action commenced must decide the rights of the parties, unless the legislative

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authority expresses a clear intention to vary those rights. GHOTAE MUNDLE *v.* KAJROO

16 W. R. 227

4. ———— Right of new relators to appeal. As to the terms on which new relators will be allowed to come in after decree to prosecute an appeal. ADVOCATE-GENERAL *v.* MUHAMMAD HUSEIN HUSENI

4 Bom. O. C. 203

5. ———— Appeal by party struck out of suit in lower Court. A person was once made a party to a suit, but the decree was set aside, the suit as against him dismissed, and the case remanded for trial. From this last decision he appealed. The Court ordered the appeal to be struck off as made by a party no longer a party to the suit. GOKOOL PERSHAD DISCHEET *v.* BROJO MONEE DEBIA

24 W. R. 259

6. ———— Appeal after intervenor had appealed and his name taken off record of suit—*Re-opening of case on remand*. A suit having been decided by the first Court after an intervenor had been made a party under s. 73, Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, it was remanded on the appeal of the intervenor, whose name was ordered to be expunged from the record. The suit was decided again in favour of the plaintiff, but the decision was reversed on appeal. Held, that the fact of the defendant having, in the first instance, allowed the intervenor alone to appeal, did not debar him, after the case was re-opened by remand, from appealing in his own person. BUCHA SINGH *v.* MASHOOK ALI BEG

15 W. R. 572

7. ———— Right of pro formâ defendant to appeal. A pro formâ defendant against whom no judgment has been given has no right to appeal, even if another party has been found to be the owner of land which he claims; for such finding carries with it no legal consequence as against him. RAM DOSS LUSHKUR *v.* HUREEHUR MOOKERJEE

23 W. R. 86

8. ———— Right of party opposing will in case of application for certificate under Act XXVII of 1860—*Party not opposing grant of certificate*. A widow having applied, under Act XXVII of 1860, for a certificate under her deceased husband's will, his brother came in not as a claimant of the certificate, and impugned the widow's allegation that the deceased husband had made a will. The Judge upon this went into the evidence, found in favour of the will, and granted the certificate applied for. Against this order the brother appealed to the High Court. Held, that the appellant had no *locus standi*, as the appeal contemplated in s. 6 was limited to persons in conflict with the original petitioner as claimants. RAM LALL MOOKERJEE *v.* KOMOLA KAMINEE DEBEE

24 W. R. 92

9. ———— Appeal brought by principal in suit where agents have sued. The plaintiffs, karindas of the appellant, having brought a suit in their own name, the suit was dismissed on the merits, and appeals preferred by the appellant



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in his own name to the Judge and to the High Court. *Held*, that the procedure was illegal, and the decrees of the lower Courts must be set aside. **FYAZ-OD-DEEN v. PUDMEE . 4 N. W. 68**

**10. ——— Right of appeal by heirs—**  
*Appeal against joint heirs—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 102—Continuance.* S. 102, Act VIII of 1859, does not bar the right of heirs to proceed with an appeal as against joint heirs. **LUTEFOONISSA BIBEE v. RAJAOR RUMMAN . 8 W. R. 84**

**11. ——— Want of interest in subject of appeal—***Appeal by sons of Hindu widow after finding adverse to her right.* Where a Hindu widow jointly with her sons sued for confirmation of title, and both the Courts below found adversely to her title to hold the land in dispute as separate property, it was *held* that her sons, who had no interest in the result of the suit, were not competent without her to prefer a special appeal. **DOORGA PERSHAD MOHAPATTUR v. RADHAMOHUN MYTEE . 15 W. R. 536**

**12. ——— Right of co-mortgagor to appeal—***Sale of equity of redemption.* One of several co-mortgagors cannot appeal against a foreclosure decree when the equity of redemption has been sold before the institution of the suit. **KOTALE UPPI v. KALLIYATT PANOLI KUNNI KUTTI . 1 Mad. 7**

**13. ——— Right of appeal as to costs—***Disclaimer of interest in subject-matter of suit.* The fact of a defendant having, in the Court of first instance, disclaimed any right or interest in the land in a suit does not deprive him of the right to appeal, if a judgment is given against him with costs. **NUND COOMAR SINGH v. GUNGA PERSHAD NARAIN SINGH . 10 W. R. 94**

**14. ——— Right of purchaser to appeal on death of assignor—***Assignment of interest in subject-matter of suit.* A sued B in the Court of first instance, and obtained a decree declaring A's right to a house. The District Court on appeal reversed this decree and rejected A's claim. The High Court reversed the decree of the District Court and remanded the appeal. The District Court on remand made a decree confirming the original decree of the Court of first instance in A's favour. Subsequently to the last-mentioned decree of the District Court, B sold the house to C. B then preferred a special appeal to the High Court, but died before it was heard. *Held*, under Act VIII of 1859, that C could not carry on the special appeal after B's death. **MORESHWAR BAPUJI PHATAK v. KUSHABA SHANKROJI . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 248**

**15. ——— Appeal from order prior to decree—***Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 363.* Objections having been successfully raised, under s. 246, Act VIII of 1859, against a decree-holder's attachment of a tenure as the property of his judgment-debtor, he brought a regular suit and obtained a declaratory decree that the property belonged to his debtor. He then took out execution, attached, sold, and himself purchased the property in question. The objector meantime appealed to the Privy Council, and, having obtained a decree reversing the

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declaratory decree, took out execution against the opposite party for costs and wasilat. The opposite party objected, but the Judge allowed the execution to proceed and deputed an Ameen to ascertain the amount of mesne profits collected. *Held*, that the Judge's order was not an order prior to decree within the meaning of s. 363 of the Code, and that the opposite party was entitled to appeal against the principal that he was liable without waiting the result of the Ameen's investigation. **GOPAL CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY v. OODOY LALL DEY . 12 W. R. 411**

**16. ——— Right of party to suit not of party to compromise to appeal from order made in execution of decree on compromise—***Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 224—Resistance to execution—Procedure.* In a suit for partition, a compromise was entered into by all the parties except S, and a decree obtained on the terms thereof. In execution S was dispossessed and presented a petition to the Court objecting that the decree was not binding on her. The petition was rejected. *Held*, that the objection raised by S ought to have been investigated under s. 245 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that S was entitled to appeal against the order rejecting the petition. **SANKARAVADIVAMMAL v. KUMARASAMYA . I. L. R. 8 Mad. 473**

**17. ——— Appeal from original decision after review granted illegally has been set aside.** Where a suit under the rent law was dismissed, and the Munsif granted a review of judgment on fresh evidence without satisfying himself that it had been out of plaintiff's power to produce such evidence at first:—*Held*, that the Munsif had acted illegally and without jurisdiction, and that the Subordinate Judge was right in reversing his judgment after the re-hearing, but that the decision did not prejudice plaintiff's liberty to appeal from the original decision. **BETIS v. BONSI MUNDUL . 25 W. R. 343**

**18. ——— Second appeal—***Rent suit—Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 102—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 153—General Clauses Act (I of 1868), s. 6.* The word "Proceedings" in s. 6 of Act I of 1868, as applied to a suit, means the suit as an entirety, that is, down to the final decree. A second appeal therefore to the High Court, on a question of the amount due as rent, will not lie when the suit was instituted previous to the passing of Act VIII of 1885, although the judgment in the suit was delivered, and the first appeal therefrom heard, subsequently to the passing of that Act. **Hurrosundari Debi v. Bhojohari Das Manji, I. L. R. 13 Calc. 86, approved. SATGHURI v. MUJIDAN . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 107**

**19. ——— Surety in execution proceedings.** A surety against whom a decree is sought to be enforced under s. 253 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882) has the right of appealing against an order made in the execution-proceedings. **SULEMAN v. SHIVRAM BHIKAJI . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 71**



**RIGHT OF APPEAL—contd.**

**20. ———— Death of one of several appellants pending appeal—Death of one of several respondents pending appeal—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 366, 368, 544, and 582.** Any plaintiff or defendant has a right to appeal without the concurrence of any of the parties to the suit. The mere fact of the death of one of several appellants cannot affect the right of the other appellants to proceed with the appeal if they choose to do so. One of several appellants (defendants) died after appeal filed, but before the hearing. An application to have the name of his heir entered on the record as an appellant was rejected as too late. One of the respondents (plaintiffs) also died pending the hearing of the appeal, and an application to enter the name of his heir as respondent was rejected for the same reason. When the appeal came on for hearing, it was dismissed as defective for want of parties. *Held*, that the proper course for the Appeal Court was to order that the appeal had abated so far as the deceased appellant (defendant) was concerned and to proceed with the hearing so far as the remaining appellants were concerned. *Held*, also, with reference to the death of the respondent (plaintiff), that the Appeal Court ought to have proceeded under the provisions of s. 368 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), and to have either declared that the appeal had abated as to him and proceeded against the rest of the respondents under s. 544 of the Civil Procedure Code, or else to have directed that the legal representatives of the deceased respondent should be placed upon the record. *CHANDARSANG VERSABHAI v. KHIMABHAI RAGHABHAI*. I. L. R. 22 Bom. 718

See *HEM KUNWAR v. AMBA PRASAD*  
I. L. R. 22 All. 430

**21. ———— Death of plaintiff-appellant—Rival applicants for substitution—Order under Civil Procedure Code, ss. 367, 582, substituting one of two applicants—No appeal from such order—Unsuccessful applicants attempting to appeal from final decree on appeal—Civil Procedure Code, s. 591—“Error, defect, or irregularity affecting the decision of the case.”** Pending an appeal before the lower Appellate Court, the plaintiff-appellant died, and two persons separately applied to be substituted as the deceased's representative. The Court, applying ss. 367 and 582 of the Civil Procedure Code, decided in favour of one of the applicants and brought him upon the record. No appeal was made against this order by the unsuccessful applicant. The lower Appellate Court decided the appeal adversely to the successful applicant. Subsequently the unsuccessful applicant established by a separate suit that she was the deceased's legal representative, and that her opponent was not. She attempted to appeal to the High Court against the lower Appellate Court's decree dismissing the appeal. *Held*, that the appellant, not having been a party to the decree below, and the order below having decided that she was not entitled to be a party to the proceedings of the lower Appellate Court, she was not entitled to maintain the appeal to the High Court, and s. 591 of the Civil Procedure

**RIGHT OF APPEAL—contd.**

Code was not applicable to the case. *Har Narain v. Kharag Singh*, I. L. R. 9 All. 447, distinguished. Where an order under the group of sections in the Civil Procedure Code relating to representatives has been made excluding a person from the record, that person must seek his remedy by an appeal against the order, and is not entitled to appeal against the decree so long as the order stands. Error, defect, or irregularity within the meaning of s. 591 of the Code means error, defect, or irregularity in procedure or in law, and not in matters of fact. In the present case there was no error, defect, or irregularity within the meaning of the section, and, even if there were, it did not affect the decision of the case in appeal below. *SANKALI v. MURLIDHAR*. I. L. R. 12 All. 200

**22. ———— Plaintiff, amendment of—Adding a defendant in a suit where leave to sue under cl. 12 of the Letters Patent, 1865, was necessary—Alternative liability—Order to add new defendant—Appeal against such order by original defendant.** The plaintiff filed this suit against the defendant *F* alleging that she had a firm and carried on business at Sihore, in the territory of Bhopal. Before the suit was filed, leave was duly obtained under cl. 12 of the Letters Patent, 1865. In her written statement, *F* denied that she was the owner of the Sihore firm, or that she was responsible for any of its dealings with the plaintiffs. She alleged that the Sihore firm had belonged to her son *P*, who died in Samvat 1943, leaving a daughter named *G*, a minor, who was still living. The plaintiff then obtained a summons calling on the defendant *F* to show cause why the plaint and proceedings should not be amended by adding the name of *G* as a party-defendant. The summons was made absolute, and an order was made to add *G* as a defendant. The defendant *F* appealed, contending that the effect of adding a defendant would be to institute a new suit against *G* without obtaining the necessary leave under the Letters Patent. She relied on *Rampurtab v. Premeukh Chandamal*, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 93. *Held*, dismissing the appeal, that the defendant *F* could not appeal against the order making *G* a party. It might be that *G* might object to the order either before or at the hearing, but she only could take the objection. The defendant *F* could not take it for her. The case of *Rampurtab v. Premeukh Chandamal* did not apply. In that case the proposed amendment altered the cause of action. Here it was left unaffected. On the cause of action as set forth in the plaint leave had been given under cl. 12 of the Letters Patent to sue the defendant *F*, and, so far as she was concerned, there was no objection to the form of the suit. If her allegation was true, *G*, and not *F*, was liable. That question would be decided at the trial. *FOOLIBAI v. RAMPRATAB SAMRATRAI*. I. L. R. 17 Bom. 466

**23. ———— Appeal by defendants against whom specifically no decree was made, but whose defence to the suit was necessarily disposed of by the decree.** Certain plaintiffs sued as second assignees of a debt



**RIGHT OF APPEAL—concl'd.**

to recover the debt, and made defendants to the suit their assignors, the original debtors, and certain persons whom they alleged to have been prior assignees of the debt, but whose assignment, according to them, had become void through non-fulfilment of the conditions upon which it was made. The Court of first instance gave a decree to the plaintiffs against the original debtors. An appeal by the first assignees was dismissed by the lower Appellate Court, on the ground that, there being no decree against the appellants, their appeal would not lie. On second appeal, it was *held* that the appeal would lie, inasmuch as the decree, though not a decree against the appellants by name, necessarily implied a finding that the assignment to the appellants, upon the basis of which they resisted the plaintiff's claim, had become void. *JAMNA DAS v. UDEY RAM* I. L. R. 21 All. 117

**RIGHT OF NON-OCCUPANCY RAIYAT, WHETHER HERITABLE.**

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**RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY.**

Col.

**1. ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—**

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**1. ACQUISITION OF RIGHT.****(a) PERSONS BY WHOM RIGHT MAY BE ACQUIRED.**

1. ——— Cultivating raiyats at fixed rates—Act X of 1859, s. 6—*Raiyats holding since permanent settlement at varying rates of rent.* Act X of 1859 provided for two classes of raiyats only, viz., those who have held and cultivated the land for a period of twelve years and those who have held at fixed rates from the time of the permanent settlement; it made no provision for raiyats who have held since the time of the permanent settlement at varying rates. Such a raiyat acquired no right of occupancy on that ground. *DINOBUNDHOO DEY v. RAMDHONE ROY.* . . . 9 W. R. 522

2. ——— Cultivating raiyats—Act X of 1859, s. 6—*Sub-lessors to actual cultivators.* Only those tenants who cultivate their lands or sub-let them to actual cultivators of the soil were entitled to rights of occupancy under s. 6, Act X of 1859. *BINDRABUN CHUNDER CHOWDHRY v. ISSUR CHUNDER BISWAS.* . . . W. R. 1864, Act X, 1

3. ——— Act X of 1859, s. 6—*Actual cultivators—Raiyats deriving profits directly from produce.* The benefits of s. 6 of Act X of 1859 were not restricted to those who with their own hands till the soil, but applied to those who are actual cultivators in the sense of deriving their profits from the produce directly. *KALEECHURN SINGH v. AMEEROODDEEN.* . . . 9 W. R. 579

4. ——— Permanent cultivator—*Paracudi.* The defendant's ancestors or predecessors in title were the cultivating tenants of the lands of a certain temple from a date not later than 1827, in which year they were so described in the paimaish accounts. In 1830 they executed a muchalka to the Collector, who then managed the temple whereby they agreed among other things to pay certain dues. They were described in the muchalka as



**RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—contd.****1. ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—contd.****(a) PERSONS BY WHOM RIGHT MAY BE ACQUIRED—contd.**

paracudis. In 1857 the plaintiff's predecessors took over the management of the temple from, and executed a muchalka to, the Collector, whereby he agreed among other things not to eject the raiyats as long as they paid kist. In 1882, the dues (which were payable separately) having fallen into arrear, the manager of the temple sued to eject the defendants. *Held*, that there was nothing to show that the defendants were more than tenants from year to year, and they had not acquired a right of occupancy. *Chockalinga Pillai v. Vythealinga Pundara Sunnady*, 6 *Mud.* 164, and *Krishnasami v. Varadaraja*, 1. L. R. 5 *Mad.* 345, discussed and distinguished. *THIAGARAJA v. GIYANA SAMBANDHA PANDARA SANNADHI*. 1. L. R. 11 *Mad.* 77

**5. ——— Holders of land—Act X of 1859, s. 6—Land cultivated by other than raiyat.** S. 6 of Act X of 1859 applied to land "held" as well as to land "cultivated," and although a tenant may not have personally cultivated, but may have made over the land to another to cultivate (assuming that by custom he has such power), he still may gain a right of occupancy if he continues to be recognized by the zamindar as the holder of the land. *BUTABEE BEGUM v. KHOSH-SHAL*. 2 *N. W.* 24

**6. ——— Possessors of raiyati tenure—Test of raiyati interest as distinguished from mere right to collect rent.** *Per FIELD, J.*—The only test of a raiyati interest is to see in what condition the land was when the tenancy was created. If raiyats were already in possession of the land when the interest was created, and the interest was a right, not to the actual physical possession of the land, but to collect the rents from the raiyats, the interest is not raiyati. If, on the other hand, the land was jungle, or uncultivated or unoccupied, and the tenant was let into physical possession of the land, the interest would be raiyati, and the nature of that interest would not be altered by the fact of the tenant subsequently subletting to under-tenants. *DURGA PROSUNNO GHOSE v. KALI DAS DUTT*. 9 *C. L. R.* 449

**7. ——— Holder of raiyati jote—Act X of 1859, s. 6—Right against purchaser of patni talukh.** The holder of a raiyati jote was protected by s. 6, Act X of 1859, and had a clear right of occupancy against the purchaser of the patni talukh fourteen years after his purchase. *WOOMANATH ROY CHOWDHRY v. ROGHONATH MITTER*. 5 *W. R.* Act X, 63

**8. ——— Persons not holding as raiyats or middlemen—Act X of 1859, s. 6.** Persons who are not shown to have held possession of lands, of which they complain they have been illegally dispossessed, as raiyats, or in any other sense than as middlemen receiving rents from the

**RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—contd.****1. ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—contd.****(a) PERSONS BY WHOM RIGHT MAY BE ACQUIRED—contd.**

actual cultivators, did not come under s. 6, Act X of 1859, and cannot acquire any rights of occupancy. *GOPEE MOHUN ROY v. SIB CHUNDER SEN*. 1 *W. R.* 68

**9. ——— Tenant holding a term under a farming lease—Act X of 1859, s. 6.** A tenant holding a term under a farming lease of land which he might sub-let is not a raiyat, and therefore did not by twelve years' occupation acquire a right of occupancy under Act X of 1859, s. 6. *HURRISH CHUNDER KONDoo v. ALEXANDER Marsh.* 479

**10. ——— Middleman—Party sub-letting—Act X of 1859, s. 6.** The mere fact of a party sub-letting did not make him a middleman excluded from the privileges of s. 6, Act X of 1859. The real question for trial is whether he was or was not a raiyat, or one who held land under cultivation by himself or others who took for him under his supervision as a superior cultivator; or whether he was a middleman because he really did not cultivate in the sense of s. 6, but was a general lease-holder or a speculator in land rent. *RAM MUNGUL GHOSE v. LAKHEENARAIN SHAHA*. 1. L. R. 1. *W. R.* 71

**11. ——— Sub-tenant of cultivating raiyat.** A sub-tenant of a cultivating raiyat cannot acquire a right of occupancy. *KEPAL GAIN v. NADUR MISTREE*. 6 *W. R.* 168

**12. ——— Sub-lessee from occupancy raiyat—Act X of 1859, s. 6.** A sub-lessee from a raiyat having a right of occupancy could gain no right of occupancy for himself under s. 6, Act X of 1859. *GILMORE v. SURBESSUREE DOSSEE*. *W. R.* 1864, Act X, 72

*NIL KOMUL SEIN v. DANESH SHAIKH*. 15 *W. R.* 469

*UNNOPOORNA DOSSEE v. RADHA MOHUN PATTRO*. 19 *W. R.* 95

*HARAN CHUNDRA PAL v. MUKTA SUNDARI CHOWDHRAIN*. 1 *B. L. R. A. C.* 81: 10 *W. R.* 113

(*Contra*) *ABDOOL JUBBAR v. KALEE CHURN DUTT*. 7 *W. R.* 81

*RAMDHUN KHAN v. HARADHAN PARAMANICK*. 9 *B. L. R.* 107 note: 12 *W. R.* 404

**13. ——— Raiyat brought on zerait land by lessee, right of, on expiry of lease—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 116—Trespasser—Right of occupancy—Liability to ejectment.** S. 116 of the Bengal Tenancy Act applies even in a case where a person is brought on the malik's zerait land as a raiyat by a lessee for a term of years; therefore such a person cannot acquire any right of occupancy or non-occupancy on the said land, and he, being a trespasser only on the expiry of the lease of the lessee, is liable to ejectment. *Henderson v. Squire*, L. R. 4 *Q. B.* 170;



RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—*contd.*1. ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—*contd.*(a) PERSONS BY WHOM RIGHT MAY BE ACQUIRED—*contd.*

*Oomatara Debia v. Peena Bibee*, 2 W. R. 155 ;  
and *Huris Chunder Roy Chowdhry v. Sree Kalee Mookerjee*, 22 W. R. 274, referred to. *Binad Lal Pakrashi v. Kalu Pramanik*, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 708, distinguished. *SHEO NANDAN ROY v. AJODH ROY* . . . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 546  
3 C. W. N. 336

14. ——— Raiyat holding over after sub-lease—*Act X of 1859, s. 6*. A right of occupancy under s. 6, Act X of 1859, could not be acquired by a raiyat holding over for more than twelve years after the expiration of a sub-lease for a term by a raiyat having a right of occupancy. *JUMMEEUTTUNNISSA v. NOOR MAHOMED*  
W. R. 1864, Act X, 77

15. ——— Ticcadar—*Obligation on ticcadar to restore tenure*. A ticcadar is bound to restore his holding to the zamindar in the condition in which he got it when his lease is over, and cannot acquire a right of occupancy under it. *RAM SARUN SAHOO v. VERYAG MAHTON* . . . 25 W. R. 554

16. ——— Purchasers from neem howladars—*Neem howlas, nature of—Transferable tenures*. Neem howlas (even though they may not comprise the right of holding at a fixed rent) and all other such rights of occupancy established by the ancient prescription and custom of the country are transferable tenures. Purchasers from neem howladars are consequently entitled to rights of occupancy. *JUGGAI CHUNDER ROY v. RAMNARAIN BHUTTACHARJEE* . . . 1 W. R. 126

17. ——— Tenants of temple lands at a specified rent so long as they hold—*Occupancy rights, proof of—Tenancy from year to year—Fifty years' tenure—Purakudi*. In a suit brought in 1882 by the trustee of a temple to eject tenants upon notice to quit, the tenants pleaded that they were entitled to occupy the lands permanently, and proved that their predecessors had cultivated since 1830. In that year a muchalka had been executed by which the tenants who were therein styled purakudis (a term which does not usually denote tenants with right of occupancy) bound themselves to pay a specified rent so long as they held the lands of the temple. *Held*, that the tenants had not acquired a right of occupancy, and were merely tenants from year to year. *THIAGARAJA v. GNANASAMBANTHA. SABRAMANYA v. GNANASAMBANTHA* . . . I. L. R. 7 Mad. 374

18. ——— Government raiyat in Assam—*Act X of 1859, s. 6*. A Government raiyat can acquire a right of occupancy in respect of lands cultivated by him under the rent law in force in Assam. *KONARAM GAONBURAH v. DHATOARAM THAKOOR*  
I. L. R. 6 Calc. 196 : 7 C. L. R. 47

But see *PRASIDHA NARAYAN KOER v. MANKOCH*  
I. L. R. 9 Calc. 330 : 11 C. L. R. 554

RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—*contd.*1. ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—*contd.*(a) PERSONS BY WHOM RIGHT MAY BE ACQUIRED—*contd.*

19. ——— Right of occupancy in Assam—*Pykes, their rights and privileges*. The plaintiff who held land in Assam under a settlement from Government, sued to eject the defendant from certain lands within his holding. It was proved that the defendant was a descendant from one of the pykes who held lands under the Assam Rajas ; that the Assam Rajas granted the pykes to a certain lakhirajdar ; that the pykes held the land in suit as before under the lakhirajdar ; that the lakhiraj was subsequently resumed by Government ; and that the defendant had his house and gardens on the land for a long time, and had paid rent for many years at Government rates. *Held*, that the defendant was not liable to ejectment. The rights of such tenants explained and discussed. *DINABUNDHU SURMA v. BODIA KOCH* . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 100

20. ——— Farmer of revenue or proprietary right. A mere farmer of revenue or proprietary right cannot acquire a permanent right of occupancy. *KRISHNASAMI PILLAI v. VARADARAJA. VARADARAJA v. VENKATACHALA PILLAI*  
I. L. R. 5 Mad. 345

21. ——— Zamindar occupying his own lands—*Transfer of zamindari*. A zamindar occupying his own lands as nij-jote cannot, when the zamindari passes in to other hands, lay claim to them on the ground that he is a raiyat with rights of occupancy. *REED v. SREE KISHEN SINGH*  
15 W. R. 430

22. ——— Occupant of land rent-free—*Beng. Act VIII of 1869, ss. 6 and 22*. A party who has been in the occupancy of land without paying any rent is not entitled to the protection of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 6, or of s. 22, even on the ground of right to hold the land rent-free. *KALEE KRISHNA DEB v. SHASHONEE DASSEE*  
25 W. R. 42

23. ——— Assignee of zamindar—*Act X of 1859, s. 6*. A person occupying land merely as the assignee of the zamindar and cultivating because of the opportunity thus afforded cannot, under colour of that character, acquire the rights adverse to the zamindar or claim the benefit of Act X of 1859, s. 6. *WOOMANATH TEWAREE v. KOONDUN TEWAREE* . . . 19 W. R. 177

24. ——— Person holding as raiyat and as farming tenant—*Assignee of landlord's interest*. Where a person holding land at first as a raiyat subsequently obtained a farming lease of it, and thus became assignee of the landlord's interests, he was *held*, at the expiration of the lease, not to have acquired an occupancy right. Where a raiyati interest co-exists with a farming lease, the raiyati interest remains unchanged in character during the currency of the lease. *SAVI v. PUNCHANUN ROY*  
25 W. R. 503



RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—*contd.*1. ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—*contd.*(a) PERSONS BY WHOM RIGHT MAY BE ACQUIRED—*contd.*

25. ——— Possession as servant—*Act X of 1859, s. 6*—Possession without payment of rent. Mere possession for twelve years in the capacity of a servant did not create a right of occupancy under s. 6, Act X of 1859, rent must be shown to have been paid so as to make the occupier a raiyat. *WOOMA MOYEE BURMONYA v. BOKOO BEHARA*  
13 W. R. 333

26. ——— Heir to tenant-at-will. A person cannot claim a right of occupancy as heir of a tenant-at-will. *BUSHEEROODDEEN v. DAL CHUND*  
3 Agra 236

27. ——— Firm, members of—*Transmission of rights in firm to changing members of it.* A firm of capitalists taking a lease of lands from a zamindar, and transmitting their rights to the changing members of the firm, cannot, by any length of occupation, acquire occupancy rights under s. 6 of Act X of 1859, or Bengal Act VIII of 1869. *RAI KOMUL DOSSEE v. LAIDLEY*  
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 957

28. ——— Indigo concern—*Power to acquire right of occupancy—Corporation.* An "Indigo Concern" or "Firm" has no corporate or legal existence so far as the question of a right of occupancy is concerned, which can only be recognized in particular individuals. *CANNAN v. KYLASH CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHRY*  
25 W. R. 117

29. ——— Partnership holding a cultivating lease—*Indigo concern as a cultivating raiyat—Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 6.* A firm owning an indigo concern, and carrying on the manufacture of indigo, took, in the collective names of Robert Watson & Co., a cultivating lease of certain lands which they held continuously for more than twelve years; cultivation of these lands being carried out by the servants of the firm and also by sub-tenants. *Held*, that the lease must be taken to be a lease to the individuals who were at the time of the grant members of the firm, and that under the circumstances of the particular case they had obtained an occupancy right. *Quare*: Whether a right of occupancy could have been obtained in this case if the whole of the original grantees had died, either before the completion of the twelve years of occupation or after acquiring a right of occupancy; or if it could be obtained, whether such right could, according to the custom of the locality, be transferred to persons subsequently admitted as members of the firm. The test of a raiyati lease is whether the lease has been originally granted for the purpose of cultivation, and if it has been so granted, it is none the less a raiyati lease, though the lessee may happen subsequently to sub-let. *LAIDLEY v. GOUR GOBIND SARKAR*  
I. L. R. 11 Calc. 501

30. ——— Liability to assessment of rent—*Chur land—Jungleburi tenure.* R, a Hindu widow, granted a jungleburi tenure to certain tenants in respect of a chur belonging to her hus-

RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—*contd.*1. ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—*contd.*(a) PERSONS BY WHOM RIGHT MAY BE ACQUIRED—*contd.*

band's estate. An amalnama was granted to the tenants signed by a karpardaz of R in respect of the tenure. R died in January 1861, and was succeeded by J and P, two daughters, the last of whom died on the 31st December 1880. On her death, her grandsons succeeded to the estate. On R's death, J and P got possession of all estate papers, and amongst them a dowl granted by the tenants in return for the amalnama. In 1865 proceedings were taken by the tenants to obtain kabuliats on the footing of those documents, which proceedings came to an end in 1868. In 1873 J and P instituted suits against the tenants, alleging the amalnama and dowl to be forgeries, and seeking to enhance the rents payable to them, as well as to have it declared that R's acts did not bind them. In these suits it was found that J and P had all along been aware of the claim made by the tenants that they held a permanent tenure, and the suits were dismissed on the ground that it was too late for J and P, after the lapse of twelve years from R's death, to raise the question. In 1884 D, a receiver, instituted a suit in the names of the grandsons to eject the tenants on amongst other grounds that the grandsons, reversioners, were not bound by R's acts, and that the jungleburi tenure was not binding on them; that the tenants were middlemen and had no right of occupancy; that at all events the plaintiffs were entitled to rent on the area of land then held by the defendants, as there had been large accretions to the amount covered by the amalnama and dowl. *Held*, that, being middlemen, the defendants had no right of occupancy, and that, were the suit not dismissed for other grounds, they were liable to have the rent assessed on the whole amount of lands held by them, which was in excess of that covered by amalnama and dowl. *DROBOMOYI GUPTA v. DAVIS*  
I. L. R. 14 Calc. 323

30. (a) ——— Agreement made before Bengal Tenancy Act—*Acquisition of right of occupancy—Contract barring acquisition of right in perpetuity—Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 7—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 178 (1), cl. (a—s), 178 (3), cl. (a).* An agreement made before the passing of the Bengal Tenancy Act between a landlord and his tenant, which bars the acquisition of the right of occupancy during the lifetime of the tenant, does not come within the prohibitory terms of s. 178 (3), cl. (a) of the Act, nor does it come within the terms of s. 178 (1), cl. (a) of that Act. Where before the passing of the Bengal Tenancy Act a landlord entered into an agreement with his tenant and the defendant that the former would hold certain lands under him for her life and that after her death the landlord would take khas possession of them and that her heirs, that is, the defendant or her heirs, would never raise any objection or prefer any sort of claim to them. *Held*, that it was a valid contract under s. 7, Bengal Act VIII of 1869: that the tenant during her lifetime



**RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—contd.****1. ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—contd.****(a) PERSONS BY WHOM RIGHT MAY BE ACQUIRED—  
concl'd.**

was not an occupancy raiyat and that the defendant, never having been recognized by the landlord as tenant, was a trespasser. **BAUL CHANDRA CHAKRAVARTI v. NISTARINI DEBI** (1905)

**I. L. R. 33 Calc. 136  
s.c. 10 C. W. N. 533**

**(b) SUBJECTS OF ACQUISITION.**

**31. ——— Land to which addition has been made—Addition creating fresh tenure of whole.** Land which is held as one tenure is either subject to a right of occupancy as a whole or it is not subject to any right of occupancy as to any part of it. If the whole land has been held for more than twelve years, then the tenant has a right of occupancy; but if within twelve years the tenant has been allowed to take possession of fresh lands, and such addition was intended to create a fresh tenure, then as regards the whole a right of occupancy has not been acquired, although a portion has been held for more than twelve years. **AMAR CHAND LAHATA v. BUKSHU PYEKAR** . . . **22 W. R. 228**

**32. ——— Land of which cultivation is changed—Nature of right of occupancy—Enhancement, liability to—landlord and tenant.** The statutory right of occupancy under Bengal Act VIII of 1869 cannot be extended so as to make it include complete dominion over the land, subject only to the payment of a rent liable to enhancement. The landlord is still entitled to insist that the land shall be used for the purposes for which it was granted; and although the Court in such cases will be disposed to place a liberal interpretation on the rights of the tenant, it will not sanction a complete change in the mode of enjoyment. **LAL SAHOO v. DEO NARAIN SINGH**

**I. L. R. 3 Calc. 781 : 2 C. L. R. 294**

**33. ——— Land held for agricultural purposes—Act X of 1859, s. 6—Dwelling-house, Occupation of land for.** The occupation intended to be protected by s. 6, Act X of 1859, was occupation of land subject to agricultural or horticultural cultivation, and used for purposes incidental thereto, and did not include occupation, the main object of which is the dwelling-house itself, and where the cultivation of the soil, if any there be, is entirely subordinate thereto. **KALEE KISHEN BISWAS v. JANKEE** . . . **8 W. R. 250**

**34. ——— Land used for habitation and cultivation—Act X of 1859, s. 6—Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 6.** The right of occupancy acquired by a cultivator under Act X of 1859, or Bengal Act VIII of 1869, was as applicable to that portion of the land which is used for his habitation as for that portion which is cultivated. **MOHESH CHUNDER GUNGOPADHYA v. BISHONATH DOSS**

**24 W. R. 402**

**35. ——— Land occupied by buildings—Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 6.** The words

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"cultivated or held" in Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 6, have the effect of excluding lands occupied exclusively by buildings from the right of occupancy there declared. **MOHUR ALI KHAN v. RAM RUTTUN SEIN** . . . **21 W. R. 400**

**36. ——— Waste land brought under cultivation—Shikmi cultivation.** Held, that land newly broken and bought under cultivation by a raiyat cannot be received as zamindar's sir land, nor can the former be held to be a mere shikmi cultivator incapable of acquiring right of occupancy in the land. **JHUGRO v. LAUTOO PANDEY**  
**1 Agra Rev. 32**

**37. ——— Nij-jote land—Act X of 1859, s. 6.** A cultivator of nij-jote land could acquire a right of occupancy under s. 6, Act X of 1859, when it had not been let under a lease for a term of years, or year by year. **GAURHARI SINGH v. BEHARI RAUT** . . . **3 B. L. R. Ap. 138 : 12 W. R. 277**

**38. ——— Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 6.** The nij-jote land referred to in Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 6, as land in which a right of occupancy could not be acquired, is land which is the nij-jote of the zamindar, and not that which is merely the nij-jote of a sarbarakar holding under the zamindars. **OBHOY CHURN MOHAPATTUR v. KANYE RAWUT** . . . **1 C. L. R. 394**

**39. ——— Khamar land—Land in possession of zamindar.** Land in the possession of the zamindar, whether cultivated or uncultivated, is khamar land, and a right of occupancy cannot be acquired upon it by a raiyat, except under some special arrangement. **HURISH CHUNDER DAM v. GUNGA DHUR BHUDDRO** . . . **25 W. R. 181**

**40. ——— Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 6.** Where a raiyat proves possession for upwards of twelve years, the mere fact of his land being khamar does not deprive him of the right of occupancy. Before his case can be brought within the exception in Bengal Act VIII of 1869, s. 6, it must be shown whether he has held on a lease for a term or year by year. **ASHRUF v. RAM KISHORE GHOSE** . . . **23 W. R. 288**

**41. ——— Khamat land—Land on expiration of lease.** Where khamat land is let by a zamindar for a term of years, and upon the expiration of that term tacitly let to the same tenant from year to year for a long period, the tenant does not thereby acquire a right of occupancy. **BHUGWAN BHAGUT v. JUG MOHUN ROY** . . . **20 W. R. 308**

**42. ——— Sir land—N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1881), s. 8—Act X of 1859, s. 6—Occupancy tenure.** Where land, originally the sir of a proprietor, has been transferred to a mortgagee and has in his hands lost its character of sir, and has been leased to a tenant on the usual conditions of a tenancy, which otherwise do not bar the acquisition of a right of occupancy in the land, such a right will be acquired by twelve years' occupancy under

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s. 8 of the Rent Act. In 1846 *B* mortgaged a share in a village together with certain land which was recorded as his *sir* and which was so described in the deed of mortgage. After the mortgage it ceased to be recorded as his *sir*, and was recorded as land held by tenants in the same way as other lands in the estate. In 1857 it was leased to *S*, and in 1863 to *H*, and from 1863 to 1882 remained in the possession of the last-mentioned lessee. In 1882 *B* redeemed the mortgage and subsequently brought a suit against *H* to establish that the land was his *sir* and for possession of it. *Held*, by the Full Bench, that there being nothing in terms of the mortgage-deed to indicate that the land was transferred to the mortgagee to be held as *sir* and the land having ceased to be recorded as the *sir* of the proprietor, and not having been leased as the *sir* of the lessor, it had not retained its character as *sir* when the defendant's tenancy commenced, so as to prevent him from acquiring a right of occupancy therein under the provisions of s. 8 of the Rent Act. *Per MAHMOOD, J.*, that there is nothing in the law to prevent a zamindar from relinquishing his rights in *sir* land and converting it into land held by ordinary tenants; that the mortgage-deed of 1846 showed that the *sir* right in the land in suit had been relinquished by the mortgagor; and that the *sir* land once relinquished by the zamindar ceases to have that character, and cannot prevent the accrual of the occupancy right within the meaning either of s. 6 of Act X of 1859 or of s. 8 of Act XII of 1881. *HARPAL SINGH v. BAL GOBIND* . . . **I. L. R. 7 All. 586**

**43. ——— Holding commenced under a mortgagee—Act X of 1859, s. 6.** Holdings which have commenced or continued under a mortgagee in possession were not within any exception to the general rule contained in s. 6 of Act X of 1859, that a raiyat who has held or cultivated a holding for twelve years is entitled to a right of occupancy therein. *HEEROO v. DHOREE* **2 N. W. 129 : s.c. Agra F. B. Ed. 1874, 204**

**44. ——— Land held as a grove—Act X of 1859, s. 6—Kashtkari land.** Land held as a grove upon the terms which have been heretofore customary in this country was not subject to the provisions of s. 6 of Act X of 1859. By an occupancy thereof for twelve years no right of occupancy can accrue. The provisions of s. 6 of Act X of 1859 were intended to apply to kashtakari lands. *PIRTUM KOORMY v. BHIKAREE* . **2 N. W. 364**

**45. ——— Holding of trees under lease of their produce—Act X of 1859, s. 6.** The possession of twelve years of the trees in a bag under a lease which only entitled the lessees to the produce of the trees, and not to cultivate the land, would not be a holding of the land within the meaning of s. 6, Act X of 1859, so as to confer upon the lessees a right of occupancy in the land. *ROOKMIN KOORER v. BUKSHEE* . . . **5 N. W. 155**

**RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—contd.****1. ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—contd.****(b) SUBJECTS OF ACQUISITION—contd.**

**46. ——— Bunkar tenure—Act X of 1859, s. 6.** *Held*, that plaintiffs, as holders of a lease from the proprietor which gave them the right of cutting grass and other spontaneous produce of the lands did not, merely by reason of lengthened enjoyment, acquire any right of occupancy in respect to such holding, that the tenure under which they claimed to hold was not a holding of land within the meaning of s. 6, Act X of 1859, and they must, in the absence of an express condition otherwise determining the period of lease, be held to be tenants-at-will holding year by year at the pleasure of the landlord. *GOOR DIAL v. RAMDUT* **Agra F. B. 15 : Ed. 1874, 11**

**47. ——— Land let for grazing cattle.** *Semble* : A right of occupancy can be gained in land let for the purposes of grazing cattle or horses. *FITZPATRICK v. WALLACE* **2 B. L. R. A. C. 317 : 11 W. R. 231**

**48. ——— Tank producing water-nuts—Growth of plant not spontaneous, but from cultivation.** In the land in suit a tank producing water-nuts, which do not grow spontaneously, but are the result of sowing or planting, a right of occupancy can be acquired. *MOOLCHAND v. CHEETREE* **1 N. W. 175 : Ed. 1873, 254**

**49. ——— Tank not appurtenant to land—Beng. Reg. XIX of 1793.** A right of occupancy in land includes the same right in respect of a tank appurtenant to the land; but a right of occupancy cannot be acquired in a tank with only so much land as is necessary for the banks, and the lease of such tank is terminable on the sale of the lessee's tenure for arrears of rent, the purchaser under Regulation XIX of 1793 receiving the tenure free of encumbrances. *NIDHI KRISHNA BOSE v. RAM DASS SEIN* . . . **20 W. R. 341**

**50. ——— Act X of 1859, s. 6.** The provisions of Act X of 1859 with respect to acquiring a right of occupancy did not apply to a tank which was not shown to form part of any grant of land, nor to be appurtenant to any land. *SIBU JELYA v. GOPAL CHANDRA CHOWDHRY* **13 B. L. R. 423 note : 19 W. R. 200**

**51. ——— Right of fishery—Julkur not appurtenant to jote.** Where a jotedar had exercised rights of fishery over two julkurs for more than twelve years, not as the owner of the jote (with which the julkurs were not connected), but as a tenant under a landlord :—*Held*, that such possession did not confer upon him a right of occupancy. *SHAM NARAIN CHOWDHRY v. COURT OF WARDS* **23 W. R. 432**

**52. ——— Julkur.** The right of occupancy which accrues to tenants who have occupied or cultivated land for twelve years or upwards does not arise in respect of the right called *julkur* or fishery. That is a right which may be let out by *ijardars* under the landlord, and may be enjoyed under them so long as their *ijara* continues,



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but is liable to be determined at the expiration of the ijara. *JUGGOBUNDHOO SHAHA v. PROMOTHONATH ROY* . . . . . **I. L. R. 4 Calc. 767**

The lessee of a julkur cannot acquire any right of occupancy. *BOLLYE SATEE v. AKRAM ALLY* . . . . . **I. L. R. 4 Calc. 961**

*WOOMAKANT SIRCAR v. GOPAL SINGH* . . . . . **2 W. R., Act X, 19**

**53.** ———— **Lands held on service tenure.** *Semble:* No rights of occupancy accrue in lands held under a service tenure. *HURROGOBIND RAHA v. RAMRUTNO DEY* . . . . . **I. L. R. 4 Calc. 67**

**54.** ———— **Land in Assam—Act X of 1859—Ejectment, suit for.** *Per MITTER and WHITE, JJ. (MACPHERSON, J., dissenting)—Act X of 1859 does not apply to lands situated in the Assam Valley District. In a suit brought to eject a tenant of certain land situated in Assam, on the ground that he was a trespasser, where it was shown that he had held the land direct from the Government for a considerable time, and that the land had been made over during his tenancy to the plaintiff in exchange for certain other lands made over to the Government, and where the tenant claimed to have acquired a right of occupancy under Act X of 1859, and not to be liable to ejectment in the manner sought for:—Held, per MITTER and WHITE, JJ., that as that Act did not apply to lands situated in Assam, no such right could be claimed; and the suit being properly framed, the plaintiff was entitled to the relief he asked for* *PRASIDHA NARAYAN KOER v. MAN KOCH*

**I. L. R. 9 Calc. 330: 11 C. L. R. 554**

But see *KONARAM GAONBURAH v. DHATOARAM THAKOOR* . . . . . **I. L. R. 6 Calc. 196: 7 C. L. R. 47**

**55.** ———— **Suburban lands let for building purposes.** There is no authority for the proposition "that there may be rights of occupancy in suburban lands let for purposes of building, though these rights may be cognizable under a law intended only for agricultural landlords and tenants." *Gungadhur Shikdar v. Azimuddin Shah Biswas*, **I. L. R. 8 Calc. 960**, explained. *Ramdhun Khan v. Haradhun Puramanick*, **12 W. R. 404: 9 B. L. R. 107** note, relied on. *RAKHAI DASS ADDY v. DINOMOYI DEBI*

**I. L. R. 16 Calc. 652**

**55. (a)** ———— **Chowkidari chakran land—Right of occupancy—Ejectment—Tenant-at-will—Act X of 1859, s. 6.** A right of occupancy may be acquired by a tenant even in Chowkidari chakran land under s. 6 of Act X of 1859. *Thakoorani Dassee v. Bisheshur Mookerjee*, **B. L. R. Sup. 212: 3 W. R. (Act X) 29**; *Hyder Buksh v. Bhupendra Deb Coomer*, **15 W. R. 231**; *Hurry Ram v. Nurshing Lal*, **I. L. R. 21 Calc. 129**; and *Adhore Chunder Bahadur v. Kishto Churn*, **6 Leg. Comp. 15**, referred to. *RAM KUMAR BHATTACHARJEE v. RAM NEWAJ RAJGURU* (1904) . . . . . **I. L. R. 31 Calc. 1021**

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**55. (b)** ———— **Ghatwali tenures—Acquisition of right of occupancy—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 181.** Occupancy rights cannot be acquired in ghatwali lands. *Mohesh Majhi v. Prar. Krishna Mondal*, **1 C. L. J. 1348**, referred to. *UPENDRA NATH HAZRA v. RAM NATH CHOWDHRY* (1906) . . . . . **I. L. R. 33 Calc. 630**

**(c) MODE OF ACQUISITION.**

**56.** ———— **Nature of right—Right independent of wish of zamindar or mortgagee—Acquisition under usufructuary mortgage.** The right of occupancy conferred by the Legislature upon cultivators of more than twelve years' standing is a right wholly independent of the wishes either of the zamindar of his mortgagee in possession, and when a cultivator acquires such a right it cannot be taken as in the nature of a grant from either of them. The right of occupancy may thus be acquired during the currency of a usufructuary mortgage and during the period of the mortgagee's possession of the zamindari rights, and the zamindar upon redeeming the mortgage cannot disturb the possession of such occupancy tenants on the ground that, when he mortgaged the zamindari, it was free of such occupancy tenures. *Heeroo v. Dhoree*, **2 N. W. 129**, referred to. *HARPAL SINGH v. BAL GOBIND* . . . . . **I. L. R. 7 All. 586**

**57.** ———— **Conditions necessary for acquisition—Non-payment of rent—Beng. Act VIII of 1869, ss. 6, 22, and 52.** Two conditions only are necessary for the acquiring of a right of occupancy,—viz., (i) the cultivation or holding of land for a period of twelve years; and (ii) that the person holding or cultivating the land should be a raiyat. The essential conditions of s. 6, Bengal Act VIII of 1869, are fulfilled without showing the payment of rent, that only being a condition necessary for the maintaining of the right when created. In a suit brought to evict a tenant who had been in possession of certain land for a longer period than twelve years, when it was shown that rent had not been paid and notice to quit had been given:—*Held*, that a right of occupancy had been acquired, and that the raiyat had the power to prevent forfeiture under the provisions of s. 52, Bengal Act VIII of 1869. *NARAIN ROY v. OPNIT MISSER*

**I. L. R. 9 Calc. 304: 11 C. L. R. 417**

**58.** ———— **Holding and cultivating for twelve years—Acquisition previous to Rent Act, 1859.** After the permanent settlement and before Act X of 1859 a right of occupancy was not acquired by a raiyat merely by holding or cultivating land for a period of twelve years. When there is no contract, and the statute of limitation does not apply, the raiyat cannot, by occupying and cultivating, become the proprietor of the soil; neither can he, by occupying with the consent of the zamindar and paying rent for the land to him, become entitled to the proprietorship of the soil, even though he should



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acquire a right of occupancy by virtue of Act X of 1859. *ISHORE GHOSE v. HILLS*

**W. R. F. B. 148**

**59. ——— Holding for twelve years partly before and partly after Rent Act—Act X of 1859, s. 6—Raiyat.** A holding for twelve years, whether wholly before or wholly after, or partly before and partly after, the passing of the Rent Act, entitled a raiyat to a right of occupancy under s. 6, Act X of 1859. *THAKOORANEE DOSSEE v. BISHESHUR MOOKERJEE*

**B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 202 : 3 W. R., Act X, 29**

**60. ——— Suits pending at time Act came into force—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 20, 21—Suit for ejectment.** S. 21 of the Bengal Tenancy Act applies to suits pending at the time the Act came into force, viz., 1st November 1885, which had not then resulted in a decree. In a suit instituted on 8th October 1885 to eject the defendants after notice to quit it was held that, although the defendant had held the land from which it was sought to eject him for less than twelve years, and therefore would not, if the Bengal Rent Act VII of 1869 had been applicable, have acquired a right of occupancy, yet the effect of ss. 20 and 21 of the Bengal Tenancy Act was to give him a right of occupancy, and therefore he could not be ejected. *JOGESSUR DAS v. AISANI KOYBURTO*

**I. L. R., 14 Calc. 553**

**61. ——— Holding under purchaser of permanent transferable interest in land—Reservation of rent—Relinquishment.** Any raiyat holding under any purchaser of a permanent transferable interest in land can acquire a right of occupancy if he fulfil the other conditions required by the law; and the mere fact that a certain rent is reserved year by year does not interfere with his right unless something in his pottah is fatal to it. But the right may be extinguished by a relinquishment of the land. *RUGHOONATH SONAR v. MOKOOND DOSS*

**25 W. R. 213**

**62. ——— Possession for twenty years under mirasi lease—Act X of 1859, s. 6.** When possession for twenty years, as on a mirasi lease, is found, the right of occupancy is inherent under the lease and under s. 6, Act X of 1859. *GOUREE KANT BANERJEE v. GOLUCK CHUNDER*

**4 W. R., Act X, 49**

**63. ——— Occupation for twelve years under lease—Suit for abatement of rent.** A right of occupancy may be acquired by a raiyat holding lands for more than twelve years under a pottah, and he is therefore entitled to sue for abatement of rent. *SHAM LALL SAHOO v. HADY BUNJARA*

**2 Hay 522**

**64. ——— Occupation by virtue of lease for term of years—Act X of 1859, s. 6.** A right of occupancy could not be acquired by occu-

**RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—contd.****1. ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—contd.****(c) MODE OF ACQUISITION—contd.**

pation for twelve years under s. 6, Act X of 1859, when such occupation has been by virtue of a lease granting a term of years, and during the whole or part of such occupation the term had not expired. *HURRISH CHUNDER KOONDOD v. ALEXANDER*

**Marsh. 479**

**65. ——— Occupation under lease for fixed term—Act X of 1859, s. 6.** While land is held under a pottah which defines the period for which the land is to be held, no right of occupancy can accrue, although such a right may accrue under s. 6 in certain cases. *SHADHOO JHA v. BHUGWAN CHUNDER OPADHIA*

**1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 75 : 5 W. R., Act X, 17**

**66. ——— Holding on after expired farming lease—Act X of 1859, s. 6.** A right of occupancy under s. 6 of Act X of 1859 could not be acquired by holding under a farming lease which has expired. *GILMORE v. SREEMUNT BHOOMICK*

**W. R. 1864, Act X, 77**

**67. ——— Holding under] customary right—Farmer of revenue—Duration of tenancy how regulated.** The principle laid down in *Chockalinga Pillai v. Vythealinga Pundarasannady*, 6 Mad. 164, is that where a tenancy rests on contract only, the duration of the tenancy is regulated by the terms of the contract expressed or implied, and neither the Rent Act nor the Regulations operate to extend its duration. That decision does not derogate from any customary right. *KRISHNASAMI PILLAI v. VARADARAJA. VARADARAJA v. VENKATACHALA PILLAI*

**I. L. R. 5 Mad. 345**

**68. ——— Holding as ijaradars during lease—Contract for renewal of lease—Beng. Act VIII of 1869 and Act X of 1859, s. 6.** By the terms of an ijara (1865) the defendants were entitled at the end of a term of five years to a renewal of their lease of the chur land in dispute, at a rent to be fixed according to the measurement of the land to be made at that time and to the productive powers of the land. Three years after the expiration of the said term a notice was served on the defendants to come to a new settlement with the plaintiff, and in 1874 the plaintiff sued to recover possession. The defendants claimed a right of occupancy acquired under Bengal Act VIII of 1869 or under Act X of 1859. Held, that the defendants' holding as ijaradars prior to and during the lease of 1865 did not create in them a right of occupancy, and that the plaintiff had a right to turn the defendants out of possession at the expiration of the term of five years, except so far as that right was qualified by the stipulation for a renewal; that the defendants at the expiration of that lease had an equitable right to a renewal not exceeding five years, according to the stipulations in the agreement; but that it was too late to rely upon their title to a renewal which, if it had been granted, would now have



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expired. *JARDINE, SKINNER & Co. v. SARUT SOONDARI DEBI*

**L. R. 5 I. A. 164: 3 C. L. R. 140**

**69.** ———— **Holding on payment of rent in kind—Goozasta tenure.** A bhaui tenure may be a goozasta tenure and a raiyat who pays rent in kind and is in possession of, or cultivates, land for a period of twelve years has a right of occupancy in the land so held or cultivated by him so long as he pays the rent in kind for the same. *JUTTO MOAR v. BASMUTTEE KOOR* . **15 W. R. 479**

**70.** ———— **Holding as bhagdari tenure—Act X of 1859, s. 6.** Ordinarily a holding under a bhagdari tenure (i.e., upon a rent consisting of a portion of the produce) would establish a right of occupancy under s. 6, Act X of 1859. *HUREE-HUR MOOKERJEE v. BIRESSUR BANERJEE*

**6 W. R., Act X, 17**

**71.** ———— **Holding for long period—Payment of rent to one of several proprietors—Act X of 1859, s. 6.** A holding for twelve years under one of several proprietors gave a right of occupancy under s. 6, Act X of 1859, provided the tenant had paid the rent, which payment he may, in the absence of fraud, make to any one of the co-proprietors whom he chooses. *MOOKTAKESHEE DOSSEE v. KOYLASH CHUNDER MITTER* . **7 W. R. 493**

**72.** ———— **Holding under permissive possession—Bengal Rent Act, 1869, s. 6.** Mere possession of a permissive character and without any right cannot confer a right of occupancy. *MOHTAR ALI KHAN v. RAM RUTTUN SEIN* . **21 W. R. 400**

**73.** ———— **Act X of 1859, s. 6.** During the plaintiff's absence on imprisonment and transportation, the defendant took possession of land which previously belonged to him as a tenant and the landlord allowed the defendant to hold as his tenant. He held possession for more than twelve years. *Held*, under s. 6, Act X of 1859, the plaintiff acquired a right of occupancy against the landlord. *DOMUN v. SUDUNKOOLAH*

**1 B. L. R. S. N. 25: 10 W. R. 253**

**74.** ———— **Possession as intruder—Right of intruder to hold house of absconding raiyat.** *Held*, that the defendant, having failed to prove his right of possession to the house of an absconding raiyat, either by sale or mortgage, was an intruder upon the holding of such raiyat, and did not, by making additions or alterations, acquire any right against the zamindar who was not shown to have assented to such additions or alterations. *KUNDHYEE v. ZUMAN KHAN* . **1 Agra 9**

**75.** ———— **Possession obtained by fraud—Act X of 1859, s. 6.** Possession obtained and continued by fraud was not possession within the meaning of Act X of 1859, s. 6, so as to give a right of occupancy. *BHOOBUNJOY ACHARJEE v. RAM NARAIN CHOWDHRY* . **9 W. R. 449**

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**76.** ———— **Possession and payment of rent to party without title—Act X of 1859, s. 6.** The mere fact that the person to whom he for some years paid rent had no title could not prevent his counting those years towards a right of occupancy under Act X of 1859. *AMEER HOSSEIN v. SHEO SHAH* . **19 W. R. 338**

**77.** ———— **Occupying and cultivating land under person without title—Nature of raiyat's right.** A raiyat occupying and cultivating land for more than twelve years under a landlord who has no title to the land, nevertheless acquires a right of occupancy. The right is not one conferred by any lessor. It is a right which, by virtue of the law, grows up in the raiyat from the mere circumstance of cultivating the land for twelve years or upwards and paying rent due thereon. *ZOOLFUN BIBEE v. RADHICA PROSONNO CHUNDER*

**I. L. R. 3 Calc. 560: 1 C. L. R. 388**

**78.** ———— **Necessity of continuous possession.** To enable a tenant to acquire a right of occupancy, the twelve years' possession must be continuous. *DEBLA v. BRIJ LAL* . **3 N. W. 50**

**79.** ———— **Possession under lease containing proviso for re-entry—Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 7—Stipulation to negative right.** Where a lease contained a provision to the effect that at the expiration of the term the landlord should be at liberty to enter into a settlement with any one he pleased, and so put an end to the lessee's tenure, and the landlord notwithstanding allowed the tenant to continue his occupation, paying rent as before:—*Held*, that, under the circumstances, there was nothing in the stipulation itself which operated to negative or destroy the tenant's right of occupancy. *EBADUTOOLAH v. MAHOMED ALI* . **25 W. R. 114**

**80.** ———— **Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 6—Effect of such proviso on acquisition of right.** The mere fact of a lease being granted for a particular term, even where there is an express provision for re-entry by the lessor does not prevent the accrual of an occupancy right under s. 6 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869 to a raiyat continuously occupies for more than twelve years, nor is a right of occupancy already acquired destroyed by a grant of such lease. *MUKHTAR BAHADUR v. BROJRAJ SINGH CHOWDHRY* . **9 C. L. R. 143**

**81.** ———— **Computation of time necessary for right—Period during which land is held under lease.** Ordinarily the period during which lands are held under a pottah or lease is not to be excluded from the computation of the time necessary to give to the raiyat a right of occupancy. *HOORAI KHAN v. MUNSUB ALI* . **3 N. W. 37**

**82.** ———— **N. W. P. Rent Act (XVIII of 1873), s. 8—Holding under a lease—Deduction of time after expiry of lease.** In a suit in which the matter in dispute was whether the plaintiff was entitled to eject the defendants from their



**RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—contd.****1. ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—contd.****(c) MODE OF ACQUISITION—contd.**

holding on the ground of their not holding a right of occupancy, and having retained possession of the holding wrongfully after the expiry of the terms of a lease granted to their father, the lower Courts were bound at the time of deciding the case by the provisions of s. 8 of the N.-W. P. Rent Act, and should have excluded from the calculation of the period necessary for acquiring a right of occupancy the term of the lease under which the occupancy commenced. *RADHAPARSAD SINGH v. BALMUKAND OJHA* . . . . . **7 N. W. 318**

**83.** . . . . . *Jotedari right under expired ijara—Act X of 1859, ss. 6 and 7—Express stipulation. Per MITTER, J.*—The expiration of the lease of the ijaradar under whom the raiyat's possession under jotedari right commenced cannot affect the application of s. 6 of Act X of 1859. A tacit understanding that the ijaradar should give up possession on the expiry of his lease is not an express stipulation within the meaning of s. 7. *Quære*: Whether such an understanding between the zamindar's predecessors and the ijaradar can affect the raiyat. *GOLAM PANJA v. HURRISH CHUNDER GHOSE* . . . . . **17 W. R. 552**

**84.** . . . . . *Cultivating raiyat under several leases, each for a specific term—Act X of 1859, ss. 6 and 7—Beng. Act VIII of 1869, ss. 6 and 7.* A raiyat who has held or cultivated a piece of land continuously for more than twelve years, but under several written leases or pottahs, each for a specific term of years, is entitled to claim a right of occupancy in that land, unless there is in the pottah an express stipulation contrary thereto. *SHEO PROKASH MISSER v. RAM SAHOY SINGH*

**8 B. L. R. F. B. 165: 17 W. R. 62**

*KHAJURANNISSA BEGUM v. AHMED REZA*

**8 B. L. R. 166 note: 11 W. R. 88**

*NARAIN SINGH v. MUNSUR RAJOT*

**25 W. R. 155**

(*Contra*) *DAMUNULLA SIRKAR v. MAMUDI NASHIO*

**3 B. L. R. A. C. 178: 11 W. R. 556**

*KEBUL MAHTON v. SUNNOO*

**5 W. R., Act X, 80**

**85.** . . . . . *Bengal Rent Act (X of 1859), ss. 6 and 7—Bengal Rent Act (Beng. Act VIII of 1869), ss. 6 and 7—Mostajiri lease—Cultivating possession—Onus probandi.* Under Bengal Act VIII of 1869, ss. 6 and 7, as well as previously under the similar ss. 6 and 7 of the Rent Act (X of 1859), a raiyat paying rent for, and cultivating, land continuously for a period of twelve years had a right of occupancy, whether he held under a pottah or not. In reference to this, it was held that a lessee of land continuously in cultivating possession for a period of twelve years under several written leases or pottahs which were for specified terms of years, but in which there was no express stipulation for the landlord's re-entry on their expiration, had a right of occupancy. The mere exist-

**RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—contd.****1. ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—contd.****(c) MODE OF ACQUISITION—contd.**

ence of a term in a lease was not an "express stipulation" to the contrary, within the meaning of s. 7, so as to exclude the right of occupancy. The decision of the Full Bench in *Sheo Prokash Misser v. Ram Sahai Singh*, 8 B. L. R. 165, approved and held applicable. In a suit for the recovery of possession, with mesne profits, of land, brought by a lessor against the tenant holding over, the defence was, as to part of the land, that the tenant had a right of occupancy, his cultivating possession, having lasted for more than twelve years. The right was established, but the burden of proving to which part of the land it attached was upon the tenant, and for proof as to this the suit was remanded. *CHANDRABATI KOERI v. HARRINGTON*

**I. L. R. '18 Calc. 349  
L. R. 18 I. A. 27**

**86.** . . . . . *Holding under leases—Act X of 1859, s. 6—Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 6—Cultivating raiyat.* From 1824 to 1832 the defendant held certain lands as cultivator; from that year to 1839 he obtained a lease from the zamindar of the village in which the lands were situate; from 1839 to 1843 he continued to hold these lands as cultivator; from that time to 1862 he again obtained a lease of the village, retaining these lands in his own cultivation; and after the expiry of the lease he continued to cultivate the lands. In a suit by the zamindar for possession on the ground that the defendant was holding over after the expiry of his lease:—*Held*, that the defendant had acquired a right of occupancy under s. 6, Act X of 1859. *MUKANDI LAL DUBEI v. CROWDY*

**8 B. L. R. Ap. 95**

*S.C. MOKOONDY LALL DOOBAY v. CROWDY*

**17 W. R. 274**

**87.** . . . . . *Act X of 1859, s. 6—Setting aside pottah as void.* Even if a raiyat's pottah be declared by a Court to be null and void, his title to the occupancy right laid down in s. 6, Act X of 1859, was not affected, provided he had held or cultivated continuously for a period of twelve years. *SHIB NATH ROY v. WATSON & Co.*

**8 W. R. 374**

**88.** . . . . . *Occupation or cultivation by trespasser.* Occupation as a trespasser, or cultivation by a trespasser, could not confer a right under Act X of 1859, and could not be taken into account in considering whether such trespasser had occupied as a raiyat for twelve years. *PEER BUX v. MEAHJAN* . . . . . **W. R. F. B. 146**

*GHOLAM HYDER v. POORNO CHUNDER ROY*

**3 W. R., Act X, 147**

**89.** . . . . . *Confiscation of zamindar's rights—Interruption of growth of right.* Confiscation of the zamindar's rights, under Act XXV of 1857, will not operate to interrupt the growth of a right of occupancy claimed by a tenant. *SHEORAJ SINGH v. LEGGE* . . . . . **3 Agra 293**



**RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—contd.****1. ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—contd.****(c) MODE OF ACQUISITION—contd.**

**90.** *Interruption of possession during acquisition of right* In a suit by a zamindar for ejectment, where the raiyat pleads continuous occupancy for twelve years, and it is found that the raiyat was evicted during that period but got back into possession, if the eviction were wrongful, it would not be such an interruption of possession as would prevent the raiyat from acquiring a right of occupancy. But it would lie with the raiyat to show that the eviction was wrongful. **MAHOMED GAZEE CHOWDHRY v. NOOR MAHOMED**

**24 W. R. 324**

Reversing decision of **BIRCH, J.**, in s. c.

**24 W. R. 324 note**

**91.** *Application for ejectment, time when pending—Act X of 1859, s. 25.* An application under s. 25, Act X of 1859, for the assistance of the Collector in ejecting a raiyat was not of the nature of a suit, so as to cause a term of occupancy to cease to run; and if the raiyat, in spite of the zamindar's efforts to eject him, nevertheless continued in cultivatory possession and paid rent, he was entitled to count the time towards the twelve years required to found a right of occupancy. **MAHOMED SHAH v. USGUR HOSSEIN** . **5 N. W. 151**

**92.** *Exclusion of period when tenure is in dispute.* In computing the period of twelve years' holding which creates a right of occupancy, all such time during which the land was subject to litigation should be excluded. **NAIPAL SINGH v. RAM NARAIN** . **2 Agra 93**

**93.** *Act X of 1859, s. 6—Change of farmers.* A right of occupancy under s. 6, Act X of 1859, was not affected by a mere change in the farmers. **SHEO CHURN SINGH v. GORA CHAND GHOSE** . **3 W. R., Act X, 125**

**94.** *Continuous occupation—Alluvial land—N.-W. P. Rent Act, XVIII of 1873, s. 8—Occupancy-tenant.* A tenant who has occupied or cultivated alluvial land, whenever such land was capable of occupation or cultivation for twelve years, acquires by such occupation or cultivation a right of occupancy in such land. **LACHMAN PRASAD v. BAL SINGH**

**I. L. R. 4 All. 157**

**95.** *Custom of district—Utbandi tenures—Effect of non-payment of rent for time when land not culturable.* Where by the custom of a particular locality rent was not payable when the land was not culturable, and the raiyat paid rent only for the period that he could cultivate, he would still come within the meaning of the provision of the law which declares that a raiyat who holds or occupies land for a period of twelve years has a right to occupy the land so long as he pays the rent due thereupon. **PREMANUND GHOSE v. SHOORENDRONATH ROY** . **20 W. R. 329**

**96.** *Bengal Tenancy Act, s. 180—"Utbandi" holding.* Case in which

**RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—contd.****1. ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—contd.****(c) MODE OF ACQUISITION—contd.**

the question as to what is an utbandi tenure is discussed. Where the plaintiff who had been dispossessed from certain land, claimed a right of occupancy in such land on the ground that he had held it for twelve years continuously:—*Held*, that, if the land formed a separate holding which he had from time to time cultivated on the utbandi system during a period which had covered more than twelve years, cultivation at various times and under separate agreements on each occasion (such periods not being continuous although of the same piece of land) would not confer a right of occupancy on the ground that the first of such periods commenced more than twelve years before the alleged dispossession. **BENI MADHUB CHUCKERBUTTY v. BHUBUN MOHUN BISWAS** . **I. L. R. 17 Calc. 393**

**97.** *Occupancy by inheritance—Successive occupants—Act X of 1859, s. 6.* Under s. 6, Act X of 1859, it is only when occupancy is inherited that the occupancy of the predecessor is considered as the occupancy of the tenant in possession. **WATSON & Co. v. SHURUF SOONDREE DEBIA** . **7 W. R. 395**

**KHERODE CHUNDER ROY v. GORDON**

**23 W. R. 237**

**98.** *Successive occupants—Act X of 1859, s. 6—Occupancy by inheritance.* A holding by a raiyat and his father before him for many years constitutes a right of occupancy which will prevent ejectment by the zamindar except in due course of law. **NIM CHAND BOROOAH v. MOORAREE MUNDUL** . **8 W. R. 127**

**99.** *Occupancy by inheritance—Occupation by raiyat as malik—Rent Act (Beng. Act VIII of 1869), s. 6.* It is only the holding of the father or other person from whom a raiyat inherits that can be deemed to be the holding of the raiyat within the meaning of s. 6 of the Rent Act. Occupation by the predecessor in title is not such an occupation as will create in the holder of land any right of occupancy. Nor can the period during which the occupant of land is in possession as malik be included in considering whether he has acquired a right of occupancy; such a right must be acquired against some body, and cannot be acquired by a man against himself. **LAL BAHADOOR SINGH v. SOLANO**

**I. L. R. 10 Calc. 45: 12 C. L. R. 539**

**100.** *Occupancy by inheritance—Succession to occupancy right—Acquisition of right by continuing holding.* Where the plaintiff succeeded to his uncle's holding, who had a right of occupancy, and the zamindar permitted him for about six years to hold the land without any new arrangement:—*Held*, that he was entitled to recover the land as against the zamindar, his occupation being presumed to have been regarded as a continuation of the right of occupancy already acquired. **BRIJBHOOKUN v. BHYROW DUTT**

**3 Agra 240**



**RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—contd.****1. ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—contd.****(c) MODE OF ACQUISITION—contd.**

**101.** ——— *Raiyat succeeding by inheritance, though not entitled—Permissive holding for twelve years.* Where the plaintiff, a raiyat, was allowed to succeed to the holding of his uncle, who had a right of occupancy, and was allowed by the zamindar to continue in the holding for eleven years:—*Held*, that, though the plaintiff was not strictly entitled to succeed by right of inheritance, yet he must be taken to have succeeded to the holding by the consent of the zamindar, and to have acquired a right of occupancy. *HUKEEM-ODD-NISA v. BHOORIA*. . . . . **5 N. W. 23**

**102.** ——— *Occupancy by purchase or transfer.* Unless the tenant hold a transferable tenure, the sale by him of his jote to another party, without the consent of his landlord, does not transfer to the purchaser any right of occupancy which the latter may have possessed, or enable the present occupant to plead that the period of his own possession, joined to that of the former tenant, gives him a presumptive right of occupancy. *WATSON & CO. v. SHURUT SOONDUREE DEBIA*. . . . . **7 W. R. 395**

**103.** ——— *Transfer of tenure by consent—Continuous possession.* Where the zamindar consents to the transfer of a tenure from one raiyat to another, the possession of both must be considered to be continuous, and the right of occupancy to date from the time of the first holder. *HURO CHUNDER GOHO v. DUNN*. . . . . **5 W. R., Act X, 55**

**104.** ——— *Receipt of rent by zamindar—Purchaser from tenant.* A zamindar does not, by the mere receipt of rent from a purchaser from the tenant having a right of occupancy, sanction the sale to the purchaser so as to give him a right of occupancy. *GAUR LAL SIKKAR v. RAMESWAR BHUMIK*. . . . . **6 B. L. R. Ap. 92**

**105.** ——— *Transfer of right—Possession of transferor—Act X of 1859, s. 6.* The possession of the vendor could not be added to the possession of the purchasers so as to give the latter a right of occupancy under s. 6, Act X of 1859. *HYDER BUKSH v. BHUBINDRO DEB COWAR*. . . . . **13 B. L. R. 276 note : 17 W. R. 179**

*TARAPRASAD ROY v. SURJOKANTO ACHARJEE CHOWDHRY*. . . . . **13 B. L. R. 281 note : 15 W. R. 152**

**106.** ——— *Joint and afterwards sole possession—Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 6.* The continuous possession for twelve years which is the subject of s. 6 of the rent law of 1869 must be a possession under one and the same right. This right may be in its inception joint with other persons, and by the death of co-sharers ultimately become a sole right without its continuous nature being affected. *FORBES v. RAM LALL BISWAS*. . . . . **22 W. R. 51**

**RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—contd.****1. ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—contd.****(c) MODE OF ACQUISITION—contd.**

**107.** ——— *Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 6.* A and B jointly obtained a pottah of a piece of land from the zamindar for a period of five years. Afterwards A alone obtained a pottah for another period of five years. Upon the expiry of this period, A held on for two years longer, when he was dispossessed by the zamindar. In a suit by A for recovery of possession on the ground that he had acquired a right of occupancy:—*Held*, that he had not acquired a right of occupancy. *MAHOMED CHAMAN v. RAMPRASAD BHAGAT*. . . . . **8 B. L. R. 338 : 22 W. R. 52 note**

**108.** ——— *Collateral relative—N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1881), s. 9—Succession to occupancy tenant—Onus of proof—Sharer in cultivation.* Where a collateral relative claims to be entitled to succeed to an occupancy holding on the death of the occupancy tenant without direct heirs, it is incumbent on him to prove both that he is the heir according to the law to which he is subject and also that he shared in the cultivation of the occupancy holding during the lifetime of the deceased occupancy tenant. But *non sequitur* that, if there is a more remote collateral who was a sharer in the cultivation of the occupancy holding, he is entitled to succeed in preference to a nearer collateral who did not so share in the cultivation. *Badri Das v. Debi Das*, *All. Weekly Notes* (1888) 200, referred to. *SHANKAR LAL v. DALIP SINGH*. . . . . **I. L. R. 17 All. 33**

**109.** ——— *Agreement restricting right of occupancy—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 178, applicability of, to suits pending when Act came into force.* S. 178 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885) has no application to suits instituted before the date on which that Act came into force. So where a landlord sued to eject a tenant who had executed a solenamah agreeing to hold the land in suit for a specified period at a specified rent, and providing that the landlord was to be at liberty to enter on the lands at the expiry of the period, and the suit was instituted on the 6th October 1885, and where it was found that at the date of the solenamah the tenant had acquired a right of occupancy with respect to the lands in suit:—*Held*, that the tenant was not entitled to the benefits conferred by s. 178, cl. 1, sub-cl. (b), of the Bengal Tenancy Act, but was liable to be ejected. *MOHESHWAR PERSHAD NARAIN SINGH v. SHEOBARAN MAHTO*. *MOHESHWAR PERSHAD NARAIN SINGH v. DURSUN RAUT*. . . . . **I. L. R. 14 Calc. 621**

**110.** ——— *Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 5, cls. 25 and 178—Definition of raiyati holding—Lessees who are not raiyati within the Act—Zur-i-peshgi lease—Stipulation contrary to right to acquire occupancy rights—Act X of 1859, s. 7.* A tenant, holding under a lease assigned to him in 1890 by the original lessee, who since 1867 had continuously occupied the land under successive leases, claimed, in virtue of the



**RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—contd.****1. ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—contd.****(c) MODE OF ACQUISITION—contd.**

occupancy for more than twelve years to be a raiyat within the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, either with occupancy or with non-occupancy rights. *Held*, that this tenant's holding was excluded from the operation of that Act by the effect of s. 5, sub-s. 5, on account of the extent of the area of the land leased, which was more than one hundred standard bighas. A zur-i-peshgi lease is not a mere contract for the cultivation of the land at a rent, but is a security to the tenant for his money advanced. Two of the leases were zur-i-peshgi, or made on money advanced by the lessee to the lessor. The tenant's possession in this case was, in part at least, that of a creditor operating payment to himself, and was no foundation for a claim for occupancy rights. As to the effect of written stipulations contrary to the latter, s. 7 of the Bengal Rent Law, Act X of 1859, is superseded, if not wholly repealed, by s. 178 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885. **BENGAL INDIGO CO. v. ROGHOBUR DAS . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 272 L. R. 23 I. A. 158 1 C. W. N. 83**

*See* **RAM KHELAWAN SINGH v. SAMBROO ROY 2 C. W. N. 758**

**111. ——— Purchase by tenant of fractional share of proprietary interest effect of, on acquisition of right of occupancy—Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 6.** A tenant, who had commenced to occupy his holding on the 13th April 1871, acquired by purchase in the year 1878 a fractional share of the proprietary interest, and continued to occupy the holding as raiyat till the 13th May 1885, when he was dispossessed. On the 30th March 1886 he instituted a suit to recover possession, alleging that he had acquired a right of occupancy. It was contended that, owing to the purchase of the share of the proprietary interest, he could not have acquired such right. *Held*, that under Bengal Act VIII of 1869 there was nothing to prevent such right being acquired by the plaintiff if after his purchase he continued to hold the land as a raiyat and if the relation of landlord and tenant existed between himself on the one hand and the proprietors on the other, and if the period for which he so held extended for twelve years from the date of the commencement of his holding. **GUR BUKSH ROY alias GUR BUKSH SINGH v. JEOLAL ROY I. L. R. 16 Calc. 127**

*See* **MASEYK v. BHAGABATI BARMANYA I. L. R. 18 Calc. 121**

**112. ——— Presumption that right of occupancy exists.** The mere fact of plaintiff suing for enhancement implies the tenant's right of occupancy, for a tenant-at-will may be ejected if he refuses to pay such rent as the landlord demands. **TARAMONEE DOSSEE v. BIRRESSUR MOZOOMDAR 1 W. R. 86**

**RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—contd.****1. ACQUISITION OF RIGHT—concl'd.****(c) MODE OF ACQUISITION—concl'd.**

**113. ——— Effect of acquisition of right—Right to hold at fixed rates.** A right to hold at fixed rates does not necessarily follow a right of occupancy. **RAMNARAIN SINGH v. HURONATH ROY . . . W. R. 1864, Act X, 92**

**114. ——— Interest in land—Proprietorship of the soil.** A raiyat having a mere right of occupancy, and not a right to hold at a fixed rate of rent, has not such an interest in the land as gives him a right to a share of the rent. He has simply a right to occupy the land in preference to any other tenant so long as he pays a fair and equitable rent. A Judge cannot fix the term in suits by a landlord for rent or for kabuliats, as can be done in a suit by a raiyat having a right of occupancy for the delivery of a pottah. **HILLS v. ISHORE GHOSE . . . W. R. F. B. 131**

**2. LOSS OR FORFEITURE OF RIGHT.**

**1. ——— Statutory right, effect on of repeal of Act which gives it—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 19.** Where a right of occupancy had been acquired under the old Tenancy Act (VIII of 1869), which is repealed by the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885):—*Held*, that, apart from the provisions of s. 19 of the latter Act, such right of occupancy was not forfeited by the repeal, there being nothing in the new enactment to deprive any person of a statutory right which had been actually acquired. **HURRY RAM v. NURSINGH LAL . . . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 129**

**2. ——— Effect upon acquisition of right of occupancy of raiyat being jointly interested in land of ijaradar—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 22, sub-s. (3).** Both under s. 22, sub-s. (3), of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885) and under the previous law, a person jointly interested in land as ijaradar does not thereby lose his occupancy-rights, and *à fortiori* his entire rights as a tenant, in land held and cultivated by him as a raiyat. **GUR BUKSH ROY v. JEOLAL ROY, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 127, referred to. MASEYK v. BHAGABATI BARMANYA . I. L. R. 18 Calc. 121**

**3. ——— Sub-letting, effect of—Right of sub-lessee of occupancy raiyat.** A raiyat with a right of occupancy does not, by sub-letting his land, lose his right; but the sub-lessee thereby gains no right. **KALEE KISHORE CHATTERJEE v. RAM CHURN SHAH . . . 9 W. R. 344**

**JAMIR GAZI v. GONEYE MUNDUL 13 B. L. R. 278 note : 12 W. R. 110**

**GORA CHAND MUSTAFI v. MADAN MOHAN SIKDAR 13 B. L. R. 279 note . 11 W. R. 94**

**DWARKANATH MISREE v. KANHAYE SIRDAR 16 W. R. 110**

**4. ——— Arrangement to pay certain rent for fixed term—Surrender of rights by raiyat for enlarged holding.** A tenant with a



**RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—contd.****2. LOSS OR FORFEITURE OF RIGHT—contd.**

right of occupancy does not lose that right merely by making an arrangement to pay a certain rent for his holding for a certain number of years; but if he surrenders his rights in return for an enlarged holding, his occupancy right will be destroyed. *DIRGANJ SINGH v. FOORSUT*

1 N. W. 99 : Ed. 1873, 144

5. **Abandonment of land—*Khodkast raiyat*.** The right of occupancy given in s. 6, Act X of 1859, was a right to occupy and hold the land. When a raiyat leaves his home, he ceases to be a *khodkast raiyat*; and if he refuses to come back and cultivate the land when called upon, the zamindar is at liberty to settle the land with others. *HARO DASS v. GOBIND BHUTTACHARJEE*

3 B. L. R. Ap. 123

S.C. *HURO DOSS v. GOBIND BHUTTACHARJEE*

12 W. R. 304

*RAM CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHRY v. BHOLANATH LUSHKUR*

22 W. R. 200

*MAHOMED TUMEEZOODDEEN MUNDUL v. LUKKEE NARAIN DEY SIRCAR*

25 W. R. 104

6. **Ceasing to hold or cultivate land.** A *mokurari mirasi pottah* was granted in 1838 to A, who was found to have held thereunder as a raiyat till 1859, when his right, title, and interest were sold in execution of a decree and purchased by B, and the latter was accepted as tenant by and paid rent to the zamindar for nearly twelve years. The zamindari, being sold in 1871 for arrears of Government revenue, was purchased by the plaintiff, who gave B notice to quit, and on his refusal brought a suit to eject him. *Held*, that, by ceasing himself to hold or cultivate the land, it might be considered that A had abandoned his right, or that the right had ceased. No right therefore remained in A or his heirs such as would prevent the plaintiff from ejecting B. *NARENDRA NARAIN ROY CHOWDHRY v. ISHAN CHANDRA SEN*

13 B. L. R. F. B. 274 : 22 W. R. 22

*See HYES v. MONEEROODDEEN AHUNG*

24 W. R. 6

and *BONOMALEE BAZADAR v. KYLASH CHUNDER MOJOMDAR*

24 W. R. 72

*See HUREEHUR MOOKERJEE v. JODOONATH GHOSE*

7 W. R. 114

7. **Landlord and tenant—Occupancy tenant—Non-payment of rent—Abandonment of tenancy.** Mere non-payment of rent by an occupancy raiyat does not extinguish or constitute an abandonment of the tenancy. *Hem Chandra Chowdhri v. Chand Akund*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 115, distinguished. *Hemnath Dutt v. Ashgur Sindar*, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 894; *Golam Ali Mundul v. Golap Sundery Dasi*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 612; *Manirullah v. Ramzan Ali*, 1 C. L. R. 293, explained. *OBHOYA CHARAN BHOOLA v. KOILASH CHUNDER DEY*

I. L. R. 14 Calc. 751

**RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—contd.****2. LOSS OR FORFEITURE OF RIGHT—contd.**

8. **Relinquishment, evidence of.** Mere non-payment of rent does not extinguish or amount to a relinquishment of the right of occupancy. *Hem Chandra Chowdhari v. Chand Akund*, I. L. R. 12 Calc. 115, explained. *NILMONEE DASSY v. SONATUN DOSHAYI*

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 17

9. **Failure to pay rent—Non-payment of rent for long period.** Where a raiyat with a right of occupancy fails to pay rent even for five years, he does not necessarily forfeit his right, unless he has abandoned his land. *BROJENDRO COOMAR ROY CHOWDHRY v. BUNGO CHUNDER MUNDUL*

12 C. L. R. 389

10. **Ejectment—Abandonment of holding—Beng. Act VIII of 1869, ss. 6 and 22.** When a tenant having a right of occupancy abandons his holding and ceases to pay rent for five years, it is not a right construction of s. 22 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869 to say that the landlord may not put another tenant into possession without the formality of a suit. S. 6 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869 expressly limits duration of occupancy right by the words "so long as he pays the rent payable on account of the same," and distinct abandonment and cessation to pay rent disentitle the tenant from enforcing the rights which he may have previously enjoyed. *GOLAM ALI MUNDUL v. GOLAP SOONDERY DOSSEE*

I. L. R. 8 Calc. 612 : 10 C. L. R. 499

11. **Land submerged for long period.** Where land held by tenants with rights of occupancy was completely submerged for a number of years, and during the period of such submersion no rent was paid by the tenants:—*Held*, that the tenants had, by non-payment of rent, during the period of submersion, forfeited their rights of occupancy. *HEMNATH DUTT v. ASHGUR SINDAR*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 894

12. **Dispossession—Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 6—Suit for possession of land.** Where a raiyat had been in possession of land, but had been dispossessed, and for some years previous to suit had failed to pay rent:—*Held*, that at the time of the institution of a suit for recovery of possession he had no subsisting title, and consequently his suit must fail. *HEM CHUNDRACHOWDHARI v. CHAND AKUND*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 115

13. **Acquisition of raiyat's holding by zamindar, effect of—Wrongful eviction—Benami purchase.** The right of occupancy is a right given to a raiyat continuing only so long as the raiyat pays rent for the land he holds, and though it cannot be affected by a wrongful eviction, still, when the zamindar acquires the land by purchase and takes possession, even in the benami name of a third party, seeing that he cannot pay rent to himself, the right is gone and cannot subsequently be revived. *RADHA GOBIND KOER v. RAKHAL DAS MUKERJEE*

I. L. R. 12 Calc. 82



RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—*contd.*LOSS OR FORFEITURE OF RIGHT—*contd.*

14. ———— **Setting up adverse title—Forfeiture of right of occupancy—Denial of title.** *Quære*: Under what circumstances may a person having a right of occupancy forfeit it by setting up an adverse title? **UNNOPOORNA DOSSEE v. RADHA MOHUN PATTRO** . . . . . 19 W. R. 95

15. ———— **Effect of denial of title on tenant's rights.** The setting up of a hostile title against the zamindar by a tenant under pottah found to be fraudulent, amounts to a disclaimer and forfeiture of all rights of occupancy to which the tenant might have been entitled had he set up his title under s. 6, Act X of 1859. **NADIR BEG. v. MUDDURRAM** . . . . . 2 W. R., Act X, 2

16. ———— **Assertion of transferable right—Ejectment—Transfer—Effect of asserting right to transfer land, by a raiyat having a right of occupancy who remains in possession.** A raiyat having a right of occupancy is not liable to ejectment by his superior landlord merely because he has asserted a transferable right in the lands, and sold that right to a stranger without giving up possession of the land. **Narendra Narain Roy Chowdhry v. Shan Chandra Sen**, 13 B. L. R. 274, and **Ram Chandra Roy Chowdhry v. Bholanath Lushkhur**, 22 W. R. 200, distinguished. **Dwarka Nath Misra v. Hurriah Chundra**, 1. L. R. 4 Calc. 925, referred to. **SRISTEEDHUR BISWAS v. MUDAN SIRDAR** . . . . . I. L. R. 9 Calc. 648

17. ———— **Surrender to landlord—Pottahdar in Madras Presidency—Transfer by tenant.** The tenancy of an ordinary pottahdar in the Madras Presidency, when properly created, entitles the tenant to the right of occupancy for the purpose of cultivation, until default in the payment of the stipulated rent or surrender to the landlord in writing and the right of the tenant is assignable as a mortgage security. A verbal surrender by the tenant to the landlord after the assignment was known to the landlord cannot be relied on as rendering the assignment void. **VENKATARAMANIER v. ANANDA CHETTY** . . . . . 5 Mad. 120

18. ———— **Delay in applying for pottah from Government—Occupancy raiyat in Assam.** An occupancy raiyat in Assam does not forfeit his right to a pottah from Government by not applying for it so soon as another who was not in possession of the land. **MORA RABHA v. DHEW RABHA** . . . . . 17 W. R. 158

19. ———— **Default in paying assessment of revenue—Bombay Land Revenue Act (Bom. Act V of 1879), ss. 81 and 153—Payment of assessment by another—Effect of order of Collector transferring lands into name of person paying assessment.** An order made by a Collector removing A's lands from his khata and transferring them to B's khata, on the ground that A had allowed the assessment thereof to fall into arrears, and that B had paid the assessment, does not by itself amount to forfeiture of A's interest in the lands. **BHAU v. HARI** . . . . . I. L. R. 20 Bom. 747

RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—*contd.*2. LOSS OR FORFEITURE OF RIGHT—*concl.*

20. ———— **Khoti tenure—Mortgage by registered occupant—Sale in execution of decree on mortgage—Suit for possession by assignee of purchaser at such sale—Bombay Land Revenue Act, ss. 86, 153.** One B, the registered occupant of certain lands situate in a khoti village, mortgaged the lands to one V, who got a decree on the mortgage. In execution of the decree, the lands were sold to P, who assigned them to the plaintiff. In January 1878 the defendant, as khot, took possession of the land, alleging that B had no right to mortgage; that he had left the village and forfeited his occupancy; that he (the defendant) had thereupon rightfully taken possession of the land in 1878, and that the occupancy had been declared forfeited by the revenue authorities in August 1887, under ss. 86 and 153 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code (Bombay Act V of 1879). In 1888 the plaintiff brought this suit to recover the lands. The lower Court held that the defendant by accepting rent from the mortgagee was proved to have "consented to the mortgage and its necessary consequences." On appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, reversing the decree of lower Court, that the plaintiff on the strength of his purchase from P in 1887, had no right to eject the defendant. **PURUSHOTTAM VAMAN SOMAN v. KASHIDAS JEYCHANDSHET** . . . . . I. L. R. 17 Bom. 677

## 3. TRANSFER OF RIGHT.

1. ———— **Nature of right as to transferability—Consent of zamindar to transfer.** A right of occupancy is not transferable irrespective of the consent or otherwise of the zamindar. **BUTI SINGH v. MURAT SINGH** . 13 B. L. R. 2 84 note  
S.C. BOOTEE SINGH v. MOORT SINGH  
20 W. R. 478

2. ———— **Right of transferee against zamindar—Consent of zamindar.** A transfer of a mere right of occupancy gives no title to the transferee against the zamindar. **DURGA SUNDARI v. BRINDABUN CHUNDRA SIRCAR CHOWDHY** . . . . . 2 B. L. R. Ap. 37: 11 W. R. 162

3. ———— **Power of transfer—Consent of landlord—Act X of 1859, s. 6—Transferable tenure.** A tenure not originally transferable without the consent of the landlord does not become so merely because the tenant has obtained a right of occupancy under s. 6, Act X of 1859. *Quære*: Per **PEACOCK, C.J.**—Whether a right of occupancy gained under s. 6, Act X of 1859, is necessarily heritable. **AJOODHIA PERSAD v. EMANBANDI BEGUM** . . . . . B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 725  
2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 192: 7 W. R. 528

4. ———— **Right of zamindar as against transferee—Mesne profits.** A right of occupancy which is not transferable is merely a right on the part of the person entitled to it to occupy and till the soil, either by himself or by persons dependent on or subordinate to him, *e.g.*, his



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servants, lessees, or licensees. Therefore, where a non-transferable right of occupancy was transferred, and the transferee was in actual possession of the soil, tilling and using it for his own benefit. *Held*, that the zamindar had a right of suit against the transferee to recover possession of the land. He was also entitled to recover as damages so much of the zamindar's rents and profits as the defendant had, while in possession, been the means of preventing the zamindar from receiving. *SOHODWA v. SMITH*  
**12 B. L. R. 82: 20 W. R. 139**

**5. ——— Right of heir of person with right of occupancy.** The heir of a person with a restricted right of occupancy, though not competent to transfer that right out and out by sale, may make for sale such arrangements as he thinks fit for the cultivation and management of the tenure. *MOHANUND BANERJEE v. SHUSHEE SHEKHUR CHATTERJEE* . . . **20 W. R. 132**

**6. ——— Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 6, occupancy right under—Sale in execution of decree—Gift.** The right of occupancy acquired by a cultivating raiyat under s. 6 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869 cannot be transferred either by a voluntary sale or gift, or by a sale in execution of a decree. *DWARKA NATH MISSER v. HURRISH CHUNDER* . . . **I. L. R. 4 Calc. 925: 4 C. L. R. 130**

**7. ——— Right of transferee—Purchaser at sale in execution of decree.** The sale of a jote in execution of a decree against the jotedar does not prove it to be transferable, nor does the purchaser acquire a right of occupancy by his purchase where the right is not dependent on custom, but is a mere creature of the rent law. *KRIPA NATH CHAKKEE v. DYAL CHAND PAL* . . . **22 W. R. 169**

**8. ——— Customary right of transfer—Tenure of khodkast raiyat.** There is nothing unreasonable in the custom by which the tenure of a khodkast raiyat, who has built a pucca house on his land, and has acquired a right of occupancy under s. 6, Act X of 1859, is transferable. *CHUNDER COOMAR ROY v. KADERMONEE DOSSEE*  
**7 W. R. 247**

**9. ——— Custom or usage, nature of evidence to prove—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 183, Ill. (1).** In suits by a landlord for ejectment of purchasers from raiyats having only a right of occupancy on the ground that the holdings of such raiyats were not transferable without the landlord's consent, the defendants pleaded custom or usage in support of the transfers. Questions arose as to the character of the usage required to be proved in such cases and the nature of the evidence required to prove the usage. In second appeal the High Court (i) upon a review of the previous law on the subject, *held*, that, however, the law may have been previously declared, as it is now expressed in the Bengal Tenancy Act, s. 183, Ill. 1, a transfer in accordance with usage is valid even without the consent of the landlord. (ii) After applying the principles laid down by the

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Privy Council as regards evidence of mercantile usages in the case of *Juggomohun Ghose v. Manic Chand*, 7 Moo. I. A. 263:—*Held*, that it would be necessary in these cases either to prove the existence of the usage on the landlord's estate or that it is so prevalent in the neighbourhood that it can reasonably be presumed to exist on that estate. The finding of the lower Appellate Court on the existence of the usage being founded on irrelevant matters, the case was remanded for re-trial. *PALAK DHARI RAI v. MANNERS* . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 178

**10. ——— Custom or usage—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 183 and 178 sub-s. (3), cl. (d)—Local usage—Evidence to prove usage—Evidence Act (I of 1872), ss. 42 and 48—Judgment as to transferability of tenures in adjoining villages.** In a suit by the landlords to avoid the sale of an occupancy holding in their mouzah and eject the purchaser thereof, one of the questions was as to the existence of a custom or usage under which the raiyat was entitled to sell such a holding. *Held* with reference to the expressions "custom or usage" in s. 183 and "local usage" in cl. (d), sub-s. (3) of s. 178 of the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885) that (i) The word "usage" would include what the people are now or recently in the habit of doing in a particular place. (ii) In deciding on the evidence of such a custom or usage, regard should be had to s. 48 of the Indian Evidence Act (I of 1872). (iii) A judgment of the High Court as to the transferability of similar tenures in an adjoining village of the same pergunnah is admissible as evidence of such usage under s. 42 of the Evidence Act. *DALGLISH v. GUZUFFER HASSAIN*  
**I. L. R. 23 Calc 427**

In the same case after remand it was *held* that to establish that occupancy holdings are transferable in accordance with local usage, it is necessary to adduce evidence of purchases or transfer by persons other than the landlords made with the knowledge but without the consent of the latter and to which no objection was made by the latter. The words "custom" and "usage" are not synonymous terms, and the same kind of evidence as would be required to prove a custom is not necessary when the existence of a local usage is in question. A long period of time must elapse, before a custom in respect of the transferability of occupancy holdings can grow up: but this is not the case with regard to the growth of usage in respect of the matter. The usage "to which ss. 178 and 183 refer is not restricted to a usage existing at the time of the passing of the Act, but it includes usage which may have subsequently grown up. *DALGLIESH v. GOZAFFER HOSSEIN* . . . **3 C. W. N. 21**

**11. ——— Transferability of right—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 65 and 73.** In the absence of custom or local usage to the contrary, a raiyati holding in which the raiyat has only a right of occupancy is not saleable at the instance of the occupancy raiyat or any cre-



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itor of his other than his landlord seeking, to obtain satisfaction of his decree for arrears of rent. *BIRAM ALI SHAIK SHIKDAR v. GOPIKANTH SHAHA*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 355  
1 C. W. N. 396

12. ————— *Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 178, 183—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 48—Admissibility of opinion as to existence of custom or usage.* In this suit the plaintiffs by virtue of patni settlements sought to obtain khas possession of certain jote lands which purported to have been conveyed by the jotedars, the first set of defendants, to the second set of defendants, although there was no custom or usage in the village recognizing the transferability of occupancy rights. *Held*, that in order to establish usage under ss. 178, 183 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, it was not necessary to require proof of its existence for any length of time. *Held*, also, that the statement made by persons who were in a position to know of the existence of a custom or usage in their locality were admissible under s. 48 of the Evidence Act. *Dalglish v. Guzuffer Hossain*, I. L. R. 23 Cal. 427, followed. *SARIATULLAH SARKAR v. NATH NANDI* . . . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 184

13. ————— *Sale of an occupancy holding not transferable by custom in execution of a decree for arrears of rent obtained by some of several co-sharers landlords—Effect of such a sale—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 65 and 188.* A decree for rent obtained by some of certain co-sharer landlords and not by the whole body of them, is not a decree under the Bengal Tenancy Act. *Prem Chand Nuskar v. Mokshoda Debi*, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 201, and *Jugobundhu Pat-tuck v. Jadu Ghose Alkushi*, I. L. R. 15 Calc. 47, referred to. An occupancy holding which is not transferable by custom, as also the interest of the judgment-debtor in the said holding, are not saleable in execution of such a decree. *Biram Ali Shaik Shikdar v. Gopi Kanth Shaha*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 355, referred to. *DURGA CHARAN MANDAL v. KALI PRASANNA SARKAR*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 727  
3 C. W. N. 586

14. ————— *Sale of occupancy-holding in execution of decree for rent by one of several joint landlords—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 22, 65, 73, 188—Arrears of rent of separate share—Execution of decree for rent—Joint landlords—Transferability of occupancy holding—Bengal Act VIII of 1889, ss. 59-64—Landlord and Tenant—Want of saleable interest in judgment-debtor—Rights of purchaser.* The Bengal Tenancy Act does not contemplate or provide for the sale of a holding at the instance of one only of several joint landlords who has obtained a decree for the share of the rent separately due to him; such a sale must be under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, and, would not carry with it the special incidents attaching to a sale under

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the Bengal Tenancy Act. When therefore an occupancy-holding, not transferable by custom or local usage, is sold in execution of a decree obtained by one of several joint landlords for the share of the rent separately due to him, the purchaser acquires nothing by his purchase, the judgment-debtor having no saleable interest in the holding. *Beni Madhab Roy v. Jaod Ali Sircar*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 390, followed. *Jawadul Huq v. Ram Das Saha*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 143, distinguished. *Bhiram Ali Shaik Shikdar v. Gopi Kanth Shaha*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 355, and *Hari Charan Bose v. Runjit Singh*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 917 note, referred to. *SADAGAR SIRCAR v. KRISHNA CHANDRA NATH* . . . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 937  
3 C. W. N. 742

15. ————— *Non-transferable occupancy holding, whether saleable at the instance of one of several joint landlords—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 65, 188.* A fractional shareholder selling a non-transferable occupancy-holding in execution of a decree which he obtained for his share of the rent is in no better position than an outsider selling the holding in execution of a money-decree. The "decree" referred to in s. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is a decree obtained by all the landlords or at all events a decree obtained by some of the landlords for the entire rent in the presence of all. *JARIF v. RAM KUMAR DE* . . . 3 C. W. N. 74

16. ————— *Non-transferable occupancy holding, whether saleable—Decree for arrears of rent by fractional co-sharer.* An occupancy-holding which is not transferable by custom or usage cannot be sold in execution of a decree for arrears of rent obtained by a fractional co-sharer. *Bhiram Ali Shaik Shikdar v. Gopi Kanth Shaha*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 355; *Durga Charan Mandal v. Kali Prasanna Sircar*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 727; and *Majed Hossein v. Raghubar Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 27 Calc. 187, relied on. *SITA NATH CHATTERJEE v. ATMARAM KAR* . . . 4 C. W. N. 571

17. ————— *Transfer to mokurari tenant—Dispossession by landlord—Trespass.* A raiyat having a right of occupancy can create a mokurari lease, but the terms of a lease granted by him to a third party can only be binding as between them both. If the landlord dispossesses the sub-lessee without the sanction of law, he is guilty of trespass. *DUMREE SHAIKH v. BISSESSUR LAL*  
13 W. R. 291

18. ————— *Proof of transferability—Custom—Special stipulation.* In order to make a right of occupancy transferable, it must be shown that it is so transferable according to the custom of that part of the country in which the tenure is situated. Where no mention is made in a dowl of any right to transfer, the existence of the power to transfer cannot be presumed. *UNNOPOORNA DOSSIA v. OOMACHURN DOSS* . . . 18 W. R. 55



RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—*contd.*3. TRANSFER OF RIGHT—*contd.*

19. ———— *Suit by transferee against zamindar for registration of name.* The purchaser of a right of occupancy in certain land, suing a zamindar who has refused to register his name in the zamindari sherista for the amount of land claimed and at a specified rent, is bound to show that the tenure was one which could be transferred, and that the sale did not involve any redistribution of the rent. *SHUNKURPUTTEE THAKOORAIN v. SAIF-OLLAH KHAN* . . . . . 18 W. R. 507

20. ———— *Obligation of zamindar to register a transfer—Act X of 1859, s. 27.* A right of occupancy is a transferable tenure, but the zamindar was not bound to register the transfer under s. 27, Act X of 1859. *TARAMONEE DOSSEE v. BIRRESSUR MOZOOMDAR* . . . . . 1 W. R. 86

21. ———— *Finding as to transferability—Right of tenant with right of occupancy to transfer.* Although it is the general rule in the N.-W. P. that a tenant's holding is not transferable without the zamindar's consent, yet the exceptions are so far from rare that it is necessary in each case to come to a distinct finding on this point, and decree accordingly. *HADAYET ALLY v. LALL SING* 1 N. W. Pt. II, p. 38 : Ed. 1873, 96

22. ———— *Transfer by raiyat holding land for agricultural purposes—Transfer for conversion to other purposes.* Raiyats having a right of occupancy for agricultural purposes may by custom have the right to transfer it to any person to hold for the same purpose, but that does not necessarily imply that the transferee may convert the land into a dwelling-house and appurtenances. *JUGUT CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHRY v. ESHAN CHUNDER BANERJEE* . . . . . 24 W. R. 220

23. ———— *Effect of transfer—Sub-letting—Right of ejectment—Sub-tenant.* A tenant having a right of occupancy does not determine it by sub-letting the land; therefore, whether the lessees are ejected by the zamindar, they are entitled to recover possession under the terms of their leases. *JAMIR GAZI v. GONEYE MUNDUL* 13 B. L. R. 278 note : 12 W. R. 110

24. ———— *Right of zamindar against transferee.* If a raiyat having a right of occupancy transfer his right to another, his right is not thereby forfeited, and the zamindar has no right to eject the transferee. *GORACHAND MUSTAFI v. MADAN MOHAN SIKDAR* 13 B. L. R. 279 note

*S.C. GORACHAND MOOSTAFEE v. BURODA PERSHAD MOOSTAFEE* . . . . . 11 W. R. 194

*DWARKANATH MISREE v. KANAYE SIRDAR* 16 W. R. 111

25. ———— *Sub-letting tenure—Right of sub-lessee.* A right of occupancy under s. 6, Act X of 1859, may be acquired by a tenant of land sub-let by a raiyat, but not unless the raiyat sub-letting has himself a right of occupancy. The acquiring the right was confined to the special cases

RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY—*contd.*3. TRANSFER OF RIGHT—*contd.*

in Act X of 1859. Where that Act was held not to apply, there was no equitable principle on which a person occupying under a grant for no specified period could acquire a right of occupancy. *RAM DHAN KHAN v. HARADHAN PARAMANICK* 9 B. L. R. 107 note : 12 W. R. 40

26. ———— *Sub-letting—Act X of 1859, s. 6.* A sued for a declaration of right of occupancy founded on a pottah and long possession, and alleged that he had under-let the raiyats the land devised by the pottah, but that B had obtained a decree against them for rent. The lower Court on appeal held that A had determined his tenancy by quitting the land. *Held*, that A did not by sub-letting, transfer the right of occupancy. Decree reversed, and case remanded for trial on the merits. *HARAN CHUNDER PAL v. MUKTA SUNDARI CHOWDHRAIN* 1 B. L. R. A. C. 81 : 10 W. R. 111

27. ———— *Relinquishment of tenancy—N.-W. P. Rent Act (XVIII of 1873), s. 9—Transfer.* Per *TYRRELL, J.*—A relinquishment by an occupancy tenant of his holding is not a "transfer" within the meaning of s. 9 of the Rent Act. *LALJI v. NURAN* . . . . . I. L. R. 5 All. 10

28. ———— *Mortgage—Act XII of 1881, s. 9—Landholder and Tenant—Usufructuary mortgage by occupancy tenant—"Transfer."* A mortgage with possession by an occupancy tenant of his cultivatory holding is a "transfer" within the prohibition of s. 9 of the N.-W. P. Rent Act, 1881. *GANGA DIN v. DHURANDHAR SINGH* I. L. R. 5 All. 49

29. ———— *Act XII of 1881 (N.-W. P. Rent Act), s. 9—Landlord and Tenant—Right of occupancy—Meaning of "transfer."* *Held* by the Full Bench (*MAHMOOD, J.*, dissenting), that an hypothecation by an occupancy tenant of his right of occupancy was not a "transfer" within the meaning of s. 9 of the N.-W. P. Rent Act, 1881. *GOPAL PANDEY v. PARSOTAM DAS. BADI NATH v. PARBAT* . . . . . I. L. R. 5 All. 12

30. ———— *Sale in execution of decree—Act XVIII of 1873, s. 9—Restriction on sale.* *Held* (by a majority of the Full Bench), that the right of an occupancy tenant is transferable by sale in execution of decree, but only as between persons who have become by inheritance co-sharers in such right. Per *STUART, C. J.*—That such right is transferable by sale in execution of decree without any restriction. *ABLAH RAI v. ULGIT NARAI BAI* . . . . . I. L. R. 1 All. 53

31. ———— *Act XVIII of 1873, s. 9.* S. 9 of Act XVIII of 1873 does not prevent a landholder from causing the sale, in execution of his own decree, of the occupancy right of his own judgment-debtor in land belonging to himself. *Albakh Rai v. Udit Narain Rai, I. L. R. 1 All. 353* distinguished. *UMRAO BEGUM v. LAND MORTGAGE BANK OF INDIA* . . . . . I. L. R. 1 All. 54



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Affirmed by the Full Bench (SPANKIE, J., dissenting). *UMRAO BEGAM v. LAND MORTGAGE BANK OF INDIA* . . . . . **I. L. R. 2 All. 451**

**32.** ——— **Rights of tenants at a fixed rate—Act XVIII of 1873, s. 9—Ex-proprietary tenant—Occupancy tenant—Inheritance to rights of occupancy.** Held, that the proviso to the last clause of s. 9 of Act XVIII of 1873 refers only to the holdings of ex-proprietary tenants and occupancy tenants, and not to tenants at fixed rates. *BHAGWANTI v. RUDE MAN TEWARI* **I. L. R. 2 All. 145**

**33.** ——— **Transfer of portion of tenure—Zamindar, right of—Ejectment.** The existence of a custom in a particular district by which rights of occupancy in such district are transferable will not justify the holder of such a right of occupancy in sub-dividing his tenure, and transferring different parts of it to different persons; and in case of such transfer the zamindar is entitled to treat the transferees as trespassers and eject them. *TIRTHANUND THAKOOR v. MUTTY LALL MISSEER* **I. L. R. 3 Calc. 474**

**34.** ——— **Transfer of a portion of occupancy holding—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 88—Custom—Ejectment—Possession.** The transfer of a portion of an occupancy holding is contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of s. 88 of the Bengal Tenancy Act VIII of 1885, and the existence of a custom in a particular place by which such a holding is transferable is immaterial and gives no right to the transferee as against the landlord. *KULDIP SINGH v. GILLANDERS, ARBUTHNOT & Co.* . . . . . **I. L. R. 26 Calc. 615**  
**4 C. W. N. 738**

See *CHANDRA MOHAN MOOKHOPADHAYA v. BIR-ESSWAR CHATTERJEE* . . . . . **1 C. W. N. 158**

*DURGA PROSAD SEN v. DOULA GAZEE* . . . . . **1 C. W. N. 160**

*KABIL SIRDAR v. CHUNDRA NATH NAG CHOWDHRY* . . . . . **I. L. R. 20 Calc. 590**

*GOZAFFER HOSSEIN v. BABLISH* . . . . . **1 C. W. N. 162**

and *KALLI NATH CHAKRAVARTI v. UPENDRA CHANDRA CHOWDHRY* . . . . . **I. L. R. 24 Calc. 212 : 1 C. W. N. 163**

**35.** ——— **Transfer of proprietary rights—Possession by conditional mortgagees—Sir land—Act XVIII of 1873—Purchase of proprietary rights by mortgagees.** The possession of sir land by conditional mortgagees must be treated as the possession of the mortgagees. Held, accordingly, that, where the mortgagees of certain proprietary rights in a mehal, being in possession of such rights, purchased the same at an auction-sale, the sir land included in the proprietary rights was held by the mortgagees at the time of the auction-sale within the meaning of s. 7 of Act XVIII of 1873, and that, after the sale in virtue of the provision of that section, they became entitled to a right of

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occupancy in the sir land. *DAKKAL RAM v. WAZIR ALI* . . . . . **I. L. R. 1 All. 448**

**36.** ——— **Mortgage—Ex-proprietary tenant—Act XVIII of 1873, s. 7—Transfer of rights.** Where a person mortgaged his proprietary rights in a mehal, which rights consisted of certain lands occupied by him covenanting to give the mortgagee possession for the purpose of cultivation and the payment of Government revenue, and being at liberty to redeem the lands at any time at the end of the month of Jaith, such person could not resist a claim on the part of the mortgagee for possession of the lands on the ground that he had a right of occupancy in the lands under s. 7 of Act XVIII of 1873, such section not being applicable and contemplating something more than a mere temporary transfer of proprietary rights. *BHAGWAN SINGH v. MURLI SINGH* **I. L. R. 1 All. 459**

**37.** ——— **Act XVIII of 1873, ss. 7, 9—Ex-proprietary tenant.** The right of occupancy which a person losing or parting with the proprietary rights in a mehal acquires, under s. 7 of Act XVIII of 1873, in the land held by him as sir in such mehal at the date of such loss or parting is a saleable interest. Held, where such a right was sold by private sale, that it was transferable, s. 9 of Act XVIII of 1873, notwithstanding. *Umrao Begam v. Land Mortgage Bank of India, I. L. R. 2 All. 451*, followed. A deed executed by a village proprietor purporting to transfer his share in the village including his sir land and ex-proprietary right divests such proprietor of the ex-proprietary right conferred by s. 7 of Act XVIII of 1873. *MAR-KUNDI DIAL v. RAM BARAN RAI* **I. L. R. 2 All. 735**

**38.** ——— **Transfer of raiyat's interest—Abandonment—Forfeiture—Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 6.** A mukurari mirasi pattah was granted in 1838 to A, who was found to have held thereunder as a raiyat till 1859, when his right, title, and interest were sold in execution of a decree and purchased by B, and the latter was accepted as tenant by, and paid rent to, the zamindar for nearly twelve years. The zamindari, being sold in 1871 for arrears of Government revenue was purchased by the plaintiff, who gave B notice to quit, and on his refusal brought the present suit to eject him. Held, that the right of occupancy which A had acquired under s. 6 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869 at the time of the sale to B was not transferable. *NARENDRA NARAYAN ROY CHOWDHRY v. ISHAN CHUNDRA SEN* **13 B. L. R. F. B. 274 : 22 W. R. 22**

See *WILSON v. RADHA DULARI GOPE* . . . . . **2 C. W. N. 63**

**39.** ——— **Abandonment—Status of purchaser as regards zamindar.** A tenant having a right of occupancy cannot create an intermediate tenure between himself and the zamindar. If a raiyat not having a transferable tenure



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quits possession, makes over his interests, and gives over the land to a third person, he may be treated as having abandoned all rights formerly possessed by him in the land. When a purchaser takes possession of a non-transferable tenure, and interposes himself between the zamindar and the raiyats on the land, he thereby commits a wrong, and the zamindar may sue to declare that no interest is vested in such purchaser or to restrain him from interfering with the collection of rent. *HURREHUR MOOKERJEE v. JODOONATH GHOSE*

7 W. R. 114

**40.** ———— *Recognition of transfer by zamindar.* The conduct and acts of a zamindar may be such as to take a case out of the purview of the Full Bench decision in *Narendra Narayan Roy v. Ishan Chundra Sen*, 13 B. L. R. 274 : 22 W. R. 22, which declares that the right of occupancy is not transferable, e.g., where a zamindar has clearly recognised a transfer and done everything in his power in accepting the transferee as his tenant. *AMEEN BUKSH v. BHYRO MUNDUL*

22 W. R. 493

**41.** ———— *N.-W. P. Rent Act (XVIII of 1873), s. 9—Sale of occupancy rights with zamindar's consent—Acceptance of rent by zamindar from vendees—Contract Act, ss. 2, 23—Estoppel—Evidence Act, ss. 115, 116.* Under a deed dated in 1879, the occupancy tenants of land in a village sold their occupancy rights, and the zamindars instituted a suit for a declaration that the sale-deed was invalid under s. 9 of Act XVIII of 1873 (the N.-W. P. Rent Act in force in 1879), and for ejectment of the vendees, who had obtained possession of the land. It was found that the zamindars had consented to the sale to the vendees, and received from them arrears of rent due on the holding by the vendors, and had recognised them as tenants. *Held*, on appeal under the Letters Patent, that the sale-deed was invalid with reference to the provisions of ss. 2 and 23 of the Contract Act, inasmuch as its object was the transfer of occupancy rights which was prohibited by s. 9 of Act XVIII of 1873. *Held*, also, that the zamindars having accepted the vendees as tenants and taken rent from them, a tenancy was thereby constituted under the rent law; that the vendees were therefore not trespassers; and that therefore the question as to ejectment did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. *JHINGURI TEWARI v. DURGA*

I. L. R. 7 All. 878

Upholding the judgment of *MAHMOOD, J.*, in *DURGA v. JHINGURI*. . . I. L. R. 7 All. 511 where *OLDFIELD, J.*, and *MAHMOOD, J.*, differed in opinion.

**42.** ———— *Transfer by one co-sharer—N.-W. P. Rent Act, 1873, s. 9—Suit by reversioner—Transferee by inheritance.* The plaintiffs sued to set aside an usufructuary mortgage of a cultivatory holding by the defendant *M* to the other defendants, on the averment that they held the same jointly

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with *M*'s deceased husband, and she had no right to make the mortgage. The lower Appellate Court found that the land was held separately by *M*'s husband, and that she had succeeded to its occupancy on the death of her son. The suit was dismissed in special appeal on the facts found and also with reference to s. 9 of Act XVIII of 1873. *BARANJA v. BASDEO MISSER* . . . 7 N. W. 241

**43.** ———— *Transfer of occupancy right and purchase by some of several co-sharer landlords—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 22, cl. 2—Merger—Right of other co-sharer landlords to rent.* The acquisition of an occupancy right by a proprietor does not, under sub-s. 2 of s. 22 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, affect the right of a co-sharer landlord to receive his share of the rent of the tenancy. The "third person" mentioned in that sub-section includes every person interested other than the transferor and transferee. *SITANATH PANDA v. PELARAM TRIPATI*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 869

**44.** ———— *Co-owner's purchase of occupancy right, effect of—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 22.* There is no law which prevents one of several co-proprietors from holding the status of a tenant under the other co-proprietors of land which appertains to the common estate. The effect of the purchase, by one co-owner of land, of the occupancy right is not that the holding ceases to exist, but only the occupancy right which is an incident of the holding. *Sitanath Panda v. Pelaram Tripati*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 869, referred to. *JAWADUL HUQ v. RAMDAS SAHA*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 143

1 C. W. N. 166

**45.** ———— *Effect of purchase, by talukhdar, of raiyat's holding—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 22, cl. (1).* If a talukhdar, at a sale in execution of a decree obtained by him against a raiyat, purchase the raiyat's interest, such purchase does not extinguish the holding, but merely divests it of the right of occupancy (if any) attached to it. *Jawadul Huq v. Ram Das Saha*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 143, followed. *MIAJAN v. MINNAT ALI* . . . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 521

See *RAM SARAN PODDAR v. MAHOMED LALIF*

3 C. W. N. 62

**46.** ———— *Occupancy, Non-transferable right of—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 22.—Effect of purchase of non-transferable right of occupancy by a co-sharer landlord.* S. 22 of the Bengal Tenancy Act applies only to occupancy-holdings which are transferable. In the case of a non-transferable occupancy-holding, the holding itself, as apart from the right of occupancy, cannot be sold so as to give the transferee a right to retain possession of it. *Jawadul Huq v. Ram Das Saha* I. L. R. 24 Calc. 143, explained and distinguished *GRISH CHANDRA CHOWDHRY v. KEDAR CHANDR. ROY* . . . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 47;

4 C. W. N. 56;



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47. ———— **Transfer by proprietor in mehal—Ex-proprietary tenant—Act XII of 1881 (N.-W. P. Rent Act), ss. 7, 9.** The words of s. 7 of the N.-W. P. Rent Act, "shall have a right of occupancy in the land held by him as sir," are intended by operation of law to confer upon the proprietor who has sold his proprietary rights in a mehal, irrespective of whether he claims it or not, the status of an occupancy tenant, to whom the prohibition of s. 9 will apply. *Held*, therefore, that where a proprietor in a mehal holding sir land, who is selling his proprietary rights, at the same time transfers all his rights, actual, vested, or contingent, in such sir land, such transfer is one of his right of occupancy in such sir land, and as such is prohibited by s. 9 of the N.-W. P. Rent Act. **GULAB ROY v. INDAR SINGH . I. L. R. 6 All. 54**

48. ———— **Right of mortgagees from tenant—Mortgagees, rights of, in suit for ejectment of tenants.** If a zamindar obtains a decree in the Revenue Court for the ejectment of tenants with a right of occupancy who have mortgaged portions of their holdings, it does not necessarily follow that the interests of the mortgagees determine with the rights of the original tenants. Where certain tenants with a right of occupancy mortgaged portions of their holdings, and the zamindar assented to the substitution of the mortgagees for the original tenants in respect of those portions of the holding of which they had respectively obtained possession, it was *held* that the zamindar could not destroy the interest of the mortgagees in possession by obtaining a decree from the Revenue Court ousting only the original tenants. **GOBERDHUN v. GOKAL CHAND . 7 N. W. 31**

49. ———— **Validity of transfer—Rights of mortgagees from tenant—Lease—"Zur-i-peshgi" lease—Act XII of 1881 (N.-W. P. Rent Act), ss. 8, 9.** The occupancy tenants of certain land executed a zur-i-peshgi lease in favour of certain persons, by which, in consideration of a sum of money, it was agreed that the latter should have the right of occupying and cultivating the occupancy holding as tenants for a term of years at a nominal rent. In pursuance of this agreement, those persons obtained possession. The zamindar thereupon brought a suit against them for ejectment and to have the zur-i-peshgi lease set aside. *Held*, by the Full Bench, that the zur-i-peshgi lease was a transfer of occupancy rights within the meaning of s. 9 of the N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1881), and was therefore invalid. *Per* PETHERAM, C. J.—A right of occupancy means nothing but the right to live on and cultivate land as one's own. *Per* STRAIGHT, J.—The last sentence of s. 8 of the Rent Act should not be read as declaring that any occupancy tenant may sub-let his land, but that the scope of the proviso is limited to tenants who actually occupy or cultivate land under a written lease, without having acquired a right of occupancy. **Hidayatullah v. Ram Nirvaz Rai, All. Weekly Notes All. (1882) 80, referred to. ABADI HUSAIN v. JURAWAN LAL . I. L. R. 7 All. 866**

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50. ———— **Suit for ejectment—Act by tenant inconsistent with purpose for which land was let—Mortgage of occupancy-holding—Cancellation of mortgage before suit for ejectment—Act II of 1881 (N.-W. P. Rent Act), ss. 9, 93 (b), 149.** An occupancy tenant made an usufructuary mortgage of his holding, and afterwards had the land and the mortgage-deed returned to him, and the mortgage was cancelled. Subsequently, the landlord instituted a suit for ejectment, on the ground that by the mortgage the tenant had committed an act inconsistent with the purpose for which the land was let, within the meaning of Act XII of 1881 (N.-W. P. Rent Act), s. 93 (b). *Held*, by OLDFIELD, J., that, apart from the question whether executing a mortgage of his holding was an act within the meaning of s. 93 (b) of the Rent Act, the mortgage having been cancelled, there was no cause of action left, and the penalty should not be enforced, with reference to s. 149. *Held*, by MAHMOOD, J., that the occupancy tenure could not be brought to an end except on grounds clearly provided by the law; and the execution of the mortgage, though illegal and void, was not "any act or omission detrimental to the land" or "inconsistent with the purpose for which the land was let" within the meaning of s. 93 (b) of the Rent Act, and furnished no ground for ejectment. **Gopal Panday v. Parsotam Das, I. L. R. 5 All. 121, and Naik Ram Singh v. Murli Dhar, I. L. R. 4 All. 371, referred to. Also per MAHMOOD, J.—The terms of s. 93 (b) of the N.-W. P. Rent Act apply, exempli gratia, to cases in which land is given to a tenant for purposes of cultivation, and is used by him for building or other purposes. DEBI PRASAD v. HAR DAYAL . I. L. R. 7 All. 691**

51. ———— **N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1881), s. 93 (b)—Mortgage by ex-proprietary tenant—Act "inconsistent with the purpose for which land was let"—Act XII of 1881, ss. 9, 56.** The policy of the framers of the N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1881) was not to protect the interest of the purchaser of proprietary rights, but that of the person whose proprietary rights have been sold, and who has become an ex-proprietary tenant. It would be straining the law, as laid down in s. 93 (b) of the Act, to hold that a mortgage of his holding granted by an ex-proprietary tenant was an act "inconsistent with the purpose for which the land was let" within the meaning of that provision. The words quoted have reference to something which may alter the character of the land, or cause injury to the land and thus to the landholder. In the case of a mortgage by an ex-proprietary tenant, the landholder would not be damaged by being unable, in the event of his rent being in arrear, to distrain the crops grown upon the land by the so-called mortgagee, s. 56 of the Rent Act giving the landholder a right to distrain any crops growing upon the land, by whomsoever grown, in respect of which the arrear arises. **Debi Prasad v. Har Dayal, I. L. R. 7 All. 691, followed.**



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*Wajiha Bibi v. Abhman Singh*, *All. Weekly Notes* (1883) 166, referred to. *FATIMA BEGAM v. HANSI*  
I. L. R. 9 All. 244

52. ————— *N.-W. P. Rent Act* (XII of 1881), ss. 7, 9—*Sir land*—*Sale of sir land by co-sharer—Ex-proprietary tenant*. *Held*, by PETHERAM, C.J., and STRAIGHT, OLDFIELD, and BRODHURST, J.J., that the question whether the proprietary right of a co-sharer in the *sir* of a mehal are distinct and separate from the proprietary rights in the mehal itself, so as to enable the owner of one share to sell and give possession of his *sir* alone as against his co-sharers, must be determined with reference to the tenure and conditions under which land is held in the mehal by the co-parceners, to be ascertained in each case. *Per* PETHERAM, C.J., and STRAIGHT and OLDFIELD, J.J.—In zamindari tenures, in which the whole land is held and managed in common, a co-sharer cannot convey his right of occupancy in the *sir* as something distinct from his proprietary rights in the mehal. In puttidari tenures, in which the lands are divided and held in severalty, each proprietor managing his own lands, there may be lands which come within the classification of *sir* given in the Rent Act, but they would not seem to be on a different footing from any other land held in severalty by a proprietor. *Per* BRODHURST, J.—So long as a person is the sole proprietor of a mehal he is not restrained by any law from effecting a sale of his proprietary rights in his *sir* land, even though he retains possession of the whole of the other lands of the mehal. *Per* MAHMOOD, J.—That the proprietary rights of a joint co-sharer in his *sir* land form an essential part of his rights in the mehal; that such proprietary rights in the *sir* land may be sold, but that the purchaser under such a sale could not obtain any such possession as would operate in defeasance of the ex-proprietary right in such *sir* land conferred by s. 7 and secured by s. 9 of the Rent Act. *Sahib Ram v. Kishen Singh*, *All. Weekly Notes* (1882) 19; *Hazari Lal v. Ug-rah Rai*, *All. Weekly Notes* (1883) 103; *Gulab Rai v. Indra Singh*, I. L. R. 6 All. 54; and *Tirmal Singh v. Bhola Singh*, *All. Weekly Notes* (1884) 169, referred to. *SITAPAL PRASAD v. AMTUL BIBI*  
I. L. R. 7 All. 633

53. ————— *Mortgage by conditional sale of occupancy rights to zamindar—Act XVIII of 1873 (N.-W. P. Rent Act), s. 9—Act XII of 1881 (N.-W. P. Rent Act), ss. 2, 9*. The occupancy tenant of certain land before the N.-W. P. Rent Act (XII of 1881) came into force, mortgaged his rights to his zamindars by a deed of conditional sale. The zamindars sued the heirs of the conditional vendee for foreclosure and possession of the mortgaged property. *Held*, by the Full Bench that the terms of the judgment of the Full Bench in *Naik Ram Singh v. Murli Dhar*, I. L. R. 4 All. 371, were directly applicable to the case, and that the transaction of mortgage, which was subsequently to become a sale, was not a tran-

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saction to which s. 2 of the Rent Act applied, because the sale would not have effect till after the Act came into operation. *MURLI RAI v. LEDRI*  
I. L. R. 7 All. 851

54. ————— *Effect of transfer on occupancy right—Transfer of trees—Act XII of 1881, s. 9*. The presumption of law and the general rule is that property in timber on a tenant's holding rests in the landlord in the same way as, and to no less an extent than, the property in the soil itself. *Faqueer Sonar v. Khuderun*, 2 N. W. 251; *Ajudhia Nath v. Sital*, I. L. R. 3 All. 567; *Abdool Rohomon v. Dataram Bashee*, W. R. 1864, 367; *Ruttonji Edulji Shet v. Collector of Tanna*, 11 Moo. I. A. 295, referred to. *Held*, therefore, where an occupancy tenant transferred his holding, that the transfer was not only invalid in respect of the holding, but in respect also of the trees on the holding. Where an occupancy tenant, under the impression that he was a tenant at fixed rates, sold his holding, and the landholder sued the tenant and his vendee to set aside the transfer as contrary to law, and for possession of the holding:—*Held*, that the transfer could not be treated as a relinquishment by the tenant of the holding to the landholder, and that the proper decree to make was that the transfer should be cancelled, that the plaintiff was entitled to eject the vendee from the land, but the plaintiff was not entitled to take the holding from the vendor. *KASIM MIAN v. BANDA HUSAIN* . . . . . I. L. R. 5 All. 616

55. ————— *Inquiry as to validity*. When a raiyat alleges a mukurari right by purchase, the nature of his vendor's title ought to be inquired into, and whether it was or was not transferable. *GOBIND CHUNDER MOZUMDAR v. BISSUMBHURREE DOSSEE*. *RAM CHUNDER MITTER v. RAMZANEE BEBEE* . . . . . 2 W. R., Act X, 4

*BANEE MADHUB BANERJEE v. JOY KISHEN MOOKERJEE* . . . . . 4 W. R., Act X, 16

56. ————— *Transfer of tenure—Ejectment of transferee*. Where a tenure has been transferred by the tenant, and it is found that the transfer was invalid, the zamindar is entitled to eject the transferee, and look to the former tenant for his rent. *SUDDYE PURIRA v. BOISTUB PURIRA* . 12 B. L. R. 84 note: 15 W. R. 261

57. ————— *Suit for registration of name in landlord's sherishta—Right of suit—Notice—Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 73*. Under the Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), the transferee of a holding of a raiyat with right of occupancy transferable by custom cannot maintain a suit for registration of his own name in the landlord's sherishta by expunging that of his vendor. A declaration that the transferee, and not the old tenant, is responsible for the rent of the holding cannot be obtained without service of notice as prescribed by s. 73 of the Act. *AMBIKA PERSHAD v. CHOWDHRI KESHRI SAHAJ*  
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 642



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See *KULHIP SINGH v. GILLANDERS, ARBUTHNOT & Co. and MOTILAL SINGH v. OMARALI*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 615  
3 C. W. N. 19

and (contra) *ANANDA KUMAR NASKAR v. HARI DASS HALDAR* . . . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 545

**58. ——— Landlord's consent—Sale of occupancy holding in execution of money-decree—Landlord's consent, effect of.** A sale, in execution of a money-decree, of an occupancy holding not transferable by local custom or usage, is valid and effectual, if the sale is held with the consent of the landlord. In principle, there is no difference between the case of a voluntary sale made by the *raiyat* and an involuntary sale had by the Court, if such sale is consented to by the landlord. *ANANDA DAS v. RUTNAKAR PANDA* (1903)

7 C. W. N. 572

**59. ——— Proof of local usage—Occupancy holding—Local usage to transfer.** Where the question was whether an occupancy holding was transferable and the lower Appellate Court found as follows: "There is abundant evidence on the record to show that such lands are actually sold in the locality, and the *kobalas* filed in this case support this fact:" Held, that this did not amount to a finding of a local usage. *DINO NATH GHOSE v. NOBIN CHUNDER GHOSE* (1900). 6 C. W. N. 181

**60. ——— Occupancy-holding—Transferability—Local usage, proof of.** A transfer of an occupancy holding cannot be justified by local usage which is still "growing-up." The usage should have fructuated into maturity. To establish a usage as to the transferability of occupancy-holdings in a locality, it is not enough to prove that several cases of transfer of such holdings have actually taken place. It is necessary to prove that such transfers have been made with the knowledge and without the consent of the landlord, and that no successful objection to such transfer has been made by the landlord. *Edward Dalglish v. Sheikh Gozaffar Hossein*, 3 C. W. N. 21, followed. *Dino Nath Ghose v. Nobin Chunder Ghose*, 6 C. W. N. 181, referred to. *RAMHURI SINGH v. JUBBAR ALI MEAH* (1902) . . . 6 C. W. N. 861

**RIGHT OF PRIVATE DEFENCE.**

See PRIVATE DEFENCE, RIGHT OF.

See RIOTING.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 296 ; 827 ; 865

**RIGHT OF REPLY.**

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, ss. 289, 292 . . . I. L. R. 30 Bom. 421

**1. ——— Witnesses not called for defence.** Where defendant's counsel did not go into evidence, but had not intimated his intention to call witnesses, the plaintiff's counsel has a right to reply. *VIRASVAMI CHETTI v. APPASVAMI CHETTI* . . . 1 Mad. 375

**RIGHT OF REPLY—cont'd.**

**2. ——— Decision on appellant's arguments after hearing respondent.** Where an appellant had been heard at length and the respondent heard partly in answer, and the Court came to a conclusion after research into the record without any new matter being brought forward by the respondent, it was considered unnecessary to hear the appellant in reply. *ROUSSEAU v. NUBOO KISHORE BHUDEO* . . . 12 W. R. 302

**3. ——— Giving no opportunity for reply—Ground for special appeal.** Where an appeal was dismissed by the lower Appellate Court after hearing the respondent's pleader, without giving the appellant's pleader an opportunity to reply, the High Court, on that objection being made a ground of special appeal from an order of the Judge refusing to grant a review on that ground, set aside the order and sent the case back for re-trial. *JARDINE v. TARINI MOHAN SEN*

8 B. L. R. Ap. 44

Distinguished in *RAM KOOMAR KYBURTO DASS v. SONATUN DASS PORAMANICK* . . . 3 C. L. R. 23

which was a case where, after some explanation from the appellant's vakil, the Judge said he did not think the Munsif's judgment erroneous, whereupon the vakil said he was not desirous of arguing the case further, and the Judge began writing his judgment, and refused to hear another vakil instructed by the appellant who came in and asked permission to argue the case.

**4. ——— Hearing of rule "nisi"—Practice.** On the hearing of a rule *nisi* after cause had been shown against the rule, it was objected on counsel rising to support it, that there was no right of reply, no affidavit having been used in showing cause. The objection was overruled and a reply allowed. *BAMASUNDARI DAS v. RAMNARAYAN MITTER* . . . 7 B. L. R. Ap. 57

**5. ——— Question of law—Construction of will—Evidence not called for defendants.** In a suit for the construction of a will, a reply was allowed, although the defendants called no evidence, the suit being of the nature of a special case. *JUDAH v. JUDAH* . . . 5 B. L. R. 439

**6. ——— Crown's right of reply—Trial for prisoners charged with distinct offences in one indictment.** Where two prisoners were charged with distinct offences in the same indictment, the calling of evidence on behalf of one does not give the Crown a right of reply upon the other. *QUEEN v. ABBAS* . . . 2 Hyde 247

**7. ——— Use of documents in cross-examination by accused.** The fact that the accused has, during the cross-examination of the witnesses for the prosecution, used certain documents, and that such documents have been put in as evidence on his behalf, does not entitle the prosecutor to the right of reply, if, when asked upon the close of the case for the prosecution whether he means to adduce evidence, the



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accused says that he does not. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. GREES CHUNDER BANERJEE*

**I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1024**

**8. ————— Practice—**

*Evidence—Witness called by Court—Tendering witnesses for cross-examination—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 289, 540.* The giving of any documentary evidence by an accused person during the cross-examination of the witnesses for the prosecution, and before he is asked under s. 289 if he means to adduce evidence, does not give a right of reply to the prosecution. *Queen-Empress v. Grees Chunder Banerjee, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1024*, followed. *EMPRESS OF INDIA v. KALIPROSONNO DOSS* . **I. L. R. 14 Calc. 245**

**9. ————— Criminal Pro-**

*cedure Code, s. 289.* Where documentary evidence was put in by the accused during the case for the Crown and before examination of the accused:—*Held*, that under s. 289 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that the Crown had the right of reply. *Queen-Empress v. Grees Chunder Banerjee, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1024*, dissented from. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. VENKATAPATHI* . **I. L. R. 11 Mad. 339**

**10. ————— Practice—Crim-**

*inal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 289.* The putting in, as evidence on his behalf, of any documentary evidence by an accused person during the cross-examination of the witnesses for the prosecution and before he is asked under s. 289 if he means to adduce evidence, does not give the prosecution a right to reply. *Empress v. Kaliprososonno Doss, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 245*, followed. *Queen-Empress v. Vencatapattu, I. L. R. 11 Mad. 339*, dissented from. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. SOLOMON*

**I. L. R. 17 Calc. 930**

**11. ————— Witnesses not**

*called for defence—Reply by prosecutor—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), ss. 289, 292.* At the close of the evidence for the prosecution the attorney for the defence in answer to the Judge, stated that he meant to call witnesses. The Court then adjourned and on the following day the attorney stated that, on re-consideration, he did not intend to call witnesses. The Judge allowed the prosecutor to reply. *Held*, that though the strict interpretation of ss. 289 and 292 of the Criminal Procedure Code would warrant this course, it was never meant by the Legislature that the prosecutor should have a reply when no witnesses are called for the defence, the object of the law being evidently to let each side have an opportunity of commenting on the evidence of the other, and not to give an additional advantage to the prosecutor in such a case as the present. *HURRY CHURN CHUCKERBUTTY v. EMPRESS*

**I. L. R. 10 Calc. 140 : 13 C. L. R. 358**

**12. ————— Documents put in**

*evidence on behalf of accused during cross-examination of witnesses for prosecution. No witnesses called for defence—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 292—Practice.* The fact that during

**RIGHT OF REPLY—contd.**

the cross-examination of witnesses for the prosecution documents are put in evidence on behalf of the accused does not give the prosecution the right of reply if no witnesses are called for the defence. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. KRISHNAJI BABURAV BULELL* . **I. L. R. 14 Bom. 436**

**13. ————— Criminal Pro-**

*cedure Code, ss. 289, 292—Adducing evidence for the defence—Documents produced for cross-examination of Crown-witness—Practice.* In a trial before a High Court or a Court of Session, evidence for the defence cannot be adduced until the close of the case for the prosecution; but counsel for the defence may, while a witness for the Crown is under cross-examination, put documents to him, and if in so doing counsel reads or causes to be read to the Court such documents, he thereby impliedly undertakes to put those documents in as evidence at the proper time. When such documents as aforesaid are filed in Court as evidence, or any other documentary evidence is put in by the defence, the defence has "adduced evidence" within the meaning of ss. 289 *et seq.* of the Code of Criminal Procedure, so as to give the prosecution a right of reply, though no witnesses may be called for the defence. In a trial at the Criminal Sessions of the High Court during the cross-examination of one of the witnesses for the Crown, counsel for the defence put certain documents to the witness, and these were read to the Court and jury and marked as exhibits as evidence for the defence, and were filed with the record in the same way as the evidence for the prosecution had been marked and filed. During the cross-examination of the next witness a similar course was pursued, and, after the cross-examination had continued for some time, counsel for the defence applied to the Court for a ruling as to whether the fact of documents having been used during cross-examination in the manner above-stated would, under s. 292 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, entitle the Crown to a reply, in the event of the accused not calling witnesses. *Held*, that although, as a matter of order, such a question would be better raised either when the first document intended to be used in this way was put to a witness or when the accused was asked if he meant to adduce evidence, yet there was nothing in the Code of Criminal Procedure to prevent the Court from deciding the question at any other stage, and that, under the special circumstances of the case, it might be considered then. *Held*, also, that the use of the documents in the manner above stated gave the prosecution a right of reply. *Queen-Empress v. Grees Chunder Banerjee, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 1024*; *Empress of India v. Kaliprososonno Doss, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 245*; *Queen-Empress v. Solomon, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 930*; and *Queen-Empress v. Krishnaji Baburav Bulell, I. L. R. 14 Bom. 436*, dissented from. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. HAYFIELD* . **I. L. R. 14 All. 212**

**14. ————— Several persons**

*tried jointly—Right of reply where one of several accused calls witnesses and the others do not—Crim.*



**RIGHT OF REPLY—concl'd.**

*minal Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 289, 290, and 292.* Where one of several accused persons tried jointly calls witnesses at the trial, but the other accused call no witnesses, they must, under s. 290 of the Criminal Procedure Code, all follow one another in their defence, and the prosecution has, under s. 292, the right of reply on the whole case.

QUEEN-EMPRESS *v.* SADANAND NARAYAN

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 364

15. ———— *Tender of document to witness for Crown in cross-examination—Criminal Procedure Code, 1882, s. 292.* The action of the defence, during the cross-examination of a witness for the Crown, in tendering a document to such witness and using the same as evidence for the defence was held to entitle the Crown to reply under s. 292 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

QUEEN-EMPRESS *v.* MOSS . I. L. R. 16 All. 88

**RIGHT OF SUIT.**

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*See* PUBLIC DEMANDS RECOVERY ACT (BEN. ACT I OF 1895).

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 619

**1. ACCRUAL OF RIGHT.**

1. Cause of action—*Limitation—Misapprehension of legal rights.* A judgment of a Court altering a pure legal misapprehension as to the rights and status, and passed in a suit to which A was not a party, cannot confer any fresh



**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****1. ACCRUAL OF RIGHT—contd.**

cause of action as against *A* by the party who previously misapprehended his correct legal claim. *LOTI ALI KHAN v. AFZULONISSA BEGUM*

**3 W. R. 113**

**2.** ————— *Right of unborn son—Hindu Law—Limitation.* The texts of Hindu law laying down the right of an unborn son to sue only inculcate a family duty, and do not apply to the operation of the law of limitation so as to give a perpetual right of action. *SEETUL PERSHAD SINGH v. GOUR DYAL SINGH*

**1 W. R. 283**

**3.** ————— *Suit by zamindar to recover possession of occupancy holding against occupancy-tenant and his alleged transferee in possession—Death of occupancy-tenant after filing of suit but before notice—N.-W. P. Rent Act, s. 9.* A plaintiff is not entitled to a decree in his suit unless, by proof or admission or default of pleading, he shows that when he instituted that suit he was entitled to a decree. One *K C*, a zamindar, sued in a Court of revenue to recover an occupancy-holding from one *B S*, his occupancy-tenant, and that tenant's transferee, *G S*, to whom, by a transfer, which was inoperative under s. 9 of Act XII of 1881, *B S* had purported to make over his occupancy-holding. The occupancy-tenant died after the suit was filed, but before he had received notice of it, and the transferee, being in sole possession of the occupancy-holding, defended the suit. *Held*, under the above circumstances, that the zamindar's suit must fail, inasmuch as at the time when it was filed he was not entitled to immediate possession of the occupancy-holding. *GULZAR SINGH v. KALYAN CHAND*

**I. L. R. 15 All. 399**

**4.** ————— *Suit for pre-emption—Mortgage.* A pre-emptor may sue any time before the expiry of a year from the date of transfer of possession. A mortgagee's absolute right and his claim to pre-emption arise from the time the sale becomes absolute. *JANKEE KOORER v. LEKRANEE KOORER*

**W. R. 1864, 285**

**5.** ————— *Suit for pre-emption—Conditional sale.* *Held*, per *PEARSON, J.* and *STRAIGHT, J.* (*SPANKIE, J.*, dissenting), that the cause of action of a person claiming the right of pre-emption in the case of a conditional sale arises when the conditional sale takes place, and not when it becomes absolute and therefore, where a conditional sale took place in 1867 and after it had become absolute, a person sued to enforce his right of pre-emption in respect of the property sold, basing his claim upon a special agreement made in the interval between the date of the conditional and the date that it became absolute, and alleging that his cause of action arose on the latter date, that the suit was not maintainable, the plaintiff having no right of pre-emption at the time of the conditional sale. *LACHMAN PRASAD v. BAHADUR SINGH*

**I. L. R. 2 All. 884**

**6.** ————— *Suit for pre-emption—Mortgage—Conditional sale.* The cause of ac-

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****1. ACCRUAL OF RIGHT—contd.**

tion of a person claiming a right of pre-emption in respect of a mortgage by way of conditional sale arises on foreclosure of such mortgage, that is to say, on the expiration of the year of grace without payment by the mortgagor of the mortgage-money, inasmuch as, on the expiration of such period, the mortgagee acquires a proprietary title to the mortgaged property. Such person can therefore sue to enforce his right of pre-emption on the expiration of such period, and need not wait to do so until the mortgagee has obtained proprietary possession of the mortgaged property. *HAZARI RAM v. SHANKAR DIAL*

**I. L. R. 3 All. 770**

**7.** ————— *Conditional sale—Pre-emption—Wajib-ul-urz.* On the 12th May 1871 *B* mortgaged, by way of conditional sale, a share of a village to *A*, a stranger. Such mortgage having been foreclosed, *A* sued *B* for possession of such share, and obtained a decree on the 16th April 1878, in execution of which he obtained possession of such share on the 9th September 1878. On the 1st September 1879 *S*, a co-sharer, sued *A* and *B*, to enforce his right of pre-emption in respect of such share, founding his suit upon the following clause in the administration paper of the village: "When a share-holder desires to transfer his share, a near relative shall have the first right; next the shareholders of the other pattis; if these refuse to take, the vendor shall have power to sell and mortgage, etc., to whomsoever he likes." *Held* (*PEARSON, J.*, dissenting), having regard to the terms of the administration paper, that a cause of action accrued to *S* when such mortgage was foreclosed. Per *SPANKIE, J.*, *OLDFIELD, J.*, and *STRAIGHT, J.* (*STUART, C. J.*, dissenting), that a cause of action also accrued to *S* when such share was mortgaged by way of conditional sale to *A*. *ALU PRASAD v. SUKHAN*

**I. L. R. 3 All. 610**

**8.** ————— *Suit for pre-emption—Mortgage by conditional sale.* The *wajib-ul-urz* of a village provided that the right of pre-emption should accrue "not only in respect of absolute sales, but also in regard to conditional sales, mortgages and *ticca* leases." *Held*, that under its terms the right of pre-emption accrued on a mortgage by conditional sale becoming absolute. The *ratio decidendi* in *Alu Prasad v. Sukhan*, *I. L. R. 3 All. 610*, relied on. The pre-emptor, in the case of a mortgage by conditional sale which has become absolute, is bound to pay as the price of the property the entire amount due on such mortgage at the time it became absolute. *ASHIK ALI v. MATHURA KANDU*

**I. L. R. 5 All. 187**

**9.** ————— *First and second mortgages—Dispossession of second mortgagee—Limitation—Interest.* *Z*, being indebted to *A*, executed in his favour a written mortgage of certain lands, in which it was agreed that, if the debt was not repaid within a fixed time, *A* should be put into possession of the lands. Subsequently *Z* executed in favour of *P*, to whom also he owed money, a second mortgage of the same land subject to the



RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*1. ACCRUAL OF RIGHT—*contd.*

same condition. *P*, not receiving payment within the stipulated time, sued *Z* on the mortgage, and obtained a decree for possession of the lands, under which he was put into possession in the year 1846. After *P* had obtained his decree, *A*, whose debt had likewise remained unpaid, brought a suit as first mortgagee against *Z* and *P* for the possession of the lands, and, obtaining a decree, recovered possession in the year 1847, dispossessing *P*. In the year 1870, the heirs of *Z*, having paid off the debt due to *A*, resumed possession, whereupon the heirs of *P* applied to be restored to possession in execution of the decree obtained by *P* in 1846. This application having been rejected on the ground that that decree had been fully executed when *P* obtained possession under it, the heirs of *P* instituted a suit against the heirs of *Z* to recover possession and for interest during the time they were dispossessed. *Held*, by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee reversing the decision of the High Court, that the heirs of *P* were entitled to possession on *A*'s mortgage being paid off, and that their cause of action accrued and limitation ran against them from the time when the heirs of *Z* resumed possession. *Held*, also, that they were not entitled to a decree for the interest accruing during the time they were dispossessed. *NARAIN SINGH v. SIMBHOO SINGH*

I. L. R. 1 All. 325

L. R. 4 I. A. 15

10. ———— *Suit by purchaser for possession—Sale for arrears of revenue—Limitation.* In suits instituted by a purchaser to recover possession of an estate sold for arrears of Government revenue due in respect of such estate the period of limitation cannot be calculated, under any circumstances, from a day anterior to the date of purchase. *NARAIN CHUNDER v. TAYLER*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 103: 3 C. L. R. 151

11. ———— *Suit to recover compensation for land taken for public purposes and paid by Government to wrong party.* In a suit to recover money paid by Government to the defendant as compensation for land taken for public purposes which the plaintiff alleged to belong to him, and not to the defendant:—*Held*, that the plaintiff's right of action against the defendant accrued at the time when the defendant first took the money from Government, and that the ignorance of the plaintiff in regard to the accrual of his right did not prevent the time from running against his suit, unless it had been brought about by the fraud of the defendant. *AZROAL SINGH v. LALLA GOPEENATH*

8 W. R. 23

12. ———— *Possession of lands not capable of occupation—Khal.* When lands which are not in their nature capable of actual occupation (such as a khal) appertain to lands which are occupied, the possession of the former in point of law necessarily follows that of the latter; but when a khal dries up and becomes culturable if any one to whom it does not belong takes actual possession of it, a cause of action accrues to the per-

RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*1. ACCRUAL OF RIGHT—*concl.*

son in possession of the land to which the khal appertains from the time of the wrongful possession, and not from the time of the khal becoming culturable or cultivated. *SUNNUD ALI v. KURMOON-SSA*

9 W. R. 124

13. ———— *Promise to pay "when I am able."* In a written promise to pay "when I am able," those words are not to be treated as mere surplusage, but as a binding part of the contract. The promisee's cause of action does not accrue until the promisee is in circumstances to pay. *WATSON & CO. v. BLECHYNDEN*

1 W. R. 368

14. ———— *Suit for lost property discovered—Jurisdiction.* Where property lost in one district is found in another, in the possession of a party who refuses to restore it, the owner's cause of action arises from the date of such refusal; and a suit to recover possession of the property must be instituted in the district in which it is found. *RAM PERTAB SINGH v. BHOLABUTTY KOONWAR*

9 W. R. 586

15. ———— *Service watan land—Successive life-tenants.* Where land belonging to a service watan held on a tenure of successive life-estates had passed out of the possession of the watandars, it was *held* that a cause of action to recover such land accrued to each successive life tenant upon the death of his predecessor. *KURI BIN HANMIA v. GURURAV*

9 Bom. 28

16. ———— *Redemption—Constructive payment.* Where an assignee of land covenants with his assignors to repay all the moneys which they have at any time actually or constructively paid to Government for redemption, a suit against him, where money has not been actually paid, is premature, unless there is some definite agreement with Government as to the amount which Government can enforce. *WOODROW v. SCHILLER*

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 90

17. ———— *Repudiation by tenant of landlord's title.* The repudiation of a tenant's title by his landlord can only form one cause of action, however often that repudiation is repeated. *NUND KISHORE SINGH v. HUREE PERSHAD MUNDUL*

13 W. R. 64

## 2. ACTS DONE IN EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWERS.

1. ———— *Suit for damages for refusal of license by excise authorities—Liability of Government—21 & 22 Vict., c. 106—Matter of revenue—21 Geo. III, c. 70, s. 8.* The plaintiff, for some years before and up to 31st March 1874, carried on the business of a retail dealer in ganja and sidhi in Calcutta, and occupied for that purpose certain shops and godowns duly licensed under the Government regulations with respect to such sales. The license had to be renewed annually, and might, for sufficient cause, be withdrawn any time within the year which terminated on 31st March. On 4th



**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****2. ACTS DONE IN EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWERS—contd.**

March 1874, while the plaintiff was carrying on his business, the Superintendent of Excise for Calcutta put the right to sell ganja and sidhi for the year commencing the 18th April 1874 up to public competition, which was the usual way of distributing the yearly licenses. The sale notification contained a list of the shops with the localities where they were situated, but the right was reserved, in case of combination or for other cause, to transfer, before settlement, any shop from the locality specified to some locality in the neighbourhood; and the conditions of sale were stated to be "that the Collector does not bind himself to accept the highest bid; that the settlement with the accepted auction-purchasers will be contingent on the approval by the police-authorities of the proposed locality of the shop, and the character of the applicant for license: that the person accepted as the auction-purchaser shall deposit at once a sum equal to the license fee payable for two months, and shall at the same time state in writing in what building his shop will be opened, it being understood that the above deposit will be returned to any person whose license is subsequently refused for police reason." At the sale the plaintiff was the highest bidder for the licenses for five shops for the sale of ganja and sidhi, and his bids were recorded; and he also paid the deposit due in respect of the licenses amounting to R968. Subsequently the excise authorities refused licenses to the plaintiff for the five shops, and failed to return the deposit made in respect thereof. In a suit brought by the plaintiff against the Secretary of State in Council for India, in which he alleged that the Government had accepted his bid, and thereby contracted with him to give him the licenses and allow him to carry on his trade in ganja and sidhi, and that by their not giving him licenses and so forcing him to close his godowns and shops they had committed a breach of contract for which he was entitled to damages:—*Held*, on the evidence *per* PHEAR, J., that there was no contract between the plaintiff and the Government. *Held*, also, both in the Court below and on appeal, even assuming there was a contract, that the suit was not maintainable, being in respect of acts done by the Government in the exercise of sovereign powers. Suits such as might, previous to the passing of 21 & 22 Vict., c. 106, have been brought against the East India Company, and subsequently against the Secretary of State in Council, are limited to suits for acts done in the conduct of undertakings which might be carried on by private individuals without sovereign powers. **NOBIN CHUNDER DEY v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA**  
**I. L. R. 1 Calc. 11: 24 W. R. 309**

**2. ———— Suit for illegal levy of import duties by Collector.** In 1877 *H* shipped salt from Bombay to Malabar ports, having conformed to the provisions of the Bombay Salt Act, 1873, and paid R1-13-0 per maund, the full duty then leviable under the Tariff Act, 1875. By a notification

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****2. ACTS DONE IN EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWERS—contd.**

under cl. B, s. 6, of the Tariff Act, the Governor-General in Council had exempted salt which paid the excise duty at Bombay from liability to pay more than the difference between what was so paid and the import duty leviable under the Tariff Act. While the salt was in transit, the Salt Act of 1877, which raised the import duty to R2-8-0 a maund, came into force. The Collector of Malabar levied 11 annas a maund on the salt imported, in the belief that he was so authorised by law, and his action was ratified by Government. *Held*, that assuming the Collector's acts to be illegal, a suit to recover the amount so levied would lie against the Secretary of State for India in Council. *Held*, also, that the payment at Bombay was not a payment of import duty by anticipation, and that the plaintiff was not excused by the notification of the Governor-General from paying the amount levied by the Collector. **NOBIN CHUNDER DEY v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, I. L. R. 1 Calc. 11**, dissented from. *Held*, on appeal, that the acts of State of which the Municipal Courts of British India are debarred from taking cognizance are acts done in the exercise of sovereign powers which do not profess to be justified by municipal law. Where an act complained of is professedly done under the sanction of municipal law and in the exercise of powers conferred by that law, the fact that it is done by the sovereign power, and is not an act which could possibly be done by a private individual does not oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. **HARI BHANJI v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA**

**I. L. R. 4 Mad. 344**

S.C. on appeal, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA *v.* HARI BHANJI . . . **I. L. R. 5 Mad. 273**

**3. ———— Suit for breach of contract by Government to grant proprietary rights in land—Contract entered into or acts done in the exercise of sovereign powers.** The plaintiff, in the suit, alleging that the Government had granted him a lease of certain land with the rights of a proprietor, promising to confer on him the proprietary rights in such land if he did certain things; that he had done such things; that the Government had refused to perform such promise and had conferred the proprietary rights in such land on another person, claimed by virtue of the contract between him and the Government, and as against the Government and such person, proprietary possession of such land. *Held, per* SPANKIE, J., that, assuming that the Government had entered into such a contract with the plaintiff as alleged, the suit would not lie, inasmuch as such contract was entered into, and the refusal of the Government to confer the proprietary rights in such land on the plaintiff, and the grant by it of such rights to such person, were acts done in the exercise of sovereign powers. *Held, per* STUART, C.J., that the Government had entered into the contract alleged by the plaintiff; that the suit would lie, as the Government had not entered into such contract in the exercise of sovereign



**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****2. ACTS DONE IN EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWERS—concl'd.**

powers, but in the capacity of a private owner; but that the plaintiff's case failed, as he had not performed his part of such contract. *KISHEN CHAND v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA*

I. L. R. 3 All. 829

**3. ATTACHMENT, SUIT TO SET ASIDE.**

1. ———— *Suit by mortgagee—Mortgagee not claiming through judgment-debtor.* A mortgagee claiming title otherwise than from the execution-debtor is competent, on behalf of himself and his mortgagor, to sue to raise an attachment on the property of which he is mortgagee. *WAI-GANKAR v. WADEKAR* . 5 Bom. A. C. 194

2. ———— *Mortgagor and mortgagee.* A and B borrowed money from D, with C as their surety, mortgaging their house to C to secure him from loss. The same house having been previously given to D, C had to pay the debt to D, but the house was attached by E in execution of a decree against A and B. C sued D and E to raise the attachment. *Held*, that the action did not lie. *SHIVLALL BIN KHUBCHAND v. BALVANT-RAV VINAYAK* . 2 Bom. 75; 2nd Ed. 70

3. ———— *Suit for attached property—Property collusively attached by one defendant against another—Cause of action.* In a suit to establish a claim to property which had been attached in execution of a decree obtained by one defendant against another which the plaintiff alleged to be collusive: —*Held*, that the plaint disclosed a cause of action. *MAHOMED GAZEE CHOWDHRY v. SHUMBHOONATH MISSEER* . 22 W. R. 389

**4. AWARDS, SUITS CONCERNING.**

1. ———— *Suit on award made ultra vires.* A suit on an award made in which the arbitrators have exceeded their powers is not maintainable. *DURJAN SINGH v. SIBIA* . 7 N. W. 329

2. ———— *Suit to enforce private award—Refusal of Court to file award under s. 327, Act VIII of 1859.* A suit lies to enforce an award made without the intervention of a Court of justice where an application has been made to file it as an award and has been refused. *KOTA SEETAMMA v. KOLLIPURLA SOOBIAH* . 8 Mad. 81

*PALANIPPA CHETTY v. RAYAPPA CHETTY* . 4 Mad. 119

3. ———— *Suit on award—Award which cannot be filed under s. 525, Civil Procedure Code.* Where an award cannot be filed and a decree obtained upon it under Civil Procedure Code, s. 525, a party is not precluded from suing upon it. *GOPI REDDI v. MAHANANDI REDDI* . I. L. R. 15 Mad. 99

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****4. AWARDS, SUITS CONCERNING—contd.**

4. ———— *Suit to enforce award—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 525.* Disputes between the members of a Hindu family were referred to arbitrators who made an award as to how the whole of the property should be divided. In pursuance of the award, part of the moveable property was divided. Subsequently one of the members of the family died. The plaintiff, another member of the family, now sued to enforce the award, or in the alternative for partition. *Held*, that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, s. 525, did not preclude the plaintiff from suing to enforce the award. *Gopi Reddi v. Mohanandi Reddi*, I. L. R. 15 Mad. 99, followed. *SUBBARAYA CHETTI v. SADASIVA CHETTI*

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 490

5. ———— *Award made on submission by person professing to represent community in religious matters.* The Courts will not interfere to enforce performance of an award made under a submission to arbitration entered into by a few persons, without the consent of the entire community in respect of religious quarrel relating to a state of things which has been in force at a mosque for fifty years, by the common consent of all the worshippers having an interest therein. *ZAHID v. PEEREE* . 3 N. W. 92

See also *MUZHUR ALI v. GANESH KOOR* . 3 N. W. 46

6. ———— *Suit for compensation awarded by punchayet in accordance with caste custom.* The plaintiff sued the defendants, his wife and her father (first and second defendants) to recover damages for the non-performance of a contract whereby the defendants agreed to deliver to the plaintiff a specified quantity of grain. The plaintiff and the first defendant appeared before a punchayet composed of members of their caste, and the first defendant having refused to live any longer with the plaintiff the punchayet awarded the compensation claimed, and the defendants promised to deliver the grain. It was found that the award of the punchayet was in accordance with the custom of the caste in cases in which the wife refused to live with the husband. *Held*, that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain the suit. *SOOBBA TEVAN v. MOOTHOKOODY* . 6 Mad. 40

7. ———— *Suit to set aside award—Beng. Reg. IX of 1833, ss. 6, 7, and 9—Consent to arbitration.* *Held*, that a suit for cancelment of an award made under ss. 6 and 7, Regulation IX of 1833, where it was not alleged that the proceedings were contrary to law, but that the plaintiff did not consent to it, was not maintainable under s. 9 of the said enactment; the consent of the parties not being necessary under the provisions of those sections. *IKRAMOOLLAH v. SHEO PERSHAD* . 2 Agra 340

8. ———— *Award as to settlement—Beng. Reg. IX of 1833, s. 9—Necessity to set aside award.* It was held that a suit to obtain



**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****4. AWARDS, SUITS CONCERNING—concl'd.**

possession of a moiety of certain lands by establishment of the title of the plaintiffs as purchasers and the cancelment of an award of arbitrators, was not barred by s. 9 of Regulation IX of 1833. The award was brought about, not under the Regulation, but owing to an application of the plaintiff for a partition of the share under Regulation VII of 1822, which application was rejected in reference to the award declaring the plaintiff's vendors were not in possession at the time of the sale. It was not necessary that the award should be set aside prior to an adjudication on the claim, as it determined no question of title. If the dispossession of the vendors did not take place at a period more remote than twelve years before the commencement of the suit, the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree for possession on establishment of their right even if there was no sufficient reason to set aside the award. *GUNGA BAKSH v. WALI BAKSH*

7 N. W. 169

**5. BOUNDARIES.**

**Suit to compel neighbouring landholders to fix boundary—*Absence of hostile act.*** A proprietor of land has no right to bring a suit to compel his neighbours to agree to a particular line of boundary being marked out between his lands and theirs, where he does not venture to say that they have by any overt act transgressed that boundary. *AMEEROONNISSA BEGUM v. GOPAL SAHOO*

22 W. R. 134

**6. BUILDING, SUIT TO RESTRAIN.**

**1. — Suit to restrain owner of land from building—*Interference with easement or right.*** A suit will not lie to restrain an owner of land from erecting buildings on his land, unless by doing so he is interfering with some easement acquired by the owner of the neighbouring land, or interfering with the free enjoyment of his land. *RAM ROOCH CHOWDREE v. DEOKEE NUNDUN*

2 N. W. 169

*KASIM ALI KHAN v. BIRJ KISHORE*

2 N. W. 182

*JOOGUL LALL v. JASODA BEBEE*

3 N. W. 311

**2. — Erection of buildings by owners of adjoining sites under agreements with Government—*Government surveyor made arbiter in case of dispute—Party wall, liability of owners for costs of—Suit before obtaining Government surveyor's certificate.*** Under separate agreements made by them respectively with Government, the plaintiff and defendant held adjoining plots of land for building. The agreements contained the same terms and stipulations among which were the following: "(a) The buildings to be continuous, with party walls common to both adjoining houses. (b) All disputes regarding the cost

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****6. BUILDING, SUIT TO RESTRAIN—contd.**

and maintenance of party walls to be decided by the Government surveyor, whose decision shall be binding on both parties." The plaintiff employed a contractor to erect a house upon his plot of land. The house was completed in 1870, the north wall of which was built as a party wall in pursuance of the condition contained in the agreement with Government. Disputes subsequently arose between the plaintiff and his contractor, which were not settled until the 26th August 1878, on which date the plaintiff paid the contractor a sum of R20,515-4-11, which included the cost of the party wall. After the plaintiff's house had been completed the defendant built his house upon the adjoining land, and in so doing he used a large portion of the party wall as the southern wall of his house. He paid the plaintiff half the cost of the portion so used by him. The rear portion of the said wall was not used by the defendant, as his house did not extend so far to the rear as the house of the plaintiff. The plaintiff demanded payment of half the cost of that part of the wall not used by the defendants, but the defendants refused to pay. The plaintiff then claimed that part of the wall as his own property, and proceeded to open windows in it. The defendants objected. The plaintiff subsequently filed the present suit, claiming from the defendants payment of half the cost of the said portion of the wall not used by the defendants, and in the event of such payment not being awarded, he prayed for a declaration that he was the sole owner of the said portion of the wall, and for an injunction restraining the defendants from disturbing him in the sole enjoyment thereof. Both the defendants pleaded limitation, and denied their liability to pay any part of the cost of that part of the wall which they did not use. The first defendant further alleged that he had paid the whole cost of the foundation and other parts of the said wall and claimed to set off this payment against the claim of the plaintiff. At the original hearing, *SCOTT, J.*, held that the part of the wall in dispute, although not used by the defendants, was a party wall, having regard to the terms of the agreement under which the said wall was erected; and that the suit was not barred, but that there was no right of action for the cost of the party wall independently of the award of the Government surveyor in whose decision lay all disputes as to such cost; and that, until his decision was given, there was no complete cause of action. *SCOTT, J.*, accordingly, on 11th December 1882 decreed that the defendants were severally liable to pay the half of whatever sum the Government surveyor might certify to be due for the cost of the disputed part of the said wall, and that the defendants were entitled to set off, in the calculation of what was due from them, the cost of any work or materials which the Government surveyor might find had been contributed by the first defendant. The case was thereupon adjourned, in order that the certificate of the Government sur-



**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****6. BUILDING, SUIT TO RESTRAIN—concl'd.**

veyor might be obtained. The Government surveyor subsequently gave his certificate as to the cost of the unused portion of the said wall, but stated that on the evidence before him he was unable to decide as to the ownership of the foundations, etc., of the wall. The case came on again before SCOTT, J., who decided to take evidence on the points left undetermined by the Government surveyor. Witnesses were accordingly examined and on 11th December 1883 the Court disallowed the defendant's claim of set-off, and gave judgment for the plaintiff for half the sum certified by the Government surveyor as the cost of the disputed part of the wall. The defendant appealed. *Held*, that, having regard to the terms of the agreement under which the plaintiff and the defendants respectively held their property, the Court was not competent to determine the question of the defendant's set-off or the other points raised by the pleadings. These were matters to be decided by the Government surveyor, whose certificate was a condition precedent to the plaintiff's right to sue, and upon which the Court might give judgment. *COVERJI LUDDHA v. MORARJI PUNJA*. I. L. R. 9 Bom. 183

**3. ——— Suit for removal of obstruction in building—Alteration in building.** The alteration of any building does not give the right to a suit to remove it or restore it to its original condition, unless the building in consequence of such alteration obstructs or impedes the access to the plaintiff's premises improperly, or takes away any frontage right from him. *KOODRUT ALI v. GHOLAM ALI*. . . . . **3 Agra 71**

**4. ——— Suit for removal of encroachment—Fear of acquiescence.** A suit for the removal of an encroachment is maintainable without actual damage having occurred or the immediate prospect of damage, if it can be shown that some damage may arise from the encroachment hereafter, when, from the plaintiff's right to interfere for a series of years, the opposite party would possibly have acquired a right which would bar the plaintiff's remedy. *JUDOONATH MULLICK v. KALEE KRISTO TAGORE*. . . . . **22 W. R. 73**

s.c. after remand, *JUDOONATH MULLICK v. KALEE KRISTO TAGORE*. . . . . **25 W. R. 524**

**7. CASTE QUESTIONS.**

**1. ——— Suit for damages for withholding a customary present from a member of a caste—Omission from distribution of funeral presents.** The plaintiff complained that on the occasion of the distribution of certain funeral presents by the defendant's father, in which as a member of the caste the plaintiff was entitled to share, he had been omitted, and had received nothing. He sued the defendants to recover damages for the injury to his character and reputation caused by such omission. *Held*, that there was no legal right in the plaintiff to the funeral

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****7. CASTE QUESTIONS—contd.**

presents, and the slight which the omission to give such presents to the plaintiff might imply was to be regarded as the result of a breach of social etiquette, with which the caste was exclusively competent to deal. *MAYASHANKAR v. HARI-SHANKAR*. . . . . **I. L. R. 10 Bom. 661**

**2. ——— Claim to be chavadi of Lingayet caste—Intrusion in office—Office to which no fees are appurtenant.** Plaintiff was the hereditary holder of the office of chavadi or bearer on public occasions of the insignia or symbols of the Lingayet caste at Bagalkot in the district of Belgaum; no fees as of right were appurtenant to that office, but voluntary gratuities might be given to the chavadi. In an action brought by plaintiff against defendant as an intruder upon his (the plaintiff's) office:—*Held*, that the plaintiff's claim to be chavadi of the Lingayet caste at Bagalkot was a caste question within the meaning of the unrepealed portion of cl. 1, s. 21 of Bombay Regulation II of 1827. *SHANKARA v. HANMA*. . . . . **I. L. R. 2 Bom. 470**

**3. ——— Custom—Caste usage—Expulsion of member of caste under mistake of fact and without notice.** In a suit relating to the management of the common property of the members of a Hindu caste, the plaintiff's right to sue was denied on the ground that, having violated the rules of the caste, he had been expelled from it. *Held*, (i) that it was open to the Court to determine whether or not the alleged expulsion from caste was valid; (ii) that if the plaintiff had not in fact violated the rules of the caste, but was expelled under the *bona fide*, but mistaken, belief that he had committed a caste offence, the expulsion was illegal and could not affect his rights. *Per KERNAN, J.*—A custom or usage of a caste to expel a member in his absence without notice given or opportunity of explanation offered is not a valid custom. *KRISNASAMI CHETTI v. VIRASAMI CHETTI*. . . . . **I. L. R. 10 Mad. 133**

**4. ——— Dispute as right to office of khatib—Mahomedan Law—Bom. Reg. II of 1827, s. 21.** S. 21 of Regulation II of 1827 has no application to suits between Mahomedans. A dispute as to the right to an office, such as the office of khatib (or preacher) is said to be among Mahomedans, is not a caste question within the meaning of the term as used in the section; a suit will therefore lie to establish such a right. *HASHIM SAHEB VALAD AHMED SAHEB v. HUSEIN-SHA VALAD KARIMSHA FAKIR*. . . . . **I. L. R. 13 Bom. 429**

**5. ——— Custom of caste—Funeral ceremonies—Right to assistance of fellow-members of caste—Refusal to assist—Cause of action.** The plaintiff, a Hindu and Kharva by caste, alleged in his plaint that, pursuant to a usage of his caste, he, on the occasion of his child's death, called upon the defendants, who were his caste-fellows, to assist him in removing the dead body and performing caste ceremonies incidental there-



**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****7. CASTE QUESTIONS—concl'd.**

to; that the defendants refused to do so, and induced other members of the caste to refuse also; that, in consequence thereof, the plaintiff was injured in his caste status; and he prayed for a declaration that the defendant's acts were unlawful, and that he was lawfully entitled to exercise and enjoy all his customary caste-rights and privileges and also for damages and for an injunction restraining the defendants from preventing other members of the caste from recognizing him and treating him as a member of the caste. *Held*, that the plaint disclosed no cause of action, and must be rejected. **KANJI BAVLA v. ARJUN SHAMJI**

**I. L. R. 18 Bom. 115**

**S. CESS.**

**Suit to establish right to cess—**  
*Order of settlement officer refusing to record cess.*  
A suit may be maintained by a zamindar to establish his right to a cess and to question the validity of an order of the settlement officer refusing to record the cess. **MAHOMMED ALI KHAN v. OOMRAO SINGH**

**2 N. W. 425**

**9. CHARITIES AND TRUSTS.**

**1. ——— Suit to recover trust property—Advocate-General—Dedication of lands for charitable use—Illegal sale—Suit to set aside sale and recover trust property—Code of Civil Procedure, 1882, s. 539.** The plaintiff's grandfather dedicated certain lands in a village, of which he was the jaghir-dar, to the expense of celebrating an annual fair in honour of a saint, and of lighting a lamp at his shrine. He reserved the paramount authority over, and management of, the said lands to his family, of which the plaintiff was the representative. The lands were sold illegally, as alleged by the plaintiff, to the defendant at an auction in execution of a decree obtained against one N who with his predecessors had, as was alleged, been employed to worship at the shrine. The plaintiff accordingly sought to have the sale set aside, and to be put into possession of the land. *Held*, that the object of the suit being merely to recover the trust property from outsiders, did not fail within s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and it could be proceeded with without making the Advocate-General a party to it. **LAKSHMANDAS v. GANPATRAY**

**I. L. R. 8 Bom. 365**

**2. ——— Suit for declaration that property is wakf—Act XX of 1863, ss. 14, 15, 18—Civil Procedure Code, s. 539—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 42.** A Mahomedan brought a suit against a person in possession of certain property for a declaration that the property was wakf. He did not allege himself to be interested in the property further or otherwise than as being a Mahomedan. He stated as his cause of action that the defendant had, in a former suit between the same parties, filed a written statement in which he denied

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****9. CHARITIES AND TRUSTS—contd.**

that the property now in question was wakf. *Held*, that, unless it could be shown that the suit was maintainable under some statutory provision, it could not be maintained. *Held*, also, that inasmuch as no permission had been given to the plaintiff to bring the suit, it was not maintainable under Act XX of 1863 or under s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, further, that the suit was not maintainable under the provisions of s. 42 of Act I of 1877 (Specific Relief Act). *Held*, therefore, that the suit was not maintainable. **WAJID ALI SHAH v. DIANAT-ULLAH BEG**

**I. L. R. 8 All. 31**

**3. ——— Suit to set aside alienation of wakf property made to a stranger—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 539.** When a suit is brought to set aside an alienation made to a stranger, such a suit by the worshipper at a mosque or temple can be maintained and does not fall within s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code. That section is only applicable where there is an alleged breach of trust created for a public, charitable, or religious purpose, and the direction of the Court is necessary for the administration of the trust. As against strangers, s. 539 does not apply. **HASSAN v. SAGUN BALKRISHNA**

**I. L. R. 24 Bom. 170**

**4. ——— Suit by worshipper for breach of trust of funds dedicated to idol—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 539.** Worshippers or devotees of an idol are entitled to bring a suit complaining of a breach of trust with reference to the funds or property belonging to the idol or appendant to its temple. *Quere*: Whether, if the suit had been brought after the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877) came into force, s. 539 of that Act could be held applicable to the devasthan of an idol or temple, dedicated merely to the purposes of such idol or temple. **RADHABAI KOM CHIMNAJI SALI v. CHIMNAJI BIN RAMJI SALI**

**I. L. R. 3 Bom. 27**

**5. ——— Suit to set aside mortgage of endowed property—"Wakf" property—Suit relating to public charity—Civil Procedure Code, s. 539—"Religious institution"—Act VI of 1871, s. 24—Mahomedan law—Endowment.** Certain Mahomedans sued to set aside a mortgage of endowed property belonging to a mosque, the decree enforcing the mortgage, and the sale of the mortgaged property in execution of that decree, and for the demolition of buildings erected by the purchaser, and the ejectment of the purchaser. *Held*, that the plaintiffs, as Mahomedans, entitled to frequent the mosque and to use the other religious buildings connected with the endowment, could maintain the suit, and s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code had no application to the case, the endowment being a religious institution within the meaning of s. 24 of Act VI of 1871, and therefore governed by Mahomedan law. **ZAFARYAB ALI v. BAKHTAWAR SINGH**

**I. L. R. 5 All. 497**

**6. ——— Suit on account of interference with right of devotion in mosque—Religious endowment—Form of suit—Civil Procedure**



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*Code, 1882, ss. 30, 539.* Every Mahomedan who has a right to use a mosque for purposes of devotion is entitled to exercise such right without hindrance and is competent to maintain a suit against any one who interferes with its exercise, irrespective of the provisions of ss. 30 and 539 of the Civil Procedure Code. S. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code applies only to cases in which many persons are jointly interested in obtaining relief, and not to cases in which an individual right has been violated. *Zafaryab Ali v. Baktawar Singh, I. L. R., 5 All. 497*, referred to. *Jan Ali v. Ram Nath Mundul, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 32*, dissented from. *JAWAHRA v. AKBAR HUSAIN I. L. R. 7 All. 178*

7. ———— **Worshipper's suit to recover land—Trustee not a plaintiff.** An individual worshipper in a mosque is not entitled to sue for the recovery of possession of land belonging to the mosque. While there is a trustee who has not been removed from his office, he is the only person entitled (irrespective of s. 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure) to use for the recovery of land belonging to the institution. *Zafaryab Ali v. Bakhtawar Singh, I. L. R. 5 All. 497*, considered. *KAMARAJU v. ASANALI SHERIFF I. L. R. 23 Mad. 99*

*SUBHARAYADU v. ASANALI SHERIFF I. L. R. 23 Mad. 100 note*

8. ———— **Suit by members of a caste and worshippers at caste temple against trustees of caste and temple property—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), ss. 30 and 539—Right to manage caste and temple funds—Public charity—Private charity—Parties—Trustees—Negligence—Wilful default—Acquiescence of majority of caste in unauthorized use of trust funds—Rights of minority.** In or about the year 1899 a temple to the god Shri Anoninathji was erected in Bombay by the Dossa Oswall Bania caste, the religion of which caste is the Jain religion. A large portion of the funds required for building the temple was advanced by one N N, at that time the leading man in the caste, the rest was obtained from the caste by subscription. The firm of N N acted as the bankers to the caste and to the temple received, all the gifts and offerings made by the worshippers, and for many years administered all the affairs of the temple. The sums advanced by N N were gradually but entirely repaid to him out of the gifts and offerings. There were three separate funds, of which separate accounts were kept in the books, viz. (i) the darasa fund, which was devoted to the temple purposes, such as maintenance of priests, repairs, etc., and gifts to poorer temples; (ii) the sadaran fund, which was more extended in its objects, but still limited to religious and charitable purposes, such as payments to poor devotees irrespective of their caste, etc., and (iii) the mahajan fund, which was devoted to caste purposes, such as purchase of caste utensils, etc. All three funds were collective at the temple. Gifts and offerings were made by all worshippers at the temple, whether members of the caste or not. Subscriptions were

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made only by members of the caste. All the regular subscriptions came from the caste exclusively, and the great bulk of the gifts and offerings came from the caste also. Only about R12,000 had been given by outsiders up to the date of the suit, while nearly six lakhs had been given by the caste. N N died in 1842, and his adopted son V became head of the firm which continued to manage the funds of the temple under the name of N V & Co. V died in 1852 and H (defendant No. 1) succeeded him. The firm meanwhile had invested the funds of the temple in eight lots of immoveable property. In 1867 the caste determined to appoint trustees of the temple property, and in September 1867 a trust-deed was executed whereby H, K, and G (defendants Nos. 1, 2, and 3), together with three others who were dead at the time of this suit,—viz., J R, T W, and M T,—were appointed trustees of all the immoveable property belonging to the temple. The deed set forth the objects to which the income of the property should be applied and provided that the surplus should be invested in Government securities, in corporation shares or in landed property, but in no other shares of any description whatsoever. It also authorized the trustees to invest surplus moneys in the firm of V N & Co. It was admitted that, subsequently to June 1869, the trustees managed the temple, and not only the immoveable property, but all the funds. A debt of R2,40,000 was due from the firm of V N & Co. to the temple and caste when the trustees took over the management. In 1870 the firm of V N & Co. became insolvent, and in their schedule the trustees were entered as creditors in respect of darasa account, R1,57,649; on mahajan account R68,017; on sadaran account, R22,597. It was admitted that the trustees knew of this entry in the said schedule. They, however, received no dividend, although other creditors, including K (defendant No. 2), were paid two annas in the rupee. The sum of R2,40,000 due to the temple was wholly lost. In April 1867, R15,000 of the temple funds were invested—it did not appear by whom—in the name of G (defendant No. 3), and in August 1868 a sum of R15,000 was advanced to one J P. In 1869 a sum of R10,000 was advanced by the trustees to N K & Co., which was never repaid, nor was any interest received upon it. It was lost on the failure of that firm in 1879. The principal partner of that firm (N K) was the only son of K (defendant No. 2), who also had an interest in it. In 1877-78 various loans were made by the trustees to three mills in which one or more of the trustees was interested. Of R55,000 lent to the mills and to N K & Co., R42,000 were lost. Half a lakh of outstanding gifts to the temple remained uncollected owing to the negligence of the trustees. Two suits brought by another caste against the trustees were defended out of the temple funds. All the defendants (trustees), with the exception of K, were in needy circumstances. In 1880 a hundred members of the caste protested against the management of caste and temple affairs by the defendants. The plaintiffs, six in number, took



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part in the protest, and filed the present suit in 1881. Thereupon there was a caste agitation in favour of the defendants, who were all shettias of the caste. A meeting of the caste was held, and a series of resolutions, supporting the defendant's management and approving of their conduct, was passed, and a document to that effect was signed by 1,468 persons—the whole caste in Bombay numbering only 1,500. The plaintiffs sought to make the defendants liable in respect of the moneys lost to the caste and temple funds, and prayed for the appointment of new trustees and for the settlement of a scheme. The defendants denied the charges of negligence, and pleaded that the suit was not properly constituted, not having been brought under s. 30 or 539 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1877, and that it was in contravention of Regulation II of 1827, Ch. II, s. 21. They relied upon the fact that the caste had approved of their conduct and had allowed them to defend this suit at the expense of the caste. They contended that under these circumstances the plaintiffs were not entitled to maintain the suit, and that the Court would not interfere with or control the decision of the majority of the caste in matters relating to the internal management of its affairs. *Held*, that s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877) did not apply. If the plaintiffs had any right of action, it was a complete right of action vested in each of them, and not a mere joint right shared with others and incomplete unless they united themselves with others. They sued as subscribers to the temple and devotees of the idol, and as such each had a right to complain of maladministration. They were entitled to sue in their own right and in their own name without permission of the Court or notice to other parties interested. *Held*, also (following *Thanga Karuppa v. Arumuga Nadan*, I. L. R. 5 Mad. 383), that s. 539 of Act X of 1877 did not apply. The three funds administered by the defendants were different in character. The mahajan fund was a purely secular fund; the other two funds were religious and charitable fund. Even if the case came under the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 539 would not apply, that section being permissive or directory, and not mandatory. Any person interested in the proper observance of a religious endowment may sue in his own name to have the trust properly administered. The section does not prohibit a private suit, and does not make the sanction of the Advocate-General a condition precedent. The gifts to the temple comprised in the darasa and sadaran funds were irrevocably dedicated to a public charity, and therefore the approval by the caste of the conduct of the trustees was no bar to the suit. They were also dedicated to the idol, who was a public, not a mere private household, divinity. The ideal personality of such an idol is well recognized, and in case of misappropriation of the property he is entitled to the protection of the public authorities, on the ground that it has been devoted to public religious purposes, and must not be wasted even by the donors. The management of the temple belonged to the Dossa Oswall

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Bania caste, and not to the whole Jain community. Although the donation were irrevocably dedicated to public purposes, the donors had never lost the right, which was attached to the caste from the beginning, of managing the temple which they had founded, and their management could only be interfered with as a public charitable trust on proof of maladministration. On the evidence:—*Held*, that the defendants were not liable for losses prior to 1867. It was not clearly proved that they were managers of the temple funds before that date. *Held*, also, that the defendants were liable for the losses incurred subsequently to 1867. They assumed the management on the execution of the trust-deed in that year, and ought to have taken steps to recover the moneys which had been improperly advanced on loan or otherwise negligently invested. Not having done so, they were guilty of wilful neglect, and were liable to refund the moneys which had been lost. The liability was, however, confined to the first three defendants, it not being proved that the remaining defendants had ever acted as trustees. The negligence of the trustees in not taking steps to recover the R2,40,000 due from the firm of *V N & Co.* was a clear breach of trust. The evidence showed that, although the whole sum could not have been recovered at any time during the trusteeship of the defendants, yet that some portion of the money might have been obtained if due diligence had been used, and that other creditors of the firm had actually been paid 2 annas in the rupee. The first three defendants were therefore liable to refund 2 annas in the rupee of such portion of the R2,40,000 as belonged to the darasa and sadaran funds. As to the mahajan fund, it belonged to the caste, and the caste had condoned its misapplication, which it had power to do. The defendants were also held liable to refund such other sums as had come into their hands and had been lost in consequence of their negligence. The Court removed the defendants from the trusteeship, and ordered a scheme to be settled. **THAKERSEY DEV-RAJ v. HURBHUM NARSEY I. L. R. 8 Bom. 432**

**9. ——— Suit for possession of endowed property—Religious trust—Charitable trust—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 30, 539—Act XX of 1863.** The plaintiff sued to recover possession as mutwalis of certain parcels of land, alleging that they were dedicated as wakf, and that the profits were "applied to the feeding of wayfarers and travellers, to lighting the mosque and shrine in the evening, and to meeting the expenses of repeating prayers on the occasion of Id and Bakhrud, and that the said profits were never spent for personal purposes." The plaintiff based her right to sue upon the fact that her deceased husband had been mutwalli, and she prayed that the property in suit might be declared wakf, and that certain alienations made by her step-son since her husband's death might be set aside. *Held*, that the trust to which the suit related was one partly for



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charitable and partly for religious purposes. As far as it related to the former, it was governed by s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code, and if viewed in the light of the latter, by Act XX of 1863; and that the suit, not being properly framed in compliance with the provisions of either of those enactments, was not maintainable. *Held*, further, that even supposing the endowment alleged was neither a public charity within the meaning of s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code nor a religious endowment to which Act XX of 1863 applied, the plaintiff was not entitled to sue alone, as it was clear upon the face of the plaint that she was not alone interested in the subject-matter of the suit, and therefore that she could only sue on behalf of all who were so interested, having first obtained the leave of the Court and otherwise complied with the provisions of s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code. *LUTIFUNISSA BIBI v. NAZIRUN BIBI*. I. L. R. 11 Calc. 33

10. ——— Suit in respect of religious endowment—*Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), ss. 30, 539—Beng. Reg. XIX of 1810—Act XX of 1863*. In a suit by two of the worshippers at a certain mosque, instituted after having obtained the sanction of the Advocate-General under s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code, against the mutwalli of the mosque and two other persons to whom the mutwalli had mortgaged part of the endowed property to secure the repayment of a loan, it appeared that one of the mortgagees had sold some of the wakf property in execution of a decree which he had obtained upon his mortgage, and the property had been purchased by the other mortgagee. The plaintiffs prayed that the property purchased might be declared to be wakf; that the sale in execution might be declared to be invalid; that a mutwalli might be appointed by the Court; and that the costs of doing the acts of the work might be defrayed from the profits of the property belonging to the endowment. *Held*, that, so far as regarded that portion of the prayer which fell within the provisions of s. 539 of the Code, the plaintiffs were not entitled to sue, as they were not "persons having a direct interest in the trust" within the meaning of the section and that the suit should have been instituted under s. 14 of Act XX of 1863 after sanction obtained under s. 18. *Held*, also, that, though the plaintiffs might possibly have obtained leave to sue under s. 30 of the Code on behalf of themselves and the other persons attending the mosque, they, not having obtained such leave, were not entitled to institute the suit for the purpose of obtaining the relief asked for in the other prayers of the plaint. *JAN ALI v. RAM NATH MUNDUL*. I. L. R. 8 Calc. 32

S.C. JAN ALI v. ATAWUR RUHMUN

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11. ——— Suit to restrain use of property for other than purposes of endowment—*Injunction—Property dedicated to religious purposes*. The plaintiff's ancestor built a temple, a bathing-ghât, a room called "Gu-gajatri ghur," and a ghât close to it, to which persons on the point of death were removed, and certain ceremonies were performed. The defendants used the last mentioned ghât for the purpose of landing goods. *Held*, that if, when the plaintiff's ancestor erected the buildings, he intended to grant to the Hindu community merely a right of easement over the property, and not to transfer the ownership therein to the community, the plaintiff was entitled to maintain a suit to restrain defendants from using the ghât for trading purposes. *JAGGAMONT DAS v. NILMONT GHOSAL*

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 75 : 11 C. L. R. 502

12. ——— Leave to sue—*Civil Procedure Code (1882), s. 539—Power of Court to grant relief outside the sanction*. When sanction is given to the institution of a suit under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882) the suit must be limited to matters included in the sanction. It is not competent to the Court to enlarge the scope of the suit and grant reliefs other than those included in the terms of the sanction. *HUSSEIN MIYAN v. COLLECTOR OF KAIRA*. I. L. R. 21 Bom. 257

13. ——— Sanction granted to two persons separately to institute suit in respect of breach of charitable trust—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 539*. R instituted a suit with the Collector's sanction to compel the performance of a charitable trust; D was subsequently joined as plaintiff, having also obtained the Collector's sanction to institute the suit. *Held*, that the sanction obtained by D related back to the institution of the suit. *RAMAYANGAR v. KRISHNAYANGAR*

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 185

14. ——— Religious institution, suit concerning management of—*Sanction of Advocate-General, necessity of—Civil Procedure Code, 1877 and 1882, s. 539*. In a suit brought in 1881 with no written consent of the Advocate-General by the head of an adhinam for declarations that a muth was subject to his control; that he was entitled to appoint a manager; that the present head of the muth was not duly appointed and his nomination by his predecessor was invalid; and for delivery of possession of the moveable and immoveable properties of the muth to a nominee of the plaintiff; the claim extended also to religious establishments at Benâres and elsewhere connected with the muth:—*Held*, that the consent of the Advocate-General to the suit was not required; the suit having been instituted under the Civil Procedure Code of 1877 and the cause of action not being an alleged breach of trust. *GIYANA SAMBANDHA PANDARA SANNADHI v. KANDASAMI TAMBIRAN*. I. L. R. 10 Mad. 375

15. ——— Public charity Trust—*Public charitable or religious trust—Offerings made to*

16 A



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*an idol—Liability of persons in possession of an idol's property—Account—Jurisdiction of Civil Courts in cases relating to public charities—Civil Procedure Code (Act X of 1877), s. 539—"Direct interest," meaning of.* 1. A trust for a Hindu idol and temple is to be regarded in India as one created "for public charitable purposes" within the meaning of s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act X of 1877). 2. The Hindu law recognizes not only corporate bodies with rights of property vested in the corporation apart from its individual members, but also the judicial persons or subjects called foundations. A Hindu who wishes to establish a religious or charitable institution may, according to his law, express his purpose and endow it, and the ruler will give effect to the bounty, or at least protect it. A trust is not required for this purpose as it is by English law. 3. Those who take charge of gifts made to a religious or charitable institution whether such gifts consist of cash, jewels, or land—incur thereby a responsibility for their due application to the purposes of the institution. They are answerable as trustees would be, even though they have not consciously accepted a trust, and a remedy may be sought against them for maladministration by suit open to any one interested as under the Roman system in a like case by means of a *popularis actio*. The plaintiffs as relators filed this suit under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act X of 1877) against the defendants as trustees of the temple of Shri Ranchhod Raiji at Dakor. The plaintiffs were five in number. The first plaintiff was the hereditary manager of the temple and its appendant villages. The other plaintiffs were priests residing at Dakor, who ordinarily took charge of pilgrims visiting the shrine, and performed worship of the idol on their behalf. The defendants were the shevaks or ministers of the idol—about one hundred and fifty in number—who took office by hereditary descent. They remained in constant attendance on the idol, performed the daily services at the temple, collected all the offerings made at the shrine, and kept them in a bhandar or store-room. The god Shri Ranchhod Raiji was held in great veneration by the followers of the Vaishnava religion throughout Western India. Every full moon thousands of pilgrims resorted to the shrine, and made offerings to the deity of cash, ornaments, clothes, and other articles amounting in value to about a lakh of rupees in the course of a year. Besides these offerings, the temple enjoyed a grant, in perpetuity, of the revenues of several inam villages, of which Dakor and Kangri yielded the largest income. The plaintiffs sued as persons interested in the maintenance of this public religious and charitable institution, and prayed that the Court would make the defendants as recipients of the offerings at the idol's shrine, accountable as trustees, for the right disposal of the property thus acquired. The plaintiffs alleged that the income of the temple had largely increased, and had been wrongly appropriated by the defendants to their personal purposes. They therefore prayed for an account, for the

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appointment of a receiver, for the removal of the shevaks from their office, and for the settlement of a scheme of future management. The defendants answered (*inter alia*) that the plaintiffs had not such a direct interest in the institution as to entitle them to sue under s. 539 of Act X of 1877; that they themselves were owners of the idol and of the idol's property, and that as such they were not liable to render an account of the offerings they had collected at the shrine. They also contended that they were not liable to be removed from their offices, which they and their ancestors had held for several centuries past. The District Judge dismissed the suit, on the preliminary ground that, except the first plaintiff, who was a hereditary manager of the temple, the other plaintiffs had not such a direct interest in the charity as to entitle them to sue under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act X of 1877). *Held*, reversing the decision of the District Judge, that plaintiffs Nos. 2—5, as priests residing at Dakor and taking part in the worship of the idol, were directly interested in its due performance and its maintenance. Though they might not be trustees, they were clearly among those who in practice benefited by the execution of the trust. They had thus an undeniable *locus standi* as relators, and the suit could proceed at their instance. *Held*, further, that the shevaks were not the owners of the offerings made to the idol. As recipients of those offerings they were responsible for their due application to the purposes of the foundation. They were liable as trustees to render an account of their management. The Court accordingly directed the District Judge (i) to take steps either by appointing a receiver, or otherwise, in his discretion, for guarding the property of the temple; (ii) to take an account of the property and of the receipts and disbursements of the temple; (iii) to make the requisite orders for recovering property appropriated by the shevaks; and (iv) to draw up a scheme for the future management of the temple and its funds, regard being had to the established practice of the institution and to the position of the shevaks and of other persons connected with it. The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters of this kind discussed. MANOHAR GANESH TAMBEKAR v. LAKHMIRAM GOVINDRAM

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 247

*Held* by the Privy Council, affirming this decision, that the decree was right, no further directions being necessary: the first thing to be done being to take an account of the trust property without which scheme for future management could not be settled. CHOTALAL LAKHMIRAM v. MANOHAR GANESH TAMBEKAR . I. L. R. 24 Bom. 50

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See MANOHAR v. KESHAVRAM

I. L. R. 12 Bom. 267 note

16. ——— Suit by worshipper of Hindu temple relating to trust—Trust for public religious purposes—Private trust—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 30, 539—Act XX of 1863—Hindu



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*law.* The defendants made a gift of land to a hindu temple for the purpose of defraying the expenses appertaining to the idol. The temple was built and the gift made in 1870. The defendants obtained from the revenue authorities mutation of names in the idol's favour and an acknowledgment of the person whom they nominated as agent or manager. The plaintiff, alleging that they had subsequently repossessed themselves of the land and the profits accruing therefrom, and that he was interested as a Hindu in worshipping at the temple, and professing to sue on behalf of the entire body of the worshippers thereat sued for declaration that the land was wakf, and the idol entitled to hold it in his own name; that the defendants should be directed to apply the income of the property to the purposes of the temple, and that the Court should give such orders and instructions as might be necessary and proper for the future management of the temple and payment of income. No sanction to the institution of the suit was obtained under s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, by the Full Bench, that the gift made by the defendants constituted a trust for the purposes of the temple. *Per* EDGE, C.J., and TYRRELL, J., that the defendants before the Court did not constitute themselves trustees in any sense. *Held*, also, by the Full Bench, that the suit was not maintainable as against those defendants. *Per* TRAIGHT, J., that the suit was not maintainable under the Hindu Law; that the trust was one for public religious purposes; that such a suit, in which the plaintiff asked to have the trust administered by the Court, could not be maintained without the sanction required by s. 539 of the Code; that assuming s. 539 to be inapplicable, an Act XX of 1863 to apply, the suit could not be maintained without the sanction required by that Act; and that, with reference to s. 30 of the Code, no cause of action had accrued to plaintiff alone on which he could maintain the suit. *Per* EDGE, C.J., and TYRRELL, J., that if the trust were one for public religious purpose, the suit as against the defendants before the Court must fail for non-compliance with the provisions of s. 539 of the Code and, if for private or quasi-private religious purposes, it must also fail, since there was no principle on which the plaintiff, as one of the public worshipping in the temple, could maintain it against those defendants who were not trustees, but (if they had wrongfully taken possession) trespassers; that Act XX of 1863 could not apply; and that, with reference to s. 30 of the Code, the plaintiff could not maintain the suit alone on his own behalf, or on behalf of himself and others against those defendants. *Jawahra v. Akbar Husain*, I. L. R. 7 All. 178, distinguished. *Manohar Ganesh Tambekar v. Lakhmiram Gobindram*, I. L. R. 12 Bom. 247; *Lutifunissa Bibi v. Nuzirun Bibi*, I. L. R. 11 Calc. 33; and *Hira Lal v. Bhairon*, I. L. R. 5 All. 602, referred to. *Wajid Ali Shah v. Dinatullah Beg*, I. L. R. 8 All. 31, approved. *RAGHUBAR DIAL v. KESHO RAMANUJ DAS*. I. L. R. 11 All. 18

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17. *Suit to remove a trustee—Civil Procedure Code, s. 539—Interest necessary to support a suit.* The plaintiffs, having an interest as the managers of a temple in seeing to the due performance of the religious part of the administration of a certain charity endowed for the sustenance of Brahmans and connected with the temple, and being further interested in its administration as Brahmans entitled under certain circumstances to share in the benefits of the charity, sued under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure to remove defendant from the trusteeship of the charity on the ground of fraudulent mismanagement. *Held*, that the plaintiffs' interest did not support the suit. *Quære*: Whether a suit for the removal of a trustee will lie under the above section. *NARASIMHA v. AYYAN CHETTI*. I. L. R. 12 Mad. 157

18. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 539—Stat. 52 Geo. III, c. 101.* A suit to remove a trustee of a charitable trust does not lie under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Narasimha v. Ayyan Chetti*, I. L. R. 12 Mad. 157, followed. *Per* SHEPARD, J.—The language of s. 535 is in part borrowed from 52 Geo. III, c. 101 (Sir Samuel Romilly's Act), and the decisions upon that Statute are in a measure reproduced in the section. S. 539 should accordingly be construed in the light of the decisions on that Statute, so far as they are applicable to the language of the section; and the Statute having from the first been held to be inapplicable to cases in which the hostile removal of a trustee is required, s. 539 is likewise inapplicable to such cases. *RANGASAMI NAICKAN v. VARDAPPA NAICKAN*. I. L. R. 17 Mad. 462

19. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 539—Suit for removal of trustees of a public charity and for account—Jurisdiction of District Judge—Jurisdiction of Subordinate Judge.* A suit to remove the trustees of a public charity, and to compel them to account and to make good the losses sustained by the charity in consequence of their default, is a suit which falls within the scope of s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), and must therefore be instituted in a District Court, and not in a Subordinate Judge's Court. *HUSSEINMIAN v. COLLECTOR OF KAIRA*. I. L. R. 21 Bom. 48

20. *Civil Procedure Code, s. 539—Jurisdiction of District Court.* In a suit under the Civil Procedure Code, s. 539, in the District Court to remove the hereditary trustee of a public trust for breach of trust, the District Judge held that the suit could not be maintained. The plaintiff appealed, and the appeal came on before two Judges, who differed in opinion. The appeal was thereupon referred under the Civil Procedure Code, s. 575, and was heard by a Bench of three Judges, including the Judges who first heard the appeal. *Held* by BEST and WEIR, JJ. (*MUTTUSAMI AYYAR, J.*, dissenting), that the suit was maintainable under the Civil Procedure Code, s. 539. *Narasimha v. Ayyan*, I. L. R. 12 Mad. 157, considered. *SUBBAYYA v. KRISHNA*. I. L. R. 14 Mad. 186



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21. *Civil Procedure Code (1882), s. 539—Suit to remove a trustee and to recover possession of trust property in the hands of a third party—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), Sch. II, Art. 134—Stat. 52, Geo. III, c. 101—Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act (VII of 1888)—Act XX of 1863, s. 14—Duty of Collector in sanctioning suit—Irregularity not affecting merits of suit—Civil Procedure Code, s. 578.* A suit for the dismissal of a trustee and for the recovery of trust property from the hands of a third party to whom the same has been improperly alienated is within the scope of s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Subbayya v. Krishna, I. L. R. 14 Mad. 186*, followed. *Lakshmandas Parashram v. Ganpatrav Krishna, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 365*, distinguished. Art. 134 of the second schedule of the Indian Limitation Act (XV of 1877) applies to such a suit. The difference between the provisions of s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code and those of 52 Geo. III, c. 101 (Romilly's Act), pointed out. Persons having a right to worship in a temple are within the scope of s. 539. Under that section, as originally enacted, the words were "having a direct interest in the trust," and the word "direct" has been taken out by Act VII of 1888. The inference is that the Legislature intended to allow persons having the same sort of interest that is sufficient under s. 14 of Act XX of 1863 to maintain a suit under s. 539. The Collector, in giving his consent to the institution of a suit under s. 539, has to exercise his judgment in the matter, and see not only whether the persons suing are persons having an interest in the trust, but also whether the trust is a public trust of the kind contemplated by the section and whether there are *prima facie* grounds for thinking that there has been a breach of trust. But where the form of the permission showed that he had omitted to exercise his judgment in the matter of the interest of the plaintiffs in the trust, such omission was held to be a mere irregularity and within the scope of s. 578 of the Civil Procedure Code. *SAJEDUR RAJA CHOWDHURI v. GOUR MOHUN DAS BAISHNAV*  
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 418

22. *Charitable endowments—Interest sufficient to support a suit relating to charity.* A Hindu, shortly before his death, directed his wife and mother to employ part of his property for the maintenance and upkeep of charitable institution, being a choultry where Japta Brahmans and travellers were fed, and at the same time empowered his wife to make an adoption, declaring that the adopted son should have no interest in the property devoted to the charitable purpose. On his death, the widow and mother executed a document, relating to the property, to give effect to the wishes of the deceased for the benefit of Brahmans; and three years later the widow took in adoption a boy, whose father acquiesced in the deceased man's dispositions. The charitable trust having been neglected and the adoptive son having taken possession in his own right of the lands constituting the

RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*9. CHARITIES AND TRUSTS—*contd.*

endowment, two Brahman residents in the neighbourhood who had obtained leave under s. 30, Civil Procedure Code, instituted a suit as representing the Brahman community at large to remove the widow from the office of trustees, to have the adopted son declared ineligible for that office and for the appointment of a new trustee. *Held*, that the plaintiffs possessed sufficient interest in the charity to enable them to maintain the suit, and that they were entitled to the relief claimed by them. *GANAPATI AYYAN v. SAVITHRI AMMAL*  
I. L. R. 21 Mad. 10

23. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 239—Trust.* A suit may properly be brought and a decree made under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the removal of a trustee. *Narasimha v. Ayyan Chetti, I. L. R. 12 Mad. 157*; *Sathappayyar v. Periasami, I. L. R. 14 Mad. 1*; *Rangasami Naickan v. Varadappa Naickan, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 462*; *Chintaman Bajaji Dev v. Dhondoo Ganesh Dev, I. L. R. 15 Bom. 612*; *Tricumdass Mulji v. Khimji Vullabhadass, I. L. R. 16 Bom. 626*; *Hussain Mian v. Collector of Kaira, I. L. R. 19 Bom. 48*; *Sajedur Raja v. Baidyanath Dev, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 397*; *Mohi-ud-din v. Syad-ud-din, I. L. R. 20 Calc. 810*; and *Sajedur Raja Chowdhuri v. Gour Mohun Das Baishnav, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 418*, referred to. *Subbayya v. Krishna, I. L. R. 14 Mad. 186*, followed. *HUSENI BEGAM v. COLLECTOR OF MORADABAD*  
I. L. R. 20 All. 46

24. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 539—Suit to remove trustees and for appointment of new trustees.* A suit for the removal of an old trustee who has committed a breach of trust and for the appointment of new trustees may properly be brought under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Huseni Begam v. Collector of Moradabad, I. L. R. 20 All. 46*, approved. *Rangasami Naickan v. Varadappa Naickan, I. L. R. 17 Mad. 462*, dissented from. *GIRDHARI LAL v. RAM LAL*  
I. L. R. 21 All. 200

25. *Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 15, 539—Religious Endowments Act (XX of 1863), ss. 14, 15, 18—Suit by a general trustee and a worshipper for removal of trustees.* A suit was filed in a District Court by the general trustee of a temple and a worshipper therein praying that certain trustees might be declared incompetent and removed, that others might be appointed in their place, that the properties belonging to the endowments of the temple might be vested in them, and that a scheme might be settled for the management of the trust. Leave to file the suit had been obtained under the Religious Endowments Act, 1863, and under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, that the suit was maintainable. *NARAYANA AYYAR v. KUMARASAMI MUDALIAR*  
I. L. R. 23 Mad. 537

26. *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 30, 539—Religious endowments—Removal of sajjadanashin—Contentious*



**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****9. CHARITIES AND TRUSTS—contd.**

and non-contentious cases. S. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies both to contentious and non-contentious cases. The decision of *BEST and WEIR, JJ.*, in *Subbaya v. Krishna*, I. L. R. 14 Mad. 186, approved. The interest required to enable a person to sue under that section must be an existing one, and not a mere contingency: the mere possibility of an interest or the mere possibility of succession to the managership of the properties concerning which the suit is brought is not sufficient to give a right to sue. The right of worship of each worshipper in a Mahomedan mosque or religious endowment is an independent right wholly irrespective of the right of the other worshippers, and therefore non-compliance by a worshipper with the provisions of s. 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not affect a suit for the removal of a trustee of Mahomedan endowment. *Jan Ali v. Ram Nath Mundul*, I. L. R. 8 Cal. 32; *Jawahra v. Akbar Husain*, I. L. R. 7 All. 178; *Lutifunnissa Bibi v. Nuzirun Bibi*, I. L. R. 11 Cal. 33; and *Zafaryab Ali v. Bakhtawar Singh*, I. L. R. 5 All. 497, referred to. *MOHIUDDIN v. SAYIDUDIN alias NAWAB MEAN*. I. L. R. 20 Cal. 810

27. ———— **Public charitable trust—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 539, 15—District Court, jurisdiction of.** A church at Palayur and the property appertaining to it were in the possession of certain of the yogakars or parishioners, who had been elected kaikars or church-wardens, but whose election had since been superseded in favour of three other persons, who now sued to recover possession. The plaintiffs were Roman Catholics; and with the three persons above referred to were joined as plaintiffs the Vicar Apostolic, the Vicar appointed to the church by him, and two other persons representing the Roman Catholic yogakars. The defendants were Syro-Chaldean Christians, and with the two persons above referred to were joined the Chor Episcopal, the Vicar appointed to the church by him, and four persons representing the other yogakars. The plaint was framed under the Civil Procedure Code, s. 539, and contained besides a prayer for possession, prayers for declaration that the church, etc., was held on trust for worship according to the faith and discipline of the Church of Rome and for injunctions against the defendants. The suit was tried by the District Judge in whose Court it was instituted, although the defendants pleaded to his jurisdiction on the ground that the Civil Procedure Code, s. 539, was inapplicable. He passed a decree for the plaintiffs, holding that the church, etc., was dedicated to the trust above stated, although it had been diverted from the purpose of that trust for a time. *Held*, (i) that the suit not being one brought by beneficiaries against trustees, or for any of the purposes mentioned in the Civil Procedure Code, s. 539, that section had no application; (ii) that although the suit should accordingly have been brought in the Subordinate Court, the District Judge had jurisdiction to try it; (iii) that the decree was right, on its appearing that the church, etc., had been held on

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****9. CHARITIES AND TRUSTS—contd.**

the above trust from 1599 to 1882 with a doubtful interruption for one year, although the original trust may have been different *AUGUSTINE v. MEDLYCOTT*. I. L. R. 15 Mad. 241

28. ———— **Suit by trustees to eject persons in wrongful possession of trust property—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 539, 622—District Judge, jurisdiction of—Subordinate Judge, jurisdiction of—Superintendence of High Court.** S. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882) has no application to a suit brought by the trustees of a religious endowment to eject persons in wrongful possession of the trust property. The plaintiffs sued, as trustees of a temple, to recover certain trust property from defendants, who were alleged to be in wrongful possession. The defendants pleaded that they were owners of the property in dispute and applied the income thereof for the purposes of the temple; they disputed the plaintiffs' title to the management or possession of the same. The Subordinate Judge, who tried the case in the first instance, held that the defendants were trustees with respect to the property in their possession, and that the suit was one of the nature contemplated by s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He therefore returned the plaint for presentation to the District Judge. This order was confirmed on appeal. *Held*, that the Subordinate Judge had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. *Held*, also, that the High Court had power, under s. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to interfere in this case, the Subordinate Judge having failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in him by law. *Held*, also, that the suit was one falling under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *VISHVANATH GOVIND v. RAMBHAT*. I. L. R. 15 Bom. 148

29. ———— **Suit by trustees to eject a trespasser from trust property—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 539.** D was the manager of a religious endowment called the Chinchvad Sansthan. On his death in 1852, disputes arose between C and G regarding the management of the sansthan, each claiming to be the heir and successor of D. After a long litigation they entered into a compromise in 1881 by which a portion of the sansthan property, consisting of certain inam villages, lands, and varshasans, were assigned to G, and C was left in charge of the rest of the sansthan property, together with all the rights, privileges, and manpans enjoyed by the hereditary trustees of the endowment. In 1886 by a decree made in a suit called the "Charity Suit," C was removed from his office, and the plaintiffs were appointed trustees in his place. In 1889 the plaintiffs filed the present suit to set aside the compromise of 1881 and recover back the sansthan property assigned to G under that compromise. *Held*, that the suit did not fall under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882). *DHUNDIRAJ GANESH DEV v. GANESH*. I. L. R. 18 Bom. 721

30. ———— **Public charitable and religious trust—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of**



**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****9. CHARITIES AND TRUSTS—contd.**

1882), s. 539—*Property set apart for religious and charitable uses—Trustee—Repudiation of the trust, effect of—Persons having a direct interest in the trust.* The plaintiffs sued as relators, under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), to have the defendants removed from the management of a religious endowment, called the "Chinchvad savasthan," on the ground that they had mismanaged and misappropriated the trust funds in their hands. The plaintiffs also prayed for the appointment of new trustees, and for the settlement of a new scheme of management under the direction of the Court. The plaintiffs and defendant were the descendants of Shri Morya Gosavi, the original founder of the savasthan. Shri Morya Gosavi was a devotee of the deity Shri Mangal Murti. He dedicated a temple to the deity at the village of Chinchvad, and established an annachhatra and sadavart for feeding the poor and the destitute. He buried himself alive, and over his tomb a temple was built to perpetuate his memory. The Raja of Satara conferred on his descendants, from time to time grants of lands, villages, and varshasans for the maintenance of the shrine and of the charities connected with it. Votaries of the god Shri Mangal Mutri visited the shrine in large numbers, and took part in the annual festivals and celebrations held in honour of the founder of the savasthan. In course of time the Chinchvad savasthan became one of the most popular sacerdotal institutions of the Deccan. In 1744 the Peshwa made a tahananama (or award) by which he set apart one half of the savasthan property exclusively for religious and charitable purposes, and distributed the other half among the descendants of the founder to provide for their temporal wants. Subsequently to the date of this award, fresh grants were made to the manager of the savasthan by the ruling authorities of the day. In 1774 and 1776 A.D. the new acquisitions were divided on the principal adopted in the Peshwa's award,—one-half being reserved exclusively for the savasthan, the other half distributed among the heirs of the grantee. In 1874 the defendant 1 succeeded to the office of manager and trustee of the savasthan. Within a few years after entering upon his office, the defendant 1, in conjunction with his son defendant 2, incurred heavy debts, mortgaged several villages belonging to the savasthan, and dealt with the savasthan income as if it was his own absolute property. The plaintiffs filed the present suit with the consent of the Advocate-General in 1883. The defendants pleaded (*inter alia*) that the property in suit was not burdened with a public religious or charitable trust; that they were not trustees, but owners, of the savasthan; and that the plaintiffs had not such direct interest in the property as to entitle them to sue under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The District Judge, who tried the case, found that the savasthan was a public religious and charitable institution; that the defendants were trustees in charge of the savasthan property, and that they were guilty of such gross misconduct as to make them unfit to act as trustees in future. He there-

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****9. CHARITIES AND TRUSTS—contd.**

fore passed a decree, directing the defendants to be removed from their office as trustees, appointed a new trustee in their place, and framed a scheme for the future management of the savasthan. *Held*, on the evidence, that the management of the Chinchvad savasthan—consisting of the sacred shrines at the villages of Chinchvad, Moregav, Theur, and Sidhateks with their endowments—constituted a public religious and charitable trust within the contemplation of s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, also, that the plaintiffs, being worshippers and devotees of the god Shri Mangal Murti and being also descendants of the original founder of the endowment, had a direct interest, in the trust, entitling them to sue under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Held*, further, that the defendants' assertion of their right to treat the trust property as their private estate and to apply the trust funds to their private purposes was sufficient to justify their removal from the trust. *Held*, further, upon the construction of the Peshwa's tahananama (or award), that it was the intention of the governing power in 1744 A.D. that thenceforth the Chinchvad savasthan—consisting of the shrines at Chinchvad, Moregav, Theur, and Sidhatek—should constitute a public devasthan; and that in setting apart a moiety of the property for the savasthan, the object was to provide a fund for the support of the four shrines and the expenses of the customary festivals, as well as of the annachhatra established at Chinchvad. CHINTAMAN BAJAJI DEV. v. DHONDO GANESH DEV.

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 612

31. ———— Cash allowance allowed to worship of idol—*Personal grant—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 319.* A plaintiff claimed to be a co-trustee of certain dargas and entitled to a share in the management and in the profits thereof, which consisted of a certain cash allowance from Government. He sued the defendants for an account and for the recovery of his share. *Held*, that the suit did not come within the purview of s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code, and did not require sanction under that section. MIYA VALI ULLA v. BAVA SAHEV SANTI MIYA

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 496

32. ———— Public charitable trust—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 539—Consent of Advocate-General.* Two out of five trustees appointed by a will to administer a public charitable trust brought this suit against the remaining three trustees praying (i) that the first defendant might be ordered to account for a specific sum of money of which it was alleged he had committed a breach of trust; (ii) that the first defendant might be removed from the office of trustee, and some other person appointed in his stead; and (i i) for such other or further relief as the nature of the case might require. The consent in writing of the Advocate-General to the institution of the suit under s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882) had not been obtained. *Held*, that the suit.



RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*9. CHARITIES AND TRUSTS—*contd.*

was one which fell within the purview of s. 539, and consequently, in the absence of such consent, was not maintainable. *TRICUMDAS MULJI v. KHMJI VULLABHDAS* . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 626

33. ——— Suit to eject one claiming to be the jheer of a muth—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 539*. Three disciples of a muth brought a suit, with the consent of the Advocate-General under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure, alleging that the defendant was in possession of the muth under a false claim of title as the successor to the late jheer, and praying that it be declared that he was not the duly appointed successor to the late jheer, and that an appointment to the vacant office of jheer be made by the Court. *Held*, that the Civil Procedure Code, s. 539, was inapplicable to the suit. *STRINIVASA AYYANGAR v. STRINIVASA SWAMI* . I. L. R. 16 Mad. 31

34. ——— Suit to remove a mohunt—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 539—Trust for "public religious purposes."* Two plaintiffs instituted a suit, on behalf of themselves and 42 other persons named in a schedule to the plaint, against a mohunt of an akhra, to have certain alienations of property belonging to the idol set aside and the mohunt removed on the ground that he was wasting the idol's property and setting up an adverse title to it, and to have another mohunt and trustee of the property appointed in his place. The plaintiffs alleged that they and the 42 others named in the schedule were in the habit of worshipping the idol or of contributing to the worship and expenses of it, but it was clearly established by the evidence that any Hindu who chose was at liberty to give puja or render service and worship, and that others than the plaintiffs and the 42 persons named in fact did so, and that the plaintiffs and the persons named were therefore not the only persons interested in the suit. The suit was one to which the provisions of s. 539 of the Code applied, the suit being one based on the existence of a trust for public religious purposes and upon a breach of that trust and for the appointment of a new trustee, and being such should have been dismissed, not having been brought in the District Court or with leave of the Collector. *SAJEDUR BAJA v. BAIDYANATH DEV* . I. L. R. 20 Calc. 397

35. ——— Suit to trustee—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 30, 539—Public charity*. The trustee of a temple sued to recover, from the representatives of the trustee of a fund constituted for special purposes in connection with the temple worship, a sum of money misappropriated by him and to obtain the appointment in his place of himself or some other fit person. The plaintiff obtained leave to sue under Civil Procedure Code, s. 30, but no sanction had been obtained under s. 539. *Held*, that the suit was maintainable. S. 539 was intended to apply only to persons who, before its enactment, had, or were believed to have, no right to take proceedings for the purposes mentioned in the section. *NELLAIYAPPA PILLAI v. THANGAMA NACHIYAR* . I. L. R. 21 Mad. 406

RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*9. CHARITIES AND TRUSTS—*contd.*

36. ——— Suit for a declaration that a certain piece of land is a grave-yard—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 539*. *Held*, that a suit for a declaration that a certain piece of land was a grave-yard dedicated to the use of such persons as had no grave-yards of their own, and asking the Court to appoint a mutawalli and settle a scheme for the management of the grave-yard, was not such a suit as fell within the purview of s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Lakshmandas Parashram v. Ganpatrav Krishna, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 365*, and *Strinivasa Ayyangar v. Strinivasa Swami, I. L. R. 16 Mad. 31*, referred to. *MUHAMMAD ABDULLAH KHAN v. KALLU* . I. L. R. 21 All 187

37. ——— Suit for ejectment of a jeer of religious institution as being illegally appointed—*Prayer for appointment of a new jeer—Elective office*. The jeer of a muth died in 1888, and the defendant assumed office as his successor. The plaintiffs, who were disciples of the muth asserting in the plaint that the office of the jeer was elective, but without having held an election, brought a suit to eject the defendants and to have a new jeer elected or appointed by the Court and placed in possession of the properties of the institution. It was alleged both that the defendant had not been duly appointed to be jeer and also that he was disqualified for that office by immorality and otherwise. *Held*, that the suit was not maintainable. *SRINIVASA SWAMI v. RAMANUJA CHARIAR* . I. L. R. 22 Mad. 117

38. ——— Public religious and charitable trust—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 539—Hindu temple, with a dharmashala and sadavart attached to it—Liability of constructive trustee—Suit to remove trustee—Limitation*. A Hindu built a temple in honour of the deity Shri Pandurang, to which were attached a dharmashala and a sadavart for feeding travellers and giving alms to the poor. For the maintenance of the temple and the charities connected with it, he dedicated certain property by a deed of gift, under which he constituted himself a trustee for life and appointed a panch to act as his successors in the trust. During his life-time he managed the temple as provided in the deed. On his death in 1867, the panch did not take charge, but his son (the defendant) assumed the management. The temple was open to the Hindu community. In 1894 the pujari of the temple and five other worshippers of the idol filed this suit, under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure, with the sanction of the Advocate-General, for removing the defendant from the management of the temple on the ground of his misconduct and mismanagement of the trust property. The defendant pleaded (*inter alia*) that the property was not a public religious and charitable trust, that he was not a trustee, that the plaintiffs had no right to sue, and that the suit was time-barred. *Held* (i) that, having regard to the fact that a certain number of the public had always used the temple, that there was attached to it a dharmashala, and that the surplus funds not required for the service of the temple were to be applied to



RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*9. CHARITIES AND TRUSTS—*concll.*

feeding travellers and maintaining a sadavart, the intention of the founder was to devote the property to public religious and charitable purposes; (ii) that although the defendant was not appointed a trustee, yet by taking charge of the endowment and purporting to manage it as temple property he made himself a constructive trustee, and was liable, as such, to the beneficiaries; (iii) that the plaintiffs were entitled to maintain the suit under s. 53 of the Code of Civil Procedure; (iv) that the suit was not time-barred as with every fresh breach of the constructive trust or whenever the direction of the Court was deemed necessary a fresh cause of action arose. *JUGAL KISHORE v. LAKSHMAN-DAS RAGHUNATHDAS*. I. L. R. 23 Bom. 659

39. ————— *Civil Procedure Code, s. 539*—Suit for a declaration that certain property is endowed property. S. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure pre-supposes the existence of a trust for the administration of which it is necessary to make provision. That section cannot apply to a suit in which the object of the plaintiff is to obtain a declaration that certain property is endowed property, the fact of endowment being denied on the other side. *JAMAL-UDDIN v. MUJTABA HUSAIN* (1903). I. L. R. 25 All. 631

## 10. CLAIM TO ATTACHED PROPERTY.

1. ————— Suit without bringing claim under s. 278—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 278 and 283*—Suit to have property declared not liable in execution. The provisions of s. 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the sections immediately succeeding are not exclusive of the remedy provided by s. 283 of the Code. *Man Kuar v. Tara Singh*, I. L. R. 7 All. 583, considered. *SUNDAR SINGH v. GHASI*. I. L. R. 18 A.L. 410

2. ————— Effect on right of suit of temporary cessation of execution-proceedings—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 283*—Order partly releasing attachment. Where a decree has not been adjusted or otherwise satisfied and is still operative, a temporary cessation of the execution-proceedings under it does not deprive the execution creditor of his rights to sue to set aside an order made under s. 283 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), releasing part of the property from attachment and to have it declared that such part or some fraction of such part, is liable to attachment. *BALAJI SHAMJI NAIK v. MOROBA NAIK*. I. L. R. 21 Bom. 58

## 11. COMPENSATION.

1. ————— Suit for compensation for expenses of releasing cattle—*Cattle seized under Cattle Trespass Act, 1871*. A suit for compensation for expenses incurred in releasing cattle which were wrongfully impounded by the defendant will not lie in a Civil Court. The Legislature when estab-

RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*11. COMPENSATION—*concll.*

lishing pounds by Act I of 1871, gave a special remedy in cases of illegal seizure, and that is the only one available. *ASLEM v. KAILA DURZI*

2 C. L. R. 344

2. ————— Suit for compensation for wrongful seizure of cattle—*Cattle Trespass Act (I of 1871)*. A suit for compensation for wrongful seizure of cattle will lie in a Civil Court, the provisions of Act I of 1871 being no bar to such a suit. *Nomaz Mollah v. Lall Mohan Tagadger*, 15 W. R. 279, approved of. *Aslem v. Kalla Durzi*, 2 C. L. R. 344, dissented from. *SHUTTRUGHON DAS COOMAR v. HOKNA SHOWTAL*. I. L. R. 16 Calc. 159

## 12. CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS.

1. ————— Special agreement under which one party has received benefit—*Implied contract*. Where there is a special agreement between two parties, and that agreement has been performed, and one of them has had all the benefit to which he is entitled thereunder, the other may sue him either upon the special agreement or upon what has been called the implied contract which arises out of the receipt of the benefit. *OOMABUTTY v. PURESHNATH PANDEY*. 12 W. R. 521

2. ————— Suit to recover difference of exchange against assignee of shipping order. An action will lie for the recovery of the difference in the rate of exchange against the assignee of a shipping order under which part of the freight was to be paid on delivery at specified rates of exchange. *GLADSTONE v. JOAKIM*. Cor. 148

3. ————— Suit for damages for omission to certify payments to Court—*Fraud*. A suit will lie in the Civil Court to recover damages for breach of contract by defendant to certify, or for his fraudulently omitting to certify, in consequence of which, on an execution fraudulently issued against the plaintiff, his property was seized. *SOOJUN MUNDUL v. WOOZEER MUNDUL*. 6 W. R. Civ. Ref. 20

4. ————— Suit for a receipt for goods as being partners' goods—*Suit for dissolution of partnership*. Plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract with a view to trade, by which each was to contribute a certain sum either in cash or goods. A trading concern was opened accordingly, but after a very short time the parties fell out. Defendant then obtained through the Magistrate the return of certain goods which, as he alleged, he had placed with the plaintiff independent of the partnership speculation. Plaintiff thereupon sued for a declaration that the goods were partnership goods and to obtain a receipt for them as such. Held, that there was no cause of action, and a suit for a receipt did not lie. In the absence of books and accounts or any other evidence, the suit could not be converted into one for dissolution of partnership. *ELIJAH v. ARATOON BROTHERS*. 14 W. R. 47



**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****12. CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS—contd.**

5. ———— **Suit on agreement to take over decrees—Subsequent compromise by payment of fixed sum.** Plaintiff took a patni from defendants, and as a part of the consideration of the lease agreed to be responsible for certain decrees outstanding at the time against the defendants. Thereupon was executed a second contract between the parties, by which that particular responsibility of paying the decrees was compromised and got rid of by plaintiff paying down a certain sum of money. Subsequently, the defendants successfully contested payment of one of the decrees, after which plaintiff sued to recover the money of which payment had been thus withheld. *Held*, that, as the second contract had absolved plaintiff from all responsibility as regards the decrees, he was not entitled to recover the money claimed in the suit. **SREENATH CHOWDHRY v. GREY . 13 W. R. 114**

6. ———— **Suit to set aside patni granted in breach of agreement.** Where the proprietors of a mehal had agreed with an ijaradar that in the event of their granting a patni to any body he should have the refusal, and, notwithstanding their agreement, gave a patni to another ijaradar:—*Held*, that the latter, having been no party to the stipulation, was not bound thereby, and that a suit would not lie by the first ijaradar to set aside the patni granted to the second. **KOMUL LOCHUN DASS v. DWARKANATH CHOWDHRY 10 W. R. 254**

*Held*, however, on review, that where *A*, taking a patni to the prejudice of *B*, had notice of an agreement existing between *B* and the zamindar, he could not in equity maintain the lease which he had obtained, but *B* would be entitled to relief against him, and the case was remanded to try if *A* took with notice of the agreement with *B*. **DWARKANATH CHOWDHRY v. KOMUL LOCHUN DASS**

**10 W. R. 414**

7. ———— **Suit on agreement not to mortgage or sell except after offer to plaintiff—Right of pre-emption—Hypothecation, suit to recover property after.** The plaintiff alleged that certain property was the hereditary property of himself and his brother *N*; that it had been determined by an award that if the plaintiff or *N* desired to mortgage or sell their respective shares they should, in the first instance, mortgage or sell to one another, and, if one party declined to take on mortgage or purchase, that the other should be at liberty to alienate elsewhere; that *N* had, however, executed a bond in favour of *R*, in which he had hypothecated the property and stipulated that the debt should only be recoverable from the property hypothecated; that *N* had confessed judgment in a suit brought against him by *R* on the bond, and had allowed a decree to be passed against the property; and that, as the bond had the effect of a deed of sale, and had been executed with an intent to defraud him, he sued to obtain possession of the property and a declaration of his title thereto as purchaser. The lower Courts decreed the

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plaintiff's claim. *R*, on special appeal, pleaded that the plaintiff had no cause of action, the property not having been sold. *Held* by PEARSON and SPANKIE, *J.J.*, that the mere hypothecation of the property did not give the plaintiff a title to it as purchaser, and that the suit as brought must be dismissed. *Held* by STUART, *C.J.*, that as the plaintiff stated matter sufficient to enable the Court to consider the validity of the claim made by the suit and on the facts and merits to do justice between the parties to the award, the objection to the form of the suit ought not to stand in the way of the plaintiff being decreed his rights under the award. **PIRTHEE SINGH v. T YA KISHUN**

**5 N. W. 226: Agra F. B. Ed. 1874, 278**

8. ———— **Suit to recover loan for Government revenue due from zamindari—Suit against zamindar for debt—Beng. Regs. of 1781 and 1787.** When money was borrowed to pay the revenue due from a zamindari, and paid to the Government on that account, the bond given by the vakils and managers of the zamindari to the trustee for the lenders in the English form, for the purpose of enabling them to enforce the personal engagements of the vakils and managers in the Supreme Court, was *held* not to deprive the lenders of their right, under the law prevailing among the natives in matters of contract, to sue the zamindari in the Courts of the mofussil. *Held*, also, that the laws of 1781 and 1787 were repealed by the laws of 1796 when this action was brought, and there was nothing in those two former Regulations which made it illegal for the zamindar to contract a debt, or for any other native to take an obligation from a zamindar without the consent of the officers of revenue; but that such an obligation, if founded on a valuable consideration, would be equally binding upon the conscience of the zamindar, and the demand and the payment would be equally legal as if such consent had been obtained and registered, though no Court of justice might have jurisdiction to enforce the right. **GOPIMOHUN THAKOOR v. RADHANATH**

**5 W. R. P. C. 72**

9. ———— **Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 10, 11—Contemporaneous "ikrarnamah"—Condition restraining alienation—Restriction repugnant to interest created—Lambardar and co-sharer—Collection of rents by co-sharer—Suit by lambardar for money had and received.** *M*, a co-sharer in a village, transferred to *A*, another co-sharer, a 2 annas share by deed of sale. Upon the same date *A* executed an ikrarnamah, in which he agreed that he would not collect the rents of the 2 annas transferred to him, that he would not ever demand partition of that share, and that he would not alienate or mortgage it or otherwise exercise proprietary rights over it. It was further provided that in the event of *A* committing any breach of covenant the sale should be avoided, and the proprietary rights in the 2 annas share should revert in *M*. A suit was subsequently brought by *M*



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upon the allegation that, in breach of the covenants of the ikarnamah, A had collected the rents of the share; that, in consequence of his action in collecting the rents, the plaintiff had been compelled to sue the tenants; that in these suits the tenants exhibited receipts given by A on the basis of which the suits were dismissed; and that he had been subjected to various costs and expenses. He therefore claimed by way of damages from A certain sums of money realized by A as rent from the tenants, and further, by reason of the ikarnamah, to avoid the sale-deed which preceded it. *Held*, that provisions of this kind, which absolutely debar the person to whom the proprietary rights have passed from exercising these rights, impose conditions which no Court ought to recognize or give effect to; that a covenant in a sale-deed, the effect of which is to disable the vendee from either alienating or enjoying the interest conveyed to him is not only contrary to public policy, but in violation of the principle of ss. 10 and 11 of the Transfer of Property Act; and that therefore, as the agreement on the basis of which the plaintiff asked for relief was one which no Court should assist him in enforcing, the suit must fail. *Holman v. Johnson*, 1 Cowp. 513; *Anantha Tirtha Chariar v. Nagamuthu Ambalagaren*, 1. L. R. 4 Mad. 200; *Bradley v. Peixoto*, Tudor's L. C. R. P. 968; and *Aminuddaula Muhammad Kakya Hussain v. Nateri Srinivasa Charlu*, 6 Mad. 356, referred to. *Balaji J. Rahalkar v. Narayanbhat*, 3 Bom. A. C. 63, distinguished. *Held* by MAHMOOD, J., with reference to the sums realized by the defendant as rent, that whatever may be the rights of a lambardar in reference to the collection of rents, the defendants, being a co-sharer in the village and having, though perhaps irregularly, realized sums of money from the tenants, could not, in a Civil Court and in a suit of this nature, be made to repay the lambardar; and the latter's only remedy was to deduct the items when the bujharat or rendition of accounts between the co-sharers and himself took place. *MAHRAM DAS v. AJUDHIA*

I. L. R. 8 All. 452

**10. ——— Suit for value of goods covered by bill of exchange—Payee for honour.** A payee for honour, though entitled to the same remedies upon the bill as the party for whom payment was made, is not entitled to bring a suit in his own name and in his own behalf for the value of the goods for which the bill was drawn. *CARMICHAEL v. BROJONATH MULLICK* 1 Hyde 274

**11. ——— Promissory note or bond executed in foreign State—Lex loci contractus—Suit upon consideration for the document—Lex fori—Procedure—Practice—Plaint, form of—Issue.** Where according to the *lex loci contractus* a promissory note or bond cannot, in the absence of registration, be a source of legal right, no action on an unregistered note or bond can be maintained. Whether a suit will lie upon the consideration for the instrument is a question of procedure to be governed by

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the *lex fori*, and in British India such a claim must either be stated in the plaint as an independent ground of claim or treated as such and an issue taken at the first hearing. *Valiappa v. Mahomed Kasim*, 1. L. R. 5 Mad. 166, cited and followed. *PALANIAPPA CHETTI v. PERIAKARUPPAN CHETTI*

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 262

**12. ——— Suit on a bond passed to a minor—Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 10 and 11.** A money bond taken by a minor is good in law, and may be sued on. *HANMANT LAKSHMAN v. JAYARAO NARSINHA* . I. L. R. 13 Bom. 50

**13. ——— Suit by the heir of the deceased against surety—Act XXVII of 1860, s. 5—Security-bond—Assignment of security-bond.** On the issue to defendant 1 of a certificate under Act XXVII of 1860, defendant 2 executed to the District Court a security-bond. The plaintiff, who had established his right to the moneys collected under the certificate, then brought his suit on the security-bond to recover the amount so collected. *Held*, that the plaintiff, not having obtained an assignment of the indemnity bond from the District Court, was not entitled to sue the surety. *MAYAN v. CHATHAPPAN* . I. L. R. 14 Mad. 473

**14. ——— Suit by assignee of contract for damages for non-delivery—Assignment of contract—Plea that assignment of contract was a sham—Sham assignment—Fraud—Right of third party to question bonâ fides of assignment—Assignment by deed—Demand for delivery—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 93.** On the 25th December 1886 the defendant contracted to deliver to the plaintiff on the 26th May 1887 one hundred bales of cotton at R196 per candy. On the 28th February 1887 the plaintiff assigned this contract to one K, and a few days afterwards, viz., on the 7th March 1887, he became insolvent. In his schedule there was no mention of this contract, or its assignment, or of the receipt of any consideration for the assignment. K, as the beneficial assignee of the contract, subsequently called on the defendant to give delivery of the goods, and offered payment of the price; but the defendant, who was then aware of the plaintiff's insolvency, refused, on the ground that K was not a *bonâ fide* assignee of the contract for value and that the assignment was a sham, and was not intended to pass the beneficial interest in the contract. A suit was then brought against the defendant by K claiming damages for breach of the contract. This suit was dismissed, on the ground that the assignment of the contract was fraudulent. The plaintiff knew of the dismissal of K's suit in 1887, but had never himself made any demand on the defendant for the performance of the contract. On the 6th November 1889 the plaintiff's petition in insolvency was dismissed for non-prosecution, and on the 18th November 1889 K re-assigned the contract to the plaintiff. The plaintiff then sued the defendant to recover damages for breach of the contract. He contended that his assignment to K though in fraud of the



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Official Assignee and the creditors of the insolvency was not in fraud of the defendant, and that by the dismissal of his petition the parties, as to their rights and liabilities under the contract, had been relegated to the position which they occupied prior to the plaintiff's insolvency. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages from the defendant. There had been no demand for delivery by the plaintiff, or on his account, as required by s. 93 of the Contract Act. *K* had asked for delivery as beneficial owner, but the property had not passed to him by the assignment; and although the defendant would be bound to recognize an assignee who could establish his title of full ownership in the contract, he was under no obligation to recognize *K* when, as a fact, the beneficial interest in the contract still remained in the plaintiff, with whom the defendant had originally contracted. In England, where there has been an assignment by deed, the assigned property passes by force of the deed, and it cannot be impeached at law by the assignor or by third parties other than creditors, on the ground of its not being a real transaction; but where the assignment is not by deed, the true nature of it as a sham may be proved. In India it is in all cases open to third parties to show that such was the case. *MULJI GOVINDJI v. NATHUBHAI HIRACHAND*

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 1

15. ——— Suit by assignee—Assignment of contract—Novation of contract—Contract Act, s. 62—Contract for forward delivery. The defendant was sued by the plaintiffs as assignees of one *S* for differences on certain contracts of purchase and sale of cotton and seeds. The defendants contended that the contracts in question were not assignable without his consent, which had never been asked for nor given, and that the plaintiffs could not therefore maintain the action. *Held*, that the objection was a good one. An assignment of a contract (as distinguished from a debt or other chose in action), to be effectual, must amount to a novation, and requires the assent of the other party to the contract (s. 62, Contract Act, IX of 1872). The defect, however, was allowed to be cured by adding *S* as a plaintiff. The legal effect of the endorsement and handing over of such contracts considered. *TOD v. LAKHMIDAS PURSHOTAMDAS*

I. L. R. 16 Bom. 441

16. ——— Compromise of decree, effect of—Mode of enforcing agreement of compromise—Reciprocal promises—Form of decree—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 51. A decree for partition having been compromised by an agreement made by the parties, and communicated to the Court which passed the decree:—*Held*, that the effect of the decree was extinguished by the agreement, which could only be enforced by a fresh suit, and not by an application for execution of the former decree. An agreement, consisting of reciprocal promises to be performed by the plaintiffs and the

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defendant, can be sued upon by the plaintiffs when they have not refused to carry out their promises, though they may not have put an allegation in the plaint saying that they are ready and willing to do so, s. 50 of the Indian Contract Act being no bar to such a suit. When the plaintiffs are entitled to ask for the performance of the part of the contract in which they are interested, and the defendant claims execution of the whole, to which the plaintiffs do not object, the Court ought to pass a decree directing execution of the whole contract, instead of rejecting the claim. *HARI RAGHUNATH JOSHI v. KRISHNAJI ANANT JOSHI*

I. L. R. 19 Rom. 546

**13. CO-SHARERS.**

1. ——— Suit by one co-sharer for value of personal property alienated by another. If a co-sharer of personal property sells the property without the consent and authority of the other owner, that other owner may sue the purchaser for the price of his share. *RADHANATH SHAHA v. KAMINEE SOONDEREE DOSSEE*

2 W. R. 37

2. ——— Suit by one co-sharer for value of wood removed—Tenancy in common—Co-owners of a forest—Mortgage by one co-tenant—Mortgagee in possession—Licensees from mortgagor and co-tenant—Cutting and removing produce—Rights of licensees—Remedy of mortgagee—Damages—Account. The first defendants, *G* and *A*, were co-owners of a forest. *G* mortgaged his interest in the forest to the plaintiff and put him into possession. The mortgage was registered. Subsequently *G* and *A* joined in a license to the second and third defendants to cut and take wood in the forest, which the latter accordingly did. The plaintiff sued *G* and the other two defendants to recover as damages, the value of the wood removed, and for an injunction restraining the defendants from removing more wood. *Held*, that the claim would not lie, neither for the whole of the damages claimed nor for such part of them as was equivalent to *G*'s interest in the value of the wood removed,—the only remedy open to the plaintiff being a suit against *A*, his co-tenant, for an account. Though *G*, being out of possession to the knowledge of the licensees, could convey to them no right, yet *A* could; and a license from *A* gave a right to cut wood in the whole of the forest, since a co-tenant may lawfully enjoy the whole property in any way not destructive of its substance so as to amount to an ouster of the other co-tenants, and whatever a co-tenant may do himself he may license another to do. The licensees therefore did no wrong in acting on their license, and no suit lay against them; nor did *G*'s joining in the license do the plaintiff any distinct injury for which an action for damages would lie against him. *Quære*: Whether plaintiff might not, however, have a right of action against *G* to recover any sum which *G* had



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obtained by assuming falsely a position and rights belonging to the plaintiff. *BALVANTRAY OZE v. GANPATRAY JADHAV*. I. L. R. 7 Bom. 336

3. ——— Suit by one co-parcener against the others for declaration of right to Government allowance forming part of joint estate. One member of an undivided family cannot sue his co-parceners for a declaration that he is entitled to recover the whole of a family varshasan. The only mode in which, as between the members of the joint family, a declaration of right to the varshasan can be properly obtained is by one of the co-parceners bringing a suit for partition of the whole of the family estate, including the varshasan and for a declaration of the shares of the respective co-parceners. *TRIMBAK DIXIT v. NARAYAN DIXIT*. 11 Bom. 69

4. ——— Suit to recover share of produce—*Property left undivided at partition—Amendment of plaint—Suit for partition—Variance between pleading and proof.* A claim to a share of the produce of the property left undivided at a partition does not lie, because such a claim is based on the right to a particular share in the property itself which has no existence in the case of an undivided family. A suit for a share of the produce of the property left undivided at partition cannot be amended, by making it a suit for partition, without entirely changing its character. *GAVRISHANKAR PARABHURAM v. ATMARAM RAJARAM*

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 611

**14. COSTS.**

1. ——— Suit for costs incurred in resisting a claim to attached property—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 246.* A suit cannot be maintained for costs incurred by the plaintiff in resisting a claim made by the defendant, under s. 246 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the greater part of which was disallowed. It is only when the costs are made a part of the order and then by execution under it, that a party can in such cases enforce the payment of costs. *ANONYMOUS*

3 Mad. 341

2. ——— Suit for costs incurred in possessory suit—*Bom. Act V of 1864.* No action lies for the recovery of costs incurred by a defendant in defending himself in a possessory suit brought against him in a Mamlatdar's Court under Bombay Act V of 1864. *JALAM PUNJA v. KHODA JAVRA*. 8 Bom. A. C. 29

3. ——— Claim for costs incurred in another suit—*Suit in Revenue Court—Damages.* In a suit for damages for breach of a covenant in an ikrarnamah not to collect the rents of a certain share in a village, and not to sue for the partition of that share, the plaintiff claimed (*inter alia*) some costs and expenses incurred in a suit brought by the defendant in the Revenue Court for partition of the share. *Held* by *MAHMOOD, J.*, with reference to the costs incurred by the plaintiff in the Revenue Court,

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that such Court in the former suit was entitled to deal with the question of costs, and dealt with it and the costs could not be made the subject-matter of fresh litigation, and therefore could not be claimed in this suit by way of damages. *Chengulva Raya Mudali v. Thangatchi Ammal*, 6 Mad. 192; *Jalam Punja v. Khoda Javra*, 8 Bom. A. C. 29; *Kabir v. Mahadu*, I. L. R. 2 Bom. 360; and *Pranshankar Shivshankar v. Gorindhlal Parbhudas*, I. L. R. 1 Bom. 467, referred to. *MAHRAM DAS v. AJUDHIA*  
I. L. R. 8 All. 452

4. ——— Suit to recover costs incurred in former proceedings in Court having jurisdiction. An objection to the attachment and sale of a house which was advertised for sale in execution of a decree for enforcement of lien was allowed, upon the ground that the objector had purchased the house from the mortgagor, and his purchase was not subject to the decree, to which he was not a party. The decree-holder then brought a suit against the objector, claiming a declaration of his right to recover the amount due under his decree by enforcement of lien against the house, and that the order releasing the property from attachment should be set aside, and also to recover the costs incurred by him in the execution department on the defendant's objection. *Held*, that, inasmuch as where a Court, having jurisdiction, orders or refuses costs, a separate action for such costs cannot be brought, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover from the defendant the costs incurred by him in the execution department. *Mahram Das v. Ajudhia*, I. L. R. 8 All. 452, followed. *KADIR BAKHSH v. SALIGRAM*. I. L. R. 9 All. 474

5. ——— Suit by Commissioner for his costs—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 180, 182.* Where a Commissioner was appointed by a Court under s. 180 of Act VIII of 1859 to take accounts at the request of the plaintiffs, and his costs were not prepaid under s. 182, and the defendant was, by the decree, ordered to pay the costs of the suit, but the costs of the Commissioner were not entered in the decree:—*Held* in a suit by the Commissioner against the plaintiffs for remuneration for his labour, that the plaintiffs were liable. *GOPALARATNAMAYYAR v. BUPALA NARASIMMA NAYUDU*. I. L. R. 4 Mad. 399

6. ——— Suit for costs incurred in criminal case. As to recovery of costs of a criminal case in a subsequent civil action. *RAM LAL v. TULA RAM*. I. L. R. 4 All. 97

7. ——— Damages, suit for—*Costs incurred in prosecuting case in Criminal Court.* *Held*, that a suit will not lie to recover as damages the expenses incurred by the plaintiff in prosecuting the defendant in a Criminal Court. *FAZAL IMAM v. FAZAL RASUL*. I. L. R. 12 All. 166

*See MAHOMED ALI v. BYAMA*

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 100



RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*

## 14a. CROPS, RECOVERY OF.

*Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), ss. 69, 73 (5)—Order of Collector, finality of.* S. 70 (5) of the Bengal Tenancy Act does not bar a suit by a tenant against a third party for recovery of crops awarded to the latter by the Collector. *Jaga Singh v. Chooa Singh*, 1. L. R. 22 Calc. 480, referred to. *CHHEDI v. CHHEDAN* (1905) . . . I. L. R. 32 Calc. 42

## 15. CUSTOMARY RIGHTS.

1. ——— Suit to restrain the use for tazias of land used for the purposes of the Holi—*Easement—Cause of action.* A, a Mahomedan, purchased a house adjacent to a piece of waste land, on which after such purchase he caused a tazia to be erected at the time of the Mohurram. J and others, Hindus, instituted a suit against A, alleging in their plaint that for a long time previously they had been in the habit of going upon the land at the time of the Holi festival for the purpose of burning the Holi and celebrating the ceremonies incident thereto, and praying that the defendant "be restrained from improper interference, and that the plaintiffs be put in possession, by maintaining observance of the Holi rights, according to the ancient usage, on the land." It was found that the plaintiffs had, for a period of twenty years prior to the institution of the suit, exercised the right of going on to the land at the time of the Holi festival, without interruption or interference. It was also proved that neither the plaintiffs nor the defendant had any proprietary right in the land, and that it belonged to the zamindars of the kasba who did not appear to object to its use by the defendant and other Mahomedans at the time of the Mohurram, for the erection of tazias. *Held*, that the plaintiffs' claim appeared to be a claim to a right by custom of the nature described in *Mounsey v. Ismay*, 34 L. J. Ex. 52, and *Abbot v. Weekly*, 1 Lev. 176, and could not strictly be regarded as for an easement, the right not being set up in respect of any dominant tenement to which it was appurtenant over a servient tenement subject to it. *Held*, further, that, inasmuch as the nature of the right claimed was to come on the land for a few days at one period of the year, it by no means followed that the plaintiffs were entitled to object to the defendant's use of the land at another period; and that, looking to the extent and nature of the said right and to the form in which the plaint was shaped, the laying of a tazia upon the land at the Mohurram could not be held to be any interference with such right sufficient to afford a cause of action on which to come into Court. *ASHRAF ALI v. JAGAN NATH* . . . I. L. R. 6 All. 497

2. ——— Custom of burial—*Local custom—Right claimed by certain section of Mahomedans to bury their dead in a certain locality—Right of burial.* Where a certain section of the Mahomedan community had been for many years in the habit of burying their dead near a darga in plaintiff's

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land, and the plaintiff sued for an injunction restraining them from exercising this right in future:—*Held*, that the right of burial claimed by the defendants was not an easement, but a customary right, which being confined to a limited class of persons and a limited area of land, was sufficiently certain and reasonable to be recognized as a valid local custom. *MOHIDIN v. SHIVLINGAPPA* . . . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 666

3. ——— Suit to enforce payment of dues for performance of marriage ceremonies—*Cause of action.* No suit lies to enforce payment of *murjada* (respect money) alleged to be a customary payment by persons of the *Kassary* caste who have marriage ceremonies or shrads performed in their house to members of the community. *NOBEEN CHUNDEB DUTT v. MADHUB CHUNDER MUNDUL* . . . 5 W. R. 225

4. ——— Suit to recover fees for use of temple—*Custom.* A suit to recover the amount of marriage fees which the defendant, it was alleged, became liable to pay for the use of a temple upon his marriage with a woman residing in the village where the temple was situated, is not maintainable unless on proof of a well-established custom to that effect. *MAADAN v. ERLANDI* 5 Mad. 147

5. ——— Suit for right to use ghât for religious purpose—*Abstract right—Cause of action—Costs.* A Hindu brought a suit in which he alleged that the Hindu community had acquired by long-established custom an exclusive right to use for religious purposes a ghât situate on the River Ganges, but that the Mahomedans were in the habit of interfering with the exercise of such right by bathing at the ghât. He prayed for a declaration of the right, and for a perpetual injunction to be issued to the Mahomedans generally forbidding them to resort to the ghât. No act of trespass was charged against any of the defendants. The defence was that the Mahomedans were entitled to use the place, and that their use of it did not cause any inconvenience to the plaintiff. *Held*, that the suit was not maintainable, since the Court had no power to pass a decree against persons who had never interfered with the property in dispute, or to issue an injunction against the whole Mahomedan world: but that, inasmuch as the defendants had fought the case all along as if the suit were maintainable and upon a false issue, both sides must pay their own costs. *SHAH MUHAMMAD v. KASI DAS* . . . I. L. R. 7 All. 199

6. ——— Suit for right to use ghât for collecting religious offerings—*Right to land of ghât Cause of action.* Certain Brahmans, on the allegation that a custom existed whereby they had an exclusive right to use a ghât for the purpose of collecting alms, the land of which did not belong to them, sued for a declaration of the exclusive right to the use of the ghât for that purpose. *Held*, that, as the plaintiffs had no right of any kind in the land of the ghât, the suit was not maintainable. *HUSAIN ALI v. MATUKMAN* . . . I. L. R. 6 All. 39



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7. ———— **Right to occupy specific portion of ghât dedicated to the public not susceptible of acquisition by prescription—Gangaputras.** Held, that no exclusive right of occupation could be acquired by prescription in any specific portion of a bathing ghât the use of which was dedicated to the public. *Husain Ali v. Matukman*, I. L. R. 6 All. 39, followed. *Tyron v. Smith*, 9 A. & E. 406 and *Tuner v. Ringwood Highway Board*, L. R. 9 Eq. 418 referred to. **MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANNING v. LALLU**

I. L. R. 20 All. 200

8. ———— **Suit for perquisites—Suit by mahar of village against other mahars to establish his right to share in mahar's perquisites.** A suit by one of the mahars of a village against his fellow-mahars to establish his right to share in the mahar's perquisites, such as the carcasses of dead animals, etc., will lie, though such a claim be not tenable against the raiyats who may have owned such animals when alive. **YELLAPA VALAD BHIMAPA v. MANKIA** . . . . . **8 Bom. A. C. 27**

**16. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.**

1. ———— **Suit by debtor to compel creditor to accept money due—Suit on bond—Refusal to accept instalments on bond.** A bond having been executed, whereby it was stipulated that a debt should be paid by instalments, subject to the condition that, if any one instalment were not paid within a certain time after it became due, the whole amount remaining due should become payable at once, the creditor evaded the debtor's attempts to pay the instalments as they became due, and the debtor brought a suit to compel the creditor to accept an instalment due. Held, that such a suit would not lie. **KRISTAYA v. KASIPATI** I. L. R. 9 Mad. 55

2. ———— **Agreement in subsequent deed to pay balance due on a prior document, gives no fresh right of suit, when previous obligation not discharged.** Where a promissory note had been executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff and some time afterwards the defendant by another document assigned certain decrees to the plaintiff and the document provided that the amounts realized by executing the decrees should be credited towards the amount due on the promissory note and that the defendant should pay any balance that may remain due after the decrees had been realized, but the original promissory note had not been cancelled or returned to the defendant or otherwise discharged:—Held, that the plaintiff's only claim was on the promissory note and that the subsequent document conferred no fresh right of suit, and that the plaintiff's suit brought after the expiry of the period of limitation for a suit on the promissory note was barred. *Barker's claim*, [1894] 3 Ch. 290, referred to and applied. **VENKATARAMIAH PANTULU v. RAMAKRISHNA PANTULU** (1906)

I. L. R. 29 Mad. 295

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****16. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR—concl'd.**

3. ———— **Joint creditors—Succession Certificate Act (VII of 1887)—Pleading—Indian Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 45.** It is open to one of two joint creditors to maintain an action for recovery of the debt if the other creditor is joined as a co-defendant and if there is good ground for not joining him as a co-plaintiff. Where plaintiff brought a suit for recovery of a debt due on a bond executed in favour of him and another person who had died before the suit and whose successor (who was alleged to have assigned to the plaintiff her share of the debt) was made a party defendant: Held, that, although no succession certificate to collect the debt of the deceased joint creditor was produced, the suit was maintainable at any rate as to the share of the plaintiff. The High Court in remanding the case directed that the successor of the deceased joint creditor who had not been properly served with notice of the suit, should be so served, and that on her expressing her desire to be joined as co-plaintiff, she should be so joined and opportunity given to her to produce a succession certificate, and that on the production of the same a decree for the entire amount should be passed. **SHITAL CHANDRA BAIRIGEE v. MANIK CHANDRA HAZRA** (1909) . . . . . **13 C. W. N. 509**

**17. DECREES.**

1. ———— **Suit to enforce execution of decree in another suit.** A suit will not lie to enforce execution of a decree in another suit. **TABEKNARAIN SINGH v. PUNCHA SINGH** W. R. 1864, 376

2. ———— **Suit to enforce execution of decree—Mode of enforcing right.** The proper mode of enforcing a decree is that pointed out by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1859, namely, by execution and sale, or by execution and attachment, and the appointment of a receiver under s. 243 to collect the property. Where the Legislature has prescribed a particular mode of enforcing a right created by a decree, the possessor of that right is bound to follow the procedure prescribed and no other. **MAHOMED AGA ALI KHAN v. WIDOW OF BALMAKUND**

L. R. 3 I. A. 241: 26 W. R. 82

3. ———— **Suit on decree of High Court—Civil Procedure Code, 1877.** There is nothing in Act X of 1877 which prevents a suit from being instituted on a decree of the High Court. **ATTHERMOHEY DOSSEE v. HURRY DOSS DUTT**

I. L. R. 7 Cal. 74: 9 C. L. R. 357

4. ———— **Suit on decree pending appeal.** *Quere*: Whether a new suit will lie upon a decree pending an appeal. **IMAMUN v. HURDYAL SINGH** . . . . . **5 W. R. 277**

5. ———— **Suit for amount due on decree lost in Mutiny.** A suit was held to lie for the amount of an unsatisfied claim adjudged by a decree which was destroyed during the Mutiny, and the cause of action to date from the lost decree. **EMAMUN v. HURDYAL SINGH** W. R. 1864, 301



RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*17. DECREES—*contd.*

*See (contra)* NUZUR BANOO *v.* HOSSEIN ALI KHAN  
W. R. 1864, 378

6. ——— Suit on decree where there were no means of enforcing it by execution. A decree in a suit upon a bond against the heir of the deceased obligor awarded to the plaintiff the amount of the bond from the property of the obligee, and directed that "the defendant be released from the claim in this suit." An order for execution of the decree was set aside, on the ground that the decree did not warrant the issue of an attachment, since it was not against any person. *Held*, that a suit was maintainable by the plaintiff upon the decree recovered in the former suit, there being no other means of enforcing the former decree or recovering his debt. ANUND ROY *v.* MUNORUT SINGH . . . Marsh. 611

7. ——— Suit for balance after execution of decree for rent—*Suit under Rent Act to recover sum due after sale in execution of decree under Beng. Reg. VII of 1799.* A suit was held to be not maintainable under the Rent Act to recover a sum due under a decree for rent obtained under Regulation VIII of 1799, and remaining unsatisfied after sale of the tenure. DHEERAJ MAHTAB CHAND *v.* DENO NATH ROY  
Marsh. 310: 2 Hay 445

8. ——— Suit on foreign judgment—*Suit on judgment of Small Cause Court.* A suit will not lie in the Courts of India upon the judgment of any Court in British India. The only exception to this rule is in the case of judgments of a Court of Small Causes on which suits are permitted to be brought in the High Court in order to obtain execution against immoveable property. *Quære*: Whether suits on foreign judgments are maintainable in the Civil Courts of India. BHAVANISHANKAR *v.* PARSADRI . . . I. L. R. 6 Bom. 292

9. ——— Native Court's decree—*Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), s. 434.* A suit cannot generally be maintained in any British Court upon the judgment of a Native Court. *Quære*: Whether it could where there had been a notification by the Governor-General of India under s. 434 of the Civil Procedure Act (X of 1882). HIMMATLAL *v.* SHIVAJIRAV . I. L. R. 8 Bom. 593

10. ——— Suit on judgment of Court in Native States. A suit will be on a judgment of a Court in a Native State. MAYARAN *v.* RAVJI . . . I. L. R. 24 Bom. 86

11. ——— Suit on decree of Small Cause Court—*Decree unsatisfied by execution.* Where plaintiff had obtained a decree in the Small Cause Court, and execution had been issued, but defendant had not moveable property sufficient to satisfy the decree. *Held*, that a suit in the High Court, on the decree of the Small Cause Court, would lie for the balance, but costs will not be given to the successful plaintiff in such a suit, nor interest on the judgment be obtained in the High Court. MOHENDRONATH ASH *v.* BEEDOBODUN DUTT  
1. Ind. Jur. N. S. 220

RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*17. DECREES—*contd.*

12. ——— Suit in High Court. A suit can be brought in the High Court on a decree of the Small Cause Court. KHOBLALL BABOO *v.* RAMCHUNDER BOSE  
I. L. R. 2 Calc. 434

13. ——— Decree unsatisfied by execution. In a suit to recover R777 due on a decree of the Small Cause Court, which decree had been obtained by the plaintiff against the defendant as executor of the estate of one R, deceased, the defendant had appeared in the Small Cause Court and had denied assets of the deceased, and the decree was wholly unsatisfied, as appeared from the certificate of the first Judge. The plaintiff proved by the evidence of the defendant himself that he was in possession of immoveable property of the deceased out of which the decree could be satisfied. The plaintiff prayed that the defendant, as executor, might be ordered to pay the amount with interest and costs, and if he should deny assets, then for administration of the estate of the deceased. The defendant did not enter appearance. The Court granted a decree for the amount with interest and costs No. 1; in default of payment for six months from date of decree, the estate to be administered in due course. MODOOSOODUN PAUL *v.* DOYAL CHAND MULLICK  
10 B. L. R. Ap. 35

14. ——— Stat. 9 & 10 Vict., c. 95. No suit will lie in the High Court on a decree of the Small Cause Court. MOHENDRONATH ASH *v.* BEEDOBODUN DUTT, 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 220; Madan Mohun Bose *v.* Laurence, 1 B. L. R. O. C., 66, and Khoblall Baboo *v.* Ramchunder Bose, I. L. R. 2 Calc. 434, dissented from. GOLAM ARAB *v.* CURREEMBOX SHAIKJEE  
I. L. R. 5 Calc. 294: 4 C. L. R. 477

15. ——— Insufficiency of immoveable property to satisfy decree. A suit may be brought in the High Court of Bombay upon a judgment obtained in the Court of Small Causes of Bombay. The execution of the decree in such suits is rigorously confined to immoveable estate. The ground of the interference of the High Court in such cases is that practically the judgment-creditor could not recover his debt except by process against the immoveable estate of the debtor. In such cases the plaintiff must contain an averment and the plaintiff must establish to the satisfaction of the High Court that there is not any sufficient moveable property of the defendant against which the decree of the Court of Small Causes can be fully executed, and that he has immoveable property situated within the original jurisdiction of the High Court against which execution can be had. FAKIRAPPA *v.* PANDURANGAPPA . . . I. L. R. 6 Bom. 7

16. ——— Suit in Small Cause Court. A suit will not lie in a Small Cause Court on a decree of that Court. SANDES *v.* JOMIR SHAIKH . . . 9 W. R. 399

17. ——— Suit in Small Cause Court—*Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (XV of 1882), ss. 1, 4, 94.* A judgment-creditor in



RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*17. DECREES—*contd.*

the Court of Small Causes had not before the 1st July 1882 the right to sue in that Court on his judgment. *MERWANJI NOWROJI v. ASHABAI*

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 1

18. ——— Suit on decree barred by limitation. *Quere*: Whether a suit could be maintained on a decree that was held to be barred by lapse of time. *LAKSHMAMMA v. VENKATARAGAVA CHARIAR* . . . . . 4 Mad. 89

19. ——— Neglect to execute decree in suit for possession. Where a party brings a suit for possession and obtains a decree which he neglects to execute, no subsequent suit on the same cause of action will lie. *GOPI MOHUN DASS v. TINCOURI GUPTA* . . . . . 1 C. L. R. 254

*NUBC DOORGA v. SEETAMONEE* . . . . . 23 W. R. 407

20. ——— Neglect to execute decree. Where persons by their own neglect have lost the remedy by process of execution to which they became entitled by an adjudication in a former suit, they cannot be permitted to revert to the position which they held prior to the institution of that suit, and to bring a fresh suit. *GOLAM HOSSEIN v. ALLA RUKHEE BEEBEE*

3 N. W. 62: *Agra F. B. Ed. 1874, 248*

*HOSSEIN BUKSH v. MUSUND HOSSEIN*

18 W. R. 260

*NURSINGH DOSS v. KUMROODDEEN*

20 W. R. 412

21. ——— Neglect to execute decree—Effect of barred decree—Former suit relating to land. By SPANKIE and TURNBULL, J.J.—When the nature of a decree is such that it admits of execution, the decree-holder cannot, after allowing the limitation period to elapse without issuing process of execution, seek by a fresh suit to obtain the relief he should have sought by execution. By TURNER, *Offg. C.J.*—Although by reason of the limitation law process of execution may be barred, the decree is not altogether void. Its effect in ascertaining the rights of the parties is unaffected by any of the provisions of the limitation law. In respect of landed property which has been the subject of a decree, a plaintiff need not necessarily found his suit on the decree. He may assert, as his cause of action, the continued trespass of the defendants subsequently to the decree, which gives him a new cause of action. *RAM JUS RAE v. RAM NARAIN*

2 N. W. 382: *Agra F. B. Ed. 1874, 226*

22. ——— A suit will not lie upon a decree the execution of which is barred by the provisions of the Limitation Act. *FAKIRAPPA v. PANDURANGAPA* . . . . . I. L. R. 6 Bom. 7

23. ——— Omission to enforce decree by execution till barred. When a decree is merely declaratory and does not require to be carried into effect the process of execution, the right thereby declared and ascertained exists independently of any process for enforcing it. But

RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*17. DECREES—*contd.*

when the nature of the decree requires that it should be executed, a decree-holder cannot, after allowing the limitation period to elapse without issuing process of execution, seek by a fresh suit on the decree to obtain that which he should have sought for by executing it. *DUBEE SINGH v. JOWKEE RAM*

3 *Agra 381: Agra F. B. Ed. 1874, 172*

*YAKOOB ALI v. UBDPOOLRAHMAN* 3 *Agra 383*  
s.c. *Agra F. B. Ed. 1874, 172*

*JUGURNATH v. BALGOBIND*

1 N. W. 105: *Ed. 1873, 154*

24. ——— Suit to enforce declaratory decree for maintenance. A decree-holder, having obtained in 1874 a decree entitling her to a certain sum to be paid annually by the judgment-debtor, applied for execution of the decree on the 11th of March 1875, but made no further application until July 1882. *Held*, that, though the application was barred by lapse of time, yet the decree being a declaratory one, a suit to enforce the annual right to maintenance would lie. *SABHANATHA DIKSHATAR v. SUBBA LAKSHMI AMMAL* . . . . . I. L. R. 7 Mad. 80

25. ——— Declaratory decree—Maintenance suit, decree in—Annual payments. A Hindu widow obtained a decree in 1876 which provided that she should receive future maintenance annually at a certain rate, but did not specify any date on which it should become due. In 1887 she filed the present suit claiming arrears of maintenance at the rate fixed in the decree of 1876. *Held*, that the suit did not lie. *Sabhanatha v. Lakshmi*, I. L. R. 7 Mad. 80. distinguished. *VENKANNA v. AITAMMA* . . . . . I. L. R. 12 Mad. 183

26. ——— Suit to set aside decree—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 108, 540, and 623—Amendment of plaint without notice to party. The only ways in which a decree may be set aside by a party thereto are by appeal, by proceedings under s. 108, Civil Procedure Code, and similar sections, and by application for review; if the decree is not tainted by fraud, no suit lies to set it aside. The mere fact that an amendment has been made in the pleading without notice to a party who has not appeared does not nullify the decree subsequently made in the suit. *SADHO MISSEER v. GOLAB SINGH* . . . . . 3 C. W. N. 375

27. ——— Suit to set aside decree—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244—Separate suit to set aside decree and sale—Jurisdiction—Fraud—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 44. A suit to set aside a decree and the sale in execution thereof, and to recover the property sold, is maintainable, notwithstanding the provisions of s. 244, Civil Procedure Code, and should be brought in the Court in the jurisdiction of which the property is situate, although the decree sought to be set aside was passed by a Court in a different district. It may not be competent to the Court to set aside as fraudulent the decree passed by another Court,



RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*17. DECREES—*contd.*

but it is competent to the Court to investigate the question as to the character and validity of the decree, for the purpose of giving relief to the plaintiff in respect of the land which he lost by reason of the sale. *Mewa Lall Thakoor v. Bhujhun Jha*, 22 W. R. 213, referred to. *Abdul Mazumdar v. Mahomed Gazi*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 605; *Pran Nath Roy v. Mohesh Chandra Moitra*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 516, and *Srimati Nistarini Dasi v. Rai Nundo Lal Bose*, 3 C. W. N. 670, followed. *KEDAR NATH MUKERJEE v. PROSONNA KUMAR CHATTERJEE* (1901) . . . 5 C. W. N. 559

28. ————— *Decree ex-parte—Execution sale—Fraud—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 108—Effect of order rejecting previous application to set aside the decree, where the plaintiff had not appealed from such order.* The defendants sued the plaintiff for arrears of rent, and obtained an *ex parte* decree, in execution of which they attached and sold land of the plaintiff. The plaintiff applied under s. 108 of the Civil Procedure Code to set aside the decree. His application was rejected, but he did not appeal from this order. The plaintiff then sued to set aside the decree and the sale in execution, on the ground that he had no interest in the land, in respect of which the arrears of rent were alleged to be due, and the decree and sale had been obtained by false returns of summons and of processes in execution, and were fraudulent and void. The defendant objected that the plaintiff, having applied under s. 108 without success, and not having appealed from the order rejecting his application, had no right of suit in the Civil Court: *Held*, that the suit was maintainable. *RADHA RAMAN SHAHA v. PRAN NATH ROY* (P.C. 1901) . . . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 475

29. ————— *Mistake in decree—Separate suit to set aside—Maintainability.* It cannot be broadly laid down that any error in a decree made by a Court may be challenged by a separate suit. *Sadho Misser v. Golab Singh*, 3 C. W. N. 375; *Jogeswar Atha v. Ganga Bishnu Ghattack*, 8 C. W. N. 473, referred to. *CHAND MEA v. ASIMA BANU* (1906) . . . 10 C. W. N. 1024

30. ————— *Compromise decree—Res-judicata—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 13—Suit instituted before Munsif—Compromise-decree on appeal before District Judge—Application for review to have compromise-decree set aside—Decision, if bars fresh suit before Subordinate Judge—Ground for setting aside compromise-decree not raised in review—Fresh suit on such ground, if lies—Procedure for setting aside decree—Rule issued by the High Court—Discharge—Effect.* Plaintiffs had instituted three suits against the defendants in the Court of the Munsif. Pending appeals preferred before the District Judge against the decree of the Munsif, a compromise was filed and decrees made thereon. The plaintiffs then applied for review of the decrees alleging that their pleader had no authority to agree to the compromise. The District

RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*17. DECREES—*conclld.*

Judge rejected the application on the ground that the pleader had the requisite authority. The plaintiffs obtained rules from the High Court against this order, but they were discharged. Plaintiffs now instituted a fresh suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge praying that the compromise and the decree made thereon be set aside on the ground that the pleader had no authority to compromise and that the terms of the compromise went outside the subject-matter of the suit. *Held*, that in order to have the compromise-decree set aside it was open to the plaintiffs to proceed either by way of suit or by an application for review, the latter being the more regular mode of procedure. *Ashootosh Chandra v. Tara Prasanna Roy*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 612, followed. That the effect of the discharge of the rules issued by the High Court was to leave the order of the District Judge undisturbed. That the question regarding the pleader's authority to compromise was directly and substantially in issue in the proceeding for review and was heard and finally decided by the Court of the District Judge, which was a Court of jurisdiction competent to try the present suit. The suit in consequence is barred by the rules of *res judicata*. *Koylash Chandra De v. Tarrack Nath Mandal*, I. L. R. 25 Calc. 571; *Bhagwanbuttee Chowdhurain v. A. H. Forbes*, I. L. R. 28 Calc. 78, relied on. An independent suit would not lie merely because a ground is alleged for setting aside the decree, which was not taken in the application for review. The plaintiffs having elected to proceed by way of review, ought to have raised upon their application all the grounds upon which they relied for setting aside the decree. *RAM GOPAL MAZUMDAR v. PRASUNNA KUMAR SANIAL* (1905) . . . 10 C. W. N. 529

## 18. DIGNITIES.

1. ————— *Suit for declaration of right to receive marks of distinction.* A suit for a declaration of a right to receive marks of recognition and honour at idol-festivals, or for damages from priests for withholding the same, is not cognizable by a Civil Court. *GOSSAIN DOSS GHOSE v. GOORO DOSS CHUCKERBUTTY* 16 W. R. 198

2. ————— *Suit to establish right to mere dignity—Dignity unconnected with emolument.* Plaintiff sued for a declaration of his right to take a cupola to a certain temple, and to place it upon the car of the idol, and to take a nandicolā (bamboo) with tom-toms from his house to the temple, and to offer the first cocoanut to the idol at the annual festival held in honour of a certain Dingayet saint. *Held*, that the suit was not maintainable, as it was brought to vindicate plaintiff's right not to an office, but to a mere dignity unconnected with any fees, profits, or emoluments. *SANGAPA BIN BASLINGAPA v. GANGAPA BIN NIRAJA JAPA* . . . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 476



RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*18. DIGNITIES—*contd.*

3. ——— Suit to establish right to parade bullock on the Pola—*Damages—Dignity.* A suit does not lie in a Civil Court for a declaration that the plaintiffs have the right of parading their bullock on the Pola (the last day of the month of Shravan) of one year, and the defendants on the Pola of the next; for damages for the invasion of the plaintiff's right in a given year; and for an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the said right. *RAMA v. SHIVRAM*

I. L. R. 6 Bom. 116

4. ——— Suit claiming right to have palki carried crossways. *Quere*: Whether a suit lies in the Civil Courts against the chief priest of the Lingayats by the swami or chief priest of the Smartava sect of Brahmins claiming, by grant from the supreme power of the State, the privilege of adavi palki, of being carried, on ceremonial occasions, in a palanquin borne crossways, so that the poles traverse the line of march. *SUNKUR BHARTI SWAMI v. SIDHA LINGAYAH CHARANTI*

6 W. R. P. C. 39: 3 Moo. I. A. 198

5. ——— *Máns*, suit for right to—*Perpetual injunction against invasion of these máns—Right to worship—Small gifts by presents of rice, cocoanuts, vida, and venison attached to such máns, how far considered as emoluments.* The plaintiffs and the defendants, as members of a family of Ganvkars, claimed to be entitled to certain *máns* consisting of the right to be the first to worship the deity on certain occasions, and to receive gifts of rice, cocoanut, and *vida* and venison made by the priest on certain religious ceremonies and other occasions. The plaintiff, being obstructed by the defendants in the enjoyment of the *máns*, sought to obtain a perpetual injunction against the defendants. The Court of first instance dismissed the plaintiff's claim as being one for mere dignities unaccompanied with emoluments, and as such not cognizable by a Civil Court. The plaintiff thereupon appealed, and the lower Appellate Court reserved the lower Court's decree, and granted a perpetual injunction against the defendants, prohibiting them from interference with the plaintiff's enjoyment. On appeal by the defendants to the High Court:—*Held*, restoring the decree of the Court of first instance, that the plaintiff's suit was not maintainable. The *máns* were mere dignities to which no profits or emoluments were attached. The trifling gifts made by the priest of rice, a cocoanut, and *vida*, on the occasion of worshipping the deity, and of a piece of venison on other occasions, could not be regarded as emoluments, being merely symbols of recognition and marks of respect of and to the holders of the *máns*. *Rama v. Shivram*, I. L. R. 6 Bom. 116, followed. *NARAYAN VITHE PARAB v. KRISHNAJI SADASHIV*

I. L. R. 10 Bom. 233

6. ——— Cause of action—*Civil right—Precedence at religious festival.* The plaintiff alleged that he and his ancestors had possessed for 300 years the privilege of receiving before others

RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*18. DIGNITIES—*concl'd.*

sacred ashes, sandal, betel and nut, flowers, etc., at certain pagodas on festival and other days, and that the defendants had disputed his claim to precedence and created a disturbance, whereby the plaintiff was prevented from enjoying this privilege. The plaintiff prayed that his claim to receive first honours might be established, and that the defendants should be perpetually restrained from preventing him from receiving the same. *Held*, that no cause of action was disclosed by the plaint. *KARUPPA GOUNDAN v. KOLANTHAYAN*

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 91

## 19. DOCTOR'S FEES.

——— Suit for doctor's fees—*Right of doctor to recover fees.* The fact of a doctor treating a patient before being paid is no bar to his suit to recover his fees in a court of law. *HURISH CHUNDER SURMAH v. BROJONATH CHUCKERBUTTY*

13 W. R. 96

## 20. DOCUMENTS, LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF.

1. ——— Suit on lost cheque—*Cause of action—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 61.* The indorsees of a cheque sued the indorser, stating in their plaint that the cheque had been lost and that the defendant refused to give them a duplicate of it, and claiming a duplicate of it, or the refund of the money they had paid the defendant on the cheque. *Held*, that the plaint disclosed a cause of action against the defendant. *BALDEO PRASAD v. GRISH CHANDRA BOSE*

I. L. R. 2 All. 754

2. ——— Suit to compel execution of another document where one has been destroyed before registration. A suit will lie to compel the defendant to execute another instrument of sale where the first one has been destroyed by fire soon after its execution, and has on that account, though compulsorily registrable, become incapable of being registered. *NYNAKKA ROUTHEN v. VAVANA MAHOMED NAINA ROUTHEN*

5 Mad. 123

3. ——— Suit to compel execution and registration of fresh deed—*Loss of sale-deed.* When a deed of sale of immoveable property for more than Rs 100 is lost within the time allowed for the registration of the same, the purchaser may bring a suit against the vendor to compel the execution and registration of a fresh deed. *NALLAPPA REDDI v. RAMALINGACHI REDDI*

I. L. R. 20 Mad. 250

## 21. EASEMENTS.

1. ——— Obstruction—*Acquiescence—Suit for removal of obstruction—Decree for plaintiff qualified by declaring that parties retain rights exercised prior to obstruction.* In a suit for the removal of a building which the defendants had erected and which was an obstruction to the plaintiffs' right to use a courtyard adjoining their residences, it appeared that the land on which the building stood



RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*21. EASEMENTS—*concl'd.*

did not belong to either party, but that all the inhabitants of the mohulla had from time immemorial exercised a right of way over it to and from their houses. It also appeared that on a part of the same land there had formerly stood a thatched building used as a "sitting place" by the residents of the mohulla. *Held*, that the right which was alleged to have been obstructed was not a public right of way, but a right which was confined to the people dwelling in the mohulla and going to and from the houses in the mohulla; and that the suit being brought in respect of an interference with a private easement, was maintainable without proof of special damage. *Karim Baksh v. Budha*, I. L. R. 1 All. 249; *Gehanaji v. Ganpati*, I. L. R. 2 Bom. 469; and *Uda Begam v. Imam-ud-din*, I. L. R. 1 All. 82, distinguished. *Held*, also, that there was no principle of acquiescence involved in the case, inasmuch as there was no evidence that the plaintiffs had given their actual consent to the building, and the only evidence of their acquiescence could be that they did not immediately protest, and the defendants must have known that they were building upon a courtyard which their neighbours had a right to use. *Uda Begam v. Imam-ud-din*, I. L. R. 1 All. 82, and *Ramsden v. Dyson*, L. R. 1 H. L. 129, referred to. *FATEHYAB KHAN v. MUHAMMAD YUSUF*. MUHAMMAD YUSUF *v.* FATEHYAB KHAN

I. L. R. 9 All. 434

2. ——— Privacy, right of—*Custom.*

A customary right of privacy, under certain conditions, exists in India and in the North-Western Provinces, and is not unreasonable, but merely an application of the maxims *sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas* and *aedificare in tuo pro prio solo non licet quod alteri noceat*. A substantial interference with such a right, where it exists, if without the consent or acquiescence of the owner of the dominant tenement, affords such owner a good cause of action. *GOKAL PRASAD v. RADHO*. I. L. R. 10 All. 358

## 22. ENDOWMENTS, SUITS RELATING TO.

1. ——— Suit by a dharmakarta disaffirming the acts of his predecessor—*Act XX of 1863, s. 7—Mad. Reg. VII of 1817, s. 12—Suit to set aside lease granted by former dharmakarta of temple—Limitation—Cause of action.* The plaintiff, who had been appointed in 1886 by the Sub-Collector to be dharmakarta of a Hindu temple, for which no committee had been appointed under the Religious Endowments Act, s. 7, sued in 1886, to recover possession of land demised to the defendant on a perpetual lease in or about 1856 by a previous dharmakarta, who died in 1885. *Held*, that, Madras Regulation VII of 1817 having been repealed as regards Hindu temples by Act XX of 1863, the appointment by the Sub-Collector gave the plaintiff no right to sue: accordingly, it was necessary to determine the question whether he had such right apart from that appointment. *Held*, that, assuming he had such right, the plaintiff, since he did not derive title through his predecessor in office (the

RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*22. ENDOWMENTS, SUITS RELATING TO—*contd.*

grantor of the lease), would be entitled to disaffirm his acts and could maintain the suit. The cause of action arose, and the period of limitation would therefore run not from the date of the lease, but from the date of the accession of the plaintiff to his office. *MAHOMED v. GANAPATI*. I. L. R. 13 Mad. 277

2. ——— Suit by a trustee of a devasom disaffirming the act of his predecessor—*Adverse possession—Limitation.* The trustee of a Malabar devasom, who had succeeded to his office in June 1883, sued in 1887 to recover for the devasom possession of land which had been demised on kanom by his predecessor in February, 1881, on the ground that the demise was invalid as against the devasom. The defendant had been in possession of the land for more than twelve years, falsely asserting the title of kanomdar with the permission of the plaintiff's predecessor in office. *Held*, (i) the suit was not barred by limitation; (ii) the plaintiff was entitled to maintain the suit for the purpose of recovering for the trusts of the devasom property improperly alienated by his predecessor. *Suppammal v. The Collector of Tanjore*, I. L. R. 12 Mad. 387, distinguished. *VEDAPURATTI v. VALLABHA* I. L. R. 13 Mad. 402

3. ——— Suit by dharmakarta of temple to recover temple property—*Religious Endowments Act (XX of 1863), s. 12.* The right to bring suits for the recovery of the property of a religious or charitable institution is vested in the trustee or manager of such institution, unless he is precluded by any special law from exercising it. There is nothing in the Religious Endowments Act to take away such powers. S. 12 relates only to the rents of property transferred by Government to the committees of such institutions. *SANKARA MURTI MUDALIAR v. CHIDAMBARA NADAN*

I. L. R. 17 Mad. 143

4. ——— Suit to prevent Committee under Act XX of 1863 from illegal interference—*Decision as to validity of testamentary paper.* The khaleefa of an endowment having, by a will or testamentary paper, appointed a successor, and given various directions respecting the endowed property, sent a copy of the paper to the Committee appointed under Act XX of 1863 for their information. The Committee having thereupon expressed their opinion that the document was of no effect, the khaleefa sued "to prevent the Committee from illegal interference, and to reverse their order respecting the will." *Held*, that such a suit was not maintainable and that no legal cause of suit appeared. *HISAM-OD-DEEN KHAN v. KHALEEFA UNWAR-OOLLAH*. 2 N. W. 400

5. ——— Alienation of wakf property—*Suit to set aside such alienation—Mahomedan Law—Wakf—Mutawali—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 539.* Plaintiffs sued to recover possession of certain lands, alleging that they had been granted in wakf to their ancestor and his lineal descendants to defray the expenses for,



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concl'd.**

or connected with, the services of a certain mosque ; that their father (defendant No. 3) and cousins (defendants Nos. 4 and 5), who were mutwals in charge of the said property, had illegally alienated some of these lands, and had also ceased to render any service to the mosque, whereupon they (the plaintiffs) had been acting as mutwals in their stead. They therefore claimed to be entitled, as such, to the management and enjoyment of the lands in dispute. It was contended (*inter aliâ*) that the plaintiffs could not sue in the lifetime of their father (defendant No. 3), he not having transferred his rights to them. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were entitled to sue to have the alienation made by their father and cousins set aside and the wakf property restored to the service of the mosque. They were not merely beneficiaries, but members of the family of the mutwals, and were the persons on whom, on the death of the existing mutwals, the office of mutwali would fall by descent, if, indeed it had not already fallen upon them, as alleged in the plaint, by abandonment and resignation. Wakf property cannot be alienated, and any person interested in the endowment can sue to have alienations set aside and the property restored to the trust. *Per* RANADE, J.—As a suit for possession, the suit was defective in form, and could not be maintained. It was a suit for partition of a moiety of the lands, and the owner of the other moiety was not a party. The suit was, however, really a suit for a declaration that the lands were the inam property of the mosque, and, as such, was not liable to alienation for the private debts of defendants Nos. 3, 4, and 5. The plaintiffs were entitled to sue for such a declaration, although they could not obtain actual possession. They were beneficiaries and had a right to sue under s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877). When a suit is brought to set aside an alienation made to a stranger, such a suit by the worshipper at a mosque or temple can be maintained, and does not fall within s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). That section is only applicable where there is an alleged breach of trust created for a public, charitable, or religious purpose, and the direction of the Court is necessary for the administration of the trust. As against strangers, s. 539 does not apply. *HASSAN v. SAGUN BALKRISHNA*

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 170

**23. ENHANCEMENT, NOTICE OF.**

*Suit to set aside notice of enhancement—Act X of 1859, ss. 13 and 14.* Where notice of enhancement of rent has been served under s. 13, Act X of 1859, upon a raiyat who has no right of occupancy, and whose rent has not been fixed by agreement with his landlord, such raiyat cannot maintain a suit to set aside the notice of enhancement. His remedy, in case the rent is excessive, is under s. 14. *MOHEEM v. RAHEEMOT-OOLLAH* . . . *Marsh. 341 : 2 Hay 433*

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****24. EXECUTION OF DECREE.**

**1. ——— Suit after adverse order in execution—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 283.** S. 283 of Act X of 1877 enables a party against whom an order has been made in execution proceedings to bring a suit to establish his rights, whatever they may be, but it says nothing as to the nature of the suit or the Court in which it is to be brought. Whether the party is to sue in the Civil Court or in the Small Cause Court depends entirely upon the nature of the claim and the right which is sought to be enforced. A person whose goods are illegally sold under an execution does not lose his right to them, though he may have claimed them unsuccessfully in the execution proceedings. He may follow them into the hands of the purchaser or of any other person, and may sue for them or their value without reference to anything which has taken place in the execution proceedings. *SHIBOO NARAIN SINGH v. MUDDEN ALLY. NATABAR NANDI v. KALI DASS PALI*

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 608 : 9 C. L. R. 8

**2. ——— Order striking off objection to attachment—Suit for damages for wrongful attachment—Suit to establish right—Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 283.** An order striking off an objection to the attachment of property attached in execution of a decree for default of prosecution is not "conclusive," as regards the right which the objector claimed to the property, within the meaning of s. 283 of Act X of 1877. *Held*, therefore where a person objected to the attachment of certain moveable property attached in execution of a decree, claiming it as his own, and his objection was struck off for default of prosecution, that such person might sue for damages for the wrongful attachment of such property without suing to establish the right which he claimed thereto. *KALLU MAL v. BROWN*

I. L. R. 3 All. 504

**3. ——— Objection to attachment by judgment-debtor on behalf of others—Order against decree-holder—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 244, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283.** Where a judgment-debtor claims property which is the subject-matter of attachment, either on his own account as his own property, under whatever right, or as the representative of third parties, in which capacity he has been sued, the question between him and the attaching creditor is properly one between the parties to the suit under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But where the judgment-debtor raises the claim or objection on behalf of third parties who are not represented before the Court, the order passed thereon must be regarded as an order under s. 280 of the Code, and the only mode in which that order can be contested is in a regular suit as provided by s. 283. In execution of a decree against a judgment-debtor in his private capacity, the judgment-creditor attached certain property. Thereupon the judgment-debtor objected that the property attached had been dedicated by him some time previously as wakf under a registered wakfnamah, and that he was only in possession as



RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*24. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*

mutwali under the deed. The lower Court found that the document created a valid wakf, and allowed the objection and released the property from attachment. The judgment-creditor appealed. At the hearing of the appeal it was contended that no appeal lay, inasmuch as the order was one under s. 280 of the Civil Procedure Code. On behalf of the judgment-creditor it was contended that the order was one under s. 244, and was thus appealable. *Held*, that the order was one under s. 280, and that no appeal lay, the remedy of the judgment-creditor being by way of regular suit as provided by s. 283. ROOP LALL DASS v. BEKANI MEAH. MOHINEE MOHUN ROY v. BEKANI MEAH

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 437

See RAMANATHAN CHETTIAR v. LEVVAI MARAKAYAR . . . . . I. L. R. 23 Mad. 195

4. ————— Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 280-283—*Judgment-debtor, suit by, to establish title to property the subject-matter of claim in execution-proceedings.* A judgment-debtor is not necessarily a party against whom an order is made within the meaning of that term as used in s. 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to preclude his instituting a suit after the lapse of one year from the date of such order (the period of limitation prescribed by Art. 11, Sch. II, Act XV of 1877) to establish his title to, and to recover possession of, the property which has been the subject-matter of a claim in execution-proceedings, and in respect of which an order has been made under s. 280 of the Code. KEDAR NATH CHATTERJI v. RAKHAL DASS CHATTERJI . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 674

5. ————— Money-decree against mortgagor—Sale of equity of redemption by mortgagor—Mortgaged land attached and sold in execution—Claim by purchaser of equity of redemption—Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), s. 246—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 278 to 283. In 1870 *B* mortgaged to *N*, with possession, a certain piece of land. On 17th June 1871 *M* and *T* obtained a money-decree against *B*. On 9th March 1872 the defendants bought from *B* his equity of redemption. In July 1872 *M* and *T* attached the land in execution of their decree. The defendants objected to the attachment under s. 246 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859), but on investigation of their claim an order was made disallowing their claim on the 23rd December 1872. In June 1873 the defendants paid off the mortgage-debt and were put into possession by the mortgagee. In October 1873 *M* and *T* put up the land for sale in execution of their decree, and the plaintiff became the purchaser. On seeking to obtain possession, the plaintiff was resisted by the defendants, whose claim was allowed by the Subordinate Judge after inquiry. The plaintiff therefore brought this suit under s. 335 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882). The Lower Courts rejected his claim. On appeal to the High Court:—*Held*, that where, under s. 246 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859) or the corresponding sections (278 to 283) of the Civil Procedure

RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*24. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*

Codes of 1877 and 1882, an order has been passed against any person making a claim to property under attachment, such person may bring a suit to establish his title to the property within one year from the date of such order; but in default of his bringing such suit within the prescribed time, he is precluded from asserting his title against the auction-purchaser, whether as plaintiff or defendant. In the present case an order had been passed against the defendants under s. 246 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1859, on the 23rd December 1872; and as they had brought no suit within a year from that date, they could not now contest the plaintiff's title to the property. The defendants, however, having, since date of the said order, paid off the mortgage:—*Held*, that it would be contrary to justice, equity and good conscience for the Court to assist the plaintiff in obtaining possession unless he paid the defendants the amount paid by them to the mortgagee to free the property from the incumbrance. NILO PANDURANG v. RAMA PATLOJI . . . . . I. L. R. 9 Bom. 35

Distinguished in JOY PROKASH SINGH v. ABHAY KUMAR CHUND . . . . . 1 C. W. N. 701

6. ————— Decree against father—Family property attached—Objection by sons—Release of sons' shares—Suit to contest order of release—Cause of action. Certain land, the property of an undivided Hindu family, having been attached in execution of a decree against the father upon a bond, whereby the said land was hypothecated to secure the repayment of the debt, the sons intervened, objecting to the attachment of their shares in the said land, and their shares were released from attachment. The decree-holder then sued the sons to have it declared that their shares were liable to be sold in execution of the decree against the father. *Held*, overruling *Chockalinga v. Subbaraya*, I. L. R. 5 Mad. 133, that the suit was maintainable. RAMAKRISHNA v. NAMASIVAYA

I. L. R. 7 Mad. 295

7. ————— Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 283—*Hindu law, Alienation—Mitakshara—Mortgage by father—Liability of sons not made parties.* The *L* Bank advanced money to *C*, a Hindu, governed by the Mitakshara school of law, upon mortgage of ancestral property. *S*, who has stated to be *C*'s only son, joined in the mortgage. Subsequently the Bank obtained a decree against *C* and *S* for the amount due on the mortgage. On attempting to sell the mortgaged property, other sons of *C* objected. This objection was allowed, and the mortgagees referred to a regular suit. They then sued all the sons of *C* to establish their lien on the mortgaged property. *Held*, that the suit was maintainable under s. 283 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Nuthoo Lall Chowdhry v. Shoukee Lall*, 10 B. L. R. 200, and *Dhase v. Hurry Prosad*, unreported, distinguished. SITANATH KOER v. LAND MORTGAGE BANK OF INDIA

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 888: 12 C. L. R. 574



RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*24. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*

8. ———— Execution of decree, suit for wrong done in—*Suit for wrong done under colour of decree.* The execution of an imperfect decree does not involve the doing of a wrong unless the decree is wrongly interpreted. An action will lie in the Civil Court where a wrong is committed under colour of a decree of another Court. *DALMIAH v. RADHA PERSHAD SINGH* . 19 W. R. 188

9. ———— Suit to remove obstruction to execution of decree. A suit may be brought for the removal of an obstruction to the execution of a decree. *TAKHURROODDEEN MAHOMED ESHAN CHOWDHRY v. KURIMBUX CHOWDHRY* 3 W. R. 20

10. ———— Suit to stay execution of decree—*Suit to stay execution against certain property until judgment-creditor had proceeded against other property—Res judicata—Suit for land—Jurisdiction—Letters Patent, cl. 12.* One *K C* was entitled to a share in *pergunnah* Alumpore. Before he obtained possession, Government revenue on the whole estate fell due. *K C* failed to pay his share, and his co-sharer *K*, to save the estate, mortgaged her share of the estate to one *H B* and with the amount so borrowed paid the whole sum due, and subsequently sued *K C* for the amount, eventually obtaining a decree. Subsequently this decree became vested in one *R*, and the *pergunnah* Alumpore came into the possession of one *K G*, who in 1874 took an assignment of the mortgage executed by *K* in favour of *H B*. The plaintiffs also alleged that since the execution proceedings had commenced they had discovered a secret arrangement made in 1877 between *K G*, *R*, and *H B*, by which it was agreed that *R* should not execute the decree against Alumpore, but would release *K G* from all liability in respect of the charge on that property, and in consideration *K G* executed a *patni* lease to *H B* of a portion of Alumpore at a small rent. *R* obtained an order for execution against the property of *K C*, and, having transferred his decree to the High Court, proceeded to enforce the decree against the plaintiff, the widow of *K C*, and her son by attaching the family dwelling-house in Calcutta. The widow and son then brought this suit against *K G*, *R*, and *H B* to have the share of *K C* in Alumpore ascertained, and praying for a decree calling upon *K G* to pay the amount of the value of the share of Alumpore in satisfaction of *R*'s decree. *Held*, that the suit could not be maintained so far as it attempted to make the decree a charge against Alumpore. *Held*, on appeal, that the suit was rightly dismissed; that, as far as *R* was concerned, it had already been decided that *R* was entitled, if he so chose, to execute his decree against the Calcutta property; and that therefore that question was *res judicata*; and that, as regards the plaintiff's claim that the *patni* given by *K G* to *H B* should be treated as part-payment to *R*, such a question could only be decided in execution proceedings; that the mere existence of the agreement between *K G*, *R*, and *H B* did not entitle the plaintiff to join them

RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*24. EXECUTION OF DECREE—*contd.*

as co-defendants in the suit; and that, as far as *K G* was concerned, the suit brought against him could only be treated as a suit to establish a charge or lien on land out of Calcutta, and therefore the Court had no jurisdiction to try it. *KRISTO MOHINEE DOSSEE v. KALIPROSONO GHOSE* . I. L. R. 8 Calc. 402

11. ———— Execution against a person not the legal representative—*Deceased judgment-debtor.* The defendants, along with *N* and *C*, had brought a suit against one *A* in the Civil Court at Peshawar in the Punjab, and obtained a decree on the 23rd July 1878 for Rs. 30,745-12. In 1881 application for transfer of the decree to the Court at Moradabad for execution was made, and it was granted, but no steps were taken thereupon. On the 12th June 1883 *A* died. On the 30th April 1884 the defendants again applied to the Court at Peshawar treating their judgment-debtor as being then alive for a fresh certificate to execute their decree in the Moradabad district, and obtained it. On the 20th of August 1885 they made an application to the District Judge of Moradabad for execution of their decree, and in it it was stated that the application was "for execution against *A*, and after his death against *A L*, the own brother, and *D K*, widow, and *L P* and others, sons of *A*, residents of Kundarki, and the said *A L*, at present residing at Umbala and employed in the Commissariat Transport Department, judgment-debtors." It was further stated that "the judgment-debtor is dead, and his heirs are living and in possession of his estate, and *A L* himself has realized Rs. 9,637-4-9 due to the deceased judgment-debtor from the Commissariat Department of Calcutta and appropriated the same, therefore to that extent the person of the said *A L* is liable." Notification of this application was issued to *A L*, as also to the other persons named therein. *A L* objected to the application as against himself, stating that, although he was the brother of *A*, deceased, yet he always lived separate and carried on business separately; and that there was no connection or partnership between him and the deceased judgment-debtor, and that he had no property of the deceased in his possession. Further that, as *A* left issue, it was wrong to call him heir to *A*, and take out execution-process against him. In reply to these objections, the judgment-creditors (defendants) did not contend that *A L* was the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor, but treated him as a person in possession of a sum of money belonging to the deceased, and therefore liable to the extent of the sum so received by him. The Subordinate Judge, holding that *A L* was the brother of the deceased and had realized the amount from the Commissariat Office, which he failed to prove that he paid to the deceased, ordered execution to proceed against him. *A L* then instituted this suit to set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge. It was contended, first, that the suit was in effect a suit under s. 283 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore barred as not having been brought within a year



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from the order of the Subordinate Judge; and secondly, that the proceedings of the Subordinate Judge were held under s. 244 of the Code, and therefore no separate suit would lie. *Held*, that the first contention must fail, inasmuch as an essential condition precedent to a suit under s. 283 of the Code is the making of an attachment of some property; of objection being taken to such attachment; of investigation being made into such objection; and lastly, of its being allowed or disallowed, and these did not exist in this case. The second contention also must fail, as the Subordinate Judge never treated the proceedings in execution against A L upon the footing that he was the legal representative of the deceased judgment-debtor. *Mahomed Aga Ali Khan v. Balmukund*, L. R. 3 I. A. 241; *Nadir Hossain v. Bepin Chund Bassarat*, 3 C. L. R. 437, were referred to. *ANGAN LAL v. GUDAR MAL* . I. L. R. 10 All. 479

## 25. FERRY, SUIT RELATING TO.

Suit to prevent establishment of ferry—*Infringement of ferry rights—Right to restrain person starting a second ferry.* A, the owner of a ferry granted him under a Government settlement, brought a suit to restrain B from running another ferry over the same spot where A's ferry plied for hire. It appeared on the evidence that B levied no tolls on his ferry, but it was not shown that it was used only for the conveyance of his own servants and raiyats. *Held*, that such suit was maintainable. *LUCHMESSUR SINGH v. LEELANUND SINGH*

I. L. R. 4 Calc. 599 : 3 C. L. R. 427

## 26. FRAUD.

1. ——— Suit to set aside decree and sale in execution on the ground of fraud—*Decree obtained by fraud—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 108 and 244.* A suit will lie to set aside a decree, and a sale held in execution of such decree, when both the sale and the decree are impeached on the ground of fraud. *Mohendro Narain Chatu-raj v. Gopal Mundul*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 769, and *Jagan Nath Gorai v. Watson*, I. L. R. 19 Calc. 341, distinguished. *ABDUL MAZUMDAR v. MAHOMED GAZI CHOWDHRY* . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 605

See *BHUBAN MOHAN PAL v. NUNDO LAL DEY*

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 324

and *MOTI LAL CHAKRABUTTY v. RUSSICK CHANDRA BAIRAGI* . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 326 note

Also *PROSONNO KUMAR SANYAL v. KALI DASS SANYAL* . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 683  
L. R. 19 I. A. 166

2. ——— Suit to set aside *ex parte* decree and sale in execution thereof, on the ground of fraud—*Res judicata—Effect of not appealing against an appealable order—*

RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*26. FRAUD—*contd.*

*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 13, 108, 244, and 311.* The plaintiff having applied unsuccessfully under ss. 108 and 311 of the Civil Procedure Code to set aside an *ex parte* decree against him and the sale of his property in execution thereof on the ground of fraud, and without preferring an appeal against the order rejecting his application under s. 108 of the Code, instituted this suit praying for the same relief. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit as not maintainable. *Held*, that such a suit was maintainable, and that ss. 13 and 244 of the Civil Procedure Code were no bar thereto. The fact that his application under s. 108 was unsuccessful, and that he did not appeal against the order rejecting that application, did not disentitle him from prosecuting his remedy by suit on the ground of fraud. *Abdul Mazumdar v. Mohomed Gazi Chowdhry*, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 605, approved. *Held*, also, that, when there is an appeal against a decision, the effect of not appealing is that the decision holds good for what it is worth: so far as concerns any other modes of relief available, the person not appealing is in no worse position than if he had appealed and failed. *Raj Kishen Mookerjee v. Modhoo Soodun Mundle*, 17 W. R. 413, distinguished. *PRAN NATH ROY v. MOHESH CHANDRA MOITRA*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 546

3. ——— Suit in Recorder's Court to set aside for fraud decree obtained in Small Cause Court—*Perjury.* Where a decree has been obtained by a fraud practised on another, by which that other has been prevented from placing his case before the tribunal, which was called upon to adjudicate upon it, in the way most to his advantage, the decree is not binding upon him and may be set aside in a separate suit, and not only by an application made in the suit in which the decree was passed to the Court by which it was passed. But it is not the law that because a person against whom a decree has been passed alleges that it is wrong, and that it was obtained by perjury committed by or at the instance of the other side (which is fraud of the worst description) that he can obtain a rehearing of the questions in dispute in a fresh suit, by merely changing the form in which he places it before the Court, and alleging in his plaint that the first decree was obtained by the perjury of the person in whose favour it was given. In this case a suit brought in the Court of the Recorder of Rangoon to set aside a decree of the Court of Small Causes at Rangoon on the ground that it had been obtained by fraud was held under the circumstances of the case to be not maintainable. *MAHOMED GOLAB v. MAHOMED SULLIMAN* . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 612

4. ——— Suit to set aside a sale on the ground of fraud, challenging the decree in execution of which the sale took place as fraudulent, although the said decree was set aside on the ground of non-service of summons—*Sale in execution of ex parte decree—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 108 and 244.* An *ex parte* decree for rent was obtained



RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*26. FRAUD—*contd.*

against *A* and others, and in execution of that decree certain lands of the judgment-debtors were sold and were purchased by a third party. Subsequently, at the instance of *A*, the said *ex parte* decree was set aside on the ground of non-service of summons, and the original suit was restored, but that was dismissed for default, as the then plaintiff did not proceed with it. An application was then made by *A* to set aside the sale on the ground of fraud which was rejected, because the auction-purchaser was not made a party to the proceedings. *A* then brought a suit for declaration of title to a portion of the land sold and for confirmation of possession, challenging not only the sale, but also the decree, on the ground of fraud. The defence mainly was that, regard being had to the provisions of s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, the suit was not maintainable. *Held*, that, although there was no decree to be actually set aside, the plaintiff was entitled to show that the decree under which the sale was held was obtained by fraud as against him, and that therefore the suit was maintainable. *Abdul Mazumdar v. Mahomed Gazi Chowdhry*, *I. L. R. 21 Calc. 605*, and *Pran Nath Roy v. Mohesh Chandra Moitra*, *I. L. R. 24 Calc. 546*, referred to. *RAM NARAIN TEWARI v. SHEW BHUNJAN ROY*

**I. L. R. 27 Calc. 197**

5. ——— Suit to set aside *ex parte* decree—Sale in execution of *ex parte* decree—Rejection of applications to set aside decree and sale in execution—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 13, 108, 311—Subsequent suit to set aside decree and sale on ground of fraud—Omission to appeal from orders of rejection. In a suit to set aside an *ex parte* decree and a sale in execution of such decree, as illegal, fraudulent and collusive, the allegations made in the plaint were clearly an attack, not on the regularity or sufficiency of the service of summons or the proceedings, but on the whole suit in which the *ex parte* decree was obtained, as being a fraud from beginning to end. *Held*, that the suit was maintainable, notwithstanding that the plaintiff had been unsuccessful in applications under s. 108 and s. 311, respectively, of the Civil Procedure Code to set aside the *ex parte* decree and the sale in execution, and had not appealed from the orders rejecting such applications; the questions in the suit as a whole being such as could not have been determined on applications under those sections. *KHAGENDRA NATH MAHATA v. PRAN NATH ROY* (1902). **I. L. R. 29 Calc. 395 : s.c. 6 C. W. N. 473 : L. R. 29 I. A. 99**

6. ——— Power of High Court, O. O. C. J. to try suit for setting aside decree of another Court—Decree obtained by fraud, setting aside of—Jurisdiction, cause of action—Letters Patent, High Courts, 1865, cl. 12—Civil Procedure Code (XIV of 1882), ss. 11, 17, 44—Evidence Act (I of 1872), s. 44. The Original Side of the High Court, under cl. 12, Letters Patent, has jurisdiction to entertain a suit to set aside, on the ground of fraud,

RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*26. FRAUD—*concl.*

a decree passed by any other Court of concurrent jurisdiction, where the cause of action has arisen either wholly or, in case the leave of the Court has been first obtained, in part, within the local limits of its Ordinary Original Civil jurisdiction. *Allen v. Macpherson*, *1 H. L. Cas. 191*, referred to. The Original Side of the High Court is a Court, within the meaning of s. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, and there is no enactment barring its jurisdiction to entertain a suit to set aside, on the ground of fraud, a decree passed by another Court of concurrent jurisdiction, if the suit complies with the provisions of s. 17 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Queen v. Saddler's Co.*, *10 H. L. Cas. 404*, and *Rajib Panda v. Lakhan Singh Mahapatra*, *3 C. W. N. 660*, referred to. Where a beneficiary brought an administration suit, which sought incidentally to set aside certain leases, which the executors of the estate had granted to themselves, of lands situated without the jurisdiction of the Original Side of the High Court: *Held*, that the suit was not a suit for land, and that the Original Side of the High Court had jurisdiction to try it, and, further the defect, if any, would be cured if leave of the Court was previously obtained. *Prosunno-moyee Dassi v. Kadambini Dassi*, *3 B. L. R. O. J. 85*, followed. *NUNDA LAL BOSE v. NISTARINI DASSEE* (1902). **7 C. W. N. 353**

## 27. FRESH SUITS.

1. ——— Suit after dismissal of suit instituted in incompetent Court—Act XXII of 1872, effect of—Decrees made before Act came into operation. No provision of Act XXII of 1872 sets aside decrees passed by Appellate Courts before the date on which it came into operation, or restores decrees of the Court of first instance which had been annulled by the Appellate Court; nor is there any provision which debars a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed on the ground of its institution in a Court incompetent to receive it, from re-instituting his suit in a competent Court. *CHOONEE LALL v. KUDHAIRA*. **6 N. W. 34**

2. ——— Suit for possession after failure to obtain it in execution—Auction-purchaser, suit by, for possession—Execution proceedings—Possession, application for, by auction-purchaser—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 318. A suit by an auction-purchaser to obtain possession of land, the subject-matter of his purchase, will lie when it is shown that an attempt has been made to obtain possession in execution proceedings, and that such attempt has been unsuccessful. In the case of *Lalit Coomer Bose v. Ishan Chunder Chuckerbutty*, *10 C. L. R. 258*, it was not intended to hold that, under no circumstances would such a suit lie, but that, so long as the means provided by s. 318 of the Civil Procedure Code are open to a purchaser, he is bound to have recourse to that section rather than to bring a fresh suit. *ISWAR PERSHAD GURGO v. JAI NARAIN GIRI*

**I. L. R. 12 Calc. 169**



RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*27. FRESH SUITS—*contd.*

3. — *Suit to obtain possession of land sold in execution of a decree—Possession, application for, by auction-purchaser—Execution proceedings—Subsequent suit for possession of land sold in execution of decree.* In execution of a decree certain land belonging to the judgment-debtor was sold; subsequently the auction purchaser, who had not got possession, resold the land to a third party and give him the certificate. The latter then applied to the Court to be put into possession, but having failed in those proceedings, owing to some irregularity in the description of the boundaries of the property, he instituted a regular suit against the judgment-debtor to obtain possession. On a plea that such suit would not lie, as the plaintiff could have got possession in the miscellaneous proceedings:—*Held*, that, having regard to the provisions of Art. 138 of Sch. II of Act XV of 1877 and of s. 11 of Act XIV of 1882, such suit was maintainable. *SERU MOHUN BANIA v. BHAGOBAN DIN PANDEY* . I. L. R. 9 Calc. 602

4. — *Obstruction to execution of decree—Merger of cause of action—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 328.* *S A, R, and S B* were members of an undivided Hindu family. *S B* died, leaving him surviving several sons. Subsequently *S, R, and M*, the eldest son of *S B*, mortgaged the family house to the plaintiff. In 1877 the plaintiff brought a suit on the mortgage against *S, R, and M*, and obtained a decree for possession of the house until payment of the mortgage debt. In execution of this decree he was obstructed by the widow and *B and L*, other sons of *S B*, but the Court on 14th January 1879 overruled their objections and directed possession to be given to the plaintiff. On 28th January 1879 the plaintiff complained that he was prevented from obtaining possession of one of the rooms in the house; *B* appeared and admitted that he had locked up the room and he refused to give up possession, contending that he was not bound by the mortgage, as he was not at the time joint with *M* and the other sons of *S B*, and that the loan was not one required for family necessity. The plaintiff's application was dismissed. In 1882 the plaintiff brought a suit against *B*, in which he prayed for a decree giving him possession of the room on the terms of the decree in 1877. By the defendant it was (*inter alia*) contended that the previous suit on the mortgage had exhausted the plaintiff's cause of action, and that the plaintiff had no further right against the defendant. *Held*, that the decree in the former suit could not affect the defendant, as he was not a party to it, nor was he represented. If he had been represented, he could not have resisted the execution of the decree. Not having been represented, he could on principle be exempted from liability in the present suit only if the cause of action was merged in the judgment against his uncles and brother. Here, however, there was no such merger. The previous decree had awarded possession of the

RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*27. FRESH SUITS—*concl.*

whole house to the plaintiff. The existence of that decree could not be a reason for not awarding part of the same house when detained by the defendant. He avowed himself a stranger to the defendants, against whom the previous decree was obtained, and his act might be regarded as constituting a separate cause of action. *Held*, also, that s. 328 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, does not make it obligatory on a decree-holder, who is obstructed in execution of the decree, to pursue his remedy under that section. Accordingly the omission of the plaintiff to avail himself of the remedy under that section did not prevent him from proceeding against the defendants by a regular suit. *BALVANT SANTARAM v. BABAJI KIN SAMBHAPA*

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 602

5. — *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 318, 335—Suit to recover possession of property sold in execution of decree.* *S* attached certain land and a house in execution of a decree against *R*. *M* put in a claim under s. 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure, alleging that he was in possession as purchaser from *R*. The claim was rejected. No suit was brought by *M* to contest this order. *S* purchased the said land and house in execution, and obtained a sale certificate. In 1884 *S* sued *M* to recover possession of the land and house, alleging that in execution-proceedings in 1882 he had been put into possession of the land, but not of the house, which was found locked up by the Court amin, and that *M* prevented him from enjoying both the land and house. *M* pleaded that *S* had never been put into possession, and again set up his title as purchaser from *R* and possession under such title. The Munsif found that *S* had been put into formal or constructive possession of the land, but not of the house, and decreed the claim. On appeal the District Judge held that *S* was bound to proceed according to the provisions of s. 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure to recover possession, and could not bring a separate suit. *Held*, that, whether there had been legal delivery or not, the suit was not barred. *SEVU v. MUTTUSAMI*

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 53

## 28. GOVERNMENT SCHOOL. SUIT FOR BENEFIT OF.

— *Suit by secretary and manager of Government aided school—Improvement, damages for removal of.* In a suit by the secretary and manager of a Government aided school for damages against the owner of the school premises for breaking down the building and removing the materials belonging to plaintiff:—*Held*, that the plaintiff, as secretary and manager, could maintain the action for the benefit of the school; that on the facts the plaintiff was not entitled to greater damages than had been awarded to him for the value of the materials removed by the defendant, or to compensation for the improvements made by him



**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****28. GOVERNMENT SCHOOL, SUIT FOR BENEFIT OF—concl'd.**

to the building ; and that there was no presumption of gift in the case. *SREEHURY ROY v. HILLS*  
6 W. R. Civ. Ref. 21

**29. IDOLS, SUITS CONCERNING.**

1. ——— Suit to establish right to deal with Hindu idols—*Property—Jurisdiction of Civil Court.* Hindu idols being property, the right to deal with such property is a right cognizable by Civil Courts. *SUBBARAYA GURUKAL v. CHELLAPPA MUDALI* . I. L. R. 4 Mad. 315

2. ——— Suit for damages on account of omission to offer food to idol—*Cause of action.* The plaintiff, alleging that he was a member of a family of Guravs holding a vatan attached to a temple, complained that the defendant was the holder of an inam allowance, granted in consideration of his daily offering to the idol some rice and cake, and burning a lamp, and that he had omitted to make such offering for one year. The plaintiff claimed R15 damages. *Held*, that the plaintiff had no cause of action. The defendant's obligation, if any, was towards the idol ; and, if that obligation had not been performed, it could only be enforced by some person claiming to have a right to insist that the worship of the idol should be properly performed. *DHADPHALE v. GURAV*  
I. L. R. 6 Bom. 122

3. ——— Suit to establish right to remove idol for turn of worship. When a plaintiff and defendant are jointly entitled to the profits from an idol in the defendant's temple, and the plaintiff is obstructed by the defendant in the use and worship of the idol, a suit will lie for a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to have the idol removed to his own house during the period he is entitled to the profits of it. *DWARKANATH ROY v. JANNOBEE CHOWDHRAIN* . 4. W. R. 79

**30. INCOME TAX.**

——— Suit for refund of income tax—*Income Tax Act (XXXII of 1860), s. 137.* A person seeking a refund of income tax illegally assessed upon him may, under s. 137, Act XXXII of 1860, apply to the Commissioner, i.e., it is "lawful" for him so to apply, but there is no law that he must do so. He may legally sue in a Civil Court to recover the illegal assessment. *COLLECTOR OF FUREEDPORE v. GOROO DOSS ROY* . 11 W. R. 425

**31. INJURIES BY REPRESENTATIVES OF DECEASED.**

1. ——— Suit for damages for destruction of life—*Son adopted by widow after death of deceased, right of, to sue—Damages.* A son adopted by the widow of a deceased Hindu (in respect of whose estate no probate, letters of

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****31. INJURIES BY REPRESENTATIVES OF DECEASED—concl'd.**

administration, or certificate of heirship has been granted) is the legal representative of the deceased, and as such was entitled to maintain a suit, under Act XIII of 1855, for the benefit of the persons, if any, entitled to compensation for the injury occasioned to them by the death of the deceased against those whose negligence caused that death. Such an adopted son was not, however, entitled to have any portion of the damages awarded in the suit allotted to him as a child of the deceased. *Quære* : Whether a son, if adopted by deceased in his lifetime, would be entitled to damages under that Act. *VINAYAK RAGHUNATH v. GREAT INDIAN PENINSULA RAILWAY COMPANY* . 7 Bom. O. C. 113

2. ——— Suit for wrong done by deceased person—*Act XII of 1855—Defamation.* A suit was maintainable under Act XII of 1855 against personal representatives for a wrong done by the deceased within a year of his death, although such wrong be of a purely personal character,—as, for example, defamation. *GOKUL CHUNDER v. BUREEK BEGAM* .

Marsh. 344 : 2 Hay 325

3. ——— *Act XII of 1855—Survival of cause of action.* Act XII of 1855 did not apply to wrongs which do not survive to the representatives of a deceased person. A widow who is the heir of her deceased husband is liable to make good the wrong committed by the husband. The plaintiff's right of suit does not abate by the death of the husband, but survives against his heir. *CHUNDER MONEE DASSEE v. SANTO MONEE DASSEE* . 1 W. R. 251

4. ——— Suit against representative of agent of Official Assignee—*Act XII of 1855—Suit for money and for delivery of bonds and papers.* Act XII of 1855 applied to suits for wrongs which, according to the law then in force, did not survive to or against executors or administrators. A suit for recovery of moneys due by an agent of the Official Assignee of an insolvent debtor's estate and for delivery of certain papers and documents belonging to such insolvent estate will lie against the legal representative of such agent after his deceased, and the right of action will not expire on his death. *NUJUF ALI v. PATTERSON* . 2 N. W. 103

**32. INJURY TO ENJOYMENT OF PROPERTY.**

1. ——— Suit for removal of trees—*Contingent damage—Cause of action.* The plaintiff claimed removal of certain trees, planted by the defendant on his own land, on the ground that the trees had been planted so near his land that, when they grew up, they would injure his crops. *Held*, that, until the plaintiff's enjoyment of his own land was directly and immediately interfered with by the growth of the defendant's trees, he had no right to ask for their removal, and he



**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****32. INJURY TO ENJOYMENT OF PROPERTY—contd.**

had therefore no cause of action. *RAM LALL v. DALGANJAN*. . . . **I. L. R. 5 All. 369**

2. ———— **Burial ground—Land belonging in common to all the Mahomedan inhabitants of a village—Encroachment by some of the Mahomedans—Right of suit of some members of a community.** Where certain Mahomedans of a village brought a suit against other Mahomedans of the same village for the removal of a wall built by the defendants upon land which was found to belong in common to all the Mahomedan inhabitants of the village for the purpose of a burial ground:—*Held*, that, the defendants having erected the wall in dispute so as to exclude the plaintiffs from a part of the common land, there was a violation of the plaintiff's right, and that therefore the plaintiffs were entitled to bring the suit for the removal of the wall. *TANUDIN v. PANDU*

**I. L. R. 13 Bom. 699**

3. ———— **Mortgage of two portions of a house with a common party wall to two separate mortgagees—Interference with common wall by one of the mortgagees—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 76.** The owner of a house, having built up a door which gave communication between one-half of the house and the other, mortgaged each half separately to separate mortgagees. One of such mortgagees re-opened the door communicating with the other mortgagee's portion of the house. *Held*, that a good action would lie on behalf of the other mortgagee against the mortgagee who had opened the door to compel him to close it. *LACHMI NARAIN v. JETHU MAL*

**I. L. R. 16 All. 386**

4. ———— **Effect of an embankment erected by a superior riparian owner on the cultivation of lands lower down the stream—Cause of action.** The defendants, being owners of land on the banks of a jungle stream, raised embankments which prevented their lands from being flooded, but caused the stream to overflow the land of the plaintiff situated lower down the stream. In an action by the plaintiff against the defendants for damages, it appeared that it was not reasonably practicable for the defendants to defend their lands from inundation by any means other than those adopted which would not have caused damage to the plaintiff. *Held*, that no actionable wrong had been committed by the defendants, and that the suit was consequently not maintainable. *GOPAL REDDI v. CHENNA REDDI*

**I. L. R. 18 Mad. 158**

5. ———— **Right to access of light and air—Suit by person who had not obtained an easement by prescription—Easement—Trespass.** The owner of a house, the light coming to which is obstructed by an erection made upon adjoining land by a person who *quâ* such adjoining land, is a trespasser, may possibly have an action against the person causing obstruction, even though he has

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****32. INJURY TO ENJOYMENT OF PROPERTY—contd.**

not obtained by prescription an easement of light. But where the person causing such obstruction is the rightful owner of the adjoining land, or acting with the permission of the owner, no such action as aforesaid will lie against him unless the plaintiff has acquired an easement. *Jeffries v. Williams*, 20 L. J. Ex. 14, and *Jootoor Achanna Vanamala v. Venkamma*, 5 Mad. L. J. 25, distinguished. *DHUMAN KHAN v. MUHAMMAD KHAN*

**I. L. R. 19 All. 153**

6. ———— **Tenants-in-common, rights of, against each other—Trespass—Exclusion from common property.** Laying a drain in land, and the incidental temporary interference with the soil necessary for that purpose, cannot be regarded as an ouster or destruction or an act of waste, and will not entitle a tenant-in-common of the land to maintain an action against another tenant-in-common. *MOHENCHAND NEMCHAND GUJAR v. ISAK BHAI TANAJI* (1900) . **I. L. R. 25 Bom. 248**

**33. INSOLVENCY.**

——— **Right of insolvent or his assignee to sue—After-acquired property—Official Assignee—Parties.** One *R* became possessed of certain properties in 1872 and 1881. In 1866 *R* had presented a petition in insolvency, and a vesting order had been duly made. No final order of discharge was ever made, and *R* died in 1888. The plaintiffs sued, as the heirs of *R*, for their share in the said properties. It was objected (i) that, looking to the insolvency of *R*, the plaintiffs had no interest in his estate; and (ii) that the Official Assignee, as the assignee of the estate and effects of *R*, was a necessary party to this suit. *Held*, that the properties in question, coming to *R* after his insolvency, vested in him subject only to the right and claim of the Official Assignee, should he think fit to assert it, and that the plaintiffs, as representatives of *R*, could maintain the action. *Held*, also, that the Official Assignee was not a necessary party to the suit, though, in case of a decree in plaintiff's favour, notice thereof should be given to him by the Court. *FATIMABIBI v. FATIMABIBI* **I. L. R. 16 Bom. 452**

**34. INSTIGATING PROCEEDINGS, SUIT FOR.**

——— **Suit against party for instigating proceedings in false name—Form of suit.** The plaintiffs sued for the reversal of a summary award and for restitution of the money they had paid under it, alleging that the proceedings before the Collector had been promoted entirely by the defendant using the false name of *B*, a person never in existence, and obtained a decree in the lower Courts. The point taken in special appeal was that the defendant not being a party on the record of those proceedings, the plaintiffs could not recover in this form of action. *Held*, that, though the proper and more prudent course would have been to sue the



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defendant for damages, yet, this being a mere matter of form, the Court refused to interfere with the decision of the Courts below. **KHELARAM DOSS MISTREE v. DHUREE DOSS** . . . **1 Hay 4**

**35. INTEREST, SUITS FOR.**

1. ——— Suit for interest on money deposited under decree afterwards reversed. A suit will not lie for interest in respect of money deposited under a decree subsequently reversed on appeal. **ASHRUFFUNNISSA BEGUM v. KHANUM JAUN** . . . **6 W. R. 285**

2. ——— Suit for interest on money for period defendant obstructed the plaintiff in his attempts to obtain it. Plaintiffs, in execution of a decree against A, attached certain money deposited in the Collectorate to which A was entitled, but were opposed by B, alleging that A's rights in the money had been transferred to him. The plaintiffs finally succeeded in obtaining the money, and then sued B for interest upon it during the time he prevented them from obtaining it. *Held*, that the suit was maintainable and the plaintiff was entitled to recover. **PARBUTTY CHURN SOOR v. PROMOTHONATH GHOSE** . . . **W. R. 1864, 174**

**36. INTEREST TO SUPPORT RIGHT.**

1. ——— Party without right or interest in subject-matter of suit. A party must show due right or interest in the subject-matter of the suit to entitle him to complain of any acts injurious thereto, and a mere stranger without interest cannot maintain any suit. **CHUNDUN v. TALIB ALI** . . . **2 N. W. 41**

**BHEKDHAREE SINGH v. KISHAN PERSHAD SINGH** . . . **15 W. R. 106**

2. ——— Want of interest in suit—*Procedure in appeal*—*Stay of proceedings on application*. The High Court will not, on the application of the defendant, stay all proceedings in the appeal, on the ground that the plaintiff has no interest in the suit, that being a question which can more properly be raised in the suit or appeal itself. *In the matter of the petition of KHODEJOONISSA* . . . **7 W. R. 486**

3. ——— Right to expose fraud in Court—*Evasion of order for guardians of minor to account*. Where a gross fraud is being practised on a Court, with the object of evading an order which the Court has made directing a minor's guardians to account, any person who appears before the Court and exposes the fraud, undertaking also to prove it, has a *locus standi* in Court, and has a right to be heard. **HOSSEIN ALI KHAN v. BURKUT ALI** . . . **10 W. R. 372**

4. ——— Suit on covenant by purchaser. *Held*, that the plaintiff had no right to

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****36. INTEREST TO SUPPORT RIGHT—contd.**

sue for the enforcement of the promise made in favour of the person from whom she bought, who did not convey to her the right to sue upon or otherwise enforce it. **KISHORE v. JEY KISHORE DASS** . . . **3 Agra 46**

5. ——— Suit by male members of family—*Insult to women*. *Held*, that male members of a family cannot sue for the injury or insult which they have sustained indirectly in consequence of ill-treatment of certain female members of the family, and that, if there was any remedy by suit for such grievance or dishonour, it was open to the women themselves, and not to the plaintiffs. **OODAI v. BHOWANEE PERSHAD** . . . **1 Agra 264**

6. ——— Suit to have trust fund paid into Court—*Suit quia timet*—*Want of title or interest in plaintiff*. A suit, the sole object of which was to have a trust fund paid into Court, was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff had no actual title to any part of the fund. When the plaintiff in a suit, seeking solely the payment into Court of a fund for the relief of poor Armenian orphans, had no interest except as a member of the Armenian community:—*Held*, that he had no such title to part of the fund as would support the suit. *Held*, also, that the consent of the defendants, the trustees of the fund to the decree sought by the plaintiff would not justify the Court in making it. To support a bill *quia timet*, the plaintiff must have a title in possession or expectancy, and the property must be in danger. **SATOOR v. SATOOR** . . . **2 Mad. 8**

7. ——— Interest sufficient to maintain suit—*Suit by representative of testator to enforce charitable or religious trusts under will*—*Plaint, allegations in*. The representatives of a testator are entitled to sue for the enforcement of the due performance of trusts created by him for religious and charitable purposes, and in which they are not personally interested, but their suit will be dismissed, unless upon their plaint they substantially allege a state of circumstances which, if proved, will constitute a distinct breach of trust. **BROJOMOHUN DOSS v. HURRO LOLL DOSS** . . . **6 C. L. R. 58**

8. ——— Suit by wife in absence of husband for his share of property under partition-deed. Plaintiff brought a suit to procure delivery to her of a share of land purchased with money subject to the provisions of a deed of partition executed by her husband and the undivided members of his family. Plaintiff's husband had been since 1854 absent in a foreign country. *Held*, that the plaintiff sufficiently represented her absent and divided husband to enable her to sue for his share. **PAPAMMAL v. RAMASWAMI CHETTI** . . . **2 Mad. 365**

9. ——— Interest as Collector of revenue of Government—*Suit for accretion*. A chur, B, formed by gradual accretion to an estate (mouzah B), was resumed by Government, who successively made temporary settlements for it with the patnidar of mouzah B, and finally with the



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zamindar. While the second settlement was in force, another chur formed, and a dispute arose between the patnidar of B and the patnidar of an adjoining mouzah, D, as to its ownership. Three suits were brought by the latter, claiming the second chur as an accretion to his estate, in all which suits he was successful, and in one of which Government was a party. Government then sued to set aside the decrees in the two suits in which it was not a party, and for possession of the land in dispute, and it was found in that suit that the land was continuous to chur B, and not to mouzah D. *Held*, that Government having a right to revenue, but not to actual possession, could have no *locus standi*, as plaintiff in such a suit. *MOOKTAKESHEE DEBEA v. COLLECTOR OF BURDWAN*. 12 W. R. 204

10. ———— **Interest of lambardar—**  
*Suit for sums paid as nuzzerana before resumption.* A certain sum was paid to Government as nuzzerana during the existence of the maafi grant through a lambardar. After the maafi was resumed and a Government jumma assessed upon it, the nuzzerana continued to be paid until the interest of the holder of the resumed maafi was confiscated for rebellion and sold at auction. After the confiscation, Government allowed the amount to the lambardar by deducting it from the amount of Government revenue paid by him. *Held*, that by such arrangement the Government did in effect convey to him (lambardar), as trustee on behalf of Government, such an interest in the estate as would enable him to sue, and enforce such claim. *ZAHOOOR HOSSEIN v. ASSUD ALI*. 2 Agra Pt. II, 178

11. ———— **Interest under decree—**  
*Suit for balance due on decree—Decree for money.* The appellant, having obtained a decree for money, sued to recover the unsatisfied balance thereof from the respondents, alleging that the property of the deceased judgment-debtor (being one-seventh share in the legacy of his father) was in their possession. He prayed that, after due inquiry, adjustment of accounts, and the determination of the value of the said legacy out of the share which might be found due to the judgment-debtor, the above-mentioned balance might be decreed with interest and costs. *Held*, that the decree did not vest in the appellant a right to the property sued for, and consequently he could not maintain the suit. *MAHOMED AGA ALI KHAN v. WIDOW OF BALMAKAND*

L. R. 3 I. A. 241: 26 W. R. 82

12. ———— **Right of remote heir—**  
*Existence of near heir.* During the existence of a near heir, a more distant heir cannot sue. *BISRAM SINGH alias BISHEN SINGH v. INDURJEET KOONWAR*

6 W. R. 2

13. ———— **Suit by widow to set aside sale of reversioner's interest.** A suit by a widow to set aside the sale of a judgment-debtor's interest as reversioner is not maintainable. *SHIB KOONWAR v. SADHO SINGH*

2 Agra 255

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****36. INTEREST TO SUPPORT RIGHT—contd.**

14. ———— **Suit by widow as representing husband—**  
*Hindu widow where sons are alive—Disclaimer by sons.* A Hindu widow cannot sue as representative of her husband when her sons are alive, nor will a petition filed by the sons in a suit brought by her as such representative (in which petition the sons state that she has always been in possession of the property and is entitled to sue) cure the defect in her title. *Held*, also by *MACPHERSON, J.*, that, in the absence of proof that the widow was the next reversioner after the sons, even a disclaimer by the sons prior to the institution of the suit, if it did not amount to an absolute assignment to the widow, would not entitle her to sue. *RAM KANNYE GOSSAMEE v. MEERNOMOYEE DOSSEE*

2 W. R. 49

*JANNOBEE CHOWDHRAIN v. DWARKANATH ROY CHOWDHRY* . . . 7 W. R. 455

15. ———— **Enhancement of rent, suit for—**  
*Right of a Hindu widow to sue for enhancement of rent as representing the estate of the deceased zamindar or as guardian of a minor son adopted to him by her.* A Hindu widow, representing a zamindari interest in a mehal, sued for the rent upon a rent-paying tenure at an enhanced rate. She had, in former years, adopted a son to her deceased husband. The defendant objected throughout that, this son (deceased in 1884) having been of full age in 1881 when this suit was brought, the widow was not entitled to sue at the time, he having that right. *Held*, that the Courts below had rightly disallowed this objection. There was no sufficient evidence to show that the adopted son had attained majority when this suit was brought, and the plaintiff could sue either in her character as widow of the deceased or as guardian of the minor adopted son. *SURJA KANT ACHARYA v. HEMANTA KUMARI*

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 498

L. R. 20 I. A. 25

16. ———— **Interest of Government after grant—**  
*Suit to recover surplus land from neighbouring grantees of Government who have encroached.* Where a certain quantity of land was granted by Government to several grantees, subject to the condition of resumption if the land were allowed to remain uncultivated for certain years, and it is subsequently found that several grantees were not in possession of the land corresponding in quantity with that originally granted to them:—*Held*, that the right of suit to recover possession of such surplus land was vested in the other grantees and not in the Government, who had no remaining interest in it, except that of resumption. *GOVERNMENT v. RAM CHARUN MISR*

2 Agra 74

17. ———— **Suit on behalf of deceased lunatic's estate—**  
*Manager appointed by Court of Wards—Parties.* One L, in December 1867, undertook by a security-bond to be answerable to the Court of Wards for any default in the payment of rent which might be made by S in performing the stipulation of a certain lease made to S M, described



**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****36. INTEREST TO SUPPORT RIGHT—contd.**

as manager under the Court of Wards of the estate of *B*, a lunatic, deceased, and brought a suit on the bond against *S* and his brother. *Held*, that the defendants were not liable. The suit was not properly framed. The suit should have been brought as to arrears accruing due during the lifetime of *B*, by his personal representative; and as to arrears accruing due after *B*'s death, by the successor of *B*. *M*, not being in either position, was not entitled to sue. **MAHOMED ABDUL HYE v. LUNJEET SINGH**

13 B. L. R. Ap. 14: 22 W. R. 200

**18. ——— Suit by vendor to set aside mortgage and decree as fraudulent—Specific Relief Act, s. 39—Sale of immoveable property—Covenant by vendor of good title—Suit and decree on a previous decree against purchaser—Vendor and purchaser.** A vendor of land who had covenanted with his vendees that he had a good title, and who after the sale had no interest remaining in the property, brought a suit in which he claimed to set aside as fraudulent a mortgage on which the defendant had obtained a decree against the vendees, and the decree itself. He based his right to maintain the suit upon his liability under his covenant. The vendees were not parties to the suit. *Held*, that, as the defendant's mortgage had merged in his decree, the suit could only be maintained if the plaintiff could show himself entitled to have the defendant's decree set aside, and that he had shown no interest which would entitle him to maintain a suit for such a purpose. **JHUNA v. BENI RAM . . . I. L. R. 9 All. 439**

**19. ——— Suit by junior members of tarwad—Fraud—Collusion between senior members and alienees.** A suit was brought by the junior members of a tarwad, which consisted of three stanoms and three tavaries against the karnavan and others to whom he had alienated some tarward property, for a declaration that the alienations in question were invalid. *Held*, that the plaintiffs, though junior members of the tarwad, were competent to maintain the suit if there was collusion between the senior anandravans and the alienees and the stani for the time being. *Anund Koer v. Court of Wards, L. R. 8 I. A. 22*, considered. **MAHOMED v. KRISHNAN**

I. L. R. 11 Mad. 106

**20. ——— Malabar law—Suit of declaration of invalidity of kanom.** The junior members of a Malabar tarwad brought a suit against their karnavan and senior anandravan, and certain persons claiming under a kanom granted by the former, for a declaration that the kanom was invalid and for possession of the land demised with mesne profits. The suit was filed nearly twelve years after the execution of the kanom. *Held*, that the suit was maintainable by the plaintiffs. **ANANTAN v. SANKARAN . . . I. L. R. 14 Mad. 101**

**21. ——— Re-admission to caste—Contract to procure admission to caste—Contract made by head of a caste in representative capacity not enforceable by him after he has ceased to hold**

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****36. INTEREST TO SUPPORT RIGHT—contd.**

*office.* The defendant was the eldest of three brothers whose mother on her marriage had been put out of the Lovana caste for having married a man belonging to a different caste. The defendant was anxious that he and his brothers should be re-admitted to the caste; and in 1864 he entered into an agreement with the plaintiff, who was at that time one of the setias of the caste, whereby the latter agreed to procure the admission of the plaintiff and his brothers and get them married to girls belonging to the caste. In consideration of these services, the defendant was to pay the plaintiff the sum of R5,000, which sum was to become due on the marriage of the defendant's youngest brother to a girl of the caste, and to be expended in purchasing caste utensils, which were to be kept for the use of the caste. The plaintiff alleged that part of this money had been already paid to him, and that on the marriage of the defendant's youngest brother in 1880 he had demanded payment of the balance (*viz.*, R3,149), which the defendant had not paid. He now sued to recover this balance. One of the witnesses at the hearing was the setia of the caste who had succeeded the plaintiff in that position. He stated that he and other leaders of the caste to whom he had spoken, disapproved of this suit. *Held*, that the suit was not maintainable. The agreement was made with the plaintiff as one of the heads of the caste. It was made with him in his representative, not in his personal capacity, and the benefit of the agreement accrued, not to him, but to the caste. It was therefore for the caste to say whether they wished to enforce the agreement. The plaintiff, however, had lost his position as one of the heads of the caste in 1869, and was no longer the spokesman of the representative of the caste. His successor had told the Court that the leaders of the caste disapproved, as he did himself, of this suit. Under these circumstances, the suit was not maintainable. **PITAMBER RATANSI v. JAGJIVAN HANSRAJ**

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 131

**22. ——— Suit by father in his own right for defamation of daughter—Suit not maintainable.** A suit for defamation of his daughter cannot be maintained by a Hindu father suing in his own right and not as general attorney or on behalf of the daughter. A suit for defamation can only be brought by the person actually defamed, if the person is *sui juris*, and if not *sui juris*, then under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, by his guardian or next friend. *Dawan Singh v. Mahip Singh, I. L. R. 10 All. 425*, and *Sarvathi v. Mannar, I. L. R. 8 Mad. 175*, distinguished. *Subbaiyar v. Kristnaiyar, I. L. R. 1 Mad. 383*, and *Luckumsey Rowji v. Hurbun Nursey, I. L. R. 5 Bom. 580*, referred to. **DAYA v. PARAM SUKH . . . I. L. R. 11 All. 104**

**23. ——— Maintainability of suit brought by widow—Liability of undivided brother of deceased Hindu to defray expenses of his niece's marriage—Improper refusal—Performance**



RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*

36. INTEREST TO SUPPORT RIGHT—*contd.*  
*by widow—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 69—*  
*“Person who is interested in the payment of money.”* The defendant having improperly refused to perform the marriage ceremony of his niece, the daughter of his undivided brother (deceased), the widow of the latter herself performed the ceremony, borrowing money for the purpose, and sued her late husband's said brother (the defendant) to recover the amount expended on the marriage. On its being contended that defendant was under no obligation to provide for the expenses of his brother's daughter's marriage:—*Held*, that defendant was liable, the marriage having been properly performed. *Held*, further, that the suit was maintainable, though it had been brought by the mother of the bride, and not by the bride herself. *Semble*: That the mother was, within the meaning of s. 69 of the Indian Contract Act, interested in making the payment which had given rise to the action. It was not necessary for her to prove that she had been compelled to make it or that she had made it at the defendant's request. *VAIKUNTAM AMMANGAR v. KALLAPIRAN AYYANGAR*. I. L. R. 23 Mad. 512

24. ——— Suit to remove a trustee—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 539, interest necessary to support a suit under.* The plaintiffs, having an interest as the managers of a temple in seeing to the due performance of the religious part of the administration of a certain charity endowed for the sustenance of Brahmans and connected with the temple, and being further interested in its administration as Brahmans entitled under certain circumstances to share in the benefits of the charity, sued under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure to remove defendant from the trusteeship of the charity on the ground of fraudulent mismanagement. *Held*, that the plaintiff's interests did not support the suit. *Quære*: Whether a suit for the removal of a trustee will lie under the above section. *NARASIMHA v. AYYAN CHETTI*. I. L. R. 12 Mad. 157

25. ——— Suit for cancellation of sale-deed—*Assignment of interest.* In a suit for cancellation of a sale-deed by the person whose name appeared on it as executant, it appeared that the plaintiff's interest in the property to which the instrument related had been assigned by her to another by a conveyance which contained certain covenants by her with regard to the land. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not entitled to maintain the suit. *IYYAPPA v. RAMALAKSHMAMMA*. I. L. R. 13 Mad. 549

26. ——— Suit to cancel a void or voidable instrument—*Reasonable apprehension of serious injury—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 39.* Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding, may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it cancelled. The test is “reasonable apprehension of serious injury.” Whether that exists or not depends upon the circumstances of each case. It cannot be laid down, as a rule of law, that in no

RIGHT OF SUIT—*concl.*

36. INTEREST TO SUPPORT RIGHT—*concl.*  
 case can a man, who has parted with the property in respect of which a void or voidable instrument exists, sue to have such instrument cancelled. *Iyyappa v. Ramalakshammamma*, I. L. R. 13 Mad. 549, referred to. *KOTRABASSAPPAYA v. CHEN-VIRAPPAYA*. I. L. R. 23 Bom. 375

27. ——— Executor and residuary legatee, power of—*Probate and administration Act (V of 1881), s. 90, sub-s. 4, as amended by Act VI of 1889—“Person interested in the property,” meaning of.* D, residuary legatee under a will, having obtained an order for grant of probate in his favour, sold certain properties covered by the will to J. In execution of a decree passed against D in his personal capacity, the properties were attached and J preferred a claim on the ground of his purchase. The claim was allowed and the properties were released from attachment. In a suit brought by the decree-holder for a declaration that the properties were liable to be sold in execution of his decree, it was *held* that the words “person interested in the property” in sub-s. (4) of s. 90 of the Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), as amended by s. 14 of Act VI of 1889, must mean a person interested independently of the executor whose alienation is sought to be avoided. The plaintiff deriving his interest as creditor of D in his personal capacity, and not as creditor of the estate of the testator, was not entitled to avoid the alienation under that section even had it been invalid. *JAGOBANDHU DEY PODDAR v. DWARIKA NATH ADDYA*. I. L. R. 23 Calc. 446

28. ——— Malabar law—*Denial of uralan's title by his co-uralan—Suit by one of two uralans without consulting co-uralan—Maintainability of suit, co-uralan being impleaded as defendant.* One of two co-uralans had for a considerable time denied the title of the other uralan. The latter brought a suit to redeem a *kanom*, without first consulting his co-uralan or asking him to join in it. He impleaded the co-uralan as a defendant, given as his reason that, inasmuch as his co-uralan had denied his title, it was unnecessary to consult him as to the institution of the suit. *Held*, that the suit was not maintainable. It is only when one perversely declines to co-operate with the other, after being invited to do so, and when it is for the benefit of the institution that proceedings should be taken, that one uralan can sue, impleading the other as defendant. *SAVITRI ANTARJANAM v. RAMAN NAMBUDEI (1900)* I. L. R. 24 Mad. 296

## 37. INTESTACY.

——— Suit by one executor de son tort against another—*Letters of administration—Succession Act (X of 1865), ss. 190 and 266—Administration suit.* D, a Parsi, died intestate in 1877, leaving him surviving a widow, three daughters, and two sons, A and F. On D's death, his sons, without taking out administration, assumed the management of the estate, and each received sums



**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****37. INTESTACY—concl'd.**

of money on account of it. The widow and daughters of the deceased obtained letters of administration, but limited to the extent of their interests in the estate. In 1888 *A* brought a suit against his brother *F* and the other members of the family to recover out of the estate a certain sum of money advanced by him to *D*. *Held*, that, the estate being unrepresented, the suit could not be maintained (s. 190 of Act X of 1865). The letters of administration issued to the widow and daughters of the deceased, being limited only to the extent of their shares in the estate, were not letters of administration such as are meant by s. 190 of the Indian Succession Act (X of 1865). *Held*, also, that the only course open to the plaintiff was to take proceedings for the appointment of an administrator of the estate who would either administer it by the payment of the debts and the distribution of the surplus (if any) amongst the heirs, after taking an account of all property already received out of it by the creditors or heirs, or who could be compelled to do so by an administration suit. *FRAMJI DORABJI GHASWALA v. ADARJI DORABJI GHASWALA*

**I. L. R. 18 Bom. 337**

**38. JOINT RIGHT.**

1. ——— Suit by one of several heirs against creditor for share of debt—*Contract—Joint obligation—Act XXVII of 1860—Contract Act, ss. 42, 45. Held*, by the Full Bench (MAHMOOD, J., dissenting), that when, upon the death of the obligee of a money-bond, the right to realize the money has devolved in specific shares upon his heirs, each of such heirs cannot maintain a separate suit for recovery of his share of the money due on the bond. *KANDHIYA LAL v. CHANDAR*

**I. L. R. 7 All. 313**

2. ——— Suit by one member of an undivided family on contract in his name for the benefit of family not maintainable though the others acquiesce—*Limitation Act, 1877, Sch. II, Art. 75—Waiver—Resolution of meeting, not convened according to rules, but notified to all members—Account stated, when enforceable as a fresh contract—Second appeal, whom appellant ought to make parties to. Where the rules of a gramajenam provide that resolutions passed at a general meeting shall be binding on all the members, a resolution at a general meeting held after notice to all the members, will be so binding, although the meeting was not convened in the manner laid down by the rules. The general authority to bind all members by a resolution will include an authority to make an acknowledgment or to enter into a fresh contract on behalf of all the members. A resolution, accepting accounts and agreeing to pay in instalments, is a fresh contract, on which a suit may be brought. Where the benefit of a contract belongs to an undivided family and a fresh contract by which the original contract is discharged is entered into in the name of one only of the members of such family, all the members of the*

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****38. JOINT RIGHT—concl'd.**

family are necessary parties to a suit on the fresh contract. A suit brought by the member in whose name the contract was made must be dismissed, when the other members are joined as parties after the period of limitation had expired; and the acquiescence of the other members will not cure such defect. Mere abstinence from suing will not constitute such a waiver as will postpone the starting point of limitation in cases falling within Art. 75 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act. *Ramanujachariar v. Srinivasachariar*, 9 *Mad. L. J.* 103, not followed. *Adaikkalam Chetty v. Marimuthu*, 1 *L. R.* 22 *Mad.* 326, not followed. An appellant on second appeal ought to add as parties all those whom he had made parties in his appeal to the lower Appellate Court. *SESHAN PATTAR v. VEERA RAGHAVAN PATTAR* (1909) . . . **I. L. R. 32 Mad. 284**

**39. JUDICIAL OFFICERS, SUITS AGAINST.**

1. ——— Suit against Government for acts of Magistrate. A suit did not lie against Government for the proceedings of a Magistrate under Ch. XX of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861. *BAGAIISHREE DYAL v. GOVERNMENT*

**2 Agra 81**

2. ——— Suit to have land declared private property—*Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, ss. 308, 311—Order of Magistrate declaring land to be public. The concluding clause of s. 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, though it prevents the Civil Courts from entertaining a suit to restrain a Magistrate from carrying out an order made under s. 308, or a suit for damages against the Magistrate or any other person in carrying out such order in the manner provided by law, does not bar a person against whom such an order has been carried into effect from instituting a suit to prove that land declared by the Magistrate to be public is his private property. LALJI UKHEDA v. JOWBA DOWBA*

**8 Bom. A. C. 94**

3. ——— Suit against Judge for maliciously issuing illegal order—*Want of jurisdiction—Knowledge of want of jurisdiction. A plaint against a Judge averring that the Judge, knowingly and maliciously, issued an illegal order to the plaintiff's injury, does not disclose a sufficient cause of action against the Judge. It must not only aver that the Judge had no jurisdiction, but also that he had no reasonable and probable cause for supposing that he had jurisdiction. PRAHLAD MAHARUDRA v. WATT*

**10 Bom. 346**

4. ——— Suit against Collector for illegal proceedings—*Entry of name in Collector's books—Improper action of Collector. The mere entry of the name of one parcener in immovable property in the Collector's books as the occupant or owner is not sufficient ground for an action by a co-parcener against the Collector, inasmuch as the Collector's books are kept for purposes of revenue and not for purposes of title. But if the*



**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****39. JUDICIAL OFFICERS, SUITS AGAINST—  
concl'd.**

Collector improperly enjoin the plaintiff from making, or other parties from paying, to the plaintiff his share of the rents or profits, an action may be maintained against the Collector. *COLLECTOR OF POONA v. BHAVANRAV BALKRISHNA* 10 Bom. 192

5. ———— *Entry of name Collector's books—Bom. Reg. XVI of 1827, s. 19.* Although the entry by a Collector of a particular person's name as "occupant" affords, however mistaken, no ground for an action against the Collector, yet where there is an apparent and reasonable ground for apprehending legal injury in the Collector's proceedings,—as when the Collector affirms one person's title to the exclusion of another by entering his name in the register of "watanas" (compiled under Regulation XVI of 1827, s. 19), or where damage to a person's right is likely to arise from the Collector's act,—it is not improper to join the Collector as a party to a suit. *ANGAPA MALAPA v. BHIMANGOWDA MARIAPA* 10 Bom. 194

**40. KING OF OUDH, SUIT AGAINST.**

*Suit against King of Oudh before Act XIII of 1868—Consent of Governor General.* A suit against the King of Oudh, commenced without the consent of the Governor General in Council, was held to be null and void even though it had been instituted and judgment had been given, before the passing of Act XII of 1868. *BEGUM BIBEE v. KING OF OUDH* 11 W. R. 116

**41. LANDLORD AND TENANT, SUITS CONCERNING.**

1. ———— *Suit for use and occupation—Suit by Receiver—Suit to recover money payable under agreement.* A suit was brought by the plaintiff and Receiver of the Tanjore Estate to recover from the first defendant, a farmer, a sum of money alleged to be rent due to the Tanjore Estate under a written agreement executed in August 1866 by the first defendant to the second defendant, who then claimed to be owner of the estate. The Judge of the Court of Small Causes considered that the subject-matter of the plaint did not constitute a cause of action to the plaintiff, and dismissed the plaint, subject to the opinion of the High Court. *Held*, that the suit was maintainable by the Receiver to recover the fair rent payable for the use and occupation of the land under the muchalka, which was good evidence of what was the fair amount of rent. The second defendant, having been held to possess no title to the property, could not afterwards maintain an action for the non-payment of the rent of a portion of such property, due according to the terms of the muchalka. *Held*, also, that the right of suit did not extend to recover anything as interest on the rent due. *MORRIS v. MUTHUSAMI PILLAI* 6 Mad. 363

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****41. LANDLORD AND TENANT, SUITS CONCERNING—contd.**

*See MORRIS v. SAMBAMURTHI RAYAR*

6 Mad. 122

2. ———— *Suit to recover arrears of rent paid to Government under certificate—Money payable to zamindar.* At the time when a zamindari came under the khas management of a settlement officer, arrears of rent were due by the plaintiff to the zamindar. The settlement officer issued a certificate against the plaintiff, under s. 19 of Bengal Act VII of 1868, requiring him to pay these arrears. The plaintiff at first objected, but subsequently withdrew his objection and paid a portion of the money into Court, and presented a petition stating that the amount paid in was partly due to the Government, and asking that his property might be released from attachment. On payment of the balance claimed under the certificate and costs, the certificate was discharged. *Held*, that a suit to recover the amount paid to Government, brought on the ground that that amount was really payable to the zamindar, would not lie. *Quære*: Whether such a suit would lie if the plaintiff were compelled to pay again to the zamindar. *BEPIN BEHARI SINGH v. GOVERNMENT* I. L. R. 5 Calc. 325

3. ———— *Suit as to validity of rent-free grant—Suit for arrears of rent—Suit for assessment.* A suit for "arrears of rent" is not maintainable in order to raise the question as to the validity of an alleged rent-free grant. The question should be raised by a suit to assess the holding. *HUREE CHUND v. BRIJ KOMAR SINGH* 1 Agra Rev. 35

4. ———— *Suit for excess payment—Omission to make deductions from rent.* Where a person has a right to make deductions of rent payable to the surburakar under his kubuliat on account of rent due from rayats or others and pays his full rent without making any deduction, his not doing so gives him no right of action against the zamindar or his representatives. *CHUNDER SEEKUR ROY v. GHOLAM SHURREEF alias LOOPAN MEEAH* 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 146

5. ———— *Suit for excess payment of rent—Receipt by one landlord of rents that ought to have been paid to another.* Where a landlord receives rents which exceed the rents properly payable to himself, the party to whom the excess is payable is entitled to recover it directly from him by a civil suit, and need not sue the tenants who made the payment. *GOOROO CHURN NAG v. GOBIND CHUNDER GOOHO* 24 W. R. 352

6. ———— *Suit for rents collected by unauthorised person without title—Cause of action.* Where A without title has collected rents due to B, B may sue A for the recovery from him of the rents so received. *RAM CHURN BANERJEE v. MUDDUN MOHUN TEWARREE* Marsh. 269; 2 Hay 198



RIGHT OF SUIT *contd.*41. LANDLORD AND TENANT, SUITS CONCERNING—*concl'd.*

7. ——— Suit complaining that defendants have dissuaded tenants from paying rent—*Cause of action.* It is not an actionable wrong to dissuade a tenant from paying his rents to his landlord, who can recover them by law. *DALGLEISH v. JEEBUN MAHTO alias JHAW MAHTO*  
25 W. R. 230

8. ——— Suit to enforce acceptance of pottah—*Jurisdiction of Civil Courts.* A regular suit in the Civil Courts to enforce the acceptance of a pottah is maintainable. *KARIM v. MUHAMMAD KADAR*  
I. L. R. 2 Mad. 89

9. ——— Suit by lessor against person injuring land leased—*Suit for damages.* A lessor may sue a third party for damages for injury sustained by reason of excavations made by such party on lands leased out by the plaintiff to a lessee. *DHEERMONEY DOSSEE v. CROFT*  
3. W. R. S. C. C. Ref. 20

10. ——— Remedy of tenant aggrieved by notice of attachment—*Madras Rent Recovery Act, VIII of 1865, ss. 39, 40, 78—Civil Procedure Code, s. 11.* A tenant, having received a notice of attachment under s. 39 of the Rent Recovery Act sued in a District Munsif's Court to have the notice cancelled, no specific damage being alleged. *Held*, that the suit did not lie. *MAHOMED v. LAKSHMIPATI*  
I. L. R. 10 Mad. 368

11. ——— Suit to determine which of two claimants of rent is landlord—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 28.* A tenant has no right to bring a suit to have it determined which of two defendants, both of whom claimed rent from him, is his landlord. *KOYLASH CHANDRA DUTT v. GOLUK CHANDER PODDAR* 2 C. W. N. 61

12. ——— Suit for rent—*Relationship of landlord and tenant must be shown to arise out of contract or privity of estate.* Before a plaintiff can succeed in a suit to recover rent, he must establish relationship of landlord and tenant existing between himself and the defendant and resting either on contract or privity of estate. *MANJAPPA v. VENKATESH (1906)*  
I. L. R. 31 Bom. 159

## 42. LOSS OF SERVICE.

——— Suit by Hindu father for compensation for the loss of his daughter's services in consequence of her abduction—*Compensation for costs of prosecution.* A Hindu sued for compensation for the loss of his daughter's services in consequence of her abduction by the defendant, and for costs incurred by him in prosecuting the defendant criminally for such abduction, for which he was convicted. The daughter was a married woman, who had been deserted by her husband, and at the time of her abduction was living with the plaintiff, her father. *Held*, by *STUART, C.J.*, that the suit by the father for compensation for the

RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*42. LOSS OF SERVICE—*concl'd.*

loss of his daughter's services in consequence of her abduction was under the circumstances maintainable, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the costs of the criminal prosecution. *Held*, by *OLD-FIELD, J.*, that a suit by a Hindu father for the loss of his daughter's services in consequence of her abduction is not maintainable. *RAM LAL v. TULA RAM*  
I. L. R. 4 All. 97

## 43. MAINTENANCE.

——— Suit by Mahomedan woman against Hindu for maintenance of her illegitimate child. Where a suit was brought against a Hindu by a woman who was a Mahomedan and the wife of a Mahomedan, for maintenance of her illegitimate child, of which she alleged the defendant to be the father, it was *held* that such a suit would not lie. *ADDOYTO CHUNDER DASS v. WOJAN BEEBEE*  
4 C. L. R. 154

## 44. MESNE PROFITS.

1. ——— Suit for mesne profits. The party in possession is the only person legally competent to sue for mesne profits. *KHETTER MONEE DOSSEE v. GOPEEMOHUN ROY*  
1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 83  
1 Hay 178

2. ——— Right to receive mesne profits, transferability of—*Suit by assignee—Transfer of Property Act, s. 1.* The right to recover mesne profits, which are in the nature of damages, is not transferable. *DURGA CHUNDER ROY v. KOILAS CHUNDER ROY* 2 C. W. N. 43

3. ——— Suit for mesne profits in respect of right to turn of worship. A suit for vasilat in respect of profits derived from a turn of worship which are in their nature uncertain and voluntary is not maintainable. *Ramesur Mookerjee v. Ishan Chunder Mookerjee, 10 W. R. 457*, followed. *KASHI CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY v. KOILASH CHUNDER BANDOPADHYA*  
I. L. R. 26 Calc. 356  
3 C. W. N. 279

## 45. MISREPRESENTATION.

1. ——— Suit for loss by misrepresentation—*Bona fide communication.* Where defendants were asked to obtain information from a railway company as to the probable cost of carriage of coal, which they were about to sell to plaintiff, and they did so, communicating in good faith to plaintiff the result, no right of suit could arise against defendants, although plaintiff was ultimately compelled to pay to the railway company a much larger sum than defendant had represented. *BENGAL COAL COMPANY v. ELGIN COTTON COMPANY*  
2 N. W. 13

2. ——— Suit against an attesting witness to a security-bond for appearance



RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*45. MISREPRESENTATION—*contd.*

of an insolvent judgment-debtor. The plaintiff held a money-decree against *M*, who was arrested in execution of it. On being brought to the Court, however, *M* applied for his discharge as an insolvent under s. 273 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859). He was released on the security of *G*, who executed a bond for the appearance of *M* at the inquiry into his insolvency. The defendant attested the bond, and wrote in the attestation that *G* was a solvent person. In consequence of the non-appearance of *M*, the plaintiff sought to execute his decree against the surety, *G*, who on his arrest also applied for his discharge on ground of his insolvency, and was discharged after inquiry. The plaintiff thereupon sued the defendant for the amount of his decree and cost of execution, on the ground of his representation in the attestation that *G* was insolvent. The Subordinate Judge rejected, but the District Judge on appeal allowed, the plaintiff's claim. *Held*, by the High Court, on second appeal, that the plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendant, whether the suit was considered as brought upon a covenant or misrepresentation, as the defendant was neither a co-obligor in the security-bond of *G* nor did he make any promise in the attestation of it to compensate the plaintiff for the non-appearance of *M* nor any representation to the plaintiff. *Quare*: Whether the nazir was liable to the plaintiff for negligence in not taking a proper surety? *NAGO MAHADEV v. NARAYAN RAMCHANDRA*. I. L. R. 4 Bom. 465

3. *Loan obtained by guardian as such—Liability for such loan—Warranty by guardian of authority to borrow—Misrepresentation on point of law—Contract Act (IX of 1872), s. 235—Guardian's liability—Breach of warranty—Principal and agent.* Plaintiff, having lent a sum of money to one *R* as guardian of her minor son, brought a suit against the minor, represented by his guardian, to recover it. In that suit a consent decree was passed, which directed the amount due to him to be recovered out of the minor's estate. On the minor's coming of age, he got the consent decree set aside, and the plaintiff had to refund the sum which he had recovered under it. Thereupon the plaintiff sued *R* to recover the amount as damages for breach of warranty, alleging that she had represented to him that she had authority to incur the debt on behalf of the minor and to bind his estate, whereas she had really no such authority. *Held*, that the plaintiff could not recover, there having been no such misrepresentation as would support an action for a breach of warranty. Assuming that there was a representation, the only possible representation, if the case be treated as coming within s. 235 of the Contract Act, was that the defendant represented that she was the agent of her son. But as the plaintiff knew that the son was an infant, he must have been aware that any representation that defendant was her infant son's duly authorized agent was incorrect, for an infant cannot appoint an agent, and consequently no warranty, such as would support a suit,

RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*45. MISREPRESENTATION—*conclld.*

could arise out of such a representation. Even if it were conceded that there was a representation by *R* as to her power to bind the minor's estate, it was one on a point of law, and, as such, it was incapable of supporting the suit. *Beattie v. Ebury*, 7 L. R. Ch. 777, followed. *MANIBHAI PREMABHAI v. BAI RUPALIBA*

I. L. R. 24 Bom. 166

## 46. MONEY ADVANCED TO GUARDIAN FOR MINOR.

Advance by plaintiff for costs of minor defendants—*Contract Act (IX of 1872), ss. 68, 70—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 220—Practice—Costs of guardian ad litem—Right to recover amount advanced.* Plaintiff having in a prior suit sued the defendants, who were minors, and their father for specific performance, was ordered by the Court to advance money to the guardian *ad litem* of the minor (who was appointed by the Court) to enable him to conduct their defence. Plaintiff succeeded, but the Court refused to provide in its decree, for the repayment to plaintiff of the amount so advanced. On the plaintiff bringing this suit to recover that amount:—*Held*, per SUBRAMANIA AYYAR, J., (i) that the Court in which the prior suit had been brought had power neither to direct the plaintiff to make the advances to the guardian, as had been done, nor to award the amount so paid as costs in the cause. The present suit therefore was not unsustainable for the reason that the subject-matter of it was one for the Court to have dealt with in the previous suit; (ii) that the circumstances of the case were not such as to render the amount recoverable under s. 70 of the Contract Act, inasmuch as the defendants could not be said to have enjoyed the benefit of the expenditure; (iii) that payments or charges connected with legal expenses in which infants are concerned may, in certain circumstances, come under the head of necessities within the meaning of s. 68 of the Contract Act. Disbursements properly made in defence of the suit by the guardian *ad litem* out of the plaintiff's advances might be allowable, if it be alleged and proved that there were reasonable grounds for the defence put forward, though it proved unsuccessful. But that this ground could not now be relied upon on second appeal, inasmuch as it had not been put forward in the Court below, when an issue relating to it could have been framed. Per DAVIES, J., that a matter of this nature can and should be settled in the suit in which it arises, and that, where a plaintiff is successful, a supplementary issue should be framed and tried as to the amount due to him on account of advances made by him to the guardian *ad litem* for conducting the defence and a decree passed in his favour for the total amount of costs found to have been properly incurred in the case by the guardian out of such advances. *VENKATA VIJAYA GOPALARAJU v. TIMMAYYA PANTULU*. I. L. R. 22 Mad. 314



**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****47. MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED.**

————— Suit for pay received and not given—*Madras Police Act (XXIV of 1859), s. 53.* The plaintiff, a head constable of police, sued the defendant, an inspector of police, for money had and received to the plaintiff's use. The defendant had received the pay of the plaintiff, but failed to give it to the plaintiff. *Held*, that the right of suit was not taken away by s. 53 of Act XXIV of 1859 (Madras Police Act) and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount sued for. *GUNDAM VENKATASAMI v. CHINNAM PURUSHOTTAMA*

5 Mad. 466

**48. MONEY LENT.**

————— Insufficiently stamped document—*Suit on hatchitta for money lent—Evidence Act, s. 91—Whether a suit maintainable if brought upon an insufficiently stamped document, where the defendant admitted the loan.* In a suit brought in the Court of Small Causes on a hatchitta bearing a stamp of one anna, the defendant admitted the loan, but pleaded payment. The Judge, coming to the conclusion that the document sued upon was a promissory note and should have been stamped with a two-anna stamp, refused to admit it in evidence. He also came to the conclusion that the plaintiff had no cause of action independently of the document, and dismissed the suit. *Held*, that the plaintiff had a cause of action independently of the document. *Held*, also, that an implied contract to repay money lent always arises from the fact that the money is lent, even though no express promise, either written or verbal, is made to repay it. Therefore, in a case where the defendant admits the loan and has not repaid it, the plaintiff may maintain an action against him for breach of his implied promise or contract, entirely independent of any security which may have been given for the advance. *Akbar v. Sheikh Khan, I. L. R. 7 Cal. 256*, explained. *Golap Chand Marwaree v. Mohokoom Kooaree, I. L. R. 3 Cal. 314*, followed. *PRA-MATHA NATH SANDAL v. DWARKA NATH DEY*

I. L. R. 23 Cal. 851

**49. MONEY PAID.**

1. ————— Suit for money paid before pupil was allowed to remain in Government school—*Right of Government to make rules and regulations as to admission to schools.* The Government has a right to make rules and regulations as to the terms on which pupils should be admitted into, and allowed to remain in, their schools. Where it is necessary, according to the rules, that a sum of money should be paid in order to a pupil remaining in a Government school, and such sum is paid, and the pupil allowed to remain, a suit will not lie to recover the money so paid. *HURRO MOHUN GAEN v. BONOMALEE MITTER*

11 W. R. 359

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****50. MORTGAGE.**

————— *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 92—Decree for redemption—Omission to execute—Maintainability of subsequent suit on same mortgage—Res judicata—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 13, 244.* Where a suit for redemption has been instituted, and a decree for redemption has been passed thereon, but not executed, a subsequent suit is not maintainable for the redemption of the same mortgage. *VEDAPURATTI v. VALLABHA VALIA RAJA (F.B. 1902)* . . . I. L. R. 25 Mad. 300

**51. MUNICIPAL OFFICERS, SUITS AGAINST.**

1. ————— Suit against Municipal Commissioners to recover assessment illegally levied under Mad. Act X of 1865—*Cause of action.* A suit cannot be maintained to recover assessment unlawfully levied by Municipal Commissioners under Madras Act X of 1865. *BHIMAVARAPU BALARAMAYA v. HODSON*

3 Mad. 370

2. ————— Suit for injury by Municipal Commissioners under Act XXVI of 1850—*Remedies given by Government rules.* Where a party was injured by an order of Municipal Commissioners under Act XXVI of 1850, issued in respect of a subject within their jurisdiction, he was debarred from bringing a suit in the Civil Court to annul such order, until he had exhausted the remedies afforded to him by the rules framed by Government in accordance with the provisions of the Act, *SAKHARAM SHRIDHAR GADKARI v. CHAIRMAN OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF KALLAAN*

7 Bom. A. C. 33

3. ————— Suit against trustees for distress for unpaid rates—*Bom. Acts II of 1865 and IV of 1867—Liability of Municipal Commissioners.* No suit can be maintained against the Justices of the Peace of the City of Bombay in respect of an alleged wrongful distress for unpaid rates levied by the Municipal Commissioner of that city, either under the provisions of Act II of 1865 (Bombay) or Act IV of 1867 (Bombay). In such a suit the Municipal Commissioner himself or the actual tortfeasor is the proper defendant. *SHIVSHANKAR GOVINDRAM v. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE FOR BOMBAY* . . . 5 Bom. O. C. 145

4. ————— Suit in respect of act done under Beng. Act III of 1864—*Attachment and sale of property for non-payment of fine—Suit for damages—Liability of Municipality.* The Howrah Municipality prosecuted plaintiff under Bengal Act III of 1864, s. 67 and bye-laws, and procured the infliction upon him of a fine which was realized by attachment and sale of moveable property. Plaintiff then brought a suit against the Corporation for the value of the goods sold and damages. *Held*, that the suit was not maintainable against the Municipal Corporation. *MOTEE LALL BOSE v. HOWRAH MUNICIPALITY* . . . 23 W. R. 222



**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****51. MUNICIPAL OFFICERS, SUITS AGAINST—contd.**

5. ——— Suit for damages and injunction restraining Municipality from stopping water supply—*Bombay District Municipal Act (XXVI of 1850)—Bombay District Municipal Act (Bom. Act VI of 1873), s. 14, Rules framed under—Rule 16—Jurisdiction of Civil Courts.* The plaintiffs having sued the Municipality of Sholapur for damages and for an injunction restraining the Municipality from stopping the supply of water to their house, the first Court allowed the claim, but the Judge in appeal dismissed the suit, holding that it was premature, and that the plaintiffs had no right to sue the Municipality for damages under rule 16 of the Rules framed by the Municipality under s. 14 of the District Municipal Act (Bombay Act VI of 1873), that rule providing that "parties dissatisfied with a decision of the managing committee or any sub-committee may prefer an appeal, to the Municipality whose decision shall be final." *Held*, reversing the decree, that the rule must be construed as permissive, and not mandatory. It referred to departmental procedure only, and did not debar the institution of the civil suit. *VASUDEVACHARYA v. MUNICIPALITY OF SHOLAPUR*. I. L. R. 22 Bom. 384

6. ——— Suit to establish right to build structure forbidden by Municipality—*Bombay District Municipal Act (VI of 1850), s. 33.* S. 33 of the Bombay District Municipal Act (VI of 1873) gives the Municipality a discretion to issue such orders as it thinks proper with reference to a proposed building. Civil Courts cannot interfere with that discretion, unless it is exercised in a capricious, wanton, and oppressive manner. The plaintiff was the owner of two houses on each side of the passage of a khidki, or open square, containing three or four other houses. He proposed to connect the two houses by building a storey across the passage at such a height as not to interfere with the passage of those who were entitled to go to and fro. He applied to the local Municipality for permission to build in the manner he proposed. The Municipality forbade the work, on the ground that it was likely to interfere with the access of light and air to the neighbouring houses. The plaintiff thereupon sued the Municipality to establish his right to build the proposed structure. It was contended for the plaintiff that the Municipality ought not to have refused permission in the interest of the neighbouring householders, who were able to protect their own rights in case of injury. *Held*, that the suit would not lie, as the order of the Municipality refusing permission was not an unreasonable one under the circumstances of the case. *Held*, further, that the authority of the Municipality was not in any way affected by the circumstance that the proposed erection might be an encroachment on private rights subjecting the plaintiff to an action by the persons injured. *NAGARVALAB NARSI v. MUNICIPALITY OF DHANDHUKA*. I. L. R. 12 Bom. 490

7. ——— Misapplication of fund by Municipality—*Right of tax-payer to sue to*

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****51. MUNICIPAL OFFICERS, SUITS AGAINST—concl.**

*restrain Municipality from such misapplication* A suit will lie at the instance of individual taxpayers for an injunction restraining a Municipality from misapplying its funds. *VAMAN TATYAJI v. MUNICIPALITY OF SHOLAPUR*

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 646

8. ——— Suit for declaration of right to be entered in list of candidates for appointment as member of a Municipal Board—*Jurisdiction—Suit brought against the Municipal Board in its corporate capacity.* Where a plaintiff sued for a declaration of his right to have his name entered in the list of persons entitled to be candidates for election as members of a Municipal Board and brought his suit against the Board in its corporate capacity, it was *held*, that such a suit would not lie against the Board, even if, which was not decided, it might lie against the revising authority, by the irregular action of which, it was alleged, the plaintiff's name had been excluded from the list of candidates. *ABDUR RAHIM v. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF KOIL*. I. L. R. 22 All. 143

9. ——— Suit to have assessment declared *ultra vires*—*Bengal Municipal Act (Beng. Act III of 1884), s. 85.* A suit is maintainable by a rate-payer in a Civil Court for a decision that an assessment made by a Municipality is *ultra vires* and not binding on him. *NAVADIP CHANDRA PAL v. PURNANANDA SAHA*

3 C. W. N. 73

**52. OBSTRUCTION TO PUBLIC HIGHWAY.**

1. ——— Suit for obstruction of highway—*Special damage, proof of.* The rule of English law that no action can be maintained by one person against another for obstruction to a highway without proof of special damage should be enforced in British India as a rule of "equity and good conscience." *ADAMSON v. ARAMUGAM*

I. L. R. 9 Mad. 463

2. ——— Suit for removal of obstruction—*Proof of special injury.* In all civil suits for the removal of a public obstruction the plaintiff must show that he himself has suffered some particular inconvenience or injury resulting from the obstruction. *GEHANAJI BIN KES PATIL v. GANPATI BIN LAKSHUMAN*. I. L. R. 2 Bom. 469

*RAJ NARAIN MITTER v. EKADASI BAG*

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 793

3. ——— Suit for declaration of right to use street and injunction to remove obstruction—*No proof of special damage.* A gate was erected in a public street (by the permission of the Municipal Council), which obstructed the exercise by the plaintiff and the public of their right to resort to and draw water from a well. It appeared in evidence, although it was not alleged in the plaint, that the plaintiff had to use the land between the newly erected gate and the well when he repaired his house. The plaintiff, not having obtained per-



**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****52. OBSTRUCTION TO PUBLIC HIGHWAY—  
contd.**

mission to sue under the Civil Procedure Code, s. 30, sued for a declaration of his right to use the street and draw water from the well and for an injunction compelling the removal of the gate. *Held*, that the suit was within the rule precluding private actions for public wrongs without special damage alleged and proved, and was accordingly not maintainable. *SIDDESWARA v. KRISHNA*. I. L. R. 14 Mad. 177

4. ——— Suit to establish right of access to public thoroughfare—*Easement—Act XV of 1873, ss. 27, 32, 38—Special damage. Municipal Committee.* While certain land formed part of a certain public thoroughfare, *F* had immediate access to such thoroughfare and the use of a certain drain. The Municipal Committee sold such land to *M* and constructed a new thoroughfare. *M* used and occupied such land so as to obstruct *F*'s access to the new thoroughfare and his use of the drain. *F* therefore sued him to establish a right of access to the new thoroughfare over such land and a right to the use of such drain. *Held*, that, having suffered special damage from *M*'s acts, *F* had a right of action against him, and that such right of action was not affected by the circumstance that *M* had acquired his title to the land from the Municipal Committee, inasmuch as the Municipal Committee could not have dealt with the old thoroughfare to the special injury of *F*, and, had it closed the same, would have been bound to provide adequately for his access to the new thoroughfare and for his drainage. *FAZAL HAQ v. MAHA CHAND*

I. L. R. 1 All. 557

5. ——— Suit against persons preventing conduct of procession on public highway—*Right to conduct procession.* The right to conduct a marriage procession along the public highway can only be questioned by the Magistrate, and an action will lie against private persons forcibly stopping such a procession even *Seemle*: where it is unusual for persons of the plaintiff's caste to conduct one. *SIVAPPACHARI v. MAHALINGA CHETTI*

1 Mad. 50

6. ——— Suit to establish right to carry tabuts along public road—*Obstruction to public road—Special damage—Public inconvenience.* Plaintiffs, who were Mussulmans, sued to establish their right to carry tabuts in procession along a certain road to the sea and alleged that the defendants (also Mussulmans) obstructed them in doing so. The plaint, however, did not allege any personal loss or damage to the plaintiffs arising from the obstruction. Both the lower Courts found as a fact that the road along which plaintiffs desired to carry their tabuts to the sea was a public road. *Held*, on special appeal, that plaintiffs could not maintain a civil suit in respect of such obstruction, unless they could prove some particular damage to themselves personally, in addition to the general inconvenience occasioned to the public. The mere absence of the religious or sentimental gratification arising from carrying tabuts along a public road is

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****52. OBSTRUCTION TO PUBLIC HIGHWAY—  
contd.**

not any such particular loss or injury as would be sufficient, according to English and Indian precedents, to sustain a civil action. Authorities as to what constitutes special damage sufficient to sustain a civil suit in such cases, referred to. *SATKU VALAD KADIR v. IBRAHIM VALAD MIRZA*

I. L. R. 2 Bom. 457

7. ——— Suit to enforce right to conduct a religious procession along a public road—*Special damage.* A civil action will not lie to enforce a right to conduct a religious procession along a public road without an allegation of some personal loss or damage to the plaintiff. *Satku v. Ibrahim*, I. L. R. 2 Bom. 457, followed. *SUJAU DIN v. MADHAVDAS*

I. L. R. 18 Bom. 693

See *MOHAMED ABDUL HAFIZ v. LATIF HOSSEIN*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 524

8. ——— Suit to restrain procession in honour of idols—*Right to conduct processions.* Persons of whatever sect are entitled to conduct religious processions through public streets, so that they do not interfere with the ordinary use of such streets by the public, and subject to such directions as the Magistrate may lawfully give to prevent obstruction of the thoroughfare or breaches of the public peace. *PARTHASARADI AYYANGAR v. CHINNAKRISHNA AYYANGAR*

I. L. R. 5 Mad. 304

See *SUNDRAM CHETTI v. QUEEN. PONNUSAMI-CHETTI v. QUEEN*

I. L. R. 6 Mad. 203

9. ——— Suit for abatement of nuisance—*Suit after refusal of Magistrate to interfere.* A person injured by the erection of an obstruction on a public highway is not precluded from suing the person by whom it has been caused by the circumstance that he has previously applied to the Magistrate for an order for its removal, and that the Magistrate had refused to make any order. *RAM TUNNOO v. SREENATH DOSS*

Marsh. 537: 2 Hay 659

10. ——— Special damage—*Lease—Right of lessee—Trespass.* The plaintiff, a holder of a ten years' lease of the share and rights of one of the co-sharers of a village, sued for the demolition of certain buildings and constructions on a plot of land within the area of the village, on the ground that the public had been very much inconvenienced in going to and coming from the road, and in taking carts, carriages, cattle, etc., and that he, by reason of his own inconvenience and also as lessee in possession of the entire rights of his lessor, had legally and justly a right to bring the action. The findings of fact were that by the terms of the lease plaintiff was entitled to maintain the action as representing the zamindari rights of his lessor; that the obstructions complained of existed when the lease was granted; that the roadway mentioned in the plaint was one used by the public in general as a footpath and also for vehicles, and that the buildings complained of had encroached on the road. The suit was dismissed by the first Court, but decreed in



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appeal by the lower Appellate Court. *Held*, that, in the absence of damage over and above that which in common with the rest of the public the plaintiff has sustained, his action must fail. Public nuisance is actionable only at the suit of a party who has sustained special damage, and the case law of British India in this respect is the same as the rule of English law on the subject. Further, that the lease to plaintiff failed to show either that the land upon which the defendant had built is included in the lease, or that it intended to confer upon the plaintiff any right to question the legality of the erections existing at the time of the lease. *Satku v. Ibrahim Aga*, I. L. R. 2 Bom. 457, and *Karim Bakhs v. Budha*, I. L. R. 1 All. 249, referred to. *RAMPHAL RAI v. RAGHUNANDAN PRASAD*

I. L. R. 10 All. 498

11. ——— Suit by zamindar for removal of building—*Obstruction by building—Special damage.* The plaintiff, who is the zamindar of the village, brought an action claiming to have a chabutra or building erected by the defendant in one of the village roads removed. The road in question was a katcha road used by the village over which the public had a right of way, and it had been dedicated as a road for the use and convenience of the general public. The plaintiff got a decree for the removal of the chabutra, and the defendant appealed. *Held*, that the rule of English law that a member of the public cannot maintain an action for obstruction to a public road without showing special injury to himself beyond that suffered by any member of the public does not apply to a zamindar who or whose predecessor in title had dedicated to the public the road over his zamindari land. A zamindar, in giving the public a right of road of way over his land, does not give the public or any one else a right to interfere with the soil of the road, as by erecting a building upon it. In such a case the zamindar has, in common with the public, the right to use the road as a road; over and above it, he has a right to the soil in the road, which he had never given to the public. In an action of this kind the zamindar does not sue as a guardian of the public, but in respect of an interference with his own rights of property. *Baroda Prasad Mustafee v. Gorachand Mustafee*, 3 B. L. R. A. C. 295 : 12 W. R. 160, discussed. *Dovaston v. Payne*, 2 Smith's L. C. 9th Ed. 154; *R. v. Pratt*, 4 E. & B. 860; *Rolls v. Vestry of St. George the Martyr, Southwark*, 14 Ch. D. 785; and *Goodson v. Richardson*, L. R. 9 Ch. D. 221, referred to. *TOTA v. SARDUL SINGH*

I. L. R. 10 All. 533

12. ——— Suit to remove obstruction in a public pathway—*Special injury—Cause of action—Jurisdiction of Civil Court.* In a suit for the removal of an obstruction in a public pathway, it was found by the Courts below that the plaintiffs were deprived of the only means of grazing their cattle by the obstruction, and that they lost some cows thereby. It was contended, on be-

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half of the defendant on second appeal, that such damage would not entitle the plaintiffs to maintain a suit in the Civil Court. *Held*, that the injury caused to the plaintiffs, by the obstruction of the way leading from the village where they resided to that in which they had their fields and pastures, was peculiar to them and to their calling, and it caused them substantial loss of time and inconvenience; and that it was sufficient to entitle the plaintiffs to maintain the action. *Held*, also, that the death of the cows was too remotely and indirectly connected with the obstruction to furnish a cause of action. *Winterbottom v. Lord Derby*, L. R. 2 Exch. 316; *Ricket v. Metropolitan Railway Co.*, L. R. 2 H. L. 175; *Cook & Co. v. Mayor and Corporation of Bath*, L. R. 6 Eq. 177; *Baroda Prasad Mostafi v. Gora Chand Mostafi*, 3 B. L. R. A. C. 295 : 12 W. R. 160; *Gehanaji v. Ganpati*, I. L. R. 2 Bom. 469; *Raj Koomar Singh v. Sahebzada Roy*, I. L. R. 3 Calc. 20; *Blagrove v. Bristol Water Works Co.*, 1 H. & N. 369; and *Rose v. Miles*, 4 M. & S. 101, referred to. *ABZUL MIAH v. NASIR MAHOMMED* . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 551

13. ——— *Public way, obstruction of—Damage peculiar to plaintiff—Special damage.* An action for obstructing a public way is not maintainable if no damage peculiar to the plaintiff is proved. Mere inconvenience, or a remote danger, will not make such an action maintainable. *Winterbottom v. Lord Derby*, L. R. 2 Ex. 316, followed. *MAHOMED ALAM v. DILBAR KHAN* (1900) . . . . . 5 C. W. N. 285

## 53. OFFICE OR EMOLUMENT.

1. ——— Suit to recover right to officiate at funeral ceremonies—*Transfer of right to officiate.* A Birth Moha Brahminy, or right to officiate at funeral ceremonies, is incapable of transfer, and therefore a suit to recover it will not lie. *JHUMMUN PANDEY v. DINONATH PANDEY*

16 W. R. 171

2. ——— Right to officiate at a marriage—*Yajman, liability of—Cause of action for fees—Invasion of privileges.* A village joshi, who is entitled by hereditary right to perform religious ceremonies at his yajman's house, can recover his fees if the ceremonies are performed, no matter by whom they may be performed. *WAMAN JAGANNATH JOSHI v. BALAJI KUSAJI PATHI*

I. L. R. 14 Bom. 167

3. ——— Action for interfering with right of performing ceremonies—*Right of yajmans to select purohit.* An action is not maintainable by a purohit against another purohit for interfering with an alleged exclusive right of performing religious ceremonies at a particular place, there being no legal obligation upon the yajmans to abstain from employing another. *DAMOODUR MISSEER v. ROODURMAR MISSEER* . Marsh. 161

S. C. ROODURMAN MISSEER v. DAMOODUR MISSEER  
1 Hay 365



RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*53. OFFICE OR EMOLUMENT—*contd.*

4. ——— Suit for right to perform pujari duties—*Right to proceeds of mundar.* An action will lie to obtain a binding declaration of a person's right to perform the duties of pujari and to receive the proceeds of a mundar. PRANSHANKAR v. PRANNATH MAHANAND . 1 Bom. 12

5. ——— Suit for an office to which no fixed fees are attached—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 11.* Under s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), a suit for an office will lie, even though the office be a religious one, to which no fixed fees are attached. HASHIM SAHEB VALAD AHMED SAHEB v. HUSEINSHA VALAD KARIMSHA FAKIR . . . . . I. L. R. 13 Bom. 429

6. ——— Hereditary right to an office—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 11—Declaratory decree—Jurisdiction—Emolument.* A suit for the establishment of a right to the hereditary title of musicians to a satra will lie under s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, notwithstanding that the right sought to be established is one which brings in no profit to those claiming it. MAMAT RAM BAYAN v. BABU RAM ATAI BURA BHAKAT . . . . . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 159

7. ——— Suit by vendee of office to compel trustees to admit him and give him the emoluments. The vendee of a karaima right cannot bring a suit to compel the trustees of a pagoda to admit him to the office and give him the emoluments. KEYAKE ILATA KOTEL KANNI alias GRANI v. YADATTIL VELLAYANGOT ACHUDA PISHARODI . . . . . 3 Mad. 380

8. ——— Suit to enforce agreement—*Agreement amongst Maha-Brahmans as to distribution of offerings—Cause of action.* Amongst the Maha-Brahmans of a particular village an agreement obtained that some of them should collect and receive offerings during certain months, that during those months the others should refrain from receiving any offerings, and that in certain other months the other Maha-Brahmans should collect and receive the offerings, and they should refrain from collecting offerings. *Held*, that this was a good agreement and sufficient to support an action for damages by the persons entitled to the offerings in a particular month as against the persons who had received those offerings contrary to agreement. OUCHI v. ULFAT . . . . . I. L. R. 20 All. 234

9. ——— Suit for damages for disturbance in religious office emoluments—*Right to perform religious worship—Damages for loss of honours and voluntary offerings.* Although it is not the duty of a Civil Court to pronounce on the truths of religious tenets nor to regulate religious ceremony, yet, in protecting persons in the enjoyment of a certain status or property, it may incidentally become the duty of the Civil Court to determine what are the accepted tenets of the followers of a creed, and what is the usage they have accepted as established for the regulation of their rights *inter se*. A claim to the exclusive right to

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perform certain portions of the religious worship in a Hindu temple, and to restrain a rival sect from joining in such worship otherwise than as ordinary worshippers, can be enforced by the decree of a Civil Court. A claim to damages for the loss of honours and voluntary offerings which would have been made by worshippers at a temple to the holders of a religious office therein, had the latter not been disturbed by the defendants in the performance of the duties of such office, is not enforceable by law. KRISHNASAMI TATACHARYAR v. KRISHNAMA CHARYAR . . . . . I. L. R. 5 Mad. 313

10. ——— Suit to establish privilege of administering purohitam to pilgrims—*Alienability of such right.* A suit will lie for the exclusive right to the privilege of administering purohitam to pilgrims resorting to Ramaswaram. The privilege claimed was admitted to be capable of alienation or delegation, and was therefore no longer the subject of religious sentiment, but a mere proprietary right. On the merits the plaintiffs were held to have failed to support their claim. RAMASAWMY AIYAN v. VENKATA ACHARI . . . . . 2 W. R. P. C. 21: 9 Moo. I. A. 344

11. ——— Suit to establish right to receive fees from pilgrims resorting to shrine. The plaintiffs sued to establish his exclusive right to receive fees paid to the purohit by the pilgrims resorting to a temple and to recover a sum of money received by the defendants as fees. *Held*, that, in the absence of any contract between the parties or of any such proof of long and uninterrupted usage as in the absence of a documentary title would suffice to establish a prescriptive right, the plaintiff's suit must be dismissed. KRISHNA AIYAN v. ANANTARAMA AIYAN . . . . . 2 Mad. 330

12. ——— Suit for confirmation of possession of land on which places of worship are erected—*Alleged hostile intention.* In a suit for confirmation of possession of a hill, with the places of worship appertaining thereto and the idols set up thereon, the alleged cause of action being that defendant intended to lay claim to the offerings made and proposed to call in question plaintiff's possessory rights:—*Held*, that the plaintiff disclosed no cause of action whatever. POORUN CHAND GALEECHA v. PARESH NATH SINGH . . . . . 12 W. R. 82

13. ——— Suit for damages for disturbance of office of village priest—*Suit for fees not received.* A suit for damages may be brought by a person holding the office of village priest by prescription against an intruder who deprives him of the exercise and benefits of that office. VITHAL KRISHNA JOSHI v. ANANT RAM CHANDRA . . . . . 11 Bom.

14. ——— Suit for a declaration of plaintiff's right to officiate as priests and receive offerings—*Jurisdiction of Civil Court.* A suit will lie in a Civil Court for a declaration of



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the plaintiff's right to officiate, in alternate years, as priests in a temple and receive the offerings to the idol. *LIMBA BIN KRISHNA v. RAMA BIN PIMPLU* I. L. R. 13 Bom. 348

15. ——— Suit for pecuniary benefits from performance of religious services. A claim to certain pecuniary benefits and payments in kind, which a plaintiff alleges himself to be entitled to receive from the defendants in respect of the performance of certain religious services, is a claim which the Courts of justice are bound to entertain; and if, in order to determine the plaintiff's right to such benefits, it becomes necessary to determine incidentally the right to perform the services, the Courts must try and must decide that right. *KRISHNAMA v. KRISHNASAMI* I. L. R. 2 Mad. 62

S.C. *TIRU KRISHNAMACHARIAR v. KRISHNA SAWMI TATA CHARIAR* . . . L. R. 6 I. A. 120

See also *KAMALAM v. SADAGOPA SAMI*

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 356

and *CHINNA UMMAYI v. TAGARAI CHETTI*

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 168

16. ——— Suit to establish right to offerings—*Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), s. 11, expl. III.* A suit claiming a right to the regular offerings made out of the funds of a temple which are of a substantial value as emoluments is a suit of a civil nature within the meaning of the explanation to s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *Krishnama v. Krishnasami*, I. L. R. 2 Mad. 62, referred to. *Narayan Vithle Parab v. Krishnaji Sadashiv*, I. L. R. 10 Bom. 233, distinguished. *KALI KANTA SURMA v. GOURI PROSAD SURMA* . I. L. R. 17 Calc. 906

17. ——— A suit for wasilat in respect of profits derived from a turn of worship, whether maintainable—*Anticipated profits of turn of worship.* A suit for wasilat in respect of profits derived from a turn of worship, which are in their nature uncertain and voluntary, is not maintainable. *Ramessur Mookerjee v. Ishan Chunder Mookerjee*, 10 W. R. 457, followed. *KASHI CHANDRA CHUCKERBUTTY v. KAILASH CHUNDRABANDOPADHYA* . . . I. L. R. 26 Calc. 356  
3 C. W. N. 279

18. ——— Suit for declaration and enforcement of a hereditary right to officiate as priest—*Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882), s. 11—Mesne profits—Suit to have a share in the offerings made to a deity by one member of a family against another, based upon an implied arrangement amongst them.* A suit by one member of a family against another, for the declaration and enforcement of a hereditary right to officiate as priest at the worship performed by votaries at the foot of a certain tree, and so to have a share in the offerings made to the deity, is maintainable. *Kali Kanta Surma v. Gouri Prasad Surma*, I. L. R. 17 Calc. 906, followed. *Jawahir Misser v.*

RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*53. OFFICE OR EMOLUMENT—*contd.*

*Bhaggu Misser*, S. D. A. (1857) Vol. I, 362, and *Kashi Chundra Chuckerbutty v. Kailash Chundra Bandopadhyia*, I. L. R. 26 Calc. 356, distinguished. *DINO NATH CHUCKERBUTTY v. PRATAP CHANDRA GOSWAMI* . . . I. L. R. 27 Calc. 30  
4 C W. N. 79

19. ——— Suit for damages for intrusion on office of chalcvadi—*Suit to recover gratuities received by intruder in office—Caste question—Bom. Reg. II of 1827, s. 21—Suit to establish right to office.* Plaintiff was the hereditary holder of the office of chalcvadi, or bearer, on public occasions, of the insignia, or symbols of the Lingyet caste at Bagalcot, in the district of Belgaum. No fees as of right were appurtenant to that office, but voluntary gratuities might be given to the chalcvadi. In an action brought by plaintiff against defendant as an intruder upon his (plaintiff's) office:—*Held*, that the action would not lie, if brought merely for the gratuities as moneys alleged to be received by defendant to the use of plaintiff. *SHANKARA BIN MARABASAPA v. HANMA BIN BHIMA* . . . I. L. R. 2 Bom. 470

20. ——— Suit for loss of fees received by Kazi of Bombay—*Intruder on office.* The sums received by the Kazi of Bombay in respect of his office of Kazi are not mere gratuities, but are fixed and certain payments annexed to the discharge of official duties, and are therefore sums in respect of the privation whereof by a wrongful intruder an action either for money had and received or for disturbance in the office will lie. *MR. HAMMAD YUSSUB v. AHMED* . . . 1 Bom. Ap. 18

*SITARAMBHAT v. SITARAM GANESH*

6 Bom. A. C. 250

21. ——— Suit for declaration of exclusive right to receive fees in office of chowdhry. In a suit for the establishment of the plaintiff's exclusive right to the office of chowdhry of boats, and for the maintenance of their possession of that office, with which the defendants interfered by obstructing the plaintiff in the collection of fees:—*Held*, that as the payments were voluntary and there was no obligation to pay them exclusively to the plaintiff, the suit could not be maintained. *RAM DEEHUL v. CHUKHOO*

1 N. W. 208: Ed. 1873, 291

22. ——— Suit by dismissed holder of land for service—*Hereditary village office—Title to emoluments.* Where an hereditary village officer, who had been dismissed from his office, sued to recover the land which had formed the emoluments of the office, and which had been enfranchised and granted to the person holding the office at the time of the enfranchisement:—*Held*, that the suit would not lie. *SRINIVASAYAR v. LAKSMAMMA* . . . I. L. R. 7 Mad. 206

*BADA v. HUSSU BHAI* . . . I. L. R. 7 Mad. 236

23. ——— Suit for land appertaining to hereditary office, but enfranchised—*Mad. Reg. VI of 1831—Mad. Act IV of 1866—Karman's*



RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*53. OFFICE OR EMOLUMENT—*contd.*

*inam land*—*Inam Commissioner's title-deed*—*Title to emoluments of office*. The lands forming the emoluments of an hereditary village office having been separated from the office by Government were enfranchised and granted by the Inam Commissioner to V, who had been appointed to, and at the date of enfranchisement held the office without possessing any hereditary claim thereto. In a suit by R, who claimed to be of the family of the hereditary office-holders, to recover the land from V:—*Held*, by the Full Bench (HUTCHINS, J., dissenting), that R could not recover. *VENCATA v. RAMA* . . . I. L. R. 8 Mad. 249

24. ——— Suit by the holder of the office to recover all the land—*Inam attached to the hereditary office of nattamgar*—*Enfranchisement of inam lands in favour of two persons*. Inam lands constituting the emolument of the office of nattamgar were enfranchised in favour of the plaintiff and defendant separately. In November 1890 the defendant was informed that a pottah for half of the lands would be issued in his name, and it was so issued in the following May. In April 1891 (after the resolution to enfranchise the lands was come to) the plaintiff was appointed to be the sole nattamgar, and he now sued in 1894 for the cancellation of enfranchisement pottah issued to the defendant and for the issue of a pottah in his own name in respect of the lands comprised therein and for possession of the lands. *Held*, that the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief sought. *SANKARA SUBBAYAR v. RAMASAMI AYYANGAR* . . . I. L. R. 20 Mad 454

25. ——— Karnam, hereditary office of—*Enfranchisement of endowment*—*Devolution of land enfranchised*. The holder of an hereditary office of karnam had two undivided sons, in favour of one of whom he resigned his office. Subsequently a revision of the village establishment took place, the new karnam was removed from the office, and the lands which constituted its endowment having been enfranchised by the Inam Commissioner, a title-deed in respect of them was issued to him. After his death without issue, his nephews sued to establish their right to the land. *Held*, that the land passed to the grantee personally, and not to his family, and consequently devolved on his death as private property. The plaintiffs therefore had no right of suit as regarded the property. *Vencata v. Rama*, I. L. R. 8 Mad. 249, followed. *VENKATARAYADU v. VENKATARAMAYYA* . . . I. L. R. 15 Mad. 284

26. ——— Lands constituting emoluments of karnam's office—*Enfranchisement of the inam in favour of a widow*. Lands constituting the emoluments of the office of karnam were enfranchised in favour of a widow who had been in possession since the death of her husband, which took place about eighteen years previously. They were subsequently sold by her. *Held*, that the vendee's title was good against the reversionary heir of the husband, and the plaintiff had therefore

RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*53. OFFICE OR EMOLUMENT—*contd.*

no right to suit to recover them. *DHARANIPRA-GADA DURGAMMA v. KADAMBARI VIRRAZU*

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 47

See *SUBBARAYA MUDALI v. KAMU CHETTI*

I. L. R. 23 Mad. 47

27. ——— *Inam Commissioner's grant*—*Hereditary office-holder*—*Enfranchisement*. A grant of a portion of inam lands by Government on enfranchisement is not illegal because the grantee, though a member of the family of hereditary office-holders, was not himself actually in office at the time of enfranchisement. Such a grant cannot be set aside in a civil suit. *TARIYA GOWDU v. VONAMO GOWDU*

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 204

28. ——— Office of karnam in a zamindari village, succession to—*Mad. Reg. XXXIX of 1802, s. 7*—*Female claimant*—*Incapacity of next heir*. The karnam of a zamindari village having died, leaving a widow his heir, the zamindar appointed her to the office of karnam. The nearest male sapinda of the deceased karnam (from whom he was divided) sued to establish his right to the office of karnam. *Held*, (i) that a woman cannot hold the office of karnam. *Held*, further, (ii) that, when the immediate heir is incapacitated, the nearest male sapinda of the deceased karnam is entitled to succeed to the office; he was therefore the proper person to maintain the suit. *CHANDRAMMA v. VENKATRAJU*

I. L. R. 10 Mad. 226

29. ——— Civil Court's jurisdiction over suit in respect of an injury caused by exclusion from an hereditary office—*Bombay Hereditary Offices Act (III of 1874), s. 40*—*Election of an officiator*—*Free election*—*Agreement in restraint of free election*—*Bom. Act X of 1876, s. 4*—*Its application to suits between private persons*. The plaintiff and his co-sharers in a kul-karni vatan entered into an agreement in 1869 for the performance of the duties of the vatan by the several sharers in turn. The agreement provided that, if sharers prevented the nomination of a sharer to officiate in his turn, he should pay R100 as damages to the person thus excluded from office. The plaintiff alleged that in 1883 it was in turn to officiate, that the defendants, instead of electing him in accordance with the agreement nominated another person, who was confirmed in the appointment by the Collector. The plaintiff therefore sued the defendants to recover R100 as damages for breach of the agreement of 1869. *Held*, that the agreement could not be enforced by a civil suit, and it was opposed to the policy of s. 40 of Bombay Act III of 1874, which contemplates a free election of an officiator by the whole body of registered representative vatandars to whom the Collector issues his notice—an election unfettered by any promises made beforehand by any of the sharers. *Held*, also, that a suit in respect of any injury caused by exclusion from office or service is barred by the second paragraph of cl. (a) of s. 4 of Act X of 1876.



**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****53. OFFICE OR EMOLUMENT—concl'd.**

Having regard to the wording of the several clauses of s. 4, the bar therein provided is not limited to suits against Government. **NARO PANDURANG v. MAHADEV PURSHOTAM . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 614**

**54. OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE.**

**Suit for unauthorized payment made by assignee—Insolvency Act (II of 12 Vict., c. 21), ss. 28 and 29—Fraud.** The account of an estate, formerly in the hands of a derivative executor who became insolvent and died in 1856, having been pending in Court for many years some of the parties being interested in the original estate and others as the insolvent's creditors, a compromise was effected, under which a suit, brought in 1858 by the Official Assignee representing the deceased insolvent, was dismissed by the consent of parties in 1875. Part of a sum of money, paid to the credit of the insolvent's estate in pursuance of the compromise, was made over, upon the passing of the consent-decree, with the knowledge of the assignee, but without notice to or the sanction of the Court to a person who had assisted in taking the account. From the representatives of the latter, he being now deceased, the successor in office of the assignee claimed repayment. In regard to the facts that he was neither a party to, nor had any control over, the compromised suit; that he owed no duty to the Court in respect of it nor to the creditors of the estate; and that he had taken no unfair advantage of the assignee:—*Held*, that there was no grounds upon which this repayment could be claimed. **ABDOOL HOSSEIN ZENAIL ABADI v. TURNER . . . I. L. R. 11 Bom. 620**  
**L. R. 14 I. A. 111**

**55. ORDERS, SUITS TO SET ASIDE.**

**1. ——— Order in contested application—Improper procedure.** A has no right of suit against B to set aside an order of Court on an application in a suit, which application has been contested between them and decided in favour of B. Such a mode of procedure for the purpose of getting an order of Court reversed is not allowed by law. **NORROTOM SIKDAR v. JUGGERNATH SHAW Bourke O. C. 371**

**SHIBESHUREE DEBIA v. MOTHORANATH ACHARJEE . . . 5 W. R. 202**

**2. ——— Order under s. 63, Beng. Act VIII of 1869—Order releasing property from attachment.** A suit will lie to set aside an order passed under s. 63 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, releasing property from attachment. **WOOMA CHURN CHATTERJEE v. KADUMBINI DABEE 3 C. L. R. 146**

**3. ——— Order refusing to entertain objection—Resumption by Government—Objection by party whose lands have been wrongly resumed.** The property of the plaintiff having been included

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****55. ORDERS, SUITS TO SET ASIDE—contd.**

among the lands to which certain resumption proceedings between the Government and a third party related, the plaintiff preferred an objection, which was disallowed by the Collector. The Special Commissioner on appeal declined, for want of jurisdiction, to entertain the objection. *Held*, that the order of the Special Commissioner could not constitute any cause of action either against the Government or a third party. **SHIBOO SOONDUREE DEBEA v. SECRETARY OF STATE 7 W. R. 373**

**4. ——— Order setting aside sale—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 256, 257.** A suit will lie to contest an order setting aside a sale not warranted by the provisions of ss. 256 and 257 of Act VIII of 1859, where the legal rights of the person bringing the suit have been injuriously affected by such order. **AMRIT MISSER v. GURDA PARDAN . . . 7 N. W. 183**

**5. ——— Order passed in execution of decree of Small Cause Court—Order as to liability to attachment.** An order passed in execution of a decree of a Small Cause Court with respect to the liability of property to attachment and sale is not final, but may be questioned in a regular suit in the same manner as a like order might be questioned when passed in execution of a decree of an ordinary Civil Court. **RAMESHUR KULWAR v. BEHAREE SETH 3 N. W. 208; Agra F. B. Ed. 1874, 254**

**6. ——— Order of Court setting aside a will and vesting minor's property in manager—Suit to direct widow to make adoption—Order made with jurisdiction.** There exists no right of suit to set aside an order of the Court which has jurisdiction deciding that a will is not sufficiently proved, and vesting the management of a minor's widow's property in her guardian. No suit can be maintained for an order directing such widow to make an adoption. The Court declined to make a declaratory decree declaring such direction to be a valid direction. **PEAREE DAYEE v. HURBENSEE KOOER . . . 19 W. R. 127**

**7. ——— Order granting certificate under Act XXVII of 1860—Suit to annul certificate—Procedure.** A suit does not lie to annul a certificate for the collection of debts granted under Act XXVII of 1860, the mode of proceeding provided by the Act being the only remedy. **PAYAYINDA AVIDATHA PERINGADI IBRAYI v. PUDIYA MADATHUMAL PERINGADI AMANATHA 5 Mad. 283**

**RUGHOOBUR DYAL SINGH v. RAM NARAIN KOLYA 22 W. R. 312**

**8. ——— Order determining title to money deposited in Court—Civil Procedure Code, ss. 272, 278, 283.** A suit will lie to set aside an order such as is contemplated by the proviso to s. 272 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that is, an order determining any question of title or priority as between the decree-holder and any other person in respect of money in deposit in a



**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.**

55. ORDERS, SUITS TO SET ASIDE—*concl'd*.  
Court of Justice. The mode of investigation and the nature of the order to be made under s. 272, and the extent to which such an order is final are provided for in ss. 278-283 of the Code of Civil Procedure. **TIKUM SINGH v. SHEO RAM SINGH**  
I. L. R. 19 Calc. 286

9. ——— Suit to set aside order of Criminal Court—*Suit to set aside order of Magistrate under Act XXI of 1841*. The proper course for a party dissatisfied with the order of a Magistrate, passed with jurisdiction under Act XXI of 1841, to pursue was to appeal against that order, and not to bring a civil suit for its reversal. **OMoola KOOWUR v. GOHUN PATUCK**  
1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 36

S.C. OMoola KOOWUR v. SOHUN PATUCK.  
1 Hay 29

S.C. SOHUN PATUCK v. OMoola KOOWUR  
Marsh. 7

KEDARNATH MOOKERJEE v. PARBUTTY PEISHKAR . . . . . 2 W. R. 267

FRANKISHEN SURMA v. RAMROODER SURMA.  
Marsh. 214

S.C. RAMROODER SURMA v. FRANKISHEN SURMA  
2 Hay 86

RAMKISHORE BHUTTACHARJEE v. BISESHUR BHUTTACHARJEE . . . . . Marsh. 231

S.C. BISESHUR BHUTTACHARJEE v. RAMKISHORE BHUTTACHARJEE . . . . . 1 Hay 559

**56. POSSESSION, SUIT FOR.**

1. ——— Purchaser from rightful owner, suit by—*Right of suit—Trespasser in possession—Sale deed voidable and not void—Effect—False recital as to consideration—Transfer by person out of possession—Validity—Champerty—Gambling in litigation—Adoption—Proof*. It is not enough for a trespasser, who seeks to maintain possession against a purchaser from the rightful owner, to make out that the sale-deed in favour of the purchaser is voidable at the option of the vendor. He must show that it is absolutely void. A sale-deed cannot be challenged by a person, who was no party to it, when apart from an untrue recital as to consideration there was no other flaw in the transaction. The sale-deed in this case had been passed in favour of the plaintiff by the rightful owner, who was out of possession, needy and unable to prosecute his claim against the trespasser without assistance. The Judicial Committee held that there was nothing extortionate or unreasonable in the terms of the bargain in this case, no gambling in litigation, nothing contrary to public policy, and that the transaction was a present transfer by the owner to the plaintiff giving the latter a good title, on which he was competent to sue. **ACHAL RAM v. KAZIM HUSAIN KHAN** (1905)  
I. L. R. 27 All 271  
s.c. 9 C. W. N. 477  
L. R. 32 I. A. 113

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****56. POSSESSION, SUIT FOR—contd.**

2. ——— Suit for possession or dispossession after obtaining peaceable possession without execution of decree. If a party in whose favour a decree for possession has been passed peaceably obtains possession without the aid of the Court, and is subsequently dispossessed, he can maintain an action against the persons who have dispossessed him, although he has not taken out execution of the decree. **RAM NEWAZ SINGH v. KISHUN RAI** . . . 6 N. W. 137

See **GOPAL DAS v. THAN SINGH**.

I. L. R. 4 All. 184

3. ——— Suit for possession of land taken away in execution of decree in boundary suit. A party has no right to bring a civil suit to get possession of land which has been taken from him and awarded to his adversary in the execution of a decree in a boundary suit. **WATSON v. BEJOY GOBIND BURAL. SHAMASOONDERY DEBEA v. BEJOY GOBIND BURAL** . . . W. R. 1864, 331

4. ——— Suit for possession after dispossession under decree obtained by mortgagees—*Cause of action*. In the year 1839 the defendant's ancestor had mortgaged a share in a mouzah to the ancestor of the plaintiffs. The mortgagee sued to foreclose the mortgage and obtained a decree, in execution of which he obtained possession of the share. After this, some prior mortgagees obtained a decree in the Sudder Court in 1847, to the effect that the disputed property should be taken away from the plaintiff's ancestor and given to the prior mortgagees till their lien was satisfied, when he should obtain possession as before. The lien of the prior mortgagees was satisfied in 1870, when the defendants obtained possession. The plaintiffs sued to recover possession. *Held*, that no right of action accrued to the plaintiffs by reason of the satisfaction of the decree of the prior mortgagees and the recovery of the possession of the estate by the defendants. **SHIMHOO v. NARAIN SINGH** . . . . . 5 N. W. 153

5. ——— Suit for separate possession of share of estate. A suit will lie for the separate possession of a share of an estate in proportion to the plaintiff's share. **GOLOKE CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY v. KALLEE KINKUR CHUCKERBUTTY** . . . . . 1 W. R. 164

6. ——— Suit by holder under durputnidar for share of estate. A patni estate was the inheritance of five brothers, two of whom appropriated the whole of it. *Held*, that the holder under a kaimi pottah from a dar-patnidar of the three ousted brothers could sue to obtain possession of his share of the estate. **TARA SOONDERY DEBIA v. SHAMA SOONDERY DEBIA** . . . 4 W. R. 58

7. ——— Suit by minor for his share of undivided property. A suit cannot be brought on behalf of a Hindu minor to secure his share in undivided family property, unless there is evidence of such malversation as will endanger the minor's interests if his share be not separately



**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****56. POSSESSION, SUIT FOR—contd.**

secured. *CHOKKALINGAM PILLAI v. SVAMIYAR PILLAI*. *SVAMIYAR PILLAI v. CHOKKALINGAM PILLAI*  
1 Mad. 105

8. ——— Suit by minor for partition—*Prejudice of interests of minor*. A suit on behalf of a minor for partition will lie, if the interests of the minor are likely to be prejudiced by the property being left in the hands of the co-parceners from whom it is sought to recover it. *KAMAKSHI AMMAL v. CHIDAMBARA REDDI* . . . 3 Mad. 94

*ALIMELAMMAH v. ARUNACHELLAM PILLAI*.  
3 Mad. 69

9. ——— Suit by tenant having right to possession, but not right of occupancy—*Act X of 1859, s. 6, and s. 23, cl. 6*. If a tenant has a right to the possession, he may sue under cl. 6, s. 23, Act X of 1859, although he may not have a right of occupancy under s. 6 of the Act. *WATSON & Co. v. DWARKANATH SIRCAR*  
Marsh. 415 : 2 Hay 533

*DHAJAH ROY v. SUKHAWUT HOSSEIN*.  
Marsh. 492

*S.C. SUKHAWUT HOSSEIN v. DHAJAH ROY*.  
2 Hay 597

10. ——— Suit for possession by un-registered purchaser after ejectment—*Beng. Act VIII of 1869, ss. 26, 64—Effect of sale of tenure by shareholder in zamindari—Onus of proof*. *K*, the recorded tenant of a mirasi mokurrari tenure, died leaving *G*, his son and heir, who sold the tenure which eventually came into the hands of the plaintiff's father, and afterwards on his death became vested in the plaintiffs, but neither they nor their father, though they made attempts to do so, ever obtained the registration of their names as tenants. *R*, one of the two shareholders in the zamindari, brought a suit for arrears of rent of the tenure against *G*, and in execution of the decree he obtained in that suit the tenure was sold and purchased by the other zamindar, by whom the plaintiffs were dispossessed. *Held*, that the plaintiffs were not precluded by the fact that their names were not registered as tenants, under s. 26 of the Rent Act, from bringing a suit to recover possession of the tenure. The holder of the decree, in execution of which the tenure was sold, assuming him to be only a shareholder in the zamindari right, had no right under s. 64 to sell the tenure, but only the interest of the person against whom the decree was passed. The onus was on the defendant to show that the sale under the decree for rent was of such a nature as to give him priority over the plaintiffs. *KRISTO CHUNDER GHOSE v. RAJ KRISTO BANDYOPADHYA* . . . I. L. R. 12 Calc. 24

11. ——— Suit for possession by purchaser at sale in execution of decree—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 11, 318—Concurrent remedies*. A purchaser at a sale in execution not having applied to the Court for possession under s. 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****56. POSSESSION, SUIT FOR—concl.**

brought a regular suit to obtain possession of the property purchased. *Held*, that, although a remedy might be open to the plaintiff under s. 318, still he was not precluded from bringing a regular suit, the remedies being concurrent. *KISHORI MOHUN ROY CHOWDHRY v. CHUNDER NATH PAL*  
I. L. R. 14 Calc. 644

12. ——— Symbolical possession obtained in execution of former decree—*Fresh suit against the same defendants to obtain actual possession*. A plaintiff who has obtained only symbolical possession in execution of a former decree is entitled to maintain a fresh suit against the same defendant to obtain real possession. *SHANKAR BISTO NADGIR v. NARSINGRAY RAMCHANDRA JAHAGIRDAR*  
I. L. R. 22 Bom. 667

13. ——— Co-defendants—*Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 27—Specific performance, suit for—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 13, 43—Relinquishment—Res judicata—Parties*. Plaintiff had obtained a decree for specific performance of a contract of sale against defendants Nos. 3 to 7, and subsequently brought the present suit for possession against them and the principal defendants, in whose favour the former had executed a conveyance, and who, although made parties in the former suit, were at the request of the plaintiff, subsequently removed from the category of defendants. *Held*, that the claim against both the sets of defendants did not arise out of the same cause of action, and that the present suit was not barred by ss. 13 and 43 of the Civil Procedure Code. *Held*, also, that it was not necessary, under s. 27 of the Specific Relief Act, to bring the previous suit against both the sets of defendants. *ABDUL MAJID v. BODA NATH DHUR* (1901) . . . 6 C. W. N. 314

**57. PRE-EMPTION.**

——— *Compromise of suit for pre-emption, by means of which property is transferred—Suit for pre-emption, based on decree in such suit*. *Held*, that no suit for pre-emption will lie, the basis of which is a decree for pre-emption in another suit. *ABDUR RAZZAQ v. MUMTAZ HUSAIN* (1903) . . . I. L. R. 25 All. 334

**58. PRIVACY, INVASION OF.**

——— *Easement—Suit for injunction—Jurisdiction of Civil Court*. The invasion of privacy by opening windows is not a wrong for which an action will lie. *Komathi v. Gurunada Pillai*, 3 Mad. 141, followed. *AZUF v. AMEERUBI*  
I. L. R. 18 Mad. 163

**59. PROPERTY AT DISPOSAL OF GOVERNMENT.**

——— Property found by police, and, no claim being proved, placed at disposal of Government by order of Magistrate under Criminal Procedure Code,



RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*59. PROPERTY AT DISPOSAL OF GOVERNMENT—*concl'd.*

1882, s. 524. *Quære*: Whether a suit lies to recover property placed at the disposal of Government by an order of a Criminal Court under s. 524 of the Criminal Procedure Code. *In re Gholam Abid, Prinsep's Criminal Procedure Code, 7th Ed., under s. 59; Government of Bengal v. Surwar Jan, 18 W. R. Cr. 33; Bukkoore Singh v. Government, 8 W. R. 207; and Queen-Empress v. Tirbhovan Manekchand, I. L. R. 9 Bom. 131, referred to. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA v. VAKHATSANG-JI MEGHRAJJI . . . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 668*

## 60. PUBLIC OR PRIVATE RIGHTS.

1. ———— Right to graze cattle—*Civil Procedure Code, ss. 31, 53—Public right—Amendment of plaint.* A suit for an injunction to restrain interference with his right to graze cattle on the bed of a certain tank. The other raiyats of the village in whom the same right vested were originally joined as plaintiffs, but the plaint was amended under s. 53 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and their names were struck off the record. A proved no special damage. *Held*, that the fact that the other raiyats of the village had similar rights did not make A's right a public right in the sense that no action could be brought upon it unless special damage was proved. *VENKATACHALA v. KUPPUSAMI . . . I. L. R. 11 Mad. 42*

2. ———— Mutwalis, rights of—*Waqf property, claim to—Suits relating to public rights—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 539.* A suit between two private parties claiming certain rights as *mutwalis* over *waqf* property is not of such a public nature as to come within the purview of s. 539 of the Civil Procedure Code, which contemplates that there must be some dispute in existence between the parties of such a public nature that the intervention of the Advocate-General is necessary to decide if and by whom a suit should be brought to establish a public right. *Sajedur Raja Chowdhuri v. Gour Mohun Dass Baishnav, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 418, referred to. MANIJAN BIBEE v. KHADAM HOSSEIN (1905) I. L. R. 32 Calc. 273*

## 61. PUBLIC WORSHIP, SUITS REGARDING RIGHT OF.

1. ———— Suit to remove place of worship—*Right to erect place of worship. Right of way—Allegation of injury.* In India the members of a sect are at liberty to erect a place of worship on their own property, although it is more or less contiguous to a place already occupied by a place of worship appertaining to another sect. The people of any sect are at liberty to erect, on their own property, places of worship, either public or private, and to perform worship, provided that, in the performance of their worship, they do not cause material annoyance to their neighbours. *SESHAYANGAR v. SESHAYANGAR . I. L. R. 2 Mad. 143*

RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*61. PUBLIC WORSHIP, SUITS REGARDING RIGHT OF—*concl'd.*

MADARY v. GOBERDUN HULWAI

I. L. R. 7 Calc. 694 : 9 C. L. R. 303

PARTHASARADI AYYANGAR v. CHINNA KRISHNA AYYANGAR . . . I. L. R. 5 Mad. 304

2. ———— Suit founded on sanctity of place of public worship—*Suit to restrain procession in public streets.* No sect is entitled to deprive others for ever of the right to use the public streets for processions on the plea of the sanctity of their place of worship or on the plea that worship is carried on therein day and night. *SUNDRAM CHETTI v. QUEEN. PONNUSAMI CHETTI v. QUEEN . . . I. L. R. 6 Mad. 203*

3. ———— Suit to restrain superintendent of mosque from using it for other purposes or obstructing worshippers—*Suit by worshipper.* The worshippers at a public mosque can maintain a suit to restrain the superintendents of such mosque from using it or its appurtenant rooms for purposes other than those for which they were intended to be used, and from doing acts which are likely to obstruct worshippers in entering or leaving such mosque. *ABDUL RAHMAN v. YAR MUHAMMAD . I. L. R. 3 All. 636*

## 62. REGISTRATION OF NAME.

1. ———— Suit as proprietor of estate to compel entry in Collector's book—*Right to share in land.* A person claiming a share in land by right of heirship has no right of suit against a Collector to obtain entry of his name in the revenue books: the proper form of suit is against the co-heirs for a declaration of his right to a share, and an award of such share. *FATMA KOM NUBI SAHEB v. DARYA SAHEB . . . 10 Bom. 187*

2. ———— Suit to compel registration of name—*Suit of vague and speculative nature.* A suit by a plaintiff, who alleges that he is in possession of property, praying that the Court will cause the registry to be altered into his name without stating that the proper authorities had refused to make the entry, and without joining as defendants the only person who had power to do so, was *held* to be not maintainable. *IBRAI BYARI v. KAUNDINYA . . . 2 Mad. 363*

3. ———— Suit to compel registration of name as proprietor—*Collector in Chota Nagpore—Beng. Regs. I of 1793, s. 9, and XIII of 1833.* A Collector in Chota Nagpore cannot be compelled by suit to register the name of any one as proprietor of an estate. *LALLA BISSEN PERSHAD v. COLLECTOR OF HAZAREEBAGH . 13 W. R. 397*

4. ———— Suit to compel registration of another person's name—*Lessee holding as agent of others.* A Collector may register as farmer a person to whom a farming lease has been given, notwithstanding he holds it in reality as the agent of another, and a third person has no right to sue



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to compel the registration of such other person.  
**COLLECTOR OF MIDNAPORE v. RAMDHONE DUTT**  
 Marsh. 65 : 1 Hay 133

5. ———— **Right of suit by a se-patnidar against a dar-patnidar for registration of name.** A se-patnidar is not entitled to sue a dar-patnidar to compel him to register his name in his sherista as the transferee of a se-patni tenure, but it is open to him to sue for a declaration of his right as a tenant of the dar-patnidar. **MOTILAL SINGH v. OMAR ALI** . . . . . **3 C. W. N. 19**

**63. RESUMPTION, SUIT FOR UNLAWFUL.**

——— **Suit for damage for unlawful resumption by Government.**—Government may be sued by any person injured by its acts of unlawful resumption. **RAMNARAIN MOOKERJEE v. MAHTAB CHUNDER** . . . **1 Ind. Jur. O. S. 48**

**64. REVENUE, SALE FOR ARREARS OF.**

1. ———— **Suit for property attached by revenue authorities—Act XXXII of 1860**—*Effect on suit of failure to deposit the revenue or give security.* When a third party objected to the auction sale of certain immoveable property which had been attached by the revenue authorities, it was held that his right to bring an action to prove that the property was his was not barred by s. 184, Act XXXII of 1860, because he had omitted to deposit the money demanded by Government or to file security. **SHEO PERSHAD SINGH v. GOPAL LALL** . . . . . **14 W. R. 276**

2. ———— **Payment of Government revenue by mortgagees in possession to save the property—Payment of mortgage-money into Court by mortgagors and relinquishment of possession by mortgagees, subsequent suit by mortgagees to recover the—Government revenue paid by them by sale of the mortgaged property—Transfer of Property Act, (IV of 1882), s. 83.** The plaintiffs were mortgagees in possession of certain shares in a village under a mortgage, which, as to the principal amount advanced, was a simple mortgage: as to the interest a usufructuary mortgage. The mortgagees, to save the property from sale paid up certain arrears of Government revenue. Subsequently the defendant, who was the representative of the mortgagors under s. 83 of the Transfer of Property Act, paid the original sum due under the mortgage into Court. The mortgagees withdrew the money so paid in and deposited the mortgage-deed in Court. The mortgagees then, after relinquishing possession of the mortgaged property, sued to recover the money which they had paid as Government revenue by sale of the mortgaged property. *Held*, that, though the mortgagees might originally have treated the amount paid by them as Government revenue as part of the mortgage-

**RIGHT OF SUIT—contd.****64. REVENUE, SALE FOR ARREARS OF—concl'd.**

money, they did not by such payment obtain a lien independently of their position as mortgagees, and when once they had abandoned their lien on the mortgaged property by accepting the money paid into Court by their mortgagors and by relinquishing possession of the mortgaged property, they could not afterwards revive it, and their suit, which was for realization of the Government revenue paid by them by sale of the mortgaged property, must fail. *Semble*: A mortgagee who had given up his lien under circumstances similar to those above described, might bring a simple money suit to recover money paid by him to save the property from sale in execution of arrears of Government revenue. **KINU RAM DASS v. MOZOFFER HUSAIN SHAHA**, I. L. R. 14 Calc. 809; **LACHMAN SINGH v. SALIG RAM**, I. L. R. 8 All. 384; **ACHUT RAMCHANDRA PAI v. HARI KAMTI**, I. L. R. 11 Bom. 313; **GIRDHAR LAL v. BHOLA NATH**, I. L. R. 10 All. 611; **PARSOTAM DAS v. JAIJIT SINGH**, All. Weekly Notes, (1890), 90; **NIKKA MAL v. SULAIMAN SHAIKH GARDNER**, I. L. R. 2 All. 193; **KRISTO MOHINEE DASSEE v. KALIPROSONO GHOSE**, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 402; and **NUGENDER CHUNDER GHOSE v. KAMINEE DOSSEE**, 11 Moo. I. A. 241, referred to. **ANANDI RAM v. DUR NAJAF ALI BEGAM**  
**I. L. R. 13 All. 195**

3. ———— **Sale for arrears of revenue—N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873), ss. 185, 186—Disposal of surplus proceeds—Distribution amongst creditors of defaulters—Suit by one of such creditors against another—Cause of action.** An estate which had been mortgaged separately to two different mortgagees was sold for default in payment of Government revenue. By the sale a much larger sum than was sufficient to satisfy the arrears of revenue was realized. The Collector, instead of paying the surplus to the defaulter, mortgagor, paid therewith one of the mortgagees in full and the other in part. The mortgagee who had been paid in part only sued the other mortgagee for the balance due on his (the plaintiff's) mortgage, alleging that it was prior to that of the defendant and ought to have been paid off in full. *Held*, that the suit would not lie. The action of the Collector in contravention of the express provisions of s. 185 of Act XIX of 1873 gave the plaintiff no cause of action against the other mortgagee. **KUNJ BEHARI LAL v. PARSOTAM NARAIN** . . . . . **I. L. R. 21 All. 137**

**65. REVENUE, SUIT FOR ARREARS OF.**

——— **Suit for arrears of Government revenue—Act XIV of 1863, s. 1, cl. 1.** In a suit under cl. 1, s. 1, Act XIV of 1863, for the recovery of arrears of Government revenue, the plaintiff was a lambardar and paid the Government revenue and the defendants severally paid rent to him according to the rent roll, the net profits after the Government demand and other payments had been made, being divided among



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—concl'd.

them. *Held*, that the suit would not lie under that section. *MURKUN v. JUSRAM* . 4 N. W. 165

**66. ROAD AND OTHER CESSSES, SALE FOR ARREARS OF.**

1. ———— *Omission to appeal to Commissioner—Act XI of 1859, s. 33—Public Demands Recovery Act (Beng. Act VII of 1880), s. 2.* A suit to set aside a sale for arrears of road and public cesses will lie, although no previous appeal to the Commissioner has been made under s. 33 of Act XI of 1859. Such a sale is not one for arrears of revenue or other demands realizable in the same manner as arrears of revenue are realizable within the meaning of that section. *MOHIBUL HUQ v. SHEO SAHAY SINGH* I. L. R. 25 Calc. 85

2. ———— *Suit to set aside a sale for arrears of cesses on the ground that no notice was issued under s. 10 of the Act, whether maintainable in the Civil Court—Public Demands Recovery Act (Beng. Act VII of 1880), ss. 2, 8, and 10—Beng. Act VII of 1868, ss. 2 and 8.* A suit to set aside a sale held for arrears of cesses on the ground that no notice of the certificate under s. 10 of Bengal Act VII of 1880 was served upon the plaintiff is maintainable in the Civil Court. *Bajinath Sahai v. Ramguth Singh*, I. L. R. 23 Calc. 775, and *Saroda Charan v. Kista Mohan*, I C. W. N. 516, referred to. *CHUNDER KUMAR MUKERJEE v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA*

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 698 : 4 C. W. N. 586

**67. SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE.**

1. ———— *Suit to set aside sale—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 257—Suit by representative of judgment-debtor.* S. 257, Act VIII of 1859, did not bar the representative of a judgment debtor from bringing a regular suit to set aside an execution sale, except on the score of its having been irregularly conducted. *JUMMAL ALI v. TIRBHEE LALL DOSS* . . . . . 12 W. R. 41

2. ———— *Suit on ground of fraud—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 256.* S. 256 of Act VIII of 1859 did not bar a suit brought by a judgment-debtor to set aside an execution sale on the ground that the decree-holder fraudulently got the property sold in execution of a previous satisfied decree : it only applied to cases of irregularity in the sale proceedings. *BUDREE v. LOKEMUN* . . . . . 3 Agra 89

3. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 257.* An order cannot be said to have been made under s. 257, Code of Civil Procedure, so as to bar a suit to set aside a sale in execution of decree, when the judgment-debtor was not aware of the proceedings. *SREEMUNTO PURAMANICK v. OBHOY CHURN MANNA* . . . . . 11 W. R. 297

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4. ———— *Suit to set aside order confirming sale—Omission to claim property on its attachment.* The plaintiffs objected to the confirmation of the sale of certain property in execution of decree, on the ground that it was their property, and they were unaware that it was incumbered, otherwise they would have discharged the debt ; neither did they know the land had been attached, and was to be sold in execution. The sale was confirmed, and they sued to set aside the order confirming the sale. *Held*, that the suit would not lie. *HOSSEIN BEG v. JEEWA RAM*

5 N. W. 139

5. ———— *Right of purchaser under previous private sale—Notice of transfer—Landlord and tenant—Beng. Act VIII of 1869, s. 26.* The plaintiff purchased under a private conveyance from the registered tenant of a permanent transferable interest in land such as is described in s. 26 of Bengal Act VIII of 1869, but no notice of the transfer was given to the zamindar. The zamindar subsequently brought a suit against the tenant for arrears of rent and obtained a decree, in execution of which he caused the tenure to be sold, and himself became the purchaser. The plaintiff took proceedings under s. 311 of the Civil Procedure Code to set aside the sale, but his application was rejected, on the ground—an erroneous one—that he was not a proper party to take such proceedings and he did not appeal against the order rejecting it. *Held*, in a suit brought against the zamindar and the tenant to set aside the sale, that in the absence of fraud the suit was not maintainable. The plaintiff might have satisfied the rent decree and so prevented the sale, or he might have appealed against the order rejecting his application to set it aside ; but having done neither and the zamindar having had no notice of the transfer, the plaintiff was not entitled to treat the proceedings in the rent suit as a nullity on the ground that he was not a party to that suit. *PANYE CHUNDER SIRCAR v. HURCHUNDER CHOWDHRY*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 496

6. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 151—Sale for arrears of rent.* S. 151, Act X of 1859, barred a regular suit by a judgment-debtor to set aside a sale in execution of a decree for arrears of rent. *RUTTUN MONEE DASSEE v. KALEEKISSEN CHUCKERBUTTY* . . . . . W. R. F. B. 147

7. ———— *Act X of 1859, s. 151 and ss. 110, 111—Dismissal of objections.* A suit to set aside a sale in execution of a Civil Court's decree of a saleable under-tenure other than that from which the arrears of the rent were due was not barred by s. 151, Act X of 1859. The provisions of s. 110, Act X of 1859, were applicable in such a case ; and a party whose objection under s. 111 was overruled had a right to bring a suit in the Civil Court. *JUGGESSUR SUHAYE v. GOPAL LALL* . . . . . 11 W. R. 260

8. ———— *Non-registration of name—Suit by unregistered holder to set aside sale*



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*of under-tenure.* The holder of an under-tenure, though his name has not been registered as the owner, may bring a suit to set aside a sale of the under-tenure made in execution of a decree for rent against the former holder, on the ground that the money due under the decree had been deposited before the sale. *AFZAL ALI v. LALA GAURNARAYAN*  
**B. L. R. Sup. Vol. 519 : 6 W. R., Act X, 59**

9. ————— *Illegal sale by Collector.* A suit will lie to set aside the proceedings of a Collector who acts without jurisdiction in selling land not within his jurisdiction. *KHOONOO v. AOODAL SINGH*  
**8 W. R. 511**

*JOKEE LALL v. NURSING NARAIN SINGH*  
**4 W. R., Act X, 5**

10. ————— *Sale under Criminal Procedure Code, 1861, s. 185.* A suit was held not to lie to set aside a sale of property carried out under s. 185 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1861. *BUKHOOREE SINGH v. GOVERNMENT*  
**8 W. R. 207**

11. ————— *Suit to set aside sale for irregularity—Beng. Act VII of 1880—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 311, 312.* The words "in respect of sales in execution of decrees" in s. 19 of Bengal Act VII of 1880 do not include any proceedings instituted after the sale for setting it aside. Ss. 311 and 312, therefore, of the Civil Procedure Code do not apply to sales under a certificate. A suit therefore to set aside such a sale for irregularity is not barred by s. 312. *SADHUSARAN SINGH v. PANCHDEO LAL*  
**I. L. R. 14 Calc. 1**

*RAM LOGAN OJHA v. BHAWANI OJHA*  
**I. L. R. 14 Calc. 9**

12. ————— *Fraud—Sale under Act X of 1859—Civil Procedure Code, s. 244—Act XXIII of 1861, s. 11.* B obtained an *ex parte* decree for arrears of rent against S under Act X of 1859, and in execution of that decree brought the tenure to sale. At the sale the tenure was purchased by N. S then brought a suit against B and N to set aside the sale on the ground that the rent-decree and all execution proceedings taken thereunder were fraudulent, and alleging that B was the actual purchaser in the name of N. An objection was taken that the suit would not lie, and that the questions in the suit were such as could have been determined, and were determined, by the Court executing the decree. *Held*, that neither s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code nor the corresponding s. 11 of Act XXIII of 1861 has any application to proceedings in execution of a decree under Act X of 1859, and that the suit being one to set aside the sale on the ground of fraud, was maintainable. *Saroda Churn Chuckerbutty v. Mahomed Isuf Meah*, **I. L. R. 11 Calc., 376**, distinguished. *BRJO GOPAL SARKAR v. BUSIRUNNISSA BIBI*  
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*and MOTI LAL CHAKRABUTTY v. RUSSICK CHANDRA BAIRAGI*  
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13. ————— *Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), s. 99, Sale contrary to provisions of—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 244—Sale by mortgagee in execution of decree.* Property subject to a mortgage having been sold by the mortgagee as holder of a decree against the mortgagors, a separate suit was brought by the mortgagors to set aside the sale being in contravention of s. 99 of the Transfer of Property Act. On objection being taken that the suit was not maintainable, the matter being one for determination in execution proceedings under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure :—*Held* (i) that, although the sale was contrary to the provisions of s. 99 of the Transfer of Property Act, that section being for the benefit only of a particular class of persons, namely, those concerned with a right to redeem mortgaged property, such a sale was not void, but voidable ; (ii) that the question, being one arising between the parties to the suit wherein the sale was made and relating to execution, could not be raised and decided in a suit, but should not be raised and tried only in execution proceedings taken under s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the sale set aside if such relief were not, for any reason, barred ; (iii) that the sale having been confirmed, such confirmation was final, and precluded the mortgagors from seeking the relief to which they would otherwise have been entitled ; and (iv) that, notwithstanding such sale and confirmation, the mortgagors might not be precluded from suing to redeem the mortgaged property on payment of the amount given credit for by the mortgagee in respect of the sale. *MAYAN PATHUTI v. PAKURAN*  
**I. L. R. 22 Mad. 347**

14. ————— *Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 287—Sale in execution subject to mortgage—Suit to set aside sale for re-sale of property free from mortgage lien.* The plaintiff, having sold property in execution of a decree subject to a certain mortgage lien which had been duly investigated and allowed, brought this suit to have the sale set aside and praying for a re-sale of the property free from the mortgage lien. *Held*, that he was not entitled to the relief sought. His proper remedy was to have brought a suit for a declaration that the alleged mortgage was null and void, and to have stayed the sale till the determination of that suit. *PARSHOTAM MAUJI v. GANESH VINAYAK*  
**I. L. R. 23 Bom. 759**

15. ————— *Suit to recover property sold on grounds which might have been*

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*made grounds for appeal against the original decree—Acquiescence in execution proceedings.* When a party to a decree and subsequent proceedings in execution thereof has suffered execution to proceed and property to be sold without appealing, he cannot sue to recover the property so sold on ground which might have been taken in appeal, from the decree or from orders in execution. BENI PRASAD KUNWAR *v.* LUKHNA KUNWAR

I. L. R. 21 All. 323

16. ———— *Suit to confirm sale—Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 256, 257—Sale in execution of decree—Order setting aside sale—Suit to set aside such orders.* Certain immoveable property was put up for sale in the execution of *B's* decree, and was purchased by him. Subsequently on the same day, such property was put up for sale in the execution of *S's* decree, and was purchased by him. *B* objected to the confirmation of the sale to *S*, on the ground that *S's* decree had been satisfied previously to such sale, and the Court executing the decrees made an order setting aside such sale on that ground. *S* thereupon sued *B* to have such order set aside, and to have such sale confirmed, and to obtain possession of such property. *Held*, that, inasmuch as such order had not been made under s. 257 of Act VIII of 1859, but had been made at the instance of a purchaser under another decree, and *B's* decree as a matter of fact had not been satisfied, *S's* suit to have such order set aside was maintainable. SANGAM RAM *v.* SHEOBART BHAGAT . . . I. L. R. 3 All. 112

17. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 256, 257—Sale in execution of decree—Suit to set aside order setting aside sale.* The Court executing a decree having made an order setting aside a sale, under Act VIII of 1859, of immoveable property, in the execution of the decree, the purchaser at such sale sued the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor to have such order set aside and to have such sale confirmed in his favour. *Held*, (OLDFIELD, *J.*, dissenting), that the suit was maintainable, the provisions of s. 257 precluding an appeal from an order setting aside a sale, and not a suit to contest the validity of such an order; and that the order setting aside the sale in this case being *ultra vires*, the auction-purchaser was entitled to the relief he claimed. DIWAN SINGH *v.* BHARAT SINGH . . . I. L. R. 3 All. 206

18. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1877, ss. 311, 312—Suit to have execution sale, after being set aside, confirmed.* *Held* (OLDFIELD *J.*, dissenting), that a suit by the purchaser at a sale of immoveable property in execution of a decree, which has been set aside under ss. 311 and 312 of Act X of 1877, to have such sale confirmed on the ground that there was no irregularity in the publication or conduct thereof, is not barred by the last clause of s. 312 or by the last clause of s. 588, but is maintainable. AZIM-UD-DIN *v.* BALDEO

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19. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, 1859, ss. 256, 257—Sale in execution—Order of attachment and sale notifications not signed by Judge, but by Munsarim—Sale set aside—Equitable estoppel.* On the 21st August 1876 certain immoveable property belonging to *M* was put up for sale and was purchased by *R*. On the 20th April 1877 such sale was set aside under s. 256 of Act VIII of 1859 on the ground that the order attaching such property and the notifications of sale had not, as required by s. 222, been signed by the Court executing the decree, but by the Munsarim of the Court. On the 27th June 1877 *M* conveyed such property to *H*, who purchased it *bonâ fide* and for value, and satisfied the incumbrances existing thereon. On the 15th April 1878 *R* sued *H* and *M* to have the order setting aside such sale set aside, and to have such sale confirmed in his favour, on the ground that it had been improperly set aside under s. 256 of Act VIII of 1859, the judgment-debtor not having been prejudiced by the irregularities in respect whereof such sale had been set aside. *Held*, by OLDFIELD, *J.*, that although such sale might have been improperly set aside, yet, inasmuch as the order of attachment and the notifications of sale could have no legal effect, having been signed by the Munsarim of the Court executing the decree, and not by the Court, as required by s. 222 of Act VIII of 1859; and inasmuch as it would be inequitable, after the incumbrances of such property had been satisfied and the state of things changed to allow *R*, after standing by for a year, and permitting dealings with the property, to come in and take advantage of the change of circumstances, and obtain a property become much more valuable at the price he originally offered, *R* ought not to obtain the relief which he sought. *Held*, by STRAIGHT, *J.*, that the fact that the Court executing the decree had not signed the order of attachment and the notifications of sale vitiated the proceedings in execution *ab initio*, and rendered the sale which *R* desired to have confirmed void and *R's* suit therefore failed, and had properly been dismissed. RAM DIAL *v.* MAHTAB SINGH

I. L. R. 3 All. 701

20. ———— *Civil Procedure Code, ss. 244, 278, 283—Suit to confirm sale after it is set aside—Person not party to proceedings—Specific Relief Act, s. 42.* *M*, in whose name property had been purchased at an execution sale which was improperly set aside, brought a suit to have the order setting aside the sale reversed and the sale confirmed in her favour, and for a declaration that the property was not liable to be sold in execution of a decree of the defendants against third persons under which it had been attached and advertised for sale. *Held*, that such a suit could only be maintained under s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), but that s. 244 of the Civil Procedure Code indicated the intention of the Legislature that such questions should be determined in the execution department, and, reading together the provisions of ss. 244, 278, and 283 of the Code, the suit was



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premature and therefore not maintainable. *MAN KUAR v. TARA SINGH* . I. L. R. 7 All. 533

**21.** ———— *Suit to have confirmed a sale set aside by Collector—Transfer of execution of a decree to Collector—Power of Collector—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 312, 320, and 588, cl. 16—Rules framed by Government under s. 320—Jurisdiction of Civil Court—Sale in execution of decree.* Certain property was sold in execution of a decree by the Collector to whom the execution had been transferred under s. 320 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882). The Collector set aside the sale before the date of confirmation, on the sole ground that the judgment-debtor had, subsequent to the sale, made full payment of the sum decreed. Thereupon the auction-purchaser filed a suit for a declaration that the sale had been improperly set aside, and for a confirmation of the sale. *Held*, that the suit would lie. Reading s. 312 with s. 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the suit was not barred under the last clause of s. 312 nor under s. 588, cl. 16. *Held*, also, that the rules framed by Government under s. 320 of the Code only restricted the powers of the Court to interfere with the procedure of the execution of decrees transferred to the Collector. They did not come in the way of a party bringing a civil suit to establish his purchase. *Held*, also, that the Collector had no power under s. 311 of the Code to set aside the sale and receive payment from the judgment-debtor. *MA-THURADAS v. PANHALAL* . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 216

**22.** ———— *Advance by mortgagee to pay off prior lien on mortgaged property and save the property from sale in execution of decree—Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), ss. 60, 68, 72, 74, 75, 95—Suit against purchaser of property to recover amount so advanced—Charge on the mortgaged property.* Plaintiff's undivided brother had advanced money on a usufructuary mortgage-bond to enable the owners of certain property to obtain possession of it from one in whose favour a lien had been decreed to subsist. The money not having been so applied, the holder of the lien attached the property and applied to the Court for its sale. To save the property from being sold, plaintiff's said brother further paid the amount of the lien into Court; and at about the same time the mortgagor sold the property to defendant. Plaintiff's brother had never obtained possession of the property and had since died. Upon plaintiff suing to recover (in addition to the mortgage amount, liability for which was not disputed), the amount of the lien so paid into Court to save the property from sale. *Held*, that, inasmuch as plaintiff could only succeed by showing that by such payment a charge was created upon the land (the money not having been paid at the request or for the benefit of the defendant), the suit must fail. There is no provision in the Transfer of Property Act to support the proposition (involved by the plaintiff's suit) that a second mortgagee may, by a transaction between himself and the first

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mortgagee, without knowledge or concurrence on the part of the mortgagor, acquire a new right over the mortgaged property. *Per SUBRAMANIA AYYAR, J.*—That as against the mortgagors plaintiff would have been entitled to add the sums paid by him to the prior incumbrancer to the mortgage amount. But as the mortgage was usufructuary and plaintiff had never obtained possession, he had acquired no charge on the mortgaged property for the money recoverable by him under s. 68 of the Transfer of Property Act. The amount sought to be added thereto consequently stood on a similar footing, and the plaintiff's contention that a charge in respect of it existed in his favour was unsustainable. *Nogender Chunder Ghose v. Kaminee Dosse, 11 Moo. I. A. 241, 259, and Anandi Ram v. Dur Najaf Ali Begam, I. L. R. 13 All. 195.* *PERIANN SERVAIGARAN v. MARUDAINAYAGAM PILLAI*

I. L. R. 22 Mad. 332

**23.** ———— *Suit for declaration of right to have property sold in execution—Refusal of Deputy Collector to sell in execution of decree of Revenue Court—Cause of action.* Where a Deputy Collector refuses to sell a certain property in execution of a decree of a Revenue Court, and the applicant fails to bring a suit within the proper time for a declaration of his right to have the property sold, he cannot procure to himself more time by making a second application to the Deputy Collector for execution and having the refusal repeated. A suit so brought cannot have its form changed and be treated as a suit to establish the lien which the plaintiff obtained on the property, and to bring the same to sale for discharge of that lien. *RUGHONUNDUN SINGH v. GOPAL CHUND CHOWDHRY* . . . . . 20 W. R. 17

*RUGHONUNDUN SINGH v. COCHRANE*

20 W. R. 18

**24.** ———— *Suit by purchaser at execution sale to sue for partition—Certificate of purchase by Registrar—Conveyance—Declaration of right to share—Rules of Court, 415, 431.* The position of a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree of the High Court after he has obtained a certificate from the Registrar under rule 415 of the Rules of Court is that of a person clothed with a right to a conveyance in virtue of a contract; he does not hold, save as regards the parties to the contract of sale, the position of an owner. When the sale is confirmed, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance, and until he obtains a conveyance the property in the estate purchased does not, having regard to rule 431, pass to him so as to give him rights as against parties not bound by the decree under which the sale took place. All that passes to him as against the defendant in that suit is an equitable estate and a right to a conveyance of the property. And, therefore, as the estate in the property purchased has not passed, the purchaser is not entitled to maintain a suit for partition. In such a suit he could not on partition give a good conveyance to the parties interested in the estate



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nor would he be entitled to a declaration of his share in the property. *JOHUR MULL KHOORBA v. TARANKISTO DEB*. I. L. R. 10 Cal. 252

25. ——— Suit for refund of proceeds of sale paid to wrong party—*Civil Procedure Code, 1859, s. 270.* No suit lay for a refund of the proceeds of sale realized in execution of a decree paid to a wrong party by order of a competent Court under s. 270, Act VIII of 1859 (*dissentiente LEVINGE, J.*). *HURISH CHUNDER SIRCAR v. AZIMOODDEEN SHAHA*. W. R. F. B. 180

26. ——— Suit by purchaser to recover purchase-money paid at sale—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 315—Sale of property in execution in which judgment-debtor has no interest—Limitation—Accrual of the cause of action.* Under s. 315 of the Civil Procedure Code, a suit will lie to recover purchase-money paid at a Court sale for property to which it is found that the judgment-debtor has no title. The cause of action in such a case does not accrue till the purchaser is deprived of the property which was sold to him. *GURSHIDAWA v. GANGAYA*

I. L. R. 22 Bom. 783

27. ——— Sale in execution of decree enforcing mortgage—*Distribution of proceeds of execution-sale—Priority of mortgages—Transfer of Property Act (Act IV of 1882), s. 80.* A mortgaged certain property to B in July 1874, to C in March 1877, and again to B in November 1877. B obtained a decree directing the sale of the property in satisfaction of his two mortgages, and it was sold accordingly. Subsequent to the sale, C obtained a similar decree upon his mortgage, and, having unsuccessfully applied in his own suit to have his decree satisfied out of the sale-proceeds after payment of B's first mortgage of July 1874, brought a suit under the last paragraph but one of s. 295 of the Civil Procedure Code to recover the amount received by B in respect of B's mortgage of November 1877. *Held*, that to read the words "an incumbrance" in s. 295, prov. (c) of the Civil Procedure Code as "an incumbrance or incumbrances," so as to give priority to B's mortgage of November 1877 over C's earlier mortgage of March 1877, would be to defeat the intention of the Legislature as expressed in that section and also in s. 80 of the Transfer of Property Act, and that C was entitled to maintain the suit. *MITTHU LAL v. KISHAN LAL*. I. L. R. 12 All. 546

28. ——— Recovery of purchase-money—*Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 315—Execution sale—Absence of interest of judgment-debtor—Suit by purchaser to recover purchase-money—Right of suit—Cause of action.* A purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree can maintain a suit against the decree-holder for recovery of his purchase-money when it has been found that the judgment-debtor has no saleable interest in the property sold; and he is not limited to the special procedure in the Execution Department

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mentioned in s. 315, Civil Procedure Code. *Munna Singh v. Gajadhar Singh, 1. L. R., 5 All., 577*, followed. In order to afford the purchaser a good cause of action it need not be shown that he had been deprived of the property purchased before the institution of the suit. *NITYANUND ROY v. JUGGUT CHANDRA GUHA (1902)*. 7 C. W. N. 105

29. ——— Suit for confirmation of prior sale—*Decree transferred to Collector for execution—Sale held by Collector, but afterwards set aside—Purchase by one joint decree-holder in his own name—Suit by auction-purchaser to have the sale confirmed.* Muthara Das and Gappu Lal held a joint decree for money against Jamna Prasad. Mathura Das applied in his own name for execution of the joint decree, and certain property of the judgment-debtor was attached. That property being ancestral, execution of the decree was transferred to the Collector, by whom the property was sold. The property so sold was purchased by Mathura Das, who, however, did not pay for it in cash, but gave a receipt for satisfaction of the joint decree. Subsequently this sale was set aside by the Collector under the provisions of s. 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Mathura Das, accordingly, filed a suit in the Civil Court to have the Collector's order set aside and the sale confirmed in his favour. *Held*, that the suit would lie; but that the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree in it, inasmuch as, to give the plaintiff the decree which he asked for, namely, a decree confirming the sale in the plaintiff's sole name without reference to the rights of his co-decree-holder, would be to assist the plaintiff in perpetrating a fraud. *Sham Behari Lal v. Rup Kishore, 1. L. R. 20 All. 379*, referred to. *MATHURA DAS v. JAMNA PRASAD (1903)*. I. L. R. 25 All. 355

**68. SHIP, SALE OF.**

1. ——— Suit for declaration of title against foreign creditor—*Sale by French Court of ship pledged to secure payment of debt—Claim by pledgee to proceeds of sale.* M pledged his ship in August 1878 to C as security for a bond-debt of Rs. 1,500, repayable by two instalments in February and August 1879. S seized the ship in French territory for a debt due to him by M, and the French Court sold the ship. C made a claim on the proceeds of the sale in the hands of the Court in December 1878. The French Court required C to produce a copy of an English Court's judgment acknowledging and sanctioning C's claim against M. C sued S to obtain a declaration of his right to recover the amount due by M on the bond. *Held*, that, whether or not his lien was destroyed by the sale of the ship in French territory, C was not entitled to any of the proceeds of the sale, either at the date of the sale or of his claim in the French Court, and the denial by S of C's right to any of the proceeds of the sale gave C no cause of action. *CHITHAMBARA v. MUTHAYA, 1. L. R. 5 Mad. 330*



RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*68. SHIP, SALE OF—*concl'd.*

2. — Suit by owners for sum realized by sale of ship—*Abandonment of French ship to French Consul—Principal and Agent.* The Captain of the French ship *C*, which had been wrecked, abandoned her to the French Consul for the benefit of all concerned. The owners assented to this arrangement, but afterwards sued the Consul as their agent, for the sum realized by the sale of the ship. *Held*, that, when the owners of a foreign ship abandon her to their Consul for the benefit of all concerned, they cannot afterwards sue him as their agent. *Semble*: That the owners of a foreign ship, when abandoning to their Consul, cannot legally enter into a private agreement with him with reference to the funds realized by the sale of the ship. ROBERT v. JAQUEHIM . . . Bourke O. C. 112

## 68 (a). SOCIETY, SUIT AGAINST.

Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), ss. 30, 539—*Suit by subscribers of society, maintainability of.* Some of the subscribers to a society brought a suit on behalf of themselves and other persons interested against the office-bearers and members of the society, for the removal of the office-bearers and for an account of the affairs of the society. No sanction of the Advocate-General under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure or permission of Court under s. 30 of the Code for bringing the suit was obtained by the plaintiffs. Under the rules of the society the subscribers as such had no control over the officers of the society or the conduct of the society's affairs and they were not beneficiaries having any claim on the funds of the society. *Held*, that they had no right to maintain the suit. *Per* SIR ARNOLD WHITE, C. J. —Even if it is assumed that the suit was maintainable without the sanction of the Advocate-General under s. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiffs cannot maintain the suit as they were not members of the society and their rights were in no way analogous to the rights of worshippers in a Hindu temple, who could maintain a suit in their own right. *Per* ABDUR RAHIM, J.—Assuming that the defendants are in the position of trustees of the society, liable to be sued for misconduct by persons interested, the plaintiffs cannot maintain a representative suit without sanction or leave obtained under s. 539 or 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. S. 539 is enabling as regards the general public interested in the sense that two persons may sue now where it would have been necessary before that all should sue, or that some should obtain leave to sue on behalf of the rest. *Thackersey Dewraj v. Hurbhum Nursey*, I. L. R. 8 Bom. 432, distinguished. *Budree Dass Mukim v. Chooni Lal Johurry*, I. L. R. 33 Calc. 789, referred to. *Subbayya v. Krishna*, I. L. R. 14 Mad. 186, referred to. D'CRUZ v. D'SILVA (1908)

I. L. R. 32 Mad. 131

RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*

## 69. SUBSCRIPTIONS, SUITS FOR.

1. — Suit by secretary of charitable institution against subscriber—*Liability of subscribers to charitable institution.* The extent of a subscriber's obligation must depend upon the nature of the particular charity or other subject for which the subscription is given, and, in some cases, upon what the subscribers said or did when he agreed to subscribe. *Quære*: Whether (assuming the liability of a subscriber for unpaid subscriptions) the secretary of a charitable institution with the consent of the committee of management, is entitled to sue a subscriber for the amount of his contribution. KEDAR NATH MITTER v. ALISAR ROHOMAN . . . 10 C. L. R. 197

2. — Liability of subscribers to a proposed town hall. A suit will lie to recover a subscription promised, the subscriber knowing that, on the faith of his and other subscriptions, an obligation is to be incurred to a contractor for the purpose of erecting a building to be paid for out of the moneys subscribed. KEDAR NATH BHATTACHARJEE v. GORIE MAHOMED . . . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 64

## 70. SUIT BROUGHT IN TWO COURTS.

Suit simultaneously brought in different Courts on same cause of action—*Bar to maintenance of suit—Election.* A suit brought in a District Munsif's Court, filed on the same day as a suit for the same amount brought on the same cause of action in the Small Cause Court, is not a bar to the maintenance of the Small Cause suit; but the plaintiff must elect which suit he will proceed with. SUBBRAMANYAN v. GANAPATHI . . . I. L. R. 2 Mad. 123

## 71. SURVIVAL OF RIGHT.

1. — Trustee and cestui que trust—*Survival in representative of cestui que trust of right to sue.* If the money due on a bond belonged to A, and B, the nominal plaintiff in a suit on the bond, was a trustee for him:—*Held*, that A's son might sue to get the benefit of the decree obtained by B. JUGGOBUNDHOO COONDHO v. NIL COMUL SURMAH . . . W. R. 1864, 190

2. — Revival of suit in favour of minor—*Suit for partition.* A suit for a partition of family property was, upon the death of the plaintiff, revived on behalf of his minor sons with the permission of the Court of first instance, and a decree for a partition given. The Appellate Court reversed the decree upon the ground that, as a partition can be enforced on behalf of minors only when it can be proved to be necessary for the protection of the minor's interest, the cause of action did not survive to the minors. *Held*, by the High Court, that this was not a universal rule, and the Court of first instance having allowed the suit to be revived, considering that it had been brought



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on grounds which entitled the minors to the partition, the competency of the plaintiff to proceed with the suit was not open to objection in the lower Appellate Court. *PARVATHI v. MANJAYAKARANTHA*

5 Mad. 193

3. ——— Suit against agent for account—*Death of agent—Act X of 1859, s. 20.* A right of suit accruing against an agent for money received and accounts kept, falling within the class mentioned in s. 24, Act X of 1859, survives the death of the agent. *HILLS v. SHOKHEE MONEE DOSSEE*

10 W. R. 59

4. ——— Malicious prosecution, suit for—*Civil Procedure Code, s. 361—Abetment of suit—Tort—Cause of action, survival of, as against heir of a deceased wrong-doer—Act XII of 1855—“Actio personalis moritur cum persona,” Application of.* The plaintiff sued to recover damages from the defendant's father *R* for wrongful arrest and malicious prosecution. During the pendency of the suit *R* died, and the plaintiff substituted the defendant as his heir and representative. The defendant contended that the suit abated. Both the lower Courts disallowed the defendant's contention, and awarded damages to the plaintiff, to be recovered from the estate of the deceased. On appeal by the defendant to the High Court:—*Held*, reversing the decision of the lower Courts, that the suit abated on the death of *R*, his estate having derived no benefit, but, on the other hand, suffered loss, in consequence of his wrong-doing. *Phillips v. Homfray, L. R. 24 Ch. D. 439*, followed. It was contended for the plaintiff that Act XII of 1855 gave the plaintiff a right to continue his suit against the heir of *R*. *Held*, that Act XII of 1855 did not apply to a suit such as this, brought originally against the wrong-doer himself, and only subsequently sought to be continued against his heir. *HARIDAS RAMDAS v. RAMDAS MATHURADAS*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 677

5. ——— Application to revive suit by person whose claim is in conflict with that of original plaintiff—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 361 and 371—Cause of action—Abatement of suit—Substitution of parties.* The language of ss. 361 and 371 of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to abatement of a suit show that, where it is sought to revive a suit on the death of the plaintiff, the cause of action of the original and revived suit must be the same, and that no fresh cause of action can be imported into the revived suit. Where a suit was brought to have it declared that the plaintiff was entitled to succeed as mohant of the Tarkessur shrine on the allegations (a) that he had been selected as the chela or disciple of the deceased mohant; (b) that the ceremony of initiation had been duly performed, by which he was brought into the brotherhood of his gurus; and (c) that the installation ceremony had been performed with the consent of the dasnami, and that by virtue thereof he became the mohant, and exercised the functions of that office; and on the death of the

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plaintiff an application to be substituted in his place was made on grounds which put the applicant into opposition to the original plaintiff and made his claim not dependent on the original plaintiff's case, but in conflict with it:—*Held*, that the right of suit could not be said to survive to the applicant within the meaning of the sections of the Court relating to abatement of suit, but that the suit abated by the death of the plaintiff. *SHAM CHAND GIRI v. BHAYARAM PANDAY I. L. R. 22 Calc. 92.*

6. ——— Claim to guardianship based on a will does not survive to claimant's representative—*Death of appellant pending appeal—Abatement of appeal—Guardians and Wards Act (VIII of 1890), ss. 7, 8, 13.* One *K* applied to be the guardian of the person and property of her minor son. Her application was opposed by *G*, the grand-mother of the minor, who alleged that she has been appointed guardian by the will of the minor's father. The Judge found the will not proved and he appointed *K* to be guardian. *G* appealed, and, pending the appeal, she died. *G*'s brother, one *M*, thereupon applied for leave to prosecute the appeal as *G*'s representative. *Held*, refusing the application, that the appeal must abate by reason of *G*'s death. Her appointment, alleged to have been made under the will, was a matter of personal preference and trust. A claim based on personal trust could not survive to her representative. *GANGABAI v. KHASHABAI. I. L. R. 23 Bom. 719*

7. ——— Application for Letters of Administration by Legal Representative of Executor—*Abatement of suit—Civil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908), Order XXII, rule 1—Application for Probate by Executor—Death of Executor—*On an application by a sole executor for grant of probate, a caveat was entered, and the matter was set down as a contentious cause. Pending the hearing, the executor died. Thereupon his widow and legal representative applied to have her name substituted for his, and to have the petition for probate amended by substituting a prayer for letters of administration with copy of the will annexed, in place of the prayer for probate. *Held* that the application must be refused, as the right to sue had not survived, and the suit had abated. *SARAT CHANDRA BANERJEE v. NANI MOHAN BANERJEE (1909).*

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 799

## 72. TAX.

——— Suit to recover tax illegally levied—*Bombay Abkari Act (V of 1878), s. 29. Omission to stay proceedings under.* Though a person subject to an undue demand may, under s. 29 of the Act, take steps by which the Collector's proceedings may be stayed, still his abstention from such a course will not deprive him of his ordinary right to recover money wrongfully taken from him for the benefit of a third person. *NARAYAN VENKU v. SAKHARAM NAGU*

I. L. R. 11 Bom. 519



RIGHT OF SUIT—*contd.*

## 73. TORTS.

1. ——— Suit for tort amounting to felony—*Cause of action—Proof of previous conviction in Criminal Court.* Where a person brings a suit alleging a state of facts which amount to felony, he must show that he has done his best to procure a conviction on the criminal charge before the Civil Court will entertain such a suit. *COONAMULL v. SARNO RAUR* . 2 Ind. Jur. N. S. 187

2. ——— Suit in respect of tort—*Taking away and detaining property—Remedy by civil action.* In a case where a person took away a cow out of another's field and wrongfully detained it, pretending that he purchased it at an auction-sale in execution of a decree, it was held there was a remedy by civil action. The plaintiff was not bound to institute criminal proceedings in the first instance, and the Civil Court was bound to take cognizance of the suit under s. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1859. *SHAMA CHURN BOSE v. BHOLA NATH DUTT* . 6. W. R. Civ. Ref. 9

3. ——— Suit for damages for abuse—*Failure to take criminal proceedings.* The failure of an injured party to institute criminal proceedings does not deprive him of his right to bring a suit in the Civil Court to recover damages for abuse. *SREENATH MOOKERJEE v. KOMUL KURMOKAR* . 16 W. R. 83

4. ——— Suit for property (or its value) attached before judgment and made away with—*Failure to institute criminal proceedings.* A suit will lie for the recovery, or for the value, of property attached under s. 81, Act VIII of 1859, and afterwards made away with by the defendants in collusion with the attaching officer without a criminal prosecution being previously instituted against them. *CHOITUNNO PARAMANICK v. ZUMEROODDEE SHAIKH* . 18 W. R. 27

5. ——— Suit for tort not compoundable—*Merger of tort in felony—Law applicable to Hindus and Mahomedans—English law—Right to bring civil suit before prosecuting for offence.* Within the original jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras, a Hindu or Mahomedan whose civil rights have been infringed by an act which is also a non-compoundable offence is not bound to prosecute the offender before maintaining his civil action, nor is his right to prosecute his action suspended until the offender is brought to justice. *ABDUL KAWDER v. MUHAMMAD MERA* . I. L. R. 4 Mad. 410

6. ——— Suit to recover damages for detention of goods—*Dismissal of criminal charge for taking same goods.* The circumstance that the plaintiff preferred a criminal charge against the defendant for the taking of his goods, which charge was dismissed, does not prevent the plaintiff from afterwards suing in the Civil Court to recover damages for the taking or detention of the goods, notwithstanding the Criminal Court may have jurisdiction upon a conviction to impose a fine and award

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it to the protector as compensation. *ROOPA BEWA v. RAMCOOMAR SANDYAL* Marsh. 248 : 2 Hay 13  
*ADRAM v. HURBULLUB* . 2 N. W. 58

7. ——— Suit for fine realized after imprisonment in default of payment—*Imprisonment—Fine.* An accused person was punished by the Magistrate both with imprisonment and fine and was sentenced in default of payment of fine to a further imprisonment. After the accused had undergone both the principal punishment and additional imprisonment, he was released, and the fine realized from him. Held, that a suit by him to recover the amount of the fine was not maintainable; the additional imprisonment not being in lieu of the fine, but as a punishment for non-payment of it. *MANOOLLAH v. GUNES* . 3 Agra 390

## 74. WITNESS.

1. ——— Suit for expenses of witness in civil case—*Cause of action.* No suit will lie for the expenses of a witness. *DE SARAN v. HURISH CHUNDER BISWAS* 5 W. R. S. C. C. Ref. 6

2. ——— Suit for damages caused by false statement of witness in a suit. No action will lie against a witness for making a false statement in the course of a judicial proceeding. *CHIDAMBARA v. THIRUMANI* I. L. R. 10 Mad. 87

3. ——— Slander—*Privilege of witness—Slander uttered by witness whilst under examination in a judicial proceeding.* A witness in a Court of justice is absolutely privileged as to anything he may say as a witness having reference to the enquiry on which he is called as a witness. The plaintiff sued to recover damages for slander, the statement complained of being alleged in the plaint to have been made by the defendant while being examined as a witness during the hearing of a case before a Magistrate. It was found that the statement was made in answer to questions put to the defendant as a witness and allowed by the Court as relevant to the case. The plaintiff alleged that the statement was made maliciously, that the defendant bore him a grudge, and that it was to give vent to that grudge, and to injure his reputation that the statement was made. Held, that the plaint disclosed no cause of action, and that the suit had been properly dismissed. *BHIKUMBER SINGH v. BECHARAM SIRKAR. BHIKUMBER SINGH v. GOTI KRISTO DAS* . I. L. R. 15 Calc. 264

4. ——— Defamation—*Verbal abuse—Special damage—Witness—Privilege.* The plaintiff was cited as a witness by one S in a suit instituted by him against defendant. After plaintiff's evidence had been concluded, in which he stated that there was no enmity between him and defendant, the defendant was examined by the Court, and stated that there was enmity between him and plaintiff, and on the Court inquiring to know what was the cause of enmity, defendant used words conveying the meaning that plaintiff



**RIGHT OF SUIT—concl'd.****74. WITNESS—concl'd.**

descent was illegitimate. In a suit for slander instituted by the plaintiff:—*Held*, by BRODHURST, J., that under the circumstances, the statement complained of was made by defendant while deposing in the witness-box, and was therefore absolutely privileged. *Per* MAHMOOD, J. (*contra*), that the question whether or not the statement complained of was made by defendant in course of his deposition or after it was finished and when he was no longer in the witness-box, had not been tried, and the order remanding the case for trial on the merits was right. Further, that the English law of slander as forming part of the law of defamation, and as such drawing somewhat arbitrary distinctions between words actionable *per se* and words requiring proof of special or actual damage, is not applicable to this country, either by reason of any statutory provision or by any uniform course of decision sufficient to establish such distinctions as part of the common law of British India; that whilst the English law of defamation recognizes no distinction between defamation as such and personal insult in civil liability, the law of British India recognizes personal insult conveyed by abusive language as actionable *per se*, without proof of special or actual damage; that such abusive and insulting language, unless excused or protected by any other rule of law, is in itself a substantive cause of action and a civil injury, apart from defamation, and that malice is an element of liability for abusive and insulting language, and that such malice will be presumed or inferred, unless the contrary is shown; that when the defendant is not absolutely privileged and protected by reason of the office or occasion on which he employed such language, he renders himself subject to a civil liability for damages, irrespective of any plea of justification based upon proving the truth of the statements contained in the abusive and insulting language complained of; that the rule of English law as to the privilege or protection of a witness in regard to defamatory statements made in the witness-box is based upon a public policy which is equally applicable to insulting and abusive language used by such witness and such statements, when made in the witness-box, are privileged and protected, even though made maliciously and falsely, so long as they are relevant to the inquiry in the broadest sense of the phrase; and that, even where such statements have no reference to the inquiry, the defendant may prove the absence of malice, and that they were made in good faith for the public good. *DAWAN SINGH v. MAHIP SINGH* . . . **I. L. R. 10 All. 425**

Nor is a witness liable to be prosecuted for defamation for what he says in the witness-box while under examination.

**RIGHT OF WAY.**

*See* ACQUIESCENCE.

**1 B. L. R. A. C. 213**

*See* APPELLATE COURT—EVIDENCE AND ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON APPEAL.

**6 C. W. N. 31**

**RIGHT OF WAY—cont'd.**

*See* EASEMENT . **I. L. R. 18 Bom. 382**  
**I. L. R. 26 Calc. 311**  
**I. L. R. 22 Bom. 525**

*See* ESTOPPEL—ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT.  
**I. L. R. 4 Calc. 692**

*See* INJUNCTION—SPECIAL CASES—OBSTRUCTION OR INJURY TO RIGHTS OF PROPERTY—RIGHT OF WAY.

**9 B. L. R. 328**  
**I. L. R. 10 Bom. 390**  
**I. L. R. 24 Bom. 188**

*See* LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1870, ss. 16 AND 17 . . . **3 W. R. 27**  
**6 B. L. R. Ap. 47**

*See* POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—DISPUTES AS TO RIGHT OF WAY, WATER, ETC.

**2 B. L. R. Ap. 9**  
**2 W. R. Cr. 64**  
**I. L. R. 5 Calc. 194**  
**I. L. R. 4 Mad. 121**  
**I. L. R. 7 Mad. 49**  
**14 W. R. Cr. 28**  
**2 C. W. N. 670**

*See* PRESCRIPTION—EASEMENTS—RIGHT OF WAY.

*See* RIGHT OF SUIT—EASEMENTS.  
**I. L. R. 9 All. 434**

*See* WRONGFUL RESTRAINT.  
**5 C. W. N. 432**

**1. ———— Creation of right of way—**  
*User—Adverse possession.* A right of way need not have its origin in an express grant, but may be established by continued user for a certain period constituting adverse possession. *RAM GUNGA DOSS v. GOBIND CHUNDER DOSS* . . . **16 W. R. 284**

**2. ———— User—Custom—**  
*Proof of right of way.* A right of way may be created either by grant or by immemorial custom or by necessity, and it is necessary for a party seeking to establish a right of this kind to prove its existence, and that it is ancient and has been exercised without interruption. The determination of the existence of the right is a question depending on the evidence in each case, the right being inferred from the evidence. *IMAMBUNDEE BEGUM v. SHEO DYAL RAM* . . . **14 W. R. 199**

*SAVALGIAPA VIRBASAPA v. BASVANAPA BASAPA.*  
**10 Bom. 399**

Proof of well established and fixed user will be sufficient. *BHUGWAN CHUNDER CHOWDHARY v. KHOSAL* . . . **7 W. R. 271**

**3. ———— User—Prescriptive right—Proof of right of way.** In order to establish a right of way, the person claiming must prove uninterrupted user for a certain length of time, and, if his right is interrupted, must go into Court at once. No length of time can give a party such a right as destroys all the ordinary uses of the servient property, *e.g.*, a general right to the promiscuous



**RIGHT OF WAY—contd.**

use of a whole property for the purpose of driving cattle over it. *JOY DOORGA DOSSIA v. JUGGERNATH ROY* . . . . . **15 W. R. 295**

*HEERA LALL KOORER v. PURMESSUR KOORER.* . . . . **15 W. R. 401**

4. ————— *User—Presumption from long user. Quære:—*Ought a Court to infer from user alone that a right of way has been conferred by the owner of the land upon the person exercising the user, unless that has extended over a period as long as that which the law would allow to the owner for bringing an action of ejectment if absolutely excluded from possession? *MOHIM CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY v. CHUNDER CHURN GOOHO* . . . . . **10 W. R. 452**

5. ————— *User—Actual user within two years—Limitation Act, 1871, s. 27.* In a suit to establish a right of way, it is not sufficient for a plaintiff to prove user for twenty years which ended more than two years next before the institution of the suit; he must show exercise of the right by actual user within such period of two years. *GOPEE CHAND SETIA v. BHOOBUN MOHUN SEN* . . . . . **23 W. R. 401**

6. ————— *Sufferance.* A right of way by sufferance over another's land cannot create a permanent right. *ASHOOTOSH CHUCKERBUTTY v. TEETOO HOLDAR* . . . . . **W. R. 1864, 293**

*FUTTEH ALI v. ASGUR ALI* . . . . . **17 W. R. 11**

7. ————— *Permitting cattle to pass over ground between village and public road.* The owner of a piece of land between a village and the public road, who allows his neighbour's cows to pass over it on the way to pasture, does not thereby create a right of easement over the land so as to deprive it of all value by rendering its cultivation impossible. *GOOROOCHURN GOON v. GUNGAGOBIND CHATTERJEE* . . . . . **8 W. R. 269**

8. ————— *User—Evidence of right of way.* User during previous ownership is no evidence of a right of way which relates to the land of another. *OBHOY CHURN DUTT v. NOBIN CHUNDER DUTT* . . . . . **10 W. R. 298**

9. ————— *User.* The finding that a right of way had been "formerly" exercised is not a sufficient finding to indicate the length of time for which the right had been exercised, and is therefore insufficient to prove a right of user. *KRISHNA CHANDRA CHUCKERBUTTY v. KRISHNA CHANDRA BANIK* . . . . . **3 B. L. R. A. C. 211**

*S.C. KRISTO CHUNDER CHUCKERBUTTY v. KRISTO CHUNDER BURNIC* . . . . . **12 W. R. 76**

10. ————— *Claim of right of way under contract.* A party who claims, under a contract, the re-opening of a way, is not required by Act IX of 1871, s. 27, to prove user for twenty years. *KALLARAM DHUR v. JOOGUL KISHORE SURMAH* . . . . . **23 W. R. 290**

11. ————— *Use limited to season of year.* A right of way may be created by

**RIGHT OF WAY—contd.**

use continued for many successive years, even though the use is limited to one particular season of the year alone. *OOMUR SHAH v. RUNZAN ALI* . . . . . **10 W. R. 363**

12. ————— *Pathway over waste land—Discontinuance during rainy season.* A right of user over a pathway may be established, notwithstanding that the path passes over waste land. A temporary interruption, such as during the rainy season, cannot affect a right of user. *MAHOMED ANSUR v. SEFATOOLLAH* . . . . . **22 W. R. 340**

13. ————— *User—Easement—Existence of other access to road.* Time and user create a right of easement over the property of others. A's right of way over B's homestead is not affected by the fact of there being another pathway by which access to the main road may be obtained by A. *SHAM BAGDEE v. FUKER CHAND BAGDEE* . . . . . **6 W. R. 222**

14. ————— *Right of user—Existence of other access to premises.* A plaintiff's right of user of a pathway to certain premises cannot be affected by the existence of another path by which he may obtain access to the same premises. *MOKOONDONATH BHADOORY v. SHIB CHUNDER BHADOORY* . . . . . **22 W. R. 302**

15. ————— *Easement—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 26—User as of right—Prescriptive right.* For the purpose of acquiring a right of way or other easement under s. 26 of the Limitation Act, it is not necessary that the enjoyment of the easement should be known to the servient owner. In this respect there is a difference between the acquisition of such rights under that Act and their acquisition under the English Prescription Act. *ARZAN v. RAKHAL CHUNDER ROY CHOWDHRY* . . . . . **I. L. R. 10 Calc. 214**

16. ————— *User of twenty years to support servitude—Extent and mode of user—Calcutta Municipal Act (Beng. Act IV of 1876).* As establishing his right of way over the defendant's passage, the plaintiff relied upon a user of it, several times in the year, for twenty years prior to the defendant's interruption of it, by mehters for the purpose of removing the contents of a cesspool connected with a privy belonging to the plaintiff's house. The facts indicated by way of limit to the user of the passage only showed that it must be a reasonable user for the above purpose. There was no agreement specifying times or occasions of access, and the inference was that if the plaintiffs had thought fit to use the passage more frequently than they did, they were at liberty to do so. In and after 1876, instead of the plaintiff's mehters, those employed by the Municipality came and went upon the passage, not at distant intervals, but daily, the plaintiffs under bye-laws, in conformity with Bengal Act IV of 1876, being bound to give them access, and the system being to clean the place daily. *Held*, that the above was neither a discontinuance by the plaintiffs of their user nor an aggravation of the servitude. Also that, although a servitude gained for one pur-



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pose cannot be used for another, the purposes before and after 1876 being identical, the user proved prior to that year supported a right in the plaintiffs to use the passage for giving access to the servants of the Municipality for the above purpose at reasonable and convenient times. **JADULAL MULLICK v. GOPAL CHANDRA MUKERJI** . I. L. R. 13 Calc. 136

S.C. **JUDOO LALL MULLICK v. GOPAL CHUNDER MOOKERJEE** . L. R. 13 I. A. 77

Affirming the decision of the High Court, Calcutta, which held that, where a right of way for a particular purpose is proved to have existed for upwards of twenty years, the Court is not bound to confine the right to the precise number of times in the year that it has been exercised, but may construe it as a right to use the road at all convenient times for the particular purpose. **GOPAL CHUNDER MUKERJEE v. JUDOO LALL MULLICK**

I. L. R. 9 Calc. 778 : 13 C. L. R. 146

17. ——— **Proof of right of way—Evidence—Particular route.** In a suit for declaration of a right of way over the land of another, the plaintiff must prove the particular line over which he claims the right. Mere proof of a right to pass over the land without proving the particular route will not entitle a plaintiff to a decree. **RADHANATH SUGRACHARJI v. BAIDONATH SEAL**

3 B. L. R. Ap. 118

18. ——— **Nature of right of way.** A right of way is ordinarily a right of passing, and not a general right to pass from one point to another point. **GOLUCK CHUNDER CHOWDHRY v. TARINEE CHURN CHUCKERBUTTY** . 4 W. R. 49

19. ——— **Mode of exercising right of way—Indirect way.** If a person has a right of way from one place to another over a particular line, he cannot be compelled to use a different and substituted way. But where the right is simply to pass from one point to another, the party desiring to exercise the right cannot claim to pass in a particular tortuous and indirect course between the two points. **HAMID HOSSEIN v. GERVAIN** . 15 W. R. 496

20. ——— **Right acquired by purchaser of house.** The purchaser of a house acquires the right to the use of a way to a road which has been enjoyed with the house by the vendor, if it is not merely a right to a way of necessity, but a particular right over a defined path. **NUBEEN CHUNDER BULLUB v. BHOOBUN CHUNDER MUNDUL**

15 W. R. 526

21. ——— **General right of way—Right of thoroughfare for processions.** A general right of thoroughfare includes a right of way for marriage or other processions of the like nature unless at the time of the first inception of the right it was restricted to a right of passage and such processions were interdicted. **RAJ MANICK SINGH v. RUTTUN MANICK BOSE** . 15 W. R. 46

22. ——— **Right to carry marriage and funeral processions.** A general right of way was held under the circumstances to include

**RIGHT OF WAY—contd.**

a right to carry marriage and funeral processions. **LOKENATH GOSSAMEE v. MONMOHAN GOSSAMEE**

20 W. R. 293

23. ——— **Right to freedom from obstruction—Ownership of soil.** A person who has a right of way cannot claim anything more than that the reasonable exercise of his right shall not be obstructed. It is only ownership of the land that carries with it the ownership of everything *usque ad cælum*. **TOOLSEEMONEY DEBEE v. JOGESH CHUNDER SHAHA** . 1 C. L. R. 425

24. ——— **Road used only by particular section of community—Private way.** Where there is a road, the privilege of using which is enjoyed only by one particular section of a community, the road is not a public one. **SHAM SOONDER BHUTACHARJEE v. MONEE RAM DOSS**

25 W. R. 233

25. ——— **Continuous user—Discontinuance—Limitation.** A right of way over the land of another must be kept up by constant use. **HURIDAS NANDI v. JADUNATH DUTT**

5 B. L. R. Ap. 66 : 14 W. R. 79

26. ——— **Immoveable property—Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), s. 9.** A right of way is not "immoveable property" within the meaning of s. 9 of the Specific Relief Act. **MANGALDAS v. JEWANRAM** . I. L. R. 23 Bom. 673

27. ——— **Obstruction to right of way—User.** Suit by members of a joint family to enforce their right to a pathway through a door (which had been blocked up) leading to a joint thakoorbari. Held, that this was not a case in which the plaintiffs claimed the right of user, but only complained of the obstruction of a passage belonging to them jointly with the defendants, and that the non-user for some years by the plaintiffs was not an abandonment of their right. **CHUNDER KANT CHOWDHRY v. NUND LALL CHOWDHRY**

16 W. R. 277

28. ——— **Substitution of new way for old one—Non-user—Abandonment of right.** Where a new way is substituted for an old one with the consent of the person entitled, and the non-user of the original way is accompanied by acts which warrant the Court in inferring an intention to release, the right of resumption is lost : the non-user need not extend over any defined period. **RAJ BEHAREE ROY v. TARA PERSHAD ROY**

20 W. R. 188

29. ——— **Loss of right of way—Relinquishment of right in land.** The relinquishment of all rights and interests in land exchanged does not necessarily involve loss of right of way over the land. **KALEE KISHORE ROY v. DEEN DYAL SEIN**

4 W. R. 83

30. ——— **Closing right of way—Substitution of another way.** The owner of the land over which there is right of way by an ancient pathway cannot, without the consent of the parties entitled to the right, substitute another path and



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shut up the ancient pathway. **TARINEECHURN CHUCKERBUTTY v. TARINEECHURN CHUCKERBUTTY**  
1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 6

**31. ——— Grant of land to build dwelling-house—Implied right to build privy—Way of necessity for sweepers—Caste prejudices—Modification of English law.** A plot of land in the centre of the defendant's oart was granted to plaintiff's predecessor in title on fazendari tenure, to build a dwelling upon. A hut was accordingly built thereon. No privy was built with or attached to the hut, the occupants of the hut using the oart or neighbouring oarts, for natural purposes. The plaintiff bought the hut, knocked it down, and proceeded to build a substantial dwelling with a privy on the site of the old hut. Defendant denied his right to build a privy, or to have any right of way for sweepers to the said privy when built. *Held*, that the suitable enjoyment of the hut, when it was originally built, implied the use of a privy, whenever the occupants of the hut should think fit to build one; and that therefore the plaintiff was entitled to build a privy, and consequently also to a way of necessity for a sweeper to have access to the privy when built. The occupants of the old hut had been allowed, as a way of necessity and had always used as a means of access to that portion of the site of the old hut on which the new privy was now being built, a path which went in a straight line from the gate in the outer wall of the oart to the front door of the hut, and thence, skirting the hut, to the site of the new privy. The plaintiff now claimed a right of way for his sweeper in a direct line from the outer gate to the new privy, thus avoiding the front entrance of the house. *Held*, that, having regard to the class of persons who had lived in the old hut (who were of low caste), there could have arisen up to the present time no reasonable necessity for two ways to the site in question, and therefore the plaintiff was limited to the old way enjoyed by his predecessor in title. *Quere*: Whether, if the lessees had been persons belonging to one of the higher castes, it would not be right to take into consideration the prejudice entertained by members of such castes against being brought into close proximity with persons following the occupation of a sweeper, and, if necessary, to modify the general principle of English law, which lays down that a grantee is only entitled to one way of necessity. **ESUBAI v. DAMODAR ISHVARDA** . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 552

**32. ——— Place dedicated by owner of land for convenience of occupiers of adjoining houses—User of such open space—Covenant or grant presumed—Easement—Public land—Encroachment—Injunction.** The plaintiff and defendant occupied houses situated in the same lane and opposite each other. Close to both houses was an open space in which a cross had stood. The plaintiff alleged that the said vacant space was originally intended for, and had always been used by, the occupants of his house and the residents in the lane in common for the purposes of recreation, save where the cross stood. The cross had been for many years visited by Christian worshippers who prayed

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and worshipped there. The plaintiff also alleged that, in addition to the general use of the open space, he and his predecessors in title and the occupants of his said house had for more than twenty years used the open space as a footway and a way for carriages and other vehicles to approach the said house and to stand and be able to turn there. He complained that the defendant had wrongfully removed the cross, and enclosed the greater portion of the said open space, and he prayed for a declaration that he and the occupants of his house were entitled to the use of the said space for purposes of recreation, and as a footway and carriageway and for an injunction. The defendant pleaded that the whole of the open space formerly belonged to a Portuguese religious confraternity who were the fazendars of both his property and the plaintiff's; that this confraternity had permitted the cross to be erected on the land, at which the residents of the houses of the plaintiff and defendant and other adjacent houses who were then Portuguese used to assemble and worship; that the Portuguese having left the locality the cross was removed, and the part of the open space which had been enclosed by the defendant had been sold to him by the confraternity in 1887. He denied the use of the space alleged by the plaintiff. *Held*, that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that the land in dispute had been dedicated to the public, but that, on the evidence, the Court was justified in presuming, and ought to presume, a covenant on the part of the fazendari owners of the oart to keep the lane, including the upper end of it, open for the use of the owners of the houses abutting upon it. Such a covenant should be presumed equally in the case of a land-owner giving land for building purposes to fazendari tenants in a perpetual tenure at a fixed rent, and in the case of a owner selling land out and out for building purposes. **RANCHORDAS AMTHABHAI v. MANEKLAL GORDHANDAS**

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 648

**33. ——— Easement of necessity—Easements Act (V of 1882)—Act I of 1872, s. 114, illus. (g)—Presumption against plaintiff from failure to produce his title-deeds.** The plaintiffs were owners of an hotel, and the defendant of certain adjacent property. The two properties had at one time been united, and at that time the manager of the hotel on behalf of the owner used to obtain water for the purposes of the hotel from a certain spring by means of a road which ran over land which subsequently became the defendant's. There was another but smaller and much less convenient path from the hotel to the spring. The plaintiffs became owners of their portion of the property in 1886, and the defendant of his portion in 1888. The plaintiffs continued to use the above-mentioned road through the defendant's property for the purpose of getting water from the hotel until 1889, when the defendant refused to permit them any longer to use the road. The plaintiffs accordingly sued the defendant for a declaration of their right of way over the said road, but refused to put in evidence the deed under which they became owners of the hotel property. *Held*, upon these facts, that the plaintiffs were not entitled



**RIGHT OF WAY—conclld.**

to any right of way over the land in question. Owing to the non-production by the plaintiffs of their title-deed, it must be presumed as against them that the evidence afforded thereby would be unfavourable to their claim, and no right of way in favour of the plaintiffs could be shown to arise otherwise, either as an easement of necessity or as an easement the intention to grant which might be inferred. *Charu Surnokar v. Dokouri Chunder Thakur*, I. L. R. 8 Calc. 956, considered. *Rajroop Kuar v. Abul Hossein*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 394; I. L. R. 7 I. A. 240; *Kay v. Oxley*, L. R. 10 Q. B. 360; *Polden v. Bastard*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 156; *Worthington v. Gimson*, 29 L. J. Q. B. 116; *Hinchcliffe v. Earl of Kinnoul*, 5 Bing. N. C. 25; *Morris v. Edgington*, 3 Taunt. 24; *Berkshire v. Grubb*, L. R. 18 Ch. D. 616; and *Bayley v. G. W. R. Co.*, L. R. 26 Ch. D. 434, referred to. *WUTZLER v. SHARPE* . I. L. R. 15 All. 270

34. ————— *Purchase of land adjoining purchaser's land—Way of access—Way of necessity—Deed of sale, construction of.* A person purchasing a plot adjoining his own land and having access to the plot through his land cannot acquire a way of necessity over his vendor's land of which the plot formed a part. The fact that, if the plot had been sold to a third person, he would have acquired a way of necessity, does not affect the question. Where a portion of an estate is sold, a right of way leading to such portion may be created by the use of general words, provided that the circumstances existing at the time of the sale were such as to justify the belief that such was the intention of the parties. Where the words used in a Marathi deed of sale were "sarva hakk wa sambandh" (i.e., all rights and accompaniments):—*Held*, that the words in themselves, apart from the circumstances at the time of the sale, did not include a right of way over the vendor's property as conveyed along with the portion of the land sold; but if there was an old path leading across the vendor's adjoining ground to the plot sold, and the purposes for which the plot was sold, and the conduct of the parties were such as to justify an inference that by the use of these words it was the intention of the parties to convey the right to use the path, it would be open to the Judge to find as a fact that such was the intention. *MUNICIPALITY OF THE CITY OF POONA v. VAMAN RAJARAM GHOLAP* . I. L. R. 19 Bom. 797

35. ————— *Right of private way, suit for—Special damage, proof of, whether necessary.* In a suit where a right of way is claimed which is not a right of way by the public but a private right of way and an easement or right by prescription, the question as to whether or not there has been proof of special damage is immaterial. *BAIJ NATH SINGH v. TETAI CHOWDHRY* (1901)

6 C. W. N. 197

**RIGHT OF WORSHIP.**

*See HINDU LAW—WORSHIP.*

————— *Claim to worship in a particular temple—Nadar or Shanar caste—Caste, who climb*

**RIGHT OF WORSHIP—conclld.**

*palmyra and cocoanut trees and manufacture toddy—Proof of custom to exclude such caste men—Compromise of suit by trustee of temple after obtaining decree—Breach of trust—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 375.* The respondent as hereditary trustee of a Hindu temple, dedicated to the worship of Siva, at Kamudi, a village in his zamindari, sued the appellants, who were of the Nadar or Shanar caste and represented that community, and who, alleging immemorial usage, claimed a right to enter and worship in the temple, to exclude them from such entrance and worship on the grounds that the presence of persons belonging to the appellant's caste was repugnant to the religious principles of the Hindu worship of Siva, and to the sentiments of the caste Hindus, who worshipped in the temple, and that it was contrary to custom for them to enter and worship there. The appellants had a temple of their own in the village, where they worshipped. *Held*, by the Judicial Committee (affirming the decrees of the Courts in India), that the fact that the appellants worshipped by themselves in a temple of their own, and that their evidence completely failed to prove any resort by persons of their caste to the temple in dispute, entirely negatived the case of the appellants so far as the assertion of immemorial usage was concerned, and also strengthened the respondents' contention that the separation in worship between the two classes was not accidental or voluntary, but rested on a deeper ground. The respondent, moreover, had succeeded in proving that by custom the appellants were not among the people for whose worship the temple in suit existed. The respondent, after obtaining a decree in the first Court, compromised the suit and asked that a decree should be made in favour of the appellants. *Held*, that the High Court, on an application to make a decree in accordance with the compromise, had acted properly in adding as plaintiff's members of the temple community, who opposed the application (as the respondent also himself then did), and in refusing the application on the ground that the compromise was a breach of trust on the part of the respondent, and therefore unlawful under s. 375 of the Code of Civil Procedure. *SANKRALINGA NADAN v. RAJESWARA DORAI* (1908) . I. L. R. 31 Mad. 236

**RIGHT TO ACCOUNT.**

*See HINDU LAW* . I. L. R. 32 Mad. 271

**RIGHT TO APPEAR.**

*See ADVOCATE* . 5 B. L. R. Ap. 70  
14 B. L. R. Ap. 12  
13 W. R. 60  
23 W. R. Cr. 14

*See COUNSEL* . 5 B. L. R. Ap. 70  
9 B. L. R. 417  
I. L. R. 1 Bom. 46

*See MOOKTEAR* . I. L. R. 1 Mad. 304  
I. L. R. 1 Bom. 14  
7 C. W. N. 524



**RIGHT TO APPEAR—conclld.**

See MURDER—APPOINTMENT AND APPEARANCE.

See PLEADER—APPOINTMENT AND APPEARANCE.

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—COUNSEL ;

VAKIL AND COUNSEL.

See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 622.

7 C. W. N. 843

**RIGHT TO BEGIN.**

See ONUS OF PROOF—POSSESSION AND PROOF OF TITLE.

I. L. R. 18 Calc. 201

L. R. 17 I. A. 159

See PRACTICE . I. L. R. 32 Bom. 599

1. ——— General rule. The rule is that the party holding the affirmative has the right to begin at the hearing before the High Court. LALLMOHUN MULLICK v. PEARY CHAND MITTRA.

1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 383

2. ——— Practice—Suits under Civil Procedure Code, 1859. It was held under the Civil Procedure Code of 1859 that the Common Law practice in respect of the right to begin ought to prevail in cases under that Act, that practice having been followed up to that time, and the Procedure Code making no distinction between suits in the nature of Common Law actions and those in the nature of equity suits. RUNGUNMONEY DOSSEE v. BRIJO LALL DAY . Cor. 25

3. ——— Small Cause Court references. The right to begin in Small Cause Court references is generally allowed to the plaintiff, but in one case the counsel for the defendant was allowed to begin where the judgment of the Small Cause Court was in favour of the plaintiff. HARAN CHANDRA MOOKERJEE v. NUNDGOPAL MUTTY LALL . 13 B. L. R. 142 : 22 W. R. 71

The right to begin is now specially provided for by s. 179 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882.

4. ——— Civil Procedure Code, 1877, s. 179—Suit for mesne profits—Burden of proof. It cannot be laid down as a general proposition controlling the provisions of s. 179 of the Code of Civil Procedure that in a suit for mesne profits against persons who have been in possession of the land in respect of which the mesne profits are claimed and who have been shown to have no title, that the burden of proof is upon the defendants. KRISHNA MOHUN BAISAK v. KUNJ BEHARY BAISAK

9 C. L. R. 1

5. ——— Suit for partition—Nucleus of joint property. In a suit for partition of certain property, and trading businesses the defendants, who resisted the suit, admitted a nucleus of joint property, and claimed the right to begin, on the ground that the onus was on them to prove that the whole property and the trading businesses were not joint. Held, that, unless the defendants

**RIGHT TO BEGIN—conclld.**

admitted all the allegations, or all the material allegations, the plaintiff was entitled to begin. AGHORE NATH NEOGY v. PREM CHAND NEOGY

7 C. L. R. 274

6. ——— Objection that no appeal lay—Appeal. Where, an appeal having been filed, the respondent objected that no appeal lay, and by agreement of the parties the case was set down for the agreement of this preliminary point:—Held, that the appellant had the right to begin. RUSTOMJI BURJORJI v. KESSOWJI NAIK

I. L. R. 8 Bom. 287

7. ——— Application for review—Order to show cause. Upon the hearing of an application for review of judgment, upon which an order has been passed directing the opposite party to show cause why the application should not be granted, counsel for the opposite party should begin. GHANSHAM SINGH v. LAL SINGH

I. L. R. 9 All. 61

8. ——— Hearing of case on preliminary issue. At the hearing of a case on a preliminary issue the defendant by whom the issue was raised was held to have the right to begin. FATMABAI v. AISHABAI . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 454

9. ——— Criminal case—Counsel—Practice—Reference to High Court under s. 434, Criminal Procedure Code (Act XXV of 1861). In a reference to the High Court under s. 434 of the Criminal Procedure Code, where counsel appeared, and the reference from the Judge impeached the order of the Magistrate, the Court called on counsel to support the argument. ANGELO v. CARGILL.

9 B. L. R. 417 : 18 W. R. Cr. 41

10. ——— Case under s. 263, Criminal Procedure Code, 1872. In a case referred to the High Court under s. 263 of the Criminal Procedure Code, because the Sessions Judge differed from the verdict of the jury, the High Court held that it was for the Government (the appellant), who asked for a conviction, to begin and satisfy the Court that there was a case calling upon the prisoner for an answer. QUEEN v. RAM CHURN GHOSE . 20 W. R. Cr. 33

11. ——— Reference under s. 434, Criminal Procedure Code, 1882. Where, on the application of counsel for the prisoner, a question of law has been reserved for the decision of the Court under s. 434 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), the prisoner's counsel has the right to begin. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. APPA SUBHANA MENDRE . I. L. R. 8 Bom. 200

12. ——— Reference to High Court by Presidency Magistrate—Onus probandi—Practice—Criminal Procedure Code (Act X of 1882), s. 432. In a reference by a Presidency Magistrate to the High Court as to whether, on the facts stated, any offence has been committed by an accused person, it lies on the prosecution to make out that an offence has been committed, and under the circumstances the prosecution must begin. QUEEN-EMPRESS v. HARADHAN alias RAKHAL DASS GHOSH . I. L. R. 19 Calc. 380



**RIGHT TO POSSESSION.**

See SALE . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 336

**RIGHT TO USE OF WATER.**

See EASEMENT . I. L. R. 18 Mad. 320  
I. L. R. 23 Bom. 506  
I. L. R. 30 Calc. 1077

See LANDLORD AND TENANT—NATURE OF TENANCY . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 693

See POSSESSION, ORDER OF CRIMINAL COURT AS TO—DISPUTES AS TO RIGHT OF WAY, WATER, ETC. 5 C. W. N. 67

See PRESCRIPTION—EASEMENTS—RIGHT TO WATER.

See RAILWAYS ACT, SS. 7, 10 AND 11.  
I. L. R. 25 Mad. 632

1. ——— Presumption of right—*User*, *Proof of*. No presumptions of law in regard to rights of water are known in this country, but proof of ancient reasonable user by particular recognized means is sufficient to give the right. BUNDHOO SOOKOOLANY *v.* JOY PROKASH SINGH  
W. R. 1864, 367

2. ——— Right to open conduit for water—*Injury to neighbours*. The right to take water is governed by established use. No one can open a new conduit to take additional water to the injury of his neighbours. ATHUR ALI KHAN *v.* SEKUNDAR ALI KHAN . . . 4 W. R. 28

3. ——— Right to surplus water of tank—*Easement—User—Channel*. A right of easement may be acquired in the surplus water of a tank flowing through a defined channel, whether natural or artificial. RAYAPPAN *v.* VIRABHADRA  
I. L. R. 7 Mad. 530

4. ——— Right to use another's canal. A person has no right to tap another's canal and abstract the water therefrom for his own land, unless he has acquired that right by grant or prescription. RUN BAHADOOR *v.* POODHEE ROY  
W. R. 1864, 319

5. ——— Riparian proprietor, right of—*Bunds or embankments*. A riparian proprietor may deal with the stream as freely as with any other portion of his land, provided only that he must not by so doing sensibly disturb the natural condition of the stream as it exists within the limits of other proprietors, whether above or below, or on the opposite side. MONOOUR HOSSEIN *v.* KANHYA LALL . . . 3 W. R. 218

6. ——— Natural water-course. The right which a riparian proprietor has, under certain restrictions, to the use of the water of a natural water-course, has no application to a water-course artificially constructed; and the mere fact of riparian proprietorship gives no rights whatever over such a stream. BHOOP NARAIN SINGH *v.* KERAMUT ALI . . . 6 W. R. 99

7. ——— Obstruction to flow of water—*Encroachment*. The plaintiff and defendant were proprietors of land and gardens on opposite sides of a tidal creek, which sides were

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protected by walls. The defendant, the wall on his side becoming dilapidated, constructed a fresh one, altering its direction, and encroaching five feet upon the bed of the stream. In a suit for possession of land by demolishing the said wall, the plaintiff alleged that he was entitled to the solum on which it was built, that his navigation was obstructed, and that there was a danger of his screw-house falling down. It appeared, however, that the Government, and not the plaintiff, was the owner of the solum, and that the plaintiff neither claimed nor proved that he was entitled to the flow of the water as it had been accustomed to flow, and that that flow was seriously and sensibly diverted so as to be an injury to his rights. *Held*, reversing the decree of the High Court, that the plaintiff had failed to show either *damnum* or *injuria*, and therefore had no right of action. KALI KISHEN TAGORE *v.* JODOO LAL MULLICK  
L. R. 6 I. A. 190 : 5 C. L. R. 97

8. ——— Easements Act (*V of 1882*), ss. 6, 7, 17—*Natural stream—Surface water*. The owners of a tank fed by natural streams, which depended for their supply on natural rainfall and surface water, sued for an injunction to restrain superior riparian owners from damming the streams or interfering with the supply of water, over which the plaintiffs claimed a right of easement. The issue as to the ownership of the land on which the streams rose was undecided. *Held*, (i) The Easements Act only declared the existing law as to easements over water; (ii) An easement can therefore be acquired in regard to the water of the rainfall. But surface water not flowing in a stream and not permanently collected in a pool, tank, or otherwise is not a subject of easement by prescription, though it may be the subject of an express grant or contract; (iii) It is the natural right of every owner of land to collect or dispose of all water on the surface which does not pass in a defined channel; (iv) Riparian owners are entitled to use and consume the water of the stream for drinking and household purposes, for watering their cattle, for irrigating their land, and for purposes of manufacture, subject to the conditions (i) that the use is reasonable, (ii) that it is required for their purposes as owners of the land, and (iii) that it does not destroy or render useless or materially diminish or affect the application of the water by inferior riparian owners in the exercise either of their natural right or their right of easement if any. (v) It was therefore necessary to ascertain where the streams rose, and the course, source, and length of their tributaries. PERUMAL *v.* RAMASAMI  
I. L. R. 11 Mad. 16

9. ——— Water-course—*Mamlatdar, jurisdiction of—Easements Act (V of 1882)*, s. 7. The law as to riparian owners is the same in India as in England, and is stated in illus. (h) of s. 7 of the Easements Act (*V of 1882*). Each proprietor has a right to a reasonable use of the water as it passes his land, but, in the absence of some special custom, he has no right to dam it back, or exhaust it, so as to deprive other riparian owners



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of like use. What would constitute an unreasonable diversion of water such as to disturb the use of the lower riparian owners is a question of fact which the Legislature has given a Mamlatdar jurisdiction to decide. *NARAYAN HARI DEVAL v. KESHAV SHIVRAM DEVAL* . . . **I. L. R. 23 Bom. 506**

**10. — Proprietor of water-course, Right of—Proof of user by other persons.** The proprietor of a pyne has a right to allow or to deny the use of water flowing through it to other persons unless they have also a clearly-defined right enabling them to control the water and convert it to their own use,—a right clearly found to have originated in some grant or valid contract, or to have been exercised for so long a period that such title may be presumed. *INDURJEET KOORER v. LUCHMEE KOORER* . . . **14 W. R. 349**

**11. — Right to discharge water on another's land on lower level—Drainage.** There is no reason why the proprietor of land on a higher level should not, for the purpose of keeping his land drained, claim a right to have the water which falls thereon run off over adjoining land on a lower level. *KOPIL POOREE v. MANICK SAHOO* **20 W. R. 287**

**12. — Easement—Embankment—Drainage—Right to drainage of surplus surface water through natural water-course.** The right of the owner of high lands to drain off its surplus surface water through the adjacent lower grounds is incident to the ownership of land in this country. Where the defendants had erected a dam across a natural water-course which was found to interfere with the natural drainage of the surplus rain-water of the adjacent lands of the plaintiffs, and where the lower Court had ordered that the dam be altogether removed:—*Held*, that the Court was wrong in taking it for granted that the plaintiffs were entitled to have the whole dam removed, but should have inquired how far the erection of the dam interfered with the plaintiff's right. *ABDUL HAKIM v. GUNESH DUTT* **I. L. R. 12 Calc. 323**

**13. — Obstruction to flow of water—Erection of bund to stop flow of water.** Where water flows in its natural course from somewhere outside A's land, through it, and onwards to other people's land, A is not entitled to stop the flow by an embankment across it, unless he can make out some special right to do so. Such course is a part of the natural condition of the land, and the flow of the water over it, when it occurs, is a natural incident. *CHUMROO SINGH v. MULLICK KHYRUT AHMED* . . . **18 W. R. 525**

**14. — Claim to erect bund cutting off water from neighbouring lands.** A party claiming to erect a bund in a natural flowing river, so as entirely to cut off the water from another party, is bound to prove that he has acquired the legal right to do so by user. *HEERANUND SAHOO v. KHUBEERONISSA* **15 W. R. 516**

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**15. — Deprivation of right to a rise of water by breaking bund—Claim to repaired bund.** Deprivation of the right to a rise of water is an injury, and a claim to repair a bund for the purpose of securing such right is not answered by the tender of another bund quite as good. *SHUNKUR SAHOO v. GURBHOO SAHOO* **15 W. R. 216**

**16. — Infringement of right to water—Suit to remove obstruction and for damages—Cause of action.** In a suit to compel defendant to remove an embankment recently constructed on his own land, on the allegation that it infringed plaintiff's right of irrigation by a certain channel where it was found that the embankment in question was no manner of obstruction to the water-course by that channel:—*Held*, that, to entitle plaintiff to a decree, there must have been some actual infringement of his right by the defendant, and not merely some act whereby, as it were, that right was denied or questioned. *SHAMA CHURN CHATTERJEE v. BOIDONATH BANERJEE* **11 W. R. 2**

**17. — Cause of action.** In order to maintain an action upon an infringement of a right (as where an obstruction is made to a natural flow of water), it is not necessary to show that there has been any subsequent injury consequent on such infringement. *RAM CHAND CHUCKERBUTTY v. NUDDIAR CHAND GHOSE* **23 W. R. 230**

**18. — Water from tank—Onus probandi.** Where a plaintiff alleged that, subsequent to his purchase of a tank, at a period specified, defendants had commenced to take water from it and had opened a channel for the discharge of the water:—*Held*, that the onus lay on the plaintiff to prove the assertion on the part of the defendants of any new right. *BUNGSHEE DHUR THAKOOR v. KHETTUMONEE DEBIA* **11 W. R. 15**

**19. — Right to raise embankment to diminish flow of water into reservoir.** Where parties by agreement in a butwarra restricted their rights by the condition that one of their number was to have full use of the water in a reservoir, the others were *held* not to be at liberty to set up, even on their own lands, an embankment round the reservoir so as to diminish materially the flow of water into it. *GOUR SAHOY SINGH v. SHEO SAHOY SINGH* . . . **15 W. R. 94**

**20. — Erection of bund to keep water in reservoir.** Water falling on A's land and collected in a reservoir there, used to flow on to B's land. *Held*, that B had no right to the use of the water, and that A was entitled to erect on his own land a bund to prevent the water flowing on to B's land. *BUNSEE SAHOO v. KALEE PERSHAD* . . . **13 W. R. 414**

**21. — Right of owner of two properties—Dispersion of rain-water.** The owner of two properties may conduct through troughs the rain-water accumulating on one property over a water-course to the other property before it reaches another water-course into which the rain-water,



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unless diverted, would naturally flow. *RAMRUT-TUN NEOGEE v. PHOOL SINGH*

W. R. 1864, 147

22. ——— Cessation to make use of water—*Revocation of permission.* Where a party who had enjoyed the permissive use of the water of a tank does not use it for four years from the date of its further excavation, the permission may be taken to be revoked. *GOOROO CHURN SOOR v. SREE CHURN GHOSE* . . . 15 W. R. 308

23. ——— Right to discharge rainfall overland—*Abandonment of right.* Exposition of the right of discharging the rainfall on one's land through a water-course over another's, and of the abandonment of such right. *KHETTUR NATH GHOSE v. PROSUNNO GHOSE* . . . 7 W. R. 498

24. ——— Abandonment of right to water—*Construction of new waterway.* Where a party suing for the use of a waterway was found to have allowed it to be filled up without objection, and another of the same description to be constructed, which he had used for a year or two, he was held to have abandoned his right of user to the former water-way. *JUGUTBUNDHOO CHUCKER-BUTTY v. JUGUT CHUNDER CHOWDHRY*

12 W. R. 519

25. ——— Irrigation channels—*Power of Collector to regulate water-supply.* In a suit between raiyats holding lands under Government, in which the Collector of the district was joined as second defendant, it appeared that the first defendant, in pursuance of an order of the Sub-Collector, made on a petition preferred by him, had opened a new irrigation channel, thereby materially diminishing the supply of water necessary for the cultivation of the plaintiff's land and causing damage to him. The lower Court passed a decree for damage and issued an injunction directing that the channel be closed. *Held*, that the order of the Sub-Collector was in excess of his powers. *RAM-CHANDRA v. NARAYANASAMI*

I. L. R. 16 Mad. 333

26. ——— Water rights for irrigation where a stream flows through separate estates—*Relative rights of upper and lower proprietors on the banks to the use of the water—Issues not raising actual rights.* A riparian owner, where a stream flows in a channel down from a property higher up, is entitled to the flow of water without interruption, and without substantial diminution caused by the upper proprietor, who may for legitimate purposes withdraw so much only of the water as will not materially lessen the downward flow on to his neighbour's land. In this suit the upper proprietor claimed the right to dam up a stream on his own estate, and to impound so much of its water as he might find convenient for irrigation, leaving only the surplus, if any, for the use of the proprietors below. He has no such right, in the absence of a right obtained by him in virtue of contract with the lower proprietors, or acquired by him as a consequence of prescriptive use. His common law right is to take for the purpose of

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irrigation so much water only as can be abstracted without materially diminishing what is to be allowed to descend. What quantity of water can be abstracted and used without infringing that essential condition, must, in all cases, be a question of the circumstances depending mainly upon the size of the stream and the proportion which the water taken bears to its entire volume. In this suit, the upper proprietor's claim having been put too high, the real question as to the proportion of his share had been omitted. No issue had raised it, and no evidence had been given to determine it approximately. The Court of first instance and the first Appellate Court had attempted to decree what they considered would be the just proportion, but the High Court had rightly pointed out that there had been no materials before the Courts upon which a right to a more limited kind than that which had been in excess claimed could be decreed to the upper proprietor; and the suit had been rightly dismissed. *DEBI PERSHAD SINGH v. JOYNATH SINGH*

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 865

L. R. 24 I. A. 60

1 C. W. N. 401

27. ——— *Riparian owners*—*Irrigation—Relative rights of upper and lower proprietors on the banks of a stream, based on custom and prescription—Prescription—Custom—Injunction—Dams, construction of—Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), s. 30—Suit by some of a class as representative of the class—Parties.* The plaintiffs prayed for a declaration that the plaintiffs and their co-villagers had a prescriptive right to conserve the water of a natural streamlet passing by their village for the purpose of irrigating their agricultural land, by constructing dams every year during the rainy season at a specified place, but allowing surplus water to run out by the sides of the dams. They also prayed for a perpetual injunction to prevent the defendants, who were riparian owners lower down the course, from interfering with the construction of dams at the place specified. The defendants denied the plaintiff's right, and claimed a similar but exclusive right to construct dams at their village. Both the Courts below found that the plaintiffs had proved their prescriptive right, and that it did not interfere with the right of the riparian owners lower down the channel. The suit was accordingly decreed, in terms of the prayer made in the plaint. *Held*, that, the plaintiffs having established their right by prescriptive use, they were entitled to the reliefs claimed, and that the injunction decreed in their favour was not unwarranted by law nor vitiated by vagueness and indefiniteness. *Debi Pershad Singh v. Joynath Singh*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 865, distinguished. *Held*, also, that, the plaintiffs having applied for permission, under s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code, to sue on behalf of all parties having the same interest in the suit, and the permission having been given in fact and notices issued accordingly, the mere fact that the order granting the permission was not recorded in the order sheet does not vitiate the proceedings. *Dhunput Singh v. Parash Nath*



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*Singh, I. L. R. 21 Calc. 180*, followed. *KALU KHAIR v. JAN MEAH* (1901)

**I. L. R. 29 Calc. 100**

**28.** ———— *Easement—Prescription—Prescriptive right to the use of water, storage of water in another's tank for the purposes of irrigation—Presumption of right from long enjoyment—Injunction.* Through an opening at the north-western corner of a tank water flowed in, and by another opening at the south-eastern corner water flowed out, into two channels. The plaintiff and his predecessors in title used from time immemorial the water of the tank through these openings and channels, for irrigating their lands. *Held*, that a presumption arose that this enjoyment had an origin, conferring a right to the use of the water. *Ramessur Persad Narain Sing v. Koonj Behari Pattuk, I. L. R. 4 Calc. 633*, relied upon. *Held*, also, that the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction restraining the defendant from closing up either of the openings. *Arkwright v. Gell, 5 M. & W. 203*; *Birmingham, Dudley and District Banking Co. v. Ross, L. R. 3 Ch. D. 295*; *Wood v. Waul, 3 Exch. 748*; *Burrows v. Lang, [1901] 2 Ch. 502*; *Greatrex v. Hayward, 8 Exch. 291*; *Kisto Mohun Mookerjee v. Juggurnath Roy Joogie, 11 W. R. 236*; and *Toolsee Dass Koberaj v. Bhyrub Lal Tewaree, 8 W. R. 311*, referred to. *MADHUB DASS BAIRAGI v. JOGESH CHUNDER SARKAR* (1902)

**I. L. R. 30 Calc. 281**

**RIGHTS OF PARTIES.**

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**RIOTING.**

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See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 221 (2).

**9 C. W. N. 599**

See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 437.

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OFFENCE COMMITTED ONLY PARTLY IN ONE DISTRICT—ABETMENT.

**I. L. R. 19 Bom. 105**

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See MAGISTRATE, JURISDICTION OF—

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**I. L. R. 24 Calc. 429**

See PENAL CODE, ss. 71, 146—148.

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See PRIVATE DEFENCE, RIGHT OF.

**I. L. R. 24 All. 143**

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See SENTENCE—GENERAL CASES.

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See PENAL CODE, s. 153.

**I. L. R. 18 Bom. 758**

See RELIGION, OFFENCES RELATING TO.

**I. L. R. 26 Mad. 554**

**1.** ———— *Requisites for offence—Penal Code, ss. 447, 453—Common object.* It is necessary before persons can be convicted of rioting, etc., under ss. 447 and 453 of the Penal Code, to ascertain clearly that they have taken such a share in the transaction as will bring them within the criminal charge; and it must appear on the evidence that they had a common object, which common object they were going to carry out by unlawful means. *QUEEN v. GHOLAM MAHOMED*

**22 W. R. Cr. 17**

**2.** ———— *Sudden quarrel—Assembly for lawful purpose.* If a number of persons assembled for any lawful purpose suddenly quarrel with an intruder without any previous intention or design, they do not commit "riot" in the legal sense of the word. *NOORUL HOSSEIN alias WAHEED JAN v. FABRE-TONNERRE* . **24 W. R. Cr. 28**

**3.** ———— *Proof of offence—Penal Code, s. 156—Manager of indigo factory.* In order to convict the manager of an indigo factory under s. 156 of the Penal Code, it must be shown by legal evidence (i) that a riot was committed; (ii) that the riot, if committed, was committed for the benefit of the accused; and (iii) that the accused had reason to believe that a riot was likely to be committed. *BRAE v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

**I. L. R. 13 Calc. 338**

**4.** ———— *Penal Code, s. 155—Zamindar's liability.* A zamindar ought not to be made liable under s. 155 of the Penal Code for a sudden and unpremeditated riot, which there was no reason to infer he could have anticipated or thought likely to happen. *QUEEN v. HURNATH ROY* . **3 W. R. Cr. 54**

**5.** ———— *Penal Code, ss. 154, 155, 157—Employment of persons to commit riot or hold unlawful assembly—Non-resident partner.* To constitute an offence under s. 157 of the Penal Code, it must be proved that the accused has hired,



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or engaged, or employed other persons for the purpose of an unlawful assembly, and it is not sufficient to show that some of the accused's servants have been taken from a district where men have a well known character as lathials, and had been in his service some time before the riot was perpetrated. A non-resident partner or sharer, who has taken no active part in the management of the estate, cannot, like a resident sharer, be convicted under ss. 154 and 155 of the Penal Code. *In the matter of RADHA NATH CHOWDHRY*

7 C. L. R. 289

6. ———— **Armed parties—Attack—Private right of defence.** Where both parties are armed and prepared to fight, it is immaterial who is the first to attack, unless it is shown that that party was acting within the legal limits of the right of private defence. *In re KALEE BEPAREE*

1 C. L. R. 521

7. ———— **Offering obstruction to persons wrongfully distraining—Power of distraint.** The law confers (certain conditions being first complied with) on landholders and their authorized agents power to distrain the moveable property of their tenants for the recovery of arrears of rents due by them. In all such cases the landholder acts on his own responsibility, and if, in the alleged exercise of this power, he attempts to seize the goods of his tenant when no rent is in arrear, mere obstruction to the seizure is not an offence, nor where made by several persons does it constitute rioting. *ANONYMOUS*. 8 Mad. Ap. 11

8. ———— **Attempting to stop what rioters thought an illegal procession.** In the case of a very serious riot, in order to stop a procession which the rioters disapproved of, the rioters were acquitted by the Magistrate because he thought they might have considered their act justified because the procession was illegal by virtue of some orders (which did not appear) which might have been efficacious in point of law. *Held*, that the thinking a thing legal which is not so can be no defence to a man who violates a rule of law; that there was no evidence that the procession was illegal, and that, if it were, the accused were bound to invoke the aid of the tribunals charged with the enforcement of the law. *ANONYMOUS*

7 Mad. Ap. 35

9. ———— **Common object—Persons coming armed with sticks on purpose to fight—Affray.** Two parties were convicted of rioting. One party consisted of not less than five persons who were all found to have been assembled together in the fight which took place, and it was also found that they, as well as their opponents, came armed with sticks, prepared to fight, and did fight. *Held*, that they were not improperly convicted of rioting, their common object being to assault their opponents. The other party only consisted of four persons. It was not found what object they had in common with the first party. The fight did not occur in a public place. *Held*, that they were not properly convicted of rioting. *Held*, also, that, had the fight

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occurred in a public place, it might have been held that the common object of both parties was to commit an affray. *QUEEN v. MUZHUR HOSSEIN*  
5 N. W. 208

10. ———— **Unlawful assembly—Penal Code, s. 148—Resisting trespass.** A disturbance having been created with reference to the possession of certain chur land, the Sessions Judge on appeal found that certain persons had unlawfully trespassed thereupon, and that the accused had been justified in resisting the trespass by force. Inasmuch, however, as he considered the accused had exceeded their right of private defence of their property, he convicted them of rioting under s. 148 of the Penal Code. *Held*, that, on the findings of the Judge, the conviction could not be supported, inasmuch as on such findings the persons convicted were not members of an unlawful assembly. *In the matter of KALLEE MUNDLE* 10 C. L. R. 278

11. ———— **Forcibly getting possession of cattle seized for trespass—Penal Code, s. 147—Act III of 1857, s. 11.** The prisoners having been part of an assembly of more than five persons, whose common object, as apparent from their acts, was by means of criminal force, to recover possession of their cattle seized for trespass (whether properly pounded or not), and who made use of such force and took away their cattle, were *held* guilty of rioting, and liable to conviction under s. 147 of the Penal Code, and not under s. 11, Act III of 1857. *QUEEN v. BOKOO SHEIKH*

W. R. 1864. Cr. 21

12. ———— **Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 141 and 147.** A party of persons consisting of some five peadas and a number of coolies sufficient for the work to be done, went to a spot on a river flowing through the lands of M, for the purpose of either repairing or erecting a bund across it to cause the water to flow down a channel on the lands of their master T. The river at the time was almost dry, and the party did not go armed ready to fight or use force, and they did not during the subsequent occurrence use force. Having arrived at the spot about 10 A.M., they proceeded to work at the bund until the afternoon. At about 4 P.M., a body of men, consisting of about 1,200 in all, many of them armed with lathies and headed by the prisoners, who were servants of M, which had been seen collecting together during the day, proceeded to the spot, and about 25 or 30 of them attacked T's men, some five of whom were more or less severely wounded with the lathies. The occurrence resulted in the conviction of some of M's servants for rioting under s. 147 of the Penal Code. M's people wholly denied any right on the part of T to construct or repair the bund, and had previously denied the existence of such right, and refused permission to T to exercise it. It was contended that the assembly of M's people was not an "unlawful assembly;" that the interference by T's people with the channel of the river justified them in coming to stop the work, and the show and use of force in compelling them to do so.



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*Held*, that the prisoners had been rightly convicted. *Queen v. Mitto Sing*, 3 W. R. Cr. 41; *Shanker Singh v. Burmah Mahto*, 23 W. R. Cr. 25; and *Birjoo Singh v. Khub Lall*, 19 W. R. Cr. 66, referred to and commented on. *GANOURI LAL DAS v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*. I. L. R. 16 Calc. 206

13. ————— *Right of private defence of property—Causing grievous hurt in furtherance of common object—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 97, 99, 147, 149, and 325.* The accused, receiving information that the complainant's party were about to take forcible possession of a plot of land which was found by the Court to be in the possession of the accused, collected a large number of men, some of whom were armed, and went through the village to the land in question. While they were engaged in ploughing, the complainant's party came up, some of them being armed, and interfered with the ploughing. A fight ensued, in the course of which one of the complainant's party was grievously wounded and subsequently died, and two of the accused's party were hurt. *Held*, that, if the accused were rightfully in possession of the land and found it necessary to protect themselves from aggression on the part of another body of men, they were justified in taking such precautions as they thought were required and using such force or violence as was necessary to prevent the aggression. *Held*, also, that under such circumstances they could not rightly be held to be members of an unlawful assembly. *Queen-Empress v. Narsang Pathahbai*, I. L. R. 14 Bom. 441; *Birjoo Singh v. Khub Lall*, 19 W. R. Cr. 66; and *Shanker Singh v. Burmah Mahto*, 23 W. R. Cr. 25, followed. *Ganouri Lal Dass v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 206, distinguished. *PACHKAURI v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*. I. L. R. 24 Calc. 686

*PACHKAURI v. EMPRESS*. 1 C. W. N. 423

14. ————— *Rights of true owners against person in wrongful possession—Affray, evidence as to nature of.* When a party is in possession of land for four or five days, though it may be in wrongful possession, another party, although claiming to be the rightful owner, is not entitled to go in force to turn him out, much less is he entitled to take armed men with him for that purpose. In an affray specific evidence as to the acts of each fighter cannot be expected, but only general evidence as to the accused taking part in it and persons who, as in this case, punted the boats on which the fight took place, and in whose interests the fight on the boats took place, were held to be just as blameworthy as the men who struck the blows. *MOHER SHEIKH v. QUEEN-EMPRESS*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 392

15. ————— *Right of private defence—Penal Code, s. 146—Unlawful distraint.* A landlord who had not tendered to his tenants such a pottab as the latter was bound to accept under the Madras Rent Recovery Act, distrainted his cattle for arrears of rent, the assistance of the police having been procured for the purpose. The tenant, with the assistance of eleven other persons,

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forcibly obstructed the removal of the cattle which had already been actually seized and driven for some yards. They were charged with the offence of rioting and convicted. *Held*, that there was no right of private defence of property, and that the conviction was right. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAM-AYYA*. I. L. R. 13 Mad. 148

16. ————— *Penal Code, s. 154—Liability of owner or occupier of land on which an unlawful assembly is held.* It is not necessary, in order to render the owner of land on which a riot takes place criminally liable, that he should be aware of the likelihood of such an occurrence. That his karinda should have taken an active part in the riot is sufficient to warrant the conviction of the owner under s. 154 of the Penal Code. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. PAYAG SINGH*. I. L. R. 12 All. 550

17. ————— *Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 154—Liability of owner or occupier of land on which a riot takes place or unlawful assembly is held—Evidence necessary to constitute an offence.* In order to establish an offence under s. 154, Penal Code, it is necessary to prove (i) that riot took place, (ii) that the accused is the owner of the land on which the riot took place, (iii) that his agent or manager knew that the riot was about to be committed, and (iv) that, knowing this, the agent or manager did not use all lawful means to suppress the riot or disperse the unlawful assembly. *Per STANLEY, J.*—That in such a case the Court must always act upon proof, and not on mere surmises. *Brae v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 10 Calc. 338, referred to. *TARAKANT DAS v. EMPRESS*

4 C. W. N. 691

18. ————— *Right of private defence of property—Causing hurt in furtherance of common object—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 147, 323.* The party of the accused accompanied by R went armed with lathies to fish in a tank in which R had a two annas share. The complainant, who with some other co-sharers represented an eleven annas interest in the tank, went there with some of these co-sharers, to protest on the ground that the accused had no share or interest in the tank. A fight ensued, in the course of which some of the complainant's party received slight injuries. *Held*, that the accused were rightly convicted of rioting and voluntarily causing hurt under ss. 147 and 323 of the Penal Code. *Ganouri Lal Das v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 16 Calc. 206, followed. *Pachkauri v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 24 Calc. 686, referred to. *ANANT PANDIT v. MADHUSUDAN MANDAL*. I. L. R. 26 Calc. 574

19. ————— *Dacoity—Penal Code, ss. 24, 147, 391—Want of dishonest intention.* Where several Hindus acting in concert forcibly removed an ox and two cows from the possession of a Mahomedan not for the purpose of causing "wrongful gain" to themselves or "wrongful loss" to the owner of the cattle, but for the purpose of preventing the killing of the cows:—*Held*, that they could not properly be convicted of dacoity, but only of riot. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. RAGHUNATH RAI*

I. L. R. 15 All. 22

16 E 2



**RIOTING—contd.**

**20. ———— Forcibly taking possession of wife by husband.** A husband, or those who aided him, cannot be convicted of kidnapping for taking away his own wife, but they are guilty of rioting if they take possession of her by force and violence and in the darkness of night. *QUEEN v. ASKUR* . . . . . **W. R. 1864, Cr. 12**

**21. ———— Forcible entry on land cultivated by trespasser—Plea of right to possession—Trespass on land.** A plea of right to possession is no answer to a charge of rioting by making a forcible entry on land cultivated by a trespasser who is in possession and opposes the entry. *APPABU NAYAK v. QUEEN*

**I. L. R. 6 Mad. 245**

**22. ———— Rioting armed with deadly weapons—Culpable homicide—Grievous hurt.** Persons found guilty of rioting may, if the circumstances warrant it, be convicted of the several offences of rioting armed with deadly weapons, culpable homicide, and grievous hurt. *QUEEN v. HURGOBIND* . . . . . **3 N. W. 174**

**23. ———— Procedure—Trial of case of affray between opposite factions.** In a trial arising out of an affray or faction fight, the members of each faction should be tried separately. The statements of the members of each faction can then, if desired, be taken on solemn affirmation, and be made evidence against their opponents; but if they decline to give evidence, on the ground of implicating themselves, they cannot be compelled to do so. *QUEEN v. MAHOMED HOSSEIN*

**1 N. W. Ed. 1873, 293**

**24. ———— Landholder's responsibility—Owner or occupier of land on which riot takes place, liability of—Agent—Manager—Acts of commission as well as omission—Knowledge—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 154.** The accused was the sole proprietor of village A. A serious riot, involving loss of life, took place at village A, and the accused's *naib*, instead of doing anything to prevent or suppress the riot, accompanied the rioters and stood close by, while the riot was going on, after which he absconded. The accused, who had no knowledge that a riot was likely to be committed, was convicted under s. 154 of the Penal Code, and fined. *Held* (*RAMPINI and PRATT, JJ.*), that a landlord is liable, under s. 154 of the Penal Code, for the acts of commission as well as omission, not only of himself, but of his agent or manager. Knowledge, on the part of the owner or occupier of the land, of the acts or intentions of the agent, is not an essential element of an offence under s. 154 of the Penal Code, and he may be convicted under that section, although he may be in entire ignorance of the acts of his agent or manager. *RAMPINI, J.*—There seems to be no ground for holding that s. 154 is intended in order to punish the landlord where his agent has not rendered himself liable to the criminal law, and that, when the agent has done so, then his liability is at an end. On the contrary, the provisions of the section impose on non-resident landholders and their agents the duty of maintaining the public peace and preventing un-

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lawful assembly and riots on their estates, and render the former liable for any dereliction in the discharge of this duty. *Queen-Empress v. Payag Singh, I. L. R. 12 All. 550*, followed. *The Queen v. Surroop Chunder Paul, 12 W. R. Cr. 75*; *Tarakant Das v. Empress, 4 C. W. N. 691*; *Queen-Empress v. Hurnath Roy, 3 W. R. Cr. 54*; *In the matter of Radha Nath Chowdhry, 7 C. L. R. 289*, referred to. *AMEER ALI, J.*—Owners of property are made responsible by law for the negligence of their agents or managers, but not for their criminal acts. A charge of neglect assumes that the agent is not directly concerned in the commission of the offence. If he is so concerned, it ceases to be neglect—it is a crime. It would be straining the law to make the absent owner, who has himself no knowledge of the occurrence, liable for not giving information of a riot that has taken place, if his agent takes part in it, and, as a rioter actually taking part in it, does not, as a matter of course, give notice of it. *KAZI ZEAMUDDIN AHMED v. QUEEN-EMPRESS (1901)* . **I. L. R. 28 Calc. 504**  
**s.c. 6 C. W. N. 771**

**25. ———— Landholder's responsibility, and stale prosecutions—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 154, 155—Riot—Landholder's responsibility—State prosecutions for such offences, if good.** Prosecutions for offences under ss. 154, 155 of the Indian Penal Code should be instituted without delay—having regard to the object of the law laid down in those sections, which is to impress upon landholders their responsibilities and obligations in respect of riots or unlawful assemblies committed under the circumstances mentioned in those sections, and thus serve as wholesome warnings not only to persons concerned, but to others. Where such a prosecution was instituted more than two years after the riot or unlawful assembly, to which the alleged misconduct or neglect related, was committed:—*Held*, having regard to the special character of the law constituting the offences, as also to other circumstances of the case, that the prosecution was stale and ill-advised, and should be discontinued. *ESHAK MEAH v. EMPEROR (1902)*  
**7 C. W. N. 245**

**26. ————** It is a question for the Crown to determine whether a prosecution under s. 154 or s. 155, Indian Penal Code, should be discontinued in view of the fact that the riots which gave rise to the prosecution occurred a long while ago. *SARAT CHANDRA SHAH CHOWDHRY v. EMPEROR (1902)* . . . . . **7 C. W. N. 301**

**27. ———— Right of private defence—Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), s. 147—Riot—Act XLV of 1860, ss. 96 et seqq.** Of two parties, each of which claimed title to certain trees, one party went to cut down the trees and went armed with *lathis*, apparently with the intention of resisting anticipated opposition on the part of the other claimants. The other party attempted to stop the cutting down of the trees, and a fight ensued, in the course of which several people were injured. *Held*, that the first party were guilty



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of rioting, and, whatever their title to the trees was, could not claim that they had acted in the exercise of the right of private defence. *EMPEROR v. KADHU SINGH* (1902). **I. L. R. 24 All. 298**

**28.** ————— *Common object, omission to find—Failure of the common object charged—Appellate Court—Defective charge—Prejudice—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898), ss. 423, 537, sc. (a)—Private defence of property in possession of assailants—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 97, 99, 147.* *Held*, by WOODROFFE and MOOKERJEE, J.J. (RAMPINI, J., dissenting), that, when the judgments of the Appellate Court and the Magistrate contain no finding as to what the common object of an unlawful assembly, if any, was, the conviction ought to be set aside. Where the common object stated in the charge against the petitioners was to take possession of some property by criminal force or to enforce a right or supposed right on it, and the Appellate Court found that the opposite party had been trying to encroach upon the land decreed to the petitioners and that the occurrence was the result of the complication, which the opposite party was trying to introduce by stealthy, wrongful acts:—*Held*, by the majority of the Court, that the common object alleged in the charge had not been made out, and that the accused were entitled to be acquitted. *Rahimuddin v. Asgar Ali*, **I. L. R. 27 Calc. 990**, followed. Where the charge did not specify the property, the taking possession of which was stated to be the common object of the unlawful assembly, and its specification would have altered the whole complexion of the case:—*Held*, by the majority of the Court, that the omission had prejudiced the accused and was not cured by s. 537, cl. (a): *Behari Mahton v. Queen-Empress*, **I. L. R. 11 Calc. 106**. *Sabir v. Queen-Empress*, **I. L. R. 22 Calc. 276**, and *Chunder Coomar Sen v. Queen-Empress*, **3 C. W. N. 605**, followed. Where the petitioners were maintained in possession of certain lands, under s. 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, including the homestead of A, and the opposite party unlawfully attempted to take possession of some huts standing thereon, whereupon the petitioners came with an armed body and demolished the huts, and on being resisted by the opposite party wounded some of them:—*Held*, by the majority of the Court, that they were justified in taking precautions and using such force as was necessary to prevent aggression by the opposite party. *Pachkauri v. Queen-Empress*, **I. L. R. 24 Calc. 686**, followed. *Ganouri Lal Das v. Queen-Empress*, **I. L. R. 16 Calc. 206**, distinguished. **PORESH NATH SIKKAR v. EMPEROR** (1905)

**I. L. R. 33 Calc. 295**

**29.** ————— *Entry on land in possession of another—Temporary occupation—Unlawful assembly—Private defence, right of—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 99, 101, 104, 147.* The petitioners went with three ploughs on land to which the complainant had the right of possession, and of which he was in possession till such entry, and began to plough up the land, to uproot some castor plants and throw them away. While they

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were thus in actual, but temporary occupation, the complainant and his party went on the land and tried to unyoke the cattle, whereupon a riot took place. *Held*, that the petitioners were not justified in entering on the land, in ploughing it, uprooting the plants and throwing them away, that they were members of an unlawful assembly, the common object of which was to enforce a right or supposed right for the exercise of which they were prepared to use force and that their action in beating the complainant's party was not justified by the fact of their having obtained temporary occupation. The right of private defence of property is a restricted one. *Ganouri Lal Das v. Queen-Empress*, **I. L. R. 16 Calc. 206**; *Pachkauri v. Queen-Empress*, **I. L. R. 24 Calc. 686**; *Poresh Nath Sirkar v. Emperor*, **I. L. R. 33 Calc. 295**; and *Queen-Empress v. Tirakadu*, **I. L. R. 14 Mad. 126**, referred to. The observations of HOLLOWAY, J., **7 Mad. H. C. Proceedings, Ap. XXXV**, cited and approved. **JAIRAM MAHTON v. EMPEROR** (1907)

**I. L. R. 35 Calc. 103**

**30.** ————— *Common object established different from that laid in the charge—Common object not to enforce, but to maintain the actual enjoyment of a right—Right of private defence—Excess of that right—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 103 (4), 141 (4), 147, 323, and 324.* It is not a general proposition of law that a conviction under s. 147 of the Penal Code cannot be supported whenever the common object, as stated in the charge, is not precisely made out. The question in each case is whether the common object established agrees in essential particulars with that laid in the charge. Where the common object set out in the charge was to assault the complainant and his party, who were cutting the paddy or their land, and thereby to forcibly oust them, but the common object established by the facts found by the Sessions Judge was to maintain possession of the land by the accused:—*Held*, that the common object in the charge had not been substantially made out, and that the conviction under s. 147 of the Penal Code was, therefore, bad. Where the accused, who were found to be in possession of the disputed land, went upon it in a large body armed with lathis, prepared in anticipation of a fight, and where reaping the paddy grown by them, when the complainant's party came up and attempted to cut the same, whereupon a fight ensued, and one man was seriously wounded and died subsequently:—*Held*, that on the facts established, the common object was not to enforce a right or supposed right but to maintain undisturbed the actual enjoyment of a right, and that the assembly was not, therefore, unlawful under s. 141 (4). Where one accused, under the circumstances, caused simple hurt, and another, a fracture of the skull which ended fatally:—*Held*, that the former was within his right of private defence, but that the latter had not proved facts bringing the case under s. 103 (4). **SILAJIT MAHTO v. EMPEROR** (1909)

**I. L. R. 36 Calc. 865**

**31.** ————— *Right of private defence—Use of excessive violence by some members*



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of the assembly—Responsibility of other members continuing in it, and aiding and abetting—Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 99, 147, 148 and 326. If the accused are justified in resisting the theft of the crops, they cannot be considered as members of an unlawful assembly, with the common object to assert a right to the disputed land and crops, because some members thereof may have exceeded the right of private defence; but if some of the members continue in it, after the others have exceeded the right by the infliction of unnecessary violence, and aid and abet the latter, they also must be considered as having exceeded the right. *In the matter of Kalee Mundle*, 10 C. L. R. 278, referred to. Where the accused, three of whom were armed with a sword, a *garasa* (scythe) and a *lobanda* (iron-shod stick) respectively, and the rest with *lathis*, went in a large body to a certain disputed land, where the labourers of the opposite party were reaping some *musouri* crop and attacked them, fatally wounding one and severally injuring another, it was held that the accused who ordered the attack and those who used the sword, *garasa* and *lobanda* had exceeded the right of private defence, and so also the others, who continued in the unlawful assembly thereafter and aided and abetted the former. *BAIJNATH DHANUK v. EMPEROR* (1908). . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 296

32. ———— *Right of Private Defence—Protection of Zamindar's right to property—Excessive hurt by one member of an unlawful assembly—Criminal liability of the other members thereof—Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 147, 326.* Where the tenants were found to have held their lands on the *batai* system, under which harvested crops should be taken to the village *khalihan*, but it appeared that they went in a large body armed with *lathis* with the avowed intention of removing them to their own houses, and were making up the crops already cut into bundles whereupon the zamindar's watchmen remonstrated and a number of their *amlas* went to the spot armed with *lathis* and swords and a fight took place, owing to the interference of the leader of the tenants, in the course of which some of the tenants received slight incised wounds and one of them a severe one inflicted by one of the accused, and where it further appeared that the zamindar's people had, four days before the date of the occurrence, sent an urgent appeal to the police for protection against a serious breach of the peace which seemed imminent:—*Held*, that inasmuch as the common object of the accused was to protect the zamindar's right over the crops, and there was no specific finding by the Sessions Judge that their intention was to use more force than was necessary or that they had in fact used excessive force, they acted in the exercise of the right of private defence and were not guilty of rioting. *Held*, also, that, as there was nothing to show that the grievous hurt caused by one of the accused was not his own individual act, the others were not guilty under ss. 326 of the Penal Code. Each case of this kind must be decided on its own particular facts. *Baij.*

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*nath Dhanuk v. Emperor*, I. L. R. 36 Calc. 296, distinguished *RAM KHELAWAN SINGH v. EMPEROR* (1909). . . . I. L. R. 36 Calc. 827

33. ———— *Common object of unlawful assembly, implied finding of—Necessity of express finding on the point by the lower Courts in their judgments—Criminal Procedure Code (Act V of 1898) ss. 367 and 424—Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 141 and 147.* Where the common object of an unlawful assembly was stated in the charge to be to enforce a right or supposed right, and there was no dispute as to the common object in the lower Courts, which did not, therefore, discuss the question, or come to any express finding in so many words on the point it was held that they had impliedly found the common object of the assembly to be the same as stated in the charge, and that the accused had been in no way prejudiced. *Sabir v. Queen-Empress*, I. L. R. 22 Calc. 276; *Poresh Nath Sircar v. Emperor*, I. L. R. 33 Calc. 295, distinguished. *DASARATHI MAHAPATRA v. RAGHU SAHU* (1908)

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 158

**RIPARIAN PROPRIETOR.**

*See ACCRETION—NEW FORMATION OF ALLUVIAL LAND—CHURS OR ISLANDS IN NAVIGABLE RIVERS*. 5 C. L. R. 154  
6 B. L. R. 255; 343

*See ACCRETION—NEW FORMATION OF ALLUVIAL LAND—RIVERS OR CHANGE IN COURSE OF RIVERS*. 2 Hay 541  
3 Agra 18  
11 B. L. R. 265  
L. R. I. A. Sup. Vol. 34  
L. R. 6 I. A. 211  
I. L. R. 13 Mad. 369

*See ACCRETION—RE-FORMATION AFTER DILUVIATION*. 5 B. L. R. 521  
13 Moo. I. A. 467

*See BOMBAY IRRIGATION ACT*.  
I. L. R. 28 Bom. 105

*See INJUNCTION*. I. L. R. 27 Mad. 409

*See LIMITATION ACT*, 1877, s. 26 (1871, s. 27). I. L. R. 1 Mad. 335

*See MADRAS FOREST ACT*, s. 10.  
I. L. R. 20 Mad. 279

*See MAMLATDAR'S COURTS ACT (BOM. ACT III OF 1876)*, s. 4.  
I. L. R. 25 Bom. 395

*See RIGHT OF SUIT—INJURY TO ENJOYMENT OF PROPERTY*.  
I. L. R. 18 Mad. 158

*See RIGHT TO USE OF WATER*.  
3 W. R. 218  
6 W. R. 99  
L. R. 6 I. A. 190  
I. L. R. 11 Mad. 16  
I. L. R. 23 Bom. 506  
I. L. R. 24 Calc. 865  
L. R. 24 I. A. 60



**RIPARIAN PROPRIETOR—contd.**

See RIGHT TO USE OF WATER.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 100

1. ——— Private proprietorship—*Bed of flowing stream.* The bed of a flowing stream may be the property of a private person. *JUGDISH CHUNDER BISWAS v. CHOWDHRY ZUHOORUL HUQ* 24 W. R. 317

2. ——— Riparian owners—*Easements Act (V of 1882), s. 7, illustration (J)—Stream—Usufruct—Right to use and consume water without material injury to other like owners.* With respect to riparian owners, the law is that each such owner has a right to the usufruct of the stream, which passes through his land. The right is not an absolute and exclusive right to the flow of the water in its natural state, but to the flow of the water and the enjoyment of it subject to the similar rights of all the proprietors of the banks on each side to the reasonable enjoyment of the same gift of Providence. *Embrey v. Owen*, 6 Exch. 353, followed. S. 7, illustration (J), of the Easements Act (V of 1882) shows that a riparian owner has the right to use and consume water for irrigating the land abutting on a natural stream, provided that he does not thereby cause material injury to other like owners. *DINKAR v. NARAYAN* (1905)

I. L. R. 29 Bom. 357

3. ——— Water rights for irrigation where stream flows through separate estates—*Relative rights of upper and lower proprietors on the banks to the use of the water—Action to enforce rights—Absence of proof of damage.* A riparian owner, where a stream flows in a channel down from a property higher up, is entitled to the flow of water without interruption and without substantial diminution caused by the upper proprietor, who may, for legitimate purposes, withdraw so much of the water as will not materially lessen the downward flow on to his neighbour's land. In order to support an action by one riparian owner to restrain another from diverting the water beyond his riparian tenement, it is not necessary that the plaintiff should prove that he has suffered any damage. *AIYAVU MOOPPAN v. SAWMINATHA KAVUNDAN* (1905)

I. L. R. 28 Mad. 236

4. ——— Watercourse—*Riparian proprietors—Ordinary and extraordinary use of water—Irrigation—Reasonable use—Injunction, mandatory and perpetual—Pleading—Proof.* The use of the water of a water-course for purposes of irrigation is not a primary use so as to entitle an upper riparian proprietor to consume the whole of the water for such purpose, without regard to the effect such use may have on proprietors lower down the water-course. *Held*, that the use of the water for purposes of irrigation was artificial or extraordinary even when it was found that the country was dry, rocky and parched, and that it was absolutely necessary that the lands which were paddy lands should be irrigated from the water-course in order to produce paddy. The authorities reviewed by

**RIPARIAN PROPRIETOR—concl'd.**

*MOOKERJEE, J.*—An upper riparian proprietor having erected a dam across the water-course so as to cut off completely the supply of water to proprietors lower down, a mandatory injunction was granted to compel the restoration of the water-course to its natural form and the wrong-doer perpetually restrained from obstructing the water-course or effacing it. *BELBHADAR PERSHAD SINGH v. SHEIKH BARKAT ALI* (1906) 11. C. W. N. 85

5. ——— Irrigation—*Prescription—Custom—Vicinity—Limitation—Limitation Act (XV of 1877), s. 26 and Sch. II, Art. 47.* A riparian owner claiming a right to irrigate his lands from the river flowing past his land by putting up dams therein must not interfere with the rights of the lower riparian owners. *Miners v. Gilmour*, 12 Moo. P. C. 131; *Swindon Waterworks Company v. Wills and Berks Canal Navigation Company*, L. R. 7 H. L. 697, *McCartney v. Londonderry and Lough Swilly Railway Co.*, [1904] A. C. 301, referred to. Any such interference would be unreasonable and inconsistent with the rights of others, unless allowed in pursuance of some arrangements arrived at between the parties interested or by the successful acquisition of a prescriptive right. *Kalu Khabir v. Jan Meah*, I. L. R. 29 Calc. 100, referred to. An upper riparian owner can acquire an easement to irrigate his land apart from the mode of acquisition mentioned in s. 26 of the Limitation Act. *Rajrup Koer v. Abul Hossein*, I. L. R. 6 Calc. 394. But if he relied on custom, he must prove that it was ancient, continuous, peaceable, reasonable, certain, compulsory and consistent with other customs regarding the right to irrigate from the river. Art. 47 of Sch. II of the Limitation Act has no application to a suit for a declaration of the plaintiff's right to put up dams in a river to irrigate his lands, it not being one to recover possession of property. *ESHAN CHANDRA SAMANTA v. NIL MONI SINGH* (1908)

I. L. R. 35 Calc. 851

**RIPARIAN RIGHT.**

See RIPARIAN PROPRIETOR.

See SECURITY TO KEEP THE PEACE.

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 935

**RISK.**

——— exception from—

See MARINE INSURANCE.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 516

13 C. W. N. 425

**RISK NOTE.**

See RAILWAY ACT (IX OF 1890), s. 72.

I. L. R. 30 Calc. 257

I. L. R. 18 All. 42

**RIVAL HÂTS.**

See HÂTS.

**RIVER.**

See ACCRETION.

See FISHERY.



**RIVER—concl'd.**

changing its course—

See JURISDICTION—SUITS FOR LAND—  
RENT . I. L. R. 23 All. 282

fordable, meaning of—

See ACCRETION—NEW FORMATION OF  
ALLUVIAL LAND—CHURCHES OR ISLANDS  
IN NAVIGABLE RIVERS 6 B. L. R. 343  
3 W. R. 95; 219  
6 W. R. 123  
7 W. R. 513

obstruction in—

See NUISANCE—PUBLIC NUISANCE UNDER  
PENAL CODE . I. L. R. 14 Calc. 656  
I. L. R. 20 Calc. 665

strewn branches in, for fishing  
purposes—

See PENAL CODE, s. 277.  
I. L. R. 2 Calc. 383

**ROAD, OWNERSHIP OF.**

Site of road—*Presumption*. There is nothing in this country which prevents the operation of the rule of law that where a road has been for many years the boundary between two properties, and there is no evidence that the owner of either property gave up the whole of the land necessary for it, the site of the road must be presumed to belong to the adjoining proprietors, half to one and half to the other, up to the middle of the road. *MOBARUCK SHAW v. TOOFANY*  
I. L. R. 4 Calc. 206; 2 C. L. R. 446

**ROAD AND PUBLIC WORKS CESS.**

See ABWABS . I. L. R. 38 Calc. 683

**ROAD AND PUBLIC WORKS CESS ACT.**

See BENGAL CESS ACT (IX OF 1880).

**ROAD-CESS.**

See MINES . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 257

See SALE . 10 C. W. N. 969

sale for arrears of—

See SALE FOR ARREARS OF ROAD-CESS.

See HINDU LAW—LEGAL NECESSITY.

I. L. R. 36 Calc. 753

**ROAD-CESS ACT (BENGAL ACT X OF 1871).**

See BENGAL CESS ACTS (BENGAL ACTS X  
OF 1871 AND IX OF 1880).

**ROAD-CESS ACT (BENGAL ACT IX OF 1880).**

See BENGAL CESS ACT (BENGAL ACT IX  
OF 1880).

**ROAD-CESS DEPARTMENT.**

See TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT (IV OF  
1882), s. 54 . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 207

**ROAD-CESS PAPERS.**

See EVIDENCE—CIVIL CASES—MISCELLANEOUS  
DOCUMENTS—ROAD-CESS  
PAPERS.

**ROAD-CESS RETURN.**

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

11 C. W. N. 211

false return of—

See PENAL CODE, s. 177.

13 C. W. N. 191

**ROBBERY**

See EVIDENCE—CRIMINAL CASES—CONSIDERATION OF, AND MODE OF DEALING WITH, EVIDENCE.

I. L. R. 13 Mad. 426

1. Theft and causing hurt with intention. When in committing a theft there is an intention and an attempt to cause hurt, the offence is robbery. *QUEEN v. TEEKAI BHEER*  
5 W. R. Cr. 95

2. Theft with grievous hurt. By the infliction of grievous hurt, theft becomes robbery, and all parties concerned in the offence are liable to punishment. *QUEEN v. HUSHRUT*  
6 W. R. Cr. 85

3. Want of dishonest intention—*Theft*. The accused was convicted of robbery, but the Magistrate found that the property taken was not taken with any dishonest intention. Held, that the conviction was bad. *ANONYMOUS*  
5 Mad. Ap. 39

4. Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860), ss. 390, 391—*Dacoity—Hurt caused to persons, not for the purpose of committing theft—“For that end,” meaning of—Splitting up of graver offence into smaller offences, in order to give himself jurisdiction*. It is not open to a Magistrate to split up a graver offence into a number of smaller offences which, when combined, constitute that offence, in order to give himself jurisdiction. When hurt or fear of instant hurt is caused by five or more persons for the purpose of dispossessing persons already in possession of some premises, and has no relation to the commission of theft, although theft may have been committed at the same time as a perfectly independent act, it does not amount to robbery, as defined in s. 390, Indian Penal Code. *OTARUDDI MANJHI v. KAFILUDDI MANJHI* (1900) . 5 C. W. N. 372

**ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH.**

See CHURCH . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 447

**ROYALTY.**

See MINES . I. L. R. 34 Calc. 257

suit for—

See LIMITATION ACT (XV OF 1877), SCH.  
II, ART. 116 . 12 C. W. N. 724

**RULE AGAINST PERPETUITY.**

See WILL . I. L. R. 29 Mad. 477



**RULE TO SHOW CAUSE.**

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—RULE TO SHOW CAUSE . I. L. R. 9 Calc. 735

See PRACTICE—CRIMINAL CASES—REVISION . I. L. R. 21 Calc. 827

See PRACTICE—CRIMINAL CASES—RULE TO SHOW CAUSE . I. L. R. 4 Calc. 20  
I. L. R. 25 Calc. 798

See PROBATE—OPPOSITION TO, AND REVOCATION OF, GRANT.  
5 C. W. N. 377; 383

See RIGHT OF REPLY.  
7 B. L. R. Ap. 57

1. ———— "To show cause," meaning of—*Alleging and proving cause.* The term "to show cause" does not mean merely to allege cause nor even to make out that there is room for argument, but both to allege cause and to prove it to the satisfaction of the Court. RUNG LALL v. HEM NARAIN GIR . I. L. R. 11 Calc. 166

2. ———— Obligation of parties applying for rules—*Practice—Refusal of former application.* Parties applying in the absence of the other side for the issue of rules *nisi* interfering with the rights of persons executing decrees are bound fully and fairly to state all the circumstances within their knowledge which it is necessary for the Court to consider in granting the rule. BROJO COOMAR MULICK v. MON MOHINEE DEBEA . 16 W. R. 55

3. ———— Power to grant rule—*Sufficiency of affidavit.* A Recorder refused an application for execution against certain defendants who came in and confessed judgment before any issue of summons in the suit. The plaintiffs then applied to the High Court by petition for an order that the Recorder should issue execution against the defendants, or that he should show cause for not doing so. The affidavit did not state whether any decree had actually been made. *Held*, that the affidavit was insufficient; the Court cannot grant a rule to show cause, unless it is satisfied that the rule should be made absolute, if no cause be shown. COMPTON D'ESCOMPTE DE PARIS v. CURRIE & Co.  
3 B. L. R. Ap. 153; 12 W. R. 413

4. ———— *Case where object of application for rule may be granted if not opposed.* The High Court can grant a rule to show cause only in cases in which the arguments advanced in favour of the party asking for the rule are such that, if not displaced by the opposite side, the rule would be made absolute. *In the matter of the petition of OMRAO BEGUM*  
13 W. R. 310

5. ———— Rule obtained by person not party to suit—*Practice.* The Court will not make a rule absolute obtained by a person who is not a party to the suit. GRANT, SMITH & Co. v. STEEL . 1 Ind. Jur. N. S. 60

6. ———— Service of rule in foreign territory—*Rule nisi for contempt of Court—Sufficiency of service.* On the 17th of December 1869 a

**RULE TO SHOW CAUSE—conclld.**

rule *nisi* for the attachment, for contempt of Court, of the defendants *U, G and T* was granted. The rule, owing to one of the defendants keeping out of the way, was not drawn up and served until the month of April following, when it was served upon the defendants in the territories of the Gaikvad of Baroda, the consent of the Gaikvad's Minister to serve the notice having been previously obtained. On motion to make the rule absolute, it was *held* that the rule was served in time, and that the service of it in the Gaikvad's territories, with the consent of the Gaikvad, was valid service. *Quære*: Whether the service would have been valid if such consent had not been obtained. HARIVALLABHDAS KALLIANDAS v. UTAMCHAND MANIKCHAND  
7 Bom. O. C. 172

7. ———— Appearance to show cause—*Waiver of service of rule.* A person appearing to discharge a rule thereby waives all objections to the formality of the service of the rule upon him. HARIVALLABHDAS KALLIANDAS v. UTAMCHAND MANIKCHAND. *In re* GOPALRAV MYRAL  
8 Bom. O. C. 236

8. ———— Grounds for granting rule—*Practice—Discretion of Court hearing a rule.* Although rules to show cause are frequently granted on particular grounds, the form of any rule granted would ordinarily be such as to leave the action which the Courts should take in case the conviction is set aside to the discretion of the Court which hears the rule. Where a rule was granted "to show cause why the conviction should not be set aside, and the case sent back for re-trial," and it came on for hearing before a Bench other than that which had granted it:—*Held*, that the terms of the rule did not prevent the Bench hearing it from discharging the accused. MILAN KHAN v. SAGAI BEPARI . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 347

**RULES AND REGULATIONS OF DIVORCE COURT IN ENGLAND.****Rule 158—**

See DIVORCE ACT, s. 35.  
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 293

**RULES AND REGULATIONS UNDER 2 & 3 WILL. IV, C. 51**

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—ADMIRALTY COURTS . I. L. R. 22 Calc. 511  
3 C. W. N. 67

**RULES MADE UNDER ACTS.**

— Act XXIV of 1839, rules under—  
See HIGH COURT. JURISDICTION OF—MADRAS—CIVIL.  
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 266

— Act XXIV of 1839, rules 18 and 20 of agency Rules under—

See REVISION—CIVIL CASES—GENERAL CASES . I. L. R. 16 Mad. 229



**RULES MADE UNDER ACTS—contd.**

**Act XXIV of 1839, rules 20 and 31 of Agency rules under—*Gunjam and Vizagapatam Agency Courts Act (XXIV of 1839)—Validity of Agency Rules Nos. XX and XXXI, passed under the Act—Application to High Court to direct Agent to review his decision. Maintainability.*** In a suit in the Court of the Senior Assistant Agent to the Governor, in Vizagapatam, a decree was passed, in favour of the plaintiff, for possession of certain villages. On appeal to the Court of the Agent, this decree was reversed. Plaintiff thereupon filed a petition in the High Court, praying that the Agent might be directed to review his judgment. The petition was filed under Rule No. XX of the Agency Rules, which is as follows:—"All decrees passed by the Agent on appeals from decrees of his subordinates shall be final, the Sudder Court having the power, on special grounds, to require him to review his judgment, as directed by them." A preliminary objection was taken to the hearing of the petition on the grounds (i) that the latter part of Rule No. XX is *ultra vires*, and (ii) that, even if it be not *ultra vires*, the application should have been presented to the Governor in Council, under Rule No. XXXI, and not to the High Court. *Held*, that Rule No. XX is not *ultra vires*; and that Rule No. XXXI has no application to a case of this nature. *Maharaja of Jeypore v. Papayamma*, I. L. R. 23 Mad. 329, referred to. *MAHARAJAH OF JEYPORE v. JAMMANADHORA* (1901) I. L. R. 24 Mad. 345

**Act XI of 1846, rule 35 of rules made under s. 3—**

*See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—BOMBAY—CRIMINAL.*

I. L. R. 25 Bom. 667

**Act XI of 1846—Rule 44 of rules made under s. 3—**

*See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—ACTS—ACT XI OF 1846.*

I. L. R. 15 Bom. 505

**Act XV of 1882, rules made under s. 9—**

*See SMALL CAUSE COURT, PRESIDENCY TOWNS—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE—RE-HEARING.* I. L. R. 27 Bom. 563

**Bankruptcy Act (English) of 1883; rule 230 made under, does not apply to India—**

*See INSOLVENCY ACT (11 & 12 VICT., c. 21), s. 40.* I. L. R. 26 Bom. 623

**Ben. Act IX of 1880—**

*See BENGAL CESS ACT (BEN. ACT IX OF 1880).* I. L. R. 28 Calc. 637

**Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 189—**

*See REVIEW—POWER TO REVIEW.* I. L. R. 25 Calc. 146

**RULES MADE UNDER ACTS—contd.**

**rule 1, Ch. VI—**

*See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, s. 692.*

I. L. R. 21 Calc. 935

**1. Bengal Tenancy Act (VIII of 1885), s. 189; rule 3 in Ch. I of Rules made under—*Notice to quit, service of—Suit for ejectment against more than one tenant.*** In a suit for ejectment against the under-raiyats, the notice to quit, when addressed to more persons than one, should be made by proclamation and beat of drum, according to rule 3 of Ch. I of the Rules made by the Government of Bengal, dated the 21st December, 1885. *TAMASHA BIBI v. MATHURA NATH BHOWMIK* (1901) I. L. R. 28 Calc. 590

s.c. 6 C. W. N. 67

**2. rule 3—*Service of notice—Giving of notice.*** Rule 3, Ch. I, of the Rules made by the Local Government under cl. 2 of s. 189 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, is intended to apply only to those cases where the Act speaks of the service of a notice and not merely of the giving of a notice; it may apply to cases where the Act speaks of the giving of notice if such notice is required to be given in the prescribed manner: rule 3 of the rules made under s. 189 in a case like the present was intended to be only directory, and not mandatory. *MADHUBRAM v. DOYAL CHAND GHOSE*

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 445

2 C. W. N. 108

**rule 25—**

*See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 622.*

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 723

*See VALUATION OF SUIT—APPEALS.*

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 723

**Bombay District Municipal Act (Bom. VI of 1873)—**

*See RIGHT OF SUIT—MUNICIPAL OFFICERS, SUIT AGAINST.* I. L. R. 22 Bom. 384

**Bombay Land Revenue Act (V of 1879), s. 314, rules 101 and 111, cl. 3 (a)—*Survey settlement, meaning of.*** The accused was charged before a second class Magistrate with digging earth within a space of two cubits of an earthen boundary-mark, in contravention of rule 101 of the rules made by Government under s. 214 (g) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code (Act V of 1879). The Magistrate convicted the accused under rule 111, cl. 3 (a) and sentenced him to a fine of one rupee. *Held*, that rule 101 is not such a rule as can be legally made under s. 214 (g) of the Code. It is not a rule "for the administration of a survey settlement." Such a settlement is a settlement of the land revenue, and relates only to such matters as are referred to in Ch. VIII of the Code, and not to boundaries or boundary-marks, which are dealt with in Ch. IX. *QUEEN-EMPRESS v. IRAPPA* I. L. R. 13 Bom. 291



**RULES MADE UNDER ACTS—contd.**

**Bombay Municipal Act (XXVI of 1850)**—*Rules whether ultra vires.* Rules made under Act XXVI of 1850, which purport to give the managing committee of the Municipal Commissioners power to try offenders against such rules, or to levy fines upon them, are *ultra vires* and illegal. Rules of the Municipalities of Balsa, Surat, Malcolm Pet and Ahmedabad referred to and commented on. How far a rule partially *ultra vires* and partially *intra vires* can be enforced, as to the latter portion, considered. *REG. v. YENKU BAPUJI* . . . . . **8 Bom. Cr. 39**

**Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 287, rule 1—**

*See EXECUTION OF DECREE—APPLICATION FOR EXECUTION AND POWER OF COURTS* . . **I. L. R. 14 Bom. 369**

**s. 320—**

*See RIGHT OF SUIT—SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE* . **I. L. R. 19 Bom. 216**

**1.** *Meaning of “with effect from the 31st October 1880.”* Held, that effect cannot be given to the rules prescribed by the Local Government under s. 320 of Act X of 1877 unless an order for sale has been made on or after the 1st October 1880. *HAFIZ-UN-NISSA v. MAHADEO PARSAD* . . . . . **I. L. R. 4 All. 116**

**2.** *Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act (VII of 1888), s. 30—Rules framed by the Local Government under s. 320 of Act XIV of 1882 as amended by s. 30 of Act VII of 1888, effect of—Sale in execution of decree—Confirmation of sale—Collector’s power to confirm or set aside a sale.* The rules framed by the Local Government in 1890 in exercise of the powers conferred by s. 320 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by s. 30 of Act VII of 1888 are not retrospective in their operation so as to give the Collector the power to confirm a sale held before the date of issue of the rules. Nor do the rules authorise the Collector to set aside a sale. On 27th July 1889 the property in dispute was sold by the Collector in execution of a decree which was referred to him under s. 320 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act XIV of 1882). On 23rd September 1889 the Collector set aside the sale, on the ground that the auction-purchaser had purchased the property for, and on behalf of, the decree-holder. Thereupon, the auction-purchaser applied to the Court which had passed the decree, complaining of the Collector’s proceeding, and praying for a confirmation of the sale. The Court asked the Collector to return the record of the case, but this he refused to do, on the ground that he had extended the time given by the decree to the judgment-debtor to redeem. In January 1890, the Local Government framed new rules in exercise of the powers conferred by s. 320 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by s. 30 of Act VII of 1888. One of these rules empowered the Collector to confirm a sale held in execution of a decree transferred to him. In April

**RULES MADE UNDER ACTS—contd.**

1890 the auction-purchaser again applied to the Court for a confirmation of the sale. This application was rejected, on the ground that under the new rules framed by Government the Collector alone had the power to confirm the sale. Held, that the rules in question had no application to the present case, the sale having been held before the rules were promulgated. The Civil Court was, therefore, competent to confirm the sale. Held, further, that, even if the rules did apply, they did not empower the Collector to set aside the sale or extend the time given by the decree to the judgment-debtor to redeem. *GANPATRAM MOTIRAM v. ADAMJI*

**I. L. R. 15 Bom. 322**

*See BAI AMTHI v. MADHAB MANOR.*

**I. L. R. 15 Bom. 694**

*See NARAYAN v. RASULKHAN.*

**I. L. R. 23 Bom. 531**

**3.** *Transmission of decree to Collector for execution—Power of Local Government to make rules for regulating procedure of Collector—Rule providing for appeal from Collector to Commissioner—Rule No. 17, cl. XIX, of 12th November, 1883, validity of—Civil Procedure Code Amendment (Act VII of 1888), s. 30—Act XIX of 1873 (N.W. P. Land Revenue Act), s. 243.* The authority conferred upon the Local Government by s. 320 of the Civil Procedure Code prior to the amendment of that section by s. 30 of the Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act (VII of 1888) to make rules for regulating the procedure of the Collector in executing decrees transmitted to him included power to make a rule providing for an appeal from the Collector’s orders. Cl. XIX of rule 17, which was added to the rules (No. 671 of 30th August 1880) published in the N.-W. P. and Oudh Gazette of the 14th September, 1880, by a notification in the Gazette of the 17th November, 1883, and which made the order of a Collector confirming a sale appealable to the Commissioner of the Division, was therefore not *ultra vires* of the Local Government. *Madho Prasad v. Hansa Kuar, I. L. R. 5 All. 314*, referred to. S. 243 of the N.-W. P. Land Revenue Act (XIX of 1873) does not apply to such orders passed by a Collector. *TAKADDUS FATIMA v. BALDEO DAS*

**I. L. R. 12 All. 564**

**Court Fees Act—**

*See COURT FEES ACT, s. 20.*

**I. L. R. 17 Calc. 281**

*See COURT-FEES ACT (VII of 1870), ss. 28, 30* . . . . . **6 C. W. N. 785**

**Criminal Procedure Code, s. 16—**

*See BENCH OF MAGISTRATES.*

**I. L. R. 16 Mad. 410**

**I. L. R. 20 Calc. 870**

**Dekkhan Agriculturists’ Relief Act, s. 49—Conciliation Agreement, notice of, to parties thereto—Service of such notice through a Subordinate Judge—Ultra vires—Procedure. The rule that a notice to parties to a conciliation**



**RULES MADE UNDER ACTS—*contd.***

agreement should be served through a Subordinate Judge, framed by the Local Government under s. 49 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists' Relief Act (XVII of 1879) and published at page 682, Part I of the *Bombay Government Gazette*, is not *ultra vires*, and a notice so served was held to be a good notice.

JOTIRAM MANIRAM *v.* DEVBA ISHWARAPA  
I. L. R. 10 Bom. 189

Income Tax Act (II of 1886), s. 38, rule 16 made by Local Government under—*Production and admissibility in evidence of income-tax papers.* Rule 16 of the rules made by the Local Government under s. 38 of the Income Tax Act (II of 1886) does not apply to the production of income-tax papers in a Court of Law in a suit between two partners. *Lee v. Birrell*, 3 Camp. 337, and *Mayne's Commentary on the Criminal Law*, pp. 86, 87, cited. JADOBRAH DEY *v.* BULLORAM DEY. I. L. R. 26 Calc. 281

Legal Practitioners Act (XVIII of 1879), s. 27—

See PLEADER—REMUNERATION.  
7 C. W. N. 300

Legal Practitioners Act (XVIII of 1879), rules 31 and 35 of rules made under, for Madras—

See PLEADER—REMUNERATION.  
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 654

Madras Abkari Act—

See MADRAS ABKARI ACT (1866), ss. 29, 55 . . . I. L. R. 11 Mad. 250  
I. L. R. 12 Mad. 450

Opium Act (I of 1878)—

See CONTRACT ACT, s. 23—ILLEGAL CONTRACTS—GENERALLY.  
I. L. R. 19 Bom. 626

Port Act (X of 1889)—

See PORTS ACT, s. 6.  
I. L. R. 17 Mad. 118 ; 397

Railways Act (IX of 1890)—

See RAILWAY COMPANY.  
I. L. R. 23 All. 367

Reformatory Schools Act (V of 1876)—

See REFORMATORY SCHOOLS ACT, 1876, s. 22 . . . I. L. R. 15 All. 208  
I. L. R. 21 Mad. 430

VIII of 1897—

See REFORMATORY SCHOOLS ACT, 1897, ss. 8 and 16 . . . 4 C. W. N. 225  
I. L. R. 27 Calc. 133  
I. L. R. 21 All. 391

**RULES MADE UNDER ACTS—*concl'd.***

Scheduled Districts Act (XIV of 1874); rules 2 and 11 of Kumaon rules of 27th July, 1894—

See LEGAL PRACTITIONERS' ACT, ss. 6 and 8 . . . I. L. R. 24 All. 348

rule 17 of Kumaon rules—

See APPEAL—ORDERS.  
I. L. R. 22 All. 405

Stamp Act (I of 1879)—

See STAMP ACT, 1879, s. 3, cl. 4.  
I. L. R. 8 Mad. 87

See STAMP ACT, 1879, s. 3, cl. 10.  
I. L. R. 8 Mad. 532  
I. L. R. 11 Mad. 377  
I. L. R. 14 Mad. 32  
I. L. R. 13 All. 66  
I. L. R. 18 Calc. 39

See STAMP ACT, 1879, s. 61.  
I. L. R. 18 Calc. 39

Stamp Act, 1899; rule 16 of Rules of 17th February, 1899—

See STAMP ACT, 1899, SCH. I, ART. 1.  
I. L. R. 23 All. 21

**RULES OF BOARD OF REVENUE.**

See PRE-EMPTION, CONSTRUCTION OF—WAJIB-UL-ARZ. I. L. R. 17 All. 447

See PRE-EMPTION—RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION . . . I. L. R. 16 All. 40  
I. L. R. 17 All. 226

darkhast rules—

See GRANT—POWER TO GRANT.  
I. L. R. 26 Mad. 742

**RULES OF HIGH COURT, BOMBAY.**

rule 6—

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—COMMISSIONER FOR TAKING ACCOUNTS.  
I. L. R. 9 Bom. 250  
I. L. R. 13 Bom. 368

rule 10, cl. (r)—

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—STAY OF PROCEEDINGS. I. L. R. 18 Bom. 65

rules 17, 18, 25—

See HIGH COURT RULES.  
I. L. R. 32 Bom. 14

rule 64—

See WITHDRAWAL OF SUIT.  
I. L. R. 15 Bom. 160

rule 183—

See EXECUTION OF DECREE—MODE OF EXECUTION—COSTS.  
I. L. R. 17 Bom. 514



**RULES OF HIGH COURT, BOMBAY—**  
*concl'd.*

*Costs—Order for payment to the attorney of taxed costs against heir or representative of client—Attorney and Client—Civil Procedure Code, Ch. XIX.* Rule 183 of the High Court Rules provides that "an attorney, when he has taxed his bill or costs against his client, may obtain an order in Chambers for payment of the sum allowed on taxation, and such order may be executed under Ch. XIX of the Code of Civil Procedure." *Held*, that the heirs or representatives of the client are not included in the words of this rule, and the attorney's claim cannot, under it, be enforced against them. *ASSUR PURSHOTAM v. RUTTONBAI* . I. L. R. 16 Bom. 152

*In re PREMJI TRIKUMDAS*

I. L. R. 17 Bom. 514

rule 190 of 1885—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 549—Practice—Appeal—Security for costs—Costs of the appeal.* The rule (190 of the High Court Rules) that an appellant shall, with the memorandum of appeal, deposit in Court the sum of Rs 500 as security for the costs of respondents in the appeal, is one which, though possibly not without exception, is generally applicable to all cases independently of any consideration as to what the costs of the appeal will amount to. *AHMED BIN ESSA KHALIFFA v. ESSA BIN KHALIFFA*

I. L. R. 13 Bom. 458

rule 208—

*See SMALL CAUSE COURT, PRESIDENCY TOWNS—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE—RE-HEARING* . I. L. R. 12 Bom. 408

rule 577—

*See SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, s. 45.*

I. L. R. 27 Bom. 307

High Court Civil Circular Order 18, cl. (i)—

*See PLEADER—APPOINTMENT AND APPEARANCE* . I. L. R. 22 Bom. 654  
I. L. R. 23 Bom. 657

**RULES OF HIGH COURT, CALCUTTA.**

*See ATTORNEY* . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 915

*See INSOLVENCY ACT, s. 36.*

7 B. L. R. Ap. 61

*See INSOLVENCY ACT, s. 40.*

13 B. L. R. Ap. 9

*See LEGAL PRACTITIONERS' ACT, s. 7.*

13 C. W. N. 415

*See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, s. 4.*

1 C. L. R. 291

*See MANDAMUS* . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 915

*See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—PAPER BOOKS* . 14 B. L. R. Ap. 11

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 289

I. L. R. 17 Calc. 57; 60 note

**RULES OF HIGH COURT, CALCUTTA—**  
*concl'd.*

Rules, Original Side, 70, 71, 72—

*See BARRISTERS* . 13 C. W. N. 605

Belchambers' Rules and Orders—

rule 71—

*See SUPERINTENDENCE OF HIGH COURT—CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1882, s. 622.*

7 C. W. N. 843

rule 365—

*See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—REPORT OF REGISTRAR* . I. L. R. 24 Calc. 437

515A—

*See LETTERS PATENT, 1865, CL. 12.*

I. L. R. 34 Calc. 619

515A, 515B—

*See LETTERS PATENT, 1865, CL. 12.*

11 C. W. N. 663

rule 605, is *intra vires*—

*See INTEREST—MISCELLANEOUS CASES—MORTGAGE* . 6 C. W. N. 769

rules 615, 617—

*See APPEAL TO PRIVY COUNCIL—CASES IN WHICH APPEAL LIES OR NOT—SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF LAW.*

6 C. W. N. 41

*See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—REPORT OF REGISTRAR* . I. L. R. 28 Calc. 272

rule 697—

*See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—PROBATE AND LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.*

I. L. R. 20 Calc. 879

I. L. R. 26 Calc. 404

General Rules and Orders, Part II, Ch. V. s. 14 (a). S. 14 (a), Part II, Ch. V, of the General Rules and Circular Orders of the High Court commented on. *BAKHIR MOHAMMED v. DOORGA CHURN SHAHA*

I. L. R. 10 Calc. 39; 13 C. L. R. 200

Part II, Ch. VIII, rule 17—

*See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART. 168* . I. L. R. 23 Calc. 339

*See REVIEW—POWER TO REVIEW.*

I. L. R. 23 Calc. 339

I. L. R. 24 Calc. 350

rule of 30th January 1865—

*See APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE* . 9 B. L. R. 6

rule of 4th April 1866—"Proceeding in a civil case." The proceeding by way of mandamus is "a proceeding in a civil case" within the meaning of the rule of 4th April 1866.



# **RULES OF HIGH COURT, CALCUTTA** —concl'd.

JUSTICES OF THE PEACE FOR CALCUTTA *v.* ORIENTAL GAS COMPANY

8 B. L. R. 433 : 17 W. R. 364

rule of 11th July 1871—

See MANAGER OF ATTACHED PROPERTY.

8 B. L. R. Ap. 23

rules 50 and 52 of 6th June 1874—

See INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS.

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 178

rule 12 of 1st May 1875—

See SUMMONS . 15 B. L. R. Ap. 12

rule 4 of 22nd June 1875—

See PROBATE—POWER OF HIGH COURT TO GRANT, AND FORM OF.

I. L. R. 1 Calc. 52

rules made under s. 287 of the Code of Civil Procedure—

See SALE IN EXECUTION OF DECREE—IMMOVEABLE PROPERTY.

5 C. W. N. 497

rules of Appellate Side, Rule II, Ch. III, Column I—

See HIGH COURT, JURISDICTION OF—CALCUTTA—CIVIL.

I. L. R. 29 Calc. 498

rule 1 of Ch. V, and rules 1 and 6 of Ch. VI—

See REFERENCE TO FULL BENCH.

I. L. R. 25 Calc. 896

rule 5 of Ch. V of Rules of Appellate Side—

See REFERENCE TO FULL BENCH.

I. L. R. 27 Calc. 839

4 C. W. N. 645; 656

Rules and Orders, Appellate Side, 86, 162—

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—PLEADER, APPEARANCE OF.

I. L. R. 15 Calc. 706

rules 341, 436—

See REGISTRAR OF HIGH COURT.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 330

# **RULES OF HIGH COURT, MADRAS.**

See SMALL CAUSE COURT, PRESIDENCY TOWNS—PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE—LEAVE TO SUE.

I. L. R. 18 Mad. 236

rules 4 and 5 of 1866—*Right of vakils in matters of ordinary original civil jurisdiction.*—24 & 25 Vict., c. 104. The 4th and 5th

# **RULES OF HIGH COURT, MADRAS—** concl'd.

rules of Court of 1866 are within the powers conferred on the High Court by the Letters Patent of 1865; and the provisions of the Letters Patent "relating to the admission and powers of Advocates, Vakils and Attorneys" are authorised by 24 and 25 Vict., c. 101. *In the matter of the petition of the ATTORNEYS*

I. L. R. 1 Mad. 24

rules 39, 43, 44, 47—

See PRACTICE—CIVIL CASES—INSPECTION OR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS.

I. L. R. 21 Mad. 490

# **RULES OF HIGH COURT, N.-W. P.**

See JUDGMENT—CIVIL CASES—FORM AND CONTENTS OF JUDGMENT.

I. L. R. 9 All. 93

1. Admission of appeals under Letters Patent, N.-W. P., cl. 10—*Limitation—Rules of Practice of High Court of 21st May 1873.* It must be assumed that rule 1 of the "Rules of Practice" adopted by the High Court for the North-Western Provinces on the 21st May 1873, regarding the admission of appeals under s. 10 of the Letters Patent, which provides that such appeals must be presented to the Assistant Registrar within ninety days of the judgment appealed from, had a legal origin, and was not *ultra vires* of the Court. *Harrak Singh v. Tulsi Ram Sahu*, 5 B. L. R. 47, and *Fazal Muhammad v. Phul Kuar*, I. L. R. 2 All. 192, referred to. *NAUBAT RAM v. HARNAM DAS* . . . I. L. R. 9 All. 115

2. Rules of Court of 22nd May 1883—*Practice—Pleader—Vakalatnama—Pleader handing over his brief to another—Civil Procedure Code, 1882, ss. 36, 37, 39, 635.* The rule of Court dated the 22nd May 1883, and authorizing legal practitioners in certain cases to appoint other legal practitioner to hold their briefs and appear in their place, was passed to facilitate the work of the Court and for the convenience of the pleaders practising before it, and was fully within the powers conferred upon the High Court by s. 635 of the Civil Procedure Code. *MATADIN v. GANGA BAI*

I. L. R. 9 All. 613

rules 1 and 4 (18th January 1898)—

See LEGAL PRACTITIONERS' ACT, 1879, s. 36 . . . I. L. R. 31 All. 59

rule 83 (18th January 1898)—

See JUDGMENT—CRIMINAL CASES.

I. L. R. 21 All. 177

# **RULES OF PRESIDENCY SMALL CAUSE COURT, MADRAS.**

Rule 428 of the Rules of Procedure of the Presidency Small Cause Court is not *ultra vires*. *MUHAMMAD KHUMARALI v. RANGA RAO* (1901) . . . I. L. R. 24 Mad. 654



**RULES OF PRIVY COUNCIL.**

rules of 31st March 1871—

See PRIVY COUNCIL, PRACTICE OF—  
ADMISSION TO PRACTICE.

I. L. R. 16 Calc. 636

**RULES OF SUPREME COURT, BOMBAY.**See LIMITATION ACT, 1877, SCH. II, ART.  
84 (1871, ART. 85).

I. L. R. 1 Bom. 253

rule 389—

See SEQUESTRATION . 8 Bom. O. C. 135

“Forthwith,” meaning of. An order commanding an act to be done “forthwith” is sufficiently in conformity with the rule that requires the time within which an act ordered to be done is to be performed to be specified in the order. HARIVALLABHDAS KALLIANDAS v. UTAMCHAND MANIKCHAND . 8 Bom. O. C. 135

**RULES OF SUPREME COURT, CALCUTTA.**

Plea side—Rule 176. Rule 176 of the Rules and Orders on the plea side of Supreme Court was still in force in 1871. KAILAS CHANDRA BOSE v. BHUBAN CHANDRA BOSE

8 B. L. R. Ap. 18

**RULES OF SUPREME COURT, CALCUTTA—concl'd.**under s. 13 of Charter Act (24  
& 25 Vict., c. 104)—See LETTERS PATENT, HIGH COURT,  
CL. 15 . I. L. R. 17 Mad. 100**RULING CHIEF.**

Suit against—*Civil Procedure Code, 1882, s. 433—Permission to sue granted in absence of the necessary conditions precedent—Jurisdiction.* A suit for the recovery of arrears of salary was brought in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Agra against the Maharaja of Jaipur. The plaintiff obtained the consent of the Governor-General in Council to the institution of the suit granted ostensibly in accordance with the provisions of s. 433 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but in fact none of the conditions enumerated in cl. (2) of the section existed. *Held*, that the suit was not maintainable. MAHARAJA OF JAIPUR v. LALJI SAHAI (1907)  
I. L. R. 29 All. 379

**RUNNING WATER.**

See THEFT . I. L. R. 35 Calc. 437

**RYOT.**

See RAIYAT.



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The End.



